Policy Issues

Beyond Orthodoxy: Asserting Latin

America’s New Strategic Options
Toward the United States
Roberto Russell
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

ABSTRACT

This essay explores the possibility that Latin America may deploy
new strategic options in its relations with Washington at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century. It starts by evaluating what have
been the five major foreign policy models of the region with regard
to Washington since the end of the Cold War. It proceeds by eval-
uating the recent dynamics of Latin American insertion into world
affairs. Then it introduces three new alternatives for handling U.S.-
Latin American relations in the coming years. It concludes by point-
ing out the importance of understanding the scope of the hemi-
spheric challenges for both the region and Washington.

A t the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, it

has become apparent that the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine
is dwindling. A combination of structural factors and recent dynamics at
the global, hemispheric, regional, and U.S. levels is generating an
unprecedented conjuncture: Latin America in general, and South Amer-
ica in particular, have the opportunity to decrease the scope of their
dependency on the United States; to renegotiate, on better grounds,
their asymmetry in regard to Washington; and to accelerate their diver-
sified world insertion.
A pragmatic China is arriving in the area with resources, trade, and
soft power. An unsatisfied Russia is returning to the region with com-
merce, on the one hand, and a new military muscle, on the other. An
assertive Iran is closer to South and Central America, both diplomatically
and in terms of energy politics. An emerging India is making incipient and
productive contacts with Latin America, on the economic and political
sides. An active South Africa is growing involved in South-South cooper-
ation with Southern Cone countries, Argentina and Brazil in particular.
Even Japan is showing a renewed interest in the area. Europe is still
an important market and a key source of technology for South America
and an important aid provider for Central America and the Caribbean.

© 2011 University of Miami

128 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

Since 2005, two South America-Arab country summits were held, while
two South America-Africa summits were carried out since 2006. Simul-
taneously, several nonstate forces—antiglobalization movements, global
NGOs, political groups, transnational criminal organizations—have
increased their presence in the hemisphere, while the U.S. government
has been deeply concentrating on domestic issues, markedly obsessed
for a long time with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda, and recently
overwhelmed by the revolts in northern Africa and the Middle East.
Even though the current global economic crisis is paramount in its
scope and proportion, Latin American countries are better prepared
than they were one decade ago for such a major external shock. There
is no clear perspective on the evolution of this critical conjuncture, even
though the region can probably endure this moment and still begin a
new phase of economic growth with a more solid standing than in the
1980s and 1990s. Obviously, there are several major problems that affect
Latin America. Several of them need global solutions (for example,
drugs and organized crime), others the regtion has dealt with (for exam-
ple, domestic institutional crisis and bilateral political frictions), and
most of them (especially the social agenda) are being tackled by the
individual governments, with mixed results.
Meanwhile, the U.S.-Latin American agenda—trade, illicit drugs,
migration, environment, investment, organized crime, corruption,
energy, democracy, human rights, rule of law—is directly intertwined
with a multiplicity of interests, policies, and actors. On most of these
issues, Washington has adopted a defensive or reactive posture. This is
quite surprising, because in recent years the United States has suffered
some setbacks in the region. For example, the Free Trade Area of the
Americas was neither signed nor started in 2005 as it was originally sup-
posed to be. The latest Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago
(April 2009) showed that the United States has no new issues to pro-
pose and discuss with the area. U.S. immigration initiatives, at both the
federal and state levels, have created criticism throughout the hemi-
sphere without solving any of the domestic problems of the United
States. President Barack Obama’s trip to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador in
March 2011 was overshadowed by the Libyan crisis.
Keeping all this in mind, this essay attempts to introduce a medium-
and long-term perspective to U.S.-Latin American relations. It assumes
that what we see as deep structural trends will bring significant shifts to
interamerican relations: the redistribution of global power; the growing
relevance of Latin America for U.S. domestic politics, as well as the
resources located in the region (namely water, energy, and minerals);
the loss of U.S. relative importance for some actors in the region, espe-
cially in South America; the probability of a genuine rise, for the first
time in Latin American history, of an ascendant power (Brazil); the
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 129

increase of extrahemispheric actors’ interests and influence in the

region; and the deepening of the dual impact of the process of global-
ization: the opening of new and wider opportunities for Latin American
international diversification and the persistence of unevenness at the
domestic level.
It is also necessary to clarify the nature of this essay. First, we iden-
tify the five major foreign policy models followed by the region in
regard to the United States since the end of the Cold War. Specific
examples are given for explaining these models and understanding their
main characteristics. Second, we develop the three major strategic
options available to the region for the handling of U.S.-Latin American
relations in the coming years. This section has a clear normative char-
acter. The current challenges and dilemmas faced by interamerican rela-
tions demand heterodoxy. We refer to a need to combine ethical com-
mitments, new evidence-based analysis, and long-term strategic
thinking. We conclude by assessing the feasibility of the three strategies
proposed.

