Peace Psychology Book Series

Series Editor: Daniel J. Christie

Keren Sharvit
Eran Halperin Editors

A Social Psychology
Perspective on The
Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict
Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal,
Vol II.
Peace Psychology Book Series

Series Editor
Daniel J. Christie

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/7298

Keren Sharvit • Eran Halperin
Editors

A Social Psychology
Perspective on The Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict
Celebrating the Legacy
of Daniel Bar-Tal, Vol II.
Editors
Keren Sharvit Eran Halperin
University of Haifa Psychology
Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
Herzliya, Israel

ISSN 2197-5779 ISSN 2197-5787 (electronic)

Peace Psychology Book Series
ISBN 978-3-319-24839-4 ISBN 978-3-319-24841-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7

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Preface to the Second Volume

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been waging for decades, resulting in mass
losses, destruction, and suffering with profound effects on the members of the
involved societies. Furthermore, its effects reach beyond the involved societies and
influence regional and global stability. Many attempts have been made to bring this
conflict to peaceful resolution, but so far without success. Due to its intensity and
extensive effects, this conflict has drawn the attention of scholars from numerous
disciplines, who attempted to explain the causes of the conflict and the reasons for
the difficulties in resolving it. Among these one can find historians, geographers,
political scientists, sociologists, and others. Social and political psychologists have
also addressed this conflict, and one of the most influential among them has been
Daniel Bar-Tal.
This is the second of two volumes intended to pay tribute to Bar-Tal’s scholarly
contribution upon his retirement from his position at Tel Aviv University. While the
first volume was devoted to Bar-Tal’s general theory of the sociopsychological
foundations of intractable conflict and the theory’s relation to other prominent theo-
retical frameworks, this volume is devoted to applying Bar-Tal’s theory to the spe-
cific case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his most recent book, published in
2013, Bar-Tal acknowledges the immense effects that living in Israel, being exposed
to this conflict, and taking part in it have had on his thinking, theorizing, and empiri-
cal research regarding intractable conflicts. We too, as his former students, have
been inspired by living in Israel and by Bar-Tal’s work to continue to investigate the
sociopsychological dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and through them to
advance the understandings of intractable conflicts in general.
We were by no means the only fortunate ones to benefit from Bar-Tal’s guidance.
Over the years Bar-Tal has educated dozens of scholars, most of whom conducted
their research in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and contributed to its
understanding. Specifically, over the past 15 years, a group of Bar-Tal’s graduate
students and other colleagues met every other Monday to present their work,
exchange ideas, develop collaborative projects, and learn about the work of other
scholars. Under the guidance of Bar-Tal and his colleague Amiram Raviv, this group
became a cohesive collective and a sort of “intellectual family.” To those of us who

v
vi Preface to the Second Volume

took part in that group, Bar-Tal is not just a world-renowned scholar, but also sim-
ply Danny, our friend, colleague, and mentor. Through the years of leading this
group, one of Danny’s dreams has been to publish an edited volume, to which dif-
ferent group members would contribute chapters. He was never able to realize that
dream himself, but in a way, we fulfill that dream for him in this volume, since 12
out of the 18 chapters in the volume are written by members of the group who are
Danny’s former students.
In studying an intractable conflict as complex as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
it is very difficult and perhaps nearly impossible to adopt an entirely impartial posi-
tion. This is true especially if the researchers are also members of one of the societ-
ies involved in the conflict. Hence, none of the contributors to this volume can claim
complete objectivity. One of our regrets regarding this volume is that we were not
able to include a larger number of Palestinian contributors. This is, in part, an unfor-
tunate reflection of the present intractable state of the conflict, in which it is very
difficult for Israelis and Palestinians to collaborate with each other. As a result, most
of the contributors are Jewish Israelis, and the volume is inevitably biased toward
their perspective, though as the different chapters illustrate, this perspective is far
from uniform and in fact encompasses a multitude of perspectives. While Palestinian
perspectives are admittedly underrepresented in this volume, they are not entirely
absent, and we are happy and proud to include chapters by Eman Nahhas and by
Anan Srour (with Adi Mana and Shifra Sagy). We can only wish for a future of bet-
ter relations between Israelis in Palestinians, which, among many positive effects,
may also allow more extensive collaborations between scholars and enrich all the
parties’ knowledge.
This volume begins with an introductory chapter by Keren Sharvit, which pres-
ents an overview of Bar-Tal’s theory of the sociopsychological foundations of
intractable conflict and discusses how the theory can be and has been applied toward
understanding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The rest of the chapters in the volume
then expand on the different components of the theory and their manifestations in
the Israeli-Palestinian context. Part I of the volume is concerned with the effects of
the conflict on young children and the manner in which children are socialized.
Yona Teichman (Chap. 2) presents a developmental perspective on children’s acqui-
sition of stereotypes and prejudice. Meytal Nasie (Chap. 3) then discusses the man-
ner in which children’s direct experiences of violence and indirect experiences of
education in preschools and elementary schools shape the formation of the socio-
psychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. Part II deals with the role of
collective memories and narratives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rafi Nets-
Zehngut (Chap. 4) discusses the Jewish Israeli collective memory of the conflict,
the changes it has gone through over the years, and its relation to developments in
the conflict and to the Palestinian collective memory. Eman Nahhas (Chap. 5) dis-
cusses the collective memory of the 1948 war among young Palestinians in Israel
and the manner in which it has been preserved despite attempts by the state to
silence it. Then, Srour, Mana, and Sagy (Chap. 6) present empirical findings regard-
ing the reactions of Israeli Jewish and Arab adolescents when presented with the
narratives of their own group and the “other” group. Part III deals with societal
Preface to the Second Volume vii

beliefs and the ethos of conflict, which are central components of the sociopsycho-
logical infrastructure of intractable conflict according to Bar-Tal’s theorizing. Eli
Podeh (Chap. 7) presents a historical perspective on the Israeli and Egyptian per-
ceptions of each other during the Nasserite period. Neta Oren (Chap. 8) and Ronni
Shaked (Chap. 9) then discuss the Jewish Israeli and the Palestinian ethos of con-
flict, respectively. Part IV deals with the relationship between ideology, ethos, and
affective experiences in the context of the conflict. Daphna Canetti (Chap. 10) dis-
cusses the relationships among exposure to violence, experiences of distress and
threat, the ethos of conflict, and political preferences. Pliskin and Halperin (Chap.
11) discuss the role of emotion and emotion regulation in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and the manner in which they may relate to and interact with the ethos of
conflict in the Israeli society.
Part V deals with the role of education and educational interventions. Ohad
David (Chap. 12) presents an educational case study in which Israeli Jewish chil-
dren learned about encountering “otherness” while applying the sociopsychological
model of identity. Then, Soli Vered (Chap. 13) discusses the potential role of peace
education in transforming intractable conflict and the reasons that such education
has not been implemented in Israel. Finally, Part VI deals with the role of various
actors and potential interventions in possibly advancing peaceful resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nimrod Rosler (Chap. 14) discusses the role of the two
national leaders, Rabin and Arafat, in the peacemaking process during the 1990s.
Tamir Magal (Chap. 15) discusses the role of civil society organizations in Israel in
different phases of the conflict. Maoz and Ron (Chap. 16) discuss the potential of
structured encounters between Israelis and Palestinians to promote peace. SimanTov-
Nachlieli and Shnabel (Chap. 17) present the needs-based model of reconciliation
and discuss how fulfilling Israelis’ and Palestinians’ needs might encourage them to
respond pro-socially toward each other. Lastly, Ofer Shinar Levanon presents the
concept of “transitional justice” and discusses the need to integrate it with knowl-
edge regarding the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict.

Keren Sharvit
Eran Halperin
Contents

Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict: Applying Daniel Bar-Tal’s Theorizing .......................................... 1
Keren Sharvit

Part I Acquisition of the Socio-Psychological Repertoire

Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental

Perspective ....................................................................................................... 17
Yona Teichman
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable
Conflicts ........................................................................................................... 31
Meytal Nasie

Part II Collective Memory and Narratives

The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian

Conflict: Its Characteristics and Relation to the Conflict ........................... 49
Rafi Nets-Zehngut
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among
Young Palestinians in Israel ........................................................................... 61
Eman Nahhas
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab
and Jewish Adolescents in Israel: A Decade
of Intractable Conflict .................................................................................... 77
Anan Srour, Adi Mana, and Shifra Sagy

ix
x Contents

Part III Societal Beliefs and Ethos

“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”: Israeli and Egyptian

Images of the Other During the Nasserite Period (1952–1970) .................. 99
Elie Podeh
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict............................................................. 115
Neta Oren
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society .................................................. 133
Ronni Shaked

Part IV Distress, Emotions and Ideology

Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political

Violence and Political Preferences in the Range of Fire .............................. 151
Daphna Canetti
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable
Conflict and Their Relation to the Ethos of Conflict
in Israeli Society .............................................................................................. 167
Ruthie Pliskin and Eran Halperin

Part V The Role of Education

When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter

Otherness: Educational Case Study .............................................................. 187
Ohad David
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice:
The Israeli Case ............................................................................................... 199
Soli Vered

Part VI Prospects for Change?

Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian

Peace Process ................................................................................................... 217
Nimrod Rosler
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking
Processes: The Case of the Jewish-Israeli Society........................................ 229
Tamir Magal
The Road to Peace: The Potential of Structured Encounters
Between Israeli Jews and Palestinians in Promoting Peace ........................ 243
Ifat Maoz and Yiftach Ron
Contents xi

Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic Needs

for Agency and Positive Moral Identity Facilitates
Mutual Prosociality ......................................................................................... 253
Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and Nurit Shnabel
Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable
Conflicts: Between the Right to Truth and Collective Memory ................. 263
Ofer Shinar Levanon

Index ................................................................................................................. 277

Contributors

Daphna Canetti School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel

Ohad David Faculty of Education, Levinsky College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel
Eran Halperin Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel
Ofer Shinar Levanon School of Social Work, Sapir College, Sderot Israel and
Rothberg International School, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Tamir Magal Center for Ethics and Morality, University of California, Irvine,
Irvine, CA, USA
Adi Mana Department of Psychology, Peres Academic Center, Rehovot, Israel
Ifat Maoz Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, Israel
Eman Nahhas Department of Education, Academic Arab College for Education –
Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Meytal Nasie School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Rafi Nets-Zehngut Conflict Resolution, Management and Negotiation Graduate
Program, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
Neta Oren School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University,
Arlington, VA, USA
Ruthie Pliskin School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv,
Israel
Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya,
Israel
Elie Podeh Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University
of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

xiii
xiv Contributors

Yiftach Ron The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of
Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Nimrod Rosler The Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation, Tel Aviv
University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Shifra Sagy Conflict Management and Resolution Program, Ben Gurion University
of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
Ronni Shaked The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of
Peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Keren Sharvit Department of Psychology and Program for Peace and Conflict
Management, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Nurit Shnabel School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv,
Israel
Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University,
Tel Aviv, Israel
Anan Srour Conflict Management and Resolution Program, Ben Gurion University
of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
Yona Teichman School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv,
Israel
Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya,
Israel
Soli Vered School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict: Applying Daniel
Bar-Tal’s Theorizing

Keren Sharvit

The theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts, developed

by Daniel Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013), refers to the social and psychological processes
through which societies involved in intractable conflicts adapt to the difficult condi-
tions of the conflict and to the consequences of this adaptation for the dynamics and
continuation of the conflict. The theory was developed, to a large extent, on the basis
of research conducted by Bar-Tal, along with his colleagues and students, in the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in
what follows, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered a prototypical case of an
intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a). It is an intense and violent conflict, which has
involved extensive deaths, injuries, destruction of property, displacement, and con-
stant experiences of threat and danger, all of which have caused considerable suffer-
ing to the members of the involved societies. Such difficult conditions are bound to
have a psychological effect on society members, as well as consequences for macro-
level societal processes. Bar-Tal’s theorizing and research is concerned with these
dynamics. The aim of the present chapter is to present an overview of the theory of
the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts and demonstrate how it
applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The subsequent chapters in this volume
then elaborate on the different elements of the theory as observed in the context of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

K. Sharvit (*)
Department of Psychology and Program for Peace and Conflict Management,
University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 1

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_1
2 K. Sharvit

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as an Intractable Conflict

Conflicts between societies and nations are not a unitary phenomenon. They may be
classified along a continuum that varies between short-term low-intensity conflicts that
involve minimal violence on one end and intense protracted conflicts that involve
extensive violence on the other end. Bar-Tal’s (2007b, 2013) theorizing is concerned
with conflicts that are placed at the negative end of this continuum, of which the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is one example. The theory begins by delineating the defining char-
acteristics of intractable conflicts, some of which were originally suggested by
Kriesberg (1993). Specifically, intractable conflicts are violent and protracted, demand
extensive investment, play a central role in the lives of the involved societies, and are
perceived by them as total, irresolvable, and having zero-sum nature.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is indeed protracted, with roots dating back to the
Jewish immigration and settlement in the territory of Palestine/Land of Israel in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Jews and Palestinians have repeatedly clashed
over the control of this territory, which both parties consider to be their historic homeland
(for detailed historical reviews, see Gelvin, 2005; Gerner, 1991; Morris, 1999; Tessler,
1994). Over the years, the conflict has expanded, involving other regional and interna-
tional parties and additional issues including religion, culture, and economy. In some
periods, it was inseparable from the broader Israeli-Arab conflict that involved Israel’s
other Arab neighbors (see Podeh, Chap. 7). Importantly, several generations have now
been born and raised into the conflict and are not familiar with alternative realities.
The conflict had been violent since its beginning. Although the extent of violence
fluctuates, it continually characterizes this conflict. Over the years, the conflict has
involved several wars, numerous large-scale military operations, military occupa-
tion, violent uprisings, and terror attacks. Engaging in such extensive violence has
forced the parties to mobilize all their available resources toward the conflict, as
well as to recruit the support of external parties (see e.g., Hever, 2013; Lifshitz,
2000; Swirski, 2005; Tov, 1998).
The conflict is central to the being of the involved societies and leaves its mark
not only on the collective lives of the Israeli and Palestinian societies but also on the
daily lives of individual society members (Bar-Tal, 2007a). It receives extensive
attention in the media and occupies a central place in the public discourse of both
societies. Consequently, it affects many of the decisions that are made by leaders,
institutions, and individuals. Moreover, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also draws
attention from the international community. Many international actors consider this
conflict to be a threat to world stability, and numerous states and international orga-
nizations have been involved in attempts to resolve it.
As mentioned earlier, there are multiple issues in dispute between Israelis and
Palestinians. The conflict concerns issues that are believed to be fundamental and
essential to the existence of the parties and central to their national identities,
namely, the rights to self-determination, statehood, security, territory, and resources
(Bar-Tal, 2007a; Dowty, 2008; Khalidi, 2010). In addition, the conflict involves
disputes around religious and cultural issues. Because these issues are seen as exis-
tential, they became protected values (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007;
Landman, 2010), and the conflict came to be seen as a zero-sum game, in which
Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Applying… 3

neither of the parties was willing to consider compromises. Indeed, attempts to

negotiate resolution of the conflict revealed that the Palestinian’s minimal demands
exceed the Israelis’ maximum willingness for concessions and vice versa (Caplan,
2011; Gerner, 1991; Tessler, 1994).
We have seen then that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is characterized by all of
the defining features of an intractable conflict as proposed by Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013).
Many of the issues in dispute in this conflict are real and tangible. Nonetheless, liv-
ing under the harsh conditions of the conflict for prolonged periods inevitably
affects the psychology of the members of the involved societies. These psychologi-
cal processes, in turn, influence the positions and behavior of society members and,
through them, affect the conduct of whole societies.
As a result of the conflict, members of both societies have been subjected to a
variety of negative experiences. In addition to the physical pain of deaths and inju-
ries and tangible losses resulting from destruction of property, displacement, and so
on, research indicates that the conflict has been a cause of extensive mental suffer-
ing (e.g., Bleich, Gelkopf, & Solomon, 2003; Canetti et al., 2010; de Jong et al.,
2001; Johnson et al., 2009; for a review of statistics regarding deaths, injuries, and
mental suffering, see Nasie, Chap. 3 and Canneti, Chap. 10). These negative experi-
ences pose considerable challenges, to which societies and their individual mem-
bers must adapt. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) refers to three specific challenges that
intractable conflicts pose to the involved societies. The first challenge is satisfying
the basic needs that are deprived as a result of the conflict, such as the need for
knowing, mastery, safety, positive identity, and others (Burton, 1990; Shnabel &
Nadler, 2008; Staub, 2003). The second challenge is learning to cope with stress,
distress, and negative emotions that are caused by the conflict and that accompany
society members for extended periods of time. The third and final challenge is to
win the conflict or at least not to lose. For this purpose, it is necessary to mobilize
society members to take part in the conflict and make sacrifices for the sake of the
group. Only when this challenge is met can societies maintain an intense conflict
with an opponent over time. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) maintains that societies involved
in intractable conflict develop a unique sociopsychological infrastructure, which is
essential in order to address these challenges. The next section presents an overview
of this sociopsychological infrastructure and its manifestations in the Israeli-
Palestinian case. The following section discusses the functionality of the sociopsy-
chological infrastructure for meeting the challenges posed by the conflict.

Sociopsychological Infrastructure of the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict

Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) refers to three interrelated elements that constitute the
sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict: collective memory, ethos
of conflict, and collective emotional orientation. These elements are discussed
elaborately in other chapters of this volume; therefore, in this chapter, they are
reviewed only briefly.
4 K. Sharvit

The “building blocks” of collective memory and ethos of conflict are societal
beliefs, which are defined as cognitions that society members share regarding topics
and issues that are of special concern for their society (Bar-Tal, 2000). Collective
memory is comprised of societal beliefs referring to the history of the conflict,
which together form a narrative that describes the beginning of the conflict, its pro-
gression, and major events that occurred in its course (Cairns & Roe, 2003;
Pennebaker, Paez, & Rim, 2013; Wertsch, 2002). The collective memory does not
represent an objective or neutral account of past events. Rather, it is selective and
biased in ways that serve societies’ present needs (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Páez & Liu,
Chap. 5, volume 1 of this series; Southgate, 2005). Specifically, societies that are
involved in intractable conflicts tend to develop narratives that justify their own
goals in the conflict, blame the rival group for the outbreak and continuation of the
conflict and delegitimize them, and portray the ingroup in a positive manner and as
the sole victims of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).
Research conducted among Israelis and Palestinians indicates that the two soci-
eties have indeed developed collective memories with these characteristics.
Although referring to similar events, the narratives of the two groups are dramati-
cally different from each other and at times appear to be mirror images (Adwan &
Bar-On, 2004; Rotberg, 2006; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Central points of dispute
between the two narratives refer to the sources of the conflict and the events of the
1948 war. Israeli Jews see the Jewish immigration to the Land of Israel as the revival
of a nation that has been in exile for thousands of years, which is returning to reclaim
the land of its forefathers. The Palestinians, in contrast, see the Jewish immigration
and settlement in Palestine as an invasion of foreign colonialists, which led to the
dispossession of the indigenous population. The Jews see the 1948 war as their “war
of independence,” in which they successfully defended their newly established state
against the Arab nations who sought to destroy it. The Palestinians refer to the same
events as “the catastrophe” (Al-Nakba), in which many Palestinians were expelled
from their homes, towns, and villages and became refugees, resulting in the disper-
sion and disintegration of the Palestinian society (for an elaborate discussion of
these narratives, see Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4 and Nahhas, Chap. 5). In the Israeli
society, there has been some movement in recent years toward a more critical narra-
tive of historical events (Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4), while Palestinians generally con-
tinue to adhere to the dominant narrative (Nahhas, Chap. 5).
A second central element of the sociopsychological infrastructure is the ethos of
conflict (EOC). A societal ethos is a system of shared societal beliefs, which define
a given society’s central characteristics and give meaning to its members’ social
identity (Bar-Tal, 2000; see also Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel & Kişlioğlu, Chap. 3 and Jost,
Stern & Sterling, Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series). An EOC is an organized world-
view that allows society members to comprehend the prolonged context of conflict
in which they live and guides their behaviors within this context. The societal beliefs
that comprise the EOC are organized around eight themes (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007b).
Beliefs about the justness of the ingroup’s goals indicate the goals over which the
conflict is fought and their crucial importance. For example, both Israelis and
Palestinians believe that the land of Palestine/Israel is their group’s historical home-
land, and that they have a right to establish their independent state in it. Beliefs
Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Applying… 5

about security refer to the importance of keeping the group secure and the condi-
tions needed to achieve such security. In the Israeli and Palestinian societies, these
beliefs often refer to the use of force (military service in the Israeli case and armed
struggle in the Palestinian case) as necessary in order to protect the group. Beliefs
about positive collective self-image attribute positive characteristics, values, and
behaviors to the ingroup. For example, both Israelis and Palestinians describe the
conduct of their own group’s members in the conflict as heroic and courageous.
Beliefs about ingroup victimization present the ingroup as the victim of unjust harm
by the adversary. Israelis, for instance, sometimes portray attacks against them in
the context of the conflict as a continuation of the historical persecution of the Jews.
On the Palestinian side, great importance is placed on commemorating the Nakba of
1948, and later violent events are portrayed as a continuation of the Nakba. Beliefs
that delegitimize the opponents deny their humanity and exclude them from those
worthy of moral treatment. One manifestation of these beliefs in the Israeli-
Palestinian case is the tendency to portray the opponent as an evil ruthless aggres-
sor. Beliefs about patriotism encourage loyalty, love, and sacrifice for the ingroup.
In both the Israeli and the Palestinian societies, those who sacrificed their life for the
sake of the group are glorified as national heroes (and in the Palestinian case as
Shahids, i.e., martyrs). Beliefs about unity refer to the importance of remaining
united in the face of the external threat. Finally, beliefs about peace refer to peace
as the ultimate goal of the society and to society members as peace loving. Though
the contents of the Israeli and Palestinian EOC are predictably different, and often
seem like mirror images of each other (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004), the central
themes of the EOC as described by Bar-Tal (1998, 2007b) are found in both societ-
ies (for extensive reviews of the Israeli ethos, see Oren, Chap. 8, and for the
Palestinian ethos, see Shaked, Chap. 9). Despite the different contents of the various
themes, research has shown that they all load on a single underlying factor (Bar-Tal,
Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).
Extensive research has demonstrated the prevalence of EOC beliefs among both
the Israeli and the Palestinian societies. On the Israeli side, frequent expressions of
EOC beliefs have been found in adult and children’s literature (Ben-Ezer, 1992;
Cohen, 1985; Govrin, 1989; Shaked, 1989; Teff-Seker, 2012), drama and films
(Gross & Gross, 1991; Shohat, 1989; Urian, 1997), the mass media (Sharvit & Bar-
Tal, 2007), school textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998; Mathias, 2002, 2005; Podeh, 2002;
Yogev, 2010), national ceremonies (Arviv-Abramowitz, 2011), leaders’ speeches,
and public opinion polls (Oren, Chap. 8). However, there are also findings indicat-
ing that alternative beliefs began to appear in the Israeli society since the late 1970
and gained prominence especially in the 1990s. These alternative beliefs are
observed in cultural products (Bar-Tal, 2007a) and in public opinion polls (Oren,
Chap. 8). Nonetheless, the EOC has remained a dominant belief system in the
Israeli-Jewish society, and one consequence of this dominance is that among Israeli
Jews, contents that are consistent with the EOC come to mind more easily than
contents that contradict the EOC, regardless of individuals’ personal adherence to
the EOC (Sharvit, 2008).
Research regarding the Palestinian EOC has been less extensive, yet evidence
exists for the prevalence of the Palestinian EOC in Palestinian school textbooks
6 K. Sharvit

(Adwan & Bar-On, 2004; Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, in press), in the writings of
Palestinian children and adolescents (Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, 2006), in leaders’ speeches and political publications (Shaked, Chap. 9),
and in public opinion polls (Oren et al., 2004; Shaked, Chap. 9).
The final element of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict
is a collective emotional orientation. This concept refers to the characteristic ten-
dency of a society and its members to express particular emotions (Bar-Tal,
Halperin, & De Rivera, 2007). According to Bar-Tal (2007b), societies involved in
intractable conflicts tend to be dominated by the emotions of fear, anger, and hatred
(see also Čehajić-Clancy, Chap. 9 and Jarymowicz, Chap. 10, volume 1 of this
series). Research has indeed revealed the prevalence of these emotions and their
expressions in the Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2008; Halperin, Canetti,
& Kimhi, 2012; Halperin, Russell, Dweck, & Gross, 2011) and to some extent also
in the Palestinian society (Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014; Nasie &
Bar-Tal, 2012). Research also suggests that these emotions are related to collective
memories of the conflict (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008; Nahhas,
Chap. 5) and that they are related to and may also interact with the EOC (Lavi et al.,
2014; Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11). Though fear, anger, and hatred have received
the most attention in research, other collective emotions may also appear in situa-
tions of intractable conflict, including humiliation, pride, and hope (for a review, see
Bar-Tal, 2013).
Having reviewed the elements that comprise the sociopsychological infrastruc-
ture of intractable conflict, we can now turn to the question of why this particular
sociopsychological infrastructure tends to develop under the condition of intrac-
table conflict. As mentioned earlier, Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) maintains that the
sociopsychological infrastructure develops as it does because it is functional for
addressing the challenges that intractable conflict poses to the involved societies.
The following section reviews the functions of the sociopsychological infrastruc-
ture in more detail.

Functions of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) lists several functions of the sociopsychological infrastruc-

ture. First, the infrastructure illuminates the conflict situation, providing a clear,
meaningful, and holistic explanation for why the conflict began and why it contin-
ues and cannot be resolved. By doing so, the sociopsychological infrastructure
fulfills the fundamental human need to form a coherent, organized, and predict-
able understanding of the world (Baumeister, 1991; Burton, 1990; Reykowski,
1982), which gains special importance in situations that involve uncertainty and
threat, such as situations of conflict. In addition, being able to make sense of and
find meaning in difficult situations within an existing worldview has been shown
to be important for coping adverse traumatic events (Antonovsky, 1987; Davis,
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Frankl, 1978; Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-
Bulman, 1992; Kobasa, 1985; Moos & Schaefer, 1986; Taylor, 1983). Hence, the
Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Applying… 7

sociopsychological infrastructure helps society members address the challenges

of fulfilling deprived needs and coping with stress. Supporting this function of the
sociopsychological infrastructure, research has demonstrated that the EOC is acti-
vated among Israeli Jews in times of distress (Sharvit, 2014). Furthermore, adher-
ence to the EOC attenuates the relationship between exposure to property loss as
a result of the conflict and depressive symptoms among both Israelis and
Palestinians (Lavi et al., 2014).
An additional function of the sociopsychological infrastructure is to justify and
provide legitimacy to negative actions of the ingroup toward the adversary in the
context of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007b; 2013; see also Jost et al., Chap. 4, volume 1
of this series). These actions are usually harmful toward humans or property and
would be considered severe moral violations under other circumstances. In provid-
ing justification for such acts, the sociopsychological infrastructure allows group
members to disengage morally (Bandura, 1999), thus avoiding unpleasant experi-
ences of cognitive dissonance and group-based moral emotions such as guilt
and shame (Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Rosler, & Raviv, 2010; Miron, Branscombe,
& Schmitt, 2006; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; Sharvit, Brambilla, Babush, &
Colucci, 2015). Supporting this function of the sociopsychological infrastructure, a
study by Sharvit and Zerachovich (2014) found that Israeli Jews who adhered
strongly to the EOC reported experiencing similar low levels of guilt and shame
when presented with information about Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, whether
that information was framed positively or negatively. In contrast, those who reported
low EOC adherence distinguished between the two frames and reported elevated
levels of guilt and shame when the information was framed negatively.
Another function of the sociopsychological infrastructure is establishing a dif-
ferentiation between the ingroup and the rival and a superior position of the ingroup
(Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013). According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979),
individuals derive part of their self-esteem from the groups to which they belong.
Therefore, they are motivated to uphold a positive view of their group and to main-
tain optimal distinctiveness between their own group and other groups (Brewer,
1991). The sociopsychological infrastructure contributes to establishing such dis-
tinctiveness and sharpens it by delegitimizing the opponent while presenting the
ingroup in highly positive terms. It has been argued that groups involved in intrac-
table conflict tend to develop oppositional zero-sum identities (Brewer, 2011).
Accordingly, Kelman (1999) suggests that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each
party believes that in order to maintain the legitimacy of its own identity, it must
delegitimize the other party.
Finally, Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) discusses the role of the sociopsychological infra-
structure in preparing society members for the conflict and mobilizing them to par-
ticipate in it. By emphasizing the ingroup’s victimization and delegitimizing the
opponent, the sociopsychological infrastructure prepares society members for the
negative experiences and difficulties that await them in the future of the conflict.
As a result, society members become attentive and sensitive to cues of threat, so that
when the threats materialize, they do not come as a surprise. This provides a sense
of predictability and immunizes society members against impending threats.
8 K. Sharvit

However, if the sociopsychological infrastructure only prepared society mem-

bers for the worst, it could soon lead to despair. Hence, in addition to preparing, the
sociopsychological infrastructure also mobilizes society members to participate in
the conflict in order to defend themselves and advance the societal goals. By justify-
ing the goals of the conflict, emphasizing the importance of security, and fostering
patriotism and social unity, the sociopsychological infrastructure encourages soci-
ety members to take part in the struggle against the enemy and make personal sac-
rifices on behalf of the group (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997). An example for the
importance of the sociopsychological infrastructure for mobilizing participation in
the conflict can be found in the prevalence of messages reflecting the EOC in the
training of new recruits to the Israeli army (Borovski-Sapir, 2004).

Institutionalization of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

As mentioned earlier, the beliefs and emotions that comprise the sociopsychological
infrastructure of intractable conflict tend to be widely shared among society mem-
bers. Consequently, they occupy a central place in the societal discourse. Moreover,
due to the functional role of the sociopsychological infrastructure in times of con-
flict, the involved societies devote great efforts to imparting the sociopsychological
infrastructure to their members. This is evident in the frequent appearance of the
elements of the infrastructure in numerous societal channels of communication and
socialization (Bar-Tal, 2013). Consequently, most society members are exposed to
the sociopsychological infrastructure from early childhood and throughout their
lives, becoming highly familiar with it. For example, research reviewed by Nasie
(Chap. 3) indicates that the contents of the Israeli EOC and collective memory of
the conflict are presented to children already in preschools. Research by Teichman
(Chap. 2) reveals the consequences of this socialization, demonstrating that Israeli
children acquire negative views of Arabs at early ages. On the Palestinian side,
research has found expressions of the sociopsychological infrastructure in the writ-
ings of children and adolescents (Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Ricks, 2006; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, 2006), again demonstrating the early acquisition of the infrastructure.
These processes eventually lead to the institutionalization of the sociopsycho-
logical infrastructure and to the development of a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013).
According to Bar-Tal, a culture of conflict develops when the elements of the socio-
psychological infrastructure are integrated into the society’s cultural symbols,
which communicate a particular meaning regarding the continuous experiences of
the conflict. The symbols of the culture of conflict eventually become routinized in
group members’ daily lives (Bar-Tal, Abutbul-Selinger, & Raviv, 2014).
Routinization takes place when society members engage regularly in practices
related to the conflict. For example, Palestinians must go through Israeli check-
points and deal with various restrictions to their freedom of movement (Longo,
Canetti, & Hite-Rubin, 2014), and Israelis have to go through security searches at
the entry to every public place. Routinization also involves exposure to images and
Sociopsychological Foundations of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Applying… 9

symbols of the conflict (e.g., monuments, street names, weapons, shelters) and to
information about the conflict in society members’ daily lives. Finally, routinization
involves integration of words and expressions relating to the conflict into the lan-
guage. For example, Israelis often use military terminology in their discourse, even
when referring to issues that are not related to the conflict (Tsur, 2013).

Implications of the Sociopsychological Infrastructure

The research reviewed thus far has suggested that the sociopsychological infrastruc-
ture of intractable conflict is functional for dealing with the challenges that the
conflict poses. Bar-Tal (2007b, 2013) points out, however, that the sociopsychologi-
cal infrastructure has other consequences, which are not necessarily functional (see
also Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). The sociopsychological infrastructure justifies the
conflict and encourages society members to participate in it and to defend their
group with force. When this takes place among both parties to the conflict, the result
is continuation and escalation of the conflict.
Moreover, once the sociopsychological infrastructure crystallizes, it can instigate
a freezing tendency, which involves a preference for maintaining one’s existing
beliefs and resistance to changing them. Freezing leads to reluctance to search for
alternative information and resistance to persuasive arguments (Kruglanski, 2004;
Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Consequently, the sociopsychological infrastructure
becomes a prism through which society members process and evaluate new informa-
tion, resulting in selective and biased information processing (Bar-Tal & Halperin,
2011). This reduces the likelihood that new information, which suggests possibilities
of resolving the conflict peacefully, would be considered seriously. Several studies
conducted among Israeli Jews indeed demonstrate that adherence to the ethos of
conflict affects the processing and interpretation of new information in ways contrib-
ute to the continuation of the conflict and reduce the likelihood of peaceful resolution
(Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Degani-Hirsch, 2007; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).
One practical implication of these findings is that Israelis and Palestinians may dis-
regard peaceful gestures coming from their opponents because those are inconsistent
with their sociopsychological infrastructure. For example, the peace initiative of the
Arab League was proposed in 2002 and reified by the League several times since.
Israel, however, has never responded to the initiative and refuses to discuss it.

Conclusion

Societies cannot survive and function if the individuals that comprise them are not
well adjusted and functioning. This may drive societies to develop collective mecha-
nisms that allow society members to cope with difficulties that they may face
(deVries, 1995). We have seen that societies involved in intractable conflict develop
10 K. Sharvit

a unique sociopsychological infrastructure, which assists them in dealing with the

challenges of the conflict but at the same time contributes to the continuation of the
conflict. The question arises, therefore, whether the sociopsychological infrastruc-
ture is in fact beneficial to societies that are involved in intractable conflicts. I suggest
that the answer to this question depends on the outcomes that the group believes are
desirable and feasible. Recall that members of societies that are involved in intrac-
table conflicts believe that the conflict is irreconcilable and that the goals over which
it is being fought are essential to their existence (Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013; Kriesberg,
1993). Hence, they may not believe that peaceful resolution of the conflict is feasible
or desirable in the foreseeable future. If this is the case, then the society needs to
prepare to face the challenges of a protracted conflict, and the sociopsychological
infrastructure remains functional. However, if the group believes that conflict resolu-
tion is feasible and desirable and decides to engage in a process of peacemaking, then
the sociopsychological infrastructure becomes counterproductive and a barrier to
conflict resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). This discussion points out the para-
doxical role of the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. On the
one hand, it helps societies and their members address the challenges that the conflict
poses. But on the other hand, it contributes to the continuation of the conflict, which
is the situation that creates those challenges in the first place.
It follows that any attempts to resolve intractable conflicts and minimize their detri-
mental effects on individuals and societies must take into consideration the nature of
the sociopsychological infrastructure, the functions that it serves, and its implications.
Given that the sociopsychological infrastructure plays a role in the maintenance and
escalation of conflicts, changing its component beliefs and emotions may be a neces-
sary step toward achieving reconciliation and developing a culture of peace (Bar-Tal,
2013). Yet it is important to keep in mind that the sociopsychological infrastructure
serves important functions for the members of societies involved in intractable conflicts.
Thus, in order to pose a significant challenge to the sociopsychological infrastructure
of intractable conflict, any alternative infrastructure must include different means of
addressing the challenges that the societies involved in the conflict face. Moreover, the
peacemaking process brings with it additional challenges, which also need to be
addressed (Rosler, Chap. 14). Only when these challenges are successfully addressed
can members of societies involved in intractable conflicts, including Israelis and
Palestinians, hope to not only cope and endure the adversities and suffering that these
conflicts cause but to eliminate them completely.

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 Part I
Acquisition of the Socio-Psychological
Repertoire
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict:
A Developmental Perspective

Yona Teichman

Introduction

One of the richest and diverse areas in the literature in social sciences deals with
stereotypes and prejudice. Paradoxically, relatively limited interest has been devoted
to questions such as when stereotypes and prejudice emerge, what is their develop-
mental course, and what are the mechanisms that determine their content and com-
plexity. Despite this observation, it has to be noted that in recent years an increase
in theoretical and empirical interest in the acquisition and development of stereo-
types and prejudice in children is evident. The accumulating results indicate that
developmental trajectories of stereotypes and prejudice are influenced by affect, by
cognitive and personality development, and by their social context.
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) were the first to sug-
gest that stereotypes and prejudice are rooted in childhood experiences. Influenced
by psychoanalytic thinking, they proposed that hostility originally experienced
toward harsh parents is projected or displaced toward other people. The easiest tar-
gets for rejection or hate are disadvantaged out-groups. At that time Allport (1954)
and later Black-Gutman and Hickson (1996) suggested that social knowledge is
acquired through social learning, identifying mechanisms such as imitation, model-
ing, or association. However, most studies showed that children’s attitudes were not
related to their personal environment: parents, teachers, and peers (Aboud, 2008).
Following the pioneering theoretical ideas, the first empirical studies were con-
ducted. The most famous are Clark and Clark’s (1947) doll studies and later the
work of P.A. Katz (1976; Katz, Shon, & Zalk, 1975).

Y. Teichman (*)
School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 17

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_2
18 Y. Teichman

Theoretical Views Explaining the Development of Stereotypes

and Prejudice

For a long time the examination of the developmental trajectory of stereotypes and
prejudice has drawn on two major theories: socio-cognitive theory (SCT) (Aboud,
1988) and social identity development theory (SIDT) (Nesdale, 1999; Nesdale &
Flesser, 2001). SCT suggests that due to limited cognitive capabilities, affective
influence (fear), an egocentric social perspective, and early emotional attachments
to individuals perceived as similar to the child, preschoolers prefer their own ethnic
group and express dislike toward other ethnic groups. As cognitive development
advances, at the age of 7–8, views of people shift to more objective criteria; thus,
cognitive maturation encourages social tolerance.
Ample findings indicate that in multiethnic nonviolent social contexts, children
aged 3–4 from dominant groups are capable of ethnic differentiation, expressing
liking for the in-group or even dislike for the out-group. When they reach the ages
of 7–9, stereotypes and prejudice decline (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1993;
Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001).
It follows that 10-year-olds and above should manifest a further reduction in biases.
However, studies that included children aged 10 and up reported a renewed eleva-
tion in prejudice (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Rutland, 1999; Teichman, 2001;
Vaughan, 1987). Thus, additional factors to cognitive development affect pre- and
early adolescents and reintroduce social biases.
Another challenge to SCT emerged from findings showing that the developmen-
tal trajectories of ethnic preferences of majority and minority children differ.
Irrespective of age, majority children prefer their own group, whereas young minor-
ity children tend to prefer the majority group, and only later their preference shifts
to their own group (Aboud, 1988). Since the developmental changes in ethnic atti-
tudes proposed by the SCT are based on universal patterns of cognitive develop-
ment, SCT cannot account for the difference between same-aged children who
belong to different social groups. Furthermore, findings for minority children in
conflict indicated that even 12–13-year-olds did not express preference for their in-
group (Teichman & Zafrir, 2003). Again it seems that factors other than cognitive
maturation influence the development of children’s intergroup repertoires.
The second major developmental theory—SIDT (Nesdale, 1999; Nesdale &
Flesser, 2001)—is based on social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel &
Turner, 1986). Drawing on the tenets of SIT, SIDT attributes major importance to
the experience of individuals as group members and to their social identity.
According to SIDT, individuals develop as group members; thus, many of their
experiences, thoughts, feelings, and actions occur within a group framework. They
categorize groups, identify with the groups to which they belong, and integrate
them as a part of their self-identity. Moreover, individuals perceive and treat others
according to the knowledge they acquire about the relationship between their group
and any given out-group. Subsequently, they engage in social comparison, and
being motivated by a basic need to enhance their collective self-esteem, they favor
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective 19

the in-group and devalue out-groups. Importantly, SIT and SIDT highlight the fact
that social self-enhancement stems from collective experiences and is not influ-
enced by age. Indeed, empirical evidence confirms that even a superficial newly
established group identity (in a minimal group paradigm), children and adults
favored in-groups and discriminated against out-groups (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner,
1997; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961;
Vaughan, Tajfel, & Williams, 1981).
Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, and Griffiths (2004) offer a developmental paradigm
that applies to children aged 2–7 of dominant groups in multiethnic communities.
The developmental sequence is comprised of four stages that progress from lack of
differentiation between social groups (age 2–3) to ethnic prejudice, reached at the
age of 6–7, when children not only prefer their own group but are also capable of
disliking or even hating out-groups. According to this paradigm, the transition to out-
group rejection depends on advances in the development of cognitive abilities, social
knowledge, and motivation for self-enhancement. Nesdale and his associates did not
study children below the age of 5. Thus, their full paradigm still needs empirical test-
ing, but already now it may be said that existing findings indicate that capabilities for
social differentiation and social preferences appear very early in the development.
One example for early expression of social biases emerges from studies con-
ducted in contexts of conflict. The idea that conditions of conflict accelerate the
development of prejudice was mentioned by many (Augoustinos & Rosewarne,
2001; Brewer, 1999; Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001). This qualification
acknowledges that the cognitive capabilities required for the development of inter-
group categorization and preferences emerge early in life and their activation
depends on the context. Indeed, findings obtained in Northern Ireland (Cairns,
1987; Connolly, Smith, & Kelly, 2002) and in Israel (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005;
Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006) indicate that in a context of an intractable conflict,
preschoolers develop social categories and children as young as 2 and 3 years old
express in-group preference and even out-group rejection.
Irrespective of conflict, findings that social preferences are expressed very early
in human development received important confirmation from studies performed
with preverbal infants (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Even more surprisingly
studies with nonhumans (rhesus macaque) (Mahajan et al., 2011) revealed that the
monkeys differentiated between in- and out-group faces, displayed greater vigi-
lance toward faces of out-groups and, as humans, favored in-group members. The
researchers conclude “… that the architecture of the mind that enables the forma-
tion of these biases may be rooted in phylogenetically ancient mechanisms.”
The findings reported for very young children and prehumans constitute another
challenge for the developmental paradigms (SCT and SIDT) suggesting that the
development of prejudice depends on cognitive capabilities that emerge at pre-
school age or even after the age of 6. In an attempt to reconcile the difficulty regard-
ing the evolvement of prejudice as well as the previously mentioned challenges
(reemergence of prejudice at the age of 10–12 and differences between majority and
minority children), Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) examined the development of
stereotypes and prejudice in several studies in the age span of 2–17. To my knowl-
20 Y. Teichman

edge, this series of studies constitutes the widest perspective on the development of
social perception and attitudes. The studies were performed in Israel that represents
a socialization context of a violent political conflict. Accounting for the influence of
conflict on children’s social perception and attitudes and highlighting theoretical
thinking related to personality development, Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) and
Teichman and Bar-Tal (2008) proposed an alternative theory regarding the develop-
ment of intergroup repertories. The new theory, referred to as an integrative
developmental-contextual theory (IDCT), points out the simultaneous influence of
factors acknowledged by SCT and SIDT and calls attention to additional factors
such as affect, personal development, and context. The recent version of the theory
is presented in the following section.

Integrative Developmental-Contextual Theory (IDCT)

IDCT proposes that social psychological intergroup repertories (SPIRs) that include
stereotypes and prejudice are products of simultaneous influence of multiple factors
in a given social context. This proposition is derived from Marcia’s (1998) theoreti-
cal expansion of Erikson’s (1968) developmental model. Marcia (1998) stressed the
cumulative progression of experience along the life-span. Thus, although develop-
mental experiences and issues are stage specific and critical stages are defined, all
developmental issues have precursors and successors that unfold through life.
Advancing from stage to stage, individuals face new stage-related issues that are
experienced with association to the accumulated experiences and resolutions from
previous stages (vertical progression). The accumulated attainments and experi-
ences from each stage are the foundation for the next developmental stage (horizon-
tal progression). In Marcia’s words: “…each stage has its preparatory predecessors
in the form of partial resolutions occurring before that stage’s ascendancy. As well,
each stage, once its ascendancy has been reached and the psychological issues
resolved, contributes its strength to the resolution of succeeding stages” (p. 32).
As for factors influencing the development of SPIRS, IDCT acknowledges the
role of cognitive development and socially embedded self-enhancement motivation,
highlighted by SCT and SIDT. However, instead of focusing on any specific factor,
IDCT includes both and traces their influence within a developmental perspective.
Along with cognitive and social identity development, IDCT acknowledges affect,
personal self-identity and motivation for personal self-enhancement, and social con-
text as factors exerting important influence on the development of SPIRs.
Applying the cumulative schema to the development of SPIRs, IDCT proposes
that though having critical stages, all the factors involved in the development of
SPIRs (affect; cognitive and identity development, personal and social; and con-
text) are active all along the developmental span. However, in different stages, a
different factor has the potential for acquiring salience and major influence, but due
to contextual conditions that also exist through the development or previous experi-
ences, it does not always do so and other factors may overshade it. Thus, in infancy
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective 21

IDCT: Developmental Model

0 -6 7-9 10 +
Time Span

Cognitive Identity
Affect Development Development

Information Processing

Stereotypes and Prejudice

Fig. 1 A representation of the integrative developmental-contextual theory (IDCT)

the main factor is affect, in school age, cognitive development, and in pre- and early
adolescence, social and personal identity development.
Proposing that at any given time SPIRs are determined cumulatively by multiple
factors expands the theoretical perspective to a wider developmental span than that
covered by SCT and SIDT. On the younger end of the developmental trajectory,
IDCT relates to children from the time they can use language, namely, ages 2–3, all
the way through adulthood. This theorization suggests a differential approach, in
which the specific configurations of the different factors vary by age and context,
thus influencing information processing and being influenced by it. The different
configurations determine specific developmental trajectories for each case. This
theoretical framework is depicted in Fig. 1.

Factors Identified by IDCT as Influencing the Development

of Social Biases

An examination of the proposed factors involved in the development of stereotypes and

prejudice will demonstrate that IDCT helps to explain findings not explained by SCT or
SIDT, such as the expression of out-group negativity among very young children, the
maintenance of prejudice among 7–9-year-olds, the reemergence of prejudice during pre-
and early adolescence, as well as differences between majority and minority children.
22 Y. Teichman

Affect: Aboud (1988) suggested that in infancy and young age, the basic reac-
tions to people are determined by the emotions they arouse (positive/negative).
However, Aboud (1988) also stated that “in the social domain affective processes
dominate from 3 to 6 years and then decline” (p. 119). Contrary to this position and
closer to Allport’s view, IDCT proposes that negative affect (i.e., anxiety, threat, or
fear) produces negativity toward the individuals or groups that arouse such feelings
and create distance from them. The implications for a context of conflict suggest
that early in life children absorb the affective atmosphere related to the dangerous
out-group. These affective consequences interfere with information processing and
reappraisal of experiences, thereby causing individuals to overlook new inputs and
to judge out-group members by relying on expectations or stereotypes (Wilder &
Simon, 2001). Thus, irrespective of developmental progression in other domains
(cognitive, identity development), affect may stabilize beliefs and attitudes estab-
lished at a very early age and may instigate, maintain, or perpetuate them (Silverstein
& Flamenbaum, 1989). Indeed, the fact that through the life-span emotions play an
important role in interpersonal and intergroup perceptions and responses was
reported in many studies (Bar-Tal, 2001; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994; Nesdale,
Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). The continuous influ-
ence of affect is shown in Fig. 1.
Cognitive development: Since Aboud’s (1988) contribution to the understanding
of prejudice in children, cognitive development is acknowledged as an important
determinant of prejudice. However, cognitive skills guide social perception and atti-
tudes much earlier than proposed by SCT and SIDT. As previously mentioned, the
view that infants possess cognitive capabilities needed for acquiring social knowl-
edge, developing a theory about their environment, and expressing it in preferences
and rejections is based on ample empirical evidence. Apparently, infants are aware of
stimuli in their surroundings; they process information, absorb, encode, analyze, cat-
egorize, and remember their inanimate and social environment (Hamlin et al., 2007;
Hirschfeld, 1996; Sherman, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Younger, 1993).
Later in development, contextual inputs (information), experiences (affect), and the
desire to preserve consistency and continuity (Stangor & Ruble, 1989) reinforce and
stabilize the initially formed categories, beliefs, and attitudes associated with them.
Integrating affect and cognition as underlying factors in the development of
SPIRs provides the developmental background for Allport’s (1954) definition of
prejudice as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9).
The early established antipathy and faulty generalizations constitute the foundation
for the primary intergroup categorization and biases. These biases continue to
develop and depending on the level of threat in the context gain power or decline
during preschool age. Accordingly, in a context of an intractable conflict, one would
not expect 8–9-year-olds to express moderation toward the enemy.
From preadolescence (age 10 and later), abstract and hypothetical thinking begin
to develop, providing the ground for valuing justice, dignity, equality, and human
rights. All of these contribute to the advancement of social tolerance (Kohlberg,
1969; Selman, 1980). However, as with children aged 8–9, advance in cognitive
development represents a potential contribution, the realization of which depends
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective 23

on the context in which they grow up and on the other factors involved in the influ-
ence on the development of SPIRs. A factor of major importance for this age is
identity development.
Self-identity: Extending the theoretical thinking about the development of social
biases beyond school age directs attention to self-identity. IDCT refers to self-
identity as an integrated identity, including personal identity, social identity, and the
self-esteem related to each.1 Importantly, self-identity as well begins in infancy
(Amsterdam, 1972) and proceeds through the developmental span (Marcia, 1998).
This suggests that in early development, along with affective and cognitive influ-
ences on SPIRs, experiences related to self-esteem may influence the development
of children’s intergroup biases. Considering minority children, it is plausible that,
due to the salience of identity and its social meaning, this factor influences their
intergroup responses earlier than it does for majority children, motivating them to
express out-group preference.
Irrespective of specific environments, during pre- and early adolescence (ages
10–14), identity formation and consolidation become the main developmental task
(Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1998). The insecurity aroused by the processes involved in
the integration of the different aspects of identity increases the need for self-
reassurance. In this stage the status of the groups to which one belongs, the drive for
self-enhancement identified by SIT and others (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1998), and
intergroup comparisons which reflect on self-esteem become highly relevant. It fol-
lows that in pre- and early adolescence, the advancement in cognitive development
or affective experiences alone cannot account for social biases.
In multiethnic communities as well as in a context of intractable conflict, it was
found that, compared with younger children and occasionally with adolescents, pre-
and early adolescents manifest an increase in in-group preference and out-group
rejection (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996; Teichman,
2001; Teichman, Bar-Tal, & Abdolrazeq, 2007; Vaughan, 1987). These findings sup-
port the contention that issues and motivations activated during early adolescence
influence intergroup biases. Likewise, findings reported by Nesdale and Brown
(2004) show that children aged 9 and 12 were more sensitive to a negative represen-
tative of their in-group than were younger children. The fact that this reaction was
more pronounced at the ages of 9–12 may be attributed to the threat that the negative,
unlikable in-group member posed for the group members’ self-esteem.
A more direct examination of the association between self-worth, in-group
favoritism, and out-group rejection may be performed, comparing intergroup
responses of participants with high and low personal or collective self-esteem
(Crocker, Blaine, & Luhtanen, 1993). In the child and adolescence literature, few
studies have examined issues related to self-esteem. As in the adult literature (for a
review see Long & Spears, 1998), these studies have yielded inconclusive results.
Studies that examined 6–9-year-olds reported that high-self-esteem participants
expressed higher in-group favoritism (Bigler et al., 1997; Gagnon & Morasse,

1
Other aspects of self-identity, i.e., gender identity, religious identity, family identity, etc., are also
parts of the integrated identity but are not considered in this chapter.
24 Y. Teichman

1995), whereas results reported for participants, aged 10–12, reported this tendency
for low-self-esteem participants (Sasson, 2004, reviewed by Bar-Tal & Teichman,
2005). Possibly, while younger children manifest self-enhancement or self-
maintenance, older children experiencing stronger self-doubts manifest self-
protection (Crocker et al., 1993). Focusing on collective self-esteem, Teichman
et al. (2007) reported that irrespective of age, participants from the highest collec-
tive self-esteem group displayed highest intergroup biases. More importantly, the
highest biases were expressed by the 10–12-year-olds.
The often reported manifestation of biases by pre- and early adolescents offers
support for the relationship, suggested by IDCT between identity-related needs dur-
ing these stages and intergroup responses. However, further examination of this
proposition is required, and more empirical evidence to support it will be presented.
Social Context: As reflected in Fig. 1, affective experiences and cognitive and
identity development are embedded in a social context and nourished by it through
information processing. The information processed regarding any group, its repre-
sentatives, or events related to them is molded by the group’s social knowledge and
shared beliefs that include categorization of social groups and their stereotypical
definitions. Thus, most often new information is processed in a way that reinforces
the existing feelings, concepts, and motivations related to the in- and out-group and
the cycle never stops.
In an attempt to identify the factors within the social context that influence social
knowledge, Tajfel and Turner (1986) noted the importance of the status of groups,
legitimacy and stability of the status relationships, and the nature of the boundaries
between them, mainly permeability. Others added factors such as group norms
(Brown, 2000), intensity of group identification (Brewer, 1999), and the threat that
groups pose for each other (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Stephan &
Stephan, 2000). By now, the influence of most of these factors on social perception
has been examined and confirmed in studies with children (Augoustinos &
Rosewarne, 2001; Bigler et al., 1997; Nesdale et al., 2005).
Conflictual intergroup relationships exert intensive and lasting effects on personal
and intergroup reality. These effects are of special interest for the study of the devel-
opment of stereotypes and prejudice. On the personal level a conflict determines the
level of threat, anger, hostility, sense of danger, uncertainty, and hardship (affect).
Conflict accelerates information processing and thus the acquisition of specific lin-
guistic expressions, concepts, and knowledge while at the same time controls others
(cognitions) (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Cairns, 1987; Connolly et al., 2002;
Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006). Finally, conflict intensifies awareness regarding group
boundaries and distinctiveness, namely, the collective and personal identification
(identity) (Brewer, 1999), and commitment (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1999).
On the intergroup level, conflict determines the content and intensity of the inter-
group repertoire. It institutionalizes the norms guiding the behavioral intentions and
actual behaviors toward the adversary, the status ascribed to the involved groups, the
type of boundaries between them, and as a result the level and type of contact between
their members. Usually, the information disseminated in societal channels presents the
in-group as pursuing moral goals, while the out-group is demonized (Bar-Tal, 1989;
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective 25

Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989). In creating this dichotomy aggression,
violence, and animosity become salient topics in the social discourse.
The circular interaction between the personal and contextual levels contributes
to the creation of the most critical aspect of the social context for intergroup per-
spective, namely, the body of shared beliefs. These beliefs are constructed and
shaped through the cumulative experiences experienced and information processed
within each society. Shared beliefs are expressed in products such as tangible and
intangible symbols, scripts, habits, rules, narratives, concepts, and knowledge relat-
ing to one’s group and other social groups. Together these products represent the
shared psychological repertoire (SPIR) that provides meaning, definitions, rules of
practice, and codes for intergroup relationships (Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2008).
SPIRs are transmitted to the younger generation by socialization agents. Children
absorb and process information related to shared beliefs, and it shapes their perspec-
tives on their social world, including their views about the nature of the relation-
ships between their group and other groups within or outside their society
(Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Nasie, Chap. 3). With time the reper-
toire becomes rigid and resistant to change.
In a study reported by Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005), Israeli preschoolers men-
tioned television as the main source of information about the adversary out-group.
Parents, particularly mothers, were mentioned in the second place and only then
teachers. The fact that television was mentioned in the first place suggests that the
information reaching children exposes them to the violent aspects of the conflict
and to the different sentiment toward in- and out-group. It does not come as a sur-
prise that children who grow up in conflict express stereotypes and prejudice about
the adversary in a younger age than children growing up in a multiethnic society
express toward minorities.
Socialization is reflected not only in content of beliefs and the affect which
accompanies them but also in the structure of in- and out-group images, i.e., their
level of complexity and the level of homogeneity attributed to members of the two
groups. It is plausible to suggest that promoting simplification and generalizations
about any out-group advances stereotypical thinking about it. New findings regard-
ing complexity of images displayed by Jewish Israeli children will be presented in
the next section. These findings provide evidence for the fact that a conflict encour-
ages generalized images and, again, the tendency of pre- and early adolescents to
stand out in favoring the in-group.

Complexity of Images of Jews and Arabs Revealed by Jewish

Israeli Youth

The perceptual differentiation of objects of social attitude was studied with adults
extensively. Its relationship to in-group preference was repeatedly confirmed
(Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980). Livesley and Bromley (1973) were the
first to examine complexity with children. Complexity refers to quantitative
26 Y. Teichman

differences in perception or attributions to in- and out-group representations. As

such, it may be considered an implicit measure for the assessment of differential
group perceptions. Livesley and Bromley (1973) asked 7–15-year-olds to attribute
traits to eight figures that differed by age. Results indicated that the number of the
attributed traits used increased with age and that same age figures (in-group) were
attributed more traits than different age groups (out-groups). This line of research
was adopted with a different measurement methodology based on human figure
drawings (HFDs). It was proposed that complexity may be inferred from the num-
ber of items drawn in a figure. Indeed, as hypothesized, participants drew in-group
figures (a Jew) with more items than out-group figures (an Arab). Interestingly, the
critical age in which differentiation in complexity emerged was early adolescence
(Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Teichman, 2001).
A recent study performed with Jewish Israeli children and adolescents aged 8–16
continued to examine different aspects of complexity of mental images of “a Jew”
and “an Arab” (Teichman, Stein, & Shechner, in preparation). The images were
assessed using HFDs that were systematically scored for complexity, but in this
study the drawings were followed by questions regarding social knowledge about
the two groups reflected in the attributed name and profession to the drawn figures.
The scoring of the names and professions was quantitative reflecting the variety of
names and professions associated with each group. A name or profession mentioned
by many participants received a low complexity score, while those mentioned rarely
received a high complexity score. An examination of the developmental range
revealed that with regard to the in-group age, differences were almost defused and
all age groups presented members of their in-group (Jew) as more complex. For the
out-group (Arab), the critical age at which differences in complexity emerged was
early adolescence. Namely, after acquiring a certain level of complexity related to
names or professions at the age of 8–9, at the age of 10–12, it regresses to a lower
level. The regression suggests motivational influence to present the out-group mem-
bers with a lesser complexity. It is suggested that in-group favoritism expressed
explicitly in complexity is even more conspicuous than favoritism expressed in con-
tent variables. Although prevention and intervention are beyond the scope of this
chapter, these findings imply that introducing more complexity to social representa-
tions before the onset of adolescence along with interventions related to the stabili-
zation of personal and social self-esteem may facilitate preventions aiming at
reducing the development of stereotypes, prejudice, or racism.

Summary of the Developmental Paradigm of Social Biases

Proposed by IDCT

The theoretical and empirical evidence presented in this chapter is based on studies
that examined children in a broad developmental range from preschool age through
different stages of adolescence. Children reacted to in- and out-group stimuli, with
explicit investigator determined traits and feelings, or to free-response implicit
Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: A Developmental Perspective 27

measures. They were assessed on content and structure variables. The findings sug-
gest that in multiethnic social contexts, social biases emerge at the age of 3–4 and
preschoolers express only positive in-group biases. For school-age children, the
leap in cognitive development and conflict-free personal development leads to a
reduction in social biases that reappear in pre- and early adolescence. Moderation
may appear in late adolescence when cognitive and identity development reach
maturity and consolidation.
For children who grow up in a context of conflict, due to the interplay of emo-
tional, cognitive, identity-related, and contextual influences, from very early age
forward, children absorb threat associated with the out-group representing the
adversary. The threat accelerates social categorization and the emergence of posi-
tive in-group and negative out-group biases. The continuous exposure to negative
and threatening information reinforces these biases. In terms of progress in age-
related trajectories, two different treks are plausible: Conflict could either amplify
or defuse the conflict-free developmental pattern. Amplification would suggest an
intensification of the developmental trends outlined above; diffusion suggests a
commonly shared age-free social bias overpowering developmental, age-related
influences. The findings reviewed for the Israeli context (Bar-Tal & Teichman,
2005) reveal with few exceptions for the in-group a tendency for a diffused positive
preference and for the out-group a zigzagging pattern in which biases are acquired
early in preschool age, occasionally drop at school age, and reemerge in the onset of
adolescence. In late adolescence both reduction and acceleration were observed.
The available findings suggest that as proposed by IDCT an integrative approach
that accounts for the simultaneous influence of multiple factors offers a framework
for a comprehensive look at the developmental trajectory of social biases.

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Young Children’s Experiences and Learning
in Intractable Conflicts

Meytal Nasie

Intractable conflicts, by definition, include violent confrontational experiences.

As a result, the parties involved have undergone chronic conditions of intense
violence, threat, stress, insecurity, uncertainty, pain, and bereavement. Such condi-
tions have a formative and lasting effect on society members (Bar-Tal, 2007; Canetti,
Chap. 10; de Jong, 2002; Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999), including the youngest
generation (Cairns, 1996; Papageorgiou et al., 2000; Sagi-Schwartz, 2008). The
socialization of children in societies involved in intractable conflict is affected by
the intense situation in which they live. From a very early age, they learn about the
conflict and concepts related to it, both due to their inevitable personal experiences
and to the learning processes in the social and educational systems. These processes
are not based on passive absorption of information, but on active and reflective pro-
cessing of information as active observers and participants in the conflict. Children
perceive, think, evaluate, judge, and reflect. They actively construct their worldview
based on materials coming from their own experiences in the conflict reality and
materials they are provided by agents of socialization in the family, the mass media,
and the educational system.
Of special importance for this chapter is that, in order to successfully cope with
the conflict, the societies involved make tremendous efforts to impart their own
societal beliefs1 to society members and to preserve them among the coming gen-
erations. When these beliefs support the conflict, they become a barrier for peace-
making (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Oren, Chap. 8). This is especially true when the
leadership highly adheres to conflict-supporting narratives and controls the formal

1
Societal beliefs are defined as cognitions shared by society members that address themes and
issues with which society members are particularly occupied and which contribute to their sense
of uniqueness (Bar-Tal, 2000; see also Oren, Chap. 8; Shaked, Chap. 9).
M. Nasie (*)
School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 31

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_3
32 M. Nasie

institutions, which, in turn, impart these narratives to society members. A main

formal institution is the educational system which widely disseminates contents that
are in line with the dominant themes of the conflict to the youngest generation.
The present chapter will first discuss the personal experiences of children in the
context of an intractable conflict, as a direct firsthand way to learn about the conflict.
Second, it will describe the indirect ways in which children learn about the conflict,
by being continuously exposed to information about the conflict through its various
representations in their daily environment and through socialization agents.
Subsequently, the chapter will indicate the content that young children acquire
regarding the conflict in pre-school and elementary school, focusing on the Israeli-
Jewish case. Finally, it will discuss the consequences of these early experiences and
learning for the continuation and preservation of conflicts.

Children’s Personal Experiences in Conflicts

In areas of conflict, conflict-related events and violent confrontations between the

sides involved are an inseparable part of society members’ daily lives, including
children. A recent 10-Year report by UNICEF (2009) indicates that more than 30
countries and territories have been affected by conflicts, touching the lives of over
one billion children, of whom approximately 300 million are under the age of 5.
Therefore, many young children inevitably accumulate significant conflict-related
experiences that serve as primary sources for their early learning about the conflict.
In such an environment, almost every child is affected by conflict-related events,
albeit at different levels of intensity and directness (Cummings, Goeke-Morey,
Merrilees, Taylor, & Shirlow, 2014; Sagi-Schwartz, 2012). Most studies on the
effects of political conflict, as reviewed below, have involved school-age children
and adolescents rather than pre-school children. However, it may be said that living
in the context of intractable conflict imprints a society member from the day she/he
is born and becomes an active absorber of experiences and information. Infants may
hear sirens, shootings, and bombardments and/or may detect emotional distress
among their family members. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that experiences
of conflict are very powerful and have a determinative influence on children even in
their early years of life (Feldman & Vengrober, 2011; Meijer, 1985; Wang et al.,
2006). As an infant or toddler grows, these experiences become more concrete, iden-
tifiable, understandable, and meaningful. Children may experience a loss or observe
the injury of a family member or of acquaintances. They may encounter destruction
or violence in cases of shooting, bombardment, terror attacks, or displacement from
their home as refugees. They may also undergo humiliation, detention, imprisonment
injury, torture, or recruitment by armed forces and active participation in violence
(e.g., Basu & Dutta, 2010; Betancourt, Brennan, Rubin-Smith, Fitzmaurice, &
Gilman, 2010; Myers-Bowman, Walker, & Myers-Walls, 2003; Rafman, Canfield,
Barbas, & Kaczorowski, 1997; UNICEF, 2013; Wessells, 2006).
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 33

The direct experiences are especially frequent in areas where conflict is violently
intensive and also occurs in residential environments. Among Palestinians, for
example, Thabet, Karim, and Vostanis (2006) examined the conflict trauma expo-
sure of 309 pre-school children between the ages of 3 and 6 years in Gaza. They
found that the children tested were exposed to three traumatic events on average
(range 0–15). As reported by their parents, 92 % of the children had witnessed muti-
lated bodies and wounded people on television; 51 % had witnessed bombardment
of other people’s homes by airplane; 28 % had witnessed fire by tanks and heavy
artillery on neighbors’ homes; 20 % had heard about the killing of a neighbor or a
close relative; and 19 % had witnessed demolition of a friend’s home. Abu Hein,
Qouta, Thabet, and El Sarraj (1993) carried out a survey of 1200 children aged
7–15 in Gaza and found that 71 % reported night raids at home, 52 % reported wit-
nessing assaults of family members, 35 % had been beaten, 19 % had been detained,
and 16 % had been injured. A recent study by Dubow et al. (2010), which investi-
gated Palestinian children from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, aged 8, 11, and
14, showed that most of the children were exposed to political conflict and violence.
Specifically, 61 % experienced a loss of, or injury to, a friend or family member;
73 % experienced a nonviolent event that disrupted their lives (e.g., spending a long
time in a security shelter); 88 % indicated that they or significant others had partici-
pated in political demonstrations; 73 % had witnessed actual violence; and 99 %
had witnessed media portrayals of political violence. In Israel, parents of children
aged 2–7 years, who were relocated to a safety camp during the Second Israel-
Lebanon War (July to August 2006), reported significant exposure of their children
to war-related experiences with severe stress reactions. Specifically, most of the
children had had three (34 %) or four (47 %) experiences. The most prevalent expe-
riences had been hearing explosions, living in bomb shelters, hearing alarm sirens,
and witnessing environmental damage (Sadeh, Hen-Gal, & Tikotzky, 2008). Landau
et al. (2010) found that Israeli children and adolescents aged 8, 11, and 14 reported
considerable exposure to various types of violent events, such as loss or injury of a
friend or family member, witnessing actual violence, and they themselves or signifi-
cant others participating in political demonstrations. In addition, Slone and Shechner
(2009) found that 85 % of the Israeli children and adolescents aged 10–18 years had
taken part in a security drill at school, 66 % reported exposure to acts of terrorism
through the news on television or in newspapers, and 39 % had experienced the
absence of a family member for an extended period due to military or political
involvement.
High levels of exposure to violence have also been reported among children in
other conflict regions. Straker, Mendelsohn, Moosa, and Tudin (1996) found that
South African adolescents reported similarly high exposure to violence. In Sierra
Leone, children and youth, who constitute a majority of the population, were found
to be exposed to violence and the most affected, both as perpetrators and victims
(Betancourt, McBain, Newnham, & Brennan, 2013; Mcintyre & Thusi, 2003).
Similarly, Derluyn, Broekaert, Schuyten, and De Temmerman (2004) interviewed
301 former child soldiers in Uganda who had been abducted by the northern
Ugandan rebellion movement, Lord’s Resistance Army, at about the age of 12.5 for
34 M. Nasie

a period of more than 2 years. On average, children had been exposed to six differ-
ent traumatic events (range 0–13). Specifically, 77 % had seen someone being killed
during their abduction; 64 % had been forced to participate in fights; 63 % had had
to loot properties and burn houses of civilians; 61 % had had to stay in Sudan, under
difficult circumstances; 52 % had been seriously beaten; 39 % had had to kill a
person by themselves; and 39 % had had to abduct other children.
In Northern Ireland, during the prolonged conflict between the Catholics and the
Protestants, Muldoon and Trew (2000) examined experiences of conflict-related
events by 689 children aged 8–11. Seventy percent of the sampled children reported
seeing soldiers on the street, 60 % experienced bomb scares, 54 % reported getting
stopped at checkpoints, 24 % reported witnessing people shooting guns, and 23 %
reported getting caught in a riot. In Sri Lanka, Elbert et al. (2009) found, in a sample
of 420 children 10–14 year olds, that almost all children reported experiencing or
witnessing a series of life-threatening events. Specifically, 79 % reported combat
experience, with 58 % having witnessed bombing, 40 % shelling, and 30 % having
experienced an attack on their homes. Furthermore, 40 % of the children had wit-
nessed someone’s death. The study revealed a high number of traumatizing experi-
ences in children and found that about one in four children suffered from
PTSD. During the siege in Sarajevo, among the investigated population of children
and adolescents, 85 % had had direct or indirect experiences of sniper fire, 66 % had
lost at least one member of their family, and almost all had experienced serious
deprivation of basic needs, such as food and/or water and/or warm clothes (Husain
et al., 1998). In Lebanon, Macksoud and Aber (1996) found that the average num-
ber of war traumas experienced per child was as high as six. These included dis-
placement, separation from parents, bereavement, witnessing violent acts, exposure
to shelling or combat, physical injuries, emigration, involvement in the hostilities,
and extreme deprivation of basic needs. These trends also appeared among Kuwaiti
7–14-year-old children, during the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait, when most
Kuwaiti children were exposed to unpleasant war experiences (Al-Eissa, 1995). In
addition, among Bosnian refugee children 8–13 year olds who had experienced the
war in Bosnia, 90 % had been forced to leave their village or town, 64 % had been
separated from their family during the war, 63 % had stayed in the basement for
long periods because of shelling, 59 % had experienced shelling at close proximity,
54 % had been in situations which made them think they were going to die or be
killed, and 43 % had seen a dead body (Papageorgiou et al., 2000).
This line of research points out the variety of children’s experiences during wars
and conflicts, which are unfortunately increasing every day. Because each country
has its own type of conflict, the experiences that children face are quite variable from
country to country in their type and intensity. However, despite their variety, what
becomes clear is that the essence of these experiences is similar, since all these expe-
riences have unpleasant implications for children’s life such as harsh conditions,
distress, suffering, pain, and interruption of the normal life. In addition, these experi-
ences may be accompanied by negative emotional reactions of children such as fear,
panic, anxiety, insecurity, and helplessness. Since these experiences usually persist
over long time, they may also have serious and cumulative effects on the children.
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 35

They affect the children’s health and well-being, which, in turn, affect their psychosocial
and physical development (Landers, 1998; Zahr, 1996; for review, see Williams,
2007). Finally, these powerful contexts also influence the beliefs, attitudes, and emo-
tions of the younger generation regarding the conflict, the in-group, and the rival
group. The threatening and violent environment affects children’s broad and realistic
understanding of violent conflict and especially of war (Becirevic, Roberts, &
Baker, 2009; Blankemeyer, Walker, & Svitak, 2009; Miljević-Ridjički & Lugomer-
Armano, 1994). In addition, at a very early age, they form a clear social identity and
identification with the in-group as well as clear differentiation between their own
group and the rival (Oppenheimer, 2006). Also, they attribute negative images to the
rival (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Finally, they acquire emotions related to the con-
flict—especially fear of the enemy and hatred toward it (Bar-Tal, 1996; Myers-
Walls, 2004; Punamäki, 1982). The following part describes at length the indirect
ways in which children learn about the conflict and the contents that they acquire
within this context.

