MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES — Wa PETER THE GREAT’S ME UNC ANGUS KONSTAM DAVID RICKMANSTREETS PETER THE GREAT’S ARMY 1: INFANTRY Text by ANGUS KONSTAM Colour plates by DAVID RICKMAN tnaPublished in 1993 by Osprey Publishing Fed Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London SW3 6RB © Copyright 1993 Osprey Publishing Lad Allrghts reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part ofthis publication may be reproduced, sored in retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, ‘mechanieal, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright ‘owner, Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers, ISBN 1 $5532 515 Filmset in Great Britain Printed through Bookbuilders Led, Hong Kong Fora catalogue of all books published by Osprey please write to: ‘The Marketing Manager, Consumer Catalogue Department, ‘Osprey Publishing Ltd, Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, ‘London SW3 6RB Acknowledgements ‘The author is indebted to several people for their assistance in his research: his especial thanks to Igor Komarov and Alexei Levokin of the Kremlin Armoury, Yuri Levkin of the State Historic Muscum, Moscow, the staff of the Royal Armouries, Francis Turner and Peter Konstam for their translations, Peter Berry and, of course, Anton Alanoviteh Editor’s Note: A full bibliography appears in Peter the Great's ‘Army 2: CavalryPETER THE GREATS ARMY INTRODUCTION ‘The figure of Tsar Peter the Great dominated Russia inthe 18th century. On his accession, the country was an inward-looking feudal state, resistant to change and suspicious of outsiders. Within a few decades his reforms, as well as his policy of increased repression and territorial expansion, had brought about changes from which no section of Russian life remained immune. The policy of ‘looking towards the West’, which entailed opening up Russia to the Western European countries, paved the for her ‘emergence as a major European power. Inno area was this more clearly achieved than in the army. Military expenditure dominated the cconomy, and Russia's increasing resources were harnessed to fulfil military needs, As Christopher Dufly has put it, however, it was inherently easier to hew the forests, to dig, to smelt and fashion the metals than to create a powerful army of reliable troops, led by officers of courage and expertise Peter’s successes and failures in these last respects were to be to a great extent the measure of Russia's military performance in the 18th century The French diplomat De Campredon summed this achievement up succinctly ina letter to Louis XV in 1723: ‘He has regulated his peoples, making them useful for the service of his state .. . He has worked to drag his nobility up from the subhuman lassitude in which they had sunk, and qualify them to serve in his, armies and navies, for which they harboured an invincible aversion until very recently ... And so, through inconceivable labour and patience, he has managed to form some excellent military and naval officers, a body of splendid soldiers, an army of more than 100,000 regular troops, and a fleet of sixty vessels, including twenty of the line. Russia, whose very name was scarcely known, has now become the object of attention of the greater number of the powers of Europe, who solicit its friendship.” This military development, impressive in times way “ Tsar Peter I (1672-1725), First Emperor ofall the Russias. The engraving is based upon a portrait painted by Kneller in 1698, when Peter visited England, (Author's collection) of peace, took place during a long and bitterly fought war against the Sweden of Charles XII. The Great Northern War (1700-1721) was largely the result of the conflicting territorial ambitions of Russia and Sweden, Russia wanted a trading ‘window to the West’, and Sweden strove to maintain the Baltic Sea as ‘a Swedish lake’, An alliance formed by Russia, Poland-Saxony and Denmark joined forces against Sweden. Their hopes of an easy victory were dashed as Charles XII first knocked the Danes out of the war, then inflicted a disastrous and humiliating defeat on the Russians at Narva (1700), The Russians were saved only by the contempt with which Charles XI viewed them, as he turned his back on Russia and began a lengthy campaign in Poland-Saxony. This 3six-year respite allowed Peter to rebuild and reorgan- ise his army. Minor campaigns in the Eastern Baltic were used to season his troops. By the time Charles XII’s army invaded Russia in 1708-9, Peter’s army was ready for them. Fighting a skilful defensive campaign, the Russians forced the Swedes away from Moscow, and by the spring of 1709 were ready to face the Swedes in battle. At Poltava (1709) Peter won a crushing victory, destroy ing the Swedish army and forcing Charles XII into temporary exile, The remaining Swedish garrisons in Finland and the Southern Baltic were gradually overrun by the Russians and their re-emergent allies, so that by 1716 the Swedes were reduced to defend- ing their homeland. Charles XII tried to revitalise his, country’s defences and ailing economy, and defended Sweden from invasion until his death in 1719. The war-weary Swedes, now subjected to Russian raids on the Swedish coast, sued for peace in 1721 By this treaty Russia supplanted Sweden as the dominant power in the Baltic, and became a major European power. Peter deservedly accepted the titles, of ‘the Great’ and ‘Emperor of all the Russias’. On his, death in 1725, the man who greeted the birth of his son with the exclamation ‘another recruit’ had forged a Russian military power that would remain a dominating influence on European military and political thinking until the present day. CHRONOLOGY The Great Northern War 1700 Apr. Danish invasion of Schleswig (Sweden’s ally), June Polish-Saxon invasion of Swedish Livonia, Augustus II of Poland besieges Riga. 25 June Swedish invasion of Zealand by Charles XII threatens Copenhagen. Danes sue for peace. 18 Aug. Treaty of Travendal. Danes drop out of war. Russians invade Swedish Livonia with 40,000 men. 4Oct. ‘Tsar Peter I besieges Narva. 6 Oct.” Charles XII lands in Pernau with 10,000 men. Representation of a Streltsi musketeer of the late 17th century. Note the che, which could serve both asa weapon and a musket rest, bardis 26 Oct. 17 Nov 18 Nov 20 Nov powder flask is depicted in ‘several near-contemporary illustrations of the Streltsi Engraving by Jean Baptiste Le Prince, 1768. (Author's collection) The curled Swedes advanee on Narva Skirmish at Pyhajoggi Pass, Cossacks retreat. ‘Tsar Peter returns to Moscow Battle of Narva. Russians decisively de- feated; remainder flee back over border.1701 17 June 8 July g July ‘Aug. 16 Sept. Dec. Charles XI marches to relieve Riga Battle of Riga. Polish-Saxon-Russian force of 28,000 under General Steinau defeated by 18,000 Swedes under Charles XII after Swedes perform assault river crossing of the Dvina. Riga relieved. Inyestment of Dunamunde fortress in Livonia. Swedes invade and annex Courland, Rus- sians raid Swedish Livonia with 8,000 men. Skirmish at Sagnitz, Russian raid repulsed. Charles XII enters winter quarters in Courland Dunamunde capitulates, rjo2 2 Jan, Jan. Mar. 14 May 19 May 29 July 31 July Aug. Oct. 21 Oct. Russian General Sheremetev invades Livonia with 12,000 men. Battle of Eresifer. Swedish army of 7,000 under General Shlippenbach defeated Charles XII advances on Warsaw. Warsaw occupied by Swedes Battle of Kliszow. 