FIVE MODELS OF FOREIGN POLICY

TOWARD THE UNITED STATES
Since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has experienced five
models of foreign policy toward the United States. They all imply a par-
ticular approach to the global system, a specific type of relationship with
Washington, and a singular role assigned to the region in each country’s
external relations. In some cases, more than one model has been imple-
mented during the last two decades. In general, this reflects the exis-
tence of changing government policies, while the few exemptions may
show the existence of a “grand strategy.”1 The five models are coupling,
accommodation, limited opposition, challenge, and isolation. They all
reveal a set of premises and practices.

Coupling

Coupling is characterized by bandwagoning with U.S. strategic interests,

at both a global and a regional level. It strives to participate actively in
the creation and maintenance of international regimes that coincide with
Washington’s position, especially on sensitive issues linked to global
security. It supports regional economic integration as long as this does
not disrupt free trade agreements with the United States. In political and
cultural terms, relations with other Latin American countries are slightly
more relevant, although they are not a matter of a significant diplomatic
activity: Washington is the guiding light for the countries that follow this
foreign policy.
130 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

The domestic economic model is strongly orthodox and is struc-

tured, in general terms, according to the basic guidelines of the neolib-
eral economic agenda, at one point stimulated by the “Washington Con-
sensus.” It assumes that market forces, and not the state power, enable
a more dynamic and fruitful insertion of the country into the world
system. Moreover, it accepts the fundamental rules of the international
economic and financial order, and it fully believes in the overall bene-
fits of free trade agreements. In essence, it defends the global status
quo, it conceives the United States as an ally, and it is notably indiffer-
ent toward the region.
The most emblematic cases of coupling are Mexico (during the gov-
ernment of Carlos Salinas), Argentina (during the government of Carlos
Menem), and Colombia (during the government of Alvaro Uribe). The
cases that are closest to this model are Peru (during the governments of
Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo, and Alan García), Bolivia (during
Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada’s first concluded government and his
second nonconcluded government), and the countries of Central Amer-
ica (except Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama) and the Dominican Repub-
lic in the Caribbean.
The determination by the Salinas government to sign the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the participation of the
Menem government in the first Persian Gulf War (1991), and the sup-
port of the Uribe administration for U.S. military intervention in Iraq in
2003 are some eloquent examples of bandwagoning with the United
States on fundamental issues of its international agenda. In general, fol-
lowing the United States is combined with a strong rhetoric in favor of
this course of action. As Washington is usually the focus of these coun-
tries’ attention, they perceive their own neighborhood as relatively
uncomfortable and as a low priority in terms of their global insertion.
Two corollaries follow from this position: a free-riding spirit and a low
tendency toward common regional positions.
The cases that are closest to coupling have appealed, under differ-
ent circumstances, to the fight against terrorism and illicit drugs (Peru
under the governments of Fujimori and Toledo, several Central Ameri-
can countries, and the Dominican Republic), economic reforms and the
fight against narcotrafficking (Bolivia under Sánchez de Losada), and the
war in Iraq in 2003 (Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Domini-
can Republic), in order to demonstrate proximity to Washington and
acceptance of its policies with respect to these critical issues.

Accommodation

Accommodation is characterized by selectively accompanying the

United States under certain circumstances. It promotes an active role in
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 131

the configuration of international regimes, preferably in harmony with

Washington. It conceives regional economic integration according to
strict pragmatic motivations, without a firm commitment to collective
mechanisms. Economic diplomacy is fundamental, at both global and
hemispheric levels. Accommodation assigns to the relation with neigh-
bors a fairly relevant place, partly to negotiate individually with the
United States under more favorable conditions.
The defense of basic international and interamerican principles
leads to dissociation from Washington on numerous issues of the inter-
national and regional agenda. The accommodation model seeks to
counteract the harmful effects of the so-called neoliberal economic
model (in terms of inequality, unemployment, deindustrialization, etc.)
by means of compensatory social policies. It promotes a balance
between market and state when projecting foreign policy toward Wash-
ington, the region, and the world. Moreover, it seeks a moderate revi-
sion of international rules and institutions in the commercial and finan-
cial fields. Essentially, it tries to introduce a partial fine-tuning to the
global order; it defines the United States as a friend; and it keeps a posi-
tion of relative indifference toward the region. The emblematic cases are
Chile and Costa Rica. The cases that are closest to this model are Mexico
(during the governments of Zedillo, Fox, and Calderón), Uruguay,
Panama, and occasionally Ecuador (up to the inauguration of President
Rafael Correa in January 2007).
The simultaneity of positions favorable to the promotion of free
trade agreements with the United States and the refusal to legitimate
Washington’s war against Iraq in 2003 have characterized both Chilean
and Costa Rican foreign policies. Costa Rica, within the Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) framework, and Chile, bilaterally, have
signed trade agreements with the United States. However, Washington
did not achieve the support of either of these two countries to invade
Iraq: Costa Rica, in appealing to its pacifist tradition, did not actively back
the invasion as did some of its neighbors, while Chile, as a nonperma-
nent member, expressed its opposition at the United Nations Security
Council. The diplomatic capacity to maneuver in turbulent waters, inter-
nally and externally, during difficult times, together with the invocation
of their democratic credentials and their attachment to international law,
has enabled Costa Rica and Chile to avoid letting a key security issue
contaminate important matters included in the economic agenda of their
respective relations with Washington.
The cases that are closest to accommodation have also appealed to
law so as to take some distance from the United States. Mexico, during
Zedillo’s government, successfully called upon the OAS Inter-American
Juridical Committee to provide a legal opinion on the 1996 Helms-
Burton Act on Cuba: the committee considered the act a violation of
132 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