Children’s Indirect Learning About Conflicts

Complementing the above experiences, children also absorb information about the
conflict indirectly by being continuously exposed to representations and expressions
of the conflict in the environment in which they grow. This exposure may occur
even in areas where armed conflict is of relatively low intensity. Family members
talk about the conflict because it is an inseparable part of their lives, and children
indirectly hear language that is laced with a vocabulary of conflict and that uses
terms and words to describe its nature, the rival group, and the in-group. From an
early age, children may also be exposed to information provided daily by the media
about the conflict. They may observe visual violent representations of the conflict
and/or hear discussions about it. The conflict is also reflected in various visual
images and symbols of everyday life to which children are exposed (Bar-Tal,
Abutbul-Selinger, & Raviv, 2014). These symbols and images may have a variety of
contents, modes, and forms, but all refer either directly or indirectly to the conflict.
Examples include military personnel seen in public spaces, weapons carried by
members of the armed forces, fighter planes and helicopters flying overhead, statues
and sculptures related to the conflict, checkpoints, street names and memorial sites
commemorating battles or fallen soldiers, bomb shelters, gas masks, and even
advertisements whose contents are related to the conflict.
Furthermore, children, like all society members, engage on a daily basis in
practices that are related to the context of the conflict situation and are established
either formally or informally. Formally established practices are imposed by the
authorities and may even be required by law, as, for example, security searches in
train stations and airports and security drills at schools. Informally established prac-
tices may emerge as norms observed by society members, as, for example, paying
attention to suspicious objects in public places. In view of this flow of information,
36 M. Nasie

it should not be surprising that children who live in conflict zones absorb this
information continuously from birth and they form concepts, categories, impres-
sions, understandings, and preferences. Specifically, they learn the categorization of
the in-group and the rival; their characteristics; vocabulary related to conflict and war;
their meaning, connotations, and implications; as well as acquiring an emotional
repertoire connected to this knowledge including fear, insecurity, threat, and hatred
(e.g., Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Connolly, Smith, & Kelly, 2002; Miljević-Ridjički
& Lugomer-Armano, 1994; Oppenheimer, 2006; Teichman, Chap. 2).
This political socialization regarding the conflict begins immediately with birth
and then continues directly and indirectly, as the child is intentionally and uninten-
tionally exposed to agents of socialization. Agents of socialization such as family
members, teachers, and the media describe and explain the conflict directly to the
children. They provide information and interpret it in a particular way. For example,
parents may respond to questions and may also initiate talk about the conflict, trying
to explain its features (e.g., Moyer-Gusé & Smith, 2007; Myers-Walls, Myers-
Bowman, & Pelo, 1993; Shamai, 2001). Pre-school teachers may refer to different
facets of the conflict, such as the bravery of the fighters, the cruel rival, commemo-
rative conflict events, and stories about the collective memory of the conflict (e.g.,
Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). In addition, children themselves as observers
may ask questions, verbally interact, and take an active part in societal, communal,
and familial ceremonies and rituals commemorating conflict events and fallen indi-
viduals. Finally, children may also see and listen to information provided daily by
the media about the conflict through the news (e.g., Cohen & Adoni, 1980; Lemish
& Götz, 2007) or on television programs for children. The next section discusses
specific learning of conflict-related narratives in early childhood.

Conflict-Related Narratives of Ethos of Conflict

and Collective Memory

The harsh conditions of intractable conflicts pose serious challenges for the societies
involved in them, which, in turn, have to satisfy the basic needs of their members
that arise in such conflicts: psychological needs of knowing, mastery, certainty,
safety, positive identity, and so on (Burton, 1990; Staub, 2003; Tajfel, 1982). The
theory of the sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007,
2013) suggests that societies that are involved in intractable conflicts develop a
sociopsychological repertoire, which includes a collective memory, an ethos of
conflict, and collective emotional orientations. This repertoire allows them to cope
successfully with the challenges that they face. The present chapter focuses on two
elements of this repertoire, namely, ethos of conflict and collective memory.
Ethos of conflict is defined as a configuration of central, shared societal beliefs
that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to soci-
etal life under conditions of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000). The societal beliefs
which comprise the ethos of conflict are organized around eight themes: justness of
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 37

the in-group’s goals, delegitimization of the rival, positive collective self-image,

in-group victimization, security, patriotism, unity, and peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; see
also Oren, Chap. 8; Sharvit, Chap. 1). Collective memory of the conflict consists of
societal beliefs and narratives that represent and construct the history of the conflict
to society members (Halbwachs, 1992; Wertsch, 2002). These beliefs and narratives
develop over time and describe the conflict’s outbreak and its course, providing
coherent meaning to the past (Devine-Wright, 2003; Tint, 2010). They provide a
complete and meaningful picture of the conflict: explain the causes of the conflict,
describe its nature, refer to major events, present the image of the rival, portray the
in-group’s presentation, legitimate present claims and acts, and make major attri-
butions of responsibility for the eruption of the conflict, its continuation, and the
violence used (Bar-Tal, 2013; see also Nets-Zenghut, Chap. 4).
The fundamental premise suggests that every society in intractable conflict needs
narratives and societal beliefs of ethos of conflict and collective memory, because
these enable successful adaptation to the conditions of the conflict and make it pos-
sible to withstand acts perpetrated by the rival (Bar-Tal, 2013; Canetti, Chap. 10).
Because these societal beliefs are so essential for coping with the harsh experiences
of the conflict, the involved societies try to maintain the dominance of their own
beliefs among the in-group members. Such societies use social mechanisms to pre-
serve this repertoire and impart it to their members. This is carried out through
socialization processes which include all social institutions and channels. These
include the educational system, curriculum, textbooks, cultural institutions, chan-
nels of communication, the army, the leaders, and national ceremonies. In this pro-
cess, the ethos beliefs and the collective memory are imparted to the young
generation as well. This is an effective way for the society to ensure the preservation
of the societal beliefs, since the young members may acquire and store this reper-
toire from an early age and carry it through their lives.

Learning the Ethos of Conflict and Collective Memory

in Early Childhood: The Jewish-Israeli Case

This section presents new empirical evidence from the Israeli-Jewish case study that
beliefs and narratives of ethos of conflict and collective memory are already trans-
mitted and absorbed at a very early age. It focuses solely on the educational system
(pre-schools and schools) as a central socialization agent that imparts beliefs regard-
ing the conflict (Barrett, 2007; Covell, 1999). In societies where the educational
system is under the control of the government, the state recruits the system to serve
as a crucial agent of socialization to convey the formal narratives to the younger
generation. Political socialization takes place in pre-schools and schools in two
major ways: first, by providing contents of national conflict-related narratives in
different ways. These include school textbooks, teachers’ instruction, discussions,
ceremonies, informal education, trips, symbols presented at schools (flags, maps,
photos of leaders, plaques memorializing the fallen in the schools), and so on.
38 M. Nasie

Second, schools on all levels usually avoid presenting alternative information about
the conflict and thereby limit critical and open discussion of topics related to conflict
(see also Lange, 2012).
This form of socialization is very powerful because it reaches all the members of
the younger generation in any society in which education is compulsory. In Israel,
formal education begins at the age of 3 (see Sprinzak, Bar, & Levy-Mazlum, 2005),
and this increases the potential of acquiring conflict-related beliefs at such an early
age. In addition, children spend many hours of the day in pre-schools and schools,
and these by definition provide knowledge related to the reality in which the society
lives. Schools and pre-schools as formal institutions are supervised by the govern-
ment in Israel with the goal of imparting official narratives (Podeh, 2002). In this
context, Bar-Tal, Spivak, and Castel-Bazelet (2003) found that 64 % of the 5- to
6.5-year-old children in their study reported that they acquired information about
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from their kindergarten teachers. Similarly, Ben
Shabat (2010) found that 50 % of the 6- to 7-year-old (first grade) children in her
study reported that they acquired information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
from their school.
The themes of ethos of conflict and collective memory are transmitted in Israeli
pre-schools and elementary schools, especially through national ceremonies and
holiday celebrations marking events that are directly and indirectly related to the
conflict. A series of studies, reviewed below, involving Jewish-Israeli state pre-
schools and elementary schools recount the contents acquired by young children, as
well as contents delivered by teachers, regarding the conflict. These studies mainly
reflect the messages conveyed and learned through Jewish holiday celebrations that
take place in schools and pre-schools. In particular, they include Hanukkah, Purim,
Passover, and Lag BaOmer, which are festivals based on biblical and postbiblical
historical events during which the Jewish people celebrated their victories and sur-
vival of persecutions by the Seleucid, Persian, Egyptian, and Roman empires,
respectively. In addition, they reflect messages disseminated and learned through
national memorial ceremonies such as Holocaust Day, Memorial Day for Israel’s
Fallen Soldiers, and Independence Day. These studies were carried out by inter-
viewing pre-school and school teachers and children about these events, after the
ceremonies and celebrations.
Ceremonies and celebrations, based on the collective memories of the Jewish
people, have been documented as powerful events which transmit contents for the
formation of national identity, as well as effective tools that the nation uses to con-
vey its doctrines to its members (Arviv-Abromovich, 2010; Furman, 1999;
Handelman & Katz, 1990; Lomsky-Feder, 2003). In Israel, these ceremonies and
celebrations are significant in the educational framework and take place every year
from pre-school to the last year of high school. In fact, for children, they strongly
convey the collective memory of Jewish history that preserves the conflict-related
narrative at present (Ben-Amos & Bet-El, 2005). Thus, already in pre-school, chil-
dren absorb the official narratives imparted by the formal institutions of the state.
Based on interviewing pre-school teachers, this series of studies found that the
messages relayed to children during the ceremonies and celebrations refer to differ-
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 39

ent facets of the conflict-related narratives of ethos of conflict and collective mem-
ory. For example, they justify the in-group’s goals by relating the present period to
Bible stories of “the Promised Land” and emphasizing that the Promised Land
belongs to the Jews: “I say that we are free people and we protect our land that
was promised to us by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob”; “I tell the children that on
Independence Day we came back to the Promised Land” (Eldan, 2006). They also
justify Jewish goals by relating them to the Holocaust: “The army was established
because of what happened to us in the Holocaust, so we will not find ourselves help-
less again” (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009). Pre-school teachers also emphasize the impor-
tance of national security and of the Israeli army that ensures Israeli security, and
they refer to the threats that Israeli society faces: “I tell the children that we have a
strong army and we will not go like sheep to the slaughter anymore; we can defend
ourselves”; “The children understand that if we don’t defend ourselves we can be
killed”; “Our country has a lot of enemies around us”; “I explain what an army is,
who serves, what the different corps are, and the role of the soldiers” (Bar-Tal &
Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).
In addition, teachers emphasize beliefs of positive collective image of the in-
group by describing events in which Jews as a small group overcame a stronger
adversary, placing particular value on attributes of heroism and courage: “We were
few against many and won heroically”; “Seven Arab countries fought us, and despite
[the disparity in army sizes], we defeated them”; “Although Jews had no weapons
and the Arabs did, they managed to establish the state, because of their courage and
bravery” (Eldan, 2006). Positive collective image is encouraged by assigning unique
attributions to one’s own group: “I tell the children how special our people are
among all nations”; “We are a light unto the nations”2 (Eldan, 2006). Teachers also
transmit beliefs of self-victimization especially in relation to the Holocaust: “Hitler
decided that he wanted to eliminate all the Jews”; “On all the holidays we had bitter
enemies and Hitler was one of them.” On Passover, the message is unequivocal and
generalized: “In each and every generation, they rise up against us to eliminate us”3
(Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).
Teachers emphasize the importance of national unity as well. First, they indicate
the importance of ignoring internal conflicts, which are emphasized in relation to
the Holocaust as a lesson for the present: “You shall remain together. This is the
message of the Holocaust. Hitler spread hatred; you will spread love and will remain
together”; “In the Holocaust it was every man for himself. There is a clear lesson
from the Holocaust; stay together and be united; you have no one but each other”;
“If we are not united in this country, what happened in the Holocaust can happen
again” (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). Second, they strengthen consensus and
sense of belonging, as well as identification with the country: “Memorial Day is a
day the entire nation feels pain. You are part of the nation”; “It is important for me
to explain to children that our strength can be maintained with our unity”; “It is

2
A term used in the Book of Isaiah (Isaiah 42:6).
3
A phrase from the Passover Haggadah (text used on Passover).
40 M. Nasie

important that they recognize the national symbols and feel part of the nation”
(Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).
The theme of patriotism is emphasized by pre-school teachers, especially in rela-
tion to Memorial Day when they talk with children about Israel’s fallen soldiers. In
this regard, the teachers transmit two main messages. One refers to the emotional
relations between the individuals and their country, fostering love, loyalty, concern,
and pride: “I teach them to love their homeland. This is our place; we shall protect
and defend it”; “This is a most beautiful and ancient country, King David lived here,
and all the figures that they know from the Bible”; “I want them to feel a sense of
belonging, respect and love for the country in which they live.” The second message
focuses on mobilization, contribution, and sacrifice: “It is a privilege to contribute
to the country”; “Many people have paid a high price to let us live in this country.
This is the duty of all”; “We shall be proud that there are soldiers who are willing to
sacrifice themselves for the country” (Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006).
Finally, pre-school teachers transmit the value of peace. Peace beliefs are
reflected in general aspirations: “We must aspire for peace”; “We want peace and
serenity in this country and that everyone will live in peace.” Teachers were likely
to present Israeli society as peace loving: “We pray for peace and I tell about
Abraham who was a peaceable person”; “We always reach out our hand for peace”
(Bar-Tal & Ozer, 2009; Eldan, 2006). The teachers also talked about interpersonal
peace as necessary for children before the intergroup peace: “First of all they should
know what peace is in kindergarten- before knowing about the larger peace”; “We
start from the small peace when the children fight and then talk about peace between
nations” (Eldan, 2006).
In accordance with the content taught by the teachers, a study by Ben Shabat
(2010) found that children absorb the collective narratives and express them. They
learn to justify the conflict with Arabs according to the self-perceived righteousness
of their in-group goals. They believe that the main reasons for the conflict include the
desire of the Arabs to “rule over Israel” and their aspiration to “harm” or “kill” Jews.
Children 6 and 7 years old said in interviews: “The Arabs started the conflict, because
they wanted to rule the country”; “The Arabs always want to fight with us; they want
to steal our country, and to do bad things to us” (Ben Shabat, 2010). They perceive
the in-group as victims, by relating past attempts to harm Jews to the present Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and thus the historical events are constructed and reinterpreted in
accordance with the events of the present. For example, children indicated that Arabs
today behave toward Jews in the same way as did past enemies: “Today as well, there
are people who want to kill the Jews and harm them. I mean the Arabs who live in
Gaza and only want to shoot Qassam rockets at us”; “The evil Arabs want us to
become their slaves, like in Egypt”; “The Arabs in Gaza are like Haman4; they want
to kill the Jews” (Ben Shabat, 2010). In addition, about half of the children in Ben
Shabat’s study (2010) responded positively to the question of whether today there are
people who treat the Jews as they were treated in the Holocaust. For example: “Yes,
Hamas today treats the Jews in the same way; they shoot Qassam rockets at us and

4
Haman is the Persian antagonist in the story of Purim.
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 41

they want us to suffer”; however, the other half answered negatively: “No, because
the Nazis did much worse things than the Arabs did.”
Young children demonstrate well-defined negative stereotypes toward the out-
group. For instance, Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) described a pattern of 2–3-year-
old Israeli children seeing members of out-groups as “bad” and expressing extreme
emotions of hate toward members of these groups. In another study, Ovadia (1993)
interviewed 114 Jewish-Israeli children aged 3–6, in which they were asked what
they knew about Arabs. The great majority of the responses pertained to the violent
behavior of Arabs (i.e., acts of war or terrorist attacks). Israeli-Diner (1993), who
interviewed 100 Jewish-Israeli children aged 2.5–6, similarly found that most of the
children perceived the Arabs negatively (i.e., in terms of behaviors, traits, and
appearance). In addition, Bar-Tal et al. (2003) conducted a study among thirty-one
5–6.5-year-old children from religious and nonreligious kindergartens. Most of the
children in this study also attributed negative traits to Arabs as “bad” and “evil” (see
also Teichman, Chap. 2).
Generally, it was found that children tend to be pessimistic regarding the future
of the conflict and do not suggest peaceful means for conflict resolution. Instead,
they tend to suggest violent and unilateral solutions. For example, when children
were asked “What shall we do about the conflict?” 68 % of them suggested “beat-
ing,” “fighting,” “killing,” or “expelling” the Arabs, and no one suggested a peace-
ful solution (Bar-Tal et al., 2003). In Ben Shabat’s study (2010), approximately
half of the children held pessimistic views regarding a peaceful solution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and said that it was impossible to solve the conflict.
The other half suggested one-sided solutions and indicated what the Arabs would
do: “The Arabs must agree to a cease-fire and talk with Israel”; “The Arabs should
move to another country”; “The Arabs have to apologize and give up”; “We will
make a peace with them, then they will go to another country and we will stay
here.” Only about a tenth of the children held alternative beliefs and suggested a
peaceful solution that involved compromising, such as dividing the country
between Arabs and Jews or connecting the two countries. For example: “We will
give half for them and half for us and then everyone will be satisfied”; “We need to
let them be here without wars.”

Conclusion

This chapter has provided evidence to suggest that children who grow up in conflict
areas are aware of the conflict and experience it in a powerful way from a very early
age. These children absorb and learn contents related to the conflict from their own
experiences, from environmental cues, and from direct instruction by agents of
socialization. Taken together, these sources lead to acquisition of beliefs of ethos of
conflict and collective memory already at a very early age, as demonstrated through
new empirical evidence from studies conducted in Israeli-Jewish educational sys-
tem. The Israeli-Jewish case study allows us to assume that generally, children who
42 M. Nasie

grow up in conflict areas acquire early in their childhood a comprehensive system

of beliefs that makes their understanding of the conflict meaningful. Imparting these
beliefs at such an early age, in a frequent and intense manner, leads to inculcation of
these conflict-related narratives deep within the children’s sociopsychological rep-
ertoires. A line of research in social psychology has established that early political
socialization (especially acquisition of negative stereotypes and prejudices) has a
lasting impact on the lives of society members in their adulthood and thus plays a
major role in the dynamics of the intergroup relations (Augoustinos & Rosewarne,
2001; Carter & Rice, 1997; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001;
Sears & Levy, 2003). It can be assumed that the described impact, found in societies
uninvolved in violent and protracted intergroup conflict, is even stronger in the
powerful context of intractable conflict. Indeed, there is evidence indicating that
children and adolescents maintain the patterns manifested at a younger age, in
which in-group preference and out-group rejection are amplified and in which the
ethos of conflict is manifested (Abdolrazeq, 2002; Barzilay, 2012; Fuxman, 2012;
Nasie & Bar-Tal, 2012; Teichman & Bar-Tal, 2008).
These beliefs eventually become a barrier for conflict resolution (Bar-Tal &
Halperin, 2011) and one of the possible explanations for the continuation and per-
sistence of intractable conflicts. The adherence of society members to conflict-
related beliefs and the transmission of these beliefs to the youngest generations
perpetuate a cyclic process through which, among other factors, society becomes
more deeply entrenched in conflict. The ethos of conflict and the collective memory
remain in the repertoire of the youngest members of society and influence their
perceptions and behaviors as adults, which, in turn, feed the new generation’s rep-
ertoire and so forth. They also constitute a prism, through which society members
look at the future of the conflict, and continue to fuel the conflict and to maintain its
insolvable nature.
Generally speaking, societies can extricate themselves from this circle by chang-
ing behavior patterns and investing efforts in changing their sociopsychological rep-
ertoires. To this end, changes are required from both rival sides to reduce the level
of violence and to show willingness to resolve the conflict in peaceful ways. It is
hard to say where to start since, on the one hand, changing behavior requires chang-
ing the repertoire and, on the other hand, changing the repertoire is hard to achieve
in a violent reality. The information received from the violent reality reinforces the
validity of the conflict-supporting repertoire. However, it is reasonable to assume
that if the change in the repertoire among society members begins at an early age on
both rival sides, it may increase the chances that the younger generation will develop
an alternative repertoire which eventually may lead to an alternative reality. A
promising start is through the educational systems, which should include more
alternative and complex information within the conflict-related narratives they
impart to the youngest generations.

Acknowledgment Meytal Nasie is grateful to the Azrieli Foundation for the award of an Azrieli
Fellowship.
Young Children’s Experiences and Learning in Intractable Conflicts 43

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 Part II
Collective Memory and Narratives
The Israeli Collective Memory
of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict:
Its Characteristics and Relation to the Conflict

Rafi Nets-Zehngut

Introduction

In the course of intractable conflicts, the rival groups develop a sociopsychological

repertoire which includes ethos, collective emotional orientation, and collective
memory (CM) (Bar-Tal, 2013; Oren, Chap. 8, Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11; Sharvit,
Chap. 1). This chapter focuses on CM, using as a case study of the Israeli-Jewish
(“Israeli”) memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict (“the conflict”). After
providing a theoretical review of CM, it reviews the changes that this Israeli mem-
ory has gone through since 1948, as well as its impact on the Palestinian CM and on
the conflict.

Collective Memory

CM is generally defined as representations of the past that are adopted by a group.

It is an umbrella category that includes various types of (sub)memories (Nets-
Zehngut, 2012a). To address some of the main types, first is the popular memory,
defined as representations of the past held by society members, best manifested
directly in public opinion surveys (Midelton & Edwards, 1997). This memory sig-
nificantly influences the psychological reactions of people (e.g., their collective
emotional orientation and ethos) and consequently their behavior; therefore, it is
accorded great importance (Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series; Tint, 2010).

R. Nets-Zehngut (*)
Conflict Resolution, Management and Negotiation Graduate Program, Bar-Ilan University,
Ramat Gan, Israel
e-mail: rafi[email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 49

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_4
50 R. Nets-Zehngut

Second is the official memory—the representations of the past adopted by the

formal institutions of the group. This memory is manifested, for instance, in publi-
cations of the army, exhibitions in national museums, and textbooks approved for use
in the educational system (Olick, 1998). Third is the autobiographical memory,
which is that of the people who directly experienced the events at hand, typically
demonstrated through their memoirs and oral histories. This is a primary source of
knowledge about the past (in addition to documents) and is therefore usually
accorded considerable importance. Fourth is the historical memory, the way the
research community—academic and independent scholars—views the past in its
studies (Winter & Sivan, 1999). Fifth and final is the cultural memory—the way the
society views its past via, inter alia, newspaper articles, memorials, monuments,
films, and buildings (Assmann, 1995).
The significance of the latter four kinds of memories is mostly that they influence
the popular memory (Liu & Hilton, 2005).1 In addition, official memory has its own
separate importance: it represents nations in the international arena and therefore
influences their foreign relations (Langenbacher, 2010). In light of the aforemen-
tioned wide significance of CM, it has recently gained salience in the academic,
public, and diplomatic spheres (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, & Levy, 2011).
The representations of the past are assembled in narratives. A narrative is gener-
ally a story about a certain topic that has a plot with starting and end points, provid-
ing sequential and causal coherence (Bruner, 1990). There are past, present and
future narratives - the first one is relevant when CM is discussed. When a past nar-
rative is adopted by a group (e.g., ethnic group or a state) as the depiction of the
past, it becomes part of its CM (Wertsch, 2002).
When the topic at hand is the history of a conflict, the past/historical narratives
address the major events that led to the eruption of the conflict and that occurred in
its course (Nets-Zehngut, 2013a). These narratives are typically selective and biased,
providing self-serving, simplistic, and black-and-white views of the conflicts
(Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, 2014; Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series;
Tint, 2010). They usually touch on at least four main themes: delegitimization of the
rival, positive image of the in-group, presentation of the in-group as the sole or main
victim, and justification of the conflict’s outbreak (when the in-group initiated
the conflict) (Bar-Tal, 2007). As such, these narratives play two important roles in
the conflict, the first being an internal role. When a group adopts such narratives, they
then become part of its members’ popular memory. As a result, the narratives influ-
ence group members’ psychological reactions and consequently their behavioral
reactions—negatively toward the rival and positively toward themselves. Thus, these
narratives promote a hostile approach toward the rival and the mobilization of society
members to be patriotic and to contribute their share to the struggle. The second
role is an external one—they present the in-group positively to the international

1
Reference is made here mostly to the influences of the external manifestations of these four
memories (e.g., books, articles, and films) in contrast to their internal manifestations (e.g., a
memorandum sent within a state ministry) that influence the popular memory much less. For a
discussion of external and internal collective memories, see Nets-Zehngut (2012b).
The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict… 51

community, promoting support for the group (Bar-Tal, Oren, & Nets-Zehngut, in
press; Nets-Zehngut, 2012b).
Adoption of such typical historical narratives into the CM of societies is often
perceived as functional during the conflict’s climax, due to the internal and external
effects described above. However, such narratives also inhibit peaceful resolution
of the conflict and the parties’ reconciliation. Internally, the group members are
discouraged from signing a peace agreement with a rival that is perceived so nega-
tively and is untrustworthy. Externally, the rival is discouraged from negotiating
with an in-group whose narratives are so biased and negative against it (Auerbach,
2010; Bar-Tal, 2007). Thus, the more a party’s CM can be transformed to include
less biased and negative narratives—as long as there is factual basis for such a
transformation, and usually there is—the more the party’s psychological reactions
can accommodate peace and reconciliation. The rival can then be viewed in a more
legitimized, humanized, and differentiated manner. Moreover, from the rival’s point
of view, observing such positive transformation within the in-group will encourage
it to take part in peace and reconciliation processes (Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, 2014;
Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume I of this series). Such transformation, however, is
difficult to achieve, partly because intractable conflicts typically cause severe
collective traumas to the parties involved (Nets-Zehngut, 2012c; Staub, 2011).
The above discussion describes the direct impact of the CM of conflict on the con-
flict. CM, however, also influences the conflict indirectly, as mentioned above, via its
impact on various psychological reactions of people, including their collective emo-
tional orientation and ethos. These psychological reactions also influence the CM.2
After describing the general background of the CM of conflicts, let us address
our case study.

The Israeli Collective Memory of the Conflict

Until the late 1970s, the Israeli CM of the conflict largely reflected the Zionist nar-
rative, which was largely a typical narrative of conflicts as described above. It was
significantly biased and distorted, presenting unrealistically the Israelis very posi-
tively and the Arabs/Palestinians very negatively (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal,
2014). Generally, this narrative delegitimized the Arabs/Palestinians as well as
blamed them for the outbreak and the continuation of the conflict. In contrast, the
Jews (prior to 1948) and later the Israelis were portrayed positively as peace loving
and moral, the sole victims of the conflict (e.g., Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002).
Specifically, for example, according to the Zionist narrative, the Jewish pioneers in
the pre-Israel period promoted the prosperity of the local Palestinian economy, the
1936–1939 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the Jewish community,
and the Jews tried to prevent the eruption of the 1948 War (as well as all other
Israeli-Arab wars). Additionally, the 1948 Palestinian exodus was presented—for

2
For a discussion of these indirect reciprocal impacts, see Sharvit (Chap. 1).
52 R. Nets-Zehngut

example, in studies, veterans’ memoirs and main newspapers’ articles—as exclusively

caused by a willing flight of the Palestinians (Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012e, 2015a).
Moreover, according to this narrative, in 1948 the Jews/Israelis were outnumbered
by the Arabs/Palestinians (“David vs. Goliath”), the post-1948 Palestinian infiltra-
tion into Israel was caused by political-terrorist motivations, the Palestinians also
left their localities willingly in the 1967 Six-Day War, and Israel always acted mor-
ally in the battlefield. These Zionist themes were presented in various outputs such
as studies (historical memory), memoirs (autobiographical memory), newspaper
articles (cultural memory), and state publications (official memory) (Nets-Zehngut,
2012d, forthcoming; Podeh, 2002).
Since the 1970s, however, a change has occurred. Members of various Israeli soci-
etal institutions have begun presenting a Critical narrative of the conflict (often enti-
tled since the late 1980s “post-Zionist”). Generally, this narrative was less biased and
self-serving, presenting the Israelis less positively and/or the Arabs/Palestinians less
negatively. Specifically, this change took place, inter alia, in the historical memory,
presented in scholarly research. For example, Yeoshua Porat (1976) argued in his
book that the 1936–1939 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the British
and not against the Jews. As for the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many scholarly studies
(see reviews in Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f, forthcoming) and daily newspaper
articles (cultural memory; Nets-Zehngut, 2012e, 2014), as well as some 1948 Jewish
war veterans’ memoirs (autobiographical memory; Nets-Zehngut, 2012e, 2014,
2015a), have begun presenting the Critical narrative. According to this narrative, some
Palestinians left willingly (e.g., due to fear, societal collapse, and calls of Arab/
Palestinian leadership to partially leave), while others were expelled by the Jewish/
Israeli fighting forces. Moreover, other studies argued that the Zionist pioneers acted
against the local Palestinians, taking their lands and closing trading markets to them
(Kimmerling, 1983), and that in an agreement with Abdullah, King of Jordan, Jews
divided the territory in 1948 (Shiftan, 1986).
This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the commencement of a
historical revisionist period commonly called the “New Historians” era. New addi-
tional historical studies criticized previously unexamined aspects of the Zionist nar-
rative or supported criticism raised earlier (Caplan, 2010). For example, studies
argued that Israel avoided peace negotiations prior to the 1948 War, negotiations
that could have prevented the war, and that the military balance between the Jews/
Israelis and the Arabs/Palestinians in the 1948 War favored the former in some
phases of the war (e.g., Flapan, 1987). As for the 1948 Palestinian exodus, historian
Benny Morris (1987) supported its Critical narrative in many documents (mostly in
his seminal book The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949),3 and
such support, though typically less wide in scope, was also provided by many other
studies (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f, forthcoming). Thus, since the
late 1980s and at least until the early 2000s, the Critical narrative of the exodus was
largely the exclusive one among Israeli studies (Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012f).
Moreover, since the late 1980s the publication of Critical newspaper articles also

3
The book was actually published in early 1988, not in 1987 as written there.
The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict… 53

has increased (vast majority), along with Critical 1948 war veterans’ memoirs
(about a third published) (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a, 2014). At the same time, Israeli
NGOs (cultural memory) began to present the Critical and the Palestinian narratives
regarding the exodus more significantly in their publications (Nets-Zehngut, 2012e).
Onward, beginning in the 1990s, some history textbooks used in the educational
system (without official state approval) began to present the Critical narrative of the
exodus (Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002).
As for the post-1948 Palestinian infiltration into Israel, studies argued that it was
mainly caused by economic and social motivations (e.g., harvesting their own aban-
doned fields and visiting relatives) and not political-terrorist ones (e.g., Morris, 1993).
It was also asserted that in the 1967 War some Palestinians were expelled, a claim
supported by other sources, such as 1967 war veterans including senior IDF officer
Uzi Narkiss (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2012d). Studies also argued that throughout
the conflict immoral and illegal acts were conducted by the Jews/Israelis, including
massacres, rapes, and tortures (e.g., Morris, 2004; Yahav, 2002). The documents
provided by the scholarly studies, and the testimonies given and newspaper articles
written by Israeli war veterans, presented a solid basis to conclude that the Critical
narrative regarding the conflict is more accurate than the Zionist one.
In contrast to the societal institutions, the situation at the Israeli state institutions
(official memory) did not change so drastically and early. For example, in reference
to the 1948 Palestinian exodus, at least until 2004, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF;
Nets-Zehngut, 2015b) and the National Information Center (Nets-Zehngut, 2008, in
press) continued to present the Zionist narrative, as they had since the early 1950s.
The situation was similar with regard to the approach of the Israeli Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, at least until 1967 (Nets-Zehngut, 2012d, forthcoming).
However, in some state institutions, changes have occurred regarding, for instance,
the presentation of the 1948 Palestinian exodus, but only since the late 1990s. For
example, from December 1997 until May 1998, the Israeli national television chan-
nel broadcasted a prestigious television series, Tekuma (in Hebrew, “Resurrection”).
The series covered the main events in the history of the state, and while describing
the 1948 War, it stated that some Palestinians were expelled (Kleinberg, 1998).
In addition, while until 1999 the Ministry of Education’s approved history and civ-
ics textbooks presented largely the Zionist narrative, between 2000 and 2004 they
have presented the Critical one (Nets-Zehngut, 2013b).4 Similarly, in 2005, the Israeli
National Archive published a book containing a selection of documents pertaining to
the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, discussing openly the expulsions of
Palestinians in 1948 (Rosental, 2005).
Lastly, regarding the Israeli popular memory of the conflict, the first study that
explored this memory was conducted in 2008, using a representative sample
(N = 500) of Israeli-Jews to examine their memory of 23 major events/topics in the
conflict. Generally, the study found that Israelis’ memory of the conflict (across 23
topics) was closer to being Critical than to being Zionist. Specifically, for example,

4
Reference is made here to the textbooks for the national secular educational system, the biggest
in Israel.
54 R. Nets-Zehngut

regarding the responsibility for the eruption of the conflict and for its continuation,
only 43 % of the Israelis attributed it only to the Arabs/Palestinians, while a similar
percentage, 46 %, attributed it to both Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis and 4 % to the
Israelis (the rest did not reply). Another example is regarding the 1948 Palestinian
exodus: only 41 % percent held the Zionist narrative, while 39 % held the Critical
narrative and 8 % that of the Palestinians—that the exodus was caused only by
expulsion (the rest did not reply). That is, 47 % of the Israelis believed that some or
all of the Palestinians were expelled in 1948 (slightly more than those holding the
“no expulsion” Zionist narrative, 41 %). Even though there is no survey evidence of
what the popular memory was like until the 1980s, the dominance of the Zionist
narratives regarding the conflict in other types of memory until those times (as
reviewed above, e.g., historical, official, and autobiographical) probably shaped in
a Zionist manner the popular memory as well until around the 1980s. Hence, the
new findings of the survey probably represent a major change in the popular mem-
ory of the conflict to being less Zionist and biased.5

Summary and Discussion

In sum, the Israeli CM of the conflict has transformed over the years. In the first
period after the establishment of the State of Israel, it was highly biased and dis-
torted, holding almost exclusively the Zionist narrative. As time passed, however,
mostly since the late 1970s, it has become less biased and distorted, giving way to
holding also—at times significantly—the Critical narrative. This process started
among the societal institutions/memories and since the 1990s was followed by some
state institutions (official memory). Let us address several phenomena that are
related to this CM transformation such as self-censorship, impacts of the Palestinian
and Israeli CMs on each other, and the impacts of the Israeli CM on the conflict.

Self-Censorship

One of the mechanisms that inhibited the aforementioned transformation of the

Israeli CM prior to the 1970s, and slowed this process onward, was self-censorship.
This took place among members of various Israeli societal institutions (e.g., scholars
and journalists, respectively, Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2012d, forthcoming) and state

5
It should be mentioned that regarding some topics, the survey found the Israeli memory to be
inaccurate and biased (e.g., regarding the extent of involvement of Israeli-Palestinians in terror
activities against Israel, many people perceived it much higher than it is actually). For data regard-
ing the Israeli popular memory of all the 23 major topics, see http://www.collective-memory.info
under “Publications,” accessed January 17, 2015. For an analysis of the survey’s findings, see Nets-
Zehngut and Bar-Tal (2016, in preparation).
The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict… 55

institutions such as the National Information Center, the IDF, and the Ministry of
Education (respectively, Nets-Zehngut, 2008, 2013b, 2015b; Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin,
& Bar-Tal, 2015). That is, these individuals and institutions intentionally did not
expose in their publications information and narratives that contradicted the Zionist
narrative of the conflict and therefore could have challenged its hegemony in Israel.
For example, regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus, many members of these insti-
tutions decided independently not to present information about expulsions or the
Critical narrative at large, even though they believed that the Critical narrative was
accurate (see, e.g., Nets-Zehngut, 2011a, 2013b, 2015b, forthcoming; Nets-Zehngut
et al., in press).

Impacts of the Palestinian and Israeli CMs on Each Other

Let us address these two directions of impacts. One factor that inhibited the trans-
formation of the Israeli CM over the years was part of the Palestinian CM of the
conflict. Regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus, for example, the Palestinian offi-
cial and historical memories of that event have been somewhat biased and distorted,
claiming that all the Palestinian refugees were expelled (Nets-Zehngut, 2011b; see
also Nahhas, Chap. 5). This, despite the fact that even according to the Palestinian
autobiographical memory of the exodus—of the refugees themselves—the expul-
sion was only one of several causes of the exodus and not even the central one
(Nets-Zehngut, 2011b, 2013c). The Israelis were aware of this biased tendency of
the Palestinian official and historical memories, and this was one reason for their
reluctance to admit the 1948 expulsions (Nets-Zehngut, 2012d). Nonetheless,
recently, a change has occurred in the Palestinian historical memory of the exodus:
at least some of the studies published by Palestinian scholars present the Critical
narrative regarding the exodus (see review in Nets-Zehngut, 2014). Moreover, since
the early 2000s, nine projects of Israelis and Palestinians addressed the historical
narratives of their conflict: PRIME, Shared Histories, Circles of Knowledge,
Zochrot, History’s Double Helix, Shared Narratives, Van Leer, IHJR, and Gabay-
Kazak. The projects were conducted mostly by scholars, as well as some educators
and peace activists, all of whom tried to expose each party to the narratives of the
other, reduce gaps between the narratives of both parties, or agree on two parallel
but legitimized narratives (Nets-Zehngut, 2013d). The above Critical Palestinian
studies and the Israeli-Palestinian narrative-negotiation projects are manifestations,
and facilitators, of a transformation of the Palestinian historical memory of the
conflict. This, in turn, may support additional transformation of the Israeli CM of
the conflict to being less biased, since the Israelis will notice, if they have not
done so already, the more open and critical tendency of their Palestinian colleagues.
The reverse process may also occur among the Palestinians.6

6
These narrative-negotiation projects can also influence directly the Israeli collective memory of
the conflict, to becoming less biased.
56 R. Nets-Zehngut

Palestinian scholars were aware of the critical trend in Israeli historical memory
since the 1980s (e.g., the New Historians). Some of the Palestinians (e.g., the
renowned late Edward Said) were encouraged by this trend, believing that they also
should be more critical in their studies of their history, like their Israeli colleagues
(Nets-Zehngut, 2015c). This was one of the causes of the aforementioned recent
transformation of Palestinian historical memory of the exodus to being more critical
(Nets-Zehngut, 2014).
Such transformation can have various positive impacts: Israelis can observe this
transformation, therefore allowing themselves to be even more critical than they
already are. Consequently, both parties can take part in a circular process in which
each is becoming more critical, encouraging the other side to be so, and so forth.
Such transformation in the Palestinian historical memory can also lead to a similar
transformation in the other types of Palestinian memories (e.g., official or cultural),
making them also more critical and less distorted. All these impacts can indirectly
support the resolution of the conflict.

Impacts of the Israeli CM on the Conflict

In the limited scope of this chapter, two such main impacts can be carefully
suggested:
1. Impacts of the Israeli popular memory on the Israelis. The Israeli popular memory
of the conflict was, as said, highly distorted and Zionist oriented in the first decades
after Israel’s establishment. Therefore, in those decades this memory probably
led—based on the above literature review—to negative emotions, perceptions, and
motivations of the Israelis toward the Arabs/Palestinians. For example, it promoted
hawkish political attitudes among the Israelis and reduced their willingness to reach
peace with the Arabs/Palestinians. It also increased Israeli willingness for revenge
and attack of the Palestinians, as well as their wish to continue the conflict. This
state of affairs supported the continuation of the conflict. Nonetheless, as time
passed, apparently mostly since the 1980s, the popular memory transformed to
being less distorted, Zionist, and negative. This led to the reverse reactions than
those that occurred before the 1980s (i.e., more positive approaches toward the
Arabs/Palestinians), consequently promoting the resolution of the conflict
(Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, in press, in preparation). The reverse, though, is also
true—the situation of the conflict also influences the popular memory. For
example, the Israeli-Jewish popular memory of the causes of the 1948 Palestinian
exodus was much more Critical oriented in 1999 (when Israeli-Palestinian peace
negotiations seemed to be resolving the conflict) compared to its more Zionist
nature in 2003 (after the collapse of the negotiations and in the middle of the second
Palestinian uprising/intifada) (Nets-Zehngut, in preparation).
2. Impact of the Israeli CM on the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem.
This problem is one of the core issues that needs to be addressed in a peace
The Israeli Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict… 57

agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For decades after the 1948
War, Israel refused to acknowledge in its peace negotiations with the Palestinians
the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and any kind of responsibility for the exodus, hold-
ing the Zionist narrative of “no expulsion” (Caplan, 2010). In contrast, the 2000
Camp David and the 2001 Taba Israeli-Palestinian peace summits witnessed a
change. At that time, the Critical narrative of the exodus was so prevalent in
Israel, as described, that it was hard for Israeli negotiators to ignore it, as was
done before. Therefore, they expressed in the summits a basic willingness to
publicly acknowledge the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and willingness to consider
accepting implicitly and indirectly Israel’s shared responsibility for it. This was
a significant factor promoting the resolution of the refugee problem and there-
fore also of the conflict (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007).
In conclusion, the Israeli CM has transformed since the 1970s, from being ini-
tially distorted and Zionist (inhibiting the resolution of the conflict) to being more
accurate and Critical (promoting various positive impacts on the conflict). While this
description addresses the impact of the CM on the conflict, it should be said that there
was also a reverse impact. That is, the impact on the Israelis of the changes over the
years in the characteristics of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict promoted the
aforementioned change in their CM. As time has passed, Israel grew stronger (mili-
tarily and economically), won all the wars in which it participated, and all this
increased Israel’s confidence in its existence and reduced the security threat. This in
turn—especially until 2000—decreased Israel’s need for a biased Zionist CM that
will mobilize its citizens to support their country in the conflict (Shapira, 2000).
Despite the aforementioned transformation in the Israeli CM of the conflict, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not yet been resolved. What does it say about CM
and conflict dynamics? Does CM really matter? Addressing this wide point briefly,
it can be said, first, that it takes two to resolve a conflict. The Palestinian CM of the
conflict is largely still significantly biased, especially the official memory, though
also the popular one (Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, 2011b, 2014). This state of
affairs inhibits the chances for peace. Second, regarding both Palestinians and
Israelis, CM is not the only factor that influences achieving peace. Many of the other
relevant factors are the other components of the psychological repertoire (collective
emotional orientation and ethos) as well as social characteristics and the context of
the conflict, as presented above. As for this latter factor, the year 2000 represented
for the Israelis (and probably also for the Palestinians) a major negative shift in the
conflict. Naming some of the main changes, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
collapsed, the second intifada erupted, later Hamas took over Gaza Strip, and mis-
sile attacks became part of Israeli life. All this promoted a major shift in the political
attitudes of Israelis to the right and maintained this shift (Ben-Eliezer, 2012). It is
the cumulative impact of all the factors, within both rival parties, that determines
whether peace will be reached. CM addresses the past, but when the present is so
dire, it is not surprising that support for peace in Israel is low. Specifically, in the
Israeli-Palestinian case, despite significant transformation of the Israeli-Jewish
collective memory of the conflict to being less Zionist, the Palestinian counter
58 R. Nets-Zehngut

memory followed this direction only partially and later; and the situation of the
conflict deteriorated dramatically since 2000. These were some of the main reasons
for the fact that despite the Israeli-Jewish memory transformation, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict was not yet resolved.

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The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events
Among Young Palestinians in Israel

Eman Nahhas

Introduction

To Palestinians, the 1948 War events were a tragedy whose consequences are felt up to
the present day and whose victims are not only external and internal refugees, but also
the entire Palestinian population living in Israel. For this minority, the disaster contin-
ues to constitute an open wound (Jarrar, 2010). In order to meet the challenges of their
present marginalized status as second-class citizens who are collectively excluded and
discriminated against in an ethnic state that denies its non-Jewish citizens a national
identity, power, property, goals, and definitions (Abu-Saad, 2006; Rouhana & Sabbagh-
Khoury, 2014; Sultany, 2012; Yiftachel, 2012), Palestinians in Israel have had to
develop their own collective cognitive-affective repertoire. Such a repertoire has devel-
oped to include as its basic components societal beliefs of collective memory and an
ethos of conflict, collective fear orientation, collective hatred orientation, and collective
anger orientation (Bar-Tal, 2000; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).
The 1948 War events have evolved as the pivotal core of Palestinian collective
memory. These occurrences connect Palestinians to a specific point in time that has
become for them an eternal present (Masalha, 2008). Israel’s victory in the 1948
War had a direct impact on the capacity of Palestinians to write their own narrative.
Since 1948 their attempts to create a coherent narrative of their collective past have
often been challenged and silenced (Khalili, 2007). The 1948 War included not only
the destruction of 80–85 % of the Palestinian villages that fell under Israeli control
and the expulsion of approximately 60 % of the Palestinian people; it was also
directed at silencing the memory and eradicating the landscape of the dispossessed
population.

E. Nahhas (*)
Department of Education, Academic Arab College for Education – Haifa, Haifa, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 61

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_5
62 E. Nahhas

The war led to the disappearance of most of the Palestinian printed word. Israelis
destroyed and confiscated all public libraries, printing presses, and publishing
houses, as well as land registries, municipal council archives, schools, and cultural
centers (Abd al-Jawad, 2007). In addition, depopulated houses were blown up or
razed to the ground, perpetuating the Zionist narrative that Palestine was virtually
empty territory before the Jews arrived (Masalha, 1997).
In fact, random life stories told by individuals who have undergone these war
experiences cannot create a national narrative and a collective memory with which
a whole community can identify. National narratives and collective memory should
be expressed through major societal communication channels and take the form of
cultural products such as books, plays, and films. Palestinians in Israel do not have
their own national agencies or archives through which young generations could be
made aware of their collective memory. In addition, they face deliberate silencing of
their narrative by Israeli authorities. Actually, this was the reason to conduct this
study which aimed mainly to investigate the nature of the Palestinian popular col-
lective memory1 regarding 1948 War events among young Palestinians who did not
experience the events nor studied about them via official authorities.

The Current Study

The sample consisted of 20 Palestinian young men (ages 21–35, average age 29.19)
who reside in the Galilee, Israel. The mode of inquiry used in this study was qualita-
tive and interpretive in nature and comprised in-depth phenomenological interviews
which included open-ended questions. A designated interview schedule examined
the collective memory of 1948 War events, participation in commemorative events
and activities related to the events, feelings about what happened, who are the major
agents transmitting that memory, and, finally, the influence of the 1948 War events on
the interviewees’ values and present lives.2 Based on the qualitative form of inquiry,
the method of analysis used was derived from thematic field analysis as outlined by
Rosenthal (1993), which involved reconstructing and categorizing the interviewees’
narrative, and classification of their life experiences and values into thematic fields.
Tutty, Rothery, and Grinnell’s (1996) guidelines were used to analyze the interviews,
according to which units of meaning were categorically classified and relevant
themes identified.
Before commencing the analysis, the interviews were transcribed (i.e., the interview
scripts, observational notes, and memos were converted into word processing

1
A popular memory is one that is held by a group of people who do not necessarily possess power,
and it refers to the societal beliefs of collective memory held by them as part of their repertoire.
Popular memory is that which is accepted by the public as valid and reflected in oral accounts of
the society members, in their customs, traditions, and social practices (Alonso, 1988).
2
It should be indicated that all of the interviewees preferred to be interviewed in their homes, and
the names used are pseudonyms to ensure anonymity.
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 63

documents). These transcripts were then analyzed using Atlas.ti., a qualitative

research software which analyzes text-based data through line-by-line coding of
themes and units of meaning. The following section will present the result of many
hours of reading through the transcripts and analyzing the contents in order to get
the main themes raised by the interviewees.

Young Palestinians’ Narrative of 1948 War Events

Almost all of the interviewees initiated their narrative regarding the 1948 War events
with one common assertion of a “…nation that had been invaded and occupied by
another foreign nation, and a substitution of residents.” They perceive Historic
Palestine before 1948 as empty of Jews. For example, Najati asserted that “The Jews
entered this country, occupied the Arab cities and villages and displaced the
Palestinians from their homes and country.” It was blatant that all the interviewees
began their narratives with the verb “entered” (dakhal), which revealed their per-
ception that “the Jews were not here.” Then they resume their narratives with two
verbs that definitely describe destructive actions, namely, “occupied” and
“expelled” (eĥtal and tarad).
The interviewees’ narrative regarding the collective memory of the 1948 War
events contains three major well-defined themes: (1) The Zionists had a predeter-
mined plan to empty Palestine of its Arab people, (2) the Jews committed atrocities,
and (3) the Palestinians fled out of fear.
Almost all of the interviewees emphasized that there was a master plan to expel
Palestinians from the new Israeli state, and they even initiated their narratives with this
specific claim. Rateb, for example, emphatically claimed that “…it was the Zionist lead-
ership’s strategy to expel the Palestinians out of the country. If we look at the villages
that were destroyed, we will find that there was a political strategy to empty these
villages of their residents. These villages either resisted the Jewish invasion or were
located in strategic positions, such as major junctions or the state’s border regions.”
Young Palestinians referred to the strategies used by the Zionist forces as “deceitful”
and used very negative terms to describe such strategies. For example, when Ma’adi
was asked what he knew about what happened in 1948 War, his answer was loaded
with very negative expressions that delegitimized the Jews. He claimed: “It was a
series of killings, slaughter and expulsion, very inhuman and harsh.”
In addition to highlighting the theme of the predetermined plan to expel the
Arabs, the majority of the interviewees also noted that Palestinians fled their homes
and villages out of fear. Rateb, for example, said that “…there was a big fuss, and
the Jews were perceived as ghosts. The people were shouting in terror: ‘The Jews
are coming, the Jews are coming’. So when the people heard that the Jews were
approaching the village, they just ran away.” Sleem also explained how “…
Palestinians left their houses wide open and had no time to take any of their personal
belongings because they were frightened by the growl of the tanks that were
approaching their village.”
64 E. Nahhas

The claims regarding the Palestinians’ frightened reaction were juxtaposed to the
claim that Jews committed atrocities and killed Palestinians. For example, Noor tried
to explain that Palestinian villagers were forced to flee after being attacked by the
invading Jewish Haganah (Jewish forces) “People were harshly attacked and assassi-
nated by the Jews; a lot of people were killed and the rest had to run away in fear.”
In fact, the Deir Yassin massacre was repeatedly cited by the majority of the
interviewees as the most significant stimulus that triggered the Palestinians’ flight
reaction. For example, Najati claimed that “…news about Deir Yassin and other
atrocities terrified the people and made them seek secure places.”
However, the majority of the interviewees asserted that fear was an inevitable
reaction to the expulsion strategies used against the Arab villagers. For example,
Najlawi said: “There was a process of deliberate uprooting of Palestinians. They
aimed to frighten the people in order to force them to flee. The Jews committed lots
of massacres to frighten Palestinians and in addition they also loaded men onto
trucks and threw them out of Israel’s borders.” Najlawi’s claim echoes the major
claims that were accentuated again and again by every interviewee.
Briefly, the three pivotal themes reflect a “black-and-white” approach, in which
a definite cause brought about a clear-cut result without involving too many factors
or participants on the “scene.” The sole “actors” were the Jewish forces that invaded
their country and occupied it, pushing the majority of the Palestinian nation out of
the country.

Family Settings as a “Mnemonic Community”

and Grandfathers as Narrative Transmitting Agents

All interviewees had asserted that they were never taught about what happened in
schools. All the information had been acquired via informal socializing agents such
as family members and friends. Their grandfathers, the so-called Nakba generation,
were the main source of knowledge. They used to recall their memories of what
happened in 1948 again and again during their family gatherings, expressing their
yearning for the simplicity and serenity of life before 1948. For those elders, the
year of 1948 represents a significant turning point. Before that year they enjoyed
simple life as peasants and farmers, but after 1948 they all were forced to work hard
to make a living and secure themselves and their families a quiet life, due to the fact
that most of them had lost their land which was their main source of living.
For example, Sleem recalled these occasions, stating: “We used to listen to my
grandfather’s memories every time he gathered with the elders in the diwan3 or in
the yard of the house. My grandfather used to talk about his personal memories of
the 1948 War and we used to listen very quietly because we were young and not

3
Diwan (divan)—a word that is basically used to refer to a Muslim council chamber or law court
or a room where a committee meets (such as the board of directors of a company), and it is used
also to describe a room in which notables are accustomed to meeting.
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 65

supposed to respond.” During these adult gatherings, Sleem learned the detailed
story of Abu Ahmad who was displaced from Amqa4 together with more than 1500
people. Sleem asserted that the same story with the same details was constantly
repeated, so that he became familiar with it as though it was his personal memory.
In contrast to those inadvertent discussions, a few interviewees asserted that
their grandfathers initiated frequent deliberate conversations, in which they shared
their personal memories of the 1948 War as well as their collective memory of the
1948 War with family members, who played the part of active listeners, asking and
commenting on the shared stories. In these few cases, the interviewees claimed that
their grandparents spontaneously shared their personal and collective memories
with family members. For example, Dimani claimed: “The fact that my grandfa-
ther experienced the 1948 Nakba and took an active part in the Palestinian resis-
tance forces has powerfully influenced his life and has caused him to share his
detailed stories with us again and again. In fact it was not only he who initiated the
telling; we were actually always thirsty to listen to his vivid, interesting stories.”
Dimani wondered how he managed to listen to the same stories with identical
details on a daily basis. However, he claimed that the way his grandfather pre-
sented the past was very attractive. Dimani explained “My grandfather’s vivid sto-
ries were so sincere; his memories were clear and included a lot of minor details,
so I used to listen very carefully.” Cappelletto (2003) explains that when the repre-
sentations of the past are a mixture of autobiographical and historical memory, the
story with all its descriptive details is recounted by those who were not witnesses as
if its events had been personally experienced by them. In point of fact, the transmit-
ted stories have become a means of communication within the families of those who
experienced the 1948 War, especially among those who were not only witnesses,
but who took an active part in it.
In Zerubavel’s (1996) conception, the Nakba generation represents a “mnemonic
community,” made up of those who witnessed the war, experienced the expulsion,
and are still engaged in remembering it. This mnemonic community incorporates
new members by familiarizing them with the community’s past, which they did not
have to experience personally in order to remember it (Zerubavel, 2003). According
to the interviewees’ claims, their grandfathers spontaneously shared their personal
and collective memories with family members when they met together. For them
these familial narrative sessions serve as both a socializing process and an exercise
in memory. Their narratives combine autobiographical and historical memory, so
that the story with all its descriptive details will also be recounted by their family
members, who were not in fact witnesses, as if the events had been experienced by
them personally. Actually, the transmitted stories become a means of communica-
tion within the family and between the family and outsiders. Consequently, all
members of this mnemonic community, the first generation as well as their descen-
dants, feel as if they serve as bearers and transmitters of an unforgettable memory,
which is relevant to their present and reflects on their future as well.

4
A Palestinian village that was destroyed in 1948 and on its ruins the Jewish Moshav of Amka
was built.
66 E. Nahhas

Triggers for Sharing the Narrative of the 1948 War Events

Discussions about the 1948 War events are frequently held within family settings.
The continuous clashes between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinians and the
numerous wars that have occurred between Israel and the neighboring Arab states
stimulate a need among elderly Palestinians to initiate a discussion about the collec-
tive memory of that period with their family members. For example, Sleem men-
tioned that “…in the last Gaza war as we saw the Palestinians fleeing their houses,
my father and grandfather never stopped linking the scenes of the fleeing people
with my grandfather’s experience in 1948.” As a matter of fact, Israel is a violent
war zone where different generations are exposed to chronic political violence5
(Canetti, Chap. 10, Nasie, Chap. 3; Sagi-Schwartz, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-
Kranenburg, 2008). It can thus be assumed that 1948 War analogy is intensified
among all Palestinians whenever they are exposed to more recent political
violence.
In addition, the core of young Palestinians’ existence as unequal citizens in the
state of Israel is also a constant reminder of the fact that their nation was defeated in
1948 and became a minority in Israel. Rateb, for instance, indicated that “…being
exposed to prolonged bias and discrimination by the so-called democratic Jewish state
is enough to initiate a discussion in which 1948 is referred to repeatedly.” Oka (2009)
claims that Palestinians in Israel have been suffering from the violent consequences of
the Nakba for over 60 years. Therefore, it seems that their collective memory is still
connected to their present and future situation.
Additionally, having relatives living in the Diasporas, who are unable to visit, is
also a topic that stimulates frequent discussions of the 1948 War events. These rela-
tives are especially remembered on holidays, when all the family members gather
together to celebrate and remember those who are absent. It must be mentioned that
most of the Palestinians who live in Israel have family members, such as brothers,
sister, uncles, and aunts, who have been living in exile for many years. Ties to fam-
ily and friends living in the Diaspora are maintained mainly through sentiments
stemming from memories. The connection with them is more powerfully imagined
and remembered than acted upon. For example, Mureed became choked up when
remembering his uncle, whom he had never met. He complained: “I grew up know-
ing that I have an uncle who lives in the Diaspora; his memory is endlessly raised
and it is always loaded with feelings of Ḥasra (sorrow). It is really painful to watch
your parents and grandparents crying just at the mention of his name.”
Farsoun (2004) highlights the significance of kin and family (‘a’ilah) ties in
Palestinians’ daily life. He claims that both traditionally and in a contemporary
context, Palestinians formulate their experiences and conceptualize their lives not as
independent individuals but as members of an extended family. The family provides

5
Major wars in the Arab-Israeli conflict between 1948 and 2011: the 1948 War, the 1956 Sinai War,
the 1967 War, the 1973 October War, the 1982 First Lebanon War, the 1987–1993 Intifada, the
2000–2005 Al Aqsa Intifada, the 2006 second Lebanon War, and the 2008 and 2014 Gaza Wars.
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 67

the individual with psychological, social, and economic functions. Family ties are
permanent, reckoned through the male line, and characterized by mutual support,
material assistance, trust, and sacrifice of the individual’s interest for the greater
welfare of the family. So, missing any family member is perceived as very tragic,
especially when his or her absence is forced and not voluntary.
In addition to relatives who live in the Diasporas, most of the interviewees
claimed that the “topography” of the country is a constant reminder of the “previous”
life of Palestinians on this land (before 1948), including such features as cactus
fences, fig trees, street names, old Arabic buildings, and other remnants of the past.
For example, Sabeel claimed that as he joins his family on trips in the area surround-
ing Kufor Kanna, they pass by several remnants of Loubieh and Sajara (former
destroyed Palestinian villages). He assures “When I see the trees and the remnants
of the destroyed houses of Sajara, I always wonder what happened there and what
happened to the people who were displaced.” The pre-1948 physical locations of the
destroyed villages have become conceptual and memorial spaces maintained and
shared through many forms and forums (Davis, 2011).
In brief, it can be assumed that despite the long period of a silenced memory,
remnants of destroyed Palestinian villages act as mnemonic arenas that recreate,
represent, and preserve the collective narrative of the 1948 War among young
Palestinians. On a basic level, these venues served as the forum where the Nakba
generation individuals could articulate their own memories, which is the first stage
in transforming personal memories into collective ones.

The Influence of the 1948 War Events on the Lives of Young

Palestinians

Nearly 67 years have elapsed since the 1948 War, but it seems that its consequences
continue to preoccupy young Palestinian generations. The majority of the inter-
viewees discussed the major influences that the Nakba has had on their lives,
whereas none of them stated that it was not relevant for them.
For most of them, the prominent theme centered on family dispersion and detach-
ment. They talked about the fact that they had relatives living in exile whom they had
never met. For example, Mureed mentioned that his grandfather’s brother and uncle
were expelled to Lebanon and never returned. He asserted that the story of that uncle
is repeatedly mentioned by his family members as a theme loaded with emotional
difficulties regarding the events of 1948. Another effect that was mentioned was land
shortage resulting from land confiscation. During the twentieth century, Palestinians
were dispossessed of a majority of land they had previously owned and possessed
individually and collectively. Thus, as years went by, young Palestinians in Israel
have become more and more distressed by the problem of land shortage and housing
difficulties. Between 1948 and 1990, the Palestinians in Israel lost close to a million
acres of land (Beit-Hallahmi, 1992). Galeel, for example, lamented the hundreds of
dunams expropriated by the Israel Land Administration (which is responsible for
68 E. Nahhas

land under the control of the Development Authority and the Jewish National Fund,
as well as the state) for the sake of building the Carmiel industrial area. He said
“Each time I pass by the industrial area of Carmiel, I recognize the extent of our loss.
My grandfather owned hundreds of dunams there and now I have nothing but half a
dunam for building my own house.” In this vein, Rekhess (2002) states that the mas-
sive expropriation of Arab lands constitutes a “…living symbol of a wound that has
not healed (p. 24).” Generally for Palestinians, the term “land” brings to mind painful
reflections of exploitation, uprooting, and dispossession.