13,000 Swedes defeat 28,000 Poles-Saxons north of Cracow Battle of Hummelshof. Sheremetey defeats remains of Shlippenbach’s Swedish army Swedes storm Cracow Swedish Livonia ravaged by Cossacks Peter I campaigns in the Neva valley. Russians capture Swedish Noteborg fort- ress guarding Neva River ba eS Ro ect a lau km a Warsaw BAX ONY geste Prague Kliszow AustRia POLAND a ew Seale nvlos er oe ig er Cae ] 8 4 Poe Russia Novgorod cErestfer Kior Livonra Nia Moscow Smolensk Minsk >< vesnaya I loloveryn.>< >.Dabroe f Tua \ = ore a Noronesh \ 7. Kee *karkovNov 1703 Mar. 21 Apr. May 16 May 40ct 1704 Apr. 1 June Mouth of Neva cleared of Swedish troops. Russia gains access to the Baltic. Charles XII launches new Polish campaign. Skirmish at Pulutsk. Charles XI with 2,000 cavalry routs 3,500 Polish cavalry Charles XII besieges Thorn. Peter I founds St. Petersburg on Neva River: Thorn capitulates, Swedes enter winter quarters, Russians under Peter I invade Swedish Livonia; Narva besieged again. ‘Swedes advance on Lemberg in S. Poland 5 June 2 July 14 July 24 July 27 Aug. 26 Sept 7 Nov 1705, 14 Jan. May July Peter I besieges Dorpat. Charles XII places Stanislas Lesze on Polish throne as rival to Augustus II. Dorpat capitulates. Battle of Jacobstadt. Swedes under Lewan- haupt defeat Lithuanian rebel army and Russian contingent in Lithuania. Charles XII assaults Lemberg, Narva capitulates. Battle of Punitz. Charles XI defeats an Allied force near the Saxon border. Russian force under Ogilvy besieged by Charles XTI at Grodno, Ogilvy’s force slips away to East Swedes pursue Augustus II around E. Poland, Tsar Peter Land his staffat the siege of Azov, 1696. Note the combination of traditional Russian and Jate-17th-century Western military dress. The Turkish-held cicy surrounded by Russian siegeworks is depicted in the background. (Private collection)Sept 1706 Jan 13 Feb Aug. Sept 14 Sept. Oct. 19 Oct 1707 27 Aug. Oct Dec. 1708 22 Jan, Mar. Apr. 3 July Augustus II escapes Swedish forces, and seeks sanctuary in Saxony Augustus IT launches campaign from Sax ony to recover Poland. Charles sends Rehnskold with 10,000 men to halt him, Battle of Fraustadt. Rhenskold’s Swedes inflict a crushing defeat on the 18,000- strong Saxons and Russian army under Schulenburg Swedes invade Saxony, Saxons sue for peace Russian force under Menshikov enters E. Poland and joins Poles loyal to Augustus II. Swedish force under Mardefelt sent to stop him. Treaty of Altanstadt. Augustus II abdi- cates; Saxons and Poles make peace with Sweden; Russia alone remains at war with Sweden Charles XII winters his 20,000 men in Saxony Battle of Kalisz. Menshikov defeats Mardefelt’s Swedes, then garrisons Warsaw Charles XII begins campaign against Rus sia; Swedes march east from Saxony with 32,000 men, Charles XII bypasses Menshikov's de fences along the Vistula River Second line along the Niemen River also bypassed by Swedes. Peter I joins Russian army Skirmish at Grodno. Peter I almost cap- tured; Russians continue to retreat. Swedes advance on Minsk 50,000 Russians gather west of the Dniepr River Swedes resume advance. Lewanhaupt with small and supply convoy ordered to join Charles XII from Livonia Battle of Holowezyn. 35,000 Russians un- der Sheremetiev and Repnin forced out of army Depiction of a lace-17th- century Russian presentation sword produced in Tula during inf soldier wears a uniform combining Russian and Western features. (State Museums of the Moscow Kremlin) the early 18th century. The Aug. 31 Aug. 13 Sept 29 Sept Oct. strong position by Swedish assault. Rus~ sian retreat continues, and a scorched earth policy is adopted Charles XII crosses Dniepr and advances on Moscow Skirmish at repulsed. Swedes reach Tatarsk (on Russian bor- der). Scorched earth policy forces Charles XII to turn south, away from Moscow Battle of Lesnaya. Peter 1 with 15,000 men decisively defeats Lewanhaupt’s 10,000 reinforcements for Charles XII, and cap- tures Swedish supply train, Revolt by Cossacks under Mazeppa gives Sweden an ally in the Ukraine, Charles Dobroe. Russian attack 7Nov 3Nov. Dec. 1709 7 Jan Feb. 9 Feb. Mar. 2 May 17 June 23 June 28 June 1 July XII forced to march there in search of supplies and winter quarters. Menshikov crushes Cossack revolt, Swedish army enters the Ukraine. Both armies enter winter quarters in Ukraine; worst winter in living memory Costly Swedish assault on Russian gar- rison at Veprik Swedes resume offensive, Cavalry skirmish at Krasnokutsk: Swedish victory. Bad weather delays Swedish advance. Charles XII besieges Poltava in attempt to bring Peter I to battle. Charles XII wounded. Peter I’s army approach Poltava and con- struct field defences. Battle of Poltava. Swedes attacked with 16,000 men, leaving 5,000 to screen Pol- tava. The attack was disrupted by a series of redoubts supported by cavalry, After a force of 5,000 Swedes under Roos were cut offand destroyed, the remainder of Peter’s 40,000 men deployed facing the Swedes ‘The subsequent Swedish attack was an- nihilated, and the survivors fled. Lewanhaupt and 15,000 Swedes surrender after being trapped against the Dniepr River. Charles XII escapes and secks asylum in Turkey. The execution of the Strcltsi, 1698. Note the mixture of Western uniforms worn by the Guard regiments and the more tradicional Russian dress worn by the musketeers of the ‘foreign’ regiments of Lefort and Boutyrski. Engraving from Baron Korb’sDiary of an Austrian Secretary, 1863. (Private collection} THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN THE 1690s Faced with threats from the Swedes and Poles to the north and the Turks to the south, the Muscovite state needed a large army to defend its interests. Unfortu- nately, the army inherited by Peter wasa slothful and badly led mass, incapable of performing its duties adequately. When Peter won control of Russia in 1689 the army available to him consisted of noble cavalry, irregular Cossack cavalry, the Streltsi, and ‘foreign’ style foot regiments of dubious quality. The returns, of that year list 80,000 regular foot and 32,000 cavalry (both noble and Cossack). This force, the army of Prince Golitsyn, was