SOFT POWER

China’s Emerging Strategy

in International Politics

edited by Mingjiang Li
Soft Power
 Soft Power
China’s Emerging Strategy in
International Politics

Edited by
Mingjiang Li

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Soft power : China’s emerging strategy in international politics / edited by

Mingjiang Li.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7391-3377-4 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-3379-8
(electronic)
1. China—Foreign relations—21st century. 2. China—Politics and
government—2002- 3. World politics—21st century. 4. Power (Social
sciences)—China. I. Li, Mingjiang.
JZ1734.A5S65 2009
327.51—dc22 2009014916

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 Contents

Acknowledgments vii

1 Introduction: Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 1

Mingjiang Li

PART I: CHINA’S SOFT POWER: THE DEBATES AT

HOME AND ABROAD 19
2 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 21
Mingjiang Li
3 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 45
Yongjin Zhang

PART II: SOFT POWER IN CHINA’S RISING STRATEGY 61

4 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 63
Yong Deng
5 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 83
Jianfeng Chen
6 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 103
Xiaohe Cheng
7 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 125
Zhongying Pang

v
vi Contents

8 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in

the World 143
Xiaogang Deng and Lening Zhang

PART III: SOFT POWER AND CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS 163
9 China’s Soft Power in Africa 165
Joshua Kurlantzick
10 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 185
Zhiqun Zhu
11 China’s Soft Power and NeoLiberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 207
Ignatius Wibowo
12 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 225
Gang Chen

PART IV: CONCLUSION 245

13 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 247
Suisheng Zhao

Index 267
List of Contributors 271
 Acknowledgments

This volume came out of a conference entitled “The Rise of China and Its
Soft Power” held in October 2007 in Singapore. The whole project would not
have been possible without the generous financial support by the S. Rajarat-
nam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological Uni-
versity, my home institution. The management team and administrative staff
at the school provided invaluable support for the conference. Special thanks
to Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS, for his enthusiastic support and
encouragement. I am indebted to the following colleagues and friends who
have kindly shared their views with me and other contributors of the book:
Su Hao, Guo Shuyong, Tang Shiping, Wang Zhengxu, Goh Nguen Wah, Hiro
Katsumata, Joseph Liow, Liu Jianfei, John Donaldson, Harry Harding, Zhao
Litao, Francis Lim, Arthur S. Ding, Wang Shanshan, and Nadège Orban. I
am also grateful to the editorial team at Lexington–Rowman & Littlefield for
their efficiency and wonderful work in producing the volume. I take respon-
sibility of any flaws of the book.

Mingjiang Li
Singapore, March 2009

vii
 Chapter One

Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature

Mingjiang Li

Soft power has become a very popular concept in international affairs. Ever
since Joseph Nye coined it in 1990 in his book Bound to Lead,1 the term
has frequently appeared in government policy papers, academic discussions,
and the popular media. The intensity of the discussion of China’s soft power
has been particularly notable. The concept of soft power provides a unique
perspective not only on China’s current foreign and security policy but, more
significantly, on the trajectory of China’s rise in the long term. In this intro-
ductory chapter, I will briefly discuss the ongoing debate about China’s soft
power, critically review Nye’s conceptualization of soft power, propose a
“soft use of power” approach, and outline the structure of the book.

WORLDWIDE SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA’S SOFT POWER

In China, soft power has become one of the most frequently used phrases
among political leaders, leading academics, and journalists. What is most
striking is the importance that Chinese leaders unequivocally assign to soft
power in China’s international political strategy. Party Chief and President Hu
Jintao, for instance, noted at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group
meeting on January 4, 2006 that the increase of China’s international status
and influence depends both on hard power, such as the economy, science and
technology, and defense, as well as on soft power, such as culture.2 Hu again
highlighted soft power in his political report to the 17th Party Congress in
October 2007, stressing the urgent need to build China’s cultural soft power
to meet domestic needs and increasing international challenges.3
In the international arena, China’s soft power has also become a spotlight
issue.4 The 2007 World Economic Forum held in Dalian, a coastal city in
1
2 Chapter One

China’s Liaoning Province, addressed the issue of China’s soft power. The
then Australian Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd presented Joshua Kurlantz-
ick’s book Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the
World to U.S. former President George W. Bush to remind him “why the U.S.
has been losing influence.”5 The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS)
conducted two comprehensive studies on China’s soft power influence in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the first half of 2008, which clearly shows
the concerns of U.S. leaders over China’s soft power.6
The widespread attention on China’s soft power notwithstanding, views
on Beijing’s capability to “charm” the rest of the world and the implications
of such a capability have been varied. The Chinese discourse on soft power
has mainly focused on its sources and potential utility in Chinese foreign
strategy. The mainstream assessment of the state of China’s soft power by
Chinese analysts is that soft power is still a weak link in China’s pursuit for
stronger comprehensive national power. It has lagged significantly behind the
growth of the country’s hard power. Many strategists maintain that China is
still not sophisticated in incorporating soft power into its strategic planning.7
However, other observers believe that the prospect of China’s soft power
looks more sanguine because China has faired quite well in the international
competition for soft power, since it boasts abundant sources of soft power
such as culture, traditional philosophy, etc.8
The international discourse, perhaps understandably, has largely focused
on the strength and potential implications of China’s soft power for the inter-
national system and for the United States in particular. On the one hand, some
international observers seem not to be worried about China’s soft power. It
is believed that China’s capability to influence the rest of the world through
soft power is restrained by a lack of agreement on what constitutes Chinese
culture and values.9 Fareed Zakaria, for instance, claims that “China has used
soft power only in the sense that it has exercised its power softly. It does this
consciously to show that it is not a bully.” And he confidently notes that the
U.S. can easily out-charm China.10 A study conducted in early 2008 reveals
that China still “ranks well below” the United States in terms of soft power
influence in East Asia,11 where China was expected to have the strongest
sway. Others have been more uneasy and anxious about China’s soft power.
Kurlantzick asserts that China’s soft power “is transforming the world.”12
Many also mention that the growth of China’s soft power has been achieved
at the expense of the United States.13 Others warn that the U.S.-China com-
petition is “most fierce over soft power issues” that will determine the rules
of the game for the global economy as it evolves in the next generation.14 The
Chinese model of development—the so-called “Beijing consensus” in which
a liberal market economy exists under an authoritarian political system—and
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 3

China’s no strings attached assistance programs to many developing nations

have been singled out as the most challenging issues for the West.15

WHAT IS REALLY SOFT POWER?

Before addressing all these competing and conflicting views on China’s soft
power, a crucial question that ought to be asked is what soft power really is.
To answer this question, a critical review of Nye’s conceptualization of soft
power is necessary because it is his approach that has guided existing analy-
ses of soft power, including China’s. Analyzing the drawbacks but adhering
to the core propositions in Nye’s theoretical framework, I argue that soft
power does not exist in the nature of certain resources of power but rather
it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power. It has to be intentionally
cultivated through prudent use of all sources of power available in certain
social relationships.
According to Nye, soft power is “the ability to get what you want through
attraction rather than coercion or payments.”16 It is the ability to get desired
outcomes because others want what you want.17 In an early article, Nye says
that the ability to affect what other countries want tends to be associated with
intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions.18 He
reasserts later that the soft power of a country has three primary sources: its
culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when
it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they
are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).19 Nye mentions that soft
power also includes the ability to shape international institutions and agen-
das,20 which actually can be seen as part of his reference to legitimate foreign
policies. In this definition, the traditional components of power, military,
economic, and technological strength would be sources of hard power.
Nye makes a clear-cut distinction between how soft and hard power are
used. Hard power is evident in the practices of threat, coercion, sanction,
payment, and inducement, whereas soft power is demonstrated in attraction,
persuasion, appeal, and co-optation. Soft power is preferable whenever pos-
sible: “When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you
want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them
in your direction.”21
Despite the prevalent use of the term soft power since the 1990s, the
complex relationship between hard power and soft power still needs to be
scrutinized and better understood.22 Nye’s approach to soft power does not
provide clear-cut answers to some notable puzzles. For instance, where is the
exact boundary between hard power and soft power? If Country A provides
4 Chapter One

economic aid to Country B without explicitly or implicitly asking for any

favor in return, is that soft power or hard power for Country A? Does soft
power include a laundry list of anything other than material factors, such as
the morality of the citizens, national image, national cohesion, domestic po-
litical stability, leadership, and innovation?23 How do we know soft power is
in play in any given instance? How do we measure soft power? More impor-
tantly, how do we know that soft power, as defined by the existing approach,
translates into policy outcomes?
In addition to these questions, there are quite a few empirical as well as
logical puzzles that cannot be explained by the resource-based approach to
soft power. Nye specifies the criteria of soft power—attraction, persuasion,
cooptation, and emulation—that few analysts would dispute. But logically it
is unclear why culture, ideology, and values have to be sources of soft power.
Such a conclusion is obviously based on the assumption that these sources
of power are inherently attractive, persuasive, and appealing in nature. But
in reality this may not always be the case. On one hand, these sources of soft
power do not always produce attraction, persuasion, appeal, and emulation.
Culture, ideology, values, and norms also often result in resentment, repul-
sion, hostility, and even conflict. On the other hand, hard power is not always
used for coercion, threat, intimidation, and inducement. Hard power can also
produce attraction, appeal, and amity in certain circumstances.
We may think that culture serves only to enhance good relations among
states. But if a country pursues an aggressive cultural policy, it may effec-
tively result in fear of cultural hegemony or cultural imperialism. Culture,
which is often regarded as the bedrock of soft power, can actually be a cata-
lyst for major conflicts. Critics of cultural soft power have a lot to say about
the excessively sanguine view of American culture. As James Traub writes,
“Nye argues that, whatever its flaws, our culture projects the core values of
‘democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility and openness.’ . . . but you
could make at least as good a case that our coarse entertainment products
have proved even more frighteningly hegemonic than our military.”24 Katzen-
stein and Keohane argue that American popular culture partially contributes
to anti-Americanism in some parts of the world.25 Another skeptic argues
that in reality it is doubtful whether American cultural power increases the
world’s love for America: “It is still power, and it can still make enemies.
Between Vietnam and Iraq, America’s cultural presence has expanded into
ubiquity, and so has the resentment of America’s soft power.”26 If Samuel
Huntington’s thesis has any truth, “the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural.”27 The Crusades are still vividly remembered by both fundamental-
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 5

ist and ordinary Muslims. In the days following the 9/11 attacks, President
Bush’s use of the word “crusade” with regard to terrorists created notable
apprehensions in the Muslim world.
Excessive or inappropriate use of hard power can lead to the decline of a
state’s soft power. A good example of this is the war in Iraq. Nye has been
relentlessly criticizing the American war in Iraq as weakening U.S. soft
power:

The four-week war in Iraq was a dazzling display of America’s hard military
power that removed a dangerous dictator, but it did not solve the problem of ter-
rorism. It was also costly in terms of America’s soft power to attract others. In
the aftermath of the war, polling by the Pew Research Center showed a dramatic
decline in the popularity of the United States even in countries like Spain and
Italy whose governments had supported the war.28

The Iraq war is not an isolated case. There are many historical cases in
which the illegitimate use of hard power reduces a state’s attractiveness. As
Nye notes, “The Soviet Union had considerable soft power in Europe after
World War II but squandered it by invading Hungary and Czechoslovakia
even when Soviet economic and military power continued to grow.”29 China
during Mao’s reign effectively turned many countries in Southeast Asia,
which had been under China’s cultural influence for centuries, into Beijing’s
adversaries because of China’s support for various communist insurgencies
in the region. The question, then, is how can military power, the main source
of hard power, produce a result that has dramatic negative consequences on
soft power?
The traditional sources of hard power can also be sources of soft power
if, for instance, they are used for international peacekeeping activities or for
humanitarian purposes such as disaster relief. The response to the U.S. rescue
efforts in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was very positive. In the wake of the
tsunami, a report in the New York Times carried this comment:

Where, in this taxonomy, do we put the images we saw in recent weeks of

United States Navy helicopter pilots aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln
ferrying supplies to victims of the tsunami in the Indonesian province of Aceh?
Is that hard power with a human face? Soft power in a flak jacket? Whatever it
is, it produces an inherently attractive narrative. . . . And the use of our immense
hard power for soft purposes has the additional benefit of humanizing the fierce
image inevitably projected by that power: the same military that shocks and
awes can also save and heal.30

There are several other loopholes in the existing approach that should be
noted. It is perplexing why we should juxtapose culture, values, and foreign
6 Chapter One

policy as if the first two are not part of foreign policy. In fact, culture and
values are very much part of a country’s foreign relations. Political values
have played no small role in foreign politics. By placing culture, values, and
policy on equal footing, Nye is able to assert that some sources of power are
soft in nature and at the same time criticize the wrongdoings of state leaders
for damaging soft power because of their foreign policy mistakes.
What is also missing in much of the existing discussion on soft power is
the social context that either engenders or hampers the growth of soft power.
For instance, many people agree that American liberal democracy, as an
ideology, is a strong source of U.S. soft power because it is very appeal-
ing to many social-political elites throughout the world. Yet it can also be a
damaging factor among those ruling elites who deem democracy a threat to
their domestic political power. American movies are popular throughout the
world, yet some societies find them repulsive on the grounds that they exces-
sively advocate individual heroism, violence, and sexuality. Another example
is the so-called Beijing consensus. Many argue that the Chinese model of
development—i.e., political authoritarianism plus economic liberalism—as
been so successful that it is appealing to many third-world countries and thus
is a source of Chinese soft power. However, the Beijing consensus may be
attractive to some countries, but its negative effect on China’s relations with
most Western powers cannot be ignored. Whether or not these factors con-
stitute hard or soft power, therefore, depends on the specific social context.
This renders the categorization of power sources into the dichotomy of hard
power and soft power inappropriate.
A few Chinese scholars have realized the shortcomings in Nye’s conceptu-
alization. Zhu Feng, for instance, argues that soft power is all about whether
the international community accepts a nation’s policies and strategic choices
and to what extent those choices accord with most nations’ interests.31 An-
other study by Chinese scholars argues that depending on the context, any
source of power can be both hard and soft, and that China’s soft power is
best illustrated by the “China model”: multilateralism, economic diplomacy,
and a “good neighbor” policy.32 These studies suggest that we need to be
more careful in treating hard power and soft power separately on the basis
of resources.
Nye actually takes note of the interactions between soft and hard power,
saying that the two “sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each
other.”33 But no convincing explanation has been provided for why the two
kinds of power reinforce and interfere with each other. Nye implicitly refers
to the distinction between hard power and soft power as largely a difference
in how a country uses its power resources. For instance, in Bound to Lead,
he says: “This aspect of power—that is, getting others to want what you
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 7

want—might be called indirect or cooptive power behavior. It is in contrast to

the active command power behavior of getting others to do what you want.”34
He further writes:

Power is like love, easy to feel but hard to define. A basic distinction is between
behavioral power, the ability to obtain outcomes you want, and resource power,
or the possession of the resources that are usually associated with the ability
to get the outcomes you want. . . . Behavioral power, in turn, can be divided
into hard and soft power. . . . Soft power, on the other hand, is the ability to get
desired outcomes because others want what you want, rather than do what you
make them do. It is the ability to achieve desired outcomes through attraction
rather than coercion.35

A “SOFT USE OF POWER” APPROACH

It is the behavioral approach that we believe best captures the essence of

soft power. If culture, ideology, and values can be used for coercion, and
military and economic strength can be used for attraction and appeal, a better
approach to soft power is how the resources of power are used rather than
associating sources of power as soft or hard. In essence, soft power lies in
the soft use of power to increase a state’s attraction, persuasiveness, and ap-
peal. If a nation state (or any other actor) makes good use of its resources of
power through various domestic cultural, economic, and political programs to
bring well-being to its own nationals, it will produce a lot of admiration from
other countries. If a state uses its resources of power in a prudent, cautious,
accommodating, and considerate approach in its relations with other states
and plays a leading role in providing public goods to international society, it
will surely win respect, amity, and positive reciprocity from other states. If a
state has the ability to make proposals in multilateral institutions that the rest
of the international community regards as legitimate, feasible, and beneficial,
it gains soft power.
By seeing soft power with the lens of how a state uses its capability instead
of focusing on the resources of power, we can then better understand how
culture, values, and institutions can be brought into the discussion of soft
power. Culture and values contain social principles or normative guidelines
on how power should be exercised. If we broadly define culture as “the be-
liefs, values, and expressive symbols (including art and literature) that any
group (including a whole society) holds in common, and which serve as ways
of organizing experience and guiding the behavior of the members of that
group,”36 culture is indeed a potential source of soft power. But we should
be aware that not all elements in a culture produce attraction and appeal.
8 Chapter One

Some aspects in a culture may seem natural and appropriate in a certain

society or to a certain social group but may be completely unacceptable to
people in other societies. For instance, no one would believe that the practice
of feet-binding for women in traditional Chinese culture would be a source
of China’s soft power. Likewise, the traditional Chinese cultural emphasis
on social hierarchy generates suspicion among some international observers
that China seeks a Sino-centric international order in East Asia. To gain soft
power, a state only attempts to display the good part of its culture that the
outside world believes is enjoyable or agreeable and hides those elements that
may cause uneasiness or misgiving in other states. It is no accident that many
Chinese analysts now talk about the Chinese cultural emphasis on “harmony”
or “peace” as the sources of China’s soft power because these values essen-
tially touch on the core issue of how power should be used.
Likewise, international institutions also become an important area to gauge
a state’s soft power. International institutions and norms essentially deal with
rules and principles of how power should be exercised in international affairs.
Non-participation in international institutions would generate suspicion of
a state’s motives because the international community is not sure how that
state is going to use its power. Participating in and abiding by commonly
recognized rules and norms reassures the international community about a
state’s behavior. A state gains soft power if it can propose solutions to cer-
tain international problems and the solutions are regarded by other states as
legitimate.
In general, to generate soft power, a state has to be considerate of the con-
cerns and interests of other states. Any action or inaction by a state has to be
perceived as legitimate or beneficial to other states. As Nye suggests:

American leadership will be more enduring if we can convince our partners that
we are sensitive to their concerns . . . if we squander our soft power through a
combination of arrogance and indifference, we will increase our vulnerability,
sell our values short, and hasten the erosion of our preeminence.37

It would be ideal if a state could use all its resources of power to attract,
appeal, persuade, and co-opt all other states. But in reality, this is simply
impossible because any state has its own self interests that often diverge
from the interests of others. The second best scenario would be to be able to
have soft power over a majority of states. If a state could use its resources
of power in such a way that the vast majority of states in the international
system regard as legitimate, justified, and beneficial for international public
good, that state possesses a significant amount of soft power. As Nye says:
“When a country’s culture includes universal values and its policies promote
values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 9

its desired outcomes because of the relationships of attraction and duty that
it creates.”38
The “soft use of power” approach also helps us understand why the discus-
sion of soft power breaks the boundary between domestic and international
politics. The domestic political values, institutions, and political system are
important considerations for a state’s soft power because all these things
demonstrate how the ruling elite in that state uses power on its own people.
Such use of power in the domestic context can resonate in the international
arena because people outside see and observe how foreign rulers treat their
own nationals and associate that practice with their dealings with the inter-
national community.
The most significant achievement of U.S. soft power—i.e., the soft use of
power—is that most states in the world today do not regard the U.S. as an
empire constantly looking for opportunities to conquer or subjugate the rest
of the world. This explains why, in the post-Cold War era, other major pow-
ers have not pursued a policy of the traditional realist balance of power policy
against U.S. supremacy. In the eyes of some analysts, other major powers are
practicing a “soft balancing” strategy against the U.S.39
Likewise, the most significant achievement for China on soft power has
been the ability to forestall the formation of a containment policy among
other major powers, largely because of Beijing’s fairly accommodating
foreign policy. Despite the popularity of the “China threat” thesis in the
1990s, China has not been perceived as an imminent threat to various in-
ternational institutions, the security of neighboring states, or the well being
of people in the rest of the world. On the contrary, China’s international
image has improved quite substantially. In fact, a BBC World Service
poll of 22 countries found that China is viewed as playing a significantly
more positive role in world affairs than even the U.S. What is particularly
noteworthy in the survey is the fact that even in neighboring Asian coun-
tries that have been historically suspicious of China, the general views are
relatively benign.40
The growth of China’s soft power can hardly be explained by the exist-
ing theoretical framework—the global profile of China’s culture, ideology,
values, and ability to shape international institutions simply has not increased
enough. China was able to achieve that growth because of its foreign policy
and how it exercised its power in international politics in the past decade.41
This new pattern of Chinese foreign policy has been described by many
scholars.42 The predominant feature in all these descriptions is a new orien-
tation in China’s foreign policy in the past decade, which “is manifested in
Beijing’s actions in promoting confidence-building measures (CBMs), set-
tling border disputes, practicing relative self-restraint, reassuring neighbours
10 Chapter One

of China’s benign intensions, and actively participating in regional economic,

political and security dialogues and institutions.”43
Existing studies that adhere to the resource-based approach to China’s
soft power tend to be more pessimistic or equivocal because they focus on
China’s culture and values.44 Studies that focus on China’s foreign policy
behaviors tend to see the growth and influence of China’s soft power.45 We
believe that the behavior-based approach is more appropriate and better ex-
plains why China’s soft power has increased over the past decade. The key to
understanding China’s soft power is to examine how Chinese cultural tradi-
tions, political values, and domestic and international imperatives ultimately
shape China’s choice of strategy and policy in its relations with the rest of
the world.

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Consisting of 13 chapters, this book seeks to present an in-depth examination

of China’s soft power potential, the perspectives among Chinese elites on soft
power, China’s practice of soft power, and the impacts and implications of
China’s emerging soft power strategy in world politics. This study is interdis-
ciplinary in nature since the subject of soft power involves domestic politics,
culture, history, social relations, and, of course, conventional approaches to
international relations.
The following twelve chapters are grouped into four parts. The first part
(chapters 1–2) discusses the discourse of soft power at home and abroad.
The second part (chapters 3–10) analyzes the potential resources, strengths,
and weaknesses of China’s soft power from various perspectives, such as
foreign policy strategy, political economy, culture, history, and education.
The third part (chapters 11–12) contains specific case studies that highlight
China’s relations with South Korea, Australia, Southeast Asia, and Africa,
and Beijing’s diplomacy in international climate change negotiations. The
concluding chapter summarizes the major points raised in the book and poses
additional questions for further study.
In chapter 2, Mingjiang Li attempts to analyze the Chinese discourse on
soft power and address the following major issues: How do the Chinese elite
conceptualize soft power and understand the state of China’s soft power? Why
has there been such a strong interest in soft power in China in recent years?
What role do the Chinese elite assign to soft power in China’s international
strategy in the twenty-first century? To answer these questions, the author
thoroughly examines various official documents, prominent scholarly writ-
ings, and the most influential national-level media reports and analyses. This
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 11

study reveals that Chinese views on soft power widely vary, with the main-
stream believing that soft power is still a weak link in China’s strategic plan-
ning but nevertheless should be an important component in China’s future. In
fact, both Chinese decision-makers and intellectuals have been searching for
a soft power strategy to upgrade China’s international status and deal with
various issues in international politics. At the moment, soft power is partially
perceived as a tool for defensive purposes in China’s international politics
and as a means to achieve various domestic goals. The chapter concludes that
a grand Chinese soft power strategy is still in its emerging phase.
The next chapter, by Yongjin Zhang, explores the external discourse on
China’s soft power. The author notes that the recent hype about China’s soft
power has evoked excitement, fascination, fear, apprehension, and anxiety
among scholarly communities and policy establishments alike. It is claimed
that China has built up its soft power ‘at the expense of the United States’
and to have mounted a ‘charm offensive’ globally to transform the world in
its own image. Is there any substance behind such claims? What is China’s
soft power? In which way is China accumulating its soft power? Why should
there be such a rage about China’s soft power at this particular time? In this
chapter, Zhang addresses these questions through an analytical examination
of what he regards as the recent ‘external discourse’ of China’s soft power in
English in an attempt to unravel major puzzles about China’s growing power.
While maintaining that it is a genuine puzzle how a recent pariah state in
international society advocating and practicing a political system contrary to
the prevailing liberal democratic values could have achieved such a power
status in so short a period of time and the implications of this phenomenon
for the emerging global order are significant, he also makes two main argu-
ments. First, the hype about China’s soft power is fallacious and is mired
in conceptual misconstruction; and second the current discourse prevents
us from engaging in a dispassionate assessment of China’s changing global
diplomacy, hence the search for a new global order.
Part II of the book provides a comprehensive examination of China’s soft
power potential as well as its efforts to increase its soft power from various
perspectives. Chapter 4 by Yong Deng investigates how soft power is treated
in the rhetoric and practice of China’s international strategy in the post-Cold
War era. The author contends that heavily influenced by Joseph Nye’s defi-
nition, most of the works, even when looking at China, invariably stress the
ability to generate genuine affection, strong identification, and willing fol-
lowership from others. He argues that this approach is misguided. First and
foremost, the United States is the established (if contested) hegemon in world
politics, whereas post-Tiananmen China must struggle for international recog-
nition in a world defined by that fundamental reality. Such status asymmetry
12 Chapter One

means that the sources, means, and objectives of their soft power differ. Thus,
the author argues, China’s soft power is evident in its ability to simultane-
ously assure and influence others that its goal is to achieve great power status
without relying on traditional power politics or war.
Viewed in this way, soft power becomes integral to China’s strategy to
elevate itself on the world stage. But in the first decade of the post-Cold
War era, there was a striking gap between China’s rhetorical silence and its
practices of soft power. Indeed, in the 1990s, the Chinese elite largely viewed
soft power as the privilege of the strong—namely, the West—while at the
same time they considered their nation a victim of a subtle form of power
politics. With greater confidence at the outset of the new century, however,
soft power has become increasingly an explicit choice in China’s foreign
policy. The more deliberate current pursuit has manifested itself in promot-
ing its traditional and cultural appeal, economic ties, partnership diplomacy,
and multilateralism. Domestic problems of governance, stability, and regime
security have threatened China’s soft power. Nevertheless, soft power will
likely continue to drive China’s aspirations abroad. In chapter 5, Jianfeng
Chen explores China’s soft power from the Chinese cultural Doctrine of the
Mean, essentially a traditional Chinese philosophy about how to use power
and influence. The Mean is one of the core values in Chinese culture. The na-
ture of the Mean is one of appropriately balanced relationships between man
and man, man and society, man and nature and equilibrium relations among
nations. Actualizing the Mean refers to being neutral and harmonizing black
and white, Yin (feminine or negative principle in nature) and Yang (mascu-
line or positive principle in nature), right and left, good and bad, them and us.
According to the Doctrine of the Mean, the ideal is when all parties arrive at
an equilibrium acceptable to all. In the context of international relations, the
Mean refers to a world that embraces a unity of opposites rather than absolute
peace or absolute chaos. Confucianism insists on treating other nations with
kindness and morality and believes that tenderness is the antidote to cruelty.
Equilibrated relations, therefore, can be maintained among nations by trad-
ing interests. The chapter concludes that China, in practice, should strive for
the “middle way” and orientate itself as a defensive participant who aims not
at changing the status quo or opposing the hegemonic power of the system,
but rather at defensively managing both internal and external challenges and
avoiding costly competition. Such an approach will sustain its modernization
and the stability of the international system. If China genuinely practices the
Mean, the author argues, it will wield much soft power and avoid the histori-
cal experience that new rising powers are typically born in bloodshed.
In the next chapter, Xiaohe Cheng emphasizes education and international
educational exchange programs in cultivating China’s soft power. He first
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 13

gives a comprehensive review of the achievements of Chinese education.

After a decades-long concerted effort, China has grabbed the title of world’s
number one producer of college graduates and has become a major learning
destination for international students. The brain drain that China has chroni-
cally experienced has been steadily mitigated due to the increased return of
Chinese graduates from abroad. The Chinese government is not satisfied with
having the largest educational enterprise in the world. As it redresses the fall-
out of the “educational great leap forward,” it sets about to transform China
into the world’s major educational powerhouse on two fronts: to continue to
push dozens of Chinese universities into the ranks of the world’s best and
to carry a new mission to project China’s soft power overseas by promot-
ing Confucius Institutes across the world. However, the author notes several
challenges in this regard. First, to generate soft power is not easy for China’s
higher education system: China is still attempting to catch up to Western coun-
tries. Its Western counterparts will not give up their superior position and will
intensify their efforts to strengthen their competitiveness. The quality issue
also continues to haunt Chinese universities. Finally, the lack of understanding
of the Confucius Institutes among other countries’ people acts against China’s
“going abroad” strategy. All of these challenges from within and without will
make the path of China’s transformation a long and tortuous one.
In chapter 7, Zhongying Pang addresses the controversial issue of the Chi-
nese model of development, also known as the “Beijing consensus.” Pang be-
gins by asking this question: Is China’s dazzling development becoming the
nation’s soft power? Rapid economic development driven by market reform
has been the dominant theme of China in the past three decades. The coun-
try has acted as a key participant and facilitator in globalization. Logically,
China’s economic “success” is a sign or source of Chinese national strength
and its soft power. Pang concedes that the Chinese experience has indeed
inspired much analysis in the rest of the world of the possibility of applying
some aspects of the Chinese path of modernization to under-developed coun-
tries. Many political leaders in the developing world are also looking at the
Chinese experience with admiration. However, Pang points out that China’s
development has some serious signs of weakness too. Its current lure to the
world may not be sustained if China fails to meet the challenges it faces. In
the long run, the Chinese model may not be a source for Beijing’s soft power
as China itself evolves and the political economies of other developing coun-
tries undergo transformations that may be very different from the Chinese
model. However, as China explores its new path toward “scientific develop-
ment,” it is likely to attract external interest in its model.
In the next chapter, Xiaogang Deng and Lening Zhang investigate Chinese
cultural influence in the world. The authors contend that little attention has
14 Chapter One

been paid to China’s sustained efforts to exercise its cultural power. Culture
is a very important potential source of soft power as nation states constantly
attempt to display the good aspects of their cultures to build a better image.
However, the current discussion of the cultural dimension of China’s soft
power has predominantly focused on the Confucius Institute and the grow-
ing popularity of learning the Chinese language. Few studies discuss China’s
overall efforts to become a major world cultural power. The common percep-
tion is that China has very limited power in this regard. Deng and Zhang argue
that China’s goal is more than becoming simply an economic superpower. As
the significance of Chinese economic power continues to grow, China also
wants to become a major world cultural power. Using various sources of data,
the authors assess whether China is becoming a major world power in cultural
production by examining its cultural trade and the promotion of its media in
the world. They conclude that China may indeed have more cultural power
than people ordinarily think.
Part III of the volume takes a detailed look at examples of China’s practice
of soft power. The approach is comprehensive and focuses on how China uses
its power resources to produce attraction and persuasion in other parts of the
world. Joshua Kurlantzick in chapter 9 examines China’s soft power influ-
ence in Africa. He observes that in a relatively short period of time, China
has developed close diplomatic and economic relations with a wide range of
African nations. In fact, China’s public image in Africa is currently far more
positive than on any other continent. In part, this African “charm offensive”
is due to Chinese soft power—in particular, training programs for African
elites, effective diplomacy, and the appeal of China’s model of development,
which has sparked more interest in Africa than anywhere else. Kurlantzick
argues that since China has less hard power in Africa than in Asia, its soft
power on the continent is even more critical. Indeed, it has used its soft power
to help produce favorable policy outcomes, including substantial new oil and
gas deals. However, in the long term, China will need to broaden its appeal in
Africa to include the “African street” if its soft power is to prove long lasting
and effective.
In the next chapter, Zhiqun Zhu examines how China has been expanding
its influence in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Australia since the
mid-1990s. The author finds that relative to the United States, the Republic
of Korea and Australia are not so concerned about China’s rise. Relations
between China and these two countries have been developing rapidly in the
past decade or so. It is therefore interesting to explore why South Korea and
Australia hold a more benign view of China than the United States does. The
author argues that China’s soft power diplomacy has become more sophis-
ticated and comprehensive in recent years. Its strategies now include engag-
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 15

ing in high-level visits, promoting economic interdependence, highlighting

expected benefits from China’s prosperity, expanding cultural and social
exchanges, and presenting a peaceful and non-threatening new image around
the world. The PRC’s warming relations with South Korea and Australia
must be understood in the context of China’s growing power and its more
sophisticated new diplomacy. According to Zhu, although there are still
some “hard security” factors in China’s relations with both South Korea and
Australia, such as the North Korea issue, China’s heavy-handed approach to
history and Australia’s lingering mistrust, China’s soft power diplomacy has
been largely successful in strengthening China’s relations with both South
Korea and Australia.
China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia has been a frequently dis-
cussed issue in the past few years. Ignatius Wibowo, in chapter 11, pays
close attention to this matter. He contends that China’s influence in South-
east Asia (SEA) has long been clear, even in the period of Cold War, when
China supported revolutionary movements in the region. After Mao Zedong’s
death in 1976 and as a consequence to the reform of 1978, China pursued a
new and different strategy of development, and accordingly, foreign policy.
Still embedded in anti-communist ideology, countries in Southeast Asia
initially looked to China with suspicion, especially its growing economic,
political, and military power. Wibowo claims that the Asian financial crisis
in 1997 changed this perspective forever: afterwards, it was not only clear
that China made a financial contribution to multiple countries, but also that
China managed to come out of the crisis relatively unscathed. The disillusion
with the effects of neo-liberal capitalism and democracy demanded by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, countries in SEA looks
to China with admiration and respect, to the extent that they take China as
model of development that combines free markets and illiberal polity. Except
in Indonesia and the Philippines, the “Beijing Consensus” is gaining ground
in SEA, and has become the prime source of China’s soft power in the region.
This influence has actually been increasing due to China’s accommodating
posture in regional affairs and the cultural products flowing, since 2000, from
China to SEA.
As the latest scientific findings describe the connection between climate
change and human activity with more accuracy, China, one of the world’s larg-
est emitters of greenhouse gases, is now under closer international scrutiny.
The chapter by Gang Chen addresses China’s soft power in international insti-
tutions by examining the case of its participation in international negotiations
on climate change. The author argues that active participation in these negoti-
ations and institutions has been an important part of China’s diplomatic activ-
ities since early 1990s, which has effectively promoted China’s international
16 Chapter One

image and elevated its soft power. In contrast to the U.S. withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol, China’s previous active participation in international agree-
ments on global warming has proved to be a diplomatic success, winning ap-
plause from both developing and developed countries. Facing more interna-
tional and domestic pressure in post-Kyoto climate talks, China understands
its image will be greatly damaged if it still refuses to accept any mandatory
emission cuts and its own emissions continue to grow rapidly. China is there-
fore in a dilemma. On the one hand, it frets about soft power damage due to
its environmental problems, but hopes to utilize international cooperation to
solve them. On the other hand, it fears that emission abatement obligations
may block its fast economic growth and hence ruin its hard power.
In the concluding chapter, Suisheng Zhao sums up the major arguments
and revelations of this endeavor. He also raises several questions that future
analysts of China’s soft power may consider. The author looks at the long-
term picture of China’s soft power by examining China’s worldviews. He ar-
gues that although China has moved quickly and made self-conscious efforts
to cultivate soft power in order to promote its interests and expand its influ-
ence as a rising power, its approach to exercising soft power is flawed. This is
largely because the pragmatic political values behind China’s rapid economic
growth are attractive mostly to authoritarian elites and China’s world order is
hardly compatible with evolving contemporary international norms. In spite
of its initial success, China’s current approach to soft power lacks contempo-
rary moral appeals and is therefore hardly sustainable in the competition with
the U.S. to inspire the vision of building a free and prosperous world.

NOTES

1. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990).
2. Ma Lisi, “Guanyu wo guo jiaqiang ruan shili jianshe de chubu sikao” [Pre-
liminary thoughts on accelerating China’s soft power building], Dang de wenxian
[Literature of the Chinese Communist Party] 5 (2007): 35–38.
3. Hu Jintao, Report to the 17th Party Congress, October 15, 2007.
4. For instance, Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is
Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Bates Gill and
Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft Power’,” Survival 48 no.2
(Summer 2006): 17–36; Gideon Rachman, “The Hard Evidence that China’s Soft
Power Policy is Working,” Financial Times, February 20, 2007.
5. Peter Hartcher, “Rudd Offers a Cheeky Lesson in Soft Power,” Sydney Morning
Herald, September 7, 2007.
 Soft Power: Nurture Not Nature 17

6. Congressional Research Service, “China’s ‘Soft Power’ in Southeast Asia,”

January 2008; and “China’s Foreign Policy and ‘Soft Power’ in South America, Asia,
and Africa,” April 2008.
7. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
on China’s soft power], Guoji guancha [International Observations], part one, issue
2, (2007): 15–26; and part two, issue 3, (2007): 37–46.
8. Jiang Haiyan, “Hongyang zhonghua minzu de youxiu wenhua yu zengqiang
wo guo de ruan shili” [Promoting the outstanding culture of the Chinese nation and
strengthening China’s soft power], Journal of the Party School of the Central Com-
mittee of the CCP, vol. 11, no. 1 (2007): 107–112.
9. Clarissa Oon, “The Art of Education,” Straits Times, November 12, 2006.
10. Fareed Zakaria, “The U.S. Can Out-Charm China,” Newsweek, December 12,
2005.
11. Christopher B. Whitney and David Shambaugh, “Soft Power in Asia: Results
of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion,” The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs in partnership with East Asian Institute, 2008.
12. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transform-
ing the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
13. Michael Elliott, “China Takes on the World,” Time, January 11, 2007; Joshua
Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Policy Brief 47
(June 2006), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
14. Joel Rosenthal, “China Goes Global: Implications for the United States,” The
National Interest, September/October 2006.
15. Robert Kagan, “League of Dictators?” Washington Post, April 30, 2006.
16. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cam-
bridge, MA: Perseus Books Group, 2004), x.
17. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the
Information Age,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 86.
18. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990): 153–71.
19. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 11.
20. Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990); Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 1990.
21. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, x–xi.
22. Zhang Xiaoming, “Yue se fu nai de ‘ruan quanli’ sixiang fenxi” [An analysis of
Joseph Nye’s soft power concept], Meiguo Yanjiu [American Studies]1 (2005):20–36.
23. Li Jie, “Tisheng ruan shili dui shixian wo guo heping jueqi zhanlue de zuoy-
ong” [The role of increasing soft power for the realization of China’s peaceful rise],
Taipingyang xue bao [Journal of Pacific Studies] 12 (2005): 64-71.
24. James Traub, “The New Hard-Soft Power,” New York Times, January 30,
2005.
25. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Anti-Americanisms: Biases as
Diverse as the Country Itself,” Policy Review 139 (October & November 2006).
26. Josef Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power,” New York Times, May 14, 2006.
27. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72 no.3
(Summer 1993): 22–28.
18 Chapter One

28. Joseph S. Nye, “Hard Power, Soft Power, and ‘The War on Terrorism’,” in Da-
vid Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, eds., American Power in the Twenty-First
Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004).
29. Joseph S. Nye, “Hard Power, Soft power,” Boston Globe, August 6, 1999.
30. James Traub, “The New Hard-Soft Power,” New York Times, January 30,
2005.
31. Zhu Feng, “Zhongguo ying duo cezhong ‘ruan shili’ jueqi” [China should give
priority to raising soft power], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], April 30, 2007.
32. Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruan liliang yiji
dui zhongguo ruan liliang de guancha” [Soft power in international politics and an
observation of China’s soft power], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and
Politics] 7 (2007): 6–12.
33. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 25.
34. Nye, “Bound to Lead,” 31.
35. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Sells—and Wins,” The Straits Times, January 10, 1999.
36. Neil J. Smelser, Sociology (5th ed.) (City, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 20.
37. Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), xii, xvi.
38. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 11.
39. T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security
30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 46–71.
40. British Broadcasting Service, “22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively
by Most Countries Including Its Asian Neighbours” Program on International Policy
Attitudes, 2005, www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbcpoll3.html. (accessed Sep-
tember 2, 2008).
41. Joshua Kurlantzick, for instance, argues that China has become a potential
rival to American soft power in Asia largely because of Beijing’s public diplomacy,
development assistance, participation in multilateral institutions, and pursuit of mu-
tual interests. See Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Decline of American Soft Power,” Cur-
rent History, (December 2005).
42. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” In-
ternational Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/2005); Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic
Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice,” The China
Quarterly 168 (2001): 835–64; Evan Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New
Dipomacy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/ December 2003); Rosemary Foot,
“China’s Regional Activism: Leadership, Leverage, and Protection,” Global Change,
Peace & Security 17, no. 2 (June 2005).
43. Li Mingjiang, “China’s Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics
and Interactions,” RSIS Working Paper, no. 134, (July 2007).
44. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Chinese ‘Soft Power’,” 17–36.; Yanzhong
Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s Soft Power,”
East Asia 23, no.4 (Winter 2006): 22–44.
45. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,”
Policy Brief 47 (June 2006), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and two
Congressional Research Service reports on China’s soft power published in January
and April, 2008, respectively.
 Part I

CHINA’S SOFT POWER: THE

DEBATES AT HOME AND ABROAD
 Chapter Two

Soft Power in Chinese Discourse:

Popularity and Prospect
Mingjiang Li

Observers of Chinese politics and international relations could hardly have

failed to notice the upsurge of references to the term “soft power” in China
in recent years. The popularity of this concept among Chinese political lead-
ers, scholars, journalists and pundits has been striking. Its prevalence in the
Chinese media is by no means an insignificant issue. International political
leaders and pundits have paid a lot of attention to the growth and practice of
China’s soft power and have unequivocally expressed their concerns over
its implications. Although it is arguably one of the most important aspects
of China’s foreign strategy that has emerged in the new century, it is insuf-
ficiently understood by the outside world. For these reasons, a thorough
examination of the term is warranted.
A good starting point for understanding the importance of soft power in
China’s international politics is how the concept is discussed among the Chi-
nese elite. How do they understand and interpret the meaning of soft power?
Why is there such a strong and growing interest in soft power in China? What
role do the Chinese elite assign to soft power in China’s international strategy
in the new century, especially in the context of China’s rise? This chapter will
neither delve into the theoretical debate of what constitutes soft power nor
focus on China’s actual practice of soft power. The purpose here is simply to
examine the overall understanding of soft power among Chinese intellectuals
and the implications of this understanding for China’s international strategy.
Methodologically, a conscious effort has been made in this chapter to
focus on official documents endorsed by the top Chinese leadership, articles
in prominent Chinese journals and the most influential national-level media

A largely similar version of this chapter appeared in the Chinese Journal of International Politics,
vol. 2, 2008.

21
22 Chapter Two

reports and analyses. The first part briefly discusses the popularity of soft
power in China. The second section analyses Chinese views on soft power
and the mainstream assessment of the state of China’s soft power. The next
section examines the motivations behind China’s strong interest in soft
power. The fourth part addresses major approaches that have been proposed
in China to increase Chinese soft power. The concluding section sums up the
main features of Chinese discourse about soft power and analyses its potential
implications for China’s international strategy.
Several conclusions emerge from this study. First, decision-makers and
opinion leaders in China have given an enormous amount of attention to the
fate of their nation’s soft power. Second, Chinese discourse largely conforms
to Joseph S. Nye’s conceptual framework but is not strictly limited to the
scope of that conceptualization. Third, unlike Nye’s primary focus on the
efficacy of soft power in achieving foreign policy goals, Chinese discourse
frequently refers to a domestic context and evinces a mission for domestic
purposes. Fourth, soft power, as expounded by Chinese analysts, is still a weak
link in China’s pursuit of comprehensive national power and largely perceived
as a tool for defensive purposes, including cultivating a better image of China
to the outside world, correcting foreign misperceptions of China, and fending
off Western cultural and political inroads in China. On the basis of these analy-
ses, I argue that a grand Chinese soft power strategy is still in its embryonic
phase, despite the painstaking efforts by Chinese strategists to devise various
proposals. The lack of assertiveness in China’s soft power discourse reflects
the fact that China has few political values to offer to a world still dominated
by Western philosophies and reveals the reality that China itself is still under-
going a profound social, economic and political transition.

SOFT POWER: SURGING POPULARITY IN CHINA

Flipping through official Chinese government pronouncements, academic

journals and popular newspapers, one frequently comes across the term “soft
power”. This is a clear indication that soft power has become a noticeable part
of official and popular discourse on foreign policy and international politics.
Soft power is no longer an alien concept for top Chinese political leaders.
The political report to the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in
2002, for instance, points out that, “in today’s world, culture intertwines with
economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position and role
in the competition for comprehensive national power.”1 The 13th collective
study session of the Politburo of the 16th CCP Central Committee, which
was held on May 28, 2004, focused on how to develop China’s philosophy
and social sciences. This study session took place two months after the CCP
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 23

Center publicized a document titled “Suggestions of the CCP Center on Fur-

ther Developing and Boosting Philosophy and Social Sciences”. Cheng Enfu,
a professor at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and also
one of the two scholars who gave lectures at the session, commented that the
study session clearly shows the importance that Chinese leaders attach to soft
power.2 Media commentary echoes Cheng’s assessment, saying that the study
session signifies the leadership’s will to accelerate the growth of China’s soft
power from a strategic height.3
Party chief and President Hu Jintao made it clear at the Central Foreign
Affairs Leadership Group meeting on January 4, 2006: “The increase in our
nation’s international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in
hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defence, as
well as in soft power such as culture.”4 Other leaders have also frequently
referred to soft power. At the fifth session of the Chinese People’s Politi-
cal Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Tenth National Committee in March
2007, Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman and a member of the CCP Politburo
Standing Committee, delivered a speech in which he elaborated on China’s
soft power. In July 2007, the CPPCC National Committee held a special ses-
sion on “cultural construction as the main approach for national soft power
building.” At the meeting, Jia urged Chinese officials to “deeply understand
the importance of national soft power with cultural construction as the main
task” in order to both meet domestic demands and enhance China’s competi-
tiveness in the international arena.5
President Hu, at the Eighth National Congress of the China Federation of
Literary and Art Circles, instructed that more attention be given to cultural
development and upgrading of China’s soft power, which, he said, are major
practical issues.6 Hu again highlighted soft power in his political report to the
17th Party Congress in October 2007, stressing the urgency of strenuously
building China’s cultural soft power to meet domestic needs and increasing
international competition. Hu’s call aroused a new round of interest in soft
power throughout China. Local governments and various cultural communi-
ties held discussion sessions on China’s cultural soft power. Soft power and
culture became the headlines in many newspapers in the aftermath of the 17th
Congress. A People’s Daily commentary, for instance, proclaimed that China
has to substantially increase its soft power in order to play an active role in
international competition.7
Various Chinese organizations and research institutes have followed up
with and contributed to the growing popularity of soft power by organizing
conferences on the topic. The China Foreign Languages Bureau hosted a fo-
rum on “trans-cultural communications and soft power building” in Beijing in
August 2006. In early 2007, the International Public Relations Research Cen-
ter at Fudan University sponsored a forum among government officials and
24 Chapter Two

leading scholars on “national soft power construction and the development of

China’s public relations.” The China Institute on Contemporary International
Relations carried out a special study on soft power8. The Institute of Strategic
Studies of the Central Party School also conducted a comprehensive study
on soft power.9
According to one Chinese strategist, soft power and its relevance to
China has become an important topic of discussion in Chinese strategic
circles.10 This observation is indeed substantiated by the number of papers
that have appeared in Chinese journals and newspapers. The China National
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database, currently the largest and most
comprehensive database of Chinese journals and periodicals, can be used
to run a simple search. Searching the three sections of CNKI’s journals and
periodicals—liberal arts/history/philosophy, politics/military affairs/law, and
education/comprehensive social sciences—resulted in 485 papers with the
term “soft power” in their titles from 1994 to 2007.11 Using the same search
method for the period 1994 to 2000, the system showed a record of 11 ar-
ticles, whereas from 2001 to 2004, the total number was 58. From 2005 to
2007, there were 416 such articles. In 2006, the number of papers was 104
and in 2007, this number rose to 237. Expanding the search to the full text
and not just the title resulted in 1,211 articles in the same three sections of
the database from 1994 to 2007. From 1994 to 2000, there were 57; from
2001 to 2004, there were 212; from 2005 to 2007, there were 942 pieces.
In 2006, there were 273 papers, and in 2007, the number was 518. Using
the Chinese newspaper section of the CNKI, the search results shows a total
of 509 articles with the term “soft power” as part of the titles from 2000 to
2008. Not all of these papers or newspaper articles are specifically relevant to
China’s foreign policy or international relations, but a vast majority analyse
soft power in relation to China’s international politics. The fact that the term
has become so popular in many fields in China is an indication of the extent
of interest in soft power among the Chinese interlocutors.

CHINESE DISCOURSE: SCOPE AND ASSESSMENT

In the decade since Nye coined the term soft power, Chinese writings almost
exclusively focused on introducing and evaluating the concept itself. But in
recent years, Chinese writings on this subject have become conspicuously
comprehensive and sophisticated, covering a wide range of topics: critical
reviews of Nye’s conceptualization, soft power in China’s peaceful rise and
development, as well as Chinese choices and strategies in cultivating and us-
ing soft power in international politics.12
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 25

Chinese writers who write on soft power frequently make references to the
Great Wall, the Peking Opera, pandas, martial arts, sports star Yao Ming and
movie star Zhang Zhiyi. However, the mainstream Chinese understanding of
soft power has largely followed the conceptual framework proposed by Nye.
The vast majority of Chinese analysts are quite faithful to Nye’s definition of
soft power, that is, “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather
than coercion or payments.”13 They have also largely followed the parameters
identified by Nye: culture, political values and foreign policy.14 Yet the dis-
cussion in China is wider in scope and sometimes emphasizes areas that Nye
paid little attention to.

China’s Soft Power Sources:

Culture, Development and Foreign Policy
According to Chinese analysts, the first Chinese article on soft power was
written by Wang Huning, who is now a member of the CCP Central Commit-
tee Secretariat.15 In that article, published in 1993, Wang argues that culture is
the main source of a state’s soft power. Chinese analysts have since followed
this central thesis. This is discernable in various speeches by Chinese leaders
and numerous scholarly writings.16 Traditional Chinese culture, in particular,
is singled out as the most valuable source of Chinese soft power on the prem-
ise that it boasts an uninterrupted long history, a wide range of traditions,
symbols and textual records. Many Chinese writings also point out the good
values in traditional Chinese culture found in Confucianism, Taoism, Bud-
dhism and other classical schools of thought, for instance, winning respect
through virtues (yi de fu ren), benevolent governance (wang dao), peace and
harmony (he), and harmony without suppressing differences (he er bu tong).
They argue that the traditional Chinese cultural values with “harmony” at
the core are the basis of Chinese cultural appeal in an era of cultural diversifi-
cation and globalization. In modern history, Western civilization, epitomized
by science, individualism and materialism, pushed for industrialization but
at the same time caused a lot of problems, including environmental degra-
dation, confusion in social ethics, and international and regional conflicts.
Traditional Chinese culture, which stresses “giving priority to human be-
ings” (yi ren wei ben) and “harmony between nature and humankind” (tian
ren he yi), may provide alternative approaches in addressing these problems,
thus putting Chinese culture in a more advantageous position in the post-
industrialization, information era.17
It is also argued that history nicely demonstrates the advantages of China’s
cultural soft power. The Chinese nation has a long history compared to other
nations, of which cultural glory was a prominent feature. More importantly,
26 Chapter Two

its culture has influenced East Asia for millennia. The socio-economic suc-
cess of East Asian “dragons” and, now, the success story of China’s own
economy are evidence of Chinese cultural merits. While China and East Asia
are in ascendancy, the West has started a cultural reflection and readjustment,
which provides China with a good opportunity to expand its cultural influ-
ence.18
The discussion of cultural soft power, however, often easily turns to no-
table Chinese discontent about losing competitiveness in the international
trade of cultural products. According to this utilitarian view, the Chinese
cultural sector has lagged far behind its Western counterparts in competing
for business in the world. This school of thought cares about China’s soft
power but is mainly concerned about being marginalized by Western cultural
business juggernauts, particularly the predominant position of the U.S. in
the international trade of cultural products, including movies, popular music,
television programs, fast food and fashion.19 In addition to this minor diver-
sion, there are also dissenting views on Chinese culture as the main source of
China’s soft power. Echoing the intellectual tradition of criticizing the many
negative aspects in traditional culture ever since the May Fourth Movement,
some Chinese scholars maintain that there is very little in traditional Chinese
culture that China could offer to the outside world because there are too many
“backward” aspects to it. One scholar notes that Chinese culture is actually
more diverse now, and includes the Han Chinese culture, the cultures of
other ethnic minorities, folk culture, Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and
other folk beliefs. In modern times, traditional Chinese culture has also been
infiltrated by Western culture. Moreover, traditional Chinese culture has been
reshaped by the revolutionary experience of the CCP to a significant extent.
Putting too high a premium on Chinese culture in the pursuit of soft power
may be misleading, according to some writers.20
Chinese analysts occasionally mention the Chinese model of development
as a source for the nation’s soft power. A study conducted by a scholar at the
Central Party School concludes that China’s gradualist approach to reform
and opening up has provided a new alternative to the classic modernization
theory and “Washington Consensus” for under-developed countries.21 The
Chinese experience of development is occasionally brought up at various
forums, indicating that it is indeed part of the consideration for China’s soft
power among the Chinese elite.22 However, there is no consensus among ana-
lysts about the efficacy of the so-called “Beijing Consensus” in bringing soft
power to their nation, as further discussion in this chapter will reveal.
A number of Chinese analysts also follow Nye’s emphasis on foreign
policy and institutions. Su Changhe argues that soft power is evident in a
state’s ability in international institution building, agenda setting, mobiliza-
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 27

tion of coalitions and ability to fulfil commitments.23 Another study suggests

that China’s soft power includes three aspects: cultural diplomacy, multilat-
eral diplomacy and overseas assistance programs.24 These analysts tend to
emphasize the flexibility in Chinese foreign policy as a source of Chinese
soft power.

Moving Beyond Nye’s Conceptualization

Deviating from Nye’s core positions, many Chinese analysts attach much im-
portance to the mass media, arguing that capability and effectiveness in mass
communications are also an important part of a state’s soft power. Chinese
analysts are impressed by the dominant role of the Western media. Accord-
ing to Chinese statistics: “Currently, the major four Western news agencies,
Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters and Agence France-
Presse, produce four-fifths of the total news stories in the world every day.
The fifty top Western trans-national media corporations hold ninety percent
of the world communication market. The United States alone controls sev-
enty-five percent of TV programs in the world. In many developing nations,
sixty to eighty percent of the content in TV programs comes from the U.S.
Over half of the total show time in the world’s theatres is taken by American
movies, which account for only 6.7 percent of the total global movie produc-
tion.” Western dominance in media and mass communications has resulted in
their “cultural hegemony” or “media imperialism.”25
There are several studies that challenge or are critical of Nye’s conceptu-
alization.26 One scholar, for instance, argues that the sources of soft power
come from three dimensions: institutional power, identifying power and as-
similating power. Institutional power refers to a state’s ability to propose or
build new international institutions or arrangements. Identifying power refers
to a state’s ability to influence other states through the latter’s recognition
of its leadership role. Finally, assimilating power refers to the attraction of a
state’s cultural values, ideology and social system.27 Yan Xuetong believes
that soft power lies in political power that is exclusively found in political
institutions, norms and credibility, rather than in culture.28 Zhu Feng argues
that soft power has little to do with sources of power but is all about whether
the international community accepts a nation’s policies and strategic choices,
as well as to what extent those choices accord with most nations’ interests.29
Concerning the relation between hard power and soft power, some Chinese
analysts seem to be more willing than Nye to emphasize the inseparability of
hard power and soft power. They argue, for example: “Soft power and hard
power are mutually complementary to each other. Soft power can facilitate
the growth of hard power; whereas hard power can demonstrate and support
28 Chapter Two

the increase of soft power.”30 Another study is critical of Nye’s dichotomy

of hard power and soft power, arguing that, depending on the context, any
source of power can be both hard and soft, and that China’s soft power is best
illustrated in the “China model,” multilateralism, economic diplomacy and
good-neighborly policy.31 Another scholar identifies five key elements for
soft power: culture, values, development model, international institutions and
international image.32 In addition to these different views, there seems to be
a tendency among some Chinese scholars to focus on anything that would be
helpful in boosting China’s international influence, ranging from traditional
Chinese medicine33 to the story of China’s economic success34 to sports cul-
ture35 to educational exchange programs.36
Another major difference with Nye’s analysis is the notable domestic
context that numerous Chinese analysts frequently refer to, e.g., national
cohesion, domestic political institution building, social justice, social moral-
ity and educational quality. Yu Keping, a well-known political analyst in
China, argues that education, the psychological and physical condition of
the people, technological advancement, superiority of national culture, hu-
man resources and strategy, social cohesion and unity, and the sustainability
of socio-economic development, are all parts of soft power.37 The domestic
context is also evident in the remarks of top Chinese leaders. Hu Jintao, for
instance, propounded that cultural soft power has two main purposes. One is
to enhance national cohesion and creativity, and to meet the demands of peo-
ple’s spiritual life. The other is to strengthen China’s competitiveness in the
competition for comprehensive national power in the international arena.38
Official documents and writings by prominent scholars frequently mention
the urgency to rebuild Chinese culture and develop new values to hold the
rapidly changing society together and strengthen national cohesiveness.39

Soft Power: A Weak Link in China’s Comprehensive Power

The dominant view among Chinese interlocutors on the current state of
China’s soft power is that China has made much headway and still has great
potential, but its score on soft power has lagged behind its own hard power
growth and the soft power of other major powers, particularly that of the
U.S.40 In fact, Chinese strategists describe the current state of China’s soft
power and its future development as worrisome. This is so because not only
is China’s current soft power still weak, the issue of converting China’s in-
creasing national power into constructive international influence is also still a
weak link in China’s strategic planning.41 Some argue that the most important
gap between China and the developed countries, particularly the U.S., is not
about gross domestic product or military force, but about soft power. This is
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 29

due to China’s drawbacks in domestic institutions, weakness in research, its

low level of education, the not-so-good national image, and the decline of
national identity and social cohesion.42 Others base their pessimistic view on
the fact that China has very few global name brands and a significant deficit
in the trade of cultural products, even though it is becoming the factory of the
world. The deficit in cultural trade, in particular, is a clarion call for many
Chinese officials and scholars. For instance, in 2004, China imported 4,068
kinds of books from the U.S. and exported only fourteen, imported 2,030
books from Britain and exported only sixteen, imported 694 from Japan and
exported only twenty-two. In 2005, in the intellectual property rights trade
with the U.S., the ratio of import and export was 4,000 : 24.43
This pessimistic orientation was echoed by participants in a forum hosted
by the Fudan University International Public Relations Research Center on
“national soft power construction and the development of China’s public rela-
tions” in January 2007. Many participants at the forum mentioned that China
has indeed made many inroads in soft power. Wang Guoqing, deputy direc-
tor of the State Council Information Office, noted in his keynote speech that
China has gained much soft power in recent years, as evidenced by the inter-
national attention given to China’s development, the international attraction
of China’s development model, the ability to shape the course of international
affairs in China’s diplomacy and the affinity emanated by Chinese culture.
But overall, he noted, China’s soft power has been lagging behind. Partici-
pants at the forum acknowledged that the weakness of China’s soft power is
most evident in China’s export of cultural products and the relatively weak
influence of China’s mass media in the international arena.44
With regards to the international impact of China’s development model,
there is notable disagreement on whether the Chinese experience is or should
be a source of China’s soft power. Some officials and scholars believe that
the so-called “Beijing Consensus” has indeed demonstrated its attractive-
ness to many developing countries. Wang Guoqing, as noted above, lists
the perception of China’s development and China’s development model as
the two most important sources of China’s soft power growth.45 But many
others are doubtful that the Chinese experience provides much soft power to
China. Their scepticism is based on the fact that Chinese development is not
complete yet; it is too early to conclude that there has been a unique Chinese
model of socio-economic development.46
A minority of Chinese scholars hold more optimistic views of China’s
soft power. Those who are more sanguine tend to emphasize the country’s
potential, arguing that China has all the elements of soft power, including
cultural power, language power, and intellectual power. The fact that China
is sponsoring “Confucius Institutes” throughout the world attests to China’s
30 Chapter Two

determination to expand its soft power.47 One author says that in today’s
world, interdependence is intensifying, calling for ever-closer cooperation
among nations. International cooperation will have to depend on certain
equality, mutual trust and mutual benefit. This increasing urgency for inter-
national cooperation provides a valuable opportunity for the Chinese culture,
which emphatically values “harmony.” The Chinese cultural proclivity of
stressing “harmony without suppressing differences” (he er bu tong) is likely
to provide new thinking and a new approach to international relations, thus
highlighting the comparative advantage of Chinese culture. In the eyes of
these optimists, “harmony”-laden Chinese culture can then proffer some uni-
versal values to the outside world.48

SOFT POWER: A MEANS TO MULTIPLE ENDS

The preceding discussion has clearly demonstrated an intense desire and a

strong sense of urgency in China to build and promote its soft power. Many
analysts have argued that China should treat soft power at the level of state
strategy.49 This urgency largely springs from the Chinese assessment of soft
power as being the weakest link in its rise in comparison to Western powers.50
There are also other reasons why China is so enthusiastic about soft power. In
a nutshell, soft power is envisioned as a means to multiple ends.

Soft Power: An Indicator of World Status

The most frequent argument is that soft power has to be part of “compre-
hensive power” that a major nation is expected to possess. It is commonly
believed in Chinese strategic circles that soft power has become an important
indicator of a state’s international status and influence.51 A great power has to
have material or hard power as well as soft power in order to enjoy flexibility
in international politics and maintain advantageous positions in international
competition. In light of this, many Chinese analysts have argued that soft
power is inseparable from China’s rise.52 A world power has to be one of the
cultural centres of the world where ideas, values, social life and beliefs are
attractive and appealing to people in other countries. “If a major power can-
not provide some guiding moral or cultural ideals of universal value for the
international society, its major power status is unlikely to be acknowledged
by other states, and even its own development is hard to be sustained.”53 Soft
power, in the view of many Chinese strategists, does not grow automatically
from the influence of material hard power. Instead, it has to be intentionally
cultivated and built up.
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 31

According to various Chinese scholars, building soft power that is com-

mensurate with China’s major power status and influence has become an
urgent task in China’s development strategy. The sense of urgency comes
from these factors. First, China’s hard power—economic, technological and
military—has already experienced a dramatic increase but its soft power has
lagged behind, creating an imbalance in its national comprehensive power
structure. This imbalance is not good for China’s aspiration of higher in-
ternational status and greater international influence.54 Others have made it
more specific by saying that building soft power is conducive to the domestic
programme of building a “harmonious society,” a concept that the Hu-Wen
leadership has proposed to tackle mounting domestic social challenges. For
the purpose of maintaining domestic stability more attention should be paid
to culture, national cohesion, morality and institutions. All these measures
are aimed at maintaining social and political stability in China to create some
sort of favourable internal conditions for China’s peaceful rise. In addition to
these specific tasks at the strategic level, the building up of soft power is also
useful for exploring alternative pathways to sustainable growth.55

A Soft Shield for Self-Defence

The emerging Chinese soft-power strategy also relates to the “important
period of strategic opportunity” that the Hu-Wen leadership has emphasized.
At a meeting with Chinese diplomatic emissaries, President Hu Jintao noted
that to better serve Chinese interests during this “important period of strategic
opportunity,” China needs to strive to ensure four “environments,” namely,
a peaceful and stable international environment, a neighbourly and friendly
environment in the surrounding regions, a cooperative environment based on
equality and mutual benefits, and an objective and friendly media environ-
ment. Chinese analysts believe that soft power is instrumental in helping
China achieve these goals. The immediate goal is to dispel what they see as
misperception or misunderstanding of the real China by outside commenta-
tors, to develop a better image of the Chinese regime in the world, and also
to fend off excessive influence or penetration of foreign cultures into China,
particularly those ideologies or beliefs that might be harmful to the legitimacy
of the ruling party.
First and foremost, soft power is intended to shape a better perception of
China by the outside world. It is primarily utilized to refute the “China threat”
thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic socio-economic
reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise.56
Externally, building soft power is good for China in order to maintain a stable
and peaceful neighbourhood. It also helps to solve various problems between
32 Chapter Two

China and other countries so that these problems do not exacerbate any ten-
sions.57 The international strategic environment also contributes to China’s
sense of urgency in developing its soft power. Unlike the American experi-
ence of developing hard economic and military power first, then soft power
influence, China does not enjoy such a propitious international context. China
has to develop its soft power simultaneously because without the kind of soft
power to maintain a favourable international status, many forces in the world
will prohibit or hamper China’s development.58
According to Chinese scholars, upgrading the capacity of Chinese mass
media outlets can also help the outside world better understand China.59 This
is due to the worry that with the increase of China’s hard power and its im-
pact on the international order, many outside observers are hyping China’s
economic competitiveness and increasing energy demand in the world and
external apprehensions toward China’s military power. Building soft power
would be beneficial to mitigate such outside concerns. Chinese scholars are
also aware that other major powers, in particular those that are critical of
China’s rise, may amplify its negative impact. Thus, developing soft power
would help create a more favourable international political atmosphere for
China’s rise.60 Many Chinese analysts also fear that Chinese voices have to
be heard in the international discourse on soft power, as Western analyses of
China’s soft power may be inaccurate due to ideological, social and cultural
differences and the inclination of Western scholars to focus on counter-
measures to China’s soft power.61

International Competition: Soft Power but Hard Reality

The long-term goal for China is to face up to the perceived competition for
soft power among the major powers. Echoing many international strategists,
Chinese analysts also acknowledge the trend that in today’s world, the role
of traditional means of power—e.g., military power—is relatively decreasing.
The world is experiencing ever deepening globalization and, in this new era,
stability, cooperation, multilateralism and democratization in international
politics are on the rise. New rules and approaches in international competition
have emerged. In addition to the traditional dimensions of military, economic
and technological hard power, soft power, as represented by culture, po-
litical ideology, development model and capacity in international institution-
building, should also be part of the national comprehensive power.62 In the
words of one Chinese analyst: “Apparently, the competition among nation-
states appears to be a rivalry of hard power, but behind such rivalry is the
competition between institutions, civilizations, and strategies, which are
essentially the rivalry of soft power.”63 Zhu Feng argues that China has to
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 33

transcend the conventional approach in international competition that focuses

on hard power, and instead seek to win ideas and international influence to
maintain a “soft counterbalance” instead of “hard counterbalance.”64
Many Chinese analysts claim that the major powers are all stepping up
efforts to build up their soft power, including European nations, the U.S.,
Japan, India and South Korea.65 Western powers have always been actively
propagating their political system, ideology (democracy) and culture.66 The
U.S. is believed to continue to pursue an aggressive soft power strategy to
practice “cultural hegemonism,” using its strong economic and political
power and advantages in global information networks to promote its spiritual
and cultural products, socio-political ideals and values.67 Japan publicized
a national strategic plan in 2005 that called for greater efforts to promote
Japanese culture in the world. South Korea proposed back in 1998 that its
cultural sector should be one of the main industries for its economy in the new
century.68 Chinese analysts frequently refer to South Korea as an example of
successful practice in soft power. Many argue that if South Korea, largely
influenced by traditional Chinese culture, could be successful in projecting
its soft power, China has no reason not to be successful, because many of the
cultural fundamentals evident in South Korean cultural products had their
origins in Chinese culture.
Many among the Chinese elite worry that American cultural hegemony
is dominating the world, including Chinese society. They worry that the
younger generation of Chinese is excessively exposed to American cultural
influence. The fear of the political elite is peaceful evolution, i.e., Western
liberal political ideology gradually infiltrating Chinese society to weaken
their legitimacy. For many scholars, Western cultural penetration will result
in the waning of Chinese traditional culture and ultimately the weakening of
Chinese identity.69 In this sense, “beefing up cultural competitiveness is as
important as building a strong military.”70
In accordance with the popular perception that “the competition of cultural
power is the core on soft power contention,”71 in September 2006, the Chinese
government released an official document entitled “The National Planning
Guidelines for Cultural Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period.”72
The document asserts that today’s world culture is increasingly intertwined
with economics, politics and technologies, all of which are important indica-
tors of a nation’s comprehensive power. To win the international competition
in this complex environment, a state will not only need strong economic,
technological and defence power but also strong cultural power. In fact, the
guidelines stipulate that one of the goals of Chinese cultural development is
to increase the influence of Chinese culture in the world so that it can match
the nation’s economic power and international status.
34 Chapter Two

THE CHINESE APPROACH TO STRONGER SOFT POWER

This section discusses roadmaps to stronger soft power that have been pro-
posed by Chinese intellectuals. It should be noted from the outset that most
analysts share the view that China should still focus on hard power and
develop soft power on the basis of economic, technological and military
advancement. Many of them, however, have proposed new ideas about how
China can further strengthen its soft power.

