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Ethnicity and Local Identity in de Folklore of the South-western Oromo of Ethiopia: a

Comparative Study
Alemu Fanta, A.

2015

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Alemu Fanta, A. (2015). Ethnicity and Local Identity in de Folklore of the South-western Oromo of Ethiopia: a
Comparative Study. VU University Amsterdam.

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 Faculty of Social Sciences

Ethnicity and Local Identity in

the Folklore of the South-
western Oromo of Ethiopia: a
Comparative Study

by
Abreham Alemu Fanta

VU University Amsterdam
Cover Photo:
A Gera Oromo elder narrating Gera history, October 2006 (Photo by the author)
 VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

Ethnicity and Local Identity in the Folklore of the South-western

Oromo of Ethiopia: a Comparative Study

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan

de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. F.A. van der Duijn Schouten,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen
op dinsdag 16 juni 2015 om 13.45 uur
in de aula van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105

door Abreham Alemu Fanta

geboren te Shambu, Ethiopië
promotor: prof.dr. G.J. Abbink
Overige leden van de Promotiecommissie:

Prof. Dr. G. Furniss, SOAS, University of London

Dr. D. Merolla, Universiteit Leiden
Dr. G. Gelaye, Universität Hamburg
Dr. M. Doortmont, Universiteit Groningen
Dr. F. Krijtenburg, Vrije Universiteit

This study was made possible with the generous support of WOTRO, The Hague (PhD
dissertation grant WR 52-1088), which is acknowledged with gratitude
To
My late teacher, mentor and colleague:
Dr. Yonas Admassu

My untimely departed friends:

Berhanu Gebeyehu Belaineh
Gemechu Gelalcha Dinagde
Wondimagegn Sulito Erbeto
Acknowledgements
I owe the completion of the long journey of this PhD study to many institutions and
individuals.
First of all, I would like to extend my gratitude to NWO/WOTRO for awarding me the
scholarship grant and the opportunity to pursue my PhD study. The African Studies
Centre at Leiden and Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, deserve special
thanks for giving me fellowship and all the necessary institutional support during my
study in Holland. I also appreciate Addis Ababa University for providing me with study
leave.
I am indebted to my promoter and supervisor, Professor Jon Abbink, for his invaluable
professional support. Had it not been for his relentless encouragement and effective
guidance, this study would never have been proposed, leave alone come to completion,
with my sluggishness and divided loyalties. Jon was always available for me,
painstakingly reading, commenting and editing every page of my messy writing. With
all earnestness, I would like to say THANK YOU, Jon.
This study would have not come to completion without the institutional and financial
support of Scholars at Risk (SAR), Institute of International Education Scholars at Risk
Fund (IIE-SRF), and my host universities, University of California, Los Angeles
(UCLA), and California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB), and PEN
Emergency Fund Amsterdam during my exile in the US. I am also grateful to my pro
bono council from Weil, Gotshal and Manges, specifically, to Jill Baisinger, Alexis
Brown-Reilly, and Stephen Shahida, and to Françoise Lionnet, Reem Hanna-Harwell,
and Wendy Belcher, for their kindness and effective professional support at the most
stressful time of my life. I am alos indebted to Professor Jamal R. Nassar, Professor
Peter Robertshaw, and Patricia Massei of CSUSB for their unreserved and generous
support.
My AAU colleagues Professor Habtamu Wondimu and Dr. Fekade Azeze assisted me
in so many ways. I am thankful to them.
My heartfelt gratitude also goes to Dr. Azeb Amha, Michael and Helen Abbink, for the
familial love and heartwarming smiles and care they gave me during my stay in Leiden.
My informants from the south-western Oromia, and my friend and research assistant
Obbo Tayib Abba Foggi, Mitiku Dibessa, Yirgu Dibessa, Daniel Yirgu, and Adugna
Berkessa all deserve my gratitude.
My heartfelt appreciation also goes to my friends and sisters and brothers in America,
for their generous material and moral support at the time of my relocation in the US:
Dubale and Mekdes Afework, Dr. Asefa Jejaw and his family, Teferi Jejaw, Merga
Feyissa and Sosina Bogale, Mintiwab Abera, Azeb Abera and Alemshet Tsegaye,
Zelalem Tsegaye and his family, Aynalem Abera and Addisu, Shimelis Kabteneh and
his family, Samuel Mekbib and Seblewongel Mekbib, and Mesfin Salilew. My old

i
friend, Zeleke Terefe, and his wife, Mekdes Abraham, deserve special appreciation for
their unreserved support and gentle proding to finalize my study.
Biruk Abate and Hilina Asnake; Dr. Asefa Negash, Teshome Ayalew, Abas Miftah,
Aregawi Berhe and many other friends in Leiden deserve so many thanks for their
warm hospitality during my stay in Leiden.
Among many of my friends and colleagues at Addis Ababa University and elsewhere in
Ethiopia, the following deserve special appreciation for their encouragement and
support: Gezahegn Getachew and his family in Canada, Abebe Dissasa, Fasika Melesse,
Bayleyegn Tasew, Asnake Kefale and his family (Asnake read and gave me
constructive comments on my thesis), Elizabeth Ayalew and Paulos Chanie, Getachew
Sahilemariyam, Bedilu Wakjira and Tigist Bekele, Selamawit Mecca, Tewodros Gebre,
Meseret Abeje, Aboneh Ashagrie, Abate Mekuriya (Gashe), Belayneh Abune
(Wosagnu), Nebiyu Baye, Tesfaye Eshetu, Daniel Sileshi (Wotatu), Tadesse Sibamo,
and Ayneabeba Teshome.
I owe much to my loving family in Kera, Tadesse Tesfa’s family: Alemtsehay Legesse
(Chehaye), Samson, Geremew and Kidist, Tesfa and Saba, Binyam, Enguday, Beminet,
Yigerem and her family, Yidenek and Tiliye, and Addishiywot Tadesse.
Thanks to my sisters and brothers for their unreserved love and support: Beliyu Abera
(Emahoy), Muluwork Alemu and Obbo Negeri Kelbessa, Tenaw Alemu, Abeba Alemu
and Meklit, Alehegn Alemu, Dagnachew Alemu and Yeshi, Habtaminesh Alemu and
Wondwossen Nigussie, Gedaminesh Alemu and Yohanis.
Last but not least, my deepest gratitude and love go to my wife Rahel Tadesse and my
beloved kids: Isaac (Abat), Betelhem (Batalam Abam) and Yabsira (Bitsaye). You have
always been my source of inspiration, courage and hope. Thank you!

ii
Contents

Table of Contents
Maps and figures
Acronyms
Glossary
A note on transliteration

Table of Contents iii

Chapter 1. Introduction: theme, aim, scope 1

Theme and theoretical orientation 1
The place of the Oromo in Ethiopia 11
Rationale of the study 17
The writer’s memory as a motivation: a personal note 20
Research questions 25
Scope of the study 26
Significance of the study 28

Chapter 2. Ethnicity and local identity in folklore: historical overview and

theoretical orientation 32

Introduction 32
Ethnicity 33
Ethnic group 33
A brief recap on theoretical approaches to ethnicity and ethnic identity 42
Situating folklore 44
Identity and folklore 45
Ethnic folklore 46
Methodological approach 47
Fieldwork and methods 50

Chapter 3. The Oromo of Ethiopia: a socio-historical overview 52

Introduction 52
Origins and dispersal 53
Differentiation and the idea of unity 55
The major Oromo groups 61

Chapter 4. The Oromo expansion in history and Macha oral traditions 87

Introduction 87
On causes and factors of Oromo expansion 87
iii
 The regional and historical context 95
Demographic pressure and internal conflicts 97
The role of the gada system 107
Oromo traditions of adoption (Oromization) 115
Concluding remarks 119

Chapter 5. Theorizing narration: an approach to local identity narrative 121

Introduction 121
The socio-political context 124
Toward a definition of local identity narrative 127
The cultural conception and performance of identity narrative 130
The communicative context and contextualization strategies 132
‘Telling right’, collaborative telling and narrative credibility 139
Thematic elements and function 151
Establishing ethical and moral superiority 154
Toward a classification of identity narrative 156
Concluding remarks 160

Chapter 6. Differentiation and Similarity: identity narratives of

the Jimma and Gera Oromo 162

Introduction 162
The Jimma Oromo 163
Jimma 165
Gera 168
Narrative 6.1. “We are different from others”: contemporary identity
narrative of the Jimma 170
Narrative 6.2. “Our forefathers are the first to settle in this area” 179
Narrative 6.3. “We are generous and peace-loving people” 183
Stereotyping others 192
Narrative 6.4. “The adventures of Yanfo Sephine” 194
Narrative 6.5. “We are like a handful pepper”: identity narrative of the
Gera 198
Narrative 6.6. “The leopard and Abba Jifar” 203
Narrative 6.7. “The reward of bravery” 204
Narrative 6.8. “Gera is the land of abundance” 207
Concluding remarks 210

Chapter 7. “We are like a handful of sand”: narrative construction of local

identity in Eastern Wollega 212

Introduction 212

iv
 The Eastern Wollega Oromo 213
The Leqa Neqemte 216
The Sibu Sire 223
Identity narratives of the Leqa Neqemte and the Sibu Sire 225
Contemporary identity narratives of the Leqa Neqemte 230
Narrative 7.1. “How our forefathers settled in this Wollega area” 231
Narrative 7.2. “We are like a handful of sand” 241
Narrative 7.3. “The nature of Leqa and Sibu” 247
Identity narratives of the Sibu Sire 248
Narrative 7.4. “How Sibu Sire was established” 249
Narrative 7.5. “The war between Sibu and Leqa” 251
Narrative 7.6. “The deceitfulness of the Leqa” 255
Concluding remarks 262

Chapter 8. Conclusion 263

Introduction 263
Narrative construction and negotiation of local identity 264
Comparative notes on identity narratives of the south-western Oromo 268
Final reflections on the theoretical framework and contribution
of the study 270

References 273

Samenvatting 293

Maps and Figures

Maps
Map 1. Oromia region administrative zones 16
Map 2. Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia 57
Map 3. The Gibe states in the first half of the 19th century 164
Map 4. Wollega in the mid-20th century 214

Figures
Figure 1. The sub-divisions of Borana Oromo 62
Figure 2. The sub-divisions of the Guji Oromo 65
Figure 3. The sub-divisions of the Arsi Oromo 67

v
Figure 4. The sub-divisions of the Karrayu Oromo 70
Figure 5. A focus group discussion in the Jimma area, November 2006 142
Figure 6. Abba Jifar’s palace in Jiren 167
Figure 7. A Jimma elder narrating, November 2006 182
Figure 8. A Gera elder narrating, October 2006 208
Figure 9. Dajjazmach Kumsa Moroda’s palace in Neqemte 219
Figure 10. A discussion with Leqa-Neqemte elders narrating history,
October 2006 230
Figure 11. A Sibu-Sire elder narrating, March 2007 258

vi
Acronyms

CSA Central Statistics Agency

DFEDJZ Department of Finance and Economic Development of Jimma
Zone
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
IFLO Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
MTA Macha-Tulema Association
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
ONC Oromo National Congress
OPDO Oromo People’s Democratic Organization
ONRS Oromia National Regional State
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front
TTI Teacher Training Institute

vii
Glossary of key Oromiffa and Amharic words

Aadaa custom
Abba father or owner of, an honorific title
Abba gada leader of the ruling age grade (gada) in power
Abba lafaa owner of land
Abba Warraa head of family
Anaa district
Awraja sub-provincial unit of government
Biyya land, locality, country
Dadhi honey mead
Dajjazmach “Commander of the gate”, a traditional politico-military title
Fitawrari “Commander of the vanguard”, a traditional politico-military title
Geerarsa personal or group experience song
Gosa clan, agnatic group
Guddifacha to adopt, to foster
Hora mineral water
Horii cattle, money
Korma bull
Lafa land, territory
Manguddo Oromo elders
Masaanuu co-wife
Masaraa palace
Moti king
Qaallu high priest of traditional Oromo religion
Qebele local area government
Qomoo named tribal sub-division or cluster
Qulqullu pure, clean
Raajuu sage, prophet

viii
Ras ‘Head,’ the highest traditional title next to king
Seera law
Siso one-third
Soddaa affine
Waaqa traditional Oromo God, divinity, sky
Warra homestead, patrilineal descent group
Woreda (sub-) district

A note on transliteration
Oromo words and texts in this study are written in italics and transliterated using
standandard Oromo spelling, with equivalent English translation. Personal and
geographical names in Amharic and in Oromiffa, such as Moroda, Tolessa, Jimma or
Wollega, are written in a simplified form using common English spelling, so as to make
the text easily accessible for both Oromo and non-Oromo, Amharic and non-Amharic
readers.

ix
Chapter 1

Introduction: theme, aim and scope

Theme and theoretical orientation

This study examines folkloric constructions and expressions of ethnicity and local
identity among the southwestern Oromo of Ethiopia from a comparative perspective.
The aim is to clarify how, on what bases, in what situations and to what end each local
Oromo group understands itself in relation to ‘others’ within and beyond the wider
ethno-regional Oromo grouping. Ethnicity is here seen essentially as a cultural
interpretation of descent among a specific people or group. Thus the study essentially
touches upon the construction and expression of ethnic and local group identity,
specifically in its discursive self-presentation.

Issues of ethnicity and ethnic identity have been loci of major problems for
developing countries with a multiethnic character, both in Africa and beyond
(Akinyele 2001; Amoo & Odendaal 2002; Appadurai 1998; Udogu 2001; Paul 2000;
Habtamu 2001). As Markakis put it (1994: 217), conflict between and within (sub-)
ethnic groups has been, and probably will continue to be, a primary source of unrest in
the Horn of Africa. Also elsewhere in Africa, ethnic-based conflicts in Sudan, Nigeria
and South Sudan regularly flare up. There is a continued need to better understand
such multi-ethnic societies, the prevailing ethno-regional and sub-regional identities
and interactions, as well as the forces and circumstances that shape them. In line with
this, there are calls for rigorous and in-depth studies on the intra- and inter-ethnic
relationships and issues of divergence and convergence among the ethnic groups in
Ethiopia, the focus of this study. This is a challenging enterprise, also for public
debate, responsible state policy formulation and development planning, to which,
among others, scholars of oral traditions and folklore should make substantial

1
contributions, while "... at the same time furthering knowledge in their own and related
fields” (Weigle 1983: 198).

The present study stands in the tradition of cultural and folklore studies – i.e.
focusing on orature and oral narrative-- and deals with issues and problem of ethnicity
and (sub-) ethnic identities, seen through the prism of oral narrative on ethno-history
and group relations. While this field of study is related to cultural anthropology, it has
developed relatively autonomously and is usually called ethnic folklore, which has
been emerging since the 1970s. The term ethnic folklore, which gained currency in
folklore studies in North America and Europe, thus refers to the study of folklore
discourses that play a crucial role in the construction and articulation of identities, and
comment upon the dialectics of intra-and inter-ethnic group relations, that constitute or
contribute to the sense of identity (see Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1983; Oring 1986;
Badone 1987; Georges and Jones 1995; Hinchman 2001). As I have a scholarly
background in comparative literature and folklore studies, I place myself first and
foremost in this disciplinary tradition. This explains my choice of terms and of leading
authors cited, as evident in the study that follows.1 However, as noted, with ‘folklore’ I
mean the oral traditions, narratives and other verbal expressive forms that are
informally produced and transmitted among a specified group.

In large parts of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, the study of folklore vis-à-vis

group identity has been relatively neglected; despite the fact that 1. its empirical
richness and diversity are notable, and 2. its ‘political’ relevance seems to increase.
What is more, issues of local identities and internal boundaries within larger ethnic
groups have often been overlooked.

The study of ethnicity within the African context, by and large, has been
devoted to investigation of its primordial aspects but more to its instrumental potency
1
With the term ‘folklore’ as used in the rest of this thesis, I therefore mean the dominant,
‘nomative’ oral traditions or oral culture of a people. My use of the term here distances
itself from the connotation of folklore as the study of the quaint relics or survivals from
the past.

2
as the basis for political mobilization. In other words, much attention has been paid to
the politicization of ethnicity and its impact on the state in postcolonial Africa (Salih
and Markakis 1998: 7; Paulos 1998; Schlee 2004). Hereby the historical conditions
that influence ethnic relations have been emphasized, but often with little
consideration to their situational, processual, and creative aspects. Similar to the study
of nationalism and democratization processes in Africa, the study of group identity is
often characterized by top-down approaches (cf. Clapham 2002). The perceptions and
roles of local group-members in the construction and expression of a shared sense of
group consciousness or identity and of relations to others within the surrounding social
world, as well as the role that folklore plays in this respect, have not been adequately
researched.

More specifically, in this study, the question how, on what bases, to what end
and in what situations local groups within the various ethnic groups in Ethiopia
discursively construct, negotiate and articulate their collective self-understanding and
their place within the wider and immediate social world will be examined.

The significance of (ethnic) sub-group oriented, detailed study of cultural

narratives and other ‘products’ has long been emphasized by writers in the humanities
(e.g., Bauman 1972; Dundes 1982; Cohen 1982; Badone 1987; Bausinger 1992;
Sokolovski & Tishkov 1996). As a baseline definition of ethnic communities or groups
we might refer to the one by Sokolovski & Tishkov: “The definition of an ethnic
community as a group of people whose members share a common name and elements
of culture, possess a myth of common origin and common historical memory, who
associate themselves with a particular territory and possess a feeling of solidarity,
opens further avenues for integration of anthropological, political and psychological
knowledge in understanding ethnic phenomena” (1996: 192). While it carries a
political connotation, the crucial aspect of the cultural interpretation of (group) descent
also comes out well. In this study on Oromo local identities it is inevitable that the
social and political dimension, articulated in group distinctions, is relevant.

3
 Furthermore, the study takes as one of its leads Ellen Badone’s stimulating
article, “Ethnicity, Folklore, and Local Identity in Rural Brittany” (1987). Badone
examined local foci of identity in rural Brittany, a province of France. Her article
forcefully argued that, although extensive folklore studies-based research was carried
out over the years related to issues of ethnicity and ethnic identity through the prism of
folkloric heritage, the trend of such scholarship was largely focused on the studies of
European ethno-regional minorities. As a result, the issue of local identity was
relatively neglected and subsumed under the concepts of ‘parochialism’ and ‘socio-
centrism.’ Badone’s plea for examining the interrelationship between ethnicity and
locality as a foci for group identity, made more than two decades ago, does not seem to
have been followed so far, especially in the field of African folklore studies. Though
there is a large number of studies on issues of ethnicity and ethnic relations in Africa
in general and Ethiopia in particular (for instance, see Nnoli 1989, Hultin 1996,
Abbink 1991, 1997, 2000), Markakis 1998, Schlee 1995, 2002; Haneke 2002; James et
al. 2002; Young 2002), little attempt has been made to understand the interrelationship
between ethnicity and locality as a venue for group identity, or to chart the discursive
construction, negotiation and articulation of local identity in the context of everyday
social interaction.

The relative dearth of knowledge in this area of inquiry seems to have resulted
from the nature of the field data on which these scholarly studies relied and from the
methods the researchers used to analyze them. While these studies put much emphasis
on social, economic, political and cultural institutions and conditions, they pay little
attention to the cognitive and epistemological dimensions of ethnicity and ethnic
identity; i.e. the subjacent, implicit ‘knowledge system’ in and through which these
notions and the values they constitute are constructed, interpreted, negotiated and
communicated among in-group members.

In this thesis, the oral traditions of the Oromo people in south-west Ethiopia
stand central, seen in relation to processes of identity formation. In predominantly oral

4
societies like the Oromo, the knowledge and values that groups have about their own
history, origin, locality and identity, as well as their perceptions of others, can be well
understood by studying their folklore. In this study I intend to take an in-depth look at
the way in which social, cultural, economic, and political experiences (imagined or
real, past or present) shape and are shaped by the folkloric productions of the people.
In this way, a novel contribution to the study of ethnicity, ethnic relations and ethno-
history can be made.

Although a significant number of anthropological and historical studies has

been done on the Oromo in the second half of the twentieth century (e.g., Huntingford
1955; Knutsson 1967; Bartels 1983; Baxter 1994; Hultin 1987; Negaso 2001; Lewis
2001 [1965], Bassi 2005 [1996]). However, few attempts were made to understand the
folklore of this people in relation to its place and role in creating and enhancing a
sense of community (close social association and ‘collective’ action) within local
groups, as well as in producing and defining ‘boundaries’ – in the sense of
distinctiveness - among and between other Oromo and non-Oromo groups in the
region. Among these works, Knutsson’s study of changes in the Macha-Oromo
authority system (1967), Lewis’s study of the Oromo monarchy of Jimma Abba Jifar
(2001), and Bartels’s penetrating research on Oromo religion and myth among the
western Macha (1983) have contributed substantially to our understanding of Oromo
society and culture. Jan Hultin’s ethno-historical study (1987) and Negaso Gidada’s
study of socio-political history (2001) are also valuable contributions to Macha-Oromo
ethnology. Though these works are by and large based on fieldwork, they had a
different pespective and did not make use of the rich repertoire of local knowledge
embedded in folklore traditions of the people. In particular, these authors have not paid
attention to the dynamism of folklore and its importance for cross-group comparative
study of local discourses and perceptions.

The present study represents an attempt to fill this lacuna by way of exploring
the potential of using folklore as an understudied domain of culture for purposes of

5
social analysis. Seen as a construction and expression of both people’s view of
themselves and ‘others’, their cumulative knowledge and beliefs, and as a critical
cultural force that shapes worldview, folklore is thus used as an appropriate entry into
the understanding of the dynamics of multiple local identities and patterns of
interaction within and between the groups.

The issue of Oromo identity in Ethiopia has long been discussed among
scholars in the field of Ethiopian studies and reflects issues in existing academic
debates on ethnicity and ethnic identity in general. The debates can be viewed in terms
of two major approaches to ethnicity which have dominated the literature on the topic
in the last two or three decades (Jones 1997). These are the ‘primordial’ and the
‘instrumentalist’ perspectives.

The concept of primordial attachment, first developed by Shils (1957) in order

to describe the specific relational qualities inherent in smaller scale kinship ties, and
later applied to social groups of a larger scale by Geertz (1963: 109), was initially used
as a means of describing certain kinds of social attachment among a particular group
of people. Later on Isaacs developed “the concept of primordial ties as a means of
explaining the power and persistence of ethnic identity, which he calls ‘basic group
identity.’ For the primordialists, a range of cultural characteristics ascribed at birth
such as language, the history and origin of the group, religion, and value system are
important elements in the definitions of ethnic groups” (as quoted by Jones 1997: 65-
66). Further elaboration on the primordialist thesis focuses on socio-biological aspects
of ethnicity, which is to be touched upon in the next chapter. In line with this
perspective, we find several anthropological and other academic works arguing that
the Oromo are a distinct, culturally homogeneous and autonomous nation with its own
distinctive culture. Among others, works of Gemetchu (1993, 1996), Mekuria (1996),
Addisu (1990), and Asafa (1993, 2007) fall in this group and have had some influence
in Oromo cultural-nationalist circles, which is why I cite them here. These scholars
tend to ignore the empirical cultural variations within the regional Oromo groupings;

6
in addition, they do not seem to realize the dynamism of society in general and the
relational, situational and flexible nature of ethnic identity in particular. For instance,
in one of his articles entitled: “Orommumma: Tradition, Consciousness and Identity,”
Gemetchu Megerssa claimed that the Oromo, as opposed to other cultural and
religious groups, are born with Oromumma (Oromoness): for the Oromo, “the belief
system, ethnicity and identity are given with birth. … An Oromo is born with
Oromumma. Thus, the simplest definition of an Oromo would be that he/she is born of
an Oromo father” (1996: 92-94). By thus describing Oromumma, which is a recently
coined term and remains a very vague and controversial concept in Oromo studies, the
author misspells how ethnic identity is built up in the course of time as a cultural
artefact, and reduces ethnicity in general, and ethnic identity of the Oromo in
particular, to a static, socio-biological entity, devoid of its empirically observable
transformability and dynamism.

The same is true of the other researchers in this particular category; they fail to
realize that without the local, adaptive variations in traditions and styles, at times
conflicting with each other, the Oromo could hardly have maintained their ethnic
identity or existence as an ethnic group or people in the multi-ethnic context of
Ethiopia. The local variations are the supple that provide the wider Oromo culture with
a wide range of cultural resources, inventions and options, ensuring legitimacy and
continuity of the local groups both as independent and as part of the society as a
whole. This is simply because association and organization at the local (community)
level is more effective and practically profitable for the members than at the wider
society level, thus ensuring the legitimacy and sustainable independent existence of
each group. As already noted by Cohen (1982), close social associations and structures
of local groups are largely pragmatic social constructs, which “are being transformed
from real frameworks for social organisation and action into idioms for legitimating
association and for creating a rhetoric of historical and cultural continuity to mask the
substantial change…” (1982: 21). The existence and importance of differences within

7
and between ethnic groups has also been clearly stated by Eriksen: “Cultural
differences continue to exist, within and between places, within and between nations
and ethnic groups, in the face of globalization and universal modernity; and to pretend
otherwise would be foolish and more likely than not politically unsound” (2000: 203).

The above-mentioned researchers’ tendency, however, to ignore this widely

acknowledged social fact might have emanated either from a nationalist ideology 2, or
from their academic orientation on essentialism, which “… attributes an unchanging,
primordial ontology to what are the historically contingent products of human or other
forms of agency” (Herzfeld 1996: 188-189). This means, as also noted and strongly
criticized by Schlee (2003), Clapham (2002) and Triulzi (2002), that two entirely
different discourses are combined in the writings of the aforementioned writers, i.e. a
discourse emanating from their scholarly endeavours and from their nationalist
ideologies. What is more, they provided little explanation of the empirical socio-
historical and political factors that account for the persistence of the Oromo as a
‘homogeneous’, distinctive ethnic group or people, unaffected by any of the factors
that have shaped the wider multi-ethnic society of Ethiopia for centuries. In this regard
an empirical, local group-based comparative study of the south-western Oromo
groups’ folkloric identity discourses may be of some importance to understand ‘what
has actually been happening’ in Ethiopia in general and among the Oromo in
particular.

The second perspective on ethnicity is that of the instrumentalism, which

conceptualizes ethnicity as “a dynamic and situational form of group identity
embedded in the organization of social behaviour and also in the institutional fabric of
society” (Jones 1997: 72). Based on the assumption that human beings create and
maintain various systems of knowledge and cultural orientation to serve vital purposes
in the day-to-day life, including survival and continuity, the instrumentalist approach

2
Where nationalism, which appears to contradict and suppress the local-level and actor-
oriented practices, is a political programme.

8
to ethnicity is characterized by its concern with the role of ethnicity in the mediation of
social relations and the negotiation of access to economic and political resources. The
works of Barth (1969a), and Cohen (1982) have played a ground-breaking role in the
development of the instrumentalist approach.

From this perspective, we find many scholars who studied the Oromo and their
identity, for instance, among others, Aguilar (1998), Schlee (1995, 2003), Haneke
(2002), Hultin (2003), and Baxter (1994). For these writers, “a common identity
acknowledged by all Oromo in general does not exist” (Haneke 2002: 144). This view
also finds a strong and substantive expression in the words of Baxter, who noted that,
“Oromo culture is much too varied and complex to be analysed as a whole…. I do not
see that there are any Boran or Oromo groupings based on shared ethnic identity that
could be utilised either for administration or for development purposes” (1994: 258-
60). Accordingly, the ethnic identity of the Oromo, the same as that of any other social
grouping for that matter, is multidimensional and fluid. Historically, it could easily
shift and vary, depending upon the size of social units and ecological, socio-economic
and political factors characterizing each unit. This is evident in the extended and
varied geographical area that the Oromo inhabit, the various ecological systems, ways
of living, religions, and belief systems that the people have adopted, and in the
linguistic and other cultural variations the different Oromo (sub-) groupings exhibit. In
1986 Paul Baxter noted: “An Oromo nation is at present being forged out of the
various major groupings: Arssi, Borana, Leqa, Macha, Afran Kallo, Wollo, Raya,
Tulama, Guji, Karaiyu, etc. There are considerable cultural diversities between
different Oromo groups, and Oromos are variously Muslims, Orthodox Christians,
Roman Catholics, Lutherans and followers of traditional religion” (1986: 54).
However, though Baxter and other writers from the instrumentalist school seem to be
objective in their observation of the situational nature and multidimensionality of
Oromo identity, they perhaps did not offer sufficient explanation for the dynamism of
the society and the underlying socio-cultural and political conditions and processes.

9
The intention of the present study is to supply new empirical data from, and
comparative study of, the folklore (oral traditions) of the various south-western Oromo
(sub-)groupings in order to show this dynamism and situationality of Oromo identity,
to be conceived in a non-essentialist manner.

In line with this I aim to add a third approach to this dual field of theoretical
perspectives on ethnicity, which will be the one underlying this thesis: the
‘constructivist’ one (see Chapter 2, below). This approach, which is becoming more
and more common in contemporary social studies (see, for example Schlee 2004), tries
to avoid the pitfalls of seeing ethnicity as ‘inborn’ and immutable (primordialists) or as
being only a product of material or political interests or as having a merely opportunist
as opposed to historical and affective character (instrumentalists). A constructivist
approach recognizes ethnicity 1. as having some ‘given’ characteristics which groups
see as their ‘heritage’ and as frequently acquiring and absorbing new ones, and 2. sees
the processes of interaction of ‘ethnic’ groups and their wider societal conditions as
the engine of group formation, but with recognition of the use of meaningful ethnic
referents which are not arbitrary signs. Thus despite the fact that old ‘ethnic’ referents
can get an entirely new meaning in contemporary contexts. This more dynamic and
contingent approach to ethnicity and ethnic identity allows for the analysis of change
and for a thoroughly historicized view on group formation and articulation of these
characteristics.

With these wider theoretical frameworks in mind, I emphasize that one of the
central aims of this study is to make an empirical contribution to the study of Oromo
narrative and self-understanding by providing and analyzing representative textual
examples. To this end, a total of 14 narrative texts have been included, collected in the
field among four sub-groups of the western Oromo: the Jimma and Gera of Jimma
zone, and the Leqa Neqemte and Sibu Sire of Eastern Wollega zone. In addition, a
number of biographical self-presentations, proverbs, songs, and idiomatic expressions
are given.

10
The place of the Oromo in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Oromo, who presently occupy large part of the country, were probably
one culturally fairly homogeneous agro-pastoral society in southern Ethiopia,
somewhere between the middle lakes of the Great Rift Valley and the Bale Plateau
(Levine 1974; Bahru 1991; Marcus 2002: 34-35). Before the time of their great
expansion in the 16th century, the Oromo appear to have been a society of egalitarian,
age-graded pastoralists, with its own indigenous religion and assembly-like decision-
making structure. However, they are believed to have undergone considerable change
and differentiation as a result of influences of and interactions with other cultures, and
due to new environmental conditions to which they have had to adapt since their
northward expansion. Though nearly all of the various Oromo tribal groups still trace
common patrilineal descent and speak more or less mutually intelligible dialects of a
single East Cushitic language (Afaan Oromo), most of them have adopted different
ways of life, religions, and local socio-political organizations. Of course, some Oromo
groups, such as the Borana and Guji, still retain a nomadic pastoral economy, and have
a traditional religion and socio-political institutions which are closer to those of the
Oromo at the time of their expansion (Trimingham 1952; Levine 1974; Baxter 1994;
Sumner 1995; Bassi 2005).

The Oromo are one of the largest ethnic groups or peoples in Eastern Africa,
and constitute 34.4% of the total population of Ethiopia (CSA 2010: 73). 3 They are
spread out over a vast area, extending from the highlands of Ethiopia in the north to
Northern Kenya in the south, and from the Sudan border in the west to the Ogaden and
Somalia in the east, and are also present in Shoa in the centre of the country.
According to the Ethnographic Survey of North-Eastern Africa (Huntingford 1955: 12-

3
Some writers estimated the number of Oromo to be 60% of the Ethiopian population;
for instance, Holcomb & Ibsa 1990, Mohammed Hassen 1994, and Addisu 1990, but
there are no clear sources for this.

11
15; Knutsson 1967: 31-34), the Oromo of Ethiopia are divided into some 200 or more
‘tribes’ in six major regional groups: Southern (Borana and Guji), Northern (Wallo,
Raayyaa), Central (Shoa, Tulamaa), Eastern (Harar, Ittu), Western (Western Wallagga,
Sayyoo), and South-western (Macha). The Macha group comprises several Oromo
tribes inhabiting the south-western part of Ethiopia, Western Shoa, Jimma, the
principal parts of Eastern Wollega, and Illu Abba Bor zones of the present-day
National Regional State of Oromia.

The Macha are considered to be one of the most clearly defined and important
regional groupings of the Oromo. Most of them subsist on mixed agriculture and cattle
husbandry. They are subdivided into four sub-regional groupings: the Gibe, Wollega,
the Illu, and the Shoa. Each of these in turn is made up of a number of named,
territorial groups (cf. Levine 2000; Hultin 1987; Eide 2000; Bahru 2001; Haneke
2002), as detailed below:

1. The Gibe Oromo - the tribes of the former (19th century) Oromo monarchies,
the Five Gibe States, namely, Jimma Aba Jifar, Limmu-Enarya, Guma, Gomma
and Gera, which together presently constitute large part of the Jimma
Administrative Zone of Oromia. In the 18th-19th century these five sub-regional
Oromo groupings developed monarchical political systems and remained
independent states until their annexation into Ethiopia in the 1880s-90s, and all
were converted to Islam.
2. The Wollega Oromo - the Oromo groupings who inhabit the present-day
Eastern Wollega Administrative Zone of Oromia, west of the Gojeb River, and
east of the Didessa River. These are by and large sedentary farmers and
followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
3. The Illu Oromo - the Oromo people inhabiting the present-day Illu Abba Bor
and Western Wollega Administrative Zones of Oromia, west of the Didessa
River and north of the Gojeb. The most important form of religious influence,
especially on those of the Western Wollega, was exerted by the Evangelical

12
 Mission run since the early 1890s by Scandinavians and Germans. Their
economy is largely characterized by a coffee-based cash crop economy.
4. The Shoa Oromo - the Oromo inhabiting north-eastern Wollega and Western
Shoa, between the Guder River and the Gibe River. Most of these are also
sedentary farmers and followers of the Orthodox Church (See Map 1).

In connection with much of the available literature on Oromo, one striking thing to
comment upon is the following. In many studies on Oromo by Oromo and some non-
Ethiopian scholars, Oromo society in general and the Oromo history, culture and
language in particular were often presented as ‘the least studied’ of all the various
ethnic groups in Ethiopia (for instance Gemechu 1996; Addisu 1999; Mekuria 1996,
Asefa 1998, Mohamed 1990). According to these scholars, even the few extant studies
were tainted with prejudice against the people and their culture. Some quotations from
these authors are presented below:

It is not an exaggeration to say that no people have had their history so distorted or
ignored and their achievements and human qualities undervalued as the Oromo
have in the Ethiopian historiography…. Until very recently, Oromo history has
been either neglected, as M. Abir admits, or it has been totally ignored, or it has
been distorted by prejudice (Mohammed 1990: 2).

The Oromo are an oral society; hence, geerarsa played a key role in transmitting
historical knowledge and cultural values from generation to generation.… For
almost a century, recognizing that Oromo transmit their history mainly through
oral discourse, such as geerarsa, the Ethiopian colonialists have discouraged the
development of this oral literature; Oromo scholars and others have been
discouraged or prohibited by the Ethiopian colonial state from studying oral
traditions (Addisu 1999: vii).

The contents of some of the courses taught at the university [Addis Ababa
University] either ignored or dehumanized the Oromo people as the elementary
and the secondary school curricula also did… At the history department dozens of

13
 lectures were given by both Ethiopians and expatriate instructors on the
genealogical mythology of Abyssinian kings or on the meanings and importance
of a few rock inscriptions in Semitic languages excavated in northern Ethiopia;
but, nothing was said about the Oromo and their history… At the department of
Ethiopian languages students spent two terms taking courses in the “dead” and
living Semitic languages of Ethiopia while the Oromo and other Cushitic
languages, spoken by more than two-thirds of the population of the empire, were
totally excluded (Mekuria 1996: 62-63).

Judging by the size and diversity of the Oromo people and the scarcity of the
written materials about them, it could be argued that our knowledge of the Oromo
culture is still in its infancy. The studies that have been carried out so far only
begin to address the vastness of the topic. …Abyssinian history, whether written or
oral, is little more than an account of how the Christian emperors persecuted the
Oromo. The ideological and social basis for this persecution of the Oromo was laid
in the sixteenth century. …This ‘history of the Galla,’ as portrayed by Bahrey and
used by historiographers as written source material for the study of the Oromo
past, became not only part of their international image but was incorporated into,
and became part of, the Oromo self-image (Gemetchu 1996: 94-96).

We can find dozens of such comments in Oromo ‘nationalist' narratives of the past
two decades. However, the alleged suppression and negligence that the Oromo people
and culture have gone through seems somewhat exaggerated. Oromo culture and
Oromo folklore, specifically, is among the few bodies of African and Ethiopian
folklore that have relatively attracted the attention of researchers as early as the first
quarter of the nineteenth century. The study of African folklore is a very recent
phenomenon. As Ruth Finnegan clearly put it in her ground-breaking book on African
folklore, Oral Literature in Africa (1970: 27), the beginning of African folklore studies
did not actually begin until the second half of the nineteenth century, albeit there are a
few earlier efforts before then, such as Rogers’ retelling of Wolof fables from Senegal
(1828). In this respect, Edme-François Jomard’s article (1839), entitled Notice sur les
Gallas de Limmou, which contains a small collection of Oromo oral literature (three
Oromo love songs, three war songs and three prayers) in Latin transcription and

14
French translation, happens to be the third ever published collection of African
folklore. The work of the German philologist Karl Tutschek is also worth mentioning,
though unpublished until 1893, as an attachment in Philipp Paulitschke’s book,
Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die Materielle Kultur der Danâkil, Galla und Somâl.
Tutschek collected and transcribed a total of 208 Oromo oral poems over a three-year
period, from 1839 to 1842 (Pankhurst 1976). Cerulli’s 1922 work was also a milstone
publication. Considering how much African and Ethiopian oral culture in general
remained underdeveloped and understudied thus far, we have hardly any ground to
lament the suppression and negligence of Oromo culture alone. 4

4
The laments about the lack of historical studies on the Oromo can no longer be made, in
view of the significant number of new contributions made in the past two decades (e.g.,
Mohammed 1990, 1994; Ficquet 2003; Tesema 1986, 2006a, 2006b; Tsega 2007, 2012;
Negaso 2001; Ezekiel, Firla & Smidt 2009, Toubkis 2011, Abbas 2014).

15
Map 1: Oromia Region Administrative Zones

Source: UN OCHA-Ethiopia IMU /http://unocha.org/

16
Rationale of the study

Ethiopia is a ‘mosaic’ of more than eighty ethnic groups, with varying cultures,
languages, and belief systems. These ethnic groups and cultures, however, developed
several common values and learned to live together with a measure of harmony and
mutual tolerance, although punctuated by intermittent clashes. In the last two decades,
i.e. since the fall of the military dictatorship of Lt.-col. Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991,
however, the Ethiopian state was organized along ethnic lines, and thus ethnic politics
and an ethno-federal state structure have become the new dispensation.

The post-1991 ethno federal state structure of Ethiopia has wrought significant
socio-economic and political changes to its multi-ethnic society. Among others, the
new state structure not only sharpened ethnic consciousness and differences between
the various ethno-regional groupings, but also led to a resurgence of local boundaries
or escalation of the sense of distinctiveness and tension between and within (sub-)
ethnic groups. For instance, the Amhara in Oromo lands, who were once the dominant
ruling group, have been transformed into a minority group (Merera 2003). In Oromia
Regional State, the competition for political power (representation in the regional as
well as federal government), resources, and privileges has come to center within and
between Oromo elites in the numerous regional and sub-regional administrative units,
rather than between the Oromo and the formerly dominant Amhara elites.
Subsequently, a subtle parochialism and favoritism among the regional governments
has been reported. Correspondingly, there has been a proliferation of (sub-) region-
based political organizations, “which are against each other as much as, if not more,
against the ruling elite” (Merera 2003: 154). A few of these were the Macha-Tulema
Development Association (MTDA), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), the Oromo People’s Democratic
Organization (OPDO), and the Oromo National Congress (ONC). Seeking grassroots
support from one’s locality has also become the rule of the day, tending toward local

17
identity formation. Under such circumstances, local cultural traditions and styles have
not only become important sources of group symbols and stereotypes, but are also
mobilized for political goals.

These seemingly commonplace situations are but a few indicators of the strong
feeling of identity attached to localities and local traditions, and of the emerging
rivalry and tension prevailing within and between the Oromo in general and the Macha
(sub-) groupings in particular. As a corollary, there is a massive body of folklore on
and about these boundaries, assigning the people to different levels of local groups and
serving as an expressive basis for collective social identification and action.
Empirically, there is a large variety of myths, stories, sayings, jokes, derisive terms,
etc., told by members of each group to create a prototypical, or even stereotypical,
portrait of their own self as well as of other groups. This body of folklore can be drawn
upon in order to construct, signal, perpetuate, and challenge perceived distinctions
between local groups in the region. More importantly, folklore is a cultural medium
providing socially sanctioned outlets for the expression of what cannot be articulated
in the more formal, direct way. It is in jokes, stories, historical narratives, folksongs,
proverbs, gestures, etc. that cultural pressure points as well as individual anxieties can
be vented. By analyzing the folklore of a social group, thus, one may well succeed in
the goal of ‘making the unconscious conscious’ (see Dundes 1983; Oring 1986;
Finnegan 1992).

The very existence of folklore forms, narratives, songs, proverbs, etc. touching
upon the identity of the culture bearers (i.e., what makes them different from ‘others’
with whom they interact in their immediate social and physical ecology) indicates the
existence of sense of belonging and group-ness among the performers. If we accept
that any form of folklore finds its existence and form in a group of people, who, as
Dundes (1983) clearly put it, share at least one common factor-occupation, language or
religion-we accept that that group of people has some sort of identity, a local identity
to be precise. Therefore, if a local group of Macha Oromo, say the Jimma, the Gera,

18
the Leqa, the Horo, the Illu, or the Sibu, have certain items of folklore which they call
their own, and which they perform to show their experiences and ‘distinctiveness’
from other groups within and outside the larger regional Oromo grouping-the Macha-
then they have and/or they put much more value on their local identity than on the
larger one. This is evident in the contents of various forms of their folklore, and
particularly narratives, in which the self-perceived notion of identity and
distinctiveness from ‘others’ is constructed and expressed.

The point is therefore that any group of people with certain traditions of orature
of their own have some sort of identity, be it ethnic, religious, gender or local, which
can be determined by identifying the most important factor upon which their group-
ness formed, and which dominates the contents of their orature (the important factor in
self-definition of the group itself): “The first test of a folk group is the existence of
shared folklore; then the background of this conformity can be investigated”
(Brunvand, in Bauman 1972: 32).