ignominiously defeated by the Crimean Tartars. In 1716 Peter I wrote that ‘the army proved incapable of standing not just against civilised nations, but even against barbarians’. ‘The Streltsi The nearest Russia had to a standing army in the 1690s were the ‘Streltsi’ (musketeers). Founded in 50, this 45,000-strong corps was grouped into 22 Regiments, 16 of which were based in Moscow, with three each in Novgorod and Pskov. They regarded themselves almost as a ‘praetorian’ élite, but by the late 17th century their military commitment was often deemed less important than their ancillary civilian trades, and involvement in Kremlin in-trigues. While their peacetime duties included fire- fighting and the enforcement of law and order, their wartime performance failed to live up to the expect ations of the Tsar Both officers and men were native Russians, resistant to religious and political change, which brought them into conflict with Peter T and his programme of reforms. Following the Streltsi revolt (1698) the Moscow regiments were disbanded and the provincial regiments gradually amalgamated into Peter’s new army. These provided a stiffening of experienced troops amongst the new levies. The six Pskov and Novgorod Streltsi regiments participated inthe Narva campaign. The Streltsi were dressed in the traditional Russian long coat (kaftan) in regimental colours, with matching fur-trimmed hats. Their normal armament vwas either a pike, or both a matchlock musket and a bardiche (used as a musket rest). The pike-to-musket ratio was approximately 1:3. ‘Foreign’ Regiments Although ‘Tsar Alexis (Peter’s father) had raised a force of 80,000 conscripted infantry organised in the ‘foreign’ style, only two regiments existed in 1695: those of Francis Lefort (First Moscow) and Patrick Gordon (Boutyrsk), The other 61 regiments were disbanded between 1689 and 1695. It was recorded that this horde of conscripts lacked any military discipline: ‘They have neither stomach for great things, nor do they achieve them’ (Korb). Irregular Infantry Peter I occasionally made use of irregular foot during the 1690s, 120,000 conscript militia were raised for the Azov campaign of 1695, partly from disbanded ‘forcign’ regiments. This militia was also partly mobilised during the Streltsi revolt (1698). Of little niltary value, they have been described as ‘a mob of the lowest and most uncouth ragamuffins’ (Korb). These troops appear to have had no issued uniform, Russian troops at the siege ‘of Azov, 1696. This highly inaccurate portrayal not ‘nly includes regular Dragoons, who were not formed until 1701; the Guard infantry also wear the post-1720 pattern uniform. Note the stylised depiction of the Turkish defenders. Watercolour from Krekshnin’s History of Tsar Peter I. (The Lenin Library, Moscow) Sergei Bukhvostoy (1650-1728), ‘the first Russian soldier’ and early poteshnyi. He is dressed in the uniform ofa major of artillery (¢. 1720-5) Painted by an unknown contemporary artist. (The Russian Museum, St. Petersburg)and so probably wore the traditional kaftan and fur~ trimmed hat. Dismounted Cossacks were also employed during the assault on Azov (1696), where their performance was praised by foreign observers. The ‘Poteshnyi’ In 1682, the ten-year-old Tsar Peter and his mother moved to the royal lodge at Preobrazhenskoe, away from the dangers of the Kremlin. Once there he gradually formed a miniature army, ostensibly to teach himself the military arts. The original ‘Potesh- nyi’ (from poteshna—amusement) were fellow chil- dren as well as servants and retainers. The first to join was a 25-year-old groom, Sergei Bukhvostov, recor- ded in 1683 as ‘the first Russian soldier’. (He died in 1728 as a Major of Artillery.) Military equipment, powder, and supplies were provided from the Kremlin Arsenal, including two artillery pieces These ‘play soldiers’ were first organised as a 100- strong company of Bombardiers, which later became a title of honour in the new army; Peter himself was, enrolled as ‘the First Bombardier’, (The original Bombardiers later became a form of military ‘inner circle’ who, when deemed experienced enough, were given proper military commands.) The poteshnyi regularly fought wargames near Preobrazhenskoe, and as Peter became older their numbers grew. By 1685 they numbered 300, quartered in speci- ally built barracks near Preobrazhenskoe, and as their ranks increased a similarly sized group was quartered in barracks in the nearby village of Semyonovskoe. By this time Peter had begun to study the art of fortification, so a small fort was built near Preobraz— henskoe, which was bombarded by the growing poteshnyiartillery train, As the wargames increased in complexity professional military advice was sought, and foreign officers living in Russia were hired as temporary instructors. These foreigners eventually became the permanent officer corps of the poreshnyi, and thus eventually of the Russian army. Further drafts of Streltsi volunteers in 1687 raised the number of poteshnyi to 600, who were then organised into the Preobrazhenski and Semenovski companies, soon to become the first and second regiments of the Russian Imperial Guard. At this stage, both units included artillery and cavalry attachments. When the Regent Sophia attempted a coup in 1689, the poteshnyi, most of the Streltsi and the leading Boyars (nobles) backed Tsar Peter, forcing Sophia into e: power, he left the running of the country to his mother and her advisors while he continued his military games at Preobrazhenskoe. The only differ- ‘ence was that now there was no limit to the resources he could call upon. The poteshnyi wargames con- The return of Tsar Peter T to the Kremlin from his ‘great embassy’ to Western Europe, 25 August 1698. The soldiers are incorrectly shown wearing the post-1720 pattern uniform, Watercolour from Krekshnin’s History of Tsar Peter L. (The Library, Moscow)tinued for a further five years under the supervision of General Patrick Gordon, a Catholic Scot who had served in Russia since 1661 These increasingly large and complex manoeuvres were also dangerous: the Tsar himself was wounded by a grenade in 1690, and in the following year the boyar Dolgorukov was killed. The largest manoeuvre was staged from September to October 1694 near Koshuchovo, when six regiments of Streltsi and 920 ‘old troops’ including cavalry defended a fortification against the two potesinyi regiments, the regiments of Gordon and Lefort, anda further conscript regiment under a Col. Scharf. In all, 15,000 men were involved in the exercise, which resulted in victory for the poteshnyi and a not inconsiderable list of casualties. ‘The poteshnyi had proved their worth, and Tsar Peter was now ready to commit them to battle in earnest. The Guard Regiments The two poteshnyi companies were