WHY FERDINAND E.

MARCOS
SHOULD NOT BE BURIED
AT THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI
12 JULY 2016
 WHY FERDINAND E. MARCOS
SHOULD NOT BE BURIED
AT THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI

National Historical
Commission of the Philippines
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Rodrigo R. Duterte proposes to bury Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos at the

Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) because he “was a Filipino soldier, period.” The
NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NHCP) objects to the burial of Mr.
Marcos at the LNMB based on his record as a soldier. The NHCP study demonstrates
that:

1. Mr. Marcos lied about receiving U.S. medals: Distinguished Service Cross,
Silver Star, and Order of the Purple Heart, which he claimed as early as about
1945.

2. His guerrilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika, was never officially recognized and
neither was his leadership of it.

3. U.S. officials did not recognize Mr. Marcos’s rank promotion from Major in 1944
to Lt. Col. by 1947.

4. Some of Mr. Marcos’s actions as a soldier were officially called into question
by upper echelons of the U.S. military, such as his command over the Allas
Intelligence Unit (described as “usurpation”), his commissioning of officers
(without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-NL presumably to build an
airfield for Gen. Roxas, his collection of money for the airfield (described as
“illegal”), and his listing of his name on the roster of different units (called a
“malicious criminal act”).

Mr. Marcos’s military record is fraught with myths, factual inconsistencies, and
lies. The rule in history is that when a claim is disproven—such as Mr. Marcos’s
claims about his medals, rank, and guerrilla unit—it is simply dismissed. When,
moreover, a historical matter is under question or grave doubt, as expressed in the
military records about Mr. Marcos’s actions and character as a soldier, the matter
may not be established or taken as fact. A doubtful record also does not serve as
sound, unassailable basis of historical recognition of any sort, let alone burial in a
site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes.

For these reasons, the NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES opposes
the plan to bury Mr. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.

The COMMISSION undertook this study as part of its mandate to conduct and
disseminate historical research and resolve historical controversies. (Section 5 and
7, R.A. 10086).
N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

I. R ATI O NALE AND M ETH O D O LO GY

During his campaign, then presidential candidate Mr. Rodrigo R. Duterte

announced his desire to bury Mr. Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB) because “he was a great president and he was a hero … he had
the idealism, the vision for this country…”1 and would have been “the best
president” had he not become a dictator.2 After the election, President-elect
Duterte backtracked and stated: “I will allow the burial of President Marcos ….
not because he is a hero, kung ayaw ng iba (if others don’t like it), but because
he was a Filipino soldier, period.”3

The NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NHCP) differs with President
Duterte’s assessment of Mr. Marcos as a ‘great president’ and ‘hero’ and stands
on enormous, solid factual evidence to support its position. (The COMMISSION is
prepared to present such evidence if so asked.) The rules of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, which determine who may be buried at the site, proscribe
military “personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from
the service” and “authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgement
of an offense involving moral turpitude”4 from being interred at the LNMB. Mr.
Marcos was certainly not ‘dishonorably separated’ from military service but he
suffered a worse and more dishonorable fate: he was removed by the collective
action of the Filipino people in 1986. He then fled to Hawaii with his family,
where he died three years later, isolated from the people who had removed him.

The mere fact of the presidency, too, does not automatically mean burial at the
LNMB. Of the eleven deceased Philippine presidents, seven are not buried there
(Presidents Emilio Aguinaldo, Manuel L. Quezon, Sergio Osmeña, Jose P. Laurel,
1  Quoted in Pia Ranada, “Duterte in Manuel Roxas, Ramon Magsaysay, and Corazon C. Aquino).
Ilocos Norte: I will allow Marcos’ burial in
Heroes’ Cemetery,” Rappler, 19 February 2016 In any case, since President Duterte withdrew his initial reason for burying Mr.
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/ Marcos at the LNMB and now settles on the simple justification that the fallen
elections/2016/123061-duterte-marcos-burial- leader “was a Filipino soldier, period,” the COMMISSION grounds its objection to
libingan-bayani> Accessed 1 June 2016. the burial of Mr. Marcos at the LNMB on his status, and especially his record, as
a soldier. As this paper will demonstrate, Mr. Marcos’s military record is fraught
2  Quoted in Ranada, “Marcos best with myths, factual inconsistencies, and lies. The rule in history is that when a
president if not for dictatorship – Duterte,” claim is disproven—such as Mr. Marcos’s claims about his medals, rank, and
Rappler, 10 February 2016 <http:// guerrilla unit (Ang Mga Maharlika)—it is simply dismissed. When, moreover, a
www.rappler.com/nation/politics/ historical matter is under question, it may neither be established nor taken as
elections/2016/121919-duterte-marcos-best- fact and therefore cannot serve as the basis of historical recognition of any sort,
president> Accessed 2 June 2016. let alone burial in a site intended, as its name suggests, for heroes.

3  Quoted in Ranada, “Duterte: Marcos NHCP MANDATE

burial ‘can be arranged immediately’,”
Rappler, 23 May 2016 <http://www.rappler. The COMMISSION undertakes this study in keeping with its mandate. By law the
com/nation/134025-duterte-marcos-burial- COMMISSION is tasked to “conduct and support all kinds of research relating to
heroes-cemetery> Accessed 1 June 2016. Philippine national and local history” and “actively engage in the settlement or
resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places,
4  Department of National Defense, AFP dates and events.”5 Its Board’s powers and functions are, among others, to:
Regulation 161-375, “Allocation of Cemetery
Plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,” Quezon (a) Conduct and encourage all manner of research pertaining to Philippine
City, 11 September 2000. national and local history; …

5  Sec. 5(a), (e) of R.A. 10086, “An (e) Approve the declaration of historic structures and edifices such as national
Act Strengthening Peoples’ Nationalism shrines, monuments and landmarks or heritage houses;
through Philippine History by Changing the
Nomenclature of the National Historical (f) Prescribe the manner of celebration or commemoration of significant events
Institute into the National Historical pertaining to Philippine history; …
Commission of the Philippines, Strengthening
its Powers and Functions and for Other (h) Discuss and resolve, with finality, issues or conflicts on Philippine history;
Purposes,” approved on 12 May 2010. …

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 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

(p)
Conduct public hearings and ocular inspections or initiate factual
investigations with respect to disputed historical issues for the purpose of
declaring official historical dates, places, personages and events….6

As head of the COMMISSION, moreover, the Chair’s function (among others) is to

“advise the President and Congress on matters relating to Philippine history.”7

The Board of the NHCP thus agreed to study the historical record of Mr. Marcos
as a soldier to resolve questions about Mr. Marcos’s claims as a soldier during
the war, which are the basis of the President’s plan for his burial at the LNMB. By
exercising its mandate, the NHCP also hopes to address the public concern about
Mr. Marcos’s possible burial at the LNMB as well as advise the President of the
Republic.