A Cultural Offensive: Reaching Out to the World

In line with the dominant perception that culture matters most, both official
and scholarly prescriptions for the growth of China’s soft power have fo-
cused on various strategies to work on the cultural front. The 2006 National
Planning Guidelines for Cultural Development vows to push for a “go out”
strategy to ratchet up the competitiveness and influence of Chinese cultural
products and actively promote Chinese culture in the world. One of the major
policies that the document proposes is to utilize various festival occasions to
promote international understanding of Chinese culture, to actively partici-
pate in international decision making in order to increase China’s discourse
right, to cultivate international sales networks for Chinese cultural products,
and to provide support to those major overseas-oriented cultural enterprises.
Zhao Qizheng, the former director of the State Council Information Office,
mentioned that China should regard reviving its culture and strengthening
cultural communication with the outside world as an important task for the
nation’s destiny.73
In recent years, the Chinese government has done a lot to promote cultural
exchanges with the outside world. These efforts include participation in the
United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO)
Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in 1998,
the 1999 Paris China Culture Week, the 2000 U.S. Tour of Chinese Culture,
the China Festival at the Asia-Pacific Week in 2001 in Berlin, the Chinese
Year in France from October 2003 to July 2004, the Sixth Asian Arts Fes-
tival, the Chinese cultural tour in Africa, the “year of Russia” in China in
2006, and the “year of China” in Russia in 2007. It has been stressed that the
Chinese diaspora throughout the world is also a good platform in promoting
Chinese culture.74
Official reports stated that part of the responsibility to increase the influ-
ence of Chinese civilization in the world lies with scholars in philosophy,
humanities and the social sciences. It is their mission to further discover and
promote traditional Chinese cultural values with “harmony” at the core. As
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 35

noted above, Chinese analysts claim that in modern history, Western civiliza-
tion spearheaded industrialization but may not provide effective solutions to
various current challenges, including environmental degradation, confusion
in social ethics, and international and regional conflicts. Traditional Chinese
culture, according to their views, stresses “giving priority to human beings”
(yi ren wei ben) and will be more valuable in overcoming the Western obses-
sion with the omnipotence of material, in resolving the increasingly growing
spiritual crisis of humankind, reversing the worsening natural environment
and reining in escalating international conflicts.75

Political Values and Institutions: Officials vs. Critics

The Chinese political elite and state-owned media continue to advocate ad-
hering to traditional Marxist and socialist ideology in constructing a spiritual
civilization.76 According to official pronouncements, China needs to make
more effort to construct a socialist core value system to enhance the cohesion
of the Chinese nation. Constructing a socialist core value system should be
the primary task in upgrading China’s cultural soft power. Sinicized Marxism
should continue to be upheld as the guiding ideology for the party and people.
The common aspirations under socialism with Chinese characteristics should
serve as the cohesive force. The spirit of patriotism and reform and innova-
tion should be used to inspire the people.77 Although Chinese decision-makers
have realized the importance of culture in promoting Chinese soft power, they
still have to regard Marxism as the primary political framework for China’s
cultural development.78
Many liberal-minded intellectuals, however, tend to look at the root imped-
iment of China’s soft power. Qian Chengdan, a history professor at Beijing
University who lectured members of the CCP Politburo, argues that the rise
of China and the increase of China’s soft power will need more institution
building in the various fields—economic, social, cultural, jurisdictional and
political—to ensure the transition from the rule of men to the rule of law.79
Another scholar argues that in addition to significant changes that need to be
made to the Chinese model—for instance, making it more sustainable, open,
free and harmonious—China has to ultimately become a constitutional state
in order to make its experience have universal application to the developing
states.80
Other scholars have explicitly opined that the challenge for the growth of
China’s soft power is to elucidate a set of values that would unite the Chinese
population domestically and be convincing, appealing and attractive externally.
The author proposes that China should promote these values to increase its
soft power: peace, development, cooperation, democracy, justice and human
36 Chapter Two

rights.81 Another scholar argues that Chinese values that may have universal
appeal include economic development, stability and harmony. The task for
China is to integrate, institutionalize and operationalize these values.82

Public Relations: Expanding the Influence of Chinese Media

According to some scholars, another reason why China still lags behind in
soft power is that previous and current Chinese efforts have concentrated on
traditional Chinese cultural legacies but the government has not done a good
job in conducting international public relations, particularly in dealing with
the Western media. As a result, the Western media have excessively focused
on the negative reporting of China.83 One reason for China’s lack of soft
power, according to some Chinese scholars, is insufficient financial input in
the tools of communication.84 The solution for this problem is two-fold. First,
China must learn to develop more effective strategies to better deal with the
Western media. Second, China needs to strengthen the capacity of its media
in international communications.

CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, both Chinese officials and scholars have gone to great lengths
to explore soft power and its implications for China’s foreign affairs. The
popularity of soft power in China perhaps reflects the widespread excite-
ment of the Chinese people about the pending rise of their nation as well as
their sensitivity to anything that may have an impact on China’s ascendance.
Following Nye’s conceptual framework, Chinese officials and scholars have
shed much light on the sources, potential, practice and objectives of soft
power in the Chinese context.
A few things, however, are still unclear in the Chinese discourse on soft
power. For instance, it is not clear how soft power can be translated into the
attainment of specific foreign policy goals. This is particularly the case in
their discussion of culture being the main source of soft power. There are very
few concrete suggestions as to how the Chinese “harmonious” worldview
could restructure the world order. Moreover, available Chinese studies are
short of empirical reviews or specific case studies, such as how its foreign
policy or participation in international institutions has had an impact on its
soft power.
Another key point is that in much of Chinese discourse, one finds constant
reference to the domestic context, whether it is culture, values or institutions.
This domestic orientation clearly indicates that China itself is in a state of sig-
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 37

nificant changes—cultural, economic, social and political. This state of flux

indicates that many sources of Chinese soft power are also uncertain, pending
the ultimate transformation of the Chinese state and society. The uncertainties
are also reflected in the debate among Chinese scholars, although the vast ma-
jority of analysts share some common views. Furthermore, even the domestic
political environment has some impact on the Chinese understanding of soft
power. For instance, in the analysis of media influence as a source of soft
power, very few Chinese analysts, at least among those who are engaged in
the soft power discourse, realize that Western media outlets, powerful as they
are in shaping world opinions, are not submissive tools of their governments.
As a matter of fact, the Western media, most importantly the U.S. media, has
played a crucial role in bringing down the international reputation of the U.S.
government soon after the invasion of Iraq.
The official inclination to cling to the last ideological straws may have
quite a significant negative impact on China’s soft power. First, given the
preference of the decision-makers, a lot of resources will continue to be al-
located to research projects that are closer to the official ideology, the new
Marxist project being a good example. Second, it gives the political and ideo-
logical watchdogs the power to censure works that they may deem unfit, for
political reasons, sometimes wantonly and arbitrarily. Third, it discourages
intellectual innovations. Perhaps most importantly, the official discourse is
likely to facilitate the slow political reform process. Given the predominance
of Western ideological and political ideals, political stagnation in China will
continue to put it in a defensive position. Instead of shaping worldviews and
setting agendas in world affairs, soft power, however the Chinese elite may
define it, will have to be used for defensive purposes.
In light of all these factors, it is perhaps understandable why Chinese
discourse on soft power also seems to demonstrate a lack of confidence and
forcefulness. This is particularly evident when compared to the American
discussion of soft power. Chinese analysts seem to downplay or neglect the
function of soft power to aggressively influence others. Chinese authors
rarely discuss political ideology or beliefs and their potential for China’s soft
power promotion. They are more or less inclined to base their arguments on
relativity, frequently stressing the relative nature of culture and ideology,
whereas the American analysis of soft power tends to be more absolute in ad-
vocating the universal nature of their ideology, socio-political system, beliefs
and cultural tenets.85
More often than not, official Chinese voices have steadfastly emphasized
the importance of respecting the cultural, social, political and ideological di-
versity in the world. This emphasis on diversity is clearly a counter-measure
to Western insistence on promoting its universal ideational influence in the
38 Chapter Two

world, including in China, which would pose a grave challenge to the ruling
position of the CCP. The lack of confidence is also a reflection of the fact
that the Chinese socio-political system is not in conformity with the global
political discourse and atmosphere in which political openness and pluralism
are the dominant norms. Another factor in Chinese reluctance to aggressively
advocate soft power has to do with their caution that such a loud voice might
be interpreted by the West as some sort of Chinese grand strategy to chal-
lenge the West. Beijing is fearful that some Western observers could use any
fanfare on soft power as part of their evidence to support a “China threat”
thesis.86
China has indeed done a lot to promote its soft power. These efforts include
various large-scale cultural activities in other countries, putting in a large
amount of financial resources to cultivate a better image of China, promoting
the capacity of its mass media in international communications, and spon-
soring Confucius Institutes throughout the world. Despite all these efforts,
Chinese intellectuals seem to be uncertain about the ultimate fate of China’s
soft power. Numerous writings by Chinese analysts do suggest the validity
of the thesis: “Soft power remains Beijing’s underbelly and China still has a
long way to go to become a true global leader.”87

NOTES

1. Jiang Zeming, “Political Report to the 16th CCP Congress,” November 8,

2002.
2. Wen Hui Bao [Wen Hui newspaper], “Yi ruan shili tisheng guojia zhonghe
jinzhengli” [Use soft power to upgrade national comprehensive competitiveness],
June 21, 2004.
3. Yang Taoyuan, “Tisheng zhongguo ruan shili: jiedu zhongyang zhengzhiju di
shi san ci jiti xuexi” [Upgrading China’s soft power: An explanation of the 13th col-
lective study session of the CCP CC Politburo], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook
News Weekly] issue 23, June 7, 2004.
4. Ma Lisi, “Guanyu wo guo jiaqiang ruan shili jianshe de chubu sikao” [Pre-
liminary thoughts on accelerating China’s soft power building], Dang de wenxian
[Literature of Chinese Communist Party], no. 7, 2007, pp. 35–38.
5. Pan Yue, “Quan guo zhengxie zhaokai zhuanti xieshanghui” [CPPCC National
Committee convenes a special consultation meeting], People’s Daily, July 25, 2007;
Excerpt from Jia’s speech at the CPPCC National Committee special session on July
24 Dang Jian [Party Building], issue 9 (2007): 6.
6. Guangming Daily commentary, “Nuli tigao guojia ruan shili” [Strive to raise
national soft power], November 17, 2006.
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 39

7. People’s Daily, “Tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” [Upgrading national cultural
soft power], December 29, 2007.
8. See Study Group on soft power at CICIR, “Ruan shili guoji jiejian” [Interna-
tional lessons about soft power], Outlook Weekly 11, March 12, 2007.
9. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power], Guoji guancha [International Observations] 1:2 (2007):
15–26.; 2:3 (2007): 37–46.
10. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power], 15.
11. The Chinese translation of soft power has four versions: ruan shili, ruan lil-
iang, ruan guoli and ruan quanli. Ruan shili is becoming more popular than the other
three. For the searches, I entered all four terms and used the “or” function.
12. For a comprehensive review of Chinese discourse on soft power, see Liu Qing
and Wang Litao, “Jin nian guonei ruan liliang lilun yanjiu zongshu” [A review of
Chinese studies on soft power theory in recent years], Journal of Jiangnan Social
University 2:9 (2007).
13. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Cam-
bridge, MA: Perseus Books Group, 2004), x.
14. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 11.
15. Wang Huning, “Zuowei guojia shili de wenhua: Ruan quanli” [Culture as
national power: Soft power], Journal of Fudan University 3 (1993).
16. For instance, Luo Jianbo, “Zhongguo jueqi de duiwai wenhua zhanlue” [ex-
ternal cultural strategy in China’s rise], Journal of the Party School of the Central
Committee of the CCP 10, no. 3, (June 2006): 97–100.
17. Jiang Haiyan, “Hongyang zhonghua minzu de youxiu wenhua yu zengqiang
wo guo de ruan shili” [Promoting the outstanding culture of the Chinese nation
and strengthening China’s soft power], Journal of the Party School of the Central
Committee of the CCP 11, no. 1 (2007): pp. 107–112; Li Haijuan, “‘Ruan quanli’
jingzheng beijing xia de wenhua zhanlue” [Cultural strategy in the context of soft
power competition], Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping liluan yanjiu [Mao Zedong thought
and Deng Xiaoping theory studies]12, (2004): 49–54.
18. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
19. Ni Xun, “Quanguo zhengxie weiyuan tan zengqiang wenhua ruan shili de
zhuoyandian” [CPPCC National Committee members discuss how to strengthen cul-
tural soft power], Guangming Daily, January 3, 2008.
20. Yu Xintian, “Ruan liliang duanxiang” [Some reflections on soft power], For-
eign Affairs Review, no. 97 (2007), pp. 35–36.
21. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
22. Feng Jian and Qian Haihong, “Gonggong guanxi shiye xia de zhongguo ruan
shili jiangou” [China’s soft power construction in the perspective of public relations],
Journalism Quarterly 92: 2 (2007), pp. 75–76.
23. Su Changhe, “Zhongguo de ruan quanli— yi guoji zhidu yu zhongguo de
guanxi wei li” [China’s soft power—an example in the relationship between China
40 Chapter Two

and international institutions], Guoji guancha [International Observations] 2 (2007),

pp. 27–35.
24. Zhao Lei, “Zhongguo ruan shili tisheng yin ren guanzhu” [Increase of China’s
soft power raises attention], Zhongguo dang zheng ganbu luntan [Forum of Chinese
party and government officials], 1 (2007), pp. 45–46.
25. Yao Xu, “Gonggong guanxi de chuanbo shouduan yu zhongguo ruan shili
jiangou” [Communication methods of public relations and China’s soft power build-
ing], Xinwen qianshao [News Frontline] 93: 7 (2007), pp. 93–94.
26. For instance, Ji Ling and Chen Shiping, “Guoji zhengzhi de bianqian yu ruan
quanli lilun” [Changes in international politics and the soft power theory], Foreign
Affairs Review 96, (2007), pp. 97–105; Fang Changping, “Zhong mei ruan shili bijiao
ji qi dui zhongguo de qishi” [A comparison of soft power between China and the
U.S. and its implications for China], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and
Politics] 7 (2007), pp. 21–27; Su Changhe, “Zhongguo de ruan quanli—yi guoji zhidu
yu zhongguo de guanxi wei li” [China’s soft power—an example in the relationship
between China and international institutions].
27. Gong Tieying, “Lun ruan quanli de weidu” [On the dimensions of soft power],
Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] 9 (2007), pp. 16–22.
28. Yan Xuetong, “Ruanshili de hexin shi zhengzhi shili” [The core of soft power
is political power], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], May 22, 2007.
29. Zhu Feng, “Zhongguo ying duo cezhong ‘ruan shili’ jueqi”[China should give
priority to soft power rise], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], April 30, 2007.
30. Zhu Majie and Yu Xintian, “Ruan guoli jianshe: bu rong hu shi de wu xing
yingxiang” [Soft power construction: Invisible influence not to be ignored], Proceed-
ings of Annual Meeting of Shanghai Social Sciences Circle, 2004.
31. Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, “Guoji zhengzhi zhong de ruan liliang yiji
dui zhongguo ruan liliang de guancha” [Soft power in international politics and an
observation of China’s soft power], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and
Politics] 7 (2007), 133–138.
32. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
33. Zhao Haibin, “Yi zhongyiyao chuantong wenhua tisheng zhongguo ruan shili”
[Use traditional Chinese medical culture to upgrade China’s soft power], Journal of
Yunnan College of Traditional Chinese Medicine 1: 30 (2007), pp. 4–9.
34. Zhao Shusen, “Jingji shijiao xia de ruan quanli yu zhongguo de heping
fazhan” [Soft power in economic perspective and China’s peaceful development], Ya
fei zong heng [All-round Asia-Africa] 5 (2007), pp. 53–59.
35. Cheng Bin et al., “Tiyu wenhua chuanbo yu tisheng guojia ruan shili” [Com-
munications of sports culture and the increase of China’s soft power], Collection of
excerpts of papers presented at the 8th national sports science conference, 2007.
36. Qian Zhengshun, “Jiaoyu waijiao zai guojia ruan shili waijiao zhong da you
ke wei” [Educational diplomacy to play a big role in China’s soft power diplomacy],
Journal of National Academy of Education and Administration 2 (2007), pp. 33–35.
37. Yu Keping, “Zhongguo moshi: jingyan yu jianjie” [The China model: Experi-
ence and lessons], in Zhongguo moshi yu beijing gongshi—chaoyue huashengdun
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 41

gongshi [The Chinese model and Beijing consensus—beyond the Washington con-
sensus], ed. Yu Keping (Beijing: Social Sciences Press, 2006), 19.
38. Hu Jintao, Report at the CCP 17th Congress, October 15, 2007.
39. Wang Zuoshu, Goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui de ruan shili [Building soft
power for a socialist harmonious society], (Beijing: People’s Press, 2007).
40. Zhan Yijia, “Zhongguo shi ruan shili daguo ma?” [Is China a nation with
strong soft power?], Shijie Zhishi [World Knowledge] 20 (2006): 5.; Deng Xiaochao,
“Qiao ran jueqi de zhongguo ruan shili” [Chinese soft power quietly growing],
Ascent 24, no. 6 (2005): 89–93.; Liberation Daily, “Touxi zhongguo ‘ruan shili’”
[Analysing China’s soft power], October 3, 2005.
41. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
42. Huang Renwei, “Ruan liliang yu guojia anquan” [Soft power and national
security], Xuexi yue kan [Study Monthly] 202: 1 (2003), pp. 23–28.
43. Li Lei, “Dazao zhongguo ruan shili” [Moulding China’s soft power], Shangye
wenhua [Business Culture], (November 2006): 86–88.
44. Feng Jian, “Gonggong guanxi shiye xia de zhongguo ruan shili jiangou” [Chi-
na’s soft power construction in the perspective of public relations].
45. Ibid.
46. Zhang Jianjing, “‘Beijing gongshi’ yu zhongguo ruanshili de tisheng” [The
“Beijing Consensus” and the increase of China’s soft power], Dangdai shijie yu she-
huizhuyi [Contemporary World and Socialism] 4 (2004), pp. 10–14.
47. Pang Zhongying, “Kongzi sixiang de ‘chukou’ he ruan liliang de shiyong”
[The export of Confucianism and use of soft power], Shijie Zhishi [World Knowledge]
17 (2006): 67.
48. Yu Yunquan, “Zhongguo wenhua ruan shili jianshe ren zhong dao yuan”
[China’s cultural soft power construction has a long way to go], Dui wai da chuanbo
[External Communications] 1 (2007), pp. 44–46.
49. Zhao Changmao, “Zhongguo xuyao ruan shili” [China needs soft power], Li-
aowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook News Weekly], June 7, 2004.
50. Huang Renwei, Zhongguo jueqi de shijian he kongjian [Time and space of
China’s rise], (Shang Hai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press, 2002).
51. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
52. Li Jie, “Tisheng ruan shili dui shixian wo guo heping jueqi zhanlue de zuoy-
ong” [The role of increasing soft power for the realization of China’s peaceful rise],
Taipingyang xue bao [Journal of Pacific Studies] 12 (2005): 64–71.; Huang Jing and
Yue Zhanju, “Ruan shili jianshe yu zhongguo de heping fazhan daolu” [Building
soft power and China’s peaceful development road], Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi
[Contemporary World and Socialism] 5 (2006): 103–7.
53. Luo Jianbo, “Zhongguo jueqi de duiwai wenhua zhanlue” [External cultural
strategy in China’s rise].
54. Wang Jianjun, “Ruan shili sheng wei” [Soft power given more attention], Liao
wang [Outlook Weekly] 11, March 12, 2007.
42 Chapter Two

55. Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruan shili pinggu baogao” [Assessment and report
of China’s soft power].
56. Fang Changping, “Zhong mei ruan shili bijiao ji qi dui zhongguo de qishi”
[A comparison of soft power between China and the U.S. and its implications for
China].
57. Song Xiaofeng, “Shi xi zhongguo heping jueqi zhong de ruan quanli yinsu”
[A preliminary analysis of the soft power factor in China’s peaceful rise], Journal of
Guangdong Institute of Public Administration 17, no.13 (June 2005): 46–50.
58. Zhang Jianjing, “Beijing gongshi yu zhongguo ruan shili de tisheng” [The
Beijing consensus and the increase of China’s soft power].
59. Liu Sen, “Xiang shijie shuoming zhongguo, guanjian kao tisheng ruanshili”
[Upgrading soft power is key in explaining China to the outside world], Liberation
Daily, November 3, 2007.
60. Wang Jianjun, “Ruan shili sheng wei” [Soft power given more attention], Liao
wang [Outlook Weekly] 11, March 12, 2007.
61. Fang Changping, “Zhong mei ruan shili bijiao ji qi dui zhongguo de qishi”
[A comparison of soft power between China and the U.S. and its implications for
China].
62. Huang Jing and Yue Zhanju, “Ruan shili jianshe yu zhongguo de heping
fazhan daolu” [Building soft power and China’s peaceful development road].
63. Zhang Jianjing, “Beijing gongshi yu zhongguo ruan shili de tisheng” [The
Beijing consensus and the increase of China’s soft power].
64. Zhu Feng, “Zhongguo ying duo cezhong ‘ruan shili’ jueqi” [China should give
priority to soft power rise].
65. See Study Group on soft power at CICIR, “Ruan shili guoji jiejian” [Interna-
tional lessons about soft power], Liao wang [Outlook Weekly] 11, March 12, 2007.
66. Yu Xibin, “Ruan shili liluan de neihan, chansheng beijing ji yunyong” [Con-
tent, background and application of the soft power theory], Dangdai shijie [Contem-
porary World] 9 (2006): 33–5.
67. Zhao Yi, “Ruan shili: daguo zheng xiong de jue li chang” [Soft power: The
arena of major power rivalry], China Society Periodical 12 (2005): 55–7.
68. Li Jie, “Ruan shili jianshe yu zhongguo de heping fazhan” [Soft power con-
struction and China’s peaceful development], Guoji wenti yanjiu [International Stud-
ies] 1 (2007), pp. 19–24.
69. He Ying et al., “Qian xi guojia ‘ruan quanli’ lilun” [Notes on national soft
power theory], Journal of University of International Relations, no 12 (2005): 5–8.
70. Huang Renwei, “Ruan liliang yu guojia anquan” [Soft power and national
security].
71. Li Haijuan, “‘Ruan quanli’ jingzheng beijing xia de wenhua zhanlue” [Cultural
strategy in the context of soft power competition].
72. Xinhua News Agency, “Full Text of the National Planning Guidelines for Cul-
tural Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period,” September 13, 2006.
73. Shen Suru, “Kaizhan ‘ruan shili’ yu dui wai chuanbo de yanjiu” [Conduct
research on soft power and external communications], Dui wai da chuanbo [Grand
External Communications] 7 (2006): 24–8.
 Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect 43

74. Lin Guoxia, “Zhongguo ruan shili xianzhuang fenxi” [An analysis of the state
of China’s soft power], Dang dai shijie [Contemporary World] 3 (2007), pp. 24–28.
75. Jiang Haiyan, “Hongyang zhonghua minzu de youxiu wenhua yu zengqiang
wo guo de ruan shili” [Promoting the outstanding culture of the Chinese nation and
strengthening China’s soft power].
76. Shen Jiru, “Bu neng hushi zengqiang wo guo de ‘ruan shili’” [The enhance-
ment of China’s soft power should not be neglected], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan
[Outlook News Weekly] 41 (11 October 1999): 12–13.
77. People’s Daily, “Tigao guojia wenhua ruan shili” [Upgrading national cultural
soft power].
78. Xinhua News Agency, “Full Text of the National Planning Guidelines for Cul-
tural Development in the Eleventh Five-Year Period,” September 13, 2006.
79. Wang Haijing and Qian Chengdan, “Zhidu jianshe chengqi ruan shili” [Institu-
tions to Support Soft Power] Liao Wang [Outlook Weekly 11, March 12, 2007.
80. Zhang Jianjing, “‘Beijing gongshi’ yu zhongguo ruanshili de tisheng” [The
“Beijing Consensus” and the increase of China’s soft power].
81. Zhu Majie and Yu Xintian, “Ruan guoli jianshe: bu rong hu shi de wu xing
yingxiang” [Soft power construction: invisible influence not to be ignored].
82. Chen Yugang, “Shi lun quanqiuhua beijing xia zhongguo ruan shili de gou-
jian” [Thoughts on the construction of China’s soft power in the context of globaliza-
tion], Guoji guancha [International Observations] 2 (2007), pp. 36–59.
83. Wu Xu, “Zhongguo ruan shili bun eng chi laoben” [China’s soft power cannot
depend on traditions only], Shiji xing [Century] 6 (2007), pp. 47–48.
84. Shen Suru, “Kaizhan ‘ruan shili’ yu dui wai chuanbo de yanjiu” [Conduct
research on soft power and external communications].
85. Fang Changping, “Zhong mei ruan shili bijiao ji qi dui zhongguo de qishi”
[A comparison of soft power between China and the U.S. and its implications for
China].
86. Yu Yunquan, “Zhongguo wenhua ruan shili jianshe ren zhong dao yuan”
[China’s cultural soft power construction has a long way to go].
87. Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of
China’s Soft Power,” East Asia 23, no. 4 (Winter 2006): pp. 22–44.
 Chapter Three

The Discourse of China’s

Soft Power and Its Discontents
Yongjin Zhang

A spectre is haunting the world—the spectre of the rise of (Communist)

China. All the discourses about China around the world have entered into
one spiral hype about this spectre: in print and other media, in academic
discussions and policy briefings, in published books and articles, and all
over the virtual space of Internet.

This light-hearted adaptation of the opening paragraph of the Communist

Manifesto is in fact a rather accurate description of the continued fascination
and obsessions about the recent transformation of China. Pei Minxin, writing
in Foreign Policy, made a mischievously rueful comment. “The only thing
rising faster than China,” in his words, “is the hype about China.”1 If the
rise of China is the topic of political moment, the latest hype about the rise
of China is about China’s soft power. Critics and enthusiasts of China alike
are entranced and bewildered by the rapid increase of Chinese influence and
assertiveness in global and regional economic development and political af-
fairs. China is said to have mounted a “charm offensive” worldwide and to
have made good use of “soft seduction” in its foreign policy. It is claimed
that Chinese soft power is “transforming the world.” Further, it is suggested
that Beijing has implemented a masterful plan as part of its grand strategy in
the last few years to project China’s soft power, taking advantage of the U.S.
preoccupation with the global war on terror, particularly in Iraq and Afghani-
stan. China has, in other words, built up its soft power “at the expense of the
United States.”2 Not surprisingly, such novel rage about China’s soft power
has evoked excitement, fascination, fear, apprehension and anxiety.
Parallel to such hype and rage about China’s soft power are, however, con-
cerns about the “clash of Titans”—China and the United States.3 It is worth
noting that whether China is a status quo or a revisionist power is an ongoing

45
46 Chapter Three

debate;4 and that China was a pariah state in the society of states, whose
legitimacy has only been reluctantly and grudgingly accepted by the cur-
rent international system not long ago. The public call for China to become
“a responsible stakeholder of the international system” remains a prospect
unfulfilled.5
Why should there be such a rage about China’s soft power at this particular
moment? Are there any substance in the claims about soft power that China
is said to increasingly possess and command? How to understand the projec-
tion and purpose of such power? What is the political logic behind this raging
discourse?
In this chapter, I address these questions through an analytical examina-
tion of the recent external discourse of China’s soft power. I have chosen
to concentrate on this discourse that looks at China’s soft power from the
outside-in perspective principally for two explicit reasons. One is that the
discourse of soft power per se is originated outside China, and more pre-
cisely in the United States. In addition, much hype about China’s soft power
comes from academics, policy analysts and journalists based in the United
States. The other is that this external discourse is a much richer one, better
conceptualised and much more focused. It is this external discourse that has
provided inspirations for the internal discourse. In contrast, the discourse of
soft power inside China, if any, seems much more fragmented and reactive
with less analytical rigor. It is, in my view, derivative from, thus secondary
to, the external one.6

SOFT POWER: CONCEPTUAL AMBIGUITIES

The discourse of soft power was single-handedly started in 1990 by Joseph

Nye. It is widely acknowledged that Nye’s initial purpose for inventing the
concept of “soft power” is to counter the prevailing pessimism about the de-
cline of American power at the end of the Cold War with the disappearance of
a defining Soviet threat. In Bound to Lead, Nye asked a seemingly mundane
question: ‘how is power changing in modern international politics?’7 In the
post-Cold War global order, Nye argued, the changing face of power was
most clearly seen in the rising importance of what he called “co-optive or soft
power”—“getting others to want what you want.”8 Given the U.S. command
of soft power resources—cultural and ideological attraction and rules and
norms of international institutions, Nye came to the conclusion that contrary
to conventional wisdom, the United States has both traditional hard power
and new soft power resources to meet the challenges of shaping the post-Cold
War global order if it is willing to take the global leadership.9
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 47

The innovative nature of the concept of soft power is indisputable. It has

affected our way of talking and thinking about global politics in very sig-
nificant ways. Over the last two decades, the debates about soft power have
been firmly entrenched in academic and foreign policy discourses globally
and have inspired a wide range of diplomatic practices and foreign policy
initiatives. Whether at Pentagon in Washington or at the Kennedy School of
Government of Harvard, Nye has been an active participant in the discourse.
Through his writings published in Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy and
numerous op-ed pieces in such media outlets as The Wall Street Journal and
Boston Globe, Nye has sought to sharpen up the conceptualisation of soft
power, and to refine its definition. In Soft Power: The Means to Success in
World Politics, published in 2004 after the Iraq War, Nye provided a most
systematic and incisive account of how soft power functions in contemporary
global politics.10
Four key analytical questions in Nye’s conceptualisation of soft power are
of particular interest here. First and most fundamentally, what is or is not soft
power? Nye initially conceptualised soft power “in contrast with command
power of ordering others to do what it wants.” Soft power occurs, in Nye
words, “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants.” Fur-
ther, the exercise of soft power involves setting the agenda and structuring the
situations in world politics “as to get others to change in particular cases.”11
Fourteen years later, Nye articulated his conceptualisation of this “second
face of power” more subtly.

A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of
prosperity and openness—want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important
to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force
them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft
power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people
rather than coerces them.12

Nye specifically ruled out economic payoffs or inducements—the so-

called carrots—as constitutive of soft power.
Nye’s conceptualisations of soft power above are clearly problematic
because they are invariably ambiguous. They only specify vaguely some
resources of soft power. They do not tell in which way resources of soft
power can be converted into power that influences the actual behaviour and
produces favourable outcomes. They could not set the context in which power
is exercised. This problem of ambiguity has been magnified as the concept
enters popular and public discourse in the United States and around the world.
As it becomes widely used in journalism, policy analysis and academic
48 Chapter Three

discourse, any residual conceptual clarity and nuances that Nye has tried to
build into the concept tend to get lost. In which way is culture soft power?
Why is economic strength more often regarded as hard power than soft
power? Under what circumstances do military resources produce soft power?
Is soft power more humane than hard power? How is the generic concept
of soft power, originated largely from the experience of the United States,
applicable in different contexts? These questions fundamental to the concep-
tualisation of soft power are among those Nye has tried to address most re-
cently in order to counter the claims that soft power is too elastic and remains
elusive as a useful concept in understanding power in contemporary global
politics.13 As Nye publicly acknowledged, it is his concerns about how soft
power had been misused, misunderstood and even trivialized in the public
discourse that prompted him to elaborate more systematically the concept in
his 2004 book.14
Second and closely related to the above conceptual ambiguity is the confu-
sion about the resources of soft power. The paradox is that Nye seems to have
suggested clearly and consistently what main resources of soft power are.
The soft power of a country “rests primarily on three resources: its culture
(in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives
up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen
as legitimate and having moral authority).”15 Elsewhere, Nye has written
that the sources of soft power are “attraction” of ideas, the ability in shaping
international norms consistent with the societal norms, and leadership in the
Information Age.16
The confusion seems to have come from several directions. In the first
place, attraction—the key word that underlies the conceptualisation of soft
power—is very often implicitly assumed and rarely debated.17 More problem-
atically, it is value laden. The critical question is attraction to whom and for
what purpose? And how does attraction happen? Hollywood and Bollywood
may be attractive to certain sectors of the population, but repulsive to others.
Ditto with Christian fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Democratic
values may or may not appeal to the ruling elite of a state. Further, is there
anything non-American that is inherently attractive to the Americans who, in
Stanley Hoffmann’s words, believe in “their own ideological supremacy?”18
Second, culture can be such an all-embracing concept that it is susceptible to
abuse. In what sense does the Japanese pop culture constitute the soft power
of Japan? Does a Nobel Prize winner add any attraction, and therefore, soft
power, to a nation and a state? Does Chinese or French cuisine constitute
their respective soft power? Third, there is the problem of perspective. For
those who exercise power, culture, political values and foreign policies may
constitute sources of soft power. For those at the receiving end of such soft
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 49

power, the differentiation between hard and soft power is only academic. To
what extent is it possible for a state to have soft power without hard power?
Can non-traditional powers claim any soft power? Who can claim any soft
power vis-à-vis the United States?
This leads to our third question. Who has soft power? In Nye’s scheme of
arguments, in the twenty-first century only the United States, and to a certain
extent, liberal democracies with a developed economy, could possibly pos-
sess the sources of and potential for soft power. More importantly, only these
countries have the means, capacity and willingness to convert successfully
such resources into real and sustained soft power that makes difference in
global politics. Robert Kagan’s celebrated characterisation that “Americans
are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus”19 seems to suggest that Eu-
rope is strong in soft power. But even Nye finds it difficult to identify exactly
where Europe’s soft power comes from. Nye’s long list of European sources
of soft power includes European countries’ ranking in winning Nobel Prizes,
music sales, book sales and internet website hosts, number of tourists, high
life expectancy, attraction for political asylum applications and soccer, in
addition to Europe’s promotion of democracy and human rights and its high
spending on public diplomacy.20 Europeans are less convinced.21 Even more
contentious is the question of Japan’s soft power.22
Nye has otherwise suggested that a wide range of non-state actors, from
NGOs to virtual communities and networks created by the information tech-
nology revolution, can and do possess and exercise soft power. “Many of
these organisations,” he writes, “will have soft power of their own as they
attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries.”23 Nye
did mention the Soviet Union as possessing certain soft power in the Cold
War period for historical and ideological reasons, but quickly dismissed it as
‘never a serious competitor with the United States in soft power during the
Cold War’ because of “a closed system, lack of attractive popular culture and
heavy handed foreign policies.”24
Finally, there is the question of the use and purpose of soft power. On a
broader scale, Nye argues that success in world politics increasingly depends
on the exercise of soft power, or of smart power. Imaginative leadership
and strategic vision are indispensable in effectively realising and exercising
soft/smart power. Agenda setting in multilateral international institutions is
a prime example of the exercise of such power. In this sense, soft power is a
means to an end. In the context of the global war on terrorism, Nye has em-
phasized the special importance of public diplomacy—as part of American
soft power—in legitimizing American policies and the American exercise of
hard power in this war and in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi peo-
ple. “In the information age,” he argues, “the success is not only the result of
50 Chapter Three

whose arms wins but also whose story wins.”25 When politics becomes part
of a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility, it is important
“to be believed.”26
Such framing of the exercise and purpose of soft power seems to have less
to do with the inherent moral authority of American foreign policy. Rather, as
contributors to The Soft Power of War demonstrate, public diplomacy of the
United States has been concerned to “produce influential knowledge about the
war and shape the ethical and political premises upon which the legitimacy of
the Iraq war and the ‘vision’ of the emergent world order rests.” Soft power
is therefore used for the purpose of “narrating the world in coherent and per-
suasive stories.” As the power of argument and belief, it has played a key role
in “shifting global public opinion from a position of disapproving a war unau-
thorised by the UN to supporting the war in the name of global security.”27

THE DISCOURSE OF CHINA’S

SOFT POWER: CONCEPTUAL TWISTS

These conceptual ambiguities and confusions concerning soft power and

contentions related to problematic exercise by state actors of such power in
specific circumstances have naturally found their ways into the discourse
about China’s soft power. There are additional conceptual twists. Judging by
Nye’s standard account, China could hardly claim any soft power resources.
The current Chinese political system could not be more different from that
of the United States. China always has an “abysmal ranking” in the Freedom
House’s survey, even among the least free countries in the world.28 Beijing
openly rejects the “Western” liberal democratic values and the Chinese state
has often been seen as the perpetrator of human rights abuses in domestic
settings. It is difficult to see any political values and ideological beliefs that
Beijing either preaches or practices to be universally appealing and attrac-
tive. In contrast to the European Union, Chinese policies on and approaches
to global problems, ranging from climate change and environmental protec-
tion to pandemics and infectious diseases, lack moral authority. If traditional
Chinese culture still holds its attraction in East Asia, contemporary China’s
cultural appeal is extremely limited. Unlike Japan, China cannot even claim
to have produced a popular culture that is in any way attractive and competi-
tive in East Asia. China’s economic success story is often said to be built on
perspirations, not inspirations or innovation.
It is not surprising, therefore, that even in his 2004 book, Nye spent less
time discussing China’s soft power than he did on that of the former Soviet
Union. He did give four examples to illustrate China’s nascent soft power.
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 51

Two of them, however, can be dismissed almost instantly. The example of

Gao Xinjian winning the Nobel Prize for literature because Beijing had virtu-
ally disavowed Gao; and the example of the box-office success of Crouching
Tiger, Hidden Dragon cannot be counted because it is a Hollywood produc-
tion and the Director, Ang Lee, is from Taiwan.29 Nye was quick to note that
“in the United States, the attraction of an authoritarian China is limited by the
concern that it could become a threat sometime in the future.”30
Nye’s change of mind seems to have occurred in late 2005. In an op-ed
piece in the Wall Street Journal, he provided a more inclusive list of indica-
tors of the rise of China’s soft power. This includes tripling of foreign stu-
dents enrolment in Chinese universities in a past decade, increasing number
of foreign tourists to China, public diplomacy initiatives ranging from the
establishment of Confucius Institutes to the increasing activities of China
Radio International, China’s participation in multilateral institutions such as
the World Trade Organisation to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and
the broad appeal of the so-called “Beijing Consensus.”31
By then, the discourse of China’s soft power had taken on its own life.32
It was claimed in International Herald Tribune back in 2004 that China was
becoming a “cultural magnet” for many people in Asia.33 New York Times
asserted, also in 2004, that “China moves to eclipse the U.S. appeal in South
Asia.”34 Robert Sutter noted in his 2005 book on China’s Rise in Asia: Prom-
ise or Perils? more specifically that China’s soft power in Southeast Asia

is said to have resulted in and reflected by the rising prominence of ethnic

Chinese communities in several Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia
and Thailand. . . . Meanwhile, there was an upsurge of travel and migration of
Chinese nationals to Southeast Asia as tourists, students and business people
that was said to be welcomed by many in Southeast Asia, a further indication
of the attractiveness of China and China’s soft power to the people and officials
of Southeast Asia.35

The establishment of the Confucius Institute worldwide has been scruti-

nized as one of Beijing’s attempts to build up China’s soft power through
its new and coordinated public diplomacy.36 Confucius Institutes are said to
have a political agenda: “to present a kinder and gentler image of China to the
outside world” and “to serve to advance China’s foreign policy goal of mar-
ginalising Taiwan’s international influence.”37 Together with the increased
financial and human capital investment in such international broadcasters as
China Radio International and CCTV 9, China is believed to engage in public
diplomacy strategically in order to build up its soft power.
On the economic front, while Beijing remained ambivalent about a number
of claims associated with the so-called “Beijing Consensus,” China’s success
52 Chapter Three

in promoting rapid economic growth seemed to have much wider appeal

among developing countries.38 Interestingly, it is the sources outside China
that make more radical claims in relations to the attraction of the China expe-
rience in this regard. For example, Mark Leonard claims that the alternative
development model presented by Beijing represents “the biggest ideological
threat the West has felt since the end of the Cold War.”39 China’s model of
development, labelled as that of state-ordered economic liberalisation with
minimal political liberalisation, is said to have significant appeal.40 Rapid
economic development of China, it was claimed, “is leading to a rethinking
of both development economics and the relationship between economic and
political freedoms.”41 China’s aggressive economic diplomacy—trade, aid
and investment—toward the global South, particularly Africa, which has of-
ten been criticized as “mercantilist” and “exploitative” and which is aimed at
satisfying China’s vivacious appetite for energy and other natural resources,
is now seen as an indispensable part of China’s soft power.
China is also seen as having exercised its soft power “with consummate
skill” in global politics.42 It is particularly successful in courting its neighbours
in Southeast Asia with good neighbourly relations policies. China’s active
participation in the international peacekeeping under the UN auspices and
its embracing of multilateralism in a wide range of global institutions and its
active involvement in regional organisations such as the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) are also seen as
enhancing China’s soft power, as they afford legitimacy and moral authority to
Chinese foreign policy. So are China’s adopting global norms, and rules in the
context of the WTO and beyond. The most recent advocacy of a harmonious
world in China’s global diplomacy harks back to traditional Chinese culture,
which is regarded as another attempt to wield China’s soft power.43
It is clear that this is a discourse of soft power with conceptual twists. It
has slid over the main analytical and conceptual criteria of soft power care-
fully constructed by Nye over more than a decade. In this discourse, it is not
political values that China articulates or the moral authority that Chinese for-
eign policies command that constitute China’s soft power. The authoritarian
nature of the regime has become less significant in considering issues related
to either the trust of Chinese power or the credibility of China’s public diplo-
macy. By smuggling in economic and diplomatic coercion into the equation
of China’s soft power, it has brutally dismantled the subtle differentiations
between soft and hard power that Nye has tried so hard to make.
No other work can better illustrate this than Joshua Kurlantzick’s Charm
Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. His catalogue
of China’s charming power includes a wide range of instruments (which he
calls ‘tools’) that are more conventionally referred to as “cultural diplomacy”
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 53

or “economic diplomacy.” His discussions concern many initiatives of Chi-

nese foreign policy that make China popular. Almost everything that China
touches, ranging from China’s unanticipated approach to the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 and ethnic Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia to China’s more
recent forays into Africa and Latin America, Kurlantzick suggests, not only
reflects but also augments China’s soft power. Conspicuously absent are
discussions of the question of the legitimacy and moral authority of Chinese
power and universal appeal of Chinese ideas, cultural, economic and politi-
cal. There are few convincing examples of how China has used its soft power
to co-opt others to change their foreign policy behaviour to be in line with
what China prefers in global politics.44

Perhaps in his self-defence, Kurlantzick noted bluntly,

But soft power has changed. In the context of China, both the Chinese gov-
ernment and many nations influenced by China enunciate a broader idea of soft
power than did Nye. For the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of
the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public
diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and
investment and participation in multilateral organisations—Nye’s carrots and
sticks.45

If Kurlantzick is right, he has left unexplained a big puzzle: namely why

should the discourse of China’s soft power outside China have adopted the
conceptualisation and ideas of soft power espoused by the Chinese govern-
ment?
It would not be an exaggeration to say that here what remains of “soft
power” as Nye has conceived it is just a conceptual shell without the original
soul in it. Charm Offensive reads more like a “soft” application of China’s
newly found power, soft, hard and smart, or any combination of them. Put it
differently, and more accurately perhaps, China has adopted a new approach
to traditional statecraft. What is left for the discourse of China’s soft power
is, therefore, no more than a different way of talking about China’s global
diplomacy.

DOES CHINA’S SOFT POWER MATTER?

Even if the broader conceptualisation of soft power as enunciated by Kur-

lantzick can be causally linked to Chinese foreign policy initiatives, and even
if China’s soft power is for real and rising and China is becoming a super
soft power, two analytical questions need to be addressed. Does China’s soft
power matter? If so, in what sense does it matter?
54 Chapter Three

To answer these two questions, first, consider the exercise of soft power in
terms of agenda-setting. Has China’s soft power enabled it to set any agenda
for global or regional institutions “as to get others to change in particular
cases?” As has been widely observed and acknowledged, China’s tentative
participation in the 1980s in such global economic institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has led to its full
embrace of multilateralism and more recently in its full membership in the
World Trade Organisation (WTO). It is true that in contrast to prevailing scep-
ticism about the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) over ten years ago, China
has sought successfully its regional integration with Southeast Asia through
a number of regional mechanisms, from ASEAN Plus One to ASEAN Plus
Three to the East Asia Summit (EAS). It is also true that China is pivotal in
mediating between recalcitrant parties in the Six Party Talks and in the con-
ception and operation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The crux of the matter here is, however, that it is still hard to argue that
China has played any decisive role in setting any agenda for these interna-
tional organisations and negotiations. The evidence to the contrary, on the
other hand, is overwhelming. As one of the Permanent Five at the Security
Council of the United Nations, China in general follows rather than takes any
leadership on global issues. At such regional organisations as APEC, China
seems to be comfortable simply accepting the agenda set by others rather than
trying to assert its own agenda. In the case of the East Asia Summit launched
in December 2005, the inclusion of Australia, India and New Zealand was
certainly not on China’s agenda and was very much against China’s wish.
Yet, China accepted it.
Second, it is the question of co-optive behaviour. It is generally acknowl-
edged that China’s international behaviour has changed significantly in the last
two decades. It is “more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional
and global political and economic systems than ever in its history.”46 China has
become more cooperative, for example, in dealing with regional and global
security issues. Its cooperation is crucial for moving forward the process of the
de-nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula forward through the Six Party Talks
and it is generally supportive of and cooperative in the global war on terror. It
is also noted to be readily accommodating in negotiations leading to the resolu-
tion of a number of stubborn territorial disputes with its neighbours. China’s
compliance to global norms embodied in the WTO has improved by leaps and
bounds since it became a full member in 2001. Indeed, according to Johnston,
in terms of five major international normative regimes, namely sovereignty,
free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self-determination and
human rights, “China appears to be conforming more with an extant interna-
tional community, such as it is, than it has in the past.”47
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 55

One may question whether such behaviour represents normative changes

in Chinese foreign policy. It can be argued that China’s changing interna-
tional behaviour is driven by the consideration of its national interest. For our
purposes here, the normative and instrumental arguments are not important.
What is important is the fact that it is not China’s soft power that co-opts oth-
ers and changes others’ behaviour. Rather, it is China that has been subject
to the co-optive power of those dominant in the international community and
global governance, as its behaviour has become increasingly convergent with
accepted international norms and rules. Viewed in this perspective, it is not
China that is transforming the world. Rather, it is the world that has changed
China!
Changes in China’s international behaviour are closely related to China’s
changing image in global international society. This is the third point to con-
sider. It is true that China started an “image project” back in the late 1990s
when Beijing was particularly concerned about a series of claims about the
so-called “China threat.” But the world seemed to be genuinely surprised
when two polls conducted respectively by the Lowy Institute for International
Policy and the BBC World Service, both in 2005, revealed an increasingly
positive image of China. Indeed, China’s influence on the world is seen as
more positive by more people than that of the United States.48 The popularity
of China in the developing world is particularly striking. Kurlantzick notes,
for example, the positive image of China in the media of Thailand in sharp
contrast to a decade before.49 He also notes the broad appeal of China’s model
of state-directed growth and poverty reduction to developing countries in Af-
rica and Latin America, which helps depict China in favourable light.50
It would be a mistake to attribute China’s improved image entirely to its
public diplomacy. In other words, it is not just the twisting of minds that
matters here. There are real changes, too. China’s increasing compliance to
and convergence with global norms, rules and values, as discussed before,
has contributed to a more positive image of China. It has enhanced the in-
ternational legitimacy of Chinese power and brought a higher international
status for China. The critical question is, however, not how popular China has
become in certain parts of the world, but how much China’s improved image
has increased the trust of the international community in China’s growing
power and the moral authority and legitimacy of China’s domestic and inter-
national policies. The evidence in this regard is at best patchy.
If the exercise of China’s soft power is not agenda-setting, if it is China
that is at the receiving end of the co-optive power of international society,
and if China’s recent popularity does not lead to either the trust in, or the en-
hanced legitimacy of, Chinese power, why should we trouble ourselves with
the discourse of China’s soft power? After all, popularity is often transient
56 Chapter Three

and is always difficult to sustain. Power, soft or hard, makes friends as

well as enemies.51 Moreover, China’s hard military power, though growing
expansively, is likely to remain weak in terms of its capability of power
projection. It will hardly be a match to that of the United States even in
the long term.
What is then the political logic behind the raging discourse of China’s
soft power? Clearly the United States is deeply concerned about the rise of
China as a transformative force in global politics and world economy in the
twenty-first century. “Embrace and hedge,” a strategy widely advocated in
Washington in regard to the rising China, reflects scepticism, uncertainty
and cynicisms on the part of the United States, the sole hegemon, about Chi-
na’s self-claimed peaceful rise. After the initiation of the East Asia Summit
without the U.S. participation in 2005, Nye specifically called for the United
States to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in Asia. Kurlantz-
ick’s description of the rise of China’s soft power is particularly illustrative
of the U.S. concerns. It is worth quoting at length.

While the US has been focused on Iraq, it has ignored a subtle—but enormous—
change in the world. Since only the early 2000s, and under the US radar, China
has changed from a country that barely interacted with the world into a grow-
ing foreign power. In fact, China savvily has amassed significant “soft power”
around the world through aid, formal diplomacy, public diplomacy, investment,
and other tools. Here in Washington, where China’s image is not great, it’s hard
for us to understand how popular China has become in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.52

A deeper anxiety in the United States is, however, about the precarious
pre-eminence and the uncertain prospects of the American power. The rise
of a potential adversary espousing different political values accentuates
such anxiety. Small wonder it is that Orville Schell claimed that China’s
growing soft power “has begun to transform the world balance of power in
a way that makes it essential for Americans to recalibrate their presump-
tion of U.S. preeminence.”53 Kurlantzick is more specific when he states
that

No one amassed chits with other nations for no reason. Now, China can begin
to use its soft power. It will be able to utilize its popularity in regions where
the US and China have potentially competing interests in resources. China is
already trying to draw upon its charm to push back against American power in
Asia. In the future, China could prod countries like the Philippines or Thailand,
which are already using China as a hedge, to downgrade their close relations
with the United States.54
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 57

CONCLUSION

Nye’s conception of soft power helps generate a discourse that is directed at

resolving a number of genuine puzzles concerning China’s rising international
status. The rapid growth of China’s economic power, its expanding influence
in global politics, its unprecedented popularity and its assertive global diplo-
macy in the last few years are no mean achievements. How a recent pariah
state in international society advocating and practicing a political system
contrary to the prevailing liberal democratic values could have achieved such
a power status in so short a period of time is not a trivial question. The impli-
cations of this phenomenon for the emerging global order are significant.
The discourse of China’s soft power, however, has been carried out with
significant conceptual twists. More often than not, Nye’s conceptual clarity
and nuances have been either abandoned or simply ignored. This is partly
because this discourse could be regarded as a proxy of the debate about the
nature and the prospects of American power. The fact that China’s soft power
rises exactly at the same time when the American soft power is perceived as
being in decline, that China is seen as providing an alternative model—the
Beijing Consensus vis-à-vis the Washington Consensus—of economic de-
velopment for developing countries, that China is claimed to be working
diligently to undermine American influence in many regions of the world,
and the call for urgent American response to balance China’s soft power—all
could well be part of the discourse about the U.S. soft power. The ultimate
paradox is that if Nye’s conceptualisation and logic apply, then China could
and should never have lasting soft power in the first place.
Perhaps, China’s real soft power lies somewhere else. In examining histori-
cal fascination about China in the West, Jonathan Spence describes China’s
lasting charm in terms of its capacity “to attract and retain the attention of
others.” He further states

This capacity is evident from the very beginnings of the West’s encounter with
China; the passing centuries have never managed to obliterate it altogether, even
though vagaries of fashion and shifting political stances have at times dulled the
sheen. The sharpness of the feelings aroused by China in the West, the reiter-
ated attempts to describe and analyze the country and its people, the apparently
unending receptivity of Westerners to news from China, all testify to the levels
of fascination the country has generated.55

Since the Enlightenment period, China has managed to inspire feelings that
alternate between fascination and frustration, admiration and condemnation, as
well as excitement and disappointment. The latest rage about China is in part a
testimony to the charm that China continues to hold beyond its borders.
58 Chapter Three

NOTES

1. Pei Minxin, “The Dark Side of China’s Rise,” Foreign Policy 153 (2006): 32.
2. For such claims, see for example Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How
China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2007); Ether Pan, “China’s Soft Power Initiatives,” Backgrounder. Council on For-
eign Relations, www.cfr.org/publication/10715/; Michael Elliott. “China Takes on
the World.” Time, January 11, 2007; and Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft
Power.” Wall Street Journal Asia, December 29, 2005. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
ksgnews/Features/opeds/122905_nye.htm.
3. Zbigniew Breczinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “The Clash of the Titans,”
Foreign Policy 146 (2005) 46–9.
4. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Secu-
rity, 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56; Nicholas Taylor, “China as a Status Quo or Revisionist
Power? Implications for Australia,” Security Challenges 3, no.1 (2007): 29–45.
5. Thomas J Christensen, “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible
Stakeholder?” (Remarks before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Washington D.C., August 3, 2006); Robert B. Zoelick, 2005. “Whither
China: from Membership to Responsibility?” (Remarks to National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2006), www.state.gov/s/d/
former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. (accessed September 23, 2008).
6. This certainly does not mean that the internal discourse is unimportant. In fact,
Hu Jintao, in the capacity of the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), used ‘soft power’ several times in his report to the 17th CCP National Con-
gress in October 2007. Where appropriate, I have incorporated the internal discourse
of China’s soft power in my discussions throughout the chapter.
7. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, 1990), ix.
8. Nye, Bound to Lead, 188.
9. This is indeed Nye’s major argument in his 1990 article.
10. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004).
11. Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 166.
12. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 5.
13. Joseph Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 152 (February 2006):
Web exclusive. www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393.
14. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 11.
15. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 11. For further
elaborations about these three resources of soft power of the United States, see pages
33–72.
16. See in particular, Joseph Nye, “Ignoring Soft Power Carries a High Cost,”
Chicago Tribune, May 16, 2004.
17. Janice B Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force
and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium—
Journal of International Studies 33 (2005): 583–612.
 The Discourse of China’s Soft Power and Its Discontents 59

18. Kat Schmidt, “Harvard’s Stanley Hoffman offers ‘A Critique of U.S.

Foreign Policy’ in speech,” Tufts Daily, October 15, 2004, http://tuftsdaily.
com/2.5511/1.599451 (accessed September 23, 2008).
19. Robert Kagan, Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World
Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 3.
20. Joseph Nye, “Europe’s Soft Power.” The Globalist 2004, www.theglobalist
.com.
21. See Elsa Tulmets, “Can the Discourse on ‘Soft Power’ Help the EU to Bridge
its Capability-Expectations Gap?,” European Political Economy, 7:195–226 (2007);
and Eneko Landaburu, et al. “Defining Europe’s Soft Power,” Café Crossfire Evening
Debate, April 25, 2006; www.friendsofeurope.org/.
22. See Ogoura Kazuo, “The Limits of Soft Power,” Japan Echo 33 no. 5 (2006);
Nissim Kadosh Otmazgin, “Contesting Soft Power: Japanese Popular Culture in East
and Southeast Asia,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 8 (2007): 73–101.;
Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 85–8.
23. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 31.
24. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 73–5.
25. Joseph Nye, “Our Impoverished Discourse,” Huffington Post, November 1,
2006, www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/. (accessed September 23, 2008).
26. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 31.
27. Lillie Chouliaraki, “Introduction: the Soft Power of War—Legitimacy and com-
munity in Iraq war discourses,” Journal of Language and Politics 4, no.1 (2005): 2–3.
28. Joseph Nye, “Assessing China’s Soft Power,” Boston Globe, April 19, 2006.
29. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 88.
30. Nye, Soft Power: A Means to Success in World Politics, 89.
31. Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal Asia De-
cember 29, 2005, www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/op-eds/the-rise-of-china-s
-soft-power (accessed September 23, 2008). For a comprehensive discussion of the
“Beijing Consensus,” see Joshua Cooper Ramo, Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign
Policy Centre, 2004).
32. Nye’s Soft Power: Means to Success in World Politics published in 2004
stimulated and inspired the discourse of soft power within China. The Chinese elites
greeted the idea of China’s soft power initially with mixed feelings, for fear that this
is a masqueraded claim of the ‘China threat.’ This is particularly acute when such
a discourse and assessment is conducted outside China. The idea is, however, also
inherently attractive, as rising China tries to rediscover and redefine its power and
to identify means to enhance its attractiveness and its influence. One thrust of this
discourse is directed at the search for the sources of China’s soft power. See, for
example, Xinhua News Agency
“Experts Comment on Soft Power and China’s Strategic Choice in Enhancing its
Own Soft Power” (in Chinese), www.xinhuanet.com and “The Charm of China’s Soft
Power,” People’s Daily Online, March 14, 2006 english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/
10/eng20060310_249577.html.
33. Robin Zachary, “The Lure of Asia: Amid the Backwaters of Beijing, a Cultural
Heart Is Beating,” International Herald Tribune, (December 1, 2004).
60 Chapter Three

34. Jane Perlez, “Chinese Move to Eclipse U.S. Appeal in Southeast Asia,” New
York Times, (November 18, 2004).
35. Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham MD: Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 201.
36. The first Confucius Institute was launched in Seoul in November 2004. By
November 2008, more than 300 were established all over the world. Even the Chinese
increasingly associate the establishment of Confucius Institutes with the projection
of China’s soft power. See “Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and
Friendliness,” People’s Daily Online, October 2, 2006, english.peopledaily.com.
cn/200610/02/eng20061002_308230.html. (accessed September 23, 2008)
37. Bates Gill, and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese ‘Soft
Power’.” Survival 48, no.2 (2006): 18.
38. For example, Gill and Huang noted in particular reports about India and Africa
looking at China as a model for economic development. Elsewhere, Gill and others
claim that “China’s historical experience and development model resonate power-
fully with Africa.” Bates Gill, Huang Chin-Hao and J. Stephen Morrison, “Assessing
China’s Growing Influence in Africa,” China Security 3, no.3 (2007): 5.
39. Gill and Huang, Sources and Limits, 20.
40. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive,” TPMcafe 2007, www
.tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2007/06/25/chinas_charm_offensive/. (accessed
September 23, 2008). Kurlantzick further argued that “it has appeal to elites in na-
tions in the region—and in other places like Africa—alienated by the Washington
Consensus and American intervention around the world.”
41. Gill and Huang, Sources and Limits, 21.
42. Lee, Kuan Yew, “China’s Soft Power Success.” Forbes, (June 18, 2007).
43. Nye, The Rise of China’s Soft Power.
44. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the
World.
45. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-
ing the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 6.
46. Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?, 5.
47. See Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?, 14–22.
48. Ivan Cook, “Australians Speak 2005: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.
Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy,” (2005); BBC News, “China’s Influ-
ence Seen Positive,” March 5, 2005. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4318551.stm
(accessed September 23, 2008).
49. Kulantzick, How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, 120.
50. Kulantzick, How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, 134–35.
51. Josef Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power,” Hoover Digest, no. 3 (2006), www
.hoover.org/publications/digest/4634921.html. (accessed September 23, 2008).
52. Kurlantzick, China’s Charm Offensive.
53. Orville Schell made this claim in praise of Kurlantzick’s book in 2007. See
Kulantzick, How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World, back cover.
54. Kurlantzick, China’s Charm Offensive.
55. Jonathan Spence, The Chan’s Great Continent: China in Western Minds (Lon-
don: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1999), xi.
 Part II

SOFT POWER IN
CHINA’S RISING STRATEGY
 Chapter Four

The New Hard Realities:

“Soft Power” and China in Transition
Yong Deng

As is well known, Joseph Nye first coined the term “soft power” nearly two
decades ago to debunk the then popular view that the global status of the
United States was in decline. He later developed the concept to detail how
the United States could take advantage of its unique strengths—beyond its
material power—to revive and prolong its leadership in world politics.1 It is
remarkable that a concept originally applied to a reigning great power would
find its popularity in the study of a rising power, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC).
Although Nye himself lately has applied the concept to the PRC, the no-
tion of China now being a real contender for soft power must have caught
him by surprise. When he first popularized the notion, the PRC was mired
in potentially the worst crisis in its modern history. With the government
struggling for survival, soft power was the farthest thing on the minds of the
Chinese policy elites or foreign observers. Even Nye’s 2004 book did not
take China’s soft power seriously. His discussions of the country are buried
in the few pages on Asia. For him, Chinese soft power paled in comparison
with Japan, which “has more potential soft power resources than any other
Asian country,” an amount comparable with India. “But the real promise for
China and India still lies in the future,” he declared. 2 But this does not jibe
with the reality of increasing acceptance of China as a leading (if not the cen-
tral) power in Asia and the country’s great leap upward in the international
hierarchy. Since a nation’s soft power cannot possibly develop in only several
years, this raises the question as to how meaningful the concept is for the
study of Chinese foreign relations. This chapter addresses that question by
investigating how soft power is treated in the rhetoric and practice of China’s
international strategy in the post-Cold War era.

63
64 Chapter Four

Soft power generally means the ability to “get your way” in world politics
without coercion, although the relationship between soft and hard power
remains vague. Heavily influenced by Nye’s writings, existing definitions in-
variably stress the ability of a country to generate genuine affection and strong
identification from others. In fact, Nye made it clear that he was concerned
with how hegemonic power, which he called “the dominant state” or “leading
states,” effectively uses the spread of its cultural and ideological influence,
dominance in international institutions, and control of prevailing norms and
principles to consolidate its material supremacy.3 I argue that this approach,
when applied to the PRC, is misplaced. First and foremost, the United States
and China differ in status; i.e., the sources, means, and objectives of their soft
power differ. For China, soft power, to a large extent, means the ability to in-
fluence others in world politics with the goal of achieving great power status
without sparking fully fledged traditional power politics of hostile balancing
or war. This is only achievable through a prudent use of its power in deeds
and words. Viewed this way, soft power is integral to China’s strategy.
I first examine the gap between China’s rhetorical silence and practice of
soft power in the 1990s and sketch how soft power is being pursued in a more
deliberate way in the new century. The second section examines the various
dimensions of China’s soft power. In the third section, I offer a preliminary
evaluation of the success, limits, and implications of China’s soft power poli-
tics. I argue that the essence of China’s post-Cold War foreign policy is to
avoid a collision with the established great powers and the international status
quo. Soft power thus represents the core of China’s foreign policy. To enhance
it, the PRC has pursued economic, multilateral, and cooperative diplomacy. It
has contested Western dominance in values and standards, but has done so by
cultivating its political and cultural influence in the context of a more pluralis-
tic world. From strictly Nye’s perspective, David Shambaugh correctly notes
that “China seems to have little in the realm of soft power.”4 But judged by its
own objectives, China’s soft power campaign has succeeded remarkably, sug-
gesting hope for its peaceful rise. The Chinese elites now no longer consider
soft power as a lopsided battle in favor of the West; rather it’s an arena they
too must and can win. Considering soft power in terms of governance at home
and influence abroad, they are also aware of myriad weaknesses and hard
realities in China’s domestic and international transitions.