expanded, and officially became the Preobrazkenski and Semenovski Regiments of the Guard on 25 April 1695. Officially referred to as Life Guard Regiments, these became the first and second regiments respectively of the Russian Guard. The Guard became the Imperial Guard in 1721. This date was carried on the ‘Alexandr Nevski’ ribbon on their standards throughout their history. Indeed, an early colonel of the Preobrazhenski Regiment was Tsar Peter I himself, and subsequently it became the rule for -y Russian monarch until 1917 to hold the title of ‘First Colonel’ of the regiment. (Peter only accepted this honour in 1704, after holding the rank of Bombardier since 1695.) ‘They were initially organised into 12 companies, cach of approximately 100 men, grouped into three battalions. In addition, from 1697, there was a separate Bombardier Company of the Preobrazhen- ski Guard, formed principally from the ranks of the original Bombardiers, which was used as a special field artillery (pushkari) battery comprising six mor- tars and four field guns. This organisation was changed in1700, when the Preobrazhenski Regiment was reorganised into four battalions, and the Semenovski into three, The combined strength of both regiments at the Battle of Pasi Preobrazhenski Guard regiment, 1700-20. An early pattern plug bayonet is being fitted to. ‘Baltic~ Jock’ musket. The Fusilier’s armament and the depiction of Narva in the background indicare that the soldier is from Peter's first army of 1699-1700. Engraving from Viskovatov’s Rossiskoi Imperatorskoi Armii (St. Petersburg, 1844-30) Narva (1700) was recorded as 2,936 men, with each battalion organised into four companies of 100 men cach, excluding officers, senior NCOs and drummers. In the establishment of 1704 a Grenadier Company was added to each regiment, which unlike the Line Grenadiers were never brigaded into combined Grenadier Regiments When the two regiments were officially formed the majority of senior commissions were filled by foreigners, although some officers came from the ranks of the original Bombardiers. The only excep- tion to this was the appointment of members of thePikeman of the Preobrazhenski Guard regiment, 1700-20. Note the ornamental pike head, probably issued only to Guards regiments. The pennon is black with silver tails, and embroidered in iid. Engraving from Viskovatov’s Rossisk Imperatorskoi Armii (St. Petersburg, 1844-56). Russian nobility. Although promotion in the Petrine army was based upon merit rather than rank, an exception was made for boyars who already had a degree of military experience. For example, Prince Repnin was appointed Lieutenant-colonel of the Preobrazhenski Guard, and the Boyar Golovin was promoted to General and the Commander of the Guard Peter I always saw the role of the Guard as much in political as in military terms. The two regiments were used as a training school for young nobles who, once they proved themselves, could be given a commission, either in the Guards or in a Line regiment. These youngsters would initially join at 16, serving first in the ranks as private soldiers, Russian noblemen officers, having accepted the direction of the Petrine reforms, could then be sent on missions to ensure that the reforms were carried out, be they in the military, administrative or economic fields. 2 ‘The military career of the Preobrazhenski and Semenovski Guard Regiments reflected their dual political and military role. They both formed the core of Peter’s army during the Azov campaigns of 1695 and 1696 against the Turks, which was their first experience of combat. Commanded by General Gordon, they supressed the revolt of the Streltsi in 1698, thus safeguarding the T'sar’s political interests At the Battle of Narva, 1700, they proved the only steady troops on the field, together with Lefort’s regiment, and helped stop the Russian rout becoming a massacre. Following Narva they were used as a central reserve stationed in Moscow (and later in St. Petersburg), taking part in only three campaigns. Both regiments were instrumental in the clearing of the Neva valley, in particular the amphibious assault of the Noteborg (Schlusselburg) in 1702. They were also awarded a medal for Peter's first naval action, when guardsmen in small boats captured Swedish vessels anchored in the Neva Delta. They partici~ pated in the assault on Narva, 1704; and the guardsmen were also called upon during Charles XIT’s invasion of Russia, when both regiments participated in the Battle of Poltava, 1709. THE NEW MODEL ARMY OF 1700 Following the Streltsi revolt of 1698, the only standing army existing in Russia consisted of the Preobrazhenski and Semenovski Guards, the ‘old regiments’ of Lefort (First Moscow) and Gordon (Butyrski), and the remaining provincial Streltsi regiments. One of the most important features of Peter's vision for his new state was a modern army, modelled along Western lines. A proclamation was published in November 1699, calling for volunteers. ‘Concerning the enlist- ment of willing men into service as soldiers. Whoever wants to enlist is to have himself enrolled at Preobraz-~ henskoe, at the “soldier's hut”. Such men will be given r1 roubles per year, and will be engaged as soldiers in the Moscow regiments. When on His Majesty’s service, and wherever they may be, they will receive rations of flour, fodder and wine on thesame basis as the soldiers of the Preobrazhenski and Semenovski regiments.’ This plea for volunteers would result in the release of peasants from their serfdom, and would therefore prove alluring; but in order to raise the number of troops required con= scripts as well as volunteers would have to be enrolled. In the same month, the Tsar ordered the conscription of serfs from throughout his empire Each district of the Orthodox Church was ordered to produce 25 men, and secular landowners owning 30 to 50 farms had to provide 30 to 50 men each. This method of conscription was a throwback to the old feudal system of recruitment, and gave the almost exclusively serf army its character. By the end of January 1700 the recruits had mustered at Preobrazhenskoe, where the Tsar in- spected them, and the men were allocated into regiments. Within three months a training pro- gramme was under way, when numbers had been swelled to 32,000 by the influx of conscripts. This mass of troops were divided into 27 foot regiments each of between 953 and 1,322 men, These in turn were formed into three divisions, under the com- mand of General Golovin, General Weide and Prine: Repnin, Two mustered at Preobrazhenskoe, while Prince Repnin’s Division gathered on the lower Volga. raining was organised by the largely foreign regimental commanders, based upon the drill laid down in Golovin’s ‘Voinskie Artikuly’ (Military Articles) of 1700. Organisation of the new levy army was left in the hands of Adam Weide, whose ‘Regulations’ of 1698 were partly based upon the Austrian model. Tsar Peter took an active interest in the promulgation of the ‘Regulations’, and may even have edited parts of the work. ‘The introductory declaration certainly reflected his meritocratic philo- sophy: ‘Soldier is defined as everyone who belongs to the army, from the highest general to the lowest man.’ The new system of military ranks introduced corresponded to those in Western armies, and for the first time attempted to induce some form of pro- fessionalism into the Russian officer corps. In prac- Fusiliers of Line inti regiments, 1700-20. Notice the variety of issued Jongarms and ‘smallswords. Two of the wry figures are wearing the kartuz. Engraving from Viskovatov's Rossiskoi Imperatorskoi Armii (St. Petersburg, 1844-36) tice, this did not prevent problems with foreign officers. Apart from the inevitable problems of language and the intrinsic Russian suspicion of outsiders, many of those officers appointed turned out to be adventurers with little experience of, and only a half-hearted interest in, their profession, Many were discharged and replaced on Peter’s orders, and the proportion of native Russians in the officer corps was increased, although mainly at fairly junior levels. his was the army with which Russia entered the Great Northern War: two Guards regiments, 27 Line regiments, two dragoon regiments, and a train of artillery. In addition, the remaining provincial Streltsi regiments and the Cossacks could be called upon to aid the new-modelled army. ‘This hastily prepared force would have to face the battle hardened Swedish army before the end of the year. ‘It is only the veteran soldier who has been broken in by many years of training that is worthy of the glory of real warfare’ (Korb): Peter’s army had months rather than years in which to train The debacle at Narva exposed the shortcomings of the Russian army; in Peter’s words: “There was only one veteran regiment, that of Lefort. The two Guards regiments had been in two attacks on Narvatown, but they had never fought a battle in the open field, let alone against a regular army. In the rest of the regiments, a few Colonels excepted, officers and men alike were the merest recruits.’ The Russian distrust of foreigners exhibited itself after the battle, when the survivors blamed their performance on their foreign officers. Several were murdered, w! the army commander at Narva, the Due du Croi, apparently escaped only by surrendering to the ‘wedes. The Russians still had a long way to go. Post-Narva reforms Following Narva the Tsar was faced with the task of rebuilding his army. The 23,000 survivors together with the 10,000 men of Prince Repnin’s Division gave him the basis from which to work. As Dufly has put it: “Phe defeat certainly had the negative advantage of clearing the ground for rebuilding on new found- ations.’ Fortunately for Peter, Charles XT turned hi back on the Russians and began his six-year cam- paign in Poland, thus giving the Tsar the respite he needed. Over the next few years Peter’s policy was to husband and retrain his troops, He was, however, bound by his alliance with Augustus of Poland. Thus in 1701, and again from 1704 to 1706, a Russian division was lent to the Polish-Saxon army, and participated in the string of Allied defeats. Despite these setbacks, this was a period of improvement in fighting experience and morale. Minor campaigns in Livonia and Ingria (1701-4) produced several small victories which helped the army regain its confidence. After Hummelsdorf (1702), Peter wrote: ‘At long last we have beaten the Swedes with superior strength. Ina few years we may defeat them when our strengths are equal.’ This ‘equal’ victory at Kalisz (1706) marked a turning point in the army’s self-image. The army expanded rapidly between 1701 and 1704, so that by 1705 the establishment stood at: two regiments of Guards, 47 regiments of Line infantry, five regiments of Grena- = MaRS — EEE Above The Battle of Kalisz, 19 October 1706: Russia's first victory over the Swedes with roughly equal forces. (A) Swedish foot; (B, C) Swedish horse; (D) Russian foot; (E) Russian horse; (F) Polish horse. Engraving by Zubov from The Book of Mars, 1713. (State Historic Museum, Moscow) Capture of the Swedish fortress of Noteborg, 21 October 1702; the fortress guarded the eastern end of the River Neva. The aunphibious assault by the Guard regiments was supported by a prolonged artillery bombardment. Engraving by Zubov trom ‘The Book of Mars, 1713. (State Historic Museum, Moscow)ders, 33 regiments of Dragoons, and one regiment of Artillery. When Charles X11 advanced on Russia in 1707, army expansion slowed as the emphasis changed to replacing losses in existing regiments. The victory at Poltava (1709) justified Peter's military reforms. ‘The highest praise came from his enemies. When the Tsar proposed a toast to the captured Swedish generals, calling them ‘my teachers’, Marshal Rehnskold re ‘the pupils have delivered a good return to their masters’, The reform process continued more gradually after Pol~ tava. Garrison regiments were created, and army administration improved. The final ‘Military Code’ of 1716 consolidated the process, and remained in use largely unchanged until 1900. By Peter’s death in 1725 the last trace of the feudal host he inherited had gone, replaced by a powerful regular army organised on European lines. ORGANISATION In the past, Tsar Peter I has been credited with the first complete remodelling of the old, semi-feudal Muscovite army. In fact, much of the groundwork for his reforms had been laid by his father, Tsar Alexis Michaclovich, assisted by foreign advisers, the prin- cipal being General Alexander Gordon. The army at the start of the Tartar campaign of 1689 consisted of 63 forcign regiments, 44 Streltsi regiments, 8,000 noble cavalrymen, about 2,000 gunners and engineers, and around 10,000 Cossack a total of over 150,000 men, The proportion of cavalry in the army was much lower than that found in Western European armies of the same period. Although regimental organisations appeared to change according to the whims of each successive senior foreign adviser, a basic structure could be determined for the Russian army of the 1680s-9os. ‘The ‘foreign’ regiments comprised an average of 1,200 men in eight companies of 130 men cach. Each company consisted of both pikemen and musketeers, in the ratio of 1:3. Streltsi regiments were larger, with an establishment of 2,000 men, divided into 10 *‘Sornias’ (companies) of 200 men. The use of pikes in the same ratio as in the foreign regiments was a was one of Peter's ablest generals. He was also instrumental in reforming the army after Narvi (State Historic Museum, Mascow) Boris