The Influence of the 1948 War Events on the Values

of Young Palestinians

Apparently, despite the fact that the interviewees did not personally experience the
events of 1948, their perception of these events and their personal experience of
their effects have acutely influenced their life values. First, the great majority of
interviewees highly value land ownership. Indeed, regardless of the fact that land is
no longer the source of their livelihood as it was for their grandfathers, their relation
to the land is still pivotal. Land seems to be the basis of their sense of belonging,
economic and psychological security, and social and cultural continuity. Lacking
land ownership brings none of these, so Abed claimed: “Losing our properties is an
open scar which hasn’t stopped bleeding. Land is a matter of belonging; I don’t
mean land in terms of material possessions, but in terms of the psychological sig-
nificance of the sense of belonging to the land.” Similarly to Abed’s claim, there
were numerous voices which cherished land ownership and also affirmed their
refusal to sell even a tiny piece of land. For example, Rateb affirmed: “I should buy
as many dunams as I can but I should never sell a single meter.” Similarly, Najlawi
stated that “…the drive to land ownership is like a legacy.” He declared that his
forefathers’ claims about their close attachment to the land have turned him into a
strong adherent of land ownership as well.
Second, it is interesting to note that the interviewees also emphatically asserted
their readiness to sacrifice for the sake of their lands and homes. According to
Dobeiss, “…the experience of the Palestinian refugees and internally-displaced
ones assure me that there is no way that I’ll abandon or give up my land, no way, as
simple as that!!!.” Equally, Shiha asserted: “Due to the fact that I know about the
millions of refugees, belonging to the land has become very crucial for me. A per-
son who knows the effect of a poison should never taste it: I learned not to surrender
and not to abandon my house, no matter what.”
Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, and Orehek (2009) explain how the bio-
logical need for physical survival is intimately linked to the quest for personal
meaning and significance. Thus, when an individual undergoes a threat undermining
his security or experiences feelings of relative deprivation or frustrated expectations
in situations of political, social, or economic inequality, significance is envisioned
as something that is lost and must be regained. In this respect, the readiness to sac-
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 69

rifice oneself for the group in the hour of need stands as a supreme good, where
individuals regain significance by contributing to some communally defined collec-
tive goal (see also Bélanger, Caouette, Sharvit, & Dugas, 2014). In view of this, the
threat of losing home or land, which is perceived as very significant for Palestinians,
justifies their readiness to die. As Crenshaw (2007) summarized it, “Sacrifice for the
cause is both personally redemptive and a mark of honor, a way of becoming a hero
and part of an exalted elite” (p. 153).
Third, the interviewees outlined their appreciation of coexistence with Jewish
Israelis. In fact, they talked about a “conditional” coexistence, in which Palestinians
should receive their rights as an indigenous minority in Israel; only then would they
be ready to coexist with Jewish citizens. For instance, Damoor claimed: “Israel is a
given fact that we should accept, but I believe in a conditional coexistence. I will
demand to receive all my rights, which are totally equal to those of the Jews. I don’t
feel like a beggar; I want to assure that we are the owners of the place, so nobody is
doing us a favor.” Similarly, Arari declared that “…if the Israelis want to coexist
peacefully with us, they should give us our full rights in order to make us feel like
Israeli citizens…I’m a man whose country was occupied and I’ve learned to accept
and coexist with my occupier, but the other should give me my rights. Today, a new
Russian immigrant has more rights than I have… So I believe that only if we receive
all our rights, will we be able to coexist and get closer to one another.” It is noteworthy
that experiences of discrimination and subordination for these young people were
intimately linked to stymieing their readiness for coexistence. For example, Hamdi,
who works in Carmiel, a Jewish city adjacent to his village, tried to explain his
anger regarding the Jews’ attitudes toward him by saying: “I believe that I’m ready
to live with the Jews and work with them. However, if I attempt to live in Carmiel,
not every house owner will agree to rent me his house; it is just sad and irritating.”
The experience of the interviewees in the context of living in a Jewish settlement or
studying in a Jewish school serves to remind them of their subordinate status rela-
tive to the Jewish majority. Indeed, the intention to coexist with Jewish Israelis is
described by Najati as “…knocking on the door of a deaf man who could actually
hear with the use of a hearing aid, but chooses to remain deaf.”
Rabinowitz and Abu Baker (2005) claim that the struggle of young Palestinians
for civil equality “…displays a new assertive voice, abrasive style and unequivocal
substantive clarity” (p. 2). Similarly, Hammack (2010) found that Israel’s young
Palestinian citizens are increasingly shifting the weight of their hyphenated identi-
ties toward the Palestinian rather than the Israeli, rejecting the state’s attempts to
subordinate and delegitimize them. Palestinian citizens of Israel have become
increasingly mobilized and vocal in expressing their dissatisfaction with their sub-
ordinate status within Israel (Peleg & Waxman, 2011). The younger generation of
Palestinians demands collective recognition as a right and not as a favor. In this
vein, Damoor stated that “…Arabs in Israel are the original inhabitants of the
region; we are not immigrants, we were here all along.” Actually, this perception,
which anchors the legitimacy of the demand for collective recognition, has become
especially popular in the political-national discourse of Palestinian Israelis in recent
years (Jamal, 2011).
70 E. Nahhas

Participation in Commemorative Activities

The vast majority of the interviewees stated that they are increasingly taking steps
to commemorate their Nakba by participating in activities such as organized visits
to the sites of abandoned villages (on 2 days: Israel Independence Day and al-
Nakba Day6) and the preservation of remaining sites and ruins, especially mosques,
churches, and cemeteries. Ma’adi, for example, stated: “For me, going to Hittin
once or twice a year is mandatory and not optional.” Similarly, Dimani declared that
his participation in such activities is “…a moral duty and a way of showing solidar-
ity with the Palestinian nation.” As a matter of fact, the grandsons referred to vari-
ous meanings attributed to these commemorative activities. For example, Shiha
explained that “…public marches to the villages have become a transmission tool to
commemorate displacement and to instill national awareness in young Palestinians,
who are expected to continue the struggle.” In this vein, Mureed explained that in
order to continue this struggle, a strong link with the Nakba generation is required:
“It is important to remind the world that there are still millions of people residing in
refugee camps. So, due to our responsibility to transmit the memory, we should ask
those who ‘know’ in order to be capable of transmitting the collective memory com-
prehensibly.” Sabeel summarized this point, declaring that “…we know that by
commemorating the Nakba, we are helping young generations to remain attached to
their history and culture. Doing so actually strengthens our national identity and
keeps us united.”
Second, and most importantly, the interviewees use these memorial activities
as a tool to show resentment and to protest against discrimination. For example,
Habaji shared the experience of the people of al-Ghabisiyya (a destroyed village
in the Western Galilee) when they were prevented from praying in the mosque on
Fridays: “When people were prevented from entering the mosque, they just prayed
outside the fences surrounding it and set up camp outside the mosque in a show of
resentment against the Israeli authorities’ practices.” Apparently, the younger
generation of Palestinians is central to having transformed Nakba Day into a gen-
eral Palestinian national memorial day. The younger generation’s visits to
destroyed villages have taken the form of a protest against what is being done to
them currently (Jamal, 2011).
To sum up, it can be concluded that the collective public expression of the mem-
ory of the 1948 War among the young generation hints at various characteristics of
this generation: First, a new generation of Palestinians has grown up that have cho-
sen to emphasize their national identity rather than hiding it. Second, their growing
sense of marginality has been another factor contributing to the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of the Nakba memory and its narrative.
In short, the Nakba memory is still relevant to the present-day reality of
Palestinian citizens of Israel. According to Rekhess (2002), “It is a living, breathing

6
5 Iyar, the Hebrew date of Independence Day in Israel, and May 15, the date of the establishment
of the state in the international calendar, is assigned by Palestinians as Nakba Day.
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 71

issue; it is not a historic event that is over and done with, but rather a tragedy whose
consequences continue to this day and whose victims are not only refugees in
camps, but also the Arab minority in Israel. For this minority, the calamity continues
to exist as an open wound” (p. 30). Clearly, this memory has never been erased and
is being transmitted to successive generations. The interviewees were mainly angry
and resentful toward what had happened in the 1948 War. Anger, as a “socially-
constructed emotion which is evoked in events where the individual perceives other
individuals’ or groups’ actions as unjust or unfair” (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, &
Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009, p. 97), involves appraisals of relative strength and high cop-
ing potential (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). In many cases, it is linked to aggres-
sive behavior (Berkowitz, 1993) or active attacking tendencies (Roseman, 2002).
Thus, as a more educated generation imbued with negative feelings such as anger
and a sense of being discriminated, these young Palestinians have evolved the most
“radical” collective memory, which totally negates the hegemonic Israeli-Zionist
narrative. This generation feels much more powerful and believes that the collective
memory of the 1948 War events should be transmitted to successive generations,
considering itself responsible for being the messengers.

Conclusion

Generally, it can be claimed that the analysis of the interviewees’ narratives demon-
strates that despite the silencing of the Palestinian narrative by the Israeli official
authorities and institutions, the narrative related to 1948 War events (so-called
Nakba) is still prevalent among young Palestinians who neither witnessed nor expe-
rienced those events.
Overall, this study has helped to illustrate a bottom-up mode of the articulation of
the Palestinian collective narrative regarding the 1948 War events and to highlight the
core factors that aided in the “preservation” of such a narrative across time. It should
be noted that young Palestinians’ narrative provides a black-and-white picture
(“them, the Jews, against us, the Palestinians”). Similarly, on an affective level,
young Palestinians express emotions such as anger and resentment regarding the
events in addition to sorrow and grief that are strongly connected to catastrophes.
It is necessary to address the relationship between emotion and collective action.
Given the negative emotional material that has emerged from this research, it can be
suggested that the depth of collective anger evident among young Palestinians is an
important means of preserving their memorial narrative. Although many different
emotions play a role in intergroup conflict—including hope, fear, and hatred—anger
is thought to be especially critical in the initiation and maintenance of such conflicts
(Bar-Tal, 2007). Halperin (2008) examined the relationship between three group-
based negative emotions—fear, anger, and hatred—and political intolerance in
Israel, finding that anger contributes to political intolerance, while hatred mediates
the relationship. Similarly, Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, and Petrovic (2010) found
that fear and anger are predictors of motivation for intergroup aggression.
72 E. Nahhas

Accordingly, it is suggested here that the negative emotion of anger developing out
of the negative experiences of younger Palestinians in Israel may in turn foster negative
beliefs and actions. Feelings of anger can generate feelings of revenge, which can
produce a cycle of violence and perpetuate feelings of victimhood on both sides of a
conflict. In addition, sharing such negative feelings might generate both a strong feel-
ing of “us” but also an “us against them” mentality. So it can be assumed that if the
Israeli government continues denying and negating the Palestinian narrative, those
who lack significant identification with Israel and wholeheartedly embrace Palestinian
identity are much more likely to engage in system-challenging behaviors.
In conclusion, this research showed that the Palestinian collective memory of the
1948 War events has not faded away but rather has become more distant from the
Zionist narrative, stating the opposite of the disseminated hegemonic narrative.
In fact, this counter-narrative is very significant for Palestinians for a number of reasons:
first, it outlines their common origin, forming a shared past and providing that sense
of continuity which is crucial for the construction of their social identity. Additionally,
it helps them construct a positive social identity, since it provides them with a sense of
commonality, cohesiveness, belonging, uniqueness, and solidarity. In view of this,
being members of an ethnic minority that is deeply engaged in an intractable conflict
with the state within which they live has caused them to hold on to their collective
memory. It can be seen to fulfill such essential functions without which their society
would find it impossible to adapt to such confrontational conditions.
The significance of collective memory to society members in times of conflict
could generate an accelerated tendency to become involved in all types of memorial
practices, maybe even turning them into “memorial maniacs.”7 They aspire to main-
tain the dominance of their own main narrative among in-group members and also
to persuade other groups of its validity. However, whenever the counter-narrative of
one group in society strongly opposes or challenges the dominant hegemonic narra-
tive of another group, those memories might be hotly contested. In some cases, such
intense contesting of memory among different groups remains contained and does
not develop into violent conflict. In other cases, however, collective memory and its
various public representations may play a major role in intensifying ethnic warfare.
If so, narratives of collective memory serve as smoldering embers which can burst
into flame at any moment.
The findings of the present research suggest that the ground is very fertile for
further possible interethnic conflict between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian
minority in Israel. As discussed previously, the feelings of anger among young
Palestinians, their sense of relative deprivation, and their expressed readiness to
make personal sacrifices could mobilize these generations in a moment of crisis to
rebel, protest, and commit violent actions against the Jewish majority. In other
words, feelings of injustice may lead to vengeance; the seeds for future conflicts
have been planted and might possibly spur those potentially capable of violence into

7
A term used by Doss (2008) to refer to “the contemporary obsession with issues of memory and
history and an urgent, excessive desire to express, or claim those issues in visibly public contexts”
(p. 7).
The “Silenced” Narrative of 1948 War Events Among Young Palestinians in Israel 73

action. On this basis, reconciliation is needed in order to stabilize peaceful relations.

Reconciliation is defined as groups’ mutual acceptance of one other (Staub & Bar-
Tal, 2003; Staub & Pearlman, 2001). According to Bar-Tal (2009), the essence of
reconciliation “involves socio-psychological processes consisting of changes of
motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions by the majority of society mem-
bers” (p. 365). Auerbach (2009) suggests a “reconciliation pyramid” (p. 302). She
claims that identity conflicts erupt in two groups involved in identity conflict when
at least one side feels that the other has negated its identity. Thus, they should ini-
tially become acquainted with the clashing narratives relating to the core issues of
their conflict. However, familiarity with these narratives is not enough but can only
pave the way for truly and fully acknowledging them, which means understanding
and recognizing them as authentic and legitimate. This acknowledgment implies
recognizing that there are at least two narratives (Salomon, 2004). Such recognition
is crucial because as mentioned earlier, the collective memories of each party’s own
past support the continuation of the conflict and make peacemaking impossible
(Bar-Tal, 2007).
The grievances of the opposing group must not only be known but must also be
acknowledged. From the Palestinians’ point of view, it is vital to acknowledge their
differing national narrative, and it is certainly important to learn about this narrative
from their perspective. An acknowledgment by the state is necessary in order to
conclude this sorrowful chapter in the history of the Palestinian nation. The evolve-
ment of a new Palestinian generation “standing tall” suggests that acknowledging
their narrative and providing legitimacy to their demands for equal citizenship is the
key to improving interethnic relations between the two nations residing in Israel.
Such acknowledgment of the Palestinian narrative could open the door for a greater
willingness on the part of the Palestinians to acknowledge the Israeli narrative, and
potentially to the development of less biased and one-sided narratives among both
parties. Such changes to the collective memory could be an important step toward
reconciliation.

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Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among
Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel:
A Decade of Intractable Conflict

Anan Srour, Adi Mana, and Shifra Sagy

One of the core concepts in Bar-Tal’s paradigm of understanding groups in intractable

conflicts is that of collective narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007). This article presents a theo-
retical approach and an empirical measure to examine perceptions of collective
narratives during a decade in which the political situation moved from peace talks
to violence. We looked at the sociopolitical context as a significant factor in the
development of empathy, anger, and readiness to legitimate collective narratives of
both the “other” and one’s own group.
During the past decades, different theoretical concepts have been developed
relating to multidisciplinary aspects of collective narratives: social knowledge, cul-
ture, ethos, social representations, historical narratives, social identity, collective
memory, and communicative memory. The concepts deal with the way members of
a group share a common world of knowledge, beliefs, actions, and emotional pat-
terns, providing a basis for their sense of shared identity (Assmann, 1992; Bar-Tal,
2000; Dougherty, 1985; Griswold, 1994; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Moscovici, 1988;
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).

A. Srour (*)
Conflict Management and Resolution Program, Ben Gurion University of the Negev,
Beer Sheva, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
A. Mana
Department of Psychology, Peres Academic Center, Rehovot, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
S. Sagy
Conflict Management and Resolution Program, Ben Gurion University of the Negev,
Beer Sheva, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 77

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_6
78 A. Srour et al.

In social psychology, the collective narrative is defined as a social construct that

creates clear connections on a continuum between historical and current events
(Bruner, 1990). Collective narratives enable the individual members of the group to
understand the social reality and the relationships between their group and other
groups and provide personal interpretations that help them to behave and function.
These individual interpretations are developed to a great extent by social agents—
sometimes overtly and sometimes covertly—that direct the thoughts, the feelings,
and the behaviors of each of the group members (Bar-Tal, 2000; Reicher & Hopkins,
2001; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). On the macro
level, collective narratives are a type of lens through which members of the group
perceive past and current events and imbue them with justification and meaning for
their social, ideological, and political acts (Bar-Tal, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
The relevant literature differentiates between approaches that focus on the con-
tent of group members’ shared narratives and models that center on the processes of
narrative structuring by educators, politicians, thinkers, media, and ideologues
(Ahonen, 1999). The models that focus on identifying group members’ shared con-
tent usually deal with defining the narrative and clarifying the social representation
of an event or a particular phenomenon. Thus, for example, some researchers have
examined specific representations of the concept of “war” or “peace” among groups
in conflict as opposed to groups that are not (Covell, 1999). Other studies have
examined representations of leaders or specific historical events (Liu et al., 2005;
Von Borries, 1995). In this approach, the collective narratives were studied with an
emphasis on content; each study related to a specific group and to a specific conflict.
A unique effort at generalizing and developing an applicable measure for various
conflicts appeared in an international study, “Youth and History” (Angvik & Von
Borries, 1997), which examined perceptions of general historical events among
youth in Europe and in the Middle East.
Other approaches center on the processes that form the basis of the narratives,
such as social representation theory (Moscovici, 1988) which described the con-
struct of the narrative as a process during which the social dialogue among the
group members and the dialogue with the “other” are crystallized. In other words,
historical narratives are the same shared social representations that enable group
members to understand their shared past and to use it to interpret the present and
future, as well as enabling communication between group members and the devel-
opment of a sense of shared collective identity. Research that has focused on collec-
tive narratives has dealt with questions of organizing the system of collective
representations, placement of the narratives (e.g., center vs. periphery), and the rela-
tionship to social beliefs and behaviors (Liu, 2005; Liu, Sibley, & Huang, 2014).
In this chapter, we will describe a model for research about perceptions of col-
lective narratives (Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002) which integrates both approaches
described above. The model is directed towards identifying specific content, both
cognitive and emotional, in the perceptions of collective narratives of national
intractable conflicts. Moreover, the model makes it possible to empirically investi-
gate collective narratives and identify possible changes that can occur over time
(Sagy, Ayalon, & Diab, 2011).
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 79

We will describe a longitudinal study that has employed this model and an
empirical measure to examine perceptions of collective narratives in different his-
torical and political contexts of the intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict among
Jewish and Arab adolescents in Israel. The model examines the relations of the
perceptions of “in” and “out” groups and focuses on the levels of the perception of
the collective narrative using measures of legitimization, empathy, and anger
towards the collective narratives of both groups. Thus, the model is proposed as a
measure to explore intergroup relationships, one which is sensitive to changes in the
level of perceived intractability of the conflict through different historical periods.

Cognition and Emotion in Perceptions of Narratives

The sociopsychological foundation of perceptions of societal collective narratives

includes both cognitive and emotional elements (Moscovici, 1988), which crys-
tallize into a complete integrated perception of the “in” and “out” groups. In
accord with this basic assumption, our study examines not only the cognitive
perception of the narratives but a variety of emotions that the narratives provoke
(empathy, shame, guilt, anger) as well. The model examines these perceptions as
expressed among members of the group as individuals. However, the picture we
get from this examination allows a diagnosis of trends that are common within the
groups at different historical periods.
Although differentiating cognitive and emotional components is sometimes arbitrary
and may cause injustice to the description of the real situation (Parkes, 1971), we hope
that it may contribute to a more reliable study of the complicated concept of narratives.
Knowledge and legitimization of the collective narrative are the two cognitive elements
in the model. Members of the social group tend to build their worldview on the basis of
their shared social knowledge, coming from shared experiences in the history unique to
them (Griswold, 1994). The model’s empirical measure evaluates the level of social
knowledge as related to the collective narratives of the in-group and the “out”-group.
The reference to knowledge and other aspects of narrative perception are the focus for
many political science researchers (e.g., Dolan & Holbrook, 2001). Most of these stud-
ies have examined the extent to which individuals do or do not have knowledge of a
range of political or historical issues (Von Borries, 1995) and changes in the level of this
knowledge over time. Beyond that, as far as we know, the relationship between knowl-
edge and other aspects of narrative perception has not been studied.
The second cognitive component, which is more central to the model, is the level
of readiness to legitimize the narrative of the “in” group and of the “out” group. The
willingness to legitimize the in-group narrative is an important part of building a
national identity and a positive in-group collective image (Kaplovitz, 1990). In con-
trast, delegitimizing the “other’s” narrative plays a central role in violent conflicts
(Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The empirical measure in our model enables
assessment of the levels of legitimization and delegitimization in the perception of
one’s own group narrative and that of the “other” group in different situations.
80 A. Srour et al.

Besides its emphasis on the cognitive perception of the collective narratives, the
model relates to the emotional repertoire that accompanies these perceptions. The emo-
tional component has been found to be significant in political perception and in particular,
in its interaction with cognitive knowledge (Dolan & Holbrook, 2001). Both individuals
in society and the society as a collective are likely to develop a collective emotional ori-
entation that lasts over time due to exposure to the same narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007).
The collective emotional orientation is likely to characterize a society or culture
when it is integrated with the collective narrative as well as when it is self-preserved
by bonding processes that are characteristic of that same society (Markus &
Kitayama, 1994). This emotional learning allows for interpretation of the narrative
of the in- and out-groups and is passed on via the family and/or by educational,
cultural, and political framework (Averill, 1980). Emotional orientation has a spe-
cial meaning in the context of conflict situations, as, for example, in the collective
feelings of fear and hatred in Israeli society or in Northern Ireland (Halperin, Russel,
Dweck, & Gross, 2011). Despite the role of emotions as significant components in
perceptions of collective narratives, only a few studies have examined particular
emotions (Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011). In the model described here, we
attempt to broaden and deepen existing knowledge on the connection between the
cognitive perceptions of collective narratives and particular emotions, including
both negative (e.g., anger) and positive (e.g., empathy) ones.
We expect that higher correlations between cognitive and emotional elements
of collective narrative perception reflect a more coherent attitude. These correla-
tions would be observed in periods with higher tensions between the groups and,
mainly, higher perceived intractability of the conflict. Supporting results have
been presented in a previous study (Sagy et al., 2011) that examined 8 years of
violent intergroup relations.

Development of the Model and the Empirical Measure

In their model, Sagy et al. (2002) focused on the cognitive and emotional elements
of the perceptions of one’s own group narrative and the delegitimization and dehu-
manization of the “other’s” narrative. The model and the measure were developed
in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict by a group of Palestinian and Israeli
researchers (Sagy et al., 2002), in order to enable a deep understanding of the social
processes that take place between members of the two national groups who are liv-
ing in persistent and violent conflict. The research developed by Sagy and her col-
leagues (2002) allows empirical examination of the concept in other conflictual
contexts such as religious, national, and ethnic groups. Up to now, this model has
been studied among national collectives (e.g., Israelis and Palestinian, Sagy et al.,
2002): groups that are divided by regime (Palestinian citizens of Israel and
Palestinians living in the West Bank, Mana, Sagy, Srour, & Mjally-Knani, 2015),
and minority and majority national groups living in Israeli society (Arabs and Jews
who are citizens of Israel, Sagy et al., 2011). Two studies focused on religious
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 81

groups in conflict: One related to Palestinian religious groups of Muslims and

Christians in Israel (Mana, Sagy, Srour, & Mjally-Knani, 2012; Srour, Sagy, Mana,
& Mjally-Knani, 2013) and the other examined the Israeli Jewish religious conflict
between ultraorthodox and national religious communities (Kalagy & Sagy, 2015).
The contextual approach requires that the measure be constructed according to
the unique characteristics of the collectives and groups being studied. Moreover,
collective contents cannot reflect the shared narrative of all the members of the
society studied. Thus, the model suggests examining central contents in the shared
social identity which are well recognized by most members of the group. Of course,
members of the society accord different degrees of importance or centrality to any
specific content, and it is possible to find individual differences among members of
the group. Due to the complexity of working with collective narratives, the measure
enables assessment of legitimization and accompanying emotions towards specific
content in the general collective narrative (Srour et al., 2013).
Based on the DeVellis (2003) model of scale development, the process of devel-
oping the questionnaire in each conflict context includes several stages. It begins
with focus groups of both parties in the conflict whose participants are asked to
describe the relationship between the two collectives from their points of view. Three
criteria are used in the selection of the collective narratives that are raised in the focus
groups: (1) the narratives are related to a significant historical/political/social events
in the past as well as in the present, (2) there is a high level of familiarity of the nar-
rative to the research population, and (3) two contradictory narratives are provided
for the same event/issue reflecting the different points of view of each group.
Based on the contents obtained in the focus groups on relevant narratives, the
research teams (who are usually members of the examined groups) adjust the themes
to specific narrative items. As a result, the questionnaire includes pairs of narratives
of each group, each pair concerning a historical, social, or political event. In the
questionnaire, two narratives for each of the above events are presented to the par-
ticipants. They are asked to rate their readiness to legitimize the narrative and their
feelings of empathy and anger regarding the narrative of their own group and the
narrative of the “other” group on a five-point Likert-style scale (1, don’t agree at all;
5, agree very much).
Here are some examples from the questionnaire in the context of Israeli–Palestinian
conflict which includes events like the Balfour Declaration, the Six-Day War, Rabin’s
assassination, the First Intifada, the Second Lebanon War, the 2000 Oslo Accords, the
Al-Aqsa Intifada, and events in the Arab sector in Israel in 2000, which were pre-
sented from the point of view of the two collective narratives (Jewish and Arab narra-
tives). One example is the item about the Balfour declaration—the Israeli narrative is:
“Many Israelis (Jewish-Israelis) view the Balfour Declaration as the first international
diplomatic recognition of the right of the Jews for a state in the Holy Land.” The
Palestinian narrative is: “Many Palestinians view the Balfour Declaration as an unfair
and illegitimate promise of the British to the Jews.” Another example is the narrative
of 1948. The Israeli narrative is: “Many Jewish Israelis view the 1948 war as an
important event marking their survival and independence,” and the Palestinian narra-
tive is: “Many Palestinians view the 1948 war as a disaster/catastrophe.”
82 A. Srour et al.

The Israeli–Palestinian Intractable Conflict

According to the conceptual paradigm of Bar-Tal (2007), intractable conflicts are

defined as protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central;
parties involved in such conflicts have an interest in their continuation (see Azar,
Jureidini, & McLaurin, 1978; Bar-Tal, 1998, 2013; Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Kriesberg,
1995). Intractable conflicts undermine the security and well-being of societies
worldwide (International Crisis Group, 2010).
Bar-Tal (2007) claims that societies involved in an intractable conflict over a
long period develop a collective fear orientation because of the ongoing threats and
dangers to individuals who are involved. In situations of ongoing conflict, fear leads
to perceptual biases about the conflict and about the other side, creating cognitive
stagnation and a tendency to avoid risks and bringing about justification of the exist-
ing policy (Bar-Tal, 2001; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002). Fear and
threat at the individual and collective levels lead to cognitive biases so that events
are likely to be processed and interpreted incorrectly in ways that strengthen suspi-
cion, delegitimization, and lack of trust towards the “other” (Bar-Tal, 2001).
Rouhana and Bar-Tal (1998) argued that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is so
resistant to resolution because of the unique characteristics of the opposing narra-
tives, the central one being a perception of exclusive legitimacy. The narratives of
the conflict, among both Israelis and Palestinians, have been central to the national
identities, are celebrated through myths, monuments, and national ceremonies and
are strongly represented in literature and songs as well as in school textbooks (Bar-
Tal, 2013; Ben-Amos & Beth-El, 1999).
During the decade investigated in this study (1999–2009), social representations
of one’s “own” group and the “other” group significantly changed among cboth
groups, due to the changes in the political and social context. For example, the other
group moved from “peace partner” to “no partner for peace,” from “choosing peace”
to “no choice, war.” We expected that these changes in perceiving the “in” and the
“out” groups would be reflected in the perception of both groups of the collective
narratives of “in” and “out” groups that expressed their social representations.
In addition to the first stage in 1999–2000 (Sagy et al., 2002), administered when
the optimism following the Oslo agreement was strong, three additional stages were
conducted: in 2002, during the Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada when suicide bombers
exploded in public areas in Israel and hundreds of Palestinians were killed or injured
in military actions all over the West Bank and Gaza; in 2004, after the Israeli army
invasion of Palestinian towns in West Bank and massive military operations in the
Gaza Strip; and in 2009, after Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which caused more
than a thousand fatalities and thousands of injuries and was initiated as a response
to intensive missile attacks on communities and cities in southern Israel.
In the current study, we examined levels of cognitive and emotional perceptions
of collective narratives in these different historical–social periods of conflict. We
suggest three measures related to narrative perceptions as indicators of the intracta-
bility or violence of the conflict:
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 83

(a) The level of readiness to legitimize the narrative of the “in” and the “out” groups
and the levels of empathy and anger towards the narratives of the “in” and the
“out” groups are expected to reflect conflict intensity.
(b) The gap between in-group and out-group narrative perceptions is also expected
to be wider in more violent periods.
(c) The correlation between emotional and cognitive ccomponents of the percep-
tion of the narratives: the more violent the stage of the conflict, the stronger the
correlation as reflecting the coherence of attitudes towards both narratives
(Sagy et al., 2011).

Method

Sample

The study was conducted in four stages, during which the questionnaires were distributed
to a sample of 5627 high school students, of which 3748 were Jews and 1849 were Arabs.
Of the respondents, 2950 were in the 10th grade and 2638 in the 12th grade (see Table 1).
The samples in each stage were different and ranged between 545 participants and
1188 in the Jewish samples and between 365 participants and 575 in the Israeli Arab
samples. Ages ranged from 15 to 18 among both groups. Careful consideration was taken
to provide representation of different types of schools and various types of locations.

Measures

The Perceptions of Collective Narratives Questionnaire

The questionnaire was formulated by a team of Israeli Jewish and Palestinian

researchers.1 It included structured questions that presented the mainstream views
of the Israeli Zionist and Palestinian narratives concerning particular historical
events in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Three criteria were followed in the selec-
tion of the tested narratives:
1. Level of contradiction—the two research groups hold different narratives regard-
ing the same event.
2. Level of familiarity—the narratives are well known among the research group
members.

1
The team included Prof. Shifra Sagy, Prof. Sami Adwan, and Dr. Muhammed Farhat from
Bethlehem University and Dr. Avi Kaplan and Dr. Fatma Kassem from Ben-Gurion University of
the Negev.
 84

Table 1 Demographic characteristics of Israeli Jews and Arabs at the four stages of the study
1999–2000 2002 2004–2005 2009
Jews Arabs Jews Arabs Jews Arabs Jews Arabs
N 1188 575 1001 531 545 365 1014 408
Gender Male 39.6 % 41.2 % 41.0 % 43.3 % 47.0 % 35.3 % 46.4 % 39.5 %
(percentage) Female 60.4 % 58.8 % 59.0 % 56.7 % 53.0 % 64.7 % 53.6 % 60.5 %
Grade 10th grade 55.0 % 52.3 % 54.5 % 50.1 % 51.7 % 54.4 % 49.7 % 54.5 %
(percentage) 12th grade 45.0 % 47.7 % 45.5 % 49.9 % 48.3 % 45.6 % 50.3 % 45.5 %
Religion Jews 96.4 % – 97.6 % – 95.8 % – 98.2 % –
(percentage) Muslims – 74.9 % – 80.0 % – 67.9 % – 87.1 %
Christians – 22.3 % – 15.6 % – 27.4 % – 10.8 %
Druzes – 2.4 % – 4.0 % – 4.7 % – 0.8 %
Others 3.6 % 0.4 % 2.4 % 0.4 % 4.2 % – 1.8 % 0.3 %
A. Srour et al.
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 85

3. Timeline—the narratives related to significant historical/political/social events

in the past (e.g., the Holocaust, the 1948 war) as well as in the present (e.g., the
Gaza War in the 2009 study).
Two narratives for each of the chosen events were presented to the participants,
one attributed to each group. They were asked to rate their readiness to legitimate
and their feelings of empathy and anger regarding the narrative of their own group,
and regarding the narrative of the “other” group, on a five-point Likert-style scale
(1, don’t agree at all; 5, agree very much).
Different events were selected in each study, taking into consideration the recent events
and the length of the questionnaire. Some events appear more frequently in the question-
naire and others less often, based on the team’s evaluation of the narrative as central to the
conflict. For example, the Balfour Declaration, which appeared frequently in the first ver-
sions of the questionnaire, was eliminated from later versions, while the 1948 war and
Holocaust narratives were kept in all versions as very important narratives.
We computed six scores by averaging the respondents’ answers to all statements
representing the score (legitimization of all the in-group narratives, legitimization of
all the out-group narratives, empathy towards all the in-group narratives, empathy
towards all the out-group narratives, anger towards all the in-group narratives, anger
towards all the out-group narratives). Reliability of the scales was found to be satis-
factory. Cronbach’s alpha of the measures ranged from .60 to .87 for the legitimacy
measure in the Jewish samples and from .71 to .89 in the Arab samples. For the
empathy measure, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .59 to .86 in the Jewish sample and
from .80 to .89 in the Arab sample. For the anger measure, Cronbach’s alpha ranged
from .57 to .88 in the Jewish sample and from .78 to .91 in the Arab samples.
The data was analyzed only after standardizing the scores in each research stage for
each presented narrative. This procedure enabled us to draw conclusions about the gen-
eral tendency of weighing the collective narratives of the in- and “other” groups, regard-
less of the number and specific narratives that were used in the measure at each stage.

Procedures

The questionnaires were distributed in Hebrew and in Arabic. They were adminis-
tered to the students in their classrooms during a normal class period and were
answered anonymously.

Results

The scores were standardized by calculating a z-score for each study among each
national group regarding each element: legitimacy, empathy, and anger towards in-
group narratives and out-group narratives. An average of the three elements was
calculated after multiplying the anger score with −1, and the gap between in-group
and out-group narrative perceptions was calculated for each group by detracting the
out-group narrative score from the in-group narrative score.
86 A. Srour et al.

To test our hypothesis regarding the differences in collective narrative perception

during different periods, we conducted a four-way mixed-design analysis of variance
(4×2×2×3). Group (Jews or Arabs) and study (2000, 2002, 2004, or 2009) were the
between-subject factors, while perception elements (legitimacy, empathy, and anger)
and narrative attribution (Israeli or Palestinian narrative) were the within-subject factors.
The findings revealed significant main and interaction effects between all factors.
The significant main effect of group (F(1,5410) = 40.91, p < 0.001) refers to the ten-
dency of Jews to assign more legitimacy and feel more empathy and less anger towards
collective narratives in general, both of the in-group and the out-group. Moreover, we
found a general tendency, among both groups, to perceive the in-group narrative as more
legitimate and feel more empathy and less anger towards it rather than the out-group
narrative as reflected by the in- vs. out-group narrative main effect (F(1,5410) = 312.32,
p < 0.001). The interaction between narrative attribution and group was also significant
(F(1,5410) = 3598.79, p < 0.001). This result reveals that the tendency to prefer the in-
group narrative is stronger among Arabs than among Jews. The averages of the percep-
tion of the three elements among Jews were 0.14 and −0.18 for in- and out-group
narratives, respectively, and 0.35 and −0.29 among Arabs (the same order).
The main effect of study period was also significant (F(3,5410) = 37.41, p < 0.001),
indicating that narrative perception is affected by the political/social contexts. More
interesting is the interaction between this factor and group (F(3,5410) = 24.59,
p < 0.001), indicating that both groups did not report similar changes along the four
stages. The following presents the results regarding changes along the studies for
each element separately (see Table 2 and Figs. 1, 2, and 3).

Legitimacy

Concerning in-group narratives, Arabs reported a sharp increase in legitimizing the

in-group narratives in 2002, and then this tendency was moderated. Jews tended to
perceive their in-group narratives as less legitimate in 2002, but they later continued
to give more and more legitimacy to their in-group narratives. Concerning out-group
narratives, both groups showed a tendency to decrease legitimization over time.

Empathy

Concerning in-group narratives, both groups felt more empathy towards in-group nar-
ratives in 2002 than in 2000, but this tendency changed to feel less empathy in the next
two studies. Arabs continued to feel low empathy towards the out-group narrative
with minimal changes in the consecutive studies, but Jews started with high levels of
empathy towards the out-group narrative but reported a continuous decline over time,
reaching the level of Arabs’ empathy towards the out-group narratives in 2009.
Table 2 Means of standardized scores of perceptions of collective narrative of in- and out-groups among Jews and Arabs along the four stages
Israeli narratives Palestinian narratives Total Gap
Israeli Palestinian
Group Year Legitimacy Empathy Anger Legitimacy Empathy Anger narratives narratives In–out
Jews 2000 0.32 0.47 −0.27 −0.19 −0.07 0.15 0.35 −0.14 0.21
2002 0.21 0.61 −0.40 −0.31 −0.24 0.31 0.41 −0.28 0.22
2004 0.60 0.53 −0.46 −0.50 −0.81 0.32 0.53 −0.54 0.56
2009 0.64 0.17 −0.57 −0.63 −0.83 0.34 0.46 −0.60 0.45
Arabs 2000 −0.70 −0.82 0.76 0.64 0.76 −0.54 −0.76 0.65 0.55
2002 −0.91 −0.92 0.91 0.94 1.01 −0.71 −0.91 0.88 0.72
2004 −0.80 −1.02 0.74 0.86 0.92 −0.51 −0.85 0.76 0.78
2009 −1.07 −0.76 0.98 0.65 0.84 −0.54 −0.94 0.68 0.60
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel…
87
88 A. Srour et al.

Fig. 1 Means of z-scores of legitimacy given to in- and out-group narratives among Jews and
Arabs. The solid line is the in-group narratives and dashed line is the out-group narratives

Fig. 2 Means of z-scores of empathy towards in- and out-group narratives among Jews and Arabs.
The solid line is the in-group narratives and dashed line is the out-group narratives

Anger

Concerning in-group narratives, Arabs reported less anger towards their in-group narra-
tives than Jews in 2000 and 2002, but they reported similar levels in 2004 and 2009. Jews
showed a continuous tendency to feel less anger towards in-group narratives in each of
the four consecutive studies. On the other hand, while Jews reported a mild increase in
feeling anger towards out-group narratives over the years, Arabs reported mixed strong
tendencies. Arabs showed an increase in anger towards out-group narratives between
2000 and 2002, but then a decline occurred in 2004 and again an increase in 2009.
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 89

Fig. 3 Means of z-scores of anger towards in- and out-group narrative among Jews and Arabs. The
solid line is in-group narrative and dashed line is the out-group narratives

In general, both groups showed a tendency to more strongly reject the “others’”
group narrative in the recent stages. The only exception was a slight decrease in
2004 among Arabs, but coming back to the 2002 level in 2009. Moreover, both
groups showed an increase in adhering to their in-group narratives in comparison
with the first study in 2000; the Jewish group showed the highest level of adher-
ence to in-group narratives in 2004 while the Arab group did so in 2002.
Moving to the second measure, gaps between in-group and out-group narrative per-
ceptions could be a good indicator for conflict intensity. Arabs reported significantly
higher gaps in all the four stages, whereas the study in 2004 showed the highest gaps in
both groups (see Table 2). The strongest change among Arabs occurred between 2000
and 2002, but among Jews the strongest change took place between 2002 and 2004.

The Relationship between Cognitive and Emotional

Components of Perception of “Other” Group Narrative

Our third measure, which we hypothesized would change according to different levels
of violence in the conflict, was the relationship between cognitive and emotional
aspects of the attitude towards the other narrative. Table 3 presents the correlations
between z-scores of legitimacy and both empathy and anger towards other group nar-
ratives among both groups for the four stages. First, we found stronger correlations
between legitimacy and empathy rather than legitimacy and anger among both groups
over the four study stages. Moreover, the results suggest that according to these mea-
sures, the relations between cognitive and emotional components also became stronger
in the more recent stages among both groups, indicating greater coherence between
cognitive and emotional aspects of collective narrative perception as the conflict
90 A. Srour et al.

Table 3 Pearson correlations of perceived legitimacy to empathy and anger towards the out-group
collective narratives among Jews and Arabs along the four study stages
Jews Arabs
Year Empathy Anger Empathy Anger
2000 0.62 −0.34 0.64 −0.18
2002 0.65 −0.35 0.77 −0.35
2004 0.69 −0.56 0.81 −0.40
2009 0.75 −0.56 0.68 −0.49

became more violent. The only exception was a mild decrease in the correlation
between legitimacy and empathy among Arabs in 2009 as compared with 2004.

Discussion

Our paper presents results from a longitudinal study which took place over 10 years,
dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as it is perceived by the Jewish majority
and the Arab minority in Israel. The study examined young people’s perceptions of
their own group and the “other” group’s collective narratives. Living in a conflicted
area has resulted in different interpretations by each side, of recent as well as of
historical events which relate to their group’s belief systems. It is commonly agreed
that the sociopsychological repertoire that accompanies intractable conflicts serves
as a prism through which society members absorb information about the conflict
and interpret their experiences (Bar-Tal, 2007), and that these can lead to a stubborn
rigidity of repertoire (Kelman, 2007). In this longitudinal study, we asked if and
how this repertoire of interpretations of past and present events, held by adolescents
from both sides, changed in accordance with changes in the reality of the conflictual
situation between peace talks and violent events. Following the failure of the Oslo
Accords in 2000, on the Israeli side, there was an escalation of violence, snipers,
and checkpoints in 2002, tanks and invasions in 2004, and air bombing in 2009 and
on the Palestinian side, shootings in 2002, suicide bombs in 2004, and missile
attacks in 2009.
Our examination concerned three different aspects of collective narrative percep-
tions. First, we examined interpretations of past and present events as reflected by
three measures: readiness to legitimate, feelings of empathy, and feelings of anger
towards the narrative of one’s own group and towards that of the “other” group.
Second, we investigated the discrepancy between perceptions of the in-group and out-
group collective narratives as measured by the gap between the mean of standardized
scores of legitimacy, empathy, and anger of both narratives. Third, we explored the
relations between cognitive (legitimacy) and emotional (empathy and anger) elements
of narrative perceptions as measured by the correlation between legitimacy and anger
towards collective narratives of the “other” group. These aspects were examined at
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 91

four stages of the longitudinal study which, in the political context, moved from
peaceful times to violent events.
First, the results reveal a tendency by members of both groups to give more
legitimacy and feel more empathy and less anger towards their in-group collective
narrative and to give less legitimacy and feel less empathy and more anger towards
the out-group collective narratives. This tendency, however, increased over the 10
years of the study among both groups. In general, this tendency was stronger among
Arab youth as compared to the Jewish youth. Arabs also showed significantly higher
gaps between the perceptions of their in-group and out-group narratives in all four
stages. Actually, the differences between Arabs and Jews lessened through the
research stages. Although Arabs have continued to show more adherence to the in-
group narratives and have rejected those of the out-group in comparison to Jews,
these differences have become smaller as time went on, while Israeli Jewish young-
sters have gradually become more radical in their perceptions of the two collective
narratives and more similar to their Arab counterparts.
It appears that this decade of research, which started with the failure of the peace
process and continued with increasing violence, has impacted individuals’ percep-
tion of in-group and out-group collective narratives, so that they adhere to the for-
mer and reject the latter. The adherence to in-group narratives seems to be an effort
to depend on collective belonging as a source of meaning for the challenges and
existential fears faced on the national level (Mana et al., 2012; Srour, 2014).On the
other hand, the rejection of the other group’s collective narratives might express the
social representation of the “other” group as the enemy, inhuman, and seeking to
wipe out one’s own group (Moscovici, 1988).
As mentioned, Arab participants presented weaker reactions to changes in the
political situation and remained more stable in their perceptions over the decade.
This finding could be attributed to their starting point. They were more radical in
their collective narrative perception from the early stage during the Oslo talks. In
spite of the peace process, Israeli Arabs felt a threat to their identities and existence
as a discriminated national minority in Israel (Smooha, 2010). The dual loyalty of
this minority both to the Palestinian people and to the Israeli state has become
almost impossible in politically violent periods. The collective narrative question-
naire seems to be a sensitive measure in this complex situation.
Examining the gap between the in-group and the out-group perceptions of collec-
tive narratives could be another significant reflection of conflict intensity and intracta-
bility. We found the highest polarization among Jews in 2004 as they strongly adhered
to their own narratives and strongly rejected Palestinian narratives. These results can
be understood against the backdrop of the loss of hope for peace, on the one hand, and
the intensified violent events and existential fears, on the other. The Israeli Arab
minority adolescents, however, reported the greatest adherence to their in-group nar-
rative and the greatest rejection of the out-group’s narratives in the 2002 stage. It
seems that the October events in 2000 and the beginning of the Second Intifada are
events that can explain this polarization. From the Israeli Arab point of view, the trau-
matic events of “Land Day” in 1975, during which nine Palestinian Israeli citizens
were killed by Israeli security forces in demonstrations against land expropriation in
92 A. Srour et al.

the Galilee, repeated themselves in October 2000; therefore, the social representations
of “us” and “them” were reproduced and confirmed by the more recent events, caus-
ing a new phase of polarization of perceptions of collective narratives.
These results, however, were changed as a decrease in the gap between percep-
tions of narratives was found in 2009 among Arab students. This reflects less adher-
ence to the Palestinian narrative rather than more rejection of the Israeli Jewish
narrative. It seems that the Arabs have become more critical of their in-group col-
lective narrative rather than accepting the Israeli Jewish majority collective narra-
tive. The change in this stage can be attributed to the Arab minority feelings of
shared stress with the Jewish majority during the Lebanon War, when Israeli Arab
villages and cities were also attacked by missiles fired from Lebanon (Sagy &
Braun-Lewensohn, 2009). We may cautiously suggest that, in that period, the Arab
minority experienced less identification with the Palestinian component of their
identity but no change in their Israeli one (Smooha, 2010). Overall, it appears that
among the Arab adolescents in Israel, in-group narrative perceptions are related to
identity construction within complex circles of belonging, from the political situa-
tion regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the regional situation to the
minority–majority relations within Israel.
The third measure of perceptions of collective narratives included in the scope of
this study is the relationship between the cognitive and emotional elements of the
“other” group narrative. This measure seems to reflect the level of coherence of the
attitudes towards the “other” (Sagy et al., 2011). We hypothesized that there would
be a higher need for coherence in times of threat and stress as a means of achieving
a certain closure for the individuals as well as for the collective (Kruglanski, 2004).
In wartime, a high level of personal sense of coherence has been found to be a sig-
nificant resource in coping with stress (Sagy & Braun-Lewensohn, 2009). Thus, we
expected higher correlations among the cognitive and emotional elements to appear
in violent periods. This hypothesis received support throughout the four stages of
the study. We found levels of coherence to be quite different in the two groups of
Israeli Jewish and Arab students. The level of coherence in the attitude towards the
out-group increased over the years with the escalation of violence. In both groups
the lowest measure of coherence was found in the first period during the Oslo talks.
It seems that this period of a relative peace, or hopes for peace, “allowed” for a
lower level of consistency and more openness to different perspectives in both
groups (Sagy et al., 2011). The results of lower coherence during this stage seem to
reflect less rigidity of the sociopsychological repertoire and provide the opportunity
for social changes needed to proceed with the peace process at the social level.
During the following stages, however, which were characterized by more violent
events of war and terror, the coherence of the attitudes increased among Israeli
Jews. Their coherent perceptions could be a significant resource in coping with the
stressful situation. At the same time, this coherent pattern of perceptions could
explain the high resistance to change among these youths (Halperin, Russel et al.,
2011). As suggested by Sagy et al. (2002), these results also indicate the influence
of top–down processes: changing reality and actual social events (peace talks vs.
Perceptions of Collective Narratives Among Arab and Jewish Adolescents in Israel… 93

war and terror) lead to changes of perceptions of the in- and out-group among youth
who are living in conflicted areas.
Another important issue that requires attention is the differentiation between the
two emotions: empathy and anger. Empathy is described in the literature as an
emotional-cognitive process (Strayer, 1987) that results in understanding and “feel-
ing with” others, while anger is usually described as a more physiologically related
emotion (Harris, Schoenfeld, Gwynne, & Weissler, 1964). Furthermore, anger is
evoked by threat against the self, especially when the threat is perceived as an unjust
assault that interferes with one’s attempts to realize specific personal goals (Lazarus,
1991). We found that the Israeli Arab adolescents felt less empathy and more anger
towards the “other” group narratives than did their Jewish counterparts. This result
could be part of the tendency of the neglected and offended minority to reject the
majority narrative (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; see also Nahhas, Chap. 5).
Another differentiation is noteworthy. Over the stages of the longitudinal study,
there were relatively higher correlations between legitimacy and empathy towards
the “other” collective narratives among Arabs and higher correlation between legiti-
macy and anger towards the “other” collective narratives among Jews. In other
words, it seems that for Arab adolescents, the barrier towards legitimization of the
Israeli Jewish collective narratives was associated with a lack of empathy towards
those narratives, while the main hindrance of the Israeli Jewish youth towards legiti-
mization of the Palestinian collective narratives was associated with a feeling of
anger towards these narratives. The role of empathy and anger in the ability to listen
to the “other” life story has been described in several studies relating to Palestinian–
Israeli encounters (Sagy, 2000). The ability to empathize with the suffering of the
“enemy” and to overcome the anger which arises while listening to the “other” nar-
ratives was found to be a contributing factor in enhancing readiness to reconcile
(Sagy, 2015). However, as far as we know, the differentiation between these two
emotions with relation to the cognitive component of legitimization has not been
examined. Our results hint at a different pattern of emotional-cognitive connection
among the Israeli Arab and the Israeli Jewish adolescents which can be understood
by both cultural and contextual (majority vs. minority) factors. It seems that further
research is needed to investigate the different meanings of anger, empathy, and legiti-
mization for these two conflicted groups as well as for other groups in conflict.
Despite these meaningful results, the generalizability of our study conclusions is
limited. The limitations are mainly in methodological concerns. The first relates to
the question of representativeness of the samples. Although we attempted to care-
fully consider this question by randomly selecting the schools during the first stage,
some of the schools refused or could not participate in the later stages of the research.
Second, our sample is limited to high school students whose experience with the
“other” group is very limited, and their identity construction process is still in its
early stages.
In spite of the methodological limitations of this longitudinal study, it may still
indicate some important directions to explore in order to deepen our understanding
of perceptions of collective narratives in intergroup relations within the context of
intractable conflict.
94 A. Srour et al.

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 Part III
Societal Beliefs and Ethos
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”: Israeli
and Egyptian Images of the Other During
the Nasserite Period (1952–1970)

Elie Podeh

Introduction

About two decades ago, I began to study Israel’s place in the Middle East. My interest
stemmed from two considerations: First, the peace process that began with the 1993
Oslo Accords believed to herald a new era, in which Israel would be more integrated
in the region as a result of growing Arab recognition of it. Second, my own realiza-
tion that the academic separation between Israel and the Middle East—the fact that
Israeli studies have traditionally been isolated from Islamic and Middle East stud-
ies—was a mistaken institutional decision motivated by ideological and practical
reasons. Consequently, Israelis have developed a perception of the Middle East that
separated Israel—politically, economically, and particularly culturally—from the
Arab-Muslim Middle East. The need to form a Jewish-Zionist identity also neces-
sitated an independent academic historiography—a process that has been impres-
sively accomplished by various departments of Jewish and Eretz-Israel studies at
various universities. This development further institutionalized the academic sepa-
ration between Jewish-Israeli studies and Orientalism—the discipline that included
the study of Islam, Middle Eastern history, and languages (such as Arabic, Persian,
and Turkish but not Hebrew). This separation, it should be emphasized, did not exist
in the German universities from which leading professors came to Palestine and

E. Podeh (*)
Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 99

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_7
100 E. Podeh

established the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the Mandate period. However,

with the establishment of the Institute of Jewish Studies in 1924, and the Institute of
Oriental Studies two years later, this separation was institutionalized and later
reproduced in other Israeli universities (Lazarus-Yaffe, 1999; Milson, 1997; Podeh,
2006, pp. 93–100).
My assessment that this separation was artificial and detrimental to scholars in
both fields prompted me to focus on the question whether Israel—not only geo-
graphically speaking—should be considered part of the Middle East. More con-
cretely, should we speak of Israel and the Middle East or Israel in the Middle East?
Far from being a question of terminology, this duality represents in essence a core
issue: Do Israel and the Middle East constitute two distinct or complimentary enti-
ties (Podeh, 1997)? My intellectual journey also included the development of a
graduate course called “Israel in the Middle East”—a title with a clear statement
about my proclivity—which has been taught since 1997. Though modest, my sug-
gestion to teach such course in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies
was designed to initiate a dialogue on whether Israel should be part of the Middle
East. Although this was meant as a purely academic rather than political exercise, it
was based on the conviction that studying both sides would yield a better under-
standing of the Arab-Israeli conflict.1 It was here that I first encountered Daniel Bar-
Tal’s academic literature; while drafting the course’s syllabus, I thought that the
students required an understanding of some cultural and psychological aspects of the
conflict from the Israeli side. As a historian, the psychological insights derived from
the material opened new vistas for me and my students; they were important in moti-
vating me to investigate the importance of images and perceptions of the Other in
intractable conflicts—of which the Arab-Israeli conflict is undoubtedly a primary
example (Podeh, 2004). My subsequent venture into the study of views of the Other
in history textbooks—this time in the Israeli education system—was influenced by
Bar-Tal’s influential work on the topic (Bar-Tal, 1998; Podeh, 2002).2
It is a given that stereotypes, and prejudice, and images of the Other play a
significant role in conflicts between states and individuals. The Arab-Israeli con-
flict is no different from other international and regional intractable conflicts, in
which the view of the Other, filtered through various state socialization agents—
such as the media, the education system, the arts, and others—shapes decision-
makers’ beliefs, attitudes, and emotions (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). In analyzing
how people process information, Alexander George (1980) posited that beliefs
and images about the environment, which are used by individuals to fashion a

1
It is interesting to note that one of my Ph.D. students, Nimrod Goren, whose dissertation was
jointly supervised with Daniel Bar-Tal, founded later a think tank called Mitvim—The Israeli
Institute for Regional Foreign Policies—one of the major tasks of which is to deal with Israel’s
place in the Middle East.
2
Many years later, Daniel Bar-Tal and Sami Adwan collaborated in an international research team
(in which this author was involved as well) in a project initiated and sponsored by the Council of
Religious Institutions of the Holy Land, called “Victims of Our Own Narrative: Portrayal of the
‘Other’ in Israeli and Palestinian Schools Books.” http://d7hj1xx5r7f3h.cloudfront.net/Israeli-
Palestinian_School_Book_Study_Report-English.pdf.
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 101

relatively coherent way of organizing and making sense of confusing signals, may
be biased and stereotyped since information processing is selective.
Societies engaged in intractable conflicts develop a conflict ethos, which, accord-
ing to Daniel Bar-Tal (2013), is “a configuration of shared central societal beliefs
that provide a dominant orientation to a society; these beliefs illuminate the present
state of affairs and conditions and set goals for the future.” This ethos, in his opin-
ion, “binds the members of society together, along with the goals and aspirations
that impel them toward the future” (p. 174). According to Bar-Tal’s typology, the
challenges of intractable conflict fuel eight themes of societal beliefs in the conflict
ethos: (1) justness of one’s own goals, (2) delegitimization of the opponent, (3) self-
victimization, (4) positive collective self-image, (5) security, (6) patriotism, (7)
unity, and (8) peace. Research shows that delegitimization plays a highly important
role in analyzing the image of the other. By denying the adversary’s humanity and
morality, delegitimization constitutes a psychological permit to harm the delegiti-
mized group, by violent means if necessary. His research identifies several forms of
delegitimization: dehumanization, outcasting, trait characterization, use of political
labels, and group comparison (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012).
It was only natural that an article in a book dedicated to Daniel Bar-Tal’s academic
contribution deals with images and perceptions of the Other. Though his contribution
was mainly in the theoretical field, he argued that “without the study of context it is
impossible to understand the functioning of individuals in groups because human
thoughts and feelings are embedded in historical, social, political, and cultural con-
texts” (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005, p. 7). Therefore, this chapter explores Egyptian
and Israeli perceptions of the Other within a specific historical context: the stormy
years of the Nasserite period (1952–1970). The main thesis is that both countries
developed a diabolical image of each other, which hampered the chances of conduct-
ing a serious peaceful dialogue. These mutual negative images trickled top down to
society and became an integral part of each nation’s collective memory.

The Nasserite View of Palestine and Israel

Egyptian interest in the Palestine conflict began in the monarchy period (1923–
1952), particularly during the years of the Arab Revolt (1936–1939). A combination
of domestic and external factors triggered Egypt’s involvement in the Palestine
issue, which King Faruq used to bolster his shaky legitimacy, since the opposition
forces, such as the Muslim brotherhood, often flogged him with the Palestine whip.
Palestine also constituted a core element in the growing importance of pan-Arab
ideology in Egypt’s intellectual and political life, as a result of which Egypt’s aspi-
ration to play a pivotal role in Arab politics required active involvement in the
Palestine question. Finally, Egyptians shared with Arab Palestinians a history of
anti-imperialist and anti-British struggle (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1995). Growing
commitment to the Palestine cause eventually led Faruq to intervene in the 1948
War, though his major concerns were Hashemite aggrandizement plans and the
102 E. Podeh

imminent threat to his own legitimacy. Although it had joined the Palestinian and
Arab chorus against the UN Partition Plan, Cairo had no difficulty in adopting a
realistic attitude toward the existence of a Jewish state after the war (Doran, 1999).
Before seizing power in July 1952, Nasser experienced the Palestine problem
first hand, participating as an officer in several battles in 1948. The war was crucial
in crystallizing his awareness and understanding that Egypt’s problems were in
Cairo and not Palestine: “We were fighting in Palestine,” wrote Nasser in his
Philosophy of the Revolution in 1953, “but our dreams were centered in Egypt. Our
bullets were aimed at the enemy in its trenches before us, but our hearts hovered
over our distant country, which we had left in the care of the wolves” (Nasser,
1955, p. 21). While besieged in Faluja in Palestine, Nasser and his fellow Free
Officers realized that “the biggest battlefield is in Egypt.” In fact, Faluja appeared
to them as a microcosmos of Egypt, which, “too, is besieged by difficulties and
enemies; she has been deceived and forced into a battle for which she was not
ready” (ibid, pp. 22–23). Palestine was not the reason for the 23 July Revolution,
as Nasser emphasizes in the Philosophy, but it added impetus to a deeply ingrained
process. Interestingly, Nasser’s acquaintance with a certain Israeli officer during
the armistice talks is described in a factual manner devoid of negative overtones
(ibid, p. 24). A similar attitude is reflected in his brief memoir of the war, published
in 1955 (Khalidi, 1973).
In the immediate post-1952 period, domestic problems and future relations with
Britain were the prime foreign policy issues rather than Palestine (Aburish, 2004;
Mohi El Din, 1995). Interestingly enough, Nasser maintained surreptitious contact
with Tel Aviv (including Prime Minister Moshe Sharett) in 1953–1954 through sev-
eral intermediaries and did not rule out the possibility of reaching some accommo-
dation with Israel (James, 2006).
However, as Nasser consolidated his rule, Israel and Palestine gradually emerged
as pivotal elements in his rhetoric. The two issues were, in fact, interconnected: by
supporting one (Palestine), Nasser was bound to negate the other (Israel). Four rea-
sons led to Nasser’s changed outlook: First, the fact that since the 1948 War, Egypt
controlled the Gaza Strip, with its Palestinian population, meant that it could no
longer ignore the Palestine question. Second, Palestine had since emerged as the
ultimate source of regime legitimacy and a core element of the pan-Arab ideology;
the liberation of Palestine, therefore, was intertwined with Arab unity (Sela, 1998;
Telhami, 1992). As a result, any leader aspiring to Arab leadership was compelled
to place the Palestinian cause at the top of his agenda.
The third reason was the growing conviction that Israel wished to eliminate the
Palestine problem and expand its territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, in line
with the biblical borders of the Promised Land. This belief was confirmed, in
Egyptian eyes, by three developments: the first was the discovery of a Jewish espio-
nage group responsible for several terror incidents in Cairo and Alexandria in July
1954, which was masterminded by the Israeli intelligence. Operation Suzanna (or
“the Mishap,” as it became known in Israel) contributed to a growing sense of
mutual mistrust, and Egyptian Jews were consequently considered potential traitors
(Heikal, 1986). The second event was Israel’s attack on Gaza, on 28 February 1955,
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 103

in which 31 Egyptians were killed. The scale of the raid surprised and humiliated
Nasser, leading him to believe that its coincidence with the formation of the Western-
led defense organization Baghdad Pact was part of a concerted Israeli-Western
conspiracy against him. Moreover, the raid convinced Nasser that all the messages
that had been conveyed to him by Western intermediaries were designed to lull him
into a state of false security. Israel, in the Egyptian view, “was determined to chal-
lenge the rising star of Egypt by every means at its disposal, and primarily by force”
(ibid, pp. 66–67). The raid, therefore, had “a dramatic effect on Egyptian images of
Israel” (Gordon, 2006; James, 2006), setting Nasser on a collision course with
Israel. The third event was Israel’s participation, along with Britain and France, in
the 1956 Suez War (termed al-udwan al-thulathi, the Tripartite Aggression). More
than anything else, this collusion (mu’amara), substantiated Israel’s role as an
imperialist stooge bent on conquering Palestine and the entire Arab world (Stein,
2012). Thus, by defending Palestine, so it was argued, the Arabs were effectively
defending the Arab world from the Zionist threat.
The fourth reason for the change in Nasser’s policy was connected with his need
to compensate for the absence of a specific program of action against Israel with
growing rhetoric. Political, military, and financial considerations motivated Nasser
to adopt a “short-of-war” policy based on economic boycotts, maritime blockades,
and Fidayyin raids from Gaza. His propaganda increased in intensity, and state pro-
paganda included anti-Semitic and Nazi elements with increasing frequency
(Beinin, 1998). In the aftermath of Nasser’s policy shift in 1956–1960, some 36,000
Jews were forced to leave Egypt, and their property was in most cases confiscated
(Laskier, 1992). Ironically, his inflammatory rhetoric eventually became a self-
made trap, as the Arab enthusiasm it aroused contributed significantly to the escala-
tion leading up to the 1967 War.
The negative image of Israel, Zionism, and the Jews was disseminated through vari-
ous state agencies. Of particular importance were Nasser’s speeches and interviews
delivered in the state-controlled media (newspapers, radio, and TV). While Nasser’s
negative expressions were usually oblique (see below), radio and TV broadcasts, as
well as books, booklets, and propaganda pamphlets published by the Ministry of
National Guidance, Ministry of Education, and the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, used direct and explicit negative epithets in their publications and teaching
materials (Harkabi, 1976; Klein, 1997). In fact, Egyptian propaganda included all the
forms of delegitimization identified by Bar-Tal: dehumanization, outcasting, trait char-
acterization, political labeling, and group comparison (Harkabi, 1967, 1976).
Close scrutiny of Egyptian propaganda reveals the centrality of four themes:
first, the need and desire to destroy Israel, either by active involvement of the Arabs
or by some other unspecified divine interventions. The terminology used to portray
this theme was rich and often direct: liquidation, wiping out, annihilation, purifica-
tion, cleansing, throwing into the sea, destruction, elimination, and disappearance
(ibid). Often enough, Nasser and certain state agencies used ambiguous expres-
sions, such as “liberation of Palestine,” “restoration of the stolen rights,” “just solu-
tion for the Palestinian people,” and “solution based on UN resolutions,” which
were construed by Israel as euphemisms for the same target of eliminating Israel
104 E. Podeh

(ibid). According to Harkabi’s meticulous study, the direct terms appeared more
frequently in local media, while more euphemistic expressions were more frequent
in foreign media.
The second theme of Egypt’s propaganda was the depiction of Israel as an expan-
sionist enemy aspiring to control the region between the Nile and the Euphrates.
The mission of the Arab states was to defend themselves against the inherent impe-
rialism of Zionist ideology (Harkabi, 1976). The third theme was the equation of
Israel and Zionism with Western imperialism and colonialism. According to the
Egyptian and Arab view, Israel functioned as a “spearhead,” “bridgehead,” “base,”
and “instrument” of imperialist forces. The memory of the crusaders’ invasion was
often evoked, linking the establishment of Israel to a chain of transient imperialist
invasions of the Middle East, in which the Jewish settlements were no more than
colonies. The fourth element of Egyptian propaganda was the use of delegitimizing
anti-Semitic terms and labels. One major feature was the descriptions of the vile-
ness of the Jews, depicted as monsters, cancer, thorns, vipers, octopi, spiders, para-
sites, riffraff, demons, monkeys, pigs, dogs, microbes, bacteria, a fifth column, and
other negative characteristics. Also common was the association of Israel and the
Jews with the fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was widely trans-
lated and circulated by state agencies in Arabic and English from the mid-1950s
onward. Publication of these and similar anti-Semitic pamphlets “exposed” the
ways in which the Jews achieved influence and world domination (Harkabi, 1976;
Lewis, 1986). These treatises were backed by the dissemination of Hitler’s Mein
Kampf in Arabic during and after the Suez War (Laskier, 1992).
Anti-Semitic themes were also prevalent in Egyptian films produced during the
Nasserite period; Jewish figures were often stereotyped, associated with usury,
greediness, cunning, seduction, and the Satan (Shafik, 2007). Demonization of the
Jews was also found in the Egyptian romance literature (Somekh, 1996). Moreover,
the Jewish community in Egypt was portrayed as an alien and mostly European
society, servant of wider Jewish and Zionist interests, and part of a worldwide
Jewish conspiracy. The Jews were blamed for exploiting Egyptian society’s honesty
and hospitality in order to promote their own economic aspirations (Mayer, 1987).
In the early 1960s, the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic image of Israel had become
well embedded in Egyptian political culture, as attested by two official documents.
The first was the National Charter—probably the regime’s most important ideologi-
cal document—drafted in 1962, which stated, “The insistence of our people on liqui-
dating the Israeli aggression on a part of Palestine land is a determination to liquidate
one of the most dangerous pockets of imperialist resistance against the struggle of
peoples…Our pursuit of the Israeli policy of infiltration in Africa is only an attempt
to limit the spread of a disruptive imperialist cancer” (Rejwan, 1974, p. 262; Stein,
2012, pp. 62–63). The second was the Charter of the Arab Tripartite Federation,
consisting of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which was proclaimed in April 1963. Its text,
which stated that “unification is a revolution because it is closely tied to the question
of Palestine and the national obligation to liberate it,” was interpreted by Israel as a
direct Arab call for Israel’s annihilation (Podeh, 2004, pp. 86–87).
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 105

Nasser’s setbacks in the Arab world—particularly the dissolution of the union

between Egypt and Syria in 1961 (the United Arab Republic)—as well as Egypt’s
military involvement in Yemen, reinforced his commitment to the Palestinian cause.
In response to Arab accusations of inactivity vis-à-vis Israel, Nasser initiated the
establishment of the palestine liberation organization (PLO) at the Cairo Arab summit
in January 1964: Under Ahmed al-Shukeiri, the PLO became an Egyptian proxy in the
Arab-Israeli conflict, serving as a cover for avoiding war with Israel. Nasser’s support
of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian cause in the years 1964–
1967 grew in direct proportion to his inactivity against Israel (Shemesh, 1996).
The escalation that led to the outbreak of the June 1967 War was accompanied by
increasingly frequent declarations in the Egyptian media, touting Israel’s liquidation
as a national aim (Harkabi, 1976). Even Nasser’s rhetoric drifted in that direction.
Thus, for example, in a speech on 26 May, following the evacuation of UN forces on
the border and the closure of the Tiran Straits, Nasser declared that “the [impending]
battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel” (Laqueur,
1969, p. 335). In a speech 3 days later, Nasser insisted that war was not about the UN
forces or the Tiran Straits but dealing with the entire Palestine problem (ibid). With
that, Nasser completed the circle that had begun with limited interest in the Palestinian
issue in 1954 and ended with a full-fledged commitment. His overconfidence fed by
enthusiastic Arab support of his moves, Nasser fell victim to his own inflammatory
rhetoric of the preceding years; it became a trap of his own doing, which blurred his
ability to distinguish between image and reality.