international law because it exceeded extraterritorial matters. Moreover,

Mexico under Fox did not side with the United States at the U.N. Secu-
rity Council on the war against Iraq. Mexico under Calderón also
resorted to legal arguments to express its criticism of U.S. state laws on
migration—mainly in the case of Arizona.
With other opportunities, some governments tried to establish a
modus vivendi with the United States by balancing political and eco-
nomic issues. Thus, Panama signed a free trade agreement with the
United States while it approved the enlargement of the Panama Canal,
favoring the interests of China, through the Hutchinson-Whampoa firm.
At one point, Quito advanced free trade negotiations with Washington
without abstaining from strongly criticizing the U.S. Plan Colombia,
which was having negative spillover effects for Ecuador’s security. In
2006, Uruguay backed Venezuela in its unsuccessful search for a non-
permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council while it signed, with the
other hand, an investment agreement with the United States.

Limited Opposition

The limited opposition model advocates a mixed policy toward the

United States that combines disagreement and collaboration, conver-
gence and obstruction, deference and resistance. Regional integration is
considered essential to enhance the negotiating power of the area, both
individually and collectively, with respect to the United States. Political
relations with the neighbors are important to strengthen the diplomatic
dialogue with Washington.
Limited opposition promotes a more heterodox internal model of
development, neodesarrollismo, and is much more sensitive to domes-
tic social issues. It assigns the state a key role both in economics and
politics. Furthermore, it promotes significant changes in the interna-
tional economic and financial institutions while discouraging or reject-
ing the establishment of a free trade agreement with the United States.
In short, it favors a reform of the global order—which it conceives as
highly inequitable; it perceives the United States as a dual player (a
combination of threat and opportunity); and it gives a crucial impor-
tance to regional relations.
The emblematic case of this model is Brazil. The cases that are clos-
est to this model are Argentina (the governments of Presidents Néstor
Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), Venezuela (the first part,
1998–2002, of Hugo Chávez’s administration), Bolivia (the government
of Evo Morales), and Ecuador (the Correa government).
Brazil, as the exemplary case of this model, presents a unique con-
dition in Latin America: it is an emerging power with aspirations to
regional leadership and extrahemispheric projection. This forces Brasília
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 133

to take some distance from Washington in order to be recognized as a

major power in the area but also forces it to be close enough to the
United States to gain Washington’s support for its international ascen-
dance. In other words, Brasília partly competes with Washington while
at the same time it needs U.S. backing to carry out its desire to play a
more active and decisive role in the international arena.
The cases that are closest to this model tend to oscillate between a
relatively pragmatic (Argentina and Ecuador) and a highly ideological
position (Venezuela and Bolivia). These countries have suffered strong
internal turbulence, which explains, to a great extent, the reorientation
of their foreign policies: the collapse of the traditional two-party system
in Venezuela, the political-economic collapse of Argentina in 2001–2,
the quasi–state collapse in Bolivia before Morales, and the repeated
institutional crises in Ecuador since the 1990s. In all these cases, the role
of the United States—either through manifest underattention or direct
interference—was important, and created the incentives for the incom-
ing governments to distance themselves from Washington. Relative
strengths and weaknesses (the possession of some strategic asset or a
prolonged decline) are significant in terms of the sustainability of this
foreign policy model.

Challenge

The challenge model promotes drastic distancing policies and the open
rejection of the United States, at both global and regional levels. It is
based on the belief that national security is in danger and therefore that
survival is the main interest at stake. It emphasizes a holistic integration
at a regional level, implying by this an integration that includes the eco-
nomic, political, diplomatic, cultural, and military dimensions; this type
of “integration from below” would serve as an antidote to the “integra-
tion from above” promoted by Washington with the approval of the old,
traditional elites. In due course, it seeks to create a new, radical domes-
tic socioeconomic model. In the meantime, it adopts decisions to
strengthen the regulatory and interventionist role of the state, conceived
as crucial for the management of external political and economic rela-
tions. In addition, it severely questions the class-based, uneven interna-
tional economic and financial order while it actively opposes free trade
agreements with the United States. In sum, it looks for a complete revi-
sion of the global order; it sees the United States as an enemy; and it
assigns the region a fundamental role for attaining the model’s main
objectives. The most emblematic cases are Cuba and Venezuela (after
the failed coup d’état of 2002).
Two further elements characterize this model: the influence exerted
by the challengers in the region through the propagation of their revo-
134 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

lutionary project, using important symbolic and material resources, and

the configuration of extraregional alliances with actors that rival the
United States. The first factor (today expressed through Chávez’s politi-
cal action in the region, as by Cuba in the past) irritates Washington, but
it does not directly affect U.S. national security. Contrary to this, the
second factor (such as the relations between La Habana and Moscow
during the Cold War and between Caracas and Teheran after September
11, 2001) directly affects U.S. vital interests.