Sheremecev (1652-1719); commander of the army during the Livonian campaigns and of the foot at Poltava, he Western imposition which reflected the lack of cavalry in the army. ‘The new Petrine army was organised for the most part along conventional Western lines. The organis- ational impetus for this came from a series of military regulations, often written by foreign officers but edited and sometimes altered by Peter himself. Each new regulation was the result of military experience. In other words, the organisation of the army was directly influenced by military experience acquired during the great Northern War or the Turkish campaign of 1711 Regulations of 1698 Each infantry regiment (folk) consisted of two battalions, each of five companies. ‘The exceptions to this were the Preobrazhenski Guard regiment, which had four battalions, and the Iscommanded the Guards at Poltava. Portrait by an unknown contemporary artist. (State Historic Museum, Moscow) General-Field-Marshal M. Golitsyn (1675-1730); a8 a divisional commander he Ted the Russian attack at Dobroe (August 1708), and Semenoyski Guard regiment and Moscoyski, Kiev- ski, Narvski and Ingermanlandski Line regiments, which each consisted of three battalions. Each regi- ment was commanded by a colonel, almost invariably while a lieutenant-colonel or major commanded the remaining battalion(s). In addition, a battery of two 3-pdr. guns was attached to each regiment. (See Tables A & B.) Regulations of 1704 The new ‘establishment’ created by General Ogilvy whilst campaigning in Livonia was based on the experiences of the Narva and Neva campaigns. The ‘enlarged’ regiments retained their extra battalions, and all regiments kept their regimental artillery battery. Each infantry battalion was to consist of four ‘companies of Fusiliers, while in addition each regi- ment received a further company of Grenadiers. The le basic company organisation remained the same, with the addition of two sergeants, two corporals and 31 other ranks (soldniki). Reforms of 1708 Although no complete set of military regulations was produced, a number of reforms were introduced. On 10 March 1708 an edict from Peter stated that henceforth regiments would be named after pro- vinces and towns rather than after their colonel. This increased regimental pride and allowed traditions to continue when the colonel changed. From 1708, the Grenadier companies attached to each regiment were split from their parent unit and used to form five ‘converged’ Grenadier regiments. Only the two Guards regiments and the Ingermanlandski and Astrakhanski Line regiments retained their Grena- dier companies, Reforms of 1712 The ukase of 19 February 1712 laid down a new standard regimental establishment of 1,487 men in two battalions, each of four Fusilier companies and an attached battery of two regimental guns. This was broken down as follows: 3 senior officers; 34 junior officers; 32 sergeants; 48 corporals; 16 drummers; 9 20 soldiers; 29 non-combatants; 24 vers; and 86 servants (denchikii). musicians; 1 artisans; 86 d Code of On 30 March 1716 Peter published the ‘Military Code of the Year 1716" (Ustav Voinskoi 1716 goda), a military manual that remained in use largely un- altered until 1900. Under the new organisation, the Guards re} consisted of three battalions, the remaining 35, regiments having two battalions. Regimental strength remained largely the same as laid down in the ukase of 1711, apart from the attached denchiki, who were reduced from 86 to 54. All these military organisations reflected the official strength of a unit. Losses from starvation, disease, desertion and, to a lesser extent, from combat would reduce these strengths markedly iments and the Ingermanlandski regiment e Army organisation During the entire reign of Peter the Great there was no permanent military organisation in the RussianOrganisation of a Two Battalion Russian Regiment, 1700 See Company 1 Captain 1 Lieutenant 1 Ensign 1 NCO Ensign 1 Captain of Arms (Armourer) 1 Doctor | 4 Adjutant | 1 Clerk 4 Corporals 2 Drummers 18 Pikemen 84 Fusiliers army above the regimental level. The army of 1700 was organised into three ‘divisions’ each of nine regiments, which in turn were sub-divided into three or four ‘brigades’ of two or three regiments each This reflected the situation which existed in the majority of contemporary Western armies, 1¢ Code of 1716 also emphasised that higher formations could be formed and reformed during a campaign. The ‘division’ was defined as ‘an army formation, in which several brigades come together under the direction of a single general’. In peacetime it was also used as an administrative formation for a number of regiments billeted in the same province. ‘The ‘brigade’ was simply defined as a formation which comprised two, three or more regiments. This, allowed the composition of ad hac formations, such as the special force commanded by Peter at the Battle of Lesnaya in 1708. In the Code of 1716, it was described as: ‘a korvolan (flying corps)... . of between six and seven thousand men. ... For these purposes we employ not only the cavalry, butalso the infantry, armed with light guns, according to the circum- stances of time and pla RECRUITMENT & MANPOWER The officers ‘The majority of the officers appointed to Peter’s first army were foreigners, principally Saxons. These proved of variable quality, the best available officers no doubt already serving in the Saxon army of Augustus II. The English ambassador in Russia, Charles Whitworth, wrote in January 1707: ‘they havea great want of experienced officers ... the most they haye are Saxon men of little reputation, and it is a question whether they will keep their companies and not fall into some gross disorder on the approach of the enemy’. General Manstein, writing of his military observations during Peter’s reign, describes, 7these foreign officers as being ‘the most useless throw-outs from the rest of Europe’. For this reason the Tsar attempted to increase the number of native Russian officers in the army, largely but not exclusively recruited from the ranks of the nobility. The autocratic nature of Peter’s Russia was such that the social system could be modified to serve the needs of the state. Thus for the nobility, social status was inextricably linked to state service, Nobles were recruited into state service at the age of 16, into either the army, navy or the civil service, Connections ensured enrolment as a common soldier into the Guard regiments, whose ranks rapidly became filled with potential officers serving a period in the ranks while gaining knowledge of their profession. A Petrine edict of 1714 attempted to introduce a programme of military education to increase pro- fessionalism. This avoided the situation where young officers were: ‘either