In line with this, one can safely argue that the various forms of folk songs of
each local group, for instance, the Iyyaasee of the Horro, the Hiyyyus of the Leqa, the
Shubis of the Gimbi, etc. all attest to the self-perceived distinctive existence of these
sub-groups and their sense of identity. It is interesting to note that what Brunvard,
already in 1968, suggested about American folklore also applies to the Oromo: “…the
bearers of American folklore might be classified into occupational groups, age groups,
regional groups, and ethnic or nationality groups, though some time it is also possible
to distinguish folk groups that are set apart by religion, education, hobbies,
neighborhood, or even family” (cited in Bauman 1972: 32). His basic premise is that
“folklore is a function of shared identity. The conceptualization of folklore –bearing
groups in terms of shared identity is closely related to the conceptualization of folklore
as a within group phenomenon” (Bauman 1972). While care should be taken not to
recede into functionalism, in doing a subgroup-oriented comparative analysis and
interpretation of folklore of the various Macha Oromo groups, seen within its social,

19
economic, and political contexts, it is fruitful to focus on processes and situations of
actualization and manipulation of these discourses. This constitutes the major
methodological concern of the present study.

The writer’s memory as a motivation: a personal note

I was born and raised in one of the various sub-regional groupings of the Macha
Oromo; i.e. in Horo Oromo, in eastern Wollega administrative zone of the present day
National Regional State of Oromiya, Abe Dengoro woreda (sub-district). During the
Dergue regime (1974-1991), Abe Dengoro was one of the eleven woredas under the
Horo Guduru awraja (district), located in western part of eastern Wollega, and
bordering in the north and northeast with western Shoa, in the south and southwest
with Gojjam. While culturally and psychologically an Oromo, I was born to ‘Amhara’
parents, who were also born in the same area and lived there all their lives.

My childhood memories are filled with colourful traditional games, plays,

songs and stories. My mother was a very good story teller, and my father was known
for his knowledge of historical narratives and traditional medicine. I learned a lot of
Oromo stories and oral traditions from my parents who constituted my primary
education at home and in our closely related community. From my boyhood memories
I would like to relate one formulaic folkloric question I was often asked by my
fellowmen/women, and which has much to do with the motivation of the present
research. It was and still is a customary practice of Oromo adults meeting a boy/girl
for the first time to ask whose son/daughter (s)he was. Thus I was often asked5:

5
This is different from the usual request to younger ones to relate their genealogy in
presence of new acquaintances, or among peer groups. (When it is two adults that meet,
rather than an adult and a young one, the question becomes, ‘How do you do?’
(Ashamaa?). And upon ensuring the person interrogated was an Oromo by way of
receiving a reciprocal response in Oromo language, Afan Oromo, this shall be followed
by, ‘Which village/locality are you from?’ (Isiin wara eesaati?).

20
 “Whose son are you?” (Gurbaa, ati kan eenyuuti?).
“I am Alemu’s son” (Ilma Alamuuti).
“Whose (son) is Alemu?” (Alamuu enyuu?).
“Alemu Fanta.” (Alamuu Faantaa)
“Whose is Fanta?” (Faantaa eynuu?).
“Fanta Mitiku” (Faantaa Mitikuu).
“Whose is Mitiku?” (Mitikuu enyuu?).

This goes on until the enquirer is satisfied, or as far as the enquired is able to provide
the appropriate answer. Then follows another set of questions, depending upon the
answers given for the first ones; that means, if the enquirer is satisfied with the
answers given to his/her questions about the name of the boy/girl and his/her father.
Here it is of interest to point out what Dundes has clearly indicated in explaining the
‘identification of strangers,’ with respect to Jews in Euro-American society, exactly
applies to the Oromo: “….it is not always easy to determine such identity from
physical appearance alone” (1983: 256). The inadequacy of physical appearance can
be extended to the inadequacy of language; in this case, one cannot easily tell whether
or not an individual is an Oromo, or to immediately establish solidarity upon first
meeting by only considering that (s)he speaks Oromo language. Speaking the language
is irrelevant, rather unimportant, when it comes to construction, articulation and (re-
)affirmation of local identity. It is rather displaying some locally recognized identity
symbols such as naming locally known personalities, places, events, etc., or
performing popular oral arts, be it an historical narrative, folktale, joke, song, or dance
that is important.

Such type of questions usually caused me irritation for a reason I could not tell
then. I often gave rather a vague answer: “I am a son of a human being” (Ilma
namaati). It might have simply been for the repetitive, monotonous nature of the
question, or due to my ignorance of what exactly was the motive behind the question.
It might have also been because of my detection of some sort of disappointment or

21
disinterestedness in the face/tone of the person when he/she learned that I belonged to
an ‘Amhara’ parent, which was only implied by my father’s and grandfathers’ names,
Alemu Fanta Mitiku. Today, I think it must have to do with the latter, which I did not
realize until I graduated from university and had an idea about what there is in a name
and place/locality, and how these serve as identity markers on the bases of which
people either establish solidarity and intimately interact with each other, or close their
doors to each other (i.e., to those who do not belong to their sub-ethnic group).

What has this recollection of my childhood experience got to do with the

motivating factors of the research at hand? Before attempting to answer this question,
let me add one more episode of my childhood memories.

I remember one young man by the name of Negera Jaleta from the Lage qebele
in Abe Dongoro woreda, the district where I was born and brought up. Negera was
said to have been a high school student in Neqemte, the capital of the former Wollega
Province. The Haile Selassie I Senior Secondary School of Neqemte was the only
secondary school in Wollega province until 1966 E.C. Students completing junior
secondary education in the six districts of the province had to come to Neqemte for
their senior secondary education. Neqemte was then the meeting ground of
competitive students from the six different districts (and local Oromo groupings):
Horo, Gimbi, Nejo, Arjo, Qelem, and Neqemte itself. At one point Negera had come
back from Neqemte, not from school but from jail, after some years of imprisonment
for murdering a class mate from Gimbi. He was the subject of talk in our village and
especially among the elders: “Having murdered a Gimbi boy, Negera came back home
from Neqemte, quitting his schooling. The Gimbi are the enemies of us, the Horo.”

I still see the then Negera’s looks - a very serious, stern face with dark-brown
skin, thick eye brows, and wearing long hair – before me, but cannot explain why this
incident stuck in my mind. Why did the elders in my village label the Gimbi
categorically as our enemies, regardless of the guilt that Negera may have carried for
the murder? The general question then arises on what the possible explanations are for

22
the self-perceived differences and enmity between the two sub-Oromo groups of the
same regional Oromo groupings-the Gimbi and the Horro. These questions, added
with my childhood recollection of the questions I was often asked about the identity
and place of my parents, have always been hovering over my mind, a puzzle that was
part of the motivation to the present study and remained unsolved until the completion
of the project.

Similar questions came up during my experience in the Jimma Teachers’

College. This institution, formerly a Teacher Training Institute (TTI), was officially
inaugurated as a college of the Regional State of Oromia in 1996 with the objective of
training teachers for elementary and junior secondary schools in the region. As the
college was the first to be launched as a regional college of Oromia, almost all of the
instructors as well as the trainees were native Oromo or at least speakers of the
language, recruited from the various schools in the region. There were some sixty
instructors in different departments. As I became aware later on, the instructors,
including myself, came from different zones of Oromia: East and West Hararghe,
Shoa, East and West Wollega, Arsi, Bale, Illu Abba Bor, and Jimma. Not surprisingly,
the original places of the instructors, and the trainees as well, subsequently became
important grounds on which several sub-groupings were formed within the campus. It
is interesting to note here that certain boundaries were also formed between the
various sub-regional groupings within and between the instructors and trainees from
some of the administrative zones of Oromia, when there were a relatively large
number of group members. The Wollegas were sub-divided, for instance, into the
Horo, the Gimbi, the Leqa, and the Nejo. The ‘Shoans’ were sub-divided into the
Gindeberet, the Ambo, and the Bako. An outsider might not easily identify these sub-
group boundaries, as their relations seemed smooth at surface value. However, subtle
conflicts between the various groups, and favouritism and parochialism among the
management of the college were manifest behind the scene. This was expressed in
different ways. For instance, holding administrative offices and playing any

23
prestigious role in the academic and social activities in the campus was possible only
for those who claimed to belong or identified themselves with the sub-regional group
in management positions of the college.

In the present-day political arena of Ethiopia in general and Oromia in

particular, being Oromo alone is not enough to be treated like Oromo by other Oromo.
My own experience in the Jimma Teacher’s Training College illustrates the point. As
indicated above, the various sub-regional Oromo groupings in the college not only had
rival relationships, similar to that of the relationships between the formerly Neqemte
Haile Selassie I Senior Secondary School students, but also tended to label each other
as belonging to other ethnic groups than Oromo. For instance, the Jimma Oromo
usually considered their counterparts from Shoa as ‘Gurage’ (a Semitic-speaking
ethnic group). Similarly, the Wollega Oromo considered the Hararghe Oromo as
‘Somali’.

These things were always puzzling to me and induced several questions about
the possible explanation for the parochialism and favouritism among and within the
same ethnic group, and about the how and why of the formation, expression and
manipulation of the various local identities. It can also be asked whether the people
think that differences between the Wollega, the Shoa, the Gibe, and the Ilu Abba Bor
and the other sub-regional Oromo groupings are real or imagined. These questions
were important inspiring points of the research project.

The focus of this study is therefore on local forms and self-reflective narratives
of local identity among the southwestern Oromo (the Macha). The aim is to understand
the formations and expressions of collective self-understandings and self-perceived
differences from others within and outside of the south-western Oromo groupings.
Based on my field experiences, on the acquaintance with available literature and
debates on the Macha Oromo, and on the ethnographically informed investigation of
folklore discourses, this study aims at examining self-perceived notions of ethnicity

24
and local identity among the above-mentioned four local groups of the south-western
Oromo of Ethiopia.

The underlying assumption is the dynamism of culture and the reflexive process
and reciprocal relationship between folklore and its social and material settings.
Systematic knowledge of such an integral and vital part of culture can not only
advance cross-cultural comparative understanding of the nature and function of
folklore in everyday life of social collectives, but also contribute to scientific and
practical understanding of the dynamics of multi-ethnicity, group formation, and
conflict in largely non-literate societies. As Wilson said: “The study of folklore is
centrally and crucially important in our attempts to understand our behaviour and that
of our fellow human beings” (cited by Georges and Owens 1995: 23).

Another core assumption behind this study is that, from the internal perspective
of a member of any subgroup, people recognize and express multiple local boundaries
differentiating their own group from those of ‘Others’, both within and outside the
Macha. For instance, the Wollega and the Gibe are demarcated from each other by
self-perceived differences in dialect variation, religious affiliation, subsistence
activities, musical traditions and dance styles, food ways, initiation rites, dress, and
even leisure activities. The processes of differentiation have given rise to intensified
feelings of competitiveness and rivalry, which are time and again manifested in the
folklore discourses of each group. This is observable in the much-politicized
environment of intra- and inter-ethnic relations in present-day ethno-federal Ethiopia,
where the cultivation and emphasis of ethnic identity and in-group consciousness have
become pervasive.

Research questions

The study attempts to answer the following central questions:

25
1. How and on what basis do members of selected Oromo local groups construct and
express their sense of self-identification and differentiation from members of other
groups within and outside of the Macha Oromo?

2. What are the contexts and situations that occasion and shape Oromo discursive
constructions and negotiations of collective self-understandings and positionings
within the surrounding social world?

3. How do the undercurrent folkloric discourses of each Oromo group construct,

reconstruct, and symbolize the intra- and inter-ethnic relations of Oromo in the
present-day Ethiopian ethno-federal state structure?

Scope of the study

The main methodological concern of the research was to identify, document,

describe and do sub-group oriented (cross-group) comparison of folklore of the Macha
Oromo, so as to reveal similarities and explaining variations in local cultural traditions
as they relate to self-perceived notions of group identity. The emphasis on comparison
was necessitated by the nature of ethnic folklore itself, in which each group defines its
own identity, its ‘group-ness’, its worldview, ethos, experiences, etc., in relational
terms based on the comparison of skills, values, physical and moral traits of itself and
‘others’ (cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1983; Oring 1986; Görög 1992; Georges and
Owens 1995). This study also takes its cue from the multidisciplinary interest in
narrative as a shared discursive resource and vehicle for enacting self-identification
with a group and differentiation from others.

In the course of the field research, verbal and performative folklore currently
performed among the south-western Oromo local groups were collected, transcribed,
translated into English and analyzed within their social and cultural contexts. Though
the southwestern Oromo consist of four major sub-regional groups (see above) each of
which comprises a large number of local groups, the study was limited only to four

26
selected local groups within two administrative zones of the present-day Oromia.
These are the Jimma and Gera of Jimma zone, and the Leqa Neqemte and Sibu Sire of
the Eastern Wollega zone. They have a long history and experiences of
interrelationships, shared culture, language, religion, coterminous geography, and
more or less similar living conditions. This is why their contemporary identity
narratives make interesting cases for an empirical understanding of the dynamism,
pragmatism, situational, relational and creative construction and articulation of local
identities and perceived differences within and outside of the larger ethno-regional
boundary.

The data consist of a large number of oral narratives, of which selected samples
were analyzed and interpreted here, based on their articulatedness and clarity. As noted
by Hinchman & Hinchman (2001), an investigation of a given people’s conception of
the self and others should pay heed to their narratives: “…our notion of who we are as
individuals is shaped by the stories we tell to make sense of the raw materials of our
lives. Since personal narratives heavily influence behavior, it is not a matter of
indifference to us what narratives of other people construct, or how well these
narratives accord with our own…. Narration, as the unity of story, storyteller,
audience, and protagonist is what constitutes the community, its activities, and its
coherence in the first place” (2001: 120). It is in and through their narrative
productions that people, notably in oral societies, make sense of their selves, their
experiences and their relations to the world in which they live. In line with this, I put
much emphasis on the social and cultural contexts of narrative performance, but allow
for individual variety and creativeness. Georges & Jones noted that: “…one cannot
characterize and analyze folklore as examples of expressive forms/genres without
considering the human and cultural identities of the individuals who are the sources of
the folklore examples selected to illustrate those forms/genres. Similarly, one cannot
characterize and analyze a society’s/social group’s folklore without discussing what

27
forms its people’s expressiveness takes and how it manifests itself in the behaviors of
individual group members” (1995: 321-322).

Significance of the study

As to the scientific significance of this study, it is hoped that I elucidate the interactive
rhetorical and interpretive processes, the discursive resources and strategies, the
situational and wider contexts that constitute and shape the emergent construction and
negotiation of each group’s identity claims. By so doing, the study aims to contribute
not only to Macha Oromo ethnography and to unexplored domains of their folklore,
but also to the scientific and practical understanding of the processes and strategies of
discursive construction and negotiation of shared senses of local group identity and
difference in largely oral societies. Insights from the research can be useful to increase
our understanding of the dynamics of culture, the processes of cultural creativity and
innovation, and the importance as well as impact of the diversity of tradition in a wider
sense.

The research project has yielded new empirical data about local foci of
competitive identity and on the self-reflective, expressive culture of a region. The
ethnography may serve as a basis for further cross-cultural comparative research in the
field of sociology, anthropology, and folklore, as well as assist the understanding and
enhancing of conditions of peaceful coexistence, national integration and political
stability in a multiethnic state.

I am aware of the fact that this study may also bear relation to a field of
political polemics in Ethiopia, a country ridden by ethnicized discourse. Issues of the
relative weight and power of ethnic groups, of discrimination, etc. are at stake, of
which I, however, aim to steer away. Nevertheless, political-discursive dimensions are
always involved. In his article entitled “The Multi-Dimensionality of Oromo Identity,”
Georg Haneke has suggested two alternatives as possible ways out of ‘the permanent

28
discrimination’ of being Oromo in Ethiopia: “…firstly, consciousness of belonging to
a discriminated group can lead to a strong self-identity in opposition to the ruling elite
or ethnicity. Secondly, Oromo people try to become integrated into a Greater Ethiopia
and wish to be accepted as equal members of a greater unit” (2002: 136). Haneke has
also indicated that there is a third alternative; i.e. following both of the other two
directions, or faking dual identity at the same time. This is said to have been
experimented or resorted to mostly by educated Oromo elites; hence the popular self-
reporting: “At daytime we are Ethiopians, at night we are Oromo.”

Though the issue of ‘permanent discrimination’ of being Oromo is a discursive

construct subject to academic debate rather than an ‘historical fact’ as often taken for
granted and propagated by some Oromo nationalists, the suggested solutions and their
respective value deserve serious consideration. To begin with, the third alternative, of
performing dual identity, is difficult to appreciate and may not even be worth
mentioning in a serious academic work, as it is self-defying. As the saying goes, ‘You
cannot eat your cake and have it at the same time.’ It is public knowledge that those
‘educated’ elites of any ethnic background who have taken such an opportunistic
positions in the last two oppressive regimes of Ethiopia have neither succeeded in
playing both sides nor won recognition of and respect from both the Oromo (or other
groups) and the larger Ethiopian citizenship about which they complain as having been
imposed on them.

As to the first alternative, forming an antagonistic group identity, this is

easier said than done; that is at least what we have seen from the past experience
of the various Oromo opposition parties and liberation fronts, among which the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has long been the major one. At this juncture it is
to be noted that the struggle of Oromo nationalism led by OLF of the last thirty or
more years failed to achieve its goals. Without going into detail, many factors may
be accountable for this. However, it is my contention that the main reason is the
inability of both this elite-led liberation front and its grand objectives of Oromo

29
nationalism to mobilize the diversified and widely dispersed Oromo masses for the
cause of winning independence from ‘Abyssinian colonialism’ and building one
nation state of Oromia. In fact, this was recently admitted, at least indirectly, by
the leadership of the liberation front itself. In an article entitled, “The Need for
Oromo Unity under Bilisummaa, and Shane’s Detrimental moves to Oromo
Liberation”, released ‘by an Objective-Setting Committee for the Independence of
Oromo’, known as Tumsa Kaayyoo Bilisummaa Oromoo (TKBO), in November
2005, we find the following paragraph:

…in their struggle against the Abyssinian occupation, the Oromo leaders
did not make enough effort to co-ordinate their forces and stand in union
against the Abyssinian armies, which were more trained and well-armed
with relatively modern weapons. Besides the superiority of the Abyssinian
fire arms, this lack of collective action was one of the reasons for the
Oromo defeat. The Oromo people have never stopped resisting against the
oppressive rules of different Ethiopian regimes. However, their resistances
were fragmented and were never centrally led up until the formation of the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1973. As a result, they could not free
themselves from the Abyssinian colonial rule (emphasis added, TKBO
2005: 1).

Whether or not the problem of lack of unity on the part of the wider Oromo people
was solved by the formation of OLF, the struggle for Oromo independence has not
been gaining enough steam in the last 25 years. As noted by Baxter (1994), Haneke
(2002), and Schlee (2001), among others, the notion of an ‘imagined Oromo
community’ based on the myth of common descent, history, language, territory and a
traditional system of age grade structuring (gada), is more of an ideological and
discursive construct than a socio-historical reality. Therefore, if the common good of
the Oromo and the larger Ethiopian people - with whom they share many historical
features, common values, ideals, and interests - is to be realized, the second suggested
solution - Oromo people try to become integrated into Ethiopia and be accepted as

30
equal members of that greater unit - should perhaps be paid more attention than the
other two mentioned above, as it may be the most feasible.

The results of this research project may serve to assist efforts towards building
multicultural values, interests, aspirations, and group tolerance on which the people of
Ethiopia can find a moral-political basis for interrelated, indivisible common goals,
and social harmony and human development. In this respect, the study can yield useful
results to inform decision makers and development planners at various levels about
how the changes they impose on the people might entail complex effects on their way
of life and socio-cultural institutions, their sense of identity and their patterns of
interaction.

Insights from the discussion of folklore discourses in which each group

expresses and explores its ideas about the world and its place in it can considerably
increase the understanding of the extent of group similarities vis-à-vis distinctiveness
from other groups. The findings of this study may also have relevance for educational
policies concerned with changes of attitude towards ethnic and gender prejudice, with
how the people should be approached in the attempt to bring meaningful changes in
their lives and by indicating priority areas in that respect.

31
Chapter 2
Ethnicity and local identity in folklore: historical overview and
theoretical orientation

Introduction

Some interconnected concepts in this study need clarification from the outset: ethnicity
(ethnic identity), ethnic group, folklore, and regional/local identity. In this chapter, a
working definition of these key concepts will be given, set against a brief history of the
study of ethnicity, local identity and folklore by way of providing a framework for
understanding these issues with reference to the south-western Oromo of Ethiopia.

Ethnicity

While the notion of ethnicity has long been a subject of cultural studies, the
intellectual history of the term itself is relatively short; the conceptualization of
ethnicity as a separate and independent field of enquiry in the social sciences was only
validated since the late 1960s (see Bendix & Roodenburg 2000; Sokolovski & Tishkov
1996; Govers & Vermeulen 1994). No agreement was reached at among scholars as to
the precise definition of the term itself. Sokolovski & Tishkov (1996) noted that there
was little mention of the term ‘ethnicity’ in anthropological literature, and textbooks
contained no definitions of the term prior to the 1970s. Among the various definitions
of ethnicity, the earlier ones forwarded by DeVos (1975) and Burgess (1978), and the
later one by Eriksen (2000) are representative of most definitions offered since the
mid-1970s and thus worth mentioning here. DeVos defined ethnicity as: “… the
subjective symbolic or emblematic use of any aspect of culture [by a group], in order
to differentiate themselves from other groups” (1975: 16). For Burgess, ethnicity is:
“the character, quality, or condition of ethnic group membership, based on an identity

32
with and/or a consciousness of group belonging that is differentiated from others by
symbolic markers (including cultural, biological, or territorial), and is rooted in bonds
to a shared past and perceived ethnic interests” (1978: 270). Similarly, Eriksen, citing
writers such as Barth (1969) and Cohen (1974) defines ethnicity as: “… the enduring
reproduction of categorical differences between groups whose group-ness is defined
both from within and from the outside (cited in Bendix & Roodenburg 2000: 185). In
our view these definitions can be briefly summarized in the core idea that (cf. p. 1, 3)
ethnicity is a group identity referred to in terms of a cultural interpretation of
(collective) descent. These and other definitions, though they vary considerably,
pinpoint shared cultural properties, consciousness and boundaries to be the central
feature of ethnicity (see DeVos 1995; Eriksen 2001; Young 2002). The cultural
differences may be historically real or more imagined. The point is that ethnicity is
expressed when a group of people perceives itself as culturally and historically distinct
from others and acts or is seen and treated accordingly. In this sense, two related
concepts should be clarified; these are ethnic group and ethnic identity.

Ethnic group

An ethnic group, is generally defined as “any group of people who set themselves
apart and/or are set apart by others with whom they interact or co-exist on the basis of
their perceptions of cultural differentiation and/or common descent” (Jones 1997: xiii).
In DeVos’s words, an “ethnic group is a self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in
common a set of traditions not shared by the others with whom they are in contact”
(1975: 9). In Hutchinson & Smith’s more primordialist definition, the ethnic group is
“a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical
memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with a homeland and a
sense of solidarity among at least some of its members” (1996: 6). In summarizing the
various definitions of ethnic group or ethnic community, which is referred to as ethnie
in French, Hutchinson and Smith, who are more close to a primordialist view of

33
ethnicity, emphasized that ethnic groups or ethnies exhibit six main features, though in
varying degrees (ibid: 6-7). In their ambitious list these are:

1. a common proper name, to identify and express the essence of the community;
2. a myth of common ancestry, a myth rather than a fact, a myth that includes the
idea of a common origin in time and place and that gives an ethnie a sense of
fictive kinship;
3. shared historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or
pasts, including heroes, events, and their commemoration;
4. one or more elements of common culture, which need not be specified but
normally include religion, customs, language or dialect ;
5. a link with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie,
only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land;
6. a sense of solidarity on the part of at least some sections of the ethnie’s
population.

The above mentioned elements might be recognizable in groups defined as ethnic,

although they appear in very different combinations, and as such this list is unduly
comprehensive and ambitious. Elements in this list defining an overarching ethnic or
ethno-linguistic group also apply to sub-ethnic or local groups, as for instance in the
case of the present study, to the south-western Oromo groups. Narratives of origin and
immigration, stories about common ancestors (genealogies) and the ‘good old days,’
local ‘history’ of the group, and the sense of solidarity they engender, as well as the
strong attachment to the locality (especially the ‘ancestral homeland’), appear as
important elementss in the self-definition of these groups and in the subjective
identification of individuals with the community, in our case that of the Macha
Oromo.6

In folklore studies the view is that a shared identity is expressed in the folklore
of a group. In this line of study the concept of ‘folk’ is helpful to avoid some of the

6
This, incidentally, illustrates that the primordialist view is close to local, often
‘ideological’ views of ethnic group identity.

34
pitfalls inevitable in the use of ‘ethnic group’7, because the term ‘folk’ can refer to
“any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common factor. It does not
matter what the linking factor is-it could be a common occupation, language or
religion-what is important is that a group formed for whatever reason will have some
traditions which it calls its own” (Dundes 1983: 242). However, the concept of ‘folk’
can also be problematic because of its connotattions of simplicity and quaintness,
primitive, non-literate, etc., as characterized by the writings of cultural evolutionist
like E.B. Tylor and R. Redfield (as cited in Schoemaker 1990: 4; see also Sims and
Stephen 2005: 31). Therefore, folklorists often use the more expansive generic term
‘group,’ instead of ‘folk group’. According to Dundes, the utilization of ‘folk group’
instead of ‘ethnic group’ would broaden the base of theoretical discussions of identity,
“beyond the unfortunately overly restrictive limits of ethnic group. For one thing, the
modern definition of ‘folk’ allows one to think of individuals belonging
simultaneously to many different and distinct folk groups” (ibid.). In the present study,
the term local group is used instead of ‘folk group,’ to refer to each Oromo group
within the south-western regional Oromo grouping (Macha), which claims to share
common sense of group-ness, name, a myth of common descent, historical memory,
and a sense of belonging to its particular locality and social group. This brings us to
the concept of identity in general and that of ethnic and regional/local identity in
particular.

The concept of identity is neither less important nor less difficult to define than
the concept of ethnicity. In the last two or three decades scholars working in various
disciplines within the social sciences and humanities have shown a strong interest in
questions concerning identity (Gleason 1983; Oring 1994; Jones 1997; Berger & Del
Negro 2004, and notably Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994 234), but the concept itself
remained something of an enigma. The present idea of identity, while imported from
psychology, is a recent social construct in social studies, and a complicated one despite
7
See Dorson 1970; Bauman & Paredes 1972; Oring 1986; Finnegan 1992; Dundes 1983;
and Owens and Georges 1995.

35
its popularity. Our present sense of identity came into use as a popular social science
term only in the 1950s, deriving mainly from the Swedish-American psycho-analyst
Erik Erikson’s concept of ‘identity crisis’ (Gleason 1983; Fearon 1999; Snow 2001).

In social anthropology, the concept of identity was often used in the context of
‘ethnic identity,’ to point not simply to selfsameness but to the sameness of the self
with others. In other words, the term identity was used to refer to the consciousness of
sharing certain common characteristics, for instance, a language, culture, religion,
territory, (alleged) historical memory or myths, etc., within a group. It is this
consciousness that forms a group’s identity. Accordingly, the group to which a person
belongs constitutes an important part of the social environment in which personal
identity was formed (Sokefeld 1999: 417). These two concepts were combined by
Erikson: “The term ‘identity’ expresses such a mutual relation in that it connotes both
a persistent sameness within oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some
kind of characteristics with others” (as cited in Sokefeld 1999: 417).

The word ‘identity’ as used today, thus, can be broken down into three
interrelated concepts: social identity, personal identity, and collective identity. All
three are relevant for the study of Oromo (sub) identities discussed below, in addition
to a fourth one - regional identity.

Social identities are the identities attributed to a social category or a group of

people designated by a label (labels) commonly used by the designated people
themselves, others, or by both, in an attempt to situate themselves or the others in
certain social space. Social identities are grounded in established social roles, such as
‘teacher,’ ‘mother,’ and ‘father,’ or in broader and more inclusive categories, such as
gender, ethnic and national categories, that are often referred to as ‘role identities’ and
‘categorical identities,’ respectively. Social identities, whatever their specific socio-
cultural base may be, are fundamental to social relations and interactions as they
provide points of orientation to ‘alter’ or ‘other’ as a social object (Snow 2001: 2;
Fearon 1999: 12).

36
 Personal identity, which depends upon a sense of individual continuity and
contributes to the sense of continuity itself, refers to particular mental dispositions and
character of individuals. It is composed of a set of attributes and meanings attributed to
oneself by the actor, i.e. memories, identifications, beliefs, desires, ideas, experiences
and principles of action that a person thinks distinguish him/her in socially relevant
ways. This set of attributes constitutes a discernable, as well as shifting configuration
of the individual. What underlies this configuration can be said to constitute and
distinguish a person, in Fearon’s words, “the aspects or attributes of a person that form
the basis of his or her dignity or self-respect” (1999: 11). Personal identity is, hence,
shaped from experiences that are unique to the individual as well as from those
common to a group, which makes it, in psychological parlance, ‘psychosocial’
(Erikson in Oring 1994: 212; Snow 2001: 2).

Collective identity refers to those aspects of personal identity that are derived
from those common to a collection of individuals (Oring 1994: 212). It is the
recognition of this collective aspect of personal identity that produces the deep sense
of identification with others-the consciousness of kind (Thorat, as cited in Oring, op.
cit.). The essence of collective identity resides in a shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-
ness.’ The sense of ‘one-ness’ or ‘we-ness’ underpinning collective identity is
anchored in shared attributes (imagined or real) and experiences among those who
comprise the collectivity, and at the same time expressed in relation and/or contrast to
actual or imagined sets of ‘others.’ Here what is important is that embedded within the
shared sense of ‘we’ lies a corresponding sense of ‘collective agency’ (Snow 2001;
Oring 1994; Fearon 1999). According to Snow, the action component of collective
identity suggests rather invites the possibility of collective action. Collective identity is
thus constituted by a shared as well as interactive sense of ‘we-ness’ and ‘collective
agency’ (2001: 3).

Correspondingly, regional identity is part of the self-identity of the human

being, resulting from the close ties of an individual to a geographical region, an

37
ecological-physical setting, or what the French aptly call a terroir. It clearly is less
encompassing than ethnic identity. If the concept of ‘identity’ is concerned with the
question: ‘Who am I’, then regional or local identity addresses the question: ‘Where
am I?’, or sometimes ‘Where do I come from?’ and ‘Where do I belong’ (Pohl 2001:
2). According to Pohl, regional identity may consist in different forms of intensity,
which in addition to a sense of belonging to a certain ethnic group range from: (i) a
vague sense of belonging to a particular region, (ii) a close attachment to a region, (iii)
a deliberate identification with a region, up to (iv) an active engagement for the region.
In each of these cases, areas or regions, defined emotionally or rationally, serve as an
objective, relatively stable source of orientation for the behaviour of the individual
(2001: 2-3).

The essence of regional identity, then, is the feeling of being at home or

belonging to an area at the local level, grounded in the imagined or ‘real’ regional
and/local history, in the surrounding landscape, in a special language or dialect
dominating in the region in question, or in other regionally bounded socio-cultural and
economic conditions. Regional identity can be considered as another situational part of
personal identity. It is also a strong feeling of a collective towards a region, which
sometimes leads to regionalism as a political movement, and an expression of social
cohesion produced and reproduced by the practical consciousness and actions of a
given people forming a local community. As identity develops and changes in social
interaction, rather than existing in individuals for itself, culture, tradition, landscape,
and history of the region or local community form regional/local identity and are part
of it. Accordingly, local identity may be similar to and/or a specific cultural
manifestation of ethnicity. It is thus the spatio-cultural dimension of inclusion and
exclusion within the society (ibid.).

Obviously the construction of identity at regional or local level has historical

and cultural dimensions. Historically, the concepts of regional or local identity are
closely linked to the 19th century nation building processes that took place in most

38
European countries. These nation building processes, aimed at establishing a
consensus of common identity, established a way of thinking that implicated people
living within a certain region or locality having, consciously or unconsciously, a
common historical, social and cultural background, common ideas, aspirations, notions
and values that constituted their common identity (Amundsen 2000; Pohl 2001; Cohen
1982).

In line with the theory of identity as a cultural construction, it is also relevant to

ask what the basic elements are in the constructing and articulating of identity related
not primarily to psychological factors but to spatial factors These are several; the
common denominator, however, is that the different elements usually relate to things
that are understood by the culture bearers as genuine, specific, authentic, and unique to
that particular region or locality, i.e. different from the identity of other regions or
local communities (Amundsen 2000; Cohen 1982; Pohl 2001).

Among the most common cultural elements that are relevant to the identity of the
south-western Oromo regions and the identification of individuals with the various
local communities within the regions are:

1. the economic basis, the most important economic activities in each locality;
2. the specific dialect or ‘slang’ spoken in the local community;
3. popular traditions like music, songs and dances;
4. a particular landscape or spatial quality of the region or local community;
5. a specific culture and/or history of the region or local community. In this
connection what is important is that common culture or history is a perceived
unifying element that gives the inhabitants traditional experiences and
references distinguishing them from the inhabitants of other regions or local
communities.
In any attempt to understand constructions of local identity it is important to look for
one or more of these elements to be articulated, either singularly or interrelated in one
way or another (Amundsen 2000: 7). Similarly, Cohen (1982: 2) has suggested that

39
two basic requirements should be demanded from an ‘ethnography of locality:’ “that
the communities or milieux studied should be displayed to us in their own terms; and
that the ways in which these localities articulate with, and inform us about, their ‘host’
societies should be clearly revealed” (ibid.). According to Cohen, the ‘ethnography of
locality’ refers to an account of how a group of people or a local community perceives,
experiences and expresses its difference from ‘others’, and of how their sense of
difference is incorporated into or informs the nature of their social organization,
collective action and cultural expression. The sense of difference, thus, “lies at the
heart of people’s awareness of their culture and, indeed, makes it appropriate for
ethnographers to designate as ‘cultures’ such arenas of distinctiveness” (Cohen 1982a:
2-3).

It is a widely acknowledged fact that the issue of local identity tends to be

loathed by those politicians whose agenda is nationalism and nation-building on the
basis of a presumed ‘homogeneity’ of society (Eriksen 2000; Cohen 1982a; Amundsen
2000). Eriksen made the important point that inter-ethnic variations have always been
emphasised at the expense of internal variations in the study of ethnicity. In his words,
“Internal variation is undercommunicated, and conversely, difference vis-à-vis others
is overcommunicated” (Eriksen 2000: 195).

Local communities also tend to be circumspect about formally expressing

perceptions of their distinctiveness and difference from ‘others’ to those ‘others.’
Rather they (re)construct difference in various forms of cultural and symbolic
expression. This makes the role of folklore in the construction and expression of
identity crucial. As Dundes put it, “…there should be no hesitation in having recourse
to the materials of folklore to better understand the nature of identity,” i.e. to
understand the onion-skin layering of the multiple identities of an individual (1983:
246). The role of the folklorist or the anthropologist should be to make the cultural,

40
symbolic constructions and messages of the local community intelligible to the outside
world.8

In the attempt to understand the cultural aspects of local identities among the
Macha Oromo, the perspectives provided by Cohen (1982a), with his ‘ascending and
descending levels,’ and Dundes (1983) and his idea of ‘onion-skin layers’ of identity
are useful. In his article entitled, “Belonging: the experience of culture,” Cohen
pointed out that cultural boundaries, which are not natural phenomena but social
constructs, can be drawn at various levels of society, and are either invoked or ignored
by those within them, depending upon their purpose. He notes: “I might choose to
identify myself as British, Scots, Shetlander, Whalsayman, or as belonging to some
particular kinship-neighbourhood nexus in Whalsay…. It should therefore be
recognized that ‘belonging to locality,’ far from being a parochial triviality, is very
much more of a cultural reality than is association with gross region or nation”
(1982a: 10, emphasis added. Similarly, what Dundes (1983: 243) has remarked about
‘the onion-skin layering’ and relativity of identity is significantly applicable to the way
an Oromo identifies himself/herself in varied contexts. This is the famous phenomenon
of situational identity. Thus, if an Oromo were to answer the question, ‘Who are you?’
while in Addis Ababa, s/he might say, ‘I am an Oromo.’ While in Oromia and among
Oromo-speaking group, however, s/he might not need to say so. Instead s/he might say
that s/he was from or belonged to Jimma, Illu Abba Bor, Wollega, Arssi, etc., and
while in one of these administrative zones of Oromia, s/he might indicate the specific
locality or woreda to which s/he belonged, and thus may say: ‘I am Sibu,’ or ‘I am
Leqa,’ or ‘I am Gera.’ This goes on in a descending order to smaller villages and even

8
Cohen (1982a: 8) expressed it as follows: “The anthropologist anxious to avoid the
fallacies of cultural reductionism has to distinguish between the locality’s voice to the
outside world, and its much more complicated messages to its own members. Indeed, he
must try to make the public message intelligible in terms of the private conversations-and
not the other way round. His account must therefore differ from, and seek to enlighten,
the gross simplifications of the politician, the bureaucrat, the journalist.”

41
neighbourhood. This indicates the relativity, nestedness, and social and spatio-
temporally bound nature of ethnic identity, albeit cross-cut by race and sex as
permanent components of one’s identity (see Dundes 1983: 244), in other words,
reflects the well-known segmentary nature of identity.

The point is that the examination of local identity should be made at the folk-
group level, i.e., as indicated above, among “any group of people whatsoever who
share at least one common factor,” and who have some folkloric traditions that help
the group “to have a sense of group identity” (Dundes 1983: 242).

A brief recap on theoretical approaches to ethnicity and ethnic identity

The centrality of the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic identity in the social sciences
since the late 1970s-early 1980s resulted in a proliferation of theories of ethnicity and
ethnic relations. As we saw on p. 9-10, three competing approaches emerged towards
the understanding of ethnicity, which can be categorized as primordialist,
instrumentalist, and constructivist. As the first two theoretical traditions are too well-
known to be treated here at length here, I here mainly focus on the perspective that
informs my own approach: constructivism.

Primordialsm (or essentialism) emphasizes that ethnic identification is based on so-

called ‘primordial’ attachments to a group or culture. At its most extreme, this
emphasizes that ethnicity is an innate, fundamental, essential aspect of human
existence, and it focuses on allegedly fixed cultural markers and ‘givens’ (language,
physical traits, culinary traditions, historical memories and symbols). This perspective
is neither sufficient nor explanatory, and it has few adherents in social science. But
ethnic ideologues and nationalists often resort to this perspective. For instance, in
explaining ethnic groups or peoples such as the Oromo, among whom ‘strangers’ can
be initiated (adopted) into the group without any pre-existing primordial attachment or
socio-biological relationship is it very unhelpful. The ‘instrumentalist’ view, current

42
since the late 1970s, sees ethnicity as a “…. dynamic and situational form of group
identity embedded in the organization of social behaviour and also in the institutional
fabric of society” (Jones 1997: 72). It considers claims to ethnicity to be primarily a
product of political aims, created and manipulated by group elites in their pursuit of
advantage and power. Cultural forms, values and practices of a given ethnic group
then become resources or means for the elite to mobilize members of the group in
competition for political power and economic advantage: a strongly‘utilitarian’ view
of ethnicity, which is too limited.

With roots in the ideas of sociologists such as Max Weber, Everett Hughes, and
Erving Goffman (Jenkins 2001), the constructivist view was first elaborated by F.
Barth and his colleagues. In his famous introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries
(1969), Barth, treated ethnicity “…as a continuing ascription which classifies a person
in terms of their most general and inclusive identity, presumptively determined by
origin and background…, as well as a form of social organization maintained by inter-
group boundary mechanisms, based not on possession of a cultural inventory but on
manipulation of identities and their situational character.” (ibid.: 13). This view
enables a focus on the situational, interactional and contextual aspects of ethnicity and
to understand more clearly its socio-political dimensions, “such as the ability to
structure intra- and inter-group relation and to serve as a basis for political
mobilization and social stratification” (Sokolovski & Tishkov 1996: 192). In other
words, discarding the simplistic view of ‘cultures’ as bounded entities for research,
ethnicity was conceptualized as those aspects of social relationships and processes in
which cultural difference is socially constructed and communicated (Eriksen 1991; see
also Jenkins 2001: 1-3).

With the advent of new interpretive paradigms based on postmodernism, the

constructivist approach enabled a shift to the negotiation of multiple subjects over
group boundaries and identity, stressing social processes and the practices of actors. It
de-emphasized biological conceptions of ethnicity or ‘race’ in ethnic studies. By

43
attaching more importance to the views and self-perceptions of social actors
themselves, constructivism undermined the taken-for-granted ethnocentrism of much
of social science analysis. Its stress on the relational character and situational
dependence of ethnicity also made it possible “to study ethnicity in the contexts of
different ‘levels’ and ‘contextual horizons’” (Jenkins 2001: 3; Sokolovski & Tishkov
1996: 192). The constructivist approach is thus the preferred approach to understand
the societal processes underlying ethnicity formation and local identity of the Oromo
discussed in this study. They have a multifaceted cultural tradition and ideas of descent
that they cherish, a remarkable perception of internal diversity, and maintain ‘open
boundaries’ (e.g. via the adoption process for new members), and this denies the
explanatory value of primordialism as well as mere instrumentalism in explaining their
identities.

Situating folklore

The term “folklore”, which indicates both the traditional cultural forms and the
discipline devoted to their study (Abrahams 1993), has always been entangled with
misunderstandings and negative connotations. This probably stems from the historical
legacy of the term itself, suggesting that folklorists deal with trivial and ephemeral
cultural products (Bauman 1992), and retaining the original evolutionist connotations
of ‘survivals’ from ancient and communal traditions of rural and unlettered 'folk'
(Finnegan 1992). Many scholars pleaded for eliminating it because of its antiquated
connotations and ‘inefficacy’ (Beck 1997; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1996; Bendix 1998),
but were opposed by others (Ben-Amos 1998; Oring 1998). Without entering the
debate here I choose to maintain the term, based on the definition of folklore as given
by Georges and Jones (1995) and UNESCO (1989). According to Georges and Jones
(1995: 1), the word folklore denotes:

…expressive forms, processes, and behaviours (1) that we [sic]

customarily learn, teach, and utilize or display during face-to-face

44
 interactions, and (2) that we judge to be traditional (a) because they are
based on known precedents or models, and (b) because they serve as
evidence of continuities and consistencies through time and space in
human knowledge, thought, belief, and feeling.

The UNESCO definition (as quoted by Finnegan 1992: 12) is somewhat different and
more emphasizes the community aspect and claims that folklore (or traditional and
popular culture) is:
“…the totality of tradition-based creations of a cultural community,
expressed by a group or individuals and recognized as reflecting the
expectations of a community in so far as they reflect its cultural and social
identity; its standards and values are transmitted orally, by imitation or by
other means. Its forms include, among others, language, literature, music,
dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, handicrafts, architecture and
other arts.