Isolation

This model is characterized by a comprehensive support of the United

States, but without calling attention to either its own people or out-
siders.2 Regional integration is defined in opportunistic terms. The
model does not seek to alter the rules of the game of the hemispheric
system. It is basically interested in obtaining from Washington as many
concessions as possible, with the central purpose of preserving the
internal status quo.
The isolation model encourages a low-profile foreign policy with
very limited goals in the region and worldwide. Fundamentally, it does
not pretend any transformation of the global order; it relates to the
United States as a client; and it conceives its neighborhood as significant
mainly for domestic reasons. The emblematic case is Paraguay under the
governments led by the Partido Colorado. In 2008, with the government
of President Fernando Lugo, which ended the long hegemony of that
political party, which began in 1947, Asunción has not altered this pat-
tern of relations with the United States.3
Some of the examples that are closest to this model are located in
the Caribbean, an area increasingly dependent on the United States on
a vast range of political, economic, social, military, and cultural issues.
President Barack Obama’s launching of the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative in 2009 will probably reinforce this type of linkage.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE WORLD:

BETWEEN NOVELTY AND DIVERSITY
The diversity of foreign policy models in Latin America is not new; such
variety existed before and after the Cold War. In the past as in the present,
this plurality reflects the distinctive circumstances of a diverse group of
countries, all of which have varied interests. Relative power, geographic
location, national or governmental interests, ideological motives, pragmatic
considerations, and, on occasion, a certain dogmatism have determined
the policies of Latin American countries toward Washington. This is a struc-
tural trait that diminishes or flourishes under different conditions.
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 135

In the last 20 years, Latin America has gone through two phases
characterized by this dynamic. First, during the 1990s, the region
showed a remarkable homogeneity in the way it defined its policies
toward the United States. Three factors strongly influenced this extraor-
dinary phenomenon: the end of the Cold War, the democratization of
Latin America, and the broad acceptance that the import substitution
model had come to an end, as a consequence of the advent of global-
ization in its neoliberal form. Latin America as a whole adapted to this
historic cycle, which concluded with the victory of the West, and to a
great extent, supported Washington’s agenda for the enlargement of lib-
eral democracy, market reforms, and free trade agreements. The wind
seemed to blow in the same direction and toward a shared future built
around similar visions and interests.
The strategic options (extrahemispheric protection, collective unity,
social revolution, and Third Worldism) available to Latin America during
the East-West conflict were perceived as museum pieces, and all of Latin
America, with the exception of Cuba, moved closer to the United
States.4 Some cases, as we mentioned in our models—like the Mexico
of Salinas and the Argentina of Menem—followed without hesitation the
strategy of “joining the North” (see Smith 2000).5 Others, like the Brazil
of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, tried to preserve spaces of national
autonomy while constructing new forms of relationship with the United
States. To some authors, this period constituted a novel boom around
the old “Western Hemisphere idea” that called on the Americas to inte-
grate and cooperate (see Corrales and Feinberg 1999).6
At the end of the 1990s, homogeneity among the Latin American
countries diminished, giving way to a new phase characterized by a
marked difference of policies toward the United States. Profound
changes in Venezuelan politics demonstrated the will of its new leader,
Chávez, to resuscitate a strategy of opposition to Washington. At the
same time, other countries extended, less vocally, their disagreement or
opposition to U.S. preferences, combining singular forms of resistance
and collaboration.
A politically more heterogeneous Latin America showed a significant
diversity of development models, as well as foreign policy orientations.
Yet despite these differences, the notion of autonomy and its significance
as an objective national interest reappeared with renewed vigor in the
political and academic debate. The concept of diversification of external
relations as an indispensable tool to expand the margins of liberty, pros-
perity, and national security followed a similar path. For a large part of
the region, the world of the 2000s, despite its turbulence and uncertainty,
became a source of new opportunities for international insertion.
In this context, each Latin American country has shown a notewor-
thy capacity and a growing interest in diversifying its relations with mul-
136 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

tiple actors or in giving new forms to its existing relations with familiar
partners. The Bolivia of Evo Morales, for example, has expanded its ties
with countries like Norway and Finland, which supported his proposals
on environmental protection. After President Morales’s visit to South
Korea in August 2010 (the first visit by a Bolivian president since the
two countries opened diplomatic relations in 1965), Bolivia signed an
accord with the authorities in Seoul for a credit of US$250 for research
and development of lithium mines in Salar de Uyni, where, it is
believed, exist half the global reserves of this basic metal, critical for the
fabrication of electronic batteries. In 2006, Peru promoted the Initiative
for the Latin American Pacific Rim, which materialized the following
year with the objective of increasing trade relations between countries
in the region and articulating common positions toward the nations of
Asia and the Pacific.
Paraguay, the only South American country that maintains relations
with Taiwan, decided in 2009 to open in Shanghai its first commercial
office in China. The Dominican Republic in 2006, El Salvador in 2008,
and Costa Rica in 2010 opened in New Delhi their respective embassies
to seek new markets and investment. The Nicaragua of Daniel Ortega
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia (some-
thing neither Havana nor Caracas has done) and suspended its relations
with Israel after the attack in May 2010 on the flotilla bringing humani-
tarian aid to the Gaza Strip.
The Panamanian government has achieved a delicate equilibrium
between capitals of diverse origin in the concession of its main ports,
the expansion of which will continue until 2014.7 Chile signed a free
trade agreement with the United States; but today its principal partners
are located in East Asia, and Santiago has been buying a large part of
its armaments in Europe (especially in Germany, Spain, France, Hol-
land, and Britain). Argentina and Uruguay have found in the Asian mar-
kets an extraordinary opportunity to position their primary products.
Moreover, the rise of Brazil has meant an important change in the equa-
tion of power in Latin America. This country is an essential counterpart
for most nations in the area, while its high international visibility and
gradual global recognition offers Latin America a relevant opportunity
to elicit greater attention in the world arena.
This common thread, marked by diversification, questions certain
notions that pertain more to the past than to the present. Relatively
recently, an observer of the comparative foreign politics of Latin Amer-
ica, William A. Hazleton, stated, “All Latin American and Caribbean
nations have foreign relations; most do not, however, have true foreign
policies” (Hazleton 1984, 152). With this assertion, he wanted to under-
score that a good number of the countries in the region barely react to
external phenomena or pressures and lack a foreign policy strategy.
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 137