CHINA’S SOFT POWER: FROM DEEDS TO WORDS

In the 1990s, the notion of soft power did not figure into Chinese foreign
policy, although the country pursued elements of what would later be called
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 65

soft power. In the decade following the Tiananmen incident, the country’s
foreign policy was first focused on how to break away from its international
isolation, and then on managing a string of crises. It was a period marked
by heightened domestic insecurity and international turbulence. Pervasive
among the educated elites were emotionally charged reactions to the seem-
ingly endless provocations and bullying of the West.
When soft power was mentioned by Chinese analysts, it was attributed
to the West or the United States. The implicit reasoning was that Western
countries, as the dominant parties in world politics, controlled international
discourse, institutions, and rules. They manipulated these soft power instru-
ments to justify and legitimize their political practices. Case in point was
the NATO war on Yugoslavia in 1999. From the Chinese perspective, what
started out as civil strife between two ethnic groups within a sovereign coun-
try was portrayed by Western media and politicians, and later accepted in
international society, as genocide. NATO members recast the nature of the
conflict and launched a well-coordinated international campaign to promote
“humanitarian interventionism,” a new principle that paved the way for its
military attacks against the Republic of Yugoslavia in the name of stopping
ethnic cleansing.5 Soft power was thus considered a Western privilege, an es-
sential part of the moral and political high ground commanded by the West,
which disadvantaged countries like China. Chinese strategists believed that
China should guard against this subtle form of power, just as it should against
Western hard power.
Besides insecurity in the Western-dominated world, another explanation
for the lack of explicit interest in soft power was a series of foreign crises
that characterized China’s foreign relations in the 1990s. Except for a brief
period, the first decade following the end of the Cold War ushered in an
intensely unstable era in the Sino-American relationship. In the early 1990s,
a host of issues, notably pertaining to China’s human rights record, “most
favored nation” status, and arms proliferation, threatened the very foundation
of the bilateral relationship.6 Nationalist emotions ran high among the edu-
cated Chinese populace, culminating in the publication of the wildly popular
anti-American bestseller, China Can Say No, in 1995. The Taiwan crisis at
the same time added fuel to the fire. After a brief respite, yet another major
incident erupted in 1999 over NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade. These rancorous disputes and crises underscored the
dangers that China faced, whereas nationalist reactions brought to the fore-
front a sense of victimization dating back to the nation’s experience as a
semi-colony following the Opium War of the 1840s.
In the rare cases when Chinese soft power was mentioned in the 1990s,
it was about the country’s domestic politics. Chinese authors invariably
66 Chapter Four

used the term to call for domestic institutional reforms, which they saw as
neglected but critical components of China’s modernization.7 In fact, the
Chinese notion of comprehensive national power (Zonghe Guoli), which
was first popularized in the late 1990s, stressed technological and economic
capacity, but also entailed non-material power in terms of national cohesion
and domestic governance.
Insecurity at home and abroad did not create a permissible environment
for explicit talk of soft power as part of a deliberate Chinese foreign policy
pursuit. Nonetheless, in practice, the country did pursue a foreign policy that
eschewed hardcore power politics. The emphasis was on domestic develop-
ment, economic diplomacy, and participation in the global mainstream. The
imperative of economic modernization dictated much of the choice. Interna-
tionally, the U.S.-led global order was structured such that a confrontational
hard-power strategy appeared prohibitively costly, while at the same time a
softer approach appeared plausible in achieving both the Chinese leadership’s
domestic agenda and international aspirations.
By the mid-1990s, the West’s “China threat” theories had been replaced
by “China collapse” theories. The former, which are essentially foreign fears
of China as a destabilizing, aggressive, and harmful actor in world politics,
started to gain currency. By then the United States had become poised to
consolidate its forward presence in the west Pacific, dissipating earlier doubts
about its security commitment in the region. A drastic realignment of regional
order detrimental to China’s interests appeared to be under way. To preempt
such a development, Chinese leaders realized they needed to promote a gen-
tler and softer approach to their country’s foreign relations. A campaign of
rhetoric thus followed. Chinese analysts rejected negative portrayals of China
that fanned fear of, and hostilities toward, their nation as biased, malicious, or
simply reflective of a Cold War mentality, while at the same time they main-
tained that their country’s rise presented an opportunity for peace, prosperity,
and stability in the world. But as E. H. Carr noted more than half a century
ago, “Every country wanted to achieve the aims of its policy without war,
and therefore stood for peace.”8 Thus, such rhetorical protestations did not
suffice, but required corresponding behavioral adjustments to lend credence
to the counter-China threat campaign in order to improve China’s image.
In practice, the Chinese government began to openly embrace the idea of
responsible power, to pursue partnership diplomacy with countries near and
far, and to establish itself as a constructive, cooperative member in Asia and
vis-à-vis the international status quo.
At the same time, events between 1997 and 1998 added impetus to China’s
pursuit of cooperative, economic, and multilateral diplomacy. During the two
years, the Sino-American relationship experienced unprecedented stability
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 67

since the end of the Cold War. Leaders in Beijing and Washington publicly
committed to building a strategic partnership. They joined hands in spear-
heading an international response to the nuclear proliferation crisis in South
Asia. The financial crisis in East Asia was soon to pass, but had enduring
effect on China’s foreign policy transformation. The PRC stood firm in not
devaluing its currency, in contrast to Japan’s manipulation of yen exchange
rate for apparently myopic self-interest. Beijing also provided funds to their
hardest hit Southeast Asian neighbors. While the funds were relatively small,
the gesture showed genuine sensitivity to neighboring states’ economic dif-
ficulties. Moreover, by comparison, neither other powers nor international
institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, demonstrated leader-
ship in crafting an effective response, further accruing image gains for the
PRC. In any case, Chinese behavior during the crisis scored it high diplomatic
points.9
The financial crisis fostered East Asian regionalism while lifting China’s
relationship with southeast Asia to a new level. The principal mission of the
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is to reverse security
dilemmas, lessen competition for relative power, and delegitimize the use
of violence in regional relations. The ASEAN approach, coupled with its
inclusive and reassuring style and adherence to the sovereignty principle, has
proved to Beijing’s liking. With the creation in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), the multilateral security platform that draws in all major pow-
ers in the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN had effectively abandoned its long-standing
policy of keeping great powers at arm’s length in favor of a policy of keep-
ing them engaged and constrained on ASEAN’s terms. Amidst and after the
financial crisis, the PRC and the ASEAN discovered that the compatibility
between their international approaches would be both beneficial and emi-
nently possible. Mutual suspicion subsequently began to give way to mutual
accommodation, whereby China’s pursuit of a softer, gentler diplomacy fit
nicely with the ASEAN style of diplomacy, generating a positive, interactive
momentum unprecedented in the Sino-ASEAN relationship.10
Against this backdrop, a renewed interest in East Asian regionalism re-
surfaced, kicking off the ASEAN “ten plus three” (China, Japan, and Korea)
dialogue. Around the same time, ideas such as responsible power, non-
conventional threats, new security, win-win policy, and the Shanghai spirit,
started to make inroads into China’s international thinking. These ideas un-
derpinned a multilateral turn in China’s Asia diplomacy that both dovetails
with and reinforces its bilateral ties with individual states and its regional
position as a whole.11 Diplomatic successes in opening up opportunities for
China abroad vindicated these ideas, further locking in the strategic choice
with a corresponding definition of national identity in world politics.
68 Chapter Four

As the 1990s drew to a close, the NATO war against Yugoslavia and the
embassy bombing incident would further mute any self-congratulatory talk
of soft power. During this time, out of necessity and by choice, the PRC
pursued economic diplomacy and a set of foreign policy choices reflective of
pro-status quo international orientations. But the country was not yet secure
or strong enough to brandish soft power in its foreign policy rhetoric.12
The new century did not start auspiciously for China-U.S. relations. Hav-
ing labeled the PRC a strategic competitor during the presidential campaign,
newly inaugurated President George W. Bush appeared ready to reverse
much of the President Clinton’s engagement policy. The EP-3 crisis in 2001
dealt yet another setback to the already volatile bilateral relationship. But
the crisis quickly passed, and the Bush administration reengaged the PRC
on an even more extensive bilateral, regional, and global agenda. The Sino-
American relationship has since seen unprecedented strength, although the
Chinese side has refrained from an overly optimistic characterization of the
new cooperative dynamics between the two countries. As it has moved to the
center stage of world politics, China’s soft power discourse and practice have
gained even greater steam. Chinese analysts have become less reticent in talk-
ing about China’s soft power and the frequency of such references picked up
particularly after the Iraqi War in 2003.
Specifically, Chinese commentators since 2004 all agree that the U.S. soft
power has been damaged, while some have expressed confidence that this in
turn creates an opportunity for China to improve its own image. At the same
time, policy-makers started to articulate a global vision designed to show-
case China’s soft power assets. However, Chinese leaders and officials have
remained cautious about the use of the term to characterize foreign policy.
Tellingly, President Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) in October 2007 only mentioned “soft power” in reference to the
need for China to build up a national value system best suited for the party’s
domestic agenda on building a “harmonious society.”13 Even after the image-
boosting Olympic Games in August 2008 and amidst the subsequent global
financial crisis, caution, wariness, and realism continued to characterize what
has become a more deliberate and confident Chinese quest for soft power.
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese-style soft power has been a key
component of the PRC’s foreign policy. The need for positive recognition as
an international actor became particularly acute after the Tiananmen incident.
In line with Deng Xiaoping’s “lie low” policy, the Chinese leadership opted
to focus on domestic development while pursuing a generally conservative,
non-confrontational approach abroad. Since the new century begun, the PRC
has more consciously pursued soft power. The various refrains in its diplo-
matic language throughout the past twenty some years invariably reflect a
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 69

softer, gentler foreign policy approach to facilitate the overall Chinese goal
of joining the global mainstream,14 to pave its own path abroad, and to define
responsibilities on its own terms. Even on Taiwan, Chinese analysts have
argued that soft power gives them more options and diplomatic tools to keep
pro-independence forces on the island in check.15 Interestingly, under the new
KMT administration since May 2008, Taiwan too has come to see soft power
beyond military deterrence against the mainland as an indispensible part of
its national security.16All in all, Chinese foreign policy is now more than
ever marked by a deliberate effort to incorporate soft power into the nation’s
international strategy.

SOFT POWER, CHINESE STYLE

China’s foreign policy has attempted to reassure others of its nonthreatening

intent, enhance acceptance by the international community, and proactively
realign the international environment to its liking. It is with these goals in
mind that the instruments of soft power are conceived and pursued. Some
of these are more “natural” insofar as they extend from the domestic path
of reforms and opening up since the late 1970s. Other soft power practices,
however, result from more deliberate choices.
Despite internal debates over its foreign policy since the end of the Cold
War, the PRC has largely stuck to the line of “peace and development.” This
has paid off in its diplomacy, not least in terms of ensuring decades of stable
growth on the domestic front. As the economy grows, its trade, investment,
and aid have cemented ties with the rest of the world while strengthening its
leverage in foreign relations. As noted earlier, the East Asian financial crisis,
in particular, underscored how a win-win approach in economics and finance
was possible, and when effectively pursued could spill over into positive
mutual recognition in world politics at large.
The success of China’s modernization has led to talk by foreign observers
of a “Beijing consensus,” supposedly a distinctive Chinese-style development
philosophy that defies the “Washington consensus,” a set of liberal values
based on Western experience and interests.17 Coined by Joshua Ramo, the
idea has quickly caught on, owing mostly to China’s continued economic
success. Chinese officials initially showed little enthusiasm to such talk, but
have quickly warmed up toward variants of reference to China’s develop-
mental approach. They are well aware that their country’s domestic transi-
tion is still in such a state of flux that it’s simply premature to declare an
exemplary role of a so-called Chinese development model. Also, it could be
counterproductive for its image abroad, as China has disavowed any attempt
70 Chapter Four

to export its ideology or developmental model. Much of China’s soft power

stems from managing its own business of domestic transition. To the extent
that the “Beijing consensus” is presented as antithetical or an alternative
to the “Washington consensus,” it’s debatable whether such a model of
third-world development exists at all. But like the once-exalted East Asian
developmental model, China’s spectacular economic growth, particularly as
experienced by certain sectors and geographic areas of the society, naturally
tempts outside observers to attribute this success to some uniquely Chinese
experience. Indeed, the path to the reforms of the past thirty years is paved
with much trial-and-error experimentation by the Chinese leadership itself.
The reformist leaders embraced globalization while at the same time insist-
ing on a strong central role of the CCP in engineering sustained growth and
resisting hasty “Western-style” political liberalization.
As China’s global presence grows, interest in Chinese language and
culture has also grown. In response, the government has done its part to
promote both, with the most notable success being the swift proliferation of
the Confucian Institute across the world. According to the official Chinese
report, from 2004, when the first Confucius Institute opened in Seoul, South
Korea, to the end of 2008, “Two hundred forty-nine Confucian Institutes
and fifty-six Confucian Classrooms (Kongzi Xuetang) had been created in
seventy-eight countries across five continents of the world,” whilst at the
same time “applications from over 100 universities and institutions of over
forty countries were still awaiting for review and approval.”18 Under the
supervision of the PRC’s Ministry of Education-based Hanban (The Office
of Chinese Language Council International), which is tasked with promoting
Chinese language studies abroad, each institute is essentially a partnership
program between a Chinese educational institution and its counterpart in the
host country. Hanban would offer a seed grant of $100,000 and will continue
to provides teaching staff, textbooks, and other educational materials to fa-
cilitate Chinese language teaching.19 The quick spread of the institutes have
caught the Chinese sponsors by surprise, as Hanban scrambles to search for
enhanced quality control to these highly variegated, disparately run forms
of collaboration. In addition to resource support, the institutes also serve as
vehicles for cultural and educational exchange. As the name indicates, China
has tapped its thousands of years of history to spread its cultural influence and
appeal. Foreign institutions favor such an arrangement for the additional op-
portunities and resources for enhancing learning about, and ties with, China.
Increasingly, however, China’s contemporary cultural products and arts
are also gaining some popularity beyond its borders. For example, Chinese
movies won the top prize at the Venice Film Festival three times in a row
between 2005 and 2007. The spectacular opening ceremony of the 2008
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 71

Beijing Olympics similarly highlighted the traditional culture and ancient ad-
vancements in the Chinese civilization. Also given some play were themes of
contemporary China’s embrace of globalization and openness. Undoubtedly,
there is growing global interest in all things Chinese, including its cuisine,
but one can hardly speak of a distinct Chinese brand of popular culture that
rivals that of the United States.
Compared with the West and Japan, the country is also woefully inad-
equate in terms of its innovative domestic institutions, science and technol-
ogy, and institutions of higher learning, all of which are often associated with
soft power. Due to a preoccupation with the myriad problems of domestic
transition, the Chinese government has not shown much zeal in promoting
its brand of politics. Chinese elites have been interested more in how the
“Beijing consensus” concept vindicates China’s self-paced reforms than its
applicability to other developing countries. The spread of Chinese language
and culture mainly results from the country’s extending global presence and
the associated economic opportunities. Compared with the political and cul-
tural arenas, the Chinese government has been more focused and deliberate
in cultivating soft power on the foreign policy dimension.
Through the post-Cold War era, Chinese leaders and analysts have pro-
moted various ideas about foreign policy and world politics, including most
recently “peaceful rise” and “harmonious world.” These are not particularly
new ideas. They boil down to a respect for sovereignty, emphasis on devel-
opment, and mutual respect for differences in political system and culture.
In practice, China’s foreign policy has been geared toward adapting to the
imperatives of deepening economic globalization, cultivating acceptance
abroad, and bringing about change to the regional and international status
quo such that its domestic and international paths are legitimized and mutu-
ally supportive.
Perhaps the most remarkable change was the country’s embrace of mul-
tilateral diplomacy. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization rep-
resented a landmark event in its path to joining the global world economy.
International institutions such as the United Nations acquire particular sig-
nificance insofar as China is a permanent member of the Security Council.20
At the regional level, the PRC has pursued multilateral diplomacy, a drastic
departure from its past refusal to be so entangled. In northeast Asia, its sub-
stantive role since 2003 in facilitating the Six-Party Talks toward the goal of
denuclearization has been widely hailed as a remarkable example of this new
course. In central Asia, China and Russia have turned what started out as a
border security mechanism (namely, the Shanghai Five) into the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, which has now evolved into a comprehensive
institution serving China’s political, economic, and security interests while
72 Chapter Four

fending off turmoil and Western encroachment in this strategically pivotal

region.
In Southeast Asia, the PRC has strengthened its ties with ASEAN and
ASEAN-centered regional initiatives, having acceded to the ASEAN Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation, signed a free trade agreement with all ten South-
east Asian economies, and pledged jointly with other regional contestants
not to unilaterally enforce its claims over the South China Sea disputes. The
PRC’s approach to ASEAN-centered cooperative initiatives, such as the
ASEAN Plus Three and the ARF, has been marked by both activism and def-
erence to the regional organization. Similarly, Beijing has played along with
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the latest East
Asian Summit (2005– ) rather than throw its weight around. This multilateral
turn has even reached Africa in the form of the Forum on China-Africa Co-
operation (FOCAC) Ministerial Conference. While the FOCAC was created
with much fanfare in 2000, it soon sunk into oblivion. However, several years
into the new century, the Forum has found a new life. Particularly after the
second FOCAC meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2003, China
has helped invigorate the Forum as it rediscovered the importance of Africa
for its economic and diplomatic interests.
China’s soft power can be better understood and evaluated in the Chinese
context. Its activism in these formal and informal institutions and processes,21
coupled with its omni-directional partnerships and economic diplomacy, has
proven to be an effective instrument to promote its economic interests, reas-
sure others of its foreign intentions, and realign regional and international
relations. Some countries, particularly in the developing world, have identi-
fied with the PRC’s priority on sovereignty and its success in domestic and
international transition. As China’s rise creates more opportunities, economic
and otherwise, foreign interest in its culture and language has also grown.
China’s emphasis on economic ties, non-violence, and multilateralism, has
been somewhat vindicated. Skepticism toward China’s international intent
has decreased, and more countries seem willing to give the PRC the benefit
of the doubt.
The country has largely refrained from projecting soft power on the po-
litical front, presumably because it is an area of China’s comparative disad-
vantage. However, a few years into the new century, Chinese officials and
scholars are increasingly vocal in arguing that their nation should not back
down on the political front. For example, former spokesman of the Chinese
Foreign Ministry Shen Guofang recently argued that soft power must entail
some say in political discourse, agenda-setting, and the “moral high ground”
in world politics.22 The influential scholar Yan Xuetong dismissed the idea
that China’s ancient culture could itself turn into soft power; rather, he con-
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 73

tended, cultural power ultimately depended on political power, which he de-

fined as the government’s ability to harness and promote its cultural resources
abroad. The corollary is that Chinese should not cede its political ground, but
rather should directly contest Western political domination.23 His argument
will find greater resonance amongst Chinese intellectual and political elites,
as they increasingly believe that their nation’s rise must entail an intellectual
and political struggle with prevailing Western ideas and values.
Indeed, the Chinese are more forthcoming now than in the 1990s in pro-
pounding a global vision that supposedly goes beyond their parochial con-
cerns about national security. Perhaps most notable is the call for building
a “harmonious world,” an idea rooted in Chinese traditional culture while
intimately connected to the current Chinese leadership’s agenda of building a
harmonious society at home.24 This notion may find some resonance with the
domestic audience or even in other Asian countries. But from the perspec-
tive of mainstream thinking in the West, such a world reflects a utopianism
divorced from the reality of world politics. As the leading American inter-
national relations scholar Robert O. Keohane writes, “Harmony refers to a
situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interest without
regard for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goals. . . .
Where harmony reigns, cooperation is unnecessary.”25 Ultimately, it remains
unclear what concrete solutions the Chinese can offer to solve the myriad real
world problems and conflicts.
The Chinese conception of soft power entails simultaneously addressing
concerns to strengthen domestic stability, governance, and vibrancy, on the
one hand; and cultivating acceptance and influence abroad, on the other. The
domestic-international nexus compels the Chinese leaders to be highly atten-
tive to their country’s vulnerabilities in both fronts, with particularly acute
sensitivity to how the unresolved problems in domestic transition impede soft
power practice abroad. The protests on the streets of London, Paris, and San
Francisco against the Olympics torch relay surrounding the March 14, 2008
incident in Tibet literally drove home how ill-quipped China’s domestic poli-
tics was to deal with the new reality of eroded state power and decentralized
control under globalization and information revolution. 26

SOFTENING THE PATH FOR GREAT-POWER STATUS

The reformist CCP leaders’ domestic reforms are closely tied to an embrace
of economic globalization, although they emphatically resist Westernization.
While complaining about the unfairness and discriminatory nature of the in-
ternational arrangement, they also recognize that the globalized world creates
74 Chapter Four

opportunities that align with their nation’s international aspirations and are
amenable for gradualist change in their favor. The current domestic track of
reforms and global integration has given rise to a particular national identity
that predisposes the political elites to imagine their nation’s “greatness” in
terms of a positive interactive process between China’s rise and the evolving
world order. The country’s deepening economic globalization cements the
symbiotic ties between the prevailing interests and institutions at home and
abroad.27
Beyond the economic benefits, globalization and the liberal world order
also rein in the containment impulse in great-power politics to provide an
orderly, institutionalized mechanism hospitable to China’s aspirations.28
Indeed the United States has signaled its positive message in welcoming
China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” and so have other established
powers in their “engagement” with China.29 Thus, to the extent that China’s
soft power emphasizes a mutually supportive domestic and international
agenda, a balance between power and acceptance, and a pursuit of change
through cultural influence, economic diplomacy, and institutional participa-
tion, it fundamentally defines the country’s foreign policy strategy in general.
Understood in the Chinese context, much of the so-called “soft power” is
essential ingredients of the Chinese model that have enhanced governance
at home and presence abroad.30 As such, soft power should not be treated as
a tool for some exigency, but rather as embedded in China’s domestic and
international transition.
China’s soft power may be distinctive, but its reliance is not sui generis
in great-power politics. In fact, both Germany and Japan after World War
II utilized economic diplomacy, international institutions, and their model
of technological advancement, to forge new international roles. Comparing
contemporary China with postwar Germany and Japan this way by no means
suggests that the Chinese are simply repeating their paths. In fact, the inter-
national trajectories of the two U.S. allies were themselves quite divergent,
with the German success in securing a leadership role in Europe contrasting
with the ambivalence between Japan and its Asian neighbors.31 If the foreign
policy patterns of the two pivotal states in the American hegemony are so
divergent,32 then we should expect the PRC, as an out-group member vis-
à-vis the established great powers in the post-Cold War world, to pursue a
diplomacy that is markedly different, with a greater challenge to the regional
and international status quo.33
In any case, the PRC has pursued a foreign policy designed to soften
competitive power politics while realigning its international relations. In
the early years of the twenty-first century, China’s soft power has seen
phenomenal growth, particularly in southeast Asia and many developing
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 75

countries in Africa and Latin America.34 The country has gained a great
deal of legitimacy, the one thing Beijing lost badly after Tiananmen. To-
day its power is less feared and more accepted. As Shi Yinhong recently
wrote, in the “asymmetrical race” between the U.S. reliance on “military
deployments, military advances, and the building of military alliances,”
and Chinese use of “peaceful economic forces, on foreign trade, and on its
diplomacy,” his country has won. Like him, many other Chinese analysts
have argued that the U.S. unilateralism has undercut its role in Asia and the
world. However, Shi subsequently noted the striking absence of China’s
contribution to liberal political values and the equally stunning costs of his
country’s single-minded pursuit of economic growth on the environment
and “social justice” at home.35 While keenly aware of the daunting chal-
lenges in their country’s domestic transition, Chinese strategic analysts at
present generally feel that the United States is somewhat constrained. There
is a growing sense that things are going their way, albeit not necessarily at
the expense of other established powers.
There is no doubt that China has gained a great deal in international status,
particularly since the onset of the new century. But more difficulties lie ahead
in U.S.-China relations. According to Iain Johnston and Daniela Stockmann,
even after 2003, survey data indicated that residents in Beijing had a deep
suspicion that the United States was trying to hold back their nation’s rightful
quest for great power status.36 As China grows stronger, power transition will
intensify to fuel frictions between the two countries. Sophisticated Chinese
analysts, aware of the challenge in managing the Sino-American relationship,
are not in a self-congratulatory mood. They are not rushing to declare that the
United States is in irreversible decline, nor are they rejoicing about the onset
of a new world order, presumably because of an awareness of the necessities
and difficulties in managing the unwieldy Sino-American relationship.
As with hard power, soft power projection encounters resistance and con-
testation. Most notably, Beijing’s practices in Africa have elicited criticism of
neocolonialism, allegedly repeating the pattern of rapacious Western plunder-
ing of local economies. The so-called “Beijing consensus” remains nebulous
in telling other countries what inspiring values and ideas China really stands
for. China’s soft power is ultimately limited by weaknesses on its domestic
front. In this connection, it is useful to recall what Deng Xiaoping said in
the 1980s: China is both a big power and a small power. 37 China is big,
given its population, scale, U.N. permanent seat, and now growing compre-
hensive power. But it is also small, in the sense that the country still suffers
from the common “third world syndrome”: the government has to combat
myriad sources of insecurity and challenges as it struggles to sustain balanced
growth, build institutions, and maintain stability on the home front.
76 Chapter Four

Internationally, China’s regional and global environment remains deeply

uncertain, particularly with regards to the United States, Japan, and Taiwan.38
The leadership remains wary of the momentum of “color revolution” along its
borders, as well as the various forms of hard balancing against Chinese power
by its neighbors. The potency of nationalism based on official remembrance
of victimization and humiliation at the hands of the West and Japan during a
bygone era reflects a real sense of vulnerability. Thus, the Chinese leadership
must carefully navigate the turbulent and uncertain waters of domestic and
international transition.
History and scholarship on international relations in the United States have
shown again and again that the power transition prompted by redistribution of
power has led to war, often between the reigning great power and the rising
one. In fact the international relations field has produced two findings that
are generally regarded as empirically “scientific”: one is democratic peace
and the other is the inevitability of hegemonic war. China’s emphasis on soft
power reflects an implicit acceptance of a single, unified power and authority
arrangement in contemporary world politics within which China can attain
its status interests. That does not mean that China’s rise will be harmonious
and friction-free. The reality is that this non-Western country’s soft power is
differently endowed compared to the United States. For its strategic, politi-
cal, and cultural interests, the PRC will try to modify the predominant ideas,
institutions, and values in world politics in order to gain an advantage in
competing with the United States and the West.39
The gap in polity could potentially be played up to drive a wedge and accentu-
ate a strategic divide between China and the liberal democratic powers.40 If soft
power competition becomes an unmitigated, zero-sum ideological struggle, it
would only harden competitive power politics. Vowing to avoid another Cold
War, Chinese leaders and analysts alike appear quite aware of the danger and
have thus stressed its soft power growth as a positive sum game with the rest
of the world. They have focused on the domestic construction of soft power,
which for them means refurbishing an institutional system in a CCP-led soci-
ety that is vibrant enough to stand its ground in the age of Westernization and
globalization. Chinese leaders do not like to talk about Chinese diplomacy in
terms of soft power, preferring instead to use various euphemisms to character-
ize China’s subtle initiatives.41 Such caution is analogous to their approach to
the concept of the “peaceful rise.” The Chinese leadership quickly dropped the
idea of the “peaceful rise” in 2004, presumably because of calculations that
an unconditional declaration of peace undermines China’s deterrence posture,
whereas premature declaration of a rising status feeds into China threat theories.
Perhaps similar concerns are behind Chinese reticence in playing up soft power
in its foreign policy discourse.
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 77

While cautious, the country has high expectations for soft power develop-
ment as its growth is considered as woefully inadequate, especially when
compared with China’s fast growing hard power. Chinese elites take solace
that soft power has now become a tool at their disposal, but they are by means
satisfied with what they have. While to a large degree it is a matter of choice
for the United States whether to turn to soft power, for China, soft power is
not readily available. They will have to work hard to discover, identify, har-
ness, and foster such new sources of influence from the past, present, and
future.

CONCLUSION

All in all, China’s foreign policy has been amenable to positive-sum compe-
tition among great powers and as such has so far softened its path to great-
power status. “Soft power” has provided a platform for the United States
and China to negotiate the meaning of “responsible stakeholder,” which the
United States wishes the latter to be. For the next fifteen to twenty years, the
PRC will remain a developing country with a continued need for international
support to address its daunting domestic agenda. And more likely than not,
the great-power politics will not relapse to cut-throat hard power competition.
Globalization has reordered how states interact with each other. The bright
side of it—multilateralism, economic interdependence, and unifying forces
that cross boundaries and erode barriers—has tied countries together in ways
never seen before. The dark side—financial crisis, environmental degrada-
tion, epidemics, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction—represents
transnational, unconventional challenges calling for collective efforts by all
the states involved, particularly the major powers. Under these conditions,
soft power has become an ever-greater part of great-power politics with each
pushing its strengths and advantages in areas of competition besides hard
power. Given the foregoing discussions, barring an unexpected economic
meltdown or a major foreign policy crisis, it is in all likelihood that soft
power will become an even greater part of China’s foreign policy.
China’s approach to soft power is characterized by a focus on domestic
renewal, an emphasis on the benign history, and an embrace of globaliza-
tion, which has curbed its ambition to push an alternative world vision. The
country’s heavy reliance on soft power indicates awareness of its own weak-
nesses at home, a sense of citizenship in international society, and a conscious
attempt to reverse the hardcore power transition. It also reveals a new con-
fidence, a discontent with the Western-dominated world order, a heightened
sense of vulnerabilities, and a determined pursuit of comprehensive material
78 Chapter Four

power commensurate with a traditional great power. China’s diplomacy does

suggest the possibility of a pattern of great-power politics as reconfigured
by a non-confrontational competition over soft power. If that paradigm shift
is to hold, a new global consensus transcending the polarized thinking of
the “Washington consensus” versus “the Beijing consensus” will have to be
negotiated. How to navigate such a transition to a more pluralist world in an
age of globalization is at the core of the questions regarding both the future of
China’s foreign relations and the future of world politics at large.

NOTES

1. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New
York: Basic Books, 1990); Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World
Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
2. Nye, Soft Power, 83–9 on Asia. (Quotes on 85 and 88).
3. Nye, “Bound to Lead,” 32–5.
4. David S. Shambaugh,”Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dy-
namics,” in David Shambaught, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 2.
5. Yuan Zhibing, “What is ‘New’ About New Interventionism,” Renmin Ribao,
July 29, 1999, 6. Open Source Center (hereafter cited as OSC, formerly Foreign
Broadcast Information Service): FTS 19990729000569; Liu Ming and Guo Suping,
“Beware of the Influence of ‘Soft Attacks’ on the Nation’s Image,” Zhongguo Dang-
zheng Ganbu Luntan, January 6, 2007, 18–19. in OSC: CPP20070417332001.
6. The classic treatment on this period is Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship:
The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,
1992).
7. Jen Hui-wen, “China Establishes the Building of Soft Power as a Strategic
Mission,” March 30, 2007, 15, OSC: CPP20070330710009; Chu Shulong, “China’s
National Interest, National Power, and National Strategy,” Zhanlue Yu Guanli, Octo-
ber 26, 1999, 13–8, OSC: FTS19991026000196.
8. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–193: An Introduction to the Study
of International Relations (2nd edition) (London, MacMillan, 1946; reprinted in
1961), 140.
9. Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, “Empowered and Restrained: Chinese
Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in David Lampton, ed.,
The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), chapter 7.
10. Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia:
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (New York: Routlege 2001); Amitav
Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institu-
tional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization, 58 (Spring 2004):
239–275.; Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 79

Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions

over Time and Space, eds. Robert O. Keohane, Helga Haftendorn, and Celeste Wal-
lander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 287–324.; Donald K. Emmerson,
“Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN,”
Japanese Journal of Political Science. 6, no. 2 (August 2005): 165–85.; Alice D.
Ba, “Who’s Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations,”
Pacific Review 19, no. 2 (June 2006): 157–79.
11. Pang Zhongying, “Zhongguo De Yazhou Zhanlue: Linghuo De Duobian
Zhuyi” [China’s Asia Strategy: Flexible Multilateralism], in Zhongguo Waijiao Juan
[China’s Foreign Affairs], ed. Niu Jun (Beijing: New World Press, 2007), 132–42.;
Xiao Huanrong, “Zhongguo De Daguo Zeren Yu Diquzhuyi Zhanlue” [China’s Great
Power Responsibility and Strategy of Regionalism], in Zhongguo Waijiao Juan
[China’s Foreign Affairs], ed. Niu Jun (Beijing: New World Press, 2007), 143–56.
12. Wang Hongying finds very few references to “soft power” in Chinese journals
during the 1990s. See her “Chinese Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implica-
tions,” Journal of Contemporary China (forthcoming), ms, 2.
13. Renmin Ribao (overseas edition, hereafter cited as RMRB), Oct. 25, 2007, 3.
14. Jeffrey W. Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising
Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (2007): 515–34.
15. Liu Hong, “Zhao Qizheng: Taiwan Issue Should be Resolved with Soft Power
First,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, January 12, 2005, OSC: CPP20050124000189.
16. On Taiwan, see Su Chi, “Soft Power + Defensive National Defense=National
Security,” Lienho Pao online, Jan. 24, 2009, OSC: CPP 20090114312008.
17. Joshua Cooper Ramo, “The Beijing Consensus,” Foreign Policy Institute Re-
port 2004, fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf (accessed October 2, 2007).
18. RMRB, Dec. 16, 2008, 3.
19. RMRB, Jan.12, 2009, 6.
20. Yong Deng, “Better Than Power: International Status in Chinese Foreign Pol-
icy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong
Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 51–72.
21. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions
1980–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). See also Bates Gill,
Rising Star: China’s New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu-
tion Press, 2007).
22. Shen Guofang,”Theory and Practice of China’s New Diplomacy,” Shijie Zhi-
shi, July 1, 2007, 42–4, OSC: CPP20070713508001.
23. Yan Xuetong, “Political Application of Cultural Resources,” Huanqiu Shibao,
August 2, 2007, 11, OSC: CPP20070822329001.
24. Liu Jiansheng, “‘Hexie Shijie’ Sixiangwenhua Suyuan” [The Intellectual and
Cultural Origins of “Harmonious World”], China Institute of International Studies.
www.ciis.org.cn/ (accessed March 6, 2007); Yin Chengde, “Jiangou Hexie Shijie”
[Building a Harmonious World), China Institute of International Studies]. www.ciis
.org.cn/ (accessed March 6, 2007).
25. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1984), 51. (original emphasis).
80 Chapter Four

26. Yang Jiemian, “Chinese Diplomacy and Theoretical Innovations off 30 Years
of Reform and Opening Up,” Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, Nov. 13, 2008, pp. 6–11, OSC:
CPP20090110267; Interview with Wang Yizhou and Wang Zaibang, “China: Crisis Di-
plomacy 2008,” Shijie Zhishi, Dec. 1, 2008, pp. 14–23, OSC: CPP200901012671002.
Qin Yaqing, “The World Strucutre, Security Threats and International Actors,” Xian-
dai Guoji Guanxi, Sept. 20, 2008, pp. 1–3, OSC: CPP20081118671001.
27. David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Link-
ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
28. G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 1 January/February 2008): 23–37.; Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore,
“China Views Globalization: Towards a New Great Power Politics?” Washington
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (summer 2007): 117–36.
29. Robert Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Na-
tional Committee on US-China Relations, New York, Sept. 21, 2005, www.ncuscr
.org/articlesandspeeches/Zoellick.htm (accessed Oct. 7, 2007).
30. See David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money,
and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
31. On Japan, see Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Japan and Asia:
Network Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). On Germany, see Peter
Katzenstein, Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1997); Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions,
Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, 1999).
32. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American
Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).
33. Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in the Era of Leading-Power Peace,” Ameri-
can Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (March 2002), 1–14.
34. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-
ing the World (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2007).
35. Shi Yinhong, “China’s Rise and Prospects of China’s Relations with the
United States, Japan,” Hong Kong Zhongguo Pinglun, no. 114 (July 2007): 16–20,
OSC: CPP20070604710001, 1; Shi Yinhong, “China’s Soft Power and Peace-
ful Rise,” Hong Kong Zhongguo Pinglun, no. 118 (October, 2007): 10–12, OSC:
CPP20071017710002. See also Yang Jiemian, “New Features of Sino-U.S. Relations
in the Transformation Period of the International System,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi,
December 1, 2007OSC: CPP20080104587004.
36. Alastair Iain Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, “Chinese Attitudes toward the
United States and Americans,” in Anti-Amerianism in World Politics, eds. Peter Kat-
zenstein and Robert Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007): 157–95.
37. Deng Xiaoping, “Heping Fazhan Shi Dangdai Shijie De Liangda Wenti”
(Peace and Development Are the Two Major Issues in Contemporary World), Deng
Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Vol. III [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping]
(Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 105.
38. Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press,
2007); Yong Deng, “Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the
 The New Hard Realities: “Soft Power” and China in Transition 81

China Threat Theories,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy,
eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2006), chapter 7.
39. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Shortcut to Greatness: The
New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” International Organiza-
tion 57 (Winter 2003), 77–109.
40. Mark Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian
Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 59–69.
41. See, example, Wang Jiarui, “Actively Explore New Pattern of Party Diplo-
macy with Chinese Characteristics,” Renmin Ribao, September 28, 2007, 7, OSC:
CPP20070928710005.

Acknowledgement
I am grateful for the helpful comments on an earlier version of the chapter by
Harry Harding and Hongying Wang. Thanks are also due to Mingjiang Li for
inviting me to write this chapter and for his subsequent advice. I also benefit-
ted from discussions with participants of the conference, “The Rise of China
and Its Soft Power,” held at the S. Rajaratnam School International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, October 18–19, 2007.
 Chapter Five

The Practice of the Mean:

China’s Soft Power Cultivation
Jianfeng Chen

The existing literature on soft power in China and other countries demon-
strates a wide and often contradictory range of views. A variety of proposals
have been put forward by Chinese scholars about how the country should
build its soft power; via a “Chinese model,”1 a constitutional state,2 policies
and strategic choices that match most nations’ interests,3 learning from the
lessons of the United States during its soft power build-up,4 and emphasizing
its cultural heritage.5
The impact of China’s soft power on the rest of the world is also disputed.
Fearing the negative impact of China’s soft power, some scholars have called
for countermeasures against its development. Nye, for instance, notes: “Al-
though China is far from America’s equal in soft power, it would be foolish
to ignore the gains it is making. It is time for the United States to pay more
attention to the balance of soft power in Asia.”6 Kurlantzick advocates that
the United States should be wary of China’s “charm offensive.”7 Other com-
mentators on China’s soft power have been less alarmist. As one scholar
argues, “the purpose of the soft power offensive is to spread Chinese values
throughout the world and to project a more benign view of the country, one
that is unquestionably committed to a peaceful rise.”8 Hunter is optimistic
about China’s soft power projection, writing:

Given a historical and cultural background in “soft-power” and “moral leader-

ship”; [and] given the intense but hopefully non-military competition with the
U.S. and other states; perhaps it is logical to expect that China will increasingly
project itself on the world stage by peaceful means, for example by culture,
education, media presence and other means.9

83
84 Chapter Five

This chapter will explore how China can effectively cultivate soft power
from a cultural and philosophical point of view. A nation’s soft power in-
creases as it provides more public goods for the international community.
In the international arena, the most significant public goods are stability and
other beneficial conditions for common prosperity. China’s soft power is
growing in tandem with its contributions to world stability and prosperity.
China is able to contribute to world stability and prosperity because there is a
profound philosophical tradition in Chinese thinking and statecraft called the
“Golden Mean.”10 I contend that the wisdom of this traditional Chinese con-
cept can provide Chinese leaders with the intellectual capacity to approach
major international issues in a balanced way, which will be more acceptable
to the international community, and thus confer significant soft power on
China.
The discussion in this chapter is also pertinent to the heated debate about
the impact of China’s rise, which is causing unease in some quarters. Many
scholars have predicted that China will change the status quo and challenge
American world domination. Regionally, China is seen as a threatening
competitor by Japan and India and a rising power with an uncertain future by
Southeast Asian nations. This chapter advances the argument that if China
bases its international strategies on the Doctrine of the Mean—as Beijing is
currently doing—it will be able to maintain rather than revise the interna-
tional status quo. The Doctrine of the Mean would dictate China to follow the
status quo because it is easier, psychologically speaking, to accept something
familiar instead of something brand new and uncertain. I suggest that Chinese
practice of the Mean will defuse the anxieties felt by much of the outside
world in response to its rise on the world stage.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN:

THE CONCEPT AND INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Different political systems are grounded in different cultures. People of the

West and the East hold different beliefs about the international order based
on their different cultural concepts, such as the Greek city-states or the an-
cient eastern Asian international system. One of the core values of Chinese
culture is the Mean, the nature of which implies balanced relationships in the
universe. The Mean is achieved when things develop and stay at their proper
degree. Peace among nations is maintained by realizing the value of equilib-
rium, which generates “a happy order” throughout heaven and earth, and then
“all things will be nourished and flourish.”
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 85

Culture and International Order

Civilizations display many variations of cultural and social arrangements,
although they are also somewhat homogeneous in the sense that there exists a
fundamental and shared human nature. A nation is a cultural system and “in-
ternational relations are therefore by definition also intercultural relations.”11
Culture is a concentric web with its core values encircled by its correspond-
ing outer layers such as social structure and economical and political forms.
Once its core is formed, culture, like an organism’s genome, shapes a nation’s
behaviors and its development pattern.
If a nation produces successive economic miracles, it is taken for granted
that its culture is robust, and vice versa. On the other hand, the rise and fall
of a nation is closely associated with its culture in specific historical periods.
When a culture is able to resolve major contradictions for a nation, it accom-
modates the circumstances and needs of the nation’s development. When a
culture is opposed to the needs for social and economic development, the
nation is bound to fall. Of course, a nation’s strategies, and even its political
system and international relations, do not necessarily remain confined to the
boundaries of its culture. But there indeed exist close relations between a
state’s strategies and the core values of its culture.
The cultural influence on international order is quite obvious. This can be
seen in scholars’ characterization of the evolution of international systems.
Wight identified three interstate systems: the Hellenic-Hellenistic or Greco-
Roman, the Chinese during the time of Spring-Autumn and Warring States,
and the Western systems.12 Bull recognized five international societies: the
classical Greek city-state system, the Hellenistic international system in the
period between the disintegration of Alexander’s empire and the Roman
conquest, the states system of China during the period of Warring States,
the states system of ancient India, and the modern international system that
formed in Europe and is now predominant on the global stage.13 Toynbee,
furthermore, characterized international relations as “Janus-headed” in the
sense that the relations among states with the same civilization are different
than those between states with different cultural identifications.14
Each of these systems was formed in a particular cultural sphere, which
implies that the core values of a culture do shape a nation’s behaviors and
development pattern. Moreover, man is a “culture-laden” or “culture-bound”
creature who makes institutions, systems, policies, and strategies. The United
States has been struggling to promote democracy worldwide because the
core values of the West are furnished with concepts such as freedom, equal-
ity, individualism, and competition. To universalize those values ultimately
becomes an American national interest. China upholds the concept and
86 Chapter Five

practice of building a “harmonious world”15 and Iran complies with Islamic

fundamentalism. All these policies and strategies result from core values of
the nations’ respective cultures.

The Mean: A Core Value in Chinese Culture

The Mean is one of the core values in Chinese culture. The nature of the
Mean encompasses the notion of appropriately balanced relationships be-
tween man and man, man and society, man and nature, and well-adjusted
relations among nations. Carrying out the Mean implies that one is being
neutral and is finding a balance between Yin (feminine or negative principle)
and Yang (masculine or positive principle), black and white, right and left,
good and bad, and them and us. The Mean focuses on self-cultivation so as
to adjust interpersonal and even interstate relations, which leads to universal
peace. The Confucian doctrine of the Mean is similar to the golden mean
in ancient Greek philosophy. Such an analogy provides human beings with
inspiration to construct a universal balance. “Confucian thought, thus, has
also universal qualities and tendencies, but it could be classified as belonging
more to a soft (aesthetic) universalism in contrast to a hard (rational) univer-
salism in the West.”16
According to the doctrine of the Mean, the right or ideal course of ac-
tion is always at the middle way between the two extremes of excess and
deficiency. Confucius’ Doctrine of the Mean begins with clarifying the con-
tent and relations of Nature (xing), The Path of duty (dao), and Instruction
or Cultivation (jiao): “What Heaven has conferred is called The Nature; an
accordance with this nature is called The Path of duty; the regulation of this
path is called Instruction.”17 Nature is the root and The Path of duty incarnates
Nature. The Path of duty is the end and Instruction is the means. Through
self-cultivation as well as the cultivation of others, man can reach The Path.
The Path of duty, the aim that man needs to reach, is of vital importance.
Therefore, “the path may not be left for an instant. If it could be left, it would
not be the path.”18 In this account, “the superior man does not wait till he
sees things, to be cautious, nor till he hears things, to be apprehensive.”19
Confucius wrote that

Shun [an ancient Chinese emperor] indeed was greatly wise! Shun loved to
question others, and to study their words, though they might be shallow. He
concealed what was bad in them and displayed what was good. He took hold of
their two extremes, determined the Mean, and employed it in his government of
the people. It was by this that he was Shun.20

The Mean also implies harmony within difference:

 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 87

All things are nourished together without their injuring one another. The courses
of the seasons, and of the sun and moon, are pursued without any collision
among them. The smaller energies are like river currents; the greater energies
are seen in mighty transformations. It is this that makes heaven and earth so
great.21

This state of equilibrium is like a well-prepared soup, which is delicious

because all the ingredients are mixed together in their proper proportions.
Unlike religions that worship only one god, Chinese culture is much more
inclusive. Christianity, Islam, and Judaism have been living and developing
side-by-side harmoniously with Confucianism and Daoism for thousands of
years in China.
Concerning the way to achieve the Mean, Confucius stated:

While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be
said to be in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred,
and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of
Harmony. This Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human ac-
tions in the world, and this Harmony is the universal path which they all should
pursue.22

The Mean is achieved when all chaos has been eliminated and order is
preserved; i.e., when a state of Equilibrium has been reached. “Let the
states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order
will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished
and flourish.”23
Applied to international relations, the Mean implies that peace and order
are achieved by taking a neutral position and choosing compromise so as
to establish a balance among diverse interests. The Mean not only stands
for a “middle way,” but also integrity. Both Confucianism and Moism (Mo
Zi) insist on treating other nations with kindness and morality and believe
that tenderness is the antidote to roughness. Balance can thus be maintained
among nations by trading interests. Sun Zi advocated winning over the enemy
without fighting. Lao Zi said: “He who would assist a lord of men in harmony
with the Tao will not assert his mastery in the kingdom by force of arms.
Such a course is sure to meet with its proper return.”24 Concerning interstate
relations, he said:

What makes a great state is its being [like] a low-lying, down-flowing [stream];
it becomes the center to which tend [all the small states] under heaven. [To il-
lustrate from] the case of all females: the female always overcomes the male by
her stillness. Stillness may be considered [a sort of] abasement. Thus it is that a
great state, by condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and that small
88 Chapter Five

states, by abasing themselves to a great state, win it over to them. In the one case
the abasement leads to gaining adherents, in the other case to procuring favor.
The great state only wishes to unite men together and nourish them; a small state
only wishes to be received by, and to serve, the other. Each gets what it desires,
but the great state must learn to abase itself.25

In this way, trust is built between big nations and small ones. Therefore, the
Mean is achieved and balanced relations are maintained.

THE PRACTICE OF THE MEAN: THE CHINESE

TRADITION OF MANAGING INTERSTATE RELATIONS

The Mean is an ideational factor that surely has had an impact on the stra-
tegic thinking of Chinese decision-makers. Looking at the major patterns of
China’s foreign relations throughout history, one can safely say that this doc-
trine has had a great impact on China’s international behavior. Rising powers
in the West, such as Spain, France, Russia, the UK, Germany, the US, and
Japan, followed a bloody path. They increased their strength and expanded
their influence by military force and colonizing weak nations. On the con-
trary, ancient China highly valued harmony among peoples.
Unlike the European system, which was replete with confrontation and
wars, the ancient East Asian international order, namely the tribute system,
was more stable. The system was “one that involves a dominant power that
does not fold secondary states under its wing in empire, and yet also does
not cause other states to balance against it.”26 As a matter of fact, the tribute
system was more a cultural and economical configuration than a political one
in East Asia. Most of the time, China’s neighboring countries, such as Japan,
Vietnam, and Korea, enjoyed full political independence within the system.
Their emissaries presented tributes to the Chinese emperor and to ask for
recognition, symbolically at least, of their rule. This system, comparable to a
family of nations with China as the center, was an extension of the Confucian
social order based on rites and morals. The order was maintained and man-
aged according to virtue (Li) and culture assimilation. “In the Chinese world
order, hierarchical power relationship, therefore, was by definition more
‘moral’ than in the West.”27
For centuries, thanks to the tribute system, China’s relations with other
states were based on a “taking less and giving more” (Houwang Bolai) ap-
proach. Because of this trading behavior, its neighboring countries enjoyed
much trade surplus. “The emissaries received lavish gifts of cloth, silks,
gold, and other luxuries that often far exceeded the value of what they had
brought.”28 Some historians believe that the trade deficit was so big that the
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 89

Ming emperor stopped the great explorer Zheng He’s expeditions to restore
the trade balance. China, the unique power in the system, followed its cul-
ture’s demands and made concessions in order to maintain balanced relations
with other “members of the family.” As Lao Zi advocated: “A great state, by
condescending to small states, gains them for itself; and small states, by abas-
ing themselves to a great state, win it over to them.”29
Another example illustrates what the Mean implies. When Christopher
Columbus first stepped on “the new continent”, he formally declared that the
land belonged to the Kingdom of Spain. By contrast, Zheng He decades ear-
lier had conducted seven voyages with more than 20,000 crew members:

He had sailed on the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, further south to
Java in today’s Indonesia, then northwest to Iran and the Holy City of Mecca
and further west to today’s Somalia in East Africa. During his visits to more
than 30 countries, he brought with him the desire of Chinese emperors to build
up friendly contacts by presenting valuable gifts and inviting the rulers to send
emissaries to China.30

His voyages were guided by the Mean-bound cultural principle of not con-
quering other people to expand China’s territory, but instead of building
friendly relations.
Of course, not all of China’s behavior has followed the principles of the
Mean, especially since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Mao
Zedong, a revolutionary opposed to Chinese traditions, employed extreme
strategies to solve the nation’s problems both at home and abroad. The his-
torical context in which he was born and raised made him embrace extremes
instead of the Mean. China’s then semi-colonial society led to his belief that
the outside world was not trustworthy and China had to adopt a policy of self-
reliance. Moreover, the unfavorable international environment–containment
from the West and threats from the USSR-led Mao Zedong to expand China’s
diplomatic sphere in the Third World, while at the same time try to protect
China from any foreign interference in its internal affairs. Domestically, he
launched the Cultural Revolution to release his anti-tradition sentiment. For
him, a Mean-based culture was too mild for China to “stand tall” in the East.
The case of Mao’s era demonstrates that his revolutionary zeal and the Cold
War context played a more important role in shaping China’s international
strategy than cultural traditions. Since Mao’s time, in the absence of such a
political ideology and international environment, the doctrine of the Mean is
expected to play a larger role in China’s foreign policy.
Indeed, since the end of the 1970s, China’s foreign policy and strategy
have been established on the basis of restoring the Mean and of transcend-
ing the international order embedded in military alliances and ideological
90 Chapter Five

confrontation. Regarding international disputes, Deng Xiaoping stated that

“some international territory disputes can be solved for the moment by joint
exploration while laying aside sovereignty”31 and “agreement can be reached
while both you and we make concessions.”32 As for interstate relations, he
advocated: “Do not try to gain benefit for one party only. It should be mutual
to both nations and their peoples,”33 and “we hope you are flourishing as well
as we are prospering.”34
Deng’s dictums conform to the essence of the doctrine of the Mean. Ac-
cording to the principles of the Mean, concession, mutual benefit, and com-
mon prosperity should all be in a state of equilibrium where human nature
is satisfied and harmony ensues. If you get what you want and give what the
others want, both parties reach the Mean. As Confucius insisted, “Do not do
to others what you would not want others to do to you.” To give consideration
to others is to take care of oneself, which is the Mean. For the practice of the
Mean, Chinese President Hu Jintao warned in a speech to party members,
at the opening ceremony of a seven-day training course in the Party School
of the CPC Central Committee on Feb. 19, 2005, that “without a common
ideological aspiration or high moral standard, a harmonious society will be a
mansion built on sand.” To the Chinese, a righteous government should use
power to solve problems in conformity to the principles of the Mean and to
maintain balanced relations among nations.
According to the Doctrine of the Mean, the “righteous point” is a situation
in which all parties’ interests are acceptable by and beneficial to all. From
the 1990s onward, China has worked together with neighboring nations to
settle territorial disputes in a rational and peaceful manner. For example,
during the past ten years, China and Russia have found their “middle way”
by jointly exploiting several islands in the bordering waters so that by the
end of 2007, they had agreed on a mutually accepted demarcation of their
common boundary. Thanks to agreements signed between China and India
in 1993, 1996, and 2005, both countries’ interests are now being protected in
the border areas. The quarrels over the South China Sea islands calmed down
in 1995 when China agreed to discuss the problem multilaterally within the
ASEAN framework. In 2002, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Brunei found themselves at the “righteous point” when they signed “The
ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea” based on the principle of engaging in joint exploitation while shelv-
ing the sovereignty issue. The declaration was followed in 2005 by a joint
agreement by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines’ national oil companies
that aimed at carrying out surveys of hydrocarbon resources in a disputed
area of the South China Sea. Finally, China shelved a sovereignty issue over
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 91

the Diaoyu Islands in order to develop a “strategic and mutually reciprocal”

relationship with Japan. “With the principle of equal consultation as well as
mutual understanding and accommodation, China has signed boundary trea-
ties or agreements with twelve of its fourteen neighbors, demarcating ninety
percent of its 22,000 km land border. . . . [As a result,] former battlefields are
witnessing booming cross-border trade.”35
Since the establishment of Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening strategy,
China has not only embraced a market economy and foreign currency, but
also a constellation of foreign music, movies, fashion, cuisine, books, lan-
guages, education, institutions, and norms. From a political point of view,
a world with different cultures and ideologies is better than a homogeneous
one. If a democratic or a socialist system is imposed on nations of different
cultures and at different stages of development, the world risks conflict rather
than equilibrium because it is departing from the principles of the Mean.
The American strategy of global democratization ultimately reduces its soft
power. According to a survey by the French-American Foundation in June
2007, the percentage of Britons having a positive view toward America de-
clined from eighty-three percent in 2000 to fifty-one percent in 2007, for the
French it declined from sixty-two percent to thirty-nine percent, and for Ger-
mans it declined from seventy-eight percent to thirty percent.36 This shows
that the most efficient way to resolve conflicts is to maintain equilibrium, just
as the sea maintains its size by balancing inflow and outflow.
Due to an insufficient understanding of the pacific nature of its culture,
China’s rise has been viewed as a threat from the perspective of power poli-
tics. Seen through the prism of experience—i.e., most rising powers emerge
from conflict and bloodshed—China’s fast economic growth is doomed to
cause unease and suspicions. “The West now needs to face the possibility
that it has welcomed a Trojan horse into the international community.”37 To
break the historical template in which rising powers are born out of blood-
shed, Deng Xiaoping created the basic national policy known as the “Guiding
Principle of Twenty-four Characters” He said: “Watch the world with a calm
mind; stand firmly; confidently deal with the difficulties; keep a low profile;
never act as a leader; and do things well” so as to build a benign China. He
further stated:
We must not act as the head. Those practicing hegemony have a bad reputation,
so acting as the head of the Third World will also be ill-reputed. This is not a
word of courtesy, rather, a realistic political consideration. Even though we
are powerful in the future, China will never serve as the head, never practice
hegemony, never seek spheres of influence, never pursue alignment, and never
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.38
92 Chapter Five

The “Twenty-four Characters Guiding Principle” aims at safeguarding the

Mean. If China achieves a dominant position of power, the Mean is vitiated
and the international system is out of equilibrium. As China’s power rises,
it ought to rise softly by taking a position at the “righteous point” between
the two extremes of “excess and deficiency” so as to balance interests among
neighboring countries as well as major powers. Only in this way can the im-
pact of a rising power be diluted.

THE PRACTICE OF THE

MEAN IN CHINA’S RISING STRATEGY

In today’s world, China intentionally promotes a Mean-based culture so as to

maintain friendly relations with the other nations while avoiding hegemony
and political disputes. Doing so also opens up markets to foster common
prosperity, it promotes cultural exchanges to unite the hearts and minds of
people of all races, it sacrifices some of its interests in order to maintain a
stable international environment, and it focuses on how to successfully solve
its numerous domestic problems. Furthermore, China’s soft power increases
whenever it embraces heterogeneous values rather than maintaining cultural
homogeneity.

Building a New World Order: China’s Prudent Move

The soft power of China’s practice of the Mean is perhaps best illustrated in
the process of building a “new world order.” The world is currently evolving
from an old system to a new one and “is still in reconciliation as well as con-
flict between [the] two halves: economically the north and south, politically
the might and right, and culturally the West and non-West.”39 Under such
circumstances, developing and developed countries are both calling for the
new order, but with different definitions of what this entails.
The United States wants to build a new world system in accordance with
American values and ideals. The Clinton administration aimed at building a
new world order according to the principles of neoliberalism and globaliza-
tion so as to maintain American world leadership. The Bush administration
used the phrase “global democratization” to promote liberty worldwide. For-
mer British Prime Minister Tony Blair advocated that Europe and the United
States should work as “one polar power” to tackle the world’s problems rather
then bickering as they did over Iraq. Qatar’s First Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister stressed the urgency of establishing a new world order lead-
ing to an equitable distribution of wealth nationally and internationally.
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 93

Meanwhile, China has tried to build a new world order based on the “five
principles of peaceful coexistence.” The old world was dominated by power
politics and ideological confrontation. The new world should be a diversi-
fied one consisting of various social systems, ideologies, values, cultures,
and religions. According to the principles of the Mean, Deng Xiaoping in
1988 enunciated a new world economic and political order of independence,
equality, and mutual benefit. Former Chinese president Jiang Zemin in March
1999 further interpreted China’s will to democratize international order. In
his speech on May 28, 2003, Hu Jintao put forward four propositions: de-
mocratization of international relations, a world of diversity, a new concept
of security, and even development and respect for U.N. institutions. To some
extent, the Chinese concept of a new world order maintains the basic prin-
ciples and norms of the international order established in the aftermath of
World War II.40
Building or transforming a new international order requires cooperation
among the major powers. Unfortunately, there is a great discrepancy among
the nations’ concepts of international order, which makes cooperation diffi-
cult and undermines world stability. Furthermore, one nation by itself cannot
reconstruct the world order. The U.S. has been trapped in Iraq and Afghani-
stan while attempting to build a unilateral order, which has decreased its soft
power to a certain extent. The new world order China is calling for is argu-
ably in accordance with international moral standards and is an ideal structure
for an international system. But establishing a new order involves challenging
the existing one. A rising power’s attempt to reconstruct the world order
implies that its ambition is to transcend the dominant power’s order, which,
in turn, is likely to cause regional and global tensions. In this sense, it is a
deviation from the principles of the Mean.
Since the reform era, China has moved away from extremes and toward
the Mean. It has evolved from a revolutionary outsider into a participant or
“stakeholder” within the system. China participates actively in U.N. reforms,
Six Party talks, anti-terrorism campaigns, nuclear weapon nonproliferation
negotiations, environmental protection initiatives, regional and global coop-
eration, as well as in international organizations such as the APEC, SCO and
ASEAN+3. Meanwhile, China has also been adjusting its economic policies
in order to cope with situations both at home and abroad. On issues such as
market share, intellectual property rights, and currency, China is willing to
follow international rules and norms. The eleventh “Five-Year Plan” explic-
itly states that China needs to transform its export-oriented economy to one of
domestic consumption for the sake of the balance of international payments.
As a matter of fact, China is fully aware that the “body” of the international
system becomes sick when it departs from the Mean.
94 Chapter Five

During the fourth session of National People’s Congress in March 2006,

Chinese premier Wen Jiabao declared that China is a participant in, and sup-
porter of, the international system. He stated: “We have participated in more
than 100 international organizations and signed almost 300 treaties. We are
willing to make great efforts together with fellow countries to build a peace-
ful world.” The will he expressed is the manifesto that clarifies China’s role
in international society. Even so, China’s declaration and strategic moves are
viewed as cunning by the international community. In essence, China does
not have the capability or the wish to revise the international system. Why
would it seek a change of the system from which it has benefited ever since
embracing the outside world?
As Lao Zi stated:

Embracing the Way, you become embraced; […] clearing your mind, you be-
come clear; […] opening your heart, you become accepted; accepting the world,
you embrace the Way. Bearing and nurturing, creating but not owning, giving
without demanding. This is harmony.41

In this regard, China’s primary strategic option is to cope with both strong
and weak nations so as to safeguard world stability while downplaying its
leading role in constructing a new world order.

China’s “Middle Way”:

Neither Encouraging Nor Seeking Hegemony
China, as its foreign policy has demonstrated in the past few decades, does
not follow any of the following four strategies: hegemonic domination, ex-
pansion by challenging the status quo, bandwagon with the dominant power,
or closed-door development. The road China is currently taking and will con-
tinue to take is the “middle way” in which the “righteous point” is achieved
by skillfully combining all four strategies so as to maintain the equilibrium
of the international system. In other words, the strategy China practices is
to “accept the world” by means of cooperation instead of encouraging or
seeking hegemony, because the Mean cannot be reached without avoiding
extremes.
There are two opposing views concerning China’s strategic moves and the
future role it will play on the world stage: one is represented by Mearsheimer,
the other by Zoellick and Johnston. In the prologue written for the Chinese
version of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer demonstrated
that if China continues its dramatic economic growth in the next decade, it
could build a gigantic military force that could dominate Asia as America
does in the western hemisphere. He maintains that China will seek regional
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 95

hegemonic status because survival is almost guaranteed when a nation

achieves predominant status. It is logical to believe that if China becomes
increasingly powerful, its elites will emulate the U.S. and depict China’s
foreign policy with idealistic rhetoric. China, like the U.S., will thus seek to
maximize its power. China has no other options if survival is its ultimate aim.
This is the tragedy of great power politics42 Mearsheimer believes that China
will eventually challenge U.S. domination of the international system. To
him, the world is full of powers with revisionist intentions unless there is an
extraordinary and absolute dominating power who ardently strives to prevent
any other great power from achieving similar status.
Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick regarded China as a
“stakeholder” that could transcend the traditional way a great power emerges.
“As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member—it
would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its suc-
cess.”43 Johnston established five criteria to assess whether a state intends to
revise or keep the status quo. Based on China’s behaviors in the past, he believes
that China is an actor willing to sustain the international system. China respects
international institutions now more than any other time in the past, which ex-
plains why it does not have revisionist or imperial ambitions.44 Brzezinski argues
that China is more of a participant than a challenger. “China’s leadership is not
inclined to challenge the United States militarily, and its focus remains on eco-
nomic development and winning acceptance as a great power.”45
There are two reasons underlying China’s choice to get involved in the in-
ternational system. First, China’s strategic choices are bound to have cultural
implications. To practice the Mean or to build a world of balanced relations
requires China to work in parallel with other nations. If China withdraws from
international society as it did in the 1950s to the 1970s, it would depart from
the Mean and turn itself into a polar power, which would cause confrontation
between the dominant power and itself, the rising power. Moreover, China
recognizes that the international system helps sustain its development.
Second, the U.S., the sole superpower, is not willing to allow China, a
socialist power with nuclear weapons, to be independent from the system. As
Mearsheimer writes:

It is clear from the historical record how American policymakers will react
if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States does not tolerate peer
competitors. As it demonstrated in the twentieth century, it is determined to
remain the world’s only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States will
seek to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer
capable of dominating Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave
toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.46
96 Chapter Five

The American motive is to contain China within the system and prevent
China from becoming a power that challenges American interests.
There are two explanations why China’s booming economy attracts more
suspicion than approval. First, China is viewed through the prism of the po-
litical culture and historical experience of the West, which values equality,
independence, competition, and conflict. Western culture cherishes progress
by sacrificing harmony whereas Chinese culture prioritizes harmony by
downplaying progress. The experience of past great powers often leads to
the conclusion that power transition results in inevitable conflict. China’s
enormous economic growth reminds the Western countries of their own rapid
rise and leads to the conclusion of a “China threat.” To pessimistic realists,
competition between the dominant power and the rising one is inescapable. A
realist like Mearsheimer does not believe that there is any status quo power in
the international system. A rising China is the most dangerous potential threat
to the United States in the early twenty-first century. A wealthy China will
not be a status quo power but rather a state determined to ambitiously achieve
regional hegemonic status47 Gilpin elaborated that “a state will attempt to
change the international system only if it has relative advantage over the
other state, that is, if the balance of power in the system is to its advantage.”48
China’s worldwide expansion of products, hunger for resources, military
build-up, and currency and trade disputes with the U.S. and European coun-
tries support the notion that “relations between a superpower and an emerging
rival are bound to be touchy.”49
Second, China is not a democratic country and has quite a different politi-
cal ideology from most of the developed world. China’s fast growth causes
more unease in developed countries than in developing ones. It is undeniable
that ideological differences have been at play in international relations. When
the United States rose in the nineteenth century, and Japan and West Ger-
many rose after WWII, they were not contained by developed nations. On the
contrary, the economic, political, and military build-up of the Soviet Union
brought about containment from capitalist countries and led to tensions and,
ultimately, to the Cold War. In today’s world, China, India, and even Brazil
all enjoy remarkable economic development. Why is only China regarded with
suspicion? The answer might be that the United States, Germany, Japan, India,
and Brazil share a similar political ideology that China does not. China is not
“one of us” for the West. At the same time, it is a nation with a long history, a
rich culture, a large territory, and a huge population. Thus it has the potential
to change the international system even if it does not have such an intention.
In fact, whether a rising power gets contained or not has to do with the
strategic choices made by the rising power as well as by other powers. Dur-
ing a time of transition, the international society first contains those who are
apparently playing the role of the challenger or who present unclear strate-
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 97

gies. By the same token, the source of the “China threat” concept may not be
found in the increase of China’s wealth but rather in the unknown strategies
for its transition economy. In order to mitigate this unease, China has articu-
lated new strategies and has conveyed to the world such intentions as peace
and development (by Deng Xiaoping), being a responsible power (by Jiang
Zemin), and a harmonious world (by Hu Jintao).
The post Cold-War international order is still uncertain. For the benefit of
China and global stability, the best approach for China is to adopt Mean-oriented
policies. As discussed previously, the Mean signifies a neutral situation in which
differences are harmonized. The physical world was born in chaos, developed
epistemological dichotomies, and then the Mean was found. In the context of
international relations, the Mean refers to a world where different factions co-
exist in harmony, and where there is no absolute peace or absolute chaos. Chi-
nese tradition emphasizes practicing the Mean positively rather than passively.
Pang Pu writes that practicing the Mean reveals neither egocentricity in inter-
personal relations nor anthropocentricity in the universe. Otherwise, it polarizes
itself into a state of duality and departs from the true meaning of the Mean. The
Mean offers a solution to many of the entrenched dichotomies of modern times:
East versus West, China versus the world, traditions versus modernity, matter
versus spirit, and science versus humanity. This does not mean that Confucian-
ism can unify the world or China can serve as the center on the world stage; if
that were so, the principles of the Mean would be violated.50
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China played the
role of a challenger in the international system with the intention to oppose
hegemony. This strategy, a deviation from the Mean, did not benefit China
but rather isolated it. At the end of the 1950s, China began to oppose the So-
viet Union’s hegemonic behavior. By the 1960s, China established the grand
strategy of “fighting with two fists,” which referred to fighting the two he-
gemons of the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of this policy,
China was plagued by both internal and external difficulties. It has paid a high
price for going to the extremes.
Historical experience demonstrates that the costs and benefits of being a
challenger are inversely related. In his theory of long cycles of world politics,
Modelski posited that since 1500, Spain, France, Germany, and the Soviet
Union acted one after another as the challenging power, yet none had won a
global war. On the contrary, the new leading power was usually one that had
been the ally or partner of the old dominant power.51 It is thus not a prudent
approach for China to show any intention of challenging the prevailing inter-
national hegemony. It is obvious that the United States would contain China
or Japan if either of them tried to dominate East Asia. This does not imply
that China is afraid of might, but rather that it avoids conflict for the sake of
international stability and its own prosperity.
98 Chapter Five

CONCLUSION

Though culture is not an omnipotent factor, it does shape a nation’s inter-

nal and external behaviors. A culture is attractive only when it is capable
of solving problems and contradictions in the process of development and
transition. Democracy is what Europe and the United States provide for the
world, whereas the Mean is China’s contribution to the international com-
munity. The world order today is still characterized by economic, political,
and cultural extremes. The Mean is what the world needs most. The lesson of
the Mean is to accept differences and harmonize the extremes of excess and
deficiency. In this sense, China’s soft power is inherent in the Mean.
In accordance with the Mean, China should stay in the “middle way.” As
such, it must orientate itself as a defensive participant within the system, one
who aims not at changing the status quo or opposing hegemony, but at defen-
sively managing both internal and external challenges and avoiding high-cost
competition so as to sustain its own development and modernization. China
should not position itself at one extreme or another but rather align itself
with the mainstream of the international community in order to maintain the
system’s stability.
China should enhance international cooperation by promoting compro-
mise, as it did during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. This is one way to
achieve the Mean. China also must solve international disputes by adopting
a soft approach: as Confucianism teaches, the soft overcomes the hard just as
dripping water eventually penetrates rock.
China needs to recognize the importance of respecting cultural, political,
religious, and ideological diversity and should encourage tolerance, respect,
and dialogue among nations. Balanced international relations are achieved
by reconciling differences; as Confucius advocated, “men of honor live in
harmony with differences, men without honor live in conflict without dif-
ferences.” All these initiatives are possible because China has a deep-rooted
cultural emphasis on the Mean, which it has successfully practiced in both its
ancient history and in recent decades.