NOTE ON SOURCES

Historians rely heavily on primary sources or documents, photographs and other

materials created during the period under study by eyewitnesses, participants
or actors in the event. Sources pass through the historian’s test of authenticity
(provenance of the document) and credibility (the source author’s ability and
willingness to tell the truth, accuracy and consistency of content, corroboration)
before they are used. In this study, the most important primary evidence comes
from declassified documents in the Philippine Archives Collection of the U.S.
National Archives/National Archives and Records Administration that are
available online at the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office website.8

Many of these documents were produced in the course of processing requests

from war veterans, including guerrilla unit members, for back pay and benefits
from the U.S. government. Hence narratives of guerrilla units were produced,
membership rosters, accounts of ‘liberation activities’ intended to justify
requests for official U.S. recognition, requests for the revision of dates of
recognition, various correspondence, and official memoranda at different levels
of the military structure issued during and in the few years after the war.

Two sets of archival document files are used in this study:

• Ang Mga Maharlica Grla Unit (Independent), File No. 60, Box 298, Guerrilla
Unit Recognition Files, 1942-1948, Philippine Archives Collection <http://
collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-
0000281>; and

• Allas Intelligence Unit, File No. 140, Box No. 372, Guerrilla Unit Recognition
Files, 1942-1948, Philippine Archives Collection
<http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/
GUA-0000658>.

The Ang Mga Maharlika file (#60) contains letters, memoranda, reports, and
accounts relating to the guerrilla unit Maj. Marcos claimed to have founded
and led. Mr. Marcos was one of those who had sought (and failed to obtain)
recognition of his guerrilla unit by the U.S. government. The Allas Intelligence
Unit file (#140), on the other hand, pertains to the organization led by Cipriano
Allas, which claimed to be the intelligence unit of the Ang Mga Maharlika. This
latter file concerns, among others, the unit’s request for the revision of its
recognition date by the U.S. government (to obtain larger back pay and benefits).
In the process numerous references to Maj. Marcos and his unit are made.

Official websites of pertinent U.S. government agencies were also consulted

(see references). Other official documents referred to in this study were obtained 6  Sec. 7, ibid.
from secondary sources and are so cited; such official records are not available
in the Philippines or online. 7  Sec. 13(b), ibid.

8  See <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph>.

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N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

Aside from the secondary sources that contain excerpts of primary records,
the most important secondary sources are the officially sanctioned biographies
of Mr. Marcos for these present the claims advanced by him about his exploits
during the war:

• Hartzell Spence, For Every Tear a Victory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964);

• Benjamin A. Gray, Rendezvous with Destiny (Manila: Philippine Education

Co., 1968);

• Hartzell Spence, Marcos of the Philippines (Cleveland: The World Publishing

Co., 1969); and

• Marcos of the Philippines (Manila: Department of Public Information, 1975).

II. O F M EDALS AND R ANK

The authorized biographies of Mr. Marcos portray him as a soldier of immense

courage; according to one, he was “the most decorated and valor-cited warrior
in his nation’s history.”9 The official biographies abound with stories of his
heroic achievements, such as how he spent the first day of 1942 “by ambushing
a company of Japanese cyclists,”10 killing 40 and turning back the rest. In the
process, the story continues, Mr. Marcos was able to get a samurai sword that
Gen. Douglas MacArthur later presented to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1944, “the first captured Japanese saber to reach the American mainland”!11 The
video recording of this event in British Pathé, a newsreel archive founded in 1910
containing 85,000 films from 1896 to 1976, however, makes no mention of the
origin of the sword.12

Another wartime feat of Mr. Marcos is described below:

… Marcos carried out reconnaissance missions almost of his own

choosing, or on direct orders from General [Mateo] Capinpin. In southern
Pampanga, near the Bataan border, he spent three days behind enemy
lines, surveying troops and material which the Japanese were bringing
up. In all that time he had no food. Spying a casuy tree, he climbed into
(sic) it to gather some fruit, only to be met by a Japanese sniper with the
same intent. Only one of them ate breakfast.13

Another passage highlights Major Marcos’s role in Kiangan (in Ifugao province
today) as part of the defense of Bessang Pass, where Marcos single-handedly
routed 50 enemy soldiers, for which he was awarded another medal.
9  Hartzell Spence, Marcos of the Philippines
(Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1969), On April 5 [1945] Ferdinand won his second Silver Star. He was at a
p. 123. command post …. in Kiangan …. still defending Bessang Pass…. What he
discovered was a well-camouflaged infiltration by fifty Japanese….
10  Ibid., p. 130.
Sending his man back to alarm headquarters, Marcos stood alone
11  Ibid., p. 131. between the attack force and its goal, a Thompson sub-machine gun
under his arm. But now the element of surprise was with him…. the enemy
12  “MacArthur Presents Sword to … did not see Ferdinand at all. At a point-blank fifty yards, he began to
Roosevelt,” 1944, in British Pathé <http://www. shoot, killing the commanding officer with the first burst. Disorganized,
britishpathe.com/video/macarthur-presents- the detachment regrouped and attacked, but Marcos repulsed it. For
sword-to-roosevelt-aka-rooseve> Accessed 3 half an hour the skirmish continued, with grenades and automatic-rifle
June 2016. fire…. Still unsupported, Major Marcos counterattacked. He had pursued
the Japanese nearly two kilometers down the trail before reinforcements
13  Spence, 1969, p. 129. reached him.14

14  Ibid., p. 189. Thus, his official biography concludes,

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 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

Before he was twenty-five he had won more medals for bravery than
anyone else in the Philippine history, had suffered the heroic Battle of
Bataan and its aftermath, the infamous Death March, and the medieval
tortures of the Japanese secret police.15

MEDALS OF COURAGE

A wartime history of the Ang Mga Maharlika, Mr. Marcos’s guerrilla unit,
which is believed to have been written in 1945 or thereabout by Mr. Marcos
himself,16 claims that Maj. Marcos, then a Combat Intelligence officer of the 21st
Division of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), received the
Distinguished Service Cross (DSC)

for having attacked with three men, an infiltrating column of not less
than a battalion of Japanese which had attacked the Divisions in
Reserve (the 21st, 31st and elements of the 51st Divisions) in the town of
Balanga [Bataan], personally blowing up an enemy artillery ammunition
dump, destroying four battalion guns and killing in combat no less
than six officers and more than twenty enlisted men; the Silver Star for
outstanding gallantry in action for having led a counter-attack on a much
more superior enemy force driving away such enemy force from the
Outpost Line of Resistance of the 21st Division; the Order of the Purple
Heart for having been wounded by enemy mortar fire while leading a
patrol to save the life of the 21st Division Commanding General, Brigadier
General Mateo Capinpin.17

Thus as early as 1945 or so, Maj. Marcos claimed to have received three major
U.S. medals: the DSC, the Silver Star, and the Order of the Purple Heart. This
story continues in the Marcos-sanctioned biographies. One says that by war’s
end, Mr. Marcos had received 27 medals.18 Two biographies claim that the DSC,
in particular, was pinned on him by Gen. MacArthur, while in a foxhole according
to one,19 and according to another:

General Douglas MacArthur, pinning on Ferdinand Marcos the 15  Ibid., p. 4.