The Israeli View of Nasser and Nasserism

The results of the 1948 War presented a paradox to Israel’s political leadership: On
the one hand, Israeli leaders developed a sense of contempt and derision for the Arab
states, their corrupt regimes, and the indolent leaders who had led their people to
such a crushing defeat at the hands of the Jews in a war of “the few against the
many.” On the other hand, Israeli leaders feared a second round against the Arabs,
whose goal would be the annihilation of the Jews and the obliteration of the shame
of defeat. The sense of historic Jewish victimhood caused fear to override hope (Bar-
Tal, 2001). As early as 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion expressed his con-
cerns of a unified Arab world that would act against the Jews, using the historic
comparison with the crusaders. Ben-Gurion’s profound knowledge of history taught
him that the emergence of a charismatic leader is a necessary precondition for unity
and spiritual rejuvenation. He was especially apprehensive of the emergence of lead-
ers of the stature of Prophet Muhammad, founder of the puritanical Wahhabiyyah
movement in the Arabian Peninsula Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab or secular Turkish
leader Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). It was the latter who particularly haunted Ben-
Gurion: In his diary, he confessed that the fear of “the possibility of our annihilation”
still gnawed at him in view of the “existence of sixty or seventy million Arabs—and
it is possible that a Mustafa Kemal will rise up among them” (Shalom, 1995, p. 39).
106 E. Podeh

The 1952 revolution in Egypt was initially welcomed by Israel. The impression
was that the group of young officers from the middle and lower-middle class would
better represent Egypt than the wealthy illegitimate elite under King Faruq. Israel
hoped that the new regime would not need to use nationalist anti-Israeli rhetoric to
compensate for a lack of political legitimacy and would thereby establish a congenial
basis for direct dialogue. Thus, on August 18, 1952, speaking to the Knesset, Ben-
Gurion welcomed the new regime. Israel also initiated secret contacts with Nasser in
1953–1954; although they failed to produce any tangible results, participation in
these talks signaled that Nasser and Egypt did not desire war (Sheffer, 1996).
To become acquainted with Nasser’s worldview, his booklet, The Philosophy of
the Revolution, was translated by the military intelligence, and attention was
directed to Nasser’s conceptualization of Egypt’s leadership role in three circles—
the Arab, the African, and the Islamic. The simplistic interpretation in Israel (and in
the West generally) was that Egypt was bent on attaining hegemony in these spheres.
It was believed that Israel constituted an obstacle to Egypt’s aspirations. Ben-Gurion
was greatly influenced by the booklet, as evidenced by his frequent references to it
in his diary. At a Knesset debate in early 1956, Ben-Gurion concluded that “the
ambition to destroy Israel is planted deep in Nasser’s heart and is a cornerstone of
his nationalist viewpoint” (Podeh, 2004, p. 76). A careful reading of The Philosophy,
however, would substantiate that this conclusion was derived not from the actual
text but from Ben-Gurion’s interpretation of it and his negative image of Nasser.
By early 1956, then, Nasser’s image in Israel had become highly negative. The
change in the Israeli view was the result of a spiral of several events, beginning with
the detention of an Israeli ship and its crew passing through the Suez Canal, in
September 1954. It continued with the two death sentences in the trial of the
Egyptian Jews involved in Operation Suzanna in January 1955. For some unknown
reason, the Israeli leadership believed—following some secret diplomatic exchanges
of third parties with the Egyptian regime—that Nasser had promised to refrain from
passing death sentences. Israeli disappointment was also expressed by Foreign
Minister Moshe Sharett, who usually advocated a moderate and restrained policy
vis-à-vis Nasser. In his diary, he concluded, “We have lost our faith in him as a
result of the hangings” (Podeh, 2004, p. 77). Next, following a series of border
infiltrations from Egypt, which involved sabotage and murder, Israel initiated the
Gaza operation in February 1955 (see above). Nasser’s negative image in Israel
(and in the West generally) was strengthened by several policy choices made by
Nasser in 1955: his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, a pro-Western defense organi-
zation, his participation in the Bandung Conference of nonaligned countries, and
recognition of the People’s Republic of China. The event that fixed Nasser’s nega-
tive image was, however, the Czech arms deal, which was viewed by Israel as alter-
ing the regional balance of power and concurrently giving the Soviet Union a
foothold in the Middle East. Nasser’s July 1956 decision to nationalize the Suez
Canal Company served as ultimate “proof” of Nasser’s aggressive ambitions,
“confirming” his imperialist desire to seize control of the oil fields and achieve
dominance in Arab and Islamic circles. This negative image of Nasser and
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 107

Nasserism, formed during the years 1954–1956, would not change until Nasser’s
death in September 1970.
Israeli discourse on Nasser and Nasserism, as reflected in the media and decision-
makers’ rhetoric, included three major themes: one, the perception of Nasser as a
kind of Arab Hitler or Mussolini, associated with Nazi type of activity and ideology;
Nasser’s Philosophy of the Revolution was portrayed as the equivalent of Hitler’s
Mein Kampf. The perception of Nasser as an expansionist and imperialist, bent on
attaining hegemony in the Arab, Muslim, and African circles, was seen as a reflec-
tion of Nasser’s desire to acquire “living space” for Egypt—a term borrowed from
the Nazi term lebenstraum. This analogy was immediate and self-evident for the
generation that had personally experienced or closely followed the Holocaust. The
conflation of Nasser with Nazi ideology stimulated delegitimation and dehumaniza-
tion of Israel’s enemy and laid the groundwork for Israel’s use of force against
Egypt during the Suez War.
For example, Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset when introducing his new gov-
ernment in November 1955, immediately after the signing of the Czech arms deals:
The rulers of Egypt are buying these arms with one goal only: to uproot the State of Israel
and its people…The head of the ruling military faction in Cairo has announced that its war
is aimed not only against Israel but against world Jewry and against Jewish finance which
rules the United States. This kind of talk is known to us from Hitler’s day [my emphasis],
and it is highly mystifying that the Czechoslovakian government in particular is ignoring
the Nazi dogma that is being sounded anew on the banks of the Nile…There is a duty to
inform all the aggressors of the world…[that] the Jewish people in its land will not be as
sheep to the slaughter… Not many nations fight for their freedom and their existence. What
Hitler did to six million helpless Jews in Europe will not be done by any enemy of Israel to
the free Jews rooted in their homeland. (Podeh, 2004, pp. 77–78)

Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal was interpreted as an attempt to con-

quer “living space” stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean. If he
succeeded, Ben-Gurion warned, he “will be able to continue to weave his expan-
sionist designs toward Jordan, Syria and Iraq, which will facilitate the encirclement
of Israel. And no force will then be able to prevent him from executing the rest of
his plan to create the Egyptian Empire” (ibid, p. 81).
A major event that further reinforced the aggressive image of the Egyptian leader
was the unification of Egypt and Syria and the formation of the United Arab
Republic (UAR) in February 1958. The Israeli Foreign Ministry viewed the unifica-
tion as “the beginning of the fulfillment of Nasser’s vision of an Arab empire signi-
fying one nation, one government and one leader—Nasser” (Podeh, 2004,
pp. 82–83). With the formation of the UAR, the fear that a charismatic leader of the
caliber of Bismarck or Atatürk would unify the Arabs appeared to be coming true in
the form of Nasser. The “aggressive” interpretation of the unification reverberated
in the Israeli press and in the Western press translated into Hebrew. The press fre-
quently used the term “Anschluss,” identified in the Western collective memory
with the annexation of Austria by Hitler, to describe Egypt’s domination over Syria.
The UAR was seen as the realization of Nasser’s vision of an Arab empire, as out-
108 E. Podeh

lined in The Philosophy, and the first step on the road to Nasser’s control over Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the remaining major oil states (Podeh, 2004).
From the establishment of the UAR onward, Israel consistently viewed almost
all developments in the Arab world—such as the civil war in Lebanon and the
toppling of the Western-oriented Hashemite monarchy in Iraq (July 1958)—as a
product of Nasserite machinations. Ben-Gurion viewed the Iraqi coup as “the grav-
est development [in the region] since World War II.” According to his pessimistic
and disillusioned analysis, “all the Arab states will be in Nasser’s hands soon.” Ben-
Gurion viewed the developments in the Arab East as a clear parallel to Hitler’s
designs for Europe:
What happened with Nasser happened with Hitler… No one paid attention that Hitler had
already stated what he wanted. It was all in his book, the methods too. Hitler told the truth.
No one believed him when he said it. The same is true for Nasser. Nasser put his cards on
the table. He clearly stated what he wants in his booklet The Philosophy of the Revolution.
He wants three things: he wants to be the ruler of the Arab nations, to be the head of Islam,
and to be the dictator of the African continent. And he goes about this step by step. All that
I have heard about him shows that he is not a fool, he is cunning as a snake. He knows how
to speak to each person in his own language. (Podeh, 2004, p. 84)

Nasser’s involvement in Yemen since September 1962 was considered another

attempt to control the Arabian Peninsula and the oil fields. Even the formation of the
Tripartite Federation between Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in April 1963 was seen as an
ominous threat, particularly the wording of the charter—“Unification is a revolution
because it is closely tied to the question of Palestine and the national obligation to
liberate it” (Podeh, 2004, p. 86). In an unusual step, Ben-Gurion dispatched per-
sonal letters to numerous heads of states around the world that maintained diplo-
matic relations with Israel, to alert them to the dangers facing Israel. The letter
emphasized that “this is the first time in our generation that a constitutional docu-
ment by three states designates the annihilation of Israel as one of the primary, and
perhaps the primary goal of the unification of Arab armies.” Ben-Gurion empha-
sized that, in contrast to Israel’s quest for peace, as stated in its Proclamation of
Independence, “the aspiration to annihilate Israel has been harbored by the Arab
rulers ever since the reestablishment of the State of Israel” (Podeh, 2004, p. 87).
In the early 1960s, Nasser hired German scientists, some of whom had served the
Nazis during World War II, to build his long-range missile program. Though
Nasser’s decision was largely based on commercial considerations and these
experts’ availability, his association with ex-Nazi experts further “substantiated”
Nasser’s image in Israel as “a Hitler” bent on the destruction of the Jewish state
(Bar-Zohar, 1965).
The third element in the Israeli discourse on Nasser was the Egyptian leader’s
depiction as a dictator, heading a regime that was bent on exploitation and oppres-
sion of the common people, rather than achieving a classless society and social
justice, as propagated by official state media. No longer was it presented in the
Israeli press as “progressive” or “revolutionary” but rather as a corrupt dictatorship.
The most widespread term used to describe Egypt’s new ruling elite was “gang” (knu-
fiyya in Hebrew); Nasser was often called a “dictator” and “despot” (rodan in Hebrew).
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 109

The use of these terms emphasized the moral superiority of Israeli democracy over
the Egyptian totalitarian regime. In addition, Nasser’s military rank of colonel
during the revolution was used extensively to deride his status and highlight the
illegitimate nature of the regime, which came to power by coup rather than by dem-
ocratic means. A typical depiction of Israel’s view of the Egyptian regime appears
in a speech by Ben-Gurion in early 1956:
A revolt took place in Egypt… Several military figures took control of the regime. Their
intent at first might have been perceived as changing the condition of the Egyptian people.
There is no nation in the world where illness and ignorance are so shocking as in Egypt…
Yet this man announced publicly that his intention was that Egypt shall head all the Arab
nations, lead the Muslim world, and hold hegemony over the entire African continent. If so,
there are two ways to accomplish this: the long and difficult way, by correcting the wretched
situation in Egypt…or a second way, by external conquests and war with those whom the
Arab nations hate—a war with Israel. The rulers of Egypt have chosen the second way.
(Podeh, 2004, pp. 80–81)

This negative view of Nasser, coupled by mutual mistrust, sabotaged the peace-
ful discussions that had begun in Paris in September 1965 between a high-ranking
Egyptian official and Israeli Mossad agent. Following the initial contacts, head of
the Mossad, Meir Amit, was invited to Cairo in February 1966. However, Prime
Minister Eshkol (who succeeded Ben-Gurion in 1963) was persuaded by his minis-
ters and advisors to suggest a European venue for the meeting, against his and
Amit’s better judgment. The insulting Israeli response foiled the continuation of the
dialogue. Undoubtedly, the opportunity missed by Israel was a result of the highly
negative image of Nasser, developed in the preceding years, which led Israeli
decision-makers to treat peace overtures with skepticism and suspicion because of
the enemy’s “known” duplicity (Podeh, 2015).
The opportunity that such talks offered to trigger a change in Israel’s image of
Nasser quickly disappeared as developments escalated toward war in mid-1967:
What started as an Israeli-Syrian air clash in April erupted into a political and ulti-
mately military showdown in May to June. As the situation escalated, Arab enthusi-
asm for war heightened, and Egypt’s inflammatory propaganda machine increasingly
used derogatory language, in which Israel’s liquidation became its main aim
(Harkabi, 1976). Thus, when Nasser, called for “the destruction of Israel” in one of
his speeches on May 26, 1967, the response of Prime Minister Eshkol and the
Foreign Ministry was a deep sense of fear. The Foreign Office instructed its repre-
sentatives to maintain an aggressive line: “Nasser’s image [should be portrayed] as
the Hitler of the Nile who has always sought hegemony in the Middle East. To fulfill
this goal: 1. He was prepared to make use of the experience of Nazis and to be aided
by war criminals; 2. He disseminated Mein Kampf and the Protocols of the Elders
of Zion in Arabic translation, as well as varied anti-Jewish literature; 3. He openly
announces his intention to annihilate Israel” (Podeh, 2004, p. 89). A message sent
by Eshkol to President Johnson emphasized the threat of Israel’s annihilation and
invoked the memory of the Holocaust (Podeh, 2004). This was not merely a cynical
attempt at enlisting Western support; it was a genuine reflection of the Israeli image
of Nasser and Nasserism.
110 E. Podeh

Conclusions

Mutual Egyptian and Israeli perceptions during the Nasserite period followed pat-
terns that are typical of intractable international conflicts. Each party developed a
collective memory and ethos that included negative images and stereotypes.
Unsurprisingly, the diabolical images that the parties developed of each other shared
certain features. Thus, each side viewed its adversary as an imperialist, expansionist
aggressor, bent on achieving hegemony and acquiring territory, either in the three
circles of influence according to the Israeli interpretation or from the Nile to the
Euphrates, according to the Egyptian interpretation. In addition, both parties,
according to the framework developed by Bar-Tal and Hammack (2012), used dele-
gitimizing and occasionally dehumanizing elements in their rhetoric, including out-
casting, trait characterization, and group comparisons. Thus, demonization occurred
on both sides of the border; often enough, events were interpreted in a way that
dovetailed with the “established” images of the adversary.
Interestingly, the two parties did not possess an ingrained negative image of the
other at the outset; Nasser initially did not consider Israel an immediate enemy and
had no preconceived negative image of Jews and Israelis. Likewise, the Israeli
decision-makers initially viewed with favor the toppling of the monarchy and the
seizure of power by the young officers. Nonetheless, a spiral of events in 1954–
1955 triggered mutual suspicion and mistrust. From the Egyptian point of view, it
appeared as if “the Israelis dealt him [Nasser] one humiliating blow after another”
(Aburish, 2004, p. 73). From an Israeli perspective, Nasser emerged as the epitome
of their worst fears, evoking immediate and remote memories of annihilation and
the Holocaust. At that point, images and historical reality became interwoven, and
the negative images became solidified and entrenched by the Suez War. These
images changed little since then, even when peace feelers were sent to the other
side. In this respect, the Israeli-Egyptian conflict, like other intractable conflicts,
involved leaders (and societies) with closed minds and fixed images of each other.
One may wonder if the same process of demonization has been ongoing between
Israel and Iran in recent years (Ram, 2009).
Palestine and Israel constituted two sides of the same coin for Nasser, growing
commitment to the first and necessitated hardening the position vis-à-vis the sec-
ond, first rhetorically and then practically, as seen by the escalation leading up to the
June 1967 War. The entanglement of Palestine in Egyptian foreign policy, which
was also due to the centrality of the Palestinian cause in pan-Arab ideology, gradu-
ally receded in the Sadat era. Yet, an analysis of Israeli-Egyptian relations shows
that reality and image were intertwined; “Every ‘reality,’” wrote Harold Isaacs, “is
made up of the sum of somebody’s images; every ‘image’ is part of someone’s real-
ity. Images, moreover, appear in the eye of the beholder” (Isaacs, 1975, p. 258).
In spite of these negative mutual images, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty
in 1979. In his speech at the Knesset, on 20 November 1977, Sadat acknowledged
the existence of a psychological barrier between the two sides: “A barrier of rejec-
tion. A barrier of fear of deception. A barrier of hallucinations around any action,
“Seeing Through a Glass Darkly”… 111

deed or decision. A barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretations of all and every
event or statement. It is this psychological barrier,” he concluded, “which I described
in official statements as representing 70 percent of the whole problem.”3 Interestingly
enough, 35 years after the signing of the treaty, this barrier still exists, at least on the
Egyptian side. An examination of current Egyptian school textbooks demonstrates
that they are replete with biases, omissions, and delegitimizing elements (Podeh,
forthcoming). This historical context of the cold peace between Israel and Egypt
substantiates the argument that the two parties have not yet reached the stage of
reconciliation (Podeh, 2007). This stage, according to Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004),
begins “when the parties in conflict start to change their beliefs, attitudes, goals,
motivation and emotions about the conflict, about each other, and about future rela-
tions” (pp. 22–23; see also Bar-Tal, 2013). Unfortunately, it is doubtful whether this
process will begin before a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at hand.
Meanwhile, the parties, according to a famous saying attributed to Apostle Paul in
a different context, will continue “seeing through a glass, darkly,” meaning that at
present they suffer from an obscure or imperfect vision of reality, which may disap-
pear at the end of time.

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3
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The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict

Neta Oren

One of Bar-Tal’s main contributions is the concept of ethos of conflict. Ethos in

general is defined by Bar-Tal as “the configuration of central societal beliefs that
provide central characterization to the society and gives it a particular orientation”
(Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xiv). Much of Bar-Tal’s work, however, is dedicated to a specific
ethos—the ethos of conflict. According to Bar-Tal (2000, 2013; Bar-Tal & Oren,
2000; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2006), such an ethos evolves during an intractable conflict
and includes specific themes, such as beliefs about the goals in the conflict, about
security, about own victimization, and about the opponent’s lack of legitimacy. He
notes that ethos of conflict is a major component of the psychological repertoire that
allows a society to cope effectively with the stressful conditions produced by a con-
flict. But at the same time, the ethos functions as a barrier to the peace process by
providing an epistemic basis for continuation of the conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin,
2011; Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010).
In what follows, I will elaborate on the meaning of the concept of ethos of
conflict from a collective perspective,1 the way it changes, and the reciprocal rela-
tionship between ethos of conflict and conflict resolution. I will focus specifically
on the Israeli–Jewish ethos, including the changes in the adherence of the Jewish–
Israeli society to the ethos of conflict during the years 1969–2013.

1
There are several studies that analyzed the ethos of conflict at the individual level, while trying to
assess the degree of adherence of an individual to the ethos of conflict. As noted, this chapter will
focus mostly on the collective level.
N. Oren (*)
School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 115

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_8
116 N. Oren

The Context of the Israeli–Arab Conflict

I begin by outlining some major events in the conflict in order to help the reader
understand the context in which the Israeli ethos of conflict evolved and changed.
The roots of the Israeli–Arab conflict can be traced to the Jewish immigration
movement to the territory known since the 1920s British Mandate as Palestine.
Inspired by the nationalist ideology of Zionism, the new Jewish immigrants aimed
to establish their own state in the territory that they considered as their old homeland
thousands of years before. This intent, and the ensuing changes in the demographic
balance of the area, was bitterly opposed by the local Arab populations and
triggered the process by which local Arab populations would develop a distinct
Palestinian national identity as well. The end of the British Mandate in 1947, and
the war that erupted following this event, shaped the history of the region with the
establishment of the state of Israel and as many as 800,000 Palestinians becoming
refugees in neighboring Arab states.
Between 1949 and 1967, the Israeli–Arab conflict was largely an interstate conflict,
and Israel’s focus was on Arab states in the region—especially Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan. This stage of the conflict includes several additional wars between Israel
and Arab states such as the war between Israel and Egypt in 1956 and the war
between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967. The 1967 war ended with
the Israeli capture of additional territories (the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the
Golan Heights), some of them heavily populated, thus bringing additional Palestinians
under Israeli control.
However, following a major war in 1973, Israel’s neighboring states gradually
withdrew from direct military confrontation, and in 1979, a peace treaty was signed
between Israel and one of its major Arab enemies—Egypt. At the same time, an
independent Palestinian movement emerged, which eventually took over the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) that was created by the Arab League in 1964. As a
result, the Arab–Israeli conflict became “Palestinianized” (Kelman, 2007), and
Israel’s focus shifted to the Palestinians (see also Morris, 2001; Sandler, 1988).
During the 1980s, PLO guerrillas, who had been staging raids on Israel from
Lebanese territory, provoked several large-scale Israeli invasions of Lebanon.
Eventually, in June 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon, driving 25 miles past the
border and moving into East Beirut. They forced the PLO leadership to flee to
Tunisia, but Israeli armed forces stayed in South Lebanon until 2000. In December
1987, while IDF was still in South Lebanon, a popular Palestinian uprising in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip began and continued, at varying levels of intensity,
through the early 1990s (what is known as the First Intifada). In 1993, a “Declaration
of Principles” between Israel and the Palestinians was signed that led to a peace
treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 and an interim agreement between Israel
and the Palestinians in 1995. A reescalation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict began
with the failure of the July 2000 US-mediated Camp David Summit between Israel
and the Palestinians. With the eruption of what is now known as the Second Intifada,
the negotiations with the Palestinians ceased, and the level of violence on both sides
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 117

surged. In 2005, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip and from four
settlements in the West Bank. This act was followed by considerable chaos within
Gaza. The Hamas movement, which calls the replacement of the State of Israel by
a Palestinian Islamic state, won the elections held in the Palestinian Territories in
January 2006, leading to the formation of a unity government. In June 2007, amid
growing anarchy in Gaza, Hamas militants drove the rival secular Fatah party out of
the Gaza Strip. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the unity govern-
ment with Hamas and formed a separate government based in the West Bank.
During the years 2007–2014, several attempts at direct and indirect negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas took
place, all to no avail. At the same time, the relationship between Israel and the
Hamas in Gaza remained tense and erupted into several major confrontations (in
2009, 2012 and 2014).
In many ways, the Arab–Israeli conflict is a prototypical case of an intractable
conflict, characterized as lasting at least 25 years, violent, and perceived as unsolv-
able, over goals considered existential, and of zero-sum nature (see Bar-Tal, 2013;
Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989; Sharvit, Chap. 1). Yet, some events since
the late 1970s, such as the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Oslo agreements in
1993 and 1995, and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, pointed towards a more
tractable end of the conflict’s dimension during the 1990s.

Content of the Ethos of Conflict

As noted, Bar-Tal (2000) defined ethos as a configuration of central societal beliefs.

Societal beliefs, then, are the building blocks of an ethos according to this definition.
They are defined as cognitions shared by society members that address themes and
issues with which society members are particularly occupied and which contribute
to their sense of uniqueness. This implies that at least some group members hold in
their mental repertoire the same beliefs, and they are aware of this sharing.
Furthermore, most society members do not have to agree with these beliefs, but
they have to recognize their importance and view them as one of the society’s
characteristics.
According to Bar-Tal (2013, p. 175), not every societal belief in a given society
is included in the ethos of a society, only those that meet particular criteria. In addi-
tion to being known to the majority of the members of a society, the beliefs of the
ethos (a) are often invoked in public debates as justifications, explanations, and
arguments; (b) influence politics and decisions taken by leaders of society; (c)
appear in many cultural products, such as literature and films; (d) appear also in
numerous social expressions, such as rituals and ceremonies; and (e) are imparted
to the younger generation and to new members of society.
Bar-Tal (2000, 2013; Bar-Tal & Oren, 2000) claims that during an intractable
conflict, an ethos of conflict often evolves that may include the following themes:
beliefs about the goals of the society in the conflict, about security, about own
118 N. Oren

victimization, about the opponent’s lack of legitimacy, about positive self-image,

about national unity, about patriotism, and about peace. Several studies applied
Bar-Tal’s ethos of conflict framework to analyze the Jewish–Israeli ethos. Included
in this line of research are numerous studies that look at the prevalence of the above
eight themes in Israeli official and cultural texts. Among others, Ben-Shaul (1997)
studied siege beliefs in Israeli films. Arviv-Abromovich (2010) analyzed beliefs of
ethos of conflict as they were reflected in the official ceremonies of Memorial Day
for fallen soldiers and Independence Day during the years 1948–2006. David (2007)
traced the beliefs of ethos in school readers used to teach Hebrew literature from the
pre-state period until 2003. Bar-Tal, Zoran, Cohen, and Magal (2010) analyzed the
existence of the ethos beliefs in Sabbath leaflets distributed in Israeli synagogues on
Saturdays during the 2009 Gaza War. Lastly, my own research (Oren, 2005, 2009,
2010, forthcoming) reviewed the appearance of the ethos themes in Israeli public
opinion polls, cinema, school textbooks, leaders’ speeches, and election platforms
during the years 1969–2013.
The above studies reveal that the eight themes of the ethos of conflict mentioned
by Bar-Tal were indeed part of the Israeli ethos for many years, although some
changes appeared over time that will be described later. This means that these
themes were shared by the majority of Israeli society over a period of time, they
served the political and economic leadership to justify and explain their policies,
they appeared in various cultural products, and they were imparted to the younger
generation and to new members of society.
Justification of Israel’s Goals—These beliefs emphasize the Zionist goals of creat-
ing a Jewish state in Israel and reject any possibility of compromising on this goal
(as in creating a binational state). The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel,
as well as the negation of the Arab right to the same land, is justified using histori-
cal, theological, legal, moral, and cultural arguments. Among the arguments cited,
the land of Israel was promised to the Jewish people by God, the land of Israel was
for generations’ home to the Jewish people, and this link was not severed—at least
in spirit—in centuries of exile. Anti-Semitism in general and the Holocaust in par-
ticular demonstrate the need of the Jewish people to have a safe haven.
Special attempts were made through the years to refute the Palestinian claims to
self-determination, statehood, and “right of return". Some of the arguments used in
this context are as follows: Palestinians are part of the Arab nation and not a sepa-
rate people; no national, societal, financial, or cultural accomplishment of any sub-
stance can be attributed to the Arabs inhabiting the land of Israel; and the land was
desolate and neglected prior to the return of Jews. Finally, claims for self-
determination by the Palestinians were raised only at the time of and in response to
the establishment of the Jewish settlement in Israel.
Security—This theme presents the Israeli society as a society that is under existen-
tial threat. Threats such as war, terrorism, and unconventional weapons have always
featured prominently in the Israeli public discourse. Therefore, security has become
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 119

the most cherished need and value, promoted as a cultural master symbol in the
Israeli Jewish ethos. All the channels of communication and agents of socialization
paid tribute to the security forces, resulting in absolute confidence and trust in the
Israeli Army. Military means were seen as more effective in dealing with threats
than diplomacy or negotiations. Israel was seen to have a right and a duty to arm
itself adequately to address the threats, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons
(Bar-Tal, Jacobson, & Klieman, 1998).
Negative Image of the Arabs—At the core of the beliefs in the Israeli ethos, related
to the Arab opponents was the perception that all Arabs were part of a single homog-
enous group (the “Arab World”) with no meaningful way to classify them into sub-
groups. During the most intense period of the conflict, the image of Arabs was
dominated by negative stereotypes describing the Arabs as primitive and backward.
They were viewed as murderers, a bloodthirsty mob, and treacherous on the one
hand, but cowardly and poor soldiers on the other. Other beliefs effectively delegiti-
mized the Arabs by comparing them to Nazis—the embodiment of evil in the
Jewish–Israeli discourse. They were perceived to be pursuing the extermination of
the state of Israel and its inhabitants and as having no interest in peace (Bar-Tal &
Teichman, 2005; Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007; Podeh, Chap. 7).
Victimhood—Israelis perceived themselves to be the victims in the conflict with the
Arabs. In this regard, the ethos describes all Israeli actions during the conflict as
self-defense and the Arabs as “forcing” Israel to act aggressively. Furthermore, this
view was consistent with a “siege mentality,” self-perception of Israel as a victim of
unjust deeds, mistrust directed even at friendly states and allies, and the idea that
Israel cannot trust anyone but itself (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a, 1992b).
Positive Self-Image—This theme presents Jews as “the chosen people” and “a light
unto the nations". In addition, this theme includes the belief in Israel as an advanced
society, Israel as a peace-loving society, and Israel as a regional military
superpower.
Patriotism and Unity—These beliefs encouraged taking pride in Israel and Israelis,
denigrated emigration from Israel, and enforced the importance of willingness to
make sacrifices for the homeland, especially in the military context and specifically
making the ultimate sacrifice in defense of the country (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997).
The theme of national unity evokes the concern that internal discord may weaken
Israel’s ability to withstand the threats it faces. Accordingly, it demands conform-
ism especially relating to the goals in the conflict with the Arabs.
Peace—Peace is considered a core value in Israeli society. However, during the
intense period of the conflict, the common belief was that peace would only come
about by having the Arabs forgo their goals and embrace Israel’s goals instead.
There was no recognition that achieving peace would require a prolonged process
which would include compromises on the Israeli side as well. Rather than being
seen as a realistic short-term prospect, peace was viewed as a distant hope or dream.
120 N. Oren

The Structure of Ethos

Another important observation of Bar-Tal (2000) is that ethos is more than the sum
of the main societal beliefs in a society. In this regard, he notes that “Although it is
important to study societal beliefs separately, the study of their wholeness, the
ethos, enables a more complete understanding of a society” (p. 141). He also notes
that “the investigation of the configuration of dominant societal beliefs allows us to
elucidate the structure of the ethos” (ibid). Indeed, as part of the research of ethos of
conflict, Bar-Tal and his students examined the structure of the Israeli ethos of con-
flict as a whole at the individual level. For example, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, and
Zafran (2012), using a scale designed to assess individuals’ adherence to ethos of
conflict (EOC), found that
The eight themes of beliefs that comprise the Ethos of Conflict load on a single factor, sug-
gesting that the different themes constitute a coherent and Gestalt view of the conflict condi-
tions. Each of the themes is unique in content and, at the same time, adds to the holistic
orientation so that the different belief themes complement one another and form a core
societal outlook about the conflict. (p. 53)

In my work, I elaborate on the structure of the ethos of conflict at the collective

level. My views about how the components of an ethos relate to each other are based
on empirical studies of national ethos such as the study of McClosky and Zaller (1984)
(about the American ethos) and the vast psychological literature regarding cognitive
structures (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958) and value systems (Rokeach & Ball-
Rokeach, 1989; Tetlock, 1986). This literature suggests that first, the elements com-
prising an ethos are organized around a limited set of core themes. Indeed, as we saw
above, Bar-Tal (2013) describes an ethos of conflict with eight main themes. Second,
some themes may be more prominent in the ethos of a society than others. That means
that more members of the society share these themes and there is less public debate
about them. In addition, more prominent themes of the ethos are more frequently
found in cultural products, such as school textbooks and media discourse. In the Israeli
context, I found that some themes such as the goals in the conflict and security were
very dominant in the Israeli ethos, while other themes such as national unity and siege
beliefs were less dominant. The latter themes appeared in some periods more than in
others. In addition, they were not equally distributed among different segments in the
Israeli society and among different sources of the Israeli ethos. For example, siege
beliefs were common in school textbooks, but the centrality of these beliefs in films
and in leaders’ speeches changed over the years, and they appeared infrequently in
some periods. During the 1990s, they appeared mostly in speeches of hawkish leaders
but not in speeches of dovish leaders. Public polls also reveal that the agreement with
these beliefs varied over time. For many Israelis, these themes may represent a “tem-
porary state of mind” that arises in some situation (like when Israel faces international
criticism or during a war) but weakens with changes in circumstances. Indeed, Sharvit
(2014) demonstrated in her research that conditions of high (vs. low) distress, either
related or unrelated to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, increased the activation of the
ethos of conflict among samples of Israeli Jews.
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 121

Third, an understanding of the structure of ethos requires analysis of how the core
themes relate to each other and to other systems of beliefs and values in the society.
The beliefs and themes of the ethos can coexist in harmony, clash, or be partly
harmonious and partly clashing with each other or with other beliefs in the society.
In addition, some issues, events, or contexts may trigger conflict among the values
while others do not. In some contexts, tension may appear in societal beliefs within
a specific theme of an ethos (e.g., between majority rule and minority rights within
the democratic values system). Other contexts may create a conflict among the
different themes of the ethos or between the ethos beliefs and other societal beliefs
in the society. For example, in the Israeli case, tension exists between the belief in
the value of democracy, that is a societal belief in Israel, and the belief that it is
necessary to ensure a Jewish nature for the state. This tension becomes apparent in
the context of Israeli control of the territories captured in 1967, which are densely
populated by Palestinians. Keeping masses of Palestinians under Israeli occupation
may strain democratic practices. On the other hand, adding masses of Palestinians
as new citizens to the Jewish state threatens the goal of having a Jewish majority and
a Jewish state.
Furthermore, it is important to identify the strategies employed by the society to
address inconsistencies among the different themes of the ethos or between the
ethos beliefs and other beliefs in the society. Indeed, the psychological literature
points to several strategies for dealing with cognitive imbalance. People may deny
the inconsistency by questioning the evidence of its existence, they may add new
cognitions to bolster one of the clashing beliefs, they may engage in cognitive
differentiation, they may change one of the beliefs, or they may decide that one of
the beliefs is more important than the other(s) (Abelson, 1968; Festinger, 1957;
Heider, 1958). The last two strategies can play an important role in the process of
change of ethos of conflict (and also in the process of conflict resolution), as will be
described in the next sections.

Changes in the Ethos of Conflict

Changes of ethos over time might take several forms. One type of change takes
place when the ethos as a whole becomes more widely or less widely shared among
society members. Another type of change involves shifts in the composition of the
ethos. Some beliefs or themes of the ethos may be dropped while others are added.
In addition, the internal balance among the different beliefs and themes in an ethos
may change over time, as some themes may become more dominant while others
become more peripheral. Finally, an ethos may also be contradicted by the evolve-
ment of new central societal beliefs that begin to constitute an alternative ethos.
With regard to the Israeli ethos, I identified the following trends of change in the
Jewish–Israeli ethos of conflict during the 1967–2000 period:
The main change regarding the goals theme was a significant erosion in the belief
denying the Palestinian goals of self-determination and statehood, a change that
122 N. Oren

started following the 1978 Camp David accord between Israel and Egypt. The rejection
of the Palestinian “right-of-return” to the 1948 boundaries, on the other hand, has
not weakened materially and still constitutes a societal belief in the Israeli society.
As for security, the perception of the nature of the existential threat shifted during
the 1990s away from the danger created by the establishment of a Palestinian state,
terrorism, or a conventional war—to focus on the threat of unconventional weapons
in the possession of Arab states. The prestige of the armed forces remained mostly
intact during this period, but open criticism of the military and its leaders became
more acceptable and common. Since the late 1970s, a change was also observed in
the beliefs related to the means of achieving security: from an almost total prefer-
ence of military means (increasing pace of arms development and acquisition,
decisive military victories) to a recognition of the importance and value of the
diplomatic component, going as far as preferring it over military means in achieving
national security goals.
Changes were apparent also in beliefs related to the opponent’s image.
Specifically, following the peace process between Israel and Egypt, Israelis started
differentiating between different groups within the Arab world—even identifying
different subgroups within national entities, such as the separate factions within the
Palestinian population. Another pronounced change, evident both in opinion polls
and in cultural products, was the decline in the delegitimization of Arabs: they were
increasingly portrayed in more human terms, and some of the negative stereotypes
previously ascribed to them (cowardly, primitive, and traitorous) became less preva-
lent. In addition, the belief that most or all of Arabs had no interest in peace with
Israel but rather aspired to exterminate it, declined as well.
In parallel, opinion polls, cultural products (e.g., movies), and political platforms
all indicated a marked decline in victimhood themes during the early 1990s, specifi-
cally a recognition that Israel was not the sole victim in the conflict, combined with
a more positive view of the world’s attitudes toward Israel. During the early 1990s,
there was also an erosion in the positive self-image of Israelis, especially as it related
to Israel’s moral superiority, but also to some degree its military dominance.
Patriotism also experienced decline, with the willingness to sacrifice as well as the
denigration of emigrants becoming less pronounced. However, it still constituted a
societal belief in the Israeli society.
Finally, a dramatic change was observed for beliefs concerning peace: starting in
the late 1970s (following the peace process with Egypt), the content of these beliefs
shifted in the sense that peace was now perceived as a realistic prospect and was
discussed in concrete rather than abstract terms, with reference to specific political
solutions that acknowledged the existence of the Arab population in the territories.
As well, peace beliefs were less concerned with a comprehensive resolution of the
conflict with all Arab nations, but rather addressed the prospects of peace with specific
Arab nations.
In sum, between 1977 (the Israeli–Egyptian peace process) and the early 1990s
(before and during the Oslo process), the hegemony of the Israeli–Arab conflict
ethos in the Israeli society started to decline, making the Israeli society less cohe-
sive. Many of the beliefs that comprised the ethos lost their status as widely held
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 123

societal beliefs: beliefs rejecting the Palestinian claims to self-determination,

statehood and their ties to the land, the image of all Arabs as objecting to peace with
Israel and aspiring to exterminate it, siege beliefs, and the view of Israeli Jews as a
chosen people and morally superior. Other beliefs retained their place in the Israeli
ethos, but their support in the Israeli public diminished: the willingness to sacrifice
and the prestige of the Israeli military. Still other beliefs, specifically about peace
and about the nature of the existential threat to Israel, significantly changed their
content. Comparatively, peace beliefs became more dominant in the ethos, while the
dominance of security-related beliefs declined. These changes, in turn, intensified
the internal contradictions between the beliefs in the ethos. For example, the new
content of the peace beliefs (portraying peace as a realistic short-term prospect
achievable by means of negotiations) contrasted with the beliefs rejecting all Arab
claims and goals. Since the late 1980s, Israeli society started acknowledging the
inconsistencies among its values in the context of Israeli control of the territories
(for instance, maintaining a Jewish majority, democracy, and peace) and tried to
resolve them by changing the context that was triggering the inconsistencies
(give up some of Israeli control of the territories). This trend intensified following
the First Intifada.
The end result of all of the changes described above was an ethos significantly
shrunken and weakened and a reduced tendency to consider the conflict as a zero-
sum game. Israeli society migrated from having a single, hegemonic conflict ethos
to being exposed to several competing belief systems, of which the original ethos
was one (that still enjoyed support within a significant proportion of the popula-
tion). It is important to note that the Oslo agreement was preceded by 5 years of
conciliatory changes in the Israeli ethos. In other words, the ethos was not only a
product of the context and the situation of the conflict, but may have also had an
effect on what happened in the conflict. I will return to this observation later.
However, the eruption of the Second Intifada in 2000 and its violence reversed
the trends described above and restrengthened some of the societal beliefs of the
ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). First,
there are indications that negative stereotyping of the Palestinians has become more
common since 2000. For example, while in 1997 39 % of Israeli Jewish respondents
described the Palestinians as violent and 42 % as dishonest, by the end of 2000 the
figures were 68 % and 51 %, respectively (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). Since 2000,
Arabs are again unanimously blamed for the continuation of the conflict and for
intransigently rejecting a peaceful resolution. In 2007 and 2009, only about 44 % of
Israeli Jews believed that the majority of Palestinians want peace, compared to 64 %
who thought so in 1999. Accordingly, polls indicate an increase in the percentage of
respondents who think that the ultimate goal of the Arabs is to eradicate the state of
Israel from 50 % who thought so in 1997 to 71 % who thought so in 2009.
Second, since 2000, there was also restrengthening of positive beliefs about
Israel as militarily superior to the Arabs. For example, in 1993, 58 % of Israeli Jews
believed that Israel had the ability to wage war successfully against all the Arab
states. This percentage dropped to 48 % in 2000 and then rose to 67 % in 2004 and
72 % in 2005 (Oren, 2009). In 2009, 74 % believed that Israel would be able to cope
124 N. Oren

successfully with total war with the Arab states, and 80 % were confident that the
Israeli army could defend the State of Israel (Ben Meir & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2010).
Finally, since 2000, there are many indications that peace beliefs have become
less central in Israeli society. For example, in a time series survey of the Institute for
National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, respondents were asked to
rank four values (democracy, peace, greater Israel, and a Jewish majority in Israel).
A drop from 72 % in 2000 to 57 % in 2009 has been found among those who ranked
peace as “the most important value” or “second most important value.” In addition,
as violence erupted in 2000, Israelis began to express pessimism about the chances
of resolving the conflict. For example, INSS surveys show a decrease in the degree
of optimism and an increase in pessimism regarding the chances for peace from 56 %
who thought that it was not possible to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians
in 2001 to 69 % in 2007 and in 2009.
In the next section, I will further elaborate about the link between changes in the
ethos of conflict and changes in the conflict context, including causes for change in
the ethos following changes in the context of the conflict.

The Ethos of Conflict and the Conflict Context

According to Bar-Tal (2013), the ethos of conflict is a major component of the

psychological repertoire that allows a society to cope effectively with the stressful
conditions produced by a conflict. It fulfills the epistemic function of illuminating the
conflict situation, which is characterized by uncertainty and stress (Burton, 1990).
By doing so, it prepares the society for violent acts by the enemy as well as for the
difficult life conditions that may ensue. It attunes the society to information that sig-
nals potential harm, allowing psychological preparations for lasting conflict and
immunization against negative experiences (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Additionally,
it functions as a motivating force for mobilization and readiness for sacrifice on behalf
of the group that is essential in time of intractable conflict. It also enables the main-
tenance of positive personal and social identities with the sense of worthiness and
integrity that every group strives to preserve on both individual and collective levels.
This is especially important in times of intractable conflict because, among other
things, the ethos justifies the negative acts of the in-group towards its enemy, includ-
ing violence against humans and destruction of property (Apter, 1997).
At the same time, these beliefs usually fuel and maintain the conflict and serve
as explicit barriers to a peace process. More specifically, they encourage the rivals
to keep hurting each other; they constitute obstacles to commencing negotiations
between the parties, to continuing the negotiations, to achieving an agreement, and
later to engaging in a process of reconciliation. For example, beliefs about own
victimization are strongly associated with willingness to continue military operations
at all costs and a desire to punish the other side even if such punishment means
retaliation and suffering inflicted upon one’s own group (Schori-Eyal, Klar, &
Roccas, 2013). Beliefs about delegitimization of the opponent exclude negotiations
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 125

with the other side because of the perception that it cannot be trusted and that its
only aim is to harm and destroy one’s own group. Beliefs about the justness of the
in-group’s goals that define these goals as protected values prevent any compro-
mises regarding these goals, even if such compromises might lead to a better result
in terms of the protected values themselves (Landman, 2010).
Recently, Bar-Tal and Halperin (2011; Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010) included
the ethos of conflict, along with other factors, such as general world views, circum-
stantial beliefs, and intergroup emotions (e.g., fear, hate), in a framework for under-
standing the sociopsychological barriers to peace. They focus mostly on information
processing during the conflict. According to this framework, societal beliefs about
the conflict “provide a prism through which individuals perceive and interpret the
reality of the conflict. That prism, integrated with general cognitive and motiva-
tional biases, frequently leads to selective, biased and distorted information pro-
cessing of new, potentially positive information” (Bar-Tal, Halperin, et al., 2010,
p. 72). The reason for this unwillingness to hear alternative information is a "freez-
ing" of the societal beliefs about the conflict. More specifically, the freezing process
involves continued reliance on these beliefs that support the conflict, a reluctance to
search for alternative information and a resistance to persuasive arguments which
contradict held positions. The result is that the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict
preserve the continuation of the conflict because they prevent acceptance of informa-
tion that provides an alternative view about the conflict or the rival. Indeed, several
studies show that ethos of conflict influences processing of information regarding the
conflict and hence functions as a conservative ideology (see, e.g., Bar-Tal, Raviv,
Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsh, 2009; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015).
The ethos of conflict, then, may help a society to pursue a conflict more or less
successfully—to win it or at least not lose it—but may also prevent the society from
resolving it. For the latter to happen, the rivals would have to change their ethos of
conflict. This change may allow readiness to be exposed and receive alternative
information that could shed a new light on the conflict and the rival and willingness
to adopt this new information that opens ways for peace building.
Change in the ethos of conflict may contribute to efforts to resolve an intractable
conflict also when seen from the perspective of the well-known ripeness theory.
According to this perspective, resolution of a conflict usually results from a long
process of searching for a formula that will satisfy both parties’ aspirations (Pruitt
& Kim, 2004). Several conditions may encourage such a process. According to
ripeness theory, “If the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselves to be in a
hurting stalemate and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out),
the conflict is ripe for resolution” (Zartman, 2000, pp. 228–229). Put differently, the
first condition produces motivation to escape the conflict, and the second condition
refers to optimism about finding a solution (Pruitt, 2005). A change in the ethos of
conflict can produce circumstantial beliefs that relate to these conditions for ripeness.
For example, the decline of confidence in Israel’s military superiority during the
1990s may have made winning the conflict decisively seem less likely. As a result,
the status quo of continuing the conflict became less desirable. Indeed, surveys from
the late 1980s and early 1990s (before the Oslo accord) show that simultaneously
126 N. Oren

with the change of the ethos beliefs, a reduction occurred in the rate of respondents
who chose the alternative of “status quo” as the preferred solution of the conflict
(Levinson & Katz, 1993; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). Likewise, awareness of the
inconsistencies among components of the ethos in the context of the conflict may
have increased the motivation to end the conflict, since the conflict was perceived as
more costly in psychological terms. This idea appeared in the election platform of
the Labor Party that won the 1992 elections, stressing the inconsistency of the
beliefs in Israel as a democratic state and in peace on the one hand and beliefs
that refute Palestinian claims to self-definition on the other (Oren, forthcoming).
In addition, a decline in the belief that the Arabs wish to exterminate Israel and in
Israel’s isolation in the world in the pre-Oslo period may have encouraged more
optimism and hope for peace. Indeed, Israeli assessment of the chances of achieving
peace increased from 57 % in 1986 to 66 % in 1990 and to 77 % in 1991 (Levinson
& Katz, 1993; Shamir & Shamir, 2000).
But what may bring about a change in the ethos? Many factors may cause such a
change. For example, changes in the society’s configuration may lead to changes of
its ethos. In this case, the new members of the society may not believe in the old
societal beliefs. The younger generations may adopt new values or give different
meaning to the old ones (Inglehart, 1997). Mass waves of immigration may also
affect the ethos of the society. However, the reality or experience of the society’s
members may influence the ethos of the society even in the absence of major
changes in the society’s demography. In this case, the information from new reality
or experience may cause society members to reevaluate their current societal beliefs.
Two concepts are highly relevant in this regard: major events and major informa-
tion. Major event is defined as an event that causes wide resonance, has relevance to
the well-being of individual society members and to society as a whole, occupies a
central position in public discussion and on public agenda, and implies information
that forces society members to reconsider their accepted psychological repertoire
(Oren, 2005). The term major information refers to information supplied by an epis-
temic authority, such as the president, government officials, and intellectual agen-
cies, about a matter of great relevance to the society’s members and to society as a
whole. Like a major event, it occupies a central position in public discussion and on
the public agenda and implies information that forces society members to recon-
sider their accepted psychological repertoire (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2007).
In my work (Oren, 2005, forthcoming), I studied the effect of several major events
in the Israeli–Arab conflict and related major information on the Israeli ethos of
conflict. Analyzing public polls, election platforms, and leaders’ speeches, I demon-
strated how major events in the Arab–Israeli conflict and related major information,
such as the visit of the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem and the Israeli–
Egyptian peace process, had an immediate and dramatic effect on the ethos beliefs of
the Jewish–Israeli public. Sadat’s visit and the peace process were extremely surpris-
ing and nonambiguous events that were accompanied by major information that
highlighted the aspects of the events that contradicted the ethos beliefs, for example,
beliefs about the Arabs as not having any interest in peace. I identified these specific
characteristics of the event as enhancing its potential to bring about changes in
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 127

prevailing beliefs (for an extended discussion about characteristics of major event

that may enhance its potential for change in ethos of conflict, see Oren, 2005).
Indeed, as noted above, immediately following this event, the beliefs depicting the
Arabs as objecting to peace with Israel as well as those rejecting Palestinian self-
determination were significantly weakened. Peace beliefs also materially changed
their content from an abstract view to a concrete and practical one.
I also demonstrated how significant changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict during
the early 1990s occurred as a result of the First Intifada and the Gulf War. More
specifically, during this time, there was a decline in the perceived intention of the
Arabs to exterminate Israel and in beliefs about Israel as a victim. Erosion was
observed also in self-image both in the moral sense and in the military might sense.
Patriotism beliefs also declined. More importantly, in this period, Israelis became
more conscious of the contradictions between their ethos and other societal beliefs,
e.g., the clash among the values of democracy, peace, and maintaining a Jewish
majority. The main strategy that was used to solve the contradiction among these
three values was changing the context that was perceived as putting these values
into conflict with each other, in other words, to advocate giving up the territories of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Indeed, since the First Intifada, we witness a trend
toward greater willingness to give up these territories.
All these changes occurred despite the fact that the leadership referred to the
Intifada during most of its duration in a way that was consistent with prevailing
beliefs. According to Israeli officials at that time, the Intifada was a massive out-
break of violence carried out by small local radical groups, as another plot against
the existence of the state of Israel. Most Palestinians, according to this view, were
actually quite content with the status quo and, hence, sought no more than local
autonomy under continuing Israeli rule or as part of a Jordanian–Palestinian confed-
eration. Israel’s role and duty was defined as restoring law and order and protecting
the lives and property of both Israelis and peaceful Palestinians. As such, this per-
ception of the Intifada was consistent with the existing societal beliefs of conflict
such as positive self-image of the Israelis and societal beliefs about security. The
changes in the ethos beliefs among the Israeli public in this case were, then, mostly
on the basis of a major event (the First Intifada) and less in response to major
information.
I explained this outcome with some characteristics of the event such as its long
duration and the fact that the Intifada was perceived as a negative event that came
as a surprise and generated some (but not extensive) fear among Israelis. More
specifically, as time passed, the intensity and the magnitude of the Palestinian pro-
test, and the long duration of the Intifada, could hardly be interpreted as a set of
local riots, but rather as a popular uprising. The event presented the Palestinians in
the territories as a group with national awareness and motivation to fight for its
rights. This information refuted prior beliefs that identified the Palestinians as part
of the “Arab nation” and not as a separate people. The Intifada further exposed the
Israelis to information that contradicted existing beliefs of the ethos of conflict, for
example, positive self-image beliefs that assumed the moral and humane behavior
of Israelis soldiers. Cases of violent behavior, killing, and abuse of unarmed
128 N. Oren

Palestinian civilians challenged these Israeli beliefs about the humane behavior of
Israeli soldiers in their encounters with Arabs.
In sum, in this case, the duration of the event may have eroded the influence of
the related major information. In addition, information concerning other events in
the international system during the Intifada years could have also transformed
Israelis’ attitudes regarding the conflict and its ethos: the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the Eastern Block, the resolution of other conflicts around the world such
as in South Africa and Northern Ireland, the Gulf War (that increased fear of weap-
ons of mass destruction and hence may influence security beliefs and self-image in
the military might sense), and the changes in the policy of the Unites States regard-
ing the PLO. In other words, the fact that the event of the Intifada was not exclusive
on the world (and media) stage for its duration may have also diluted the effect of
the Intifada-related major information.
It must be noted that while some major events and/or major information inputs
may weaken the ethos beliefs, others may have the opposite effect of reinforcing
them. Indeed, Bar-Tal and Sharvit (2007) show how the major event of the Camp
David Summit with its unsuccessful ending and outbreak of the Second Intifada,
along with the major information regarding these events that was provided to the
Israeli public by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, their
associates, and army commanders, bolstered beliefs of the ethos among the Jewish–
Israeli public. For example, they point to strengthening of beliefs regarding delegiti-
mization of the Palestinians, self-victimization, and internal pressure for conformity.
Bar-Tal and Sharvit identify characteristics such as the fact that the event was inten-
sive and included negative psychological conditions for the society as explaining
these changes.
The changes in the ethos of conflict that were described above, then, present a
circular relationship between ethos of conflict and major developments in the con-
text of the conflict. For example, significant changes in the ethos started after the
Israeli–Egyptian peace process in 1979 (in themes about the goals in the conflict,
about the image of the Arabs, and about peace). It seems, then, that this event shaped
Israeli ethos of conflict rather than being a product of such a change. On the other
hand, changes in the ethos of conflict that preceded the 1993 Oslo accord between
Israel and the Palestinians may have provided a significant contribution to the mech-
anisms and conditions that made the 1993 Oslo accord possible. The collapse of the
Oslo process, in its turn, restrengthened the ethos of conflict that currently serves as
one of the barriers to a peace.

Conclusion

Ethos of conflict is a major component of the psychological repertoire that evolves

during an intractable conflict. Studies showed that societal beliefs of ethos of con-
flict that were identified by Bar-Tal (2000, 2013), i.e., beliefs about the goals in the
conflict, about security, own victimization, delegitimizing the opponent, positive
The Jewish–Israeli Ethos of Conflict 129

self- images, patriotism, and peace, were central beliefs in the Israeli society, that is,
they were shared by the majority of the Israeli society over a period of time, they
served the political and economic leadership to justify and explain their policies,
they appeared in various cultural products, and they were imparted to the younger
generation. The research about changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict reveals that
the relationship between ethos and conflict is mutual: the Arab–Israeli conflict
shapes the Israeli ethos but also is affected by changes in Israeli ethos that contrib-
ute to the escalation or de-escalation of the conflict.
It is important to note that the ethos of conflict is only one component (although
a central and important one) of the psychological repertoire that creates major
obstacles to beginning negotiations, achieving agreement, and later engaging in a
process of reconciliation. Other components include collective memory of conflict
(Nahhas, Chap. 4; Netz-Zenghut, Chap. 5), as well as collective emotions (hate,
fear, the desire for revenge; see Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11). In addition, other
beliefs that are not directly related to the conflict but reflect general world views
(such as religious beliefs) also fuel disagreements that may serve as barriers to
negotiation (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Lastly, conflict resolution and reconcilia-
tion require that all sides undergo a similar psychological change. Thus, a change in
the ethos of conflict in both societies (the Israeli and the Palestinian) is needed for
the reconciliation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

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Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society

Ronni Shaked

This chapter sketches the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. It deals with its
roots, the process of its formation, its components, and its unique content as reflected
and expressed in the psychological repertoire of the Palestinian society. First, I will
define and characterize the concepts and notions that relate and connect to the idea of
“ethos.” The analysis will be based on the important scientific work of Daniel Bar-
Tal which contributed to the development of modern academic research on intracta-
ble conflicts. The second part of the chapter will review briefly the evolvement of the
Palestinian ethos through the major historical events in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, which crystallized, shaped, and influenced the ethos. The third part will discuss
the composition and nature of the eight themes of societal beliefs which are the
building blocks of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. The discussion will
emphasize the four dominant societal beliefs that constitute the Palestinian ethos of
conflict: justness of the goals, patriotism, delegitimization, and victimization. I will
illustrate the significance of each societal belief, its contents, and its contribution to
the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society. The last part will deal with the
Palestinian culture of conflict and its components.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict exists on the physical, national-ideological, and
psycho-socio-cultural levels. Essentially, the conflict revolves around one territory
which two people claim as their homeland. The continuing and violent nature of the
conflict has turned the struggle between the two people to one rich in symbols,
myths, beliefs, emotions, as well as religious beliefs. Since all of these are closely
interwoven, it is sometimes difficult to separate myth from reality and narrative
from historical facts

R. Shaked (*)
The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 133

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_9
134 R. Shaked

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a prototypical case of a conflict which meets

the criteria describing an intractable conflict: it is prolonged, irreconcilable, violent,
and perceived as having zero-sum nature and total. It is considered to be unbridge-
able with the involved parties having an interest in its continuation (Azar, 1990;
Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000; Kriesberg, 1998; Sharvit, Chap. 1).
In order to meet the challenges of the conflict, a society develops a psychological-
social repertoire of societal beliefs, attitudes, and functional emotions. The resultant
repertoire constitutes the basis of a psychocultural infrastructure, at its center the
ethos, which accompanies the conflict and serves as a foundation for the develop-
ment of a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000).
In light of the prolonged experiences of the members of a society involved in an
intractable conflict, they develop an ethos of conflict defined as a configuration of
central societal beliefs, which leads to a specific governing orientation of a society
experiencing an intractable conflict. The ethos of conflict is the narrative of the pres-
ent which reflects the experiences of the members of the society, gives meaning to
their social life, and connects present issues of significance with future goals and
aspirations (Bar-Tal, 2000; 2003, 2013).
The societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict are reflected in language, stereotypes,
images, myths, and collective memories and are also connected with the emotional
orientation of the society. Bar Tal (1997, 1998, 1989, 1990, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2013;
Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005;
Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin & Zafran, 2012; Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal, 2007) pro-
posed that the challenges that arise in an intractable conflict can lead to the crystal-
lization of eight themes of societal beliefs in the ethos of conflict that are crucial in
the functioning, mobilization, and struggle of the group during intractable conflict.
1. Justness of the goals; These societal beliefs delineate the ingroup’s goals and
establish their justice, justify and outline the way to attain them, and reject the
adversary’s goal as unjust.
2. Delegitimizing beliefs deny the adversary’s humanity and morality and portray
the opponent in delegitimizing terms, through dehumanization, outcasting,
extremely negative trait characterization, political labels, and group comparison
that define the opponent as an enemy (Bar-Tal, 1998, 1989).
3. Victimization beliefs are based on viewing the ingroup’s goals as just and the wicked-
ness of the opponent’s goals (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009).
4. Patriotism beliefs reflect the attachment of love and loyalty of society members
toward their nation and their homeland. (Tamir, 1997).
5. Positive collective self-image beliefs involve intense self-justification and
self-glorification.
6. Security beliefs provide psychological conditions to maintain security, motivating
and mobilizing society members to participate in coping with the stressful situation.
7. Unity beliefs refer to the importance of maintaining unity and solidarity and
keeping the society’s consensus.
8. Peace beliefs are the supreme goal of a society that will be implemented after
achieving the goals of the struggle. Peace is described in utopian terms and as a
dream.
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 135

I propose that the analysis of societal beliefs of an intractable conflict should take
into account the religious dimension. Religious beliefs intensify the conflict by pro-
viding it with symbols, myths, and intense emotions. The ethno-religious solidarity
acts as a basis for political organizations and loyalties. In periods of violent conflict,
religious beliefs act as a stabilizing anchor and a source of support for the other
societal beliefs. Religion is one of the factors in the crystallization of a social iden-
tity and one of the driving forces of societies (Weber, 1963), and it supplies a com-
munal identity to the believers.

Historical Background

The beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be traced back to the end of the
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, when the Zionist
settlement enterprise in the ancient land of Israel/Palestine took its first steps (1881–
1882) (Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003). In the eyes of the Arab inhabitants of the land,
the new Jewish settlers were foreigners who had broken into their territorial, social,
cultural, and religious area. The purchase of land by the Jewish settlers led to dis-
putes with the indigenous population and the emergence of suspicion, hostility, fear,
and an existential threat, together with feelings of anger and hatred, turning the new
settlers into the enemy (Mandel, 1976). The violent local disputes became the con-
cern of the Arab population as a whole, and fear of the Zionist newcomers, who
were viewed as colonialist invaders, drove the population to resist and to struggle by
means of violence (Khalidi, 1997).
Those first three decades of the conflict saw the emergence and formative period
of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society, which developed in reaction to the
Jewish Zionist settlement of Palestine (Khalidi, 2006). The development of these
societal beliefs received an impetus following the Balfour Declaration of November 2,
1917, which promised the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in
Palestine. The declaration was perceived by the Arab inhabitants as a threat to their
future. Henceforth, territorial conflict between Palestinians and Jews broke out,
which involved violent confrontations that culminated in the war of 1948.
From the 1920s, a culture of conflict began to develop within the Palestinian society
and in its core the Mukauma—resistance by violent struggle.1 Since then, the conflict
has been accompanied by incessant violence, and it exists in a permanent reality of
low-intensity conflict and eruption of waves of high-intensity conflict every few
years. The intractability of the conflict and the negative experiences of violence have
crystallized and shaped the societal beliefs of the Palestinians, especially the beliefs
regarding justness of goals, victimhood, and delegitimization.
Three additional seminal events have had a major impact on the Palestinian ethos
of conflict. The first is the war of 1948, known among the Palestinians as the Nakba

1
For definition of the concept, see Milstein, M. (2009). Mukawama: The challenge of resistance to
Israel’s national security concept. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, pp. 9–10,
29–34 (in Hebrew).
136 R. Shaked

(catastrophe), which crushed the Palestinians, sociologically, demographically, as

well as psychologically and created the refugee problem (Morris, 1987). The Nakba
is the “chosen trauma” (Volkan, 2001) for the Palestinians, the central event in their
national consciousness, and their collective memory of the conflict (see Nahas,
Chap. 5). The Nakba for the Palestinians is not a onetime event but an ongoing pro-
cess, which many believe will come to an end only in a new context which enables
them to regain their rights as before the Nakba.
The second major event was in 1964 with the establishment of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) resulting in the reconstruction of the Palestinian
national identity and its goal to establish a Palestinian State (Cobban, 1984).
The third major event was the Nakasa—the defeat in the 1967 war, resulting in
the conquest of the whole of Palestine by Israel, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque in
Jerusalem, the third holy shrine of Islam—which was perceived as the defeat of
Islam and led to the intensification of the conflict (Gazit, 2003). The Nakasa intensi-
fied the hatred and hostility toward Israel, Zionism, and Judaism, especially from a
religious dimension, and deepened the ethos beliefs, especially the perceived vic-
timization of the ingroup.
The first Intifada (uprising) against the Israeli occupation (1987–1993) brought
the Palestinian ethos of conflict to one of its peaks. It was a kind of patriotic declara-
tion, crossing borders of social standing, sex, age, and geographical division stress-
ing societal beliefs of unity, justness of goals, and positive collective self-image.
Paradoxically, the Oslo process in 1993, which led to mutual recognition between
Israel and the PLO and to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), did
not lead to any significant change in the Palestinian ethos, not even with regard to
peace. On the contrary, postponing the discussion on core issues—Jerusalem, refu-
gees, borders, and settlements—led to disappointment and strengthened the
Palestinian ethos of conflict. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, which started in September
2000, was deadly and bloody and caused great suffering to both sides.
The Palestinian civil war (2007) between the Islamic movement Hamas and the
national secular Fatah caused division between Gaza and the West Bank, but did not
affect the ethos because it did not refer to the conflict with Israel. On the contrary,
the wars between Hamas and Israel in Gaza, in 2008, 2012, and 2014, strengthened
and stabilized the ethos of conflict in Gaza as well as in the West Bank.
In sum, according to the Palestinian perspective, which is reflected in their nar-
rative collective memory,2 at the end of the nineteenth century, the Palestinians, who
were the earliest inhabitants of Palestine, fell victim to the Zionist movement, which
motivated the Jews to migrate to a territory not theirs—Palestine—while spreading
the false myth that the land was the homeland of the Jews. The Zionists, who arrived
in Palestine as colonialist settlers, began to take over the land. In the Nakba and
subsequently, the Jews adopted methods of terror, expelled Palestinians from their
lands, destroyed their homes and villages, and turned them into refugees. The State
of Israel, which was established on Palestinian land, did not respect international

2
This part is based on official documents of the PA, http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.
aspx?id=2087
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 137

laws and did not allow the refugees to return to their homes. In 1967, Israel, which
sought to expand and spread, conquered all the territory of Mandatory Palestine. It
refused to retreat from it, and by means of its military power—backed by Western
imperialism—it intends to continue to expand in the Middle East. The Palestinians
are fighting with all the means at their disposal in order to win back for themselves
their natural and lawful rights and ownership of their territory.

The Palestinian Societal Beliefs About the Conflict

Bar-Tal (2000) emphasized that any attempt to understand the ethos of a society
requires an analysis of the particular societal beliefs that comprise it. In this part I
will analyze the contents of the eight themes of the societal beliefs which are the
building blocks of the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society.

Justness of the Goals

Palestinians’ beliefs about justness of their goals are based on their perception that
they are the indigenous people, descendants of the Canaanites, who had lived in the
land centuries ago, before the ancient Hebrews (El-Hasan, 2010, 2013; Litvak,
1994, 2009). Therefore, the territory belongs to them, and they have the full right to
return to their homeland, from which they were exiled in the Nakba, and have the
right to build an independent state in their homeland. Their beliefs are based on the
international legitimization and from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In 1977, the Palestinian National Council coined a new idiomatic expression to
describe the Palestinian goals in the conflict: “Thawabit,” namely, the firm, just, and
unchangeable principles and goals.3 The Thawabit are protected values, red lines,
which the Palestinian society with all its diverse parts, the PLO and its factions,
adopted as goals that cannot be compromised or surrendered, and no leader has the
right or authority to change them.4 The Thawabit have become the cornerstones of
the ethos of conflict of the Palestinian society, featuring prominently in all cultural
products, in the media, in the speeches of leaders,5 in official documents,6 in text-
books, and notably in the daily life of the Palestinian society.7 The Thawabit are
consensual, dominant, and hegemonic in the Palestinian society including Hamas.8

3
http://palestineun.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/conclusions-of-the-PLO.pdf
4
http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4883
See, for example, the claim of the popular front, Al-Ayam 15.12.2004.
5
For example, the speech of Abu Mazen: http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=8748
6
http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4938. See the Independence Declaration.
7
Graphic wall in Dehisha refugee camp; pictures were taken by the author.
8
Al-Ayam 29.7.2004.
138 R. Shaked

The following are the Palestinian Thawabit:

• The establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its
capital.9
• The right to self-determination.
• The right of return of the Palestinian refugees according to the international and
Arab resolutions.
• Release of all the Palestinians prisoners from the Israeli jails.
• Since 2012, in response to Israeli demands, the objection to recognize the State
of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people was added to the Thawabit.10
Although The Thawabit were formulated in 1977, they were the demands of the
Palestinians since the early 1920s. The demand to establish an independent
Palestinian state was the first article in the resolution of the third Palestinian
Congress in 1920, and since then, it has become a permanent and constant demand.
It was demanded in the uprising of 1929 and in the Palestinian revolt of 1936, it was
the main demand of the All-Palestinian Government in 1948, and it appeared in the
Palestinian charter as well as in all the resolutions of Palestinian National Council
(PNC) and the PA. Thus the Thawabit became instruments enabling the Palestinian
leadership to adjust their demands according to the level of the conflict and the pos-
sibility of its resolution.