ignorant of the fundamentals of soldiering, or if they had served in the army, have one so only for show and for a matter of weeks or months? (Beskrovnyi). Other influences were exerted on these potential young officers. Hundreds were sent abroad in 1700 and 1705, and colleges teaching military skills were opened. This led to a steady improvement in the standard of native Russian officers. Military ranks in the Western style were intro- duced, and in 1722 the Table of Ranks equated these to similar naval and civil ranks, ensuring a guaranteed level of status and pay. One of the advantages of the Petrine system was the emphasis on promotion by merit, where commoners could be made officers, and thus achieve ennoblement. The ranks used through~ out the Petrine period were as follows: Generalissmus General Feldmarshal Generalshef General Poruchik Major-General (supreme commander) (field-marshal) (general) (lieutenant-general) (major-general) (brigadier) (colonel) (major 1st class) (major 2nd class) Brigadir Polkovnik Major (151) Major (2nd) Kapitan (captain) Poruchik (lieutenant) Podporuchik (2nd lieutenant) Praporshchik (ensign) ‘The last four were deemed ‘under-officer’ ranks, the rest classified as being ‘over-officers’. Guard officers were graded two ranks higher than their given rank Military rank meant responsibility as well as ge. The edict of 1716 stated: ‘As the officers are pri Peter I, The sash colours are red over blue over white. (State Historic Museum, Moscow) Full-dress uniform of a colonel of the Preobrazhenski Guard regiment, c.1720-5. This example belonged to TsarDetail of an engraving of the Battle of Poltava, 28 June 1709, by Nicolas de Larmessin. The Russian regiments on the left are deployed in two lines, the battalions interspersed with regimental guns. (State Hermitage Mus St. Petersburg) The Order of St. Andrew: with associated light blue sash. Instituted by Peter I, the order was awarded t0 senior officers for outstanding achievement ‘on behalf of the state. Recipients included Sheremetev, Menshikov and the tsar himself. (State Museums of the Moscow Kremlin) Siimpesurrecee meson to the soldiers as fathers are to children, so they must act in a paternal fashion and as the children without question obey their fathers, and lay all their hopes with them, they in turn should look after mainten- ance, instruction, nourishment and all that is re~ quired.’ This relationship between officers and men was a world removed from that found in Western armies; these paternal responsibilities and increasing professionalism were, of course, embraced more cagerly by some than others. A later 18th-century Western officer noted that: “There can exist striking differences between individual officers of the same regiment’ (Masson), ‘The improvement in the quality and number of native Russian officers was a gradual process but, by 1725, 42 out of 65 officers ranked major-general or above were Russian, as were most under-officers. Themen Peter's first army was a mixture of volunteers and conscripts, but after Narva the need for soldiers outweighed any considerations of free will. A national levy in 1701 was followed by a system of compulsory military service in 1705, which continued throughout Peter’s reign. Any voluntary scheme of enrolment was abandoned largely because it undermined the tight control of serfs by the Russian landowning classes. Conscription meant that in theory all classes were obliged to perform military service. In practice, 19Line infantry colours, anda tricorne regiment, 1700-32. No trimmed with gold standard uniform was feathers. Engraving from Viskovatov’s Rossiskoi Imperatorskoi Armii (St. Petersburg, 1844-56). issued to commissioned officers. This captain wears a green coat faced red, 1 sash in the national conscripts were chosen by landowners or village councils, later replaced by district authorities (sev das). Naturally, the least productive members of society were chosen: ‘If amongst his peasants or servants there is an incorrigible thief, then he will send him. In the absence of a thief, he will dispatch a drunkard or an idler’ (Langeron) Military service was for life, later reduced to a period of 25 years. The high attrition rate due to sickness, starvation or fatigue meant that_most conscripts would never return to their homes. From 1705 to 1715 an average of 40,000 men were 20 conscripted each year, most aged between 16 and 20. Desertion was rife, despite a move in 1712 to brand conscripts, and those who survived long enough to join their regiments found conditions extremely punishing, Discipline was harsh. ‘The initial disciplinary codes dated from the reign of Tsar Alexis, but Peter revised these in 1716, Both codes were characterised by their severity, and were based on the civilian system of deterrents. The penalty for minor offences was hanging, while more serious capital offences were punished by decapitation, breaking on the wheel, or burning. More minor punishments included piercing the tongue with a red-hot iron, savage beatings with the knout, or, after 1716, the Swedish punishments of sitting on a wooden horse or running the gauntlet. On occasion, units which had been routed were subjected to a lottery which chose one man in ten to be shot, while his colleagues were simply beaten. Although the more serious punishments were severer than those normal in many Western armies of the period, they mirrored the Russian civil codes, A later Russian officer commented: ‘Foreign armies are composed of freemen, and ours of serfs, The first kind of person must be treated with some circumspection, whereas our men are long-enduring and docile’ (Orlov) Rations took the form of an issue of flour and water, from which the soldiers baked bread or sukhare, a type of biscuit. When available this diet was supplemented by cabbage, used to make shchi, and washed down with vas, a weak beer produced from rye bread, Meat, when available, had to be purchased by the soldiers themselves, or the artel—a group of about 25 men messing together. Training was the responsibility of the individual regiment, based upon the successive Military Codes. Drills for firing and manoeuvring were laid down for the whole army, but it was not until 1716 that a standardised schedule of training was introduced. One of the problems with Peter’s army was the lack of suitable NCOs, all being serfs promoted from the ranks. Therefore, in 1721, a soldiers’ school was founded in each garrison town, whose aim was to increase the number of NCOs, scribes and artisans in the army. Although the lot of the Petrine soldier was hard and his chances of survival slim, the stoic attitude and tolerance of appalling’ conditions resulting fromiene ity The Guard 28. Destroyed 1707 1. Preobrazhenski 2: Semenovski 29, Destroyed 17 Line Raise