REPUBLIC V.
EVANGELISTA, 466 SCRA 544 [2005]
FACTS:
The Complaint alleged that private respondent Legaspi is the owner of a land
located in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In November 1999, petitioner Calimlim,
representing the Republic of the Philippines, and as then head of the Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Presidential Security Group,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with one Ciriaco Reyes. The MOA
granted Reyes a permit to hunt for treasure in a land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Petitioner Diciano signed the MOA as a witness. It was further alleged that thereafter,
Reyes, together with petitioners, started, digging, tunneling and blasting works on the
said land of Legaspi. The complaint also alleged that petitioner Calimlim assigned about
80 military personnel to guard the area and encamp thereon to intimidate Legaspi and
other occupants of the area from going near the subject land.
On February 15, 2000, Legaspi executed a special power of attorney (SPA) appointing
his nephew, private respondent Gutierrez, as his attorney-in-fact. Gutierrez was given
the power to deal with the treasure hunting activities on Legaspi’s land and to file
charges against those who may enter it without the latter’s authority. Legaspi agreed to
give Gutierrez 40% of the treasure that may be found in the land.
On February 29, 2000, Gutierrez filed a case for damages and injunction against
petitioners for illegally entering Legaspi’s land. He hired the legal services of Atty.
Homobono Adaza. Their contract provided that as legal fees, Atty. Adaza shall be
entitled to 30% of Legaspi’s share in whatever treasure may be found in the land. In
addition, Gutierrez agreed to pay Atty. Adaza P5,000.00 as appearance fee per court
hearing and defray all expenses for the cost of the litigation. 4
ISSUE:
Whether the contract of agency between Legaspi and private respondent
Gutierrez has been effectively revoked by Legaspi
HELD:
No.
Petitioners claim that the special power of attorney of Gutierrez to represent Legaspi
has already been revoked by the latter. Private respondent Gutierrez, however,
contends that the unilateral revocation is invalid as his agency is coupled with interest.
We agree with private respondent.
Art. 1868 of the Civil Code provides that by the contract of agency, an agent binds
himself to render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of
another, known as the principal, with the consent or authority of the latter. A contract of
agency is generally revocable as it is a personal contract of representation based on
trust and confidence reposed by the principal on his agent. As the power of the agent to
act depends on the will and license of the principal he represents, the power of the
agent ceases when the will or permission is withdrawn by the principal. Thus, generally,
the agency may be revoked by the principal at will.
An exception to the revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with
interest, i.e., if a bilateral contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its
irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It
is not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and third persons which
are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked
at the sole will of the principal.
In the case at bar, we agree with the finding of the trial and appellate courts that the
agency granted by Legaspi to Gutierrez is coupled with interest as a bilateral contract
depends on it. It is clear from the records that Gutierrez was given by Legaspi, inter
alia, the power to manage the treasure hunting activities in the subject land; to file any
case against anyone who enters the land without authority from Legaspi; to engage the
services of lawyers to carry out the agency; and, to dig for any treasure within the land
and enter into agreements relative thereto. It was likewise agreed upon that Gutierrez
shall be entitled to 40% of whatever treasure may be found in the land. Pursuant to this
authority and to protect Legaspi’s land from the alleged illegal entry of petitioners, agent
Gutierrez hired the services of Atty. Adaza to prosecute the case for damages and
injunction against petitioners. As payment for legal services, Gutierrez agreed to assign
to Atty. Adaza 30% of Legaspi’s share in whatever treasure may be recovered in the
subject land. It is clear that the treasure that may be found in the land is the subject
matter of the agency; that under the SPA, Gutierrez can enter into contract for the legal
services of Atty. Adaza; and, thus Gutierrez and Atty. Adaza have an interest in the
subject matter of the agency, i.e., in the treasures that may be found in the land. This
bilateral contract depends on the agency and thus renders it as one coupled with
interest, irrevocable at the sole will of the principal Legaspi. When an agency is
constituted as a clause in a bilateral contract, that is, when the agency is inserted in
another agreement, the agency ceases to be revocable at the pleasure of the principal
as the agency shall now follow the condition of the bilateral agreement. Consequently,
the Deed of Revocation executed by Legaspi has no effect. The authority of Gutierrez to
file and continue with the prosecution of the case at bar is unaffected.