Despite the ongoing polemics over the necessity of eliminating the term
folklore,9 the negative connotations are now challenged by leading professional
folklorists, who stress the significance of individual creativity and dynamism of
folklore, of modern forms and urban as well as rural contexts. Moreover, as Finnegan
already noted in 1992, the modern discipline of folklore is now "established in many
countries as a highly reputable and often innovative academic subject" (Finnegan
1992: 12).

Identity and folklore

The concept of identity in folklore studies first appeared in 1971, in the title of an
essay by Richard Bauman, “Differential Identity and the Social Base of Folklore”
(Bauman 1971). But despite its growing prominence in the work of folklorists as well
as scholars in the social sciences and humanities, folklore studies were always
9
As evident in the tendency among social science scholars to replace the term/discipline
‘folklore’ by folkloristics, verbal arts, or orature.

45
implicitly concerned with identity. As Oring said (1994: 211), “Notions of identity
have been fundamental to the definition of folklore. Divers definitions, methodologies,
and theories of folklore cohere in their concern with the arts, artefacts, and artifices by
which identity is created, conceptualized, and expressed.”

The connection between the concept of identity and folklore has long been
recognized by writers in other fields of the social sciences and humanities as well
(Dundes 1983; Bauman 1972; Oring 1994), because evidently the formation of group
identities occurs via the body of folklore, symbols and other socio-cultural constructs
that they develop. Just to mention one example, DeVos (1975) noted that “…the ethnic
identity of a group consists of its subjective, symbolic, or emblematic use of any
aspect of a culture, or a perceived separate origin and continuity in order to
differentiate themselves from other groups. … Ethnic features such as language,
clothing, or food can become emblems, for they show others who one is and to what
group one’s loyalty belongs” (1975: 116).

Ethnic folklore

In the last quarter of a century a group of North American folklorists have developed a
model of ethnic folklore that assumes ethnicity as “a creative response to personal
and social problems” (Stern: ix, emphasis added). In their book Creative Ethnicity:
Symbols and Strategies of Contemporary Ethnic Life (1991), these scholars provided
examples of the ethnic creativity they observed in performances of traditional forms,
such as ceremony, festival, song, rumor, narrative, celebration, and naming practices,
among a cross-section of ethnic groups in American society. According to them, ethnic
folklore reflects “an entire range of ethnic issues, from the preservation of ethnic
communities to the formulation of ethnic identities to the development of ethnic
values” (Stern and Cicala 1991: ix-xi). They emphasized the complexity, creative
nature and multiple meanings of ethnicity, from both the perspectives of group identity

46
and individual identity. In Stern’s words, “From the individual’s point of view,
elements of ethnic lore are neither isolated and sporadic, nor unpredictable, but rather
are manifestations of the self that are expressed to meet the demands and concerns of
the individual when interacting with others. Both positive and negative forces operate
to attract and detract individuals from selecting particular identities and expressive
forms” (Stern 1977: 32).

In studying ethnic folklore, observation of performances and their contexts is

generally considered important, as performances “…provide concrete situations in
which the active, emergent, creative qualities of folklore can be dynamically
portrayed.” Stern from this concludes that ethnic folklore is always to be examined in
its social matrix, rather than abstracted from textual records” (ibid.). This idea has
been basic to the methodology underlying this study on Oromo identities.

Methodological approach

The collection and interpretation of data in this dissertation was done by adopting a
combination of approaches common to folklore and related fields of the human
sciences. This is due to the multidisciplinary nature of folklore studies, which shares
concepts and methods with these other disciplines (mainly history and anthropology).

The issue of research being the folklore expressions of the Oromo, and the very
term being a compound of “folk” and “lore” suggest the importance of resorting to
multi-perspective approaches. ‘Folk’ underscores the sociological aspects, while the
second term relates to the expressive dimensions of culture in which the folklore
tradition endures. Using folk intimates that such a tradition exists within a describable
social unit, a specifiable collectivity that has some notions of its group-ness and shared
cognitive constructs (cf. Dundes 1983; Abrahams 1983; Buchan 1992; Finnegan 1992;
Georges & Owens 1995).

47
 To understand the dynamic processes and interactive relationships between
folklore and its socio-cultural and physical environment, and, specifically, the role
they play in the negotiation and articulation of group identity requires a combination
of ethnographic and sociological approaches, which differ somewhat in emphasis but
are complementary.

The ethnographic approach underscores how folklore operates within a specific

behaviour and performance system. Detailed observation and description of traditional
expressive acts of narration, of communicative events, and of processes and systems in
which a sense of communal identity (group-ness) is created are the stuff of
ethnographic inquiry. The basic frame of reference here, and the unit of description
and analysis, is the communicative event - the performance process. This includes the
physical setting, participants’ identities and roles, cultural ground rules for
performance, norms of interaction and interpretation, and the sequences of actions that
make up the conventional scenario of the event itself (cf. Bauman 1983; Abrahams
1992).

To fully comprehend the significance and function of folkloric phenomena they

should be viewed “as situated in a web of interrelationships”, and in terms of the
individual, social, cultural and political factors that give it shape, meaning and
existence (Bauman 1983: 362). In the research it was also tried to approach each of the
Oromo local groups in terms of their own context and their own particular body of
folklore. As folklore embodies stereotypes both of others and of self (Bauman 1983), I
paid close attention to the ways in which one local group depicted itself and reacted to
others’ depictions of it. By setting these off against the ‘counter-stereotypes’ that the
group had of those who imposed the stereotypes, a better understanding of the inter-
group dynamics within the south-western Oromo can be attained.

Taking into account this social basis and embedding of folklore phenomena as
well as heeding the relational dynamics of labelling and mutual positioning of groups
constitute the sociological concern of the study.

48
 In the research endeavour it was also tried to work towards reflexive
ethnographic description, rather than giving a ‘reportage’ account of the research
experience (see chapter 5). This entailed an attempt to integrate, or rather confront, the
local perspectives (cultural interpretations) of the informants with the theoretical
interpretation of the researcher (cf. Alvesson 2002: 71). This is especially relevant in
view of the researcher’s relationship with the area and the people studied (see chapter
1.3). Folklorists have long emphasized the value of considering local perspectives and
contextual approaches. And, as Bauman aptly noted, “... trained folklorists who are
themselves members of the groups whose folklore they study, can perform a valuable
service by elucidating the cultural meaning of materials gathered from those groups”
(1983: 363). In its role as an identity-forming lexicon of symbols culture, as enacted
in folkloric expressions, thus contributes to the discursive construction of local identity
(cf. Hóppal 1992: 146).

Both the ethnographic and sociological aspects of folklore require the

researcher to look closely at the performance settings and their context. Enactment and
content features refer to the process and structure of daily life of the groups, and reflect
ways in which social problems and trouble spots are named, projected, and played
upon (cf. Abrahams 1983).

To summarize, the methodological concern of this research was a) to identify,

document, describe the folklore, especially oral narratives, of the Macha Oromo
groups, and b) to and do sub-group comparison so as to reveal similarities and
variations in local discourses as they relate to self-perceived notions of group identity.
Comparison was called for due to each group defining its own identity, its group-ness,
its worldview, ethos, experiences, etc., in relational terms, based on their own
comparison and interpretation of selected local history, life experiences, ethics and
moral values of itself and others (cf. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1983; Oring 1986; Georges
& Owens 1995). The comparisons are therefore not cross-cultural but ‘intra-cultural’,
based on a wider regional-cultural unit.

49
Fieldwork and methods

The fieldwork for this study was intermittently conducted in Jimma, East Wollega, Illu
Abba Bor and West Shoa from September 2006 to April 2007. During my residence
in the research area, I collected a total of 54 cassettes/ 60 minutes of audio data in
Oromo language, and a large body of video and photographic data. The audio data
were all digitized, and selectively transcribed and translated into English. The process
and strategies of my fieldwork are described and constituted part of the data analysis
of the study (see chapter 5, 6, 7). The specific methods and instruments employed for
gathering folklore and ethnographic data include the following.

Participant observation: this provided the researcher with an optimal ‘learning

situation’ about the interrelationships between folklore discourses and daily life of
social collectives. The necessary data were collected by involvement and participation
in cultural performances and live events, such as storytelling sessions, life cycle
events, religious and social festivals, rituals and other formal and informal
communicative events.

Focus group discussions were held with key informants. This technique helped
to learn about commonly shared values, experiences, norms, and attitudes towards
others and self. They were also helpful to obtain information about the system of
symbolic communication that governs both the production, transmission and
interpretation of the various expressive forms from the actors’ point of view (i.e.,
socially constructed cognitive models).

Interviews, both formal and informal, were conducted with key informants and
a variety of locally recognised people, administrators and officials.

Life history collection (personal narratives and experiences) on important

narrators was also done.

50
In addition to note taking, tape recorder, and photo camera, a video camera was used
in data gathering. Using video allowed extensive, in-depth documentation of situations
and cultural performances. The video equipment was also of great help in establishing
rapport with informants, as a relaxed atmosphere minimized the potentially distracting
and intimidating effects of the presence of the researcher and the data collecting
process in general. Playing previously recorded video tapes of other people engaged in
similar activities was an important ice-breaker and proved an effective way of
prompting informants into narrative performances.

51
Chapter 3

The Oromo of Ethiopia: a socio-historical overview

Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the Oromo people in Ethiopia and their spatial
distribution, historical role and group composition. I aim, first, to present a more or
less comprehensive and authoritative overview of the existing Oromo (sub)groups.
Secondly, I will comment on some of the major socio-historical factors and dynamics
that underlie the current state of the Oromo in general and the south-western Oromo
groupings in particular, with reference to the wider multi-ethnic Ethiopian context.

The Oromo are the largest as well as the most widely dispersed single ethnic
group, or rather people, of Ethiopia, and also one of the largest Cushitic-speaking
peoples inhabiting the Horn of Africa. They are divided into numerous (sub-) regional
and local groupings. The Oromo range from the Tigray region in the north to the
region of the Tana River in northern Kenya in the south, and from Somalia in the east
to the Sudan border in the west.

According to the 2007 national census of Ethiopia (the last one held), the total
population of the Oromo in Ethiopia was 25,363,756, which constituted 34.4 per cent
of the then 73.8 million total population of Ethiopia. The total population of the
Oromia Regional State was 26,993,933, of which the Oromo constituted 23,708,767.
The Oromia State, which is an ethnic-based state in Ethiopia since 1992, occupies an
area of 353,006 km2, with 88.7% of the population being rural and engaged in mixed
farming. The major other ethnic groups in the Oromia state are, besides the Oromo:
Amhara (7.22%) and Gurage (0.93%), with others making up 4%. The religious
adherence in Oromia is: Muslims (47.5%), Orthodox Christians (30.5%), Protestants

52
(17.7%), followers of traditional religions (3.3%), and other religious groups (1.1%)
(CSA 2010: 73-80).

Origins and dispersal

It is often supposed that the Oromo originally constituted a homogeneous society in

the south-eastern part of the present Ethiopia – as Haberland said, in "the cool
highland in the region of Bali" (1963: 2), or as Braukämper said, in "the highland area
between the Darassa country and the upper Dawa in the west and the Ganale valley in
the east" (Braukämper 1980: 35). The Oromo are said to have initially been a society
of egalitarian, age-graded and mobile pastoralists with a mixed cattle-breeding and
grain-growing economy and a traditional belief system. According to Mohammed
Hassen, the Oromo tribes in the highlands of Bale and the valley of River Ganale
might have shared a common culture and language, "government" and institutions
such as the gada and the qallu, governing the totality of their existence (Mohammed
1990: 4). The gada is a system of social organization based on generation-sets and
age-sets as well as an egalitarian administrative system, whereby a nine-member
presidium assuming the leadership are elected on the basis of adult male suffrage, and
who serve a fixed term of eight years as representatives of the age-class of middle-
aged males. The qallu is the high priest and spiritual leader in Oromo traditional
religion.

The above authors (or anyone for that matter) have no way of knowing the
exact nature of an ‘original’ Oromo society, and made hypothetic evolutionary
constructions. Their story continues by suggesting that during their expansion, the
Oromo experienced considerable changes as a result of adaptation to and interaction
with varied cultural groups and ecological conditions into which they came to settle

53
and cope with for survival.1 This may be the case, but we do not know what exactly
this primeval Oromo society was, and what groups changed and which ones did not,
and how. Certainly most of the various Oromo groupings speak mutually intelligible
dialects of a single East-Cushitic language, Afaan Oromo, and more or less share core
elements of a common culture and feelings of difference towards other ethnic groups
in the country. Also, in the last four hundred or more years, the Oromo have
proliferated into a vast number of named (sub-) tribal and/or regional groupings that
exhibit a remarkable diversity in their mythical beliefs of descent, historical memory,
style of life, religious belief systems, and local socio-political organization. This went
to the extent that each developed its own ethnic consciousness and distinctive local
identity (Schlee 2002; Haneke 2002; Levine 1974; Braukämper 1980; Hultin 1987).
The notes on the changes, branchings, etc. of Oromo society as presented here must,
however, be read with caution; while much can be reconstructed from sources (e.g.,
the 16th-century report by Bahrey) they also reflect the contemporary self-presentation
by Oromo groups.

The traditional institutions such as the gada system and the qallu present in the
sixteenth century were known to have entered a decline among most of the groups
prior to the nineteenth century. Among the northern and south-western Oromo, for
instance, several monarchic states were formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth
century. These were the Yajju and the Warra-Himanu dynasties in Wollo, the five
Gibe states of Jimma, Gomma, Guma, Gera, and Limmu-Ennariya, the Leqa Naqamte
state of Wallaga, and the small state of Gama-Mora in Guduru, in Eastern Wallaga. In
these areas, the gada and the qallu institutions have long been forgotten. Nearly all of

1
The Oromo expansion over vast areas of Ethiopia and adjacent countries during the
sixteenth century is generally considered to be one of the most remarkable in history. For
instance, Asmarom Legesse suggested that it was one of the great expansions in history,
"comparable in magnitude to the conquests of the Fulani of West Africa and the Nguni of
southern Africa" (Asmarom 1973: 7-8). Similarly, Tellez said that the eruption of the
Oromo into Ethiopia "…was like an inundation from a mighty river, which swelling over
all the plain, spares nothing that stands in its way, but bears down all it meets…." (Tellez
1710: 65).

54
my informants in Jimma and Eastern Wollega area confessed that they knew little
about these institutions and rarely heard their fathers discussing anything about them.

Differentiation and the idea of unity

Several factors must have contributed to the differentiation of the Oromo in general
and the decline of the gada system, along with other customs associated with it, and
the formation of the monarchical system among the northern and south-western
Oromo in particular. Among these, the major ones are the dispersion of the people
over vast territories and varied ecological and cultural areas with little means of
communication, the transformations most of them underwent in their new settlement
areas from a traditional nomadic-pastoral mode of life to sedentary mixed agriculture,
the introduction and expansion of trade and the class differentiations that resulted (cf.
Lewis 1964; Bahru 2001; Mohammed 1990). To these should be added the changes
they underwent in their belief systems, from the traditional belief in Waaq to Islam and
Christianity,2 their frequent intermarriage, intermixture and assimilation with members
of other ethno-linguistic groups of Ethiopia and with whom a clear territorial and/or
cultural boundary can now hardly be drawn. There were also the protracted internal
wars that brought about social stratification within and among the various Oromo-
speaking groupings - resulting from an accumulation of wealth and power in the hands
of war-lords (Abba Dula) - and culminating in the incorporation of the Oromo to the
Ethiopian state in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The decline of traditional
institutions was further intensified by the 'national oppression,' i.e., the social, cultural
and political suppression felt by the majority of Oromo, together with a large number
of other ethno-linguistic groups in the multi-ethnic Ethiopian state, following their
political incorporation since the 1880s (Keller 1995: 624).
2
In this connection it is interesting to note that the Christianization of some Oromo
groups was begun as early as the mid-seventeenth century. Job Ludolph indicated, citing
Tellezius (1660), that thousands of the Oromo had been converted to Christianity and
were baptised under King Fasiladas (r. 1632-1667) (Ludolph 1681: 85).

55
 It follows that despite the commonly shared language and cultural values, there
was no a strong pan-Oromo identity. Nevertheless, Oromo nationalist aspirations that
have been on the move at least since the early 1960s, specifically since the
establishment of the Macha-Tulama Self-help Association (MTA) in 1963,
emphasized imagined pan-Oromo identity in line with Anderson’s ‘imagined
community’ idea. The MTA made considerable attempts not only in demanding full
citizenship for the Oromo but also towards promoting an Oromo self-identity. Thus it
paved the way to the establishment of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 1973, a
group which has been engaged in armed struggle for the “right to self-determination”
of the Oromo and for an independent Oromo nation-state (Oromia). To this end, they
also tried to resuscitate the ideal of the gada system and the Oromo language as major
cultural instruments for the construction of a new collective identity.

The Oromo-speaking peoples of Ethiopia were always diverse and were not
aiming to consolidate into a unified larger state nor to establish political hegemony or
permanent dominance over parts of Ethiopia before the last quarter of the twentieth
century, despite their ability to conquer and control most parts of the country in the
sixteenth century. There was never an historic Oromo nation-state. The idea of forging
unity among the Oromo-speaking people is a recent one, and in this emerging ethno-
political quest the ‘diversity’ of the people has been considered a major hindrance to
achieve the objectives of the OLF secessionist insurgent movement. In addition, the
movment, formed in 1975, had a lack of international and popular support, and of a
unifying or all-inclusive mythical and ideological foundation that could serve as the
bases for the imagined independent and modern Oromo nation-state (Keller 1995: 632;
see also, Merera 2006: 125; and Van Heur (2004: 41). The very idea of an exclusive
ethno-political unity may also stand in stark contradiction with the historical and deep-
rooted cultural openness and flexibility of the Oromo to absorb as well as intermix
with other ethno-linguistic groups.

56
Map 2. Administrative regions and zones of Ethiopia

Source: UN OCHA-Ethiopia IMU 2005, at http://unocha.org

57
 Present-day Oromia,3 one of the nine post-1991 regional states of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,4 is a new unit made possible within the ethnic-based
federal framework that emerged when the Dergue regime of the former President
Mengistu Hailemariam was overthrown and replaced by the EPRDF/TPLF-led
Transitional Government of Ethiopia in May 1991. The very name "Oromia" 5 was
non-existent until its presentation in the first political program of OLF, issued in 1976
(as cited by van Heur 2004: 114).

The political disunity and fragmented identity of the Oromo has more or less
been noted by a large number of scholars, Westerners and Ethiopians alike, including
some of the leading Oromo nationalists (see for example, Abir 1968; Levine 1974;
Hultin 1987; Schlee 2001; Merera 2003; Asafa and Schaffer 2007). For instance, the
opening paragraph of one recent article co-authored by Asafa Jalata and Harwood
Schaffer pinpoints that the Oromo struggle for self-determination in the early twenty-
first century has been hampered by, among others, the fragmented identity of the
Oromo in general and the political leadership of OLF in particular, expressed in the
usual "triumph of the particular, be it local, regional, religious, or partisan, over a
sense of Oromo peoplehood", and the tendency of the leadership towards centralism
with few democratic links to the large mass of Oromo speakers (2007: 80-81). The
Oromo scholar and ex-Ethiopian President Negaso Gidada made a similar remark:
"…One endemic difficulty is internal disunity of the Oromo which contributes of [sic]
the continuation of oppression and exploitation." (2001: xi).

3
The national regional state of Oromia was instituted in 1992, as per the FDRE
Proclamation No. 7/1992, which was issued to establish ‘national regional governments’
(in Amh.: killiloch) in the country.
4
There are also two Administrative Councils for the cities of Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa.
5
It is interesting to note the derivative basis of the name Oromia, which is partly evident
in the sound-parallelism with the historical names of Ethiopia and Abyssinia. Besides, it
may have also been adapted from the name "Ormania" that had been proposed by the
German missionary J.L. Krapf in 1843 for "the [Oromo] nation and its territory"(as cited
by Charles T. Beke 1845: 96).

58
 American Ethiopianist Donald Levine on his part has argued that the Oromo do
not even constitute a nation by any measure of the term. "If by nation one means a
sizable group of people who have some sense of belonging to a single societal
community by virtue of sharing important past experiences and a common historic
destiny, then the [Oromo] do not constitute a nation, nor have they since their
appearance as significant actors in the arena of Greater Ethiopia during the sixteenth
century" (1974: 135). Haneke also argues that the OLF-led struggle for independent
Oromo nation-state cannot be successful mainly due to the multi-dimensionality of the
Oromo identity: "…a common identity acknowledged by all Oromo in general does
not exist.” One proof that sub-ethnicity-based identities are more important than the
idea of being Oromo is the number of clashes between these sub-groups (Haneke
2002: 144). With regard to this, Merera Gudina has made the following critical
observation:

… neither geography nor demography appears to support their [Oromo

nationalists] argument. While the task of boundary creation was made far
easier for Eritreans by the Italian occupation, how are Oromo nationalists
to draw a clear boundary, either territorial or cultural, between Oromo
and non-Oromo in Ethiopia? To be sure, Oromo constitute the single
largest ethnic group in the country and they extend across the heart of
Ethiopia, from east to west and north to south. But the logic of the
country's largest ethnic group fighting for separation from numerically
lesser groups seem to escape the bulk of the Oromo population, who do
not consider it a cause worth dying for. … Furthermore, if the question
of independent statehood is going to become a reality, how is one to
decide who is an Oromo and who is not? (Merera 2003: 125-126,
emphasis added).
It goes without saying that the history of the Oromo is a history of internal and
external conflicts and wars re-constructed and interpreted in the light of present-day
perspectives and concerns. Oromo oral traditions abound with symbolic identifications
and definitions of the ‘onion-skinned layers’ of genealogical and spatial divisions
within the society, as well as with narrative accounts and interpretations of pivotal
events and exploits of outstanding figures (local heroes) of the various Oromo groups

59
in battles against each other. This disunity and lack of an all-inclusive unifying
ideology has been assumed to have hindered the Oromo elite from consolidating the
various Oromo-speaking groups into a united large polity (though there were smaller
Oromo kingdoms in the southwest and north) prior to the Ethiopian reunification of
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The same is attributed to the thus far limited
achievements of the OLF-led armed struggle for self-determination and an
independent Oromo nation state. However, there has been little attempt, if any, so far
to explain the factors behind these social phenomena. Why is it that the Oromo have
developed such a strong tendency of warring not only against non-Oromo but also
against Oromo 'enemies'? What were the sources of tensions, conflicts and rivalries
that often led to internal clashes and wars, not to mention the external ones? These
questions constitute interesting research problems for social scientists and historians to
deal with, but my intention here is not to venture on such an ambitious project. This is
beyond the scope of my study. My attempt here will be limited to outlining some of
the important socio-historical and cultural factors that seem worth considering for
understanding the multi-dimensionality and richness of Oromo identity and its
consequences on different aspects of their life.

Before proceeding with our discussion, I present an outline of the major (sub-)
regional Oromo groupings with their respective socio-cultural and spatial settings.
This may help the reader to understand the rest of the account, on the discursive
constructions and articulations of shared sense of local identities and differences from
others within the south-western Oromo-speaking groupings. To be noted at the outset,
however, is that there is an extensive overlap in the groupings and the territories they
occupy.

60
The major Oromo groupings

In this section I present a survey of all the (sub-) regional branches of the Oromo
people on the basis of the self-reporting of spokesmen of the constituent groups and
the work of scholars that identified them.

The Borana consider themselves as descendants of the first-born son of the ancestral
father of Oromo. They live in and around the present Borana Zone of Oromia Regional
National State in southern Ethiopia. This is near the region which probably was the
original home of Oromo and the heartland of Oromo culture. The Borana land
contained shrines that were visited by many Oromo pilgrims from distant areas until
recently. The Borana are also found in northern Kenya extending as far south as the
Tana River and the coasts of Indian Ocean (the Orma branch). The Boran are bordered
by the Guji in the north and the Arsi in the north-east, as well as by the Somali in the
south-east and the Konso in the west. The Borana and the Guji are assumed to be the
two ‘least changed’ groups of the Oromo; they have still retained much of the nomadic
pastoral economy, the traditional belief system and the socio-political institution (the
gada system) which characterised the Oromo at the time of their expansion (Bassi
2005).

On the basis of genealogical accounts of patrilineal descent structure, which

seems applicable to the Oromo of Ethiopia as a whole, the Borana are divided into two
exogamous moieties or sections (Qomoo): Sabbo and Gona. The former is divided into
three sub-moieties (Digalu, Karrayyu, and Mattarri), and the latter into two (Fullelle
and Harooressa), each of which is in turn sub-divided into several clans or gosa, a term
which in Oromo means "united people” (see also, Phillipson 1916: 180). These all
speak the Oromo dialect of Borana, which is generally considered different from the
other dialects, especially from the eastern, central and the south-western Oromo
dialects. I have always found it difficult to communicate with my students speaking
the Borana dialect. Haneke similarly noted the difficulty a native Shoa Oromo would

61
face while communicating with a Borana (2002: 134). The two moieties and sub-
divisions of the Borana Oromo are presented below.

Figure 1. The sub-divisions of the Borana Oromo 6

Borana
Sabbo Gonna
Digalu Mettarri Karrayu Fulele Harooreessa
Nurtu Wara-Qalu Dayu Dachitu Arsii
Titti Wara-Bokku Basu Mechitu Hawattuu
Udumtu Odditu Qarcabduu
Wellaji Gelanta Warra Jidda
Daddo Sirayu Maliyyuu
Emajji Konitu Danbituu
Bechitu Nonituu

The Guji, another large Oromo confederation, live in the southern region of Ethiopia,
in the Rift Valley and the adjacent highlands, to the north of the Borana. The Guji are
divided into two regional confederations: the Alabdu or the northern Guji, consisting
of Hallo and Wajisitu; and the southern Guji consisting of Uraga, Mati and Hoku.
Each of these formerly politically independent tribal groupings was divided into
several tribes and had its own gada system and gada leaders (Levine 1974).
Originally, the Alabdu inhabited the northern and southern regions of the former
Sidamo province, west of Burji and Koyra people, the east of Lake Abaya, and south-
east of the Wolaita, where two minor Alabdu groups, the Otu and the Shelo, still live.
These two minor groups remained behind while the larger part of the Alabdu moved

6
Cf. Alemayehu Haile 2004: 227-229.

62
into their present territory in southern Ethiopia. Consequently, they have long
established strong trade and ritual relationships with the neighbourly Konso and Gedeo
people. Furthermore, the Otu have assimilated to Sidama culture so much that today
many of them speak only the Sidama language. The southern Guji thus disparagingly
call their northern fellowmen "half-Darasa" (Levine 1974: 81).

Like the Borana, the Guji are by and large agro-pastoralists and retain some
aspects of the traditional socio-political and religious institutions, the gada and the
Qallu, which still have a considerable ritual significance, if not political. The Qallu,
the high priest in the traditional Oromo belief system, is still commonly recognized as
their spiritual leader and thus strengthens the bond of all the Guji groups, in addition to
their tribal name, Guji. Currently, there is one common Qallu centre in Alabdu
territory, close to the Gedeo border, to which the gada classes of all the Guji tribes
make a pilgrimage every eight years.

The southern Guji, consisting of the Uraga, Mati and Hoku, were supposed to
have originally inhabited the highlands east of the Gedeo and south of the former
Sidamo region. In the last hundred years, these rapidly increasing groups greatly
extended their territory moving south- and westwards and pushing the Borana out of
Liban and the adjacent regions in the west (Haberland 1963: 11). Consequently, there
have been old and recent localised conflicts between the Borana and the Guji, often
based on competition for scarce resources, including grazing land and water wells, and
since the establishment of the ethno-federal government of Ethiopia, also for access to
power in the local administrations.

As the current central government of Ethiopia allocates most vital resources

through local authorities, intra-ethnic competition for access to local power structures
has increased, often leading to violent and armed clashes and displacements of
thousands of people. In late May 2006, for instance, a conflict erupted between the
Guji and the Borana, displacing tens of thousands of people. The conflict was
allegedly triggered mainly by the zoning activities of the government of Oromia

63
Regional National State. According to a recent report by the International
Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC/IDMC, 30
October 2007), the Borana and Guji were joined in the Borana Zone of Oromia
established in 1992, but as the Borana felt dominated by the more numerous Guji, they
demanded their own zone. Since the creation of Borana Zone, the Guji initiated a
further southward expansion at the cost of the Borana, who already lost huge parts of
their grazing land to various Somali clans. In September 2003, the Borana
administrative zone was restructured, and thus the eastern part of the formerly Borana
zone was established as a new Guji zone, which caused a violent conflict between the
two groups. The NRC/IDMC report says:

"The division did not correspond to the territorial distribution of Borana

and Guji. A substantial Borana element was left in the southern part of Guji
zone around Negele Borana, while the northern part of the reduced Borana
zone around Hagere Maryam was exclusively Guji. In each zone the new
‘minority’ felt oppressed by the dominant local group. In April 2005, the
long simmering communal tensions erupted into armed clashes" (2007: 30).

It seems that these recurring conflicts between the Guji and their neighbours,
such as the Borana Oromo and the Gedeo, have heightened a distinct ethnic
consciousness among the Guji. In 2007 they were reported to have officially
demanded political autonomy and self-government, aimed at upgrading the status of
the present Guji Zone under the Regional State of Oromia to that of a regional state. 7
As recently as March 2014, the disputes and clashes between between the two
communities of Guji and Boran continued.8

7
Reporter (Amharic weekly, Addis Ababa), 19 August 2007.
8
See: ‘Conflict between Borana and Guji communities’, 5 April 2014, at
http://www.ethiomedia.com/broadway/4419.html (accessed 29 May 2014).

64
Figure 2. The sub-divisions of the Guji Oromo 9

Guji
Northern Guji Southern Guji
(Alabdu)
Hallo Wajjistu Uraga Mati Hoku
Obbitu Bigge Gelalcha Insal Gelalcha
Meritu Wentity Wajitu Handoya Abora
Jantu Hargaga Sarbartu Hirgatu Michile
Massintu Darimu Agantu Hera
Hangetu Derartu Bunjitu
Anoltu Gula Kinn
Bala Hallo Balla

The Arsi live in the present-day administrative zone of Arsi, Bale and Southeastern
Shoa, to the north of the Borana and north-west of the Guji. They are spread over a
vast area, stretching from the bottom of the Rift Valley in the west to Tulama,
Karrayu, and Harar Oromo in the north-east and Somali in the east. Among the various
Oromo groups, the Arsi constitute the largest single group, which, correspondingly,
inhabits the largest territory in Oromia Regional National State (Abbas 1999: 2). Prior
to the great Oromo expansion, the region presently occupied by the Arsi was said to
have been inhabited by people of the historical states of Bali, Hadiya, Ganz, Dawaro,
Waj, and Sharkha (Shirka), the inhabitants of which were predominantly Muslims of
Hadiya-Sidama stock, and who were absorbed and adopted the ethnic and cultural
identity of their conquerors, the Arsi (Trimingham 1952; Braukämper 1984).
Currently, the Arsi in general subsist on mixed farming, though they were primarily

9
Source: Alemayehu Haile 2004: 238-39.

65
pastoralists in the past. In fact, the lowland Arsi, in the savannahs around the Rift
Valley lakes, were until recently still pastoralist. According to Arsi oral tradition, the
Arsi are all descendants of the same eponymous father (Ketebo 1999: 22). 10 He was
said to have fathered two sons, Siko and Mando, whose descendants constitute the two
large tribal groupings of Arsi Oromo. The Siko and the Mando are divided into five
and seven politically independent ‘tribes’ respectively, each of which formerly had a
separate gada system and gada leaders. Most of the Siko tribes inhabit the present-day
Bale zone, due to which they identify themselves and are also known as Bale Oromo;
most of the Mando tribes live in the present-day Arsi zone.

The Arsi Oromo were characterized by four distinct features: Islamization of a

large proportion of Arsi during the second half the nineteenth century (Trimingham
1952; Braukämper 1984); their assimilation of the original inhabitants of the area, the
Hadiya-Sidama people, who eventually adopted the Oromo culture, language and thus
became Oromo; adoption of the use of painted memorial stones from the same people
(see, Haberland 1963; Braukämper 1984; Ketebo 1999); and their strong military
resistance against the conquest of Emperor Menilik II during the last decades of the
nineteenth century (Abbas 1995; Bahru 2001; Abir 1968. As highly efficient warriors,
the Arsi were incorporated into the Ethiopian empire only after several campaigns of
Meniliks military forces led by Ras Darge in the 1870s. According to Abbas Haji
(1995: 2), the Arsi would not have been defeated and incorporated into the Ethiopian
empire by military force had it not been for the assistance from the Shoan Tulama
Oromo, who enrolled in Ras Darge's army, and for Italian colonial policies.

10
According to Ketebo (1999), Arsi oral traditions do not go beyond Arsi in tracing
either Borana or Barentuma as their primordial father. Abba Bahrey also did not mention
Arsi in his long genealogical list of the Oromo. From the location of the settlement area
of the present Arsi in the south-east, however, one could say that they belong to the
Barentuma group.

66
Figure 3. The sub-divisions of the Arsi Oromo 11

Arsi

1. Siko 2. Mando

1. Siko

Bulala Wachale Jaysi Waji Illani

Tijjo Ittaya Supha Jarsu Adaal

Ara’a Boru Tuqqa Warsu Ruggus

Ogal-cha Uttala Liban

Abuna Ali

Gelinsha Bodha

Abbu Halchaya

Haphanosa Folqa

11
Cf. Alemayehu Haile 2004: 260-88.

67
 2. Mando

Raya Hawatu Kajawa Wanama Ulta Wayyu Beltu/

Haroj

Shedama Karayu Agarfa Hamida Daye Qoma

Liban Ali Kabira Waji Washirmana

Ambentu Sambitu Heban

Gambo Temmo

Qasso Islamana

Chimo

Halengo

The Karrayu are a branch of the eastern Oromo confederation, the Barentu.12
According to Karrayu oral traditions, the original homeland of the Karrayu was a place
called Madda Wallabu, the area located between the present-day Borana and Bale
zones. Some four hundred years ago, the Karrayu, just like their Oromo brethren,
embarked on a northward migration in search of better grazing land for their cattle.
After temporarily staying in various areas, they eventually came to settle in the present
area of Mount Fantale and Metehara Plain, in the Awash Valley. According to Ayalew
(2001: 152-155), the Karrayu traditionally and until the 1940s and 1950s were
primarily pastoralists, subsisting on multi-species pastoral activities. Actually, they
still consider themselves as pastoralists, despite major transformations in their pastoral
way of life following the appropriation of large portions of their grazing land in the

12
According to Abba Bahrey's genealogical chart of the Oromo, Karrayu is the oldest son
of Barentuma, the alleged ancestral father. However, this is not supported by oral
traditions of the Karrayu.

68
Metahara Plains for development of large-scale irrigation farms, and the appropriation
of large chunks of the area for the establishment of a national park. Over the years,
more and more land was converted to large-scale agriculture and other new schemes
that contributed to a decline in Karrayu's access to grazing land and related resources,
and eventually led to transformation in their traditional pastoral economy. Thus, the
Karrayu exhibit a considerable degree of differentiation among themselves along with
diversifications in their subsistence activities; some of them still remained pastoralists,
others have become sedentary farmers practicing different forms of cultivation. Some
others have been forced completely out of their traditional pastoral occupation and
took up entirely new lines of occupation such as wage labor, charcoal making and
firewood selling (Ayalew 2001: 107).

The Karrayu are divided into two large tribal groupings: Basso and Dulecha,
which are assumed to have descended from the same ancestor, Karrayu. According to
oral traditions of the Karrayu, Dulacha and Basso are the elder and younger sons of
Karrayu. Each of the two consists of a number of named exogamous clans (gossa), and
headed by a local leader, the Hayyu. Further, clans are subdivided into lineages
identified as balbala, which literally means "people from the same door" (Ayalew
2001: 168).13

13
As a background to his study, Ayalew (2001) gives a detailed account of the traditional
and changing patterns in the settlement and social structure of the Karrayu. He also
describes their long-standing tradition of clan identifications which include different hair
styles of boys and girls, married and unmarried men and women, and markings and body
languages on their cattle.

69
Figure 4. The sub-divisions of the Karrayu Oromo 14

Karrayu

1.Basso 2.Dulacha

1.Basso

Dhassu Abri Koyye Dorani Dagga Berre

Loyya Subba Dulacha Ubbaya Dullo Kutaye

Dabbo Gallo Qallu Ubba Baragu Gilbe

Bubbu Wajji Sirba Dulacha

Waldhaji

2.Dulacha

Dayyu Abajjo Hawano Gelan Guracho Mulata

Yaya Tullo Warragura Doyitu Digalu Gura

Ittaya Bojja Robille Wameji Wayu Anna

Dulecho Bodda Kojji Waraqallu Borri

Jarso Galgalo

Until recently, the two major groupings of Karrayu had their own separate territories,
gada centers and leaders. The territory of the Basso Karrayu used to be the area
stretching from the Dega Iddu locality east of Mount Fentale and encompassing the

14
Source: Alemayehu Haile 2004: 251.

70
whole area presently controlled by the Awash National Park. The Dulacha used to
inhabit the area of Chercher, Melka Jillo, Kogne, Arole, and the Kesem River, locally
known as Laga Bulga, which is presently occupied by the Argobba people. According
to Ayalew (2001), the Dulacha had two distinctively marked settlement patterns
known as Amagne Warra Bulga (Amagne families inhabiting the Bulga area), and
Dulacha Warra Sapansa (Dulacha families inhabiting the Sapansaarea); and there was
a strong sense of rivalry between these two: "The Bulga Dulacha reportedly held the
Spansa Dulacha in low esteem" (Ayalew 2001: 164). A large proportion of the Basso
Karrayu are Muslims, while the Dulacha adhere to the traditional Oromo religion,
Waqefata, which is still prevalent in the area though Islam is considerably growing.
An important factor contributing to the Islamization of the Basso tribe is "the common
understanding and marriage alliance between the Basso and the Ittu Oromo in the face
of attacks from the Arsi Oromo, age-old enemies of both the Karrayu and the Ittu"
(Ayalew 2001: 154).15 The Karrayu Oromo in general have also been interacting with
their neighbors, particularly the Afar, and thus adopted many aspects of their culture
(Levine 1974: 81).

The Eastern Oromo, also called Harar Oromo, which belong to the Barentu group,
constitute another of the major regional Oromo groupings in Ethiopia. These are
divided into three large tribal confederacies living in the areas of eastern Ethiopia, in
the present-day east and west Hararghe highlands, bordering the Afar in the north-
west, the Somali in the east, the Bale in the south, the Arsi in the south-west, and the
Great Rift Valley in the south-east. These are: the Ittu, the Annia, and the Afran Qallo.
The Ittu are mainly found in the present West Hararghe zone, around Chercher area
often called Chiro. The Ittu are divided into two tribes designated as Shanan Babbo
(the five Babbos), and Afran Ittu (the four Ittus), who are all descendants of one father,
Marawa. As indicated in their respective names, the former consists of five clans

15
For reports of the long-standing hostility and series of fighting's between the Karrayu
and the Arsi over territorial claims, see also Ketebo 1999.

71
(Babbo, Alga, Galan, Warre, and Gamo), and the latter of four (Adayo, Aroji, Wayye,
and Bayye).

The Annia are divided into two tribal groupings, Sadacha (three tribes), and
Kojele (four tribes), all of which are said to have descended from one father,
Humbena. The Annia inhabit south-eastern region of the present-day East Hararghe
administrative zone, in the vast lowlands of Garamulata. The third confederation of the
eastern Oromo consists of four independent tribal groupings, locally known as Afran
Qallo (the four Qallos). These are: the Ala (Dulacha and Galalcha), Babile (Arelle and
Hebban), Dagga (Nolle, Jarso and Humme), and Obora (Akkitchu, Daga, Billi, and
Dorani). The Afran Qallo inhabit clearly demarcated territories in central highlands of
eastern Hararghe, specifically, Harar, Gursum, Garamulata, and Deder administrative
districts (worada). The traditional boundary between the Ittu and the Afran Qallo was
the Burka River, whereas that between the Afran Qallo and Anniya was the Mojo
River. Many of the eastern Oromo are known to have long been sedentary
agriculturalists and hence locally designated as Qottu, the farmers.

The eastern Oromo, who came into contact and intermixed with other eastern
peoples of Ethiopia, such as the Harari and the Somali since the last three decades of
the sixteenth century, have experienced significant socio-cultural differentiation. As
they settled in the vicinity of Harar, the most important center from where Islamic
culture radiated over southern Ethiopia, most of them adopted Islam at an earlier
period, and also frequently intermarried with the neighboring Harari and Somali
people. Furthermore, some of them, particularly the Jarso and Babile Oromo, who live
in proximity to and have inter-married with their Somali neighbors, are reported to
have been acculturated to the Somali, taken on a Somali genealogy. They are even
considered by their neighbors themselves as members of the Ogaden Somali family
(see, Haberland 1963; Trimingham 1952; Abir 1968). Correspondingly, some Oromo
in this region were reported to have claimed a strong link to the Arab world through
ancient trade routes and the practice of Islam.

72
 In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Islamic Front for Liberation
of Oromo (IFLO) was mainly based in and supported by the eastern Muslim Oromo.
IFLO was engaged in a guerrilla fight against the Dergue in the 1970s and 1980s.
Islam and Islamic ideology and culture became the major underpinning of political
mobilization for the IFLO and its supporters among the eastern Muslim Oromo.
Following the 1991 regime change in Ethiopia, a short-lived military alliance was
forged between IFLO and the victorious TPLF/EPRDF against OLF (Oromo
Liberation Front).16 Needless to say, OLF is the biggest Oromo political organization
that has been waging an armed struggle against the successive Ethiopian governments
since the second half of the 1970s. Together with some two dozen political
movements, including four Oromo-based groups, OLF was invited to and participated
in the transitional conference convened to form the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE) in July 1991 (Merera 2007). The OLF, however, withdrew from the

16
I am a survivor of and a living witness to the armed clashes between the EPRDF-allied
IFLO and OLF in the eastern Haraghe area in 1992, which caused large human and
material losses and displacement of many civilians from both Oromo and non-Oromo
ethnic groups. For the IFLO and its supporters, an Oromo may be classified as a neftegna
(i.e., a descendant of the former conquering Northern soldier-settlers in Southern
Ethiopia), if (s) he is a Christian or non-Muslim, for which, unfortunately, s/he may be
arbitrarily 'sentenced' to death or inhuman beating in the hands of these fundamentalist
'liberators.' During those eight or more months in 1992 of IFLO fighters freely moving
around in Harar and its vicinity, hardly any one seemed secure out of, if not inside,
his/her home. Nor did being an Oromo alone guaranteed one’s safe movement from place
to place in the region. Once I myself and some other six men and four women travelling
from Alemaya (the present-day Haramaya) to Dire Dawa by public transport (minibus)
were captured by and escaped from the knife of the IFLO gangs that had ambushed us at
the outskirts of Dire Dawa (Guenet Menafesha), only because of two Muslim Oromo
women among us, who sympathetically cried their eyes out imploring their Muslim
'brothers' to have mercy on their co-passengers. I still vividly remember those two women
with sense of justice in their traditional Harar Oromo women's dress rolling in the hot
sandy road, pleading to the 'freedom-fighters' in Afan Oromo to spare our life: "Allaaf
jedha gad lakkisaa, yookaan nuuniis wajjin nuqalaa, isaanis uummatuma Mohaammadii"
(Let them free for the sake of Allah, otherwise knife us with them, because they are also
children of Mohammed." Luckily, the armed IFLO men gave in to the women's
heartbreaking cries and set all of the passengers free. The IFLO men persistently
addressed the passengers as “neftegna," though some of us, including me, tried to
convince them that we were not neftegna but their Christian-Oromo brothers by speaking
in Afan Oromo and showing our ID cards.