NOTES

1. Yu Keping and Zhuang Junju, “Guanyu ‘Beijing Gongshi’ Yu Zhongguo Fa-

zhan Moshi De Duihua” [Dialogue about ‘Beijing Consensus’ and China’s model of
development], October 26, 2005, www.people.com.cn. (accessed October 6, 2008).
2. Zhang Jianjing, “‘Beijing Gongshi’ Yu Zhongguo Ruanshili De Tisheng” [‘Bei-
jing Consensus’ and increasing of China’s soft power], Contemporary World and
Socialism 4 (2004): 7.
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 99

3. Zhu Feng “Zhongguo Ying Duo Cezhong ‘Ruanshili’ Jueqi” [China Should
Particularly Emphasize the Rise of Soft Power], Global Times, April 30, 2007, 11.
4. Pang Zhongying, “Guanyu Zhongguo Ruanliliang Wenti” [On China’s soft
power issue] Forum on International Issues 42 (Summer 2006): 9.
5. Lu Gang, “Wenhua Shili Ruo Rang Zhongguo Shifen” [China loses score
because of her weak cultural power], Global Times, June 19, 2007, 11.; Zhu Hong,
“Wenhua Xiyingli Yu Guojia Xingxiang” [Culture attraction and national image],
World Culture 4 (2007): 7.; Li Haijuan, “‘Ruanquanli’ Jingzheng Beijing Xia De
Wenhua Zhanlue” [The cultural strategy on the background of competition among
‘soft powers’], Studies on Mao-Zedong and Deng-Xiaoping Theories 12 (2004): 73.
6. Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” Wall Street Journal/Asia,
December 29, 2005, x.
7. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,”
Policy Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2006.
8. James F. Paradise, “Can China’s Soft Power Offensive Succeed?” Asia News
Daily, March 5, 2007, www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=65078. (ac-
cessed October 6, 2008).
9. Alan Hunter, “China: Soft Power and Cultural Influence,” www.ipra2006
.com/papers/CRPBC/ChinaSoftPowerAndCulturalInfluence, x.
10. Pang Pu. “Zhongyong Yu San Fen” [The mean and three divisions], 2000,
www.confucius2000.com. (accessed October 6, 2008).
11. Adda Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Edison, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1994), 5.
12. Martin Wight, Systems of States, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester Univer-
sity Press, 1977).
13. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New
York: Macmillan, 1977).
14. A. J. Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1934–1961).
15. An “equilibrium world” is much closer to the Chinese concept of “Hexie Shi-
jie” than a “harmonious world.”
16. Karl-Heinz Pohl, “Communitarianism and Confucianism: In Search of Com-
mon Moral Ground,” in Chinese Thought in a Global Context: A Dialogue Between
Chinese and Western Philosophical Approaches,” ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl (Leiden, Bos-
ton, Köln: Brill, 1999), 262–86.
17. Confucius, The Doctrine of the Mean, trans. James Legge, 1893, www
.sacred-texts.com/cfu/conf3.htm. (accessed October 6, 2008).
18. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
19. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
20. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
21. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
22. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
23. Confucius, “The Doctrine of The Mean”.
24. Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching, 30, trans. James Legge, 1891, www.sacred-texts. com/
tao/taote.htm.
100 Chapter Five

25. Lao Zi, Tao Te Ching, 61.

26. David Kang, “Why China’s Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in
the East Asian Region,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no.3 (September 2005): 539–75.
27. Mark Mancall, “The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy,” The
Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science 349 (September 1963):
14–26.
28. Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 1992), 30.
29. Laozi, Tao Te Ching, 61.
30. Zhao Xianfeng. “Great Voyage, Peace Envoy,” a special news report, July
08, 2005, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2005-07/08/content_
245223.htm. (accessed October 6, 2008).
31. Deng, “Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan,” 49.
32. Deng, “Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan,” 19.
33. Deng, “Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan,”53.
34. Deng, “Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan,” 20.
35. People’s Daily Online, October 2, 2007
36. Zhang Niansheng, “Ouzhou Qingshaonian Fuza Kan Meiguo” [European
youngsters complicate views toward the United States], Global Times, August 14,
2007, 4.
37. Hugo Restall, see Axel Berkofsky, “The Hard Facts on ‘Soft Power’,” Asia
Times Online, May 25, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IE25Ad02.html. (ac-
cessed on October 6, 2008).
38. Deng, “Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan,” 363.
39. Chen Jianfeng and Guo Xuetang, “Maodun Yu Zhenghe:Guoji Shehui Xiang
Hechu Qu?” [Conflict and reconciliation: Where the world should head to?], Social
Science 1 (2003): 37.
40. Zhang, “Beijing Consensus,” 316.
41. Laozi, Tao Te Ching, 10, trans.Peter A. Merel, 1995, www.chinapage. com/
gnl.html.
42. ohn Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Chinese version),
(Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2003), 28.
43. Robert B. Zoelick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”
Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005.
44. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”. International Security.
Vol.27, No. 4 (Spring 2003). 5–56.
45. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, January/February
2005, web.rollins.edu/~tlairson/easia/chinaforpol.pdf (accessed October 6, 2008).
46. John Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy, January/February
2005, http://web.rollins.edu/~tlairson/easia/chinaforpol.pdf (accessed October 6,
2008).
47. Mearsheimer, “Tragedy,” 529.
48. Robert Gilpin, War and Chang in World Politics (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1981): 54.
 The Practice of the Mean: China’s Soft Power Cultivation 101

49. Editorial, “Emerging China,” Washington Post, July 10, 2005, B6.
50. Pang Pu, “Zhongyong Yu San Fen” (The Mean and Three Divisions). www
.confucius2000-4-4.
51. George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,”
Comparative Studies in Society and History 20 (1978): 214–238.
 Chapter Six

Education: The Intellectual

Base of China’s Soft Power
Xiaohe Cheng

According to Joseph Nye, higher education is a significant driver of a coun-

try’s soft power, “the ability to win the hearts and minds of others.”1 Powerful
nations are rarely weak in the educational sector. A strong and prosperous
society always attracts foreign nationals for advanced education, and a qual-
ity higher education system elevates a nation’s international status and repu-
tation. After a decades-long, single-minded pursuit of hard power, Chinese
leaders have finally come to realize that it is now time to develop China’s
soft power. Part of their effort is to transform Chinese universities into world-
class institutions. The latest attempts to promote the Confucius Institutes
across the world is also a critical indicator that the Chinese government is
trying to transform its higher education institutes into world powerhouses,
which can then generate and project Chinese influence abroad.
The first part of this chapter is a brief review of Chinese educational
history that helps explain Chinese leaders’ ambitious “charm offensive” in
general and the country’s higher education development in particular. Next,
I address the efforts by the Chinese government during the reform era to
rejuvenate the educational sector. I then discuss the increasing attraction of
China’s higher education for foreign students. In the last part of the chapter, I
analyze some of the challenges for China in its attempt to use education as a
means to advance its soft power. I conclude that China has great potential to
develop its educational sector as part of its soft power initiative but daunting
challenges exist.

103
104 Chapter Six

EDUCATION IN ANTIQUITY

Education has occupied a central position in Chinese life since ancient times.
Confucius, the great educator and thinker, emphasized that human beings
are teachable, improvable, and perfectible. Thus, education—together with
rituals and family—is one of the three major institutions that people can use
to cultivate their virtue. With a few exceptions, the successive dynasties in
China have stressed the importance of education. Highly developed educa-
tional systems gave birth to cultural prosperity, which in turn helped to shape
China’s relations with other parts of the world. Yu observed that the introduc-
tion of the tributary system in Chinese foreign relations, which was largely
derived from the educational system, clearly formed a vision of a world order
based on the superiority of Chinese culture.2
As the traditional educational system became mature, the civil service
examination was introduced for the first time by the Sui Dynasty (581–
618). Although the short-lived Sui did not have time to fully implement
the new procedures, the introduction of the examination system began a
new era in Chinese history. The examination became a convenient instru-
ment for the ruling class to recruit new talent; for the ruled, it offered a
valuable way to move upward in a hierarchical society. The Tang Dynasty
made good use of the examination system. As the most open and dynamic
dynasty in China’s history, the Tang gave rise to a vibrant outward-looking
culture. As Mu (2001) notes, “current academic thought is that the politi-
cal and social institutions of the Han and Tang dynasties have not been
surpassed.”3
The Song Dynasty adopted a national strategy of “attaching importance
to civil affairs . . . [and] neglecting military ones” (zhongwen qingwu), and
thus rode another wave of educational advancement and cultural prosperity
rarely seen in China’s history. The dramatic technological improvements
in printing and papermaking helped to facilitate the proliferation of carved
wood books. In turn, the availability of printed texts greatly encouraged the
spread of knowledge far beyond the privileged class. Private schools (sishu)
and academies (shuyuan) proliferated across China. The enlarged pool of
educated people and the emergence of distinguished scholars such as Zhuxi,
made the Song Dynasty a standout in Chinese educational history.
As the Mongols began to rule China in the thirteenth century, education
became much less important. The traditional civil service examination was
suspended, and often abolished, for lengthy periods of time, thus blocking the
ability of the Han Chinese to pursue careers within the government through
the exam system. Although the continuity of the Chinese educational tradi-
tion was interrupted, cultural expansion continued its momentum largely due
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 105

to the Mongols’ endless military campaigns that brought about extensive

interactions between China and other parts of the world. For the first time,
educational development and cultural expansion diverged: education faltered
but culture remained relatively strong.
This divergence was never redressed during the Ming Dynasty even though
education was re-established and the civil service examination restored. The
Ming’s educational system became more complicated as the “eight-legged
essay” (ba guwen) was adopted as the primary format for civil service exams.
Although the eight-legged essay helped to eliminate favoritism by standard-
izing the exams, its rigid format seriously reduced students’ creativity.
As a consequence of the exploration of the New World, Western Christians
made their way into China starting in the mid-sixteenth century. Missionaries
like Matteo Ricci made great efforts to translate Western books into Chinese.
Unfortunately, the sporadic contacts between the Chinese and the West did
not significantly change China. As an agrarian country with a highly cen-
tralized leadership, China showed little enthusiasm for Western ideas and
technologies. As neo-Confucianism began to permeate into Chinese society,
education became a mere instrument for people to secure a position in the
government. Cultural vigor withered and China increasingly became conser-
vative and inward-looking.4 In attempt to consolidate their internal control
and prevent external attacks, the Ming rulers imposed a ban on maritime
trade, forbidding Chinese from going overseas as well as foreigners from
coming in to do business. Although the ban was never strictly enforced, it
remained in place as a long-term national policy. Except for Zheng He’s
naval expeditions, which lasted twenty-eight years and were mainly aimed at
demonstrating China’s superiority in culture and technology, the Ming had
no interest in trade or cultural exchanges.

WESTERN IMPACT: STUDIES ABROAD

Traditional Chinese education, which was based on Confucianism, reached

its final but highest stage during the Qing Dynasty. At that time, education
lost its function of projecting China’s influence over neighboring countries. It
essentially became an instrument for the Court to maintain the empire’s inter-
nal order. Government control over academia tightened to an unprecedented
degree. Cultural vitality and intellectual dynamics were ruthlessly strangled.
Although the Qing rulers continued to regulate their external relations with
neighboring countries by exercising the age-old tributary system, they be-
came increasingly inward-looking and gradually slipped into self-imposed
isolation: the inherited ban on maritime trade was much more rigorously
106 Chapter Six

implemented with only one port, Guangzhou, opened to foreign traders. Pri-
vate contact between the Chinese and foreigners was strictly forbidden.
The traditional Chinese educational system experienced its first sudden jolt
when China’s closed-door was ripped off by British gunboats. The Western-
ers’ technological superiority, as revealed by their military might, shocked
the Chinese ruling class and forced them to build up the country’s hard
power. As Ting-Tee Kuo noted, “since European military power appeared to
depend on technology, the adoption of this technology was regarded as the
primary task.”5 The Qing ruling class adopted a policy of “learn advanced
technology from Barbarians in order to oppose Barbarians” (shiyi changji yi
zhiyi).6 As a direct result of this policy, new types of schools emerged one
after another. The Beijing Tongwen Guan, a new school designed to train
translators for Chinese diplomats, was established under the Grand Council’s
auspices in 1860. In addition to formal education, training schools affiliated
with big factories and shipyards were established. Hundreds of students under
the age of fourteen were recruited from local families in the hope that they
could learn how to manufacture guns and ships.
Studying foreign technology at home was not enough for the Qing. In the
late nineteenth century, they took the unprecedented step of sending students
abroad. In 1872, the first group of 30 Chinese youths was sent to the United
States to study. By 1875, the number of students in the United States had in-
creased to 120. Initially, these students had planned to study there for fifteen
years, and were strongly advised to study military and industrial engineering.
Unfortunately, as anti-Chinese sentiment intensified in the United States and
opposition from Chinese conservatives strengthened, the Chinese govern-
ment decided to call back all the students in 1881.7 Almost at the same time,
the Qing rulers also sent smaller group of Fuzhou school graduates to Europe,
including Great Britain and France. Some of them were trained to be future
ship captains, who could operate modern warships being ordered in Europe.
In contrast with the abrupt termination of the program in the United States,
the program in Europe lasted well into the twentieth century.
Although the first government-sponsored overseas study program was
small in scale, it produced a number of distinguished scientists, diplomats,
and captains. More importantly, for the first time, the Chinese government
was willing to learn directly from a foreign land, which opened the door for
more Chinese people to study overseas. But the traditional Chinese educa-
tional system was not ready to give way to the new learning. The ruling class
had not fundamentally overcome its contempt for the “Barbarians.” They
insisted upon “Chinese learning as the basis, Western learning for practical
use” (zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong).8 In other words, the Chinese wanted
Western technology but not its ideas.
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 107

As the old education system struggled, schools sponsored by Christian mis-

sions began to take root in China. From 1843 to 1860, the Christian church
established about fifty schools, which enrolled 1,000 students. But from 1861
to 1874, the numbers of schools and their enrollment jumped to 800 and
20,000, respectively. For the first time, Western-style middle schools, as well
as schools for girls, emerged. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the
first group of universities funded by the Christian church appeared in China.
From 1901 to 1911, the number of Christian schools surged to over 10,000
with about 300,000 Chinese students attending them. In terms of enrollment
numbers and teaching quality, these Christian schools clearly outperformed
their Chinese government-funded counterparts.9
As the Christian schools developed, more and more Chinese students, disil-
lusioned with the “Self-Strengthening Movement” that had been bankrupted
by the first Sino-Japanese war, studied abroad. Ironically, Japan, which tradi-
tionally played the role of student of China, became the first destination for
Chinese students overseas. The first generation of Chinese revolutionaries,
such as Sun Yat-sen, Huang Xing, Zhou Enlai, and Chiang Kai-shek, were
educated in Japan. As a response to the humiliating defeat in the war with
Japan, Emperor Guangxu attempted to carry out sweeping reform by issuing
some forty decrees, including the abolition of the civil service examination
system. As Fairbanks (1998) noted, “the old order was losing its intellectual
foundation and therefore its philosophical cohesion.”10
As China was poised to embrace the Western educational system, the great
powers intensified their efforts to attract Chinese students. In 1906, in the
wake of a nationwide boycott of American goods due to the resumption of the
Chinese Exclusion Act in 1905, Edmund J. James, then President of Illinois
University, sent a memo to President Theodore Roosevelt, suggesting that the
American government should take measures to attract more Chinese students
to the United States on the grounds that American-educated Chinese leaders
might be more receptive to American influence.11 In 1907, in an effort to ad-
dress Chinese grievances and to compete with Japan who had already made
some inroads in Chinese educational sector, the American government de-
cided to refund half of the Boxer Indemnity on the condition that the money
would be allocated to scholarships for Chinese students sent to American col-
leges. From 1909 to 1910, 118 Chinese students were awarded the indemnity
scholarships and were sent to the United States.12 By 1911, there were 650
Chinese students in the United States, 443 of whom were self-funded.13
However, this last-minute reform failed to save the Qing rule. The final
collapse of the dynasty in 1911 pushed “learning from the West” to a new
level: the mere emulation of Western technology and institutions gave way
to the study of Western “isms.” A variety of “isms,”—including anarchism,
108 Chapter Six

liberalism, and socialism—made deep inroads into Chinese intellectual life,

which in turn gave birth to various political parties, including the National-
ist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party (CCP). In 1912, the new repub-
lican regime formulated a new educational system, which turned out to be
short-lived because of President Yuan Shikai’s attempt to restore monarchy.
After years of debate, influenced by the ideas of American philosopher John
Dewey and educator Paul Monroe,14 an American-style educational system
was finally established in 1922. This system still forms the basic framework
of Chinese education today.15 As predicted by Westerners, many returning
students became political activists and played a leading role in overthrowing
the Qing dynasty. Sun Yat-sen, a Japanese-educated student, even became the
interim President of the Republic of China.
A new twist on “learning from the West” occurred when the CCP estab-
lished the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. To administer the
war-ravaged country, the new regime needed a large skilled work force. As
the PRC adopted the “lean-to-one-side” policy, the Soviet Union replaced
the United States as the main destination for Chinese students. The older
American-style educational model underwent a thorough reconstruction in
accordance with the Soviet model, which stressed the specialized training
of scientific personnel in natural sciences. The Western-style colleges of
liberal arts were transformed into polytechnic colleges that produced more
engineers, Soviet curricula and textbooks made their way into Chinese
campuses, and Russian became the most popular foreign language to study
(approximately eighty percent of high school students learned Russian at that
time).16 In 1953, China sent 583 students to the Soviet Union but by 1956,
that number jumped to 2,000.17
However, the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s made this educational
boom short-lived. As China gradually slipped into self-imposed isolation in
the 1960s, the whole educational system became increasingly politicized.
Party affiliation took precedence over expertise, enrollments were mainly
based on class background rather than academic merit, and educational ex-
changes with other countries nearly stopped. The whole educational system
was in a shambles as large numbers of high school and college students and
their teachers were sent to the countryside for “reeducation.” Interestingly,
even though Chinese higher learning was in bad shape, China became a study
destination for students from some third-world countries. As Pepper (1986)
observed, “it became fashionable to explore what could be learned from the
Chinese experience and applied elsewhere.”18 Unfortunately, the number of
foreign students was very small: by the end of 1966, only 190 African stu-
dents from fourteen countries came to China.19
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 109

Deng Xiaoping’s initiation of reform and the open-door policy in late

1970s fundamentally changed the Chinese educational landscape. In 1978,
the Chinese government resumed the massive overseas study program, and
more than 480 government-funded Chinese students were sent abroad that
year.20 With the passage of time, the government’s control of self-funded
overseas study was also relaxed. After 1980, Chinese students were allowed
to accept scholarships provided by foreign institutions and individuals.
“Studying abroad” became a huge phenomenon in Chinese society, as hun-
dreds and thousands Chinese students pursued academic degrees overseas.
From 1978 to 1989, about 60,000 government-funded students were sent out,
including 20,000 graduates and 1,000 undergraduates. During the same time,
the number of self-funded overseas students was over 20,000.21 Hu Yaobang,
former General Secretary of the CCP, announced in 1983 that “we’ve sent
nearly 20,000 students to study abroad; such a large scale has never been seen
in China’s history.”22
The purpose of sending out so many students was simple: “to learn ad-
vanced science, advanced technology, and advanced managerial skills in
order to facilitate China’s ‘Four Modernizations.’”23 But Western ideas also
fueled the students’ movements that occurred in 1986 and 1989. “Learning
from the West” was so strong that the Tiananmen incident did not derail the
state-run overseas study program even though the program was somewhat
scaled back.
In sum, for the last 150 years, the Chinese have demonstrated a strong
commitment to education as an essential component of their strategy to make
China wealthy and strong. During this “catch-up” period, the aura of the Chi-
nese traditional education quickly dimmed and foreign systems became the
main source of inspiration.

EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM

DIYI SHENGCHANLI TO KEJIAO XINGGUO24

As Deng Xiaoping re-emerged as China’s top leader in the Post-Mao era, he

made a sober assessment of China’s educational situation: (1) “Now it ap-
pears that China is fully 20 years behind the developed countries in science,
technology and education,”25 (2) “The key to achieving modernization is the
development of science and technology” and “unless we pay special attention
to education, it will be impossible to develop science and technology,”26 and
(3) Initially education and science lined up in third place in Chinese strategic
priorities;27 later, in Deng Xiaoping’s “three-step” strategy of development
110 Chapter Six

formally announced in 1987,28 the first priority became “to develop education
and science and technology.”29
With these pronouncements, the battered school system was put back on
track, the suspended national entrance examination for college was restored,
academic merit was again emphasized, and previously denounced intel-
lectuals were welcomed back. Deng Xiaoping’s call to “respect knowledge,
respect trained personnel” gradually took root, and hundreds of thousands of
underprivileged students went to college.
The new series of measures produced impressive results. As the Chinese
government tried hard to promote nine years of compulsory education, higher
education also leapfrogged to become a global enterprise. The enrollment of
full-time students in higher education institutions jumped from 1,140,000 in
1980 to 1,750,000 in 198530 and 2,701,000 in 1988.31 From 1979 to 1989,
higher education institutions produced 3,821,600 graduates, exceeding the
total produced in the first thirty years of the PRC’s history. In 1982, for
the first time, China began to train its own doctoral students. As of 1989,
147,948 students with master’s degrees and 4,827 students with doctoral
degrees had joined the workforce.32 From 1978 to 1989, more than 80,000
students traveled abroad to study in over 70 countries, with 600,000 of them
state-funded.33
As public higher education institutions proliferated, the Chinese govern-
ment took further steps in 1985 to reform the outmoded educational system
with an aim to produce more talent students as quickly as possible. In 1985,
in order to enhance the role of science and technology and root out the re-
maining prejudice against intellectuals, Deng Xiaoping began to emphasize
that “science and technology are productive forces.”34 Deng’s tone sharpened
further as the 1980s ended. At a meeting with President Gustav Husak of
Czechoslovakia in 1988, Deng announced that “science and technology are
the primary productive force” [emphasis mine].35 In order to develop science
and technology, Deng pledged that “we should try every way to expand edu-
cation, even if it means slowing down in other fields.”36
The Tiananmen incident did not disrupt China’s efforts to promote educa-
tion inside China. After Jiang Zemin took over the leadership of the PRC, he
faced two kinds of challenges: the first was the new technological revolution
introduced by information breakthroughs and the second was the “peaceful
evolution” initiated by the Western countries. In 1994, during the National
Educational Conference, Jiang Zemin emphasized that “education is a fun-
damental issue concerning the general situation of socialist modernization
and the historical fate of socialism.”37 Accordingly, it would be China’s basic
strategy to shift from economic development to a new track mainly based
on technological progress, improving the quality of the labor force, placing
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 111

a priority on education, and raising the national level of ethics, science, and
culture.38 These proposals were included in the “Outline of Educational Re-
form and Development in China,” which systematically detailed the general
objectives of educational development that were announced in 1990.39 For the
first time, the outline revealed the “211 Project,” which was designed to push
100 Chinese universities into the highest rankings in the world.
In 1995, Jiang Zemin further left his personal mark on China’s educational
strategy by coining the concept of “rejuvenating the country through science
and education” (kejiao xingguo). “Kejiao xingguo” became the new strategy
for China’s development following the promulgation of the landmark “Deci-
sion on Accelerating the Progress of Science and Technology.” This Deci-
sion made it clear that “science and technology is no longer the province of
the old Soviet-style institutes; universities and the private industry should do
research as well.” Furthermore, it called on research and institutions of higher
education to create joint ventures with Chinese or foreign companies in order
to accelerate the transfer of science and technology to China’s industry.40 A
few years later, then Premier Zhu Rongji echoed, “The implementation of the
Kejiao Xingguo is a matter of vital importance for economic development and
national modernization.”41
Over time, China’s leaders have come to realize how essential education
is for the country’s development. Education has jumped from being the third
priority to the first, from one of the necessary prerequisites to the Four Mod-
ernizations to a “fundamental strategy” (gengben daji). This paved the way
for the Chinese government to shift gears from merely catching up with the
West to overseeing the spectacular rise in education seen today.

BECOMING A GREAT EDUCATIONAL POWER

Due to its rapid economic development, China has more resources than ever
before, which in turn has whet its appetite for transforming Chinese universi-
ties into heavyweight, respected global institutions. As early as in 1994, the
Chinese government launched the “211 Project,” the largest direct investment
ever made by the government in PRC’s history.42 This project envisaged that
after several years’ effort, l00 universities and 100 key disciplines would have
greatly improved their quality of education, scientific research, management,
and institutional efficiency. Consequently, they would become the bases for
training highly skilled workers, who would then solve the major problems of
the country’s economic and social development.43 From 1996 to 2000, China
invested more than 18 billion Yuan (US $2.2 billion) on the project.44 How-
ever, 100 universities competed for the limited funds and the results were not
112 Chapter Six

encouraging. In 1998, after Jiang Zemin’s call to promote a number of elite

Chinese universities to world-class rank, the Ministry of Education launched
the “985 Project,” in which the government allocated significant funds to a
small number of these elite universities. Thirty-four top universities, which
were also awarded funds by the “211 Project,” would receive three-year
grants ranging from 200 million to 1.8 billion Yuan. As Mohrman (2005)
wrote, “The 985 Project reflects a conscious strategy to concentrate resources
on a handful of institutions with the greatest potential for success in the in-
ternational academic marketplace.”45 The launch of the “985 Project” set in
motion an unprecedented large-scale expansion of China’s higher education:
the total number of new students admitted into higher education institutions
in 1999 jumped to 1.3 million, a twenty percent year-over-year increase.
In 2006, this number skyrocketed to 5.42 million.46 Postgraduate education
also experienced the same stunning growth: in 1998, higher education and
research institutions enrolled about 58,000 postgraduates, but in 2006 the
number reached about 400,000. The total number of students in higher edu-
cation institutions hit a record 23 million in 2005.47 During the same period
of time, college mergers also took place. Tsinghua University led the merger
movement in 1999. A number of mega-sized universities, like Zhejiang and
Jilin Universities, emerged overnight.
As higher education expanded, the Chinese government carried out the
“bring-in strategy” (qing jilai zhanlue) aimed at encouraging more foreign
students to study in China. The “bring-in” strategy is essential for Chinese
universities to embark on the path of internationalization. In fact, attracting
foreign students is not new for China. From the founding of the PRC to 1979,
China has received 9,757 foreign students.48 After pausing during the Cultural
Revolution, China resumed its student exchange program in 1973. From 1973
to 1978, a total of 2,498 international students studied in China.49 The 1979
Working Conference on Foreign Students emphasized that “accepting foreign
students not only helps friendly countries to train their talented students, but
also facilitates understanding and friendship between the Chinese people
and the people of the other countries.” The Conference decided to create
favorable conditions for a gradual increase in foreign students in China.50
Subsequently, from 1979 to 1984, the number of foreign students jumped to
about 17,800.51
As foreign students flocked to China, the Chinese government gave more
resources to student exchange programs. At the 1984 National Work Confer-
ence on Foreign Students, then Vice-Premier Li Peng reiterated, “Foreign stu-
dent work is an integral part of diplomacy, and must serve the general foreign
policy. . . . With the economic development and the growth of international
stature, China will accept more foreign students.”52 The Conference stressed
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 113

that accepting and training foreign students was a strategic initiative and that
government agencies at all levels had to pay enough attention to it.53 In 1988,
following the line drawn by the Conference, Chinese higher institutions en-
rolled 3,800 new foreign students from 110 countries.54 In order to encourage
more foreign students to study in China, in 1991, 1995, and 1999, the Chinese
government substantially increased stipends for foreign students who were
awarded scholarships. In 1990s, the number of foreign students increased at a
much quicker pace. In 1992, the number jumped to 13,000,55 then to 32,758 in
1995, and to 52,150 in 2000, according to data in the 1996 and 2001 editions
of the China Education Yearbook. More importantly, nearly ninety percent of
the foreign students were self-funded by 2000.56 Nonetheless, China attracted
far fewer students from other parts of the world than Western countries. For
example, in 1995, there were 452,000 foreign students in the U.S. but only
32,758 in China.57
Aware of this huge gap, the Chinese government intensified its efforts to
court more foreign students to come to China. In 1999, the Chinese Service
Center for Scholarly Exchange held its first-ever “Study in China Seminar”
(Liuxue Shuoming Hui) in Japan. In 2000, a similar promotion seminar was
held in South Korea. In order to encourage more foreign students to come to
China, the Chinese central government also significantly increased scholar-
ship quotas allocated to them, from 5,211 in 1999 to 11,000 in 2007.58 Chi-
nese local governments and companies also joined in and began to provide
financial support to foreign students.
While the “211” and “985” Projects were well under way, Chinese uni-
versities also became enthusiastic about bringing more foreign students onto
their campuses because maintaining a certain percentage of international
students was one of the critical requirements to raise their internationaliza-
tion level. As a critical step to lure foreign students, more and more uni-
versities offered scholarships and English-instructed courses, ranging from
acupuncture to international trade. In 1999, Beijing University for the first
time offered scholarships to thirty-five foreign students.59 Fudan and Renmin
Universities began to offer two-year English-instructed Master Programs in
2006. These programs attracted diplomats, members of NGOs, and employ-
ees of multinational corporations. As a result of these concerted efforts, the
number of foreign students in China skyrocketed from 52,150 in 2000 to
162,695 in 2006.60 China overtook Japan and became the number one study
destination in Asia.
The dramatic expansion of foreign students in China is a useful barometer,
since it not only demonstrates the reversal of the trend of talent outflow from
China but also reveals the strength of Chinese soft power. The rapid increase
of foreign students studying in China, and especially the significant ratio of
114 Chapter Six

self-funded students, clearly shows the increasing attractiveness of Chinese

higher education. More importantly, the attractiveness of traditional disci-
plines, such as Chinese medicine and Chinese language, began to spill over
into other fields, such as science and engineering. In addition to bringing in
more foreign students to China, the Chinese government has also adopted an
aggressive strategy of “going global” (Zou chu qu) in an attempt to promote
Chinese language and culture overseas in a systematic way.
“Chinese learning” became a new phenomenon in the 1970s when China
regained its seat in the United Nations Security Council. Nonetheless, “Japa-
nese learning” overshadowed “Chinese learning” during the 1980s as Japan
experienced its economic miracle. From 1978 to 1987, about 27,000 students
came to China to learn Chinese for short-term courses.61 In order to improve
the quality of Chinese learning, the Chinese government introduced the
“Chinese Proficiency Test” (HSK) in 1990, which is a standardized national
examination to assess the Chinese proficiency of non-native speakers. It
also issued the “Evaluation Method for Teachers’ Qualification in Teaching
Chinese as a Foreign Language (TCFL),” which aims to recruit qualified
teachers. As of 1991, about 120 higher institutions engaged in the TCFL and
hosted about 16,000 foreign language students.62
In the 1990s, as the Japanese economy struggled and the Chinese economy
boomed, Chinese learning regained its popularity across the world. From
1988 to 1999, more than 251,900 foreign students came to China to learn Chi-
nese.63 The Chinese government seized the chance to promote Chinese learn-
ing. In December 1999, the Second National Work Conference on TCFL was
convened in Beijing. On that occasion, Vice-Premier Qian Qichen pointed
out that teaching Chinese as a foreign language was “a national cause” and
had “important and far-reaching meaning in expanding China’s influence.”64
Echoing Qian’s analysis, Chen Zhili, Minister of Education, called for inten-
sifying efforts to promote Chinese learning overseas.65 In 2002, the Chinese
government announced plans to set up institutions overseas to systematically
promote Chinese culture and language. In 2004, the government finally put
forward an ambitious plan of setting up 500 Confucius Institutes throughout
the world by 2010.66 The Chinese government acted swiftly: the number of
overseas Confucius Institutes multiplied to 155 by May 200767 and to 209
by November 2007.68 The pace of this expansion was spectacular: about one
Confucius Institute was built every four days. Xu Lin, director of the Chinese
Language Council International (CLCI), jubilantly described the current
chance to be “once in a blue moon” and “if China misses the chance, it would
be very hard for it to do the same job again, even with tremendous effort”.69
The Confucius Institutes were publicly endowed with the primary task of
teaching Chinese as a foreign language. Since language itself is the princi-
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 115

pal instrument used by human beings to communicate with one another, as

well as being an effective medium for transmitting ideas, beliefs, values,
and tradition, promoting Chinese language learning overseas is the first step
to promote Chinese culture abroad. As Yan Juanqi, former Vice Mayor of
Shanghai, said, “to promote Chinese learning overseas is beneficial to the
revival and the spreading of traditional Chinese culture, to the projection of
a benign image of China on the international stage, as well as to the expan-
sion of China’s influence in the world.”70 The ultimate goal for the Confucius
Institutes is to “carry forward the great Chinese culture and promote Chinese
culture to the world”.71
In summary, over the years China has become a nation where higher edu-
cation is promoted and nurtured. As of today, there are 18 million students in
China’s higher education institutions. Moreover, it has produced 1.8 million
postgraduates in the past twenty-nine years.72 In less than thirty years, China
has overtaken the United States as the country with the largest student popu-
lation and is now the fourth-largest destination of international students.73
Keenly aware of the negative consequences that this spectacular expansion
might have on the quality of higher education, the Chinese government has
begun to consolidate its achievements by trying to focus more on quality
control than on mere numbers.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

There is no doubt that Chinese higher education helps to generate and project
China’s soft power abroad: more and more foreign students flock into China,
the Confucius Institutes continue to proliferate across the world, and aca-
demic interactions between China and the outside world multiply. But when
we analyze in detail China’s higher education strategy, we find that the over-
all results of China’s “charm offensive” are mixed and could face significant
challenges in the future.
The exponential increase in foreign student enrollment in China tells only
one side of the story. The origin of these students tells the other side: in 2006,
seventy-four percent of the students came from Asia, with Korea accounting
for almost fifty percent of that total.74 This extremely uneven distribution re-
veals that China’s educational influence is largely confined to its periphery.
Although the international students coming to China originate from the same
countries as those going to the United States,75 the gap between China and
the United States is quite wide on a number of key indicators: (1) While in
China, only thirty-four percent of international students pursue degrees, while
eighty-six percent do so in the United States. In other words, a significant
116 Chapter Six

proportion of international students stay much longer in the United States than
in China, and American higher educational institutes receive much higher tu-
itions and fees from international students than their Chinese counterparts;
(2) Among the degree-seeking students, only sixteen percent are graduate stu-
dents in China, but they are forty-five percent in the United States. This large
percentage disparity indicates that many more American-educated students
have advanced degrees than their counterparts in China, and so they would
likely have more promising careers back in their homeland; and (3) In China,
according to the 2007 China Education Yearbook, more than sixty percent
of international students focus on Chinese learning, and only four percent
major in science and engineering, while in the United States, eighteen per-
cent of international students major in business and management and fifteen
percent in engineering.76 In 2006, non-U.S. citizens earned forty-five percent
of all doctorates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics in the
United States.77
As China received more and more foreign students, the exodus of Chinese
students to Western countries also increased. Although the Chinese govern-
ment has taken a number of measures to encourage overseas Chinese to return
to China, and although the number of returning students is on the rise, the
majority of these students choose to stay where they have been studying. In
2004, more than 114,700 Chinese students, among whom 91 percent were
self-funded, went to study abroad, but only 25,100 returned home.78 This
“brain drain” has not significantly changed since then.
Any euphoria derived from the apparent progress made by China in higher
learning should be tempered by these facts. The lackluster attractiveness of
China’s higher education in comparison with some developed countries has
to do with its weak historical foundation on the one hand and the side effects
of its exponential growth on the other. Liu Daoyu, former President of Wuhan
University, criticized this expansion by labeling it a “New Great Leap Forward”
that has caused a crisis of quality (zhiliang weiji), a crisis of study style (xuefeng
weiji), and a financial crisis (caizheng weiji). According to Liu, these three crises
influence each other and severely undermine the quality of higher learning.79 In
November 2005, a task force led by Yang Jie, Vice Director of the Institute of
Higher Education at Shanghai Jiaotong University, released a report warning
that “the quality of graduate education in China’s key universities is fairly low”
and the future of higher education in the country “is vague.”80 Certainly, the
lasting attractiveness of a Chinese education depends on its quality, but quality
improvement takes time; compromised educational quality would discourage
foreign students from coming to China to study.
Although Chinese officials have denied that the development of Confucius
Institutes was, as critics put it, a “blind great leap forward,” establishing one
Institute every four days has caused problems that cannot be ignored. The
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 117

problems are three-fold: First, there is the difficulty of learning the Chinese
language. Although more people speak Chinese as a native language than any
other language in the world, it is largely confined to mainland China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Macau, and Singapore. As a non-alphabetic language, Chinese
has a reputation as one of most difficult languages to learn.81 The difficulty
of learning Chinese may scare away some people who are interested or force
some to give up prematurely.
Second, Chinese officials have acknowledged that the absence of high
quality textbooks and the shortage of certified teachers are the two major
bottlenecks in the development of Confucius Institutes. In fact, the chal-
lenges that the Institutes face extend far beyond the textbooks and teachers.
The prospect of long-term financial relations between the Chinese govern-
ment and the local host universities is troublesome. The Chinese government
pledged that each branch of the Institute would receive funding during its first
three years, and then it would have to find ways to become self-sufficient.
This arrangement triggers a thorny question: why would the host universities
agree to make a long-term financial commitment to Institutes tasked with
boosting China’s soft power? In fact, the host universities tend to seek more
sources of funding from Hanban by leveraging their cooperation with China.
With regard to the future locations of the Confucius Institutes, the critical
questions are: What benefits accrue to the host universities? For how long and
to what extent is the Chinese government willing to give money?
Finally, fierce international competition could make China’s “bring in” and
“go global” campaigns an uphill struggle. Chinese higher education and the
Confucius Institutes do not have the privilege of being a one-man show on the
world stage. They have to compete for influence with their foreign counterparts
sponsored by the Western powers. China cannot ignore the facts that Germany
has run its Goethe Institutes for more than five decades, the United Kingdom
and France both are strong players in the field thanks to a chain of British Coun-
cils and Alliances Françaises, and the United States and Japan are also trying
to maintain their leading position. Therefore, “ensuring the quality of teaching,
establishing and improving the quality of the certification system, and publish-
ing high quality Chinese teaching materials”82 is not enough to make China’s
voice heard above this boisterous chorus in the long run.
China’s enhanced educational attractiveness is, to a large extent, an out-
growth of its incredible economic success. But rapid economic growth has
caused a variety of social and environmental problems, which in turn threaten
development sustainability. Although the recent reforms and the open-door
policy have brought tangible benefits to ordinary people, many Chinese are
now struggling with the so-called “New Three Mountains”: the high cost of
housing, schooling, and medical care. Drinking clean water and breathing
clean air have become luxuries that many Chinese dream about. As Chinese
118 Chapter Six

economist Hu Angang acknowledged, the challenges that a rising China are

facing mainly come from within rather than from outside. A “green” envi-
ronmentally friendly development model is a welcomed alternative to the
current “black” model, which is characterized by high-energy consumption
and severe pollution.83

CONCLUSION

China has the longest tradition of education in the world. As a convenient

governing tool, education once helped to create a united and strong Chinese
empire and spread China’s culture and influence across its borders. As the
traditional education system became more sophisticated and stable, it was
blamed for being the root of China’s backwardness and weakness. This
century-long humiliation transformed China from a role model for its neigh-
bors to a humble imitator. The Western countries became its source of inspi-
ration, from technology to institutions to political philosophy. In addition to
emulating foreign educational systems, the Chinese began to travel to foreign
countries in order to seek knowledge and technology. After 150 years, the
process of emulation is not yet finished and the momentum of overseas stud-
ies continues to grow.
Nonetheless, after generations of painstaking efforts, the Chinese educa-
tional enterprise has finally been experiencing rapid development and has
begun to produce soft power by attracting more foreign students and promot-
ing Chinese culture and language abroad. The logic that underlines China’s
efforts to lure more foreign students has actually been spelled out by former
American Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said: “I can think of no more
valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who
have been educated here.”84
But China has a long way to go to become a great educational power. It is
still in the process of catching up with Western countries, as shown by the ex-
ponential growth of higher education and the apparent scarcity of strong aca-
demic disciplines. China’s ambition to transform itself from a global factory
to a center of high-quality education faces a number of internal and external
challenges. The prospects of this transformation, which, to a large extent,
hinges on the sustainability of its economic success, remain to be seen.

NOTES

1. Joseph Nye, “You Can’t Get Here From There,” New York Times, November
29, 2004.
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 119

2. Yu Ying-Shih, “Han Foreign Relations,” The Cambridge History of China 1:

The Chin and Han Empires, 221 B.C.–220 A.D., eds. Denis Twitchett and Michael
Loewe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 383.
3. Qian Mu, Guoshi Xinlun [New comments on Chinese history] (Shanghai: SDX
Joint Publishing Company, 2001), 356–357.
4. Zhang Weihua, Zhongguo gudai duiwai guanxishi [History of Chinese exter-
nal relations in antiquity], (Beijing: Higher Education Press, 1993), 270.
5. Kuo Ting-Tee, “Self-Strengthening: the Pursuit of Western Technology,” The
Cambridge History of China 10: Later Ching 1800–1911 ed. Dennis Twitchertt &
John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 492.
6. Wei Yuan, “Haiguo Tuzhi·xu” [Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms.
Xu], in Zhao Lixia ed., Muo Gu: Seleced Works of Wei Yuan (Shenyang: Liaoning
People’s Publishing House, 1994), 270.
7. Liu Xuyi and Lin Jie, “The First Group of Government-sponsored Overseas
Students and Sino-US Cultural Exchange,” Symposiums on the Sino-US Cultural
Exchange, (1999): 171.
8. Zhang Zhidong, Quan Xue Pian [Exhortations to Study], Complete Collection
of Zhang Zhidong’s Works (Shijiazhuang: Hebei People’s Publishing House, 1998),
9703–9770.
9. Wang Rongsheng, Complete History of Qing Dynast 9 (Shenyang: Liaoning
People’s Press, 1991), 417–9.
10. John K. Fairbank & Merle Goldman, China: A New History, enlarged edition
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 243.
11. “Memorandum for President Roosevet sent by the President of University of Il-
lionis to,” Dictionary of China’s Diplomacy (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2000). 395.
12. Su Yunfeng, From Qinghua School to Qinghua University (Beijing: SDX Joint
Publishing Cmpany, 2001), 16.
13. Education Journal, no.6 (1911), cited in the Historical track of Overseas
Chinese Students 1872–1949, ed. Wang Kesheng, (Wuhan: Hubei Education Press,
1992), 17.
14. John Dewey once held a lecture series in China during 1919–1921; Paul Mon-
roe first visited China in 1913 and lectured in China in 1921.
15. Shen Xiaoyun, “The Formulation and Implementation of the 1922 Educational
System and the American model Adopted in China’s education,” Symposiums on the
Sino-US Cultural Exchange (1999): 116.
16. Sun Qiming, History of Sino-Soviet Relations (Shanghai: People’s Publishing
House, 2002), 207.
17. Wang Taiping, Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China 1949–
1956 (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1998), 42.
18. Susanne Pepper, “Education,” Cambridge History of China 14: The People’s
Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): 389.
19. “Jiaoyu Hezuo: Fazhan Jingji Yuren Weixian”[Educational Cooperation: To
Develop Economy, Education Takes the Lead], People’s Daily, Sept.12, 2000.
20. “Woguo Qunian Paiqian Yipi Renyuan Chuguo Liuxue, Xiang Ershi Baguo
Paichu le Sibai Bashi Duoren” [Our Country Send a group of Students Overseas Last
Year, More Than 480 Peoples sent to 28 Countries], People’s Daily, Jan. 4, 1979.
120 Chapter Six

21. Li Tieying, “Guanyu Woguo Jiaoyu Gongzuo Ruogan Wenti de Huibao” [Re-
port On the Educational Works in Our Country], People’s Daily, Jan. 3, 1990.
22. “Hu Yaobang Zhao Ziyang Peng Zhen Deng Yinchao Mianli Zaimei Liuxue
Renyuan, Ba Yiqie Xianjin de Zhishi Xuedaoshou Zuo Shehui Zhuyi Xiandaihua
Jianshe Shenglijun”[Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang Peng Zhen and Deng Yinchao En-
courage Students Who Are Studying In the United States: to Master the Advanced
Schientific and Technological Knowledge and to Be Fresh Constructors for the So-
cialist Modernization] People’s Daily, Dec. 31, 1983.
23. Ibid.
24. Diyi Shengchanli means “science and technology are primary productive force”;
Kejiao Xingguo means “Rejuvenating the country through science and education.”
25. Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping II (Beijing: Foreign Lan-
guages Press, 1995), 40.
26. Deng, “Selected Works,” 40.
27. The first is agriculture; second, energy resources and communications. See
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping III (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 11.
28. China is developing its economy in three steps. Two steps will be taken in this
century, to reach the point where out Chinese people have adequate food and clothing
and lead a fairly comfortable life. The third step will take China 30 to 50 years into
the twenty-first century.
29. State Education Commission, China Education Yearbook (1995) (Beijing:
People’s Education Publishing Press), 1.
30. Zhao Ziyang, “Guanyu Diqige Wunian Jihua de Baogao” [Report on the Sev-
enth Five-Year Plan], People’s Daily, April 14, 1986.
31. Lie Tieying, “Report On the Educational Works in Our Country,” People’s
Daily.
32. State Education Commission Department of Planning and Construction, Edu-
cational Statistics (1989)(Beijing: People’s Education Press), 16.
33. “Paiqian Liuxue Renyuan Fangzhen Bubian, Li Ruihuan Li Tieying Yan Jici
He Sibai Duo Liuxue Guiguo Renyuan Lianhuan” [The Policy of Sending Student
Abroad Remains Unchanged, Li Ruihuan Li Tieying Yan Jici celebrate New Year
With More Than 400 Returned Students], People’s Daily, Jan. 21, 1990.
34. Deng, “Selected Works II,” 107.
35. Deng, “Selected Works III,” 274–6.
36. Ibid.
37. “Jian Fuqi Lingdao de Zhongren—Quanguo Jiaoyu Gongzuo Huiyi Xunli”
[Shoulder Leaders’ Heavy Responsibility—a Brief on the National Educational Con-
ference], People’s Daily, June 18, 1994.
38. “Dangzhongyang Guowuyuan Zhaokai Quanguo Jiaoyu Gongzuo
Huiyi”[Central Committee of the CPC and State Council Convene National Educa-
tional Conference], People’s Daily, June 15, 1994.
39. The tasks included universalizing the 9-Year Compulsory education and il-
literacy eradication among young and middle-aged groups, proactively developing
vocational and adult education, developing higher education properly, optimizing the
educational structure, improving education quality and efficiency, etc.
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 121

40. “Kejiao Xingguo” [rejuvenating the country through science and education],
People’s Daily, May 22, 1995.
41. “Jianchi Shishi Kejiao Xingguo Zhanlue” [Adhere to Implementing the Kejiao
Xingguo Strategy,” People’s Daily, March 6, 1999.
42. “‘211 Gongcheng’ Shishi Shunli Chengguo Fengshuo” [‘211 Project” Smoothly
Implemented and Bears Rich Fruits], People’s Daily, Dec. 12, 2000.
43. Ibid.
44. “‘211’ Schools Lead Pack In research, Students,” China Daily, Sept 5, 2002.
45. Kathryn Mohrman, “World-Class Universities and Chinese Higher Education Re-
form” International Higher Education, Spring 2005, www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/
newsletter/News39/text013.htm (accessed October 16, 2008).
46. “China’s Colleges to Enroll 5 pct More Students,” China Daily, Jan. 24,
2007.
47. Ibid.
48. “Laihua Liuxuesheng Qunian Zuiduo” [The Number of Foreign Students
Reaches Record High Last Year], People’s Daily, Feb.8, 1993.
49. China Education Yearbook (1949–1981), 668.
50. Ibid.
51. “Li Peng Huijian Quanguo Waiguo Liuxuesheng Gongzuo Huiyi Daibiao Shi-
shuo Woguo Jiang Jinyibu Kuoda Jieshou Waiguo Liuxuesheng de Renshu” [Li Peng
Says Our Country Will Receive More Foreign Students When He Meets Delegates to
the National Educational Conference], People’s Daily, Dec. 21, 1984.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. “Duiwai Jiaoliu Sishinian: Chuguo Liuxue Qiwanren, Xuecheng Guilai Si-
wanduo, Jieshou Waiguo Laihua Liuxuesheng Liuwanduo” [Forty Years of Foreign
Educational Exchange: 70,000 Students Go Abroad, 40,000 Return, and Receive
More Than 60,000 Foreign Students], People’s Daily, Sept.16, 1989.
55. “The Number of Foreign Students Reaches Record High Last Year”, People’s
Daily, Feb. 8, 1993.
56. China Education Yearbook (2001), 282–3.
57. China Education Yearbook (1996), 358.
58. Xinhuanet, Dec. 21, 2006, news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-12/21/content_
5517742.htm (accessed on Oct. 20, 2008).
59. “Beida Xiang Waiguo Zifei Liuxuesheng Panfa Jiangxuejin” [Beijing Uni-
versity Offers Scholarship to self-funded Foreign Students], People’s Daily, July 5,
1999.
60. China Education Yearbook (2007), 345.
61. “Shijie Xuduo Guojia Chuxian Hanyure, Quanguo Duiwai Hanyu Jiaoxue
Gongzuo Huiyi Zaijing Jiesu” [Chinese Learning Fever Emerges in Many Countries,
the National International Chinese Language Teaching Conference Draws to Conclu-
sion], People’s Daily, Sept. 26, 1988.
62. China Education Yearbook (1992), 270.
63. “Qian Qichen zai Dierci Quanguo Duiwai Hanyu Jiaoxue Gongzuo Huiyis-
hang Qiangdiao Nuli Kaichuang Duiwai Hanyu Jiaoxue Gongzuo Xinjumian” [Qian
122 Chapter Six

Qichen Reiterates at the Second National International Chinese Language Teaching

(ICLT) Conference to Create a New Situation for ICLT ], People’s Daily, Dec. 11,
1999.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. “2010 Nianqian Zhongguo Jiang Jian 500 Suo Kongzi Xueyuan” [China Will Set
Up 500 Confucius Institutes by 2010], news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-11/08/
content_7036268.htm (accessed October 16, 2008).
67. “Chen Zhili zai Chuxi Dierci Kongzi Xueyuan Dahui bing Zuo Zhu-
zhi Yanjiang” [Chen Zhili’s Keynote Speech at Second Conference of
Confucius Institutes], www.gov.cn/ldhd/2007-12/11/content_831067.htm (accessed
October 16, 2008).
68. “Juren Xuqiu Cuisheng ‘Kongzi Xueyuan Sudu’” [The Giant’s Need Gives
Birth to a Speed of Confucius Institute], Global Times, Dec. 3, 2007.
69. Ibid.
70. “Zhengxie Weiyuan Jianyi Jiakuai Hanyu ‘Zou Chu Qu’” [Members of CP-
PCC Encourage Chinese to “Go Abroad”], Beijing Daily, March 13, 2006.
71. “Li Changchun Yaoqiu Dali Fazhan Wangluo Kongzi Xueyuan, Hongyang
Zhonghua Wenhua” [Li Changchun Requests to Vigorously Develop Online Confu-
cius Institute to Promote Chinese culture], Xinhuanet, April 25, 2007, news.xinhuanet
.com/overseas/2007-04/25/content_6025148.htm. (accessed October 16, 2008).
72. “China Grants 1.8m Postgraduates in Three Decades,” China daily, Jan. 15,
2008.
73. The top three include USA, Australia and Canada.
74. China Education Yearbook (2007), 346.
75. Asia accounted for 59 percent of total U.S. international enrollments, see The
Boston College Center for International Higher Education, International Higher Edu-
cation 50 (Winter 2007), 13.
76. International Higher Education 50, 13–4.
77. National Science Foundation, 2007, www.nsf.gov (accessed October 17,
2008).
78. China Education Yearbook (2005), 463.
79. “Liu Daoyu: ‘Gaoxiao Dayuejin Haiku Xuesheng, Gaodeng Jiaoyu Cun
SanweiJi’” [Liu Daoyu: “Universities’ great leap forward threatens students, Higher
Education Is Faced With Three Crisis”], sohu.com June 4, 2007, learning.sohu.
com/20070604/n250379477.shtml (accessed October 17, 2008).
80. Lu Ling, “Graduate Education’s Trying Times,” Beijing Review 49, no.02
(2006): 28–9.
81. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4th edition, (Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1980), 42–3, 77–8.
82. “The Number of Confucius Institutes reaches 155 globally,” People’s Daily
Online, May 29, 2007, english.peopledaily.com.cn/200705/29/eng20070529_378769
.html (accessed October 27, 2008).
 Education: The Intellectual Base of China’s Soft Power 123

83. “Hu Angang: Zhongguo Bujin Yao Heping Jueqi Yeyao Luse Jueqi” [Hu
Angang: China Should Rise in Peace and in Green”, news.sina.com.cn/c/2007-02-
12/063611221191s.shtml (accessed October 20, 2008).
84. Colin Powell, “Statement on International Education Week 2001,” cited in
Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education,” The Internet and the University:
Forum (2004): 42.
 Chapter Seven

China’s Soft Power Dilemma:

the Beijing Consensus Revisited
Zhongying Pang

“Success or failure, Xiao He is the man behind it.” (Cheng ye Xiaohe, bai
ye xiaohe)
—A Chinese proverb

In any study of China’s soft power, it is crucial to discuss economic devel-

opment. Development has been a major driving force in China since the
late 1970s and the resultant meteoric economic transformation has awed
the world. The story of Chinese economic achievement itself is an impor-
tant source of its soft power. Meanwhile, some countries in the developing
world have been inspired by China’s economic development and want to
learn about the Chinese experience and its development model. In particular,
its strategy for poverty relief has been acknowledged as a good example to
other poor countries. In the words of one observer, “China’s emergence as
part of the modern world gives hope to many people in other developing and
newly-industrializing countries. . . . China’s success provides a model, and
the country is therefore an attractive partner for many Africans.”1
However, it is risky and premature to overestimate the significance of
China’s development model for its soft power. Development is, in China’s
case, a double-edged sword: its benefits have been accompanied by many so-
cial, environmental, political, and diplomatic challenges. In this sense, it also
weakens or even undermines China’s efforts to strengthen its soft power be-
cause of the numerous negative aspects of the Chinese experience. If China’s
development can become a more effective model for the developing world,
the country will eventually be able to command powerful and important soft
power. Conversely, failing to address China’s long-term challenges will put
the growth of its soft power in jeopardy. The relationship between China’s

125
126 Chapter Seven

development path and its soft power very much resembles the proverb noted
above.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I describe how China’s develop-
ment has engendered so much soft power for China. Second, I examine some
of the negative aspects of China’s development to show that the Chinese
model is rife with shortcomings. In the third section, I examine the lack of
competition for the Chinese model in the world and argue that China’s de-
velopment both generates soft power and harms it. Finally, I present the view
that not only is there a political gap between China and the West, but there is
also a growing values gap between China and some parts of the developing
world, especially in Asia and Africa.

THE LINK BETWEEN CHINA’S

SOFT POWER AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

In late 1970s, China launched its long-awaited modernization plan, which was
to be focused on the industrial, agricultural, defense, and science and technol-
ogy sectors. The country’s leaders and the state machinery at that time were ea-
gerly doing everything they could to get rid of the material poverty after the end
of the Cultural Revolution. They sought to solve the problem of a shortage of
food and clothing, to achieve a universal “freedom from want” in China. Need-
less to say, there was no mindset of cultivating soft power at that time. In the
earlier stages of the modernization, particularly in 1980s, the goal of China’s
development was simply to let the people make money. Deng Xiaoping encour-
aged some Chinese who wanted to have wealth to boldly “get rich first.”
Throughout the 1990s, despite the harm caused by the 1989 Tiananmen
incident, China continued to focus on its “economic construction.” The party
and its state tried to solve China’s social problems and overcome political
challenges by focusing on economic development rather than seeking further
reform of the system. As a result, the party told the country that all the coun-
try’s problems could be easily solved as long as there was more development.
Deng Xiaoping, by devising the developmental doctrine—i.e., “development
is the most important means to solve China’s problems” (fazhan si ying
daoli)2—was seen as China’s founding father of development.
Even with new leadership in the beginning of the twenty-first century,
one of China’s top political slogans was the same as the old: “development
is the first task in ruling and governing” (fazhan shi zhizheng xingguo de di
yi yaowu). In fact, China’s development strategies (poverty relief and other
problem-solving initiatives) gradually paid off. China’s economy finally ex-
perienced a “take-off” moment and its economic growth trajectory has been
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 127

sustained for more than two decades. Internationally, as China successfully

entered into the global economy, China was assessed by the global commu-
nity as a “miracle” and a “rising great power” geo-politically.
Previous Chinese development initiatives were really about the develop-
ment of “hard power” in terms of the economy, technology and military
rather than about the development of soft power. We still have little evidence
to support a strong correlation between this kind of development and the rise
of soft power. However, this does not mean that historically, China’s soft
power had made no progress.
This rapid and continuous growth has indeed brought much fame for China
from political leaders and pundits throughout the world. With the outside
world continuously applauding China’s economic achievements, China has
received a significant amount of intangible soft power. Many developing
countries and international economic institutions (mainly the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund) praised China’s economic performance.
As the former president of the World Bank, for instance, noted: “In the last
quarter century, over 300 million people have escaped poverty in China. With
ingenuity and pragmatism, they have pursued a path that offers valuable les-
sons for the 600 million people in sub-Saharan Africa who still struggle to
find the path out of poverty.”3
The good reputation that China has harvested from its economic rise is
in particularly sharp contrast to the reduced influence of the “Washington
Consensus” based on Western liberal political economy. The Washington
Consensus has a history of more than two decades in Africa.4 In the past years,
however, the development assistance policies of both the United States (US)
and the European Union (EU) were not well received in the developing world,
and several grand development proposals that the West initiated in various de-
veloping countries have been demonstrated to be ineffective. The Consensus’
liberal market orthodoxy has been resisted in the majority of African countries.
Growing numbers of developing countries do not simply want to learn about
the Chinese experience; they also believe that the Chinese model of economic
development may be an alternative to Western prescriptions.
In this context, Ramo coined the buzzword “Beijing Consensus.” The
Beijing Consensus was a new development model that described the effect
of the China experience on developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Ramo predicted that the Beijing Consensus would replace Ameri-
can-dominated development model hegemony.5 An Oxford-trained Chinese
scholar, he nicely summarized the Chinese model. He writes that one of the
key features of the “Beijing consensus” is a strong state that is capable of
shaping a national consensus on modernization, ensuring overall political and
macroeconomic stability, and pursuing wide-ranging domestic reforms. What
128 Chapter Seven

makes the Chinese experience unique is that Beijing has safeguarded its own
policy space as to when, where and how to adopt foreign ideas.” He criti-
cizes “the ideology driven” American model that failed to bring democracy
and development to Africa and elsewhere. Rather, the Chinese model “has
enriched the world’s political discourse and wisdom and hence expanded the
policy options.”6
Indeed, many developing countries have shown interest in the Chinese
experience. Zimbabwe’s “Look East Initiative” exemplifies the influence
of China’s economic growth path. The Look East Initiative was proposed
for the sake of trade, investment, and political agreements with China rather
than Harare’s traditional Western partners, Britain and America. Zimbabwe’s
senior leader Robert Mugabe recently said in a speech that

during the past year, the Government continued to implement the ‘Look East’
policy. This effort received a boost from my State Visit to the People’s Republic
of China in July this year, and has been expanded by our ever-deepening rela-
tions with most countries in Asia and the Middle East. This region has stood
by us in our time of need and has created and offered new trade and investment
opportunities.7

Zimbabwe is a small African country, but Mugabe’s China policy is not just
an isolated and insignificant case. In the eyes of many Africans, China’s eco-
nomic achievements serve as a good example.8 Coupled with the attraction
of the Chinese model, “China is seen as more willing than the West to help
develop the predicates of industrialism in the global South and to do so at a
lower cost to the continent, without imposing what many find to be onerous
requirements for African states’ policies.”9
Africa’s interest in the Chinese model comes at least partially from the
failures of imported policies. The neo-liberal paradigm has not been a cure for
Africa’s developmental ills. Since the 1970s, Africa has never lacked donor-
dictated socio-economic reforms, but the continent as a whole has nonethe-
less become the most indebted, marginalized, and aid-dependent region in an
increasingly globalized world. “The African people were not given a chance
to determine their own development paths. They were coerced to implement
those preferred by the donors and creditors.”10 In 2006, leaders of forty-eight
African countries gathered in Beijing and expressed that “the African coun-
tries are greatly inspired by China’s rapid economic development.”11

DEMYSTIFYING CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT

While there is no denying that China’s impressive economic growth has at-
tracted the world’s attention, provided food for thought for various leaders
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 129

in the developing nations, and conspicuously elevated China’s international

status, it is clear that the Chinese model, if there is a coherent model at all,
is fraught with problems. To a large extent, the Chinese themselves are still
in the process of searching for a model of modernization. These factors are
likely to serve as constraints for the influence of the Chinese experience.
Thirty years after the modernization movement began, the Chinese are
only now seriously and openly reflecting on their development in its various
forms. Since 2003, Chinese leaders have been promoting their new political
slogan: “scientific development” (kexue fazhan guan), by which they mean
placing more emphasis on balanced and sustainable development. These new
considerations clearly highlight the following shortcomings in the Chinese
development experience.
First, China has repeated many old methods, strategies, and policies that
other industrial countries have already tried. Instead of learning from others’
unfortunate mistakes, China has followed their path. For example, in the
1980s, Chinese leaders and reformist elites solemnly vowed to not follow the
similar road of economic growth at the expense of environmental degrada-
tion. However, China has quickly become the most polluted country in the
world; it has paid an over enormous environmental price for its development.
China’s environmental challenge is quickly becoming a diplomatic disadvan-
tage as global climate change takes center stage in international negotiations.
Europe, Japan, and the US—the world’s most developed country—is asking
China—the world’s largest developing country—to take action to control its
emissions.12
Second, it is commonly acknowledged that China’s development has
mainly followed a gradual, trial-and-error, market-oriented path rather than
a well-designed comprehensive reform strategy that includes democratic
political reform. China’s economic changes have happened quickly but the
pace of political change toward a Chinese-style democracy has been slow.
This has seriously hampered the expansion of China’s soft power, which is
currently limited around the world mainly for this reason. After the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the international environment turned against China’s
political ideology. To secure and stabilize China’s global economic interests,
Beijing has had to claim that it wants to go beyond the political and ideologi-
cal differences with the West. This “ideology-free” or “value-neutral” politi-
cal strategy served China’s economic and security interests well during the
1990s. The China-West economic relationship was strengthened, and some
unnecessary political disputes were avoided. Since then, China no longer
“exports” its values.
Third, China’s economic growth has been fueled by direct foreign invest-
ment. However, the policy of attracting and using foreign investment has led
to China becoming the world’s producer of cheap value-added products. As
130 Chapter Seven

an inevitable result, the development of home-grown Chinese brands was

very slow; they “occupy an infinitesimal piece of the export pie. . . . In fact,
the share of Chinese exports under the control of foreign-invested entities
grew in the decade between 2005 and 2006 to almost sixty percent.”13 Ac-
cording to Overholt, China is “a far more open economy than Japan and it is
globalizing its institutions to a degree not seen in a big country since Meiji
Japan.”14 The foreign investment driving the Chinese economy has negatively
impacted the increase of China’s hard power—and perhaps its soft power as
well. China is flooded with other nations’ soft power, including foreign cul-
tural products but its own cultural industry is still in a less-developed stage.
As a result, a soft power deficit has emerged and is growing bigger: on the
whole, China exports few soft power products but imports many more.
Fourth, as China follows a dependent economic development path like
other developing countries, its economic and social vulnerability in the global
arena has been fully exposed. A highly outward dependent economy lacks
necessary protection and is easily attacked by others’ politically motivated
trade and investment protectionism. Currently, in the United States, Europe,
and Japan, dominant opinions have continuously focused on the quality and
safety issue of the “made in China” products. Of course, many export firms
in these developed countries have acknowledged their economies still largely
need “made in China” products. “China’s [reputation] as a quality ‘factory for
the world’ has been damaged.”15 In response, the Chinese government needs
to propose international dialogues to deal with the challenges from “made in
China” products. Some bilateral agreements such as China-United States and
China-Japan, and multilateral mechanisms such as the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Food Safety Cooperation Forum, have begun to address
how to improve the quality and safety of Chinese goods. The proliferation of
the issue of the safety and quality of “made in China” goods not only dam-
ages China’s export prospects but also damages its reputation and credibility
around the globe.
Fifth, China’s economic gains are at the expense of political losses. It is
now falling into several political traps because of economic engagements in
Asia and elsewhere. To meet its dramatically increasing demand for energy
and raw materials, China has had to conduct “resource/energy diplomacy.”
However, this development-driven diplomacy may be not conducive to
increasing China’s soft power. Many in the West and elsewhere have been
outspoken in their criticism of China’s expanded energy relations with re-
source-rich, so-called “rogue states” in Africa and Asia, such as Sudan and
Myanmar.
A price China has paid for its economic relations with countries like Sudan
is that the Western-dominated international community closely links China
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 131

with human rights violations and humanitarian crises. Both Western govern-
ments and NGOs have taken advantage of these Chinese engagements in Asia
and Africa to press China take up a “responsible” role in mediating domestic
conflicts in Sudan and Myanmar. Moreover, some Africans (for example,
South Africans), despite the fact that their countries generally have benefited
greatly from China’s economic engagements, including development as-
sistance, have unexpectedly accused China of pursuing a neo-colonialism
strategy. “China is not immune to accusations of exploitation.”16
Clearly, China’s current development path has resulted in various con-
straints on its soft power. Some of these constraints are related to drawbacks
of its development model, whereas others originate from its expanding need
for energy and raw materials to fuel its domestic economic growth.

CHINA’S RELUCTANCE TO
EXPORT ITS DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Normally, if a country has indeed been successful, it will not hesitate to pro-
mote itself to other parts of the world. Successful models can be parlayed into
an increased ability to influence other countries. For instance, Taiwan has
actively exported the so-called “Taiwan experience”—its half-century his-
tory of economic and political self-proclaimed successes—to other countries,
including African, South Pacific, and Central American states. During the
Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) ruling period, Taiwan attempted to sell
its experience in the Chinese mainland too. However, China has not followed
Taiwan’s example. Instead, it has intentionally tried to avoid actively pro-
moting its model. If China really has valuable development and governance
experience, why doesn’t it share it with others?
The reality is this: while the outside world is interested in talking about and
learning from the Chinese experience, China modestly claims that it respects
other countries’ choices and that it is not interested in being an exporter of
development models. The simple reason for this posture is that the Chinese
model is incomplete, besieged by the Western liberal political economy
model, and politically assaulted by Western elites. Analysts and critics in
the West are worried that African countries are following in the footsteps of
China, perhaps rightfully so. If the “allure” of the Chinese model is true17, it
conflicts with the established development models that the West has exported
to Africa. The adoption of the Chinese model in Africa has been widely seen
in the West as having negative political consequences.18
In the following section, I provide an analysis of the popularity of the
Western model, Africa’s model “demands,” and China’s model “supplies.” I
132 Chapter Seven

hope to make clear the clash of the Chinese and Western development mod-
els, and to advise that Western concern of the influence of the Chinese model
in Africa is an overreaction. China has neither exported its model to Africa
nor has Africa imported the model from China. African countries will of
course learn from some aspects of China’s development, but to say that they
will copy the Chinese model is simply unwarranted.