Distinguished Service Cross for valor in battle far beyond the call of
duty, commented publicly that without Ferdinand’s exploits, Bataan 16  “‘Ang Mga Maharlika’ — Its History
would have fallen three months sooner than it did. Military historians in Brief,” in Ang Mga Maharlica Grla Unit
concede that the heroic stand at Bataan upset the Japanese timetable (Independent), File No. 60, Box No. 298,
of conquest, gave the allies time to defend the South Pacific, and thus Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files (AMM-GURF)
saved Australia and New Zealand. In a very real sense, therefore, the <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/
refusal of Ferdinand Marcos to admit he was beaten made a contribution GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000281>
to the war that was of enormous consequence to the world.20 Accessed 9 June 2016. Although for the most
part, the narrative refers to Maj. Marcos in the
MEDALS QUESTIONED third person, on p. 27 (first paragraph) the
narrative shifts to the first person ‘I’.
Filipino war historian and University of the Philippines Prof. Ricardo T. Jose
argues, however, that it was simply not possible for one man to have caused the 17  Ibid., p. 3.
delay of the fall of Bataan by three months. If true, then Mr. Marcos would have
received not the second highest medal, the DSC (as Mr. Marcos claimed), but the 18  Marcos of the Philippines, 1975, p. 50.
top recognition, the Medal of Honor. Consider, for instance, that mess cook Sgt.
Jose Calugas (Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, Philippine Scouts), who was able to 19  Benjamin A. Gray, Rendezvous with
set back the Japanese advance by two days,21 received the U.S. Medal of Honor. Destiny (Manila: Philippine Education Co.,
Sgt. Calugas’s citation reads: 1968), p. 174.

The action for which the award was made took place near Culis, Bataan 20  Spence, 1969, p. 123.
Province, Philippine Islands, on 16 January 1942. A battery gun position
was bombed and shelled by the enemy until 1 gun was put out of 21  Ricardo T. Jose quoted in Raissa Robles,
commission and all the cannoneers were killed or wounded. Sgt. Calugas, “Part 1 – Eminent Filipino war historian
a mess sergeant of another battery, voluntarily and without orders ran slams Marcos burial as a “hero,” 17 May 2011
1,000 yards across the shell-swept area to the gun position. There he <https://raissarobles.com/2011/05/17/part-1-
organized a volunteer squad which placed the gun back in commission eminent-filipino-war-historian-slams-marcos-
burial-as-a-hero/> Accessed 30 May 2016.

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N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

and fired effectively against the enemy, although the position remained
under constant and heavy Japanese artillery fire.22

As for the biographical claim that Gen. MacArthur himself pinned the DSC on
Mr. Marcos, which, according to the wartime narrative, Maj. Marcos received
about 1945, it is simply not possible. Then commander of the U.S. Army forces in
Asia when the war broke out, MacArthur and his men had retreated to the Bataan
peninsula. In March 1942, on orders of President Franklin Roosevelt, MacArthur
escaped to Australia. He returned to the Philippines (Leyte) only in October
1944. He officially accepted Japan’s surrender on 2 September 1945 aboard the
USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Thereafter and until 1951, he was occupied with the
military demobilization of Japan, its economic development and the framing of
its new constitution.23

Dr. Jose pored over the archives of the MacArthur Memorial in Norfolk, Virginia,
which made no reference at all to Gen. MacArthur pinning the DSC on Mr. Marcos.
Neither is there any mention in John Toland’s The Rising Sun (1970), nor in any
of the published works on Bataan, adds Dr. Jose. In contrast, nearly everyone in
Bataan knew about Sgt. Calugas, who received his award in 1945.24

Furthermore, writing in 1982, retired Army officer Bonifacio Gillego examined

primary wartime sources in the General Archives Division in Washington D.C. and
found “[n]o mention, no hint whatsoever … of the exploits of Marcos that delayed
the fall of Bataan ‘considerably.’”25 The official records Maj. Gillego examined are
enumerated below:

• Gen. Jonathan M. Wainright, Report of Operations of Northern Luzon Force

and I Philippine Corps from 8 December 1941 to 9 April 1942, dated 12 April
1946;

• Report of Operations of USAFFE [United States Armed Forces in the Far East]
and USAFIP [United States Army Forces in the Philippines] in the Philippine
Islands, 1941-42, dated 10 August 1946; and

• Maj. Gen. George N. Parker, Jr., Report of Operations of North Luzon Force
and II Philippine Corps in the Defense of North Luzon and Bataan from 8
December 1941 to 9 April 1942.26

22  U.S. Army Center of Military History, Gillego added:

Medal of Honor Recipients: World War II
<http://www.history.army.mil/moh/wwII-a-f. The scale of Marcos’ war exploits would hardly escape notice if they
html#CALUGAS> Accessed 30 May 2016. were indeed true. The first man that should have trumpeted such heroism
to the world was the man who claimed he was “the last man to come out
23  “Douglas MacArthur” <http://www. of Bataan” — Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo. Yet in his book I Saw
history.com/topics/douglas-macarthur> the Fall of the Philippines [1943], he was altogether oblivious of even the
Accessed 2 June 2016. presence of Marcos in Bataan. Neither in General Douglas MacArthur’s
Reminiscences [1964] nor in William Manchester’s The American Caesar
24  Cited in Robles, 17 May 2011. [1978] is there a mention of Marcos.27

25  Bonifaco Gillego, “Marcos: Hero of REBUTTAL

Kiangan Who Never Was,” We Forum, 5-7
November 1982. It must be mentioned that two American war veterans, Capt. Donald V. Jamison
(ret.) and Lt. Larry O. Guzman (ret.) rebutted Gillego’s assertions in sworn
26  Ibid. affidavits they executed in 1982.28 Both debunked the sworn statement of Col.
Romulo A. Manriquez (ret.), which Gillego also used in his investigation into Mr.
27  Ibid. Marcos’s war record. Guzman stated that he felt

28  Larry O. Guzman and Donald V. Jamison, proud and privileged to have fought side-by-side with such a gallant
Sworn Statements, 29 September 1982, in We Filipino officer as Major Marcos and I feel doubly proud that today, this
Forum, 29-31 October 1982. same man who joined Capt. Jamison and myself and the other gallant
Filipinos in risking our lives for the Allied cause, is the leader of his
29  Ibid. country and nation.29

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 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

Narrative shifts from third person to first person, in “‘Ang Mga Maharlika’ — Its History in Brief,” AMM-GURF