73
TGE and resumed its armed insurgency without even celebrating the first anniversary
of the new government. It accused the TPLF/EPRDF of hegemonic tendencies. It,
therefore, did not participate in the June 1992 regional elections.

The northern Oromo, the Wollo, about whom very little was known, 17 settled in the
fertile highlands of Ethiopia, the present-day Wollo and southern Tigrai zones,
between Gojjam on the west and the Afar lowlands on the east. According to Abba
Bahrey, the first writer on them, Wollo was one of the six descendants of Karrayu of
the Barentuma Oromo group (Abba Bahrey, in Getachew 2002: 200).

This historical northern region of Ethiopia was the scene of many encounters
and interactions between varied cultures and religions. It was initially occupied by
Christian Amhara, who still live in the area, considerably intermarried and intermixed
with the Oromo. The northern region has also been known as one where the influence
of Islam was spread even before the invasion of the Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim ‘Gragn’
in the first quarter of the sixteenth century (Trimingham 1952: 193). Here Christians
and Muslims from different ethnic groups, such as the Amhara, Tigrai and Oromo,
have a long history of relatively peaceful coexistence and social cohesion.
Following their settlement in this region, therefore, the northern Oromo
underwent a series of changes so much so that they constitute now one of the most, if
not the most, differentiated regional Oromo groupings. Today they are ‘Wolloye’,
Amharic speakers of quintessentially mixed background. Most of the northern Oromo
became sedentary agriculturalists with stock-breeding; the vast majority is Muslim,
with some adherents of Christianity, along with some elements of the traditional belief

17
Many writers such as Haberland (1963), Knutsson (1967), and Hultin (1987) have
earlier noted the paucity of ethnographic information about the Oromo tribes who live in
this part of the country. The same is still true today. I could not find any information
about the northern Oromo even in official documents of Oromia regional state. For
instance, the Wollo Oromo were not mentioned in the 2000 and 2005 editions of Physical
and Socio-Economic Profiles of 180 Districts of Oromiya Region. It should also be
remembered that processes of assimilation and mixture over the past few centuries have
led to countless ‘Oromo’ being absorbed into the Amharic-speaking population.

74
in Waaq. They are often intermarried and mixed with the Amhara as well as other
peoples in the region (Afar and Tigrai), adopting many practices of these neighbours to
the extent of, in some cases, being bilingual or changing their language to Amharic,
Tigrigna or Afar.18 As noted, the process of assimilation and acculturation in this part
of the country has gone so far that it is difficult to differentiate the people as Oromo,
Amhara, Tigrai or Afar. The only Wolloye identifying as ‘Oromo’ are in the Oromo
Zone of Wollo, around Kemise. In the political sphere, some of the northern Oromo
early adopted the monarchic system, which radically modified the traditional socio-
political institution, the gada system; and they were able to dominate the political
scene of the Ethiopian empire from the 1750s to the 1850s (see also, Beckingham and
Huntingford 1954; Abir 1968; Levine 1974; Ahmed 2001; Ficquet 2003, 2006). The
initial Wollo Oromo were divided into three large tribal confederations, namely, Raya,
Yaju and Wollo.

The Raya, also called Azebo by the Tigrai people, are the most northerly of
these three northern Oromo groups. They were initially divided into two large tribal
groupings inhabiting extreme north of the present Wollo region and southern Tigrai.
The first consists of four tribes (Dobba, Marawa, Iggu and Ofla) living in the area
now known as Rayya and Azebo, extending from southern Wajjirat southwards as far
as Ambalage, while the second consists of two tribes (Assabo and Qobbo) in the
southern Tigrai known as Rayya and Qobbo. The Rayya Oromo have experienced a
great degree of cultural interaction and integration with the neighborly peoples of
Tigrai and Afar. As a result, their political and social life has been considerably
18
How the conqueror northern Oromo changed their language and learned to speak the
languages of the conquered people, Amhara and Tigrai, rather than following the other
way round commonly taken by conquerors, remains a theoretical challenge for future
historical research. In the meantime, three main factors can be mentioned. First, the
northern Oromo appear to have a lower population number than those they conquered.
They did not also manage to take in the majorities of the Amhara and the Tigrai.
Probably, the expansion at that point might have lost its steam. Second, the northern
Oromo appeared to have been cut off from the larger Oromo groups, and expanded far
away from the heartlands. Third, there is always acculturation between conquerors and
the conquered.

75
changed, though some of them still speak a dialect of the Oromo language, and have
retained some elements of their traditional culture and pastoral way of life. Today,
many of the Rayya speak the Tigrigna or Afar language; they are by and large agro-
pastoralists, subsisting on cattle-breeding and cultivation; and they have also been
converted into Muslims since the first half of the nineteenth century.

Historically, the Rayya were known for their rebellions against imperial rule in
Ethiopia. An instance of this is the Rayya-Azebo rebellion of the early 1940s,
generally known as the Weyane rebellion,19 which was often seen as a continuation of
the late 1920s confrontation between the Rayya-Azebo and the central government of
Ras Teferi (Haile Selassie I), who conducted a campaign of retribution against them
because of their cattle-raids on the Afar lowlands (for details, see Prouty and
Rosenfeld 1981: 151-152; Gebru 1984: 78-80). As an opportunity to settle past scores
against the government, the Rayya were also said to have aided the Italians as
irregulars during the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-6 (see also, Bahru 2001; Trimingham
1952; McClellan 1996).

The Yeju Oromo inhabit the present Northern Wollo zone, in the Waldiya area,
formerly part of the historical Yeju Awraja, south of the Rayya and north of the Wollo,
bordering Aussa to the east, Amhara to the west, and Lasta to the north. Divided into
five tribes (Wara-Dorani, Wara-Rufo, Wara-Qallu, Wara-Uggi, and Wara-Sheikh), the
Yeju were said to be all descendants of the same father, Yejju. In this fertile area the
people are preponderantly sedentary farmers, combining agricultural and pastoral life.

As a result of a wide range of interaction and inter-marriage with the Amhara

and Afar-Saho Muslims that were believed to have inhabited the region prior to and
during the Ahmed Gragn period, many of the Yeju as well as the Wollo Oromo
underwent profound changes in their social, cultural and political life. They adopted

19
The Woyyane rebellion occurred in Tigre province, where the Rayya-Azebo Oromo
joined the people of Enderta and south Temben under the leadership of Haile-Maryam
Redda of Enderta.

76
many practices and languages of these peoples, though at the same time maintained
some elements of their traditions, political autonomy, and a distinct identity. Apart
from reinforcing their independence vis-à-vis the state by adopting Islam, from the
eighteenth century onwards they were able to establish an autonomous enclave in the
heartland of the Solomonid kingdom, enter into the mainstream of Amhara life,
becoming enmeshed in the intricate political web of the country and "to play a crucial
role in working out the destiny of the empire." (Levine 1974: 82; Cf. also Abir 1968).
Over a period of about half a century, i.e. during the reigns of emperor Bakaffa (1719-
29), and his successors Iyassu II (1730-55) and Iyoas I (1755-69), who established a
lasting Amhara-Oromo network through inter-marriage and made Oromo the language
of the court, the Yeju and Wollo Oromo nobility were able to become a dominant
party at the Gondarine imperial court in the late eighteenth century.

Consequently, initiated by a powerful political figure of the Warra Sheikh Yeju

by the name of Ali Gwangul (Ras Ali Tiliqu, the Great), the Yeju Dynasty was
founded in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The guardianship of the Emperor
(the King of Kings) passed to and remained in the hands of successive members of the
Yeju Oromo family for about eight decades. Ras Ali became governor of the province
of Amhara and Begemdir, centered in Debre Tabor. His position was transferred to
several generations of his descendants, all of whom were said to have originally been
Oromo Muslims who traced their descent back to Sheikh Umar of Arabia, but they
accepted Christianity and adopted other Amhara customs in order to legitimatize their
authority. Subsequently, the Yeju and Wollo Oromo played a great role in bringing
about nearly a century of extreme fragmentation and decentralization of the empire
(1769-1855), the period known in Ethiopian history as Zemene Mesafint, the ‘era of
the princes’ (Abir 1968).

The Zemene Mesafint was a period characterized by very weak central imperial
rule and prolonged anarchy and degeneration under provincial/regional lords
(‘princes’). Ethiopia was torn apart by a chain of bloody civil wars and left without

77
central government, law and order. According to Abir (1968), the period should be
"…understood to be the era of the judges, in the Biblical sense … when the regional
rulers held the real power in the country and the King of Kings in Gondar became but
a puppet in the hands of his regents, who, from the last decades of the eighteenth
century, were of [Oromo] origin." (Abir 1968: xxiii). The history of Ethiopia during
this period, in which the Oromo played a dominant role, was a history of separate
kingdoms in the provinces of Begemdir, Tigray, Lasta, Damot, and Shoa. Their leaders
acted as sovereign powers, with their own armies. In 1855, however, the powerful
provincial warlord Kassa Hailu of Quara in 1855 became Emperor Tewodros II and
attempted a reunification of Ethiopia, curbing the influence of the Yeju Oromo leaders
and other rebellious lords.

The third of the northern Oromo, the Wollo, inhabit the region on the southern
side of the Bashilo river, the present-day South and North Wollo administrative zones,
the formerly Wollo province. Originally inhabited by the Amhara, this region was
known as ‘Amhara’ in medieval times but later on came to be identified by the name
of Wollo, after the tribal Oromo ancestor (Walo)20 and his descendants who settled in
the area in the second half of sixteenth century. The Wollo initially consisted of seven
tribes and were referred to by the Amhara as Säbat Bet Wollo (the seven houses of
Wollo): Warra Himanu, Warra Qallu, Warra Babbo, Warra Illu, Warra Bukko, Warra
Ambo, and Laga Idda. These were said to have been mutually hostile to each other.
The Wollo Oromo, like the Yaju, were able to play a very significant role in the
political arena of the region. According to Bahru (2001), a Muslim Oromo dynasty
known as the Mammadoch, named after its founder Muhammad Ali, based at Warra
Himanu, established its hegemony over the whole region at the end of the eighteenth
century (2001: 12). The political power of the Mammadoch dynasty began to decline

20
According to my informants, the name Wollo, which collectively refers to the northern
Oromo and the region they inhabit, was originally "Walo," which means "together."
Wollo, pronounced as "wäl-lo," with a geminated 'l,' is an Amharic derivation of the
originally Oromo word "Walo."

78
in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, due to the rivalry among Muhammad
Ali's descendants, who fought each other for supremacy. The disunity and mutual
hostility among the Wollo Oromo gradually resulted in the reduction of Wollo to a
buffer zone, which eventually was incorporated into Ethiopia by war and diplomacy at
the end of the nineteenth century (Bahru 2001: 12; Prouty and Rosenfeld 1981: 181-
182; Abir 1968: 27-33).

Wollo, however, put up strong resistance against the successive military

campaigns of emperors Tewodros II (r. 1955-68) and Yohannes IV (r. 1872-89),
before it was defeated by the military forces of Menelik of Shoa and incorporated into
Ethiopia in 1876. Subsequently, the Muslims of Wollo were also subjected to a
vigorous Christianizing campaign, to which they reacted variedly. Some complied,
following the example of their political leaders who generally acquiesced and were
baptized into the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.21 Many of them strongly resisted and
rebelled, until they were suppressed by the combined forces of Yohannes and Menilik.
There were also others who held on to their faith and suffered the consequence of
exile, following confiscation of their land and properties. Very interestingly, some
found a middle ground between renouncing Islam and accepting Christianity, "praying
to the Christian God in the daytime and to the Muslim Allah at night - thereby
reinforcing the unique juxtaposition of Islam and Christianity that we find to this day
in Wollo" (Bahru 2001: 45; see also, Hussein 2001).

The same as the Yejju and Rayya, most of the Wollo Oromo have undergone a
gradual process of absorption and acculturation so that they are now hardly
distinguishable from the Amhara, Tigrai and Afar people with whom they are
intermixed, often intermingle harmoniously, and have much in common. Elements of
the original Oromo culture and language, by extension the Oromo identity, were also
maintained by a large number of people inhabiting the southern Wollo and northern

21
Among others, two prominent converts were Muhammad Ali and Abba Wataw, who
became Ras Mikael and Hayla Maryam, respectively.

79
Shoa areas, and the administrative zone of Oromia around Kemissie town within the
Amhara Regional State.

As indicated above, the Wollo played significant cultural and political roles and
contributed much to the defense of the country. They participated in the defensive
wars Ethiopia fought against aggressive campaigns of Egypt (1875-76) and the
Sudanese Mahdists (1889), and in defeating the Italians at Adwa (1895-96). The
people in this northern region suffered much from recurrent famines during the second
half of the twentieth century, of which the Wollo Famine of the 1972-73 was the most
devastating. This tragedy was generally believed to have been handled irresponsibly
by the imperial government of Haile Sellassie, and was one of the factors leading to its
demise and eruption of the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974.

The Tulama, also known as Shoa Oromo, are made up of a number of named tribes
inhabiting large parts of the present-day Eastern, Western, and Southern Shoa
administrative zones of Oromia, the former Shoa province of modern Ethiopia,
initially inhabited by the Amhara. The Tulema are divided into four major tribal
groupings, namely, Dachi, Bacho, Konno and Jille, each of which in turn is subdivided
into several clans (gosa). The Tulama are by and large sedentary farmers on the
extensive and fertile Shoan plateau, and engaged in crop farming and animal
husbandry.

According to a widespread version of an historical narrative (Seenaa) recorded

among the Macha Oromo,22 Tulama and Macha were brothers, the first and second
born sons of a man called Borana and his two wives, Sire and Akito, respectively.

22
A similar but extended version of the narrative text, together with other corpus of
historical documents in Amharic, was published by Addis Ababa University Press, in a
volume entitled Documents for Wallaga History (1880s-1920s E.C.), edited by
Alessandro Triulzi and Tesema Ta'a (2003: 285-306). The narrative was said to have
been originally recorded from Wollega Oromo elders and written down in Amharic with
a title, የመጫ (ቦረና) ዘር ሀረግ (Genealogy of the Maccaa (Boorana)), in 1916 E.C., for which
the then governor of Wollega, dajjazmach Kumsa Moroda, baptized as Gebre-Egziabher,
was credited.

80
Thus the present Tulama and Macha Oromo are said to be all descendants of the same
father, Borana. These two Oromo groupings together with their other Oromo brethren
originally inhabited a place called Maada Walabu, in the formerly southern Bale
region, and began their northward expansion from there. The two brothers at the time
shared a common gada government centered at Hooda Nabe, in the area of the Awash
River in the present-day Eastern Shoa administrative zone, and acted in alliance while
launching raids against other groups. The two brothers’ descendants stayed peacefully
in the Hooda Nabe area for some five or more generations, where each of them
fathered many children who were to become large tribes. When children of Tulama
and Macha grew into large tribes, internal conflicts and warfare began to erupt
between the two groups, which eventually resulted in separation and settlement of the
two away from each other. The Tulema defeated and drove the Macha further
westward to the area known as Hooda Bisil, in the central region of Ethiopia, while
they remained in Hooda Nabe area.23 Accordingly, Bisil also became and remained to
be the gada center of the Macha groupings until their further dispersal over the vast
territories in the south-western region. According to many informants in the West
Shoa area, and as also noted by Negaso Gidada, the enmity between the Tulema and
Macca persisted long even after their separation and settlement of the latter in Bisil,
and lasted until quite recently (Negaso 2001: 24.)

Following their settlement in the heart of Ethiopia during the sixteenth and
seventeenth century, the Tulama were significantly influenced by the Amhara and
Gurage with whom they intermingled and intermarried frequently. Today, the Tulema
are preponderantly Orthodox Christians, and much intermarried with the Amhara and
the Gurage. The change was generally believed to have been facilitated by the
incorporation of the Shoa Oromo by Emperor Menilik II (r. 1889-1913), and,

23
There are various versions of the historical narrative about the process and underlying
causes of the fighting between and separation of the Macha and Tulama, which have also
been noted by several writers such as Yilma Deressa (1966), Jan Hultin (1987),
Mohammed Hassen (1994), and Negaso Gidada (2001). The details of separation of the
Macha from the Tulema shall be presented in the next chapter.

81
subsequently, by the establishment of the new capital of Addis Ababa in 1886. In this
regard, Merera Gudina has noted that the Amhara elite under the leadership of Menelik
"… successfully incorporated and assimilated the Oromo elite of Shoa with its three-
pronged ideology of Orthodox Christianity, Amhara cultural ethos and Ethiopian
unity." (Merera 2007: 86). However, despite all the influences of the peoples and
cultures in the central part of Ethiopia, the Tulama still retained large elements of
Oromo cultural traditions including ritual aspects of the gada system. The educated
elite of Tulama were also the founders of the afore-mentioned Macca-Tulama Self-
help Association (MAT), established in 1963 and subsequently gaining growing
support. The organization was aimed at promoting the Oromo self-identity and
improving the lot of the Oromo (Keller 1980-81: 542).

It should be noted that the Shoa Oromo have not only been influenced but also
privileged by their geographical and social proximity to and interaction with the
economic and political center of the country in the twentieth century. This privilege is
evident, among others, in their relatively higher participation in secondary and tertiary
level education and industrial establishments of the post Italian occupation. According
to Bas van Heur, Oromo-speaking students that were able to pursue higher education
in the 1960s usually came from Shoa and Wollega. (Van Heur 2004: 42).

The incorporation of Shoa, as well as large parts of the southern and south-
western Oromo groupings, was said to have been made possible partly by active
military participation of the Shoa Oromo in the army of Emperor Menilik II, following
the political fragmentation and internal wars among themselves. Many of the military
campaigns incorporating these Oromo groupings were led by a powerful military
commander from the Shoa Oromo, Ras Gobena Dache (1821-1889), and supported by
a large number of Oromo noble men and soldiers. According to Abbas Haji (1995), the
Tulama, who were disunited and weak through successive internal wars, were ‘used’
by the Shoan kings not only one against the other, but also against other Oromo groups
and peoples in the south. The Tulema "became an instrument of Shoan expansionism

82
by enrolling as soldiers and military commanders, the best known being Gobana; …
the Tulama clans … enrolled in Ras Darghe's army who ruthlessly suppressed the
fierce resistance of the Salale before becoming the butcher of the South" (Abbas 1995:
2-4).

It is interesting to note here that the incorporation of the Oromo in general and
the role some prominent Oromo figures represented by Ras Gobena played in the same
in particular has been interpreted differently in the Oromo nationalists’ and pan-
Ethiopian nationalists’ perspectives, not to mention the large variants of these major
contradictory perspectives. From the first perspective, a large part of the Oromo
nationalist elite, especially those proponents of the OLF, consider the late nineteenth
century incorporation of the Oromo to the Ethiopian state as 'Abyssinian colonialism.'
Correspondingly, Ras Gobena, who played a major role in the incorporation of the
south and south-western Oromo, has been considered as a symbol of 'treason,' who
fought on the side of the enemy to enslave his own people. But this should not be
taken for a general view commonly held by the Oromo-speaking peoples as a whole.
Many of my informants in the south-western Oromo, for instance, remembered Ras
Gobena as a brave warrior and king of Shoa (Jagna Motii Shawaa).24

Views critical to Ras Gobena are in line with the broader interpretation of the
history of the expansion by various ethno-nationalist elites in Ethiopia, for whom the
formation of the modern multi-ethnic Ethiopian state was nothing but a process of
'colonization' which brought the majority of formerly independent ethno-linguistic
groups under Ethiopian colonial domination. It is on the basis of this 'colonial and
national oppression thesis' that a large number of region- and ethnic-based liberation
movements, such as OLF, ONLF, and TPLF, emerged between the mid-1970s and
early 1980s, with a secessionist political agenda and armed struggle as the only option

24
E. Cerulli included a number of oral songs glorifying Ras Gobena in his "Folk
Literature of the Galla." I have also recorded a number of historical narratives and songs
about the bravery and military achievements of Ras Gobena in the field.

83
to overcome of the country's political malaise (for details see, among others, Asafa
1993; Clapham 2002; Merera 2003, 2006; Levine 2007).

From a historical perspective, the making of a multi-ethnic Ethiopian polity in

the late nineteenth century out of the fragmented and decentralized Ethiopia of the
preceding period of the Zemene Mesafint can be considered as a 'nation-building'
process, i.e., a (re)unification of Ethiopia that resulted from "bringing together
territories formerly under the control of historical Ethiopia" (Merera 2006: 120). To
the upholders of this thesis, thus, Ras Gobena was one of the farsighted architects who
laid the military and political foundation for modern multi-ethnic Ethiopia. This view
has been artistically expressed in a short Amharic couplet by Getachew Haile:

ምንልክ ተወልዶ እልም ባያልም፣

ጎበና ፎክሮ ያን ባይተረጉም፣
ኢትዮጵያ እምትባል የሰው ልጅ እናት፣
በዛሬው ዓለም ውስጥ ቦታም ባልኖራት፡፡

Had it not been for Menellik,

Born to dream the dream,
Had it not been for Gobena,
Vowed to realize the dream,
Ethiopia, the cradle of humanity,
Would never have appeared
In the history of the modern world.
(Getachew 2002: 164; my translation).

In any case, the Oromo in general and the Shoan elite in particular played
significant cultural and leadership roles in the formation of the modern Ethiopian
multiethnic state in the second half of the nineteenth century and subsequently in the
preservation of the independence and sovereignty of the country. This is evident in the
fact that many eminent political figures, generals, military appointees, governors and
kings that constituted a significant part of the Shoan leadership credited with the
making and maintaining of independence of modern Ethiopia, either had a direct
linage of or a significant intermixture with the Oromo. This includes, to mention but a
few examples, Ras Gobena Dache, Fitawrari Habte Giorgis Dinagde, Dejazmach

84
Kumsa Moroda, Abba Jifar Abba Gommol, Dejazmach Garasu Duki, and the royal
figures such as Atse Menelik II, Itege Tayitu Bitul, Nigus Tekle Haymanot, Dejazmach
Hailu Gudissa, Ras Mekonnen Gudissa and his son Teferi Mekonnen (the later Haile
Selassie I) and his wife Itege Menen (see Cerulli 1922: 71; Getachew 2002; Levine
2007; Merera 2003). In this respect, a remark Charles Beke made more than 160 years
ago may be worthwhile quoting here: "The [Oromo] element is … fast becoming the
predominant one in Abessinia. At the present day almost every principal ruler
throughout the empire is, in the male line, of [Oromo] extraction" (1850: 210).

It seems that the Oromo have had a great influence on the other ethno-linguistic
groups of Ethiopia, so much so that nearly all Ethiopians are said to have some
element of Oromo lineage; as the old Amharic saying goes, "Kä Galla yaltäwälädä
buda bicha näw," (The only one not born from the Oromo is the ‘evil-eye’).

The final section of the Oromo group treated here are the Macha Oromo, the
focus of the present study, who consist of a large number of territorially separate
groupings inhabiting much of southwestern Ethiopia, i.e. in the present-day West
Shoa, Jimma, Illu Abba Bor, East Wallaga and West Wallaga administrative zones of
Oromia. The Oromo of the nineteenth-century monarchic states in the Gibe region,
often known as the ‘Five Gibe States’ (Jimma, Gera, Gomma, Gumma, and Limmu-
Ennarea), the Leqa Naqamte state of Wallaga, and Gama-Mora in Guduru (Eastern
Wallaga) all belong to this group (See Map 3 and Map 4).

The Macha are one of the most differentiated and fragmented of the various
Ethiopian Oromo groupings. The Jimma and the Oromo of the former five Gibe states,
for instance, accepted Islam in early nineteenth century, apart from their developing a
monarchic political system. The majority of the Wallaga Oromo of the former
monarchic states of Gama-Mora and Leqa Naqamte, in the area west of the Gibe River
and east of the Didessa, the Oromo of Illu Abba Bor to the west of the Gojeb River
and north-east of Wollaga, and the Oromo of western Shoa between the Guder River
and the Gibe River were converted to the Christianity of the Orthodox Church. Unlike

85
the Oromo of the three monarchic states, those of the Illu Abba Bor and Shoa had not
developed any political unity of that type. Another group of the Wallaga Oromo,
inhabiting the area west of the Didessa River and the deep Didessa valley, became
followers of the Protestant Church as a result of the influence of the Evangelical
Mission run by Scandinavians and Germans since the early 1900s. The transformation
from a pastoral mode of production to sedentary agriculture with a coffee-based cash-
crop economy was believed to have been one of the decisive agents of change and
differentiation experienced by many of the Macca groupings beginning from or prior
to the nineteenth century (Cf. Knutsson 1969: 33-34).

Broadly known as the Macha, members of these Oromo groupings also refer to
themselves as Jimma, Gera, Leqa, Sibu, etc., identifying themselves with the
geographical areas they respectively occupy. It is also common for individuals within
each of these wider areas to identify themselves by their specific locales or descent
groups. Among the Oromo of East Wallaga, for instance, an individual may identify
her/himself as Leqa, Sibu, Horro, Gimbi, Najjo, etc., based on her/his membership in
or belonging to a local group. The Macha are thus divided into a large number of local
groups, each more or less with a defined territory and sense of distinct local identity.
The Macha Oromo are the focus of my study and hence shall be discussed in detail in
the ensuing chapters.

86
Chapter 4

The Oromo expansion in history and Macha oral traditions

Introduction

This chapter treats the expansion of the Oromo across Ethiopia as a background
necessary to understand the frequent self-references in oral narratives of the sub-
groups discussed. The great Oromo expansion into large parts of Ethiopia during the
sixteenth century – in the decades after the ‘Gragn’ wars that ended in 1543 - was a
major historical process that reshaped Ethiopian history. This chapter treats this crucial
episode because of its legendary, foundational status and its function as a frequent
reference point in both studies of Ethiopian history as well as internal Oromo debates
and self-references by sub-groups positioning themselves vis-à-vis each other. An
overview of this history is needed as a general background for the subsequent analysis
of Macha Oromo identity narratives, debates and group oppositions.

On causes and factors of Oromo expansion

The causes and contributing factors of the Oromo expansion have been the subject of
much debate among Ethiopian and western scholars, but no clear consensus was so far
reached.25 The literature on this complex episode in the history of the Oromo is
considerable, although relatively little new empirical information was offered in
English-language studies since the major work by the late historian Merid Wolde-

25
In order to reconstruct the socio-historical background of the self-perceived differences
and fragmented identities of the Oromo in this chapter, I largely draw on the sources
written or translated in English, as well as on the few available documents in Ethiopian
languages, and on my own field materials. Most of the important works are in Italian,
German, Dutch and Swedish, which makes them largely inaccessible to Ethiopian
researchers (who are not well versed in these languages).

87
Aregay (1971). 26 In his attempt to explain the success of the Oromo, however, even
Merid put much more emphasis on the external factors - the long-standing medieval
history of civil wars and upheavals that weakened and left the Christian kingdom of
Ethiopia open to attacks - with little consideration to the internal socio-cultural and
moral motivations for the expansion of the Oromo in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. In his words, “The inability of the empire to withstand the Muslim and
[Oromo] invasions …is best explained by the factional conflicts which divided and
weakened it” (1971: 3).

It should also be pointed out that most of the historical and anthropological
studies on the Oromo exhibit the regional frame as well as the social and political
fragmentation within the wider Oromo groups. With the exception of a few studies
written and/or edited by Oromo nationalists often advancing a secessionist agenda (for
example, Asafa 1993, 1994, 1998a, 1998b; Mekuria 1997; and Mohammed 1994), the
larger part of Oromo studies are focused on one of the various regional Oromo
groupings rather than on the Oromo-speakers as a whole. Some examples of these
include the study of Jimma and Eastern Mach by Lewis (1965, 1990), the work of
Knutsson on the Macha (1967), Asmarom's study of the gada system of the Borana
(1973), Bartels's study of the western Macha (1983), Hultin's anthropological study of
the Macha (1987), Negaso's historical study of the Sayyo of West Wollaga (2001), the
works of Baxter and Bassi (2005) on the Arsi and Borana, and the papers of
Blackhurst (1978, 1980) and Nicolas (2006, 2007a, 2007b) on the Shoa Oromo. Even
a few works bearing the name Oromo as a major part of their title focus or put more
emphasis on a certain group rather than on the Oromo as a whole. A typical instance of
this is Mohammed Hassen's, The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860 (1994),
which has little to do with the history of the Oromo in general, but more with the
history of a particular Oromo group - those in the Gibe region.

26
Unfortunately, this important study remains unpublished.

88
 The process of fission-fusion and segmentation within the Oromo of Ethiopia
seems to have begun during, if not prior to, their expansion. This can be seen, among
others, in the classification of the Oromo into two large tribal confederacies, the
Borana and Barentu, known to have already had a separate and independent existence,
each with its own socio-political organization, gada centers and gada leaders, during
their expansion. It is hardly possible to trace in detail how the division and separation
of the two major groups and the formation of numerous (sub-) groups within them
took place due to the time-depth involved and the lack of sufficient sources of
information. However, both available historical documents and oral traditions indicate
that it happened when certain Oromo groups began to move from the highlands of
historical Bali to the lowlands south of the same region and northward to the interior.
According to Mohammad Hassen (1994: 6), the separation began much earlier than the
sixteenth century; the Borana and Barentu Oromo had developed into two separate,
full-fledged confederacies in the lowlands south of Bali and in the valley of Ganale
river probably before or during the fourteenth century.27 After the separation and the
subsequent migration, the several confederacies adapted different modes of life and
socio-political institutions in response to the requirements of their new environments.
This eventually led to the fragmentation of the society. Mohammed has noted, citing
Asmarom (1973): "The Oromo nation broke down into autonomous confederacies and
the nation was not able to hold the confederacies together under a unitary national
government" (Mohammed 1994: 14). This is a view confirmed by several other writers
such as Haberland 1963; Braukämper 1980; Hultin 1987; Trimingham 1952; Abir
1968, and most importantly by the oldest written record of the Oromo by the Ethiopian
monk, Abba Bahrey (1593). Abba Bahrey's brief written record, Zenahu le-Galla
(Record/Ethnography of the [Oromo]), is not only the oldest but also the most
important first-hand account of the political history of the Oromo at the time of their
rapid expansion. He wrote his record with the authority of an eyewitness of the events,
which displaced him from his homeland of Gamo, a place close to the expansion route.
27
The writer hardly provided any historical evidence in support of this suggestion.

89
Because of this, his text may not be free of biases and prejudices against the Oromo
whom he called throughout his text as "Galla,"28 a name by which they were known
until very recently. Nonetheless, his influence on further historical and anthropological
studies on the Oromo cannot be underestimated. Apart from a detailed description of
the tribal divisions, social organization and the well-known socio-political institution
of the Oromo, the gada system, the writer left us a valuable source of information
about the factors that facilitated the rapid Oromo expansion into the interior of
Ethiopia in the sixteenth century. Though it is difficult to infer the exact location of the
homeland of the Oromo from the above-mentioned introductory remarks of Abba
Bahrey, they have been used as a basis for the hypothesis that the original homeland of
the Oromo was in the southern part of present-day Ethiopia: somewhere between the
middle lakes of the Great Rift Valley and the Bale Plateau (Haberland 1963;
Braukämper 1980; Mohammed 1994).

In his work, Abba Bahrey (1593) noted that the Oromo were divided into two
large tribal groupings at the time they began their penetration into the central part of
the country: "The owner of (this) book says: The [Oromo] appeared from the west and
crossed the river of their country, which they call gelena, to the frontier of Bali, in the
time of the Hatse Wenag Segged. They are the two tribes who are called Bereytuma
and Borena."29 Abba Bahrey further indicated that each of these two Oromo

28
The name ‘Galla’, by which the Oromo were known in most of the literature prior to
the second half of the 20th century, has been considered by the people, especially by the
Oromo nationalists and their supporters, as implying a pejorative meaning and is now
seen as an insult. The etymological origin and meaning of the term is also controversial.
So far, various and contradictory etymological assumptions have been forwarded by
expatriate and Ethiopian scholars. Most of them are fanciful and based on erroneous
associations (see, for example, Tellez 1710; Harris 1844; Beke 1848; Cerulli 1922;
Phillipson 1916; Krapf 1860; Tutschek 1844; Jaenen 156).
29
የአባ ባሕርይ ድርሰቶች ኦሮሞችን ከሚመለከቱ ሌሎች ድርሰቶች ጋራ (The Works of Abba Bahrey with
Other Documents Concerning the Oromo, translated and published by Getachew Haile
(2002: 196). Here it should be noted that there are different English translations of Abba
Bahrey's historical record of the Oromo, which was originally written in Ge'ez, the
classical language of Ethiopia. Among these, the earlier version is the one translated from
the original text in Ge’ez by E. Wallis Budge. He included the text in his A History of

90
confederacies was divided into numerous (sub-) tribal groupings, and had separate
political institutions, gada center and leaders. Accordingly, Bareytuma was the
founding father of the six tribal and regional groupings comprising the large eastern
Oromo, in the present-day Arsi, (the Arsi), East Shoa zone (the Karrayu), east and
west Hararghe highlands to the south and east of the Great Rift Valley, and the
northern Oromo in Wollo and Tigray (the Rayya and Azebo). 30 The large tribes of
south-western Oromo, the Macha and the Tulama, were said to be descendants of
Datche, who in turn was the first-born son of Borana, the founding father of twelve
tribes (Getachew 2002: 196-99).31

Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia (1928: 603-13). The second is found in Beckingham &
Huntingford (1954: 111-129). This translation was based on I. Guidi's French translation,
published together with the original Ge’ez text in 1907. The third and most recent one is
that of Getachew Haile, one of the most prominent scholars and authorities on classical
Ge'ez literature, appended to his book in Amharic, “የአባ ባሕርይ ድርሰቶች ኦሮሞችን ከሚመለከቱ
ሌሎች ድርሰቶች ጋራ” /The Works of Abba Bahrey with Other Documents Concerning the
Oromo/ (2002: 195-213). Getachew's book gives both Amharic and English translations
of Abba Bahrey's "Ethnography of the Galla". It also includes other four religious texts
by the same author, and very important historical documents, together with critical
analysis and interpretations of all the available sources on the Oromo. These points
justify my choice of the last version.
30
These two major divisions were also noted by many other writers, and partly confirmed
by my own field materials collected from the Maccha Oromo. In his Ethnographic Survey
of North-eastern Africa, Part II, The Galla of Ethiopia, The Kingdoms of Kafa and
Janjero, for instance, Huntingford lists some 200 or more tribes of Oromo in six major
territorial groups: I. Western (Wallaga, west of the Didessa river). II. Mača, east of the
Didessa, and south of the Abay. III. Central (Tulama, east of the Mača). IV. Northern
(Wallo, north of the Tulama, and extending as far as Lake Ašangi). V. Eastern (Qottu),
centered on Harar, and extending thence 120 miles westwards and 40 miles eastwards).
VI. Southern (Arusi, on both sides of the Webi Shabelle). He further gives a provisional
long list of the tribes in each of the six territorial groups, p. 12-15. Job Ludolphus also
pointed out that the Oromo were divided into "two nations," which in turn were divided
into seventy or more tribes (A New History of Ethiopia, p. 85).
31
Abba Bahrey does not seem to have had a clear understanding of the origin of the
Oromo in general and the tribal division of the Borana group in particular. His description
contains a couple of confusing assertions. First, he tells us that "the father of Boren was
Seppira", but he does not tell us who the father of Bareytuma was; nor anything about
how these two tribes were related. Secondly, he says "Seppira begot Datche, and Datche
begot Metcha. Metcha begot Da'ale and Jidda. And the two brothers gave birth to many
tribes …" Abba Bahrey further gives a list of four and three descendants of Da'ale and

91
 Among the Macha Oromo, the two major divisions, Bareytuma and Borana,
were identified by some of my informants, for whom they meant different things. For
some informants, Borana and Barentuma were the first and second born sons of
Oromo, the two progenitors of all the Oromo of Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Borana and
the Guji of the southern Ethiopia, the Tulama of Shoa (five groups) and the Macha of
south-western Ethiopia (four groups)32 are all descendants of Borana, while all the
other Oromo groups in eastern and northern parts of the country are descendants of
Barentuma. This view was expressed in a historical narrative (Seenaa) recorded from
the south-western Oromo region. The summarized narrative text33 runs as follows.

The original homeland of the Oromo is around the present-day administrative

zone of Borana, in the southern part of Ethiopia. The Oromo had been living
in the Borana area before they migrated to settle in the vast land they occupy
today. At the beginning, they moved to the area near the River Gennale,
where they stayed for a short period of time making preparations for their
further northward expansion. There they found ample time, peace and
stability, and enough pasture for their cattle, so much so that they grew in
population and prospered in cattle. The River Gennale got its name from the
Oromo word "gana'alee," which denotes a playful commotion of the cattle in
satisfaction. There and then, the river was named "Gana'alee," in memory of
the cattle that were running here and there, hopping playfully and
harmoniously in satisfaction of the drink from the river and grazing in the
area. However, others who were not able to pronounce the word correctly
called it "Gennale."

Jidda, respectively. In addition, he tells us that Datche, the father of Metcha, also begot
another three children, and lists their names. As a corollary, Boren was said to have
fathered twelve children, which must be a mistake for eleven, as only eleven names were
listed. Besides, the same tribal names, with a few omissions, listed as descendants of
Datche were also mentioned as children of Boren, which included Datche himself.
32
There is no consistency in the number of the major tribes of the Borana Oromo in
general and in that of the Tulama and Maccha groups in particular. In some genealogical
narratives, the number of the Borana tribes is nine, i. e. the five Tulama and the four
Maccha tribes, which is also expressed in the popular Oromo saying, "Salgan Boranaa," -
the nine Boranas. In another version, the Borana consists of eleven large tribes. The
number of Tulama and Maccha tribes even goes as much as eighteen, nine tribes each.
33
This narrative was narrated by Obbo Tolessa Bora, 48, on March 4, 2007, in Neqemte.
Slightly different versions of the narrative were also recorded during my fieldwork
elsewhere in the region.

92
At the bank of the River Gan'aalee, the Oromo made sacrifice for and
supplication to Waaq so that they would be able to cross the river safely to
move to a place called Madda Walaabuu. Thus Waaq gave them a way
across the river, dividing it in to two, and they safely moved to and settled in
Madda Walaabuu area. In Madda Walaabuu the Oromo people celebrated
their independent existence and made the well-known system of gada. While
the Oromo were in the Madda Walaabuu area, they lived peacefully and the
number of the population and the cattle again grew enormously, so much so
that the land hardly could accommodate them. What is worse, they were
troubled by a very huge and ferocious beast, which devoured both the people
and their cattle. Having felt the population pressure (baay’ina uumataa), they
were forced to separate from each other and disperse in different directions.
There and then the Oromo were divided in to two large groups that
thenceforward were to be separated peacefully for good and all, each group
taking its cattle and moving in different direction. The two groups were the
Borana and the Baarentuu, the descendants of the senior and junior sons of
Oromo, respectively. The descendants of Borana are eleven, while that of
Baarentuu are five. The Oromo groups presently inhabiting Bale, Arsi, East
Hararghe, West Hararghe, East Shoa, and Wollo are descendants of
Barentuma.
The descendants of Borana were separated in to two groups; one group
moved further southwards to occupy the southern part of the present-day
Ethiopia, which was to be named Borana. The Oromo that occupied southern
Ethiopia are, thus, the Borana and the Guji, who are currently found in the
Borana and Guji administrative zones of Oromia, respectively. The second
group moved northward and settled in a place called Hooda Nabee, in the
present Eastern Shoa administrative zone. This group consisted of two
brotherly tribes, the Tulama and the Maccha, descendants of the first and the
second born sons of Borana. When Tulama and Macha came to settle in
Hooda Nabee, there was no one in the area; it was covered with forest full of
wild animals. There, the two brothers lived peacefully for about five
generations; they grew into large tribes and prospered in cattle so much so
that the land could barely accommodate them. Then conflicts started over
land and pasture, which gradually led to open war between the two brothers.
As a result, the Tulama defeated and forced the Macha to move west-ward to
a place called Hooda Bisil, in western Shoa. Most of the Tulama remained in
the Hooda Nabee area, while others moved to and settled in the formerly
Shoa province, which is presently divided into four administrative zones of
Oromia: North Shoa, South Shoa, East Shoa, and West Shoa. The Macha in

93
 turn were divided and separated into a number of groups that further
migrated to and settled in Shoa, Wollega, Jimma, and Illu Abba Bor
provinces.
According to other informants Barentuma and Borana were derived from the
Oromo phrases "barii-antu," and "boroo-ana," which mean "those to the east” and
“those to the west," respectively. Accordingly, the former refers to the numerous
eastern Oromo tribes and the latter to those migrated to and settled in the vast area
stretching from south to western Ethiopia. 34 There were also a number of informants
who were unaware of even the existence of the tribal divisions such as, Tulama,
Karrayyu, Ittu, etc., let alone the two major Oromo divisions, the Borana and
Barenruma. More interestingly, there is quite a large variety of oral narratives about
the genealogical origin of the Macha itself and the (sub-) tribal divisions and
relationships within. The narratives of one group often contradict with those of another
group, which generally seems the case with the various Oromo groupings. Some even
go as far as denying the existence of other groups outside of their own group, each
setting its own community or group at the center of its own genealogical accounts that
legitimatize its precedence and/or seniority rights to the land and other regional
resources and political power over others. This is yet to be discussed in detail in the
following chapter; here it suffices to say that the narratives of each group are both
constructions and expressions of different levels of identities responding to and shaped
by certain historical, cultural and political processes and situations.

It has already been indicated that the Oromo of Ethiopia are not only one of the
largest and most widespread, but also the most fragmented and disunited ethnic
group/people of Ethiopia. This is at least what their history of the past four centuries

34
Many of my informants hold the view that the two names, Barentuma and Borana, do
not refer to founding fathers of the Oromo, for all the Oromo descended from one father,
Oromo, but to the two major confederacies into which the Oromo were divided at the
time of their expansion. From the suggested meanings of the two names, therefore, it is
safe to assume that the names were derived from and referred to the relative directions of
the migration and settlements of the two groups; hence, the Barentuma took the eastern,
while the Borana took the western direction. Huntingford contends the same (1955: 11).