The Assertiveness of the Western Model

The West exports a wide range of values to the rest of the world, including
China. Indeed, China has been the biggest recipient of the Western models.
The United States has been a leading exporter of such a “product.” The Euro-
pean Union, as a newly emerged global actor, has limited hard power but has
nonetheless also become an exporter of values and models.19
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, one of the United States’ biggest exports
was the “Washington Consensus,” a standard reform package promoted to
crisis-stricken countries. It quickly evolved into a neo-liberal formula for
promoting economic growth in the developing or less developed world. “In
this sense, it is argued that the Washington Consensus policies propose to in-
troduce various free market-oriented economic policy prescriptions which are
theoretically designed to make the targeted nation’s economy function more
like that of First World countries such as the United States.20
The West’s strategy, however, has been about more than the promotion of
liberal economic policies in the rest of the world. “The policies of Western
governments towards Africa have come to reflect a more normative and reform-
oriented edge in recent years, and despite pervasive ambiguities, have broadly
sought to promote democracy, human rights and conflict prevention.”21 The
export of development models from the West has been described as the West
“flexing its soft power muscles” or conducting “soft diplomacy.”22
The West has not only proactively promoted its model, but has been very
vigilant for the influence of other models, especially from China. Africa has
been learning lessons from China and this move has made some in the West
feel uneasy, threatened, and even panicky. The West has also flooded China
with repeated criticisms, such as (emphasis mine): “Chinese loans help re-
luctant reformers escape the International Monetary Fund’s clutches” and
“Beijing is intent on securing raw materials and commodities to fuel its own
booming economy, and on finding new markets for Chinese exports. That
sounds very much like the past strategy of Western colonial powers.” Domi-
nant opinion in the West has consistently warned African countries that “the
Chinese model is no panacea for Africa” and that “China’s policy in Africa
is not an alternative to neo-liberalism.”23
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 133

China as a Weak Competitor in the International “Model Market”

China is a weak competitor in the international “model market” because of
the ambiguity in defining its model, the still strong influence of Western lib-
eral ideology, and the increasingly international scrutiny of China’s political
influence in some parts of the world.
Reception to Ramo’s description of the Beijing Consensus has been mixed
in China. Nevertheless, the emergence of the concept has provided a good op-
portunity to re-think China’s development. Chinese scholars have acknowl-
edged that there probably is a “Chinese development model,” but that the
Beijing Consensus fails to accurately summarize it.24 Other scholars in China
believe a more accurate term is neither “Beijing Consensus” nor “Chinese
model” but rather “Chinese experience” or “lessons from China.” This subtle
distinction is meant to convey that China still has not successfully produced
a new development model; it has just provided many lessons of both success
and failure.25
Growing numbers of scholars in the West now conclude that the Chinese
model means a market economy/capitalism combined with political au-
thoritarianism and repression. China is now an “autocratic superpower whose
seemingly unstoppable economic ascent shatters the comfortable belief that
capitalist development leads to democracy. Should the liberal west brace it-
self for a new global ‘Beijing consensus’ of authoritarian modernity?”26 The
global media, led by the West, increasingly describes China as an “illiberal”
polity just as Russia is an “illiberal democracy.”27 It has been alleged that
both Chinese and Russian political elites are

pursuing an alternative to the prevailing Western model. The new Russo-

Chinese model is authoritarian rather than democratic. . . . Rather than relying
on democracy or communist ideology to create loyalty to the political system,
the Russian and Chinese elites increasingly stress a combination of economic
growth and nationalism. The two ideas are related because rising prosperity not
only offers individual citizens new comforts—it also holds out the promise that
the nation will be more respected around the world.28

Africa has been learning lessons from China and this move has made some
in the West feel uneasy threatened and panicky. The West has also flooded
repeated criticisms to China (for instance, “Chinese loans help reluctant re-
formers escape the International Monetary Fund’s clutches,” “Beijing is intent
on securing raw materials and commodities to fuel its own [present author’s
italics] booming economy, and on finding new markets for Chinese [pres-
ent author’s italics] exports. That sounds very much like the past strategy of
western colonial powers”). Dominant opinions in the West have consistently
134 Chapter Seven

warned African countries that, “the Chinese model is no panacea for Africa”,
and that “China’s policy in Africa is not an alternative to neo-liberalism.”29

Chinese Reluctance to Export its Model

There is no evidence demonstrating that China has promoted, or has ambitions
to promote, its model in Africa. Since the late 1970s, China has not offered an
alternative political model to the developing world. Although it is prevalent
in the political imagination in the West, China is actually cautious and re-
luctant to sell its social-economic experiences to other developing countries.
Deng Xiaoping told the visiting president of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings, in Sep-
tember 1985: “Please don’t copy our model. If there is any experience on our
part, it is to formulate policies in light of one’s own national conditions.”30 In
2006, China and Africa declared to the world that “each country has the right
to choose, in its course of development, its own social system, development
model and way of life, in light of its national conditions.”31
Intentionally promoting its own experience would sharply contradict one
of China’s staunch foreign policy principles. For a long time, China has
maintained that countries that vary from one another in terms of social sys-
tem, stages of development, historical and cultural background, and values
have the right to choose their own approaches to promoting and protecting
human rights. Moreover, Beijing has also claimed that the politicization of
human rights and the imposition of human rights conditionality on economic
assistance should be vigorously opposed as they themselves constitute a vio-
lation of human rights.32 This Chinese-African joint statement is of course a
declaration against the West’s political intervention in the developing world,
including China, but it also implies that China has no intention of exporting
its political models. Therefore, Africa’s demand for “alternative models” is
not being fully met by China.
There is a gap between Africa’s high expectations for alternatives that
could be supplied by China and China’s reluctance to supply such a model.
Although China rhetorically supports Africa’s independent choice of devel-
opment paths, it does not want to compete with the world’s dominant model
exporters in the West. It does not want to violate its own policies of 1) “no
political conditionality” (i.e., “no strings attached”) in giving aid to less de-
veloped countries, and 2) non-interference in others’ internal affairs. That is
why accusations that China promotes its model in Africa are irresponsible
and groundless. One of the “neo-con” policy analysts in Washington asserts
that “Beijing actively promotes its development model, based on a limited
market economy controlled by a totalitarian government.”33 However, there
is little evidence to support this assertion.
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 135

As a matter of fact, China has been at the receiving end of soft power influ-
ence. One indication of China’s soft power deficit is that it has been one of
the major markets for American values based on neo-liberal market econom-
ics since the 1970s. The “Chinese” model actually contains major ingredients
of the Washington Consensus, most notably in the domestic and international
economic arena. China is ironically a good student of Washington.
After the end of the Cold War, China eagerly and completely joined the
America-led world economic order. In other words, today’s China is already a
part of a U.S.-centered international system. Some American analysts acknowl-
edge that “all of China’s economic successes are associated with liberalization
and globalization,” which the United States architected and dominated.34

China is no longer a vacuum that sucks the world’s great powers into gigantic
conflicts. China no longer sponsors insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Africa and
Latin America. China no longer seeks to undermine the global financial institu-
tions. We obtain benefits from a China that supports stable capitalist democracy
in Thailand and the Philippines; that joins the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and
that counsels its neighbors about the benefits of political stability, free trade, and
free investment.35

China Supports Africa’s Neo-Liberal Development Model

Africa’s new inter-continental development plan, called the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), is based on essentially the neo-liberal
principles of liberalization and privatization. NEPAD is basically a continu-
ation of projects inspired by international financial institutions (for instance,
the Structural Adjustment Programs), “albeit ostensibly now advocated
by Africans themselves.”36 Various Western actors proposed partnerships
with Africa for development purposes.37 NEPAD’s application of neo-
liberal prescriptions is a new starting point in Africa’s quest for an effective
development model. It “provides another mechanism for implementing the
“Washington Consensus/post-Washington Consensus framework.”38 Both the
European Union and the United States have repeatedly endorsed, encouraged,
and praised NEPAD for its role in Africa’s development.
Naturally, China has been a strong supporter of NEPAD. The Forum of
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and its China-Africa summit in Beijing
is the kind of “development partnership” that NEPAD has been pursuing.
This NEPAD-based China-Africa connection shows that the Chinese model
is a variant of neo-liberal principles. Any supposed “conflict” between China
and the West over development models in Africa is imaginary. The Chi-
nese model is really a Western product “made in China” (but not “made by
China”).
136 Chapter Seven

THE EXPANDING VALUE GAP BETWEEN

CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Many countries in Africa have benefited greatly from China’s non-

ideological economic engagement. However, the influence of China’s Afri-
can policy has been weakened by the West’s persistent and overstated oppo-
sition. The West is worried that Beijing’s economic presence in Africa may
undermine Western efforts to create democratic administrations in African
countries. The West has accused China of not being concerned about account-
ability, good governance, and human rights in Africa—issues that the West
has been trying to export.
My purpose here is not to stimulate a political debate between China and
the West over issues such as governance and rights, but rather to address
fundamental questions about China’s soft influence on developing countries.
As discussed above, the West has exported values and development models
to Africa and most African countries have experienced democratization since
the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, is there a values gap between
China and other developing countries in general and Africa in particular?
China and other developing countries share many common ideas and val-
ues. However, a values gap exists and is increasing. China needs to be aware
of how its values differ from those of other developing countries.

Africa’s Political Changes Strain Africa-China Relations

In 2000, the African Union (AU) replaced the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and adopted a new pan-African continental constitution that embraced
new principles and norms in order to accommodate new realities in both
Africa’s domestic politics and international relations. The AU constitution
explicitly codifies the terms of direct intervention into a member state if the
Peace and Security Council (PSC) finds that there are gross violations of hu-
man rights or other humanitarian crises. The New Economic Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is empowered to go through an independent
review process to investigate whether an African country adheres to good
governance criteria. This is clear evidence that Africa is moving closer to
accepting Western norms. Furthermore, the functions of the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples Rights’ have been strengthened.
All of this moves the emerging continental architecture of Africa a consid-
erable distance from the unconditional support for unlimited state sovereignty
promoted until recently by the Organization of African Unity. . . . For Beijing
this has troubling implications: a bloc of states that could once be counted
on to defend the prerogatives of sovereignty in multilateral settings (with the
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 137

exception of the case of apartheid South Africa) is no longer wedded to this

position.39
Scholars such as Alden overstate Sino-African friction over values because
they don’t adequately consider the history of relations between the two re-
gions.40 But if we consider China’s current worsening domestic corruption,
including business bribery, bad governance, low moral standards, and the
shortage of rights protection, Western worries cannot be easily ignored by the
Chinese. If African countries continue to struggle for good governance based
on the principles NEPAD advocates, and if China’s domestic governance still
has serious problems, the values gap will continue to widen.

Southeast Asia’s Widening Values Gap with China

The financial crisis from 1997 to 1999 was a turning point for domestic
politics and international relations in East Asia. Indonesia finally terminated
the country’s dark days of the “New Order” created by Suharto’s highly
authoritarian and military-controlled government and began to make a halt-
ing transition to democracy. Other Southeast Asian countries also deepened
their domestic reforms and improved their governance by pushing democ-
ratization. Since then, like the African Union, most of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries have reconsidered their old
norms—norms that have been used to manage their intra-regional relations
for more than four decades. In December 2005, ASEAN published the Kuala
Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter for the
first time. In January 2007, ASEAN released the Cebu Declaration on the
Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter. In November 2007, “the Heads of State or
Government of the Member States of ASEAN, assembled in Singapore on
the historic occasion of the fourth anniversary of the founding of ASEAN,
agreed to this Charter.”41 According to the ASEAN Charter, while member
countries respect “the fundamental importance of amity and cooperation, and
the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference,
consensus and unity in diversity,” they adhere “to the principles of democ-
racy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms.”42 This is a fundamental change from
previous agreements.
The West has been satisfied to closely watch the drafting and approval pro-
cess of the ASEAN Charter and has seized the opportunity to notice a growing
values gap between China and its Southeast Asian partners. U.S. President
Bush loudly praised the ASEAN Charter, saying at the 2007 APEC Summit
in Australia that it “includes democratic and human rights principles.”43 At the
EU-ASEAN summit to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of their partnership,
138 Chapter Seven

the regional groups commended “the adoption of the ASEAN Charter which
marks a new level in ASEAN regional integration and sets a firm basis for its
further community building” and express “support for the realization of the
ASEAN Community by 2015.”44
There is some evidence that ASEAN is truly embracing the new values. In
the current Myanmar crisis, ASEAN’s 2007 chair country Singapore issued a
statement in New York against Yangon. The ASEAN foreign ministers

were appalled to receive reports of automatic weapons being used and de-
manded that the Burmese government immediately desist from the use of
violence against demonstrators. They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar’s
Foreign Minister, Nyan Win, over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar
are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fa-
talities. They strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a
political solution. They called upon Myanmar to resume its efforts at national
reconciliation with all parties concerned, and work towards a peaceful transi-
tion to democracy. The Ministers called for the release of all political detainees
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.45

It is important to mention that one of the reasons for ASEAN’s revision of

the principle of non-interference was the influence from the West and Japan.
The United States has been promoting democracy in the region, the European
Union has been pursuing its regional policy in Southeast Asia by addressing
the issue of international intervention, and Japan has been doing its “values-
oriented diplomacy” in the region in recent years. The United States and
Japan, together with several ASEAN members and India, the world largest
democracy, is now forging a “Concert of Asia-Pacific Democracies.”46 Under
Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Japan is seeking to implement an “arc of freedom
and prosperity” in Asia.
It is also necessary to emphasize that that China and the developing world
still have many solid shared values, including age-old principles such as
sovereignty, equality, non-interference in others’ domestic affairs, and a
common commitment to peaceful resolutions to conflict.47 China has various
reasons to reassure the developing world that its current value-free policy
may be the best and most important contribution to securing human rights in
poor countries48. But the emerging differences over values between them may
not be good for China’s relations with the developing world in the long term.
China will have to deal with opposition parties, nascent civil societies, and
other new political actors in multiple African and Asian countries.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s ideologically
driven economic policies such as privatization and liberalization have been
not so successful. Many African countries have resisted the West’s combina-
tion of aid and political conditions. Nevertheless, these countries will find
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 139

that China cannot be used as an excuse when they don’t fully implement
Western programs because China still provides smaller amounts of develop-
ment assistance. As leaders in Beijing have repeatedly said, China is still a
developing country; African countries have to continue to depend on devel-
opment assistance from the West.
In short, the West’s criticism of China’s value-neutrality in the developing
world is weakening China’s political influence in these countries. The emerg-
ing values gap between China and its strategic partners in Asia and Africa
have constituted another challenge to China’s soft power. China is conduct-
ing its “development diplomacy” in Asia and Africa, and it has provided
many economic benefits to these countries. But China should not neglect the
importance of values in managing its relations with the developing world. If
China not only delivers economic growth, quality cheap products, and infra-
structure, but also assists in governance at various levels, those in the West
who criticize China’s role in the world will lose ground.

CONCLUSIONS

China’s development dilemma leads to its soft power dilemma. There is a real
imperative to fully develop China’s soft power potential. Negative develop-
ments within China are harmful to its lure to the outside world. The country is
now the world’s factory but few countries want to emulate the high environ-
mental and human costs of this model. It is impossible to have a soft power
surplus as the country lacks the intellectual infrastructure. The stability of
China’s foreign relations, especially China’s relations with the United States
and Asia, are maintained only by economic common interests. China exports
few ideas and values to the world; its values gap with the world is widening
rather than shrinking.
China needs to revise its development strategy to focus on making itself a
world-class soft power. The country has an abundance of creative and inspira-
tional ideas for human and social development, so to increase its soft power,
China needs to make the following changes. First, it needs to pursue real
“scientific development,” which can help solve China’s soft power dilemma
by alleviating China’s crises (for example, the environmental degradation).
Second, China must seek an effective and pragmatic path to reform its po-
litical system in order to further empower its people. Third, China needs to
narrow its widening values gap with the world; otherwise, a genuine “Beijing
Consensus will be impossible. Finally, China should use the achievements
of its “scientific development” to demonstrate that it is not an “authoritarian
modernity”49 but rather a growing democratic society.
140 Chapter Seven

NOTES

1. Heribert Dieter, “Healthy Competition,” Development and Cooperation 48,

no. 6 (2007): www.inwent.org/ez/articles/055144/index.en.shtml.
2. China’s official translation of “fa zhan shi ying daoli” is “development is a
fundamental or absolute principle.”
3. Paul Wolfowitz, “China has valuable lessons for sub-Saharan Africa,” Finan-
cial Times, October 30, 2006.
4. See Barry V Sautman, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with
Africa,” Hong Kong: Center on China’s Transnational Relations, Working Paper, no
12 (2006): 14.
5. Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy
Centre, 2004), 3–5.
6. Zhang Weiwei, “The allure of the Chinese model,” International Herald Tri-
bune, November 1, 2006.
7. Robert Gabriel Mugabe, “State of the Nation Address,” House of Assembly,
Harare, December 6, 2005, www.zimfa.gov.zw/speeches/president/pres0024.htm
8. Heather Sidiropoulos, “China and Africa: Into Africa,” The World Today 62,
no. 10 (2006).
9. Sautman, “Friends and Interests,” 14.
10. NEPAD Brainstorming Concept Document, (Midrand, Johannesburg: South
Africa, 2005), p. 2.
11. Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,
(Beijing: November 2006.)
12. The US government hosted “historic meeting” the “Major Economies Meeting
on Energy Security and Climate Change” in Washington DC in late days of Septem-
ber 2007.
13. Ken DeWoskin, “The ‘Made in China’ Stigma Shock,” Far Easter Economic
Review, September 2007, 10.
14. William H. Overholt, “China and Globalization,” Statement before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 19, 2005.
15. DeWoskin, “Made in China,” 12.
16. Ian Taylor, “China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa,” International Affairs 82, no.
5 (2006): 954.
17. Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model.”
18. Denis M. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Con-
sequences,” Journal of Modern African Studies (2006): 44.
19. F. Petiteville, “Exporting ‘Values’? EU External Cooperation As a ‘Soft Di-
plomacy’,” in Understanding the European Union’s External Relations, eds. Michèle
Knodt and Sebastian Princen (New York: Routledge, 2003).
20. See “Washington Consensus,” Wikipedia,October 28, 2008, en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Washington_Consensus. (accessed October 31, 2008)
21. Tull, “China’s Engagement in Africa,” 476.
22. Petiteville, “Exporting Values,” 128.
 China’s Soft Power Dilemma: The Beijing Consensus Revisited 141

23. Financial Times, “Chinese Model is No Panacea for Africa,” February 6,

2007.
24. Yu Keping, “Dialogue on ‘Beijing Consensus’ and ‘the China Model’,”
People’s Website, October 26, 2005.
25. Huang Ping, “‘China Model’” or ‘Chinese Experience’,” People’s Daily Web-
site, October 26, 2005.
26. Daniel Twining, “Asia’s challenge to China”, London: Financial Times, Sep-
tember 25, 2007
27. Fareed Zakaria coined his term “illiberal democracy.” See Fareed Zakaria,
“The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (November/December): 1997.
28. Gideon Rachman, “Illiberal Capitalism: Russia and China Chart Their Own
Course,” Financial Times, January 8, 2008.
29. Financial Times, “Chinese Model is no panacea for Africa.”
30. Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model.”
31. “Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Coopera-
tion”, (Beijing: November 5, 2006).
32. Ibid.
33. Peter Brookes, “Back to the Maoist Future: China’s African Ambitions,” The
Weekly Standard, April 17, 2006.
34. Overholt, “China and Globalization.”
35. Overholt, “China and Globalization.”
36. Ian Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’s Development or Another False Start?
(Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 94.
37. Taylor, “NEPAD,” 75.
38. Sautman, “Friends and Interests,” 20.
39. Chris Alden, “China in Africa,” Survival 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 157–8.
40. Alden, “China in Africa.”
41. The ASEAN Charter, Preamble, 2007.
42. The ASEAN Charter, Preamble, 2007.
43. White House, “President Bush Attends APEC Business Summit,” September
7, 2007, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070907.html. (accessed
October 31, 2008).
44. The Joint Declaration of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit, (Singa-
pore, November 22, 2007).
45. George Yeo, “Statement by ASEAN Chair Singapore’s Minister for Foreign
Affairs,” New York, September 27, 2007, www.aseansec.org/20974.htm.
46. Twining, “America’s Grand Design in Asia,” 86.
47. China signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Phnom
Penh in 2003. This was the first non-ASEAN country signature.
48. Dieter, “Healthy Competition.”
49. Daniel Twining, “Asia’s Challenge to China,” Financial Times, September.25,
2007.
 Chapter Eight

China’s Cultural Exports and its

Growing Cultural Power in the World
Xiaogang Deng and Lening Zhang

In the past three decades, China’s economic performance has captured the
attention of the world. Although cheap Chinese products have deluged world
markets, little attention has been paid to China’s sustained efforts in exporting
and exercising its cultural power. Current discussion of the cultural dimen-
sion of China’s soft power has been predominantly focused on the Confucius
Institutes and the growing popularity of learning the Chinese language.1 Few
studies discuss China’s overall efforts in cultural export and its drive to be-
come a major world cultural power.
One potential source of soft power is a nation’s culture, which may appeal
to other countries. However, not all aspects of a culture produce soft power;
indeed, some cultural practices actually harm a nation’s soft power if the
foreign audience finds them unappealing. That is why all nations attempt to
display the good aspects of their culture. Also, a state’s international cultural
policy could be coercive and heavy handed. The recent China-South Korean
dispute about the cultural and historical heritage of Koguryo is a good ex-
ample. Only a non-coercive approach to international cultural relations con-
tributes to soft power. Compared to economic and military power, it is much
cheaper and more effective to use various cultural means to achieve one’s
political objectives. This is particularly the case if one considers international
image and reputation as part of a state’s national interests and goals.
In this chapter, we examine various resources in Chinese culture to evalu-
ate China’s growing ambition to become a major world cultural power. In the
first section, we analyze China’s envisioned grand program to boost its cul-
tural influence in the world. In the next two sections, we assess whether China
is becoming a major world power in cultural production by examining its cul-
tural trade and the promotion of its media in the world. In the final section,
we explore China’s cultural influence in Africa and Latin America. Contrary
143
144 Chapter Eight

to the common perception that China has very limited cultural power that
insignificantly affects world opinions, we argue that China’s intentions go
beyond becoming simply an economic superpower. As the significance of
Chinese economic power continues to grow, China also wants to become a
major world cultural power.2 There is some evidence that China may have
more cultural power than people ordinarily think.

CHINA’S NEW AMBITION TO

BECOME A MAJOR CULTURAL POWER

China’s current aspiration and drive to be a major world power is signifi-

cantly shaped by its “superiority-inferiority complex.”3 Although China has a
glorious past and a very rich cultural heritage, its modern history since 1840
has been marked by a series of humiliating defeats in various wars, invasions
by Western powers, unequal treaties, internal wars, and socio-political chaos.
All these failures and humiliations have been deeply ingrained in the Chinese
mentality.
After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China had few
diplomatic connections with the outside world. China’s international isolation
from 1949–1971 may have also contributed to such a superiority-inferiority
mentality. In the minds of the Chinese, “Beijing was treated by the Western
world largely as an ‘international outlaw’.”4 With limited political and eco-
nomic resources, China had to rely on informal channels of communication
ranging from trade exhibitions, cultural shows, and overseas Chinese connec-
tions to build up social and economic foundations for subsequent diplomatic
recognition.5
China started its economic reform in 1978 and since then its economy has
taken off. It gradually increased its world status from an international outlaw
to a major economic and political power. As China’s economy grew at an ex-
ponential rate, its self-confidence gradually increased. Now, for the first time
in modern history, Chinese leaders see that China has an opportunity to catch
up with the Western powers and to revisit China’s glorious past to become a
major world power.6
Cultural exports have been perceived as having critical functions for
China’s emerging cultural power in the world. First, they can satisfy China’s
desire to be a major world cultural power in addition to their economic and
political influence. China feels that its current status in cultural exports does
not adequately match its economic power in the world. Moreover, a super-
power should also influence the world through its cultural products, as clearly
seen in U.S. cultural domination.7 Cultural exports can help “promote Chi-
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 145

nese culture abroad and enhance our country’s cultural soft power and meet
the urgent need to increase China’s comprehensive power in the world.”8
Second, cultural exports can enhance China’s cultural security and coun-
terbalance America’s influence. According to Zhao Qizheng, the former
Director of the State Council Information Office, China should rejuvenate its
culture to enhance its cultural security: only “when we have cultural security
. . . [can] we discuss the security of our value orientation and the security of
our ideology.”9
Third, cultural exports may help China take a larger share of the world
cultural market. Juxin Wang argues that China has rich cultural resources and
that cultural exports can contribute to the promotion of Chinese culture in the
world. Cultural exports can draw the world’s attention to Chinese culture and
meet the increasing demand for its cultural products. He maintains that people
around the world are not only interested in the economic indicators of China’s
development but also show “strong interests in the cultural environment that
has contributed to China’s development, and they want to know China and its
history and culture. Thus, there is a vast market demand for Chinese culture
in the world.”10
At the same time, some Western countries are beginning to perceive China
as a security threat and strong competitor that may be harmful to their own
economic prosperity. Some scholars argue that China’s “siege mentality” and
“national humiliation mentality” will not easily disappear among Chinese
elites.11 The Chinese believe that their national image is negatively portrayed
and even demonized by the Western media.12 Various accusations about
violations of human rights, intellectual property rights, and trade rules reflect
“Westerners’ hostilities, biases, and misunderstandings.”13 According to the
official Chinese rebuttal, the real goal of these accusations is to prevent China
from becoming a true world power. The Chinese feel that their voices cannot
be heard in the world because of the domination of the Western media. If
China wants to be a major world power, it has to develop its cultural power
and make itself heard in the international arena.
According to Zhao Qizheng, China has a serious deficit in cultural trade
and concerted efforts should be made to redress this imbalance. China’s
cultural deficit indicates that China does not have much power in the inter-
national arena. “China cannot become a cultural superpower until China has
a sufficient market share in the world’s culture market. Only when China
becomes a cultural superpower, is it possible for China to be a world super-
power.”14 Zhao further argues:

if China can only export TV receivers but not attractive TV programs, it means
that China cannot export its own ideas and we will become “a hardware factory.”
146 Chapter Eight

China must develop a strategy for its national cultural advancement. Cultural
export and the media’s role in international communications should be an im-
portant part of our national plan.15

China also feels the urgent need to increase its power in various forms of
media. Liu Changle, a television executive, argues that although the Chinese
constitute twenty percent of the world’s population, eighty percent of world
media is dominated by the Western English media:

On one hand, the English media shapes how the audience views the world in its
daily coverage. On the other hand, how the English media selects and reports
major world events directly affects how the audience perceives and evaluates
these events. . . . Non-Western media, including the Chinese media, is excluded
from the mainstream of the world and we are in a very weak position.16

Recognizing its weak position as a cultural power, the Chinese govern-

ment recently unveiled a strategic five-year cultural development plan to
boost China’s cultural exports and promote Chinese culture abroad.17 The
plan recognizes that culture plays a crucial role in international competition
and is an important factor in assessing a country’s comprehensive power
and competitiveness. “Cultural power has increasingly become an important
yardstick to measure a nation’s comprehensive power. On the international
stage, China not only needs strength in economy, science, technology, and
defense, but also cultural strength to be ahead of international competition.”18
It emphasizes that China should substantially increase its efforts to expand
its channels of cross-cultural exchanges, promote Chinese media abroad, and
increase the competitiveness and influence of Chinese cultural products. The
plan also stresses the importance of actively promoting Chinese culture in
the world. As Liu Yunshan, the former head of the Publicity Department of
the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee recently pointed
out, “The first two decades of this century are a critical strategic period for
China’s cultural development, and we should seize this opportunity to greatly
improve the country’s cultural ‘soft power.’”19 It is clear that China intends to
become a major cultural superpower commensurate to its growing economic
power.

CHINA’S CULTURAL EXPORTS AND CULTURAL POWER

It is a well-known fact that China has become a world power in producing

cheap products such as clothing, shoes, electronic equipment, and toys. How-
ever, little is known about China’s vigorous marketing of its cultural exports
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 147

and its overall status in the global cultural trade. The current literature also
does not adequately address the role of the media in China’s overall cultural
promotion and its determination to be a major cultural power. It is critically
important to evaluate these issues because it can help us assess China’s cul-
tural resources and their role in the application of Beijing’s soft power.

Sources of Data to Assess China’s Cultural Exports

Conceptually, cultural power can be measured quantitatively through nation-
states’ custom records of import and export in cultural products. Those na-
tions that export more cultural products than import them can be seen to have
higher cultural power. Rapid globalization may also substantially reduce the
costs of cross-border trade and make cultural products more readily available.
However, it is difficult to operationalize foreign trade in cultural products
because cultural products that are intangible intellectual assets (such as mu-
sic or a novel) cannot be easily measured in terms of sales. Moreover, there
is a substantial variation in the definition of cultural products in different
countries.20 For instance, a video game may be defined as a toy or a cultural
product depending on the country. Furthermore, lack of reliable and valid
data that can capture cross-country cultural trade has constrained researchers’
evaluation of nation-states’ cultural power.
For the past twenty years, the United Nation Education, Science, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) has worked diligently to develop more reliable
measures of cultural exports that can capture the flow of cultural products
both in volume and content. Currently, the UNESCO’s report on International
Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services is the only available data that
can comprehensively capture cross-cultural trade. In its latest report, it devel-
ops a new method to distinguish between content products and those products
that make possible their creation, production, and distribution. Although the
data have some limitations, it is all that is available to comprehensively assess
China’s overall cultural trade in the world market.21
Another possible source is statistics from the Chinese government. How-
ever, Chinese Custom’s product classification system is quite different from
the definitions of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Commerce and
this complicates a comprehensive evaluation. Chinese statistics usually do
not include information about the content of cultural products. Thus we can
only use data from Chinese documents in international trade to assess China’s
cultural power in the publication area.
One observation is that the evaluation of China’s cultural exports can be
elusive, depending on what you look at. UNESCO and Chinese govern-
ment sources do not cover the same aspects and sometimes contradict each
148 Chapter Eight

other. The UNESCO reports include more information on cultural produc-

tion (equipment and supplies such as blank CDs or DVDs) instead of the
creative side and overall cultural influence. Some discrepancies are therefore
expected to result from the limited available data. However, we think that the
UNESCO data are more complete and consistent across different regions of
the world.
In our discussion below, we will first present UNESCO’s report on cultural
exports and then discuss China’s import and export data in printed media and
audiovisual media. Based on these data, one may get two entirely different
pictures of China’s cultural exports in the world.

China’s Cultural Exports

According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistic’s 2005 report “International
Flows of Selected Cultural Goods and Services 1994–2003,” China ranked
fourth in the world in terms of export revenues of cultural goods and services.
China’s total cultural export revenue was $5.27 billion in 2002 and only the
United Kingdom (U.K.), United States (U.S.), and Germany had higher num-
bers of cultural exports than China. The UNESCO report was based on each
country’s import and export data from 1994 to 2002 in the following areas:
1) heritage goods, including collections and collectors’ pieces or antiques of
over 100 years old; 2) books, including printed books, brochures, children’s
pictures, drawings, or coloring books; 3) newspapers and periodicals; 4)
other printed matter such as maps, postcards, and pictures and designs; 5) re-
corded media, including gramophone records, audio compact discs, magnetic
tapes, and other recorded media for sound; 6) visual arts, including paint-
ings sculptures, statuettes, lithographs, etc.; 7) audiovisual media, including
video games with a TV receiver, photographs, and movies; 8) equipment
and support material, including musical instruments, sound player/recorders,
recorded sound media, television and radio receivers, etc.
The report indicated that China’s export in cultural products has developed
at a fast pace. For instance, China only had a 8.3 percent share ($636 million)
of the U.S. cultural product market in 1994 but its share increased to 30.8
percent ($4.2 billion) in 2003. Some of China’s cultural and creative products
were in the top-ranking categories: China is 1) number one in audio-visual
media, which is one of the fastest growing cultural products in the world; 2)
number two in visual arts; and 3) number seven in export of books and other
printed matter.22
Overall, the report shows that China is a major exporter of cultural prod-
ucts and has a positive trade balance. Previous studies have paid scant atten-
tion to China’s cultural production capability in enhancing its attractiveness.
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 149

As discussed earlier, data from UNESCO are more comprehensive and cover
a wider range of cultural areas both in content and culturally related products
or services. It is a valuable source of data and makes cross-country compari-
sons possible although its ability to capture the complexity of cultural exports
is limited.

China’s Publication Trade

Publication is a crucial component of cultural production, so it is important
to review China’s status in the publication trade when assessing its cultural
power. If a country exports more cultural products such as books, news-
papers, and periodicals than it imports, it has a positive trade balance and
thus has more cultural power in the world. Table 8.1 shows that China has
a significant cultural imbalance in the publication business. For instance, it
exported $36.3 million worth of books in 2006 while importing $180 million.
Similarly, China exported only $2.8 million worth of audio and video prod-
ucts while it imported $30.8 million. The import-to-export ratio for audio and

Table 8.1. Imports and Exports in China’s Publication Industry24

Total # of Export Total # of Import Total # of Export Total # of Import
Books, periodicals Books, periodicals Audio, Video & Audio, Video &
& newspapers & newspapers Electronic Electronic
Publications Publications
(Total Value in (Total Value in (Total Value in (Total Value in
U.S. dollars ) U.S. dollars) U.S. dollars) U.S. dollars)

1998 5.199mln 2.50mln 68,460 0.442mln

($14.81mln) ($49.75mln) ($0.323mln) ($3.02mln)
1999 4.839mln .2.57mln 0.2169mln 0.505mln
($15.89mln) ($56.56mln) ($0.482mln) ($3.59mln)
2000 5.90mln 14.13mln 0.354mln 1.17mln
($16.72mln) ($57.92mln) ($0.595mln) ($5.02mln)
2001 6.05mln 16.82mln 0.457mln 0.947mln
($17.64mln) ($69.04mln) ($0.769mln) ($10.72mln)
2002 6.20mln 14.18mln 0.885mln 0.830mln
($17.41mln) ($94.87mln) ($2.17mln) ($12.23mln)
2003 7.66mln 18.77mln 1.33 mln 1.4mln
($23.30mln) ($146.08mln) ($1.39mln) ($22.73mln)
2004 7.68mln 19.74mln 1.28mln 0.633mln
($25.46mln) ($162.54mln) $2.20mln ($21.36mln)
2005 7.32mln 14.29mln 0.752mln 0.149mln
($32.87mln) ($164.18mln) ($2.11mln) ($19.33mln)
2006 10.07mln 23.95mon 1.05mln 0.178mln
($36.31mln) ($180.9mln) ($2.85mln) ($30.79mln)
150 Chapter Eight

video products is thus 10.8, suggesting that China has a significant cultural
trade deficit in this market.23
In the publication trade, copyrighted products also reflect a country’s
cultural power in marketing its products abroad. Those countries that export
more copyrighted books or titles are likely to have more influence in the
world. China has suffered a large cultural deficit in its copyright trade. For
instance, China imported 12,386 copyrighted products in 2006 while it only
exported 2,057.24 The Chinese government has been aware of the cultural
deficit in the publication business, especially its deficit in copyright trade.
According to a report by China Book International, the deficit does not match
China’s economic position in the world and Chinese publishers must work
hard to promote Chinese culture and help the outside world develop a positive
image of China. The report argues that it is critically important for China to
promote its culture abroad through publication because

export of culture is of great significance to protecting, developing and enhanc-

ing a nation’s influence in the world as well as to the building of the nation’s
image. . . . The China Book International program we are now carrying is part
of this cultural promotion. Having Chinese books exported to the outside world
is a national strategy as well as a challenge that Chinese publishers face in their
journey to the international market.25

The content of China’s publication exports primarily focuses on language,

culture, and education.26 In 2005, exports surged significantly partly due to a
worldwide “fever” for the Chinese language. But fads can end as quickly as
they start. In recent years, international customers increasingly are interested
in philosophy, social sciences, traditional medicine, and children’s books.
However, buyers are predominantly from China’s traditional markets in
Hong Kong and Southeast Asia.27
The report recognizes that major barriers are the difficulty of the Chinese
language for foreign readers and translation.28 The Chinese government
sponsors the China Book International Program to sell its products of printed
media abroad. For the first time in Chinese history, China has developed its
specific long-term strategic five-year plan for cultural development (the cul-
tural development used to be embedded in the social development plan). Chi-
nese leaders have realized the critical role of culture in boosting the country’s
overall power. Funding for translation is one of the major national projects
included in the five-year plan. China has set aside a special state budget to
cover translation costs and to encourage foreign publishers to translate and
publish Chinese books in the world. The program formally started in 2006.
The Information Office of the State Council signed contracts with more than
ten foreign publishers in seven countries to promote 170 books on China in
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 151

2005. The total funding was about RMB 3 million in 2005. China spent more
than RMB 10 million to fund 210 projects with fifty foreign publishers in
nineteen countries in 2006.29
According to the UNESCO report, China is a major player in the publi-
cation business, ranking seventh in the world.30 However, this assertion is
contradicted by the data cited above. Two major factors may contribute to
the observed differences. First, Chinese official statistics are still a reflection
of a state-planned economy. Its data is primarily comprised of major state-
owned publication firms while many foreign-owned or private publication
firms do not have to report their trade figures to the state authority directly.
Second, Chinese publication export data only reflect books or products that
are indeed produced by the major state-owned firms and do not count value-
added or outsourcing products by foreign publication firms. The UNESCO
data reflect outsourcing in publication trade that is not accounted for in the
Chinese statistics.

China’s International Television and Radio Industries

Similar to the Chinese publication industry, all media in China have the des-
ignated function of supporting, promoting, and serving the Communist Party
and the government as their “mouthpiece” for propaganda.31 Chinese TV and
radio are under the dual control of the State Administration for Radio, Film
and Television (SARFT) and the Publicity Department of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. Administratively, the SARFT has direct control. For instance,
China Central Television’s (CCTV) or China Radio International’s annual
budget allocations have to go through the SARFT. The SARFT is also in
charge of the technical and operational aspects of the media industry. The
Publicity Department makes sure that the media is accurately presenting the
Party’s policies and is not distorting the Party’s positive image in the minds
of the people. Internationally, Chinese media has to keep in line with Chinese
foreign policy and promote China’s image abroad, which is considered an
important part of public diplomacy.32
CCTV has about 1.88 billion viewers at home, covering 95.9 percent of the
population in China. Because it’s under the direct control of SARFT, CCTV
is able to monopolize the media market and reduce potential competition.33 It
has three international channels specifically for foreign audiences. CCTV’s
programs are transmitted via satellite twenty-four hours a day, seven days per
week, and can be viewed in more than 100 countries in the world. It claims
to have more than 65 million viewers outside China at the end of 2006.34 In
1992, CCTV-4 became the first international channel; it primarily targets
overseas Chinese and those who understand Chinese. It has about 15 million
152 Chapter Eight

viewers worldwide. CCTV-9, the first English international channel, was

launched in September 2000 and its target audience is the non-Chinese. It
has nearly 50 million subscribers worldwide. In 2004, CCTV started its first
Spanish and French channel, CCTV-E & F, with more than 2 million viewers
in the world in 2006.35 However, there are no independent sources to verify
whether China’s official estimates are accurate. Although it is very expensive
to broadcast its programs all over the world twenty-four hours a day, China
offers these channels free of charge.
CCTV has made headway into the United States, and has become its larg-
est overseas market with over 10 million viewers for CCTV-9 and 800,000
for CCTV-E & F.36 China considers entering the US market as a major media
event. There are more than 6 million ethnic Chinese in the United States
but the TV market is fragmented. Chinese language TV stations have been
dominated by Taiwan and Hong Kong programs produced by immigrants.
Sometimes these programs report events from a Taiwanese perspective and
their view on China may not be as positive as what China would like to see.
With three CCTV TV channels in the United States, China expects that it can
counter-balance Taiwan’s influence and affect public opinion. According to
China’s Radio and Television Yearbook, CCTV’s entrance “has changed the
landscape of the U.S. TV market where Taiwan has a strong presence and
our voice is weak.”37 CCTV also helps China’s “One China” foreign policy
to counter-balance Taiwan’s influence in the US.
CCTV’s presence in the U.S. market also indirectly affects the Chinese
TV market by providing low cost or no cost news programs and TV series.38
As Chinese immigrants have increased rapidly, local Chinese TV stations
emerged in the late 1990s (in Houston, New York, or Washington, DC, for
example) and the local Chinese prefer to watch TV programs that they are
familiar with. These TV stations usually cover happenings in their respective
local areas then use low-cost CCTV news and series to attract a large audi-
ence.39
For the international radio and TV industries, China also has its own pro-
motion plan as part of the national five-year plan. The main purpose of the
promotion project is to

get China’s voice heard in every part of the world. Within five years (2001–
2006), our country’s radio, TV, film industries should have a major develop-
ment or breakthrough in reaching out to viewers or listeners in every country
in the world, especially in North American and Western Europe, and let these
audience have a better understanding of the ‘real China.’ Efforts should be made
to let foreign audience know China’s position and perspective on all major inter-
national issues. In the next ten years our radio, film and TV industries should be
strong enough to compete with major Western media companies.40
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 153

The ultimate goal for the media industry is to

have Chinese voices heard in any location where major Western media outlets
are able to present their audio and visual images, and let our radio, TV programs
and films have significant international impacts, and substantially improve the
current unfavorable situation that Western media is strong but Chinese media
is weak in the international media arena41 (the State Administration of Radio,
Film, and TV, 2001).

China’s video and audio exports are also developing rapidly. In 2003, China
produced 456 million audio and video products.42 It exported about RMB 100
million worth of video and audio materials in 2003. The primary markets are
North America, Southeast Asia, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Some firms have
established an overseas market and rental network in America, Canada and
Europe. In 2004, Chinese-produced movies had RMB 110 million in foreign
box office revenues, which was fifty percent higher than in 2003.43
In summary, China’s active promotion of its media abroad is an impor-
tant part of its cultural promotion plan to exert greater influence beyond
its borders and speak to the world with its own cultural voice. It reflects its
concerted efforts to export Chinese-related content to the outside world and
influence how overseas audiences think about China. Although at present its
influences may be limited to the Chinese living abroad, its impacts cannot be
underestimated. It could potentially help China achieve its political and diplo-
matic goals indirectly as more overseas Chinese integrate into host countries
and participate in the democratic process. China’s growing influence in the
U.S. media market, especially among ethnic Chinese, is a good example.

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION
OF CHINESE CULTURAL INFLUENCE

China’s traditional sphere of influence is in Asia but as the Chinese economy

grows, it needs more resources from other parts of the world. Its foreign
policy objectives have also changed, focusing more on Africa and Latin
America. According to Li (1998)44, China’s foreign policy in the developing
world has several major objectives: 1) systematically bring together support
from the Third World countries, 2) promote economic cooperation, 3) counter
Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts to gain formal recognition from a small number
of countries that still maintain formal ties with Taiwan, and 4) minimize
direct confrontation with the West and emphasize cooperation to achieve a
win-win scenario. Under this policy, China has increased its diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and cultural efforts to court African and Latin American countries.
154 Chapter Eight

China’s Cultural Power in Africa

China’s use of soft power in Africa is not something new; China has a long
history of engagement with the region. In the 1950s and 1960s, China was
internationally isolated and had few diplomatic relations with the major
Western countries, so China had to shore up its alliances in Africa. China sup-
ported African nations’ independence efforts and encouraged them to break
away from the yoke of Western colonial rulers.45 China’s anti-colonialist
foreign policy helped it reshape the geopolitical landscape in the region and
cultivate friendly relationships with African countries46 However, from the
late 1970s to 1980s, China focused more on its internal development and its
activities in Africa became relatively dormant. According to two U.S. observ-
ers, China’s influence in Africa was relatively limited and its aid programs
were hardly significant in the 1980s and early 1990s. Its major goal at the
time was to defend its “One China” policy.47
China’s “continued strong economic growth, a more sophisticated genera-
tion of Chinese leaders, better scholarship in China on Africa, and a domes-
tic population more confident in China as a global actor, have encouraged
Beijing to take a more proactive approach to foreign affairs.”48 From the
Chinese point of view, as its economy developed rapidly in the 1990s, it
faced increased protectionism from Western countries. In 1991, China started
its strategic drive to diversify its foreign trade market to reduce the risk of
anti-dumping legislation. At the same time, China’s demand for energy be-
came increasingly insatiable, forcing it to look for energy in Africa and Latin
America. Africa’s share of trade with China increased from 2.1 percent ($10.
8 billion) in 2001 to 2.8 percent ($39.71 billion) in 2005.49
In addition to economic assistance and debt relief, educational and cultural
exchanges are also part of China’s effort to strengthen its influence in Africa.
Chinese culture is quite different from the many indigenous cultures on the
African continent. The economic resources of African countries also limit
what cultural products they can purchase from China. Instead, China’s efforts
now focus on two major areas: training future generations of African leaders
and cross-cultural promotions.
China has educational exchange agreements with fifty African nations.
When international students receive their education in China, they also have
full exposure to Chinese culture and political ideas. In 2000, there were 1,388
African college students in Chinese universities, a figure that increased to
3,737 in 2006.50 From 1950 to 2005, China provided 19,000 scholarships
to African students. Twenty percent of China’s scholarships were granted
to African students in 2005, although they only constituted less than three
percent of the total foreign student population. Many students become very
successful and some of them have become national leaders in their own
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 155

countries. African students often use their Chinese language skills and social
connections to establish their own businesses, which contribute to the rapid
development of Sino-African trade. “Many African students consider China
as their second home,” according to Mr. Cui, President of China Language
and Culture University that has trained more than 4,000 African students over
the years.51 Learning Chinese has become a fad in Africa. China established
its first Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi in 2005.52
China has been extraordinarily active in cross-cultural exchanges across
the continent, especially in the past decade. In recent years, more than 100
performing arts troupes have taken trips to Africa.53 China’s National Ballet,
the National Ballet of China, the China Oriental Song & Dance Ensemble, the
China Acrobatic Troupe, the Wuhan Acrobatic Troupe, the Dalian Art En-
semble, and the Sin Kiang Song & Dance Ensemble, along with thousands of
artists, actors, singers and other entertainers, have visited African countries.54
China and African nations have also held hundreds of art exhibitions of dif-
ferent sizes throughout Africa and in China. “China held the Chinese Paint-
ing and Sculpture Exhibition in Egypt, the Chinese Watercolor Exhibition in
Zimbabwe and Tunis, the Chinese Arts and Crafts Exhibition in Benin, and
the Chinese Contemporary Oil Painting Exhibition in South Africa. Mean-
while, African countries held many exhibitions in China.”55
China’s presence in Africa has shaped the geopolitical alliance in the region
and the African nations have been China’s powerful allies in world politics.
With the help of the African countries, China has defeated Taiwan’s fourteen
attempts to reenter the UN in the past twenty years. They have also supported
China to defeat the United States and the other Western countries’ eleven at-
tempts to criticize China’s human rights records over the years.56 “At every turn,
these African nations have supported Beijing’s efforts to sideline the attempts
to redress abuses throughout China and Africa.”57 China obtained substantial
votes from African countries in the decision to award China the right to hold the
2008 Olympic Games, the 2010 World Trade Show, and to select Chen Feng
Fuzhen from Hong Kong as the Head of the World Health Organization.58

China’s Presence in Latin America

Historically, China has had weak ties with Latin America due to the geo-
graphical distance between the two continents. However, in the past five
years, China has increased its presence in the region. In 2001 and 2004, two
Chinese presidents (Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao) visited the region. The re-
gion has become increasingly important for China’s ever-expanding appetite
for energy and raw materials such as oil, copper, iron, soybeans, etc.59 In
2000, China’s total trade in the area was $12.6 billion and this increased to
156 Chapter Eight

$72.2 billion in 2006.60 Latin America is one of the few regions in the world
that has a positive trade balance with China. While the United States and
other Western countries have decreased investment in the area, China has
stepped up its investment. In 2005, China’s total expenditure in the region
was about $11.5 billion. Economically, China is attractive to many countries
in Latin America because of its vast market for raw materials and its remark-
able purchasing power.
Since Chinese culture is distinctively different from South American cul-
tures, China’s attractiveness mainly lies in its unique developmental model
for the region. The Chinese model is characterized by heavily handed state
intervention in the economy, preoccupation with political stability instead of
individual freedom, massive media control, and greater reliance on a strong
government to guide the development process.61 The Chinese model provides
a seemingly viable alternative to the Washington Consensus—a free market
economy with democratic institutions. Many countries in the region are frus-
trated with the developmental model of the United States, and how the Inter-
national Monetary Fund has tried to sell it.62 The economic rise of China has
made many people in the region, including political leaders, reconsider their
own political and economic developmental models. China’s experience is
particularly attractive to those newly elected presidents in Bolivia, Brazil, and
Venezuela.63 In 2005, after Evo Morales was elected as Bolivia’s president,
he immediately visited Beijing and skipped the United States. This may have
strategic implications for the United States since the region, “once firmly in
the United States sphere of influence, is slowly but surely drifting East.”64
An influential regional political commentator claimed that the year of 2005
would go down in history as “the year in which the United States lost much
of its once almighty influence in Latin America, and [China] began to play a
modest but rapidly growing role in hemispheric affairs.”65
China’s cultural ties with the region are relatively weak but it has worked
very hard to promote its culture though various cultural exchanges. Cubans
now can watch Chinese TV series through CCTV-E & F.66 China’s cultural
promotion activities have been very active. In the first eight months of 2007
alone, there were more than thirty cross-cultural activities in the region.67
For instance, people in Guyana, Mexico, Panama, and Surinam saw Chinese
acrobatic shows by three groups of Chinese art performers. There were sev-
eral cultural and art exhibitions such as Chinese Paintings, Chinese Design,
China’s Historical and Ethnic Clothing and Decorations Shows in Mexico,
Chile, Argentina, Brazil and other countries. China’s cultural promotion ac-
tivities are widespread in the region.
At the same time, China also systematically promotes its culture through
the teaching of the Chinese language and the Confucius Institutes in the re-
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 157

gion. In 2005, China sent sixteen Chinese language teachers to Argentina to

cope with its rising demand.68 There were about 2,000 students who studied
Chinese in Argentina in 2005. In 2005, former Chinese Vice President Zeng
Qinghong visited Mexico and signed a cultural and educational agreement,
promising to provide thirty-two scholarships for Mexican students. In 2006,
China established its first Confucius Institute in Mexico. The Chinese lan-
guage has been taught at about twenty Mexican colleges. The number of stu-
dents who majored in Chinese has exceeded 1,000 and Chinese teachers are
needed by many Mexican colleges. Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile are also
observing an increasing popularity in the learning of the Chinese language.69

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

With the ever-increasing role of China in the international political econ-

omy, Chinese leaders see a historical opportunity to revitalize their coun-
ty’s glorious past and foster a renaissance of its rich culture. Apparently,
China is not satisfied simply being an economic superpower—it would
like to project its power into the cultural sphere as well. China’s sense
of cultural superiority and repeated humiliations between 1840 and 1949
have significantly shaped China’s national aspiration to achieve world
superpower status. Chinese elites believe that it is China’s 5,000-year old
continuous civilization and unique cultural heritage that have motivated
them to get what they have achieved so far. Of course, Chinese leaders
would like people to believe that their “great leadership” and the socialist
system contributed to their success. Chinese leaders have been obsessed
with the notion of comprehensive power that usually includes a nation’s
economic, military, and cultural power.70
Currently, China’s cultural power is not on par with its economic and po-
litical clout in the world. However, it is commonly acknowledged that China
has the many cultural resources to become a major world power. The results
of our study show that China is indeed a major cultural exporter: the fourth
largest cultural exporter in the world in 2002, as shown in the UNESCO
report. China seems to be realizing gradually that the best way to promote
its culture is through either marketing or economics.71 Its television network
has made major inroads into all the continents of the world and now attracts
more than 65 million viewers outside China. Its international radio network
is broadcast 1,035 hours per day in forty-three foreign languages all over the
world to disseminate China’s policies and present China’s positive image to
the world.72 It claims to be the most comprehensive and far-reaching radio
network in the world.
158 Chapter Eight

Although China’s publication trade is not as strong as its overall cultural

export, China has developed a strategic plan to promote all forms of media
and become a major contender in the world media market. Currently, China’s
media power cannot compete with that of the United States, but it may still
have its own market niche (specialty TV programs) tailored specifically to its
East Asian neighbors, who tend to be China’s traditional sphere of influence,
and 30 million overseas Chinese whose background makes them more recep-
tive to the Chinese media. Furthermore, Chinese media has the potential to
become more competitive in reporting internal events or major world events
when the Western media may have an obvious bias; however, only if the
Chinese government can relax its obsessive control. It may be too early to
predict how successful China’s long-term plan for cultural development will
be. However, there are clear signs that China is working very hard to project
its cultural power beyond its traditional sphere of cultural influence. It has
reached out in Africa, Latin America, Europe and North America, and has
become a powerful competitor in multiple forms of communication. With
the growing role of the Chinese media supported and controlled by the state,
China’s alternative developmental model can be attractive to some develop-
ing nations through the power of example.
Of course, any scholar of Chinese studies cannot miss China’s active pro-
motion of the Chinese language and the rapid expansion of the Confucius
Institutes into every continent of the world. The global demand for Chinese
language skills has prompted more than 40 million people all over the world
to study Chinese. Chinese universities have also increased their appeal to in-
ternational students. There are more than 1.04 million international students
who have studied or are studying in China.73

NOTES

1. Ding Sheng and Robert Saunders, ”Talking Up China: An Analysis of Chi-

na’s Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of the Chinese Language,” East
Asia 23, no 2 (Summer 2006): 3–33; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How
China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2007).
2. Huang Yanzhong and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of
China’s Soft Power.” East Asia 23, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 22–44.
3. Wang Jisi, “What China Needs in the World and From the United States,” in
China’s March on the 21st Century: A Report of the Aspen Strategy Group, eds.
Kurt M. Campbell and Willow Darsie (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 2007),
86.; Ding and Saunders, “Talking Up China.”; Alan Hunter, “China: Soft Power and
Cultural Influence,” Coventry University, UK: Centre for Peace and Reconciliation
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 159

Studies, 2006, www.ipra2006.com/papers/CRPBC/ChinaSoftPowerAndCulturalIn-

fluence.doc (accessed October 9, 2007).
4. Wang, “What China Needs in the World,” 85.
5. Chen Hao-su, “On Civil Diplomacy.” The Chinese People’s Association for
Friendship with Foreign Countries, 2004, www.cpaffc.org.cn/llts/detail.php?id=177
(accessed August 17, 2007).
6. Zhao Qizheng, “How China Becomes a Major World Power: Four Major Ele-
ments,” Wenhui Daily, March 15, 2006, www.zsr.cc/ExpertHome/ExpertAttention/
200603/12959.html (accessed September 1, 2007).
7. Xu Suqin, “Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture and Enhance Our Soft Power,”
Jinyang Network, August 22, 2007, //www.ycwb.com/myjjb/200708/22/content_
1592212.htm (accessed September 15, 2007).
8. Wang Juxin, “Theoretical Consideration for Promoting Chinese Cultural
Abroad,” Provost Office of Shandong Provincial School of the Communist Party,
November 26, 2007, www.sddx.gov.cn/001/001016/001016007/2401215257846.htm
(accessed December 16, 2007).
9. Xu, “Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture.”
10. Wang, “Theoretical Consideration for Promoting Chinese Culture Abroad.”
11. Wang, “What China Needs in the World,” 86.
12. Zhao, “How China Becomes and Major World Power.”
13. Wang, “What China Needs in the World,” 86.
14. See Xu, “Rejuvenation of Chinese Culture.”
15. Zhao, “How China Becomes a Major World Power.”
16. Liu Changle, “Have Chinese Media’s Voices Heard in the World,” Direc-
tor of Phoenix Television (Speech at the Advanced Forum of the Chinese Media
Development, 2005), academic.mediachina.net/academic_zjlt_lw_view.jsp?id=4528
(accessed August 31, 2007).
17. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Outline of the National
Plan for Cultural Development During the Period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.”
The State Council Gazette, 2006, www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_
431834.htm (accessed December 20, 2007).
18. The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Outline of the National
Plan for Cultural Development.”
19. “Senior Official Stresses China’s Need for Developing “Soft Power,” Xinhua
News Network English, April 7, 2007, english.sina.com/china/1/2007/0407/108862
.html (accessed August 20, 2007).
20. For a more detailed discussion, see UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005.
21. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The International Flows of Selected Cul-
tural Goods and Services, 1994–2003.” (Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics,
2005).
22. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The International Flows of Selected Cul-
tural Goods and Services.”
23. “Basic Facts about China’s News and Publication Business in 2006,”
China News & Publication, June 26, 2007, book.sina.com.cn/news/v/2007-06-
26/2037216665.shtml (accessed December 20, 2007).
160 Chapter Eight

24. Chinapublish.com, “Annual Status of Publication,” 1998-2007, www.csc

.edu.cn/gb/ readarticle/readarticle.asp?articleid=2560 (accessed December 22, 2007).
Note: There are some inconsistencies in trade figures provided by different Chinese
sources and sometimes the same state agency provides different figures. We con-
sulted with the officials in the State Bureau of News and Publications. In their view
the online data from Chinapublish.com may be more reliable because it actively
reflects recent changes.
25. “Basic Facts about China’s News and Publication Business in 2006,”
China News & Publication, June 26, 2007, book.sina.com.cn/news/v/2007-06-
26/2037216665.shtml (accessed December 20, 2007).
26. China Book International, “Promotion of Chinese Publications Overseas
Needs a Boom of Translation Industry.” China Book International Report, August
8, 2007, www.cbi.gov.cn/en/info/infodetail.jsp?ID=1873 (accessed September 10,
2007).
27. “Digital Technology Helped China’s Export of Books in 2006.” Publishing
Business Weekly, September 12, 2007, www.chinabookinternational.cn/cn/info/info-
detail.jsp?ID=2334 (accessed December 15, 2007).
28. “Digital Technology Helped China’s Export of Books.”
29. China Book International, “Promotion of Chinese Publications.”
30. Li Yuejin, “Fully Implement the Chinese Book Promotion Abroad Plan,”
China Book Reading Newspaper, April 25, 2007, www.gmw.cn/content/2007-04/25/
content_600252.htm (accessed December 20, 2007).
31. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “The International Flows of Selected Cul-
tural Goods and Services.”
32. Edward Davis, ed. Encyclopedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture (London
and New York: Rutledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005).; Zhao Yuezhi, Media, Mar-
ket and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1998).
33. Chen, “On Civil Diplomacy.”
34. Yuezhi Zhao. 1998. Media, Market and Democracy in China: Between the
Party Line and the Bottom Line. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
35. Editorial Committee of China Radio and Television Yearbook, China Radio
and Television Yearbook (Beijing: Radio and Television Yearbook Press, 2006).
36. Editorial Committee of China Radio and Television Yearbook, “China Radio
and Television Yearbook.”
37. Editorial Committee of China Radio and Television Yearbook, “China Radio
and Television Yearbook.”
38. Editorial Committee of China Radio and Television Yearbook, “China Radio
and Television Yearbook.”
39. Shun Feng, “General Introduction of Chinese Language Media in US,” March
5, 2006, column.bokee.com/125167.html (accessed September 8, 2007).
40. Shun, “General Introduction of Chinese Language Media.”
41. The State Administration of Radio, Film, and TV, “The State Administration
of Radio, Film, and TV’s Implementation Guidelines for the Promotion of Chinese
Media Abroad Project.” The State Administration of Radio, Film, and TV’s Document
 China’s Cultural Exports and its Growing Cultural Power in the World 161

1494, December 24, 2001, www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/22598/22619/22876/

2006/3/cd96314749413600228-0.htm (accessed August 31, 2007).
42. The State Administration of Radio, Film and TV, “Implementation Guide-
lines.”
43. Northern Media Studies, “China’s TV and Film Markets Reflect the Spiritual
Ethos of the Era,” Northern Media 2006, yule.sohu.com/20060817/n244856276
.shtml (accessed December 15, 2007).
44. Northern Media Studies, “China’s TV and Film Markets.”
45. He Li. 1998. “Economic Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism Mar/Apr98,
Vol. 45, Issue 2.
46. An Yong-yu, “Great Success of Fifty Years’ Sino-African Mutual Benefit
Cooperation,” Foreign Affairs Review: The Academic Journal of the Institute of Di-
plomacy of People’s Republic of China 1(2007): 10–14.
47. Li Xiguang, “China’s Charming Offensive in Africa,” (Speech de-
livered at the 56th General Assembly of the International Press Insti-
tute which by the Executive Dean of The School of Journalism and Com-
munication, Tsinghua University, Istanbul, May 15, 2007). www.media
.tsinghua.edu.cn/data/2007/0521/article_522.html (accessed September 8, 2007).
48. Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy” Current
History (May, 2006): 219–224. www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Africa.pdf (ac-
cessed September 5, 2007).
49. Eisenman and Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” p. 219.
50. “Brief Introduction to China’s Foreign Trade During the Tenth Five Year Plan
Period, 2001–2005,” Department of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Commerce of
People’s Republic of China, 2006, wms.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/200601/20060
101322709.html (accessed August 12, 2007).
51. “2006 A Historical Record Setting Year for International Students in China,”
China International Studies Network 2007,www.csc.edu.cn/gb/readarticle/read
article.asp?articleid=2560 (accessed September 10, 2007).
52. Cui Xiliang, “From the Bottom of Their Hears: African Students Call Chi-
na Their Second Home,” People’s Daily, October 7, 2006.
53. “First Confucius Institute for Africa officially launched in Nairobi,” Xinhua
News Network, December 20, 2005.
54. Zhang Xiaolan, “Cultural Exchange Promotes Sino-African Friendly Relation-
ship,” People’s Daily, August 8, 2006, 7.
55. An, “Great Success of Fifty Years.”; Lan Qing, “Sino-African Cultural Ex-
change Increased: ‘Little Red Flower Performance Group’ Promotes Chinese Culture
in the Chinese New Year,” China Culture, March 19, 2007, 8.; Zhang, “Cultural
Exchange.”
56. Lan, “Sino-African Cultural Exchange”; Zhang, “Cultural Exchange.”
57. An, “Great Success of Fifty Years.”
58. Eisenman and Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” p. 220.
59. An, “Great Success of Fifty Years.”
60. Mark P. Sullivan and Kerry Dumbaugh, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin
America,” Chinaelection.org 2004. Also available in Congressional Research Service
162 Chapter Eight

Report RL32804 www.chinaelections.org/en/readnews.asp?newsid=%7BBEF2823E-

5C4D-4E98-A32DD46FC9938EDF%7D&classid=83&classname=Sino-
Latin%20Am.%20Alliance (accessed August 30, 2007).
61. Li He, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America and Its Implications,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 4–5 (2007): 833–62.
62. Kurlantzick, “Charm Offensive.”
63. Ana Margheritis, “The Neoliberal Turn in Latin America: the Cycle of Ideas
and the Search for an Alternative,” Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 3(2007):
25–48.
64. Li, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America.”
65. Marcelo Ballve, “Latin American Sees China in Its Future,” National Catholic
Reporter, January 13, 2006.
66. Ballve, “Latin America Sees China in Its Future.”
67. Li, “China’s Growing Interest in Latin America.”
68. China-Latin America Economic and Trade Network, “Cross-cultural Exchange
Activities in Latin America,” 2007. The network is under the supervision of China
Economic and Social Development Association and Sino-Latin America Economic
and Technological Committee. www.china-latin.com/servlet/Node?Node=25665&La
nguage=1&Pos=25&Listing=6002 (accessed September 16, 2007).
69. Li Xiaohua, “Confucius Institutes Taking Chinese to the World,” 2007, www
.china.org.cn/english/education/204196.htm (accessed September 1, 2007).
70. Li, “Confucius Institutes.”
71. Andrew Scobell, “China’s Soft Sell: Is the World Buying?” China Brief 7,
no. 2 (2007): jamestown.org/publications_details.php?article_id=2371836&issue_
id=3983&volume_id=422 (accessed September 10, 2007).
72. Gary Rawnsely, “A Survey Of China’s Public Diplomacy,” Center on Public
Diplomacy, The University of Southern California, May 2, 2007, uscpublicdiplomacy
.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_detail/070502_a_survey_of_chinas_public_
diplomacy/ (accessed September 10, 2007).
73. The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, China Radio and TV
Yearbook (China Radio and TV Yearbook Press, 2006).
74. China Ministry of Education. 2007. 1.04 million was calculated from two
sources. From 1950–2005 the total number of international students came to China
was 884,315 based on China Ministry of Education’s website listed below: www.gov
.cn/jrzg/2007-05/28/ content_628456.htm (11/20/2007). And in 2006 the number was
162,695 from the following source: www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/33/info20133
.htm (accessed on 11/20/2007).

Acknowledgement:
The authors would like to express their appreciation for Dr. He Li’s assistance
in writing the Latin American section of this chapter.
 Part III

SOFT POWER AND CHINA’S

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
 Chapter Nine

China’s Soft Power in Africa

Joshua Kurlantzick*

When President Hu Jintao embarked upon his first trip to Africa, in 2004,
China’s image on the continent seemed at its zenith. Flush with the romance
of a first date, African states enthused over China’s new interest.1 China had
been inking deal after deal on the continent, as many African nations eagerly
attracted Chinese investment and China became Africa’s third-largest trading
partner: a $2.5 billion stake in one of Nigeria’s offshore petroleum fields; a
$1.5 billion pact to upgrade Ethiopia’s telecommunications system; invest-
ments in Angola that eventually made that country the largest source of
Chinese oil imports.2 China also was winning striking diplomatic victories.
In 2005, Senegal, a leader of francophone Africa, and a country courted as-
siduously by Taipei, switched relations from Taiwan to China. Not long af-
terwards, oil-rich Chad switched diplomatic relations as well. Across Africa,
Hu received the type of welcome and access once reserved for American
or French leaders, and many African media outlets contrasted the Chinese
leader’s trip with the fact that George W. Bush rarely devoted much attention
to the continent.
In 2007, Hu Jintao took another, twelve-day tour of Africa, following on
the heels of visits by Wen Jiabao and many other senior Chinese officials.
This time, however, Hu faced a more mixed reaction. In Zambia, local lead-
ers welcomed Hu almost like a royal, and Hu announced that China would
build an economic cooperation zone in Zambia that would attract some $800
million worth of investments. Former Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda
personally received Hu, Chinese in Zambia flocked to the airport to greet Hu,

* Portions of this chapter are adapted from Joshua Kurlantzick, “Beijing Envy,” The London Re-
view of Books, July 5, 2007 and from Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power
is Transforming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

165
166 Chapter Nine

and the Chinese president delivered his usual well-scripted speech, telling his
audience, “China is happy to have Zambia as a good friend, good partner,
and a good brother.”3 But some average Zambians responded far differently.
Two years earlier, accidents at a Chinese-owned copper mine in Zambia had
killed fifty-one Zambians. Zambian protestors gathered the following year to
demand better safety conditions and higher salaries at the copper mines, since
their bosses paid them below the Zambian minimum wage, roughly thirty-
five pounds per month.4 Armed with tree trunks, the protestors marched to the
company’s gates, but no supervisors came to negotiate. The opposite: guards
opened fire on the protestors, nearly killing several more workers. Anti-China
demonstrators then took to the streets of Lusaka, Zambia’s capital, where
they targeted Chinese-owned businesses and rallied outside the Chinese em-
bassy.5
Now, with China’s president arriving in Zambia, protestors had their
perfect target. Hu had planned to visit Zambia’s copper-producing region,
where he would highlight China’s largesse by laying the cornerstone at a
new stadium financed by Beijing. At the last moment, Hu’s advisors probably
realized he might face massive anti-China rallies in the copper heartland. Hu
cancelled his trip to the copper belt.6 Yet Hu faced one popular protest after
another in other parts of the continent. In South Africa, the local press blasted
the labour policies of Chinese firms investing abroad. In Namibia, Hu faced
similar criticisms.
This dichotomy in African reactions to Hu on these two visits was strik-
ing. Over the past decade, China has transformed its interactions with Africa.
While fifteen years ago China had more limited relations with the continent,
it has become one of the most important foreign partners for many African
nations. Much of these gains are due to Chinese soft power—to China’s aid,
investment, and diplomacy in Africa, and particularly to its training programs
for African opinion leaders, many of whom come to China and return home
amazed by China’s growth rates and seeking to emulate China’s model of
development.
In the short term, these soft power strategies have helped China build strong
relationships across Africa without yet engendering as much concern about
China’s rising power as is evident in Europe, Asia, or North America. Yet at
the same time, as evidence by Hu’s most recent visit, as China’s influence
grows it is causing grave concerns among African civil society, trade unions,
and some political leaders. Whether Beijing can respond to these concerns in
a manner suitable to the local environment, which in much of Africa means a
freer climate for media, unions, and political parties than in China itself, will
determine whether Beijing can consolidate its ties to the continent.
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 167

SOFT POWER THEORY

When Joseph Nye coined the phrase soft power, he originally intended a rela-
tively limited definition of the term. To Nye, soft power originally meant an
ability by a certain state to get other nations to do what it wanted by attraction
rather than coercion, payments, or force. Other countries, Nye said, would go
along with this state because of the appeal of its culture, ideas, ideology, and
overall public image. Nye specifically ruled out what he viewed as coercive
political, military, and economic tools, including aid, formal diplomacy, in-
vestment, sanctions, political pressure, and, of course, military force.7
Yet in the period since 1990, when Nye first coined the term, soft power
has taken on a broader, more fluid, meaning. In part, this is because scholars
and officials have begun to realize that drawing distinctions between hard
and soft power can be difficult, especially in real world case studies.8 As
Mingjiang Li notes in the introduction, Nye himself also has realized how the
unwise usage of hard power, such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq, can sharply
diminish a nation’s soft power.
China in particular poses a challenge to Nye’s traditional definition of
soft power. Many Chinese scholars and officials themselves, as chapter
two describes, view China’s soft power more broadly than Nye did, and
simply use the term to mean all power outside of the military and security
sphere, including tools Nye considered coercive, like aid and investment.
Chinese officials, including Hu Jintao, also clearly have embraced the idea
of soft power, and it has become central to their discourse about China’s
role in the world.
Mingjiang Li probably comes the closest to summarizing the idea of soft
power enunciated by Chinese officials to this author. In the author’s experi-
ence, these Chinese officials’ idea of soft power goes far beyond the ideational
sources of soft power, in which China is clearly limited. To many Chinese
officials, soft power is, as Mingjiang defines, the soft use of power—using
power judiciously, wisely, and prudently, and engaging and accommodating
other nations. And as we will see, despite some scholars’ claims that China
has gained little from this soft use of power, in Africa it has had significant
policy implications, producing many favourable outcomes for China, one of
the key definitions of successful wielding of soft power. However, unlike in
other parts of the world, where one aspect of China’s soft power may be as-
suring other nations that they do not need to balance against China, in Africa
there is little of this “assurance” element of soft power referred to by Yong
Deng in his chapter. As Yongjin Zhang asks in his chapter, does China’s soft
power matter? In Africa, where China has no hard power, and where China’s
168 Chapter Nine

ideational leadership in combating poverty is impressive, China’s soft power

clearly does.