Such a contention, perhaps correct in its moment, today is equivocal. A

series of circumstances (e.g., the relative withdrawal of the United States
from the region after 9/11), processes (globalization, regionalism, and
democratization), opportunities (the economic dynamics around Asia),
and domestic conditions (economic growth combined with active lead-
ership and more mobilized civil societies) have enabled Latin American
countries to become more assertive and varied in their foreign policies.
In spite of this situation, the United States remains the most influ-
ential external actor in the foreign policy of all countries in the region.
In many cases, this position of relevance could have diminished in rel-
ative terms, but so far the United States has not lost its place of privi-
lege. It is clear, as a general tendency, that its political and economic
presence and influence today have declined, a phenomenon that is
more evident the further one moves from Washington. At the same time,
however, the U.S. military presence and influence have grown, also fol-
lowing a pattern strongly conditioned by geography. This process takes
place at a conjuncture characterized by a certain apathy in Washington
toward the region, something that encourages the phenomenon of
“subimperialism,” as explained by David Fieldhouse: agents of the state,
in this case the military, that act in the region with higher margins of
autonomy in regard to the central government (Fieldhouse 1961).
So, with the exception of military issues, Latin America feels less of
the predominance of the United States, while this country experiences
a greater presence of the region in its territory. We refer especially to
the growing Latino population in the United States, a growing factor in
U.S. domestic politics and therefore in interamerican relations. In addi-
tion, the U.S. global agenda is strongly influenced by issues that involve
Latin America, and economic relations with the area are becoming more
significant for the well-being of U.S. citizens.

THREE STRATEGIC OPTIONS

In this context, Latin American countries have a window of opportu-
nity to develop new strategic options that differ to a great extent from
the traditional ones. The loss of relative influence on the part of the
United States, with the nuances mentioned above, and the horizon of
alternatives open to the region by the diffusion of international power
make the strategic options of classical balancing, bandwagoning, and
confrontation ever more anachronistic and dysfunctional to the inter-
ests of a majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Never-
theless, all three options are still present in some of the models
described here.
The option of balancing seems unfeasible, since no country in the
region has the conditions to put it into practice individually or to lead a
138 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

solid coalition toward this goal. There is a typical collective action

dilemma here: how to establish effective leadership, distribute tasks,
and keep commitments. The option of alignment is full of risks and
uncertainties. It involves a problem of scope, since the United States can
continuously increase its standard of loyalty while, on the other hand, it
is highly probable that some states will be more willing than others to
pledge fidelity and fulfill their commitment. Moreover, it compels coun-
tries to join the U.S. government in the foreign adventures of their
choice: lack of compliance, minimal criticism of the policies, or the
abandonment of bandwagoning will be perceived as a demonstration of
lack of perseverance or, worse, an act of treason. Nevertheless, for the
smaller and geographically nearer countries to the United States, the
option of closely aligning with Washington may be valid and functional
for their interests.
The third option, confrontation, seems extremely dangerous for
every country in the region. It can generate strong sanctions from the
United States and, consequently, the challenge may be extremely costly
and even unsustainable. Furthermore, confrontational policies by an
individual state or group of states in the region tend to produce fear in
the neighboring countries, thereby giving some an additional incentive
to adopt a strategy of bandwagoning with Washington, or for the United
States to promote counteralliances opposed to the contenders or to
mobilize a coalition of the willing to contain them.
In fact, Latin America’s margins of international maneuvering are
more varied than what the classic strategic options usually establish.
Thus, Latin American countries may defend and promote their national
interests in cooperation or competition with the United States, incorpo-
rating other alternatives. In particular, we propose three strategic
options to be deployed: binding multilateralism, restricted containment,
and selective collaboration. These three options are based on the exis-
tence of common interests, values, and aversions at hemispheric,
regional, and subregional levels.