94
reveals, and is but a reflection of a continuous process of group formation and cultural
exchange. Fission and fusion among the Oromo speakers and other ethno-linguistic
groups of Ethiopia always occurred depending on factors in the particular and wider
socio-historical context. The processes of fission-fusion and cultural exchange showed
the dualism of cause and effect on the Oromo expansion and on the subsequent nature
of their socio-economic adaptations within the vast territories and cultural ecologies in
Ethiopia since the sixteenth century. The assumption here is that the essence of the
Oromo expansion may be well explained in relation to thees processes. Needless to
say, in this respect the Oromo-speaking peoples played a significant role in the
formation of the modern multi-ethnic Ethiopian state and society of which they
constitute a major part.

The process of fission and fusion characterizing the Oromo since their first
north-ward movement into and subsequent spread over large parts of Ethiopia forms a
recurring pattern in their history since the early sixteenth century. In this regard four
interrelated factors facilitated the expansion and subsequently lent it far-reaching
consequences for the development of the Oromo-speakers into independent ethno-
regional groupings or confederacies and into a major agent of the multiethnic
Ethiopian state and society. These include: the regional and historical context of the
Oromo expansion, the demographic pressure and internal conflicts, the role of gada
system, and the tradition of ‘adoption’ (Oromization of non-Oromos), which shall be
discussed in turn below.

The regional and historical context

All the available historical sources indicate that the first Oromo movement of
expansion occurred during the reign of Emperor Libne Dingel, also known under his
regal name Wenag Segged (1508-40), in the 1520s, when they came from "the west

95
and crossed the river of their country, which they call galena, 35 to the frontier of Bali"
(Abba Bahrey, in Getachew 2002: 196). Shortly afterwards, they crossed the Wabi
Shebelle River and penetrated into parts of Dawaro, the lowlands between the Wabi
Shebelle and the eastern Harar Plateau. This was the period when the invasions of the
Muslim states in the south-east under Imam Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1506-43),
nicknamed Ahmed ‘Gragn’ (Ahmed the left-handed), had destroyed and weakened
large parts of the South and South-east as well as Northern Ethiopia. In the following
two or three decades, i.e., in the 1540s and 1550s, certain Oromo groups moved
northward into Fat’agar and Shoa. At the same time, another one turned eastward and
attacked the Muslim state of Harar in 1567, and yet another one pushed northward as
far as Angot and Begemdir. At the end of the sixteenth century, they moved further
into Begemdir, Dembiya, and Gojam, with some groups branching towards the West.
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Oromo moved up the Great Rift
Valley to the area of Waji, subsequently spreading to and controlling the region of
Gibe River, a large part of South-western Ethiopia, Damot and Gojam. 36 By 1600 the
Oromo were virtually in control of most of the territory they presently occupy in
Ethiopia.

The Oromo expansion occurred while the then Abyssinia was in a state of
exhaustion from a long history of internal and external wars. These include the series
of wars carried out by successive Abyssinian kings for authority and control over the
small Christian states in the south and Muslim sultanates in the east and south-east
beginning from the second half of the thirteenth century. This had culminated in a

35
This is an Oromo name for "river."
36
The Oromo were said to have been defeated in their repeated military expeditions to
conquer and establish their own ethnic enclaves in the former Gojam province. According
to Levine, most of the Oromo fighters fled after such skirmishes, many joined the
victorious army and became soldiers of the Amhara king, and some remained to settle in
the Gojam area where they were to be absorbed by the host Amhara society, and are
"remembered today in Gojam mainly through records of [Oromo] names in some parish
genealogies" (1974: 82). For details on Oromo expansion, see also Beckingham and
Huntingford 1954; Trimingham 1952.

96
jihad against Christian Abyssinia at the beginning of the sixteenth century. This
Islamic war led by Ahmad Gragn (c. 1506-43) of the Adal state, reinforced and armed
with firearms by the expansive empire of Ottoman Turkey, threatened the very
existence of Christian Ethiopia during this period. From 1527 to 1543, the Muslim
forces under Gragn embarked on a series of attacks on central Abyssinia which
devastated and brought nearly three-quarters of the country into his power, including
Shoa, Dawaro, Lasta, Tigrai, and the Muslim tributary states of Bali, Hadiya, Sidama,
and Gurage. It was with the assistance of a Portuguese force of some 400 musketeers
responding to the call for help of Emperor Libne Dingil (that arrived in 1541) that the
Muslim force of Adal was eventually defeated, in the battle of Shimbra Kure in 1543.
Here Gragn was killed (for details, see Trimingham 1952: 84-90, Abir 1968: xix-xx,
Huntingford 1955: 19; Hussein 2001: Ficquet 2006: 47; Østebø 2012: 47-50).

The effect of the fifteen-year wars was equally disastrous for both the Christian
Abyssinian kingdom and the Muslim state of Adal, which were left too weak to resist
the Oromo raids. It is likely that the rapid Oromo incursions at that particular period of
decline also saved Ethiopia from further attacks by the eastern Muslim states. As Abir
put it, the evading Oromo forces unintentionally came to end the wars "between the
Christian and Muslim rivals, gave the Christians a much-needed breathing space, and
broke the Muslim attack" (Abir 1968: xx).

Demographic pressure and internal conflicts

As we saw above, there are a number of hypotheses about the whereabouts of

the original homeland of the Oromo. But there have been few significant attempts to
explain the causes of and factors for the successful territorial expansion of the Oromo
from their original homeland. The above mentioned writers that dealt with the problem
of the Oromo origins also made passing remarks about the causes of the expansion,
and generally share the view that the Oromo originally lived in the eastern parts of the

97
Horn, the vast lowland area in what is now Somaliland and the northern Somalia (see,
for example, Haberland 1963; Braukämper 1980; Mohammed 1994). They were
attacked and forced by the Somali to retreat west and south-west-wards and
subsequently to migrate towards the central highlands of Ethiopia. Accordingly, the
Oromo occupation of the lowland regions preceded that of the Somali; but the latter
eventually became much stronger. Furthermore, the establishment and development of
Muslim sultanates in the region, the reconsolidation of the Abyssinian kingdom, and
the subsequent conflicts and wars between the two since the tenth and the thirteenth
century were also considered to have encouraged the expansion.37 These historical
processes were also said to have disturbed the stability of pastoral life of the Oromo
and their socio-political system, the gada, so much that they were eventually forced to
move (see, for example, Mohammed 1994: 6; and Yilma Deressa 1957 E.C.: 213).
According to Mohammed Hassen, the various Oromo groups were separated from
each other and moved in different directions "[o]wing to the transhumant nature of
their economy" (1994: 5).

But the aforementioned view does not seem acceptable for two simple reasons.
First, as noted by Haberland (1963), it is difficult to conceive of how the same people
who were to be such an irresistible force to penetrate into and occupy large parts of the
Ethiopian empire could be too weak to defend themselves and their territory from the
Somali, who had hardly any advantage over them, neither technological nor numerical
(Haberland 1963: 2). It should also be noted here that the hypothesis of Oromo origins
in the arid lowland Ogaden region has been under question since the 1960s. Apart
from the improbability of the defeat of Oromo by the Somali, for instance, Haberland
forwarded his hypothesis of the Oromo original homeland as "the cool highland in the
region of Bale" based on examinations of historical documents, oral traditions and
culture-trait analyses. Accordingly, the northward Oromo expansion from the Bale

37
Those upholding this view are, among others, Beckingham and Huntingford (1954:
xxi), Trimingham (1952: 210), I.M. Lewis (1960: 227) and Yilma Deressa (1957 E.C.:
213.).

98
region, where they practiced a mixed cattle rearing and grain-growing economy, must
have been caused by demographic pressure (Haberland 1963: 2). Second, it is unlikely
that the migration was a forced one made by entire tribal groupings from "the region
where there was conflict and control to the region where there was no conflict or
control" (Mohammed 1994: 6). It was rather a series of incursions made by smaller
tribal groups at a time while other tribes remained behind, 38 which was motivated
mainly by several internal factors and achieved by way of organized military
expeditions against neighboring territories. The expansion was further facilitated by
cultural openness and flexibility of the Oromo social structure, which allows for
adoption and incorporation (Oromization) of the conquered autochthonous populations
(which shall be touched upon below).

The most serious attempt so far to explain the causes and processes of the
Oromo expansion was made by Jan Hultin. Following suggestions by Izikowitz
(1963), Hultin argues that the problem of Oromo expansion may be understood by
looking for the reasons in the socio-political structure and the value systems of the
people instead of in external causes. Based on written sources 39 and his own field
materials from the southern (Borana) and western Oromo (Macha and Tulema), Hultin
(1987: 60) suggested that the "predatory expansion" of the Oromo was primarily
motivated by two factors: first, the moral and ideological motivation of the gada
system, whereby periodic war raids were prescribed and undertaken by maximal
segments of the tribes against a territory that was attacked by an earlier gada class; and
second, the contradictions within the structure of the minimal patri-lineage that
resulted from the rule of primogeniture, whereby first-born sons hold privileged
positions over their younger brothers (Hultin 1987: 60-68).

38
We know this from Abba Bahrey, who wrote: "When they (first) left their country, they
did not all leave, but whoever wished (to stay) stayed, and whoever wished (to leave)
left" (in Getachew 2002: 199).
39
Jan Hultin largely draws on Abba Bahrey's Ethnography of the [Oromo], and
Asmarom Legesse's Gada (1973).

99
 These are significant points, but Hultin tends to view the problem as reducible
only to these two factors. I contend that developmental sequences and a multiplicity of
causes, especially internal factors, seem also to have much relevance for the question
under discussion. Among others, Hultin pays little attention to the traditional Oromo
institution of adoption (medhicha) and its function of assimilating (‘Oromizing’) other
peoples. In other words, more emphasis should be given to the flexibility and openness
of the Oromo to easily adapt to and intermix with new physical and cultural
environments, to assimilate and at the same time to be absorbed by others. All this
must have facilitated the expansion process. What is more, Hultin may also
underestimate the impact of the practice of polygyny, which seems to be, just like the
rule of primogeniture, a major source of tension and rivalry and feuding within the
patrilineal descent groups, often leading to community fission. Finally, Hultin also
neglects the full impact of ecological and demographic pressures, regardless of the
available historical documents and oral sources to support the assumption. He
contends: "Demographic, as well as ecological factors, may of course have played a
part in the initial phase of the expansion, but they certainly did not in the later stages"
(Hultin 1987: 50). The only reasoning he advances to support his argument is,
"Problems resulting from such an assumed population growth, for example pressure on
resources like grazing land, must have been eliminated already after the first phase of
the expansion" (1987: 50). But this is to belittle the escalating impacts of demographic
pressure and to consider it as a static.

Below, I follow the assumption that the expansion and dispersion of the Oromo
was motivated by: 1. rapid population growth, 2. recurrent conflicts and internal as
well as external wars; 3. other internal societal factors such as the practice of
polygyny, infanticide and the rule of primogeniture.

Needless to say, the relationship between population growth and warfare has
long been recognized. According to several proponents of the shift theory, an
alternative theory of human evolution, warfare and traditional practices such as

100
infanticide were caused by "the need to disperse populations and depress their rates of
growth."40 The case of the Oromo cannot be an exception. This is supported by several
historical sources, ethnographic and sociological studies, as well as by the bulk of
Oromo oral traditions recorded from my fieldwork in the south-western region.

The oldest existing historical sources such as Bahrey (1593) and Almeida
(1628-46) already indicated that there was rapid population growth among the Oromo
during their expansion. According to Almeida, the population increased greatly
‘because each man had many wives’ (1954: 138), of course a quite doubtful assertion.
Whether polygyny necessarily leads to a rapid population growth or not is an issue yet
to be solved. What has so far been known is only that it facilitates warfare, which in
turn leads to dispersion of population and regulation of population growth. The
assumption of demographic pressure as a motivation to the Oromo expansion does not
seem unreasonable when seen against other supportive evidence and findings of
several researchers. Among others, Haberland (1963), Braukämper (1980), Baxter
(1978), Merid (1971), Levine (1974), Asmarom (1973), and Negaso (2001), all accept
the probable impact of demographic pressure in accounting for the Oromo expansion,
though they have not been able to explain how it was caused in its turn.41

More importantly from our point of view in this thesis, the rapid population
growth happens to be one of the most frequently recurring themes of the Macha
Oromo oral narratives. According to a widespread version, the Oromo first moved

40
For example, see the studies by Van der Dennen (1995, 2005); Divale and Harris
(1976), and Harris (1978).
41
Haberland, for instance, contends that the Oromo originally lived in the highland
region of Bali as a single tribe, "until for reasons unknown to us there was a very rapid
rise in the population. As a result they split up into various tribal groups and finally…
overflowed from the highlands and spread out in all directions"(1963: 2). Asmarom
Legesse on his part considers the expansion as "a function of a massive growth in
population that occurred during the sixteenth century"(1973: 8). Levine suggested that it
was triggered by two motives: "a need to carry out ritually prescribed military
expeditions against enemies and a search for new land to accommodate a rapidly growing
population" (Levine 2000: 79-80).

101
from the present-day Borana region in southern Ethiopia to the area known as Madda
Walaabuu, near the River Gennale, where they stayed for a short period of time,
making preparations for their further northward expansion. There they found ample
time, peace, and pasture for their cattle. Hence they rapidly grew in number and
prospered in cattle so much so that they began again to move in different directions in
search of new land and pasture.

Though we do not have adequate historical evidence to substantiate this

assumption and may not be able to explain what exactly caused the sudden
demographic pressure and to the resultant expansion, it seems convincing when seen
in relation with some important Oromo customs and values mentioned above, such as
the high value attached to fertility, historical continuity and territorial expansion. The
following popular Macha Oromo blessing may illustrate this point:

Duumessa ta'a waaqa uwisaa,

Čoqorsa ta'a lafa uwisaa.42

Be a cloud and cover the sky,

Be a quitch-grass and cover the earth.

The Macha, by extension the Oromo as a whole, perceive and express their history of
vast segmentation and territorial expansion in the image of the web-like nature of the
quitch-grass (čoqorsa). As clearly noted by Bartels (1983), the metaphor of the
čoqorsa grass has paramount importance for understanding the people's own view of
historical continuity, dispersion and expansion. Bartels reported how one of his
informants explained the process of the Macha expansion: "As we moved westwards,
it was done like this: the eldest son always remained on his father's land; the other sons

42
Čoqorsa is Eleusine jaegeri Pilg., also called manyatta grass.

102
went in search of new land for themselves. We spread the way chokorsa grass spreads.
Thus, you find our names everywhere in the country" (Bartels 1983: 68).43
What presumably underlies the demographic pressure at the earlier stage of the
expansion as well as in the longstanding years subsequent to their settlement in the
vast areas is a recurring conflict among the various Oromo groups, as well as between
the Oromo and other neighboring peoples, over the most important but scarce
resources – land, water and pasture. According to Tutschek, the Oromo, who were
agriculturalists and cattle-breeders, often went away far to distant areas seeking for
fodder for their numerous herds, "which causes continual disputes with the
neighboring tribes" (1844: xx). Abir also contends that the Oromo invasion of Ethiopia
in the sixteenth century was only aimed at seeking better land to settle in, as they were
deeply disunited and had no unifying ideology (1968: xxii) and hence were attacking
not only other people but also each other.
The tendency towards fission as well as the problem of internal and external
conflicts and wars continued to cause further separations and expansions of the various
tribal groupings even after their penetration and settlement in the central and south-
western regions. With regard to the group under study, Beckingham and Huntingford
(1954: lxxvii) noted that inter-tribal warfare and rifts within the Macha Oromo forced
some of the tribes, such as the Afre confederacy ('the four'), to migrate southwards to
the region of the Gibe river system. The bitter enmity and fighting among the Macha
Oromo of the Five Gibe States was said to have persisted until the eventual

43
The čoqorsa is a runner grass with deep roots that makes it very difficult to uproot.
Besides its web-like spread over the ground, it is highly resistant to drought and thus
survives and provides fodder for the cattle even during periods of prolonged drought.
While creeping over the land, the plant shoots new branches and roots here and there;
therefore, many of its branches are connected with each other and with the mother plant
through common roots, and at the same time each branch seems to have its independent
existence with its own roots and branches. The 'ever-green' čoqorsa grass is used in many
social and religious ritual contexts and serves as a symbol of life, fertility, endurance,
connectedness, continuity and proliferation of the Maccha lineage. By the same token, it
may be used to illustrate the continuous process, the 'alpha-omega' of fission-fusion and
expansion of the Oromo-speaking peoples of Ethiopia as a whole (cf. Hultin 1987: 8).

103
incorporation of the region at the end of the nineteenth century (Beckingham &
Huntingford 1954: lxxxvi-lxxviii). According to Cerulli, in a period of five years
beginning from 1855, during which the Oromo tribes beyond the Gibe were converted
into Muslims, nineteen wars were fought between these five states, "often occasioned
by religious pretexts which several times disguised the usual motives of competition"
(1922: 14).44
Warfare was constant among the Oromo groups who fought each other as well
as non-Oromo peoples, which was also the case of the Amhara regional groups. In
line with this, Mohammed Hassen's book, The Oromo of Ethiopia (1994), is worth
mentioning for its detailed account of the internal divisions and warfare’s among the
Macha Oromo in general and the Five Gibe States in particular. It discusses at length
how they went on weakening each other and contributed towards their own
incorporation into the Ethiopian state beginning from as early as the reign of Susneyos
(r. 1606-32) until they were completely brought under control of the Ethiopian state by
Menelik II in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. More importantly, Mohammed
discusses how internal conflicts, along with other internal factors such as the
differentiation in wealth, the rapid increase in population and the topography of the
land, caused the breakdown of the Oromo ‘unity’ (Mohammed 1994: 58-65).

Apart from the internal factors mentioned above, from an insiders' point of view
one major source of tension and conflict within Oromo family life is the old custom of
polygyny, which allows a man to marry as many wives as his wealth permits him (see
chapter 7). Though this custom seems to be on decline since the introduction of
Christianity among some Oromo groups beginning from the eighteenth century, it is
still practiced among many followers of Islam and among the traditionalists believing
in Waaq. It has been said to have a considerable impact on the relationships between
members of the patrilineal descent group. As is generally the case the relationship

44
E. Cerulli (1922) also gives a large collection of original as well as English translations
of historical songs of the southwestern Oromo, which recount the heroic deeds of the
warriors of each group in the wars against each other.

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between co-wives is usually one of antagonism and rivalry, as a result of competition
and conflict over their husband's affection and favors, as well as over access to
household resources and inheritance of the family patrimony (cf. Asmarom 1973: 24;
Levine 2000: 129; Negaso 2001: 22). Culturally, this is expressed in the Oromo term
for co-wives, masaanuu, which symbolizes jealousy, rivalry and animosity among two
or more individuals or groups sharing something.

The hostility between co-wives also seems to affect the relationship between
their respective children, who often compete over physical and intangible family
things. In fact step-siblings may have much more reason to fight each other than we
can imagine. Here it will suffice to say that the custom of polygyny among the Oromo,
coupled with the rule of primogeniture, was and is a major source of strife between
both co-wives and between their (step-) children, as well as between fathers and sons.
Among the Maccha Oromo, step-siblings are generally expected to be enemies and are
culturally referred to as ilmaan masaanuu (the children of the malevolent co-wives).
The friction between (step-) brothers is said to be so great that it often drive them to
separate from each other and/or, after the nineteenth century incorporation, move in
different directions to establish their own households or to seek other means of
livelihood than farming. In this way, polygyny may have contributed to the
fragmentation and disunity of the Oromo-speaking peoples in general and the various
Maccha Oromo groups in particular.

With regard to this, it should be noted that the political incorporation of the
Oromo in the Ethiopian empire’s political structures at the end of the nineteenth
century was probably also the result of disunity of and armed conflicts among the
Oromo (sub-) tribal groupings. 45 An elderly informant from the Leqa of Eastern
Wollega succinctly gave his view on the causes and consequences of the Oromo
disunity as follows:

45
This was a commonly held view of the majority of my informants in most of the
research areas.

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 The Oromo people may get together and deliberate on a certain matter;
however, they can never arrive at a consensus. We are like a handful of
sand; as soon as you let it out of your hand, it falls apart. Similarly, the
Oromo cannot stand in unison and act collectively. Do you know why? It
is because the Oromo are the children of the malevolent co-wives; we are
all brothers and the children of one father but of different mothers. This
is why we are always at daggers drawn and at war with each other. They
often fight at the side of the enemy and consign each other to the enemy.
In the past, they always quarreled and fought over land. For instance,
Tulema and Macha were stepbrothers, the senior and junior sons of
Borana; they were born from different mothers. The mother of Tulema
was known as Siré, while that of Macha was Akito. These two brothers
had always borne malice for each other. Even today their descendants are
not in good terms; they are kept at arm's length. They never liked each
other beginning from the time immemorial. It is the same with the other
Oromos. While they were at war with each other, the Amhara came and
took their land. It is but the Oromo themselves who handed over the land
to the Amhara. The Amhara had never defeated the Oromo. The one who
won and subdued the Oromo was the Oromo themselves.46

What can be surmised from the foregoing discussion is that the strong interest
for and severe conflicts over land and pasture and other scarce resources including
local political power, must have set the large Oromo groups against each other as well
as against others. This process, facilitated by other internal factors (which shall be
touched upon below), might eventually have resulted in fission and dispersion of the
once more homogeneous Oromo society into numerous disunited Oromo-speaking
groups (in some cases different language speaking groups) that settled among and
subsequently coalesced with the various ethno-linguistic groups in Ethiopia. In this
way, needless to say, the Oromo have become active agents for and integral parts of
the Ethiopian multiethnic state and society. 47 The point to be made here is that internal

46
Interview with Obbo Emiru Gebre (72), March 3, 2007, Neqemte.
47
Mohammed Hassen (1994: 6) contends that at the initial stage of the separation the
group which moved to the region west of the Ganale River acquired the name Borana,
while the other which remained in area east of the Ganale retained the old Cushitic name

106
factors, in-group tensions and conflicts inherent to the socio-political institutions, must
have played a more important role than external factors.

The role of the gada system

According to Bahrey, the Oromo had already been divided into two major groups,
Barentu and Borana, by the time they began their incursion into the neighboring
territories. Each of these was comprised of numerous patrilineal descent groups often
separated and occasionally (re-)united into patrilineal segments (tribal confederacies)
for launching predatory expeditions within the framework of the gada system every
eight years. This may be best understood in relation with the cognitive foundation of
'coalitional aggression.' From the point of view of an evolutionary psychological
analysis (cf. Tooby and Cosmides 1988), coalitional aggression evolves because it
allows the male participants in such coalitions to increase their probability of victory
in warfare, to assure random distribution of the risk of death and fair allocations of the
benefits of victory among participants, and efficiency in utilization of reproductive
resources. In other words, coalitional aggressions are formed to allow participants to
promote their fitness by gaining access to disputed material and reproduction
enhancing resources that would otherwise be denied to them (van der Dennen 1995:
4). This evolutionary approach may be helpful to explain not only the evolution of
such cooperative aggression groups or, in case of the Oromo, the tribal confederacies,
but also its far reaching implication of the continuous process of fission and fusion
within the Oromo social organization, which eventually resulted in their great
expansion.

As indicated above, whenever the large number of tribal groups within the
Barentu and Borana, often divided and reorganized into various patrilineal segments,

of Barentu. Similarly, Donald Levine (1974: 135) indicated that oral traditions of the Arsi
place the break-up of the Oromo into separate tribes in the first decade of the sixteenth
century.

107
happened to be victorious in their incursions into neighboring territories, further
fission and dispersion of each tribe occurred. This means, more and more divisions
and segmentations occurred within those tribal groups that were united in their battle
against common enemies and for common interests. Some members of the groups
remained in their traditional territory, while others moved into the newly acquired
areas, each evolving into an independent community, socially and politically, within
its own confines. Abba Bahrey left us a detailed account of this cyclic process of
fission and segmentation within the tribal organization of the Oromo during their
penetration into the interior of Ethiopia in the sixteenth century. In an attempt to show
this continuous process of fission and fusion within the Borana Oromo, he wrote:

The father of the Boren was called Seppira. Seppira begot Datche, and
Datche begot Metcha. Metcha begot Da'ale and Jidda. And the two
brothers gave birth to many tribes… All these are called Tulema, 48
because they are many. They used to make war together; (but) after a
long while, they quarreled with each other and separated from each
other, as Abraham and Lot separated when their herds became a
multitude,49 that they said to one another: 'Let us separate, so that if you
are to the right, I be to the left; or if I am to the right, you be to the left.'
… Similarly, the two tribes of Da'ale, who are Tchile and the Hoko, and
also the two tribes of Jidda, Liben and Gudru, separated from their
brothers and formed unity; and were called Afre,50 in the time of the
luba51… Furthermore, the Hakako, sons of Jidda, and the children of
Da'ale, Abbo and the Suba, formed unity in the time of the luba, called
Birmeje; and were called Seddecha52…. When all these are allied, they

48
"Tulema" in Oromo language means something piled up or abundant.
49
It should be noted that the monk Abba Bahrey used this biblical allusion (Genesis 13:9)
to explain the reason for separation of the two, from which it can be inferred that it was
caused not only by "their growing number of cattle," as indicated in the footnote of
Getachew Haile's English translation of Ethnography of the [Oromo], p. 197, but more
importantly by the rapid growing number of population of the two tribes. This
interpretation finds clear indication in the frequent reference the writer makes to: "…the
two brothers gave birth to many tribes…."
50
Derived from the Oromo word "afur" (four),"Afre" means "the four."
51
Luba is the sixth of the ten gada grades wherein a class of mature men are initiated to
an eight-year period of leadership of the tribe.
52
Means "the three," from "sadi" (three).

108
 are called Metcha; and when they quarrel, they are called Afre and
Seddecha. When they are all united with the Tulema, they are called
Seppira (in Getachew 2002: 196-98, emphasis added).
In a slightly different vein, Almeida wrote that the Oromo could have
conquered the whole country if they had not been divided into various groups that
were fighting each other. "If God had not blinded them [Oromo] and willed that
certain families or tribes among them should be at war with one another constantly,
there would not have been an inch of land in the empire, of which they were not
masters" (Almeida 1954: 135).

It may be safely inferred from the two quotations above that the consistent
fission and segmentation, and conflicts within the several tribes, which were
considered by Almeida only as a problem that hindered the Oromo from conquering
the whole of the Ethiopia, were at the same time both important motivations for their
great dispersion and territorial expansion.

This brings us to the role that the gada system and related institutions within the
system played in facilitating the continuous process of fission and fusion and
expansion in the ethno-regional organization of the Oromo.

The overall operation of the gada system is too complicated and exhibits
considerable regional variations to present in detail. It also lost its actual political
significance long ago among nearly all groups, which makes it difficult to reconstruct
the details of its structure, function, constituent parts and their interrelations. Besides,
it has been discussed at length by a number of scholars, such as Asmarom (1973),
Hallpike (1976), Prins (1953), Cerulli (1922), Beckingham & Huntingford (1954),
Lewis (1964), Levine (1974) and Bassi (2005). For the purposes of this chapter, I limit
myself to sketching the most important structural and functional features of the system
that seem to have relevance for understanding the Oromo expansion and in view of the
formation and expression of (segmentary) local identities among the south-western
Oromo.

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 The gada system has been variously defined by different writers. For the
purpose of this chapter, however, the definition of Asmarom Legesse is adopted:

The gada system is a system of classes (luba) that succeed each other
every eight years in assuming military, economic, political, and ritual
responsibilities. Each gada class remains in power during a specific term
(gada) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony.
Before assuming a position of leadership, the gada class is required to
wage war against a community that none of their ancestors had raided.
This particular war is known as butta and is waged on schedule every
eight years. It is this event that was most directly connected with the
pulsating frontier of their dominions in the sixteenth century leading
toward the conquest of nearly half of Ethiopia's land surface (1973: 8).
The gada system is an exclusively masculine domain whereby male members
of every local Oromo group are classified into generation-sets (gada classes, luba) and
age-sets (peer-groups, hirriyyaa). The classes occupy hierarchical gada grades and
succeed each other every eight years. This means, every eight years all members of
each class move into the next higher grade, assuming different corporate
responsibilities and rights. The generation sets, hence, could be understood as groups
or classes of men organized into two cyclic series of five gada classes each, i.e. a set
of five gada classes of the fathers' generation and five classes of the sons,' "who share
the same status and who perform their rites of passage together …" (Asmarom 1973:
51). The gada classes of the sons always follow those of the fathers' in the gada grades
every forty years. The age-sets, hiriyyaa, which means peer-groups, refer to an
organization of all males born within a specified eight-year period, which thus would
share the same status and roles and get initiated together into a series of rites of
passage or grades via rituals celebrated every eight years. The gada grades amount to
formal stages of development, through which every male member of the society passes
in an ascending order from one level to the next every eight-years. The full cycle of
the gada system, thus, consists of ten grades, each of which is always occupied by a
group of men for a period of eight years which makes a total of eighty years of one full
gada cycle.

110
 The gada grades are designated by distinct names, varying from region to
region, but with more or less similar tasks or positions through which every male
member of the two sets of gada classes hierarchically moves every eight years.

Detailed description of the gada grades can be found in the anthropological

literarure, e.g. on the Borana (Prins 1953, Asmarom 1973, Hallpike 1976, Bassi 2005),
and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the dominant functional feature of
the gada system, which played a critical role towards the fission and expansion of the
Oromo, lies in its dual system of stratification of the society into a large number of
rival age-sets and gada classes. As such a foregrounded theme of social differentiation
runs through the entire system. This confirms to Jaenen's observation that the very
term gada represents "that which is separated" (1956: 178). Asmarom also considers
the gada as a system of temporal differentiation of a society that allows for
institutionalized segregation of generations into opposite and rival sectors of the life
cycle. This means, the society is continuously "stratified into two distinct but cross-
cutting systems of peer-group structures… in which the members of each class are
recruited strictly on the basis of chronological age… and genealogical generations"
(1973: 50).

In the system, thus, a boy enters the lowest grade exactly forty years behind his
father, regardless of his and his father’s physical age. The sons never occupy a
leadership position as long as their fathers are still in active service; it is only when the
set of the fathers' class moves out of the leadership position that the set of the sons'
class can move in. This is the basic rule of the gada system that entails an
institutionalized conflict and social distance between the fathers and sons; the two
generations are not only separated but there is a consistent strife and "mock battle"
between them. The rule functions as a way of putting limits on the authority of the
older generations and of equitably distributing social duties and privileges across
generational lines. More importantly, the development of social distance between
parents and children weakens individualized bonds and facilitates the formation of

111
groups on the basis of descent (filiations). It also encourages the formation of
corporate groups and a strong sense of such group identities (local groups and local
identities) within larger ethno-regional groupings.

The gada system thus seems to have traditionally centered on ritually

prescribed periodic warfare or raiding expedition. Needless to say, the gada system is
a socio-political as well as a military institution that allows for supply of young men
for group aggression and leadership at the same time. No wonder that Tutschek's entry
for the word gada reads, "to go a robbing at night …, to go on a warlike adventure at
night" (1844: 54). Both written historical and oral sources indicate that it was an
indispensable requirement for every gada class that before assuming a leadership
position they should wage an offensive war or a predatory raiding expedition against
an 'inimical community' (non-Oromo as well as Oromo) which were not yet attacked
by any of its predecessors (Abba Bahrey in Getachew 2002: 206).

As in many traditional societies, among the Oromo the success in warfare was
not only important to the social and political status of individual members, but also
affected the development of the gada class and its successors as a whole, for as much
as eight generations. According to Asmarom, initially this cyclic military event, the
butta, was not merely a sacrificial ritual, meat feast or transition rite:

It was the main occasion for the great wars and campaigns of the
[Oromo] and as such it has a great significance for our understanding of
Ethiopian history. Butta was the occasion on which the gada class was
expected to go out into enemy territory and to bring back the spoils of
war. It was the time when the warriors sought to punish those who raided
the camps of their fathers and their ancestors. It was the time when
young men sought to build up their prestige as warriors and, thereby,
improve their prospects for marriage and political office. In earlier
centuries, the butta wars probably played a critical role in the evolution
of the Oromo polity. The vast expansion of the [Oromo] in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries must be understood, in part, as a function of
the structural requirements of the gada system. Under normal
circumstances the butta wars were nothing more than large cattle raids.

112
 In times of rapid population expansion, however, they turned into large-
scale campaigns (1973: 74).53

The butta must also have been the cause for the endemic internal wars and
clashes that generally characterized Oromo groupings during and subsequent to their
expansion, and in some cases even after their incorporation into the Ethiopian state in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Among others, the perpetual clashes among
the Borana, Guji, and Arsi attests to this fact.

Two important corollaries to this institutionalized warfare worth consideration

are the ‘cult of masculinity’, as demonstrated by displays of aggressive prowess in
battles, and the custom of infanticide. While not requiring a full treatment here in the
theoretical sense, these factors deserve some discussion. It has already been indicated
that an Oromo man could not be considered marriageable before he had entered the
fifth grade (senior warrior grade) and bloodied his spear in warfare or predatory
raiding expeditions; nor was he allowed to raise boys and daughters before
participating in the fatherhood and circumcision ceremonies that would occur at the
end of the fifth grade and in the third year of the sixth grade, respectively. Here the
tendency towards a general preference to raise boys is manifest, though infanticide
was practiced on both sexes. It is generally the case that in societies where warfare and
predatory raids are customary practices, the survival of each group is conceived as
contingent upon the rearing of combat-ready sons; correspondingly, males and
masculinity are more valued than females and feminine attributes (see, for example,
Van der Dennen 1995: 9). It follows that the restriction of marriage and the practice of
preferential female infanticide facilitate warfare. To this end, the former motivates the
sexually deprived young men to engage so readily in warfare, regardless of all possible
risks at stake, in order to enhance their prospects for sex and marriage that would

53
In line with this, Prins indicated, citing Michels 1940, the importance of predatory
raiding and killing; "A curious corollary of the necessity to kill is the periodic occurrence,
every eight years, of [Oromo] aggressions upon their neighbours" (1953: 72).

113
otherwise be denied to them. As noted by Van der Dennen, "… the sexually frustrated
young males are controlled by the men's' club and the cult of masculinity: an
institution most suited for conducting wars" (1995: 10; see also Van der Dennen
2005).

Correspondingly, the practice of selective female infanticide entails the

elimination of female infants and at the same time the rearing and maturation of many
more boys than girls. As a result, there exists a relative shortage of marriageable girls
among young men. This shortage of girls is further intensified by the practice of
polygyny, as well as the rule of primogeniture, which allows older and senior men to
have as many wives as they can afford leaving the younger combat-ready men
wifeless. The effect of this culturally created shortage of women for the younger age
category is manifested in two interrelated ways: 1) the persistent existence of tensions,
conflicts and feuding over women, often resulting in internal warfare and in-group
fission; 2) the practices that sustain male supremacy and the high value of masculine
displays (such as patrilocality, polygyny, marriage by capture and bride wealth,
aggressiveness and fighting prowess, and the sexual and political privileges reserved
for successful men in battle).

The practice of female infanticide, coupled with that of polygyny, thus,

facilitates coalitional aggressions and warfare against 'enemies' both within- and out-
groups. Warfare in its turn leads to elimination of ‘excess’ male population. This is a
continuous cyclic process which is perpetuated through the generations, all of which
boils down in the fission and dispersion of groups and the control of excess
population. The interrelationship between traditional warfare, infanticide, polygyny
and male supremacy, and the manner in which traditional societies regulate their
population has been postulated by Divale (1974) as follows:

Infanticide is practiced on both males and females for a variety of reasons.

However, since there is a general preference to have a boy as the first child
… In the childhood generation boys greatly outnumbered girls because of
female infanticide. But in the adult generation the ratio between the sexes

114
 is balanced because males die in warfare. However, even though the adult
ratio is about equal a relative women shortage still exists because of the
practice of polygyny. The constant warfare of these societies creates a
constant need for warriors and it is this need which causes the cultural
preference for a boy as the first child which begins the process in the first
place. The root of this entire system is a culturally produced women
shortage. Female infanticide and polygyny create shortage of women
which leads to wars which in turn favor male infants, etc. The cycle is
continuous and each generation creates conditions which perpetuate the
process in succeeding generations. The next effect is the control of excess
population (as quoted by Van der Dennen 1995: 9-10).

Oromo traditions of adoption (Oromization)

It has already been indicated that one of the major factors that facilitated the
great Oromo expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth century and subsequently
their dispersal to large parts of Ethiopia was the ‘openness’ of the people to adapt to
new ecological, social and cultural conditions. The Oromo are reputedly known for
their ability to make friends out of outsiders, i.e., to incorporate (‘Oromize’) as well as
to assimilate the non-Oromo peoples living in the areas they penetrated: "They readily
found ways of relating to peoples near whom they settled once the antagonisms of
battle were temporarily or permanently set aside" (Levine 2007: 56). It is this openness
and adaptability that made it easy for remnants of the conquered peoples such as, for
instance, the Hadiya, Sidama, and Gedeo in the south to join the Oromo communities.
In line with this, Herbert Lewis has observed how much the Shoa Oromo are open for
members of non-Oromo groups: "Shoa [Oromo] communities are open communities,
easy for newcomers to join… New settlers are accepted if they are willing to
participate in community affairs. Members of other ethnic groups, such as Amharas,
are accepted if they are cooperative" (as quoted by Levine 1974: 162).

The other way around, many of the Oromo-speaking groups have also been able
to adopt non-Oromo cultural elements and at the same time to share their own with

115
those peoples near whom they settled. For instance, the northern Oromo, the Wollo,
Yajju and the Rayya, many of whom have been intermixed with the Amhara and
Tigrai peoples, accepting Christianity, adopting many of their practices and learning to
speak the Amharic and Tigrigna languages. The eastern Oromo (Harar) became
Muslims, some of whom have greatly acculturated to their Somali neighbors to the
extent of assuming Somali genealogy. The south-western Oromo (the Macha) early
became agriculturalists; some of them accepting Islam and developing monarchic
political systems, while others became followers of the Orthodox Christian Church or
the Protestant Church, and inter-marrying with members of other ethnic groups. One
proof of the influence of Oromo culture on other cultures of Ethiopia, for instance on
the Amhara, can be seen in the large number of Oromo loan words and idioms in the
Amharic language. It is interesting to note that the peculiar Ethiopian highland culture
habit of eating raw meat must have been learnt from the Oromo people (see Ludolphus
1682: 84). This cultural flexibility and openness to readily incorporate as well as
assimilate and intermix with non-Oromo peoples of Ethiopia and to adopt to and
influence cultures of others, not only facilitated their expansion over vast areas of
Ethiopia, but also wrought far-reaching changes on the ethnic and cultural features of
Ethiopia. It played a significant role in the formation of the modern multi-ethnic
Ethiopian state in the nineteenth century.

The Oromo had two important ways of incorporating aliens, defeated or

otherwise, into their community. Especially in the south-western region these are
known as medhicha and moggaasa.

Medhicha is a traditional system whereby remnants of the defeated

autochthonous groups – a lot of whom were either evacuating their own territory or
fleeing to safer areas or to submit to the conqueror - are ritually adopted (Oromized)
and incorporated into an Oromo clan or tribe. Upon raiding and conquering a new
territory, the victorious Oromo group took the defeated pre-existing non-Oromo
peoples, along with their land and other properties, into its possession and made them

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its subjects (medhicha). Adoption of the submitted group(s) and making them subjects
was done through a ceremony to be led by the Abba Gada of the conqueror group. The
ceremony consisted of slaughtering sacrificial bulls and a declaration of the inclusion
of the hitherto alien groups. To this end, pieces of hide (medhicha) are cut off from
limbs of the sacrificial bulls and put on the wrists of the conquered individuals. First, a
spear is dipped into the blood of the sacrificed bulls and planted at the center of the
assembly composed of the gada class of the Oromo and representatives of the other
groups. Then the Abba Gada says a prayer, blessing his clan (gosa) as well as the
newcomers. At the end of the blessing, the Abba Gada and representatives of the alien
groups touch the bloodied spear and the former pronounces an oath of incorporation of
the new members into his clan or tribe. In pronouncing the oath, to be repeated in
chorus by those to be adopted, the Abba Gada says:

I hate all that you hate,

I like all that you like,
My enemy is your enemy,
Your enemy is my enemy,
I fight those you fight,
I will always share your fate,
In times of peace and war,
In times of prosperity and adversity.

Bound by this unbreakable oath of mutual relationship, thenceforward the

adopted aliens become "ilmaan gosaa" (sons of the gosa) and would be collectively
identified with the gosa, taking up the genealogy and tracing their patrilineal descent
several generations back to the mythical father of the adoptive tribe or confederacy.
The pieces of hide (medhicha) put on them symbolize their integration not only into
the clan that adopted them but also into the tribe and tribal confederacy to which the
clan belonged, and by extension into Oromo society. The blood symbolizes the newly
forged solidarity (corporate-ness) or brotherhood among the adopted sons and the gosa
as a whole. By the same token, the bloodied spear symbolizes the mutual obligation
and readiness of the gosa to fight for protection of rights of its newly acquired sons,

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and reciprocally readiness of the adopted sons to fight for the common good and cause
of the gosa. Through the medhicha system, the subjected groups were traditionally
assured protection, social and legal rights and made marriageable partners; while they
were turned into fighting units to be used by the Oromo in future attacks on other
'enemies.'54 Eventually, however, the conquered people became to be accorded with
lower status and made into tribute-paying and service-giving serfs, and hence referred
to as gabra, which amounts to mean 'slaves,' as distinguished from the 'free men'
referred to as Borana. The gabra are often assumed to have outnumbered the
conqueror Oromo. The popular Oromo expression, "Nine are the Borana (the Oromo)
and ninety are the gabra" (Salgan Borana, sagaltamman gabra), captures this
historical process.

Moggaasa, the second traditional institution, is a system whereby both gabras

and Oromo persons originally belonging to a small or weak clan secure vertical
mobility into a status of free men and membership in a stronger clan, respectively. For
common understanding, the moggaasa may be likened to the process of naturalization
in many of the modern states. Through the moggaasa - which literally means 'to give a
name' - a man who originally belongs to a lower class or a weaker group is ritually
adopted into and conferred with equal social status or identification with a stronger
group. The ritual of moggaasa is almost similar to that of medhicha with one major
variation: it involves changing the name of the adopted individual along with that of
his father and his patrilineal linage as a whole.

It goes without saying that the incorporation and Oromization of a large number
of non-Oromo peoples into the Oromo-speaking communities, as well as the
subsequent inequality that occurred between the subjected and their conquerors, has

54
Mohammed Hassen has indicated how the Oromo increased the number of fighters and
their fighting capacity by incorporating the defeated groups. In so doing, however, he has
committed two errors. First, he mistakenly used the term moggaasa for medhicha, which
refers to an entirely different concept. Secondly, he confused the concept of gudifacha
with moggaasa, p. 21-23. For further understanding of these institutions, see also, for
example, Negaso (2001: 34-40).