For his part, wrote Jamison,

it saddens me to read in leftist-dominated opposition groups, as well as

some of our own people in the U.S., comments and reports purportedly
made by Col. Manriquez that Mr. Marcos is a “fake hero and an impostor”
and that he supposedly said that the Marcos medals were “typewriter
decorations” based on affidavits, which lies and distortions of history 30  Ibid.
some liberal newspapers are wont to publish.30
31  We Forum, 3-4, 5-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-14, and
Both affidavits were evidently executed as a direct response to Gillego’s article, 19-21 November 1982.
which was published as a six-part series in the triweekly newspaper in Manila,
the We Forum.31 Months later the dictatorship affirmed Jamison’s perception 32  Ron Redmond, “Newspaper shut
of ‘leftist-dominated’ comments; the We Forum office was raided and the for questioning Marcos war record,” 17
newspaper, shut down on 7 December 1982 and its staff, arrested on subversion December 1982, in UPI Archives <http://
charges.32 The subsequent publication of Gillego’s article in American media www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/17/
prompted John Sharkey, Assistant Foreign Editor of the Washington Post, to Newspaper-shut-for-questioning-Marcos-war-
undertake his own investigation. In 1983 Sharkey wrote: record/7382408949200/>; Pamela G. Hollie,
“Manila Newspaper Closed,” The New York
… an 18-month effort to verify Marcos’ claims to high American Times (NYT), 8 December 1982 <http://www.
decorations raises serious doubts about whether he actually was nytimes.com/1982/12/08/world/manila-
awarded them. This effort included a search of U.S. military archives, newspaper-closed-by-marcos.html> Both
a detailed examination of official military histories, personal memoirs accessed 9 June 2016.
and portions of Marcos’ personal file at the U.S. military records centre
in St. Louis, and conversations with Philippine and American survivors 33  John Sharkey, “The Marcos Mystery:
of the war. Did the Philippine Leader Really Win the
U.S. Medals for Valor? He Exploits Honors He
Nor could any independent, outside corroboration be found to May Not Have Earned,” Washington Post, 18
buttress a claim made in Philippine government brochures that he was December 1983 <https://www.washingtonpost.
recommended for the U.S. Medal of Honor because of his bravery on com/archive/opinions/1983/12/18/the-
Bataan, as a document in his US military file suggests.33 marcos-mystery-did-the-philippine-leader-
really-win-the-us-medals-for-valorhe-exploits-
honors-he-may-not-have-earned/2af4be05-
5b92-4612-a223-d379780991c6/> Accessed 9
June 2016.

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N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

THE FACTS

The fact is that U.S. officials knew that Mr. Marcos had never received the
DSC and the Silver Star. Among the U.S. State Department documents, reports
historian and Ateneo de Manila University Prof. Ambeth Ocampo, is a confidential
telegram (dated 6 September 1966) from U.S. Ambassador William McCormick
Blair, Jr. in Manila about President Marcos’s upcoming state visit to Washington.
In the telegram Ambassador Blair recommended that Mr. Marcos be awarded
two medals for his “wartime heroism under US flag” because the latter “had
never received the Distinguished Service Cross.”34 The response from the State
Department two days later affirmed that Mr. Marcos had indeed never received
the medals:

We have determined that Army ready and willing go ahead with

presentation Distinguished Service Cross and Silver medals on basis
34  U.S. Ambassador William McCormick that Marcos’ US Army records do not, repeat, not show he ever received
Blair, Jr., telegram to the U.S. State them…35
Department, 6 September 1966, cited in
Ambeth Ocampo, “The fake Marcos medals,” Ocampo surmises that the U.S. kept the myth of the Marcos medals afloat
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 May 1996. because it needed Philippine support for America’s war in Vietnam.36

35  Confidential telegram from the U.S. State Finally, the official websites of the U.S. Medal of Honor,37 Silver Star,38 and
Department to Ambassador Blair, 8 September Order of the Purple Heart39 do not list Maj. Marcos as a recipient of these awards.
1966, cited in ibid.
As for Mr. Marcos’s military rank, while in earlier communications Mr. Marcos
36  Ibid. referred to himself as ‘Major’, by the end of 1947 he signed with the rank of Lt.
Col.40 Higher officials, however, did not recognize his rank promotion. As Capt.
37  U.S. Army Center of Military History, E.R. Curtis noted on 24 March 1948:
Medal of Honor Recipients: World War II
<http://www.history.army.mil/moh/wwII-m-s. During the liberation period Marcos was serving with the 14th Infantry
html> Accessed 30 May 2016. USAFIP, NL, i.e., December 1944 to May 1945 and is recognized as a
major in the roster of the 14th Infantry USAFIP, NL as of 12 December 1944
38  U.S. Department of Defense, Military to his date of discharge.41
Awards for Valor <http://valor.defense.gov/
Recipients/Army-Silver-Star/> Accessed 30 May
2016.
III. AN G M GA M AHARLIK A
39  National Purple Heart Hall of Honor, Roll
of Honor <http://www.thepurpleheart.com/
recipient/> Accessed 30 May 2016. Another part of Mr. Marcos’s claim to heroic fame rests on his leadership of
the Ang Mga Maharlika, a guerrilla unit that operated in Pangasinan and other
40  See Lt. Col. Marcos, Letter to the parts of northern Luzon. U.S. military records present a vastly different picture
Commanding General, Headquarters, from the sanctioned biographical accounts of Mr. Marcos. For one, American
PHILRYCOM, 2 December 1947, in AMM-GURF. military officials entertained serious doubts about the status of the Ang Mga
Maharlika as a guerrilla organization. Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer’s “Report on
41  Capt. E.R. Curtis, “Check Sheet, Subject: the Allas Intelligence Unit” (21 July 1947), for example, described the Ang
Ferdinand E. Marcos” sent to Lt. Col. W.M. Mga Maharlika as “a purported guerrilla unit” and questioned the practice of
Hanes, 24 March 1948, in AMM-GURF. “collusion by many guerrilla leaders in listing as members of their units men
who were already members of other purported guerrilla organizations,” which he
42  Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer, “Report on the found to be the case among supposed members of the Ang Mga Maharlika and
Allas Intelligence Unit,” 21 July 1947 in Allas the Allas Intelligence Unit42 (the latter, led by Cipriano Allas, claimed to be the
Intelligence Unit, File No. 140, Box No. 372, intelligence unit of the former). U.S. officials believed that this practice was done
Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files (AIU-GURF), to gain eligibility for back pay and war benefits.
1942-1948, Philippine Archives Collection,
PVAO <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/ NO RECOGNITION OF UNIT
GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000658>
Accessed 9 June 2016. In fact, military records repeatedly stated that the U.S. government never
recognized the Ang Mga Maharlika led by Maj. Marcos because of grave doubts
43  Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos, “Request about its authenticity. For example, Maj. Marcos’s request on 1 May 1945 for
for Release from Detached Service to the release from the 14th Infantry (to which he had been assigned on 20 January
Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL,” 1 May 1945, 1945) so that he could return to his unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika,43 was precisely
in AMM-GURF.

8
 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

1. … disapproved [on 6 May 1945] by reason of the fact that his

organization “Ang Manga Maharlika” is not among the guerrilla units
recognized by Higher headquarters.