ORIGINS OF CHINA’S MODERN

DAY ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

The People’s Republic of China has had substantial relations with sub-
Saharan Africa since at least the early 1950s. In the 1950s and 1960s, China
looked to Africa primarily as a place to spread communism, a centre of the
global revolutionary struggle. By portraying African struggles against colo-
nialism or, later, against ruling governments, as Maoist revolutionary battles,
China also tried to show that Mao Zedong Thought had a global reach.9
Chinese media published reports of African insurgents studying Mao’s
theories, and many African revolutionaries did base their strategies on Mao’s
successes. China also utilized the Bandung Asian-African Conference to
demonstrate its shared history of predation by colonial powers and to portray
itself as the ideological leader of the developing world. At Bandung, China
also enunciated its adherence to “non-interference” in other nations’ affairs,
a policy that would continue up to the present day. At the time, China also
provided some limited material support to African rebel groups. At one point,
it supported the Marxist African National Congress in its struggle against
apartheid rule. It funded leftist rebels in Zaire (today’s Congo), and it used
the Chinese embassy in Tanzania to support rebels in other African nations.
These longstanding ties would help China reestablish its Africa relationships
in the 2000s, since Beijing enjoyed the trust of older African revolutionary
leaders like Robert Mugabe, Kenneth Kaunda, and many others.
Beijing also contributed significantly to new infrastructure development
and to agricultural production across the continent. In its aid, China focused
on large, high-prestige projects like the Tanzam Railway, which linked
Zambia to Tanzania. As Deborah Brautigam notes in her study of Chinese
assistance to Africa, during the 1970s, Beijing also launched agricultural aid
projects in Liberia, the Gambia, and Sierra Leone, though this aid had little
sustainable impact.10
By the early 1980s, as China’s internal revolutionary struggle diminished,
and Deng Xiaoping focused on China’s opening and reform, Beijing largely
withdrew from its ties to Africa. Though as Brautigam notes, senior Chinese
leaders continued to make visits to Africa, China’s aid initiatives to the conti-
nent dwindled and it occupied a lower priority among Chinese strategic think-
ers; major projects like the Tanzam Railway fell into disrepair.11 Anti-African
protests in China in the late 1980s, most notably a series of attacks on Afri-
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 169

cans in Nanjing—really protests against reform and opening—further soured

relations between China and Africa.12 At the same time, in the 1980s and
1990s Africa itself struggled through famines, the last gasps of authoritarian
rule in many nations, and economic declines caused by a collapse in com-
modity prices and years of failed structural adjustment programs promoted
by international financial institutions. Not for nothing were the 1980s called
Africa’s “lost decade”: By the turn of this century, many African nations
had barely grown since independence. Between 1960 and 2001, for example,
Nigeria grew by an average of 0.2 percent annually, while Ghana’s economy
shrunk by 0.1 percent over that time period.13
Over the past decade, however, China has reengaged with Africa. China’s
renewed ties with the continent are merely part of Beijing’s broader soft
power initiative around the world. Deng Xiaoping’s leadership circle had
emphasized rebuilding China’s own economy: China should “keep a low pro-
file and never take the lead” on global issues, Deng warned—Beijing wasn’t
strong enough to expose itself to a world leadership role. Today both the Chi-
nese leadership and many Chinese elites have become convinced that China,
a rising power, should play a larger role in the world. Over the past decade,
China’s breakneck economic growth fostered greater confidence within the
Chinese public, and intellectuals began calling for China to take a larger role
in global affairs. Reflecting these sentiments, this winter Jia Qingguo, a lead-
ing international affairs scholar in Beijing, told the New York Times, “Like it
or not, China’s rise is becoming a reality.”14
Meanwhile, China’s leadership also was becoming more confident and
sophisticated in global affairs. H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong produced
one of the most comprehensive recent assessments of the Chinese leader-
ship. As they found, of the twenty-four officials who became full or alternate
members of the Politburo at the Fifteenth National Congress in September
1997, only six had served in the Party leadership before 1992, and most were
ten years younger than the men they’d replaced. Many of these new leaders
hailed from China’s urbane eastern provinces, which had benefited the most
from economic reforms, and which were most open to external influence. In
contrast to older leaders, they had completed undergraduate and even gradu-
ate studies. They had studied outside China, often in Western nations. But
these leaders also had seen how, after the Tiananmen crisis, Western nations
had shunned China. Several leading African nations supported China after
Tiananmen, and Chinese leaders apparently recognized that Beijing could not
rely on the US, but must develop its relations with developing Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.15
With a more sophisticated knowledge of the world, these leaders rec-
ognized that China must become a greater international player. China had
170 Chapter Nine

pressing great power needs—needs for oil, allies, markets, security, and other
desires of a major power. Yet the United States had built alliances around the
world that could constrain China one day, if Washington chose to contain Be-
ijing the way it had tried to contain Moscow. To break through this American
containment, and to gain more allies at bodies like the United Nations Hu-
man Rights Commission, Beijing would have to rely on developing nations.
The Chinese leaders also increasingly understood that as China continued to
grow, and opened its borders, it could not avoid the world’s problems, like
HIV, drug trafficking, and transnational disease.
Beijing would make soft power the centre of its new engagement with the
developing world. In part, according to Chinese officials interviewed by the
author, this resolve to focus on soft power was strengthened by the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which at least initially showcased the overwhelming
power and technology of the U.S. military, which seemed to be widening the
gap between it and the People’s Liberation Army. Africa, in particular, would
be a place nearly impossible for China to exert hard power, as the PLA lacked
expeditionary capacity, the Chinese navy had limited range, and, after 9/11,
the United States sought to increase its military contacts on the continent
through the pan-Sahel Initiative, an African counterterrorism-training pro-
gram, and the Africa Command, a new department within the U.S. military
with a responsibility for Africa alone.
In statements and speeches, Chinese leaders began to enunciate a doctrine
of “win-win” (shuang ying) relations, highlighting that Latin American and
African and Asian and Arab nations could benefit from their relationship with
China even as China benefits from its relationship with them. Win-win rela-
tions also revolved around noninterference, particularly relevant in an Afri-
can context where leaders had witnessed decades of intervention by Western
powers. In fact, while the ideational aspect of China’s soft power may be
less relevant in other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, in Africa it
is clearly relevant. In one major address given in 2005, entitled “An Open
Mind for Win-Win Cooperation,” Hu Jintao announced, “Dialogue and con-
sultation . . . is an important avenue to win-win cooperation . . . [China] will
only [promote] peace, stability, and prosperity.”16 “The aim of Sino-African
cooperation is mutual benefit . . . it is particularly conducive for the develop-
ment of African countries,” echoed assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei, in a
speech marking Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s 2006 tour of Africa.17 Begin-
ning in the late 1990s, China also enunciated what a “new security concept,”
in which it emphasized that Beijing, and other nations, could guarantee their
own security by working more closely with multilateral institutions and
building mutual trust.18
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 171

Africa would prove especially important to China. Africa contained large,

undeveloped oil and gas deposits, in nations like Angola, Sudan, and Chad.
Countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia also were
major copper producers, and other African nations were important sources of
other metals, as well as timber. Along with Central America and the South
Pacific, Africa also was a battleground with Taiwan, which as recently as
1997 still had eight diplomatic allies on the continent. Compared to devel-
oped markets in the West and developed Asia, Africa also contained many
untapped markets avoided by Western multinationals because of high levels
of political risk. As Chinese companies began going global—in the late
1990s, the central government designated favoured firms as part of the zou
chuqu “going out” strategy—they would look to these African markets for
initial opportunities, since African nations like Sierra Leone or Mozambique
had little Western investment, and often were less competitive than the do-
mestic Chinese market itself.19
Finally, and perhaps most important, many African nations had far less
experience with China than countries in Asia, and so had less inherent fear
of Chinese security and economic competition. In fact, after years of slow
growth following Western-oriented economic reforms, many African states
were looking for a new model of development, and a major-power-partner
that would treat Africa as a top priority. The ideational aspect of China’s soft
power would then be relevant, even if China did not explicitly suggest the
ideational aspect of its model. After all, a decade of African democratisation
during the 1990s also ironically made many African states more amenable to
closer ties with Beijing. New, democratically elected African leaders, who
enjoyed more popular legitimacy than their authoritarian predecessors, gener-
ally felt freer to build relations with a broader range of external actors beyond
the traditional Western powers.

CHINA’S TOOLS OF SOFT POWER

As China’s international engagement has become more sophisticated, so too

it has developed more sophisticated tools of soft power. In Africa, develop-
ment assistance may be the most important tool. China’s total assistance to
Africa is difficult to quantify, both because Beijing does not publish thor-
ough, official statistics and because it remains unclear what percentage of
China’s announced aid actually qualifies as aid under Development Assist-
ance Committee definitions.20 But it is clear that China has reinvigorated its
assistance to Africa. In June 2007, it launched the $5 billion China-Africa
172 Chapter Nine

Development Fund, managed by China Development Bank, to support Chi-

nese firms investing in Africa.21 Over the past seven years, China also has
cancelled over $10 billion worth of African debts, and provided some $5.5
billion in aid to the continent, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit.22
The World Bank estimates that China is now the largest lender to Africa, and
at a recent summit in Shanghai, Chinese leaders announced they would offer
Africa $20 billion in new financing.
Chinese aid tends to be untied to conditions other than supporting Chinese
investment, which makes it popular with African leaders and many African
elites, who may support political and economic reform in their countries but
do not see tied aid as useful to promoting these goals. China also has taken
advantage of African complaints about Western trade barriers to advertise that
Beijing has no tariffs on exports from Africa’s twenty-five poorest nations.
Since the major international financial institutions stopped funding in-
frastructure for years, much of China’s aid to Africa goes for infrastructure
projects like rebuilding the Benguela Railway in Angola and the Nigerian
railway system. Yet compared to the 1950s and 1960s, today China’s assist-
ance to Africa is more diversified than just focusing on infrastructure. The
Chinese government seems to have recognized that it needs to spend aid
money on building a broader public appeal in Africa, on improving people-to-
people contacts. This is a critical change from the past, when China focused
almost exclusively on building relations with African leaders, not African
publics. China also has more opportunity to build these people-to-people
contacts in Africa than in Southeast Asia, where countries have a much longer
experience of interaction with China, and where local ethnic Chinese com-
munities tend to dominate people-to-people interactions with China. Beijing
has developed the China Association of Youth Volunteers, a Peace Corps-
like program designed to bring young people to countries like Ethiopia on
agriculture and language projects. According to the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation’s action plan, Beijing also has focused on social needs in Africa,
like planning to fund anti-malaria clinics and rural schools. All of these pro-
grams help boost China’s public appeal.
China, however, rarely coordinates with other donors, which risks duplica-
tion and also undermines efforts by other donors to support better governance
within African nations. However, there are some signs this may be changing,
that China is beginning to learn from other donors. Chinese officials have
held meetings with American aid specialists designed to study the U.S. aid
program.23 Chinese aid specialists also have held meetings with officials from
the World Bank, the U.S. Ex-Im Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, and other major lenders in order to learn about their
practices.
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 173

Training programs for African opinion leaders are a significant part of

China’s aid to Africa, and probably a larger component of its aid than in
other, more developed regions like Southeast Asia. Again, this demonstrates
an understanding by China of the need for building people-to-people con-
tacts, since these opinion leaders will return to Africa and become unofficial
ambassadors for closer ties to China. Beginning in 1996, China Foreign Af-
fairs University ran a comprehensive seminar for diplomats from Africa and
other regions entitled “Understanding China Symposium”; the class included
lectures on Chinese history, culture, and strategies of development.24 Other,
similar training projects include programs at Zhejiang Normal University
for African university presidents, seminars run by the Chinese Ministry of
Education on training educational personnel, programs on health education
for African officials, and a project to provide some 1,500 scholarships annu-
ally for African students to come to China, among many others. Perhaps most
notably, China has begun organizing training programs for African media, a
critical means of ensuring better press coverage.25
The training and visitor programs are supplemented by assistance for
Chinese language and studies programs on the African continent, whether at
Confucius Institutes or, in some cases, at local secondary schools. There is
significant incentive for African students to take these classes: As one report
notes, “Recently, Khartoum University had a Chinese speech competition,
and a Chinese professor there said ‘…nearly 100 percent of students who
graduate from the department get jobs with Chinese companies’.”26 Though
the number of Confucius Institutes in Africa remains relatively small at this
point, this is largely because of a lack of resources in African universities
to support the Institutes, not because of a lack of Chinese will to establish
them.
These training and visitor programs, as well as technical assistance pro-
grams, implicitly support probably the most compelling aspect of China’s
soft power to African elites: Its model of development, the so-called “Beijing
Consensus.”27 This model is particularly attractive to authoritarian nations
in Africa whose leadership would like to emulate China’s high growth rates
and lack of political liberalization, but it is also attractive to leaders in demo-
cratic African nations, who believe China’s combination of protecting cer-
tain industries, liberalizing gradually, and maintaining some degree of state
intervention in the economy have proven more successful than the neoliberal
Washington Consensus. Unsurprisingly, the African Development Bank held
its 2007 meeting in Shanghai partly because it wanted many of its officials
to study, first-hand, China’s model of growth. This despite assurances from
Chinese leaders that they have no model to suggest to other countries, and
that each nation needs to follow its own development path.
174 Chapter Nine

Besides the training and visitor programs, the Chinese government has
used other, secondary, tools to build soft power in Africa. It has established
closer party-party relations across the continent—the number of African
parties visiting China rose from sixteen in 2002 to twenty-four in 2005.28 It
has upgraded its diplomatic corps, although according to Chinese diplomats
the diplomatic corps in Africa lags behind that in Southeast Asia or Western
nations, partly because most Chinese diplomats cannot bring their families
with them to Africa and thus do not view the continent as an attractive post-
ing. Still, high-level diplomacy shows African states that China places a high
priority on relations with the continent, and has helped bring new life to
African multilateral organizations. Senior Chinese leaders have been making
two visits per year to Africa29, in November 2006 China hosted nearly all the
continent’s leaders for a major summit in Beijing, and China has established
the China-Africa Cooperation Forum to provide a formal site for diplomatic
relations with the continent.30
China also has dramatically boosted its investment in and trade with Africa,
with the investment often supported by favourable loans from China Ex-Im
Bank, and with trade balances now in Africa’s favour. China has become the
continent’s third-largest trading partner, and according to the International
Monetary Fund, bilateral China-Africa trade has been rising by fifty percent
per year. In speeches, Chinese leaders suggest to African nations that Beijing
will be a fairer trading partner than Western nations—China will help African
countries obtain the technology and skills they need to develop themselves,
and to earn some of the wealth that industrialized nations now wield.31
Yet it remains unclear whether this new investment and trade actually
has helped China’s soft power on the continent. Clearly, Chinese demand
for resources has boosted Africa’s growth, and rescued commodity-
dependent economies like Zambia. Compared with the more developed
economies of Southeast Asia, where Chinese investment generally has
been welcomed, many African states, which have virtually no manufactur-
ing sector, worry that trade links with China will prevent them from ever
climbing the value-added ladder. This sentiment is expressed widely. “We
are back where we started,” Wilfred Collins Wonani, who leads the Cham-
ber of Commerce in Zambia, told the New York Times. “Sending raw ma-
terials out, bringing cheap manufactured goods in. This isn’t progress. It is
colonialism.”32 At its most extreme, this sentiment finds voice in populist
politicians like Zambia’s Michael Sata, who used anti-China sentiment to
rally support in the 2006 presidential election, and nearly triumphed in the
poll. Large, state-linked Chinese energy and construction companies’ habit
of relying on imported pools of Chinese labour, kept isolated on company
compounds, also does not endear them to local populations. Unused to
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 175

protests and vibrant civil society, lacking expertise in security, some large
Chinese companies have responded poorly to popular demonstrations, as
with the protests in Zambia.
Recognizing these concerns, the Ministry of Commerce has announced
new regulations designed to push Chinese firms on the continent to act more
responsibly, including by hiring local workers.33 But it has little power to
actually enforce these regulations. Beijing also has tried to increase transpar-
ency about its policies toward Africa by publishing white papers, such as the
comprehensive 2006 paper on China’s Africa Policy.
The Chinese government has less control over other aspects of China’s soft
power in Africa, yet some of these non-governmental elements of soft power
actually have significantly boosted China’s image in Africa. Since liberaliz-
ing restrictions on Chinese outbound travel, Beijing has limited control over
where Chinese citizens move for business or tourism. Sensing commercial
opportunities, significant communities of small-scale Chinese traders have
moved to Africa over the past decade. One paper, by Barry Sautman, suggests
there are as many as 100,000 Chinese residents in South Africa alone, while
other reports note that there are as many as 750,000 Chinese residents on the
continent.34 They tend to concentrate in large cities, where they work trading
clothes, cheap electronics, toys, and other medium-value goods, mostly im-
ported from China.35 Compared to the large Chinese companies, which tend
to segregate their workers from local communities, these small traders mix
with African populations, where they have boosted local goodwill, and even
study in local schools. To be sure, for some of these migrants, their culture
does not mesh well with that of Africans—there is little historic overlap, as
compared to Chinese and Southeast Asian or Chinese and Northeast Asian
cultures. Still, as Barry Sautman notes in an extended paper, compared to
Western expatriates, who live in secure mansions, many of these Chinese
traders live a local lifestyle, staying in inexpensive housing and winning
credit for their simple style.
Just as important, with their stocks of capital, economic knowledge, and
wealth—compared to local populations—many of the Chinese businesspeo-
ple offer an image of China as a prosperous nation, a country whose success
should be emulated. They also tend to bring cheaper goods than Western
peers, thereby helping African consumers spread their budgets wider, and
these small traders are willing to launch businesses in countries considered
too risky for Western entrepreneurs—Chinese firms are building hotels and
shops across Freetown, Sierra Leone, for example.36 Rising Chinese tourism
to Africa—roughly 110,000 Chinese tourists visited in 2005—strengthens
this perception of wealthy Chinese, though these numbers are small com-
pared to Chinese tourism to Southeast Asia or Western nations.37
176 Chapter Nine

DROP CAP: SHORT TERM SUCCESS

Partly because many African nations had limited historical experience with
China, Beijing has enjoyed a longer, more favourable honeymoon period in
sub-Saharan African than it has in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, or other parts
of the developing world. Indeed, since the early 2000s, China’s global charm
offensive has paid off most handsomely in Africa. In the most recent Pew
Global Attitudes survey, some of the warmth toward China in other regions
of the world, expressed in previous polls, had faded. “The image of China has
slipped significantly among the publics of other major nations,” Pew noted.
Yet in Africa, Pew did not find such trends. People in nearly all the African
nations surveyed by Pew had favourable images of China, with some over-
whelmingly favourable—in the Ivory Coast and Mali, over ninety percent of
respondents had a positive view.38
China is able to utilize this public image for policy gains. Growing warmth
toward China makes it easier for Beijing to achieve policy objectives on the
continent, since African publics back their leaders’ desires for closer ties
to China. For example, nations like Senegal have severed ties with Taiwan
despite the fact that, in democratic Senegal, one might think switching rec-
ognition from democratic Taiwan to authoritarian China could spark local
protests. Yet China’s image is so favourable in Senegal that the decision en-
gendered little public comment, and today Taiwan has only five formal allies
in Africa. China also has become a significant contributor to peacekeeping
efforts in Africa, deploying troops to Liberia and Sudan.39 The fact that these
troops served with little public complaint, or even comment, indicated how
comfortable Africa had become with China, including with the presence of
Chinese troops.
According to many African and Chinese officials, China’s popularity also
allows it to move rapidly on consolidating oil and gas deals across the con-
tinent. Again, both Beijing’s claims of noninterference and China’s warm
public image, which makes its firms less vulnerable to militant attacks, help
clinch these petroleum concessions. To take just one example among many
new oil deals, in 2006 CNOOC took a forty-five percent interest in a major
Nigerian offshore oil field, and China also bought a major stake in Nigeria’s
Kaduna refinery.40
This popularity, of course, makes it easier for Chinese firms to ink deals
in other sectors as well, particularly in sectors dominated by African state-
linked firms. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has sewn up deals in
Kenya, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, while Chinese aerospace Great Wall Indus-
try has won the rights to build and launch a satellite for Nigeria, to take but a
few examples out of hundreds of new deals.41
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 177

The appeal of the China model also appears stronger in Africa than in
Southeast Asia, where many nations have successfully followed their own
growth strategies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that African opinion leaders
who attend China’s visitor programs, often concentrated in wealthy Chinese
cities, return to the continent impressed with China’s staggering growth rates,
unknowledgeable about rural poverty in China, and hoping to bring elements
of China’s economic strategy back to their home countries. They also often
note that China is the first developing country to enter the ranks of major
economic powers, which gives Beijing great credibility. “You are an example
of transformation,” Madagascar President Marc Ravalomanana told Chinese
leaders during the May 2007 African Development Bank meeting in Shang-
hai. “We in Africa must learn from your success.” The appeal of the China
model, of course, depends on China’s continuing to post astounding growth
rates. Any slippage would cost it dearly in soft power; in the old Soviet
Union, when sympathetic foreign visitors actually came to the USSR and saw
how poorly its economy was performing, they often became far less enthusi-
astic about the potential spread of the Soviet model around the world.

LONG TERM QUESTIONS

In the longer term, however, China’s soft power in Africa faces significant
hurdles. This point has been raised by Zhongying Pang in his chapter, but let
me provide a more detailed analysis. First, though African civil society ini-
tially welcomed China’s new relationship with the continent, especially since
other powers like the United States ignored many African needs, as the hon-
eymoon period with China wears off African media and non-governmental
organizations will begin to speak out more. This is especially true in southern
Africa, which boasts vibrant trade unions, newspapers, and activist groups.
Already, non-governmental organizations in southern Africa have begun to
express concern that China’s growing power in Africa will lead to Beijing
exporting its own weaknesses, including poor environmental regulation, low
labour standards, and weak corporate governance. Though they often detest
the World Bank and other citadels of Western power, many of these activists
realize that the conditions lenders propose for African governments do help
ensure money goes to social welfare.42 Consequently, they fear that Chinese
assistance could contribute to environmental destruction, poor labour stand-
ards, or rampant graft, since China does not coordinate with other donors to
make sure aid money was spent wisely and in accordance with international
standards. Most traditional donors, after all, had realized that good govern-
ance is vital to development. But in Angola, one of the most corrupt nations
178 Chapter Nine

on earth, a Chinese aid package worth as much as $9 billion allowed the

regime to avoid having to deal with the IMF, which would have insisted
that aid money actually trickled down to the country’s vast underclass.43 The
International Rivers Network, a global environmental group, revealed that
Chinese support for the Merowe Dam, a project in Sudan, may have displaced
as many as 50,000 people, and the Sudanese government has violently sup-
pressed protests against the project. Justica Ambiental, a Mozambican NGO,
travelled to Shanghai to launch similar complaints about a China-backed dam
in Mozambique. These complaints travel quickly, picked up in the African
media: Unlike in the colonial era, when it would take months for stories of
colonial atrocities to make their way to the British press, in the era of the
Internet abuses get reported immediately.
At times, these attacks have turned violent. In April 2007, militant group in
Ethiopia called the Ogaden National Liberation Front launched an attack on a
Chinese oil exploration area in eastern Ethiopia, killing nine Chinese workers
and kidnapping seven others. The Front warned Beijing “to refrain from en-
tering into agreements with the Ethiopian government.” Militants in the Niger
Delta have issued similar warnings, and even kidnapped a group of Chinese
labourers in January. In the Nigerian commercial capital of Lagos, police
have begun expelling recent Chinese migrants from local markets because
Nigerians complained that Chinese goods are undercutting local products.44
In Zambia, Angola, and other countries, local media now report small-scale
incidents of violence against Chinese migrants. The attacks will not push
Chinese companies out, of course; after the Ethiopia killing, one leader of
Sinopec, the company operating in Ethiopia, told reporters, “There is no way
we will withdraw from Africa due to the fear of risk”45 But they have led the
Chinese government to reconsider its responsibilities. The Ministry of Com-
merce, for example, has passed new laws designed to help protect Chinese
workers overseas, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched a massive
campaign to remind Chinese heading abroad to respect local laws.
Some African leaders also have begun to doubt whether China will prove
any different type of power than anyone else. Though Chinese officials por-
tray their approach to development as a model more appropriate for Africa
than Western models, some African officials have begun to question whether
China’s model, which depends upon the vast stocks of foreign investment
into China, really teaches any lessons for the continent, which struggles to
attract significant investment. Sensitive to these concerns, in November 2006
Wen Jiabao told African leaders, “China still hopes to further expand its im-
port from African countries.”46 China also has agreed to quotas on its textile
exports to South Africa. What’s more, in an era where the U.S. war in Iraq has
made China’s vow of noninterference seem welcome, some African leaders
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 179

wonder whether China actually is committed to this policy. In Zambia, the

Chinese ambassador in 2006 warned that Beijing might cut off diplomatic
ties if voters picked Michael Sata in the presidential poll.47 The ambassador’s
comments, which sent shock waves through the local media, hardly seemed
like an example of noninterference. Initially, when faced with these types of
criticisms, Chinese officials wrote them off to isolated incidents or, in the
case of complaints about its policy of noninterference, to concerns raised
solely by Western states. But it is African elites themselves who have increas-
ingly voiced doubts about China’s relationships on the continent. Darfur is a
prime example of this. Over the past decade, when Sudan developed a major
oil industry, China’s leading oil companies have invested at least $10 billion,
making them critical to Sudan’s economy; China also sold arms to the Suda-
nese government and repeatedly blocked any United Nations actions against
Khartoum.48 When reports of mass killing first emerged in Darfur in 2004,
some Chinese diplomats wrote them off to hype created by human rights
groups and America, which they believe never misses an opportunity to criti-
cize Beijing. But by 2007, it became clear that Darfur was not only a concern
of Western human rights groups. African leaders themselves called for solu-
tions to the genocide, and some of these African elites wondered why China,
a country that supposedly stood on the side of developing nations, stood by
silently as those nations’ leaders eliminated their own people. Still, Chinese
leaders had difficulty understanding why Beijing would be criticized. “The
hat of neocolonialism simply doesn’t fit China,” Wen Jiabao said at a press
conference in 2006.49

CONCLUSION

Unlike regions of Asia, where nations have had longer interactions with
China, and where there is less appetite for the China model, a critical aspect
of Chinese soft power, Africa is fertile territory for growing Chinese influence.
What’s more, because of the absence of significant Western interests in Africa,
China’s influence has not provoked as strong a reaction as it has in parts of
Asia and Latin America. In part because of Africa’s receptiveness, China’s
public image in Africa remains much more favourable than in other parts of
the globe, and China’s soft power has yielded some significant policy gains.
But some of this goodwill toward Beijing is merely because China is a
relatively new actor in Africa, and thus enjoys a kind of honeymoon period
in public opinion. As China’s honeymoon in Africa has begun to wane, it will
prove a critical test of whether Beijing can adapt its new global diplomacy to
address local concerns.
180 Chapter Nine

There are some signs of this flexibility. After three years of unflinch-
ingly backing Khartoum, in the spring of 2007 a top Chinese official visited
refugee camps and then publicly attempted to push Khartoum to allow in a
peacekeeping force. China then named a special envoy to focus on Darfur and
agreed to contribute 275 troops to the hybrid African Union-United Nations
peacekeeping force in Darfur, even winning praise for its actions from U.S.
officials like White House envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios.50 “China realizes
these countries [like Sudan] are ruining its image, and what China wants is
international respect,” said one long-time observer of China’s Africa policies
in Beijing in an interview with the author. In recent months, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs also has begun pushing Chinese diplomats to broaden
their circle of contacts beyond simply political elites to include the “African
street”—NGOs, media, unions, and other important actors outside of typical
leadership circles. This will be a tough task, as the Chinese diplomatic corps
has little experience interacting with NGOs, and many Chinese diplomats
have ignored African NGOs that are seeking a dialogue with them. Still, if
China can prove flexible enough to use its soft power with both African lead-
ers and the African “street,” it could truly be ready to challenge the values,
ideas, and models of Western actors playing a role on the continent.

NOTES

1. In this chapter, Africa refers only to sub-Saharan Africa.

2. Esther Pan, “China, Africa, and Oil,” Council on Foreign Relations 2008,
www.cfr.org/publication/9557/ (accessed August 1, 2007).
3. Joseph Schatz, “Zambian Hopeful Takes a Swing at China,” Washington Post,
September 25, 2006, 16(A).
4. Yaroslov Trofimov, “New Management: In Africa, China’s Expansion Begins
to Stir Resentment,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2007, 1(A).
5. David Blair, “Ignored by the Mob,” Daily Telegraph online, October 2, 2006,
blogs.telegraph.co.uk/foreign/davidblair/oct06/mob1.htm (accessed July 20, 2007).
6. Chris McGreal, “Thanks China, Now Go Home: Buy-up of Zambia Revives
Old Colonial Fears,” The Guardian, February 5, 2007, 21.
7. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New
York: Public Affairs, 2004).
8. Recognizing this blurry line, Nye himself has helped launch an initiative
focused on “smart power,” and has written approvingly of China’s soft power, even
though China does not fulfil the original, more limited Nye definition of this power.
9. Bruce Larkin, China in Africa 1949–1970: The Foreign Policy of the People’s
Republic of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
10. Deborah Brautigam, Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green
Revolution (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998).
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 181

11. Deborah Brautigam and Adama Gaye, “Is Chinese Investment Good for Af-
rica?” Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, www.cfr.org/publication/12622/is_chi-
nese_investment_good_for_africa.html (accessed May 25, 2007).
12. Guillaume Moumouni, “Domestic Transformations and Change in Sino-African
Relations,” Centre on China’s Transnational Relations Working Paper no. 21 (2007).
13. Roberto Zagha and Gobind T. Nankani, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy,” in Eco-
nomic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform (Washington: World
Bank Publications, 2005).
14. Joseph Kahn, “China Opens Public Discussion of Its Rising Power,” Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, December 8, 2006, www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/08/news/
china.php (accessed January 2007).
15. H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohong, “The Foreign Policy Outlook of China’s
Third Generation Elite,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, ed.
David Lampto (Stanford: Palo Alto, 2001).
16. Hu Jintao, “An Open Mind for Win-Win Cooperation,” (speech to APEC Sum-
mit 2005, Busan, South Korea, November 2005).
17. Antoaneta Bezlova, “China’s Soft Power Diplomacy in Africa,” Asia Times, 23
June 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HF23Ad01.html, (accessed January 2007).
18. Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore, “China Views Globalization: Toward a
New Great Power Politics?” The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004):
117–136.
19. “China Spreads its Wings: Chinese Companies Go Global,” Accenture Con-
sulting Company 2005, www.accenture.com/NR/rdonlyres/6A4C9C07-8C84-4287-
9417-203DF3E6A3D1/0/Chinaspreadsitswings.pdf (accessed September 20, 2006).;
and “Zhongguo qiye jingwai shangwu tousu fuwu zanxing banfa” [Chinese enterprise
overseas business legal claims procedural law], Regulation 16 (2006).
20. To be considered aid under the DAC definition, according to the DAC’s glos-
sary of statistical terms, the assistance must consist of “flows of official financing
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of devel-
oping countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a
grant element of at least 25 percent.”
21. Jamil Anderlini, “CDB Seeking a Socialist Market System,” Financial Times,
25 July 2007, 22.
22. Danna Harman, “China Takes up Civic Work in Africa,” Christian Science
Monitor, 27 June 2007, 1.
23. Michael A. Glosny, “Meeting the Development Challenge in the 21st Century:
American and Chinese Perspectives on Foreign Aid,” (Conference Report: National
Committee on United States-China Relations, December 2005), www.ncuscr.org/
Publications/Foreign percent20Aid percent20Report.pdf (accessed January 2007).
24. Li Anshan, “Transformation of China’s Policy Toward Africa,” Centre on
China’s Transnational Relations Working Paper no. 20 (2006).
25. Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: From the Beijing Consensus
to Health Diplomacy,” China Brief 13 Oct 2005, www.jamestown.org/publications_
details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3491&article_id=2370717 (accessed January
2006).
182 Chapter Nine

26. Preeti Aroon, “Chinese: The Language of Choice for Sudanese Students,”
Foreign Policy Passport June 15, 2007, blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/5121 (accessed
August 2007).
27. Barry Sautmam, “Friends and Interests: China’s Distinctive Links with Af-
rica,” Centre on China’s Transnational Relations Working Paper no. 12 (2006).
28. Li, “Transformation of China’s Policy Towards Africa.”
29. George Bush, by contrast, has not visited the continent during his second
term.
30. For more on the summit, see english.focacsummit.org/.; also see Joshua Ei-
senman, “China’s Post Cold War Strategy in Africa,” in China and the Developing
World, eds. Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham and Derek Mitchell (Armonk, NY.:
ME Sharpe, 2007)
31. Sautmam, “Friends and Interests.”
32. Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, “China’s Trade with Africa Carries a
Price Tag,” New York Times, August 21, 2007, 1.
33. Bates Gill and James Reilly, “The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa,” The
Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 37–52.
34. French and Polgreen, “China’s Trade with Africa.”
35. Alec Russell, “Small Businesses from China Follow in the Footsteps of Gi-
ants,” Financial Times, August 28, 2007, 6.
36. John Donnelly, “China Scooping up Deals in Africa as US Firms Hesitate,”
Boston Globe, Dec 24, 2005.
37. Elling N. Tjønneland, “China in Africa. Implications for Norwegian For-
eign and Development Policies,” CMI Report, 2006, www.cmi.no/publications/
publication/?2438=china-in-africa-implications-for-norwegian, accessed Aug 2007.
38. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Unease With Major World Powers,”
(June 2007).
39. Su Qiang and Le Tian, “Peacekeeping—a Rising Role for China’s PLA,”
China Daily July 24, 2007, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/24/content_
5442172.htm (accessed Aug 2007).
40. “China, Nigeria to Ink Oil Deal,” China Daily, April 24, 2006.
41. Bright B. Simons, Evans Lartey and Franklin Cudjoe, “China Draws Africa
into its Orbit,” Asia Times, March 30, 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Busi-
ness/IC31Cb03.html (accessed August 2007).
42. See, for example, Firoze Manji and Stephen Marks, eds. African Perspectives
on China in Africa (Oxford: Fahamu, 2007).
43. Paul Hare, “China in Angola: An Emerging Energy Partnership,” China Brief,
November 8, 2006, jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_
id=3918&article_id=2371629 (accessed January 2007).
44. Laurie Goering, “China’s Investment, Clout in Africa Cause Concern,” Chi-
cago Tribune, February 19, 2006, 11.
45. Howard French, “Letter from Ethiopia: China’s Risky Venture into Resource-
Rich Africa,” The New York Times, 2 May 2007.
46. “China-Africa Trade Expected to Top $100 Billion by 2010,” Xinhua, Novem-
ber 4, 2006.
 China’s Soft Power in Africa 183

47. Schatz, “Zambian Hopeful Takes a Swing at China.”

48. Erica Downs, “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations,” China
Security 3 no. 3 (Summer 2007): 42–68.
49. Chris Zambelis, “Public Diplomacy in Sino-Egyptian Relations,” China Brief,
April 5 2007, www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/cb_007_007a.pdf (ac-
cessed August 2007).
50. Downs, “The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations,” 42–68.
 Chapter Ten

China’s Warming Relations with

South Korea and Australia
Zhiqun Zhu

China’s rise as an economic, military, and political power at the end of the
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century has been
met with mixed reactions from the international community. While most of
China’s Asian neighbors and many developing countries in other regions
seem to welcome China’s steady growth and see it as an opportunity, a few
countries, such as the United States and Japan, are more cautious. They ques-
tion China’s intentions as its power, especially its military strength, continues
to expand. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) and Australia, two
key allies of the United States, seem not to be as concerned. In fact, relations
between China and these two countries have developed rapidly in the past
decade or so.
This chapter will explore the reasons why South Korea and Australia hold
a more benign view of China than the United States. In addition to promot-
ing robust trade relations, how is China enhancing its influence in the ROK
and Australia? Are there any differences and similarities in China’s relations
with the two countries? Are there any limits to China’s “soft power” in the
ROK and Australia? The answers to these questions will help explain why
and how China is expanding its soft power in Australia and South Korea,
and how effective China’s new diplomatic strategy is. I argue that China’s
soft power approach to South Korea and Australia has played a significant
role in cementing bilateral relations. Without the play of soft power, China’s
relationship with the two countries could have been more strained.

185
186 Chapter Ten

PARADIGM SHIFT IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has emphasized the
peaceful development of its economy and military, which, according to Chi-
nese officials, poses no threat to other nations. China claims that its growth
is good not only for itself but also for the world. China is attempting to sub-
stantiate this claim by pursuing a “soft” approach in its foreign relations. It
is enhancing its soft power by promoting the Chinese language and culture
at leading universities in many countries and by presenting an image of itself
as a peaceful rising power. Meanwhile, China has increased the number of
overseas students coming to its universities, from about 8,000 two decades
ago to about 120,000 today.1 In addition to satisfying China’s key economic
and security interests, projecting its influence or soft power around the world
has become a new objective of Chinese foreign policy.
At the beginning of the reform era, China’s prevailing strategy was yin
jinlai or “bringing in.” China enthusiastically attracted foreign direct invest-
ment, particularly investment from expatriate Chinese. It established four
Special Economic Zones in the south near Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South-
east Asia where the majority of the Chinese diaspora live. However, since the
late 1990s, especially after it became a member of the World Trade Organiza-
tion in 2001, China has been more deeply integrated into the global economy.
The strategy in the twenty-first century has become zou chuqu or “going out.”
China has been actively seeking oil and other energy deals around the world,
and Chinese companies have started to invest overseas, including purchasing
foreign assets. Backed up by a foreign exchange reserve of about $2 trillion,
China is now confidently going global. According to China scholar Harry
Harding, China is now in a position to make major investments in the United
States. Those investments include strategic and iconic ones, such as oil and a
well-known American automobile brand.2
Indeed, along with the country’s growing political and economic power,
Chinese foreign policy is undergoing a paradigm shift. As Wu Jianmin, a se-
nior diplomat and former President of the China Foreign Affairs University has
observed, China is moving from “responsive diplomacy” (fanying shi waijiao)
to “proactive diplomacy” (zhudong shi waijiao).3 “The nail that sticks out will
get pounded down,” the late Deng Xiaoping admonished, meaning that China
needed to focus on domestic growth and should keep a low profile and never
take the lead in international affairs. Not anymore. The Hu Jintao leadership
seems to be walking a different path: take the lead when necessary. The new
policy thinking is also reflected in President Hu’s theory of the “Three Harmo-
nies” (San He), which includes seeking peace (heping) in the world, reconcili-
ation (hejie) with Taiwan, and harmony (hexie) in Chinese society.
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 187

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has demonstrated

leadership in several international arenas. In 2003, China initiated the Six-
Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program, which involved the United
States, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Russia. Through several rounds
of tough negotiations, the six nations finally reached an agreement in Beijing
in February 2007 to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, the process
of which started in July 2007. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is
another multilateral venue where China has demonstrated leadership.
According to Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin
University of China, China’s peaceful rise is all about its projection of soft
power. A peaceful rise relies primarily on non-coercive use of resources.
These include economic power, foreign trade, diplomatic and cultural power,
esteem from successful national development, and simple persuasion. A
peaceful rise is also nonviolent, gradual, and beneficial to all parties. It may
meet strong resistance but generates results are a “win for all.”4
The proposed establishment of 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, to-
gether with Chinese trade and investment, has become an important component
of China’s new diplomacy that emphasizes soft power. China has become more
self-confident and aspires to be an active member in the international political
economy. Its soft power diplomacy is now more sophisticated and comprehen-
sive and includes, for example, engaging in high-level visits, promoting eco-
nomic interdependence, highlighting the expected benefits from China’s pros-
perity, expanding cultural and social exchanges, and presenting a peaceful and
non-threatening new image around the world. The PRC’s close relations with
South Korea and Australia must be understood in the context of China’s grow-
ing power and its more sophisticated new diplomacy or soft power approach.

CHINA’S STRATEGIES FOR

RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA

The speed with which China and South Korea developed their close partner-
ship has few precedents in bilateral relations. The two countries established
diplomatic relations on August 24, 1992. In only sixteen years after this
normalization of relations, South Korea’s economic and cultural relationship
with China surpassed that with its long-time ally, the United States. This has
come as a surprise to South Korea’s older generation, who fought against the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army in the Korean War. “Establishing diplo-
matic ties then was a shock to the world, and such a leap in the relationship
between the two in all aspects is once again shocking the world,” Kim Ha-
joong, South Korea’s ambassador to Beijing, commented in an interview.5
188 Chapter Ten

It takes two to tango. Both the PRC and the ROK have a strong desire
to maintain close ties in today’s changing international political economy.
Both have worked hard to strengthen bilateral relations and enhance their
images in recent years. In the following section, we will focus on the Chi-
nese strategies.

Holding Frequent High-Level Meetings to Consolidate Ties

A solid political relationship is the foundation for expanding ties in other
areas, and the frequency of high-level visits is a barometer for bilateral re-
lations in international politics. Whenever the PRC leadership realizes the
importance of China’s relations with another country, it takes the initiative
and makes an extra effort to strengthen ties with that particular country. The
ROK, due to its close economic, geopolitical, and cultural linkages to China,
is certainly one of China’s foreign policy priorities.
Visits at the highest level have been frequent in recent years. For example,
after President Roh Moo-hyun took office in 2003, he paid two official visits
to China. Notably, during his first visit in July 2003, only about five months
after his inauguration, the bilateral relation was officially redefined and up-
graded from “cooperative partnership” (hezuo huoban guanxi) to “compre-
hensive cooperative partnership” (quanmian hezuo huoban guanxi). Chinese
President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to South Korea and attended the APEC
summit meeting in Busan in November 2005. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
visited South Korea in April 2007, and his predecessor Zhu Rongji went in
October 2000. Significantly, during Prime Minister Wen’s visit, the two sides
agreed to set up military hotlines between their navies and air forces and con-
duct joint search-and-rescue operations in the Yellow Sea for humanitarian
purposes.
There have been other high-level visits between the two sides in recent
years. For example, Jia Qinglin, chairman of the National Committee of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), paid an of-
ficial goodwill visit to the ROK in August 2004. Prime Minister of the ROK
Lee Hae-chan visited China in June 2005. Aside from this frequent exchange
of the highest-level visitors, leaders and officials from the two countries
also meet regularly at the sidelines of international conferences, such as the
ASEAN regional security and economic conferences and APEC summit and
ministerial meetings.
To a large extent, South Korea’s post-1997 growth was boosted by rapid
economic integration with China. In his visit to Seoul shortly after the finan-
cial crisis in 1997, then Chinese Vice President Hu Jintao confirmed to the
South Korean government that China would not devalue the yuan, which
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 189

proved vital to the economic stability and prosperity in Asia. Hu also an-
nounced the Chinese government’s decision to allow its citizens to travel to
Korea as tourists, thereby helping South Korea’s economic recovery.6
Regular summit meetings have yielded some South Korean policies
deemed favorable to China. President Roh, for example, has attempted to
strengthen security relations with China. In a meeting with Chinese Defense
Minister Cao Gangchuan in April 2006, President Roh suggested that the
two countries further cooperate on security affairs. President Roh’s policy of
balancing between the United States and China was interpreted by some as a
change of the status quo that benefits China at the expense of South Korea’s
alliance with the United States.7
The complex Northeast Asian security challenge binds the two countries
together. Both South Korea and China fear a sudden collapse of North Korea,
which will create an enormous economic and social burden and potential
military clashes.8 Still haunted by the bitter memory of over two million
casualties during the internecine Korean War, South Korea has a tremendous
stake in preventing another outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
China’s leadership role in the Six-Party Talks is timely and crucial. China’s
efforts to engage North Korea and to help resolve the nuclear dilemma peace-
fully are much in the interests of South Korea.

Broadening Cultural, Educational, and Social Exchanges

A bilateral relationship only promoted by top leaders without the participa-
tion and support of the public cannot be maintained. Realizing this, China has
tried hard to promote and expand exchanges between the two societies.
Korea and China have strong cultural and historical bonds. Confucianism
is well respected in Korean culture and society. Throughout history, Korean
scholars have built many schools to study Confucianism. Toson Sowon
(Taoshan Shuyuan) in Andong, Korea is one such well-preserved Confucian
academies established by Korean scholars in the sixteenth century. In fact,
current Chinese efforts to promote its culture abroad began with the establish-
ment of the world’s first Confucius Institute in Seoul, Korea on November
21, 2004.
China welcomes South Korean students and many Chinese schools have
established scholarships for these students. The number of Korean students
in China reached 54,000 by the end of 2006, accounting for thirty-eight
percent of the total number of foreign students in China that year.9 The stu-
dent exchange goes both ways: out of the 32,557 foreign students studying
at South Korean colleges and universities in 2006, 61.7 percent were from
the Chinese mainland.10
190 Chapter Ten

The growing bilateral trade between China and South Korea makes it
easier for these visiting Korean students to find employment when they return
home. Indeed, an increasing number of South Koreans are making a living in
China: as many as 400,000 of them now live permanently in China. About
800 weekly flights connect South Korea’s six major cities with some thirty
Chinese cities, while the number between South Korea and the United States
is only about 200.11
The year 2007 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between China and South Korea, and the two countries held
various activities to celebrate the “Korea-China Friendship Year.” Both coun-
tries promoted tourism as part of the anniversary celebration. Over 1.5 million
Chinese tourists were expected to travel to South Korea in 2007.12 Korean
tourism authorities predict that the Chinese would replace the Japanese as the
largest foreign tourist group in Korea by 2015.13 South Korea has in turn been
the fast-growing foreign country that sends its tourists to China since 1992.
By 2005, it had become the largest market for China, with a quarter of Korean
tourists (about 4 million people) coming to China.14 According to the Tour-
ism Bureau of Shandong Province, the birthplace of Confucius, Shandong
alone currently receives one million South Koreans a year. It planned to take
advantage of the Beijing Olympics to attract two million South Koreans and
to send one million tourists of its own to South Korea in 2008.15
South Korea currently is experiencing a Chinese language boom as well. In
the 1960s, only two South Korean universities had Chinese language depart-
ments, graduating about forty or fifty students a year. Today, 131 universities
and colleges in South Korea have Chinese language departments, graduating
over 3,000 students a year.16
Public opinion polls show that these changes are resulting in a growing num-
ber of Koreans having a favorable view of China. In an early 2006 Korea Times
poll of 1,000 South Koreans aged between eighteen and twenty-three, almost
forty percent said China should be South Korea’s top diplomatic priority, while
only eighteen percent opted for either the United States or North Korea.17 These
developments have led some American observers to worry that the Chinese
influence over South Korean policy is likely to rise in the future, at the expense
of the United States.18

Deepening Economic Cooperation

The two economies are highly complementary. South Korea generally con-
siders China’s development to be a great opportunity, not a threat. South
Korea has become China’s third largest trading partner, just after the United
States and Japan, while China replaced the United States and became the
ROK’s largest trading partner in 2004. When the two countries established
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 191

diplomatic relations in 1992, their bilateral trade volume was less than $5
billion. In 2005, the bilateral trade volume first broke the $100 billion bench-
mark and reached $134.3 billion in 2006. It surpassed $150 billion in 2007
and is expected to reach $200 billion in 2010.19 Besides, China is also the big-
gest importer of South Korean products. Since 2002, China has been South
Korea’s top investment destination.
By the end of 2006, South Korea had set up more than 30,000 enterprises
in China, with an accumulated investment of $35 billion. Meanwhile, more
and more Chinese enterprises choose to invest in South Korea.20 Currently,
the two countries are studying establishing a free trade area (FTA). The rapid
economic growth in the two countries has not only created an abundant ma-
terial basis for their exports, but also enlarged their markets. South Korea’s
acknowledgment of China’s market economy provides the necessary atmo-
sphere for trade and economic development of the two countries.

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN
CHINA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

Though it is true that political, economic, and cultural relations between

China and South Korea are strong, China’s “charm” in South Korea has also
been tainted by several problems. China-South Korea bilateral relations are
warm at the highest level, but ordinary Koreans and Chinese have mixed
feelings, and sometimes even negative ones, toward each other. The biggest
challenge for both countries is to sustain the close relationship by properly
handling these issues.

Historical and Other Disputes

China and South Korea have enjoyed a shared history and cultural and eco-
nomic exchanges for thousands of years. In recent years, historical and terri-
torial issues such as the kingdom of Goguryeo (Koguryo) have aroused emo-
tions by both sides, especially among academics. At its peak (37 BC to 668
AD), the territory of Goguryeo extended to today’s Manchuria. Some South
Korean scholars argue that the reinterpretation of Goguryeo ownership by
China’s “Northeast Project” (Dongbei Gongcheng) has played a key role in
eroding the positive view of China in South Korea.21 A South Korean scholar
states that Koreans now question whether China is a responsible power in
East Asia and that more Koreans are accepting the “China threat” argument
because of the project.22 Some worry that the Northeast Project may annihi-
late China’s diplomatic accomplishments over South Korea with one stroke.
192 Chapter Ten

Such nationalistic clashes were also shown plainly during the 2002 World
Cup and the 2007 Winter Asian Games. Chinese media and Internet users’
denouncements of Korea and the Korean soccer team during the World Cup
period triggered harsh reactions from South Korea.23 On January 31, 2007,
when being awarded medals in Changchun during the Asian Games, Korean
female short-track speed skaters held up signs reading “Mt. Baekdu is our
territory.” They were expressing many South Koreans’ unpleasant feelings
toward China, which claims Mt. Baekdu (Changbai in Chinese) a part of its
territory.24
Fortunately, the two governments seem to be trying to dampen the ten-
sions. In an interview with South Korean journalists, Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao stated that there were “no territorial issues between China and South
Korea.”25 Wen called on both sides to properly handle issues relating to the
Koguryo kingdom. He suggested that while doing research on ethnic move-
ments and territorial changes, the two sides should stick to the principle of
separating research from politics and reality from history, and avoid any
negative impact on bilateral relations.
In addition to Koguryo, the two countries have been embroiled in other
disputes. For example, a South Korean freighter sunk after colliding with
a larger Chinese vessel off China’s east coast in early 2007, killing all six-
teen crewmen on board. The Chinese authorities reported the incident to the
Korean Embassy in Beijing almost twenty-one hours after it occurred. Unsat-
isfied with China’s handling of this and other incidents, some Koreans asked
a fundamental question: “What sort of a neighbor is China for us?”26 Issues
like these may become obstacles to furthering bilateral relations.

Taiwan and North Korea

Taiwan and North Korea are core national interest issues for China and South
Korea, respectively. Taiwan has become a destabilizing factor in Northeast
Asia in recent years. While almost every country prefers the status quo across
the Taiwan Strait, former President Chen Shui-bian’s pro-independence gov-
ernment in Taipei had been challenging it.
In his America’s Coming War with China, Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato
Institute described an interesting scenario in a hypothetical cross-Taiwan
Strait war in 2013. “The South Korean foreign ministry issued a statement
emphasizing that its mutual security treaty with the United States did not
cover contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. Seoul reiterated its adherence to
a one-China policy and admonished Taipei to stop provoking a crisis with
the PRC.”27 Perhaps it is true that South Korea is less willing to get dragged
into a Taiwan Strait conflict than Japan or even Australia. But exactly what
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 193

South Korea would do in such an unpredictable conflict is unknown. Even if

South Korea just plays a passive role, such as allowing U.S. troops in Korea
to move to the Taiwan Strait, its normal relations with China would be dif-
ficult to maintain.
Although there are no official ties between Seoul and Taipei, relations at
the non-governmental level have been very dynamic. In both Taiwan and
South Korea, there are politicians who argue that the two should form a
democratic alliance and reestablish official relations, in spite of the PRC’s
strong opposition. Similar to China’s relations with other powers, the Taiwan
factor, if mishandled, has the potential to jeopardize PRC-ROK relations.
While the PRC and the ROK share similar concerns over North Korea’s
nuclear program and fear a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime, the
two countries may not necessarily see eye to eye regarding the future of the
Korean peninsula. There is little agreement about when and how Korea should
be unified or, perhaps more importantly, what the future relationship should
be between a unified Korea and both the United States and Japan. China may,
for example, demand a strategic demilitarized buffer with a unified Korea as
well as forbidding U.S. troops north of the current Demilitarized Zone.28
In addition, South Koreans are not happy with the Chinese government’s
handling of North Koreans fleeing to China in recent years. For example, on
October 9, 2007, Chinese police entered a South Korean international school
in Beijing to arrest four people believed to be North Korean refugees. The
police were allegedly to have pinned the arms of two South Korean consuls
behind their backs, creating a diplomatic incident between the two countries.
Refusing to recognize their refugee status, China routinely considers these
people “economic migrants” and has sent those fleeing North Korea back
home, though it has also allowed most of the North Koreans who take refugee
at diplomatic missions to leave China for a third country. South Korea and
China’s different, even conflicting, interests on these vital issues may hamper
their cooperation in the future.

Leadership and Policy Changes

South Korea held a presidential election in December 2007 and Lee Myung-
bak, former mayor of Seoul and CEO of Hyundai Motor Company, was
elected ROK president. It is not guaranteed that former President Roh’s
“balancing” and China-friendly policy will be carried on by the new admin-
istration. During his campaign, Lee, who represented the more conservative
Grand National Party, called for stronger relations with traditional ally the
United States and a more critical stance on North Korea. According to some
194 Chapter Ten

analysts, Lee Myung-bak has insisted on more reciprocity and much better
terms than his predecessor in dealing with North Korea.29
Although Lee’s election is unlikely to lead to an about face in Seoul’s
engagement policy with Pyongyang as long as the North follows through
with its denuclearization pledge, some fine-tuning of existing ROK policies
will almost certainly happen. Lee told U.S. President George W. Bush in a
phone conversation shortly after the election that he intended to strengthen
South Korea’s alliance with the United States. At his first news conference
as President-elect, he again said he would get tough with North Korea: “I
assure you that there will be a change from the past government’s practice
of avoiding criticism of North Korea and unilaterally flattering it,” and “the
North’s human rights issue is something we cannot avoid in this regard, and
North Korea should know it.”30 Seoul’s new approach is expected to improve
relations with the United States and Japan, which had sometimes been critical
of Mr. Roh’s conciliatory “sunshine policy” toward North Korea.
In terms of economic ties, some Koreans have already expressed concerns
about South Korea’s over-dependence on the Chinese market. A 2004 Cho-
sun Ilbo editorial called on the Korean government and business to develop
a counter-plan to “strengthen the economic system by dispersing the market
and production.”31 Meanwhile, some officials, such as the ROK’s ambas-
sador to Israel Shin Kak-soo, argue that “Seoul should fully capitalize on its
alliance with Washington in solving problems that Beijing’s rise may bring
forth.”32 It remains to be seen how the new South Korean administration will
handle the delicate balance of ROK-China-U.S. trilateral relations.

CHINA’S STRATEGIES FOR RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

China’s growing influence in Australia can be gauged from the fact that
during the 2007 APEC summit, New South Wales, the state where the con-
ference was held, planned only one formal state dinner—for the Chinese
delegation. New South Wales Premier Morris Iemma, who hosted the dinner
that was attended by three former Australian prime ministers and other dis-
tinguished guests, remarked that “Australia views China’s achievements with
admiration and satisfaction, not simply because we rejoice in the prosperity
of a friend.”33
China surpassed the United States as Australia’s biggest source of imports
in 2006. In 2007 it eclipsed Japan as Australia’s biggest trading partner,
according to Australian Trade Minister Warren Truss.34 The growing trade
between Australia and China is due to Australia’s voracious demand for
Chinese manufactured imports and China’s demand for Australia’s mineral
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 195

and other exports. Australia is where forty percent of the global reserves of
uranium are located. The bilateral agreement that allows China to import
uranium from Australia speaks volumes about the close relationship between
the two countries. Australia is the world’s biggest wool exporter and China is
its biggest customer, buying $1.3 billion worth, or more than sixty percent of
its total clip each year.35 Two-way trade, excluding Hong Kong’s trade with
Australia, was expected to top $50 billion in 2007 and continue to grow in
the future. In September 2007, the two countries signed a $35 billion (U.S.
$28.8 billion) agreement for Woodside Petroleum Ltd to export liquefied
natural gas to China.36 Like South Korea, Australia has recognized China’s
market economy status and is negotiating a free trade agreement with China.
Like most of China’s neighbors, Australia is focused on China’s growth, an-
ticipating the economic benefits in trade and investment it will bring about.
China’s growing appetite for energy and other natural resources is feeding
an economic boom in Australia and, like other countries in the Asia-Pacific
region, Australia wants China’s growth to continue without disruption by
conflicts over Taiwan.37
In March 2006, the United States launched a political forum for security
dialogue with Australia and Japan in a bid to checkmate China in the Asia
Pacific region. Interestingly, Australia was the only country among the three
that had explicitly stated that the talks were not aimed at containing China.38
Barely a month later, on April 3, 2006, Australian Prime Minister John How-
ard and his visiting Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao oversaw the signing of
a bilateral nuclear energy deal. This was not only a triumph of China’s di-
plomacy but also demonstrated Australia’s increasing autonomy with regard
to the United States. In September 2007, Prime Minister Howard announced
that Australia would begin security talks with China in 2008, a move regarded
as an effort to ease concerns in Beijing about the trilateral security talks be-
tween the United States, Japan, and Australia.39
Geopolitically, Australia increasingly considers itself an Asian nation,
though it has traditionally maintained close ties with Great Britain, the United
States, and other Western powers. When meeting with visiting Chinese premier
Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister Howard said that the relationship with China is
one of Australia’s most important foreign relationships. Australia very much
welcomes China’s development and appreciates its positive role in interna-
tional and regional affairs. It sees China’s rapid development as beneficial for
the world at large and disagrees with China containment policies.40 Similar to
South Korea, Australia’s strong desire to maintain good ties with China and
China’s increasingly sophisticated diplomacy make it possible for the coun-
tries to enjoy friendly relations. China’s strategies to enhance its image and
strengthen its relations with Australia include the following initiatives.
196 Chapter Ten

Promoting Cultural and Educational Exchanges

On May 20, 2005, the Confucius Academy, the first Confucius school in
Australia, was officially launched at the University of Western Australia
(UWA) in Perth. Present at the ceremony was a high-level Chinese delegation
led by Redi, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of National People’s
Congress. The selection of UWA as the site of the Confucius Institute was
significant, since the last six Australian ambassadors to China have all come
from Western Australia with five graduating from UWA.41 The establishment
of the Confucius Institute helps promote a greater awareness and understand-
ing of China and Chinese language and culture in the broader West Australian
community—particularly in the government, business, education, and indus-
try sectors. Two more Confucius Institutes were set up at the University of
Adelaide and the University of Melbourne shortly afterwards.
In 1999, Australia was one of the first Western countries (along with New
Zealand) to be granted Approved Destination Status (ADS) by China. In
2005 alone, 285,000 Chinese tourists visited Australia, an increase of 13.4
percent from the previous year. This is forecast to grow by 15.7 percent to
1.2 million tourists by 2015.42 China has become the country with the fastest
growth in the number of tourists visiting Australia.43 In 2007, nearly 100,000
Chinese students were studying in Australia, making China the largest source
of overseas enrollment. Tighter U.S. visa policies and the growing wealth of
the Chinese middle class mean that more and more Chinese citizens will go
to Australia for study and travel.

Holding Regular High-Level Meetings

This top-down approach is considered to be a favorable strategy by Chinese
leaders. President Hu Jintao paid a state visit to Australia in October 2003
and became the first Chinese leader to have been given the honor of address-
ing the joint sitting of the Australian parliament. Prior to attending the APEC
summit in Sydney, President Hu paid another official visit to Australia in
September 2007.
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Australia in April 2006. During the visit, he
and Prime Minister Howard agreed to establish a mechanism for regular
meetings to discuss major issues affecting both countries.44 Less than three
months later, Prime Minister Howard visited China. On June 28, 2006, Pre-
mier Wen and Prime Minister Howard jointly attended a ceremony in Shen-
zhen commemorating the first phase of the Guangdong Dapeng Liquified
Natural Gas (LNG).
Other Chinese leaders have traveled to Australia too. For example, Wu
Bangguo, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, paid an official visit
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 197

to Australia in May 2005. Leaders of the two countries also meet frequently
on the sidelines of international and regional conferences. The China-
Australia Agreement on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
and Agreement on Transfer of Nuclear Material, which came into force in
February 2007, is one of the most remarkable outcomes of these high-level
meetings.

Reaching Out to the Public

Both President Hu and Premier Wen made public speeches during their visits
to Australia in an effort to reach out to the Australian public. They talked
about how both countries could benefit from a cooperative relationship and
how China is committed to peaceful development. These words and deeds
helped create an open, friendly, and peaceful image of China.
During his September 2007 visit to Australia, President Hu Jintao dem-
onstrated his personable side by talking to the Australian public directly. In
addition to meeting with Australian officials, he went to Western Australia
to meet with executives of Australian enterprises and research institutes,
watched a presentation about geological modeling, mining, and exploration,
and visited two laboratories.45 President Hu also visited a sheep farm outside
Canberra and drank tea with farmer Ian Cusack and his family, who were
very impressed by Hu’s charm.46
Chinese leaders also seem to understand the importance to cultivating good
relations with opposition parties and future leaders. During the same Septem-
ber 2007 visit, President Hu met with Kevin Rudd, the opposition Labor Party
head. At the meeting, President Hu invited Rudd and his family to attend the
2008 Beijing Olympics, which Rudd gladly accepted.47 Rudd was a diplomat
in Beijing in the 1980s and speaks fluent Chinese.
In the December 2007 federal elections, the Labor Party defeated the
Conservative Party, and Kevin Rudd became the new Australian Prime
Minister. China lost no time in cultivating good relations with this first
Mandarin-speaking Western leader. Wen Jiabao was one of the first for-
eign leaders to send congratulatory messages to Rudd. Following his elec-
tion, Rudd spoke by phone to the leaders of Australia’s traditional allies:
George W. Bush in Washington and Gordon Brown in London. But Wen
Jiabao was the first foreign leader Mr. Rudd spoke with after being sworn
in as prime minister.48
As another example of how China is displaying its soft power to the Aus-
tralians, China announced ahead of the 2007 APEC summit that it would lend
two giant pandas to the Adelaide Zoo for ten years.49
198 Chapter Ten

THE LIMITS OF CHINA’S SOFT POWER IN AUSTRALIA

Though China’s influence has been growing in Australia, the two sides have
substantial differences over certain issues, which may disrupt normal relations.

Human Rights
Close economic, political, and cultural links notwithstanding, Australia does
not always kowtow to China. For example, despite warnings from China,
both Prime Minister John Howard and opposition Labor Party leader Kevin
Rudd met with the Dalai Lama in June 2007. The Australian side emphasized
that these meetings were “private” and would not hurt bilateral relations. But
China considers such meetings to be interference in its internal affairs, which
presents an obstacle in China-Australia relations. At the core of the issue are
their different views on human rights.
Even human rights violations by China’s neighbors or countries friendly
to China may create tensions between China and Australia. During the Sep-
tember 2007 protests and democracy movement in Myanmar, Prime Minister
John Howard said his government would press Beijing to urge the junta to
end its violent repression. However, China refused to condemn Myanmar’s
military rulers for the crackdown of the protests, and together with Russia, it
contended at the UN that the situation in Myanmar was an internal affair and
did not threaten international peace and security. In the future, China may
face increasing pressure from the international community, including Aus-
tralia, to intervene in places where human rights are grossly violated, such as
Sudan and Myanmar.

Security Concerns
In early September 2007, Australia, though extremely worried about upset-
ting Beijing, participated in a joint naval exercise with the United States, Ja-
pan, India, and Singapore in the Bay of Bengal. Participants stressed that the
exercise in no way threatened a certain growing Asian power to the north, but
there was little doubt that such military exercises pointed toward the future
geopolitical arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region. As Brahma Chellaney,
Professor of Strategic Studies at the Delhi-based Center for Policy Research,
commented, some of the countries involved did not want to promote this too
much to avoid upsetting China, but at the same time it was a very important
reminder to China.50 Apparently to maintain a delicate balance between China
and the United States, Australia invited two Chinese warships to visit Aus-
tralia at the end of September 2007 for a joint naval exercise involving the
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 199

Chinese, Australian, and New Zealand navies in early October. According

to Australian Defense Minister Brendan Nelson, more military exercises and
cooperation are planned between his country and China.51
These balancing efforts notwithstanding, Australia does have security con-
cerns over China’s rapid military modernization. Australia’s 2007 defense
strategy report pointed to the destabilizing effect of China’s growing military
strength. “The pace and scope of its military modernization, particularly
the development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite
missile, could create misunderstandings and instability in the region,” stated
the paper, which was released in early July 2007, coincident with the visit to
Sydney of the USS Kitty Hawk.52 Australia’s participation in a four-nation
security dialogue, which also includes the United States, Japan, and India, is
perceived by some analysts as “encirclement” of China.

South Pacific Islands

China’s new diplomacy has extended to small South Pacific island nations.
Australia’s sphere of influence covers many of these small island nations,
especially Melanesia (Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu).
China is moving into the region at a time when many Pacific Island countries,
particularly Papua New Guinea and Fiji, have become critical of the Australian
government’s heavy-handed tactics in the region.
Australia is by far the biggest aid donor in the region with its annual
Australian Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) budget to the Pacific
standing at $720 million. However, a major part of it in recent years has been
earmarked for “strengthening governance and to reduce corruption” in recipi-
ent countries. Under these aid schemes, Australia stations bureaucrats, police
officers, and financial advisors in strategic departments and law enforcement
agencies in the region. In Papua New Guinea and Fiji, this has been greatly
resented and seen as an attempt to undermine their sovereignty. In May 2005,
a Supreme Court decision in Papua New Guinea deported 800 Australian
police officers deployed in the country under the aid program.53
China has expanded trade and other relations with Pacific nations lately.
Much like China’s diplomacy elsewhere, Chinese trade and investment come
with no political conditions attached except that recipients must affirm the
“one China” policy. This is in sharp contrast to Australia’s emphasis on good
governance, economic reform, and anti-corruption policies. However, the
PRC and Taiwan have been accused of engaging in “checkbook diplomacy”
to gain favor with Pacific leaders, which distorts the political process in those
countries. China and Australia’s different approaches to development and
governance may create friction between the two countries in the future.
200 Chapter Ten

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Both South Korea and Australia are key allies of the United States, yet they
have fostered a strong and close relationship with China. The two sets of
bilateral relationships are developing in the broader context of a global and
regional power shift. Against the background of the competition between the
United States and China, the China-ROK and China-Australia relationships
have their limitations. Neither Australia nor South Korea will abandon their
crucial alliance with the United States, yet both desire a stable and produc-
tive relationship with China. As a result, both Australia and South Korea are
adopting a strategy of hedging the power conflict between China and the
United States. They are both attempting to maintain a delicate strategic and
diplomatic balance in their respective relations with the two great powers.
Fortunately, South Korea and Australia are not yet faced with a stark choice
between the two powers, though they on occasion have to manage the dif-
ficult feat of riding two horses simultaneously.
The two cases also bear other similarities, especially in terms of China’s
strategies to promote its relations with both countries. These strategies include
promoting cultural and educational exchanges (the “bottom up” approach),
holding high-level meetings regularly (the “top down” approach), and em-
phasizing economic cooperation. China is playing its geo-economic cards and
emphasizing the softer side of its growing influence in both countries. These
efforts have helped China to become a vital partner for both South Korea and
Australia. South Korea’s expectation of China playing a positive role in re-
solving the North Korea nuclear crisis also contributes to China’s soft power
in South Korea. In Australia, the fact that China is not perceived as a direct
and tangible threat has provided China with an opportunity to practice soft
power. In both cases, the expectation and desire of economically benefiting
from China’s rapid growth played a very significant role in maintaining good
relations with China.
There are differences too, especially in terms of potential obstacles that may
hinder further relations. Despite its disclaimer, Australia has become increas-
ingly concerned about China’s rising military strength in recent years and has
stepped up its security alliances with the United States, Japan, India, and Singa-
pore. This perceived “containment” of China, led by the United States with the
participation of Australia, has the potential to disrupt China-Australia relations.
However, China-Australia relations seem to have more potential to im-
prove and expand. For example, current trade volume between the two coun-
tries is only about one-third of China-South Korea trade volume. In addition,
South Korea and China have historical and other disputes, while Australia
and China have neither historical grievances nor conflicts of fundamental
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 201

interests. Australia is rich in natural resources, and its iron ore, aluminum,
grain products, and wool have great market potential in China.
In a 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Lowy Institute poll, when
asked whether they think China will act responsibly in the world, sixty percent
of Australians polled reported that they trust China “somewhat” or “a great
deal” to act responsibly. In the same poll, when asked about their feelings
toward China on a scale from zero (very cold and unfavorable) to 100 (very
warm and favorable), China received a mean of sixty-one from Australians and
fifty-seven from South Koreans. When asked to rate Chinese and United States
influences in Asia on a ten-point scale, with zero meaning not at all influential
and ten meaning extremely influential, Australians gave China a 7.5, ahead of
America’s 6.6.54 Clearly, most Australians hold a very positive view of China.
South Koreans’ positive view of China has declined in recent years due
to a combination of factors.55 But their view of the United States has also
declined. This has as much to do with South Korea’s recent pursuit of a more
independent foreign policy versus any unfavorable policies by China and the
United States.