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manifested itself in two important and interdependent developments. Coupled with
other factors mentioned above, 1) it intensified the differentiations and internal
conflicts within the Oromo-speaking groupings, and thereby facilitated the process of
fission and diversification within the Oromo and the formation of various local groups
and identities; 2) it created a conducive ground for a wide range of interactions,
intermixture and integration of the Oromo with other peoples of Ethiopia, which
significantly contributed to the eventual formation of the modern Ethiopian state and
society in the end of the nineteenth century.

Concluding remarks

This chapter discussed the possible historical and sociological causes of the Oromo
expansion, and their fission and segmentation, so as to understand the role and place of
folklore in construction and negotiation of the ideological bases for identification with
a local group and the dissociation from others within the south-western Oromo social
organization. The chapter has shown how multifaceted socio-historical, cultural,
economic and political factors contributed to the great Oromo expansion and the
formation of several sub-regional and/or local groups and sense of ‘distinct’ local
identities within the larger Oromo society.

It appears that the Oromo often define the inclusive community on the level of a
‘sub-ethnic’ entity. Thus the various Oromo groups today identify themselves as
Borana, Guji, Arsi, Karrayyu, Rayya, Jimma, Gera, Leqa, Sibu, Harar, Horro, etc.,
within which loyalty is also expected toward one's (sub-) ethnic or local community
rather than to the broader Oromo identity. Each such community followed its own
destiny within its territory, fighting for its own group interest rather than for the
common good of ‘the Oromo’ as a whole. This political particularization, based on
narrowly defined group interest seems to have significantly contributed towards the
breakdown of an originally small-scale and probably more ‘homogeneous’ Oromo

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society into a large number of diversified Oromo-speaking groups that spent as much
time, if not more, fighting each other as fighting other peoples. In Mohammed
Hassen's words, "With their spread over wider territory, it became very difficult to
reconcile the interests of various groups. Clan interest replaced the wider interest of
the confederacy…. With the break-up of confederacies, different groups fought against
each other as much as they fought their enemies" (1994: 58).

The old socio-political system of the Oromo, the gada, also seems to have
contributed to the fragmentation of the Oromo society. Besides the ‘democratic’
nature evident in its parliamentary-government type of leadership, institutionalized
limitation of power, and periodic power transfer, the most important feature of the
gada system lies in the institutionalized warfare: armed expedition (butta) waged on
schedule every eight years, which led to dispersal and fission of the society over varied
ecological settings. Though the precise processes and factors of Oromo expansion and
diversification need further investigation, the present chapter has discussed some of
the historical and cultural aspects of the expansion and its far-reaching impacts on
Oromo society as well as on the ethnic and cultural picture of the wider Ethiopian
society. Folkloric performances of the south-western Oromo, as currently observable,
illustrate the ongoing production of local Oromo sub-group identities and will be
discussed in the ensuing chapters.

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Chapter 5

Theorizing narration: an approach to Macha local identity

narratives

…in order to make minimal sense of our lives, in

order to have an identity, we need an orientation to
the good… we grasp our lives in a narrative…. In
order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have
a notion of how we have become, and of where we are
going. We must inescapably understand our lives… in
narrative form...
Charles Taylor, 1989: 47, 52

Introduction

The past few decades have seen the steady growth in narrative studies in the social and
human sciences (see Czarniawska 2004; Herman et al. 2005). The broad interest in
narrative denotes a scholarly fascination with the way people understand themselves,
their lives and experiences through narrative - a crucial mode of self-representation,
positioning and knowledge whereby human life is conceptualized and made
meaningful in terms of people’s personal and group experience. More specifically, the
narrative tradition in cultural studies commonly denotes a subjective, multiple, social
constructionist and interpretive perspective on human experience. Needless to say, it
also has a formative impact on identities. Increased growing amount of research has
pointed to the ‘storied nature’ of life, the active self-shaping quality of human thought,
and the inter-subjective construction of knowledge and experience. Narrative practices
have the power to construct and refashion personal as well as collective identity.
Hinchman and Hinchman (2001) emphasized the importance of the narrative

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perspective as follows: ‘Every phenomenon social scientists investigate arises out of a
web of communication that, in turn, depends largely on personal or social narratives’
(2001: xiv). 1

In line with the now widespread understanding of narrative and narrativity as

concepts of both social epistemology and social ontology, the concepts have been
defined in multiple different ways. For the purpose of this thesis, focused on the
presentation and interpretation of narratives as modes of self-representation by Oromo,
I follow Somers and Gibson’s definition of narrative as: ‘… constellations of
relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal
emplotment’ (1994: 59, emphasis in the original). Here the underlying assumption is
that the meaning of an event can be discerned only in a narrated temporal, spatial and
causal or contextual relationship to other events. It is through selective appropriation
and interconnection of events and actions - emplotment - and normative evaluation of
these elements that narratives construct networks of relationships and thereby
discursively express experience as well as generate meaning, coherence and direction
in life. According to Hinchman and Hinchman (2001: xiv), narratives emphasize ‘the
active, self-shaping quality of human thought, the power of stories to create and
refashion personal identity.’ Ricoeur (1991) noted that life becomes meaningful and
human by being articulated in a narrative way; and identity is constructed, constituted
and reconstituted in the process of narrating it.2

1
In this connection, it should also be noted how this growing popularity of narrative has
of late awakened critical writings and warnings against ‘narrativity’ (Strawson 2004), and
‘narrative imperialism,’ the marked tendency of narrative researchers ‘to claim more and
more territory, more and more power for our object of study and our ways of studying it’
(Phelan 2005: 206).
2
In Somers and Gibson’s words: ‘it is through narrativity that we come to know,
understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and
narrativity that we constitute our social identities. … all of us come to be who we are
(however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by locating ourselves (usually
unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our making’ (1994: 59, emphasis in the
original).

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 The present chapter sets out to illuminate the formal, cultural and pragmatic
foundations - the discursive concepts, resources, situations, conventions and practices -
- of the narrative construction and articulation of local identity, on the basis of the
tradition of the south-western Oromo of Ethiopia. In cognizance of the conception of
identity as discursively constituted, constructed and reconstructed rhetorical reality in
situated acts of speaking and other signifying practices (Bauman 2004; Somers 1994),
I emphasize the importance of a processual understanding of the dynamics of
conversational narrative practices in which participants collaboratively construct and
display their sense of reality. Specifically, a process-oriented understanding of the
discursive mechanisms and functions of narrative performances - what functional
claims they make and how the claims are corroborated by other discursive forms and
intertextual productions - examining the form-meaning-function interrelationships is to
be aimed at. The major concern of the chapter is thus the explication of multifaceted
discursive processes, the interactive face-to-face communicative acts, the culturally
available expressive resources and conventions, and the situational and extra-
situational factors that shape the production and interpretation of narrative
performances in the region. The Oromo tradition in the various regions discussed (see
previous chapters) provide the ethno-cultural framework within which these
performances are expressed. The underlying intention of this thesis is to investigate
how the people under study discursively construct meaning and social cohesion, i.e., -
how they make sense of themselves and their world in relation to that of others,- by
temporally and causally interweaving seemingly separate symbolic elements into
coherent and effective (aesthetically and pragmatically) narrative performances. In this
respect, these theoretical explorations provide a connective thread for the chapters to
follow and thereby yielding a more holistic understanding of the problem.

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The socio-political context

The south-western Oromo or Macha inhabit the present-day Jimma, East Wollega, Illu
Abba Bor and West Shoa administrative zones of Oromia Regional State. Within each
of these zones there are a large number of locales or districts (woräda or anaa), largely
based on pre-existing local groupings. The groups claim to be agnatically related to
each other and even trace descent from common ancestors -- often the first pioneers
who settled in the area generations ago -- and to share local historical memory, a sense
of belonging to the common ancestral territory, and moral and ethical values, all of
which are articulated in their narrative performances.

The various Oromo groups have their own specific migration histories. For
instance, the Macha Oromo are said to have migrated from a place called Hooda Bisil
in West Shoa area and moved further westward, and settling in the south-western
region at the end of the sixteenth century, displacing pre-existing peoples such as the
Kaffa and Ennarya (see, for example, Hassen 1994; Hultin 1987; Tesema 1986).
Initially, the Macha were said to have consisted of several named tribal and sub-tribal
clusters. After the incorporation of the south-western Oromo region into the Ethiopian
state at the end of the nineteenth century, followed by the assimilationist ‘nation-
building’ processes (by way of modern education and bureaucracy), the political
significance of the (sub-) tribal structures appeared to have substantially declined.
Subsequently, tribal (clan) names were mostly used as regional, sub-regional and local
designations (Huntingford 1955; Knutsson 1969; Levine 2000; Lewis 2001).

Even if the tribal structural basis of the Oromo society and the relative value
attached to its elements at different levels has changed over time, the change is often
downplayed by folkloric constructions of history that emphasize social and cultural
continuity.3 This seems especially applicable to the situation following the Ethiopian
revolution in 1974 that removed the imperial regime. The demise of imperial rule in

3
Cohen (1982: 10) has made a similar observation in his study of the social organization
and local identity in the British rural cultures.

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Ethiopia was followed by a time of revival and reconstruction of Oromo cultural
values, thereby producing a heightened sense of Oromo identity. The small educated
Oromo elite and the rural non-literate masses alike to some extent ‘rediscovered’
traditional structures, practices and cultural values as a way of repudiating the cultural,
political and economic domination that Oromo had faced under the old imperial polity
(see also Hultin 2003; Merera 2003).

Nevertheless, ethnic and sub-ethnic consciousness seems also to have become

more evident in the much-politicized environment of inter- and intra-ethnic relations in
post-1991 Ethiopia, following the TPLF/EPRDF-tailored reordering of the Ethiopian
state on the basis of ethno-linguistic criteria. Leaving out the details that have already
oversaturated the socio-political literature on the country, it suffices to say that the
current ethno-regional federal structure of multi-ethnic Ethiopia has wrought
significant socio-economic and political changes in the country, based on a political
recognition of ethnicity (see, Abbink 1997: 160; Merera 2003: 151-52).

In spite of the constitutional goal of the ethno-regional federalism of Ethiopia --

“in full and free exercise of [nations, nationalities and peoples] right to self-
determination, to building a political community founded on the rule of law and
capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing
[their] economic and social development’’ 4 -- the stark reality in the country is an
ongoing degradation of local autonomy and hence more localized intra- and inter-
ethnic conflicts and intra- and inter-elite competitions (cf. Abbink 2005, 2006; Asnake
2009; Merera 2003; Paulos 2007).

The new ethnic/linguistic-based regionalization policy introduced from above

not only led to sharpened ethnic consciousness and difference between the various
ethno-regional groups, but also to a resurgence of local boundaries and a sense of
distinctiveness between the major (sub-) ethnic groups. Correspondingly, old socio-

4
Preamble of FDRE Constitution 1995: 75.

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political relations among the various groups in the country have altered. For instance,
the Amhara in Oromo regions, the dominant and more privileged group under the pre-
1991 regimes, were effectively reduced to a minority with little political role
whatsoever (Merera 2003). 5 Since the declaration of the FDRE Constitution of 1994
that institutionalized the rights of ‘Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia to
a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of
government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and
Federal governments…’ (Article 39.3), in the Oromia Region the competition for
political power (for representation in the regional as well as federal governments,
appointments to government posts and even employment opportunities), economic
resources and privileges has created competition and rivalry between and among the
sub-regional and local Oromo elites (cf. Merera 2003; Paulos 2007). The new ethno-
federal state structure and the subsequent socio-political order have shaped, and are
also being shaped in turn, by processes of cultural production in the country.6

Local history, traditional values, and genealogical and geographical connections

thus not only became important sources of group symbolism and stereotyping, but
were also mobilized for political ends. A strong sense of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’
attached to one’s locality and local ‘traditional values’ are today an advantage, and
rivalry on ‘boundaries’ within and between the several south-western Oromo (sub-)
5
The ethno-federal state structure has also been reported to have affected socio-economic
interactions and development endeavours of the country in general and the regional states
in particular. According to a report in Africa Confidential (1994), ‘The ethno-
linguistically based regional governments inhibit mobility of labour and capital: farmers
and business people are discriminated against in areas outside their ethnic group’s
regional government’ (as quoted by Schlee 1995: 11).
6
As my informants in the south-western region repeatedly stated, there is a subtle
parochialism and favoritism (naannummaa) within the regional and sub-regional
government offices, and seeking grassroots support from one’s locality in various social
and political arenas has become the rule of the day). In this connection it is interesting to
quote the prevalent satirical political saying: “You need to have a BA in order to hold a
government office in Oromia” (BA qabdaaree?). Here the acronym ‘BA’ refers to ‘Bale
and Arsi’ - the two regional Oromo groupings that appeared to dominate the power
structure of the Oromia regional government (especially the office of the regional
president).

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groups is rampant. There has been a massive body of folkloric expression on and about
these local boundaries, breaking down the large regional Oromo people into different
local groups, and serving as an expressive basis for collective identification and action.
This repeated and reflexive construction of folklore is drawn upon in order to
articulate or challenge perceived distinctions between the local groups. Folkloric
performances provide a socially sanctioned outlet for the expression of what cannot be
articulated in formal and direct (i.e., political) ways. It is in and through these
performances that cultural pressure points as well as individual anxieties can be vented
by groups. By analyzing the folklore of a social group, one may thus well succeed in
the goal of ‘making the unconscious conscious’ (Dundes 198o: x; see also, Abrahams
1983; Finnegan 1992; Oring 1986).

Toward a definition of local identity narrative

As local identity narrative can be seen as a part of the folklore genre, a definition of it
will be given here. A local identity narrative is a group-oriented narrative that emerges
in contexts of group relations to construct, interpret and display a shared sense of
identity and belonging to a specific local group. It is a conversational narrative in
which members of each local group come to create a shared horizon of meaning and
understanding of themselves and their life vis-à-vis that of others. Identity narratives
are told and accepted as ‘true’ accounts and explanations of local historical events, life
experiences and conditions, with corroborating details and other rhetoric devices of
verisimilitude (see Chapter 6 & 7). As a conversational narrative, they are
collaboratively performed by respectable men or public figures (Oromo: manguddoo)
during every day social interactions. It clearly differs from a narrative that relates
personal experiences (i.e., with a non-traditional content) and is told from the

127
perspective of the first person. 7 The local identity narrative is a group-oriented
narrative where life events and experiences of common interest to a group are
collaboratively constructed and imbued with shared meaning and values of a we-group
story (‘our story’ or ‘the story of us’). In parallel with Ricoeur’s definition of narrative
identity -- ‘the kind of identity that human beings acquire through the mediation of the
narrative function’ (1991: 188) -- identity narrative may thus be best defined as that
narrative form in and through which people come to grips with their shared sense of
identity and belonging to a local group.

This rudimentary definition differs from that of the conventionalized generic

definition of folklore forms, often made on the basis of form, content, function, and
other features. As all these aspects of oral narrative are interrelated and overlapping
analytical constructs, their separation and description seems an arbitrary task. What is
more, the dynamism and malleability of narrative performance, its situatedness within
various aspects of social life and other expressive forms make it less amenable to
‘precise’ definition. As Bauman put it, the very preoccupation with “definitional
precision and specificity… makes for a concomitant resistance to intertextuality in
narrative constructions of the self that extends across generic categories” (2004: 83).
Similarly, Ochs and Capps argue that as personal narrative is varied and a ubiquitous
feature of ordinary conversation, “it resists delineation in terms of a set of fixed,
generic, defining features” (2001: 54). In this regard, there have been many attempts to
identify the major characteristics of a narrative account. From a synthesis of these
works8 what seems most relevant is explication of the key interactional aspects of
narrative performances that account for the ways in which they are realized in the
conduct of social life: “to consider the ways in which discursive productions may

7
For an in-depth definition of the characteristic features of the personal experience
narrative, see Sandra D. Stahl’s seminal work (1989).
8
See, for example, the work of Bauman 2004, Gergen 2005, Ochs & Capps 2001 and
Stahl 1989.

128
employ life experience as an expressive resource, using it to shape and present the
social self in dialogue with others (Bauman 2004: 83).

The primary concern here and in what follows is thus an exploration of the
discursive process of narrative performance -- the form-meaning-function
interrelationships -- within the wider cultural setting and the specific context of social
interaction. This includes explication of how, in which situations, to what end, and
with what cultural resources (expressive forms, rhetoric strategies and devices) the
narrative function of identity-construction is realized among the south-western Oromo
groupings. Suffice it to say that narrative performance is understood as a rhetoric
practice, a way of speaking, and a mode of interactional communicative activity -
situated in specific contexts of use and also connected to other discursive formulations
- “whose repetitions situate actors in time and space, structuring individual and group
identities” (Kapchan 1995: 479, emphasis added). I leave the attempt at definition here
and proceed to explore the major performative aspects that constitute and shape the
production and function of narrative discourses under study.

At this juncture, I propose that four interrelated and overlapping interactional

features characterize identity narratives of the south-western Oromo (to be discussed
hereunder). These are: (1) an interactive communicative context and collaborative
performance; (2) a consistent truth claim presented with corroborating details and
other devices of verisimilitude; (3) an open-ended conversational structure and
adaptive blending of locally available discursive formations; and, (4) enactment of
shared moral identity and differentiation from other groups (through identification
with the major characters’ moral stance).9

In line with the conception of social life as discursively constituted in situated

conversational interactions and other signifying practices, the study of narrative with a

9
For comparative understanding of these performative dimensions of group-oriented
narrative and those of the personal experience narrative, see Bauman 2004, Ochs and
Capps 2001, and Stahl 1989.

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focus on investigating the relationship between the performance and identity of the
interlocutors has long gained prominence within the purview of folkloristics and
sociolinguistics. It is generally considered as an important entry point into describing
and understanding the interpretative repertoires and other relevant aspects of ‘what’
and ‘how’ people do by way of constructing, positioning and presenting themselves
through and in the situated flow of discourse (Grad and Luisa Martín 2008: 8; Bauman
2000: 1). Repeated discursive constructions and negotiations of ‘shared’ views, beliefs
and values posit individuals and bind them together into a well-knit community. As
Drew noted, ‘It is through talking that we live our lives, build and maintain
relationships, and establish who we are to one another’ (2005: 74).

The cultural conception and performance of identity narrative

I use the generic term identity narrative to refer to conversational narratives which
members of the south-western Oromo groups tell about themselves in defining their
respective local identity vis-à-vis that of others -- Oromo as well as non-Oromo groups
within the region. This type of narratives is designated as seenaa, which is generally
understood by Oromo themselves as ‘historical narrative.’ Commonly told and
accepted as ‘true history’, seenaa represents ‘factual’ accounts of memorable events
and shared experiences, exemplary stories of outstanding personalities, or explanatory
narratives about the past and present state of life of each local group. In seenaa
performances, members of each local group relate the collective experiences, practices
and qualities they most value about themselves and their group, as well as what they
do not value about others. Such narratives are used as a means of interpreting and
displaying collective self-identification with one’s own group and differentiation from
other groups. Such identity narratives depict, to use Franz Boas’s phrase, ‘the
autobiography of the people’ (cited in Herskovits and Herskovits 1958: 8).

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 Seen from this perspective, the seenaa narrative is the most important vehicle
for symbolic construction and expression of the shared sense of local identity and
belonging.10 For most of my informants in each local group, the meaning and value of
seenaa -- as ‘true’ recollections of lived experiences and outstanding personalities
(local heroes) that account for present state of communal life -- are inseparable from
the very meaning of their humanity (namummaa) in general and distinctive group-
existence (sabummaa) in particular. As one of my informants even said, in a very
explicit way: ‘Our history is nothing but a symbolic representation and verbal
explanation of who we are and how we have come to be what we are today, and in
what ways we are similar with and different from other groups.’ 11 The point is that for
the people their history is not only the most important source for construction,
expression and perpetuation of their collectivity as a continuation of the past, but
forms the foundation of their self-identification as competent social actors and as a
moral community. The narrated events and other symbolic codes, as well as the
cultural conventions for their selection and organization into a meaningful narrative
construction of collective identity -- the shared cultural resources -- are generally
known to and valued by the interacting members of the we-group. Even though today
one may observe some influence of literate and multi-media traditions on cultural

10
The common view is that ‘Our seenaa is the symbol of our identity (mallattoo
eenyummaa keenyaa); it shows who we are, how and where we have come to be what we
are. Seenaa connects us to the good-old days of our forefathers, to their ways of life and
to their territories to which we belong. It is through Seenaa that we learn about our
ancestral roots (hida) and our genealogical relationship. Seenaa is the very embodiment
of our cultural heritage (aadaa), the sum-total of our traditions, ways of doing things and
of tackling challenges of life, etc., all of which are inherited from our forefathers. It is
through seenaa that we celebrate and emulate heroic achievements and victories of our
forefathers, and learn lessons from their defeats and mistakes. It also helps us to identify
and distinguish our friends from our enemies. To know one’s own seenaa is to know
oneself. A man who does not know who he is and where he has come from (the identity
and ways of his forefathers) cannot have a clear sense of direction and way of living his
life’ (Interview with Obbo Tayib Abba Foggi (52), November 12, 2006, Jimma).
11
Interview with Obbo Emiru Gebre, 72, March 2, 2007, Neqemte. Actually, this
expresses the most common view of history (seenaa) among my informants.

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productions of the people, the value of oral tradition, especially of narration, is still
high and its place in the everyday life is central.

Values, as noted by Nordby (2008), can be understood in three interrelated

ways. In one usage of the term, values are properties we ascribe to actions, objects,
practices, or experiences that we think of as ethically good or wrong. The second way
of understanding the term value is to think of it as general concepts people believe in.
For instance, freedom, justice, peace, autonomy and unity are examples of values that
most people endorse. The third concept of value is intimately connected to the ways
people wish to live their lives. In this sense of the term, cultural values are attitudes to
ways of living, the important interests we have and the activities we appreciate to
participate in. What is common to and important about these usages is that
“fundamental concepts of value are always experienced as valid from a particular point
of view, woven into a person’s social and cultural context” (Nordby 2008: 4). Hence,
shared values function as general principles and resources for the making of moral
judgments of one’s own actions (behaviors) and of others. And here comes in the
function of identity narrative -- the discursive form through which we translate values
into action. It is in and through these narratives collaboratively told by members of
each local group (the ‘stories of us’) that the values, the appreciated lifestyles and
qualities that the people choose to identify themselves with are repeatedly enacted,
authenticated and articulated. In so doing, people go beyond mere generation and
communication of information with each other; they ‘reaffirm’ to each other that they
belong together and share such common values and perhaps destiny.

The communicative context and contextualization strategies

The analysis of verbal performance in context, which gained wide currency among the
ethnographers of speaking in the 1970s (see, for example, Bauman 1983; Amos 1983;
Hymes 1975), paid much attention to the multidimensional web of intersubjective

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relationships that link performances and texts to the culturally defined systems of
meaning and social reality in which they occur (Bauman 2004). Since the last two or
three decades, the focus of contextual study in folklore has shifted away from an
inventory of contexts of verbal performance towards investigation of contextualizing
and framing practices that allow for situating and interconnecting of seemingly
separate discourses into specific contexts of social interaction and cultural production.
It was widely acknowledged that the investigation of contextualization practices and
strategies yields considerable degree of insights into how people discursively construct
shared meaning and social cohesion -- shared sense of identity (Hufford 1995).

In the context of the south-western Oromo there is no special occasion

organized only for narration or related verbal performances. Collective experience
narratives are collaboratively constructed in and through the medium of face-to-face
conversational interaction between two or more adults. They often grow out of
ongoing conversations and easily move back into them. In everyday social life,
opportunities for such social interaction, involving narrative performance, are
ubiquitous, though varied in terms of the number of interactants and their interpersonal
relationships as well as of the purpose and duration of their interaction. For example,
daily neighbors’ coffee-drinking parties (buna-dhuguu), family get-togethers (walgahii
maatii), community meetings (walgahii hawaasaa), mourning rites (taaziyaa), elders’
arbitrations of conflicts (jaarsummaa) and local drinking houses (mana dhugaatii) are
but a few of the social arenas for narrative practice in which interlocutors
collaboratively build, negotiate and externalize their shared understandings and
expectations of themselves and the world they live in. To these could be added even
the incidental meetings of fellow men or visits of guests from other places, such as
researchers, government officials or others. Whoever the guest and for whatever
purpose his/her visit to a particular locality may be, his/her presence among the local
people creates but an ‘especial’ occasion for a heightened verbal exchange and update
on local events and about what is going on ‘out there’ in other places and times. In this

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regard, I think, there is no significant difference between contexts of ordinary social
interaction and that of ethnographic encounters -- research interviews and discussions -
- as both occasion and involve the discursive construction of social realities. In both
contexts, topical talks (about local, regional, national and international experiences and
issues), reminiscences, eye-witness testimonies, future plans, gossip, jokes, songs,
dreams, convictions, prayers, lamentations, and many other verbal expressions can be
freely communicated, provided that they are in line with or appropriate to the
immediate social interaction.

From my own field experience among the south-western Oromo, I have come
to realize that narrative performances naturally occur within the ethnographic
encounter, which is also considered by many ethnographers as one significant order of
natural situational context in which the researcher stimulates the construction of and
reflection on collective identity.12 The textual corpora for this study were recorded
through my participation in ordinary social interactions, and (in)formal interview
sessions and discussions with elders, community leaders, government office holders,
administrators and such like influential figures from the various local groups within
the south-western Oromo. As indicated, the investigation of the discursive construction
and display of local group identity was at the center of the fieldwork. While this
perspective suggests the dynamic and situationational nature of the ‘production’ of
narrative performances, obviously they take place within a defined historical-cultural
setting, relating to Oromo (sub-)ethnic identities and group formations. These more
durable conditions set the cultural stage and frames of reference within which the
narrative performances occur.

During the course of my almost two years residence in the research areas, both as
a researcher and someone native to the region, I was able to actively participate in
various social events wherein I stimulated conversations and discussions on issues

12
See for example Bamberg 2006, 2010; Bauman 2004; Briggs 1986; Butler 1992;
Hymes 1975; Lee 1972; and Norrick 2001.

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related to ethnicity and local identity. For many of my informants, my fieldwork
appeared to create a special opportunity for talking about and reflecting on their past
and present life experiences, thereby reaffirming a shared sense of belonging. All of
the narrative texts in this dissertation were extracted from the conversations and
discussions I had with informants during the course of my ethnographic work. During
interviews and focus group discussions, narrative performances were often prompted
by my assistant introducing me and the purpose of my study to informants. The
introduction often went more or less as follows:

Here among us is our brother Obbo Abreham, who is engaged in teaching

and studying Oromo language, history and culture. He has been teaching
our language, literature, oral traditions and customs in Jimma Teachers
College and Addis Ababa University for so many years. Currently he is
studying and writing a book about our locality, history and culture at a
university in Europe, so as to show who we are to the rest of the world. It
is with this noble purpose that he has come all the way from Addis Ababa,
seeking our help to collect and document all the necessary information and
supporting evidences to bring our true history and identity to light.

In most cases my introduction was received with appreciative comments of

understanding on the importance of my research project and/or questions regarding my
professional affiliation. The common question was whether I knew someone so-and-so
from the Jimma College. More often than not I responded in the affirmative,
displaying a common socio-cultural background and thereby paving the way for active
participation in the ethnographic encounter. At this juncture, informants usually also
gave some introductory information about their personal experiences and their
connection to the local community, thereby indicating their ‘appropriateness’ to speak
about their community. This sort of self-introduction or intimacy-building narratives
(to be detailed below) was used as a kind of ice-breaker to ease the initial tension of
the ethnographic encounter. More importantly, it served as a directing strategy to how
the interlocutors should go about in speaking about and making sense of their life and
the world they live in. Without this directing strategy, production of the ‘gossip-like’

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group experience narrative and thereby identification with a group, and differentiation
from others, would be hardly possible.13 As Brenneis has noted, gossip provides ‘…
opportunities for the expression of moral values, for making sense out of aberrant or
outrageous behavior, and for the creation of a clear definition of who one is by the
delineation of who one is glad not to be’ (1992: 150).

It goes without saying that there are various contextualization cues and directing
strategies for the spontaneous launching and ending of narrative performances (frame-
in and frame-out). (cf. Butler 1992). Of course, the particular strategy to be employed
is determined by the nature and topic of the ongoing conversation, the interpersonal
relationship between participants, the intention of the turn-taking speaker, and so on.
What appears the most important convention for the successful launching and telling
of a narrative is, however, securing shared attention and collaboration of the
interacting group members by indicating its relevance and connectability to the
ongoing interaction. When a conversationalist wants to get the floor to launch a
narrative, he does not suddenly break into it. He should signal his intention using a
contextualizing device or an introductory phrase (a story preface).14 For example,
consider the following phrases that are commonly used among the south-western
Oromo:

1. Dubbit dubbii kaasa jedhani. It is said that one speech act triggers
another one.
2. Eegaa dhugaa himuun gaarii mitiree? Isn’t it good to tell the truth?
3. Akkuma hundi keenya beeknu… As we all know.…
4. Waan beekanu himuu mitiree? Isn’t it that one tells what one knows?
5. Akka abbootiin keenya jedhanii,... As our fathers/elders say
6. Akkas tae jeddhan egaa. It was said it happened….

13
It is interesting to note that Sandra Stahl made similar observation when she said: “…a
person tells personal narratives only to those people who want to know the teller better.
…One gets to know someone else when by sharing experience; intimacy is our word for
the exciting sensation that comes with our perception of someone else in our personal
world” (1989: x, emphasis added).
14
For cross-cultural understanding of forms and usages of story preface, see for example
Ochs and Capps 2001: 117-118, Norrick 2000: 108-111 and Butler 1992: 35-36.

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 7. Akkas jechuudhan dhagahe. This was what I learned from our elders.

By using such type of opening (1-5) and closing (6-7) devices -- ‘meta-
narration’15 -- the speaker not only declares his intention (provoked by the ongoing
discourse) to take the floor to launch a narrative of current importance, but also
underscores the ‘traditionality’ of the narrative (as something learnt from the past
generation) and his moral obligation to share it with his fellowmen. Upon making a
smooth transition from the general conversational mode of communication into the
narrative mode -- establishing the ‘tellability’ and topical relevance of the narrative --
the speaker temporarily holds the floor and plays the role of a leading narrator. It is in
keeping with the customary way of speaking that the speaker relates his story both to
pre-existing and ongoing discursive productions. That is a way of showing
accountability to one’s fellow-auditors and a means of securing their active support in
carrying out the narrative performance successfully.

Viewed from this perspective, contextualization (traditionalization) may be

understood as an important mechanism of ordering seemingly separate events,
experiences, discourses, actions and actors into a coherent narrative of group identity.
‘Interperformance’ is the term Lee Haring (1988: 365) coined to refer to “that relation
of inclusion which connects storytelling events to the various types of discourse which
engender them.”16 The practice of re-contextualization allows for building an

15
Drawn from Allan Dundes’s concept of ‘metafolklore…folkloristic statements about
folklore’ (1966), the term ‘metanarration’ was used by Barbara Babcock (1977) to refer
to ‘all devices which comment upon the narrator, the narrating, and the narrative both as
message and code’ (as quoted in Haring 1988: 368).
16
The model for the notion of interperformance was taken from two interrelated concepts
in literary criticism, ‘intertextuality’ and ‘intergeneric dialogue,’ which were explicated at
length by M.M. Bakhtin (1981) to subsequently gain a widespread recognition in
literature and folklore studies. Intertextuality is Julia Kristeva’s term for the relation
between literary texts. According to Bakhtin, discourse in general and the discourse of art
in particular orients itself to other discourses: everyday talk, religion, politics, the human
sciences and the like are all intermixed in the continuing human conversation. The notion
of intergeneric dialogue concerns the ways in which different genres engage one another

137
evaluative framework for establishing coherence in temporal and logical order across
past, present and imagined future experiences (Stahl 1989). As the narrative
performance within a conversational interaction is a collaborative activity, the
evaluative or interpretive frame enables the interactants, who belong to the same
‘interpretive community,’17 to play active roles in the meaning-making process.

The roles of the audience involve undertaking such responsibilities as showing

their reaction to the speaker’s selection and interpretation (evaluation) of the narrated
events, negotiating mutual understanding and agreement or disagreement on what the
speaker is talking about and the point he is trying to make, interjecting questions and
motivating words, refreshing memory of the speaker and adding details to the narrative
in progress. This is more clearly observable in the reflexive or evaluative commentary
at the end of each narration, whereby the narrator and the auditors take turns at
negotiating acceptable meaning or end-point of the narrative within the current topic of
discourse, thereby providing justification for the telling and the time used thereof.
Narration or speaking without a currently relevant or acceptable end point is frowned
upon and received with a scornful criticism from the audience: “Maaliif jette?” (What
is the point of your narration?).18 This seldom occurs.

Needless to say, to make a point at the end of narrative performance involves

not merely the exchange of information and/or reporting of events, but the comparing

in varying degree of integration and exchange (as cited in Haring 1988; See also Bauman
2004, Butler 1992, Georges 1969).
17
A phrase popularized by Stanley Fish (as cited by Lee Haring 1989: 367), which refers
to a community of readers defined by a distinct epistemology, whose members share a
linguistic system and other cultural repertoires for constructing and making sense of their
social world. The recognition of a corporate dimension of the self-identity and influence
of one’s own group-interpretive community-on the meaning-making process resulted
from postmodern thinking that emerged in reaction to modernism’s radical individualism
and lack of emphasis on collective identities (Walt Russell 1994).
18
This is in conformity with the widely held understanding of folklore performance “as a
special mode of situated communicative practice, resting on the assumption of
responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative skill and efficacy” (Bauman
2000: 1).

138
of events and values in the narrative with those in present or past life conditions, and
thereby distilling shared values and beliefs. According to Labov (1972), narrative end-
points are established by means of evaluation: “… the means used by the narrator to
indicate the point of the narrative, its raison d’être; why it was told, and what the
narrator is getting at” (1972: 366). It is through the process of negotiating agreement
on the meaning of narrated events or end-points of stories within the situational
context of conversational interaction that interlocutors collaboratively (re-)construct,
interpret and share the values, beliefs and behaviors with which they want to identify
themselves and be identified by others. As noted by Norrick, “…collaborative
narration serves to ratify group membership and modulate rapport in multiple ways,
first because it allows participants to re-live salient common experiences, second
because it confirms the long-term bond they share, and third because the experience of
collaborative narration itself rebounds to feelings of belonging” (2000: 157).

‘Telling right’, collaborative telling and narrative credibility

Narrative performance within everyday conversational contexts takes the form of

social exchange rather than purposeful storytelling of a single narrator to an audience,
in which the interlocutors interactively build accounts of life events. Virtually every
participant who has some tellable and relevant information can contribute to the
ongoing conversational interaction. In actual practice, however, participation in most
narrative performances seems a matter of ‘knowledge-ability’ or seniority right.

In every locality there are certain men who by virtue of their recognized life
experiences and social position are considered as more knowledgeable and
authoritative than other members to tell about history, origins and current life
conditions of their community. Such senior/knowledgeable men (Or.: manguddoo)
usually take the lead and, of course, are given priority in speaking and telling about the
‘who we are’ and ‘where we come from’ of their group, though they do not control

139
the whole conversational interaction. It is that social and contextual factors such as
age, sex, social and political status of and interrelationship between the interactants, as
well as the purpose and topic of the ongoing conversation, determine the ‘telling
rights’ and the turn-taking structure within the conversational narrative performance.
At issue is, of course, the dynamics of the discursive process and the rhetorical
mechanism whereby such individuals establish themselves and are recognized
temporarily (within the conversational interaction) as ‘legitimate spokesmen’ or
‘representatives’ of their community.

The narrators’ telling right and authority is tacitly established early in the
process of narrative performance. This is achieved through and in self-introduction
narrative19 whereby the narrator highlights his personal experiences as an individual
‘who has seen’ much in life and has a great ‘memory’ of the past that deserves to be
recalled. The self-introduction can be done in various ways, depending on the
participants’ inter-personal relationships and the nature of the immediate interactional
context within which the talking about and reflecting upon and sharing of experiences
take place. More often than not, participants are composed of fellow-men or members
of the same local group, who have a lot in common and can easily relate to and
understand each other. Among such participants, many things do not have to be told
and explained in self-introductions. Instead, each narrator succinctly shows the
authority that his personal experience and seniority earned him, which in turn serves as
a basis for the credibility of the narratives he is to tell. Typical examples of brief self-
introductory remarks are as follow:

Akkuma beektani, ani nama waan heddu arge;

As you know, I am a man who has seen a lot in life;

Akkuma yaadatan, ani ilma abbaan umurii dheeraafi dubbi beekaati”

As you all remember, my father was a man of long age and great knowledge;

Umuriikootti waan baayee argeera; dhagaheeras;

19
For details, see Abreham (2000).

140
 I have seen and heard a lot in my life.

It is also possible for a narrator to tell a detailed personal narrative, 20 which

extends to implicate collective experiences constitutive of the we-group identity. For
example, consider the following narrative by Mr. Dirib Abba Macha:

As you all know, …I was born and grew up in this very village. I lived all my
youth and adult life with my parents, even after I got married and fathered four
children in the same compound I was born. I supported my parents in their old
age. I used to do so until the last days of their life. My father and mother died nine
and five years ago, respectively. May Allah rest their souls in heaven! My father
was known for his knowledge of history. You know that he was a grandson of
Abba Diko Abba Billo, who was a special advisor to Abba Gommol, the father of
Abba Jifar. I am from the same linage with King Abba Jifar; we are from the
Diggo lineage.

I am Dirrib Abba Macca, the son of Abba Macca Abba Waji.

Abba Waajii is the son of Abba Dikko Abba Bilo.
Abba Bilo is the son of Abba Magal.
And Abba Jifar is the great grandson of Abba Magal. His full name is Abba Jifar
Abba Gommol Abba Boqaa Abba Magaal. Both of us are descendants of Abba
Magaal. It is my father who taught me all these things. I lived with my father until
his death on March 11, 1996. My mother died on November 15, 2000. My father
told me that I was born in 1950. He also told me that Etege Menen, the wife of the
late Emperor Haile Sellasie I, died in 195421

My father was a Sheikh, a learnt man, who lived a long satisfying life. I supported
him in his old age. I did everything for him and for my mother as well. I used to
serve my mother just like a girl. I did everything for her, including all the
household chores. I also did all that is expected of a man, farming the field and
harvesting the crop. I did all the laundry work for them; I gave them baths, shaved
their hair, cut their nail, and did all sort of things that old people needed. As a
reward, my father taught me a lot about the history of Jimma Abba Jifar to which
he himself or his father was an eye-witness. These days, people do not seem to
care much about their history.22

20
This is done in the presence of unfamiliar auditors, as often happened when I as a
researcher solicited information.
21
E.C. (Ethiopian calendar), which is 1961-62.
22
This was narrated in a focus group discussion held in Saqqa Chaqorssa, Jimma, on 28
February 2007. Apart from me, four native Jimma men participated, ranging in age from

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 Figure 5. A focus group discussion in the Jimma area, November 2006

This type of personal narratives aims to enhance the reputation of the speaker as a
knowledgeable and dependable person fulfilling his filial duties and social obligations.
The narrator directly calls upon his forebears -- his father and great grandfather -- who
were said to be locally known, the former for his ‘knowledge of history’ and the latter
for his political authority as an advisor to the king. More importantly, he refers to his
father as his mentor and source for all the historical narratives in his repertoire. He also
claims consanguineous relationship with Abba Jifar, the last king of Jimma, by descent
from the same ancestor. To substantiate his claim, he traces the details of his and Abba
Jifar’s common lineage. It should also be noted that the speaker mentions the ‘exact’

46 to 55. The narrator, Dirib Abba Maccha (52 at the time), was a highly respectable
local community leader.

142
dates of his own birth and death of the queen. By making use of such narrative display
of personal experience, ‘knowledge-ability’ and ‘certainty’ about the past -- appealing
to ethos -- narrators establish their relative telling rights and credibility.

Ironically, narrators’ introductory remarks of uncertainty and disclaimers also

serve as means of highlighting personal integrity, which in turn helps to enhance the
credibility of the narration there of. Some examples of these are: “Beekkaan
Rabbuma…” (Only God is knowledgeable…), “Anille waa’ee durii badaa
hinbeeku…” (I lay no claim to know much about the past), “Anille jabana sana
hinqaqabne, waan abbotiin keenya himanirraa akkan yaadadhutti…” (In fact, I was
not an eye-witness to the old days, but as I remember from what our elders used to tell
…). It seems that, as noted by Ochs and Capps, acts of remembering are acts of
authenticating: “Displays of relative certainty and displays of positive and negative
affect are the building blocks of identities’ (1997: 86).

As indicated above, the performance of local identity narratives within the south-
western Oromo is a collaborative and dialogic activity. Right from the outset, narrative
performances commence with introductory sessions characterized by informal
interaction and call-and-response exchanges between narrators and audiences.
Engagement in such interactions helps participants to reaffirm their fellowship and
advance their mutual interest. Of course, the extent of individual participation varies
from person to person and depends on the situational context of the performance event.
Generally speaking, however, members of the audience actively respond to and
participate in narrative performances. Actively engaged audiences respond with verbal
and non-verbal expressions of shared understanding -- pragmatic and aesthetic
responses -- interjecting commentaries, questions, supplements (refreshing the
memory of the narrator), (dis-) agreements, corrections, appreciations and/or
criticisms. Given the dialogic nature of the conversational narrative performance,
which consists of spontaneous collective production of narrative discourses over time -
-fragments, interjections, commentaries and random interruptions by separate speakers

143
-- it is sometimes even difficult to distinguish between the main performer and the
audience.23 This does not mean that there is no communicative order and principle
governing the performance. It is simply to emphasize the open-ended, polyphonic
nature of the conversational narrative structure that requires the interlocutors to piece
together bits and fragments of various discursive and intertextual productions into a
coherent whole in terms of shared values and meanings. In doing so, interactants are
governed by conventional communicative rules such as, mutual respect and support to
each other, respect to seniority rights, and acknowledgement of oral and other
authoritative sources.

Once the floor is obtained and the shared attention and involvement of the
interacting group members are invoked, an interlocutor is expected to lead the
construction and negotiation of the narrative discourse as a ‘true’ recounting of group
experiences, carrying it to an acceptable end (coda) and segueing back into the
conversational mode of communication. This involves, among others, establishing
tellability and credibility of the narrative discourse through selective and adaptive
appropriation of shared cultural resources.

It has been pointed out that the basic convention of identity narratives is that
they should be told and accepted as ‘true’ accounts of lived experiences. As the
fundamental function of this narrative practice is to allow for construction, negotiation
and articulation of the tellers’ collective self-understanding and worldview, its
tellability and effectiveness (pragmatically as well as aesthetically) mainly depends on
its persuasive power to be accepted as authentic representation of local truth and social
reality. It is that for an experience or event to be told and contribute to human
understanding, it must carry enough interest and veracity to be accepted as worth the
telling and listening by those engaged therein (Butler 2002; Bruner 1991; Labov 1997;
Stahl 1989).