Binding Multilateralism

The strategy of binding multilateralism consists of the diligent use of

world institutions in order to restrain the power of the United States and
persuade Washington to adhere or comply with international laws and
rules. It is employed in multilateral arenas; it covers a wide set of issues;
and it requires the formation of flexible and diverse coalitions at a
global level. By the way, it is highly improbable that the United States
will leave its main security interests to the decisions of international
institutions, as is the case with the “war against terrorism” or the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, the field is more
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 139

open and the results are less defined for other political and economic
issues, and this allows some room to maneuver so as to hinder or dimin-
ish U.S. arbitrary use of its power.
Furthermore, the existing world consensus with respect to numer-
ous issues on the international agenda increases the costs to the United
States (in terms of both credibility and legitimacy) for not obeying
agreed principles and rules, as well as for not joining certain institutions
(e.g., the International Criminal Court), assuming certain commitments
(e.g., the Kyoto Protocol), or subscribing to certain mechanisms (e.g.,
the U.N. programs to regulate and reduce light weapons).
The condition that makes binding multilateralism possible is the
existence of a highly institutionalized international order. Institutions
weigh heavily in the prescription of state behavior, in the restriction of
the use of power, and in the legitimation of the decisions adopted. The
United States cannot ignore them systematically without paying increas-
ing costs in terms of loss of support for its postures and policies. There-
fore the best potential way the strategy of binding multilateralism can
work demands an active Latin America searching for assertive coalitions
with like-minded countries from both the North and the South.
Certainly, binding multilateralism implies a test of international
credibility for Latin America. It would be incongruent—and in the long
run, very costly—to try to strengthen international institutions without
doing the same at hemispheric, regional, and subregional levels. Periph-
eral unilateralism, understood as the behavior of a country of the
periphery that violates international law or that is based solely on the
search of individual benefits and advantages without considering or
ignoring the neighbors’ interests, reduces or eliminates the credibility of
binding multilateralism as an alternative.

Restricted Containment

Restricted containment, by contrast, implies the gradual creation of

regional spaces, means, and policies to reduce, exclude, or prevent the
influence or interference of the United States in a given geographical area
of the region while favoring the region’s collective capacity to interact
with Washington. As in the case of binding multilateralism, this second
strategic option includes a wide range of topics, although the emphasis
here is on security issues. As opposed to the classical balance of power,
restricted containment enables states to increase their power and decision
autonomy without confronting or rivaling Washington. To a certain
degree, this strategic alternative can even be functional to U.S. security
interests in this area: for example, it might allow for the creation or con-
servation of a peace zone without interstate conflicts and with collective
action capacity to respond to institutional crises or regional tensions.
140 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

The condition that makes restricted containment possible is the

existence of common interests among key Latin America states, such as
the preservation of peace and democracy and respect for political plu-
ralism. South America may be the most adequate area to put this strate-
gic option into practice.
The progress achieved in security matters since the mid-1980s—the
end of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in South America; the consolida-
tion of transparent, verifiable trust relations between Brasília and
Buenos Aires on nuclear matters; the mutual determination in favor of
nonproliferation; the joint contribution to the peaceful resolution of
armed conflicts (for example, the 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru),
of institutional crises in the subregion (for example, in Paraguay during
the 1990s and in Bolivia lately), and of strong bilateral tensions (for
example, between Colombia and Ecuador and Colombia and
Venezuela)—provides important antecedents that pave the way for fur-
ther development of this strategic option. However, the prolonged
armed confrontation in Colombia without a visible peaceful outcome,
the failure to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked status and its access to the
Pacific Ocean, the growing arms purchases by some countries (Colom-
bia, Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil), and the ongoing frictions on energy
questions among several countries show both the paralysis and the dif-
ficulties the region has in solving critical problems on its own.
Nevertheless, Latin America has given a new dynamic to restricted
containment since 2008. While the U.S. Southern Command was becom-
ing increasingly influential in U.S. Latin American policy and the Penta-
gon was reactivating the Fourth Fleet (which had been disbanded in
1950), the South American countries decided to create the South Amer-
ican Defense Council, an unprecedented initiative in the subregion that
shows, without rhetoric of confrontation, the feasibility of reconciling
regional interests in security matters. Furthermore, as a result of a deep-
ening political crisis in Bolivia, the Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), meeting in Santiago de Chile in September 2008, managed
to defuse the situation, find a diplomatic exit, and open a path for even-
tual compromise between the opposition and the government. By 2010,
UNASUR was crucial in two additional circumstances: first, by generat-
ing the conditions for a Colombian-Venezuelan détente after the serious
deterioration of diplomatic relations between Bogotá and Caracas; and
second, when it quickly supported President Correa in the midst of an
attempted, and finally failed, coup d’état.

Selective Collaboration

The selective collaboration strategy involves the construction of coop-

erative ties with the United States in order to cope jointly with common
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 141

problems, reduce uncertainties, and avoid mutual errors of perception.