CONCLUSION

China, South Korea, and Australia are good examples of countries with dif-
ferent political systems living together in amity and embarking on mutually
beneficial cooperation. China has distinct differences with South Korean and
Australian political structures, principles of national governance, and foreign
relations, including their alliances with foreign powers. But these discrepan-
cies have not posed obstacles to developing close bilateral relations between
China and the two democracies.
China’s warming relations with South Korea and Australia are also an
embodiment of China’s largely successful new diplomacy of the past decade.
China’s efforts to consolidate relations with these two important nations are
consistent with its major foreign policy objectives of building a secure inter-
national and regional environment, obtaining energy and other resources for
continued domestic growth, and expanding its soft power globally.
Although there are still some “hard” security factors in China’s relations
with both South Korea and Australia—such as the North Korea issue, China’s
heavy handed approach toward history, and Australia’s lingering mistrust
of China—China’s soft power diplomacy has been largely successful in
strengthening China’s relations with both countries. China’s growing soft
power has also caused South Korea and Australia to pursue a more balanced
approach between China and the United States.
202 Chapter Ten

How will China’s growing ties with South Korea and Australia affect the
United States? Are South Korea and Australia true and committed allies of
the United States? Maybe so now, but as two Australian commentators have
suggested, these alliances will change because of 1) the changing nature of
U.S. foreign policy since 9/11, and 2) the rise of China. 56 Generally speaking,
South Korea and Australia perceive China’s rise differently than the United
States. For the United States, China’s growth represents the emergence of a
potent geopolitical rival. For South Korea and Australia, it is a great opportu-
nity for rewarding relations—an opportunity that has eagerly been seized by
both countries. South Korea and Australia have their own set of priorities. At
times they may disagree with the United States and adopt policies that seem-
ingly tilt toward China. But China’s gain is not necessarily America’s loss.
China’s soft power has its limitations: for one thing, China cannot provide the
security guarantees that the United States has to most of the countries in the
Asia Pacific. For both South Korea and Australia, the United States remains
their most important ally, but China has become an increasingly critical part-
ner in the regional political economy.
To protect their own national interests, South Korea and Australia will
continue to attempt to maintain good relations with both the United States
and China. However, due to discrepancies in their political systems, differ-
ences in their perceptions of history, or the demands of Asian security, neither
South Korea nor Australia is likely to form a formal alliance with China. In
the foreseeable future, South Korea and Australia will remain inside the U.S.-
led security structure in the Asia-Pacific region and, at the same time, will
further expand their burgeoning ties with China. Though both South Korea
and Australia will refrain from any act that may possibly offend China, they
will continue to adopt a strategy of hedging the China-U.S. competition. It is
unlikely that China will replace the United States to become their closest ally
any time soon. For this reason, there is still much room for China to improve
its image and promote its soft power in the Asia-Pacific region.

NOTES

1. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive,” Los Angeles Times, June 23,
2007.
2. Harry Harding et al., “The Gramercy Round: China Goes Global: Implications
for the United States,” The National Interest (September, 2006): 56.
3. Chen Bo, “China’s Increasingly Active Diplomatic Stance,” Zhongguo Qing-
nian Bao, February 18, 2004.
4. Shi Yinhon, “China’s Peaceful Rise Is All About Soft Power,” China Daily,
June 16, 2007.
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 203

5. “China Outruns U.S. in S. Korea 15 Years after Normalization of Ties,” Yon-

hap News, August 23, 2007.
6. Zhao Quansheng “China and the Korean Peace Process,” The Korean Peace
Process and the Four Powers, eds. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate, 2003), 106.
7. Ruediger Frank, “A New Foreign Policy Paradigm: Perspectives on the Role
of South Korea as a Balancer,” Policy Forum Online April 25, 2005, www.nautilus
.org/fora/security/0535AFrank.html
8. Shin Kak-Soo, “The Implications of the Rise of China for South Korean For-
eign Policy,” Korea and World Affairs 31, no. 1 (2007): 25.
9. Lie Wei and Zhang Ke, “South Korea Tops the List with Over 50,000 Students
in China,” Xinhua, November 20, 2006.
10. “61.7 percent of S. Korea’s Foreign Students from Chinese Mainland,” Zhong-
guo Wang, October 25, 2006.
11. “China Outruns U.S. in S. Korea 15 Years after Normalization of Ties,” Yon-
hap News, August 23, 2007.
12. Qian Chunxuan, “South Korea Expected to Receive over 1.5 Million Chinese
Tourists This Year,” Xinhua News Agency, July 3, 2007.
13. Zhao Ming, “South Korea No Longer Mistreats Chinese Tourists,” Weekly
Chosun, November 28, 2005.
14. Zhang Youyin, “A Strategic Study on the Market Expansion for South Korean
Tourists to China,” Jingji Zongheng, May 20, 2007.
15. Liu Baosen and Dong Xueqing, “South Korea to Send 2 Million Tourists to
Shandong in 2008,” Xinhua, May 2, 2007.
16. Zhang, “A Strategic Study.”
17. Anna Fifield, “US Out of Favor in S. Korea,” Financial Times, February 24,
2006, 9.
18. Mark E. Manyin, “South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Fric-
tion, and Future Prospects,” Congressional Research Service, July 1, 2004, 8.
19. Xu Changwen, “A New Stage: This Year is Likely to See Even Tighter Trade
and Economic Ties Between China and South Korea,” Beijing Review, May 3,
2007.
20. “China Seeks Deeper Economic Ties with S. Korea,” Xinhua, April 11, 2007.
21. In February 2002, the Center for China’s Borderland History and Geography
of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, together with research institutes from
three northeastern provinces, launched the “Northeast Project” (Dongbei gongcheng)
to study the northeastern borderland’s history and current status, with the central
government’s endorsement. The project concluded that Koguryo was a local regime
of China, and thus the history of Koguryo is a part of China’s history.
22. Shin Sang-Jin, “China, a Stabilizer or Hegemonic Power?” Next, no. 12 (Oc-
tober 2004): 52.
23. It was reported that a female commentator on CCTV-5 shed sorrowful tears
when the Korean soccer team beat the Italian team.
24. China designated Mt. Changbai as one of the “Top 10 Mountains of China” in
2004 and is now preparing to register it with UNESCO as a world natural heritage site.
204 Chapter Ten

25. “Wen: No Territorial Problems Between China, S Korea,” Xinhua, April 6,

2007.
26. Kim Tae-Ho, “Impact of Ship Collision on Seoul-Beijing Relations,” Munhwa
Ilbo, May 18, 2007.
27. Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005), 15.
28. Brue Klingner, Brue, “China Shock for South Korea,” Asia Times online,
September 11, 2004.
29. Ralph A. Cossa, “North-South Summit: Same Bed, Different Dreams,” CSIS,
PacNet 38, (September 29, 2007).
30. Choe Sang-Hun, “Newly Elected South Korean Forecasts Chill with North,”
New York Times, December 21, 2007.
31. Klinger, “China Shock for South Korea.”
32. Shin, “The Implications of the Rise of China,” 33.
33. Sarah Smiles, 2007. “Ewe Beaut Day for Hu As He Praises Labor PMs,” The
Age, September 6, 2007.
34. “China Will Be Our Top Trade Partner,” The Sydney Morning Herald, June
14, 2007.
35. James Grubel, “Shear Delight? China’s Hu Visits Aussie Sheep Farm,” Re-
uters India, September 5, 2007.
36. “Aust, China Sign $36b Gas Deal,” ABC News, September 6, 2007.
37. Lee Kuan Yew, “China’s Soft Power Success,” Forbes, June18, 2007.
38. Linda Sieg, “Australia Says Not Trying to ‘Contain’ China,” Reuters India,
June 5, 2007.
39. Peter Smith and Richard McGregor, “China Puts Bush in Summit Shade,”
Financial Times, September 7, 2007.
40. “Premier Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with His Australian Counterpart Howard,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 4, 2006.
41. “The First Confucius Academy in Australia Established in Western Australian
University,” The Office of Chinese Language Council International (hanban), May
27, 2005.
42. See Australian Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources website 2008,
www.industry.gov.au (accessed October 9, 2007). Approved Destination Status
(ADS) is a bilateral tourism arrangement between the Chinese government and a
foreign destination whereby Chinese tourists are permitted to undertake leisure travel
in groups to that destination.
43. Zha Peixin, “China-Australia Ties Bring Tangible Benefits,” China Daily,
September 3, 2007.
44. “Premier Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with His Australian Counterpart Howard,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 4, 2006.
45. “President Hu Visits Australia, Attends APEC Meeting,” Xinhua, September
4, 2007.
46. Grubel, “Shear Delight?”
47. “Hu Invites Rudd Family to Beijing Olympics,” The Sydney Morning Herald,
September 7, 2007.
 China’s Warming Relations with South Korea and Australia 205

48. “Australia to be ‘Climate Bridge’,” BBC News, December 6, 2007.

49. “China Puts Bush in Summit Shade,” Financial Times, September 7, 2007.
50. “A Gunboat Message to China,” Time, September 5, 2007.
51. Simon Robinson, “A Gunboat Message to China,” Time, September 5, 2007.
52. Meraiah Foley, “Australia, US Concerned Over China’s Military Buildup,
Back Greater Role for Japan,” International Herald Tribune, July 5, 2007.
53. Kalinga Seneviratne, “South Pacific: Chinese Relief From Domineering
Australia,” Inter Press Service, April 17, 2006.
54. “Global Views 2006: The United States and the Rise of China and India,” The
Chicago Council on Global Affairs in partnership with Lowy Institute for Interna-
tional Policy, 2006.
55. More details can be found in Zhu Zhiqun and Kim Jih-Un, “China’s ‘Charm
Offensive’? Assessment of China’s Soft Power in South Korea,” (paper presented at
the 2007 American Political Science Association Annual Conference: Chicago, Il-
linois, August 30–September 2, 2007).
56. Owen Harries and Tom Switzer, “US Alliance Will Change,” The Australian,
October 4, 2007.
 Chapter Eleven

China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal

Agenda in Southeast Asia
Ignatius Wibowo

The neoliberal agenda has traditionally been limited to the United Kingdom
and the United States. In the 1980s, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher
and Ronald Reagan, both countries implemented an economic policy that was
radically different from their previous ones with the aim of invigorating their
sluggish economies. Instead of following the prescription of John Maynard
Keynes, they chose to adopt the Milton Friedman model, abandoning the state
to embrace the market.1
Subsequently, more countries in the world followed suit, believing that the
“free market” would be the remedy for all their economic problems. In the
process, free markets and democracy became inseparable. Wealthy countries
throughout the world implemented this model vigorously because it was as-
sumed that a free market could not be compatible with any political system
except democracy. Since then, free markets and democracy have been part
of the standard discourse of every president and prime minister.2 This con-
nection has been further strengthened by international organizations such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade
Organization.3
But is the combination of capitalism and democracy the only model of
development for all countries in the world? More specifically, is it a model
that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ought
to follow? These questions are inevitable since most ASEAN members are
developing countries that are in the process of searching for the right de-
velopment model—despite the imposition of a single model by developed
countries and international organizations.
This chapter attempts to show that, despite its popularity, the combined
free market and democracy model has been accepted by countries in South-
east Asia only with reluctance and hesitation due to, in part, the rise of China
207
208 Chapter Eleven

in the past ten years. China has been tremendously successful in its effort to
develop its economy not by combining free market economics and democ-
racy, but by separating the two. China has adopted a semi-market system
and maintains an illiberal political system. This success story has inevitably
attracted the developing countries of the world, especially the countries of
Southeast Asia. The more these nations look to the rise of China, the more
they become attracted to its model. The attractiveness of China, in turn,
has helped it enhance its soft power. China’s soft power in Southeast Asia
comes from multiple sources, including its culture and its cooperation and
participation in ASEAN-related multilateralism. The “Beijing consensus” is
not the only decisive factor in influencing the politico-economic development
of ASEAN countries, but it is certainly one important factor in shaping their
future.
The first part of this chapter presents a historical overview of Southeast
Asian countries’ attitude toward China, which has evolved from suspicion to
a more positive opinion. This is followed by a description of the spread of
the Chinese model of development among Southeast Asian countries, which
shows how the majority of these countries are converging in their desire to
emulate China’s success. The fourth section describes the conflict between
the two models within international forums, including the ASEAN. The final
section of the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the rise of China’s
“soft power” in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN COUNTRIES IN
SEARCH OF A DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Most members of ASEAN, except Singapore, are still struggling to develop

their economies. Independence from the colonial powers after World War II
has not guaranteed an instant route to prosperity. Most of them have gone
through various attempts by trial and error and are still searching for a devel-
opment model that fits their needs.
From the beginning, the five original members (Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines) opted for a Western capitalist
development model based on private property. These countries pursued
different strategies in achieving their development goals, but none of them
deviated from the free market system. They also had different degrees of
state intervention, but their economies were not centrally planned.4 Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have been com-
mitted, since their independence, to develop their economies along free
market principles.
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 209

Before 1975, Vietnam was divided into North Vietnam and South Vietnam.
The former followed the socialist-communist model, whereas the latter fol-
lowed the capitalist model. After the North Vietnam’s victory in 1975, the
whole country became communist. Like Vietnam, Laos experimented with
both models, supported by two different regimes, but it was only in the early
1970s that the communist model was adopted for the entire country. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both Vietnam and Laos decided to re-
form their economy and adjust their development model. Cambodia, under the
rule of King Norodom Sihanouk, first followed the capitalist model. This was
interrupted in mid-1970s and replaced by the communist model, but then went
back to capitalist model again. Myanmar also walked the capitalist path in the
beginning, but shifted, in the early 1960s, to the so-called “Burmese socialist
model,” a variant of the communist model. Finally, Brunei, a small country at
the tip of Borneo Island, has not done any significant experimentation, and has
consistently followed only the capitalist model of development.
The “Cold War” between the capitalist and communist powers influenced
the adoption of the models by Southeast Asian countries. The region became
a battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union over the poli-
tics of development. It is no surprise, then, that countries in Southeast Asia
also split into two opposing camps: those that formed ASEAN, who adopted
the capitalist model despite official pronouncements, and those remained
outside ASEAN, who fell under the communist camp.
During much of the Cold War, Mao Zedong wished to be the leader of the
socialist movement in the Third World. It was for this reason that China was
active in sponsoring communist parties in various capitalistic Southeast Asian
countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. Under Mao Zedong, China promoted a distinct model of develop-
ment, in which “people’s communes” were meant to be an alternative to the
Western model of development. However, to these countries, the “people’s
communes” were not attractive at all since they ran counter to the tenets of
the free market. China itself was still struggling to bring about domestic eco-
nomic development; indeed, it was still considered a poor country. Chinese
sponsorship of revolutionary movements, combined with its status as a poor
country, made Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
look at China with contempt and disdain.
The period of the 1970s through the 1980s was quite confusing in terms of
development models. On the one hand, there was a widespread attack on the
strategy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI)5 that to varying degrees
was being practiced by developing countries, including those in Southeast
Asia. In place of ISI, a strategy of export-oriented industrialization (EOI)
was proposed, which gave prominence to free trade. The empirical evidence
210 Chapter Eleven

provided in favor of this model was the high growth of the economies of the
“four little dragons”: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. On
the other hand, there was another school of thought that argued that the suc-
cess of these “new industrialized countries” (NICS) could not be attributed
to free trade or the free market alone, but also to the role of the state. They
showed the association between rapid economic growth and pervasive state
intervention in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. This school was known as the
“developmental state” model.6
Given these academic debates, Southeast Asian countries were increas-
ingly convinced that the ISI strategy should be replaced by another strategy
that combined both free trade and state intervention. It was apparent that they
could not simply do away with the state and embrace free markets and free
trade. The political reality was simply that the demise of the state would not
be tolerated. By coincidence, from 1982 to1986, Southeast Asian countries
experienced some external economic shocks: falling oil prices followed by
sharp downturns in other commodity prices. Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand created incentives for export-oriented, foreign capital-dependent
industrialization.7
However, the shift to economic liberalization was not accompanied by po-
litical liberalization or democratization. Suharto in Indonesia and Mahathir in
Malaysia stopped at economic reform, eliminating the possibility of democra-
tization. Indonesia and Malaysia both retained their authoritarian government
that regularly intervened in the economy. Nevertheless democratization did
take place in Thailand with the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1986. A
year earlier, in 1985, the Philippines saw the dramatic downfall of President
Marcos through “People Power,” and also started to embark on democratiza-
tion.
The World Bank as well as the IMF applauded the Southeast Asian
countries’ moves. In 1993, the World Bank optimistically stated that Thai-
land, Malaysia, and Indonesia were making rapid progress and that they
represented, quite legitimately, the “East Asian Miracle.” The World Bank
published a special report with the provocative title of East Asian Miracle:
Economic Growth and Public Policy. However, this report admitted that the
“miracle” was the result of a not so absolute adherence to free market prin-
ciples. In other words, it recognized the practice of an “East Asian develop-
mental state” model.8
No ASEAN country at that time sought to emulate the Chinese model of
development. For them, the communist model was out of question; hence the
capitalist model was the best one available. The promise was clear: develop-
ment will be accomplished through free markets and democracy. Although
China was starting to make an impact on the world economy, Southeast
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 211

Asian countries considered it more an exception than the rule. Basically, they
believed that China was still searching for the right model and that the path
it was currently following was only temporary. In addition, ASEAN coun-
tries–in spite of the debate over development models – were committed to a
free market-based development strategy.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 taught all ASEAN members a hard les-
son. The value of their currency dropped as a result of the turbulence of the
exchange rate, starting in Thailand and then spreading to Malaysia and Indo-
nesia. This situation had a severe impact on business, especially the banking
sector, and led to waves of worker layoffs. Eventually, Thailand, Malaysia,
and Indonesia were thrown into an even deeper economic crisis.9 As a matter
of fact, all the ASEAN members bore the brunt of the financial crisis; as a
result, there was widespread frustration and anger, much of which had anti-
Western overtones.10 Indonesia in particular experienced both an economic
and political collapse, which resulted in unprecedented chaos at every level
in the country.11
In response to the crisis, most of the ASEAN members made various ad-
justments in their economic and political strategies. The standard prescription
came from the IMF and the World Bank, who asked them to implement a
“structural adjustment program” (SAP). The root of the financial crisis, they
argued, was that the economies of the ASEAN were not liberalized enough
and that there was still too much government intervention. Specifically, this
meant that ASEAN members had to consistently implement three reforms:
deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization. At the political level, these
countries also needed to democratize; although democratization was not part
of the SAP package, the pressure to have a democratic system was strong.
Thailand and Indonesia immediately followed the IMF prescriptions and
the latter, without hesitation, imposed the infamous “conditionalities” on both
countries. Malaysia did not follow their lead but instead adopted the opposite
policy of controlling the capital market. Among the ten ASEAN countries,
only Indonesia implemented the IMF recipe consistently. After the signing
of a “Letter of Intent” with the IMF in late 1997, Indonesia dutifully and
faithfully implemented the conditionalities imposed by the IMF. Democra-
tization also took place in 1998 with the fall of Suharto and the emergence
of a multi-party system, followed by a general election.12 Thailand also had
to sign “Letters of Intent” with the IMF, which were less stringent than the
one signed by Indonesia. The other eight Southeast Asian countries carefully
watched these developments and tried to look for an alternative way to over-
come the crisis.
It was at this juncture that the search for a new model became urgent. The
liberalization of the financial market, they believed, was the main reason for
212 Chapter Eleven

the crisis and this was why they had become easy prey for speculators around
the world.

ASEAN LOOKS TOWARD CHINA

China, meanwhile, emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed; indeed, it

maintained its high level of economic growth. One of the accepted explana-
tions for this was the fact that China did not carry out financial liberalization
as prescribed by the IMF. China “adhered to some of the principles of the
original and expanded Washington Consensus, rejected a few and modified
others.”13 The absence of financial liberalization, evidently, saved China
from the attacks of speculators. China’s economy slowed down a little, but it
escaped financial collapse like its unfortunate neighbors. China did not even
devalue its currency, something that was envied by ASEAN members.
Due to this turn of events, ASEAN members slowly shifted their attention
to China. ASEAN had actually been engaging China since the beginning of
the 1990s. In 1991, for the first time, China was seated as an observer at the
twenty-fortieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Three years later, letters were exchanged between the Secretary General of
ASEAN and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen; ASEAN-China relations were
formalised in Bangkok on July 23, 1994. ASEAN accorded full dialogue sta-
tus to China at the twenty-ninetieth Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in 1996.
Since then, China-ASEAN relations have taken off. In December 1997,
the first ASEAN-China Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, which saw the
signing of a document signaling increased cooperation between ASEAN and
China to mark the beginning of the twenty-first century. This was translated
into a series of cooperation measures in the economic, political, and cultural
spheres. For instance, China agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN-China
Cooperation Fund with the purpose of supporting agricultural, information
technology, transportation, education, and human resources development. In
October 2003, China was accepted as a friend of the ASEAN with the signing
of the “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” at the ASEAN-China
Summit in Bali, which then led to China’s signing of the “ASEAN Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation.” 14
Among the various treaties China has signed with ASEAN, the two most
important were signed in Phnom Penh in 2002: the “Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in South China Sea” and the “Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s
Republic of China.” These two treaties can be viewed as the pillars of the new
relationship between China and ASEAN because they cleared away many
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 213

misunderstandings and prejudices. In the 1990s, China and ASEAN were

locked in a dispute over the Spratly Islands, which may have led to a serious
armed conflict.15 China eventually signed an agreement with Malaysia, Viet-
nam, Philippines, and Brunei, which eased tensions over the territory.16
The strained relationship between ASEAN and China was further com-
pounded by the flood of cheap Chinese products into Southeast Asian mar-
kets, especially after China joined the WTO in 2001. Numerous small and
medium enterprises in the region were reportedly forced to close their doors
as they were unable to compete with Chinese products. In response, China
took swift action by offering ASEAN a free trade agreement. China also of-
fered an “early harvest” program to be implemented between 2004 and 2006
for the original ASEAN members and until 2010 for new members. The
Chinese government unilaterally made the decision in the hope that Southeast
Asian countries would not see it as a threat. According to Lu Jianren, China’s
initiative can be understood as a bid to “quell fears of its rising.”17
The close relationship between ASEAN and China has substantially in-
creased China’s soft power. In forums where ASEAN leaders meet with
their counterpart from China, ASEAN leaders consistently speak positively
about China and of China’s success. Commenting on the meeting between
Chinese and ASEAN leaders in October 2006, a journalist correctly noted
that “Chinese and Southeast Asian leaders at the China-ASEAN Business
and Investment Summit spoke effusively of a relationship based on mutual
trust in politics and economic integration.”18 Indeed, ASEAN leaders “take
pains to downplay the negative effects of trade with China.”19 This positive
atmosphere was not noticeable ten years ago.
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia have particularly benefited from their re-
lations with China. As relayed by an eyewitness in 2000, Chinese president
Jiang Zemin received a very warm welcome in Laos, where “banners were
hung across the capital lauding Jiang, and endless banquets were held in his
honour.” This scene was repeated in Cambodia where “over 200,000 cheering
schoolchildren welcomed Jiang’s motorcade.” This was in stark contrast to
the early 1990s when Cambodia was opposed to China due to its involvement
with the Khmer Rouge. Suffering from an embargo by the West, Myanmar is
very grateful to China’s support, which has translated into multiple economic
and political agreements.20
Thailand is no exception from this pattern. A long-time British and U.S.
ally, Thailand now considers China—along with India—the most important
countries for its diplomacy. Although Vietnam and China went to war in
1979, relations have improved remarkably since 1991, when diplomatic rela-
tions were restored. This was exemplified in February 2002 when the two
countries proposed the “four good themes”: good neighbours, good friends,
214 Chapter Eleven

good camaraderie, and good partners. All the countries in the Mekong River
basin—Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand—have tremen-
dously benefited from trade with China. Under the framework of the Greater
Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) China has agreed to implement a Mekong Basin
development program and projects.21 It is clear that China pays great attention
to this region, including providing economic aid, and it is within this area that
the soft power of China is most widespread.22
Similar trends are evident in maritime Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Singa-
pore, the Philippines, and Indonesia.23 Malaysia, under Prime Minister Ma-
hathir bin Mohamad, developed a close relationship with China. At both the
economic and diplomatic levels, the two countries have consistently been on
good terms. Singapore is a “natural” friend of China since the majority of the
city-state is of Chinese origin. Although their relations were strained in the
1970s, Singapore–China relations have been reinvigorated since 1990 by an
increase of trade and mutual visits of leaders. China and the Philippines, how-
ever, have been caught up in a dangerous dispute over Mischief Reef. Fortu-
nately, in the past five years, this relationship has improved, as demonstrated
by their many high-level exchanges. The Philippines have also received a
grant from China to build a railway, which is vital for its economy.
Historically, the relationship between Indonesia and China has been very
difficult, most notably during a thirty-two-year gap in diplomatic relations.24
Yet in the past eight years, Indonesia and China have developed relations a
positive relationship. Visits by leaders of the two countries have become more
frequent and trade has increased rapidly. Chinese soft power in Indonesia is
most apparent in the area of financial assistance. When the Asian financial
crisis hit Indonesia, China took the initiative to extend its assistance. In addi-
tion to U.S. $400 million in standby loans as part of an IMF rescue package,
China contributed U.S. $200 million in export credit facilities.25 Chinese as-
sistance kept coming in the following years. Between 1999 and 2003, China
provided grants totaling RMB 180 million.26 Following the tsunami disaster
at the end of 2004, China was among the first countries to provide not only
financial assistance, but also medical help.27 (The value of the financial assis-
tance package was not disclosed.) During the visit of President Yudhoyono to
Beijing in late July 2005, Indonesia and China signed a series of agreements
on grants and loans, and also agreed to work on “technical cooperation.” In
this agreement, the Chinese government offered RMB 30 million in the form
of a grant28 as well as a loan of U.S. $100 million to finance particular “com-
mercial contracts.”29
Domestically in Indonesia, the display of Chinese culture, which had been
banned for over thirty years, has been revived since the fall of the “Orde
Baru” (New Order) in 1998. Chinese characters can now be seen in public
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 215

places, as well as Chinese dragon dances and other Chinese symbols. Since
2003, the Chinese community in Indonesia has been allowed to celebrate the
Lunar New Year openly, without any restrictions, marking a complete rever-
sal of the previous policy. Furthermore, Chinese-Indonesians are no longer
afraid to go to temples to pray.
The Chinese-Indonesians, during the Orde Baru era, were not allowed to
speak Chinese, or even to learn it. But, after 1998, Chinese language courses
both at the university level and non-university level have spread rapidly in
big cities. Along with language classes, there has been a proliferation of
Chinese language mass media, such as TV news, newspapers, and bulletins.
Chinese language courses have received support from the Chinese govern-
ment. For instance, a group of twenty volunteer Chinese language teachers
from Jinan University in Shandong arrived in Indonesia in 2004 to spend a
year teaching Mandarin at fifty high schools in nine provinces. This was part
of the Chinese Volunteer Program for International CAFL Teachers program,
which is supported by the National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign
Language and the Chinese Ministry of Education.30 To further the spread of
Chinese language, China has agreed to set up four Confucius Institutes in four
Indonesian cities.
There has been no other time in Indonesian history when China and Chi-
nese culture has received such a welcome. There are still problems related
to the government’s discriminatory practice toward ethic Chinese, but the
general mood is positive. The fall of Suharto and the rise of China have both
contributed to the emergence of Chinese soft power in Indonesia.
China’s soft power is indeed strong among the people of ASEAN. One
observer asserts that “Chinese culture, cuisine, calligraphy, cinema, curios,
art, acupuncture, herbal, medicine and fashion fads have penetrated into re-
gional culture.”31 He also refers to Chinese films and film stars such as Gong
Li and Zhang Ziyi, as well as pop music, which are all very popular amongst
Southeast Asian youth. Mainland Chinese consumer brands – such as Hai’er,
TCL, and Huawei—are also becoming increasingly popular in the ASEAN
region.

ASEAN INTEREST IN THE “BEIJING CONSENSUS”

It was at this critical juncture that countries in Southeast Asia found that they
could also learn about strategies for development from China. As presented
above, many of them were first fascinated by models of development that
came from Western Europe, then those from the Soviet Union, and later those
from Japan. The bitter lesson from the Asian financial crisis and China’s
216 Chapter Eleven

success story, however, convinced them to turn their eyes to China. The com-
bination of a semi-market economy and illiberal polity that China practices is
now considered by many ASEAN countries as the right model to adopt.
Data collected by the Fraser Institute indicate the ten ASEAN members
have experienced a gradual change with regard to market freedom. There
are five indicators to measure it, but government size is considered the most
important one. Government size is calculated from revenues, institutions and
staff, expenditures, investments, and subsidies. The report shows that market
freedom in most ASEAN countries is decreasing whereas government size
has continually increased since 1980.32 The greater the size of the govern-
ment, the lower the level of market-oriented economy. This may reflect their
distrust of a completely free market – which perhaps can be traced to the 1997
financial crisis—although they do not abandon a market economy entirely.
This is to be compared with data collected by the “Freedom House” in
2000 on the political freedom. The index indicates that most ASEAN coun-
tries are “unfree”: Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Brunei, and Cambodia. Singa-
pore, Malaysia, and Indonesia fall under the category of “partly free.” Only
the Philippines and Thailand belong to “free country.”
From these two sets of data, a pattern emerges: ASEAN members are pur-
suing a semi-market economy combined with an illiberal polity. At present,
some countries of ASEAN are following, to varying degrees, the “Beijing
Consensus” by which they practice a semi-market economy combined with
an illiberal polity.33 Table 11.2 shows countries that have adopted the Beijing
Consensus. In 2006 Thailand, after having adopted democracy for about

Table 11. 1. ASEAN members and levels of freedom

Freedom House Average Annual GDP
Southeast Asian Country Rating (2000) Per Capita (1975–2000)

Un-free countries (Rating 5.5–7)

Myanmar 7.7 1.3%
Vietnam 7.7 4.8%
Laos 7.6 3.2%
Brunei 7.5 Unavailable
Cambodia 6.6 1.9%
Partly free countries (Rating 3–5.5)
Malaysia 5.5 4.1%
Singapore 5.5 5.2%
Indonesia 4.4 4.4%
Free countries (Rating 1–2.5)
Philippines 2.3 0.1%
Thailand 2.3 5.5%

Source: freedomhouse.org, nationmaster.com

 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 217

Table 11.2. ASEAN members and the “Beijing Consensus”

Explanation
Country Beijing Consensus? Economy Polity
Brunei Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Cambodia Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Indonesia No Semi-Market Liberal
Laos Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Malaysia Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Myanmar No Closed Market Illiberal
Philippines No Semi-Market Liberal
Singapore Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Thailand Yes Semi-Market Illiberal
Vietnam Yes Semi-Market Illiberal

Source: author constructed from data available at freedomehouse.org and nationmaster.com

eighteen years, slipped back to illiberal polity where the military junta ruled
the country again.
Indonesia and the Philippines belong to the group of countries that follow
the path of semi-market freedom and democracy. Both countries do not seem
interested in the “Beijing Consensus” after having undergone the long experi-
ence of living under dictatorships (Suharto and Marcos). Myanmar is at the
opposite end of the spectrum; it practices neither democracy nor the Beijing
Consensus. It has a closed economy combined with a military regime.
There are, of course, no official statements from these countries about
their decisions to follow the Beijing Consensus or not. The attraction to the
Chinese model is unconscious – a silent admiration of the spectacular rise of
China. Ramo recounts one senior ASEAN economist who asked him: “Why
is our experience so different from China’s? We are like them. We have
low-cost labour. Our political system is strong. What are we doing wrong?”
Ramo continued: “The question was a familiar one. All around Asia, and in-
creasingly around the world, you stumble on anecdotes of nations examining
China’s rise and trying to see what pieces of this miracle they might make
manifest in their own land.”34
Clearly, countries in Southeast Asia and around the world are attracted to
the Chinese model of development.35 They are inspired by China’s ability
to maintain high economic growth with illiberal politics and, consequently,
they try to emulate it. The rise of China has drawn their attention ever since
China avoided the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and even more so afterward
when it posted double-digit economic growth. In their eyes, China’s success
story is the result of a certain degree of free markets and a certain degree of
free government.
218 Chapter Eleven

THE CONTEST OF THE TWO MODELS

The United States is, of course, not happy with the situation in ASEAN be-
cause of its specific agenda around the world, including Southeast Asia. Since
the end of the Cold War, the United States has been aggressively promoting
a “free trade” model. According to Hutton, one of the principal aims of the
Economic Security Council set up by President Clinton in 1993 was to open
up ten countries to U.S. trade and finance. Most of these target countries
were the Asian tigers.36 During his 2000 presidential campaign, George W.
Bush consistently promised to “work tirelessly to open up markets all over
the world” and “end tariffs and break down barriers everywhere, entirely,
so the whole world trades in freedom.” Even after 9/11, Bush promised to
“ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free
trade.”37 Bush argues that “policies that further strengthen market incentives
and market institutions are relevant for economies – industrialized countries,
emerging markets, and the developing world.”38
This idea has been further popularized by New York Times journalist
Thomas Friedman in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree. At present, he
states, there are millions of currency traders and CEOs of large multinational
corporations that he calls the “Electronic Herd.” Their main interest is to find
production sites that are the most efficient in the world. In order to succeed
in the era of globalization, countries around the world not only have to put
on the “Golden Straitjacket” (the free market), but they also have to please
the Electronic Herd.

The Electronic Herd loves the Golden Straitjacket because it embodies all the
liberal, free-market rules the herd wants to see in a country. . . . Those countries
that put on the Golden Straitjacket are rewarded by the herd with investment
capital. Those that don’t want to put it on are disciplined by the herd—either by
the herd avoiding or withdrawing its money from that country.39

The free-trade agenda was not connected to democratization by Clinton

and Bush. It was Francis Fukuyama who argued that the “end of history”
is marked by a “free market and liberal democracy.”40 Socialism and com-
munism apparently no longer have a place in the future of the world. In his
view, the triumph of capitalism cannot be separated from democracy. His
book immediately became a best seller. Fukuyama and U.S. Senator Hillary
Clinton are both of the opinion that globalization strengthens the existing
affinity between democracy and the free market. During her visit to Poland,
Clinton insisted that “choosing the path of democracy, free markets, and
freedom required a great vision, courage and moral leadership. Ten years ago
it was not the obvious choice, nor was it easy. But today in so many of your
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 219

countries, there is no question that the path of free markets and democracy
is the right choice.”41 This campaign of democracy is even more urgent in
Third World countries where authoritarian regimes are prevalent. Thomas
Friedman underlines this by saying that “the Electronic Herd will intensify
pressures for democratization generally, for three very critical reasons – flex-
ibility, legitimacy and sustainability.”42
The financial crisis of 1997 was the turning point. First, the response of
the United States and the IMF to the crisis generated unease, frustration, and
anger across Asia. Americans had no interest in the crisis and, at the same
time, the IMF’s initial response attached stringent conditions. It was no sur-
prise then that at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July 1997, Prime
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia said that the West intended to weaken the
ASEAN economies by undermining their currencies: “We are told that we
must open up, that trade and commerce must be totally free. Free for whom?
For rogue speculators? For anarchists wanting to destroy weak countries in
their crusade for open societies, to force us to submit to the dictatorship of
international manipulators?” For this reason, Malaysia decided on September
2, 1998, not to ask for assistance from the IMF.
Obviously Mahathir echoed the unspoken anger of many ASEAN people
who were disappointed by the turn of events. Criticism of the World Bank
and the IMF became louder and louder, especially in Thailand, Indonesia,
and Malaysia. Indeed, there was a global critical reaction not only to the IMF,
but also to the World Bank and the World Trade Organization—the “Seattle
War” of 1999 being the most conspicuous example. The discourse against
the “Washington Consensus” spread across the world as more and more
people joined the World Social Forum that started in 2000 in Porto Allegre,
Brazil.43
In the end, many people are questioning the validity of the link between
free trade and democracy. China, for example, has shown that democracy is
not an absolute condition to attain economic prosperity. The proponents of
free markets and democracy consistently refer to the U.S. experience just as
the opponents point to the Chinese experience. The United States and other
developed countries are successful in combining both free markets and de-
mocracy, but China is also successful in blending a semi-free market with an
illiberal political system. The debate, therefore, is not at a theoretical ques-
tion, but rather is an empirical one. China has demontstrated that it is now
possible to develop an alternative strategy of development using a combina-
tion of different concepts.
China has also tried to disseminate the “Chinese model.” According to
Peerenboom, in 2004 China and the World Bank jointly hosted the Shanghai
Global Learning Process. There were at least 1,200 participants from 117
220 Chapter Eleven

countries who attended the conference to discuss what other countries could
learn from China. Slowly, China is developing its soft power through the
spread of the “Beijing Consensus.” There was no formal announcement when
this strategy was adopted, although some Chinese scholars have discussed it.44
For example, Zhang and Huang came to the conclusion that “it is very crucial
for China to develop ‘hard power’ and ‘soft power’ at the same time, if China
would like to upgrade its international status and developing peace.”45
Although Peerenboom still puts a question mark on the “Chinese para-
digm,” he says that disenchanted countries are looking to China for a new
model. “Given the many problems confronting developing countries, China
may seem to offer a new model for development, albeit one that challenges
aspects of the dominant legitimating narrative being exported by Western
countries and the international financial institutions they control.”46

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have tried to show how ASEAN members have shifted their
development strategy from one based on free markets and democracy to one
based on semi-free markets and an illiberal political system. Two factors were
predominantly responsible for this shift: (1) the Asian financial crisis and (2)
the rise of China. The latter in particular has inspired ASEAN members and
has legitimized their economic and political systems. The “Beijing Consen-
sus” has clearly gained ground in Southeast Asia.
Given these changes, it is understandable that China’s soft power has
spread in the region. It began with China’s participation in various multilat-
eral organizations, a move meant to prove that China was not an aggressive
rising power. It was then followed by demonstrations of Chinese generosity
in providing financial assistance to numerous developing countries.47 Ramo,
who coined the phrase “Beijing Consensus,” stated: “many elements of the
country’s rise have engaged the developing world. Some of that engagement
is rooted in China’s growing commercial influence, but some of it reflects the
appealing spirit of the new Chinese physics.”48
The rise of China itself has provided a model, which in turn has become
a source of its soft power. This has been a more formidable influence than
China’s participation in multilateral organizations or China’s financial aid.
Compare this to two similar processes in the past, namely the European ideal
of democracy and the Japanese model of development. Both the Europeans
and the Japanese have dominated the discussions of political theory and
development theory, respectively. But now, the Beijing Consensus will be
included in high-level debates, whether one agrees with it or not.
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 221

Chinese soft power is growing not only in Southeast Asia but also in Latin
America and Africa. “The appealing spirit of the new Chinese physics,” as
Ramo put it, has traveled across the ocean. People will see that something
good is emerging in China. The slogan “peaceful rise” promoted by President
Hu Jintao four years ago but derided by many, is gaining credibility today as
a result of the increase of China’s soft power. This is not to say that problems
with China are disappearing. It is in the best interest of China to minimize
these potential problems to preserve its recent gains in soft power.

NOTES

1. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle
for the World Economy (New York: Touchstone Book, 1998); Will Hutton, “Anthony
Giddens and Will Hutton in Conversation,” in Global Capitalism, ed. Will Hutton and
Anthony Giddens (New York: Free Press, 2000).
2. Manfred Steger, Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism (Lanham,
Maryland: Roman & Littlefield, 2005).
3. Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, World Bank and WTO (London: Zed
Books, 2003).
4. Islam and Chowdhury wrote, “In the 1950s and 1960s, many countries in the
developing world embraced a development strategy whose key components formed
the substance of the so-called dirigiste doctrine.” State intervention was acceptable,
the most conspicuous one being the strategy of import substitution industrialization.
Iyanatul Islam and Anis Chodhury The Political Economy of East Asia: Post-Crisis
Debates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
5. The attack on ISI was initially launched by Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky and
Maurice Scott, Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970).; and the Asian Development Bank.
6. Among the proponents of this model are Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the
Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).; Robert Wade, Gov-
erning the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian
Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).; Alice Amsden,
The Rise of ‘The Rest’: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
7. Islam and Chodhury, The Political Economy of East Asia, 30.
8. Islam and Chodhury, The Political Economy of East Asia, 22–23.
9. Ross Garnaut,”The East Asian Crisis,” in East Asia Crisis: From Being a
Miracle to Needing One, ed. Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut (London: Routledge,
1998), 3–27.
10. Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2004), 148.
222 Chapter Eleven

11. Ross H. McLeod and Ross Garnaut, eds., East Asia in Crisis. From Being a
Miracle to Needing One (London: Routledge, 1998).
12. Zainuddin Djafar, Rethinking the Indonesian Crisis (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya,
2006).
13. Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the
Rest? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 73.
14. For a good review, see Ho Khai Leon and Samuel C.Y. Ku, eds., China and
Southeast Asia: Global Challenges and Regional Challenges (Singapore: ISEAS,
2005).
15. Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, The Dispute in the South China Sea (Alder-
shot: Ashagate, 1997).
16. Hasjim Djalal, Preventive Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Lessons Learned
(Jakarta: The Habibie Center, 2002).
17. Lu Jianren, “China’s Economic Growth and Its Impact on the ASEAN Eco-
nomics,” in Harmony and Development: ASEAN-China Relations, ed. Lai Hongyi
and Lim Tin Seng (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007), 112.
18. Donald Greenlees, “ASEAN Hails the Benefits of Friendship with China,”
International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2006.
19. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-
ing the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 4.
20. Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Chance,” Prospect Magazine 108 (March 2005):
1.
21. Kao Kim Hourn and Sisowath Doung Chanto, “ASEAN-China Cooperation
for Greater Mekong Sub-Region Development,” in ASEAN-China Relations, Reali-
ties and Prospects, ed. Saw Swe-Hock et al. (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), 316–328.
22. Zhang Haibing, “China’s Aid to Southeast Asia,” in ASEAN-China Economic
Relations, ed. Saw Swee-Hock (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 261–262.
23. Jüngen Haacke, “The Significance of Beijing’s Bilateral Relations,” in China
and Southeast Asia, ed. Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C.Y. Ku (Singapore: ISEAS,
2005), 111–145.
24. David Mozingo, Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1949–1967 (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1976).; Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China: The Politics of a
Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999).
25. Michael Leifer, “Indonesia’s Encounter with China and the Dilemmas of En-
gagement,” in Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power, ed. Alastair
Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 104.
26. Author’s Interview with a staff member of the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta,
January 2004.
27. “Indonesia Praises Chinese Aid, Commitment,” China Daily, January 8, 2005.
According to another source, China donated about U.S. $62 million for all countries
affected by tsunami. Jim Yardley, “In Multilateral Role, China Tests Its Ability,”
International Herald Tribune, January 4, 2005.
28. See the Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation Between the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the People’s Republic
of China, July 28, 2005.
 China’s Soft Power and Neoliberal Agenda in Southeast Asia 223

29. See the General Loan Agreement of U.S. $100 million of Preferential Buyer’s
Credit from the Government of the People’s Republic of China to the Government of
the Republic of Indonesia, July 28, 2005.
30. ”Ketika Guru Bahasa Mandarin Jadi Duta Bangsa” [When Chinese teacher
becomes the ambassador for the nation], Kompas, June 23, 2005.
31. Cheow Eric Teo Chu “ASEAN + 3: The Roles of ASEAN and China,” in
ASEAN-China Relations, Realities and Prospects, ed. Saw Swe-Hock et al. (Singa-
pore: ISEAS, 2005), 63.
32. See “Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report” The Fraser Institute
of Canada 2007, www.freetheworld.com/2007/3EFW2007ch3.pdf (accessed January
10, 2009).
33. This concept was created by Joshua C. Ramo in 2004.
34. Joshua C. Ramo, “The Beijing Consensus,” (London: Foreign Policy Centre,
2004), 26.
35. I. Wibowo, Belajar dari Cina [To learn from China], (Jakarta: Penerbit KOM-
PAS, 2004).
36. Hutton, “Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton,” 41.
37. Quoted in Steger, Globalism, 57.
38. Quoted in Steger, Globalism, 58.
39. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (London: HarperCollins,
2000), 109–110.
40. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
1992).
41. Quoted in Steger, Globalism, 78.
42. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 187.
43. Marlis Glasiuss et al., Global Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
44. Peerenboom, China Modernizes.
45. Zhang Youwen and Huang Renwei, “Zhong Guo Guoji Diwei Bao Gao” [Re-
port on the international status of China], (Beijing: People Publishing House, 2006),
271.
46. Peerenboom, China Modernizes, 19.
47. I. Wibowo, “The Rise Of China’s Power: How Hard And How Soft?” (paper
presented at the International Conference on Rationalising China’s Place in Asia,
1800 to 2005, the National University of Singapore, Singapore, August 3–4, 2006).
48. Ramo, “The Beijing Concensus,” 5.
 Chapter Twelve

China’s Climate
Diplomacy and Its Soft Power
Gang Chen

The growth of a state’s soft power comes not only from its domestic policies
and bilateral relations with foreign nations, but also from its participation
in international treaties and agreements. This chapter addresses China’s
soft power within global institutions by examining the case of China’s
participation in international negotiations concerning climate change.
Climate change has been an important international issue since the 1980s,
when calls for multilateral actions to control and reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions first appeared. Due to its large population, rapid economic
growth, and heavy reliance on coal, China has become one of the largest
emitters of GHG. It is estimated that its emissions reached 6,100 million tons
of CO2 in 2004, accounting for 12.45 percent of the world’s total of 49,000
million tons. China has also played an especially important role in interna-
tional climate talks as well as the formation of climate institutions.
In this chapter, I first outline some observations regarding the relation-
ship between international institutions and soft power. The next part traces
China’s participation in negotiations for the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). I then examine China’s role in the
talks on the Kyoto Protocol. These two cases clearly demonstrate how China
attempted to exercise and cultivate its soft power through various means, such
as setting the agenda, gaining diplomatic support from other like-minded
states, making proposals to attract others to its side, and creating win-win
situations that would benefit all. Meanwhile, its willingness to accept inter-
national environmental norms and to support international climate accords
also enhanced its soft power and enabled it to gain respect from others. In
the third part of the chapter, I analyze the challenges that China faces in post-
Kyoto negotiations and some of the major actions that the Chinese govern-
ment has taken to meet those challenges. I conclude that active participation
225
226 Chapter Twelve

in international climate negotiations and institutions has been an important

part of China’s diplomatic activities since the early 1990s and has effectively
elevated China’s international image and soft power.

INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION ENHANCES SOFT POWER

International Institutions and Soft Power

Voluntary participation in major international institutions and compliance
with established rules in the international community are essential for the
maintenance of soft power. International institutions are “the rules that gov-
ern elements of world politics and the organizations that help implement
those rules.”1 Although international society is still described as anarchical,
with world politics driven by the traditional exercise of state power, inter-
national institutions are increasingly important and no longer marginal. In
reality, even the most powerful states are relying increasingly on international
institutions—not so much on institutions such as the UN but rather on other
organizations and regimes that set rules and standards to govern specific sets
of activities.2 Institutions create the capability for states to cooperate in mu-
tually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agree-
ments—what economists refer to as “transaction costs.”3 International institu-
tions have become extremely important nowadays when sovereign states are
facing more global problems that need joint effort and policy coordination.
These urgent problems include terrorism, transnational crimes, global warm-
ing, trade protectionism, hot money flow, increasing epidemic diseases, and
overuse of common-pool resources. Without the necessary institutions, self-
interested sovereign states face the prisoners’ dilemma and few states are
willing to take voluntary actions for the collective benefit of international
society. Certain institutions and rules have to be set up to provide incentives
and disincentives for individual states in order to act collectively.
By reducing the uncertainty of enforcing agreements, international in-
stitutions help states achieve collective gains.4 Meanwhile, participating in
international institutions requires an acceptance of certain types of commonly
recognized norms and rules. Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or
the Convention on Biological Diversity is an indication that a state recognizes
and is willing to follow international norms limiting the spread of nuclear
weapons or the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Therefore, a state’s stances on various kinds of international institutions are
extremely important for its soft power expansion because they directly affect
its moral attractiveness in the eyes of other states that value cooperation in
the frameworks of these institutions.
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 227

Participation in international institutions is an important indicator of a

state’s soft power because it provides the arena for a state to use its power—
and other states take notice of how this is done. If a state uses its power re-
sources coercively in international institutions to get what it wants, it is clear
display of hard power. Conversely, if a state uses attraction, persuasion, and
appeal to achieve its goals, it is essentially using soft power.
Such soft power can be gained through various means. First, a state’s par-
ticipation in multilateral institutions often results in positive responses from
the rest of the international community. Non-participation quickly raises
concern and suspicion of that state’s motives. Joining an international institu-
tion is not only a part of a country’s foreign policy but it is also an indicator
of its political values. Second, if a country’s policies and practices abide by
commonly recognized international norms that win the support and respect
of others, its soft power will be fortified. Moreover, soft power is in play if a
country can effectively exercise its influence through non-coercive means, set
the agenda in international affairs, have its positions accepted by the majority
of other countries, shape other states’ preferences, have the ability to offer
suggestions to solve problems, delegitimize other countries’ positions, and
build coalitions. The best scenario for a state’s soft power would be a situa-
tion in which it can provide international public goods that other states can
enjoy freely or at low cost. This is of course not always possible since all
states have their own selfish interests. The second best thing a state could do
is to create win-win situations.

China’s Active Participation in International Institutions

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is a signatory to
a large number of international treaties and a member of many influential in-
ternational organizations. In the field of disarmament and arms control, China
has signed almost all the major international accords including the NPT, the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Convention on the
Banning of Chemical Weapons, the Convention on the Banning of Biological
Weapons, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. In the field
of environmental protection, China has ratified more than fifty international
environmental treaties including the well-known UNFCCC, the Montreal
Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the
UN Convention to Combat Desertification, the Rotterdam Convention on
the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals
and Pesticides in International Trade, and the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants. Despite its deficient protection of intellectual
property rights domestically, China is a member of the World Intellectual
228 Chapter Twelve

Property Organization, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary

and Artistic Works, the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights administered
by the World Trade Organization. Although the United States often attacks
China’s human rights record, China has ratified more international treaties on
human rights protection than the United States. As the world’s second larg-
est greenhouse gas emitter, China’s participation in the international climate
regime and the Kyoto Protocol shows how the country gained its soft power
through joining an international institution that seeks a common global goal.
It also means that if China fails to make further commitment as expected by
the international community in the next round of climate talks, its soft power
will probably be weakened.

CHINA’S PERFORMANCE IN UNFCCC NEGOTIATIONS

Global warming, mostly caused by an increase in human activities that gen-

erate GHG emissions, is one of the most serious environmental problems
confronted by the international community today. Scientists believe that a
continual rise in temperature will lead to frequent meteorological disasters,
including drought, floods, and tropical storms, as well as rising sea levels that
may submerge coastal cities and island states, alter entire ecosystems, nurture
the insect pest population, and cause epidemic outbreaks.
An effective negotiation strategy has become extremely important for a
sovereign state to protect or promote its national interest in climate negotia-
tions. On the one hand, whether or not a country can successfully utilize its
soft power to attract others to its side and maximize diplomatic support is
essential for its final gains from long-lasting multilateral negotiations. On the
other hand, to what extent the final outcome reflects the basic proposition of
a state will enhance its soft power in the eyes of other states.

China’s Unity with Developing Countries

Enhances Soft Power in Climate Talks
To prevent an ecological catastrophe, the international community started ne-
gotiations under the framework of United Nations to draft international trea-
ties restraining GHG emissions in the early 1990s. A milestone in this process
was the signing of the UNFCCC at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The UNFCCC, with the anticipation of subsequent agreements establishing
more concrete obligations, aimed to protect the world’s climate against the
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 229

effects of anthropogenic GHGs, most notably CO2, and their adverse climatic
warming effects.5 The parties to the UNFCCC can be roughly categorized
into two groups: Annex I lists members of industrialized countries and non-
Annex I lists the developing countries. The UNFCCC set basic guidelines for
future international climate negotiations, but heated quarrels and sharp diver-
gences still remain among the different parties due to the fear that emission
controls will hamper national economic growth and be very costly.
China has taken part in the negotiations for the UNFCCC since its pre-
liminary stages, viewing climate change as a controversial issue that involves
North-South equity problems. China believed that developed countries
should take responsibility for environmental protection and give developing
countries the opportunity to develop as much as the developed countries were
able to.6 As the world’s largest developing country and a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, China has been playing a leading role among de-
veloping countries in steering international climate change negotiations, unit-
ing with other developing countries to form the “bloc of G-77” (the group of
seventy-seven developing countries), which comprises about ninety percent
of the developing countries that signed the UNFCCC.

China Exercises Soft Power to Set the Agenda in Climate Talks

When the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) meetings in
preparation for the UNFCCC began, China argued for equity on historical
grounds, placing the blame primarily on the North.7 From June 1991, China
aligned itself closely with India and pushed for a fair convention, arguing that
the South had a much smaller responsibility than the North, whose high per
capita emissions and opulent lifestyle were the primary causes for climate
change. As China was the largest greenhouse gas emitter among all develop-
ing countries, its officials feared that they might come under undue pressure
to reduce emissions immediately.
In February 1991, when formal negotiations on a climate change conven-
tion began with the first meeting of the INC in Chantilly, Virginia, a core
element of China’s negotiating position included an emphasis on the major
scientific uncertainties that surrounded the causes of climate change.8 In Feb-
ruary 1995, during the final negotiating session leading up to the Conference
of Parties (COP) 1, China again explicitly questioned the scientific conclu-
sions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that served
as the basis for those arguing for the inadequacy of existing commitments.9
China’s stance echoed that of the United States and was also supported by
large developing countries such as India and Brazil. The European Union and
some small island countries, however, argued that despite all the scientific
230 Chapter Twelve

uncertainties, the consequences of climate change may be so serious and ir-

reversible that humanity cannot afford to risk inaction. In June 1991, China
convened the Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in
Beijing, attended by delegates from over forty developing countries.10 At its
conclusion, a ministerial declaration was unanimously approved that largely
reflecting the principles enunciated earlier by China: differentiated respon-
sibilities, obligations and capabilities, state sovereignty and equality, untied
aid, and preferential treatment.11
In 1992, Chinese Premier Li Peng explained China’s views on green issues
at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He said “protecting the environment is a common
task of humanity, but economically developed nations should take greater
responsibilities.” He also mentioned safeguarding national sovereignty as a
basic principle for international environmental cooperation. China strongly
opposed legally binding emission reduction targets for developing countries.
It insisted that industrialized countries should transfer advanced, environ-
mentally friendly technologies and offer financial aid to developing countries
in fighting against climate change. It advocated the preservation of national
sovereignty, claiming that developing countries have the right to develop and
should neither be obliged to undertake measures that might impede develop-
ment nor be subject to conditions being placed on aid or development financ-
ing. As early as the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, China and India, speaking on
behalf of other developing countries, insisted that developed countries should
commit themselves to technology transfer as a requirement for gaining de-
veloping countries’ support for the proposed agreements on global warming.
These stances are consistent with those of other developing countries and are
embodied in the UNFCCC. China’s adherence to the principle of “common
but differentiated responsibilities” won support and praise from developing
countries, asserted its legitimacy, and increased its soft power. By consolidat-
ing a coalition around itself, China sought to ensure that its interests would
be better supported, and that it would gain international prestige by being
proactive in environmental protection.12
From this stage, we can see that China showed a very effective ability to
influence other developing countries and help set the agendas of the climate
negotiations. China used its soft power already established among develop-
ing countries to form the “bloc of G-77 plus China” in order to magnify their
say in the talks. China’s success partially comes from soft power that already
existed before the start of climate talks: the image of China being a major
power, its UN Security Council membership, and the perceived leadership
role in championing the interests of the developing world ever since the Mao
era. Through giving unselfish material aid to developing countries and politi-
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 231

cal support for independence movements, China succeeded in accumulating

huge soft power in the 1970s. China’s early reforms and “opening-up” in the
1980s further elevated its appeal among developing countries.
Due to the enormous scientific uncertainties over the climate change issue
in the early 1990s, most poverty-stricken developing countries paid more
attention to development than environmental issues, and so the principle of
fairness raised by China was very attractive in their eyes. Beijing’s success
in hosting the Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environ-
ment and Development in 1991 and the unanimous approval of the Beijing
Declaration were apparent evidence of China’s ability to unify the stances
of developing countries and gain support from them. Hence, it was quite
clear that emphasizing the principle of “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities,” the Third World’s right to develop, and the need for monetary and
technological aid from developed countries, China enhanced its soft power
among developing countries in the early stages of international climate ne-
gotiations.

China Uses the Climate Issue to Regain

Soft Power Among Developed Countries
Meanwhile, China adjusted its stance when negotiating with developed
countries by showing its respect for international norms of environmental
protection and trying to reduce Western countries’ hostility toward it after
the Tiananmen incident in 1989. China felt diplomatically isolated in the
early 1990s, and relations with the United States and European countries
deteriorated sharply. Some international aid was suspended or cut off. The
climate change issue came into focus at the same time, thereby serving as
an ideal tool for China to regain its international position.13 The UNFCCC
negotiations were high profile negotiations, putting China in the spotlight
whenever it took the initiative.14 China was not only one of the first countries
to formulate a domestic “Agenda 21” in 1994, mirroring the UN Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) program on sustainable devel-
opment, it also passed the Air Pollution Law in 1996, accounting for provi-
sions in the UNFCCC.15 China thought it would gain international prestige in
being proactive in environmental protection cooperation. Though refusing to
accept any commitment at first, China and other developing countries agreed
finally in the UNFCCC to establish national emissions inventories, report on
national programs, and promote cooperation, sustainable development and
information exchange.16 Due to a long-time suspicion that Western countries
may shift their own responsibilities and use environmental issues to hamper
China’s economic rise, China initially opposed a new protocol on the grounds
232 Chapter Twelve

of scientific uncertainty, fearing that giving credit for reduced emissions

may lessen developed countries’ commitment to emissions abatement. China
also opposed “joint implementation” programs, which allow industrialized
countries to meet part of their required cuts in GHG emissions by paying for
projects that reduce emissions in other industrialized countries. As the inter-
national talks proceeded, however, China gradually changed its tough stance
on these issues in the following COPs to the UNFCCC, paving the way for
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.

KYOTO PROTOCOL AND CHINA

China’s Participation in the Kyoto Protocol: A Diplomatic Success

After years of heated debates, delegates from 149 countries and regions
passed the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in Japan in December 1997. The KP is the
first international treaty to set detailed, legally binding obligations for indus-
trialized nations to reduce their greenhouse gases. The principle of “com-
mon but differentiated responsibilities” advocated by China, India and other
developing countries was included in the KP, which stipulated the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage developed countries to pro-
vide financial and technical assistance to developing countries. Conversely,
developing countries have no concrete abatement commitments.
The KP represents a success for China’s diplomacy, showing the country’s
ability to use soft power to formulate international rules serving its own in-
terests. The outcomes of the Kyoto negotiations were conducive to China: no
compulsory emission cutting obligations for developing nations and potential
economic benefits from the flexible mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. China
certainly does not have enough hard power to coerce other developing coun-
tries to support its stance or force developed countries to compromise on the
climate issue. Only soft power is effective.
China completed its domestic ratification process in 2002, and appealed to
other hesitant parties to ratify the protocol as soon as possible. The KP came
into effect in 2005, requiring thirty-eight industrialized countries to reduce
their greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012 by an average of
5.2 percent below 1990 levels. China is not one of the thirty-eight countries
named, and it is not required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But it is
the world’s second largest greenhouse gas emitter after the United States, and
has announced its willingness to reduce its emissions on account of the rapid
deterioration of its own environment.
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 233

China Preserves its Favorable International

Image as a “Responsible Power”
In contrast to the United States’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, China’s
active participation in international treaties on global warming has proven to
be a diplomatic success, winning applause from both developing and devel-
oped countries. China’s cooperation has special importance to the interna-
tional community because of its large GHG emissions and quickly growing
energy consumption. China’s active participation in climate change negotia-
tions is closely related to its concern to preserve a favorable international
image as a responsible major power. Enhancing China’s international image
and elevating its international stature are important goals of Chinese foreign
policy. China traditionally considers solidarity with developing countries as
fundamentally important, and the climate change issue has provided an un-
precedented opportunity for China to boost its prestige and shore up support
from developing countries as well as enhance its relationship with developed
countries.17
China’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol shows that it is willing to accept
international norms of environmental protection, which have been gradually
developed since the 1950s. The logic of collective action prevents sovereign
states from making joint efforts to cope with the global warming problem
without any new institutions established to provide incentives and disincen-
tives for individual states. As every country will benefit from the public
goods of climate change mitigation—no matter if the country controls its own
emissions or not—the best way for it to maximize its national interest is to
take a “free ride” strategy with no substantive domestic emission cutting that
may lead to huge economic costs. Refusing to join international institutions
that seek to regulate such negative externalities, therefore, would be regarded
by other states as selfish and irresponsible. Its charm and attraction in the in-
ternational community would definitely be weakened if it refused to shoulder
its responsibility for global issues.
The U.S. case was a good example that showed how soft power could
be badly impaired by not participating in international climate institutions.
In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that his country would
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol because the deal did not include mean-
ingful participation by key developing countries. The unilateral U.S. action
immediately aroused long-lasting global anger and criticism. The IPCC, the
United Nations’ leading body on global warming, then published its Fourth
Assessment Report in 2007, which described the connection between climate
change and human activity with a higher degree of certainty. As a result, the
234 Chapter Twelve

Bush Administration and Australia’s Howard faced even greater international

pressure for not joining the Kyoto Protocol. Former U.S. Vice President Al
Gore, George Bush’s rival in the 2000 presidential election, together with the
IPCC, won the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for spreading awareness of man-made
climate change and laying the foundations for counteracting it. This was seen
as increasing pressure on the Bush Administration and showed that President
Bush’s approach missed the mark. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
also declared Australia’s returning to the Kyoto Protocol immediately after
he beat John Howard in the 2007 election. Voluntarily cutting GHG emis-
sions and joining global efforts to mitigate climate change, therefore, have
become the mainstream consensus in the international community, even if
some suspicions and reluctance lingers. If a sovereign state now evades its
responsibility in this area, its soft power would be greatly reduced.

POST-KYOTO NEGOTIATIONS
THREATEN CHINA’S SOFT POWER

China’s Growing Emissions Come Under International Scrutiny

In 2007, the tenth anniversary of the Kyoto Protocol, the global warming de-
bate became more heated. New reports released by a UN panel described the
connection between climate change and human activity with an even high de-
gree of certainty. The Kyoto Protocol, which is scheduled to expire by 2012,
cannot meet the demand from the international community for further emis-
sion reductions. At the UN climate change summit in Bali, Indonesia in De-
cember 2007, a new round of international negotiations formally started over
a new accord to replace the Kyoto Protocol. China, whose greenhouse gas
emissions have been rising as rapidly as its double-digit economic growth, is
now facing more international pressure for stringent emission reduction tar-
gets. If China cannot handle this problem effectively in the future talks, its
soft power may be weakened and its international image damaged.
In May 2007, more than 400 scientists and experts from about 120 coun-
tries attended a major conference held in Bangkok by the IPCC, the United
Nations’ leading body on global warming. Delegates finalized the third
IPCC Working Group report of 2007, laying out an arsenal of anti-warming
measures that must be rushed into place to avert a disastrous spike in global
temperatures. According to the IPCC report, global GHG emissions increased
seventy percent between 1970 and 2004, while global mean surface tempera-
tures have risen by 0.74 °C ± 0.18 °C over the last 100 years (1906–2005).
The rate of warming over the last fifty years is increasing, and the IPCC
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 235

predicted global temperature to rise 1.8 to 4 °C by 2100 even with various

kinds of mitigation actions.
China was one of the nations under the most scrutiny at the Bangkok meet-
ing. With carbon dioxide-spewing, coal-fired power plants generating around
70 percent of China’s exponentially growing energy needs, the world’s most
populous nation is now firmly entrenched as one of Earth’s most significant
climate changers.18 Without any detailed emission cutting obligations in the
Kyoto Protocol, China’s GHG emissions have been growing very rapidly due
to its heavy reliance on coal and the booming of its nascent auto industry. As
a carbon-intensive fuel, coal contains almost twice the amount of carbon per
unit of energy compared to natural gas, and about twenty percent more than
petroleum. In fact, there are more coal power plants installed in China than in
the United States, the UK, and India combined. In Beijing, the number of au-
tomobiles doubled in just five years to reach 3 million, with more than 1,000
new private cars hitting the roads every day. In the capital city, transportation
already accounts for twenty percent of the total energy consumption, and
frequent traffic congestion exacerbates the problem. China’s emissions of
carbon dioxide climbed approximately nine percent in 2007 to more than 6.2
billion metric tons based on projected fuel consumption figures, after jump-
ing roughly the same amount in 2006 and ten percent in 2005.19
At the Bangkok meeting, China was seen by some participants as the
“biggest obstacle” in approving the new IPCC report that outlined a specific
strategy to charge polluters for their emissions.20 The report suggested that
stabilizing greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere would require charg-
ing polluters up to U.S. $100 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2030.
Although the IPCC reports are not binding agreements, they have become
quite powerful in forging international consensus on climate change. During
the Bangkok talks, China called for removing a statement that developing
countries were responsible for half of the current emissions. The statement
was ultimately deleted. China sought more than ten amendments to the draft
summary of the IPCC report, saying it would cost more and be much harder
to reduce GHG emissions than the report indicated. But the voices of dismay
over China’s tactics were largely silenced after it agreed to the final report,
which emphasized that the world already had the money and technology to
fend off the worst impacts of climate change.21 Beijing-based Greenpeace cli-
mate and energy campaigner Li Yan, who attended the Bangkok conference
as an observer, said China had appeared to be interested in political issues at
the start of the week rather than dealing with the problem, but later became
more open, more constructive, and more helpful.22
Besides growing GHG emissions, many other worsening environmental
problems in China have drawn international attention and threatened the
236 Chapter Twelve

country’s image and soft power. Environmental degradation is now so severe

in China, with such stark domestic and international repercussions, that it
poses not only a major burden on the Chinese people but also an acute chal-
lenge to the country’s soft power in the long run.