Patriotism

As a societal belief, patriotism grew already from the beginning of the early 1920s,
when Palestinians began to develop a strong and growing national identification
with Palestine. The Nakba and its devastating results, such as living in refugee
camps, gave rise to a kind of patriotism—wataniyya, which refers to yearning and
longing for a homeland. The establishment of the PLO in 1964, with its main goal
to liberate the Palestinian people in their homeland, gave rise to the concept of
Mukawama, meaning resistance and referring to violent struggle of various forms
and nuances, which became the dominant and permanent feature of the culture of
conflict of the Palestinian society and an upmost expression of patriotic beliefs.
It expresses the willingness and readiness to fight and to sacrifice. This is evident in
the emergence of the mythical figure of the Fedayee—the new Palestinian fighter,
which was depicted as a fearless hero, restoring honor to his people and liberating
his homeland, a figure which transformed from the image of the poor refugee to a
revolutionary hero (Jamal, 2004).
Since the establishment of the PLO, the Palestinian society has developed a
sense of national pride. The new patriotism includes love of the people and the land
and revenge against Zionism; steadfastness includes living in refugee camps as a

9
http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=59&more=1#4
10
http://palestineun.org/category/mission-documents/statements/page/2
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 139

way of showing commitment to the land of Palestine. A poster published by Fatah

in 1969 illustrates a new Palestinian patriotic message. It shows a Palestinian fighter
with a koffiyeh on his head and a Kalashnikov in his hand with the words “my way,
my blood, my name, my house and address is Palestine”.11 Patriotism has encour-
aged the armed struggle and legitimized it.
On March 30, 1976, which came to be known as Land Day, Palestinian citizens
of Israel held violent protests against land expropriation in which six Palestinians
were killed by the Israeli Army. This was another milestone in the national revival
of solidarity and love of the homeland, with land as a focus of patriotism. A poem
by’Abed Ebeid Al-Zara’i became the anthem of the Land Day: “For the olive
trees… and for the sake of the citrus trees, we want to fight till we die, till we get
back our Palestine”.12
The first Intifada brought Palestinian patriotism to one of its peaks in terms of
preparedness for sacrifice for the homeland and unity around the national leader-
ship—the PLO. The Palestinian flag became an inseparable part of the landscape in
the territories. The Palestinian society is portrayed in the Intifada literature as
fiercely patriotic, solidly united, with values of national honor, and glorifying its
martyrs (Marouf, 1997; Nachmani, 2001).
The Oslo agreement created new symbols of patriotism, such as security forces,
flag, and anthem. The return of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat to the territories was
accompanied by rallies and gatherings in every town of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The rousing speeches by Arafat used mantras and patriotic slogans and cre-
ated the popular expression of patriotism “with spirit and blood we shall redeem and
liberate Palestine.”
The emergence of Hamas in 1987 led to the construction of more patriotic soci-
etal beliefs that are based on religious patriotism (Shaked & Shabi, 1994). Hamas
has stated that “nationalism is part of a religious belief” (Sela & Mishal, 2006).13
Palestine as a homeland became a waqf,14 and the struggle for its liberation is a
religious duty; the armed struggle became a jihad, and the patriotic sacrifice became
death for the sake of Allah. Hamas succeeded in Islamizing the Palestinian patrio-
tism (Abu Amr, 1992).
The motif of a struggle bound up with blood and sacrifice occupied a central
position in the Palestinian societal beliefs about patriotism. Without sacrifice, patri-
otism has no significance (Bar-Tal, 2000; Somerville, 1981). These motifs grew
stronger and were reinforced in the course of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; they were
expressed in acts of sacrifice by suicide bombers. The presence of the myth of the
martyr—shahid—in the Garden of Eden in the Palestinian society as a whole pro-
vided the spur and incentive for these acts of sacrifice, which are the psychosocial

11
Ronni Shaked, private collection of posters and pictures.
12
Retrieved 3-9-2013 from http://pulpit.alwatanvoice.com/content/print/19456.html
13
The Hamas Charter, Article 12.
14
Waqf means the permanent dedication by a Muslim of any property for any purpose recognized
by the Muslim law as religious, pious, or charitable. According Hamas, all Palestine was pro-
claimed as a Waqf for the Muslims.
140 R. Shaked

products of the societal beliefs of patriotism. This phenomenon encompasses both

religious and national patriotism and involves a dominant presence of myths and
societal beliefs. The martyr is perceived as a hero who is esteemed and honored.
School textbooks present martyrs in a positive way and respect them (Firer &
Adwan, 2004).
The Mokauma is hegemonic and consensual in the Palestinian society. For exam-
ple, in 2000, 52 % of the Palestinians supported the Mokauma; in 2001, 75 %; in
2002, 90 %; and in 2003, 75 %. In 2004, 82 % supported armed struggle and 59 %
supported suicide terrorism. In 2008, 48 % supported armed attacks; in 2010, 32 %
supported armed struggle; and in 2012 41 %. In 2104 42 % believed that armed
struggle is the most effective means for establishing a Palestinian state.15 The
Mokauma, especially the armed struggle, mainly contributed to social solidarity and
strengthening of the societal beliefs; above all the Mokauma escalates the conflict
and its intractable nature.
The Palestinian patriotism contains a number of central features: it combines
national and religious patriotism, in which religion serves as a platform for national-
ism and as a motivating vehicle; it is a blind patriotism, devoid of self-criticism
(Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999); it is a patriotism geared to the struggle against
the adversary, and it is motivated by “love of the homeland,” the struggle to achieve
the national Palestinian aims, and by the societal beliefs relating to the justness of
the goals. The Palestinian anthem states: “Palestine is my home, is the soil of my
victory. Palestine is my revenge and the land of steadfastness.”16

Delegitimization

Palestinian delegitimizing beliefs portray the natural character of the Jew, the
Zionist, and the Israeli as involving negative traits, including racism and fascism.
Zionism and Israel are considered inciters of violence, aggression, and wars (Rubin,
1993). The term “Zionism” has become a label for political deviation and a syn-
onym for colonialism. Zionism and Israel are portrayed as cruel, oppressive, bloody
minded, demonic, and Nazis.17
The Palestinian delegitimization of Judaism, Zionism, and Israel draws on the
conflict, on the religion of Islam, on the Arab world, and on the Western world.
Collective experiences connected with the conflict and its violent nature created
negative impressions of deaths and injuries, damage to property, stress, fear, suffer-
ing, and anxiety, which led to the development of delegitimizing beliefs. The per-
ception of the Jew as an enemy in the Koran and the Hadith led to the creation of a

15
Polls conducted by Khalil Shakaki, retrieved from http://heb.inss.org.il/index.
aspx?id=4354&articleid=6496
16
Retrieved from http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=2353
17
See leaflets of the First Intifada: No. 1, 10-1-1988; No. 5, no date indicated; No. 4, 21-1-1988;
No. 7, 13-2-1988; No. 9, 2-3-1988.
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 141

delegitimizing infrastructure with diverse expressions, mainly dehumanization,

stereotyping, and assigning negative traits to Jews. The Jews are described in the
Koran as killers of the prophets, as deviants from the truth, and as descendants of
monkeys and pigs. These images, which leaders and religious preachers use, have
helped to shape the Palestinian delegitimizing beliefs.
A survey conducted in the West Bank in 1972 shows that the motif of attributing
negative stereotypical traits to Jews is predominant. Jews were portrayed as cow-
ards, deceitful, thieves, and greedy (Peress, 1972). In cultural products, the Jew is
presented as weak and humiliated on the one hand, and as a sneaky conspirator on
the other (Moreh, 1975). In the second Intifada, Jews were perceived in the same
way, as a prototype of evil murderers, violent, satanic, and racist.18
During the first Intifada and also in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli soldier was
described as one who humiliates Palestinians without distinguishing between old
and young or men and women. The description of Israel, Judaism, and Zionism as
inferior and noxious creatures appears in articles in newspapers, on posters, in cari-
catures and drawings, as well as in sermons in the mosques (Elad-Buskila, 2006).
The Jews are identified as viruses, as insects, as worms, as grasshoppers, as scorpions,
as donkeys, as monkeys and pigs, and as only half-real creatures.19 A widespread
image of the Jew is that of the snake, a motif borrowed from Western anti-Semitism
(Shragai, 2010).
Delegitimization also appears in school textbooks, especially through ignoring
the existence of Israel and describing Jews as colonialists20 (Adwan, Bar-Tal, &
Wexler, in press). The attribution of negative characteristics includes expressions
such as bloodsuckers, dishonest, moneylenders,21 war traders, sadists,22 and murderers
of elderly, women, and children.23
Since the founding of the Hamas in 1987 and the process of Islamization, the
image of the Jew became more negative and connected to “monkeys and pigs”
which was taken from the Koran. Hamas’s first leaflet begins with the words “Here
are the Jews—brothers of the monkeys, and the killers of the prophets.”24 The same
image reappeared in 2012 in the Fatah community: “our war is with the descendats
of monkeys and pigs, it is a war of religion and belief.”25 In 2012 the term “descen-
dents of the monkeys and pigs” appeared 86 times in various contexts in the online
version of the Al-Quds newspaper referring to Jews and Zionists. Other dehuman-

18
For example, Al Hayat al Jadeeda 31.10.2004.
19
Al-Resala 1.6.2007; 13.7.2006; 28.2.2008. Al Hayat Al Jadida 7.3.2004; 27.2.2009; 23.5.2010.
20
See, for example, Arabs History and problems of the present, for 10th grade, part 2; 2005,
Ramallah.
21
Releases of the United National Headquarter: No. 8 March 1988; No. 1 January 1988; Hamas
release 11-9-1990.
22
President of Al-Quds Open University, Dr. Younis Amr, Al Hayat Al Jadida 25-3-2009.
23
Sheikh Taysir Tamimi, the head of Shari’a Courts, Palestinian TV 9-6-2009.
24
Ronni Shaked, Private collection, 1987.
25
Palestinian TV 21-9-2012.
142 R. Shaked

ized images were donkeys, dogs, and mice.26 These images appear in sermons,
speeches, and media.27 Burning Israeli flags is common in demonstrations and rallies.
The Swastika appears in graffiti and posters in demonstrations.28
An analogy between the State of Israel and fascism and Nazi Germany is a
widespread motif. The Palestinians maintain that a similarity exists between the
State of Israel and the National Socialist fascism, both ideologically and in actual
behavior, since they are all racist. Since the occupation of the territories in 1967 and
the need to delegitimize and dehumanize Israel, the use of Nazi imagery has
intensified. In the first Intifada, nearly every leaflet labeled Zionist Jews and Israel
neo-fascist. Prisons were called “Nazis concentrations Camps” and Israel—a fas-
cist, racist entity—and especially the settlers were called Nazis.29
In the Hamas covenant, Zionism is portrayed as a Nazi enemy behaving brutally
toward women and infants. Paragraph 20 of the covenant asserts: “The society facing
us is a cruel enemy which acts like a Nazi.”30Jews are labeled as fascist Nazis, even
in official announcements of the PA.31
The analogy of Israel with racism is a central motif in the Palestinian delegitimi-
zation, which reached a peak on 10 November 1975 in a vote in the UN General
Assembly inspired by the Palestinians stating that “Zionism is a form of racism and
racist discrimination.” Although this resolution was abolished in 1991, the slogan
“Zionism is racism” filtered down to Arab and general public opinion and served as
a foundation for the delegitimization of Israel.
During 2012, the terms “Zionist racism” and “racist” appeared in the Palestinian
communication channels many times: in the official Palestinian news agency Wafa,
874 times; in the news agency “Maan,” 726 times; and more than 3000 times in
Al-Quds newspaper.
Comparing the Jews with crusaders is another way to delegitimize and exclude
Israel, since it is compared to an imperialist-colonialist movement (Sivan, 1998).
The concept appears especially in fundamental documents of the Palestinian move-
ments.32 The crusaders are described as a small group imbued with religious ideology
representing a foreign culture, which came to conquer the Arab region as a whole
and Palestine in particular in a cultural-religious struggle. The analogy between
Israel and crusaders serves as a motivating instrument for waging a holy war, a jihad,
against the “new” crusaders—the Jews.

26
Al Hayat al Jadeeda 20-3-2004, 5-6-2012; Al Risala 28-02-2008; The Palestinian TV
30-08-2012.
27
See Ronni Shaked, Yediot Ahronot, 14-1-2001.
28
Pictures, private collection of Ronni Shaked, 25-2-2013.
29
The Intifada leaflets No. 19 8-6-1988; No. 12 2-4-1988; No. 3 2-1-1988; No. 2 January 1988; No.
7; No. 2; No. 12; No. 13; No. 17.
30
The Hamas Covenant, Article 20.
31
Palestinian Information Ministry, cited in Al Quds 17-11-1997.
32
The Hamas Charter, Article 34, 35.
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 143

Victimization

The sense of victimization rests on feelings of historical injustice suffered by the

Palestinians, especially in the Nakba and since the occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip in 1967. It is dominant and enshrined in day-to-day events rife with
physical suffering and mental anguish, injustice, and abuse of person and property.
The societal beliefs relating to the experience of victimization present the
Palestinians as the sole victims of the conflict. They portray themselves as victims
of the victims. They believe that they suffer unjustly from the consequences of
Holocaust, for which they are not to blame (Bar-On & Sarsar, 2004). The Palestinians
adopted the analogy between the Holocaust and the Nakba, maintaining that the
establishment of the State of Israel, while stealing Palestine, turned the Palestinians
into the victims of the Jews victimized by Nazism.
The beliefs stress not only that the Palestinians are victims of Zionism, but also
victims of the Arab world, which neglected them and did not help them to achieve
their rights. They view the Arab leaders as betrayers, using the conflict for their own
political purposes (Khalili, 2007).
The experience of victimhood drove the Palestinian society to search for justice
in the international arena by harnessing the societal beliefs relating to the justice of
the goals, which furnish the rationale and explanation of the goals of the conflict.33
The victimization narrative creates a dichotomy between the good Palestinians and
the others who are the bad, between the abusers and the abused, and between the
moral and the immoral.
Since the reality of their lives is in the shadow of the Nakba, the event which, in
their view, turned them more than anything into victims of the conflict, the
Palestinians consider the Nakba the ultimate trauma of their victimhood. Since the
Nakba, the Palestinians enumerate a long series of massacres and other injustices
that reinforce the societal beliefs and the sense of victimization. Israel’s actions are
perceived as a long succession of assaults and physical abuse, with the aim of com-
pleting the expulsion of the Palestinians which began with the Nakba in order to
Judaize Palestine. Since the Nakba, the feelings of suffering and distress intention-
ally caused against them have intensified, feelings of having been robbed and beliefs
about the constant threat of expulsion, transfer, uprooting from their land, or as they
put it “a new Nakba.” This feeling leads the Palestinians to a psychological state of
victimization.
Because the Palestinians are the defeated party in the conflict, because of the
negative experiences, and because of the feeling of injustice and wrongdoing accom-
panying their defeat, Palestinians’ beliefs about societal victimization have become
dominant and central in the ethos of conflict of the Palestinians society. I maintain
that the Palestinian experience of victimization has turned the Palestinian people into
a “victimization community” which preserves the memory of the victimization as a

33
For example, see President Abbas speech at UN General Assembly, September 2011.
Retrieved from http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=7390
144 R. Shaked

central part of the collective memory of the conflict, perpetuates the societal victimiza-
tion beliefs, and weaves into its sociopolitical reality a mythical plot, by means of which
it comes to acknowledge itself as a community of suffering and victimization.

Other Themes of the Palestinian Ethos of Conflict

The societal beliefs about justness of the goals, patriotism, delegitimization, and
victimization are the most dominant and hegemonic in the Palestinian ethos of con-
flict. They are the key themes that feed and maintain the conflict, without which it will
be almost impossible for any society to survive intractable conflict and withstand it.
Without changing these societal beliefs, it is impossible to reach resolution of the
conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Henceforth I will describe briefly the other four themes:
National Unity. Despite the ideological sociological and geographical divi-
sions between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, resulting from the Palestinian
civil war in 2007, Palestinians have aspired to unity and emphasize its importance
in their national struggle. They have not excelled in unity, but they managed to join
their forces in times of escalation in the conflict against Israel, as, for example, in
the first and second Intifada. The beliefs stress that victory will be achieved by
unity34 (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994) and independence will be reached with the
strength of unity.35
Furthermore, beliefs about unity became stronger as a result of the division
between Fatah and Hamas in 2007, which enhanced the calls for unity. Polls con-
ducted between 2006 and 2009 reflect the high importance and concern attributed to
Palestinian’s national unity. They indicate that achieving national unity is the pre-
dominant desire of the majority of the Palestinians.36
Positive Self-Image. The asymmetric characteristic of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, in which the Palestinians are perceived as the weaker side in number and
power, necessitates them to find their strengths out of their weakness for the sake of
keeping a positive collective self-image. This positive image is important for sus-
taining collective morale and coping with the stronger rival. The words of a
Palestinian young man illustrate this point: “We are mentally and psychologically
much stronger, they are materially stronger, with airplanes and missiles.”37
One way to present their strengths and enhance their positive self-image is by
emphasizing historical events in which they confronted the strong Israeli army suc-
cessfully. For example, the success in the battle of Al-Karameh in 1968, in which

34
Leaflet no. 10, p. 69. Leaflet no. 1, p. 54, Leaflet no. 28, p. 143.
35
For example, Abu Mazen’s speech in January 2011. Retrieved from http://www.aawsat.com/
details.asp?section=4&article=601976&issueno=11723#.UoZnAsR-xK0
36
Retrieved from http://www.heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?id=1632&meid=43; http://www.
heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?id=1651&meid=43; http://www.heskem.org.il/sources-view.asp?
id=296&meid=43
37
Interview with a 24-year-old Palestinian man in the West Bank in 17-12-2012.
Ethos of Conflict of the Palestinian Society 145

the Palestinians inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli side, became a symbol for victory
and pride (Jamal, 2004). Similarly, the battle of Jenin in 2002 was described as a
“heroic battle,” “a legend”.38 Also, the image of a boy throwing a stone on a tank
contributes to this "positive image.”39 An additional way to enhance the positive
image is by using attributes of heroism, courage, endurance, and resistance—
whether passive or active. This image was a source of identification for the society
and played a strong psychological role in transforming the state of despair of many
Palestinians into feelings of hope.
Security. Palestinians’ societal beliefs about security are related to the percep-
tion that Israel aspires to completely transfer them out of the country. Feelings of
fear, uncertainty, and beliefs about victimization play a major role in their percep-
tions of security.40 In a poll conducted in June 2013, 74 % of the Palestinians were
worried that they or a member of their family could be hurt by Israel in their daily
life or that their land would be confiscated or home demolished.41 Collective emo-
tions of insecurity, fear, and frustration led to the development of societal beliefs
maintaining that Israel intends to deport and transfer the Palestinian and to cause
another Nakba. These beliefs have increased in the last decade, largely due to
increases in Jewish settlements in the West Bank and violent interactions between
Palestinians and settlers.
Peace. Beliefs about peace are the least common in the Palestinian ethos. A study
that examined adolescents’ articles in newspapers between 1996 and 2007 (Nasie &
Bar-Tal, 2012) found that only 3 % reflected peace beliefs. Such beliefs were pre-
sented through general and vague terms or terms that reflected doubts and disappoint-
ments regarding peace. In addition, only 2 % of the contents of Palestinian school
textbooks42 refer to peace43 and reflect a general aspiration for it without referring
directly to Israel. The Palestinians emphasize the link between peace and justice and
often use the phrase “just peace” (salam ‘adel).44 Among Palestinian adolescents,
peace means justice, independence, and freedom (Biton & Salomon, 2006).

38
Retrieved from http://www.alestqlal.com/ar/index.php?act=Show&id=11008
39
Retrieved from https://fr-fr.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=351496761635
40
http://mondoweiss.net/2013/09/general-assembly-transcript.html
41
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2013/p48ejoint.html
42
Retrieved from http://www.israeli palestinians school books.blogspot.co.il/; See http://d7hj1xx5r
7f3h.cloudfront.net/Israeli-Palestinian_School_Book_Study_Report-English.pdf
43
See Israeli-Palestinian School Book Project Research Materials, Posted 1 February 2013 by
IsraeliPalestinianSchoolbooks, retrieved from http://www.israelipalestinianschoolbooks.blogspot.
co.il/
44
See, for example, Arafat’s speech, The Nobel Peace Prize 1994: “Only in an atmosphere of just
peace shall the Palestinian people achieve their legitimate ambition for independence and sover-
eignty, and be able to develop their national and cultural identity, as well as enjoy sound neigh-
borly relations, mutual respect and cooperation with the Israeli people”. Retrieved from http://
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1994/arafat-lecture.html and in the first speech
of President Mahmoud Abbas in 2005: “We will also continue on the path of Yasser Arafat to
achieve just peace – the peace of the braves”. Retrieved from http://www.multaqa.org/access/
inside.php?id=565
146 R. Shaked

Conclusion

As an intractable conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict touches the emotional and

psychological needs of the Palestinian society, and this is in addition to economic,
social, or political interests. The psychocultural infrastructure has become an
inseparable part of the conflict, created the culture of conflict, and has become a
central force driving the behavior of the Palestinian society in the conflict in all its
aspects. Thus, a vicious circle has been created that feeds itself: the psychological
infrastructure feeds the conflict and drives its intractable character and nature, and
the continuation of the conflict and the accompanying violence feed and reinforce
the psychological infrastructure (Bar-Tal, 2013). A similar infrastructure also
developed on the Israeli side, as Oren (Chap. 8) describes.
The Palestinian ethos of conflict is a foundation pillar of the Palestinian society.
Since the beginning of the conflict and until present day, it tends toward aggravation
and escalation; the ethos of conflict is hegemonic, dominant, rigid, and stable and
prevents the growth and development of an alternative ethos. There are no disagree-
ments over the ethos. It is the unifying factor in the Palestinian society.
The ethos of the conflict is comprised of societal beliefs, which make it domi-
nant, solid, and impenetrable to changes. There is a reciprocal relationship between
the ethos and the realities of the conflict. Each one strengthens the other and it is
sometimes difficult to know which is the cause and which is the effect. In order for
the Palestinian and the Israeli people to advance toward reconciliation and a better
future, a culture of peace needs to develop. As long as the reality remains unchanged,
and with it the culture of conflict, Palestinians as well as Israelis will not implement
and adopt culture of peace, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will continue with its
current intractable character.

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 Part IV
Distress, Emotions and Ideology
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure
to Political Violence and Political Preferences
in the Range of Fire

Daphna Canetti

Introduction

Understanding and ultimately resolving long-standing conflicts remains a first-

order global goal. Unfortunately, however, radical shifts in political attitudes—such
as increased out-group negativity—can significantly hinder peacemaking efforts
and dismiss reconciliatory measures. Civilians living in societies suffering from
intractable conflicts face extended periods of time under difficult conditions of
human and material loss, exhaustion, misery, uncertainty, grief, danger, demands
for resources, and other hardships (Bar-Tal, 2007). I believe that psychological
mechanisms representing wrongs or hardships suffered—commonly termed “griev-
ances” (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010)—can serve as a key to understanding
radical political shifts following exposure to political violence. For this chapter, I
focus on prolonged exposure to political violence. The term “political violence” is
used here to include violence waged between countries, protracted conflicts within
countries, and to a limited extent, to relate to the consequences of singular terrorist
attacks. I address changes in two types of political attitudes: intra-societal attitudes
(e.g., exclusionism and political intolerance) and intersocietal attitudes (e.g., sup-
port for militancy, violence, and reconciliation).
Civilians living in societies suffering from intractable conflict deal with daily
exposure to war-related events, including resurgences of political violence and ter-
rorism that cause casualties. Many studies have shown that political violence often
results in large-scale political transformations in affected societies: for example,
political violence has been linked to deterioration in economic conditions (Abadie
& Gardeazabal, 2003) and the availability of employment (Greenbaum, Dugan, &
LaFree, 2007). Individual-level exposure and its effects, however, have received less

D. Canetti (*)
School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 151

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_10
152 D. Canetti

attention outside the boundaries of clinical psychology and social work. This situa-
tion is surprising, since individual exposure to conflict and violence can result in
drastic, sometimes long-lasting, changes in the physical and mental health of
exposed individuals, which in turn has implications for the wider politics of conflict,
including radical shifts in political attitudes (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014). Hence,
the following questions deserve particular attention: How are people changed by the
societies they live in? How does exposure to conflict violence lead to—mostly radi-
cal—changes in civilians’ subsequent political attitudes and behavior?
I argue that in order to understand the impact on political attitudes among those
affected by political violence, we must account for personal exposure, along with
various psychological mechanisms such as stress and threat perceptions. In addi-
tion, I argue that ethos of conflict, as a set of ideological beliefs in an intractable
conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013), helps to understand changes in political preferences toward
current policy issues. I put forward a methodological claim arguing that systematic
rigorous empirical research in conflict zones is not only feasible, but of the utmost
importance to deepening our understanding of human behavior under continuous
existential threat and uncertainty. Through a review of relevant contemporary litera-
ture on political psychology in conflict zones, I hope to contribute a more nuanced
understanding of how individual exposure to political violence and terrorism shapes
the politics of conflict, including the extent to which it is possible to change indi-
vidual responses to exposure—an issue that consumes much social and public pol-
icy and is central to clinical, organizational, and health agendas aimed at improving
lives. Theoretically, the work presented here connects individual trauma subsequent
to political violence with wider collective political attitudes and behavior and, as
such, breaks new ground.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world’s most deeply intractable con-
flicts. It is protracted, violent, total, and central, perceived as zero-sum, and imposes
high material and psychological demands on both sides (Bar-Tal, 2007). Particularly,
since the eruption of the second “Intifada” (Palestinian uprising) in September
2000, in which thousands of Israeli and Palestinian civilians were injured and killed
(B’tselem, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), both sides have suffered the worst period of
mutual violence since the 1948 war. This eruption of violence was accompanied by
a severe economic crisis both in Israel and in the territories administered by the
Palestinian Authority (Jaeger & Paserman, 2005). Continuous exposure to conflic-
tual violence has led to heightened levels of distress and threat perception in both
populations, as well as adherence to the ethos of conflict (Al-Krenawi, Graham, &
Kanat-Maymon, 2009; Canetti-Nisim, Halperin, Sharvit, & Hobfoll, 2009; Rouhana
& Bar-Tal, 1998; Solomon & Lavi, 2005).
For the majority of Israelis and Palestinians, routine exposure to violent con-
flict events is an unfortunate reality. Since 2000, 6835 Palestinian citizens have
been killed by Israeli security forces, and a further 1767 were killed during
Operation Protective Edge (2014); 1155 Israeli citizens have been killed by
Palestinians since 2000 (B’Tselem, 2014a). Meanwhile, in just the past 2 years,
2172 rockets and 175 mortar shells were launched by Palestinian militants from
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political… 153

the Gaza Strip into southern Israel (B’Tselem, 2014a), forcing a huge segment of
the Israeli population to live under constant threat of attack. Of the Palestinians
killed during Operation Protective Edge, 431 were minors and 200 were women
under the age of 60 (B’Tselem, 2014b). Thousands of Gazans were exposed to
conflict violence.
Though the basic contours of a compromise and a two-state solution to this long-
standing conflict are acknowledged, significant factions of the public on both sides
object to compromise (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Maoz & McCauley, 2005).
The inability to resolve the conflict peacefully in spite of the numerous bilateral
attempts and third-party interventions may be greatly attributed to the sociopsycho-
logical barriers that underlie the disagreements and prevent their resolution (Bar-Tal
& Halperin, 2011). Specifically, years of exposure to violent conflict gave rise to the
development of dominant conflict-supporting beliefs in both societies, each accus-
ing the other of responsibility for the continuation of the conflict and for refusing a
peaceful resolution (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Shamir & Shikaki, 2010).
Analyzing how this intense exposure to conflict can affect the political behavior
of civilians is critical to our understanding of political behavior and conflict zone
preferences. Specifically, does exposure to conflict change citizens’ preferential
attitudes toward intergroup relations, diplomatic negotiation, or violence? Existing
work on the linkages between conflict exposure, political attitudes, and voting
behavior has provided a host of contradicting evidence. For example, research into
the rally-around-the-flag effect suggests that, at least in the immediate aftermath
of attacks or the beginning of wars, citizens become more militant, “rallying
around the flag” and supporting the incumbent government’s military efforts
(Mueller, 1970).
However, research on public sensitivity to casualties suggests that civilian sup-
port for war (and the incumbent party) will drastically wane in the wake of increas-
ing casualties on their side, limiting the longevity of the rally effect. Studies on
actual exposure to conflict violence also offer a mixed bag of political attitudes as
shown in Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, and Hobfoll (in press) study. While
some studies have demonstrated how exposure can lead to pacification (Beber,
Roessler, & Scacco, 2012), others have shown radicalization stemming from a host
of other mechanisms such as threat, trauma, or revenge motives (Canetti, Hirsch-
Hoefler, & Eiran, 2014). Research on whether a violent or nonviolent conflict strat-
egy engenders support for negotiation and compromise among civilians, and how
much warfare civilians can absorb before they soften their militant attitudes, has
also been inconclusive (Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, Rapaport, & Hobfoll, in press;
Longo, Canetti, & Hite-Rubin, 2014). Some studies demonstrate the efficacy of
these strategies (whether violent or nonviolent) in pacifying the population, while
others show that these tactics simply serve to inflame militant sentiments and lead
toward a violent spiral of conflict (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Kocher, Pepinsky, &
Kalyvas, 2011; Lyall, 2009).
This chapter is structured as follows: first, I define individual exposure, showing
that civilians are not exposed to political violence to the same degree. Further, I
154 D. Canetti

identify post-traumatic stress symptoms (PSSs)1 and perceptions of threat as key

mechanisms for understanding changes in political attitudes, followed by an
extended model which accounts for ethos of conflict/ideology. I show that pro-
longed exposure to violence does not directly translate into political preferences—
rather, it is prolonged individual exposure, along with stress and threat perceptions,
that encourage uncompromising and militant political attitudes.

Exposure to Political Violence and Political Attitudes

While other studies test the effects of political violence on civilians’ political atti-
tudes by looking at pre- and post-event samples, they fail to measure individual
exposure (directly or indirectly) to the attacks (Davis & Silver, 2004; Echebarria-
Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006; Jakobsson & Blom, 2014; Lerner, Gonzalez,
Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Although studies in political psychology focus on indi-
vidual exposure, they define exposure broadly—the number of victims one knows
(Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007).
I argue that to understand the relationship between political violence and political
attitudes, one needs to measure individual-level exposure. I define such exposure as
the harm inflicted on individuals amid political violence (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll,
Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Lyall, Blair, & Imai, 2013; Zeitzoff, 2014).
In a recent study conducted in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Canetti, Russ, Luborsky, and Hobfoll (2014) employed a novel strategy to identify
individual exposure to political violence, combining physical, geographic, and
emotional, personal exposure of civilians. The definition of personal exposure is
based on the assumption that political violence deliberately creates fear and anxiety,
not only among those who are personally exposed—that is, who were harmed them-
selves or whose family members or close friends were harmed—but also among
members of the targeted group that do not suffer personal injuries but witness the
attack from some emotional and/or physical distance (Canetti, Russ, et al., 2014). In
line with this, recent studies show that the negative effects of exposure to terrorism
and political violence are in no way restricted to individuals who have been directly
affected by attacks (Cohen & Arieli, 2011; Palmieri, Chipman, Canetti, Johnson, &
Hobfoll, 2010). Keinan, Sadeh, and Rosen (2003), for example, showed that expo-
sure to media coverage of terrorist acts was associated with the development of
symptoms similar to those of PTSD. Hence, the direct and indirect impact of expo-
sure alone on the individual does not suffice as a comprehensive definition. Rather,
exposure along with other individual grievances amid conflict—such as the threat
of loss or knowing someone who might be harmed—can elicit severe distress and

1
As field research deals with the general population and not a clinical population, it does not allow
for diagnosis. However, we conducted a study which compared our questionnaire scales to that of
clinical interviews, which revealed an equivalency and which strengthens the validity of the scales
(Hobfoll et al., 2011).
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political… 155

impair mental health and are thus an integral part of our definition of individual
exposure to political violence.
A growing literature in political science has sought to address the role of war and
conflict exposure in informing political attitudes and behavior, specifically on intra-
society attitudes toward exclusionism and political intolerance and inter-society
attitudes toward war and compromise (Canetti, Rapaport, Wayne, Hall, & Hobfoll,
2013). Historically, attempts at integrating this large literature have been hampered
by discipline and subfield divisions between research that studies the effect of war
on political attitudes and studies that explore the more specific impact of actual
conflict exposure during war. The present chapter seeks to unify these areas of study,
analyzing the impact of war and conflict exposure on political attitudes at various
levels of disaggregation—national, city/neighborhood, and individual.
Thus, the casualty sensitivity hypothesis postulates that, after the initial shock of
the crisis wears off, the public will become increasingly war-weary in the face of
casualties, blame the incumbent government, and support a cessation of hostilities.
Indeed, the public’s sensitivity to casualties is often postulated as a primary reason
for democracies’ reluctance to go to war and the democratic peace theory (Russett,
1990). This theory has also been diligently explored by researchers who have found
significant theoretical nuances. For example, casualty sensitivity depends on the
context in which the casualties occurred (Gelpi, Feaver, & Reifler, 2006) and may
be a result of both recent casualties and overall casualty trends (Gartner, 2008).
Essentially, this means that support for war among the public does not reflexively
decline with casualties, but is a result of a rational cost-benefit model that includes
casualty counts as a cost (Larson, 1996). This cost-benefit calculation incorporates
many factors, such as the public perception of the “principle-policy objective”
(Jentleson, 1992), the casualty tolerance of other domestic elites (Larson, 1996), the
presence of multilateral international support (Kull, Destler, & Ramsay, 1997), and
the expectations of success in the conflict (Gelpi, 2001).
This literature in its current form has several shortcomings. First, most studied
cases examine the United States, limiting their generalizability to other conflict con-
texts. Second, research in these areas has generally not examined individual differ-
ences in war support and militancy among citizens who have been more or less
affected by the conflict. Finally, these studies generally explore attitudes during war.
They do not answer the central question of how political attitudes will change dur-
ing periods of calm in an intractable conflict.
A second strain of research addresses some of these limitations, utilizing lab in
the field or natural experiments to disaggregate the civilian population and explore
the impact of individual or neighborhood level conflict exposure on political atti-
tudes in various conflict contexts. For example, a recent study conducted in Israel
(Grossman, Manekin, & Miodownik, forthcoming) found that the assignment of
Israeli citizens to an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) combat unit in accordance with
their health profile scores (in other words, the assignment to more conflict exposure
based on the random distribution of poorer or stronger health) hardened attitudes
toward the rival and reduced support for negotiation and compromise post-service.
Former combat soldiers were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties. The
156 D. Canetti

authors speculate that a host of mechanisms related to conflict exposure—socialization,

prejudice, threat, and trauma—may play a role in this process.2 Likewise, in Vietnam
(Kocher et al., 2011), studies have found that bombing of Vietnamese villages sys-
tematically shifted control of these areas to the Viet Cong insurgents rather than
pacifying the civilian population. Thus, the US airpower was ineffective in pacify-
ing the population, as the Vietnamese blamed the United States and became more
supportive of the local Viet Cong following exposure to these bombing campaigns.
In the United States, Bonanno and Jost (2006) found similar results in response to
the 9/11 attacks. Examining high-exposure survivors of the 9/11 attacks, they found
a significant conservative shift in political attitudes. This shift was, in turn, strongly
associated with increased desires for revenge, patriotism, and militarism against
Al-Qaeda and other groups.
However, some other studies have contradicted this trend of exposure to conflict
violence leading to increased militancy. In Sudan, for example, Beber et al. (2012)
found that exposure to violent riots by South Sudanese in Khartoum led to pacifica-
tion of the North Sudanese, who became more likely to support the South’s seces-
sionist claims in the riot’s aftermath, even if they recognized that secession would
negatively harm their economic well-being. This suggests that groups exposed to
violence placed personal safety considerations above all else, supporting compro-
mise on a core conflict issue in order to increase their own personal security.
Likewise, in Israel, a recent study (Gould & Klor, 2010) found that though votes
shifted to the right in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks, political attitudes
actually shift to the left over time in response to terrorism (e.g., the increasing pub-
lic acceptance of a two-state solution).3 This indicates that terrorism brings a left-
ward shift to the entire political map, including the stances of political parties; thus,
it is critical to distinguish between the effects of terror on political attitudes and its
effects on party preferences, because the platforms of parties are possibly endoge-
nous to the level of terrorism (Gould & Klor, 2010).

Mechanisms Affecting the Exposure-Attitude Relationship

In the wake of these conflicting results, several recent studies have tried to explore
the nuances of the way conflict exposure is translated into political attitudes. In
Ireland, Hayes and McAllister (2001) found that indirect exposure to violence
enhanced public support for paramilitary groups and reduced support for the decom-
missioning of paramilitary groups. However, direct exposure to violence influenced

2
A study by Borovski-Sapir (2004) revealed the effect of socialization in military training bases on
the development of conflict attitudes.
3
A study by Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, and Gurevich (2010) on the effect of terrorism on
political attitudes found that in the aftermath of terror attacks during a period of violence escala-
tion, those aligned with “dovish” political views became less favorably disposed to supporting
peace, while those holding more “hawkish” political opinions became more favorably disposed to
supporting peace.
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political… 157

Catholics and Protestants differently. Catholics exposed to violence increased their

support of paramilitary groups, whereas Protestants exposed to violence became
less supportive of such groups. This difference may be attributable to the differential
experiences of violence in this asymmetrical conflict—for Catholics, redress could
only be found through paramilitary groups, while Protestants could turn to the gov-
ernment. In Afghanistan, Lyall and colleagues (2013) asked whether the combat-
ant’s identity affected exposed civilians’ political attitudes. They found that harm
inflicted by one’s own group or co-ethnics will generally be ignored, while harm
inflicted by the out-group will increase antipathy and support for militant action. In
Israel, Longo et al. (2014) found that exposure to checkpoints increased militarism
and support for violence and encouraged voting for the militant Hamas party among
Palestinians but that this increase was largely explained by variations in perceptions
of humiliation felt at checkpoints.
The question of which mechanism accounts for this empirical relationship has
different implications for generalizability and the conditions under which govern-
ments might seek to enhance public support for militancy and exclusion of out-
groups (or vice versa) through engagement in major violent conflicts. Let us
therefore outline the logic underlying each of the mechanisms. Contemporary litera-
ture offers numerous psychological mechanisms that do not speak about individual-
level exposure, but about emotions (e.g., Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011) or needs
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, Chap. 17) in conflict.
These many competing results demonstrate the need for a deeper exploration of the
mechanisms underlying attitude change in the wake of exposure to violent conflict.
What factors will cause citizens to become pacified after conflict exposure, and what
factors will trigger increased militancy? What role does individual psychology—
specifically, individual differences in reactivity to conflict exposure—play in affect-
ing subsequent political attitudes? I argue that psychological distress and threat
perceptions are central drivers of political attitudes such as political intolerance,
extremism, and support for compromise or violence. I also argue that another com-
mon mechanism behind why individual-level exposure to violence might instigate
militancy, hostility, resentment, and rebellion is the ethos of conflict.

Psychological Distress

In today’s atypical conflicts, exposure to violent conflict events among the civilian
population is incredibly high. Such exposure might possibly lead to a host of psy-
chological disorders and physical illnesses that can affect conflict attitudes (Canetti,
Hall, Rapaport, & Wayne, 2013). Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is one such
debilitating disorder; symptoms include reexperiencing of the traumatic event,
active avoidance of reminders of the trauma, emotional numbing, and hyperarousal
(Spitzer, Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, & First, 1994).
I examined how PTSD symptoms resulting from terrorism relate to aggres-
sion, militancy, and ethnic exclusion to form a defense and protection (Canetti
158 D. Canetti

et al., 2009; Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, & Johnson, 2006). If the actions of others
have been threatening and if that threat has had emotional consequences, then
counteraggression may be one coping response (Chemtob, Hamada, Roitblat, &
Muraoka, 1994).
Prolonged exposure to conflict violence has indeed triggered substantial psycho-
logical trauma among Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations. In a large survey
conducted in Israel in 2011 (Chipman, Palmieri, Canetti, Johnson, & Hobfoll,
2011), almost a third of the sample reported some form of impairment caused by
post-traumatic stress, and a fifth of these respondents met the full criteria for diag-
nosis with PTSD. A second study, conducted in the Palestinian territories in 2010
(Canetti et al., 2010), discovered that the prevalence of PTSD and depression for
Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem was extremely high.
Recent studies have demonstrated the central role of this type of trauma and
psychological distress in informing citizens’ response to conflict violence in a vari-
ety of contexts. A study conducted on adolescents in Israel (Shamai & Kimhi, 2006)
found that young adults living close to the Lebanon border were significantly less
supportive of political compromise and suffered from higher stress and threat lev-
els. Stress and threat were in turn negatively correlated with support for political
compromise, indicating that the stress and threat of living in a more active conflict
zone may crystallize the formation of more militant political attitudes. Other studies
conducted by Canetti-Nisim and colleagues (2008) have found that personal expo-
sure to terrorism predicted psychological distress, which led to an increase in the
perceived threat of future attacks from Palestinian citizens of Israel and, in turn,
predicted exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens. These findings suggest
that personal exposure and psychological distress play an important role in the
development of extreme political attitudes among citizens in conflict contexts and
therefore set the ground for the stress-based model of political extremism (Canetti-
Nisim et al., 2009).
These studies have been replicated in other countries. In Uganda, civilians living
in conflict zones had high prevalence rates for symptoms of PTSD and depression.
These respondents were more likely to favor violent over nonviolent means to end
the conflict (Vinck, Pham, Stover, & Weinstein, 2007). In Rwanda, civilians who
experienced traumatic exposure to conflict violence were more likely to express
PTSD symptoms and in turn less likely to have positive attitudes toward three fac-
tors related to reconciliation: belief in nonviolence, belief in community, and inter-
dependence with other ethnic groups (Pham, Weinstein, & Longman, 2004). Studies
of the psychological implications of terrorist attacks in the United States (Galea
et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001) and Spain (Miguel-Tobal et al., 2006) have also
pointed to PTSD as one of the most problematic expressions of pathological psy-
chological reactions following exposure to terrorism. Studies on Israeli and
Palestinian civilians have shown that the more an individual was exposed, the more
likely he or she was to fall into a group with a worse trajectory (i.e., chronic poor
mental health) (see Hobfoll et al., 2009).
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political… 159

Perception of Threat

Although inherent to PTSD, a key distinct factor connecting exposure to violence

and political attitudes is the perception of threat. Perception of threat is the appraisal
of danger that the “other side,” or out-group, poses to the life or well-being of the
individual or group (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Huddy, Feldman et al., 2002).
Indeed, since 9/11, a growing number of researchers have begun to examine the
impact of terrorism and violence on psychological aspects as well as political ones
(Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Laor, Yanay-Shani, Wolmer, &
Khoury, 2010; Rubin, Brewin, Greenberg, Simpson, & Wessely, 2005). Our group
joins others in examining the impact of threat perceptions as drivers of harsh coun-
terterrorism policies and increased intransigence (Gadarian, 2010; Herrmann,
Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Huddy, Feldman, et al., 2002; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, &
Prior, 2004) while rephrasing the discussion of conflict exposure and the psycho-
political consequences.
Threat perceptions are heightened in situations of prolonged conflict, with seem-
ingly unrelated events liable to be seen as threats. This is true for both relatively
circumscribed and acute incidents of political violence, such as NYC 9/11, Madrid
3/11, London 7/7, or Oslo 7/22 (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández-Guede, 2006;
Huddy & Feldman, 2011; Jakobsson & Blom, 2014; Lerner et al., 2003; Rubin
et al., 2007), as well as violence over prolonged periods (Cairns, 1996).
An extensive body of work establishes perception of threat as a significant pre-
dictor of a wide array of attitudes and beliefs. This array includes prejudice, animos-
ity, and hostility (Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001), exclusionism (Canetti
et al., 2009), and political intolerance and xenophobia (Quillian, 1995). Several
studies reveal that perception of threat is positively correlated with political prefer-
ences supporting aggressive national and international security policies (Bonanno
& Jost, 2006; Huddy et al., 2007). The centrality of perceptions of threat to policy
preferences is particularly important when studying intractable conflicts.

The Ethos of Conflict

I view ethos as a specific case of political ideology of conflict. Ideology constitutes

a coherent worldview often prevalent in one’s culture, which can provide a sense of
meaning in the face of individual and collective threats. Theories of distress result-
ing from protracted conflicts emphasize the importance for the coping process of
finding meaning, establishing a coherent worldview, and adhering to a cultural
worldview (Antonovski, Meari, & Blanc, 1978; Greenberg, Solomon, &
Pyszczynski, 1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski,
1991). A strong ideological belief may attenuate the effect of exposure to political
violence on psychological distress. For example, studies have shown that the rela-
tionship between exposure and psychological distress was weaker among
160 D. Canetti

individuals who were highly committed to an ideology compared to those who were
less committed (Kaplan, Matar, Kamin, Sadan, & Cohen, 2005; Punamäki, 1996;
Shechner, Slone, & Bialik, 2007).
It has been suggested that there are qualitative differences in the effects of various
ideologies. Jost and Hunyady (2005) proposed that system-justifying ideologies that
defend the social status quo are especially functional for coping with adversities. For
example, threat perceptions were found to be positively related to conservatism.
Thus, conservatism can be seen as a part of a coping strategy when facing high threat
levels. Political extremity, either conservative or liberal, was not found to be related
to perceptions of threat, a finding that stresses the possibility that not all sets of ideo-
logical beliefs are as functional in situations of threat (Jost et al., 2007).
Ethos of conflict is a particular ideology that is prevalent among societies that are
involved in intense violent conflicts. It can serve as a system-justifying ideology and
thus may play an important role in the effects of political violence exposure on cop-
ing with adversity created by political conflict (see Jost, Stern, & Sterling, Chap. 4,
volume 1 of this series). Ethos of conflict is likely to decrease support for the peace-
ful resolution of intractable conflicts. It has been shown that the ethos is a coherent
feature of Israeli society (Bar-Tal, 2007) and is an active part of the psychological
repertoire of most Israelis (Sharvit, 2014).
In light of the above theorizing regarding the role of ideologies in general and
conservative system-justifying ideologies in particular in coping with adversities, I
propose that high levels of psychological distress relate to high levels of ethos, post-
traumatic, and depressive symptoms, even in times of exposure to conflict (Canetti,
Lavi, Elad-Guy, & Bar-Tal, in press). The beliefs that comprise the Israeli and the
Palestinian ethoses of conflict are, to a great degree, mirror images. There are eight
beliefs: justness of the goals, victimization, security, positive collective self-image,
delegitimization of the adversary, patriotism, unity, and peace. Full descriptions of
the content of these beliefs in both societies can be found elsewhere in this volume
(Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9; Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004).

Conclusion

Despite recent developments in the study of the political psychology of civilians in

conflict zones and in particular those related to the psychosocial infrastructure of
intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013), the manner in which prolonged exposures to
political violence impacts attitudes toward peace and violence and the role of psy-
chological components in determining these attitudes have remained unclear. Our
findings provide powerful evidence that exposure to violence reduces the willingness
to compromise and prompts support for further violence (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011;
Haass, 1988; Zartman, 1989; Zartman & Touval, 1985). Our ongoing analyses reveal
that under prolonged exposure, elevated levels of distress influence perceptions of
threat, which in turn are associated with more intransigent and militant attitudes.
This chapter points to individual-level outcomes as key micro-foundations of
conflict. At the theoretical level, my work extends previous research on political
Harmed by Our Protection: Exposure to Political Violence and Political… 161

attitudes among civilians living amidst political violence by connecting individual

trauma subsequent to such violence with collective attitudes toward peace and com-
promise. I propose a mediation model linking individual-level exposure to political
violence to reduced support for negotiations, with psychological distress and threat
perceptions as mechanisms bridging the two. More importantly, my colleagues and
I have continuously tested and validated this model across populations of Israelis
and Palestinians on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., Canetti, Elad-
Strenger, Lavi, Guy, and Bar-Tal, in press).
At a practical level, my work provides useful guidance for practitioners seeking
to advocate peace. Specifically, the current findings highlight the role played by
individual-level exposure, coupled with stress and threat, in acting as a barrier to
peace. It thus demonstrates the importance of removing violence, particularly vio-
lence directed at civilians, from the political landscape. In addition, our findings
emphasize that actions to reduce threat perceptions are crucial to the success of any
peace negotiations. As a start in this direction, acknowledging and legitimizing the
losses of the other side are imperative for building support in those constituencies
that find moving toward peace most challenging.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict offers ample evidence that waves of violence will
continue to take their psychological and political toll. Civilian casualties in and of
themselves constitute impediments to breaking the cycle of violence, as affected
civilians and their communities become increasingly resistant to peace. From a
defensive coping perspective (Hobfoll et al., 2006), hardening their hearts by adopt-
ing defensive attitudes aimed to protect the self (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., in press) may
be the most effective means for individuals victimized by violence to help them-
selves: adopting a more militant attitude has been found to be an effective coping
mechanism in dealing with increased conflict, perception of threat, and resulting
stress. However, these militant attitudes perpetuate the conflict by increasing sup-
port for militant policies (Canetti, Hall et al., 2013). Only by changing these protec-
tive dynamics can we hope to create a psychological-societal infrastructure capable
of sustaining formal political agreements in conflict zones.

Acknowledgments This research was made possible, in part, by grants awarded from the
National Institute of Mental Health (R01 MH073687), from the Israel Science Foundation
(487/08), from the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation (2009460), and from the Institute for
Social and Policy Studies and the Macmillan Center at Yale University. I also thank Mahshov
Institute in Israel as well as JMCC and NEC Institutes in Ramallah for enabling data collection. Of
course, all errors are mine.

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Emotions and Emotion Regulation
in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation
to the Ethos of Conflict in Israeli Society

Ruthie Pliskin and Eran Halperin

Life under the conditions of intractable conflict and the challenges posed by it are
known to lead to the emergence of a multifaceted sociopsychological infrastructure,
comprising various societal beliefs about the past and the present and collective
emotional orientations (Bar-Tal, 2013, chapters 4–6). A central element within this
infrastructure is the Ethos of Conflict (EOC), a concept brought forth by Daniel Bar-
Tal to describe “the configuration of central societal shared beliefs that provide a
particular dominant orientation to a society” (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2013; see also Oren,
Chap. 8). In an intractable conflict, the EOC is formed to provide individuals with
the ability to deal with the challenges of life under such difficult circumstances, but
as it becomes more entrenched, the conflict-supporting societal beliefs comprising
it may begin to serve as barriers to the conflict’s transformation and resolution.
Because of the omnipresence of the conflict in societal life, individuals carry the
beliefs of the EOC with them throughout their daily routines. Indeed, multiple stud-
ies have demonstrated that the long-term societal beliefs of the EOC influence not
only people’s attitudes but also their behaviors (e.g., Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, &
Dgani-Hirsch, 2009; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Zafran, & Halperin, 2012; Porat, Halperin, &
Bar-Tal, 2013; and see Bar-Tal, 2013 for a review). What remains to be explored,
however, is the process by which this long-standing psychological construct influ-
ences intermittent political reactions and even behavior. How are people’s long-term
societal beliefs about the conflict, the ingroup, and the adversary translated into

R. Pliskin (*)
School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
E. Halperin
Baruch Ivcher School of Psychology, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 167

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_11
168 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

concrete policy support and personal action? Through what process do these beliefs
act to shape individuals’ interpretation of new information and the way they react to
it? And what processes might be at play in times in which individuals strive to act
contrary to the mandate of these societal beliefs? In the present chapter, we would
like to propose that an examination of emotional processes may serve to answer
these important questions. In other words, we propose that in the context of intrac-
table conflict, the influence of the EOC on actual decisions and behavior is at least
partially mediated through emotional processes.
This view of the central role played by emotions in this process has received
some initial support in the literature (e.g., Halperin, 2011; Halperin, Sharvit, &
Gross, 2011), highlighting the importance of understanding how emotional pro-
cesses shape attitudes and behaviors. More importantly, however, when studying
the influence that emotional processes have on attitudes and behaviors in a context
as unique and difficult as intractable conflict, it is important to understand how the
long-term features of that context, and chiefly the EOC, shape this influence. Indeed,
the EOC may influence these emotional processes in several important ways, such
as shaping the emotional experience itself, shaping the outcomes of that experience,
and shaping the efforts people make to modify their emotional experience.
Below, we will discuss each of these possible influences. First, however, we will
review the existing knowledge on emotions and their regulation in the context of
intractable conflict, drawing on evidence from Bar-Tal’s native context: Israeli soci-
ety and its experience as an actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Next, we will
briefly describe the EOC and its function as a conflict-supporting ideology.
Subsequently, we will discuss the existing knowledge on the EOC-emotion relation-
ship and the various features of EOC as an ideology that may affect emotional
processes. Finally, we will examine each of the possible influences EOC may have
on emotional processes, mentioned above: its influence on the levels of emotion
experienced, its influence on the outcomes of experienced emotions, and its influ-
ence on processes involved in the regulation of emotions. Throughout the chapter, we
will draw on examples from Israeli society.

Emotions and Emotion Regulation in the Context

of Intractable Conflict in Israel

From Emotion to Group-Based Emotion

Even though the study of emotions has grown rapidly (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, &
Barrett, 2010), scholars do not yet agree on a single definition, with differences
pertaining mostly to the boundaries of the concept and its phenomena (e.g., emo-
tional words, emotional experience, emotional expressions, or emotional behavior;
see Frijda, 2004). The number of scientific definitions proposed has grown so rap-
idly that counting seems rather hopeless (Kleinginna and Kleinginna already
reviewed more than 100 in 1981). In our work, we adopt William James’s (1884)
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 169

classical perspective on emotions as flexible response sequences (Frijda, 1986) that

are called forth whenever an individual evaluates a situation as offering important
challenges or opportunities (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). According to this defini-
tion, emotions transform a stimulus into a motivation to respond to it in a particular
manner (Zajonc, 1998).
But emotional experiences and their motivational, attitudinal, and behavioral
implications go far beyond the intra- and even the interpersonal context (see Halperin,
Sharvit, et al., 2011 for a discussion of these). There is wide consensus today that
emotions are driven by intra- and intergroup dynamics, are often expressed within
social contexts, and in themselves influence the nature of intra- and intergroup rela-
tions. Most relevant to the present discussion is the concept of group-based emotions
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Empirical research has demonstrated that individu-
als may experience emotions not only in response to personally relevant develop-
ments but also in response to developments that affect other members of their group
(e.g., Mackie et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordin, 2003). Although
the emotion-provoking event is not personally experienced, group-based emotions
are personally experienced emotions with various possible targets, including events,
individuals, or other social groups. In this final case, they are termed intergroup
emotions: emotions one experiences as a result of identification with a certain social
group and targeted at another social group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).

Group-Based Emotions in Intractable Conflict in Israel

As we have stated earlier, emotions have the ability to influence individuals’ opinions
and even actions in the context of intractable conflict. Halperin, Sharvit, et al. (2011)
presented a comprehensive appraisal-based framework for understanding the influ-
ence of emotions over conflict-related beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The most
basic element in this proposed framework (see Fig. 1) describes a sequence of psy-
chological processes beginning with exposure to the emotion-provoking stimulus,
which may be real or remembered information pertaining to the intergroup context.
As an illustration, an Israeli may hear on the news that a member of her group has
been hurt by a rocket launched by Palestinian militants. This exposure results in
individual cognitive appraisal of the stimulus, and depending on the specific ways

Exposure to Reactive Political

or Cognitive emotions— attitudes,
recollection appraisals of personal or personal and
of conflict the events group-based group actions
events

Fig. 1 The process model of reactive emotions and their influence in the context of intractable
conflict
170 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

in which the information or events are appraised, the appraisal results in the experi-
ence of a discrete emotional reaction. For example, if the Israeli appraises the
launching of the rocket as unprovoked, she may respond with anger; if she believes
the action stemmed from the perceived fundamental evil nature of the Palestinian
group, she may react with hatred; and if she believes she is also at risk of being hurt
by similar actions, her reaction might be one of fear.
Each emotion, in turn, is associated with specific emotional goals, and to address
these goals, individuals may adopt or strengthen certain political attitudes, or, alter-
natively, take or support certain lines of political action. In other words, discrete
emotions influence people’s political reactions to specific events by simple transla-
tion of the core emotional goals and action tendencies of the emotion into support for
(or opposition to) practical policies that are seen as relevant reactions to the emotion-
eliciting event. Accordingly, the same event would lead to support for different poli-
cies among different individuals who experienced different emotions in its wake. For
example, if an Israeli’s dominant emotion in response to aggression by Israelis would
be group-based guilt, it could lead to support for policies aiming to correct the
wrongdoings and/or compensate the Palestinians (see Čehajić, Effron, Halperin,
Liberman, & Ross, 2011; Čehajić-Clancy, Chap. 8, volume 1 of this series). If he is
instead dominated by hope for a better future, he may be motivated to search for new
avenues to change reality in the long run, probably by seriously considering new
political information and creative political solutions to the conflict (see Cohen-
Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal,
2014; Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren & Halperin, Chap. 7, volume 1 of this series,
Jarymowicz, Chap. 9, volume 1 of this series). Conversely, if the Israeli is domi-
nated by fear of retaliation by the Palestinians, most of his efforts would be devoted
to support of policies that would increase his feeling of security (see Jarymowicz,
Chap. 9, volume 1 of this series, Dupuis, Porat, & Wohl, Chap. 10, volume 1 of this
series; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010).
The above differences in the outcomes of different emotions stem from the fact
that each emotion has its own unique “story” and thus its own unique ramifications.
Whereas anger is a highly motivating emotion (Mackie et al., 2000) that may lead
to either destructive (Berkowitz, 1993; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994) or con-
structive (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Halperin, Russel, Dweck, & Gross, 2011)
action tendencies, hatred unequivocally results in destructive attitudes or goals
(Halperin, 2008, 2011; Sternberg, 2003). Fear, contrary to both of these emotions,
is an inhibiting emotion, leading to closure and risk avoidance (Frijda, Kuipers, &
ter Schure, 1989; Gray, 1987; Halperin, 2011)—which may be indirectly achieved
through either aggression (e.g., Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) or compromise (e.g., Gayer,
Tal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009; Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013; Spanovic et al.,
2010). Hope, a positive emotion, leads to greater openness to new information and
ideas (Snyder, 2000) and therefore to greater support for compromises and changes
required for ending an intergroup conflict (Bar-Tal, 2001; Cohen-Chen, Halperin,
Crisp, et al., 2014). Empathy, on the other hand, is directed at the outgroup rather
than the (political or social) situation and therefore leads to action tendencies serv-
ing a goal of helping the group (Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009; Cikara,
Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011), not necessarily affecting attitudes toward the ingroup or
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 171

the situation itself (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, in press). Understanding that
each group-based emotion has a unique profile and a unique set of ramifications is
highly important for understanding emotional dynamics in conflict but also for under-
standing how these various ramifications can be changed by tackling the emotions
associated with them. The study of emotion regulation, described below, can make use
of these understandings for the purpose of overcoming barriers to conflict resolution.

Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict in Israel

As demonstrated in the previous section, it is now well established that group-based

emotions play a central role in shaping people’s attitudes and behavior in conflict
situations, with the Israeli context as no exception. Following this understanding, our
research in recent years (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, et al., 2014; Halperin,
2014; Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2014; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, &
Gross, 2013) attempts to employ strategies of emotion regulation, previously used in
basic psychology, in the context of intergroup conflicts as a tool for promoting con-
flict resolution.
We first focused on cognitive reappraisal, one of the most widely-researched emo-
tion regulation strategies, finding that its use was associated with Israelis’ increased
support for humanitarian aid to the Palestinians during wartime (Halperin & Gross,
2011). Subsequent experimental studies, conducted in Israel, demonstrated that reap-
praisal instructions increase political tolerance toward disliked groups (Halperin,
Pliskin, et al., 2014) and increase support for conciliatory policies immediately after
an anger-evoking event and even following several months (Halperin, Porat, Tamir,
et al., 2013).
However successful, the use of direct emotion regulation may have limited
applied potential, due to both practical difficulty in administering wide-scale train-
ing and the personal motivation required for people to employ such strategies
(Tamir, 2009). Furthermore, recent findings indicate that beyond a dearth of motiva-
tion to regulate emotions in a manner congruent with conciliatory attitudes, indi-
viduals involved in conflict are often motivated to regulate their emotions in the
opposite direction (Sharvit, Brambilla, Babush, & Colucci, 2015). In order to over-
come these obstacles, we have begun developing methods designed to indirectly
regulate emotions (For a review, see: Halperin, Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014).
This approach involves a process of (1) identifying a potentially destructive action
tendency, (2) connecting the action tendency to a discrete emotion associated with
it (following Frijda, 1986), (3) identifying the emotion’s core appraisal theme (e.g.,
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984), and (4) finding a way to directly change this core
appraisal theme so as to transform the emotion and its consequent action tendency
(see Fig. 2).
Several studies have demonstrated the great promise contained in this approach.
For example, in a series of studies, Halperin and colleagues (Halperin, Russell,
Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011) hypothesized that a core appraisal of hatred,
that the outgroup’s negative character is inherent and unchanging, is based on a
172 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

Identify desired, Identify core Develop indirect

Identify driving
conflict related, appraisal for intervention to
emotion
action tendency emotion address appraisal

Fig. 2 The steps to developing indirect emotion regulation interventions in intractable conflict

more fundamental belief that social groups hold stable characteristics, known as an
“entity” (or fixed) implicit theory about the malleability of groups (e.g., Rydell,
Hugenberg, Ray, & Mackie, 2007). Indeed, we found that promoting an incremental
view of the malleability of groups reduced intergroup hatred, thereby increasing
support for compromises, among both Israelis and Palestinians (Halperin, Russell,
et al., 2011). We have since conducted several other studies along these lines, target-
ing various discrete emotions. In all cases the process was the same, be it to trans-
form levels of hope (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2013; Cohen-Chen, Halperin,
Crisp, et al., 2014; Saguy & Halperin, 2014) and guilt (Čehajić et al., 2011), and
always resulted in more constructive intergroup attitudes.
As demonstrated, research has provided much empirical support for the effec-
tiveness of both direct and indirect approaches to emotion regulation in intergroup
conflict in general and in Israeli society in particular. Nevertheless, much work is
still needed for these approaches to materialize into implementable interventions to
improve intergroup relations or promote conflict resolution. One key to such mate-
rialization may be in the examination of the unique characteristics of the context at
hand, such as the EOC in societies that, like Israel, are involved in intractable
conflict.

The Interrelations of the Ethos of Conflict and Emotional

Processes in Israel

The findings presented thus far are promising in that they demonstrate how the adop-
tion of previously accumulated knowledge about affective processes on the individual
and group-based levels can further our understanding of the psychology of emotions
in intergroup conflict and reconciliation. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that
these emotional processes never exist in a vacuum. Every stage of the emotional
process responds to the context in which the emotion arises and to the unique
sociopsychological features of this context, with the EOC one such prominent and
omnipresent feature in the extreme situation of intractable intergroup conflict—
one that is intimately related to the emotions that arise in such realities.
As the EOC is an ideology, it is important to first understand the function of
ideology more generally. Ideology can be defined as an organized construct of
beliefs, attitudes, and values that provide a general worldview about a present and
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 173

future reality (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; McClosky & Zaller, 1984). Various
examinations into ideological belief systems have provided evidence for a connec-
tion between the set of long-standing beliefs contained within an ideology and a
variety of interpersonal and intergroup attitudes and outcomes (see Jost et al., 2009
for a review). But beyond ideological content, researchers have also identified the
importance of the cognitive as well as underlying psychological and motivational
properties of ideology (Jost et al., 2009), which are universal to ideological belief
systems around the world (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). According
to this view, all ideologies can be described in terms of two dimensions that form
their “discursive superstructure,” and these determine whether someone belongs to
the political right (high acceptance of inequality and low openness to change) or
political left (low acceptance of inequality and high openness to change) (Jost
et al., 2009). Moreover, this approach claims that each end of the ideological spec-
trum fulfills different relational, epistemic, and existential needs, with people high
in needs such as the need for cognitive closure (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, &
Sulloway, 2003), the need for security, and the need for certainty (Jost et al., 2009)
more likely to adopt rightist ideologies. Thus, it is important to take into account
both the specific contents of the ideology (the societal beliefs contained in it) and
the motivational basis for its adoption in understanding how ideology may shape
other psychological processes.
But ideology takes on specific contents in the context of intractable conflict—
namely, in the form of the EOC. As described in other chapters in this series (see
Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9, Cohrs, Uluğ, Stahel, & Kişlioğlu, Chap. 3, volume
1 of this series, Jost, Stern & Sterling, Chap. 4, volume 1 of this series), the EOC
plays a central role in intractable conflicts in general and within Israeli society in
particular. This conflict-supporting ideology denotes a strong adherence to a set of
societal beliefs, including beliefs about the justness of the group’s goals, about
security, of a positive collective self-image, of the group’s victimization, of delegiti-
mizing the opponent, of patriotism, of unity, and of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007).
Because of the centrality of the conflict in such societies, self-identification of indi-
viduals in conflict as rightists versus leftists is highly related to their level of adher-
ence to the EOC. Indeed, empirical examinations have shown that the EOC serves
as the dominant ideology influencing the attitudes and political reactions of indi-
vidual members of societies involved in intractable intergroup conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal
et al., 2009, 2012; Lavi, Canetti, Sharvit, Bar-Tal, & Hobfoll, 2014; Sharvit, 2014).
With the above in mind, we already know that group-based emotions play a key
role in intractable conflicts, and Bar-Tal’s theory stresses the importance of the EOC
within these contexts. What we do not yet know, however, is how these two impor-
tant constructs may act together to influence the psychological processes of individu-
als involved in intractable conflicts. The integrated model of psychological barriers
to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011, 2014) has already initially pro-
posed that emotions are intimately related to the EOC. First, the model suggests that
certain emotions function to freeze the sociopsychological beliefs contained in the
EOC and stabilize their rigidity. The emotions prevalent in intractable conflicts,
which are characterized by high stability and resistance to change (Abelson &
174 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

Exposure to
Reactive Political
or Cognitive
emotions— attitudes,
recollection appraisals of
personal or personal and
of conflict the events
group-based group actions
events

Emotion Ethos
regulation at any of
of the emotional Conflict
generative stages

Fig. 3 The influence of Ethos of Conflict on emotions, the results of emotion, and emotion regula-
tion processes

Prentice, 1989), serve as glue, holding the conflict-supporting beliefs together. In this
regard, Sharvit (2014) has recently demonstrated that the EOC is activated in times
of emotional distress—indicating that emotions can serve to increase the accessibility
of these beliefs.
Furthermore, according to appraisal theories of emotions, each and every emotion
is related to a unique configuration of comprehensive (conscious or unconscious)
evaluations of the emotional stimulus (Roseman, 1984). Hence, emotions and
beliefs are closely related and reinforce each other steadily. More than a decade ago,
Lerner and Keltner (2000) argued that each emotion activates a cognitive predispo-
sition to appraise future events in line with the central-appraisal dimensions that
triggered the emotion (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). This appraisal
tendency approach is of great importance in our context, mainly because it signals
that long-standing beliefs and intermittent emotions that arise in the context of con-
flict constantly feed into one another, creating a vicious cycle of entrenchment in
these beliefs and increased emotional reactivity. Indeed, the literature on emotions in
conflict designates ideology—namely, EOC —as an important factor influencing
individuals’ cognitive appraisals of conflict-related events and stimuli, thus influenc-
ing emotional reactions to such events and stimuli (see Fig. 3 as well as Halperin,
Sharvit, et al., 2011).
For example, the belief in the justness of the group’s goals, which is embodied in
the EOC, should theoretically be associated with higher levels of anger in response
to any action or attitude undermining or criticizing efforts to achieve these goals,
because a core appraisal of intergroup anger is a perceived unjust wrongdoing by the
outgroup (Halperin, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000). Similarly, the belief that the out-
group’s character is negative and subhuman (the EOC theme of the adversary’s dele-
gitimization) should be associated with higher levels of intergroup hatred, because a
core appraisal of hatred is that wrongdoing by the outgroup is intentional and related
to the outgroup’s fundamental nature (Halperin, 2008). An additional connection
may be drawn between the EOC belief in security, its absence, and the constant need
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 175

to achieve it and intergroup fear, which stems from a perception of threat to the group
and relates to a desire to reduce this threat (Gray, 1987). As a final example, the belief
in the ingroup’s positive collective self-image should be associated with chronically
high levels of pride, a group-based emotion associated with the evaluation of the
group as meeting or exceeding desired standards (Lewis, 1999).
While the relationship between the contents of the beliefs of the EOC and emotions
has received some attention in the literature, the way that emotion may be shaped by
the needs and motivations underlying the adoption of this rightist, conflict-
supporting ideology has not. The findings brought forth by the recent view of ideol-
ogy as “motivated social cognition” (Jost et al., 2009) and especially those related
to the differing epistemic needs that characterize people of different ideologies indi-
cate that ideological differences are related to differences in fundamental cognitive
processes, even with regard to stimuli unrelated to one’s held ideology. For exam-
ple, Amodio, Jost, Master, and Yee (2007) found that leftist individuals outper-
formed rightist individuals in a go-no-go task requiring the management of cognitive
conflict, explaining that rightists’ higher need for certainty made them less equipped
to manage the task. This focus is relevant to the present discussion, because, as the
ever-growing literature on the relationship between emotion and cognition has dem-
onstrated, the neural circuitry of emotion and cognition interacts from early percep-
tion to decision making and reasoning (Phelps, 2006). Thus, cognitive processes
and the factors affecting them likely play a decisive role in shaping emotional
processes and determining emotional outcomes. In other words, it may be the case
that beyond the influence of ideological content—namely, EOC—on emotion, the
differing epistemic needs related to the adoption of such ideologies, such as needs
for certainty, security, and cognitive closure (see Jost et al., 2009), influence emo-
tional processes and outcomes by influencing the process through which new events
and information are appraised.
We argue that these attributes of the EOC may influence the emotional process
and its outcomes in several important ways. First, it may influence the emotion
experienced—its type or its intensity. Second, the EOC may influence the outcomes
of the emotional process, leading people to greater or lesser likelihoods to act in the
face of emotion or to different modes of behavior. Finally, it may have an impact on
processes related to emotion regulation, influencing individuals’ ability to regulate
their emotion, their motivation to do so, and the way in which they chose to do so
(see Fig. 3 for a full conceptual model of these influences).

