[EXTINGUISHMENT OF AGENCY]
Case Republic v. Evangelista, 466 SCRA 544 (2005)
Citation:
Date: August 11, 2005
Petitioners: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by LT. GEN. JOSE M. CALIMLIM, in his capacity as former Chief
of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), and former Commanding General,
Presidential Security Group (PSG), and MAJ. DAVID B. DICIANO, in his capacity as an Officer of ISAFP and
former member of the PSG
Respondents HON. VICTORINO EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 223, Quezon
City, and DANTE LEGASPI, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Paul Gutierrez
Doctrine: o A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation
based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the
agent to act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of
the agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus,
generally, the agency may be revoked by the principal at will.
o When an agency is constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract, that is, when the agency
is inserted in another agreement, the agency ceases to be revocable at the pleasure of the
principal as the agency shall now follow the condition of the bilateral agreement.
Subject The treasure that may be found in the land is the subject matter of the agency
matter of
controversy:
Antecedent Private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land located in Bulacan.
Facts: Petitioner Calimlim (Lt. General), entered into a MOA with one Ciriaco Reyes. The MOA
granted Reyes a permit to hunt for treasure in a land in Bulacan. Reyes, with petitioners,
started, digging, tunneling and blasting works on the said land of Legaspi. It was also
alleged that Calimlim assigned about 80 military personnel to guard the area and
intimidate Legaspi and other occupants of the area from going near the subject land.
Legaspi executed an SPA appointing his nephew, private respondent Gutierrez, as his
attorney-in-fact. Gutierrez was given the power to deal with the treasure hunting activities
on Legaspi’s land and to file charges against those who may enter it without the latter’s
authority. Legaspi agreed to give Gutierrez 40% of the treasure that may be found in the
land.
Gutierrez filed a case against petitioners for illegally entering Legaspi’s land. He hired the
legal services of Atty. Adaza (as legal fees, Atty. Adaza shall be entitled to 30% of
Legaspi’s share in whatever treasure may be found in the land). Upon the filing of the
complaint, a 72-hour TRO was issued against petitioners. The case was then raffled to the
court of Judge Evangelista, who then granted an extension to the TRO.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss contending. One issue that they raised was that there
is no real party-in-interest as the SPA of Gutierrez to bring the suit was already revoked by
Legaspi as evidenced by a Deed of Revocation.
RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of the private respondents
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether the contract of agency between Legaspi and Gutierrez has been effectively revoked
by Legaspi.
SC Ruling: NO. CA decision is Affirmed.
- A contract of agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation
based on trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent.
- An exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with
interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its
irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It
is not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons which
are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked
at the sole will of the principal.
- In the case at bar, we agree with the finding of the trial and appellate courts that the
agency granted by Legaspi to Gutierrez is coupled with interest as a bilateral contract
depends on it. It is clear from the records that Gutierrez was given by Legaspi, inter alia,
the power to manage the treasure hunting activities in the subject land. It was likewise
agreed upon that Gutierrez shall be entitled to 40% of whatever treasure may be found
in the land.
- It is clear that the treasure that may be found in the land is the subject matter of the
agency; that under the SPA, Gutierrez can enter into contract for the legal services of
Atty. Adaza; and, thus Gutierrez and Atty. Adaza have an interest in the subject matter of
the agency, i.e., in the treasures that may be found in the land. This bilateral contract
depends on the agency and thus renders it as one coupled with interest, irrevocable at
the sole will of the principal Legaspi.
- When an agency is constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract, that is, when the
agency is inserted in another agreement, the agency ceases to be revocable at the
pleasure of the principal as the agency shall now follow the condition of the bilateral
agreement. Consequently, the Deed of Revocation executed by Legaspi has no effect.
The authority of Gutierrez to file and continue with the prosecution of the case at bar is
unaffected.
Extra Notes:
RE the Judge’s impartiality:
We have carefully examined the records and we find no sufficient basis to hold that respondent judge should
have recused himself from hearing the case. There is no discernible pattern of bias on the rulings of the
respondent judge. Bias and partiality can never be presumed. Bare allegations of partiality will not suffice in an
absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge dispensed justice without fear or
favor. It bears to stress again that a judge’s appreciation or misappreciation of the sufficiency of evidence
adduced by the parties, or the correctness of a judge’s orders or rulings on the objections of counsels during
the hearing, without proof of malice on the part of respondent judge, is not sufficient to show bias or partiality.
As we held in the case of Webb vs. People, the adverse and erroneous rulings of a judge on the various
motions of a party do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify him. To be disqualifying, it must be
shown that the bias and prejudice stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as based on the evidence adduced, do not prove
bias or prejudice. We also emphasized that repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneously,
vigorously and consistently expressed, do not amount to bias and prejudice which can be a bases for the
disqualification of a judge. Finally, the inhibition of respondent judge in hearing the case for damages has
become moot and academic in view of the latter’s death during the pendency of the case.