China’s Actions to Salvage its Reputation

China has long been fending off an international accord that could force it to
cut emissions and scale back its economy. Beijing’s fears of being targeted
on climate change were heightened by the statement in April 2007 by an offi-
cial of the International Energy Agency (IEA) that China could soon become
the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases.23 The Netherlands Environ-
mental Assessment Agency (MNP) even announced that China’s 2006 CO2
emissions have already surpassed those of the United States by eight percent.
In 2006, global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use increased by about 2.6
percent, which is less than the 3.3 percent increase in 2005. The 2.6 percent
increase was mainly due to a 4.5 percent increase in global coal consumption,
of which China contributed more than two-thirds. With this, China topped the
list of CO2 emitting countries for the first time. In 2005, CO2 emissions from
China were still two percent below those of the United States.24
The growing international pressure on China to protect its environment has
made it pay more attention to bilateral and multilateral cooperation on green
issues. China plans to join more international environmental agreements to im-
prove its image on ecological protection and enhance its soft power, which may
help it better position itself in the forthcoming global climate negotiations.
Multilaterally, China is more willing to accept international agreements
that call for voluntary actions rather than those with mandatory emission
targets. The former will help China to enhance soft power while not harm-
ing its hard power (economic growth). In the recent Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Sydney in September 2007, both China and
the United States accepted a program with non-binding goals on energy ef-
ficiency and reforestation. According to the program, APEC members will re-
duce “energy intensity”—the amount of energy needed to produce a dollar of
gross domestic product—by twenty-five percent by 2030. They also pledged
to increase forest cover in the region by at least 20 million hectares (50 mil-
lion acres) by 2020 (APEC, 2007), and establish an Asia-Pacific Network
for Energy Technology and Forest Management. This declaration, which
does not have any compulsory targets, was criticized by some environmental
activists and green NGOs for having no real restrictive effect upon sovereign
states’ GHG emissions.
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 237

In 2005, China joined a collective action with Australia, India, Japan,

South Korea, and the United States to establish the Asia-Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate (AP6), which also emphasized energy
conservation and technology cooperation instead of setting mandatory emis-
sion cuts. The six founding partners have agreed to work together and with
private sector partners to meet goals for energy security, national air pollution
reduction, and climate change in ways that promote sustainable economic
growth and poverty reduction. The AP6 will focus on expanding investment
and trade in cleaner energy technologies, goods, and services in key market
sectors. It has approved eight public-private sector task forces covering alu-
minum, buildings and appliances, cement, cleaner use of fossil energy, coal
mining, power generation and transmission, renewable energy, distributed
generation, and steel.
Once again, China’s ability to use its soft power in setting the agenda in in-
ternational negotiations was manifested. China’s long-time attention to tech-
nology transfer and sustainable economic growth was reinforced in the AP6
framework. In addition, many of the eight task forces chosen—aluminum,
cement, coal mining, power generation, renewable energy and steel—are also
major Chinese industries.
The six partner countries of the AP6 represent about half of the world’s
economy, population and energy use, and produce about sixty-five percent of
the world’s coal, forty-eight percent of the world’s steel, thirty-seven percent
of world’s aluminum, and sixty-one percent of the world’s cement.25 The
United States and Australia, two of its members, have not ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate is
therefore a mechanism for cooperation outside the UNFCCC and Kyoto Pro-
tocol. The AP6 is regarded by some observers as a ploy used by these large
emitters to fend off international pressure and avoid mandatory emission cut-
ting obligations. The establishment of the AP6 showed that these big powers,
including the United States and China, have realized that their international
image and soft power might be greatly damaged if they are inactive in the
international actions against climate change. The six founding countries
warmly welcomed Canada as an official partner in October 2007, during the
second AP6 ministerial meeting in New Delhi, India.
In the bilateral context, China pays more attention to its own interests,
namely by seeking aid and technological transfer.26 In the 1990s, Japan’s
generous environmental assistance to China, including low interest loans
for environmental projects and aid to the establishment of the China-Japan
Friendship Environmental Protection Center, increased the level of trust be-
tween China and Japan.27
238 Chapter Twelve

During Singaporean Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong’s meeting with

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Beijing in April 2007, Goh proposed jointly
developing an “Eco-City” in China. This coincided with Wen’s demand
for much tougher action domestically to deal with the country’s grave en-
vironmental problems, and so won Beijing’s interest and endorsement in
principle. During Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi’s visit to Singapore in July
2007, the Eco-City plan was again emphasized during the bilateral talks and
it will hopefully serve as an iconic project for sustainable development that
the Chinese leadership is very eager to develop. During Wen’s visit to Sin-
gapore in November 2007, the two countries signed an agreement to locate
the Eco-City Project in Tianjin’s Binhai New Area. This scheme will surely
promote China’s international environmental image, a long-term goal of its
diplomacy.
By joining all these multilateral and bilateral green programs, China wishes
to lessen international pressure for further emission cut and to improve its im-
age. For this reason, China, for the first time, publicized a lengthy national
program in response to global warming on June 4, 2007. The “National
Climate Change Program,” which took the Chinese government two years to
formulate, documents the efforts China has made in tackling climate change,
analyzes its future challenges, and describes China’s policies and positions
on international cooperation. Climate change “is an issue involving both
environment and development, but it is ultimately an issue of development,”
the national program said in its first paragraph. This indicates that China will
continue to put economic growth ahead of climate change without commit-
ting itself to quantified emission cuts.
However, this does not mean that China’s original stance on climate
change remains unchanged. Compared with its previous suspicion about
the certainty of the global warming trend, the national program uses much
stronger language to confirm the trend and describes serious consequences
of climate change. In the document, China admits that “annual average air
temperature has increased by 0.5 to 0.8 °C during the past 100 years, which
was slightly larger than the average global temperature rise.” China also now
admits that it is facing a potentially devastating impact from climate change,
which has become a social and economic problem in the country. The pre-
dicted increase in droughts will lead to reductions in agricultural output,
while the acceleration of glacial melting on the northwestern Qinghai-Tibet
plateau will reduce the water supply to the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers, the
two largest in China. China’s rising sea level, triggered by global warming,
is faster than the global average, and this will threaten China’s coastal cities,
the nation’s economic powerhouses.
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 239

The Chinese government has now come to realize that if the worsening
environmental problems are not properly addressed, the consequences may
be so disastrous as to cancel all benefits from economic development. The
government has been especially sensitive to heightened public complaints
about the pollution. The number of protests caused by environmental pollu-
tion in China has been growing at an annual rate of thirty percent, according
to Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan.28
Through publicizing the national program, China wants the international
community to know that the Chinese government pays intensive attention
to environmental issues. China established the National Leading Group to
Address Climate Change in 2007, with Premier Wen Jiabao as the director.
China’s Foreign Ministry in 2007 also set up a special office to address the
climate change issue, with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi as the head. How-
ever, unique national conditions, such its coal-dominated energy infrastruc-
ture, still prevent the country from accepting mandatory emission cuts.
Despite its refusal to shoulder its share of emission reductions, China’s
national program is putting forward some voluntary targets in energy con-
servation and fuel use that can be converted to a certain amount of emission
cutting (see table 12.1). The plan reiterates the goal in China’s eleventh Five-
Year Program that the country will achieve the target of about twenty percent
reduction of energy consumption per unit GDP by 2010. China also said it
wants sixteen percent of its energy mix to come from renewable energy by
2020. However, in 2006, China cut energy use per unit of GDP by only 1.23
percent, well below the target for that year of four percent.

Table 12.1. Estimated Emission Reductions From Energy Saving Measures by 2010
Emission Reduction Means Estimated Emission Cutting
(in millions of tons of CO2 equivalent )
Developing hydropower stations, especially
in western areas 500
Developing nuclear power stations 50
Upgrading technology in thermal power
generation 110
Developing coal-bed methane, coal-mine
methane industry 200
Developing bio-energy 30
Developing wind, solar, geothermal and
tidal energy 60

Source: China’s National Climate Change Programme (2007)

240 Chapter Twelve

The release of the national program came at a calculated time so as to fend

off international pressure. On the same day the program was made public, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that President Hu Jintao was expected
to discuss China’s views and policies on global climate change during his
meeting with the G-8 leaders in Germany.

Imbalanced Carbon Trade Income

Distribution Poses Threat to China’s Soft Power
Another source of international pressure and discontent comes from the im-
balanced regional distribution in global carbon trade income. China, India,
and other developing countries’ persistent diplomatic efforts have helped to
shape the current climate regime under the Kyoto Protocol framework into a
kind of “Robin Hood” scenario, in which billions of dollars from rich coun-
tries are transferring to poor countries to curb the emission of global warming
gases.
According to the Clean Development Mechanism, a market-based flexible
mechanism introduced by the Kyoto Protocol, affluent regions like Europe,
Japan, and Canada that have difficulties meeting even the minimum require-
ment set by the protocol, can invest in overseas environmental projects in
developing countries and then buy the certified emission reductions (CERs)
to offset their obligations. China is the biggest beneficiary, receiving three-
fifths of the money from international carbon trade in 2006.29 According to
the World Bank, China captured U.S. $3 billion of the U.S. $4.8 billion in
subsidies last year for dozens of CDM projects. Of course, China is no lon-
ger so poor, with U.S. $1.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. However, it
only accounted for less than two-fifths of the developing world’s fossil fuel
consumption, the major source of greenhouse gases.30
Together with China, several other large developing countries, including
India, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, are claiming the bulk of the CDM bo-
nanza. The possible price rise of carbon credits will probably make China’s
business more lucrative. The supply of credits will be 300 million metric
tons short of demand when the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012.31 Increased
demand has raised the price of the credits by more than seventy percent from
February to May 2007: Japan paid as much as $16 per ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent, compared with an average price of $10 last year.32
Most other developing countries, including many very poor ones that are
extremely vulnerable to global warming, have been largely left out of the
CDM pie. In 2006, all of Africa only received less than U.S. $150 million
from selling carbon credits, or three percent of the global total.33 The imbal-
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 241

anced regional distribution in carbon trade income as well as China’s surging

energy consumption and emissions have led to international dissatisfaction
about the current climate change regime dominated by the Kyoto Protocol.
If the imbalance cannot be changed, China’s image and soft power concern-
ing the climate change issue will be damaged even among many developing
countries that used to support China’s climate stances in the international
arena.

CONCLUSION: THE INTERPLAY OF HARD AND SOFT POWER

From this study, we can see that a sovereign state sometimes has to sacrifice
some material interests (in this case, economic growth and benefits) to gain
soft power (international image related to green issues). According to the
IPCC estimation, in 2050, the macroeconomic costs for stabilization between
710 and 445 ppm CO2 equivalent are between a one percent gain and a 5.5
percent decrease of global GDP. 34
The United States, fearing that emission cutting obligations would hamper
its economic growth, refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus witnessed
its soft power and international reputation greatly damaged. China actually
gained both its hard power (via huge economic gains from CDM projects)
and soft power through joining the first international cooperation against
climate change, but it seems very likely that China now has to make a choice
between the two in the next round of international talks. China once gained
soft power among African countries by giving them huge material donations
during the Cold War, and now it may need to transfer part of the material
interest gained in the emission trading to African countries to gain soft power
in the combat against climate change.
The next round of international talks kicked off in Indonesia’s Bali Island
at the end of 2007 to formulate a new pact replacing the Kyoto Protocol, and
the international onus as been on China to accept compulsory emission cuts.
Environmental activists hope that this time, the United States, the current
world’s number one greenhouse gas emitter, plus China and India, will all be
included in the new treaty with fixed emission quotas or even carbon taxes.
China is in a dilemma. On one hand, it frets about damage to its reputation
due to its environmental problems and hopes to utilize international coopera-
tion to solve them; on the other hand, it fears that emission abatement obliga-
tions may block its fast economic growth. China’s total GDP is still less than
one-fourth the size of the United States, but its total emissions have ballooned
because of an investment splurge on steel, cement, and aluminum production,
242 Chapter Twelve

all hugely energy-intensive industries, plus reliance on coal to produce power.

From China’s perspective, the international effort against climate change is a
two-edged sword: it can both transfer funds and technology to China or put
economic shackles on it if disadvantageous regulations are passed.
Chinese experts argue that if China accepts emission quotas just like those
placed upon industrialized nations in the Kyoto Protocol, it will eventually
pay much more than it currently gains from CDM projects. The carbon tax,
if adopted in the next protocol, is expected to cost Chinese industry billions
of dollars or more if China’s economy and emissions continue to grow at the
current rates.
Whether China can gain more soft power through all these proactive mea-
sures to mitigate climate change is yet to be seen. Some countries and inter-
national environmental organizations have expressed their disappointment in
the goals agreed upon at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, claiming that
all the targets are still only voluntary. China will definitely face greater chal-
lenges to its policy in the coming climate talks. China’s economic strength
has grown so rapidly in the past decade that it has to shoulder a greater inter-
national responsibility. Otherwise, its soft power will probably be damaged
if it continues on its present course.

NOTES

1. Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?”

Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 82.
2. Keohane, “International Institutions,” 84.
3. Keohane, “International Institutions,” 86.
4. Keohane, “International Institutions,” 86.
5. United Nations, Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Article
2.
6. Yuka Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,”
in Global Warming and East Asia: The Domestic and International Politics of Cli-
mate Change, ed. Paul G. Harris (London: Routledge, 2003), 88.
7. Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations,” in Negotiat-
ing Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving Mintzer and
J.A. Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 133.
8. Michael Hatch, “Chinese Politics, Energy Policy, and the International Cli-
mate Change Negotiations,” in Global Warming and East Asia: The Domestic and
International Politics of Climate Change, ed. Paul G. Harris (London: Routledge,
2003), 50.
9. Hatch, “Chinese Politics,” 52.
10. Hatch, “Chinese Politics,” 51.
11. Hatch, “Chinese Politics,” 51.
 China’s Climate Diplomacy and Its Soft Power 243

12. “Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 88.

13. “Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 91.
14. “Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 91.
15. “Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 91.
16. United Nations, Framework Convention, Article 4.
17. Zhang Zhihong, “The Forces behind China’s Climate Change Policy,” in
Global Warming and East Asia: The Domestic and International Politics of Climate
Change, ed. Paul G. Harris (London: Routledge, 2003), 78.
18. Karl Malakunas, “Question Marks over China’s Climate Commitment,” AFP
News, May 6, 2007.
19. Rhett A. Butler, “China May Top U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in 2007,”
Mongabay.com, March 23, 2007, news.mongabay.com/2007/0323-china.html, (ac-
cessed January 11, 2009).
20. Alan Zarembo, “China Seen as a Roadblock to U.N. Climate Report,” Los
Angeles Times, May 3, 2007.
21. Malakunas, “Question Marks.”
22. Malakunas, “Question Marks.”
23. Richard McGregor, “China More Assertive in Climate Talks,” Financial
Times, May 4, 2007.
24. “China Now No. 1 in CO2 Emissions; USA in Second Position,” Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency 2007, www.mnp.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/
moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition.html (accessed Janu-
ary 11, 2009).
25. David Mulford, “Address Climate Change in Real Terms, Not by Sacrificing
Growth,” Embassy of the United States: New Delhi, India 2007, newdelhi.usembassy
.gov/pr061107.html (accessed January 11, 2009).
26. Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 98.
27. Kobayashi, “Navigating Between ‘Luxury’ and ‘Survival’ Emissions,” 101.
28. Yao Yi, “Protests Caused by Pollution Grow at Annual Rate of 30 percent,”
Fa Zhi Wan Bao, May 13, 2007, 3.
29. Keith Bradsher, “China Knows Which Way Wind Blows: Country Gets Larg-
est Share of UN Credits to Curb Emissions,” International Herald Tribune, May 10,
2007. 1–4.
30. Bradsher, “China Knows Which Way Wind Blows,” 1.
31. Dinakar Sethuraman, “Carbon-Credit Sales May Double This Year,” Bloom-
berg News, May 27, 2007.
32. Sethuraman, “Carbon-Credit Sales.”
33. Bradsher, “China Knows Which Way Wind Blows.”
34. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 4th Assessment Report, (2007),
22.
 Part IV

CONCLUSION
 Chapter Thirteen

The Prospect of China’s

Soft Power: How sustainable?
Suisheng Zhao

As China’s status rises on the global stage, its soft power has increasingly
become a subject of scholarly scrutiny in recent years. While most analysts
agree that China is not in a position to employ its military might against
Washington, they are not quite sure about China’s soft power challenge to
the United States. One book among the growing body of works on China’s
increasing soft power is titled Charm Offensive and has the alarmist subtitle
How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. China is portrayed as
extremely skillful and effective in the fields of public diplomacy and the
global battle for hearts and minds—effective enough to seriously challenge
the United States in selected regions of the world as American soft power is
waning in the aftermath of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, among other
factors.1 Indeed, China has moved quickly and made self-conscious efforts
to mobilize its soft power resources to promote its interests and cultivate its
influence as a rising power.
The future growth of China’s soft power, however, is seriously restrained
by the fact that pragmatic political values behind China’s rapid economic
growth are attractive mostly to authoritarian elites. In addition, China’s view
of a world order derived from either the old Sinocentric hierarchy or the
realist tradition with an emphasis on absolute national sovereignty is hardly
compatible with evolving transnational norms. In spite of its initial success,
China’s current approach to soft power lacks a contemporary moral appeal
and therefore is hardly sustainable in the competition with the United States
to inspire the vision of building a free and prosperous world.

247
248 Chapter Thirteen

CHINA’S SOFT POWER POTENTIAL

Soft power is one indispensable component of national power and tangible

military and economic power alone is no longer sufficient for a nation to
project its might in international affairs. With the diminishing possibility of
major wars in the post-imperial era, competition in soft power has become
more and more important in international relations. National governments
need to use intangible soft power along with hard power to gain influence in
the global stage. As Nye suggests, “in a global information age, soft sources
of power such as culture, political values, and diplomacy are part of what
makes a great power. Success depends not only on whose army wins, but also
on whose story wins.”2 While Nye has urged the U.S. government to use soft
power to complement its hard power, especially in the wake of the September
11 attacks, the Bush administration ignored his advice and relied mostly on
U.S. military might in its war on terrorism. As a result, the U.S. international
image has suffered in recent years.

Beijing Embraces Soft Power

In contrast to the U.S. approach, “the concept of soft-power advocacy has
made a strong impression in China.”3 Chinese leaders have moved quickly
to grasp the distinction between hard power and soft power and begun to
make efforts to increase China’s soft power while building its hard power to
enhance China’s global influence. One scholar surveyed a Chinese academic
journal database and revealed that the phrase “soft power” first appeared
around 1997 and has become a popular phrase since 2001.4 China has readily
embraced the concept of soft power not only because it is compatible with
many aspects of Chinese traditional and strategic thinking but more impor-
tantly because the concept offers a ready solution to ease the anxieties around
the world about China’s rise.
In its strategy of “peaceful development,” China has already emphasized
building comprehensive national power, which includes soft as well as hard
power. Together with the development of its coercive power, it is not dif-
ficult for China to become sensitive to mobilizing its soft power resources,
which would be less alarming and thus more acceptable to other countries in
the world. The timing cannot be better for Beijing to mobilize its soft power
resources because China has achieved robust economic growth in recent
decades and has not involved itself in any major war. In the meantime, the
United States’ Iraq misadventure has tarnished the international image of the
world’s sole superpower and the Bush administration’s unilateralism has led
to the decline of U.S. moral leadership in the world.
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 249

As a result, whereas the United States has been busy reacting to interna-
tional crises and terrorism, the Chinese government has taken active steps
to enhance its soft power influence in many parts of the world. One study
of China’s soft power by two Western scholars reveals that (1) China has
been trying to promote its traditional culture as a world culture; (2) China’s
successful economic development model has been sold to many countries as
a preferable choice for their own modernization drives; and (3) China has
sought to play a more active and responsible role in international affairs.5 One
People’s Daily report confirms this observation, claiming that Chinese cul-
ture is quite attractive to foreigners and China’s tradition of treasuring peace
is widely appreciated. China has attempted to put forward the idea of taking
a peaceful development road and building a harmonious society. These ideas
are very inspiring to the international community and help resolve doubts and
fears about China’s rapid development.6
Chinese leaders clearly see the effectiveness of culture as a soft power
resource. A China Daily report states that “China hopes to dissolve the mis-
conception of its development as the ‘China threat’ by making its traditional
value systems known to the world.”7 Mobilizing cultural resources, Beijing
has established Confucius Institutes all over the world to promote the Chinese
language, culture, and business environment. More than one hundred of these
institutes have already been established around the world, in such places as
Thailand, Japan, Australia, Sweden, and the United States. One Asian Times
report suggests that the choice of the name is instructive, since for years the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) asserted that Confucianism had held back
China’s development. In recent years, however, Confucianism has undergone
a kind of political resurrection in China and now has a non-threatening con-
notation.8
Meanwhile, the country has been working to present its culture to the world
by staging heritage exhibitions and art performances abroad. Wan Yiping,
president of the Sino-American Education Consortium, claims that “these
endeavors illustrate our aspiration to present a true peace-loving China to
the world.”9 In addition, the Chinese government has made great efforts to
increase the enrollment of foreign students and the number of foreign tourists
in China. A Chinese government scholarship has been established to fund
foreign students to enroll in Chinese universities for year-long studies.
Promoting China’s traditional culture abroad, Chinese leaders have pleas-
antly discovered that as the United States fails to sell its liberal model of de-
velopment to Third World countries, China’s rapid economic growth makes
it an alternative model of development for many developing countries by
default. A Chinese analyst cites the Chinese-African summit that gathered
more than forty African heads of states in Beijing in the Fall of 2006 as an
250 Chapter Thirteen

example and suggests that “many of the African leaders coming here for the
Chinese-African summit meeting are attracted not only by opportunities for
aid and trade, but also by the Chinese model of development.”10 According
to him, the paramount task for most developing countries is how to eradicate
poverty, a root cause of conflicts and various forms of extremism. What they
usually need is not a liberal democratic government, but a good government
capable of fighting poverty and delivering basic services and security. So
long as the American model remains unable to deliver the desired outcome, as
shown so clearly in failures from Haiti to the Philippines to Iraq, the Chinese
model will become more appealing to the world’s poor. He concludes that
in terms of eradicating poverty and helping the poor and the marginalized,
the Chinese model, however imperfect, has worked far more effectively than
what can be called the American model, as represented by the IMF-designed
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) for sub-Saharan Africa and the “shock
therapy” for Russia.11 To a certain extent, this Chinese analyst is correct. Even
Joseph Nye admits that although China remains authoritarian, the success of
its political economy in tripling gross domestic product over the past three
decades has made it attractive to many developing countries. In parts of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, the so-called “Beijing Consensus” of combining
authoritarian government with a market economy has become more popular
than the previously dominant “Washington Consensus” of market economy
and democratic government. China has reinforced this attraction by providing
developing countries with economic aid and access to its growing market.12
On the diplomatic front, China has proposed a value-free concept of a
“world of harmony”—the peaceful coexistence of diverse countries. The con-
cept has two major points: one is to respect and tolerate different ideologies
and social systems, and the second is to emphasize consultation among all
countries involved, not unilateralism driven by hegemonic ambitions (i.e., the
American strategy).13 The People’s Daily reported that President Hu Jintao
has paid friendly visits to many countries and put forward the idea of building
a harmonious world.14 A Western observer noticed that “China’s diplomats
and politicians are in charm-offensive mode wherever they speak and travel
to these days, reading from pre-written scripts that China is striving for the
establishment of a harmonious and peaceful international society.”15
In light of the concept of a world of harmony, China has advocated non-
intervention in the affairs of other countries and is careful not to make its
trade, investment, and other aspects of its foreign relations conditional on
how well its counterparts live up to political, environmental, or labor stan-
dards. China’s diplomacy has been particularly successful in the Asia-Pacific
region after it abandoned ideology as the policy guide and developed friendly
relations with neighboring countries regardless of their ideological tendencies
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 251

and political systems (buyi yishi xingtai he shehui zhidu lun qingsu).16 Lee
Kuan Yew, a state leader in Singapore, writes that “China has been courting
its neighbors, and although the Chinese did not coin the phrase ‘soft power,’
they have exercised it with consummate skill.”17 China has launched this
charm offensive in order to settle territorial disputes with its neighbors, take
a lead in setting up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and join a variety
of regional organizations. Nye commends that “this new diplomacy helps to
alleviate fears and reduces the likelihood of other countries allying to balance
a rising power.”18

SHORT-TERM SUCCESS, LONG-TERM UNCERTAINTY

Mobilizing its considerable soft power resources, China’s influence and im-
age has been enhanced on the global stage in recent years. In an interview,
Nye recognized China’s increasing attractiveness to other countries when he
said, “I think it is a wise policy for China to increase its soft power. China’s
successful economy makes it attractive, and Chinese traditional culture is
attractive. And China has pursued a series of policies which have been at-
tractive to other countries.” The fact that a lot of people are learning the
Chinese language around the world “helps to expand China’s soft power.”19
Polls taken by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and the BBC
show that the majority of people in most countries today consider China to
be a more positive influence and less of a threat to international peace than
the United States. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the developing
world.20 It is from this perspective that one Western observer suggested that
“the Iraq war isn’t over, but one thing’s already clear: China won. As the U.S.
model has become tarnished, China’s has gained new luster. As the United
States has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world, China
has been gaining both.”21
In spite of its initial success, China’s exercise of its soft power in the
current form is seriously flawed. One study lists an imbalance of resources,
legitimacy concerns of its diplomacy, and lack of a coherent agenda as three
major factors hindering its efforts to project its soft power effectively.22 An-
other study points to a blind spot in China’s exercise of soft power as “the
absence of Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the interna-
tional stage, which deprives China of a crucial soft power tool, hampers its
public diplomacy, weakens the credibility of the messages it seeks to send
out, and reduces the amount of feedback.”23 Still another study suggests two
major factors that have constrained Beijing’s ability to project its soft power.
One is the gap between an increasingly cosmopolitan and confident foreign
252 Chapter Thirteen

policy and a closed and rigid domestic political system. The other is the constant
tension between its multiple foreign policy objectives and the still nascent soft
power resources. This study concludes that “soft power remains Beijing’s under-
belly and China still has a long way to go to become a true global power.”24
While all these factors are important, the most important flaw is the lack
of contemporary moral appeals in relation to China’s pragmatic approach to
exercising soft power. In a comparison of Chinese discourse of soft power with
Nye’s discussion of American soft power, one scholar finds that “the Ameri-
can appeal to the world emphasizes the contemporary culture and the political
model whereas China’s attraction to the world focuses on traditional culture and
economic model.”25 The different emphases reflect the different approaches to
exercising soft power between China and the United States. China’s pragmatic
emphasis on its traditional culture and current economic growth may be a con-
venient way to achieve short-term success but it may be difficult to sustain in
the longer term and ultimately win the soft power competition with the United
States. The flaws of China’s soft power are best illustrated by China’s evolving
view of the world order and the pragmatism behind its development model.

THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER:

STUCK IN ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY

In response to “China fever” in the West in recent years, one Western scholar
raised a controversial question: Are Westerners ready to adjust to Chinese
civilization’s reemergence as one of the main sources of global order?26 He
could not give a definite answer to this question, but one may find some im-
portant clues by looking at the evolving Chinese view of the world order in
the context of China’s entry into the modern international system.
World order is used descriptively by scholars as “an aggregate conception
of dominant values, norms, and structures as well as of established patterns
of actors’ behavior that give shape and substance to international society at
any given time.”27 The modern international order began to acquire its present
shape and definition more than three centuries ago with the emergence of the
nation-state system in Europe.28 The principle of state sovereignty provided
the general framework from which specific state practices on war, peace,
commerce, and political competition evolved.29

Sinocentrism and the Traditional Chinese World Order

World order meant very different things to the Chinese prior to the coming of
the Western powers in the nineteenth century. A China-centered world order
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 253

existed in East Asia for thousands of years: the “Sinocentric hierarchy.”30 An

Asian empire with one of the longest continuous civilizations in the world,
China was a proud and strong continental power overshadowing other nations
in the region. Its bureaucratic organization was strong, use of its language had
spread, and Confucianism, along with other traditional philosophies, gained
prominence and influence. It had not only an advanced civilization but also a
self-sufficient agricultural economy. As a result, China held a different world
outlook from the West, maintaining ethnocentric foreign relations for centu-
ries. There were no concepts such as the nation-state and state sovereignty in
the traditional Chinese mindset. Imperial China considered other countries its
cultural inferiors; they were expected to appear in the Chinese capital, make
obeisance to the emperor, and present tribute. China’s relations with the sur-
rounding areas and with non-Chinese peoples generally were colored by the
concept of Sinocentrism and an assumption of Chinese superiority.
Such Sinocentrism and the Chinese world order were unusual and main-
tained for centuries by the strength of Chinese civilization and its military
force. Most of the societies in East Asia, especially in Northeast Asia, devel-
oped within Chinese cultural boundaries. They were strongly influenced by
the civilization of ancient China, including the Chinese ideographic writing
system, the Confucian classical teachings about family and social order,
the official examination system, and the imperial Chinese monarchy and
bureaucracy. The strength of Chinese civilization made China “zhongguo”
(the Middle Kingdom) and “the natural center of the East Asian world.”31
Under the Chinese world order, its relationship with its neighbors was similar
to the relationship between an overlord and a vassal. It was manifested in a
highly sophisticated tributary system that was, in effect, the only institution
for traditional “international” relations in the region before the intrusion of
Western powers.32
The process through which China was forcibly drawn into the European-
dominated international system began with the demise of Sinocentrism and
the Chinese world order. The collapse of Sinocentrism was also a process of

China’s struggle to resist aggressive European expansion, to adjust itself to the

changing international realities, to meet its problems without totally abandon-
ing its imperial tradition, and finally to accept slowly and gradually, though
sometimes reluctantly, some of the European standards, institutions, rules and
values.33

This process took several centuries. China’s defeat in the 1840 Opium War
was a heavy blow to the Chinese sense of superiority and led to the collapse
of Sinocentrism and the disintegration of the Chinese world order. In the sixty
years after its humiliating defeat, the Qing government was forced to sign
254 Chapter Thirteen

numerous treaties with foreign powers. This began a transition from the old
tributary system to a treaty system. The Chinese empire was forced to enter
into “the Eurocentric family of nations.”34 The new treaty system affirmed the
principle of diplomatic equality between China and its treaty partners, shat-
tering the fictive remnants of the ancient tributary system. The first decade of
the twentieth century was the end of transition from the Chinese world order
to a modern nation-state system. China no longer constituted a world unto
itself, but was part of the greater world, a unit in the anarchical international
system. After the long and sustained resistance of Sinocentrism, the Chinese
world order collapsed, giving way to an international order defined by West-
ern powers.

China: An Adamant Defender of National Sovereignty

Because China entered the modern international system of the nation-states
under the threat of imperialism to its territorial integrity, it has become a zeal-
ous defender of the concept of sovereign rights, an important underpinning
of the nation-state system. Embracing the Western concepts of legal equality
and territorial sovereignty, the Chinese political elite has moved to vigorously
defend Chinese national and territorial sovereignty against foreign invasion.
When China began to accept the idea of equality among nation-states and
struggled to defend its sovereignty, however, the non-Western world had
come under the domination of imperialist powers that did not treat weak
nations as equals. This was a social Darwinian world in the eyes of many
Chinese elites. The status of a nation-state was determined by its economic
and military strength. China was stagnant and weak and therefore had to fight
for a status equal to other nation-states. As a result, the collision between
traditional Sinocentrism and the modern nation-state system, as well as the
crushing defeats that China suffered in a series of military confrontations with
the West, was accompanied by the rise of the modern Chinese nation-state.
The wars, unequal treaties, humiliations, and material and territorial losses
suffered by the Chinese people during a century of contact with foreign im-
perialist powers were continuous sources of inspiration to the Chinese zeal of
defending its national sovereignty.
Emphasis on territorial sovereignty thus characterized much of China’s
thinking about international relations in the twentieth century. This zeal has
continued into the twenty-first century when many of the originators of that
system had begun to move away from strong views on state sovereignty.
China’s effort to establish diplomatic relations with other countries of the
world on a reciprocal basis, and to participate in the UN and other world or-
ganizations with the condition of non-interference in domestic affairs, speaks
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 255

to an insistence on the absolute sovereignty of the nation-state. China’s po-

litical leaders all share a deep commitment to overcome humiliation, secure
redress of past grievances, and achieve a position of equality with all other
major powers. That is why a persistent theme of Chinese foreign policy has
been to win back the territories lost during the country’s time of internal dis-
integration and external humiliation in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
China’s rise in the twenty-first century has not fundamentally changed this
sovereignty-centered perspective on international relations.
The principle of non-interference in internal affairs has for decades been at
the core of China’s foreign policy. Foreign criticism of China’s human rights
violations is rejected as unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of a
sovereign state. In the meantime, China has been building friendly relations
across the globe with various nations, including those shunned by the United
States and other democracies—nations like Venezuela, Iran, Sudan, Burma,
Cuba, and Zimbabwe—because of their records of internal human rights vio-
lation and other bad governance issues. Beijing’s practice is hardly compa-
rable with the evolving norms of a twenty-first century international, global-
ized system and has been seriously criticized. As a New York Times editorial
commented, “human rights violations cannot be relegated to untouchable
internal affairs. Just as the world has not hesitated, rightly, to lambaste the
United States over issues like Guantánamo Bay, it should not be shy about
systematic and widespread violations of human rights in China.”35
China’s realist view of nation-state sovereignty, in this case, has often been
a liability in its diplomacy and is subject to modification. For example, be-
cause of its close relationship with the Sudanese government, which has been
accused of committing genocide in Darfur, China has been under heavy inter-
national pressure in recent years. The U.S. Congress, Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, and others even labeled the 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympics the “genocide games.” Initially, Beijing reacted with fury to the
criticism and “interference” in its affairs, but then it reconsidered its strategy
of seeing no evil in Darfur and caved in as the “genocide games” label threat-
ened to have a lasting impact on its ability to stage the “best Olympic Games
ever.” In May 2007 Beijing announced that it was dispatching a 275-strong
team of military engineers to Sudan to join a UN peacekeeping mission set to
begin operating in Dafur within the year.36 Beijing’s concern about possible
embarrassment at the 2008 Olympics is certainly an important factor that led
to the change in Beijing’s attitudes toward Darfur. Nevertheless, one analysis
found that the Darfur crisis coincided with “a fundamental reassessment” of
China’s entire approach to foreign policy in “addressing such transnational
concerns as terrorism, trafficking in arms, drugs and humans, health pandem-
ics and climate change.37
256 Chapter Thirteen

These are significant changes. But China needs to do far more to make a
thorough transition in its foreign policy. If China cannot complete this transi-
tion, the West, on the rise since the fifteenth century and still dominant, will
have difficulty accepting the Chinese view of the world order becoming a
dominant position. In this case, China will risk a dangerous clash of civiliza-
tions with the Western world. This flaw certainly sets a limit to the attractive-
ness of China’s soft power in the twenty-first century.

THE BEIJING CONSENSUS

VERSUS THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS

The “Beijing consensus” is used to describe the model of development that

has allowed China to achieve a high level of economic growth without fun-
damental change in one-party communist rule. In contrast, the “Washington’s
consensus” demands a free market system going hand in hand with liberal
democratic reform.38 Indeed, China’s economic achievements under the lead-
ership of the Communist Party has stood out as one eye-catching exception to
the general pattern of modernization in the West and has provided an example
for some developing countries to follow. The Chinese model, however, has a
clear fault line; that is, it lacks moral appeals because it is guided entirely by
pragmatism, which, by definition, is behavior disciplined by neither a set of
values nor established principles.
To a great extent, China’s economic development path is a modified ver-
sion of the East Asian model that emerged in several East Asian newly in-
dustrialized economies (NIEs) such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. Industrialization took place in these
NIEs when neo-classical economic policy and political authoritarianism coin-
cided with historical opportunities for export-led development. In a modified
way, the Beijing Consensus has displayed the following three features.39
First, it has been an economic reform and modernization process driven
not by any ideological doctrine or principles but economic success-oriented
pragmatism. This was vividly expressed in Deng Xiaoping’s cat theory: “a
cat, whether it is white or black, is a good one as long as it is able to catch
mice.” Taking a pragmatic and experimental approach, the reform has been
piecemeal and gradual. Potential reform programs are adopted and imple-
mented in selected sectors and regions in order to judge their effectiveness
and feasibility. Those that succeed can then be adopted on a wider basis,
while those that fail can be abandoned or modified. The Chinese leadership
has taken on easier and less controversial reforms first with the hope that the
success of the initial reforms would create enough political momentum and
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 257

support to permit the adoption of more complicated and less popular mea-
sures later on. Consequently, China’s reform-oriented leadership has rejected
“shock therapy” and has worked through existing institutions while gradually
reforming and reorienting them to serve their modernization goals.
Second, China’s economic development has been led by a strong, pro-
development state that is capable of shaping national consensus on modern-
ization and ensuring overall political and macroeconomic stability to pursue
wide-ranging domestic reforms. The developmental state has emphasized
economic growth rather than civil and political rights as an overarching
national goal. A certain degree of political stability has been maintained
under authoritarian rule as a pre-condition for economic development. As a
result, rapid economic growth has occurred under authoritarian Communist
Party rule.
Third, China’s modernization process has involved “selective learning”
from the neo-liberal American model, especially its emphasis on the role of
the market, entrepreneurship, globalization, and international trade. What
makes the Chinese model unique is that the communist regime has safe-
guarded its own policy space as to when, where, and how to adopt foreign
ideas. In particular, the Chinese state has adopted most of the basic macroeco-
nomic principles of the Washington Consensus for the domestic economy but
rejected or modified the neo-liberal aspects that would greatly reduce the role
of the state through rapid privatization and democratization. While the state
gradually opened the domestic economy to international competition, it has
offered some protection to key sectors and some support to infant industries.
The state has also been more active in reducing poverty and in ensuring mini-
mal material standards to compete in a more competitive global economy.
Essentially being a pragmatic approach to economic development and
political stability, the Beijing Consensus has gained ground mostly among
leaders of authoritarian countries and repressive regimes. These authoritarian
elites increasingly look to Beijing largely due to the following three develop-
ments over the past decade.
The first is China’s economic success under the one-party rule. Making
economic growth the country’s top priority, pragmatic Chinese leaders have
demanded that economic success depends on political stability, which can be
maintained only by the authoritarian rule of the CCP. In pursuing these policy
objectives, China has created the world’s fastest-growing economy in recent
decades. An OECD country survey praised that

the pace of economic change in China has been extremely rapid since the start
of economic reforms just over twenty-five years ago. Economic growth has
averaged 9.5 percent over the past two decades and seems likely to continue at
258 Chapter Thirteen

that pace for some time. Such an increase in output represents one of the most
sustained and rapid economic transformations seen in the world economy in the
past fifty years.40

China’s astonishing economic success is presented as evidence that the Bei-

jing Consensus is a fast track to economic growth without the visible social
and political disorder that often comes as a by-product of democratization.
As one observer writes,

Today’s China demonstrates that a regime can suppress organized opposition

and need not establish its legitimacy through elections. It shows that a rul-
ing party can maintain considerable control over information and the Internet
without slowing economic growth. And it indicates that a nation’s elite can be
bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money, and ad-
vances in personal, non-political freedoms (clothes, entertainment, sex, travel
abroad).41

The second development is the declining attractiveness of the Washington

Consensus due to the United States’ economic, political and foreign policy
failures. Economically, the globalization process has become less favorable
to the U.S. economy. As one study puts it, “the country is now so deeply
in debt to China and other export economies that its very solvency is put in
question. That is hardly an economic model to offer as the shining example
of global development.”42 The American model is largely ideology-driven
to spread democratization, and so treats sub-Saharan Africa and other less-
developed countries as immature societies in which Western institutions will
automatically take root. It imposed liberalization before safety nets were
set up, privatization before regulatory frameworks were put in place, and
democratization before a culture of political tolerance and rule of law was
established. The end result has often been discouraging or even devastating.43
It is not incidental that

in Latin America, it produced more than one ‘lost decade,’ on the Pacific Rim it
effectively turned a recession (Asian Crash of 1997) into a veritable Great De-
pression, and in Russia it propelled the best-connected apparatchiks into global
capitalist ranks even as it pushed ordinary Russians into penury.44

The failure of U.S. foreign policy, symbolized by the war in Iraq, further
damaged the Washington Consensus. As one observer points out, U.S. for-
eign policy has been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes mili-
tary power and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. This has
not only failed but also undermined support for democracy. U.S. attempts to
export free markets and political liberty by force have been unable to bring
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 259

even security, much less prosperity, to Iraq. And they’ve eroded the appeal
and clout of the United States worldwide.45 It is from this perspective that
Joshua Cooper Ramo argued that developing nations were increasingly fed up
with the doctrinaire of Washington Consensus and increasingly impressed by
a Chinese model that emphasized pragmatism, innovation, social cohesion,
and self-determination. It is not difficult for them to discover that only three
decades ago, China was as poor as some of the poorest third-world countries.
While many of these countries remain poor, China’s economy has expanded
rapidly. Given the many problems confronting developing countries, China
seems to offer a new model on how to fight poverty and ensure good gover-
nance, albeit one that challenges the conventional wisdom being exported by
Western countries and the international financial institutions they control.
The third development is China’s so-called “value-free” diplomacy toward
many developing countries. Unlike Western diplomacy that sets moral prin-
ciples such as good governance, democracy, transparency, rule of law, and
respect for human rights as foreign policy objectives, China’s diplomacy is
not guided by any moral principles. Pursuing economic or strategic inter-
ests, China has developed friendly relations with many developing countries
without the preconditions that have often been demanded by the Western
democracies. For example, in its global search for energy resources, China
has pursued deals with countries that are off-limits to Western companies
because of sanctions and the threat of bad publicity. Beijing has justified
this policy on the grounds that China is applying the so-called principle of
non-interference; i.e., a strategy of not bothering authoritarian regimes with
Western-style criticism of human-rights violations and political oppression
in countries where business can be conducted. As one study of China’s
projection of soft power among third-world countries indicates, “Offering
no-strings-attached financial aid and economic assistance to Africa and to
Southeast, South, and Central Asia has become a central part of China’s for-
eign and trade policies.” Examples of this “value-free” diplomacy including
awarding Zimbabwe’s dictator Robert Mugabe an honorary professorship at
the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2005, and signing eco-
nomic cooperation agreements with Uzbekistan a few days after the country’s
Interior Ministry fired into a crowd of peaceful demonstrators in May 2005.46
Given China’s rising power status, political leaders in these countries may
readily use Beijing as a hedge against American power. As a result, many
authoritarian leaders in third-world countries have welcomed the Chinese
development model together with its value-free diplomacy as an alternative
to the European and U. S. versions of both.
It is against this background that political leaders in developing coun-
tries seeking to combine authoritarian rule with an economic miracle have
260 Chapter Thirteen

increasingly taken the Beijing Consensus as a successful model of develop-

ment and international relations. Their attraction to the Beijing model has
come almost entirely due to its tangible economic and political aspects rather
than its intangible moral appeals. As the idea of a Beijing consensus gained
ground, however, Joshua Cooper Ramo returned to the fray with dissonant
data. In a pamphlet called Brand China, he takes a much less optimistic view
of China’s image. Using global opinion research conducted by Young and
Rubicam, Ramo concludes that China’s brand is weak and that the country is
not trusted overseas.47 Citing Ramo’s changing view, one Western observer
believes that even the more vaunted examples of Chinese soft power can
easily be turned on their heads. The Chinese may get on famously with the
governments of Sudan and Zimbabwe, but such relationships are only likely
to confirm the damaging impression that China is a country that will always
put profits above human rights and other moral principles. Seen in this light,
“China’s growing influence in Africa and even Southeast Asia has little to do
with a new Beijing Consensus; it is simply old-fashioned power politics.”48
Joseph Nye, the original theorist of soft power, also argues that while the
“Beijing Consensus” is attractive in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian
developing countries, it undercuts China’s soft power in the West because
China suffers from corruption, inequality, and a lack of democracy, human
rights and the rule of law.”49 In this case, the United States is better placed to
polish up its image than China since it is much easier to change a country’s
policies than to change its political system.
In addition to its authoritarian nature, the Beijing Consensus has not been
effective in dealing with many important dimensions of human development
at home and abroad. As one observer writes, “Chinese economic growth,
while undeniably impressive, is widely associated in the West with pollution,
cheap labor and a threat to jobs.”50 A New York Times editorial comments
that although the “Chinese miracle” has been the biggest economic story for
several years now, a tale of a nation rising from the ashes of a Stalinist com-
mand economy to become the world’s premier trading partner, China reminds
us with distressing regularity that the progress has been selective. It cites the
recent reports of slave labor in Chinese factories and the discovery that some
of the popular Thomas the Tank Engine toys manufactured in China contain
lead in their paint. It also points to the earlier reports about the contaminated
dog food, the stubborn support of Sudan for its oil, the regular reports of hu-
man rights abuses, the huge economic disparities between city and country,
and the controls on the media. According to this editorial, China’s unre-
formed political system fosters corruption and an undue focus on short-term
economic gains, which will lead to more internal inequities and injustices and
more tainted exports.51
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 261

From a historical perspective, the current Beijing Consensus is only a

transitional model of development. It may go from a “value-free” to a “value-
added” model involving the sequencing of economic growth, legal reforms,
democratization, and constitutionalism, with different aspects of develop-
ment being emphasized at different times. This has been demonstrated by
the evolution of several East Asian NIEs. After achieving high levels of
economic growth, these NIEs have eventually implemented the rule of law
and eventually democratize and protect the full range of human rights through
some form of constitutionalism.
A study of the China model in comparison with the East Asian model by
an American scholar describes a potential transition of the China model along
this direction. According to him, although democratization in the sense of
freely contested multiple party elections for the highest level of office may be
postponed until a relatively high level of wealth is attained, as the economy
grows and wealth is generated, the government will invest in human capital
and in institutions, including reforms to establish a legal system that meets the
basic Fullerian requirements of a procedural or thin rule of law. Over time,
as the legal system becomes more efficient, professional, and autonomous, it
will come to play a greater role in the economy and society more generally.
Constitutionalism begins to emerge during the authoritarian period, including
the development of constitutional norms and the strengthening of institutions.
Social organizations start to proliferate and civil society begins to develop,
albeit often a civil society with a different nature and political orientation
than in Western liberal democracies, and with organizations with a political
agenda subject to limitations. Citizens will enjoy economic liberties, rising
living standards for the vast majority, and some civil and political rights,
although with limitations especially on rights that involve political issues and
affect the control of the regime. There will be greater protection of civil and
political rights after democratization, including rights that involve sensitive
political issues, although with ongoing abuses of rights in some cases and
with rights frequently given a communitarian or collectivist interpretation
rather than a liberal interpretation.52

CONCLUSION

China’s rise has included both building its tangible economic-military power
and intangible political-cultural influence. This was the position that China
had enjoyed before a rising Europe began to eclipse it in the eighteenth
century. In particular, the Chinese government has become aware of the
distinction between the two components of power and become conscious of
262 Chapter Thirteen

developing soft power to increase its legitimacy as an emerging great power.

It is aware that many countries are anxious about a rising China and if China
looks like an attractive and friendly place, these countries might be more
relaxed about its growing power. This has been known as China’s “charm
offensive” for transforming the world and has caused concerns in the United
States and elsewhere.
Indeed, China is mobilizing its soft power resources to transform the
world. But, as this chapter has argued, it is not yet clear how effective and
how far the transformation can go because of the flaws in China’s soft power
resources. It is true that the decline of the United States’ international im-
age since the Iraq War is increasingly evident. It is also true that China’s
extraordinary rise from poverty to prosperity has served as an inspiration
for some third-world countries that are in despair. However, as one Western
scholar asserts, “For a rich, free and culturally powerful country such as the
United States to lose a soft power contest with China seems all but impos-
sible. It would be like losing a boxing match with a one-armed man.”53 Even
Kurlantzick, the author of China’s Charm Offensive, suggests that America
is not to be dismissed even if its soft power is waning. It still offers a set of
values, based on the twin attractions of freedom and prosperity, which appeal
to average people around the world. China cannot offer a comprehensive,
inspiring vision of how to build a free, rights-oriented political system and
economy, a vision that remains popular in many parts of the world. And it is
America to which countries will turn if China’s soft power ceases to appear
that soft after all.54
Looking at the young people in China’s major cities, one observer found
that many of them saw that Westernization is China’s future. “It gives Chi-
nese students ‘face’ to speak some English—more ‘face’ if it is American
English. On campus they practice sports popular in the West, and after
graduation they would opt preferably for a career in a joint venture where the
corporate culture is supposed to be Western—and the pay higher.”55 Just as
China’s economic and military power is far from matching that of the United
States, China’s soft power still is not an equal of the United States, particular
in terms of its political values and moral appeal.
Of course, this does not mean that the United States can ignore the rise
of China’s soft power. If the decline of the U.S. global image continues and
China eventually moves out of the shadow of its modern history and takes
a fundamental turn in its reform toward democratization, as some of East
Asian NICs have done, it is not impossible that China will win the soft power
contest with the United States. Joseph Nye is correct in saying that “although
China is far from America’s equal in soft power, it would be foolish to
ignore the gains it is making. The declining poll results and Washington’s
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 263

absence at the East Asian Summit are warning lights. It is time for the
United States to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in Asia.”56
Views and opinions regarding China’s soft power are fairly diverse both
within China and in the international arena. This book largely reflects this
reality. While not attempting to build a consensus, the chapters taken as a
whole do provide a variety of observations of China’s soft power. The central
theme of this book is that soft power is a useful and important perspective to
understand Chinese foreign policy and the future evolution of China’s role in
international politics.
A few common arguments have emerged. First, it is clear that soft power
has become a very popular concept in China, even among political elites and
decision-makers. Second, China is seriously contemplating and exploring a
soft power strategy as it rises on the international political stage. Third, in the
past decade, there have been noticeable elements of soft power in China’s
diplomatic practice, including softer rhetoric, promotion of Chinese culture
abroad, economic diplomacy, and image building. Finally, this book describes
some of the limitations of China’s soft power. These restraints primarily stem
from China’s political values and its ongoing transformation.

NOTES

1. Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transform-

ing The World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
2. Joseph S. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” The Wall Street Journal
Asia, December 29, 2005.
3. He Jingying, “The Charm of China’s Soft Power,” People’s Daily Online,
March 14, 2006, english.people.com.cn/200603/10/eng20060310_249577.html (ac-
cessed January 6, 2009).
4. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power and its
Policy Implications,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (August 2008):
426.
5. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power,”
Survival 48, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 17–36.
6. He “The Charm of China’s Soft Power.”
7. “China Threat” Fear Countered By Culture,” China Daily, May 29, 2006.
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/29/content_4613721.htm (accessed January 6,
2009).
8. Purnendra Jain and Gerry Groot, “Beijing’s ‘Soft Power’ Offensive,” Asia
Times Online, May 17, 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HE17Ad01.html (ac-
cessed January 6, 2009).
9. China Daily, “‘China threat’ fear countered by culture.”
10. Wei-wei Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model,” International Herald
Tribune, November 1, 2006.
264 Chapter Thirteen

11. Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model.”

12. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power.”
13. Lun Tan, “China’s Dream of Harmonious Existence,” China Daily, November
11, 2005, 4.
14. He “The Charm of China’s Soft Power.”
15. Alex Berkofsky, “The Hard Facts on Soft Power,” PacNet 26 (May 31,
2007).
16. Suisheng Zhao, “The Making of China’s Periphery Policy,” in Chinese For-
eign Policy, Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, ed. Zhao Suisheng (Armonk, NY:
M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 260.
17. Lee Kuan Yew, “China’s Soft-Power Success,” Forbes, June 18, 2007.
18. Joseph S. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” The Wall Street Journal
Asia, December 29, 2005.
19. “China Increasingly Attractive to Others,” Xinhua, August 8, 2006,
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-08/08/content_659235.htm (accessed January
6, 2009).
20. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Beijing’s Big Push,” Newsweek International, April
9, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17886723/site/newsweek/ (accessed January 6,
2009).
21. James Mann, “China’s Dangerous Model of Power,” Washington Post, May
20, 2007.
22. Gill and Huang, “Sources and Limits,” 2.
23. Lu Yiyi, “Blind Spots in China’s Soft Power,” The Straits Times, July 15,
2007.
24. Huang Yanzhong and Sheng Ding, “Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of
China’s Soft Power,” East Asia 23, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 41.
25. Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, “The Conception of Soft Power,”
26. David Gosset, “A New World with Chinese Characteristics,” Asian Times
Online, Apr 7, 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HD07Ad01.html (accessed
January 6, 2007).
27. Samuel Kim, “Mainland China and a New World Order,” Issues and Studies
27, no. 11 (November 1991): 4.
28. There are many studies of the Thirty Years War and the subsequent interna-
tional system in Europe. See, for example, C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty Years War
(London: J. Cape, 1938); Henrik Tikkanen, The 30 Years’ War, trans.George Blecher
and Lone Thygesen-Blecher (Lincoln, NB.: University of Nebraska Press, 1987);
Hugh Redwald Trevor-Roper, ed., The Age of Expansion; Europe and the World,
1559–1660 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); John Baptist Wolf, The Emergence of
the Great Powers, 1685–1715 (New York: Harper, 1951); Herbert Langer, The Thirty
Years’ War (Poole, England: Bandford Press, 1978); and Theodore K. Rabb, ed., The
Thirty Year’s War (New York: University Press of America, 1981). For an excellent
brief description of the emergence of the great powers in Europe during this period,
see Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983), 3–27.
 The Prospect of China’s Soft Power: How sustainable? 265

29. Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1969), 31–35, 345–56. For a classic work on the nation-state sys-
tem in the Western tradition, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1948).
30. Yang Lien-sheng, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in The
Chinese World Order ed. John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968), 20.
31. John K. Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in The Chinese World Order
ed. John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 2.
32. A bibliography of some 55 studies of aspects of China’s tributary relations
was published in J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng’s, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System,”
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6, no. 4 (June 1941): 135–148.
33. Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 1918–20, The Middle King-
dom at the Periphery (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 16.
34. John K. Fairbank, “The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” The
Chinese World Order ed. John K. Fairbank, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1968), 258.
35. Editorial, “The China Puzzle,” New York Times, June 22, 2007.
36. Berkofsky, “The Hard Facts on Soft Power.”
37. Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg, “Signs of Transition,” The Guardian,
June 11, 2007.
38. Joshua Cooper Ramo, Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chi-
nese Power, (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2004).
39. The discussion of the features is based on Randy Peerenboom, China Modern-
izes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007); and Wei-wei Zhang, “The Allure of the Chinese Model,” International Herald
Tribune, November 1, 2006.
40. OECD, “Economic Survey of China 2005: Key challenges for the Chinese
economy,” www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_201185_35343687_1_1_1_
1,00.html. (accessed January 6, 2009).
41. James Mann, “China’s Dangerous Model of Power,” Washington Post, May
20. 2007.
42. William Thornton, “Sino-Globalization: Politics of the CCP/TNC Symbiosis,”
New Political Science 29, no. 2 (June 2007): 212.
43. Zhang “The Allure of the Chinese Model.”
44. Thornton, “Sino-Globalization,” 211.
45. Mann, “China’s Dangerous Model of Power.”
46. Berkofsky, “The Hard Facts on Soft Power.”
47. Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China, London, UK: The Foreign Policy Center,
2007, pp. 12–19
48. Gideon Rachman, “The Hard Evidence That China’s Soft Power Policy is
Working,” FT.com, February 19, 2007.
49. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power.”
50. Gideon Rachman, “The hard evidence that China’s soft power policy is work-
ing,” Financial Times, February 19, 2007.
266 Chapter Thirteen

51. Editorial, “The China Puzzle,” New York Times, June 22, 2007.
52. Peerenboom, China Modernizes.
53. Rachman, “The Hard Evidence.”
54. Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive.
55. Gosset, “A New World.”
56. Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power.”
 Index

16th Party Congress, of the Chinese Chen, Zhili, 114

Communist Party, 22 China Central Television, 51, 151–152,
17th Party Congress, of the Chinese 156
Communist Party, 23, 58, 68 China model, 6, 28, 177, 179,
211 project, 111–113 261
China threat, 9, 31, 38, 55, 59, 66, 76,
American soft power, 49, 57, 247, 252. 96–97, 191, 249
See also U.S. soft power Chinese media, 21, 36, 146, 151, 153,
ARF. See ASEAN Regional Forum 158, 192
ASEAN Regional Forum, 52, 54, 67, 72 Chinese model of development, 2, 6, 26,
208, 210, 217, 250
Beijing Consensus, 2, 6, 13, 15, 26, 29, Chinese People’s Political Consultative
51, 57, 69, 70–71, 75, 78, 125, 127, Conference, 23, 188
133, 139, 208, 215–217, 220, 250, Cold War, 15, 46, 49, 52, 65–66, 76, 89,
256–257, 260–261. See also Chinese 95–96, 209, 241
model of development or China Competition for soft power, 2, 32. See
model also soft power competition
Beijing Olympics, 71, 73, 190, 197, Comprehensive national power, 2, 22,
255 28, 66, 248
Bush, George W., 2, 5, 68, 92, 137, 165, Confidence-Building Measures, 9
194, 197, 218, 233–234, 248 Confucius institute, 13–14, 29, 38, 51,
70, 103, 114, 116–117, 156–158,
CBMs. See Confidence-Building 173, 187, 189, 196, 215, 249
Measures CPPCC. See Chinese People’s Political
CCTV. See China Central Television Consultative Conference
Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Cultural hegemony, 4, 33
Group, 1, 23 Cultural power, 4, 14, 29, 33, 73,
Charm offensive, 11, 14, 45, 52–53, 83, 143–148, 153, 157–158, 187
103, 115, 176, 247, 251, 262 Cultural Revolution, 89, 126

267
268 Index

Darfur, 179–180, 255 Made in China, 130, 135

Deng, Xiaoping, 68, 75, 90–91, 93, 97, Mugabe, Robert, 128, 168, 259
109–110, 126, 134, 168–169, 186,
256 National Climate Change Program,
238–239
Economic assistance, 134, 154, 259 National Planning Guidelines for
Cultural Development, 34
Financial aid, 220, 230, 259 Neo-liberalism, 132, 134
Financial Crisis, 15, 53, 67–69, 77, 98, New world order, 75, 92–94
116, 137, 211, 214–220 No strings attached, 3, 134. See also
FOCAC. See Forum on China-Africa value-free diplomacy
Cooperation Ministerial Conference Non-interference, 134, 137–138, 168,
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 254–255, 259
Ministerial Conference, 135, 172
Four modernizations, 109 Peaceful development, 186, 197,
248–249
Globalization, 3, 13, 25, 32, 70–71, Peaceful evolution, 33, 110
73–74, 76–78, 92, 135, 147, 218, Peaceful rise, 24, 31, 56, 64, 71, 76, 83,
257–258 187, 221
Great power status, 12, 64, 75 Political reform, 39, 129
Publicity Department of the Chinese
Hanban, 70, 117 Communist Party, 146, 151
Harmonious society, 31, 68, 73, 90,
249 Qian, Qichen, 212, 114
Harmonious world, 52, 71, 73, 86, 97,
250 Responsible stakeholder, 46, 74, 77, 95
Hu, Jintao, 1,16, 23, 28, 31, 68, 90, 93, Rudd, Kevin, 2, 197–198, 234
97, 155, 165, 167, 170, 186, 188,
196, 197, 221, 240, 250 Scientific development, 129, 139
Human rights, 49–50, 54, 65, 131–132, SCO. See Shanghai Cooperation
134, 136–138, 145, 155, 179, 194, Organization
198, 228, 255, 259–261 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 71,
93, 187, 251
Image of China, 22, 38, 51, 55, 115, Sinocentrism, 252–254
150, 175, 176, 197, 230 Six-Party Talks, 54, 71, 93, 189
Iraq war, 5, 47, 50, 251, 262 Soft use of power, 1, 3, 7, 9, 167
Soft power competition, 252
Jia, Qinglin, 23, 188 South China Sea, 72, 89–90, 212
Jiang, Zemin, 93, 97, 110–112, 155, State Council Information Office, 29,
213 34, 145
Strategic partnership, 67, 212
Koguryo, 143, 191–192 Sun Zi, 87

Liberal democracy, 6, 133, 218 Tiananmen, 11, 65, 68, 75, 109–110,
Liu, Yunshan, 146 126, 169, 231
 Index 269

Traditional Chinese culture, 8, 25–26, 219, 250, 257–259. See also Western
33, 35, 50, 52, 115 model
Tribute system, 88, 104–105, Wen Jiabao, 94, 165, 170, 178–179,
253–254 188, 192, 195–197, 238–239
Western culture, 26, 96
U.S. soft power, 5–6, 9, 57, 68. See also Western model, 131–133, 178, 209
American soft power Westernization, 73, 76, 262
Win-win cooperation, 67, 69, 153, 170,
Value-free diplomacy, 138, 250, 259 225, 227

Washington Consensus, 26, 57, 69–70, Zhao, Qizheng, 34, 145

78, 127, 132, 135, 156, 173, 212, Zheng, He, 89, 105
 List of Contributors

Gang CHEN is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National Uni-
versity of Singapore. He received his Ph.D. in International Relations from
China Foreign Affairs University. His research interests include China’s
domestic politics and foreign policy, international environmental governance
and climate change. His papers have appeared in journals such as The Chi-
nese Journal of International Politics, American Studies Quarterly, Journal
of China Foreign Affairs University, and the International Forum. He is the
author of The Kyoto Protocol and International Cooperation on Climate
Change (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2008).

Jianfeng CHEN is Professor of International Relations and Dean for Aca-

demic Affairs at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law. He re-
ceived his Ph.D. in International Relations from Fudan University. He is the
author of The Study of Party Policies from the Perspectives of Documentary
Films (coauthor, 2008), Culture and International Order in East Asia and
West Europe (2004), Contemporary Economics and Politics on the World
Stage (bilingual textbook, 2004), Theories of Contemporary Western Inter-
national Relations (coauthor, 2001), and International Business Communica-
tion (1996). He has published more than thirty articles in various periodicals
in mainland China and Hong Kong.

Xiaohe CHENG is an assistant professor at the School of International Stud-

ies, Renmin University of China. He did his undergraduate work at Fudan
University and received his Ph.D. degree from Boston University. He worked
for China’s Institute of Contemporary International Relations in the 1990s.
Cheng’s research interests include international relations in the Asia-Pacific

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272 List of Contributors

and China’s diplomacy. He is currently working on the book tentatively en-

titled The Rise and Fall of China’s Alliances.

Xiaogang DENG is Associate Professor of Sociology in Sociology Depart-

ment at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. He is the Director of the
Criminal Justice Program. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the State
University of New York-Buffalo in 1994. His teaching areas include statis-
tics, criminology, deterrence, research methods, and deviance. He received
a Post-doctoral Research Grant ($30,000) from Chiang Ching-Kuo Founda-
tion for International Scholarly Exchange (U.S.A.) in 2001. His papers have
appeared in various sociological or criminological journals on recidivism,
criminological theories and comparative criminology.

Yong DENG is a professor of Political Science at the United States Naval

Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. His research has been focused on Asian
international relations and Chinese foreign policy. Currently he is interested
in the domestic origins of China’s foreign policy choice. He is the coeditor
of two volumes on Chinese foreign policy, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China
Views the World (1999) and China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese
Foreign Policy (2005). His single authored books are Promoting Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation: Perspectives from East Asia (1997) and China’s
Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (2008). His
other scholarly works have appeared in such journals as Political Science
Quarterly, China Quarterly, Pacific Affairs, Washington Quarterly, Journal
of Strategic Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, and Harvard China
Review.

Joshua Kurlantzick was previously foreign editor at The New Republic, a

correspondent for U.S. News and World Report and The Economist. He is a
visiting scholar in the Carnegie Endowment’s China Program. Also a special
correspondent for The New Republic, a columnist for Time, and a senior
correspondent for The American Prospect, Kurlantzick is assessing China’s
relationship with the developing world, including Southeast Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Additionally, Kurlantzick is currently a fellow at the USC
School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy.
His new book, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming
the World (Yale University Press, 2007) has been nominated for the Council
on Foreign Relations’ 2008 Arthur Ross Book Award. Kurlantzick’s articles
have appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post, For-
eign Affairs, Harper’s, The Atlantic Monthly, GQ, The American Prospect,
Mother Jones, Current History, and The Washington Quarterly.
 List of Contributors 273

Mingjiang Li is an Assistant Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of In-

ternational Studies, Nanyang Technological University. He was a diplomatic
correspond for Xinhua News Agency. His main research interests include the
rise of China in the context of East Asian regional relations and Sino-U.S.
relations, China’s diplomatic history, and domestic sources of China’s inter-
national strategies. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston
University. He is the editor or coeditor of several books on China’s interna-
tional relations in East Asia. He has published many papers and book chapters
on China’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

Zhongying PANG is Professor of International Relations at Renmin Univer-

sity of China. He was a senior fellow at the China Institute of International
Studies and worked as a diplomat with the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. He
received his B.A. in Economics from Nankai University, his M.A. in Politics
from University of Warwick, and his Ph.D. in International Relations from
Beijing University. He was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in
Washington during 2007–2008. His areas of expertise include global politi-
cal economy, regional issues, and Chinese foreign policy. His is the author
of Economic Nationalism (Shandong Renmin Press, 2002), China and Asia
(Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2004), Global Governance:
Chinese Perspectives (editor, The Peace Books Inc., Hong Kong). His ar-
ticles have appeared in many Chinese journals and English Periodicals, such
as International Peacekeeping, and International Politik.

Ignatius Wibowo is the Head of the Centre for Chinese Studies, Faculty of
Humanities, the University of Indonesia. He received his doctorate degree
from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
Among his publications are two books Negara dan Masyarakat di Cina [State
and Society in China] (2000) and Belajar dari Cina [To Learn from China]
(2004), and a few edited books on globalization and Chinese Indonesians. He
has contributed to international journals and his articles on the Chinese Com-
munist Party can be found as book chapters. In Indonesia he has regularly
contributed op-eds on China to various national newspapers. In the past three
years, he was interested in research on “China’s Rise,” especially in South-
east Asia.

Lening ZHANG is Associate Professor of Sociology/Criminal Justice in the

Department of Behavioral Sciences, Saint Francis University. He has published
about 50 articles and a coedited book, Crime and Social Control in a Chang-
ing China (Greenwood, 2001). He is a coprincipal investigator of a research
project that was funded with a grant of $300,000 by the National Science
274 List of Contributors

Foundation of the United States. The project has successfully collected pri-
mary data of criminal victimization from a sample of 2,500 households in
China and has been conducting comparative studies of criminal victimization
in China and Western countries.

Yongjin ZHANG is Professor of East Asian Studies and Director of Centre

for East Asian Studies at the University of Bristol in Britain. He has previ-
ously held teaching and research posts at Oxford University, Australian
National University, the University of Auckland and the Institute of Interna-
tional Politics in Beijing. Professor Zhang has published in such prestigious
journals as Review of International Studies, European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations, The China Journal and Journal of Contemporary China. His
most recent publications include ‘China and the Emerging Regional Order in
the South Pacific’ in Australian Journal of International Affairs (2007); ‘Poli-
tics, Culture and Responsible Scholarship in China—Towards a Culturally
Sensitive Analytical Framework’ in Asian Perspective (2007); ‘Discourses
of Security in China—Towards a Critical Turn?’ in Anthony Burke and Matt
MacDonald, Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific (Manchester University
Press, 2007); and ‘Understanding Chinese Views of the Emerging Global Or-
der’ in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, China and the New International
Order (Routledge, 2008).

Suisheng ZHAO is Professor and Executive Director of the Center for China-
U.S. Cooperation at Graduate School of International Studies, University of
Denver. He is the founder and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China,
a member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Committee of the Council
for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP), a member of Na-
tional Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and a honorary adjunct professor
at Beijing University, Renmin University and Fudan University. He received
a Ph.D. degree in Political Science from the University of California-San
Diego. He is the author and editor of nine books. His most recent books are:
China and the United States, Cooperation and Competition in Northeast Asia
(Palgrave/Macmillion, 2009), China-U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspec-
tives and Strategic Interactions (Routledge, 2008), and Debating Political
Reform in China: Rule of Law versus Democratization (M. E. Sharpe, 2006).
His articles have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, The Wilson Quar-
terly, Washington Quarterly, International Politik, The China Quarterly,
World Affairs, Asian Survey, Asian Affairs, Journal of Democracy, Pacific
Affairs, and elsewhere.
 List of Contributors 275

Zhiqun ZHU is currently MacArthur Chair in East Asian Politics and As-
sociate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell
University in Pennsylvania. He was previously Assistant Professor and
then Associate Professor and Chair of International Political Economy and
Diplomacy at University of Bridgeport, Connecticut. He received a Ph.D.
in Political Science from University of South Carolina in 2003. Professor
Zhu’s teaching and research interests include international relations theory,
East Asian political economy, and Chinese foreign policy. He is the author
of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace
(Routledge, 2006), and is working on a manuscript about China’s new diplo-
macy in the developing world. His research articles have appeared in Asian
Perspective, Global Economic Review, Journal of International and Area
Studies, Journal of Asia-Pacific Affairs, Journal of Chinese Political Science,
and Yale Journal of International Affairs.