bfare 1609: 1. Lefort (Lefort) First Moskovskifrom Raised in 1702-3 3o. Ingermanlandski 2. Butyrski (Buryrski) gi. Narvski Raised in 16093 32. Koporieschski 3. Rostovski (Caspar Gole) 33. Tobolski 4 Kievski (Withelm von 34. Ryazanski Delden) 35. Nevski 5. Sibirienski (Friedrich von Werden) 6. Vologdski (Roman Bruce) 36, St. Peterbourgshi 7. Pskovshi (Gol. Mewes) 8 Schlusselburgski (Matthias Trieden) 9. Archangelski (Alex Deydut) 37. Kargopolsi ro, Nishegorodski (Col, Boblmann) 11, Smolenski (lias Bis) 38, Ustiugski 12. Tichernigovski (Col, von Schweden) 15, Asovaki (yan Busch) 9. Byelgorodski 14, Viadimirski (Col. Jungor) 4. Yamburgski 15, Kazanski (ohana von Delden) 41, Destroyed 1707 16, Moskvaski 17, Novgorodski (Col. Tvaniesky) (Nicklaus Balk) 18. Voronezhski (Theodor Balk) Raised in 1704: 1, Luzkski (Nicklaus von 442, Destroyed 1707 Werden) 2p, Yaroslavshi (Johamn Treiden) 31, Permski (Ivan Angler) 43, Destroyed 1707 a2, Vyatski (Paul Berner) 23, Tverski (Col, Dewsin) 44. Destroyed 1707 Disbanded 1712 (Johann Berner) Garrison Rgt. from ra 46. Olonetaski (Alexander Gordon) 47. Galitschski (Col Fliwerk) (Johann Culm) Raised in 1706-7: Viborgshii from 48. Lvangorodski ria 49, Renteel 24. Byelosershi 45. Destroyed 1707 25, Astrakhanski 26. Troizki 2 Inglis (Zacharias Crow) Raised in 1708: Denis Bils from 50. von Fichtenheim i701 51. Schnewenz (Peter von 52. Simbirski Bushowden) 53. Periaslavski Lewison from 170154. Sotovski 55. Tolbuchin 536. Fraser (Aleande Ostrovski Menshikos) Schmidt (Gal Schonbeck) (Col. Skripzyn) (Prince Repnin) Disbanded in 1712 (used to form the cadres ofthe Garrison Infamy regiments) (Col, Lange) Kargopolski (Gol, Kulikoy) Not Oloneteki fully raised until Simbirski 1706 ‘Tyerski (Governor Apraxin) Oustioneyski Name changed in Yambourgski 12 Isangorodski (Stekalov) Pereslavshi Disbanded 1712 Belozerski (Col. Oserov) Disbanded 1712 (Gol, Augustos) Raised in 1722 (Army ofthe Lower Caspian) also know asthe Nizevoi Dorpous! (Col. West) 59. Asterabadshi Disbanded 1712 66. Bukurski (Col, Romanoyski) 61. Hyrkanski (Old Strelsi Rewt. 62, Schirvanski 63. Sinsliski 64, Masenderanski (Col 5. Derbentski Kanischtschey) Old 66. Ryazhtschki Strcltsi Reg. 6. Daghestanski (Col, Danilov) Old Sucltsi Regt Grenadiers (Col, Nelidov) O14 1, Prince Repnin’s (ater Taylor's, then Suelesi Rest Lacey's) (Col. Gulitz)Old 2. Buseh’s (later Weide’, then Strcltsi Regt Hallar’s) (Col. Scharf) 3. Ensberg’s (later Du Bois, then (Col. Stubensk) ‘Kampenhausen’s) 4. Biles (later Hagen's) 5. Prince Baryatinshi's (later Sykov's) (Col. Bokan) (Col Rentzly: Note:‘The name in brackets isthe regimental name used before 1708, when, folowing the Tsar's whas, almost all regiments were named after a town or province. The number given refers to seniority ont (1) Formed from the survivors of the Battle of F (2) Regiments 59-67 were « ‘regiments, as follows: four companies each came from the Grenadier Regiments Sykov and Kampenhausen, a no regiment was given a regimental number, as was the case in some Western armies stadt (Regiments listed as 26-7, 42-5) eated to guard the new Russian territories acquired during the Caspian campaign. ‘They were formed from exiting the Line Regiments Luzki, Schlusselburgski, Azovski, Kazanski, Ryazanski, Nishegorodski, Moskovshi, St. Petersburgski, Viborgski, Galitishski, Troiteki, Sibirski, Koporyeschshi, Archangelshi, Pshovski, Voronceski, Tobolski and Vologdshi, 1¢ Daghestanski Regiment had no Grenadier Company. (5)'The first four composite Grenadier Regiments were formed in 1708, the last-named in 1710 from the Grenadier Companies of Line Regiments. After 1708 only the Guard Regiments and the Ingermanlandski and Astrakhanski Regiments retained their Grenadier Companies, serfdom enabled him to endure army life. This tendency was reinforced by increasing national pride and a normally fervent Orthodox religious belief. ‘The old Russian soul, even when clothed in a uniform of Western cut, remained the same; when the soldier was freed from his former master he simply moved toa new kind of lifelong serfdom. Although the serf nature of the army meant that initiative and skilled training were lacking compared with other European armies, the system did have its advantages. Throughout the 18th century Russian soldiers displayed, when adequately led, a level of 2Foot Guard Regiments Moskovski Preobrazhenski Narvski Semenovski Nischin-Novgorodski Grenadier Regiments Novgorodski Bieltz, Pskovski Busch Schlusselburgski Du Bois Troitski Prince Repnin Siberienski Line Regiments Vologdski Apraxin von Rentzel Azovski Garrison Regiments Ingermanlandski Byelgorodski Yaroslayski Natyaevski Kievski Nekludovski Lefort Horse Cavalry Escort Moskovski The Life squadron Narvski Menshikov’s squadron Nevski Horse Grenadier Regiments Nischnin-Novgorodski Kropotov Novgorodski Roschnev Novotroitski van der Roop Permski Dragoon Regiments Riazanski Archangelski Sibirienski Azovski ‘Tyerski Ingermanlandski Viatski Yaroslavski Viadimirski Kievski Vologdski Artillery 1 light battery 2 medium batteries 2 heavy batteries 2 mortar batteries Total of 72 guns In redoubts (Augustov): 1 light battery 2 medium batteries Main train (Bruce): endurance and stoic courage which was unusual in other armies. *,.. Taken as individuals the Russians are gentle, even timorous. But massed in battalions they manifesta herd-like cohesion which makes them redoubtable, and sometimes unbeatable’ (Masson). n Detail from the ‘Battle of Poltava’ mosaic by Mikhail Lomonosow, 1736. The Russian soldier despatching the Swede is UNIFORMS & EQUIPMENT Uniforms incorrectly dressed in the post-1720 pattern uniform of the Preabrazhenski Guards. (The Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg) From their inception Tsar Peter dressed his poteshinye in uniforms of a Western cut, completing the Westernisation of dress begun by the ‘foreign regi ments’ of Tsar Alexis. When the new army was formed in the winter of 1699-1700 these Western styles were adopted by the whole an of the noble or irregular cavalry. With the exception of a few particularly Russian features such as the kartuz the now resembled its Western counterparts, at least in dress. The basic features of the Petrine uniforms were similar for Guard, Grena- dier and Line regiments alike, with each regiment having a uniform colour chosen by the regimental commander. As the Russian textile industry was in its infancy, the majority of material for early Petrine uniforms was imported from England and Holland, The materials used were coarse, and quality varied almost as widely as regimental coat colours. ‘The cost of clothing was deducted from the soldiers’ pay. No dress code was imposed for officers, and they usually wore finer quality versions of the soldiers’ coats, embellished with gold trim. This freedom army