2. It is therefore believed that his trip to Manila at this time to report

to an unrecognized guerrilla organization would be futile, and that
if he continues to render service to USAFIP, NL [Northern Luzon], in
whatever capacity he may be assigned it will be for the best interest
of the service. [underscoring supplied]

By Order of Colonel [Russell William] VOLCKMANN44

The non-recognition of the Ang Mga Maharlika was reiterated a few weeks later
by Maj. R.G. Langham, signing on behalf of the Regimental Commander of the
5th Cavalry. In his memorandum dated 31 May 1945, Langham wrote that the Ang
Mga Maharlika, with a strength of six officers and 18 enlisted men, was deployed
“to guard the Regimental Supply Dump and perform warehousing details.”45
Langham added: “They are not recommended for recognition because of the
limited military value of their duties” (underscoring supplied). The Commanding
General accepted Langham’s recommendation.46

APPEAL FOR RECOGNITION

Thus began Maj. Marcos’s appeal for the recognition of his guerrilla unit. On
18 August 1945 he sent the Adjutant General of the Philippine Army the complete
membership roster of the Ang Mga Maharlika. Among others, Maj. Marcos
asserted:

5. A grave injustice has been committed against many officers and men
of the Maharlika because while the men listed down in the roster
of the East Pangasinan Unit have been granted their guerrilla ranks,
those members of the Maharlika who had served this organization
since its start of operations in 1942 and who were not included in the
approved roster of the East Pangasinan Unit have not been credited
with recognition of their proper ranks.47

A month later, Maj. Harry McKenzie (Infantry, Army of the U.S., Commanding)
refuted Maj. Marcos’s claims. With regard to Marcos’s statement that “Landings
at Lingayen Gulf cut off my return to my organization,” McKenzie remarked:

b. Par 3 b. is contradictory in itself. “Landings at Lingayen Gulf cut off

my return to my organization”. However, he [Marcos] atched (sic)
himself to USAFIP NL 12 December 1944, only a few days after he
arrived in that area. Landings a month later could not have influenced 44  Lt. Col. Parker Calvert, Memorandum to
his abandoning his outfit and attaching himself to another guerrilla the Adjutant General, Camp Spencer, General
organization.48 Headquarters USAFIP North Luzon, 6 May 1945,
in AMM-GURF.
McKenzie, too, did not accept Maj. Marcos’s assertion that his unit began at
the end of 1942; neither did McKenzie accept Marcos’s authority to set up his unit 45  Maj. R. G. Langham, “Recognition of
and commission officers. Instead, McKenzie questioned the liberation activities Guerrilla Unit,” 31 May 1945, in AMM-GURF.
Maj. Marcos claimed to have undertaken.
46  Capt. James H. Alley, “Recognition of
c. Suggest inquiry into veracity of par 4 a. [where Marcos claimed Guerrilla Unit,” 7 June 1945, in AMM-GURF.
Ang Mga Maharlika had been in operation since 1 December 1942]
and authority of Ferdinand E. Marcos to organize guerrillas and 47  Marcos, “Complete Roster, Submission
commission his own officers; also check-up of papers in support of of” to the Adjutant General, Philippine Army,
subpars 4 c. & 4 d [where Marcos detailed how his unit was crucial to 18 August 1945, in AMM-GURF.
the recovery of Manila from enemy hands].
48  Maj. Harry McKenzie, 1st Ind to Lt. Col.
d. Further suggest case be referred to Maj Narciso Ramos, now James W. Davis, Guerrilla Coordinator, Leyte
Congressman, for his comment and explanation re par 3 d. basic Area Command, 16 September 1945, in AMM-
communication [where Marcos claimed that then Maj. Ramos, acting GURF.

9
Mr. Marcos, letter to the Commanding General,
2 December 1947, in AMM-GURF
 Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer, report on the
Allas Intelligence Unit, 21 July 1947, in AIU-GURF
N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

Lt. Col. Parker Calvert, memorandum to the Adjutant General, Camp Spencer, General Headquarters USAFIP North Luzon, 6 May 1945, in AMM-GURF

as Commanding Officer, submitted a list of Maharlika members in

eastern Pangasinan, which was not complete].49

Acting on Maj. McKenzie’s endorsement, Lt. Col. James W. Davis (Guerrilla

Coordinator) wrote the Commanding General of the Philippine Army on 20
September 1945:

1. No basis for recognition can be established this command [Ang Mga

Maharlika].

2. Present location and attachment of subject unit unknown.50

DENIAL OF APPEAL

On 7 June 1947, the PHILRYCOM Headquarters denied Maj. Marcos’s appeal,

citing the following reasons:51
49  Ibid.
• “Record of service was not substantiated by sufficient acceptable
50  Lt. Col. J. W. Davis, 2nd Ind to the evidence.”
Commanding General, Philippine Army, 20
September 1945, in AMM-GURF. • “The unit was not maintained satisfactorily in the field in opposition
to the enemy.”
51  These reasons were cited in and are taken
from Mr. Marcos’s letter to the Commanding • “Activities of the unit did not contribute materially to the eventual
General of PHILRYCOM, 2 December 1947. defeat of the enemy.”

12
Maj. R. G. Langham, “Recognition of Guerrilla Unit,”
31 May 1945, in AMM-GURF
Inset: Capt. James H. Alley, “Recognition of Guerrilla Unit,”
7 June 1945, in AMM-GURF
N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

Special Roster, Ang Mga Maharlika, 1 August 1945, in AMM-GURF

Marcos’s appeal, denied by PHILRYCOM Headquarters, 7 June 1947, in AMM-GURF

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 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

• “A definite organization was not established.”

• “Adequate records were not maintained (names, ranks, dates of

enlistment or joining, dates of promotions, and necessary related
information).”

• “Performance of the unit did not indicate adequate control by its

leaders because of the desertion of its commanding officer to join
another unit.”

• “Sphere of operations and unit strength claimed by the unit were

not commensurate with the nature of the terrain, limitation of
communication facilities, and the degree of anti-resistance activities
of the Japanese in the area during the period concerned.”

• “Unit did not show any satisfactory continuity of activity and

organization.”

• “Frequent change of geographic location was not justified.”

• “Members of the unit did not devote their entire effort to military
activities in the field to the exclusion of normal civilian occupation
and family obligations.”

• “Many members apparently lived at home, supporting their families

by means of farming or other civilian pursuits, and assisted the
guerrilla unit on a part time basis only.”

PROTEST VIA RADIOGRAM

Maj. Marcos, then representing the Philippine Veterans Mission to the U.S.
Congress, protested this decision by radiogram.52 Capt. Elbert R. Curtis responded
with a ‘check sheet’ addressed to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes on the subject, “Radiogram
Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika Guerrilla Unit.” Curtis pointed out that:

4. Maj R [Robert] B Lapham is familiar with the activities of the

commanding officer of the Maharlika unit and attests to the following:

Ferdinand Marcos was in San Quintin, Pangasinan two or three

months prior to the landing of the American forces, soliciting funds and
guerrilla help to construct a landing field in the vicinity. The purpose of
the landing field was to allow a plane to come in and evacuate General
Roxas. Capt Ray C Hunt, commanding officer of PMD [Philippine Military
District], LGAF [Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces] placed Marcos under arrest
for collecting money under false pretense. Gen Roxas intervened on
Marcos’ behalf and had him released to his custody. It is quite obvious
that Marcos did not exercise any control over a guerrilla organization
prior to liberation.

5. The [Maharlika] unit claims a vast amount of intelligence coverage by

submitting reports to Col [Wendell W.] Fertig, Col [Macario] Peralta,
Col Andrews, Col [Augustin] Marking and Maj [Ismael] Ingeniero. One
letter from Col Fertig is the only supporting evidence to substantiate
these claims. There is no mention in the Green book of the Maharlika
Unit being a source of intelligence information.53
52  Capt. Curtis, Memorandum for Record to
Capt. Curtis concluded that: Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, n.d., in AMM-GURF.