23
For details on dialogic nature of narrative performances in various African societies,
see, for example, Okpweho (1992), Fretz (2004: 163-168), and Finnegan (2007).

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 The issue of narrative truth value or credibility is, of course, also a matter for
negotiation, determined by the social and situational factors that shape the production
and reception of narrative discourse. Social variables such as age, sex, experience and
inter-personal relationship between the narrator and members of the audience as well
as their proximity to the narrated events contribute more weight to the determination
of credibility than textual elements of the narrative. What may not sound plausible in
other storytelling situations can be adapted and rendered relevant to the discursive
construction of shared identity (for example, see the stories about local kings and
heroes in the ensuing chapters). As noted by Fine, “…credibility becomes a
characteristic of interaction and relationships, and is not linked directly to information
or persons” (1995: 126). In fact, the important issue is not whether or not the group-
oriented narratives are “true,” but how the interlocutors collaboratively assemble them
as authentic accounts of their life experiences.24 Considering identity narratives and
their authenticity as matters of social practice “centers attention on the relation
between these ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of narration, on storytellers engaged in the work of
constructing coherence under the circumstances of storytelling” (Gubrium and
Holstein 1998: 164). Thus, focusing on the practical production of narratives --
uncovering the collaborative activities, the cultural resources and strategies used
therein, as well as the factors that inform and shape the narrative meaning-making
process -- helps to understand how and out of what narrative authenticity is socially
constructed.

As indicated above, narrators of group experience are required to tell their

narratives convincingly with the necessary corroborating details and other devices of
verisimilitude. The strategies and practices that allow for establishing narrative
authenticity are many and often inextricably intertwined. These include, among others,
direct claims of historicity (veracity) and eye-witness knowledge of narrated events,
reference to familiar and common concerns, reference to tradition and other

24
This of course differentiates such narrative accounts from scholarly analyses.

145
authoritative sources (both oral and written), reference to popular tribal (clan) and
place names and unique environmental features, selective manipulation of familiar
historical events and personalities (local heroes), adaptive blending of locally available
discursive formations, dialogical narration and enacting of shared values, beliefs, and
moral codes. 25 (For examples of authenticity-establishing strategies, see the ensuing
chapters).

The most common and effective mechanism of establishing narrative credibility

is selective and adaptive manipulation of familiar cultural resources. Narrators make
situational selections from locally available and understandable cultural resources and
adaptively blend them into intelligible narrative discourses. The resources include all
sorts of socially constituted repertoires of events and experiences (both imagined and
real) that can accountably be interwoven into the open-ended conversational structure
as well as in the various discursive forms:26 e.g., historical accounts, political
discourses, origin stories, chronicles, jokes, songs, sayings, proverbs, blessings, chants,
riddles, or personal narratives.

Selection from these resources is mainly made on the basis of relevance to the
specific context and end-point of the ongoing narrative performance, which is also
influenced by wider socio-cultural and political factors. Needless to say, the narration
of group experience, like any other form of conversational practice, is not a direct
‘reporting’ of a priori completed stories or a comprehensive recounting of past
experiences. Rather it is an ongoing rhetorical and interpretive process (of meaning
and identity making) in which interlocutors collaborate at piecing together self-
reflexive perspectives on experiences and conditions of communal life, for better
understanding and negotiation of their selves and values within the wider social world.
Hence, no surprise that only what is deemed relevant to make sense of what it means

25
This seems a common practice in performance of both personal and group experience
narratives in different cultures; for example, cf. Bauman 2004: 113; Butler 2002: 158;
Stahl 1989: 18).
26
Cf. Gubrium and Holstein (1998: 164).

146
to be ‘Jimma’, ‘Gera’, ‘Leqa’, ‘Illu Abba Bor’, etc. is selected, distinctively combined
and incorporated into a coherent narrative performance. People ‘remember’ and tell
only what they believe is useful and relevant of the past to shape their present and
allow for anticipation of better future.

In Oromo society, group-oriented narrators27 are expected, if not obliged, to

articulate and affirm their collective values, so as to provide the in-group members
with a shared sense of direction and a way of dealing with the existing social world.
To this effect, they rely on local forms of knowledge (folklore) that they assume to be
familiar and appealing to their fellowmen. This does not mean that they do not tell
personal experience stories. They can and do tell about their own experiences, display
their own self-images, self-understandings and understandings of the familiar others,
often intermixing them with and within their recounting of group experiences. But my
point is that the group-oriented tellers generally tend to underplay their personal
experiences and self-images to emphasize the idea of collectivity and historicity of the
narrated events, experiences, views and values. The central element is the collective
group-image and identity, rather than the tellers’ personal self-image and identity,
which is generally the case with personal experience narratives. By choosing and
telling about events and personalities in the ‘history’ of the local community, familiar
stories -- both about the ‘glorifying’ past and the ‘gloomy’ present -- that resonate with
the community-members emotionally, the narrators can easily achieve the simplicity
and credibility or ‘truthfulness’ of representing and giving voice to one’s own values
and social reality. This is also implicated by, among others, the recurrent thematic
concerns of collectivity and the consistent use of the first person plural narrative
subject and point of view -- ‘we/us/our.’ As rightly noted by William Wilson (1988:
16), “…folklore usually is expressed in and is given color by the groups to which we
belong; it can serve, therefore, as a means of understanding and increasing our
sympathy for these groups.” That the selective manipulation and adaptive blending of
27
Cf. Stahl’s “other-oriented” and “self-oriented” narrators of personal experience (1983:
270).

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formal, thematic and pragmatic elements of the locally available discourses enhances
the credibility of identity narratives was evident in the Oromo narratives that I studied.
Most of my informants opted for the historical narrative form (seenaa) deliberately
and strategically, in order to provide their discourses with a broad cultural currency
and truth-value claims. Thereby they aimed to convince themselves and others that
they deserved better treatment and a place of privilege within the present-day regional
state of Oromia and the ethno-federal state of Ethiopia. Among the Jimma Oromo, for
example, a number of narrative templates were often recalled: about the history of the
monarchic state formation and Islamization in the early nineteenth century,
highlighting:

- the establishment of Jimma as the center of foreign trade within the south-
western
region;
-the peaceful submission of Abba Jifar to the military forces of Emperor
Menilik and
thereby maintaining internal autonomy of his state until mid-20th century;
- the consultative decision-making and ‘democratic’ leadership qualities of
Abba Jifar
informed by the currently widespread ethno-federalism discourse in Ethiopia;
- the generosity and friendliness of the Jimma Oromo.

Hereby emphasis was laid on the ‘wisdom’, pragmatism, peace-lovingness, moral

standing, etc. of both the past and present generations and hence on the general moral
superiority of the Jimma group over all other groups in the region. In contrast, among
the Gera the battles they fought against the rest of the Gibe States and Menilik’s
forces, their ‘natural’ fearlessness, patriotism and freedom-loving spirit, the abundant
natural endowments of the Gera land, etc. were among the major themes of the identity
narratives. Similar themes could however be found among the rest of the south-
western Oromo groups.

In narrative constructions of communal life events, individual experiences and

geographical details as well as contemporary political issues are often ‘forgotten’ and
left out of the stories, regardless of their relevance and proximity in time and space.

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This does not mean that such issues are never raised in narration. It is simply to show
that they are rather indirectly mentioned or suggested than being openly and
extensively dealt with. Also general features like the original homeland of the Oromo,
and that of the south-western Oromo in particular, was rarely mentioned; only Hooda
Bisil, a nearby place in west Shoa area, was remembered. 28 Memories of life events
prior to the Macha Oromo migration from Bisil to the present settlement areas were
considered as something quite remote in space and time. Among the Jimma, memories
of the period subsequent to the 1930s --during which Jimma lost its internal autonomy
--including the seventeen- year period of the military (Derg) regime, as well as life
conditions in post-1991 ethno-federal Ethiopia, were often glossed over. More
surprisingly, many of my informants from certain local groups rarely mentioned - and
some even claimed ignorance of - the existence of and their relation with other Oromo
groups within the same region (to be discussed in the ensuing chapters). At work here
seems to be ‘structural amnesia’, which involves collective forgetting of ‘…those
elements of the past that are no longer in meaningful relations to the present. This form
is typical of oral societies’ (Assmann, as cited in Brockmeier 2002: 31). But more
probably, a process of ‘politically correct’ forgetting or ignoring certain facts seems to
be involved, as there is political fear and self-censorship, a kind of narrative
opportunism, due to the sensitivities of the current political order and its tensions.

It should also be noted that not only the selection and interweaving of self-
significant experiences and discourses but also the ways of telling and sharing them as
‘true’ accounts of group experience are crucial in fashioning and displaying acceptable
local identity. Viewed from this perspective, narrators’ self-introductions (i.e.,
personal experience narratives) and tacit claims to seniority and/or knowledge-ability,
usually supported by the active involvement of other participants within the face-to-
face conversational interaction, can be considered as another discursive strategy to
achieve authenticity. As indicated above, most of the narrators I worked with in the
28
No other place beyond Bisil was mentioned among any of the local groups in the
research area.

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field were influential public figures -- elders, community leaders, government office
holders, etc., with high social status -- who currently or in the past were able to win
certain positions of power and aspired to achieve more. It is interesting to note that
most of them were also found to be educated and able to reinforce their narrative
repertoire by reading from their own notes and/or other written materials. Thus, the
respectability and social authority that the narrators hold in their respective
communities significantly contributes to the credibility of the narrative discourses and
the local cultural reality they construct thereof. Presenting a brief meta-narrative
commentary by one of my informants from Jimma, Abba Simal Abba Foggi (76 at the
time), may illuminate the strategic interconnection between telling rights and narrative
authority of the notable narrators, i.e. the negotiation of identity and power:

Only four types of people are responsible for telling about the past. These are
the learnt, the wealthy, the powerful and the elderly. These are the only ones
who are responsible for maintaining the well-being of the community and
country at large. Others are simply followers who do not have any say or role in
shaping the destiny of the community. The common people are concerned about
their daily bread, not about history. As the saying goes, “You cannot fetch
water with a sealed gourd” (Qabeen dudaa bishaan hinwaraabdu).29
By invoking legitimacy and responsibility to tell about the past of the
community, narrators such as Abba Simal assert their own direct connection to the past
and influence over the present and future of the community, thereby imbuing their
narrative discourses with traditional authority and communal value. As noted by
Bauman and Briggs, characterizing discourse as a particular traditional genre creates
intertextual relationships between a particular text and prior discourse, indexically
establishing social, ideological and political connections “that extend far beyond the
present setting of production or reception, thereby linking a particular act to other
times, places, and persons. …When great authority is invested in texts associated with
elders or ancestors, traditionalizing discourse by creating links with traditional genres

29
In a focus group discussion held in Aggaro, Jimma, 11 November 2006. Abba Simal is
a retired administrator of Aggaro who served during the Dergue regime.

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is often the most powerful strategy for creating textual authority” (1992: 147-48,
emphasis added).

It goes without saying that local identity narrative is not ‘traditional’ in the old
conception of the term ‘tradition’ as something ‘ready-made’ or as a relic that was
passed down from generation to generation. In this sense neither the structure nor the
content is strictly traditional, but rather an emergent discursive production (i.e.,
narratives in progress) within a specific conversational context, shaped by broader
socio-cultural and political factors. Like any other form of folklore or expressive
culture, however, identity narratives are traditional in the sense that they are shared
verbal productions (from shared oral resources) that continue to be significant and
repeatedly practiced within the south-western Oromo. More importantly, the very act
of currently telling and sharing these narratives as something learned from the past
generation (‘as our fathers say,’ ‘as it was said…’) -- traditionalization -- lends them
cultural meaning and perpetuates the value of ‘tradition.’ It is the traditionalizing
process of narrative discourse that helps to connect members of each local group with
a meaningful past and thereby create their current sense of group identity as competent
social actors worthy of recognition and better position within the wider socio-political
space. Shuman and Briggs (1993: 116) even suggest that: “…traditionalizing culture
thus emerges as a locus of strategies for empowering particular groups, rhetorics, and
interests.”

Thematic elements and function

It has been indicated that identity narratives are not finished, self-contained, polished
stories. Rather they are elliptical and fragmented conversational discourses--highly
embedded in and constitutive of ongoing social interaction--that are pieced together,
shaped and reshaped to fit into and emerge over the course of conversation as a
framework for interconnecting and understanding life events in temporal and logical

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order. Thus, such narratives may be best characterized by their strategically effective
relational features of ongoingness, open-endedness30 and adaptive blending of various
discursive formations (generic intermixing), which involve adaptive appropriation of
formal, thematic and functional elements from the locally available expressive forms -
such as proverbs, songs, myths, jokes, personal experience narratives, historical
accounts, political discourses, stereotypical representation of the self and others, etc..
At work here is ‘generic intertextuality,’ which Bauman defines as “…the assimilation
of a text to more than one generic framework, drawing upon and blending the formal
and functional capacities of each of the genres thus invoked” (2004: 4-7).31 This
adaptive incorporation of the various generic elements into the open-ended
conversational narrative structure affords an effective framework for the discursive
construction, negotiation and display of the speakers’ public self and shared sense of
identity, ‘who we are’ and ‘who we are not’ (Whitebrook 2001). As clearly noted by
Bauman, “generic intertextuality is a means of foregrounding the routinized,
conventionalized formal, pragmatic, and thematic organization of discourse…, which
suggests that generic convention alone is insufficient to account for the formal-
pragmatic-thematic configuration of any given utterance” (2004: 7).

Content elements of identity narratives of the south-western Oromo groupings

are several, often combined, interconnected and/or emphasized in different ways and
situations of use. Generally speaking, however, the basic elements are related to those
things that are believed to ‘naturally’ and ‘specifically’ characterize each local group.
More often than not, local identity claims are constructed and articulated in relation
with three interrelated and overlapping thematic concerns:

30
As noted by Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps, open-endedness is an inherent feature of
conversation, which is informal discourse characterized by its local organization and
hence a contingent orderliness. Accordingly, “the flow of talk lies in the hands of the
interlocutors; it is a moment-by-moment, emergent interactional achievement” (2001: 7).
31
Cf. Somers’ notion of ‘emplotment’ (1994).

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 - local historical events and experiences (recollections of great
achievements/failures and outstanding personalities in the past),

- connection to a common genealogical and/or geographical origin of unique

features, and

- ‘superior’ ethical values. As noted by Moriarty, “identity is constructed

through the recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics
with another person or group or with an ideal, and with the natural closure
of solidarity and allegiance established on the foundation” (2005: 6).

Whatever the content of a group-oriented narrative performance may be, it

serves the interlocutors as a vehicle for assembling, negotiating and legitimating
‘specificity’ of who they are - their group identity - in terms of the putative defining
characteristics, qualities and experiences (local history, geographical conditions, social
relations, behavioral norms, ways of living, understanding and valuing, etc.) that bind
them together and characterize them as members of a well-knit local group ‘different’
from and ‘better’ than other groups in the region. This means that in their collaborative
narration interlocutors aim at building consensus, common public agreement (among
themselves and other in-group members) on what makes their local group (locality)
historically or potentially ‘distinguishable’ from and/or ‘better’ than other Oromo
groups, and thereby justifying their claims to scarce resources. This seems to be
indirectly aiming towards viable transformative routes to a better future (positive
change) for one’s own group, in terms of enhanced social, cultural, political and
economic opportunities within the wider regional and now federal state structure. It is
this motivation for recognition and claims to a better social position that comes to lead
members of each local group to base the narrative construction and interpretation of
their identity on a ‘we/us’ and ‘they/them’ dichotomy. In constructing and articulating
the self as well as the other in this essentialist way of thinking, thus, identity narratives
express more of primordial or common sense views. By so doing, they function as
ideological means for fashioning, negotiating and fostering a shared sense of group-

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ness and a better position for the we-group members within the (sub-) regional and
(ethno-federal) socio-political space. In fact, narrative performances of group
experience may aim to serve or address complex of purposes, aesthetic as well as
informative, including re-construction and expression of local history, values, norms
and worldviews. All the complexity of concerns, however, centers on the most
fundamental one of concern: to allow for construction, negotiation and displaying of
socially acceptable and rewarding local identity.

In and through conversational narrative performances, the interlocutors

collaborate at assembling and articulating ‘who we are’ and ‘how we differ from
others’ along three thematic claims: 1) connection to specific genealogical and
geographical origin; 2) shared local history, and; 3) ethical and moral superiority over
others. These constitute, I argue, self-perceived variations in the south-western Oromo
groupings across the past, present and expected future.

Establishing ethical and moral superiority

As noted above, in and through conversational narrative performances, the

interlocutors collaborate in assembling and articulating ‘who we are’ and ‘how we
differ from others’, not only by connecting to specific genealogical and geographical
origin and to a shared local history, but also expressing ethical and moral superiority
over others. I elaborate here on this latter element. Notably among the southwestern
Oromo is that via narrative performances that the interlocutors collaboratively enact
their own moral and ethical superiority in direct opposition to other local groups. To
this effect, they make use of locally accepted moral standards (the reference frame)
that allow for positive portraying and evaluating of the selected self-defining symbols -
- events, experiences, beliefs and values. These epitomize and objectify the so far
unrecognized, unexpressed ‘unique’ and/or ‘superior’ qualities of the ‘we-group’ over

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those of other Oromo and non-Oromo groups within the region and that are deemed
worthy to be recognized.

Here it should be noted that though the interlocutors’ common attitude towards their
own group is generally positive and in some cases even inflated, negative assessment
of identification and/or criticism of ‘negative’ experiences and weak spots of one’s
own group -- regressive narrative32 - is also not a rarity. In fact, self-criticism is a
common theme of identity narratives of the south-western Oromo. This is often
expressed in relation to the annexation of the Oromo at the end of the 19th century and
the subsequent loss of independence, and more specifically, in relation to the lack of
‘meaningful autonomy’ within the present-day Ethiopian political space (cf. Asnake
2009; Merera 2003, 2007).

The local Oromo elites currently seem to have become sensitized to this ‘loss’
more than ever before since the establishment of OLF in 1973. There is a high
consciousness and concern with today’s political challenges to their life and group
status. This was evident in many of the narratives I recorded from the study area. The
narrative of Leqa Neqemte, “We are like a handful of sand”, in which the narrator
laments the ‘disunited nature’ of the larger Oromo, is a typical example (see chapter
7). Here it is interesting to note that many of my informants ascribed the annexation of
the Oromo by Emperor Menilik to Oromo warlords and soldiers. The common view is:
“It is no one but our Oromo men themselves that defeated the great Oromo people”
(Or.: Goota Oromooti Oromoo cabse). In support of this, the role of Ras Gobena
Dache, the Oromo military general who led the imperial conquest of the south-western
Oromo political units, was often recounted in the region. Among others, the strategic
and material support of Oromo local kings and chiefs, such as Abba Jifar of Jimma,
Kumsa (Gebre-Egziabher) Moroda of Leqa Leqemte and Habte-Giorgis Dinagde of
Shoa, were also remembered by some informants as examples of ‘weakness’ in Oromo

32
This is one of the three forms of narrative (stability and progressive being the other
two) identified by Gergen (2005: 103), which depicts “a continued downward slide.”

155
history (for details, see the next two chapters). In fact, among informants from the
various local groups there is no agreement on the role of the Oromo in the military and
political conquest of the Oromo. For example, Ras Gobena was remembered both as a
brave warrior and king of Shoa, and as a ‘traitor’ and by others as ‘enemy to his own
people’. Similarly, many informants from Illu Abba Bor condemned the Jimma and
the Wollega Oromo for their ‘failure’ to resist and peaceful submission to the military
forces of Menelik, whereas the Jimma described the Illu, the Gera and all other Oromo
groups who put up resistance as ‘unrealistic’ and ‘irrational’ people who fought a
‘futile’ war with spears and clubs against a powerful enemy armed with modern rifles.
By the same token, the decision of Abba Jifar and his councils’ advice to peacefully
submit and pay tribute to Menelik was interpreted as well-considered and realistic, as
it saved the Jimma from massacre at the hands of the enemy and enabled them to
maintain their internal autonomy for many years, while others lost their territory and
suffered under Amhara imperial rule (see chapter 6).

In this connection it should be noted that narrations and reflections of ‘negative

experiences’ of one’s own group allow for self-aggrandizement although they sound
self-belittling on the surface. Such type of narratives not only depict in-group members
as responsible for their own history, but also motivate them to seek improvement, to
reverse the decline and achieve positive results through enhanced efforts (cf. Gergen
2005: 106). Considered within the interactive context of narrative performance,
narratives of negative experiences, decline or loss furnish an important rhetorical
resource of imbuing discursive constructions and articulations of group identity with
credibility and social relevance.

Toward a classification of identity narrative

It has already been indicated that the symbolic and practical function of narrative -
establishing a shared sense of local identity and belonging - is realized through

156
selection and ordering of events (temporally, logically and contextually) and a
reflexive evaluation of these elements. It is through these interactional features that
narratives can explain experience, account for social action, engage participation, and
generate meaning, coherence and direction for a community. On the basis of this
function and on that of the major thematic concerns identified above, three
rudimentary forms of identity narrative were distinguished. These are the origin
narratives, exemplary narratives, and critical narratives (cf. Gergen 2005; Jörn 1987;
Somers 1994). This typology is taken here primarily for its methodological importance
to the purpose of the present dissertation rather than for its validity as a generic
classification of the full range of Oromo oral narratives, which is of little concern to
me at this point.

Origin narratives are concerned with the genesis of traditional socio-cultural

networks and/or institutions that are believed to have constituted the foundation of the
present. The people use this type of narratives to make sense of themselves and their
lives across the past, the present and the yet unrealized but imagined future. Such
narratives are told to articulate and affirm, ‘who we are, where we came from and how
we came to be who we are today,’ and to know ‘what and how to do in our lives.’
Origin narratives, like other narrative forms, selectively arrange and connect events
and actors in life time and space to construct stories about and/or explanations for the
origins constituting the present state of group life. They are understood and employed
to give ‘factual’ accounts for the formation of generally accepted social networks,
rules, principles, norms and codes of conduct as revealed in the actions of the past and
present generations alike. 33

The folklore of the southwestern Oromo abounds with this type of narratives
(see chapter 6, 7, 8). Each group tells stories about ‘how our forefathers came to and
settled in this area where we live today.’ Members of each group seem to take much
33
Cf. Gergen’s ‘stability narrative,’ in which live events are linked “in such a way that
either increments or decrements characterize movement along the evaluative dimension
over time” (2005: 104).

157
interest in telling them, and do often narrate about the origin, genealogical and
historical relationship of their group with other groups in the region. There are also
stories about the beginning of important social, cultural and political phenomena, how
things were in the past and how they changed and came to take their present form.
Connecting the present to a meaningful past, thus, origin narratives help the
interlocutors to establish and maintain stability of their identity, as a continuity and
permanence of ‘naturally’ or ‘historically’ constituted phenomena. Hence, origin
narratives play a significant role in construction and articulation of local identities by
affirming inherited cultural patterns of self-understanding. In short, the telling and
sharing of narratives of origin reinforces the interlocutors’ sense of attachment to their
locality and community.

Exemplary narratives are those narratives that provide exemplary cases

demonstrating characteristic attributes, prototypical and/or even stereotypical images
of one’s own group vis-à-vis those of others. In this type of narratives, the
interlocutors aim to articulate, affirm and/or even question ethical and moral values,
worldviews, beliefs, norms and aspirations of their own group in contrast to those of
others. These narratives lend validity and continuity to the assumed shared values and
ideals of a group over a long span of time and across varied social systems. Exemplary
narratives consist of stories, recollections or accounts about pivotal events and
experiences in the recent and distant past. This type of narratives are mainly concerned
about memorable deeds and achievements (and failures) of outstanding public figures
(local chiefs, kings, wise men, heroes), with which the interlocutors identify
themselves. In and through collaborative performance of such exemplary narratives,
the experiences, qualities, potentials and practices that the interlocutors value most
about themselves and want to be identified with are enacted, negotiated and articulated
in contrast to those of others. Among the south-western Oromo, members of each local
group tell such type of narratives (e.g., anecdotes, jokes, historical accounts, heroic
narratives and songs, proverbs, sayings) elucidating the exemplary acts and values of

158
their own positive characteristics (bravery, patriotism, heroism, generosity, etc.), as the
accomplishments, wisdom and moral excellence of their fellow-men (local heroes) in
the recent and distant past. Such a type of narrative is mostly based on stories about
each group’s various encounters, conflicts and rivalries with and struggles against
other forces (both Oromo and non-Oromo). Stories about local historical/cultural
heroes and/or villains also serve as models of virtue or vice for present-day group-
members. Exemplary narratives thus establish a continuity and validity of group
identity as historically, socially and morally superior to others by generalizing and
interrelating experiences across time. As noted by Jorn, the core logic of exemplary
narratives is expressed in the old maxim, “History is the teacher of life” (1987: 92).

Critical narratives (‘stories of now’) constitute critical evaluations of or

commentary on cultural and daily patterns of life. This type of narratives, like the
‘regressive narratives’ of Gergen (2005: 104), depicts continued crises or ‘downward
slide’ over a course of time. Critical narratives reveal ‘negative’ behavior and/or
deviations that account for the loss of a ‘cherished’ old identity and thereby evoke or
lament the present adverse conditions of life. Foregrounding the ‘ugly’ faces of the
past - the legacy of diminished status, loss of independence and autonomy, and moral
degeneration - critical or regressive narratives of the south-western Oromo objectify
the ‘common’ need for change, and furnish the means of informing and motivating the
people towards reversing the decline and realizing a better future through commitment
and concerted action. In these narratives, the interlocutors adopt a rhetorical strategy of
reflexive commentary on and assigning positive or negative values to those aspects of
past experience (individuals, institutions, objects or happenings) that are identified as
responsible for the present ‘problematic’ conditions of life. Thereby they seek to
persuade themselves and others, by appealing to their sense of value-judgment and
mastery over the world, towards achieving meaningful changes. By negotiating
traditionally given meaning of events and patterns of self-understanding, critical

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narratives reveal viable transformative directions to the construction of better
conditions in the near future.

Concluding remarks

Identity narrative performance, as discussed in this chapter, may be best described as

an interactive creative practice in search of collective self-understanding and of a sense
of group identity (via meaning construction), by interconnecting the past, the present
and the future. This involves concerted communicative actions situated within contexts
of face-to-face social interaction of adult group members, making socially and
situationally appropriate selections from locally available discursive resources and
interweaving them into the encompassing conversational narrative structure. The open-
ended, flexible structure allows for adaptive manipulation of the relevant formal,
thematic and functional elements of the various discursive forms (locally available and
understandable to the interlocutors), for fashioning, authenticating and contextualizing
the emergent collective self-understandings and values of its subjects.

We saw that the performance process chiefly consists of spontaneous or coaxed

launching, collaborative telling of and reflection on individual as well as collective
experiences, intertextual blending and contextualization, traditionalization,
commentary and evaluation. Each of these discursive strategies allow for reflection on
the preceding narration and justification of the ongoing conversational interaction and
instigation of the next narration in the communicative continuum. During or at the end
of each narration, the narrator may stop to ask the audience for attention, additional or
forgotten information or confirmation, and may be interrupted and/or stopped in the
middle of narration. S/he is then relieved of her/his responsibility as leader of the
performance and becomes an auditor; while another participant in the communicative
event can take her/his place. At this juncture of role transfer, the narrators and the
auditors reflect on the point of the narrated event in light of local standards of

160
goodness and relevance to the present and/or the future way of life, i.e.,- how the
present is a continuation or negation of the past and what is expected of the future. The
reflexive or evaluative commentary plays a crucial role in the repeated exercise of
creating a shared sense of moral identity and solidarity, interweaving selected
experiences and values from the socio-culturally constituted repertoires of expressive
resources, seeking explanation for the present crisis and the way to a better future.
Narrative performance thus affords a framework for and a connective thread to the
construction, or reaffirmation, of networks of social and local cultural relationship - a
community of shared meaning, a sense of belonging and identity. As Ochs and Capps
put it: ‘Every-day narration of life experience is a primary medium for moral
education, in that each recounting involves piecing together the moral meaning of
events’ (2001: 51).

As folklore in general and narrative in particular is a cultural space for locating

individuals and groups within a society, the construction and affirmation of identity
which can be achieved by connecting and integrating events, discourses, ideas, actions
and actors into a wider framework of meaning, becomes of central importance. The
production of aesthetic effects is secondary. ‘Situating its subjects (people, places,
events) in space as well as in time, historical discourse authenticates and/ or contests
social positions in space and time’ (Hufford 1995: 538), or as noted by Pasupathi:
“…even when they are rooted in an existing view, the selves people express in
storytelling are also situated selves” (2006: 144). As a final note, a sense of local
identity, i.e., the collective self-understanding constructed and expressed in and
through narrative performances, is not always fully consistent or characteristic of all
the interlocutors’ socio-cultural profile; nor is it necessarily instrumental, geared
towards mobilizing in-group members into immediate action. Rather, it is an
ideologically charged rhetorical identity, situated within a specific discursive context.
The themes identified in this chapter will be illustrated in the presentation and
interpretation of Oromo narratives in the following chapters.

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Chapter 6

Differentiation and similarity: identity narratives of the Jimma

and Gera Oromo

…identity is constituted and reconstituted in the process of narrating it.

Elaine Moriarty 2005: 5

Introduction

The present chapter examines narrative constructions and definitions of local identity
among the Jimma and the Gera Oromo in the Gibe region. In so doing, the wider and
situational contexts of the narrative performances, as well as rhetorical strategies and
devices of narrative discourses from these two groups will be explicated, using
selected sample texts and related ethnographic data. Before going into the discussion, a
brief socio-historical overview of the Jimma and Gera Oromo is presented. With their
long history and experience of interrelationship, interaction, shared culture, language,
religion, coterminous geography and more or less similar living conditions, the Oromo
groups’ contemporary contemporary narrative performances make interesting cases for
the empirical understanding of the dynamism, pragmatism, situational, relational, and
creative construction and articulation of local identities within the present-day ethno-
regional boundary of Oromia and the ethno-federal state of Ethiopia.

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The Jimma Oromo

The name ‘Jimma’ refers to the Oromo people of the Gibe region as a whole and to the
land they inhabit. It designates both the region and as well as the people living in the
area west of the Gibe River and east of the Gojeb. According to one of the most
widespread historical narratives (in Oromo: seenaa) recorded in the area, the name
‘Jimma’ was derived from the founding father, Jimma Sirba, whose descendants were
said to have been the first to settle in the area. Though today the name Jimma refers to
all of the Oromo of the Gibe region, it was said that originally referred only to five
tribal groups (gosa), (descendants of Jimma Sirba). These were Qore, Harsu, Lalo,
Bilo, and Badi. These five groups united and formed the kingdom of Jimma Kaka in
the beginning of the nineteenth century. The other four major groups, i.e., not
descended from Jimma Sirba, were said to have come later on and settled in the
adjacent areas that became small kingdoms of Gera, Gomma, Guma, and Limmu (See
map 3 below).

163
Map 3. The Gibe states in the first half of the 19th century

Source: Mohammed 1990: 87

164
Jimma

In the nineteenth century Jimma Abba Jifar became the strongest of the five monarchic
Oromo states in the Gibe Region that emerged towards the end of the eighteenth and
beginning of the nineteenth century (Abir 1968: 75.; Mohammed 1994: 84.; Marcus
2002: 48). Jimma consolidated into a strong kingdom under the rule of a powerful
warlord called Abba Jifar Abba Magal (r. 1830-1855), also known as Abba Jifar I
(Abba Jifar Gudda). Thus the kingdom was named Jimma Abba Jifar after its first
king.

The Oromo of the Gibe region in general became centralized kingdoms due to
processes of change in three important spheres: they became sedentary agriculturalists,
developed a monarchical political system, and adopted Islam. The transformation from
an agro-pastoral mode of production to sedentary agriculture, with a coffee-based
cash-crop economy and emerging trade differentiated them from other Oromo groups
more to the east, beginning prior to the nineteenth century. In other words, the new
economy and the long-distance trading allowed for the formation of elites that
monopolized the agrarian surplus and trade privileges; this was the main underlying
reason. The kingdom of Jimma became also a center of Islamic teaching in the south-
western region since the beginning of the nineteenth century (Trimingham 1952).

With regard to the monarchs of Jimma, the memory of its last king, Abba Jifar
II (r. 1875-1932), is still fresh in the minds of the people today. My informants
claimed that Jimma was a strong and prosperous kingdom during the reign of Abba
Jifar II. This is confirmed by writers such as Trimingham (1952) and Lewis (2001).
According to Lewis (2001: xiv), the kingdom of Jimma was “a remarkably centralized,
well-organized, and powerful monarchy.”

The south-western region was incorporated into the Ethiopian state at the end of
the nineteenth century by the imperial forces of Ethiopian emperor Menilik II (r. 1889-

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1913), led by Ras Gobena Dache and armed with rifles. Abba Jifar II submitted
peacefully. He agreed to pay an annual tribute to Menilik II, as a result of which he
was allowed until his death in 1932 to maintain the internal political autonomy of his
state under Emperor Haile Selassie I (r. 1930-1974). Today Abba Jifar’s reign is
remembered as ‘the good old times’ in which Jimma was a prosperous independent
state.

Jimma was an important center of commerce in the country with its control of
local markets and long-distance trade routes that connected the south-west with the
north of Ethiopia. Trade from the northern parts of the country passed through Jimma
to the Kaffa, Illu Aba Bor, Gimira, Kullo and Maji regions in the South, and vice
versa. Several of the then important commercial items such as coffee, civet, elephant
tusks, gold and slaves from Jimma and the south-western region were brought to
Hirmata, the commercial center of Jimma, and then taken by caravan to different parts
of the country or to be exported to the outside world. Goods of foreign origin such as
glass, weapons, ornaments, and the like followed the opposite course into Jimma and
then to the adjacent states. Jimma established a strong relation with Arabia, India, the
Sudan and Egypt (and also some European countries), and received a number of
immigrants and cultural influences from there (Mohammed 1994).

In sum, Lewis (2001: 46) noted with regard to Jimma’s past: “During his reign
[Abba Jifar II] trade flourished, agriculture and coffee-growing expanded, and Jimma
and its king gained a reputation for wealth and greatness all over Ethiopia.”

Along with the growth of the kingdom in agriculture and trade, artisanship was
also developed to a comparatively advanced stage vis-à-vis many other parts of
Ethiopia. The establishment of Abba Jifar’s palace (masaraa), still found at a hilltop
in Jiren, the old capital and political center of the kingdom, seven km. north-west of
present-day Jimma town, is regarded as a living monument to the past greatness
Jimma. Today, the masaraa serves as a cultural museum, displaying historical items
from the wider Jimma area and drawing domestic and foreign tourists.

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Figure 6. Abba Jifar’s palace in Jiren (Photo by the author, 2007)

As said, Jimma ceased to be an autonomous kingdom in 1932, after the death of

Abba Jifar II. As part of his political modernization drive, the then Emperor Haile
Selassie I took over the administration of Jimma from Abba Jobir, the grandson of
Abba Jifar, because of his alleged failure to cooperate with the central government. In
reality it was to end the ‘anomaly’ of such political autonomy within the centralizing
empire that Haile Selassie I wanted to establish. Jimma assumed a new status as one
district (awraja) in Kaffa Province, in which the other formerly independent Gibe
States were also included. Thenceforward it was to be administered directly from
Addis Ababa by a governor-general appointed by the Emperor.

During the five years of the Italian occupation (1936-1941), Jimma served as
the center and as the provincial capital for the south-western region. The Italians
expanded Jimma town and established several new infrastructural facilities, of which
the Addis Ababa-Jimma asphalt road still remains important. Though most of the

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Italian-built edifices in town have been going to rack and ruin, the architectural
landscape of the town still exhibits the imprint of the Italians.

Since the downfall of the Dergue military dictatorship and the establishment of
an ethno-federal structure in the country in 1991, Jimma has become one of the twelve
administrative zones of Oromia Regional State. The Jimma zone is bordered on the
south by the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State, on the
northwest by Illu Abba Bor, on the north by Western Wollega, and on the northeast by
East Wollega Zone. The Jimma Zone today consists of thirteen local administrative
districts (woräda or anaa), largely coinciding with the borders of the formerly
independent kingdoms of Jimma Abba Jifar, Gera, Gomma, Gumma, and Limmu. The
capital of the zone is Jimma town. (Hence, the name Jimma in this chapter refers both
to the old kingdom of Jimma Abba Jifar and the present-day Jimma administrative
zone of Oromia.)

Gera

Gera, one of the Five Gibe States that emerged in the nineteenth century, is presently a
local administrative district (anaa) in the south-western part of Jimma zone. Its capital
is Chira. According to the projection made by the Central Statistics Agency in 2007,
Gera woreda had an estimated total population of 104,036 (2010: 8). Apart from
coffee, Gera is known for its dense forests, still rich in wildlife, and for the production
of production of honey, spices and the teff grain.

The district was said to have got its name from the word gera, which means
“spear.” According to oral narratives recorded in the area, the forefathers of the
present Gera Oromo were fighting their neighbors over land and pasture with long
spears, as rifles had not entered the area yet in the 18th century. They were known in
the Gibe region for their bravery and use of the long spears. Being adept with using
their gera and famous for their fighting skills, they were feared by their enemies.

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Because of this reputation their land became to be known as Gera. Even today the
people of Gera consider themselves - and are considered by the Jimma Oromo as a
whole - as ‘men of war and adventure.’

The old kingdom of Gera was said to have been founded by a warlord called
Gunji in the second quarter of the 19th century. Oral tradition has it that Gera was
established as an independent monarchic state after the establishment of the other Gibe
States, and as a result of the victory Gunji won in the wars he fought against Jimma
and Gomma. Gunji did not live long after his kingship and was succeeded by his son
Tullu Gunji. In oral tradition, Tullu is said to excel his father in bravery and
shrewdness, and is remembered as an unflinching warrior king and war strategist, who
won the respect and recognition of his rivals in the whole Gibe region.

Gera only briefly existed as an independent political formation as it was

incorporated into the Ethiopian state in the last quarter of the nineteenth century after a
year of strong armed resistance against the forces of emperor Menilik, led by his
general Ras Tesemma Nadew. In 1932 it became a district (awraja) of Kaffa province.
Gera oral tradition asserts that the warriors of Gera would not have stopped fighting
and surrendered had it not been for the ‘ill advice’ of Abba Jifar, who had peacefully
submitted to Menilik at the beginning of his conquest of the Gibe region. According to
oral narratives, Abba Jifar tricked the king of Gera out of resisting the military forces
of Menelik on the basis of a false promise that the latter would maintain the internal
autonomy of his state. Due to this, Gera considered the Jimma Abba Jifar king to be a
traitor. Today, the Gera define themselves as clearly distinct from the Jimma and other
local Oromo groups in the Gibe region.

In the discussion that follows, a number of identity narratives of the Jimma and
Gera Oromo will be presented and examined in the light of their self-presentation and
their relational positioning.

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Narrative 6.1

“We are different from others”: a contemporary identity narrative of the Jimma 1

1. As a native Jimma Oromo, I have a lot to say about whom the Jimma
Oromo are and how we differ from the rest of the south-western Oromo
groups.
2. As you know, the Oromo as a whole were initially known to have been
administering themselves by way of the gada system. While they were
ruled by the gada system, the Abba gada (head of the gada)…, one of the
duties of Abba Gada was to ensure territorial expansion of their society, to
acquire more land, pasture and settlement areas for the people.
3. As you know, this area was originally very sparsely populated. It was only
after our ancestors came to and settled in the area that it began to be densely
populated. Initially there were only a few Kaffa people in the area, and the
land was no-man’s land, which was by and large uninhabited.
4. As everywhere in the world, the territorial expansion of the Oromo was
necessitated by population growth. Accordingly, a group of the Macha
Oromo, our ancestors, who were originally in the area known as Bisil, in
west Shoa area, first came to this area for hunting.
5. When they came, they realized that the area was uninhabited and endowed
with water resource, beautiful waterfalls, springs, rivers, and forest rich
with wild life. The land was covered by the scented tree of soyyoma. As the
Oromo were pastoralists then, they found the land, the climate, the water
and the pasture very favorable for cattle breeding and farming.
6. Then, as our elders told us, our forefathers who first came to this area for
hunting built fire in the place they stopped for a while. Then the people who
were in this area were the Kaffa.
7. When the Kaffa saw the fire made by the Oromo men, the smoke of which
was visible in a very distant area, they were puzzled by what made the fire
and came to the place to see what made it. Then they saw the Oromo men,
who were very few in number, and they chased them away.
8. When our Oromo forefathers returned back to Bisil, they told to their
people about the beautiful and uninhabited land they found beyond the Gibe
River. Then the gada class in power decided to move to and settle in the
area. Then, the Oromo came and settled in this area, which was to be
known as Jimma after the name of our forefathers, Jimma Sirba, who was

1
A narrative told by Obbo (Mr.) Tayyib Abba Foggi in a focus group discussion held on 13
November 2006, in Jimma.
170
 one of the first to come to and settle in the area. They settled on the land
chasing the Kaffa people away to the area beyond the Gojeb River.
9. This Jimma area was used as a long trade route for traders from the north,
because of which the Oromo people came into contact and interaction with
other peoples and cultures. As a result of this and in a process that took a
long period of time, the Jimma Oromo, then known as the Five Gibe, gave
up the gada system and took up the monarchic political system.
10. Therefore, what makes the Oromo of Jimma different from the others is,
first, their being the first to replace the old gada system by a monarchic
rule. Secondly, along with the monarchic rule came the development of
agriculture, cattle rearing, crafts and trading in the area.
11. The Jimma were also the first to make use of silk production for economic
purpose. Yes, silk was produced in the Jimma area as early as the 1860s.
This shows how Jimma was economically strong and competent to other
countries such as Egypt.
12. Even there are some writers who described Jimma as a very developed
country, as developed as, if not excelling, England, in terms of its economic
superiority, legal system, quality of life and awareness of the people.
13. The Jimma were known to have been very happy and rich people, far better
than their present state of life. They used to make a huge amount of money
and great living out of the breeding of civet, not to mention other economic
resources.
14. Most of the people were said to have been very rich from the income they
get selling the civet. To mention but an example, there were men such as
Abba Chibis who were said to have been very rich and able to lend money
to the then government.
15. It was said that Emperor Menelik II many times wrote letter to King Abba
Jifar asking him to send him some money, borrowing from the rich men of
Jimma. This means that there were some men in Jimma who had much
more money than the government of Jimma and even than the Ethiopian
government itself.
16. Thus, in comparison to and contrast with the other Oromo groupings, the
Jimma Oromo consider themselves as a civilized society, the first civilized
Oromo society that began to develop trade, crafts and agriculture.
17. We the Jimma say that we are the first to be civilized, the first to develop a
monarchic system, the first to develop trade, the first to establish trade
contact with the rest of the world, the first to export valuable things such as
civet, elephant tusks, hand craft products including things made of iron and
leather to the outside world. It is also the Jimma Oromo who first exported
coffee to the world market.
18. I believe the Jimma Oromo differs from the other Oromo groups such as the
Wollega, Shoa, and Illu Abba Bor by its primacy in its introduction to
modernity, in its understanding of modern way of life and civilization.