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on Experienced Emotions

The EOC may exert an influence on the emotional process in several different ways.
First, in line with appraisal theories of emotions, ideological content should influ-
ence emotional reactions to new conflict-related occurrences by guiding people’s
appraisals of these occurrences. Accordingly, two individuals holding different ide-
ologies will respond differently to an emotion-eliciting event because they
176 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

differently appraise that event. Empirical findings support this approach, with
ideology leading to differences in emotional reactions, through the mediation of
appraisal processes (Halperin, 2011; Halperin, Pliskin et al., 2014; Kahn, Liberman,
Halperin, & Ross, in press). As discussed above, the EOC has been conceptual-
ized as a long-term factor influencing the appraisal of new events and stimuli
(see Halperin, Sharvit, et al., 2011), with its beliefs potentially feeding into
emotion-relevant appraisals.
Indeed, adherence to beliefs of the EOC has been found to lead to varying levels
of discrete emotions, such that higher adherence to the EOC leads to stronger fear,
anger, and hatred experiences in response to information about Palestinian inten-
tions (e.g., Halperin, 2011). Likewise, high EOC adherence leads to lower levels of
guilt and shame among Jewish Israelis in response to information on Israeli mis-
treatment of Palestinians at checkpoints (Sharvit & Zerachovich, 2014). A recent
reanalysis of two large data files collected in Israel in recent years,1 published here
for the first time, provides further support for these relationships between ideology,
measured either on a right to left scale or using the EOC scale, and discrete emo-
tions. More specifically, rightist ideology and adherence to EOC showed significant
negative correlations with compassion and empathy and positive correlations with
intergroup’s hatred, anger, and fear. Furthermore, when regressing either ideology
or EOC on all of these emotions, almost all remained significant predictors, indicat-
ing that each emotion is uniquely related to ideology, above and beyond the rela-
tionship between ideology and the other emotions. While these results are highly
intuitive, they provide empirical support for the existing theoretical intuitions.
In addition to the beliefs of the EOC, it is possible to conceptualize ideology in
the context of intractable conflict by examining its intensity or structure rather than
its content. To this end, the literatures on moral conviction and sacred values are
particularly useful. Moral conviction reflects the extent to which a person experi-
ences subjective evaluation of an attitude target in terms of fundamental right and
wrong (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Such fervor in adherence to ideology also
characterized strong adherents to the EOC in conflict situations, and thus it is a
relevant construct to examine in the present chapter. Moral conviction has also
been tied theoretically and empirically to differences in the experience of emotion.
Skitka and her colleagues (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka & Wisneski, 2011) pos-
ited that people might have stronger emotional associations with policy outcomes
when they hold positions with strong rather than weak moral conviction, proposing
that these emotional associations may help explain how morally convicted atti-
tudes motivate individuals toward various political behaviors. Indeed, empirical

1
Data file 1 consisted of a representative sample of 501 Jewish Israelis (253 females and 248
males) who voluntarily participated in a telephone survey conducted in Israel in October 2007, 3
weeks prior to the Annapolis Conference to relaunch peace negotiations. Data file 2 included a
representative sample of Jewish Israelis who completed an online questionnaire distributed by the
research firm Midgam Project (MP) in two waves: 808 participants responded in February 2012
(during a period of relative calm) and 402 (203 females and 199 males, ages ranging from 18 to
81, M = 45.65, SD = 15.4) responded again in November 2012 (during Israel’s 1-week military
operation in Gaza, a time of war).
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 177

work has demonstrated ties between moral conviction and anger (Mullen & Skitka,
2006) and also ties between morally convicted policy preferences and positive as well
as negative emotions (Skitka & Wisneski, 2011), with emotions partially mediating
the relationship between moral conviction and political behavioral intentions.
Research addressing moral conviction and emotions in the specific context of
intractable conflict (Reifen Tagar, Morgan, Skitka, & Halperin, 2014) examined
how both ideology and moral conviction were related to the experience of group-
based emotions, namely, anger and guilt. Jewish Israelis’ anger immediately after a
war between Israelis and Palestinians was predicted by political ideology, such that
rightists were angrier at the Palestinians than leftists. Guilt, however, was predicted
by ideology only for those high on moral conviction, namely, Israelis on the left and
right differed in their levels of guilt substantially only when moral conviction was
high. With these results in mind, it may be important, in the future, to also consider
the effect of moral conviction on the emotions of strong rejecters of the EOC.

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on the Outcomes of Emotion

A second key aspect of the potential relationship between the EOC and emotions
in conflict relates to possible differences between people high or low in adherence
to the EOC in how they respond politically further to experiencing similar emo-
tions. When considering how levels of EOC may moderate the relationship between
discrete emotions and their outcomes, two emerging hypotheses emerge. Intuitively,
it may be argued that, in a conflict, the conflict-supporting rightist ideology is more
“hot emotional” than “cold cognitive” (see arguments in “How to Create a Leftist,”
2012; Kroeger, 2005), and therefore the positions of rightists should be most
guided by emotion. However, there is little evidence in the literature to support this
prediction. Conversely, research indicates that rightists’ positions change less than
others’ positions under different circumstances: ideological rightists such as high
adherents to the EOC are consistently found to be more rigid in their beliefs (Jost
et al., 2009; Stone & Smith, 1993). As stated earlier, the EOC provides a clear
ideological orientation to its adherents, providing certainty and security in the face
of the uncertain reality of life under conflict. This certainty may make individuals
high in EOC less susceptible to the effects of emotion. Therefore, it can be hypoth-
esized that individuals relatively low in adherence to the EOC would be guided by
their emotions more than high-EOC adherents.
We recently tested this interesting question and found consistent support for the
latter hypothesis across six studies (Pliskin, Bar-Tal, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2014),
all conducted in Israel. In two initial experimental studies, induced empathy raised
Jewish-Israeli leftists’, but not rightists’, support for conciliatory and humanitarian
policies toward an adversarial outgroup (Palestinians) and even a non-adversarial
outgroup (asylum seekers), even though the manipulation affected people’s empathy
regardless of their ideology. In a third experimental study, induced despair similarly
led to reduced support for gestures to the Palestinians only among leftists, despite
178 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

similarly affecting levels of despair for rightists and leftists alike. Then, a series of
correlational field studies provided further support for our hypothesis, this time
showing that both positive (empathy) and negative (anger and fear) emotional
processes were related to support for policies only among low-EOC (leftist) partici-
pants (both among Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel, PCIs), in posi-
tive (peace negations) as well as highly negative (wartime or threat by governmental
policies) conflict-related contexts (Pliskin et al., 2014). Similar trends were found
when examining the effects of induced fear (Pliskin, Sheppes, & Halperin, 2015) in
the context of intractable conflict.
We also have initial evidence that moral conviction moderates the relationship
between emotions and support for policies (Glik, Halperin, & Tamir, in preparation).
In two correlational studies conducted among Jewish ideological rightists in Israel
(i.e., Jewish Israelis particularly high in adherence to the EOC), participants
responded to measures of moral conviction, read an anger (Study 1) or empathy
(Study 2) inducing text, and then reported their levels of anger or empathy and their
support for conflict-related policies. Results revealed that the more morally convicted
the participants were, the more their willingness to support aggressive action was
related to their anger. Interestingly, this pattern also held true for empathy—in this
case an emotion somewhat at odds with these participants’ moral convictions. Among
participants who were morally convicted, there was a stronger relationship between
empathy and support for conciliatory policies toward the Palestinians. Thus, it
appears that there may be more nuanced variations among high-EOC individuals in
their susceptibility to the effects of emotion, beyond the differences between them
and low-EOC individuals.

The Effect of the Ethos of Conflict on Processes of Emotion

Regulation

Finally, it is important to examine the influence that the EOC may have on processes
related to emotion regulation. No studies have been published specifically addressing
the various facets of this relationship, but it is possible to hypothesize as to its nature,
and there are a few initial unpublished empirical indications regarding it. First, it is
possible to view the EOC as a potent motivator to experience—and therefore regu-
late—emotions. Rightist ideology, more generally, is associated with resistance to
change, and therefore rightists may be motivated to feel anger in the face of attempts
to change the status quo and therefore choose to upregulate anger in reaction to such
attempts. This is especially true in the context of intractable conflict, in which the
EOC functions to sustain the conflict and guides the interpretation of new informa-
tion. This ideology may thus motivate people adhering to it to upregulate pride or
downregulate empathy toward the outgroup, in accordance with the societal beliefs
in a positive collective self-image and the outgroup’s delegitimization, respec-
tively. Initial findings from an experimental study examining ideology as a possi-
ble motivation to up- or downregulate emotions provide support for this hypothesis.
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 179

When Jewish Israelis were given a distraction-based emotion regulation strategy

before viewing an empathy-eliciting presentation regarding an injured Palestinian,
they either up- or downregulated empathy (compared to a control condition), depend-
ing on their ideology: rightists’ empathy decreased, but leftists’ empathy increased
(Porat et al., in preparation). Interestingly, a similar manipulation of cognitive
resources, used by Sharvit and her colleagues (2015), also decreased the negative
association between guilt and rightist ideology, with findings indicating that rightist
ideology is associated with decreased levels of guilt only when cognitive resources
are sufficient to allow for conscious downregulation of this emotion.
EOC may also serve to influence the effectiveness of various emotion regulation
strategies—both due to the motivation factor described above and because people of
different ideologies have differing cognitive and epistemic needs. Therefore, cogni-
tive change-based strategies of emotion regulation may prove more appealing and
effective for people low on the EOC, as leftists in general tend to be higher on need
for cognition (Sargent, 2004). An alternative, opposite hypothesis might be that
because leftists are higher on the need for cognition, low-EOC individuals tend to
employ strategies for cognitive change automatically (for evidence that leftists auto-
matically “correct” their initial response, see Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, &
Chamberlin, 2002) and therefore will be largely unaffected by an intervention
designed to promote the use of this strategy, compared to high-EOC individuals. One
study, referenced above, has examined these possibilities, finding moderate support
for the second hypothesis. When Jewish Israeli leftists read reappraisal (versus neu-
tral) instructions before reading a text about PCIs, it had no effect on their levels of
negative emotion. When their rightist counterparts underwent the same proce-
dure, those in the reappraisal condition reported lower levels of negative emotion
toward the Palestinians than those in the control condition (Halperin, Pliskin
et al., 2014). Nonetheless, no other studies have tackled this question directly, and
these hypotheses remain to be thoroughly examined.

Summary and Thoughts for the Future

As we have seen above, the central and potent role played by emotions in intractable
conflict is growing clearer and clearer over the past few years (for a full review, see
Halperin, 2014). Indeed, emotions may serve to explain the process by which the
EOC—Daniel Bar-Tal’s conceptualization of the specific societal beliefs that serve
as the dominant ideology in societies in conflict—exerts its influence over individu-
als’ attitudes and behaviors. But beyond understanding the importance of emotions
and their study in this context, it is important to understand that emotional processes
and their regulation are also a product of the specific context. Therefore, the study
of emotions should not be implanted “as is” from other disciplines into political
psychology, as if the emotions exist in a vacuum. When examining emotions in the
context of intractable conflict, the EOC is a uniquely important feature of the context,
as it is prevalent, strong, and constantly promoted by individuals and societal
180 R. Pliskin and E. Halperin

institutions (see Bar-Tal, 2013). While we believe this is true in the context of any
intractable conflict, this statement is all the more relevant in the Israeli-Palestinian
context, within which Bar-Tal initially developed the concept of an EOC. In this
chapter, we examined how the EOC shapes emotional processes in this context by
influencing the extent to which individuals experience various emotions, their sus-
ceptibility to the downstream effects of these emotions, and their willingness and
ability to regulate their emotional experiences.
Throughout the chapter, we examined existing findings and hypothesized as to
the possible effects of the EOC wherever findings were lacking. An important next
step would be to identify these and other gaps in our understanding of the influence
the EOC may have on various stages in the emotional process and develop studies
to bridge these gaps. Such studies should both examine how these influences may
be manifested in societies involved in intractable conflict, such as Israeli society,
and include innovative experimental methods to explore the causality and inner
workings of these processes. Of all the issues examined above, the clearest gap
exists in our understanding of how the EOC might shape emotion regulation pro-
cesses in the context of intractable conflicts. Because processes of emotion regula-
tion may provide an important key to overcoming barriers to conflict resolution, this
may be the most urgent gap to fill in our empirical knowledge with regard to the
EOC-emotion relationship.
Another important avenue for future examination would be to understand the
other side of the reciprocal EOC-emotion relationship: namely, how repeated
emotional experiences shape adherence to the EOC. A central assumption in the
theory on psychological barriers to conflict resolution is that such effects occur
(see Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), but there is little empirical data to illustrate and
illuminate the process by which emotions exert their influence on the EOC. One
recent empirical examination (Sharvit, 2014) begins to shed light on this process.
Its findings indicate that inducing anxiety and negative emotions in individuals
leads to the greater automatic activation of EOC beliefs, even when such an induc-
tion is unrelated to the conflict. Furthermore, it appears that this activation occurs
outside direct awareness, as the resulting distress is unrelated to explicit self-
reported adherence to the EOC (Sharvit, 2014). This initial demonstration of a
way in which emotional experience shapes and reinforces the EOC (see also
Canetti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, in press) proves that while an exam-
ination of the causal influence of emotions on the EOC may be challenging and
may require a complex longitudinal design, its findings and their significance
would be exceptionally rewarding.
Finally, the present discussion focused on the Israeli context, Bar-Tal’s native
context, and one of international importance due to the centrality of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict on the global agenda. Accordingly, the findings brought here are
mostly those collected in this context. While findings on the EOC from other societ-
ies involved in conflict exist, they are few, and even fewer have tackled its relationship
with emotional processes. Therefore, it is important that future research expand our
understanding of these interrelations to other societies, illuminating similarities across
specific contexts, but also differences stemming from specific contextual differences.
Emotions and Emotion Regulation in Intractable Conflict and Their Relation… 181

Findings from a multitude of societies would enrich the literatures in political

psychology and conflict resolution, but, more importantly, they could help guide
attempts to promote effective conflict resolution, in which both general psychologi-
cal processes and unique contextual differences are taken into account.

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 Part V
The Role of Education
When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter
Otherness: Educational Case Study

Ohad David

In recent decades the social sciences have shown an extensive theoretical and
scientific interest in defining the reciprocal relationship between “identity” and
“otherness,” as well as analyzing the dynamic impact one has on the other. It appears
that globalization, which creates transnational identities, and the multicultural era,
which has given birth to the politics of identity and sub-nationalities, have awak-
ened a discourse over the definition of both of these concepts (Ben-Rafael &
Sternberg, 2001; Deaux, 2006). Within the science of social psychology, the theo-
ries of social identity and self-categorization have created a foundation for the
understanding of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes which lead to
dividing social stimuli into groups (categories), defining the boundaries between an
in-group and an out-group, and adopting behaviors consistent with the membership
in the in-group (Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oaks, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987). All the models analyzing the concept of identity in sociopsycho-
logical, sociological, and/or anthropological terms have recognized the crucial role
of defining the boundaries between self-identity and other identities in the process
of forming one’s own identity as well as in intergroup processes (Ashmore, Deaux,
& McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Ben-Rafael, 2002; Brewer, 1991; David & Bar-Tal,
2009; Eriksen, 1995). In political science, theories of nationality have faced issues
such as the boundaries of citizenship and conflicts between national identities and
the identities of ethnic minorities (Brown, 2000; Yakobson & Rubinstein, 2010).
And in the field of education, complex dilemmas have been debated, such as the role
of the national educational system in maintaining national solidarity, teaching val-
ues, and imparting fundamental ethoses, as opposed to recognizing the cultural
plurality of students (Banks, 2004; Schlesinger, 1993).

O. David (*)
Faculty of Education, Levinsky College of Education, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 187

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_12
188 O. David

However, it would be a mistake to assume that “identity” and “otherness” are

relatively new concepts or social realities; they are as old as humanity. According to
the biblical story, man succeeded in building the Tower of Babel because “the whole
earth was of one language and of one speech” (Genesis 11:1). The declaration that
all of those present spoke one language is not limited to a linguistic characteriza-
tion, but in a broader conceptual sense, it describes people who had only one system
of codes, values, and behavioral norms which allowed them to coordinate their
activity and build the tower. However, the moment that God confused their language
so that they began speaking in different languages, they could not continue building
Babel and were scattered over the face of the earth. From that time until today, the
encounter between different identities is simultaneously the basis for benevolent
deeds and troublesome confrontations.
In this chapter, I will propose three different paradigms through which we can
interpret the connections and tensions that exist between the concepts of “identity”
and “otherness.” Subsequently, I will consider the implementation of this theoretical
analysis in a specific context related to the intractable conflict in which Israeli soci-
ety is involved. An important observation in Bar-Tal’s work is that almost all intrac-
table conflicts are identity based (Bar-Tal, 2013). There is no doubt that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is such. Both the Jews and the Palestinians perceive the
conflict in terms such as sovereignty in the territory which is “our homeland” and
“the cradle of our culture tradition” (Morris, 2001). Therefore, it is extremely
important to analyze the role of each paradigm in encouraging or moderating the
intractability of the conflict. The implementation of the theoretical analysis will be
based on an educational program which was devised and put into practice in an
elementary school in Israel following expressions of racism against Muslims.

Three Paradigms of Identity

Like many theoretical definitions, the meaning of “identity” in general and “national
identity” in particular is dependent upon the paradigmatic glasses through which we
view these concepts. Sagi (2006) proposed three different models for the analysis of
the concepts of “identity” and “otherness” in three opposing ways.
The basis for the paradigm of essentialism is that identity is a fixed, coherent,
and homogenic trait, which is not dependent upon transitory historic, cultural, and
social contexts; it exists by virtue of itself—a natural “given” into which an indi-
vidual is cast at birth. This paradigm factors identity as an innate essence which is
formed through internal-group processes, rather than one that has been shaped by a
historic and social process, in which others have a distinct role in its formation and
development. This approach does not maintain, of course, that no other identities
exists other than self-identity, but it does underrate the role of other identities in
forming a self-identity and establishing its singularity. Essentialism emphasizes the
constant striving for authenticity: only those who bear the characteristics which are
identifiable as essential to defining the collective (beliefs, values, norms) can be
When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter Otherness: Educational Case Study 189

considered individuals who authentically embody their identity in their lives. In

light of this view, cultural exchanges with other identities are seen as a threat to the
authenticity and uniqueness of the self-identity, since they harbor a danger of alter-
ing its firm and homogeneous essence, as well as endangering individuals’ true
loyalty and commitment to their collective identity.
The paradigm of essentialism thus magnifies the self and negates the role of the
other in the process of forming one’s own identity. In contrast, the paradigm of
radical constructionism deconstructs identity while at the same time magnifies
otherness. It emphasizes the march of the Western world toward a global and cos-
mopolitan era, in which national identities will play a secondary role, if any, in
defining one’s concept of belonging (Habermas, 2001). Furthermore, as far as the
radical constructionist is concerned, there is no such thing as a “real unique iden-
tity.” Individuals and collectives invent themselves over and over again through
their contact and negotiations with others (Bauman, 1995). Therefore, the “other”
is the sole medium through which identity is constructed. The ideology of multi-
culturalism associated with postmodernism and post-colonialism, which maintains
that national identity is the product of constant conflict with others, is an explicit
application of this paradigm. This ideology deals with the dissolution of hege-
monic national identities and the strengthening of the identity of “others” (the
generic name given to minorities), which, according to this approach, have been
repressed by hegemonic national collectives (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991;
Chambers, 1994). For example, Yona and Shenhav (2005) maintain that “our view-
point requires us to adopt an asymmetrical attitude toward efforts to establish col-
lective identities—while it criticizes the practices involved in creating
ethno-national identities that lead to the creation of a cultural, political and eco-
nomic hegemony… it supports these practices when they are adopted by groups
trying to free themselves from that hegemony” (p. 154).
The third paradigm suggested by Sagi is the paradigm of moderate construc-
tionism, which maintains that identity and otherness are constituted in a reciprocal
manner: the formation of an identity is a dynamic process during which a dialogue
is maintained vis-à-vis other identities. The dialogue is based on recognizing a
unique self-identity, and confirming the authentic existence of the core of this entity,
while maintaining the possibility of transcending this identity through cultural
exchanges and dialogue with other identities. The foundation, or core, of self-
identity includes the primary complex of beliefs, feelings, and practices available to
the individual or society, which determine their basic attitudes toward the social
world. Nevertheless, the dialogical character of identity formation allows the indi-
vidual or society to deviate from these primary components to encounter new con-
texts of meaning. In the process of dialogue, human beings decide what part of the
“other” will become integrated in their own self-identity (if at all) and what part of
the other’s identity will be rejected. This is a process of redefining and reinterpret-
ing one’s self-identity, which distances us from what Taylor (1994) calls the “mono-
logical ideal” typical of the paradigm of essentialism and from the fragmental ideal
and the lack of commitment and loyalty that is characteristic of the paradigm of
radical constructionism.
190 O. David

Identity and Otherness in the Context of Intractable Conflict

According to Bar-Tal (2013), a society that is engulfed in an intractable conflict

develops a sociopsychological infrastructure which helps it in dealing with the con-
stant state of conflict, and this becomes the prism through which the society inter-
prets events related to the conflict. Within this infrastructure, I wish to describe two
elements which are particularly relevant to the present discussion.
The first pertains to the societal beliefs of positive self-image, de-legitimization of
the enemy and victimhood, which are part of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000).
The societal beliefs related to positive self-image paint self-identity in bright and favor-
able colors, suggesting that those who bear this identity possess positive characteristics
and that the entire collective behaves according to values which are moral and just. In
contrast, the societal beliefs of de-legitimization label the enemies—meaning, of course,
the “others”—with extremely negative social characteristics, describing them as the
ones who act outside the boundaries of accepted norms and human values. The combi-
nation of these two societal beliefs creates a prism which maximizes the distinction
between the in-group and the out-group, but also the homogeneity within each one of
them. In addition, the societal belief of victimhood puts the blame for the eruption, esca-
lation, and continuance of the conflict on the shoulders of the enemy and focuses on the
atrocities done by the adversary. These three societal beliefs are internalized into the
collective’s self-identity and become part of its contents (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004).
The second element I wish to emphasize is collective emotional orientation: the
strong feelings which have developed in individuals who have been exposed to the
conflict for a long period of time, which are now shared by members of the society due
to their broad exposure to a variety of social media. Most important to the present dis-
cussion are the negative emotions of fear and hatred (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, 2008).
Life in the shadow of extreme violence, physical destruction, and extensive killing gives
rise to collective fear. It is not only the fear associated with the next violent event, but
mainly a fear from the generalized “other.” The fear is not directed at the enemies just
because of the possibility that they could harm one physically, but rather because their
beliefs negate the mere existence of the self-identity. In addition, feelings of collective
hatred could arise toward the others, who are perceived as the enemy, fostering violent
acts against them. It should be noted that the beliefs and negative feelings discussed here
could conceivably spread to include not only the enemies themselves but any person or
group who is identified in one way or another with the enemies. Negative stereotypes,
prejudice, and expressions or acts of racism are the result of generalizations such as
these (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Spears, Oaks, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997).

Implications for the Educational Arena

I would like now to combine the notions derived from the two theoretical frame-
works outlined above into a holistic view and to consider its educational impli-
cations. My argument will be as follows: the attitude of educators and educational
When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter Otherness: Educational Case Study 191

programs to the question of identity and otherness expressed through a particu-

lar paradigmatic lens might intensify the sociopsychological infrastructure of
intractable conflict or moderate it. Both the paradigms of essentialism and of
radical constructionism go hand in hand with the intensification of this infra-
structure. The first one tends to interpret contacts with others as a possible threat
to the authenticity of self-identity. “Others” are categorically “others,” so that
between myself and their “otherness,” a distinct and clear boundary exists. The
second paradigm “attributes the ‘other’ the exact same thing that it negates from
the self-identity” (Sagi, 2006, p. 229), i.e., the legitimacy of its existence as a
genuine cultural and historical phenomenon. It delegitimizes the self-identity
and puts the “other” in a position of the ultimate victim.1 In contrast, the para-
digm of moderate constructionism is the only paradigm which might be applied
in the educational arena toward moderating the sociopsychological infrastruc-
ture of intractable conflict, because it is the only one which legitimizes both
sides of the conflict.

Identity and Otherness: Educational Case Study

In order to examine the argument above, I will now present an educational case
study. This educational program was devised and implemented by teachers and
students at an elementary school in Israel in response to the occurrence of inci-
dents of racism on soccer fields in Israel. In the season of 2012–2013, two
Chechen Muslims joined the Beitar Jerusalem soccer team. Hundreds of Beitar
fans objected to allowing the Chechens to play on the team, claiming that only
Jewish players should be allowed on the team, and certainly not Muslims, the
religion identified with the Arab enemy.
The school administrators decided that they could not ignore such incidents
and initiated a program based on a staged courtroom.2 The real incidents provided
background material for the trial, but some fictional details were added: the team’s
management gave in to the pressure asserted by the fans and fired the Muslim
players under the pretense of “incompatibility with the social and cultural compo-
sition of the team” (in reality, the Chechens remained on the team). The dismissed
players appealed to the court, contending their contracts had been breached
because they were foreigners.

1
For a critical review of the dichotomy between essentialism and radical constructionism, see
Calhoun (1994, 2007) and Smith (2000).
2
The program was initiated as part of the school’s progress towards the “Ma’arag Award—
Excellence in Jewish, Zionist and Civic Education.” I wish to thank the school’s principal and
teachers who initiated the program for letting me use their educational materials.
192 O. David

The Prosecution’s Arguments

The prosecution began its argument with the claim that Israel is a democratic state and
therefore is obligated to maintain certain values: “The State of Israel is a democratic
country. The Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty applies to honoring basic
human rights; its purpose is to protect individual persons’ dignity. Israeli law forbids
racial discrimination. In the case at hand, the cessation of employment was due to
racial discrimination. The Beitar team had employed foreign players in the past, but
not Muslims; therefore the plea of the social composition of the team cannot be an
argument.” This argument is universal in its nature: it is based on a policy of human
rights derived from the liberal-democratic Western culture of which Israel is a part.
However, these claims did not satisfy the prosecution, which turned to defend its
arguments on the basis of Jewish culture itself: “The Hebrew law and Jewish tradition
defend the plea that the attitude toward foreigners must be humane. The Bible warns us
about our treatment toward foreigners 36 times: ‘The stranger who sojourns with you
shall be to you as the native among you and you shall love him as yourself; for you
were strangers in the land of Egypt’.” The prosecution even quoted a judgment made
by the assistant chief justice, Judge Menachem Aylon, who wrote: “It appears that there
is not another individual about whose treatment the Bible so repeatedly warns us such
as the foreigner, if in words or in deeds…as foreigners we were in Egypt.”
Later in the trial, one of the fired players is called to the stand and says: “At school
I learned about everything that happened to the Jewish people, and I thought that a
nation that had suffered from racism would behave according to other standards.” It
appears that the prosecution was calling upon the collective memory of the Jews in
order to establish its argument that humane treatment of foreigners has not been
derived from liberal-democratic thought alone; it is a basic tenet of Jewish identity
itself. Both the prehistoric memory (of slavery in Egypt) and the more recent historic
memory (discrimination in the Diaspora) form a bridge of awareness between Jewish
suffering in the past and a moral beacon of behavior in the present.

The Argument for the Defense

The defense presented two types of arguments. The first was pragmatic: employing
foreign players causes more harm than benefit to the team. Economic damage due
to the cancellation of subscriptions by fans and moral damage that causes the team
to lose games are the main pragmatic claims. But then, the defense turns to a second
type of argument, which is of an ideological nature: “In the contract there is a clause
which states that there is a possibility of cancelling the contract with the players
when there is an incompatibility with the social-cultural mentality of the team.
Indeed there appears to be an incompatibility… these players were unable to adjust
to the team spirit. The team is Israeli and Jewish; it represents the State of Israel.
Israel is a Jewish state: the state emblem is the seven-branched candlestick
When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter Otherness: Educational Case Study 193

(Menorah) from the Temple; the Israeli flag bears the stripes of a prayer shawl
(Tallit); the national anthem begins with the words ‘a Jewish soul still yearns’…the
social and cultural fabric of the team is different.”
The arguments of the defense strongly stress the need perceived by the heads of
the team to prevent an encounter between the Jewish identity and other identities.
The Jewish character of the team identifies with the Jewish nature of the state, and
both of them are expressed in an essentialist terminology. The case presented here
is that preservation of the authentic Jewish identity of the state and the team requires
building walls of separation between Jews and non-Jews. The fact that the emblems
of the state are taken from Jewish culture, and express the national character of
Israel as the state of the Jewish people, constitutes a basis for defining all of the
social relationships existing under the political roof of the state in terms of possible
threat to an authentic Jewish identity.

The Court’s Judgment

The Court opens its judgment in the trial with: “In the case brought before us, there
seems to be a confrontation between the character of the state as a Jewish national
state and the state as a democratic entity. It is our duty to protect the values of the
State of Israel, as well as the balance between its Jewish nature and its democratic
nature.” This statement indicates the court’s stand that the values of the state and the
way it operates must represent both its nature as a Jewish national state and its
nature as a democratic state, sworn to protect human rights.
However, following the opening statement, the judges maintain that in the case
before them, there is no contradiction between the two value systems: “Throughout
the entire history the Jewish people has experienced the tragic consequences of rac-
ism… We cannot allow racism. Jewish culture pays special attention to foreigners.
Images of our slavery in Egypt as foreigners in a foreign land are imbedded in our
collective memory. Slavery in Egypt gave birth to the ideas of freedom of man and
ethical behavior towards foreigners and the weak among us… ‘One law and one
ordinance shall be for you and for the stranger who sojourns with you’ (Numbers
15:16)… In the spirit of this commentary, we can say that in order for the State of
Israel to be a Jewish state, it must be a humane and just state for all, including
minorities and the foreigners within it.”
If this is the case, the court adopts the language of the moderate constructionist
paradigm, according to which there is a Jewish national, religious, and cultural
identity, which has existed from ancient times until today as a unique identity.
However, this does not mean that cultural exchanges with others inevitably endan-
ger the authenticity of the Jewish identity. The opposite is true: a significant part of
the positive values on which that identity is based falls in the realm of humane and
equal relations toward the identities of others.
194 O. David

Deficiencies in the Arguments of the Prosecution and the Court

All the arguments on both sides were related to issues of Jewish identity. However,
while the defense emphasized the nationalistic elements of this identity (e.g., the
relationship between Jewish tradition and the emblems of the state and its character
as a Jewish state), the prosecution referred mainly to cultural and moral aspects
derived from traditional Jewish writings, mainly the Bible. But it could have
anchored its claims also on modern Zionist writings. By doing so, it would have
demonstrated that not only Jewish culture, but also the Zionist idea itself, is not
congruent with the essentialist point of view.
For example, the prosecution could have cited Benjamin Ze’ev Herzl, the man
who envisioned the establishment of the State of Israel. In his utopian novel
“Altneuland” (The Old New Land) ([1902], 1997), Herzl describes an election cam-
paign taking part in the Jewish state. The campaign centers around the conflict
between the party standing for ethnocentric and racist ideas and the liberal party
which supports the idea that the new society being formed in the Land of Israel must
be based on social equality. The racist party uses the slogan: “Whoever is not Jewish
will not be accepted to the new society.” In contrast, the liberal party affirmed that
“we must preserve that which has made us a great nation: freedom of thought and
expression, tolerance and love of humanity. Only then will Zion really be Zion.”
The prosecution could have also cited Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder of the
Revisionist party (the secular right-wing party in the Zionist movement), and its
youth movement, Beitar. As mentioned above, Beitar is also the sports association
to which the soccer team discussed here belongs. Therefore, it would have been of
special importance to understand Jabotinsky’s worldview concerning identity and
otherness and to present it during the trial. Jabotinsky was a realpolitik and a liberal
Zionist leader. He believed that the Arab national movement in Palestine will use
military force to prevent the Zionists from achieving their national goals. Therefore,
he called upon building what is known as an “Iron Wall” against it, so that it will
recognize that the Jewish national movement cannot be defeated. Yet, at the same
time, Jabotinsky developed a comprehensive worldview of the relationships that
should exist between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in the future Jewish
state. These relationships should be based on full equality: “Even after the forma-
tion of a Hebrew [=Jewish] majority [in the Land of Israel], there will always be
here a large Arab population. And if this part of the population will know bad times,
then all population will suffer. Therefore, the solid political, economic, and cultural
condition of the Arabs will always be the basis for a healthy and solid country. Full
equal rights of both nations, both languages and all religions will prevail in the
Hebrew State” (Jabotinsky, 1953, p. 298).
Both examples of Herzl and Jabotinsky are expressions of identity taken from the
paradigm of moderate constructionism: a national Jewish identity exists, and it
receives recognition and legitimacy within an independent political entity. Social
communications with others under the umbrella of the state furthers ratification of
that identity on the one hand and a fruitful dialogue with other identities on the other.
When Jewish and Zionist Identities Encounter Otherness: Educational Case Study 195

Summary and Educational Implications

There is no doubt that the sociopsychological processes which create collective

identities require that borders be defined between self-identity and the identity of
others. Without these boundaries and without defining the singular characteristics
of the in-group, the concept of identity has no meaning. The controversy dis-
cussed in this chapter relates to the nature of the boundaries and of the relation-
ships formed between identities.
The analysis of the mock trial shows how arguments based on essentialism of
identity emphasize—directly or indirectly—raising the walls of separation between
Jewish identity and Muslim identity, which is in keeping with the intensification of
the sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict. It includes negative ste-
reotyping, feelings of threat and fear, and beliefs which create a dichotomy between
positive self-identity and negative otherness (Bar-Tal, 2013). In contrast, the argu-
ments that were based on a moderate constructionist way of thinking emphasized—
clearly or by inference—the need to lower the walls of separation between Jews and
Muslims and create relationships between Jews and Muslims based on mutual
respect and humanism in order to contribute to a change in the sociopsychological
foundation of the conflict.
All in all, the moderate constructionist view is the only one among the three
paradigms presented here which answers the challenge of identity and otherness.
The other two paradigms annul one side of the equation or, at best, do not give it
the place it deserves. In contrast, the paradigm of moderate constructionism main-
tains that identity and otherness are two sides of the same coin. Thus, the educa-
tional system has to implement pedagogical programs that will allow students to
deal with questions and dilemmas which arise from the encounter between their
national and cultural self-identity and other identities. This notion has great sig-
nificance when we turn to conceptualize the roles of the educational system in
peacebuilding processes (see, e.g., Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2009;
Salomon, 2002; Vered, Chap. 13). This theme is, of course, beyond the scope of
this chapter. But it is worth mentioning that it is not possible to educate students
to “recognize the national identity of the other” without fostering their own
national identity and facilitating identification with the in-group. For this reason,
the arguments in the trial which were based on moderate constructionism facili-
tated the cultivation of a national Jewish-Zionist identity among the students and
at the same time developed their willingness to engage in a dialogue with the
other. Most of the arguments which denounced prejudices and racism stemmed
from Jewish and Zionist culture and history themselves. It should be noted that
the analysis here dealt with relations between Jews and Muslims in which those
involved were not Israeli Arabs or Palestinians. However, the conceptual analysis
made here is valid in terms of all encounters between identities and certainly rela-
tive to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
196 O. David

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Peace Education Between Theory
and Practice: The Israeli Case

Soli Vered

Education has long been perceived as an essential tool in promoting social change.
Alongside providing knowledge, the educational system also instills values, symbols,
norms, collective memories, attitudes, perceptions, and social as well as national
goals. As such, it serves as a central socialization agent by which societies con-
struct, reinforce, and transmit their social ethos to younger generations (Dreeben,
1968; Himmelweit & Swift, 1969). Through curricula, textbooks, learning materi-
als, teaching in the classroom, and extracurricular activities, the educational system
transmits messages and narratives that have a wide-ranging impact on political,
social, and cultural processes. Among these are also processes concerning war and
peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; Firer & Adwan, 2004; Slater, 1995).
In recent decades, peace education became accepted throughout the world as an
educational element necessary for modern democratic societies. Generally speak-
ing, it aims to reject violence and conflict and promote a culture of peace against the
culture of war (see Iram, 2006). This educational effort strives to encourage justice
and equality, to foster tolerance toward the other, to eliminate prejudices and stereo-
types, to impart skills in conflict resolution, and to increase tolerance and trust
between rival groups (Bar-Tal, 2002; Bjerstedt, 1993; Danesh, 2006).
Peace education has many faces, and it is carried out in various ways and at dif-
ferent levels corresponding to society’s needs, characteristics, and goals and the
sociopolitical context (see Bar-Tal, 2002; Harris, 1999; Salomon, 2002). Various
definitions have been suggested, seeking to encompass this broad field (see, e.g.,
Fountain, 1999; Reardon, 1988, 2000; Harris, 1988; Staub, 2002). However,
according to Salomon and Cairns (2010), the fundamental conception of peace
education relates to edupsychological processes that take place in the context of

S. Vered (*)
School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 199

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_13
200 S. Vered

war, threat, violence, and conflict and addresses attitudes, beliefs, skills, and
behaviors in such contexts.
In societies involved in intractable conflict (see Sharvit, Chap. 1), peace educa-
tion is designed to instill a new worldview in the younger generation – new atti-
tudes, values, motivations, and skills that are consistent with principles of
reconciliation and a culture of peace. These include new conceptions regarding the
nature of the conflict and the nature of peace, regarding one’s ingroup and the
opposing party, and of the need to reconcile. The new approaches are destined to
replace those thinking patterns, shared beliefs, motivations, and emotions which
nurtured the conflict and which were built and reinforced for decades. Peace educa-
tion thus involves a process of social change, since it must overcome a deep-rooted
sociopsychological infrastructure that supports the conflict and contradicts the fun-
damentals of peace building (Bar-Tal, 2013; Firer, 2002; Salomon, 2002, 2011).
Noteworthy is that even societies engaged in deadly prolonged conflict cherish
the value of peace, which in fact is one of the leading themes in the conflict-
supporting narrative of ethos of conflict (see Oren, Chap. 8, Shaked, Chap. 9).
However, peace in this regard is presented as a general, abstract, amorphous, and
idyllic aspiration, a utopian dream or a heart’s wish. Genuine education for peace,
on the other hand, involves specific reference to certain beliefs, images, ideas, per-
ceptions, and emotions. When it truly educates for peace, then, the school system
may serve as a central instrument for communicating messages and contents that
actually support ending the conflict and encourage reconciliation between the par-
ties. Thus, peace education may contribute to nurturing young people who will
become agents for positive social change as regards to a peaceful resolution of the
conflict and establishing peaceful relation between the rivals (Ardizzone, 2001;
Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2010; Clarken, 1986; Smith, 2010).
Peace education, therefore, is perceived to be a crucial element in promoting
peace building and establishing conditions required for reconciling (Aall, Helsing,
& Tidwell, 2007). Indeed, there are societies and nations that have started imple-
menting peace education programs as mechanisms for social change, even while
still being involved in conflicts, indicating their strategic intention to embark on the
path toward peace (see, e.g., in Northern Ireland, Duffy, 2000; Smith, 1995, 1999,
and in Cyprus, Papadakis, 2008; Zembylas, 2011).
These widely accepted perceptions are also reflected in Israel’s state education
goals, one of which is “educating toward the desire for peace and tolerance in rela-
tions among people and nations” (State Education Law 1953; Amendment Act
2000). Given that peace education is marked as one of its goals, this chapter seeks
to examine Israel’s education policies applied in practice over the years in light of
the prolonged Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as related to political
and social developments that took place in its course. Specifically, it intends to
investigate whether and how Israel’s peace education policy reflected crucial events
and movement toward peace that took place since the late 1970s, as well as escala-
tions of the conflict in recent years.
The examination of Israel’s educational policies in changing contexts will relate
to two models of direct and indirect peace education suggested by Bar-Tal, Rosen,
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case 201

et al. (2010). Their conceptualization outlines the scope of possible themes of peace
education within varying circumstances of conflict and the given political-societal
and educational conditions, as will be hereinafter described.

Direct and Indirect Peace Education

In his book on sociopsychological foundations and dynamics of intractable con-

flicts, Bar-Tal (2013, Chapter 3) describes the context of conflict and its determi-
native influence on society members who take part in it. He notes that an
intractable conflict is not stable but has a dynamic nature. Its context, referring to
environmental as well as psychological conditions, changes over time in various
directions.
In evaluating the development of peace education, four contextual levels may be
considered (see also Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). The first level refers to the overall
context of the conflict and its fluctuations of low or high intensity. It includes such
circumstances as the levels of violence, the status of the peace process, and the
behavior of the rival which influence the beliefs of ethos of conflict and the emo-
tions among society members. The second contextual level concerns the ruling gov-
ernment and political climate, which determine the levels of closedness or openness
of the society, restricted or free flow of information, obstruction or legitimation of
alternative views, and so forth. Obviously, the leaders’ ideology, their views regard-
ing the conflict, and their perceptions of the goals of education constitute an impor-
tant backdrop to the development of peace education. A third context to be
considered is the views of society members regarding the conflict and the levels of
objection or support of the public for the peace process. This includes also the levels
of opposition or ripeness of the society to changing the ethos of conflict and recon-
ciling with the rival. Lastly, the fourth level of context refers to the standing of for-
mal educational authorities in leading particular educational policies and their
mobilization for the missions of the intractable conflict or, alternatively, in support
of peace-building processes. This aspect is particularly important in centralized
educational systems, in which the education ministry determines the contents of
educational policy and its implementation.
As noted, Bar-Tal et al. (2010) present two types of peace education depending
on the political-societal climate and educational conditions at the background of its
development. They suggest that when the political-societal conditions are favorable
to the development of peace education, and the educational system is ready both
administratively and pedagogically for this major endeavor, it is possible to imple-
ment direct peace education. Supportive contexts are created when a peace agree-
ment is achieved, violence has ceased, the leaders convey messages of peacemaking,
and at least a majority of society members substantially support the peace process.
Under these circumstances, education can relate directly and specifically to the
themes of the culture of conflict that characterized the involved societies, which
served as barriers to the conflict’s peaceful resolution.
202 S. Vered

Direct peace education focuses, then, on changing beliefs, attitudes, values, and
behaviors related to the culture of conflict. In addition, it presents themes that allow
construction of a new culture based on an ethos of peace, including new collective
memories and an emotional orientation of hope and trust rather than fear and hatred.
Possible themes of direct peace education may include general studies of peace and
conflict; reference to the particular conflict in which the society is involved, as well
as to the peace process on its meanings and implications; change in the presentation
of the opponent concerning legitimization, equalization, differentiation, and person-
alization of the rival group; reanalysis of the history of conflict and reconsideration
of past acts by both parties; and more.
However, the political-societal conditions are often unfavorable to the develop-
ment of peace education and do not allow challenging themes of the culture of
conflict – such as the conflict’s goals, its course, its cost, or the image of the rival.
Indeed, when violence or hostile rhetoric of the opponent still continues, it is very
hard, if not impossible, to carry out direct peace education. In such a context, the
beliefs of the ethos of conflict as well as emotions of fear, distrust, and hatred are
reinforced. Consequently, large segments of the society support continuation of the
conflict and object to a peace process. Moreover, contents of direct peace education
in these circumstances are perceived by the institutions and society members as
being detrimental to the common efforts to withstand the rival.
Under these conditions, Bar-Tal et al. propose that it is possible to engage in
indirect peace education. This type of education suggests that the scope of themes
to be addressed within the school system could be limited to fostering general skills,
dispositions, and values relevant to peacemaking and reconciliation. These themes
contribute to the solidification of democracy and humanism in general and thus
can – and should – be part of the educational line of every society that cherishes
these values.
These may include, for example, dealing with questions of identity and multicul-
turalism, enhancing sensitivity to human rights, stressing the rejection of violence,
instilling tolerance and empathy toward other ethnic groups, fostering critical think-
ing, and nurturing conflict resolution skills. Indirect peace education does not aim
to promote profound sociopsychological change in the short term, but rather aspires
to establish a new sociopsychological repertoire conducive to peacemaking indi-
rectly. This new repertoire can focus on general themes and values of democracy
and humanism that do not directly negate the contents of the ethos and collective
memory of conflict. The ultimate purpose of indirect peace education is for the
young generation to transfer these general insights to the context of the conflict
eventually, so that in the long run they may contribute to its peaceful resolution.
In general, then, it can be expected that when a peace process is underway and
has public support, the political-societal climate will allow direct peace education.
Whereas when the conflict still continues, violence takes place, and the sociopsy-
chological repertoire of the ethos of conflict is dominant among the majority of
society members – only indirect peace education can be applied in the school sys-
tem. The primary importance of the conceptualization of these two models is in
proposing that some kind of peace education could be implemented under any
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case 203

circumstances; not only in response to a peace process, but also under unfavorable
conditions, and even in a state of ongoing conflict.
In order to examine how these possibilities were reflected in Israel’s state educa-
tion, the next part provides a general overview of Israel’s educational policies
applied in practice over the years of changes in the context of the conflict and in the
political, societal, and educational conditions. Examination of the Israeli case may
provide an answer to the question of whether, and what kind of, peace education can
indeed be applied in varying circumstances in the complex reality of living with
conflict. Thus, while the present chapter focuses on Israel’s education policies, the
results of such a review may contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities
of implementing peace education – whether direct or indirect – in other societies
involved in intractable conflict.

Peace Education in the Test of Reality: Israeli Chronicles

Israel’s educational policies have gone through significant changes over the past
decades with regard to conflict and peace (see Vered, 2015). They reflected the
evolution of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict and were influenced by its
sociopsychological infrastructure that has also transformed over the years
(see Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4, Oren, Chap. 8). These changes were also reflected in
transformations of the national narrative presented in learning materials and text-
books used in schools. Numerous studies have examined the representation of the
Israeli-Arab conflict and of Arabs in Israeli textbooks in different periods of the
conflict (see, e.g., Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, 2013; Bar-Gal, 1993; Bar-Tal, 1998;
David, 2012; Firer, 1985; Firer & Adwan, 2004; Podeh, 2002, Chap. 7). A thorough
review of these studies is beyond the scope of the present chapter, yet the following
overview relies, in part, on their findings.

High Intractability: Educating for Conflict (1948–Mid-1970s)

At the climax of the Israeli-Arab conflict, from the late 1940s until the 1970s, the
political-societal conditions prevented the development of any educational line rem-
iniscent of peace education. The life of Israelis during these decades took on all the
characteristics of an intractable conflict in their high intensity. The societal beliefs
of ethos of conflict prevailed in Israeli society, and the hegemonic culture of conflict
was dominant (Oren, Chap. 8). This dominance was well reflected in the educa-
tional system, which was used to hand down to the younger generation the hege-
monic Zionist narrative and its values. To support processes of building the newly
established state, education in this period focused on creating social cohesion and
provided the youth with a national identity assured of its righteousness and strength.
In these contexts, the goal of the Ministry of Education was to educate students for
204 S. Vered

constant mobilization as citizens of a state surrounded by enemies seeking its

destruction (see Firer, 1985; Kizel, 2008; Yogev, 2010).
Podeh (2002) points out that, in fact, the educational system at this stage did not
develop any clear position at all regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. Thus, although
hatred toward Arabs was not intentionally built into the educational system, the
system still conveyed militant messages and the most negative attitudes toward
Arabs. This approach reinforced the ideological and cultural consensus among
Israeli society regarding the conflict and the image of the Arab. In the long run, then,
the absence of an educational policy concerning the “Arab question” contributed to
the formation and perpetuation of hostility between the parties.
However, over time, several significant events and developments that have taken
place have moderated some of the conflict’s intractable features and affected the
relations between Jews and Arabs in the region. These changes were followed also
by transformations in the repertoire of the sociopsychological infrastructure of the
Jewish society in Israel, as certain segments of the society have altered their beliefs,
attitudes, and feelings regarding the conflict and its goals.
The 1967 war marked the first step toward changes in the educational policy
regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict. Its results led to political, cultural, and societal
changes in Israeli society, including processes of democratization and openness,
growing awareness of the Arab problem, and legitimization of the existence of a
Palestinian entity (Morris, 2001). The political and social developments increased
awareness by the Ministry of Education of the Arab issue and stirred debate over the
desirability of teaching it in the educational system (see Podeh, 2002, pp. 37–39).
Later, in the mid-1970s, the ministry introduced a new curriculum for history and
civic studies. The educational reform reflected the political-societal processes and
decreased the focus on national goals.

Moderation: Peace Education Taking First Steps

(Late 1970s–Late 1980s)

Less than a decade later, a most dramatic turning point took place in the relation-
ship between Israel and Egypt, with the beginning of a formal peace process
between the two states. In November 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made
his historic visit to Jerusalem, and two years later, the signing of the peace treaty
officially ended over thirty years of hostility between the two parties. These forma-
tive events in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict brought about additional
changes in the sociopsychological disposition of the Jewish society in Israel. Large
parts of the Israeli public shifted from delegitimization to recognition of the
national rights of the Palestinians, as well as to willingness to settle the conflict
peacefully (Bar-Tal, 2007; Oren, Chap. 8).
Nonetheless, these seminal political and social developments were not translated
at the time into actual change in the educational policy with regard to peace. In fact,
the educational system remained firmly fixated on the main themes of the hegemonic
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case 205

Zionist narrative: it continued to instill a sense of threat and fear of the Arabs,
while reinforcing the Zionist-Jewish identity and strengthening the society’s stance
against the enemy (Firer & Adwan, 2004; Pinson, Levy, Gross, & Soker, 2010;
Podeh, 2002).
And yet, toward the mid-1980s, the change in context ultimately bore an edu-
cational fruit. The conflict at that stage was still ongoing but quite moderate, and
the culture of conflict, particularly after the Lebanon War in 1982, had lost its
absolute hegemony with parts of the public demanding peace (Oren, Chap. 8).
During that period, the Ministry of Education adopted a more truthful and open
approach with regard to the issue of Jewish-Arab relations, which brought some
changes in teaching the historical narrative of the conflict and in representing the
Arabs (Kizel, 2008; Podeh, 2002).
This new attitude was eventually translated also into guidelines laid down by the
ministry, headed by Zevulun Hammer, for a new policy of educating for Jewish-
Arab coexistence. The proposed program, published in early 1984, marked the first
signs of peace education. It introduced new attitudes of openness and readiness to
get acquainted with Arab people and Arab culture, and respect toward Arabs as
human beings. In addition, it dealt with several aspects of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-
Palestinian conflict using concepts of multiculturalism, respect, tolerance, and
equality. The policy was intended to reach all students from kindergarten to high
school and was planned to be integrated in as many subject matters as possible. It
also intended to examine all the school textbooks to eliminate expressions of hatred
and negative stereotyping of Arabs, and new educational programs were supposed
to be developed within three years (Ministry of Education, 1984).
However, this initiative was never implemented in this format, but was rather
shifted into another direction. The new Minister of Education Yitzhak Navon,
appointed in September 1984, decided to focus on education for democracy and
declared the topic as the main educational subject for the two following school years
(Ministry of Education, 1985). At the backdrop of this decision were manifestations
of racism and intolerance among Israeli society at that time, among them the killing of
Emil Grunzweig during a “Peace Now” rally in 1983 and the rise of the far-right party
Kach (Podeh, 2002). Subsequently, in 1986 a new unit for education, democracy, and
coexistence was established in the ministry in order to promote such issues as active
citizenship and improving relations between different groups in Israeli society.
As part of the new policy and under the unit’s guidance, through the mid-1980s,
various measures of peace education focused on education for democracy and coex-
istence between Jews and Arabs within the State of Israel were carried out. These
included new textbooks written for different grades, wide-scale teacher training,
encounters between Jewish and Arab students, new educational programs, and
activities by nongovernmental organizations in the school system aimed to advance
the values of democracy and coexistence. The ministry, then, eventually turned
away from dealing directly with the issue of relations with the Arab states and with
the Palestinians. Nevertheless, as Podeh (2002) notes, its engagement in education
for democracy and coexistence during these years contributed to deepen the dis-
cussion within the educational system on themes of direct as well as indirect peace
206 S. Vered

education. Among these were the promotion of positive attitudes toward Arabs and
tolerance toward the other and toward minorities, pluralism, questions of identity,
and peaceful relationships.
However, this momentum of peace education stopped when political and societal
conditions changed. The outbreak of the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) at the end
of 1987 brought violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians in the occu-
pied territories, and the educational efforts eventually disappeared from the agenda of
the Ministry of Education.

Peace Process: The Educational System Mobilizes for Peace

(Early 1990s–2000)

During the 1990s there were additional turning points in the peace process, includ-
ing the Madrid Conference in 1991, the agreements reached between the Israelis
and the Palestinians between 1993 and 1995 (“Oslo Accords”), and the peace treaty
with Jordan in 1994. The new context of peacemaking required the advancement of
mutual trust building and decreased hatred between the parties. The educational
system, however, was not prepared at the time for this surprising peace process (see
Pinson et al., 2010). Yet eventually, the ministry responded to the changing political
and social situation and under Minister Amnon Rubinstein – for the first time ever –
began implementing direct peace education fully.
In May 1994, a most comprehensive educational program was published, which
stated that education and teaching should provide students with the knowledge,
skills, and attitudes that will enable them to achieve educational goals set forth in
the spirit of peace. It included new topics such as the concept of peace, the history
of the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab world, the Middle East
peace process, and others (Ministry of Education, 1994). The new program was
implemented at the district and school levels, as well as in teacher-training courses,
in the ministry’s work plans, and in wide-ranging activities of nongovernmental
organizations in educational institutions. In addition, hundreds of new educational
materials for teachers and students were published. They dealt directly and exten-
sively with the essence of peace education, understanding of the Arabs, the history
of the conflict, and the meaning of peace.
In this manner, to support political developments, the state educational system
sought to establish a psychological process among students dealing with their pre-
ceding values, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, emotions, images, and stereotypes. Its
purpose was to instill in students a new worldview grounded in an ethos of peace
that would facilitate different perceptions of the past along with establishing new
expectations for the future – appropriate for peacemaking and for reconciliation
with the former enemy.
However, these efforts did not have a chance to be sufficiently developed and
become established. In fact, peace education was met with many objections and
faced social, political, and educational difficulties (see Firer, 1995). Palestinian violent
acts against Israelis during this period aroused fear, disappointment, and anger.
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case 207

Opposition to the Oslo Accords among Israeli society eventually culminated in the
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995. In this situation the
implementation of extensive peace education was very difficult. The reappointment
of Hammer as the new education minister in 1996 brought an end to the short mobi-
lization of the educational system for the peace process and to the advancement of
another agenda which emphasized mostly Zionist and Jewish values.

Reescalation: Leaning on a National Ethos (2000–2014)

During the first decade of the 2000s, there was a substantial withdrawal from the peace
process. The failure of Camp David Summit in July 2000, followed by several violent
clashes over the years such as Al-Aqsa Intifada, the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and
Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2009, led to renewed strengthening of some of the
intractable characteristics of the conflict. The deterioration in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict also reinforced some of the societal beliefs of the ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal,
Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008; Oren, Chap. 8). Consequently,
peace education as a process aimed at changing hearts and minds to promote the end
of the Israeli-Arab/Israeli-Palestinian conflict has vanished completely from the min-
istry’s policies. Instead, the desire for peace remained part of the militaristic discourse
within the ethos of conflict, as a utopian goal (Pinson et al., 2010).
In recent years, parallel to reescalation of the conflict with additional violent
confrontations, the state education policy seems to have taken a more narrow-
nationalistic direction. The ministry, headed from 2009 to 2013 by Gideon
Sa’ar from the center-right, national-liberal party of the Likud, has focused its
efforts on strengthening the Jewish and Zionist identities of students and launched a
series of initiatives aimed at reinforcing Israeli heritage and culture as well as mili-
taristic values in schools (Ministry of Education, 2009). At the same time, state
education seemed to renounce themes relating to humanist values and democratic
citizenship and avoided dealing with sensitive social and political issues that are on
the public agenda (see Aloni, Yogev, Michaeli, & Nave, 2011). In addition, various
instructions and decisions made by the ministry have reflected its opposition to
enabling open discussions on issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which
could promote tolerance, empathy, social responsibility, and freedom of expression.
These include, for example, the instruction to cease using a history textbook that
presents both Israeli and Palestinian narratives of the conflict, the removal of the
concept of “Nakba” from the official curriculum of the Arab sector, and others.
In March 2013, Rabbi Shai Piron from the center party of Yesh Atid was
appointed Minister of Education. His term in the ministry ended after less than two
years, due to political disputes that ended the government’s term. Like other issues
that the ministry did not succeed in addressing in this short period, peace education
too had no revival (see Kashti, 2014; Kashti & Skop, 2014). In general, it appears
that despite statements made regarding education for shared life, the educational
system remained primarily focused on reinforcing Jewish, Zionist, and militaristic
values at the expense of promoting universalism and Jewish Arab coexistence.
208 S. Vered

Conclusions: Is It Possible to Apply the Theory in Practice?

The concise review of the policies applied over the years by the Israeli Ministry of
Education sought to examine whether, and under what circumstances, Israel has
educated its future citizens to enable a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab and
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This, in order to investigate how models of direct and
indirect peace education, proposed by Bar-Tal, Rosen, et al. (2010), were reflected in
Israel, being a typical case of a society involved in an intractable conflict. As men-
tioned, the conception of Bar-Tal et al. suggests that, theoretically, themes of some
type of peace education could be appropriate in certain political and social condi-
tions. When the conditions are favorable to the development of peace education, it is
possible to implement the direct model within the school system. If the political-
societal climate does not allow direct challenging of themes of the culture of con-
flict, Bar-Tal et al. advise that it is possible to engage in indirect peace education.
Given that it is defined by law as an educational goal, one would expect that
peace education will indeed be implemented in some form as an integral part of
Israel’s educational policy. Yet, the most important conclusion of the above over-
view is that Israel never fully implemented for a continuous period any consistent
framework of peace education as a process aimed at instilling in students a new
worldview to advance peacemaking. Generally speaking, this could be attributed to
the political instability of the Israeli democracy. Since Israel’s school system is
centralized and directed by the Ministry of Education, the frequent turnover of gov-
ernments affects its swaying back and forth over the years.
Bringing their worldviews into office, often reflecting the ideological orientation
of the ruling government, and having the power to set nationwide educational goals,
education ministers have a critical impact on the direction taken by the school sys-
tem. Israel’s education policy is thus influenced by the frequently changing minis-
ters, leading ever-changing educational agendas. This instability is evident in many
levels and aspects of education in Israel; among them are the fluctuations that
occurred over time in peace education and the absence of a constant educational line
in this matter. A notable example is the extreme changes in peace education policy
within a few years during the 1990s, by the end of which the achievements attained
in 1994–1995 were completely gone due to shifts in power and leading ideologies.
However, characteristics of Israeli politics and the structure of the state education
system are only part of the story. Indeed, as suggested by Bar-Tal et al. (2010), the
changing educational trends can be traced to the broader context of the Israeli-Arab/
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the sociopsychological processes that have taken
place in Israeli society over time. Thus, in order to understand the ongoing failure
of the state school system to educate students for peace and, particularly, to appreci-
ate the attempts that were made to apply peace education policies at certain times,
the political-societal conditions in which these educational circumstances were
formed must be considered.
The context’s determinative influence on the chances of peace education being
effectively initiated is particularly evident in three periods in the Israeli school system.
Peace Education Between Theory and Practice: The Israeli Case 209

In the early decades, extremely negative conditions made it absolutely impossible to

consider any instance of peace education. The conflict was characterized by all the
features of an intractable conflict, the culture and ethos of conflict dominated
Israelis’ belief structures and the political-social order, and the educational system
was mobilized for the missions of nation building and the intractable conflict. In
stark contrast, in the mid-1980s and, especially, in 1994–1995, extraordinary favor-
able circumstances enabled exceptional attempts to implement peace education in
the educational system. The peace processes in the late 1970s and during the 1990s,
along with processes of democratization and openness and changes in public opin-
ion, greatly facilitated the launching of direct peace education and legitimized its
institutionalization in schools. Moreover, consistent with Bar-Tal et al.’s conceptu-
alization, the changes in political-social contexts were the factors that ended peace
education efforts both in the 1980s, when the conflict had escalated, and in the
1990s following strong opposition to the Oslo agreement with the Palestinians and
later the collapse of the peace process.
However, these periods were quite exceptional in the history of Israeli education.
In fact, it appears that even the peace agreements that were achieved with Egypt,
Palestine, and Jordan only slightly influenced Israel’s education policies overall.
Rather, the educational line faithfully adhered over the years to the narrow-
nationalistic ideology and maintained support for the hegemonic Zionist narrative
of the conflict. Thus, the societal beliefs, worldviews, images, and values generally
conveyed in Israel’s school system reinforced the conflict-supportive narrative and
contributed to the conflict’s perpetuation. As noted by Pinson et al. (2010), the
Ministry of Education has encouraged peace as the noblest value and the ultimate
desideratum of Israeli society, yet still has been engaged most of the time primarily
in imparting the ethos of conflict to students and in preparing them for conflict.
Indeed, the ongoing state of conflict, which in the last decade seems to be escalat-
ing, undoubtedly makes it very difficult for the educational system to focus on such
values as peace and reconciliation that seem far out of reach. At the same time, the
dominant political forces in Israel seem to have taken in recent years a more nation-
alistic direction, and significant parts of the public have lost confidence in the pros-
pects of peace. The main question still remains, then, whether under such unfavorable
political-societal conditions education can still prepare students for peace and reduce
the fear, distrust, and alienation that they feel toward the rival.
According to the theory proposed by Bar-Tal, Rosen, et al. (2010), even in a state
of active conflict, in which the sociopsychological repertoire of ethos of conflict
dominates among society members, it is still possible to apply indirect peace
education. They suggest coping with these challenges by educating for general val-
ues and fundamentals of democracy, assuming that the indirect way – which suppos-
edly does not challenge the contents of the ethos of conflict – can take place even
when violence is still ongoing. Had this been the case, such topics as tolerance,
human rights, acceptance of the “other,” and resistance to violence, as well as conflict
resolution skills and education for critical thinking, could have been taught as an
integral part of Israel’s overall educational policy throughout the years.
210 S. Vered

Nonetheless, the Israeli case shows that even these general themes, widely valued
by many societies, are often neglected in the context of violent conflict in favor of
focusing education on national values. In fact, it appears that in this context, they are
perceived as potentially threatening the national ethos as well as the overall climate
that requires conformity and obedience to ensure full mobilization of society mem-
bers. Thus, while in theory peace education in its indirect form is essentially about
humanistic education, in practice its contents are loaded with politically sensitive
meaning that concerns core themes of the collective narrative of conflict.
Furthermore, in a state of ongoing conflict, dealing with human rights and the
moral necessity to establish justice and equality to every individual, group, or nation
could have ideological and political implications. Hence, when leading political forces
want to prevent the use of universalistic criteria for evaluating the conflict and the
ingroup, education retreats into a closed, particularistic, and nationalistic approach. In
Israel, too, the educational system tends over the years to conservatism and authori-
tarianism that do not leave much room for critical thought and for contents which
might challenge the existing political and social order, even if indirectly.
These conclusions are particularly disturbing in light of Israel’s traumatic experi-
ence of attempts at making peace, which teaches that the educational system must not
wait for the “appropriate” sociopolitical conditions in order to engage in peace educa-
tion. Embarking on the road of peace-building requires change of the conflict-
supporting narratives with their basic goals, premises, assumptions, and aspirations.
Such transformation demands change of fundamental views about the conflict, the
goals of the group, the rival, the image of self, and so on. The new repertoire should
include ideas about the need to resolve the conflict peacefully, personalization and
legitimization of the opponent, alternative views of the conflict as being solvable, new
ambitions that encourage peaceful resolution of the conflict, building trust between the
parties, and eventually recognition of the need to construct a new climate that promotes
peace-building. These ideas have to be adopted by society members to enhance the
peace process, and education has a crucially important role in this endeavor.
Upholding an uncompromising national ethos, fostering a continual consciousness
of an existential threat, and reinforcing a sense of alienation toward its rivals, Israel
does not educate its future citizens for peace. This is very unfortunate, especially in
light of Bar-Tal et al.’s (2010) theory which suggests that it is actually possible, even if
difficult, to apply peace education even in societies still involved in conflict. If it truly
desires to achieve peace, Israel must find a way to nurture among the younger genera-
tion at least the necessary moral environment for making peace with its neighbors.

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 Part VI
Prospects for Change?
Containing the Duality: Leadership
in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

Nimrod Rosler

The movement toward the peaceful resolution of an intractable conflict is long and dif-
ficult, while advancement and deterioration are intertwined. This process is character-
ized by a complex political and social context creating difficult challenges for societies
previously engulfed by conflict and for those who lead them. In the current chapter, the
sociopsychological characteristics of peace processes and the challenges they create
for those engaged in them are examined, and a conceptual frame for the role that lead-
ers play in peace processes is delineated. Using the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as
a case study, examples of how the leaders on both sides addressed these challenges in
public speeches designed to mobilize group support are suggested.
The growing body of research exploring the psychological barriers that inhibit
conflict resolution and ways to overcome them focuses primarily on the level of
society and its members (e.g., Arrow, Mnookin, Ross, Tversky, & Wilson, 1995;
Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009, 2011). Barriers to conflict resolu-
tion, according to this approach, originate from factors such as attitudes, beliefs, moti-
vations, emotions, and ideologies that exist among society members as well as specific
political and social institutions. These factors contribute to the maintenance of the
conflict by freezing the existing disagreements and fueling them while blocking open-
ness to new information. Whereas their important influence over public opinion is
increasingly examined (e.g., Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat, & Bar-Tal, 2014; Maoz,
Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015), the influence of one of
the most prominent social agents, political leaders, is overlooked. The achievement of
peace requires that leaders engage upon a constructive political process of negotiation
and creating official agreements. Yet they must also mobilize group members by

N. Rosler (*)
The Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation, Department of Public Policy,
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 217

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_14
218 N. Rosler

addressing the long-standing sociopsychological infrastructure of the conflict that is

being challenged and preparing them for the changes that peace will bring.