1. It is evident that Ferdinand Marcos and S [Simeon] M Valdez combined 53  Capt. Curtis, “Check Sheet” on
their forces in order to gain recognition, and by so doing have created “Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika
a very confused picture of the unit. It is also known that Marcos has Guerrilla Unit” sent to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes,
n.d., in AMM-GURF.

15
Check Sheet sent by Capt. Curtis to
Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes on radiogram
protest made by Marcos, in AMM-GURF
 Second page of the Check Sheet sent by
Capt. Curtis to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes on radiogram
protest made by Marcos, in AMM-GURF
Neubauer Memorandum to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 9 October 1947, in AIU-GURF
 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

enough political prestige to bring pressure to bear where it is needed

for his own personal benefit.

2. All the available evidence on the case indicates that the decision
of this headquarters, not favorably considering the unit, should be
sustained….54

The decision not to recognize the Ang Mga Maharlika also appears in the
memorandum of Lt. Kenneth H. Neubauer to Capt. J. O. Keider, Chief of the
Revision Section, on 18 September 1947, regarding the appeal of the Allas
Intelligence Unit for a revision of its recognition date (to obtain larger benefits for
its members). Lt. Neubauer wrote:

4. … The Ang Mga Maharlika was not favorably considered for

recognition by Headquarters PHILRYCOM.… The activities of the Ang
Mga Maharlika were not of such a nature to warrant recognition…

5.b. … The Ang Mga Maharlika does not exist as a guerrilla organization;
therefore intelligence activities of the unit were not of such a nature
to warrant recognition…

5.e. … the Ang Mga Maharlika … was NFC’d [not favorably considered].55
(underscoring supplied)

Lt. Neubauer reiterated his position on the Ang Mga Maharlika in a subsequent
memorandum to Lt. Col. Wallace M. Hanes (9 October 1947): “Activities of the
Allas Intelligence Unit are based on an organization which has not been favorably
considered for recognition. (Ang Mga Maharlika).”56 This memorandum had the
concurrence of Capt. Keider as head of the Revision Section and Capt. Elbert R.
Curtis, head of the Unit Branch.

APPEAL FOR RECONSIDERATION, DENIED

On 2 December 1947, Maj. Marcos appealed once again to the PHILRYCOM

headquarters, refuting each of the reasons cited by Asst. Adjutant Gen.
Thomas J. Brown. For example, Marcos enumerated his unit’s guerrilla activities
(intelligence gathering, sabotage, propaganda, offensive lines, actual battle). He
explained that the unit’s records were destroyed in mid-1944 upon his orders
because his men were being hunted by the enemy. He reiterated that he did
not abandon his unit to join another but left East Pangasinan on 8 December
1944 on a mission by President Manuel Roxas to put up air-reception bases and
airfields. He stressed that even as some of his unit members kept up normal
civilian lives, they remained devoted to the military effort against the Japanese.
Finally, he pointed out that his unit’s funds were limited and that the members
were supported by their families.57 54  Ibid.

Maj. Marcos failed to persuade his superiors. Capt. Curtis noted in March 1948 55  Neubauer, Memorandum to Capt. J. O.
that “Marcos took the liberty of usurping the command”58 of the Allas Intelligence Keider, 18 September 1947, in AIU-GURF.
Unit—recognized by the U.S. as an independent organization—which Cipriano S.
Allas had organized in August 1942 and that disbanded two years later. Curtis 56  Neubauer, Memorandum to Lt. Col. W. M.
further described Maj. Marcos’s arrest by Capt. Ray Hunt Hanes, 9 October 1947, in AIU-GURF.

for illegally collecting money to construct an air field near Baguio for the 57  Marcos, Letter to PHILRYCOM, 2 December
purpose of rescuing General Roxas. Had General Roxas not appealed to 1947.
Maj Lapham for the release of Marcos, Capt Hunt would have held him
prisoner until the liberation.59 58  Curtis, Check Sheet on Ferdinand E.
Marcos sent to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 24 March
Indeed, Capt. Curtis observed, “[t]he liberation activities of the Ang Mga 1948, in AMM-GURF.
Maharlika are of very little value as is shown on recommendation against the
unit by the 5th Cav.”60 Too: 59  Ibid.

60  Ibid.

19
N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

The Ilocos Norte Regiment under the command of Valdez was not contacted
by Marcos until November 1944. Marcos claims that this unit is a part of his
organization. The facts are that the Ilocos Norte Regiment became a part of the
15th Infantry USAFIP, NL.61

Unable to obtain recognition of his unit, Marcos redesignated the Alles (sic)
Intelligence Unit to be the Ang Mga Maharlica (The Freemen) Intelligence section
and listed his name as the commanding officer. The recognition of this unit
specifically did not afford recognition to Marcos.

The recognition of the Maharlica Unit, East Pangasinan, under the command
of Donato C. Ancheta, redesignated Ang Mga Maharlica (The Freemen) Co C, by
Marcos specifically did not include him for recognition.

Marcos has listed himself in two separate rosters for recognition that was
denied both in the field by this headquarters on 7 June 1947…62

Capt. Curtis thus concluded that:

1. The Ang Mga Maharlica Unit under the alleged command of Ferdinand
Marcos is fraudulent.

2. The insertion of his name on a roster other than the USAFIP, NL roster
was a malicious criminal act.63 (underscoring supplied)

Capt. Curtis then recommended no further consideration of the recognition of

the Ang Mga Maharlika. On 31 March 1948, PHILRYCOM Headquarters replied to
Maj. Marcos’s letter of 2 December 1947, denying his appeal with finality:

after extensive investigation and full consideration of all substantiating

evidence submitted by this unit and a careful analysis of all other
available information of the military activities of the unit from its
inception, scrutinized in relation to the overall resistance movement,
it was determined that the unit failed to fulfill the requirements of our
constant guerrilla recognition criterion used in the consideration of all
claimant guerrilla units.64

FORGERY AND ‘PAPER GUERRILLAS’

Ray C. Hunt, Jr., a retired Army captain who had led the command in Pangasinan,
61  Ibid. stated in an interview cited in 1986 that “Marcos was never the leader of a large
guerrilla organization, no way. Nothing like that could have happened without
62  Ibid. my knowledge.”65 Although Hunt subsequently retracted this statement in his
memoir, Behind Japanese Lines, An American Guerrilla in the Philippines (1986),
63  Ibid. because “my memory of the precise details is inexact,”66 he clarified that “I know
he did not command an armed guerrilla organization in Pangasinan province,
64  Asst. Adj. General R. E. Cantrell, Letter to but it is possible that he did organize guerrillas elsewhere” (emphasis in the
Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos, 31 March 1948, in original).67 Note that even this retraction contradicts Marcos’s claims in U.S.
AMM-GURF. military archives and in his own biographies that his unit operated in Pangasinan
and other parts of northern Luzon.
65  Jeff Gerth, “Marcos’s Wartime Role
Discredited in U.S. Files,” NYT, 23 January Hunt also clarified that:
1986.
I do not recall ever ordering his arrest, and I believe the document
66  Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norling, Behind purporting to show this is a forgery. Of course, it is conceivable that
Japanese Lines, An American Guerrilla in the some of my subordinates might have arrested him for a brief time
Philippines (Lexington, Kentucky: University without telling me about it, or that I might have been so informed but
Press of Kentucky, 1986), p.154. forgot about it merely because I attached little importance to it and had
other matters on my mind.68
67  Ibid.
There are actually three documents in the U.S. Archives that speak of Hunt’s
68  Ibid. arrest order. The first, which Hunt refers to above, is a letter signed by him to