It is carried out at the bilateral, regional, and hemispheric levels, and it
basically focuses on highly sensitive issues of mutual interest, such as
migration, state weakness, organized crime, illicit drugs, light weapons
trafficking, or environmental protection. The feasibility of carrying out
this strategic alternative depends on two essential factors: Washington’s
willingness to face these issues together with Latin American states, and
the latter’s decision and capability of interacting cooperatively, both
among themselves and with the United States. In this non–zero-sum
game, in which everyone may win, the states must be committed to
adjusting their own policies, considering the others’ preferences and
interests.
Let us consider, for example, the case of Colombia, in which three
intertwined issues—illicit drugs and organized crime, the potential
deployment of international terrorism, and the weakness or absence of
the state—are especially worrisome for the hemisphere. In this case,
Washington is eager to preserve its individual capacity to maneuver. It
tries to encapsulate the hypothetical challenge arising from an uncon-
trolled situation; it privileges a mode of massive, indirect intervention;
and it searches for the tacit acceptance, among Colombia’s neighbors,
of Washington’s role in this Andean country. Clearly, these key objec-
tives will be difficult to modify. However, to ignore the role of regional
powers, such as Brazil; to alienate the potential contribution by the
Southern Cone countries to resolving some of Colombia’s problems; and
to misinterpret the legitimate security concerns of neighboring coun-
tries, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, may have unfor-
tunate consequences for U.S. strategic interests in the Andean ridge.
By contrast, the tripartite cooperation between Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay in the Triple Frontera (triborder) zone, as well as the col-
laboration between these countries and the United States, has made it
possible partly to overcome Washington’s uneasiness over this territory
as a vulnerable point that may affect U.S. security interests regarding the
potential development of international terrorism in Latin America. Today
there is no evidence to suggest the presence of active, organized Muslim
fundamentalist cells, ready to carry out terrorist actions against U.S.
objectives. Of course, this type of collaboration is also essential for the
security of the countries of the Southern Cone. Thus, discrete and effec-
tive collaborative work on this issue has reduced insecurity, both in the
area and for Washington. At the same time, Buenos Aires, Brasília, and
Asunción have improved their collaboration in the triborder area: they
have gained in terms of confidence, transparency, security, and effec-
tiveness. This, in turn, was quite significant to Argentina, which suffered
two major terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s that were
linked to actors and activities in the Triple Frontera.
142 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

The drug issue is a matter of concern throughout the hemisphere.

The so-called war on drugs, carried out since its proclamation on May
1971 by President Richard Nixon, has been a dramatic failure. Today,
from Alaska to Patagonia, every nation is affected and linked by a lucra-
tive and illicit transnational enterprise that has created a real industrial
chain in all territories (production, processing, trafficking, distribution,
consumption, fabrication of chemical precursors, money laundering),
generating a devastating erosion of justice, a remarkable rise in crime
levels, and an extended civilian, political, police, and military corrup-
tion. In addition, there is an ongoing “democratization” of this phe-
nomenon through the expansion and articulation of small groups of
organized crime, operating as a network, less visible and more lethal.
A few examples are enough to synthesize the magnitude of the fail-
ure. In 1990, 23,080 hectares of coca, poppy, and marijuana were erad-
icated in Latin America; in 2001 the total of these illicit crops eradicated
was 148,401 hectares; and in 2009 this total reached 209,460.8 hectares.
It should be noted that, whether by hand or by spraying, the use of
defoliants has been the dominant characteristic of the destruction of the
illicit crops. The area of crops destroyed (some 28,811 square kilome-
ters) in 20 years of forced eradications is equivalent to approximately
5 1/2 times the size of the state of Delaware or 11 times the territory of
Luxembourg. It is also noteworthy that in terms of production of
cocaine, while Colombia shows a decline in the last biennium, both
Bolivia and Peru show an increase during that period (see U.S. Depart-
ment of State 2010). Meanwhile, Mexico increased its production from
8 metric tons of heroin in 2005 to 38 metric tons in 2008 (see U.S.
Department of Justice 2010). The United States became the major pro-
ducer of marijuana in 2006 (see Gettman 2006).
In brief, the logic of the “war on drugs”—strongly influenced by the
prohibitionist mood—is wrong, deficient, burdensome, and counterpro-
ductive. Thus, the dilemma is not to do the same, do less of the same,
or make more of the same: it is basically to do something different. The
failure of more than four decades perhaps may offer a window of
opportunity for a change of paradigm. Certain recent events show sig-
nificant progress in this direction: the current U.S. “drug czar,” Gil Ker-
likowske, determined that the expression “war on drugs” should no
longer be invoked, showing a U.S. disposition to re-evaluate certain
aspects of its antinarcotics strategy (Fields 2009).
Even though it failed, Proposition 19 in California, which would
have legalized various activities related to marijuana, is clear evidence
that a more sophisticated debate is under way and the possibility of
adopting an alternative focus to address the drug issue has arisen. In
Latin America, various countries have decriminalized the possession of
the personal dose of psychoactive substances.
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 143

In turn, the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy,

led by former presidents Zedillo, Cardoso, and César Gaviria, has
declared the current “war on drugs” strategy a fiasco and has suggested
more creative ideas to address the phenomenon of illicit narcotics (Latin
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy n.d.).8 This issue,
despite the enormous complexity that characterizes it, probably
demands more than any other the implementation of a strategy of selec-
tive collaboration between Washington and Latin America.