The Legacy of Intractable Conflicts and Their Aftermath

The legacy of intractable conflicts that include objective characteristics such as

violence, protractedness, and immense human and material investment in the con-
flict, as well as subjective perceptions and feelings like zero-sum nature, irresolv-
ability, and high levels of mistrust, animosity, fear, and hatred (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013),
creates a heavy burden with which society members and their leaders must deal.
Many of these characteristics, their implications, and the attitudes and emotions that
society members hold during the conflict were previously studied and found to create
difficult barriers to peacefully resolving these conflicts (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren,
2010; Halperin, 2011; Sharvit, 2014). In fact, the transition from intractable conflict
to peace is a difficult, nonlinear, and easily reversible process requiring the fulfill-
ment of conditions on several levels—political context, society, and leadership (cf.
Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Bar-Tal, Landman, Magal, & Rosler, 2009; Zartman, 2000).
Scholars from diverse disciplines have dealt with the challenges confronting
groups engaged in reconciliation processes (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2008; Kelman,
1999; Lederach, 1997; Rouhana, 2011) that are mostly post-agreement efforts
aimed at restoring peaceful relations between societies that have been involved in
protracted violent conflicts (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). However, few have exam-
ined this issue within the context of peace processes (cf. Brewer, 2010; Darby &
Mac Ginty, 2000), which are defined as the coming together of adversaries in dia-
logue in order to reach a political agreement on the issues under contention (Deutsch,
1973; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012). This stage is crucial in the transition from an
ongoing protracted conflict to peace, with successful peace processes paving the
way for reconciliation and stable peace. Although leaders play a critical role in this
process, very few studies have examined what part they play and/or the challenges
that peace processes entail for groups long accustomed to living under conflict
(Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Gormley-Heenan, 2007; Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

The Duality of Peace Processes

Peace processes are fragile stages in the transition from intractable conflict to peace.
They are essentially dual in nature, retaining many of the characteristics of conflict
even as real and perceptual processes of de-escalation begin to develop (Rosler, in
press). Alongside gradual political changes stemming from negotiation and dia-
logue—such as midterm agreements or transitional arrangements (Bar-Siman-Tov,
1997; De Dreu, 2010; Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012)—the level of institutionalized
violence begins to de-escalate. As both sides begin to invest in the peace process
materially and psychologically, economic and cultural joint projects are initiated
Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 219

(Fitzduff, 2002). A new perception of the conflict as being amenable to resolution by

peaceful means emerges and becomes institutionalized among growing parts of
society (Bar-Tal et al., 2009), who begin to acknowledge that accepting former pro-
tagonists as legitimate partners for peacemaking does not pose a threat to their own
existence. Increasingly, segments of society begin to regard the sociopolitical goals
imposed by the conflict as no longer sacred or total and to pursue new objectives that
recognize the importance of mutual cooperation with the other side (Bar-Tal, 2013).
At the same time, spoilers on both sides set themselves in opposition to the
process (Stedman, 2000), some adopting peaceful protest and persuasion, others
threats, coercion, and violence. Both the deep-rooted psychological infrastructure
of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007) and the still present evidence of violence (Höglund,
2008) reinforce conflict-oriented beliefs and emotions, which ensure that the con-
flict remains a central element of social life. The long, turbulent history of conflict
makes the potential collapse of the peace process very tangible. Hence, decision-
makers are likely to continue channeling resources toward maintaining security
and defense, as well as preserving the psychological infrastructure of the conflict.
This duality characterizing the peace process creates difficult challenges for the
society that embarks on the road of change. During the conflict society members had
confronted a dichotomous context that became inherent to the identity of the group.
In this context, the group’s positive collective image, its goals, and their total justifi-
cation are clear. On the other hand, the negative collective image of the enemies and
their malicious aims, as well as the win-lose nature of the struggle, are taken for
granted (Oren, Chap. 8; Shaked, Chap. 9). The psychological infrastructure of the
conflict, which includes societal beliefs and emotions that support and justify the
continuation of the conflict while providing meaning to the situation, helps society to
cope with it (Canetti, Chap. 10). However, the peace process creates an ambiguous
context, in which the clear in-group versus out-group distinctions are being under-
mined; the goals and motivations of the society are undergoing significant changes,
and reality is becoming increasingly unpredictable. Furthermore, the supportive psy-
chological infrastructure of the conflict is becoming less relevant and useful to cop-
ing with the new situation, and its basic premises regarding the other side, one’s own
group, and the nature of the conflict are being challenged. This transition process,
both psychologically and politically, will intensify the resistance to change
(Marcus, 2006) in the context and within society which is underway. Therefore,
peace processes highlight the need for a charismatic leader capable of generating a
sense of a stable and predictable social environment, ensuring security and control,
and providing common understanding and justification for the new path.

Leadership Roles in Peace Processes

While political scientists frequently perceive political leaders primarily as decision-

and policy-makers (Elcock, 2001; Gormley-Heenan, 2007; Kellerman, 1986), social
psychologists tend to highlight their function as agents of social influence and entre-
preneurs of social identity (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2007).
220 N. Rosler

Although political leaders are required to make tough decisions on controversial

issues, this is only one aspect of their role in the process of peace-building.
In addition to determining the course of action taken by their group, providing it
with a rationale and epistemic basis, and shaping its identity, political leaders must be
attentive to group members’ needs, seek to fulfill them, and provide their followers
with new coping mechanisms. Doing so legitimizes their leadership and the policies
they espouse while mobilizing their group for collective action. The challenges that
a leader faces in the peace process context fall into three principal categories: deal-
ing with threats to basic psychological needs for security and control, adapting the
collective identity, and creating mobilization for the process while coping with
social polarization.
A leader’s initial task is to respond to the pressing psychological needs for secu-
rity and control engendered by the culture of conflict and by the peace process real-
ity (Bar-Tal, 2013). These needs are directly threatened by the uncertainty inherent
in the process of change (Marcus, 2006), the risks involved in breaking the circle of
violence (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997), and the actions taken by spoilers (Stedman, 2000).
Because resources and power are inevitably ceded in seeking a settlement whose
outcome is far from assured, stress is created among society members, and the
leader is expected to help them cope.
The reality of peacemaking requires the leader to construct a new shared under-
standing that the detested enemy must now be recognized as a partner in the pursuit
of peace and that the goals previously perceived as existential are now subject to
negotiation and compromise. In a wider sense, the collective identity of the group
having been largely dictated by the conflict now has to be modified (David, Chap.
12). The group’s leader must therefore help the public adapt their societal beliefs,
collective emotions, and values (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, in press).
The threat that peace poses to the conflict ideology and its identity-related
components requires gaining the group’s support and legitimacy for the process
and tends to create a growing social polarization between members who support
the process and those who oppose it based on ideological and/or material grounds.
Hence, leaders must identify personally with the norms and values of the group,
frame policy in accordance with these, and appeal to resonating messages that
also strengthen socio-national unity and solidarity (Haslam et al., 2011; Snow &
Benford, 1988).
The three principal challenges that leaders face in the peace process are derived
from the characteristics of the context. Since the prominent characteristic of peace
processes is duality, we can assume that the basic role of the leader in this context is
to cope with the duality and lead social change toward peace. One of the most pow-
erful tools that leaders possess in order to fulfill these demands is rhetoric—the art
of persuasive speech (Aristotle, 1909; Condor, Tileagă, & Billig, 2013). In light of
the above analysis of leaders and their roles, their speeches should reflect their iden-
tification with their group’s values and use them to address the dual reality, cogni-
tions, and emotions that group members encounter while motivating acceptance of
the new peace-oriented ideology.
Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 221

Rhetorical Containment

The duality that evolves during the peace process creates a tremendous difficulty to
societies that developed institutionalized psychological mechanisms to cope with the
long conflict and became habituated to it, at least on the psychological level (Bar-Tal,
2013). Thus, for example, while the conflict seems dichotomous and clear, the peace
process includes risks, uncertainty, and dual reality that create resistance to change and
a sense of chaos. I suggest that using their public rhetoric, leaders can assist in contain-
ing the duality of the peace process while enabling the public to accept change.
The function of containing was suggested in the psychoanalytic literature
(cf. Bion, 1962; Segal, 1989) and refers to the capacity of comprehending feelings,
conflicts, and other difficult experiences of another; helping her or him to work
them through, moderate, and ease them, so they can be internalized in their new
form. Therefore by containing the duality, the leader can aid the public in moderat-
ing and processing the difficulties and the pain involved in the peace process.
Through their speeches, leaders can support the transition from a dichotomous per-
ception of the conflict to acknowledging and accepting the complex character of the
process. Furthermore, by constructing a set of beliefs and emotions supporting the
peace process and emphasizing the commitment to peaceful conflict resolution, the
leader can assist the public in adapting its collective identity and internalizing the
new attitudes and emotions.

Duality and Social Challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Process, 1993–1995

The Oslo Accords, beginning on September 1993, constituted a dramatic shift in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the first time, Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) engaged in an ongoing negotiation process that led to mutual
recognition and several interim agreements. Following secret negotiations, both
sides turned from an illegitimate and vicious enemy to a partner to dialogue and
implementation of accords in the civil and security spheres.
A sharp duality characterized this process, especially during the years 1993–
1995, when on the basis of mutual agreements the Israeli army redeployed its forces
in the occupied territories, new national Palestinian institutions were created gain-
ing control over some territory in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and security
and economic cooperation started developing between the Palestinian Authority
(PA) and Israel. But at the same time, Israel kept on building in the occupied terri-
tories, and radical spoilers began to employ severe violence. Through the use mainly
of suicide terrorism within Israeli cities, the radical Islamic opposition movements
strived to sabotage the transfer of powers from Israel to the PA, compromise the
credibility of the interim agreements, and halt the process as a whole (Kimmerling
222 N. Rosler

& Migdal, 1994; Shikaki, 1999). Radical Israeli spoilers began protesting violently
against the process, culminating in a deadly terrorist attack inside the Ibrahimi
Mosque in Hebron on February 1994 and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin on November 1995.
The Oslo Accords created and intensified major challenges to the Israeli and
Palestinian societies. From the Israeli side, the need for security and control was
deprived following the violent actions taken by Palestinian radicals that brought an
increase in Israeli fatalities compared to the years before the peace process started
(Arian, 1998).1 In addition, societal beliefs delegitimizing the PLO were under-
mined following the shift in the stance of the Israeli government toward the PLO
(Kimmerling, 2008). The process created stress among society members due to the
uncertainty and risks that were integral to negotiating with a non-state actor that was
labeled as a terrorist organization by Israeli law until early 1993, as well as follow-
ing the harsh dual reality of peacemaking alongside violence. The process intensely
created a need for social mobilization in light of the narrow parliamentary majority
that the Israeli government had and the deep polarization it created within the Israeli
public and elites between the supporters of the process and those who objected it
(cf. Bar-Siman-Tov, 1997; Grinberg, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 1997).
The Palestinian society had to confront during the Oslo Accords dramatic
changes in their national goals and perceptions of the conflict following the interim
agreements with Israel that did not accomplish an end to the occupation and con-
tradicted their original goal of freeing Mandatory Palestine as a whole. In addition,
their security needs were deprived by the continuation of violent confrontations
with the Israeli army and Jewish settlers and the growing polarization between the
mainstream Fatah movement and the Islamic opposition groups that escalated to
violence (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1994; Said, 2000). Stress was elevated even
before the process began due to the PLO’s support of Iraq during the First Gulf War
that brought to severe loss of economic and political resources and the sharp
increase in the construction of houses in Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
It was later intensified during the peace process due to the uncertainty regarding its
final results, the delays in its implementation, the decrease in the standards of living
of Palestinians residing in the occupied territories, and the increase by 44 % of the
settlers’ population between the years 1992 and 1995 (Khalidi, 2006; Kimmerling
& Migdal, 1994).2
Hence, the leaders of both sides of the conflict had to contain the duality of the
peace process and mobilize the support of their people for its continuation. Yitzhak
Rabin, serving as the Israeli Prime Minister between 1992 and 1995, and Yasser
Arafat, who continued during this period to serve as the PLO Chairman, addressed
these challenges in their public speeches.

1
http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables.
2
http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts.
Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 223

Rhetorical Containment in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Process

The rhetorical expressions of ways through which Rabin and Arafat addressed the dual-
ity of the Oslo Accords were examined in research that I recently conducted (Rosler,
2012b). The research was based on qualitative content analysis of public speeches
made by the two leaders between 1992 and 1995. The results of the study show that
when both leaders sought to provide their public’s needs while paving the way for the
process of change, they used rhetorical containment—each in his own unique way.
Rabin repeatedly mentioned in his speeches the violence of the radical Palestinian
Islamist groups, while condemning it and referring to the Israeli casualties as vic-
tims of the spoilers of the peace process:
A deadly terrorist attack was carried out this morning in a bus in Ramat-Gan area… No
doubt it was carried out by one of the extreme elements who wish—using deadly terrorism
against innocent people—to achieve their political aim: stopping the negotiation process
between us and the Palestinians. (Rabin, July 24, 1995)

In order to explain the dual life experience, he differentiated between the spoilers
in both societies, who were delegitimized in his speeches as “extremists,” “murder-
ers,” and “lunatics,” and the supporters of the peace process. This was part of Rabin’s
efforts to lead a perceptual change and mobilize the Israeli society for his twofold goal
in the peace process—achieving peace and conflict resolution while fighting terrorism
and achieving security. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of the resilience
against the violent actions and the destructive political goals of the spoilers:
One straight line connects the lunatics and racists all over the world. One line of blood and
terror is drawn from the men of the “Islamic Jihad”, who shot Jewish worshippers in syna-
gogues in Istanbul, Paris and Amsterdam, and the Jewish “Hamas” man, who shot the
Ramadan worshippers.
…For those who still doubt the commitment to peace of the state of Israel, I say loud and
clear: Don’t get it wrong—we will continue with peace-making. (Rabin, February 28, 1994)

Another rhetorical aspect of acknowledging the duality that characterized the

Oslo Accords while mobilizing for its continuation was expressing ambivalence
toward the process and the PLO. Rabin expressed mixed feelings of hardship and
pain inherent to the process of change in the conflict while mentioning the opportu-
nities and hope that this process opens up. However, he clearly delineated the
achievement of peace as a feasible and desired goal while stressing the willingness
of Israel to act on this basis:
We cannot choose our neighbors nor our enemies, even not the cruelest of them. We have
only what there is—the PLO which fought against us and against which we fought. Today
we are looking with it for a path to peace. (Rabin, September 21, 1993)

To conclude, Rabin rhetorically contained the duality by referring to the com-

plex reality which included serious violence, ambivalent feelings, and difficulties
that this reality aroused. Along with that he emphasized the importance and need to
continue to advance the peace process as the long-term response to difficulties and
224 N. Rosler

threats, as can be seen in the quote from his speech on a Memorial Day ceremony
in Jerusalem:
We are doing these days everything possible to end wars, so no more Israeli families will
have to confront the doorbell, the messengers of grief, the terrible tragedy. These are difficult
days for Israel: The terrorism is increasing, today Jews and Israelis paid with their lives as
well, the enemies of peace are trying to sabotage, and beyond the bloodshed and booby-
trapped cars, we are trying to reach out for peace, to stop the bereavement. In spite of the
difficulties, we are continuing the march for peace. (Rabin, April 13, 1994)

Yasser Arafat addressed the duality of the peace process using different rhetorical
content. He presented complex—sometimes even contradicting—mobilizing
messages in his speeches. His messages moved between constructing the need to
continue the sacrifice and struggle against Israel and commitment to the peace pro-
cess and negotiation with Israel. These complex messages can be found in one of his
public speeches carried out in a Gaza rally:
Today marks a plebiscite in favor of the National Authority, the PLO, and the peace pro-
cess—the peace of the brave. On this day, we pledge to the Fatah Hawks and to those who
made the great victory… in every part of the Palestinian territory, I tell you, brothers, we
fought for the sake of this land, and for its sake we will fight to keep this Palestinian flag
flying over this Palestinian territory. (Arafat, November 21, 1994)

Similar to Rabin, Arafat differentiated between elements within Israeli society

who support the process, such as the Israeli leadership, and other elements such as
the Jewish settlers and parts of the Israeli army, who are sabotaging the process and
trying to maintain the occupation. However, he also expressed ambivalence toward
the process and the other side, as well as skepticism toward Israeli intentions:
While today we celebrate the signing of the first step … it is the right of our people and of
everybody concerned with genuine peace to point to the measures isolating holy Jerusalem
from its surroundings and preventing the Palestinians from entering it and the other sacred
Islamic and Christian places. (Arafat, May 4, 1994)

In addition, Arafat addressed the duality by acknowledging the past sacrifices

and courage that the Palestinian struggle took while presenting the peace process as
a continuation of that patriotic commitment. He also mobilized the Palestinians to
support the peace process by reframing powerful symbols from the period of the
violent struggle:
Alive and great nations make their wounds, the sacrifice of their martyrs, and their long
suffering the motives for the future and the banners for building a new era based on justice
under the shadow of tolerance and coexistence. (Arafat, May 4, 1994)
Brothers, when we fought and launched the Intifada, we fought with courage and triumphed
with an iron will, and when we made peace, we did so with courage. Therefore, we called
this peace the peace of the brave. (Arafat, March 24, 1995)

To recap, Arafat rhetorically contained the duality by acknowledging in his

speeches the distress and difficulties which were part of the peace process, as well
as past grievances. Furthermore, he walked on a tightrope, committed to the peace
process and the agreements which had been signed, simultaneously retaining the
legitimacy of the struggle against Israel:
Containing the Duality: Leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 225

From my political position, and from my position as PLO chairman, I understand that when
we signed the agreement with them, we signed that agreement in the name of the PLO,
the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere, here inside the
homeland and outside the homeland. We must respect that agreement.
I remind you and remind all of our people and Arab and Islamic nations that when the
Prophet Muhammad, God’s blessings and peace be upon him, signed the al-Hudaybiyah
truce agreement, Quraysh refused to have the Prophet sign his name as “Muhammad the
Prophet of God”… Umar Bin-al-Khattab called that agreement the humiliating agreement,
and said: Prophet of God, how can we agree to have our religion humiliated?
We signed that agreement in Oslo, and if any of you has one objection to it, I have one
hundred objections. (Arafat, April 16, 1995)

Discussion

Moving a social group from conflict to peace and reconciliation is a complex pro-
cess. As one of the most influential of all social agents, political leaders are expected
to guide and assist their group in the process of change. While previous research in
this field has largely focused on the difficulties created by intractable conflict or
reconciliation (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013; Lederach, 1997), this chapter suggests a
conceptual framework within which the sociopsychological challenges that con-
front leaders in a peace process can be analyzed. Drawing attention to the real and
perceptual duality of peace processes, leaders in this context are required to address
a diminished sense of security and control, accommodate their group’s collective
identity, and create social mobilization for peace. I suggest that in order to fulfill
these tasks, leaders use rhetorical containment that assists their society in process-
ing the complexity and duality inherent to this context while constructing percep-
tual change and internalization of new attitudes and emotions supporting peace.
Interestingly, during the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the two leaders and
their followers encountered a challenging dual reality. However, each one of the
leaders had a different way of coping: Arafat adapted his mobilizing messages to the
perceptions prevalent among his people (see Shikaki, 1999) supporting both the
continuation of the peace process and of the struggle against Israel, while Rabin led
with determination a perceptual change supporting peacemaking. The complex
reality that each leader faced probably had a major influence over the level of suc-
cess of their efforts to rhetorically contain the duality. The opposition to the process
on the Palestinian side aimed most of its violent efforts to bring the process to a halt
toward the Israeli side and was led by movements that did not constitute the main-
stream of Palestinian society at that time. Hence Arafat was successfully able to
maintain the support and legitimation he had for his leadership and his policy during
that period. However, the harsh violent attacks carried against Israeli civilians, the
radical spoilers, and the strong mainstream opposition groups within Israel created
tougher circumstances for Rabin and resulted in his partial success in gaining public
legitimacy and mobilizing for peace (cf. Grinberg, 2009).
226 N. Rosler

To conclude, leading peace processes not only demands political and rhetorical
ability but also depends on a triangular interaction between three factors: leaders,
their constituents, and the context in which they operate. In this regard, the peace
process poses challenges to the group that can be addressed by the leader. By meet-
ing these while mobilizing for peace, a leader can influence the context toward
conflict resolution. Yet any of these factors can impact the process in the opposite
direction, pulling the conflict back to violence, as events in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict at the beginning of the twenty-first century indicate.

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The Role of Peace Organizations During
Peacemaking Processes: The Case
of the Jewish-Israeli Society

Tamir Magal

Introduction

Long-standing intractable conflicts give rise to a prevalent system of societal beliefs

which develops into a culture of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This culture perpetuates
the conflict and undermines any attempts to resolve it peacefully. Any attempt to
resolve such conflicts is dependent on the ability to challenge and undermine these
societal beliefs and sway significant segments of society to accept alternative beliefs
which support peaceful resolution. In most cases such a process, which can be
referred to as peacemaking, initially requires bottom-up mobilization through grass-
roots practices. Only in its later stages, when supported by a significant part of
society members, will the initiative pass to national political leaders, who will insti-
tutionalize top-down mobilization.
In these initial stages, individuals and civil society organizations serve as bear-
ers of alternative beliefs and fulfill a role as agents of mobilization. However, these
organizations are often marginalized and excluded from the process in its later
stages. The present chapter intends to highlight the different roles of such organi-
zations throughout the peacemaking process. The chapter will first elaborate the
conceptual framework regarding the distinct phases of peacemaking and the roles
that civil society organizations play within this process. Then it will examine these
roles through a case study of the emergence and development of Israeli peace
organizations during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, the chapter will con-
clude with some general remarks as to the role of these organizations in the peace-
making process.

T. Magal (*)
Center for Ethics and Morality, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 229

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_15
230 T. Magal

In his conceptual writings, Bar-Tal (2013) outlined three phases in the peace-
making process: emergence, legitimization, and institutionalization. The transi-
tion between these distinct phases depends on two distinct factors: acceptance and
internalization. Acceptance refers to the willingness of political elites to acquiesce
to these attempts to challenge the culture of conflict and not to oppose them.
Internalization refers to the active support of the general population which grants
legitimacy to these alternative beliefs.
Emergence refers to the initiation and endorsement of alternative beliefs regard-
ing peacemaking, which contradict the consensual ethos of conflict. This phase is
characterized by official state repression and marginal levels of public support.
Legitimization occurs when these alternative beliefs and their bearers become
accepted as part of the legitimate public discourse. This phase is characterized by
official acquiescence to alternative activism, together with small but meaningful
public support. Finally, institutionalization refers to the internalization of such alter-
native beliefs by elites, societal institutions, as well as societal channels of commu-
nication. This phase is characterized by active official endorsement and high levels
of public support for alternative beliefs.
Peace organizations are civil society groups, which are dedicated to promoting a
peaceful resolution of an intractable conflict (Magal, 2013). In each stage of the
peacemaking process, peace organizations play a specific part, which may be
divided into several distinct roles.
In the emergent phase of the peacemaking process, individuals and groups that
are critical of the conflict form organizations, which seek to challenge the consen-
sual ethos of conflict. These organizations espouse an alternative belief that peace-
ful resolution of the conflict is indeed possible. They may also endorse alternative
beliefs which counter specific components of the ethos of conflict. These specific
alternative beliefs may espouse a humane view of the enemies and their goals, may
recognize their national collective rights, or may acknowledge possible wrongdo-
ings by the in-group. Through various types of activities, these organizations strive
to raise public awareness and support of these alternative beliefs.
During the legitimization phase, peace organizations emphasize and increase
their endorsement of specific alternative beliefs. Some of these organizations spec-
ify a clearly defined vision of what a future peace should look like. Furthermore,
these organizations also mobilize ever-growing public support for the general belief
in a peaceful solution, as well as for specific beliefs regarding peacemaking.
During the institutionalization phase, when societal institutions adopt the peace-
making agenda, peace organizations become incorporated into the institutional pro-
cess, and their activities become more professional and less controversial in content.
New organizations are funded by members of the institutional elites, while veteran
organizations begin to receive government support and funding. These organiza-
tions focus most of their efforts on internalization of alternative beliefs in public
opinion through educational activities at the grassroots level.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the emergence and development of
the Israeli peace movement while implementing theoretical concepts developed
above. The historical presentation of the Israeli case study will be divided according
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case… 231

to major historical events. These events have been shown to affect both the character
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and public beliefs and attitudes toward it (Oren,
2005, Chap. 8). As will be seen, these events correspond with shifts in the character
of the peacemaking process.

Emergent Phase

Pre-state/Yishuv Period

Alternative beliefs about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been part of the Israeli-
Jewish discourse even before the establishment of the state of Israel. During the
Yishuv period, two groups of intellectuals which were centered at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem—Brit Shalom (Hebrew: peace covenant) and Ihud (Hebrew:
union)—expressed their opposition to the Zionist animosity toward the Arab popu-
lation of Palestine. These groups espoused the establishment of a binational state,
where Jews and Palestinians will enjoy equal rights (Heller, 2003; Ratsabi, 2002).
However, although they were comprised of people of great renown and reputation,
both groups were harshly derogated and delegitimized by the Jewish national lead-
ership (Epstein, 2008; Hermann, 1989). Furthermore, these early attempts to chal-
lenge existing societal beliefs failed to gain significant traction within public opinion
and remained the purview of a negligible group of supporters. These attempts sig-
nify the beginning of the emergent phase of peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian
context, as political elites actively opposed them while public support remained
negligible.

Following the 1948 War

Following the establishment of the state of Israel, alternative beliefs about the con-
flict were largely relegated to political parties which represented the Palestinian-
Arab minority in Israel. These parties were effectively excluded from political
discourse within the Jewish-Israeli society (Greenstein, 2009; Lockman, 1976). In
1962, a Jewish-Palestinian group Matzpen (Hebrew: compass) splintered from the
Israeli Communist Party (Maki). This group attempted to challenge societal beliefs
regarding the conflict by expressing strong opposition to the Zionist national proj-
ect, coupled with support for a binational solution. However, as it represented the
excluded fringes of Israeli politics, Matzpen did not gain any acceptance within the
Israeli society while its members were derogated as “traitors” and suffered legal
repression (Greenstein, 2009).
A more mainstream attempt to challenge the ethos of conflict came from the New
Outlook journal, founded by members of the United Workers Party (Mapam) in
1957. This journal brought together Jewish and Palestinian writers, who expressed
232 T. Magal

their support for a peaceful solution, and enjoyed modestly sized distribution both
in Israel and in neighboring Arab countries. During the 1960s New Outlook spon-
sored several international conferences, which were attended by prominent Jewish
and Palestinian figures (Bar-On, 1996). These conferences, although not forming a
continuous dialogue, created awareness of the possibility of a peaceful solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The lack of formal repression and the modest circu-
lation that the journal enjoyed signaled the beginning of legitimization phase in the
peacemaking process.

Legitimization Phase

Following the 1967 War

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the territories) in the 1967
war ushered a wave of religious and nationalistic sentiments which gave rise to the
Greater Israel movement. Following the war, an overwhelming majority (approx.
90 %) of the Jewish population believed that the Arabs did not desire peace with
Israel and supported the idea of Greater Israel (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). The Peace and
Security Movement (PSM) was established in May 1968 to counterbalance these
sentiments. PSM began as a petitioning campaign, initiated by a group of academics
and signed by over 300 prominent figures from Israeli academia, arts, and science.
This petition called upon the Israeli government to express its willingness to relin-
quish the territories in exchange for peace. The group also endorsed negotiations
with Palestinian representatives and expressed willingness to resolve the issue of
Palestinian refugees (Epstein, 2008). Following this successful initial mobilization,
the PSM consolidated and attempted to mobilize public support for a peaceful solu-
tion through house meetings, newspaper ads, and rallies. Some of its leaders formed
a political party “Peace List,” which ran in Israel’s general parliamentary elections
in October 1969 but received only 5100 votes (Bar-On, 1996). Although not sub-
jected to formal repression, PSM did suffer derogation in the public discourse
(Hermann, 1989).
Concurrently in 1969, the New Israeli Left organization—Siah (Hebrew: dia-
logue)—was founded by radical students from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem universities
who were previously active in Mapam and Maki (Kaminer, 1996). It filled a niche
between the anti-Zionist Matzpen and the more mainstream approach of PSM. Siah
espoused “recognizing the right of the Palestinian people for self determination in
Eretz Israel, and a just solution for the problem of Palestinian refugees” (Siah,
1969). Siah attempted to mobilize public support through grassroots activities at
university campuses and in high schools and included at its height several hundred
participants. Siah also sought to expand its constituency by participating in protest
activities organized by other radical groups such as Matzpen and the Israeli Black
Panthers (Portugez, 2013).
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case… 233

Both Siah and PSM represent attempts to mobilize public support for the
possibility of peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, combined with
initial steps to raise awareness and recognition for alternative beliefs about the
enemy. These two organizations initiated grassroots mobilization activities and
enjoyed modest public support, while their activities were tolerated by state authori-
ties. However—due to its identification with the Israeli mainstream and its attempt
to integrate into the institutionalized political system—PSM fulfilled a more mean-
ingful role in initiating the legitimization process of the idea of peaceful solution to
the conflict.

Following the 1973 War

The 1973 war represents a landmark for alternative beliefs in peaceful compromise
within the Israeli society. The war disrupted the Israeli climate of euphoria and
superiority and left a sense of insecurity and unease in the general public. Following
the war, an overwhelming majority of the Jewish population still mistrusted the
Palestinians and Arabs (90 %). However, support for the idea of Greater Israel
decreased significantly (55–60 %) (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). Increased political con-
tention during this period created new opportunities for peace-oriented activism
(Bar-On, 1996). One such initiative was the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian
Peace (ICIPP), which was founded in 1975 by a group of 100 well-known Israeli
figures. Among them were a former army general, a former director general of the
finance ministry, and a former member of the Israeli parliament (Dekar, 1985; Hall-
Cathala, 1990). ICIPP was the first to outline concrete principles for peaceful reso-
lution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including recognition of the PLO, a
Palestinian state alongside Israel, and the sharing of Jerusalem (Council for Israeli-
Palestinian Peace, 1976). The Council attempted to mobilize public support for its
plan through lectures and conferences and initiated informal dialogue between
prominent Israeli and Palestinian representatives (Yesod, 2004). Its activities con-
tributed to the creation of alternative beliefs regarding the enemy and an alternative
vision of peace. Concurrently, a religious peace organization named Oz VeShalom
(Hebrew: strength and peace) was founded in 1975 by a group of moderate religious
leaders who wanted to counter the influence of the Greater Israel movement among
the religious Jewish public. It used rabbinical arguments to justify interreligious
tolerance and peaceful relations (Hall-Cathala, 1990; Landau, 2003). Oz VeShalom
expanded the constituency which was susceptible to the idea of peaceful solution.
Both these organizations enjoyed modest public support. However, they were
allowed to act freely, with no formal restrictions or attempts of political
repression.
Peace Now (PN), the biggest and well-known Israeli peace organization, was
established in 1978, following the political turnover in 1977 and the historical visit
of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to Israel. Initially focused on the Israeli-Egyptian
peace process, from the mid-1980s, PN focused exclusively on the Israeli-Palestinian
234 T. Magal

issue (Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009). Through house meetings, conferences, and
rallies, PN mobilized large-scale public support for peaceful resolution of the
conflict, based on a vague “territorial compromise.” Furthermore, members of
parliament from the Ratz and Labor parties actively participated in some of these
activities (Reshef, 1996). This public mobilization served to legitimize the idea of a
peaceful solution. PN also initiated large-scale meetings between Israelis and
Palestinians, which served to break down stereotypes and rehumanize the enemy
(Bar-On, 1996). The significant success of PN in mobilizing public support, as well
as its acceptance and endorsement by political elites, ushered a new phase in the
peacemaking process.

Institutionalization Phase

The First Palestinian Intifada

A major turning point in the evolution of the Israeli peace movement came with the
outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in December 1987. Even before the inti-
fada, political elites began to internalize the idea of peaceful resolution.1 However,
the intifada dashed the illusion of enlightened occupation and emphasized the
dilemma between the ideal of Greater Israel and the need for personal security in the
public’s consciousness. This dilemma convinced significant segments of the Jewish
public to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Svirsky, 1996). Following the
outbreak of the intifada, support for territorial compromise among the Jewish popu-
lation steadily increased, while the public became evenly divided in its opposition
to the establishment of a Palestinian state (Oren, 2005, Chap. 8). During this period
numerous new peace organizations emerged, some of which represented specific
constituencies and focused on specific types of activity. These included rabbis, doc-
tors, psychologists, women, and generals.
The Council for Peace and Security (CPS) was established in 1988 by a group of
retired military generals and senior public officials. Through flyers, newspaper ads,
and public lectures, the Council espoused a peaceful solution based on territorial
compromise. Their influence relied mainly upon their personal prestige and reputa-
tion, as former members of the institutional elites (Bar-On, 1996; Hermann, 2009).
The council signified the acceptance and internalization of the idea of peaceful solu-
tion within the political establishment.
Another important sector within the Israeli peace movement included the
women-only peace organizations. These organizations first appeared in the early
1980s, during the height of public protest against Israel’s war in Lebanon (Gilath,
1991; Zukerman-Bareli & Benski, 1989). However, during the Palestinian intifada
additional women’s peace organizations were founded, which collated into two

1
This process is exemplified by the Peres-Hussein negotiations and the London accords (Bar-On,
1996).
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case… 235

loosely knit coalitions—Women’s Peace Network and the Women and Peace
Coalition (WPC) (Deutsch, 1994). These organizations endorsed a two-state solu-
tion and mobilized women through grassroots activities. Among their most signifi-
cant activities were weekly Women in Black vigils, routine house meetings of
ordinary Israelis with Palestinians, as well as ongoing dialogue between Israeli and
Palestinian feminist leaders (Deutsch, 1994; Sharoni, 1995; Svirsky, 1996). The
annual conferences of WPC brought together several thousand participants each
year. These activities expanded the constituency and outreach of the peace move-
ment, as well as contributed to the growing rehumanization of the enemy.

The Oslo Peace Process

The Labor party’s victory in the 1992 general elections, after 15 years of nationalist
rule, signified the public’s willingness to entertain the idea of a peaceful settlement
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, only a significant minority actively sup-
ported a territorial compromise (40 %), or the establishment of a Palestinian state
(35 %) (Arian, 1995). In September 1993 the Israeli government and the PLO
signed the Oslo declaration. As Rabin’s government progressed with the Oslo peace
process, peace organizations were relegated to promoting alternative beliefs at the
grassroots level (Hermann, 2009). Some of the more confrontational organizations
ceased their activities, while others turned to grassroots educational activity. Peace
activists from various women groups came together to establish Bat Shalom
(Hebrew: daughter of peace), which focused on joint seminars and dialogue activity
between ordinary Israeli and Palestinian women (Kershenovich, 2000; Sharoni,
2000). PN invested most of its efforts in youth education through its youth move-
ment, while other organizations initiated ongoing dialogue groups.
In contrast, some of the more radical activists in the Israeli peace movement,
who were critical of the Oslo accords, founded Gush Shalom (Hebrew: peace bloc).
This organization raised public awareness regarding core issues of the conflict
which were not addressed in the Oslo accords, such as Palestinian refugees, and the
status of Jerusalem (Magal, 2013). Following the Oslo accords only a marginal
minority of the Jewish public was willing to acknowledge these issues (12 % and
15 %, respectively) (Arian, 1995). In the late 1990s, as the official peace process
became moribund, other organizations joined Gush Shalom in raising alternative
beliefs regarding core issues of the conflict. The most notable was Bat Shalom,
which organized a series of activities to raise public awareness regarding such issues
as the sharing of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees (Cockburn, 1998; Sharoni,
2000). These organizations broke the taboo over core issues, promoted alternative
beliefs, and initiated public debate around these issues, which later enabled their
discussion in formal negotiations. By the time of the Camp David summit in July
2000, a significant minority among the Jewish population (30 %) was ready to dis-
cuss these core issues as part of the formal negotiations (Arian, 2002).
236 T. Magal

Rollback: The Reemergence of the Ethos of Conflict

The Second Palestinian Intifada

The failure of the Camp David summit and the outbreak of the second intifada in
October 2000 substantially affected the Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking process.
Following the outbreak of violence, Israeli leadership placed the blame on the
insincerity of the Palestinian leadership and resumed delegitimization of the
Palestinians as terrorists and murderers (Bar-Tal & Sharvit, 2008). This trend was
further enhanced by the escalation of violence and the beginning of the suicide
bombing campaign in 2001. As the intifada escalated, Israeli public’s support for a
peaceful solution to the conflict dropped (from 50 to 40 %), while suspicion and
mistrust toward the Palestinians rapidly increased (from 50 to 60 %) (Arian, 2002;
Oren, Chap. 8).
The outbreak of the intifada disrupted the activities of the numerous dialogue
groups which were active during the Oslo period and ended official funding for
grassroots organizations. As a result, many peace organizations ceased their activ-
ity, while those that remained active adopted other roles and tactics. Therefore, it
may be concluded that the peacemaking process suffered a significant rollback fol-
lowing the outbreak of the intifada.
However, even at the height of the intifada, some peace organizations maintained
their activities and continued to espouse alternative beliefs regarding rehumaniza-
tion of the enemy and willingness for a peaceful compromise. Newly formed main-
stream initiatives, such as The National Census and The Geneva Initiative, sought to
challenge the widespread notion of “no partner.” These initiatives presented alterna-
tive principles for peace, formulated in track-II negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians, and sought to rally public support for these alternative ideas.
Mainstream organizations, such as PN and CPS, sought to arrest the tide of declin-
ing public support through more traditional means such as rallies and educational
activities.
Radical peace organizations took a different approach. Veteran organizations
(such as Gush Shalom, Rabbis for Human Rights, and the Coalition Against House
Demolitions) as well as newly funded ones (e.g., Ta’ayush, Women’s Coalition for
Peace and Justice, and Anarchists Against the Wall) engaged in acts of civil resis-
tance—such as clearing road blocks, rebuilding demolished houses, and supplying
food to besieged Palestinian communities. These activities emphasized the exis-
tence of an alternative voice within the Jewish community and signaled comrade-
ship and solidarity with their Palestinian counterparts.
Other organizations challenged societal beliefs regarding the justness and moral-
ity of the Israeli point of view. Newly funded organizations, such as Machsom
Watch (Hebrew: checkpoint watch) and Shovrim Shtika (Hebrew: breaking the
silence), dedicated their activity to raising public awareness regarding misconduct
and wrongdoings of the Israeli authorities (Katriel & Shavit, 2011; Kaufman,
2008; Naaman, 2006). Another organization, Zochrot (Hebrew: remembering),
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case… 237

dedicated its activities to raising awareness of the Palestinian Nakba and educating
the Jewish public regarding past atrocities of the Israeli side (Aviv, 2011; Bronstein,
2005; Lentin, 2007).
Such tactics led to growing alienation between radical peace organizations and
the majority of the Jewish-Israeli public, as they were considered by many as unpa-
triotic and even traitorous acts. These organizations were often derogated in popular
discourse. However, their activities were not inhibited, and no official repression
was enacted during this period.

The Gaza Disengagement

The idea of unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was first proposed by
the leader of the Labor party, Amram Mitzna, during his 2003 general elections
campaign (Eldar, 2002). This idea was later adopted by Likud’s leader, PM Ariel
Sharon, in his speech at the Herzliya conference in December 2003 (Sharon, 2003).
The disengagement plan was formally approved by the Israeli government in June
2004 and won the Knesset’s approval in October of that year. The death of the
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in November 2004 created new opportunities for a
mutually agreed-upon withdrawal, which were rejected by PM Sharon (Bakhur-Nir,
2004; Bar-Siman-Tov & Michael, 2007). During the period leading up to the execu-
tion of the disengagement plan, support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict
among Israeli Jews increased (from 32 to 40 %), while a majority of the Israeli
public supported unilateral disengagement (53 %) (Truman-Institute, 2005).
Consequentially, despite its unilateral character, the disengagement plan was
favorably accepted by Israeli peace organizations, which perceived it as “a step in
the right direction” (Shefer, 2004). Most notably, mainstream organizations such as
PN and The Geneva Initiative organized a popular mobilization campaign of sup-
port for the plan. Such mobilization was intended to counterbalance the mobiliza-
tion and resistance raised against it by the Greater Israel movement. Other peace
organizations, although more critical of the disengagement plan, also took part in
this campaign which proved to be the last great mobilization effort of the Israeli
peace camp.

Following the Disengagement

Although the second Palestinian intifada ended following Israel’s disengagement

from Gaza, the societal peacemaking process did not resume. The Jewish public
support for the idea of a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained
steady (55–60 %). However, expectations that such a solution will materialize
decreased steadily between 2005 (40 %) and 2012 (30 %), and the public’s
238 T. Magal

willingness to support territorial compromise also declined (from 48 to 30 %).

This decline is largely due to a lack of trust in the sincerity of Palestinian intentions
and disbelief regarding their commitment to a peaceful solution (Ben-Meir &
Bagno-Moldavsky, 2013).
However, some of the blame for this deterioration may also be placed on the
Israeli peace organizations. The majority of organizations which remained active
during this period focused their activities on solidarity and support for the struggle
of the local Palestinian population (Aggestam & Strömbom, 2013). Some of these
organizations assisted and supported calls for boycott and divestment on Israeli
products, institutions, and individuals. Such activities alienated these organizations
from the Israeli public and adversely affected the perception of their legitimacy in
the public’s eye (Peled, 2010; Steinberg, 2009). Even those organizations which
targeted the Israeli constituency in their activity focused exclusively on raising
awareness through educational activities and did not attempt to mobilize the public
to actively support peaceful conflict resolution. Therefore, even when formal nego-
tiations between Israeli and Palestinian representatives where taking place, no
significant public mobilization campaigns were undertaken to support these nego-
tiations (Aggestam & Strömbom, 2013).
Furthermore, besides their lack of appeal to the general public, Israeli peace
organizations were systematically derogated and delegitimized in a campaign
orchestrated by right-wing political leaders and civil society organizations (Golan,
2014; Peled, 2010, 2012). In some respects, even though the activities of Israeli
peace organizations are still tolerated and their activists are not being arrested and
harassed by state officials, their current state of legitimacy and influence may be
equated with Siah and Matzpen in the late 1960s. However, when examining the
composition of societal beliefs, one finds higher support for some alternative beliefs
regarding the conflict and higher general support for peaceful conflict resolution,
compared with similar beliefs during the 1980s. More specifically, support signifi-
cantly increased for the evacuation of settlements (30 % in 1990, compared with
49 % in 2012), as well as for the sharing of Jerusalem (9 % in 1995, compared with
37 % in 2012). However, support for the issue of Palestinian refugees has signifi-
cantly decreased since 2000, returning to its level in the 1980s (10–15 %) (Ben-
Meir & Bagno-Moldavsky, 2013; see also Oren, Chap. 8). Therefore, it may be
concluded that, although Israeli peace organizations have been significantly dele-
gitimized, some of the ideas and beliefs they have been propagating still enjoy sub-
stantial support within the Israeli public.

Conclusion

The case of the Israeli peace movement enables us to draw several conclusions
regarding the role of civil society organizations within the framework of peacemak-
ing process.
The Role of Peace Organizations During Peacemaking Processes: The Case… 239

Peace organizations were found to play a significant role in raising public awareness
and legitimizing alternative beliefs regarding the possibility of peaceful resolution
to the conflict, as well as mobilizing support for specific alternative beliefs which
challenge the ethos of conflict. In this regard, these organizations affect the climate
of public opinion, which enables the progress and sequencing of the peacemaking
process. However, as other factors also affect the climate of opinion, it is difficult to
assess the direct effect of the activities of these organizations on changes in public
opinion.
In each phase of the peacemaking process, peace organizations fulfilled specific
roles. Some of these roles were bounded to a specific phase, while other roles
extended and overlapped into different phases of the process. Most of the organiza-
tions examined performed a specific role and ceased their activity when that role
became obsolete. Only a handful of organizations were able to adapt their activities
to the needed changes in roles.
By mobilizing public participation through their activities, peace organizations
gained legitimacy for their cause, as well as legitimated their own existence and
activities. However, these organizations could not overcome dramatic changes in
the political context and could not maintain public support and legitimacy for the
peacemaking process against the backdrop of a recurring cycle of violence.
Furthermore, as peace organizations devoted most of their activities to bridging the
divide between the warring communities, they became detached from their own
constituency and lost their ability to garner legitimacy and support for their alterna-
tive beliefs. However, as the Israeli case might indicate, legitimacy and support for
these alternative beliefs may not always be so strongly linked to the legitimacy of
the organizations themselves.

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The Road to Peace: The Potential
of Structured Encounters Between Israeli
Jews and Palestinians in Promoting Peace

Ifat Maoz and Yiftach Ron

Introduction

Intractable ethnopolitical conflicts, such as the long-running dispute between

Israelis and Palestinians, are often protracted, deeply set conflicts involving intense
hostility and repeated violence. These conflicts significantly influence the emotions,
thought processes, worldviews, and ethos of those involved in them (Bar-Tal, 2000,
2013; Bar-Tal, Rosen, & Nets-Zehngut, 2009; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).
Contesting narratives play a crucial role in intractable conflicts, with each side
adopting a narrative that justifies its own claims, demands, and position while dele-
gitimizing those of the other side (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2011; Bar-Tal & Hammack,
2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). Selective and limited exposure to the narrative of
one’s own side in the conflict can heighten intergroup dispute and misunderstanding
as well as strengthen the tendency to exclude out-groups from the realm of moral
responsibility (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009;
Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Salomon, 2004).
This chapter presents an overview of an extensive research program investigating
the processes that take place in structured intergroup encounters through interviews
with Israeli Jews who have been repeatedly involved in such encounters (Bekerman,
Maoz, & Sheftel, 2006; Maoz, Bekerman, & Sheftel, 2007; Ron & Maoz, 2013a,
2013b; Ron, Maoz, & Bekerman, 2010). Its goal is to discuss the extent to which the

I. Maoz (*)
Department of Communication, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]
Y. Ron
The Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 243

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_16
244 I. Maoz and Y. Ron

exposure to the narrative of the other through the encounter process can transform
deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Bar-Tal (2007a, 2010,
2013) as central to the societal ethos that preserves and perpetuates situations of
intractable conflicts.

Narratives in Intractable Conflict

While intergroup conflicts are often rooted in competition over material resources
and political or territorial control, they are often made salient through the con-
struction of stories that motivate intergroup antagonism (Bar-Tal & Hammack,
2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Hammack, 2008, 2009; Kriesberg, 1998; Liu &
Hilton, 2005; Paez & Liu, Chap. 5, volume 1 of this series). Group narratives are
limited by nature both in terms of the extent to which they are able to represent
others and their otherness and in terms of the quality of those representations
(Bar-On & Adwan, 2006; Bar-Tal, 2007a). Especially in intractable ethnopolitical
conflict, the opposing narratives of both sides are characterized by the absolute
justification and idealization of the national self and the cultivation of its victim-
ized collective identity alongside the exclusion and the devaluation of the “enemy”
and their narrative (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2010; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-
Tal & Hammack, 2012).
As a conflict between rival nationalist movements, the conflict between Israeli
Jews and Palestinians is framed in largely narrative terms (Rotberg, 2006).
Substantive research led by Daniel Bar-Tal has identified the role played by the
ethos of conflict, collective memory, and ethnocentric narratives of Israelis and
Palestinians in shaping national identities that negate one another and construct the
psychological reality of the conflict as a “zero-sum game” (Bar-Tal, 1997, 1998,
2000, 2007a, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009; Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, &
Zafran, 2012).
Conflict-supporting narratives play a major role in the eruption and the persis-
tence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the societies involved investing efforts
as well as material and cultural resources to form, legitimize, and maintain the dom-
inance of these narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2013). Clusters of “societal
beliefs” about security, identity, and history that construct coherent narratives are
told and retold by Israeli Jews and Palestinians that inherently delegitimize the
counter-narrative (Bar-Tal, 2007a; 2010; 2011; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Nahhas,
Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; Shaked,
Chap. 9; Srour, Mana, & Sagy, Chap. 6).
It is these attitudes and beliefs regarding the causes and nature of the conflict,
as well as perceptions regarding the opponent and the desired solution to the
conflict, that reconciliation-aimed intergroup encounters between Israeli Jews
and Palestinians aim to address (Maoz, 2011; Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron
et al., 2010).
The Road to Peace: The Potential of Structured Encounters Between Israeli Jews… 245

Intergroup Encounters and Exposure to the Narrative

of the Other

While much of the earlier research on intergroup contact has centered around its
outcomes and effects (Tropp, Chap. 12, volume 1 of this series), recent scholarly
work increasingly focuses on the communicative, cognitive, and emotional pro-
cesses that evolve within the contact situation (Maoz, 2011). Stephan (2008), for
instance, has stressed the importance of cognitive and affective intergroup processes,
such as the reduction of threat and empathizing with the other’s suffering. This may
also include cognitive moves, such as taking the out-group’s perspective (Chambers,
Baron, & Inman, 2006). Salomon (2004) claims that the collective narratives of
groups in conflict and their implied delegitimization of the out-group’s narrative
should be the main target for change when promoting intergroup reconciliation.
Maoz (2000, 2004, 2005, 2011), in an extensive longitudinal research program,
focuses on power relations and dynamics of domination and control in Jewish-Arab
encounters aimed at reconciliation. This research points to the importance of
enabling the minority group to present its agenda and claims in a majority-minority
intergroup interaction in conflict (Maoz, 2000, 2011). Bar-Tal (2002, 2004, 2010,
2013; Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009b) importantly conceptual-
izes the main goal of education for peace as educating towards recognition of the
perspectives, goals, needs, and narratives of the other side in conflict.
Against this backdrop, intergroup encounters aimed at Israeli-Palestinian recon-
ciliation have increasingly come to focus on the narrative or storytelling approach
(Bar-On, 2009; Bar-On & Kassem, 2004; Maoz, 2011; Maoz & Bar-On, 2002).
However, very little empirical attention has been devoted to the impact that the
exposure to the narrative of the other in conflict has on the ethos, beliefs, emotions,
and views of those involved in dialogue encounters.
Can exposure to the narrative of the other through the intergroup encounter
transform deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Bar-Tal (2007a,
2010, 2013) as central to the societal ethos of intractable conflicts? In the next sec-
tion, we present an overview of findings from our research program that address
this question.

Exposure to the Narrative of the Other and Transformation

of Beliefs in Intractable Conflict

Overview

Our analysis relates to a unique and extensive set of data, which includes in-depth
interviews with Israeli Jews who have been continuously involved in Israeli-
Palestinian reconciliation-aimed intergroup encounters over a considerable period
246 I. Maoz and Y. Ron

of time (for a more complete and detailed description of this research program and
its products, see Bekerman et al., 2006; Maoz et al., 2007; Ron & Maoz, 2013a,
2013b; Ron et al., 2010). The findings presented here are based on an analytical
inductive process informed by the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss,
1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This analytical process revealed that first and most
significantly, in line with Bar-Tal’s (2002, 2004, 2010, 2013; Bar-Tal & Rosen,
2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2009) seminal writings on the goals and mechanisms of peace
education, facing the narrative of the other is indeed experienced as a transformative
experience that has the potential to change deeply set beliefs related to the ethos of
conflict. Encountering the narrative of the Palestinian other is described by most of
the Jewish dialogue participants as a meaningful, dramatic, and transformative
experience that seriously undermines their previously held narrative, ethos, and
worldview (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron et al., 2010). The dramatic response to
encountering the narrative of the other is not surprising, given the extent to which
individuals who belong to opposing parties in conflict tend to be monolithically
invested in the ethos, beliefs, and narratives that justify their own side (Bar-Tal,
2007a, 2010; Bar-Tal & Hammack, 2012; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006).
Second, more specifically, and also consistent with prominent conceptualiza-
tions by Daniel Bar-Tal (1998, 2000, 2002, 2011; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009), our
findings point to the particular psychological, cognitive, and emotional changes
brought by the continued exposure to the narrative of the other in conflict. These
involve increased awareness of the Palestinian perspective in the conflict and of
Palestinian pain and suffering (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b). These interrelated
themes are exemplified by the following closer analysis of relevant quotes from our
interview data (see also Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010 for a more
detailed and complete description of the findings of this research program).

Findings: Accounts of Transformation—Excerpts

from the Interview Data

A close analysis of our interview data revealed accounts of dramatic transformation

in the perceptions, feelings, and worldviews of Israeli Jews who have been involved
in extended encounters with Palestinians, following their repeated exposure to the
perspectives and experiences of their Palestinian counterparts (Ron & Maoz, 2013a,
2013b; Ron et al., 2010).
Yair,1 a Jewish-Israeli male, described his experience of exposure to the
Palestinian narrative during a dialogue encounter in the following way:
I can tell you that it was a very meaningful experience… It hadn’t happened to me before,
certainly no Arab had ever told me—you are responsible for this and that. It’s really power-
ful. It questions whether my own story, my national story, is correct and right. And not only
is it not, but I’m a party to something that causes pain and suffering… oppression, discrimi-

1
All names have been changed.
The Road to Peace: The Potential of Structured Encounters Between Israeli Jews… 247

nation. Speaking about how I could support certain things, morally, democratically,
humanely… Things that hold it up to your face that you are responsible for violating basic
rights.

Exposure to the Palestinian narrative is portrayed by Yair as forcing him to ques-

tion his own “national story.” The experience, which confronts Yair with the pain,
frustration, and sense of oppression and discrimination among his Palestinian inter-
locutors, undermines his own narrative about how humane, moral, and enlightened
he is (Ron & Maoz, 2013a).
Yoav, another Jewish-Israeli male who also went through a similar process of
Jewish-Arab dialogue, described his reaction to the encounter with Palestinians and
their narrative:
Finally my eyes were opened and I understood what the hell was going on… I’d go home
and I’d be totally wiped out. So emotionally charged and so sad or pained or I don’t know
what. I went through a very difficult period. But fascinating. Fascinating because I dealt
with things that I’d never dealt with before, and they opened my eyes and broadened my
horizons… It was the first time I could really hear about other people’s suffering in the first
person… It was the first time I realized where I live, in terms of the state, Zionism, all sorts
of concepts that I’d been fine with until then… And that’s where it hit me. It hit me and left
its mark, that there are questions and a story I haven’t been told. Let’s say, they concealed
it from me. I wasn’t smart enough or sophisticated enough or involved enough to find it out
on my own. It took me quite a long time. And it’s not a simple story, it’s really complicated,
and it’s to do with me too, with my nation, my tradition, my history.

The following excerpt from the interview with Naama more specifically describes
the process through which the exposure to the Palestinians’ narrative and point of
view elicited a new understanding in her as a Jewish Israeli:
It’s like the other has got a face, and that what I know to tell about history, they tell some-
thing else, and to suddenly see things through their eyes. And it’s like the very fact that you
can look at what happened differently, it was really dramatic. And their description of life
in the Occupied Territories, like, their everyday life, how they live, what happens to them
there. All sorts of bits of information that as a Jew, you know, who lives in Israel and
watches the news on TV, you’ve got no idea what’s going on.

Naama describes the face that the Palestinian other is given during the dialogue
encounter and the opportunity to “see things through their eyes” while implying that
the dialogue has brought her to understand that her knowledge and perspective on
the conflict—as an Israeli Jew—have been only partial and selective (“what I know
to tell about history”). It thus seems that encountering the narrative of the Palestinian
other inevitably and powerfully forces the Jewish dialogue participants to confront
the incompleteness and selectiveness of their own in-group narrative regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000, 2007a; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006).
Several of the participants note that the encounter with Palestinians and the expo-
sure to their narrative had substantially changed their perspective on their own soci-
ety—the Jewish-Israeli society.
Sharon described her experience as follows:
I feel, I see, that Israel is in a very dark place. It’s really sad, I mean, a kind of victimhood…
I think that most people in Israel don’t understand that there’s an occupation… They don’t
248 I. Maoz and Y. Ron

understand what it means, and they don’t want to know. They only see how miserable they
are, we are… We’ve got racism here which is based on seeing us as good and them as bad
and that’s why we’re allowed to be racist. It’s terribly frightening, and sad.

Sharon portrays Israel as a society living in denial and with a sense of perpetual
victimization (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007a; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-Tal &
Hammack, 2012; Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Raviv, & Rosler, 2010). This descrip-
tion conveys Sharon’s criticism of her own society.
In a similar vein, many of the interviewees spoke of how the encounter with
Palestinians and their narrative of the conflict brought about dilemmas and even a
sense of alienation regarding significant aspects of their identity as Israelis (Ron &
Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010). Naama explained how her identity as an
Israeli was unsettled by the encounter with Palestinians and their perspectives, how
the dialogue with the story of the other caused her to feel detached from the ethos
and symbols of Israeli identity, and how hard it was for her to take the experience
back to her family and friends:
There was something about my identity as an Israeli that was really, really, really unsettled
by the encounter, so much so that I left with a really difficult experience of feeling alienated
from my identity… Alienation from parts of my identity of Israeliness, from symbols, the
flag, the national anthem, all sorts of ethos. And a very difficult feeling. It was really hard
to go back to my friends, my family, like, how to convey what I’d been through… It clashes
with returning to reality, to the family, like, things that it arouses in other people.

This sense of conflict and alienation and the criticism expressed by many of the
encounter participants were not only directed at the state and its symbols or at Israeli
society in general. The criticism that followed their encounter with the other was
also directed at who they, the participants, had been before the encounter—their
previous narrative and state of awareness and the way they had been raised and
educated (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron et al., 2010). For instance, Yoav attacked the
“Zionist bubble” in which he had been raised and socialized:
I lived in a bubble; totally, I didn’t know what was happening in East Jerusalem. I wasn’t
very interested either. Even when I joined the army, what did I understand? What did I
know? Nothing. I was completely living in a bubble. Really. A Zionist bubble… I grew up
in a very conformist family. Very mainstream. I mean, what the state says is sacrosanct.
Zionism was the best thing ever to happen, no questions asked. I grew up in the bosom of
Zionism… And I didn’t ask too many questions.

Yoav describes the social and ideological environment in which he grew up as a

“Zionist bubble” characterized by conformism, a lack of critical awareness, ethno-
centricity, blindness, and indifference to the circumstances of the lives of Palestinians
(“I didn’t know what was happening in East Jerusalem. I wasn’t very interested
either”). Yoav’s comments clearly show how large the gap is between his previous
and current levels of awareness and between his views and those of his family. This
gap, described by many of the Israeli-Jewish participants (Ron & Maoz, 2013a; Ron
et al., 2010), reflects the potential impact of continuous exposure to the narrative of
the other through the encounter process to challenge and transform narratives and
beliefs deeply rooted in the ethos of conflict. This process entails a destabilization
The Road to Peace: The Potential of Structured Encounters Between Israeli Jews… 249

of one’s own narrative, identity, and self-image, and although difficult and painful,
it is portrayed by participants as meaningful, formative, and “eye-opening” (Bar-
Tal, 2000, 2007a, 2010, 2011, 2013; Bar-Tal et al., 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter points to the potential of confronting the narrative of the other in con-
flict to transform deeply set beliefs and values that have been identified by Daniel
Bar-Tal (2000, 2007a, 2010, 2013) as central to the societal ethos that preserves and
perpetuates situations of intractable conflicts. In the specific context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, this potential is realized among Israeli Jews by creating a
greater awareness of the perspective and narratives of Palestinians in conflict and of
the discrimination and injustice suffered by Palestinians (Ron & Maoz, 2013a,
2013b; Ron et al., 2010). The aim of confronting contested narratives through dia-
logue with the other is thus to disrupt those regimes of feeling, thinking, and moral-
izing that underlie and perpetuate a monolithic ethos of conflict and to reconstruct
more complex and inclusive narratives (Bekerman & Zembylas, 2011).
More specifically, the analytical process presented in this chapter revealed the
following two major interrelated themes:
First and most significantly, in line with Bar-Tal’s (2002, 2004, 2010, 2013; Bar-
Tal & Rosen, 2009; Bar-Tal et al., 2009) important writings on the goals and mecha-
nisms of peace education, facing the narrative of the other is indeed described by
Israeli Jews as a transformative experience that has the potential to change deeply
set beliefs related to the ethos of conflict. Encountering the narrative of the
Palestinian other is described by most of the Jewish dialogue participants as a mean-
ingful, dramatic, and transformative experience that seriously undermines their pre-
viously held narrative, ethos, and worldview while at the same time entailing a great
deal of difficulty, defensiveness, and resistance (Ron & Maoz, 2013a, 2013b; Ron
et al., 2010). The dramatic response to encountering the narrative of the other is not
surprising given the extent to which individuals who belong to sides in conflict tend
to be monolithically invested in the ethos, beliefs, and narratives that justify their
own side (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2011, 2013; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai et al., 2009; Bar-Tal
& Salomon, 2006). It seems that repeated, non-mediated personalized encounters
with out-group members and their narratives may disrupt these regimes of feeling
and thinking, constitute a space enabling intergroup inclusion, and, thus, can bring
about change even in such entrenched narratives and beliefs.
Second, more specifically, and again consistent with prominent conceptualiza-
tions brought by Daniel Bar-Tal (1998, 2000, 2007a, 2011, 2013; Halperin & Bar-
Tal, 2011), our findings point to the particular psychological, cognitive, and
emotional changes brought by the continued exposure to the narrative of the other
in conflict. These involve increased awareness of the Palestinian perspective in the
conflict and to Palestinian pain and suffering. Exposure to the Palestinian narra-
tive also increases Israeli-Jewish awareness of the structural power asymmetry
250 I. Maoz and Y. Ron

that is embedded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to the injustice and

discrimination that are repeatedly enacted towards Palestinians (Ron & Maoz,
2013a, 2013b; Ron et al., 2010).
These findings reflect the unique role of intergroup dialogue in altering aware-
ness and attitudes of high-power group members in settings of asymmetric conflict.
While disadvantaged group members constantly face situations of power asymme-
try in their daily lives and are often compelled to interact with the point of view and
the narratives of their out-group, high-power group members can limit their interac-
tions to the boundaries of their in-group and are less exposed to intergroup situa-
tions. Intergroup encounters constitute a unique and rare opportunity enabling
members of more advantaged groups to increase their awareness of power asym-
metries and of issues of social justice.
In line with the seminal work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2000, 2002, 2004, 2007a, 2010,
2013; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Bar-Tal, Rosen et al., 2009), then, the analysis
brought here as well as Jewish-Israeli participants’ accounts of dramatic cognitive
and emotional transformation indicate that confronting contested narratives in eth-
nopolitical conflict is not only a difficult task but also a transformative form of
intergroup engagement. It can create spaces for more complex and multifaceted
beliefs, attitudes, and feelings towards the others in conflict and thus increase soci-
etal, cognitive, and emotional readiness for reconciliation.

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Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic
Needs for Agency and Positive Moral Identity
Facilitates Mutual Prosociality

Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and Nurit Shnabel

Introduction

A famous quote of Israel’s first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion is that “The fate
of Israel depends on two things: its strength and its righteousness.” This quote points
to two basic resources that are perceived by many Israelis as critical for their in-
group’s survival and prosperity, namely, its power and its morality (i.e., righteous-
ness). However, in societies involved in intractable conflicts (for definition of such
conflicts, see Bar-Tal, 1998; Kriesberg, 1993, Sharvit, Chap. 1) such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, attaining one of these resources is often perceived to come
inherently at the expense of the other. This trade-off is reflected in two other quotes
of Ben-Gurion, who, on the one hand, stated that “Israel will be tested not through
its material wealth, military might or technical achievements, but in its moral char-
acter and human values” yet, on the other hand, said that “If all the great ideals in
the world were placed on one tip of the scale, and Israel’s existence was placed on
the other, I would choose the latter.”
According to Bar-Tal’s (2007, 2013) theorizing, Israelis’ attempt to “square the
circle” and satisfy their strong motivation to protect both their in-group’s strength
and its positive moral identity simultaneously often translates into rigid beliefs
regarding Israel’s urgent need to defend itself at any cost and the unquestionable
righteousness of its way. Such rigid beliefs are characteristics of societies involved
in intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), whose members become frozen
in their self-defense and self-righteousness (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010) due
to a sociopsychological infrastructure that both reflects and perpetuates these
beliefs. As explained in detail by Sharvit (Chap. 1; see also Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013),

I. SimanTov-Nachlieli (*) • N. Shnabel

School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 253

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_17
254 I. SimanTov-Nachlieli and N. Shnabel

this infrastructure is comprised of three elements: collective memories, the ethos of

the conflict, and collective emotional orientations, which feed the experience of
urgent need for self-defense and justify the in-group’s self-righteousness, “thus
becoming part of a vicious cycle of intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1430).
The goal of the present chapter is to integrate Bar-Tal’s theorizing with the logic
of the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) whose
main tenet is that groups’ unaddressed psychological needs serve as barriers to rec-
onciliation. Focusing on the Middle East conflict, we propose that Israelis and
Palestinians become frozen in their self-defense and self-righteousness beliefs
because the involvement in the conflict chronically threatens their ability to address
their fundamental psychological needs for agency (i.e., strength and ability to pro-
tect their security and pursue their goals) and positive moral identity (i.e., ability to
maintain a just and humane image of their in-group). Palestinians’ and Israelis’
strong clinging to these beliefs reflects a psychological strategy that allows them to
deal with the frequent threats posed to their in-group’s agency and positive moral
identity. Optimistically, however, and in line with the logic of the needs-based
model, we provide empirical evidence suggesting that addressing Israelis’ and
Palestinians’ fundamental needs can defreeze their rigidity and open them to recon-
ciliation. To achieve our goal of integrating these two lines of research (i.e., Bar-
Tal’s theorizing and the needs-based model), we now turn to describe the main
principles of the latter.

The Needs-Based Model: A Brief Overview

The needs-based model has been proposed in an attempt to explain the dynamics
between victims and perpetrators and point to ways to improve it. It suggests that
transgressions pose asymmetric threats to victims’ and perpetrators’ identities. In
particular, transgressions impair victims’ sense of agency, namely, they threaten
their identity as powerful, autonomous social actors who are able to determine their
own outcomes. Consequently, victims are motivated to restore their agency and
strength (e.g., by taking revenge, Frijda, 1994). Perpetrators, in contrast, experience
impairment to their moral identity. Because the sanction imposed upon those who
violate their community’s moral standards is their social exclusion (Tavuchis, 1991),
perpetrators are motivated to restore their positive moral identity and reassure their
(re)acceptance by meaningful others in their community. In terms of “Big Two”
theorizing, which argues that there are two fundamental content dimensions along
which people judge themselves and others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013), victims can
be said to experience threats to the dimension representing constructs such as com-
petence, respect, power, and agency, whereas perpetrators experience threats to the
dimension representing warmth, love, communion, and morality. Consequently,
conflicting parties experience a psychological need to reaffirm their impaired identi-
ties (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013).
Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic Needs for Agency and Positive Moral… 255

Building on human needs theory (Christie, 1997), which argues that conflicts can
be managed through the satisfaction of basic human needs such as the need for secu-
rity and positive identity, the needs-based model further argues that victims’ and
perpetrators’ unaddressed needs block the path to reconciliation. Yet, addressing
these needs through a reciprocal exchange of messages between victimized and per-
petrating groups can remove these emotional barriers and facilitate reconciliation. To
examine this claim, in one study Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi (2009,
Study 1) exposed Israeli Arabs and Jews to two speeches allegedly given by their
out-group’s representative on the 50th anniversary of the 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre,
in which 43 unarmed Arab civilians were killed by the Israeli border patrol. In line
with the needs-based model’s rationale, Arab participants showed greater willing-
ness to reconcile with the Jews following an empowering (compared to an accepting)
message conveyed by a Jewish representative (i.e., a message that reaffirmed Arabs’
right for pride and self-determination). By contrast, Jewish participants showed
greater willingness to reconcile with the Arabs following an accepting (compared to
an empowering) message from an Arab representative (i.e., a message expressing
sympathy, understanding, and brotherhood toward the Jews).
While this experiment supports the logic of the needs-based model, its contribu-
tion to our understanding the dynamics between Israelis and Palestinians in general
has remained limited because it focused on a specific episode in which the social
roles of victims vs. perpetrators were distinct and clear-cut. However, the conflict as
a whole—despite the undeniable power differences between Palestinians and
Israelis—is characterized by mutual transgressions. That is, because Israelis and
Palestinians repeatedly aggress against each other, the conflict as a whole is marked
by a “duality” of social roles in the sense that both groups serve as victims in some
situations and as perpetrators in others. Our recent research (Shnabel & SimanTov-
Nachlieli, 2015; SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014, 2015) aimed to amend this
shortcoming of previous work within the needs-based model’s framework through
investigating how the experience of such duality influences the psychological needs
and consequent behaviors of Palestinians and Israelis.