20
 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

“I. C.,”69 believed to be Capt. Crispulo Ilumin,70 dated 9 October 1944. Hunt
asserted that he had never heard of Ilumin and that he never signed with just his
first name as it appears on the letter. He believes that the letter was “most likely
invented after the war to bolster claims for back pay by supposed followers of
Allas and Marcos.”71

The second document is a general arrest order from Hunt, dated the same day
as the letter above, issued to all sector commanders:

1. You are hereby ordered to apprehend any and all organizations within
your territory who are working under any command other than the
LGF [Luzon Guerrilla Force]-USAFFE. This office will then be notified
immediately upon apprehension of every organizer.

2. For your information there is only one authorized command in

Pangasinan and any organization operating in P.M.A. [Pangasinan
Military Area] will do so only after receiving authority from the
Commanding Officer, P.M.A. or the Commanding Officer, 2nd Military
District, P.A. [Philippine Army], Maj. Robert B. Lapham.

3. Major [Edwin Price] Ramsey has no authority within Pangasinan;

Major Lapham having assumed command as per orders from S.W.P.
[Southwest Pacific], G.H.Q. [General Headquarters] on the 6th of
April, 1944.72

Hunt accepts the veracity of the foregoing document.73 Given the official refusal
to recognize the Ang Mga Maharlika and its leadership, the order above can be
presumed to have covered units like Marcos’s, which were seen as fraudulent.

The third document, mentioned earlier (p. 14), is the ‘check sheet’ prepared
by Capt. Curtis on the ‘radiogram protest’ of Maj. Marcos against the non-
recognition of the Ang Mga Maharlika.74 Here Curtis referred to the arrest of Maj.
Marcos by Hunt. In his memoir Hunt maintained that “forty-one years later, I have
no recollection of this.”75

As for the size and membership of guerrilla outfits, Hunt explained that:

it was and is always difficult to say with any precision how many people
there are in any irregular outfit or resistance movement. If one counts 69  Capt. Ray Hunt, Letter to I.C., 9 October
only those who are actively engaged on a full-time basis, the number 1944, in AIU-GURF.
is almost always small…. With “paper guerrillas” estimates are the
merest guesses; and my own surmise (not unimpeachable knowledge) 70  See letter of Cipriano S. Allas, Letter to
is that most of Marcos’s followers were “paper guerrillas,” particularly in the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukyus
Pangasinan. In 1944-45 a “paper guerrilla” was a person who possessed Command, 16 August 1947, in AIU-GURF.
a piece of paper identifying him as a member of a guerrilla organization,
even though he did not have a gun. Some such people really wanted 71  Hunt, Behind Japanese Lines, p. 239.
to be guerrillas. Others were former collaborators with the Japanese
who wanted to cover their tracks. Others were fence-sitters who now 72  Hunt, Jr.,“Arrest of Organizers, P.M.A.,” 9
judged that the Allies were going to win the war. Still others were out for October 1944, in AIU-GURF.
personal gain of some kind.… Whatever their intentions, and whatever
the risks involved, “paper guerrillas” did little good and much harm.76 73  Hunt, Behind Japanese Lines, p. 239.

SUMMARY 74  There is actually a fourth document, the

“Check Sheet on Ferdinand E. Marcos” dated
What clearly emerges from the war records are the following: 24 March 1948. But since it is also authored
by Capt. Curtis and was likely based on his
1. The Ang Mga Maharlika was never recognized by the U.S. government based previous check sheet, it is not included in the
on the letter of PHILRYCOM on 7 June 1947 and reiterated (with finality) on list above.
31 March 1948, the latter after rejecting Mr. Marcos’s appeal on 2 December
1947. The unit was, in official eyes, non-existent. 75  Ibid., p. 240.

76  Ibid., p. 155.

21
Check Sheet sent by Capt. E.R. Curtis to
Lt. Col. W.M. Hanes, 24 March 1948, in AMM-GURF
 Letter sent by Asst. Adj. General R. E. Cantrell to
Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos, 31 March 1948, in AMM-GURF
N AT I O N A L H I S T O R I C A L C O M M I S S I O N O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S

2. Even Hunt’s concession that “I know he [Mr. Marcos] did not command an
armed guerrilla organization in Pangasinan province, but it is possible that
he did organize guerrillas elsewhere” runs counter to Mr. Marcos’s claim
that his unit operated in Pangasinan (among other parts of northern Luzon).
Hunt also contradicts himself when he writes on another page of his memoir
that “most of Marcos’s followers were ‘paper guerrillas,’ particularly in
Pangasinan”77 (emphasis supplied).

3. Mr. Marcos’s leadership of the unit was seriously doubted at official levels
and described variously as questionable, non-existent, and even fraudulent.
His practice of double listing his name on different units was called a
“malicious criminal act.” U.S. military officials, in fact, decried the practice
of collusion among guerrilla leaders in allowing multiple memberships
across units (presumably to obtain larger back pay and benefits), as was
the case between the Ang Mga Maharika, Allas Intelligence Unit, and other
units operating in northern Luzon.

4. Other acts of Mr. Marcos were officially called into question, such as his
command over the Allas Intelligence Unit (described as “usurpation”), his
commissioning of officers (without authority), his abandonment of USAFIP-
NL presumably to build an airfield for Gen. Roxas, and his “illegal collection”
of money for the airfield.

5. As early as the war period, U.S. military officials were aware, in Capt. Curtis’s
words, “that Marcos … [had] enough political prestige to bring pressure to
bear where it is needed for his own personal benefit.”78

IV. CO N CLUSI O N

With regard to Mr. Marcos’s war medals, we have established that Mr. Marcos
did not receive, as the wartime history of the Ang Mga Maharlika and Marcos’s
authorized biographies claim, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Medal,
and the Order of the Purple Heart. In the hierarchy of primary sources, official
biographies and memoirs do not rank at the top and are never taken at face
value because of their self-serving orientation, as is abundantly palpable in Mr.
Marcos’s sanctioned biographies. In a leader’s earnestness to project himself to
present and succeeding generations as strong and heroic, personally authorized
accounts tend to suffer from a shortage of facts and a bounty of embellishment.