CONCLUSIONS
This essay has asserted that the traditional strategic options of classical
balancing, bandwagoning, and confrontation are less attractive and
practical today for Latin American countries. It also has asserted that the
three strategic options proposed here are available for the large major-
ity of these countries. Our argument is neither ideological nor idealistic;
we firmly consider binding multilateralism, limited containment, and
selective collaboration to be reasonable and realistic. Together, they
offer a firm basis for guiding Latin America’s foreign policies vis-à-vis
Washington, while bringing back the best and finest regional diplomatic
traditions (for example, limiting power through the use of law), as well
as the brightest side of Latin America’s recent democratic experience
(for example, the importance given to human rights and peacekeeping
operations). In addition, the three strategies are consistent with the per-
manent national and regional objectives: the search for autonomy and
diversification.
Binding multilateralism implies the active use of international insti-
tutions to oppose initiatives or actions developed by the United States
that violate international law. Under either a Democratic or Republican
administration, it is crucial that Washington rejoin the multilateral forums
and the international regime system in order to make them more bind-
ing, credible, and effective. At the same time, Latin America should
increase its capacity for collective action, and not only with respect to
Washington. Multilateralism is fundamental for the whole region to have
a voice in the international system, to amplify its bargaining power, to
earn world prestige, and to demonstrate responsibility on key global,
hemispheric, and regional issues.
Since the United States has focused its vital security interests in
other regions of the world with greater levels of unrest than Latin Amer-
ica, since the region does not constitute a major source of threat to
Washington, and since democracy has contributed to generating a basic
level of mutual trust between the nations of the area, these develop-
ments have opened interesting—and even unknown—margins for
implementing the limited containment strategy. Indeed, and especially
144 LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 53: 4

in the Southern Cone, there is a unique opportunity to contribute to

South American stability, and thus to constrain and prevent U.S. inter-
ference. This strategy is not only convenient for Latin America, but also
serves the interests of the United States in the region. It requires a Latin
America more committed to facing its own dilemmas and a United States
more willing to recognize that this strategy is the best means to avoid
instability in the area.
Selective collaboration entails “attracting” the United States into joint
and peaceful means to cope with and solve shared problems. Unilateral
and military responses to the Western Hemisphere’s difficulties and
dilemmas are destined to fail, and will generate growing material and
symbolic costs for the United States. The lack of cooperative undertak-
ings will be for Latin America a permanent source of conflict and crisis.
It is also clear that the absence of a collective response will only worsen
everyone’s security. Latin American countries, through formal and infor-
mal institutions, should look for a new “deal” with the United States.
Somehow, both Latin America and the United States must agree to sur-
render certain areas of sovereignty in order to find common solutions
to mutual problems.
Is there a chance to move beyond orthodoxy in U.S.-Latin American
relations? We are convinced that this is possible. After all, President
Obama’s latest trip to the region shows the predisposition on the part
of Washington to reach out to Latin America and to broaden the level
of dialogue within the Western Hemisphere. In turn, the region has
been more attentive to its own problems and challenges. Both parties,
in this intersection, have a unique opportunity to deal with interameri-
can relations by putting aside prevailing dogmas and rituals.

NOTES
1. For a comparative analysis of the region’s foreign policies from a U.S.
perspective, see Mora and Hey 2003; and for a Latin American viewpoint, see
Lagos 2008.
2. This is essentially a low-risk and low-visibility strategy. Fernando Masi
calls this option for the case of Paraguay “benevolent isolationism” (Masi 1991).
3. The U.S. government has increased its assistance to Paraguay over the
years, from US$29,633,263 in 2007–8 to US$61,822,082 in 2009–10. By 2009, the
Department of Defense had given Paraguay a one-time security and stabiliza-
tion aid package totaling US$6.69 million. That same year, two bills in the House
and the Senate were introduced with the purpose of allowing the U.S. president
to designate Paraguay a beneficiary of trade preferences, amending the Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of 2002. Somehow, these resources
and initiatives were a reward for Asunción’s antinarcotics and antiterrorist coop-
eration with Washington.
4. To simplify, we use the same denominations defined by Smith (2000).
5. We appeal again to a category developed by Peter Smith.
 RUSSELL AND TOKATLIAN: LATIN AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY 145

6. According to these authors, the other two moments were between 1889
and 1906 and between 1933 and 1954. Conceived in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, this thesis relies on two assumptions: the existence of values,
interests, and common goals between the two Americas; and a “special rela-
tionship” that would differentiate the nations of the American continent from the
rest of the world.
7. Hutchison Whampoa (from Hong Kong) is a Chinese company with
close ties to the government of Beijing and the country’s armed forces. It man-
ages the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal. One of the terminals of the port of Colón
is controlled by a U.S. company, Stevedoring Services of America, while the
other is operated by a Taiwanese company, Evergreen Marine Corp. For the
expansion of the Panama Canal—validated by a referendum in 2006—the
United Group for the Canal was constituted. It is composed of the Spanish com-
pany Sacyr; the Italian, Impregilo; the Belgian, Jan de Nul; and the Panamanian,
Constructora Urbana, which will undertake this project of approximately US$3.2
billion.
8. Among others: emphasize drugs as a public health issue; concentrate the
efforts against organized crime; search for regulatory mechanisms to deal with
different drugs; improve the quality of the public debate.

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