Duality of Social Roles: The Primacy of Agency Effect

In line with the logic of the needs-based model, we hypothesized that group mem-
bers who feel as both victims and perpetrators at the same time would experience
heightened needs for both agency and positive moral identity. To examine this
hypothesis, we conducted an experiment (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014,
Study 2) in which Israeli Jewish participants were randomly assigned into three dif-
ferent roles: “pure” victims, “pure” perpetrators, and “duals.” Using a recall task
developed by Mazziotta, Feuchte, Gausel, and Nadler (2013), participants assigned
to be victims were asked to recall and write about two incidents in which their in-
group was victimized by Palestinians (e.g., the Passover massacre of 2002 in which
256 I. SimanTov-Nachlieli and N. Shnabel

30 unarmed Israeli civilians were killed by a suicide bomber). Participants

assigned to be perpetrators were instructed to recall and write about two incidents
in which their in-group victimized Palestinians (e.g., the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs
massacre in which 29 unarmed Palestinian civilians were killed by an Israeli settler
who opened fire inside a Mosque). Finally, participants assigned to be duals were
instructed to recall and write about one victimization and one perpetration episode.
Note that due to the conflict’s nature, it was impossible to ask participants to
recall neutral (control) incidents within the conflict: cooperation between Israelis
and Palestinians (e.g., a friendly football match) constitutes a positive rather than a
neutral episode, and a period of quiet cannot be considered “an incident.” To over-
come this obstacle, we used bipolar scales for our dependent variables with neutral
levels represented by their midpoints. These midpoints represented no change in
participants’ needs and behavioral tendencies and, thus, corresponded to a control
condition such that scores lower or higher than the midpoint represented respective
decreases or increases in needs and behavioral tendencies, which were our main
dependent variables (note that the pattern of results reported below was replicated
in another study that used a real control condition, see SimanTov-Nachlieli &
Shnabel, 2014, Study 1).
We found, consistent with previous findings obtained within the needs-based
model’s framework, that victims, but not perpetrators, showed an increased need for
agency (e.g., “I would like Israel to demonstrate more power”), whereas perpetrators,
but not victims, indicated heightened need for positive moral identity (e.g., “I would
like Israel to act more morally”). Correspondingly, victims showed increased venge-
fulness (e.g., “Israel must use unrestricted force against any act of terrorism”),
whereas perpetrators showed increased helpfulness (e.g., “Israel must provide
humanitarian aid to Gaza”). Of most interest, however, were participants in the dual
condition, because this condition corresponds to the dynamics that generally charac-
terize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more closely than the conditions of “pure”
social roles. We found that similar to victims, duals showed a heightened need for
agency, and similar to perpetrators, duals showed a heightened need for positive
moral identity. However, in terms of behavior, duals resembled victims: like victims,
they showed heightened vengefulness, whereas unlike perpetrators, they did not
show increased helpfulness. These findings suggest that even though duals are moti-
vated to restore both their agency and positive moral identity, they place greater
priority on addressing the first need (i.e., restoring agency through using force)
rather than the latter need (i.e., restoring positive moral identity through increased
helping behavior).
This finding contradicts current social-psychological theorizing, which points to
morality as the most important dimension in in-groups’ identity—the one that was
most important to group members’ pride in their in-group and psychological close-
ness to it (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). This finding is highly consistent,
however, with Bar-Tal’s (2007) theory about the collective fear orientation that
develops in societies involved in intractable conflicts, as part of their unique socio-
psychological infrastructure. Due to this emotional orientation, acute security
threats become chronically salient, and beliefs about dangers to society members
Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic Needs for Agency and Positive Moral… 257

and to society as a whole become embedded in societies’ collective memory and

ethos. This set of beliefs “justifies and legitimizes the most immoral acts and allows
the attribution of one’s own immoral behavior to the rival’s violence and external-
situational factors” (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 1441).
Bar-Tal’s perspective is consistent with Maslow (1970) who viewed security as
one of the basic needs that has to be satisfied for the well-being of humans. This
perspective thus explains why even though duals in our study experienced enhanced
needs for restoration of both agency and positive moral identity, the first need
received primacy in determining their behavior toward Palestinians (as opposed to
participants in Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto’s, 2007 research mentioned above, which
was not conducted in a context of an intractable conflict). Bar-Tal’s perspective also
offers insights that may explain why our dual participants did not experience a press-
ing need to remove the threat posed to their in-group’s moral identity. It is possible
that Israelis, who chronically experience moral threats (e.g., in the form of economic
and academic boycott initiatives; see Shnabel & Noor, 2012), become habituated to
them and continuously repeat their “habituated course of action” (Bar-Tal, 2001,
p. 620) without considering alternative responses. Such a habituated response may
be illustrated in a recent speech of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
“There is a new campaign against us…but this is not new. Boycott campaigns against
Jews have always existed” (“Netanyahu: Boycott campaign is anti-Semitic,” 2014).
Admittedly, participants in the perpetrator condition responded to the experience of
moral threats by increased helpfulness. Nevertheless, perhaps the experience of
simultaneous agency and morality threats made participants in the dual condition
revert to a habituated, dismissive response toward the moral threats, similar to the
one expressed by Netanyahu.

The Agency Affirmation Intervention

Although our above findings pessimistically revealed that duals show heightened lev-
els of aggressiveness and vengefulness, we reasoned that the fact that they did show
an enhanced need for positive moral identity (as opposed to “pure” victims who did
not exhibit a similar enhancement) leaves some room for optimism. In particular, we
theorized that addressing Palestinians’ and Israelis’ urgent need for agency may allow
their need for restoration of positive moral identity to come to the fore and exert its
positive effect on their mutual behavior toward each other. To examine this possibility,
we developed a novel “agency affirmation” intervention in which Israeli and
Palestinian participants were exposed to a text that reassured their in-group’s strength,
competence, and resiliency. We hypothesized that once group members would be
reminded of their in-group’s agency, they would be more willing to relinquish some
power for the sake of moral consideration. This greater willingness, in turn, would
lead to their lower vengefulness and greater helpfulness toward each other.
We tested the effectiveness of this agency affirmation intervention in a series of
four experiments. In the first experiment (Shnabel & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015,
258 I. SimanTov-Nachlieli and N. Shnabel

Study 1), which focused on Israeli Jewish participants, we pitted the agency
affirmation intervention against a moral threat manipulation, which was found to
increase prosocial tendencies in various interpersonal and intergroup contexts (e.g.,
Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Hopkins et al., 2007; see also Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder,
& Penner, 2006). Thus, our experiment used a 2 (agency affirmation [yes, no]) × 2
(moral threat [yes, no]) between-subjects design. Participants assigned to the agency
affirmation condition were exposed to a text that affirmed Israel’s strength, self-
determination, and resilience (i.e., reminding participants that Israel is a strong
nation that has proved its strength and resilience in many domains such as economy,
technical achievements, and military might). Participants assigned to the moral
threat condition were exposed to a text that portrayed Israel in a way that under-
mined its positive moral identity (i.e., reminding participants that since the 1980s
[the onset of the first Intifada, in which the violent military oppression of the
Palestinian uprising by the Israeli Defense Force severely tarnished Israel’s moral
image], many nations including the Palestinians perceive Israel as immoral).
Participants assigned to the agency affirmation and moral threat condition were
exposed to a text that combined both agency affirmation and moral threat, whereas
control participants read no text. We found that compared to the control condition,
the exposure to agency affirmation significantly reduced Israeli Jews’ aggressiveness
against Palestinians while increasing their helpfulness toward them. By contrast, the
exposure to a moral threat did not affect Israeli Jews’ aggressiveness or helpfulness
tendencies. As expected, the positive effect of agency affirmation was mediated by
participants’ willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., “Israel must give up
its power superiority in order to be just and fair with the Palestinians”).
While the above experiment was conducted during a relatively calm period of the
conflict, the onset of a military operation in Gaza provided us with a (hopefully)
unique opportunity to test the effectiveness of our agency affirmation intervention
during wartime. During this operation, the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) air force
bombed more than 1500 sites in the Gaza Strip, including rocket launch pads,
weapon depots, government facilities, and apartment blocks, while Hamas and
other Palestinian militant groups fired over 1500 rockets into highly populated areas
in Israel including the cities Rishon LeZion, Beersheba, Ashdod, and Tel Aviv. On
the sixth day of the operation, we recruited Israeli Jewish participants to take part in
an online experiment, in which they were randomly assigned either to a control, no-
text condition or to the agency affirmation condition, which exposed them to a text
based on the previous study, yet with specific adjustments to better fit the war con-
text. For example, the text referred to the effectiveness of the Israeli Iron Dome
anti-rocket defense system, which was used for the first time during the operation
and proved to be highly effective. Interestingly, the positive effect of agency affir-
mation was replicated even under these extreme conditions of security threat:
Participants in the agency affirmation condition showed significantly greater will-
ingness to relinquish power for the sake of moral considerations (e.g., “Israel should
restrain its operations in Gaza to maintain its positive moral image in the world”),
which in turn led to less vengefulness (e.g., “Israel must protect its citizens even at
the cost of harming many Palestinian civilians in Gaza”) and greater helpfulness
Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic Needs for Agency and Positive Moral… 259

(e.g., “When the operation ends, Israel must make substantial financial investments
to improve the situation of Gaza’s civil population”). An alternative explanation—
specifically, the reduction of existential threat—was ruled out, and all the effects
reported above persisted when controlling for political left-right orientation and
in-group identification (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2015, Study 4b).
After establishing the effectiveness of agency affirmation among Israeli Jews, we
turned to examine whether it would have similar effects among Palestinians (Shnabel &
SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015, Study 2). We were concerned that it would be harder to
replicate the positive effects of agency affirmation among Palestinian (compared to
Israeli) participants for two reasons. First, we reasoned that as the party who is often
perceived worldwide as the David rather than the Goliath in the Middle East con-
flict, Palestinians may experience a less pressing need to restore their moral identity
compared to Israelis. Even more importantly, we also thought that as the weaker
party in the conflict, Palestinians might be less susceptible than Israelis to an affir-
mation of their in-group’s agency (i.e., it might be harder to effectively affirm
Palestinians’ agency, due to their in-group’s relative inferiority in terms of military
force, economically, etc.). Notably, despite the power asymmetry, the obtained pat-
tern of results generally corresponded to the one obtained among Israeli Jews. Using
a 2 (agency affirmation [yes, no]) × 2 (moral threat [yes, no]) between-subjects
design, we randomly assigned Palestinians from the West Bank into the four experi-
mental conditions. Once again, the exposure to moral threat (i.e., a reminder that
since 2000 [the onset of the second Al-Aqsa Intifada in which the killing of Israeli
civilians by suicide bombers severely tarnished the Palestinians’ moral image],
many nations including the Israelis perceive the Palestinians as immoral) did not
affect participants’ prosocial behavioral tendencies. Yet, in line with expectations,
exposing Palestinian participants to a text that affirmed the Palestinians’ strength
and resilience (i.e., reminding participants that the Palestinian nation is strong,
cohesive, and known worldwide for its inner strength and resiliency) increased their
willingness to relinquish power for morality (e.g., “The Palestinians must give up
the use of violence in order to be just and fair in the conflict against the Jews”). This,
in turn, led to greater helping tendencies toward Israelis (e.g., “Palestinians should
not hesitate to provide humanitarian aid to Israel in cases of natural disasters such
as the Mount Carmel fire”).
As the final step in our research program, we turned to establish that the effec-
tiveness of agency affirmation did not result merely from the general reassurance of
in-group positive identity, regardless of particular content. Specifically, we aimed to
establish that to increase prosociality in contexts of dual conflicts, the affirmation
must focus on the specific identity dimension about which conflicting groups are
most concerned, namely, their agency. For this purpose, we assigned Israeli Jews to
one of three conditions: a control, no-affirmation condition, the agency affirmation
condition, and a corresponding morality affirmation condition, which assured
Israel’s moral identity (i.e., reminding participants that Israel is a moral nation that
has proved its morality in various ways such as sending teams to aid countries
facing natural disasters). We chose morality affirmation for comparison because,
first, the needs-based model consistently points to agency and morality as the two
260 I. SimanTov-Nachlieli and N. Shnabel

fundamental identity dimensions that are impaired among conflicting groups.

Second, according to the social labeling literature (Kraut, 1973; Strenta & Dejong,
1981), an affirmation of a group’s morality, which labels the in-group as moral, can
activate group members’ self-perception of themselves as moral people and conse-
quently lead to prosocial behavior consistent with this label. Nevertheless, we did
not expect morality affirmation to exert positive effects on prosocial behavior in the
present context, given our general reasoning that in dual conflicts the restoration of
agency is a prerequisite for moral needs to come into play. Although the two affir-
mations were perceived as equally positive (i.e., presenting Israel in a positive light),
consistent with previous findings, agency affirmation increased prosociality
(i.e., decreased actual donations to an anti-Palestinian organization and increased
donations to a pro-Palestinian organization), whereas the morality affirmation failed
to increase prosociality (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2015, Study 4a).
In summary, the series of four experiments described above revealed that an affir-
mation of the in-group’s agency led to greater prosocial tendencies and behaviors. It is
interesting to note that in another series of experiments, Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor
(2013) also found evidence of positive effects of agency affirmation. Specifically,
Shnabel et al. (2013) exposed Israeli Jews and Palestinians to a text that highlighted
that both parties are equipped with lethal weapons and have actively inflicted substan-
tial harm upon each other. The exposure to this text was found to increase Palestinians’
and Jews’ sense of in-group’s agency (e.g., their belief that their in-group has the power
and resources to solve the conflict) compared to a control, neutral-text condition.
The increase in agency, in turn, translated into reduced engagement in competition over
the victim status and greater forgiveness tendencies. It seems, thus, that drawing group
members’ attention to their in-group’s strength, even through a reminder of how this
strength was misused against the out-group, can address their pressing need for agency.
Addressing this need, in turn, can contribute to more constructive relations even
between groups involved in intractable conflicts.

Summary and Conclusions

For several decades, Bar-Tal’s research has been devoted to identifying the components
of the sociopsychological infrastructure that blocks societies involved in intractable
conflicts from coming to terms with each other. His legacy for us, the new generation
of researchers, is to find ways to disassemble this infrastructure and defreeze the con-
flicting groups’ rigid conflict-related beliefs. In this chapter, we argued that Israelis and
Palestinians experience an inherent dilemma between their need to protect their secu-
rity and agency, on one hand, and their need to maintain a positive moral identity, on
the other. We have reviewed empirical evidence suggesting that, sadly, the first need,
which dictates revenge and aggression, has a greater impact on group members’ behav-
ior than the latter need, which pulls behavior into prosocial directions. Optimistically,
however, we also showed that an affirmation of their in-group’s agency allowed
Palestinians’ and Israelis’ need for positive moral identity to come into play and exert
Addressing Israelis’ and Palestinians’ Basic Needs for Agency and Positive Moral… 261

its positive influence on their mutual prosocial tendencies and behavior. Thus, remov-
ing the threat to Palestinians’ and Israelis’ sense of agency can “defreeze” their rigid
clinging to aggressive defensiveness and self-righteousness.
Our endeavor joins the efforts of other researchers whose work tries to disas-
semble the harmful sociopsychological infrastructure identified by Bar-Tal’s work.
These include dialogue group interventions aiming to “work through” the conflict
by developing empathy and mutual recognition of suffering (Maoz & Bar-On, 2002;
Maoz & Ron, Chap. 16) or increasing group members’ insights regarding how their
conflict-related beliefs serve its perpetuation (Sonnenschein, 2008). Laboratory-
based interventions that build on Bar-Tal’s legacy include emotional regulation
techniques (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013) and interventions intended to
change Israelis’ and Palestinians’ beliefs regarding groups’ malleability (Halperin,
Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011). We hope that our joint efforts will
build a large body of knowledge that may contribute to our understanding of how to
remove the sociopsychological barriers to enduring peace.

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Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging
from Intractable Conflicts: Between the Right
to Truth and Collective Memory

Ofer Shinar Levanon

“The truth must dazzle gradually

Or every man be blind.”
Emily Dickinson

Introduction

This chapter examines the manner in which research regarding intractable conflicts
can inform and shape truth-seeking processes, contributing to the development of
the right to truth, an emerging principle of international law within the framework
of transitional justice. The quest for truth can be met with serious hurdles in societ-
ies involved in prolonged and violent conflicts such as the Israeli or Palestinian
society: Most members of such societies find potentially shameful truth about their
collective past hard to bear. Therefore, in these societies the principal goal is not to
search for truth but rather to deny and avoid it. As noted by Michel Foucault, social
truths are inherently limited, as “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general
politics’ of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function
as true” (1980, p. 131).
The work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2013) has contributed significantly to illuminating
the unique sociopsychological attributes of intractable conflict pointing to the per-
vasive manner in which societies create a distorted view of the past and present, a
view which is extremely difficult to change. This conflict-supporting repertoire of

O. Shinar Levanon (*)

School of Social Work, Sapir College, Sderot Israel and Rothberg International School,
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 263

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7_18
264 O. Shinar Levanon

beliefs, thoughts, and emotions, while functional for a society, allowing it to address
the considerable challenges of the conflict, becomes a barrier to conflict resolution.
Peacemaking requires construction of a new repertoire of beliefs that must gain
wide acceptance by society members in order to support peaceful resolution efforts
and later stable and lasting peace (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). In
order to avoid resurgence of violence, peacemaking requires a process of coming to
terms with the past, generating a more complex social narrative of the conflict and
ingroup’s responsibility for gross human rights violations that occurred during the
conflict’s violent stage. However, truth-seeking efforts, exposing disturbing truths
about each society’s involvement in the conflict, will likely encounter significant
difficulties because they threaten societies’ ability to maintain societal beliefs of
positive self-image and a positive social identity, which are central societal beliefs
observed in every society, especially in societies involved in intractable conflicts
(Bar-Tal, 2013).
Yet the growing research available regarding the vital role that truth avoidance
plays in sustaining and cultivating conflict-supporting repertoires of societies
involved in intractable conflict has, unfortunately, rarely informed truth-seeking
efforts undertaken in the context of transitional justice processes or the right to truth
as an international law concept. While truth-seeking efforts have been extensively
discussed in the context of other political and judicial difficulties, the problematic
nature of such efforts in the context of society’s conflict-supporting repertoire has
not been extensively discussed by transitional justice researchers. In a similar man-
ner, the difficulties that societies face in acknowledging past wrongs have not been
addressed by evolving definitions of the right to truth.
To further examine this argument, the following section briefly discusses transi-
tional justice and its goals and mechanisms, while the third section explores the role
of truth seeking as a transitional justice goal. The fourth section briefly discusses the
right to truth as a developing concept of international law. The final section exam-
ines the sociopsychological dynamics of societies involved in intractable conflict as
challenges to truth-seeking efforts.

Transitional Justice: A Brief Introduction

Consisting of a multitude of processes and mechanisms and recognized by the

United Nations as the primary approach to dealing with legacies of mass human
rights violations, transitional justice has become a thriving field of research and
practice.1 Transitional justice processes were implemented, to some degree, in
dozens of conflicts, as evident by the large number of truth commissions, more than
40 (Hayner, 2010; Phelps, 2014).

1
In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council has appointed a Special Rapporteur on the
promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence, largely regarded as the
four pillars of transitional justice.
Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable Conflicts… 265

Emerging in the late 1980s and early 1990s, mainly in response to political
changes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, transitional justice refers to a field of
activity and inquiry focused on how societies address legacies of past human rights
abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or
civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future (Bickford &
Shelton, 2004). Another definition of transitional justice, offered by the International
Center for Transitional Justice, suggests that transitional justice refers to the set of
judicial and nonjudicial measures, including criminal prosecutions, truth commis-
sions, reparations programs, and institutional reforms, that have been implemented
by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses
(Boraine & Valentine, 2006; ICTJ, 2013). Ruti Teitel (2000), who coined the term,
notes that paradigmatic cases of transitional justice processes have taken place at
the heels of a political transition, such as a transformation from an oppressive
regime to a democratic and liberal one. Despite substantial variation in political,
cultural, and geographic circumstances, transitional justice mechanisms are assumed
to share a common set of goals, aiming to avoid “repeating, reenacting, or reliving
past horrors” (Bhargava, 2000, p. 54), deterring gross human rights violations,
restoring dignity of those victimized by atrocities, and thereby creating the best pos-
sible conditions for democracy.
Transitional justice processes entail an inherent tension between the focus on the
victims’ needs and even perpetrators’ needs, thereby failing to address wider social
needs (Teitel, 2003). The challenge of creating an all-encompassing social transfor-
mation, not only a process aimed at victims or victimizers, is echoed in the opinion
of Kader Asmal (2000), South Africa’s former Education Minister, regarding the
South African transitional justice process. Asmal notes that the true scope of the
problems which should be addressed by the process requires the transitional justice
process to include not only those who have “pulled a trigger nor held a smoking
gun,” i.e., those directly involved in the violence, but also those who have benefited
from the societal system defended by the violence. Asmal’s views demonstrate the
gap between, on the one hand, “normal” criminal accountability and, on the other
hand, the more pervasive approach of transitional justice to the moral transforma-
tion of society as a whole. Erin Daly (2002) suggests that a transformation of social
norms by a transitional justice process involves a change in the culture of the given
society, which extends beyond the transition of legal norms. This transformation is
manifested at all levels of society (Lederach, 1995; Teitel, 2000).
The effectiveness of transitional justice is fundamentally linked to social contex-
tuality: The need to create a transitional justice process reflecting the specific social
circumstances may explain why successful transitional justice mechanisms cannot
be replicated, as different societies do not share the same set of historical circum-
stances, narratives, or societal beliefs (Daly, 2002; Elster, 2004; Fletcher, Weinstein,
& Rowen, 2009; Hayner, 2010; Wierzynska, 2004). Legal scholars have called for
the incorporation of local and national justice—with regard to both values and pro-
cedures—in the facilitation of transitional legal solutions (Waldorf, 2006).
According to Hayner (2010), creativity and sensitivity to national needs are likely to
be the most important components contributing to the success of a transitional process.
266 O. Shinar Levanon

A United Nations Secretary-General report expressed support for contextually

based transitional legal solutions, noting that experiences from other places should
simply be used as a starting point for local debates and decisions (United Nations
Secretary-General, 2004). While the report highlights the value of contextuality,
noting the importance of local, including indigenous and informal, traditions of
justice, it also stresses the need for conformity with international standards regard-
ing the administration of justice and the settling of disputes.
Psychology, both clinical and social, has yet to play a major role in guiding tran-
sitional justice processes. A telling example of the gap between transitional justice
theory and psychology is the absence of the term “trauma” from Teitel’s (2000)
seminal work, Transitional Justice. Some scholars have noted that by providing a
voice to victims, allowing their stories to be heard by sympathetic listeners, forging
a relationship with them, and establishing potentially affirmative roles for bystand-
ers and perpetrators, transitional justice can provide key elements of recovery for
trauma victims (Minow, 2000), helping them regain a sense of dignity and self-
worth (Barsalou, 2005). However, others have been more cautious with regard to the
therapeutic or psychological healing effects of transitional justice rituals (Hamber,
2006; Martín-Beristain, Páez, Rimé, & Kanyangara, 2010). Furthermore, scholars
have noted that knowledge of the effects of transitional mechanisms on social and
individual healing is limited (Minow, 1998), as “international law and its institu-
tions are not designed to focus on the social and psychological processes that guide
how people form attachments in groups and communities” (Weinstein & Stover,
2004, p. 14).
The need to address the past has yielded different approaches, yet establishing the
truth about past wrongs has always been considered among the chief transitional
justice goals (Hayner, 2010). In states emerging from repressive regimes, truth com-
missions are considered a preferable option to prosecutions of former authoritarian
leaders, which may halt the transition and even lead to reinstatement of the repressive
regime (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Snyder & Vinjamuri, 2003; Zalaquett, 1992).
Truth has also been regarded as a first, crucial, step on the road to other transitional
justice goals, including justice and reparations: as was the case in South Africa, a
highly divided society, in which reconciliation was established through truth (Teitel,
2000). The importance of truth may also reflect victims’ needs: As noted by a wife
of disappeared man from Nepal, quoted by Eduardo González and Howard Varney,
“It’s okay if they give us truth now, then the other things will follow. The first thing
is finding out” (2013, p. 14). The following section will examine truth seeking as a
pillar of transitional justice.

Truth Seeking as a Transitional Justice Goal

Truth seeking as a transitional justice goal is often met with fierce opposition from
political and military elites who were responsible for planning and ordering of past
human rights violations and therefore are likely to suffer from the consequences of
Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable Conflicts… 267

truth-revealing processes. Hence, the ability to establish factual truth in the context
of transitional justice processes depends, to a large extent, on “cooperation by the
former organs of repression: the minister of the interior, the army, the police, the
intelligence service, the militia and so on” (Hazan, 2006, p. 37). Reflecting this
notion, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission has granted
amnesty, on an individual basis, to those who testified to having committed crimes
while proving a political motivation. The historical truth sought by the commission
allowed various types of truth to emerge, from social truth, factual and forensic
truth, personal and narrative truth, and finally healing and restorative truth (Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 1998).
However, willingness to grant amnesty for truth, either as a “blanket” amnesty
for a certain group of wrongdoers or granted on an individual basis, has received
criticism from international bodies, who question the benefits of studying the
South African example. According to a report by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights (2006): “amnesty laws and similar mea-
sures (…) may violate the right to truth. Human rights bodies have generally
rejected amnesties for serious violations of human rights (…) based on the need to
combat impunity for these crimes and to ensure that victims and their relatives
know the truth” (paragraph 45).
The struggle against blanket amnesties in exchange for truth has led to percep-
tions of truth seeking as clashing with the goal of establishing justice in interna-
tional tribunals. For example, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia announced that truth-finding was a one of its “fundamental
objectives,” the adversarial mode of trial has afforded priority to other goals (Doak,
2011). Moreover, in contrast to prosecutors’ duty at the International Criminal
Court to establish truth (according to Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC statute), no such
duty is set out for the judges, a prevailing problem in all international tribunals
(Eser, 2011). However, truth commissions aim to provide an account of past human
rights violations, an acknowledgment of the secret wrongdoings of the state
(Asmal, 1992; Roht-Arriaza, 2006; Van Zyl, 2005) or an “affirmation of atrocity”
(Minow, 1998, p. 4). For example, the mandate of Guatemala’s 1994 Commission
for Historical Clarification provides that ‘the right of the people of Guatemala to
know the whole truth regarding these events, which, if clarified will help to ensure
that this sad and painful chapter will not be repeated and that the process of democ-
ratizing Guatemala will be strengthened.”2 Such truth-seeking processes are
thought to promote justice eventually (Millar, 2011). However, following the South
African transitional process, the focus has moved to truth-telling, which aims to
catalyze psychological or socio-emotional healing (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) as
well as provide restorative notions of justice to victims and perpetrators alike
(Leebaw, 2003; Teitel, 2003).

2
Agreement on the establishment of a “Commission for Historical Clarification of human rights
violations…that have caused suffering to the Guatemalan people” preamble, § 2, cited in Kritz
(1995) p. 220.
268 O. Shinar Levanon

The rapidly growing field of transitional justice scholarship focusing on truth and
truth seeking and the pivotal role played by truth-seeking mechanisms in transitional
settings have been mirrored, to some extent, by the developing concept of the right to
truth. The following section will briefly explore the right to truth, pointing to its
attempts to address the needs of victims and their families rather than those of
society.

The Right to Truth as an International Law Concept

The right to truth has undergone major changes in the last few decades, extending
to far more than a limited right of family members of those who disappeared due to
violence and war. The right to truth has grown in scope as well as through a gradual
process of codification, as conventions and other documents of international law
have included references to the right to truth. This process has reflected a rise in
the significance of truth seeking in the context of transitional justice: The right to
the truth has been cited as a legal basis of several instruments establishing truth
commissions and other transitional justice mechanisms (Hayner, 2010; Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006).
Adopted in 1977, Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions3 is the first
document of international humanitarian law which explicitly recognized the exis-
tence of “the right of families to know the fate of their relatives”.4 The Principles on
Combating Impunity, approved in 1997 by the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, better known as the Joint Principles, stressed that the effort to battle
impunity has long been established as a social interest spearheaded by victims and
their families. An updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of
human rights through action to combat impunity have reaffirmed the inalienable
right to truth in the context of gross human rights violations and serious crimes
under international law.
The right to truth has been extensively developed through the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American human rights bodies: In a 1988 case the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights has recognized the existence of the right of relatives of victims of
forced disappearance to know the fate suffered by the disappeared person.5 In a
series of cases brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the court
has gradually extended its definition of the right to truth as a right of society as a
whole, rather than an issue that influences only victims and their families (González
& Varney, 2013; Schonsteiner, 2011). In a more recent, 2009 decision, the court

3
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
4
Article 32, Protocol I.
5
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Ser. C), No. 4, par. 181, p. 75 (29 July 1988).
Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable Conflicts… 269

emphasized an additional, collective, dimension of the right to truth, yet did not
provide additional remedies on that basis.6
The International Committee of the Red Cross (2005, p. 421) has recognized the
growing significance of the right to truth by declaring it to be a rule of customary
international law. The first study by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (2006) on the right to the truth expanded the scope
of the right, arguing that: “[T]he truth about gross human rights violations and seri-
ous violations of human rights law is an inalienable and autonomous right, linked to
the duty and obligation of the State to protect and guarantee human rights, to con-
duct effective investigations and to guarantee effective remedy and reparations. This
right (…) has both an individual and a societal dimension and should be considered
as a non-derogable right and not be subject to limitations.”
In 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which,
while stressing the need to combat impunity for the crime of enforced disappearance,
further reaffirmed the right to truth as a right aimed at victims and their families:
“each victim has the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of the
enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the investigation and the fate of
the disappeared person” (Article 24(2)). In 2009, the Human Rights Council has
adopted a resolution on the right to the truth, emphasizing that as part of this right,
access to information should be granted to individuals, presumably victims and their
families, yet also to the public. In 2011, the United Nations General Assembly pro-
claimed March 24th as the International Day for the Right to the Truth. The procla-
mation acknowledges the significant conclusions of the reports by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights. A 2012 resolution by the United Nations
Human Rights Council has detailed several judicial and nonjudicial mechanisms
aimed at facilitating the right to truth. Finally, as noted above, a Special Rapporteur
on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-recurrence was
appointed by the Human Rights Council, providing further testimony to the increas-
ing recognition of the importance of the right to truth.

Sociopsychological Dynamics of Societies Involved

in Intractable Conflict as Challenges to Truth-Seeking Efforts

Scholars have noted that society plays a crucial role in promoting the right to truth:
Some researchers argue that the role of civil society in promoting truth can be even
more important than that of the state (Davis, 2005), while others note that a synergy
of both civil society and the state is the best method to unveiling hidden truths
(Phelps, 2014). While transitional justice scholars have often stressed the importance
of public participation in truth-seeking processes, such as truth commissions, since

6
Las Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 211, 1310 (24 November 2009).
270 O. Shinar Levanon

public participation demonstrates a commitment to legitimacy, public participation is

often discussed in a more limited context, helping lawmakers to understand the needs
of victims (González & Varney, 2013). A more concise view of truth commissions’
role in shaping public views is offered by Teitel (2000) who notes that truth commis-
sions allow victims’ testimony to be narrated by “commissioners’ quasi-state
authors,” thereby becoming “sharable truth, a national story, and the basis of transi-
tional consensus” (p. 82).
Yet according to the groundbreaking work of Daniel Bar-Tal (2007a, 2013) and
fellow conflict resolution researchers (see other chapters in this volume), some soci-
eties will likely strain to legitimize and endorse such truth-seeking processes and
their outcomes. Societies emerging from an intractable conflict are unlikely to sup-
port historical accounts, which expose shameful chapters of their collective past
based on public testimonies by victims of the conflict and their family members,
which will be acknowledged by a truth commission and later included in the com-
mission’s final report. Socially constructed accounts of the past in societies involved
in intractable conflicts are not only rigid but almost unbearably difficult to untangle
(Nahhas, Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Srour, Mana, & Sagy, Chap. 6). Although
intergroup conflicts are all too common, even inherent to human relations, intrac-
table conflicts, or violent conflicts lasting more than a generation, are a distinctive
category of conflicts manifesting clear and all-inclusive sociopsychological attri-
butes and dynamics. In order to protect individual members of society from insuf-
ferable psychic pain due to the prolonged and violent conflict, societies develop
functional beliefs, attitudes, emotions, values, motivations, norms, and practices
(Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013). These provide a meaningful picture of the conflict situation,
justify the behavior of the society, facilitate mobilization for participation in the
conflict, and maintain a positive social identity. Societies involved in intractable
conflict perceive the conflict to be existential, zero-sum in nature, and unsolvable.
This world view preoccupies a central position in the lives of the involved societies
and therefore requires immense investments of material and psychological resources
(Bar-Tal, 2007b, 2013; Coleman, 2006; Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). Eventually, the
unique sociopsychological repertoire solidifies, forming a sociopsychological infra-
structure, a well-organized system of shared cognitions: ethos of the conflict and a
collective memory of the conflict and collective emotional orientations (Nahhas,
Chap. 5; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8; Pliskin & Halperin, Chap. 11;
Shaked, Chap. 9; Sharvit, Chap. 1). The sociopsychological infrastructure of societ-
ies involved in intractable conflict tends to limit access to truth by creating a “tunnel
vision” of reality, precluding contrasting information and alternative approaches to
the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007b; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Jervis, 1976; Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Vertzberger, 1990; White, 1970). For societies
involved in intractable conflicts, shared cognitions serve as the basis for forming
social identity (Ashmore, Jussim, & Wilder, 2001; Cash, 1996; Oren, Bar-Tal, &
David, 2004; Ross, 2001; Worchel, 1999). According to social identity theory,
individuals derive part of their self-esteem from the groups to which they belong
and with which they identify (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner &
Reynolds, 2010).
Transitional Justice in Societies Emerging from Intractable Conflicts… 271

The study of sociopsychological structures created by intractable conflicts sheds

light on what is currently a less discussed aspect of the legal right to truth: the cogni-
tive and emotional costs required from the majority of the members of society to
accommodate unpleasant truths which directly contradict hard-earned beliefs,
thoughts, and emotions. Stanley Cohen’s (2009) seminal work on states in denial sug-
gests that the right to truth may be met with resistance from societies as collectives
emerging from a prolonged and violent conflict: Too much truth may compromise
social stability. Cohen (2001) notes that “societies have an astonishing ability to deny
their past” (p. 138), which is likely to reflect a top-down, state-sponsored process.
However, a social “collusive wall of silence” (p. 138) can also be generated without
the state’s active involvement.
Arguably, societal legacies of silence may linger long after human rights violations
have ceased, adding to the burden of victims and their families. Revealing the truth
through transitional justice mechanisms involves exposing the currently held social
ethos as distorted and inaccurate. More so, truth-revealing mechanisms will be per-
ceived as contradictory to the interests of society as they are believed to fracture social
unity and cast a shadow over society’s ability to continue to hold on to a moral self-
image. Such an image is vital to most members of society during the active stage of
the intractable conflict (SimanTov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, Chap. 17), protecting them
from exposure to unmitigated, painful, negative feelings of guilt and shame.
Therefore, the need to reconcile between internalized social cognitions and emo-
tions, which are highly dichotomous and polarized in nature on the one hand, and a
much more complex account of the past, generated through truth-seeking mecha-
nisms on the other hand, is likely to take its toll not only on social identity as a
construct and the self-identity of the majority of society members but also on
society’s willingness to legitimize the findings of truth-seeking processes.
Resistance to such processes has been demonstrated by Israel’s refusal to coop-
erate with the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (the
“Goldstone Commission”) report as well as the United Nations Fact-Finding
Mission on the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. Israel unfortunately serves as a prime
example of the impact of intractable conflict on society’s ability to negotiate diffi-
cult truths about its past involvement with human rights violations. Such historical
view is in direct opposition to the collective memory and ethos of the conflict of the
Israeli Jewish society, both of which regard the Israeli Jewish society as a victim of
a hostile world (Bar-Tal, 2007a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai,
Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Nets-Zehngut, Chap. 4; Oren, Chap. 8).
A transitional justice process aimed at transforming the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict would therefore have to utilize a revised concept of the right to truth acknowl-
edging the pervasive nature of sociopsychological dynamics of societies involved in
the intractable conflict. In order to be effective, truth promoting transitional justice
processes will have to address the psychological needs of societies emerging from
intractable conflicts. Given the deeply ingrained yet distorted worldview, such pro-
cesses would likely be prolonged and open-ended, allowing members of society to
gradually distance themselves from past cognitions and emotions at their own pace.
This process is unlikely to be attained utilizing single-shot solutions offered by
courts or even by certain truth commissions.
272 O. Shinar Levanon

Conclusion

While transitional justice processes should aim to “reconceive the social meaning of
past conflicts, particularly defeats, in an attempt to reconstruct their present and
future effects” (Teitel, 2003, p. 76), this is neither a simple nor straightforward task.
Effective transitional process should be layered upon existing national narratives,
reflecting collective social memory and aimed at creating a representation of past
narratives (Hamber & Wilson, 2002). Available research regarding the role of col-
lective cognitions and emotions in sustaining the mental health of members of soci-
eties involved in intractable conflict should inform transitional justice efforts and
promote the much needed psychosocial sensitivity.
Scholars have stressed the importance of the distinction between “right to the
truth” as a legally enforceable right in international law and the societal interest in
knowing the truth (see, e.g., Groome, 2011). The dichotomy between right to truth
and the social implications of truth echoes a broader distinction, between legal and
psychological approaches to conflict resolution (Millar, 2011). Yet truth-seeking
mechanisms in societies involved in intractable conflicts would benefit from gaining
knowledge regarding societies’ sociopsychological dynamics, which has led them
to develop resistance to potentially unpleasant truths. Knowing more about socio-
psychological dynamics can also lead to lessening tensions between social goals
and the needs of victims, which too often have been neglected in pursuit of more
pressing goals of punishment and/or societal reconciliation (Doak, 2011; Hamber,
2001; Wexler & Winick, 1998).
Yet while addressing the needs of victims is imperative, sociopsychological
dynamics of societies involved in intractable conflicts imply that the right to truth
should first reflect society’s need to know hidden truths, which are actively denied
and hidden, and second society’s need for a gradual process, reflecting the societal
investment in hiding the truth as a necessary process enabling psychic survival dur-
ing a prolonged and violent period.
Studying societies’ unequivocal support for a distorted memory of the past, held by
a majority of their members, including memories of their responsibility for past human
rights violations, will allow transitional justice practitioners to create a socially sensi-
tive process, lessening potential opposition and gaining legitimacy for the process.
Daniel Bar-Tal’s (2013) research can inform transitional justice practitioners and schol-
ars regarding the intricate manners in which truth is hidden from society and by society,
as long as it is perceived as a threat, rather than a cure, for society’s ailments.

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Index

A Memorial Day, 118

Adolescents national, 5, 37, 38, 82
Arab and Jewish (see Collective narratives) and rituals, 117
in-group preference and out-group Challenges
rejection, 23 duality and social, 221–222
and Israeli children, 33 intractable conflicts, 3, 6, 101
and Palestinian children, 6 and opportunities, 169
and school-age children, 32 peace process, 219
Agency affirmation intervention, 257–260 in public speeches, 217
Anger principal, 220
Arab and Jewish adolescents, 77, 79–81, societies, 36
83, 85–91, 93 sociopsychological infrastructure, 9
collective anger orientation, 61 truth-seeking efforts, 264, 269–271
emotions, 6, 170 Children. See also Young children
EOC, 174 and adult literature, 5
Jewish Israelis’ anger, 177 Jewish Israeli, 25, 26, 40
Anschluss, 107 minority, 18, 21, 23
Appraisal-based framework, 169 Palestinian, 6, 33
Autobiographical memory, 50, 52, 55 and preschoolers develop social categories, 19
sociopsychological repertoires, 279
Civilian casualties, 161
B Civil society organizations, 229, 230, 238, 269
Bar-Tal’s legacy, emotional regulation Cognitive reappraisal, 171
techniques, 261 Collective emotional orientation, 3, 6, 36, 49,
Bar-Tal’s perspective, 257 51, 57, 80, 167, 190, 254, 270
Bar-Tal’s theory, 173 Collective memory (CM)
Barrier to the peace process, 115 autobiographical memory, 52
court’s judgment, 193
and ethos of conflict (EoC), 4, 8, 36–41
C definition, 49
Ceremonies historical narratives, 55
and celebrations, 38 intractable conflict, 3, 4
familial, 36 Israeli collective memory, 51–54
Jewish–Israeli Case, 38 Israeli popular memory, 56

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 277

K. Sharvit, E. Halperin (eds.), A Social Psychology Perspective
on The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Psychology Book Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-24841-7
278 Index

Collective memory (CM) (cont.) reconciliation, 129

Jewish-Israeli Case, 37–41 War of 1948 (see War of 1948)
and national narrative, 62 Conflict resolution
1948 Palestinian exodus, 54 emotion regulation, 171–172
Palestinian refugee problem, 56, 57 EoC (see Ethos of conflict (EoC))
popular memory, 53 and intractable conflicts, 42
post-1948 Palestinian infiltration, 53 peace education, 199, 202, 209
right to truth, 263–272 psychological barriers, 180
societies, 51 researchers, 270
state institutions, 53 terrorism and security, 223
1948 War events, 63, 65, 71 Conflict’s violent stage, 264
Western, 107 Conflict-supporting repertoire, 42, 263–264
Zionist narrative, 51 Conflict zones, 36, 152, 153, 158, 160, 161
Collective narratives Council for Peace and Security (CSP), 234
Arab and Jewish adolescents CSP. See Council for Peace and Security
anger, 87–89 (CSP)
cognitive and emotional components, Critical narrative, 4, 52–55, 57
79, 80, 89, 90 Cultural memory, 50, 52, 53
criteria, 83 Culture of conflict
demographic characteristics, 83, 84, 86 characterization, 201
emotional-cognitive process, 93 and components, 133
empathy, 86 development, 8, 134
empirical examination, 80, 81 internalization, 230
hypothesis, 86, 92 Lebanon War in 1982, 205
in-group and out-group narrative Palestinian society, 138
perceptions, 85 routinization, 8
Israeli–Palestinian intractable conflict, Culture of peace, 10, 146, 199, 200
82, 83
legitimacy, 85, 86, 91
literature, 78 D
longitudinal study, 79, 90 Delegitimization
procedures, 85 of Arabs, 122
social dialogue, 78 and dehumanization, 80
social psychology, 78 and levels of legitimization, 79
out-group’s narrative, 245 out-group’s narrative, 245
1948 War, 67 Palestinians, 128, 140–142
Commemorative activities, 70–71 societal beliefs in conflict ethos, 101
Complexity and victimization, 133, 144
Jewish Israeli youth, 25–26 The Destruction of Israel, 109
working with collective narratives, 81 Developmental trajectories, 17, 18, 21, 27
Conflict Development of prejudice, 17–27
Bar-Tal’s main contributions, 115 Development of stereotypes, 17–27
CM (see Collective memory (CM)) Direct peace education, 201–203, 206, 209
collective narratives Duality
(see Collective narratives) peace processes, 218–220, 224, 225
escalation/de-escalation, 129 rhetorical containment, 221–223
(see also Ethos of conflict (EOC)) social roles, 255–257
intractable (see Intractable conflicts)
psychological repertoire, 115, 128
sociopsychological foundations E
(see Sociopsychological Educational programs
foundations, intractable conflicts) argument of defense, 192, 193
stereotypes and prejudice (see Stereotypes Court’s Judgment, 193
and prejudice) deficiencies in arguments, 194
Index 279

prosecution’s arguments, 192 EOC. See Ethos of conflict (EOC)

theoretical analysis, 188 Essentialist paradigm, 190
Educational system Ethos of conflict (EOC)
Israeli-Jewish case study, 41 Camp David Summit, 128
national secular, 53 characteristics, 127
official memory, 50 cognitive
peacebuilding processes, 195 and motivational biases, 125
peace education, 199, 201, 203–207, imbalance, 121
209, 210 structures and value systems, 120
pre-schools and schools, 37 collective memeory (CM), 37
and social, 31 (see also Jewish–Israeli Case)
Education policies, Israel’s, 200, 203, 208, 209 competing belief systems, 123
Education system, Israeli, 100, 208 components, 120
Egyptian and Israeli perceptions, 101, 110 conflict resolution, 121
Elementary school, 32, 38, 188, 191 conservative ideology, 125
Emergent phase contexts, 121
peacemaking process, 230 cultural products, 117, 120
Pre-state/Yishuv Period, 231 definition, 36–37
War of 1948, 231–232 delegitimization, 122, 124
Emotional and cognitive reactions, 83 democratic value system, 121
Emotions diplomatic component, 122
and beliefs, 8, 10 election platform, 126
and cognition, 79–80, 89–90 and emotional processes
collective emotional orientation, 6, 49, 51, appraisal theories, 174
57, 190, 254 cognitive processes, 175
costs, 271 conviction and emotions, 177
distress, 32, 174 discursive superstructure, 173
and emotion regulation emotion regulation, 179
attitudes and behaviors, 168 emotion-eliciting event, 176
cognitive appraisal, 169 empathy, 178
cognitive reappraisal, 171 function, 172
discrete emotions, 170, 172 group-based emotions, 173
empathy, 170 ideological orientation, 177
EOC (see Ethos of conflict (EOC)) ideology, 173
group-based emotion, 168 Jewish Israelis, 176
indirectly regulate emotions, 171 political behaviors, 176
intractable conflict, Israel, 171 political psychology, 181
and ethos of conflict (EoC), 201 erosion, 127
negative reactions, 34 eruption, 123
relations, 40 freezing process, 125
socio-emotional healing, 267 Gaza disengagement (see Gaza Strip)
transformation, 250 individual and collective levels, 124
Empathy influence politics and decisions, 117
and anger, 93 Institute for National Security Studies
cognition and emotion in perception, 79–80 (INSS), 124
collective narratives, Arab and Jewish intensity and magnitude, 127
adolescents, 86 internal balance, 121
description, 93 intractable conflict, 124
development, 77, 261 Israel’s role and duty, 127
emotions and emotion regulation, 170 Israeli
feelings, 85 attitudes, 128
Jewish-Israeli leftists, 177 context, 120
legitimacy, 89, 90 films, 118
means of z-scores, 88 military, 123
280 Index

Ethos of conflict (EOC) (cont.) national unity, 144

Israeli–Egyptian peace process, 128 right-wing political leaders, 238
Jewish–Israeli public, 126 victimization, 143
justification of Israel’s goals, 118 1967 War, 232
major events and information, 126, 128 and West Bank, 33, 82, 116, 117, 127, 139
motivating force, 124 General Assembly of the United Nations, 269
negative image, Arabs, 119 Grandfathers, 64–68. See also Mnemonic
negative stereotyping, 123 Community
numerous social expressions, 117 Group-based emotions
opponent’s image, 122 from emotion, 168–169
Oslo process, 122, 128 and emotional processes, 173
Palestinian self-determination, 127 intractable conflict in Israel, 169–171
patriotism, 122 Gush Shalom, 235, 236
beliefs, 127
and unity, 119
peace process, 119, 122, 124 H
political and economic leadership, 118 Hamas, 40, 57, 117, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142,
positive self-image, 119, 122 144, 157, 223, 258
psychological repertoire, 124 Historical memory, 50, 52, 55, 56, 65
public debates, 117 Human Rights Council, 269
public polls, 120
radical groups, 127
reconciliation, 124 I
restrengthening, 123 Identity
ripeness theory, 125 agency and positive moral identity, 253–261
rivals, 125 Israeli, 248
school readers, 118 Jewish and Zionist, 187–195, 205, 207
second Palestinian intifada, 236–237 national, 2, 38, 70, 79, 82, 116, 203
security, 118, 122 Palestinian, 72
siege beliefs, 120 positive, 3, 36
societal beliefs, 117, 120, 123, 125 personal identity development, 21
society members, 121 self-identity, 23, 271
sociopsychological infrastructure, 3–5 social, 4, 7, 264, 270, 271
status quo, 125 social identity development theory (SIDT),
temporary state of mind, 120 18, 20
tension, 121 social identity theory (SIT), 18
themes, 117, 121 Ideology
uncertainty and stress, 124 conservative, 125
unconventional weapons, 122 emotional process, 173
victimhood, 119, 122 ethos of conflict (EoC), 159, 160,
younger generations, 117, 126 168, 172
zero-sum game, 123 Nazi type, 107
Exposure to violence, 33, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160 orientation, 177
pan-Arab ideology, 101, 102, 110
peace-oriented ideology, 220
F political, 159, 177
First Palestinian intifada rightists, 177–179
Council for Peace and Security (CSP), 234 sociological, 144
Women and Peace Coalition (WPC), 235 Zionism, 116
Zionist ideology, 104
Indirect peace education, 200–203, 208, 209
G INSS. See Institute for National Security
Gaza Strip Studies (INSS)
civil society organizations, 238 Institute for National Security Studies
mobilization, 237 (INSS), 124
Index 281

Institutionalization Israel’s first Prime Minister David

in schools, 209 Ben-Gurion, quotes, 253
phase Israel’s moral identity, 259
first Palestinian Intifada, 234–235 Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) air force, 258
Oslo peace process, 235 Israeli education system, 100
sociopsychological infrastructure, 8–9 Israeli–Arab/Palestinian conflict
Integrative developmental-contextual theory collective memory, 49–51, 55–56
(IDCT) Israeli collective memory, 51–54
affect, 22 Israeli popular memory, 56
cognitive and social identity development, 20 Jewish–Israeli ethos of conflict, 116–117
cognitive development, 22, 23 Palestinian refugee problem, 56–57
cumulative schema, 20 peace education, 203–207
pre- and early adolescence, 21 political attitudes, 57
socio-cognitive theory (SCT), 21 psychological repertoire, 57
self-identity, 23, 24 self-censorship, 54–55
social identity development theory societal institutions/memories, 54
(SIDT), 21 sociopsychological repertoire, 49
social biases, 26–27 Israeli–Egyptian peace process, 122, 126,
social context, 24, 25 128, 233
SPIRs, 20 Israeli–Palestinian conflict
stage-related issues, 20 intractable conflict, 2–3, 134, 152
Inter-American human rights bodies, 268 characteristics, 144, 256
Intergroup contact, 245 duality and social challenges, 221–222
International Committee of the Red Cross, 269 pre-state/Yishuv period, 231
International law, right to truth, sociopsychological infrastructure, 3–9
268–267 Israeli–Palestinian intractable conflict, 82, 83
Intractable conflicts, 272. See also Israeli–Palestinian reconciliation, 245–246
Sociopsychological foundations, Israelis and Palestinians experience, 260
intractable conflicts
asymmetric conflict, 250
children’s indirect learning, 35–36 J
children’s personal experiences, 32–35 Jewish and Arab adolescents
children’s sociopsychological repertoires, 42 anger, 87–89
collective memory, 36–37, 42 cognitive and emotional components, 79,
collective narratives 80, 89, 90
(see Collective narratives) criteria, 83
definition, 31 demographic characteristics, 83, 84, 86
dramatic cognitive and emotional emotional-cognitive process, 93
transformation, 250 empathy, 86
EoC (see Ethos of conflict (EoC)) empirical examination, 80, 81
identity and otherness, 190 hypothesis, 86, 92
in-depth interviews, Israeli Jews, 245 in-group and out-group narrative
Israeli-Jewish case, 32, 37–41 perceptions, 85
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 2–3 Israeli–Palestinian intractable conflict,
legacy, 218 82, 83
narratives, 244, 249 legitimacy, 85, 86, 91
non-mediated personalized encounters, 249 literature, 78
preserves and perpetuates situations, 249 longitudinal study, 79, 90
societies, 42 procedures, 85
transformation—excerpts, 246–249 social dialogue, 78
transformative experience, 249 social psychology, 78
transitional justice, 263–272 Jewish–Israeli Case
truth-seeking efforts, 269–271 Ben Shabat’s study, 41
young children’s (see Young Children) complexity, 25–26
Intractable ethnopolitical conflict, 243, 244 ceremonies and celebrations, 38
282 Index

Jewish–Israeli Case (cont.) Learning

children, 40 intractable conflicts
distraction-based emotion regulation (see Intractable conflicts)
strategy, 179 materials, 199, 203
EoC (see Ethos of conflict (EoC)) Legal-led approach, 272
Hanukkah, Purim, Passover, and Lag Legitimacy
BaOmer, 38 collective narratives, 86
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 38 and empathy, 93
national security, 39 means of z-scores, 88, 89
national unity, 39 measure in Jewish samples, 85
negative stereotypes, 41 and mobilizing, 225
Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), 178 political, 106
patriotism, 40 rhetorical containment, 224
peace organizations, peacemaking shaky, 101
processes, 229–239 sociopsychological infrastructure, 7
political socialization, 37 and stability of status relationships, 24
pre-school teachers, 38 Legitimization phase, 230
pre-schools and schools, 37 1967 War, 232–233
self-victimization, 39 1973 War, 233–234
value of peace, 40 Longitudinal study, 79, 90, 91, 93
victims, 40
Jewish-Zionist identity, 190
categories, 187 M
educational programs (see Educational Major events
programs) characteristics, 127
essentialist paradigm, 188 conflict, 50, 116
intergroup process, 187 definition, 126
intractable conflict, 190 Egyptian leader, 107
moderate constructionism, 189 Nakasa, 136
national identity, 188 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 136
otherness, 187 Major information, 126–128
paradigm factors, 188 Matzpen, 231, 232, 238
postmodernism paradigm, 189 Mnemonic arenas, 67
radical constructionism, 189 Mnemonic community
Justness of the goals, 133, 134, 137–138, 140, adult gatherings, 65
144, 160 autobiographical and historical memory, 65
bearers and transmitters, 65
informal socializing agents, 64
L Nakba generation, 64, 65
Land Day, 91, 139 narratives, 65
Leadership personal and collective memories, 65
Arab/Palestinian, 52 Mobilization
Egypt’s leadership role, 106 educational system, peace process, 207
Israel’s political leadership, 105 Gaza Strip, 237
Jewish national leadership, 231 and readiness, 124
peace process society members, 50, 210
characterization, 217 Moderate constructionism, 189, 191, 193–195
duality, 218, 219 Mokauma, 140
intractable conflicts, 218 Moral conviction, 176–178
psychological barriers, 217
rhetorical containment (see Rhetorical
containment) N
political and economic leadership, 118 Nakasa, 136
PLO leadership, 116, 139 Nakba, 5, 65, 66, 70, 71, 136–138, 143, 145, 207
Index 283

Nakba generation, 64, 65, 67, 70 depiction of Israel, 104

Narrative of the other, 244–249 domestic and external factors, 101
Narrative of the 1948 War, 66–67 Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, 102
Narratives foreign policy issues, 102
collective (see Collective narratives) growing commitment, 101
conflict-related narratives, 42 growing conviction, 102
ethos of conflict (EoC), 36–37 ingrained process, 102
intergroup encounters and exposure, 245 Israel’s attack on Gaza, 102
intractable conflict, 244 Jewish espionage group, 102
Israeli-Palestinian narrative-negotiation Muslim brotherhood, 101
projects, 55 Nasser’s policy, 103
silenced narrative of 1948 War events National Charter, 104
(see War of 1948) negative image, 103
Zionist, 203, 205, 209 Operation Suzanna/Mishap, 102
Nasserite Period (1952–1970) Palestine Liberation Organization
aggressive line, 109 (PLO), 105
Anschluss, 107 pan-Arab ideology, 101, 102
Arab world developments, 108 scrutiny, 103
Bar-Tal’s typology, 101 seizing power, 102
cold peace, 111 shaky legitimacy, 101
collective memory and ethos, 110 short-of-war policy, 103
conflict ethos, 101 Suez War, 103
Czech arms deals, 107 Tiran Straits, US forces, 105
delegitimization, 101 Western imperialism and colonialism, 104
demonization, 110 Zionist ideology, 104
destruction of Israel, 109 peace process, 99
diabolical images, 110 The Philosophy of the Revolution, 106
dictator and despot, 108 progressive/revolutionary, 108
distinct/complimentary entities, 100 pro-Western defense organization, 106
Egypt revolution, 106 psychological barrier, 110
Egyptian Empire, 107 realization, 99
Egyptian Jews, 106 skepticism and suspicion, 109
Egyptian leader’s depiction, 108 societies, 101
Gaza operation, 106 state socialization agents, 100
goals, 109 Suez Canal Company, 106
historical context, 101 Tripartite Federation, 108
Hitler’s designs, Europe, 108 United Arab Republic (UAR), 107
human thoughts and feelings, 101 unification, 108
Israel in the Middle East, 100 National identity
Israelis, 99 ceremonies and celebrations, 38
decision-makers, 110 and ethnic minorities, 187
discourse, 107 non-Jewish citizens, 61
education system, 100 Palestinian, 116, 136
political leadership, 105 paradigm of radical constructionism, 189
Jewish victimhood, 105 and positive in-group collective image, 79
Jewish-Israeli studies and Orientalism, 99 National minority, 91
Jewish-Zionist identity, 99 Needs for agency
Palestine and Israel agency affirmation intervention, 257–260
ambiguous expressions, 103 duality of social roles, 255–257
anti-Semitic terms and labels, 104 needs-based model, 254–255
Charter of the Arab Tripartite Needs-based model, victims and perpetrators,
Federation, 104 254–255
delegitimization, 103 Need for positive moral identity, 256, 257, 260
demonization, Jews, 104 Negative images, 35, 101, 103, 106, 109, 110, 119
284 Index

O Palestinians’ moral image, 259

Official memory, 50, 52–54, 57 Patriotism, 5, 8, 40, 101, 118, 119, 122, 127,
Oslo peace process, 136, 221, 222, 235 134, 138–140, 144, 156, 160, 173
Otherness, 187–195 Peace-building process, 201, 210, 220
Oz VeShalom, 233 Peace and Security Movement (PSM), 232, 233
Peace education
characteristics, 208
P culture, 199
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) development, 201
Arab–Israeli conflict, 116 direct, 202, 203
Cairo Arab summit, 105 indirect, 202, 203
duality and social challenges in Israeli- intractable conflict, 200
Palestinian peace process, 221–222 Israel
ethos of conflict (EoC), 139 high intractability (1948–mid-1970s),
leadership, 116 203, 204
Oslo peace process, 235 moderation (1970s–late 1980s), 204–206
War of 1964, 136 peace process (early 1990s–2000,
Palestinian children, 6, 33 206, 207
Palestinian civil war (2007), 136, 144 reescalation\national ethos
Palestinian narratives, 53, 71, 72, 81, 83, 86, (2000–2014), 207
91, 92, 246, 247, 249 sociopsychological infrastructure, 203
Palestinian National Council (PNC), 137, 138 peace-building process, 201
Palestinians perceptions, 200
agency and positive moral identity, reconciliation, 200
253–261 Peacemaking process, 229–239
and Israeli Jews, 243–250 Peace organizations, peacemaking process,
silenced narrative of 1948 War events 229–339
(see War of 1948) Peace process
Palestinian Society educational system mobilizes, 206–207
Arab inhabitants, 135 leadership, Israeli-Palestinian, 57, 217–226
delegitimizing beliefs, 134, 140, 141 Oslo peace process, 235
ethos of conflict (EoC), 134 with Egypt, 122
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 133, 134 Perceptions
and Jews, 135 collective narratives (see Collective
justness of their goals, 137 narratives)
Mokauma, 140 humiliation felt, 157
monkeys and pigs, 141 and motivations, 56
Nakba, 136 Nasser, 107
National Unity, 144 negative image of the Arabs, 119
Oslo agreement, 139 peace education, 200
Oslo process, 136 principle-policy objective, 155
Palestine Liberation Organization security, 145
(PLO), 138 self-perception, 260
patriotism, 134, 138 social, 20, 22, 24
peace, 135, 145 of threat, 159, 175
positive image, 144 Perpetrators and victims, 33, 254–256,
psychocultural infrastructure, 134 265, 267
security, 134, 145 The Philosophy of the Revolution, 102, 106
self-justification, 134 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization
societal beliefs, 134, 137, 144 (PLO)
Thawabit, 137 Political attitudes
victimization, 134, 143 emotion, 170
Palestinians’ and Jews’ sense of in-group’s identity, 157
agency, 260 and violence, 154–156, 159
Index 285

Political leaders, 105, 217, 219, 220, 225, peace, brave, 224
229, 238 psychoanalytic literature, 221
Political violence and preferences qualitative content analysis, 223
attitudes and behavior, 155 Right to truth
civilians, 151 and CM (see Collective memory (CM))
cost-benefit calculation, 155 international law concept, 268–269
ethos of conflict, 160 transitional justice (see Transitional justice)
exposure-attitude relationship, 156
fear and anxiety, 154
human behavior, 152 S
individual-level exposure, 152 Second Palestinian intifada
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 152, 161 escalation of violence, 236
perception of threat, 159 funded organizations, 236
political attitudes, 154 grassroots organizations, 236
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 158 radical peace organizations, 237
psychological distress, 157 veteran organizations, 236
stress, 158, 161 Self-censorship, 54–55
threat, 161 Shared beliefs, 24, 25, 200
Popular collective memory, 62 Silencing, 61, 62, 71
Popular memory, 49, 50, 53, 54, 56 Social context, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 27, 82, 86,
Postmodern paradigm, 189 169, 188, 217, 265
Post-traumatic stress symptoms (PSS), 153 Social identity development theory (SIDT),
Pre-school children, 32, 33, 38 18–22
Pre-state/Yishuv Period, 231 Social identity theory (SIT), 18, 19, 23
Primacy of agency effect, victims and Socialization, 20, 36, 37, 41, 100, 199
perpetrators, 255–257 Social psychological intergroup repertories
Prosociality, 260 (SPIRs), 20–23, 25
Psychological distress, 157–161 Social representations, 26, 77, 78, 82, 92
Psychological repertoire Societal beliefs
collective emotional orientation and ethos, 57 collective memory, 4
component, 124, 128 EOCs (see Ethos of conflics (EOCs))
ethos of conflict (EoC), 202, 209 components, 61
intractable conflicts, 36, 90 conflict-supporting narratives, 244
shared psychological repertoire (SPIR), 25 peace organizations, 229, 231, 238
PLO, 222
positive self-image, 264
R Societies’ unequivocal support, 272
Rabin, Yitzhak, 222 Socio-cognitive theory (SCT), 18–22
Radical constructionism, 189, 191 Socio-psychological dynamics of societies,
Reconciliation 264, 269–272
definition, 73 Socio-psychological foundations, intractable
intergroup conflict, 172, 245 conflicts
Israeli-Palestinian, 245 challenges, involved societies, 3
peacemaking, 202 collective narratives, 79
principles, 200 educational implications, 195
South African Truth and Reconciliation direct and indirect peace education, 201
Commission, 267 mental suffering, 3
stage, 111 negative experiences, 3
Reconciliation-aimed intergroup encounters, religious and cultural issues, 2
244, 245 short-term low-intensity conflicts, 2
Rhetorical containment violence, 2
duality, 221–223 infrastructure
legitimacy, 224 beliefs, security, 5
patriotic commitment, 224 collective emotional orientation, 6
286 Index

Socio-psychological foundations, intractable Participants, 256

conflicts (cont.) Perpetual, 248
collective memory, 4 self-victimization, 39, 101, 115, 117–118,
ethos of conflict (EOC), 4 124, 128
functions, 6–8
implications, 9
institutionalization, 8–9 W
interrelated elements, 3 War of 1948, 231, 232
societal beliefs, 4 Carmiel industrial area, 68
Stereotypes and prejudice catastrophes, 71
developmental course, 17 chronic political violence, 66
IDCT (see Integrative Developmental- civil equality, 69
Contextual Theory (IDCT)) collective memory, 62, 66
in childhood experiences, 17 collective recognition, 69
Jewish Israeli Youth, 25–26 conditional coexistence, 69
theoretical ideas, 17–20 continuous clashes, 66
cultural products, 62
democratic Jewish state, 66
T depopulated houses, 62
Thawabit, 137, 138 deprivation/frustrated expectations, 68
Threat perceptions, 152, 154, 157, 159–161 destroyed villages, 67
Transformation of beliefs. See Intractable diasporas, 66
conflicts discrimination and subordination, 69
Transitional justice emotions, 71
International Law concept, 268–269 exploitation, uprooting and dispossession, 68
late 1980s and early 1990s, 265 family dispersion and detachment, 67
local and national justice, 265 family members, 66
processes and mechanisms, 264, 272 fear and anger, 71
psychology, 266 land confiscation, 67
reconciliation, 266 land ownership, 68
substantial variation, 265 memorial maniacs, 72
transitional justice, 265 mnemonic arenas, 67
truth seeking, 266–268 national narratives and collective memory, 62
at victims/victimizers, 265 Palestinian generation, 73
sociopsychological dynamics, 269–271 participation, commemorative activities,
Truth commissions 70–71
establishment, 268 popular memory, 62
transitional Justice, 264–267 psychological, social and economic
truth-seeking processes, 270, 271 functions, 67
Truth seeking qualitative and interpretive inquiry, 62
processes, 263 readiness to sacrifice, 68
efforts, 264, 269–271 reconciliation, 73
transitional Justice goal, 266–268 social identity, 72
societal beliefs, 61
thematic fields, 62
U topography, 67
UAR. See United Arab Republic (UAR) young Palestinians’ narrative, 63–64
United Arab Republic (UAR), 105, 107, 108 young Palestinian generations, 67
(see also Young Palestinians)
War of 1967
V Arab enthusiasm, 103
Victimization changes, educational policy, 204
in-group, 5, 7, 37, 136, 173 Egyptian media, 105
Palestinian ethos of conflict, 133, 134, ended with the Israeli capture of additional
143–145 territories, 116
Index 287

PSM, 232 black-and-white approach, 64

Siah, 233 deceitful strategies, 63
veterans, 53 destructive actions, 63
victimization of the ingroup, 136 expulsion strategies, 64
War of 1973, 233–234 interviewees, 63
Women and Peace Coalition (WPC), 235 Jewish forces, 64
WPC. See Women and Peace Coalition (WPC) collective memory, 63
Zionist leadership’s strategy, 63

Y
Yasser Arafat, 139, 145, 222–225, 237 Z
Yishuv period. See Pre-state/Yishuv Period Zionism, 103, 104, 116, 136, 138, 140–143,
Yitzhak Rabin, 53, 222 247, 248
Young children. See Intractable conflicts Zionist bubble, 248
challenges, 19 Zionist narrative
experiences and learning, 31–42 hegemonic, 203, 205, 209
IDCT, 21 Israeli collective memory, 51–55, 57
Young Palestinians. See also War of 1948 Palestinian collective memory, 62, 71, 72
atrocities, 64 Zionist racism, 142