With respect to Mr. Marcos’s guerrilla unit, the Ang Mga Maharlika was never
recognized during the war and neither was Mr. Marcos’s leadership of it. Note
that other guerrilla units in northern Luzon were recognized, such as:

• 103rd Regiment, East Central Luzon Area, LGAF;79

• Pangasinan Anti-Crime Service, Pangasinan Military Area, LGAF;80

77  Hunt, Behind Japanese Lines, p. 155.
• 100TH Bn/100th Inf. Regiment LGAF;81
78  Capt. Curtis, “Check Sheet” on
“Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika • Southern Pangasinan Guerrilla Forces (Gonzalo C. Mendoza Commander).82
Guerrilla Unit.”
Furthermore, grave doubts expressed in the military records about Mr. Marcos’s
79  GURF File No. 102-27. actions and character as a soldier do not provide sound, unassailable basis for
the recognition of a soldier who deserves to be buried at the LNMB.
80  GURF File No. 102-18.
On these grounds, coupled with Mr. Marcos’s lies about his medals, the
81  GURF File No. 102-10. opposes the plan to bury Mr.
NATIONAL HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES
Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
82  GURF File No. 199.

24
 W H Y F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S S H O U L D N O T B E B U R I E D AT T H E L I B I N G A N N G M G A B AYA N I

REFERENCES

Philippine Archives Collection, U.S. National Archives/National Archives and Records Administration (available at the
website of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office):

From Allas Intelligence Unit, File No. 140, Box No. 372, Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files, 1942-1948, Philippine Archives
Collection <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000658>
Accessed 9 June 2016.

Allas, Cipriano S. 1947. Letter to the Commanding General, Philippine Ryukyus Command, 16 August.

Hunt, Ray. 1944. “Arrest of Organizers, P.M.A.,” 9 October.

____. 1944. Letter to I.C., 9 October.

Neubauer, Kenneth H. 1947. Memorandum to Capt. J. O. Keider, 18 September.

____. 1947. Memorandum to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 9 October.

____. 1947. “Report on the Allas Intelligence Unit,” 21 July.

From Ang Mga Maharlica Grla Unit (Independent), File No. 60, Box 298, Guerrilla Unit Recognition Files, 1942-1948,
Philippine Archives Collection <http://collections.pvao.mil.ph/Guerilla/GuerillaInformationDownload/GUA-0000281>
Accessed 9 June 2016.

Alley, James H. 1945. “Recognition of Guerrilla Unit,” 7 June.

“Ang Mga Maharika — Its History in Brief.” N.D.

Calvert, Parker. 1945. Memorandum to the Adjutant General, Camp Spencer, General Headquarters USAFIP North Luzon,
6 May.

Cantrell, R. E. 1948. Letter to Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos, 31 March.

Curtis, Elbert R. 1948. “Check Sheet on Ferdinand E. Marcos” sent to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes, 24 March.

____. N.D. “Check Sheet on Radiogram Protest Non-Recognition Maharlika Guerrilla Unit” sent to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes.

____. N.D. Memorandum for Record to Lt. Col. W. M. Hanes.

Davis, James W. 1945. 2nd Ind to the Commanding General, Philippine Army, 20 September.

Marcos, Ferdinand E. 1945. “Complete Roster, Submission of” to the Adjutant General, Philippine Army, 18 August.

____. 1947. Letter to the Commanding General, Headquarters, PHILRYCOM, 2 December.

____. 1945. “Request for Release from Detached Service to the Commanding Officer, USAFIP, NL,” 1 May.

Langham, R. G. 1945. “Recognition of Guerrilla Unit,” 31 May.

McKenzie, Harry. 1945. 1st Ind to Lt. Col. James W. Davis, 16 September.

Other Official Sources

Department of National Defense. 2000. AFP Regulation 161-375, “Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani,” Quezon City, 11 September.

U.S. Army Center of Military History, Medal of Honor Recipients: World War II <http://www.history.army.mil/moh/wwII-
a-f.html#CALUGAS> Accessed 30 May 2016.

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U.S. Department of Defense, Military Awards for Valor <http://valor.defense.gov/Recipients/Army-Silver-Star/>

Accessed 30 May 2016.

Books, Periodicals, and Online Sources

“Douglas MacArthur” <http://www.history.com/topics/douglas-macarthur> Accessed 2 June 2016.

Gerth, Jeff. 1986. “Marcos’s Wartime Role Discredited in U.S. Files,” The New York Times, 23 January.

Gillego, Bonifacio. 1982. “Marcos: Hero of Kiangan Who Never Was,” We Forum, 3-4, 5-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-14, and
19-21 November.

Gray, Benjamin A. 1968. Rendezvous with Destiny. Manila: Philippine Education Co.

Guzman, Larry O. 1982. Sworn Statement, in We Forum, 29-31 October.

Hollie, Pamela G. 1982. “Manila Newspaper Closed,” The New York Times, 8 December <http://www.nytimes.com/
1982/12/08/world/manila-newspaper-closed-by-marcos.html> Accessed 9 June 2016.

Hunt, Ray C. and Bernard Norling. 1986. Behind Japanese Lines, An American Guerrilla in the Philippines. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky.

Jamison, Donald V. 1982. Sworn Statement, in We Forum, 29-31 October.

“MacArthur Presents Sword to Roosevelt.” 1944. British Pathé <http://www.britishpathe.com/video/macarthur-

presents-sword-to-roosevelt-aka-rooseve> Accessed 3 June 2016.

Marcos of the Philippines. 1975. Manila: Department of Public Information.

National Purple Heart Hall of Honor, Roll of Honor <http://www.thepurpleheart.com/recipient/> Accessed 30 May 2016.

Ocampo, Ambeth. 1996. “The fake Marcos medals,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 24 May.

Ranada, Pia. 2016. “Duterte in Ilocos Norte: I will allow Marcos’ burial in Heroes’ Cemetery,” Rappler, 19 February
<http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/123061-duterte-marcos-burial-libingan-bayani> Accessed
1 June 2016.

____. 2016. “Duterte: Marcos burial ‘can be arranged immediately’,” Rappler, 23 May <http://www.rappler.com/
nation/134025-duterte-marcos-burial-heroes-cemetery> Accessed 1 June 2016.

____. 2016. “Marcos best president if not for dictatorship – Duterte,” Rappler, 10 February <http://www.rappler.com/
nation/politics/elections/2016/121919-duterte-marcos-best-president> Accessed 2 June 2016.

Redmond, Ron. 1982. “Newspaper shut for questioning Marcos war record,” 17 December, in UPI Archives <http://
www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/17/Newspaper-shut-for-questioning-Marcos-war-record/7382408949200/>
Acessed 9 June 2016.

Robles, Raissa. 2011. “Part 1 – Eminent Filipino war historian slams Marcos burial as a “hero,” 17 May <https://
raissarobles.com/2011/05/17/part-1-eminent-filipino-war-historian-slams-marcos-burial-as-a-hero/> Accessed
30 May 2016.

Sharkey, John. 1983. “The Marcos Mystery: Did the Philippine Leader Really Win the U.S. Medals for Valor? He Exploits
Honors He May Not Have Earned,” Washington Post, 18 December <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
opinions/1983/12/18/the-marcos-mystery-did-the-philippine-leader-really-win-the-us-medals-for-valorhe-exploits-
honors-he-may-not-have-earned/2af4be05-5b92-4612-a223-d379780991c6/> Accessed 9 June 2016.

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Commission of the Philippines
T.M. Kalaw St., Ermita, Manila 1000
www.nhcp.gov.ph