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19. The other thing is related with the long trade routes known in the area.
After the establishment of monarchic rule in the Jimma area, a lot of traders
from different parts of the world, especially from the Middle-East, such as
Turkey, were coming to the area.
20. These people were responsible for the export of coffee to the Arab world
and to European countries. This is why today coffee is known by the same
name, Qaawaa, in the Jimma area, Egypt and Turkey. The Arabs,
Egyptians and Turks call it gawa. Thus it is not difficult to see how coffee
and its very name (Qaawaa) was taken from the Jimma Oromo and
transmitted to the Turks and Arabs.
21. In addition, a large number of traders were also coming to the Jimma area
from northern and central part of the country as well. The valuable products
of the area, including coffee, attracted a large number of traders from
different parts of the country and the outer world. This resulted in the first
introduction of the Islamic religion in this southwestern region of the
country.
22. The introduction of Islam, in turn, brought a substantial change in the way
of life of the people: in their food habits, costumes, mourning rites,
marriage customs and such like practices. And hence, large part of the
culture of the Jimma has long been influenced by the Islam religion in the
last two hundred or more years.
23. Though the culture of the Oromo as a whole is almost similar, that of the
Jimma exhibits certain level of peculiarities. This is evident, for instance, in
the marriage custom (Nikha) practiced in the area, which is the same with
other Muslim people such as the Indians, Pakistanis or the Arabs, because it
is based on the Koran, the Haddis and other Holy writings. This means the
marriage custom of the Jimma has got elements of the Oromo as well as
from Islam.
24. The influence of Islam is discernible even in our language, i.e., in the way
we speak, in the words and expressions we use, and in our daily life. Thus it
is possible to conclude that the Jimma Oromo differ from the other Oromo
groupings in the south-western region by their adoption of the monarchic
system, by its transition from the gada system to monarchic rule, its
acceptance of the Islam religion as a result of its contact with other Muslim
people because of the long trade routes, and the use of Arabic script for
writing the Oromo language.
25. These make it different from the other neighboring Oromo people in Shoa,
Wollega and Illu Abba Bor. In this connection, the influence of Islam on
the way of life of the people should be noted. As I have already indicated,
the way we dress including our headwear is different from the other Oromo
groupings. For example, the Jimma women cover their heads, while women
in Wollega or Shoa do not do so.

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 26. Secondly, the habit of taking baths, that is washing one’s body or some
parts of the body five times a day for the Salat is one of the requirements of
Islam. As one has to pray five times a day, he/she is required to keep his/her
body clean and neat. Anyone is required to wash his/her genital area after
sexual intercourse.
27. One is not allowed to eat, go out of his/her house, cross a river or do
anything without being clean. Thus you can see that the religion is
important even in keeping oneself neat and clean, and in leading a hygienic
life.
28. You see, if a woman does not wash her hair after anointing herself by
butter, which is a common cultural practice among women in other Oromo
groups; her hair may get a bad smell… But among the Jimma women,
washing the hair is an obligatory requirement of the religion.
29. So washing one’s body, keeping one’s body and clothing clean and neat is
something that differentiates the Jimma culture from others, which is the
result of the Islam religion.
30. Yes, there are also a lot of things that are unique to or originated in Jimma.
One example is the akaafa (spade).2 Akaafa was originated in Jimma. Yes,
we have evidence supporting the fact that it originated in Jimma. It was the
Jimma craftsmen who extracted iron from the soil and made it into akaafa.
31. Our elders tell us that it was designed by an Indian man called Tickum and
then forged out by the Jimma craftsmen.
32. The other thing is the sickle (hamtuu). We have different types of sickle.
One is the ordinary type which is imported from abroad and used for
cutting grasses. The other which is unique to Jimma is longer than the
former one and often referred to as Hamtuu Jimma (Jimma’s sickle). This is
usually used by older men who find difficulty in stooping down to cut
grasses.
33. There is also a similar tool known as wollo. It is also referred to as wolle in
some areas. In the Jimma area it is known as wollo. This is a sharp metal
tool with a long wooden handle used for cutting tree branches.
34. There are also different types of axes. The Jimma actually have a rich body
of material culture. Among this, the harness of horses known as maxaabirii
originated in Jimma. What makes this harness unique to Jimma is that it is
decorated with silver, while in other areas such as Shoa it is decorated with
threads of cotton.
35. We have also a special type of rein which is made and used only here in
Jimma. The one imported from the white men’s (Ferenji) country and that
of ours are different. The one from Jimma is very strong.
36. There is a song testifying to this fact:
Jimma Abba Jifar malee eenytuu

2
A locally made spade that is used for hoeing.
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 lugamaan farda leenjisaa,
Garaa jaalalaa malee maaltuu
dukanaan nama deemsiisaa.

Who but the Jimma Abba Jifar

Can break in the horse to the harness,
What but love
Can force one to make a trip in darkness.
37. In short, based on its earlier establishment of long trade routes, adopting
monarchic rule, and accepting the Islam religion and way of life, the Jimma
differ from other Macha Oromo groups. Thus the Jimma Oromo says my
culture, my custom of marriage, my customs of mourning and my belief
system makes me different from others, though we also share many
common features with the others.

The narrator of this text, Obbo (Mr.) Tayyib Abba Foggi, was Head of the Tourism
Department in the Culture and Tourism Office of Jimma Zone.3 Apart from his ethnic
affiliation and his official responsibility to promote the culture of the Jimma, he was
considered by his fellow Jimma Oromo as one of the most knowledgeable men in the
traditions and history of the area. He often writes articles for the weekly Oromo
newspaper called Barissaa and gives interviews on Ethiopian Radio about the
traditions and customs of the Jimma. In his narration, Obbo Tayyib mentions only a
few of his qualifications, as it is culturally not considered proper for a man to ‘brag of
oneself.’ However, he begins his narration by stressing his affiliation to the Jimma and
that he knows much and has a lot to say about his people (see line 1). By giving
personal details he establishes himself (appealing to a shared ethos) as an unassailable
authority on the articulation of local identity, which at the same time claims to give
authenticity to his identity narrative. This kind of opening generally characterizes the
opening of any telling of identity narratives among the southwestern Oromo.

At first glance it may not be difficult to see that the above narrative is
performed more in the form of conversation than following a strict story line. In fact, it

3
Obbo Tayyib had a diploma in Library Science from Addis Ababa University, and a BA
degree in Management from Jimma University.
174
is intentionally presented in a form of explanation of the claim how the Jimma Oromo
are ‘different’ from and ‘superior’ to the other Oromo groups in the region. The
conversational form gives the narrator more freedom not to be confined by the strict
story line so as to marshal as much evidence as possible to support his group-centered
arguments. To this effect, the narrator presents a blend of fragments of historical
narratives that are supposed to be factual and known to the audience, as evidences to
make his point.

The narrative is set in wider historical and social contexts. First, the migration
from the said original homeland, Bisil, to the present-day Jimma area was said to have
been caused, ‘as elsewhere in the world’ (4)4, by demographic pressure. Second, the
migration of the Jimma is set in the context of Oromo expansion and as a function of
the gada system (2), which was a ritual socio-political order geared to cyclical
expansion of lower grades of youths towards other areas and peoples. By so doing, the
narrator is able to present his story as containing a general and universal truth. What is
more, the Jimma area was said to have been ‘no man’s land’ and ‘uninhabited’ before
the arrival of the Jimma Oromo (3) (remarkably, despite the admitted presence of the
Kaffa people). The land is said to have been endowed with abundant water resources,
favorable climate, fertile soil and a dense forest rich with animal life (5). The land of
Jimma is often described as “king of lands” (motii biyyaa), where anything under the
sky, including the scented Soyyoma tree, can grow well. The land was also presented
as if it were ‘discovered’ by the keen-eyed Jimma hunters, who at the first glance were
able to recognize its heavenly nature and habitable features. It is interesting to note
that the narrator intentionally makes reference to the Kaffa people as predecessors of
the Jimma (6), who were forced to move out of the area by the latter. By so doing, the
narrator tries to justify the penetration of the Jimma into the area and legitimize the
latter’s claim to the land as their communal ancestral territory since time immemorial.
He has to foreground the military superiority they have over the other group, the Kaffa

4
Numbers in brackets refer to the lines in the narratives presented.
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people as original inhabitants. The importance of place - ancestral territory) -as a basis
of identity construction is apparent.

Additionally, the early establishment of long-distance trade routes, the

formation of the monarchic state and Islamization in the nineteenth century are all
adduced as historical evidence to support the claim that the Jimma are different from
and superior to others, as well as to evoke the nostalgia among the audience for the
‘long-lost’ glorious past of Jimma. To these may be added the repeated references to
the early development of Jimma as the source of coffee5 and coffee export to the
outside world, and to agriculture, cattle breeding, crafts, flourishing trade and the
production of silk, begun as early as the 1860s (10, 11, 16).

The narrator also appeals to anonymous experts that are alleged to have testified
to the early development of Jimma on a par with England (12). What is more, the
Jimma Oromo is said to have been a ‘civilized society’, governed by a monarchic ruler
rather than by the old and traditional gada system, influenced by early civilizations of
Egypt, Turkey and the Arab world, and accepted the Muslim religion. It followed the
‘modern way of life’ characterized by, among others, foreign relations, trade and
hygienic physical and social environment (24, 26, 28). The term “qaawaa,” or coffee
in the Jimma Oromo dialect, is said to be synonymous with the Arabic term “gawa”
(20), claimed as evidence for the influence of the Arab world on the Jimma Oromo.
The narrator also uses traditional song to support his claim that the Jimma have got
their own harness (36), appealing to the ethos of the audience.

The central point of the narrator seems to be to convince his audience,

especially his intended audience - me as an outside researcher - that the Jimma are
‘different from and superior to’ the other Macha groups. The narrative emphasizes the
explanation of difference and an argument with reference to history. Recounting the
history of Jimma is the major rhetorical strategy aimed at establishing an authenticity

5
Although a much stronger historical claim for this can be made by the Kafa Region.
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of construction and articulation of the very identity. Knowledge of history, thus, is
used as a source of authority to articulate local identity of the Jimma and also as an
important element for construction of the identity itself.

According to the narrator, Jimma was not only powerful and prosperous country
in the past but also has the potential to be the same in the present, provided that it is
given the opportunity for development. In general, it is this nostalgia for the past, the
grievance of loss and the consistent urge for change and betterment of the political and
economic status of the elite, and by extension the community, that runs through most
of the identity narratives recorded in the southwestern region. As noted by Bitzer
(1968: 4), the urge for change resides at the center of any work of rhetoric; and a work
may be considered rhetorical because it occurs as a response to a certain situation:

… a work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of

something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in
the world; it performs some task. …rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by
the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which
changes reality through the mediation of thought and action. The rhetor alters
reality by bringing into existence a discourse of such a character that the
audience, in thought and action, is so engaged that it becomes mediator of
change. In this sense rhetoric is always persuasive.

Hence, the maintenance of memories of the past seems to be a form of protest or

reaction against the present state of affairs, which is implicitly referred to as
deplorable. The Jimma indulge in their memory of the past so as to contrast
themselves to their current state of life. In fact, the present-day ethnic-federal political
system of the country also encourages the construction and articulation of ethnic as
well as sub-ethnic identities; it encourages articulation and glorification of local
histories and traditions so as to legitimize a political system which emphasizes socio-
cultural difference and thus the importance of ethno-regional autonomy. But as a
result, inter- as well as intra-ethnic competition over power, ethnic prestige/status, and

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resources has become much more intense, which in turn takes the heat off the center to
the regional and local level.

The nostalgia for the glorious past of Jimma and the present-day urge for
change, which consistently run through the whole narrative, is anchored in the alleged
evidence of differences with and superiority over others in the region in various
aspects of life past and present. For the Jimma Oromo, the past is not something
romantic or mythic but recent and memorable, fresh in the memory of every sensible
person. It is the time of Jimma’s glory in which Jimma was the most powerful,
prosperous and independent state of not only the southwestern region but allegedly
also of the whole country. It was the time when, “The Jimma were known to have been
very happy and rich people, far better than their present state of life” (13). The
economic strength of the old Jimma was asserted by the hyperbolic reference to
Emperor Menilik’s letter to King Abba Jifar in which the latter was asked to borrow
money from his fellow-rich men and send it to the former (15).

As indicated above, the intention of the narrator is more to convince than to

inform the audience, 6 which is presumed to be familiar with (1) the narrated historical
events and how the Jimma differ from the other south-western Oromo groupings. It is
interesting to note the narrator’s usage of the seemingly meretricious phrases such as
‘as you know’ (2, 3, 9), ‘you see’ (28), ‘as our elders told us’ (6), ‘our forefathers’ (4),
‘our forefathers who first came to this area’ (6), which serve to draw the narrator and
the audience closer and hence to construct a shared local identity. What is more, the
rhetorical strategy of the narrator, i.e. the use of historical referents, explanation and
enumeration of supportive ‘evidence’, was shaped by the situation in which he is
expected to define the Jimma Oromo (to whom he belongs) in relation to and contrast
with other groups in the region.

6
Consisting of six Jimma Oromo men and myself.
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 The ideological theme of the narrative clearly comes out in its coda. The
narrator, based on the aforementioned historical referents and daily life experiences
such as the Islamic marital custom of Nikha (23), women’s head-dress (25), the daily
practice of Salat and the habit of bathing (26, 27), indicates how the Jimma are
‘different from and superior to’ the other Oromo groups in the southwest, a point
emphasized and interspersed in the entire narrative text (1, 10, 16, 18, 30, 37). Hence
history and Islamic values are used as major constituent elements for the construction
of Jimma Oromo identity.

Finally, it can be seen that the speaker is summarizing information from written
history in his account, and mixed it with alleged oral traditions. It should not be
forgotten that the context of telling this long story was that of presenting his group to
the outsider, the researcher from another group, and neither that he is a political
functionary. The story he tells has a strong political sub-text, resembling here and
there a legitimizing ‘conquest myth’. It was presented almost in the form of a quasi-
academic ‘lecture’ given to the interviewer. In many aspects it thus differs from a
folkloric oral tradition that is rooted in community life and in a traditional context of
transmission.

In other narratives, the claim to ‘shared common ancestral land’ and being the
‘first-comers’ is articulated and manipulated in more detail, in combination with other
‘historical’ features, in the construction of a local identity. The following example may
help to illustrate the point.

Narrative 6.2

Our forefathers are the first to settle in this area7

Our ancestors are the first to come to settle in this area. They came from a
place called Bisil, beyond the Giba River in Shoa. They came to Bisil from
7
Told by Abba Jebel Abba Biyya (72), 12 November 2006, in Yabbu, Manna district.
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their original homeland in Wollo, Rayya. They were living in Bisil before
they came to this Jimma area. It was there that the population multiplied very
much and became so numerous to the extent that the land became too small to
accommodate them. This Jimma area was uninhabited then; there was no one
on it. This Jimma area was originally uninhabited. Of course there were a few
Kaffa people on it. But the Kaffa people were not original inhabitants of the
area. They came from another area simply to look for mineral water (Hora)
for their cattle. And when they saw the Oromo, they fled to the area beyond
the Gojeb River where they are found today.
Then our forefathers came here in different groups and settled in different
areas. The first to come here were the Waro, who moved into Binoyyi and
Guchi into the present-day Nadda district. The Sadacha came to settle in the
area known as Nadaa Gudda. A group known as Hagaloo settled in Nadda
Tina, Laloo in Manisa, in the Qarsa district, and the Biloo settled in Duru area
in the same district. The clan called Harsuu came to settle in the district of
Dedoo and the Diggo, the clan to which king Abba Jifar belonged, settled in
the Manna district. Here it should be noted that these groups have got their
own sub-groups. And all of the Baddi clan settled in this district of Saqqa.
You know, this Saqqa area was ruled by a man called Abba Qiriphe. Another
clan by the name of Qoree also settled in Manna district. A clan called
Hariroo settled in this Saqa area specifically in a place called Kutaaree. In this
way they settled in different areas. These groups initially had their own gada
centers. The Laloo had a Bokku known as Saroo, which of the Sadachaa was
Abullu, which of Biloo was Wayyu, which of Qoree was Ganjoo, which of
Harsuu was Korjee, etc. Later on all these came together and agreed to be
administered under a rule of one man. It was a woman called Makka Ware
who was first elected as a ruler of the people in the area. Then some people
opposed to Makka Ware and Abba Qiriphe came to power. Abba Qirphe
ruled for a brief period of time and Diggo came to power. Diggo came to
power in this way.
One day two groups of people quarreled over a foal. All claimed that it
was his jenny that gave birth to the foal. Then they went to Diggo to seek his
judgment over their dispute. Diggo listened to the claim of each group and
devised a way to settle the dispute. He tied the foal in a valley and ordered the
people to bring their respective jenny near to the place the young one was
tied. When the jennies were brought to the area, one of them was found to be
anxious about the foal and ran down to the place it was tied, while the other
remained indifferent to the kid. When he saw the jenny running towards its
foal, Diggo said, ‘That was the one which gave birth to the young donkey,

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 and the owner of that particular jenny was entitled to the foal’. When the
people saw how Diggo settled the dispute wisely, they designated him as their
leader. It was in this way that the Diggo family came to power. 8

The above narrative purports to make two interrelated points. First, it establishes
the Jimma Oromo as the first-comers and legitimate inhabitants of the land (as in
Narrative 6.1). In other words, the land was depicted as the ancestral territory of the
people since time immemorial. This is achieved by again, as in Narrative 6.1,
understating of the presence of other people (the Kaffa) before the coming of the
Jimma Oromo. Rather than outright denial, the narrator admits the pre-existence of the
Kaffa people, which is an historical fact, but understates the fact as a mere chance and
temporary happening - “They came from another area simply to look for mineral
spring (Hora) for their cattle.” More importantly, the narrator goes on validating his
group’s claim to the ‘ancestral land’ by painstakingly presenting minute details of the
(sub-) tribal identity of the people within the Jimma. By identifying the tribes and
clans that are said to have been the first-comers (and still inhabitants of the Jimma
area), the narrator lends his narration the credibility and immediacy of the present in
spite of its alleged remote mythical setting. Second, and related to the first one, it
presents the Diggo family of Jimma, by extension the Jimma Oromo as a whole, as a
people with a long history of ‘justice’ and ‘wisdom’. This is achieved by recounting
the dilemma tale about how Diggo resolved a conflict over ownership of a foal.
Appropriating the dilemma tale, which is a common form in African oral literature (for
example, see Finnegan 1970), and presenting it as an historical account of Diggo’s
wisdom, the narrator not only justifies the ascendance of the Diggo family to power
consolidating the several (sub-) tribal groups into one strong monarchic state, Jimma
Kakka, in the first quarter of the 19th century, but also substantiates the self-definition
of the Jimma as ‘wise and thoughtful people’.

8
Abba Jebel Abba Biyya, see previous note.
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 In other narratives, moral values such as peacefulness, an ethic of generosity
and a sense of justice are used as elements of self-definition of the Jimma, as opposed
to the other Oromo groups in the region, i.e., for themselves, and not for indigenous
people. The following narrative is a typical example of its kind.

Fig. 7. A Jimma elder narrating, November 2006

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Narrative 6.3

‘We are generous and peace-loving people’9

1. The Jimma have a lot of things. They have wisdom, I swear to Allah.
They like each other. They share whatever they have; they are generous, is
it clear?
2. Yes, it is clear [audience’s response].
3. This is the way of life of the Jimma. The people like each other dearly and
also like others as well.
4. You see, I was in Illu Abba Bor for thirteen years; people do not like each
other there; nor do they like others. I got married and my first son was
born there.
5. You know my son, Saman, don’t you?
6. Yes, I know [one of the audience’s reply].
7. He is now in the country of the Janjero10. Thanks to Allah, now he is
doing fine. He was imprisoned in Gomma for seven years; he was
imprisoned by the government. He was also imprisoned for three years
and six months in Tolay. He was taken prisoner while he was in Gomma.
Thanks to Allah, now he is doing fine. He has a good job in Janjero; he is
paid two thousand and five hundred Birr monthly.
8. You were telling us something about the Illu Abba Bor [one of the
audience’s request].
9. Yes, the Illu Abba Bor, the Illu Abba Bor are shrewd people; every one of
them is interested only in himself.
10. It is the Jimma people who are peace-loving and friendly to other people.
There is an Oromo saying attesting to this:
11. Ya motii Jimma,
Ya hirriyaa Limmu,
Ya lafa Gomma,
Oh, the king of Jimma,
Friendship of the Limmu,
The land of Gomma.
12. What does this mean? [one of the audiences’ question].
13. This means that the king of Jimma is known for his wisdom and
generosity and good governance, while the land of Gomma is very fertile
and favorable for agriculture. Similarly, the Limmu are known for their
friendship; they put much importance on friendship; they never betray
their friends.

9
Told by Abba Zinab Abba Gissa (98), November 11, 2006, Yabbu, Manna.
10
I.e., the Yem people.
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14. As to the wisdom of Jimma, for instance, it is evident in Abba Jifar’s
decision not to fight the Amhara. So long after the Jimma Oromo came to
and settled in this area, the Amhara king Menelik came and asked Abba
Jifar to pay him tribute. He does not know the Oromo language. Then
Menelik could talk to no one because he was not able to speak the Oromo
language.
15. Later on Abba Digga came from Gumma. Abba Digga was son of
Gumma’s king. He came, and… He was an uncle of Abba Jifar. He came
and discussed with Abba Jifar about whether they were to fight Menelik or
not.
16. Then Abba Jifar summoned one sheikh from the Manna area to his palace.
Abba Jifar asked the sheikh for his advice on whether they should fight or
not.
17. The sheikh was a well learnt man. He knows much about the Jihad.
18. He told them that the Amhara had a gun, which was known as Sabo. The
Amhara used their gun to kill people from afar.
19. Upon learning this, Abba Jifar said, “We knew from books that the
Amhara had sword and spear; but if they have got guns now, then we
should peacefully submit to them.”
20. Abba Digga shook his head in disagreement and stood up to go back to
Gumma.
21. Later on Gumma was conquered while the king Abba Magaal Abba
Faaroo was giving his people a lavish feast. They were feasting and
relaxing, saying that they would not submit to the Amhara. They said that
they would not prostrate to men and Allah at the same time (Namaa
guggufnee Rabbi hin guggufnuu); however, they were defeated without
any resistance when the Amhara got to them.
22. On his way to Gumma, Abba Digga was shot in his chest by the Amhara
at a place called Nago, beyond the Didessa River. They shot him by their
gun, Sabo, and he fell off his horse. Many of his soldiers were also killed
or wounded. Abba Digga died on the spot. And his soldiers ran for their
lives. Then the Amhara followed and killed them all.
23. Then Abba Jifar wanted to send someone who could talk in Amharic to
Menelik. But he could find no one. No one was able to speak Amharic
then.
24. Later on two individuals were reported to speak Amharic; they were
Usman Sali, who was my uncle, and Abba Wari Adam Qajelo, who was
from the Taru clan.
25. Both of these men were itinerary merchants. They had learnt to speak
Amharic while traveling in the Amhara country for trading.
26. These two men were brought to Abba Jifar and sent to Menelik. They took
a lot of tributes to the king, a great deal of gold, many slaves and other

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 things. They also took a lot of oxen and other food and drink stuff to the
Amhara king.
27. It is in this way that the Jimma peacefully submitted to Menelik. Abba
Jifar decided to submit peacefully not to get his men killed in a futile war.
28. By so doing, he saved his people from destruction and maintained
autonomy of his state till his death.
29. The Jimma submitted peacefully without any loss of life. Only two men
were killed, whereas the Gumma, the Gera and the Illu lost a lot of men
fighting a war in which their defeat was inevitable.
30. The Jimma do not like fighting. They do not even have the custom of
killing wild animals.
31. The Gera and Illu Abba Bor and Wollega have this custom. A man is not
allowed to get married unless he killed a buffalo or a lion or another big
game. Even if he gets married, his wife will not be allowed to fetch water
from a stream in the presence of wives of those men who killed big game.
So, women always drive their men to the wilderness to kill animals.
32. Boys of 16 and above go to a far off place called Baqqo to kill a lion,
buffalo, elephant or other big animal. They go to the wilderness in order to
kill animals but get killed themselves. A lot of men die every year in Illu
Abba Bor while trying to kill wild animals. They have even the song that
goes as:
33. Baqqo baqaattu lafa,
Eenyutu hindhaqiin hafaa?
Baqqo, that hostile place,
No one avoids going there.
34. It is but foolish to kill animals. The Jimma do not have such a foolish
tradition. We are peace-loving people.
35. The Jimma are also known for their generosity and sense of justice. As the
saying goes, “The reaction of Jimma to a thirsty person is not offering
water but milk with a piece of bread” (Dheeboodheen Jimma debiin
bishaani miti anaaniifi cabdiidha).
36. There are a lot of songs attesting to the generosity of the Jimma. And
Abba Jifar was well known for his generosity. May I tell you about his
generosity?
37. Yes, please.
38. Once there was a man who served Abba Jifar loyally. One day he was sent
to the king of the Kaffa, who was married to the daughter of Abba Rebu.
The man went to the king to buy slaves for Abba Jifar. He often goes and
stays there for two or more months. Once while he was in the Kaffa land
he fell ill. He fell ill after he bought forty-five slaves for Abba Jifar. Abba
Jifar heard that his servant suffered a lot of pain in the land of others.
When the servant came back to Jimma, Abba Jifar received him warmly

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 and arranged several things for his recovery. He fed him well and when he
recuperated, Abba Jifar gave him all of those forty-five slaves as a reward
for his loyalty and pain he underwent while serving his king.
39. Abba Jifar was such a generous man. It is not that easy to give a man
forty-five slaves which were too much to give away then.

The above transcribed narrative was recorded in a focus group discussion held in
Yabbu, Manna woreda of Jimma, on 11 November 2006. Manna is the place of origin
of the Diggo family, i.e., the family of the kings of Jimma. The focus group discussion
was held in the home of Abba Zinab Abba Gissa, a man of 98, who told us the above
narrative. Like most of the focus group discussions and interview sessions I conducted,
the discussion was on the question who the Jimma are and how they define
themselves. The above narrative was performed and recorded within this specific
context. Apart from Abba Zinab and me, there were three Jimma men, who had an
acquaintance with the old man and helped me to arrange the focus group discussion at
his place.

Abba Zinab was an old man but was reputed to have a sharp memory of the
past. He indeed remembered a lot of things about the old way of life of Jimma. Upon
my introduction to him, he warmly welcomed and invited all of us to coffee in his
place.

After the necessary introductions, Abba Zinab began to tell us about himself
and his long life experience. He said that he had been an itinerant merchant and had
visited many places outside of Jimma. He often went to the central and northern part of
Ethiopia. He lived in Illu Abba Bor and visited Wollega on many occasions. He
commented that the time of Abba Jifar Abba Gommol, the last king of Jimma, was a
time of prosperity, happiness and much work for him and the Jimma as a whole. Abba
Zinab said that he had known Abba Jifar personally and was invited to the palace
many times. He said, “Abba Jifar was a very wise and generous king; he usually
consulted men of experience like me before making his decision on matters of
importance.”
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 I asked him to tell us something about the Jimma people, what their
characteristics are and how they relate to and differ from other Oromo groups. He
recounted the above long, highly ideological, narrative, which can be summarized as
follows:

The Jimma are peace-loving people. They are generous and respectful to
others. They do not like war and that is why they did not resist the military
force of Menelik II. Abba Jifar submitted to Menelik without any
bloodshed; Jimma lost only two persons, while the Gera, Gumma, Illu
Abba Bor, and Wollega lost a lot of men in fighting a futile war against the
army of Menelik armed with guns. They are war-like people. They even
have a long tradition of killing wild animals as a display of manhood. And
they get themselves killed while trying to kill the dangerous wild animals.
Whereas the Jimma are always engaged in trade and agriculture and live
peacefully. The others are fools.

Abba Zinab spoke with a voice of an authority accorded to him due to age and
experience. Narration of his experiences in many parts of Ethiopia, especially in the
neighbouring sub-regions of Illu Abba Bor and Wollega, as well as his relationship
with the late king Abba Jifar gave him an additional advantage to be accepted in the
community as authentic and credible narrator. He effectively used his claims to
knowledge and his thirteen years of experience in Illu Abba Bor to substantiate his
version of Jimma identity. He presented himself as an eyewitness to the self-perceived
difference in way of life and behaviour between the Jimma and the Illu Oromo (4):
that the former are ‘more generous, wise and humane than the latter’ (the central point
of the whole narration). The appropriation of the nearly universal values of generosity,
wisdom and peace, as if these were only the values of the Jimma, serves here as a
major rhetorical strategy for construction and articulation of the Jimma identity and for
winning recognition and support of the audience.

To establish himself as an eyewitness authority on the issue of Jimma identity

the narrator digresses from the topic of his story, also raising his personal experiences

187
in Illu Abba Bor (4). He further goes to recount about his son, Saman, whom he
assumes and confirms to be well known to the audience (5-7); he uses him as a bridge
to fill the generation gap and create closer relationship between himself and his
audience. At this juncture one of the audiences also requests the narrator to continue
his narration about the Illu Abba Bor (8). Hence digression is used as a rhetorical
device to present the narration as a matter of fact and account of natural course of life.
This device serves the narrator as a back channel response from the audience that they
are not only attentive to but interested in details of his narration. It also gives him a
chance to compose himself and return back to the major point of his narration. It is
only at this point the proper performance begins, i.e. after the authority of the narrator
and authenticity of his performance has been established.

The sentential saying (11), an expletive with the brevity and artistic power of a
proverb, alludes to the historical ‘wise decision’ of the Jimma, represented by King
Abba Jifar, to be incorporated into the Ethiopian state without any resistance. It
includes an antanagoge11 --“Friendship of the Limmu, the land of Gomma,” - in this
case an expression of compliment used to tone down the faulty criticism against the
absent others to be recounted. Prompted by the audience’s request for explanation on
the meaning of the saying (12), the narrator goes on to recount the details of the
‘peaceful submission’ of Jimma to the forces of emperor Menelik - in contrast to the
resistance of the Gera, the Gumma and the Illu, which is said to have resulted in an
enormous loss of human life. By so doing, the narrator is able not only to reconstruct
and spin the historical decision as a justifiable and wise one (which in other contexts
may be considered otherwise), but also to provide a basis for the important Jimma
myth and a framework for the Jimma self-conception as a peaceful and peace-loving
people.

In other words, the saying concretizes not the wisdom of the king of Jimma but
the wisdom of the people of Jimma as a whole. The king of Jimma and his decision not

11
The rhetoric figure of answering the charge of an adversary by a counter-charge.
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to resist the conquest of Menelik II (14) is used as a metaphor, as a synecdoche to be
more precise, in which the part stands for the whole. By way of appealing to tradition,
in short, this device serves to establish the authenticity of Jimma’s wisdom and peace-
lovingness in contrast with ‘foolish’ and ‘war-loving’ nature of the others, as the
central point of the narrative.

The narrator at the outset casually indicates the unfairness of the very idea of
the armed incorporation by Emperor Menelik II. This is implied in the seemingly
meretricious statement, “So long after the Jimma Oromo came to and settled in this
area, the Amhara king Menelik came and asked Abba Jifar to pay him tribute” (14).
This statement contains two contrasting facts: i) the earlier coming to and settlement of
the Jimma in the area; ii) the late arrival of Menelik to the area and his request for
tribute. The first establishes the Jimma as a legitimate inhabitants and owners of the
land, with the sovereign right to all the produces and fruits of the land. As first-comers
to the area they are entitled to full property rights, which include exemption from
paying taxes or tributes to any ‘foreign body.’ Contrary to this, Menelik, the latecomer
and ‘outsider’ who neither speaks the Oromo language nor has any right whatsoever to
the land, requests tribute.

After pointing out the unfairness of Menelik’s request, i.e. setting the
background, the narrator proceeds to recount the contrasting reactions of Abba Jifar
and Abba Digga to the request. On the one hand, Abba Jifar seeks and accepts advice
of a learned man, a sheikh from Manna of Jimma, who knows much about war or jihad
(17). Based on the advice Abba Jifar decides to submit peacefully and to pay tribute to
the ‘undeserving’ Menelik in order to save his people from destruction (28). By so
doing, Abba Jifar proves himself to be a wise leader, a far-sighted king, far from
claiming to be an omnipotent and all-knowing monarch who takes every decision and
law into his hands. On the other hand, Abba Digga, the son of the king of the
neighbouring state of Gumma, decides to fight the armies of Menelik (20), heedless of
the advice of the learned sheikh and the informed decision of Abba Jifar, and this

189
results in his own and his soldiers’ death. What is worse, Gumma was attacked and
conquered while the king, Abba Magal Abba Faro, and his people were feasting and
relaxing in preparation to the fight (21). Hence the Jimma are characterized and
identified as wise and peace-loving people, in contrast to the ‘short-sighted’ and
‘thoughtless’ Gumma people.

The peaceful submission of the Jimma is one of the most recurring themes of
Jimma oral narratives. This seems to have been a justification and/or a reaction against
the stereotyping of the Jimma as ‘cowards’ and criticism of the neighboring Oromo
groups and Oromo nationalists against Jimma’s peaceful submission to the Amhara
rule that has been often pronounced since the establishment of the ethno-federal
structure of the Ethiopian State in 1991. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and its
supporters that long aspired for an independent nation state of Oromia lament and
accuse of the incorporation of the Oromo people and land into the Ethiopian state at
the end of the nineteenth century as an act of colonialism (see also: Mekuria 1997;
Guluma 2002; Abbas 1995; Mohammed 1994; Asafa 1993). In this regard, the military
general of Menelik, Ras Gobena Dache, who successfully accomplished the
incorporation of the southwest Oromo, as well as Abba Jifar Abba Gommol, the last
king of Jimma, Kumsa Moroda, king of Leqa Leqemte, and others who submitted
peacefully and later on supported Menelik’s army to incorporate adjacent states in the
region, have been among the butts of the Oromo nationalists’ criticism. 12

In the above narrative (6.3), the theme of the ‘peace-loving nature’ and the
appropriateness of the peaceful submission of the Jimma is reinforced and justified by

12
Also according to some of my informants in the fieldwork area as well as some writers
such as Abbas Haji (1995) and Mohammed Hassen (1994), Ras Gobena Dache and the
others who supported the incorporation of the Oromo regions into imperial Ethiopia are
considered as akin to ‘traitors’. In this respect, Mohammed Hassen ruefully noted that
“…only the kingdom of Jimma survived. The thrones of Limmu-Ennarya, Gomma,
Gumma, and Gera lay in dust. The remaining members of the ruling houses spent their
last days in the dungeons of Abba Jifar II of Jimma. The common people did not fare
any better” (1994: 200).

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the absence of the tradition of killing wild animals in Jimma (30) in contrast to Gera,
Illu and other Oromo groups in the region. We are told how important and dangerous
the killing tradition in those groups is (31). It is interesting to note that the practice of
killing big game, said to be an act of heroism in those groups, is criticized and
condemned as an act of foolishness by the narrator (34). The oral song (33) is also
used to concretize the ‘foolishness’ of the people who venture into such a dangerous
game while they are aware of the possible adverse consequences. Hence the ‘wisdom
and peacefulness’ of the Jimma is foregrounded against the foolishness and war-like
character of the other groups.

Correspondingly, the narrator concludes with highlighting the generosity of the

Jimma in general and of the king Abba Jifar in particular, citing a popular saying (35)
and a story (38) as exemplums to illustrate his point. The story is preceded by a
request to the audience: “May I tell you about his [Abba Jifar’s] generosity?” (37).
Inciting the curiosity and involvement of the audience, the narrator recounts how Abba
Jifar gave forty-five slaves to his servant as a reward for his loyal service and suffering
(39). Here it should be noted that the reward was given to the man more of for the pain
he underwent “in the land of others” than for his loyalty, which implies reluctance to
the very idea of being in ‘the land of others’ and, inversely, a strong sense of local
identity and belonging.

The selection of the ethic of generosity as a mark of Jimma identity might

partly have emanated from Islamic teachings. One of the five pillars of Islam, Zakat or
alms-giving, requires all able Muslims to be generous to the poor and needy. Muslims
who are able to accumulate wealth are expected and obliged to offer a fixed portion to
the needy so as to ease their economic hardship and combat inequality. Every good
Muslim is also expected to make donations as an act of voluntary charity (sadaqah) in
return to get divine rewards. The narrator effectively used this universal Islamic value
as a mark of Jimma identity.

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 In other narratives, Abba Jifar is portrayed as the most wise and intelligent king
of all kings in the southwest as well as in the whole country. He is often presented as a
rival to, and even smarter than, emperor Menelik, whose aspiration of reunification of
Ethiopia was said to have been based only on his military might and firearms from
Europe. Abba Jifar, on the other hand, was said to have economic and intellectual
dominance over Menelik. He was able not only to neutralize and nullify Menelik’s
military power by using his abundant economic resources, buying off threats to his
political autonomy with an enormous amount of tribute to Menelik, but also to play a
critical role in the very process of the reunification; he supplied a great deal of human
as well as material resources to Menelik without which the reunification would not
have been realized.

As the selection and incorporation of the ethic of generosity into the above
identity narrative of the Jimma may have come as an influence of the Muslim religion,
the emphasis on values of peace and justice seem to have resulted from the influence
of the post-1991 political discourse on ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ in the
country. As a confirmation of the requirement of the ethics and principles of
democracy, Abba Jifar is now presented as a model of ‘good leadership’, which
includes consultative and participatory decision-making, farsightedness, non-
discriminatory treatment of the governed, a sense of justice, and so on. Hence the
aspiration of the Jimma elite for a leadership position in the regional as well as federal
state of Oromia finds expression.

Stereotyping others

The ‘peace-loving and serene nature’ of the Jimma is also frequently expressed
and perpetuated in stereotyping other groups as ‘fierce’ and ‘pugnacious’. There are
many such stereotypes of the local groups in the Jimma area. For instance, the Gumma
are often labelled as impatient (jarjaraa), always dealing with each other as well as

192
others in a hurry. On the contrary, the Jimma define themselves as patient and serene,
liking to proceed in a slow and wise manner. They have the tradition of dealing with
things unperturbedly. As the saying goes, the Jimmas’ motto is: “Let us sleep over the
matter; leave the matter as it is and decide it later on” (Jimman haabulu beeka). One of
my informants in Jimma said literally: “The Jimma do not make decisions in a hurry;
they like to discuss every matter thoroughly before making their decisions. But the
Gumma do not take time for discussion; they are always in a state of haste.” Similarly,
another Jimma informant expressed the two opposing characteristics of the Jimma and
Gera Oromo as follows:

When a Jimma man wants to buy a knife in a market, he usually makes his
choice by testing the sharpness of the knife by putting his fingers to the
edge and making sure whether or not the handle is intact. Whereas a Gera
man tests the sharpness of the knife by aiming or slashing at (acting as if
he were to stab) at someone [Laughter of audience].
As shown above, the main purpose of identity narratives is not only defining the
identity of the narrator and his audience in relation and contrast with other groups, by
extension the local group to which they belong, but also to place the group (the self) at
the top rank of the various Oromo groupings. It is an attempt to convince themselves
and others that one’s group is ‘superior’ to that of others and hence that it deserves
better status and position in the ethno-federal structure of the region and the country at
large. To this effect, influenced by the political discourse of the day on democracy,
self-administration, good governance and development, qualities and character traits of
good leadership (farsightedness, wisdom, consultative and participatory decision
making, deliberation, negotiation, compromise, tolerance, sense of justice and even
smartness) become important elements in articulations of local identity.

In the following example, the alleged wisdom and astuteness of the Jimma is
expressed through the deeds of a legendary hero known as Yanfo Sephin. Yanfo was
said to have been a wise man of Jimma who lived during the reign of Abba Jifar I (r.
1830-55). He was a kind of man to whom the king and the people turned for solutions

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whenever a problem threatening the interests and existence of the Jimma occurred. His
adventures were narrated as examples of wisdom and craftiness of the Jimma, and of
how they could outdo neighboring Oromo groups.

Narrative 6.4: The adventures of Yanfo Sephin

1. Yanfo Sephin was one of the many wise men of Jimma, such as Jolombis,
Abba Diko and Abba Bilo. Yes, he was one of the wise men of Jimma. He
belongs to the Mirgano of Baddi clan.
2. At the time Abba Gommol got married to Abba Jifar’s mother, the father
of the bride posed a riddle to the party of the groom as a test to giving the
hand of the bride in marriage.
3. Initially, it was the Gumma king who asked for the hand of the daughter
of Gomma’s king in marriage. The latter refused due to the custom that a
girl should not be allowed to get married to a man in a nearby community.
4. As the Oromo saying goes, “A girl’s hand is not to be given in marriage to
a neighboring man; it is only fire that is to be given to one’s neighbor”
(Ollaatti durba hin keennani abida malee).
5. When Abba Gommol asked for the hand of the daughter of Gomma’s king
in marriage, her father proposed a precondition that he would give his
consent only if the Jimma king could solve a riddle.
6. The riddle was: “What is pepper in a pot, a flock of monkeys, a leopard
on the palm of a man, a house without a door?” (Mimmixa xuwwee
keessaa, hoomaa jaldeessaa, qeeransa harkkarra taa’u, mana balbala hin
qabne).
7. It was said that Abba Gommol became anxious about the riddle till he
found Yanfo Sephin.
8. Yanfo Sephin was able to provide the correct solution to the riddle. He
solved it as follows: ‘Pepper in a pot’ refers to a braggart man who is
known for his boasting in his own village but a coward to say anything
when he is among others. ‘A flock of monkeys’ are the Jimma, we are like
a flock of monkeys large in number and united in fighting and beating
enemies. ‘A leopard on the palm of a man’ refers to the Gomma, who are
apt to fight like a leopard. ‘A house without a door’ represents people that
sell their relatives.
9. Then it was customary for the people to sell each other in slavery.
10. When the father of the would-be bride listened to the solution of the
riddle, he became happy and consented to give the hand of his daughter in
marriage to Abba Gommol and decided the day for the wedding.

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11. Then he posed another precondition to be met on the wedding day; he
said, “No short man is allowed to accompany the groom to the wedding
place.”
12. What is worse, the Gumma people were heard to have vowed to attack the
wedding procession when they reach at the outskirt of Gumma.
13. Again the king sought the advice of the sage Yanfo Sephin, who was
living in the Saqqa area, in a village presently known as Salale.
14. As a solution to the threat of the Gumma to attack the wedding procession,
Yanfo said that nothing could be done but to confront and bravely fight
the enemy if the need really would arise.
15. As to the second precondition posed by the father of the bride, Yanfo
instructed all the short men to wear cloaks and high heels, which would
make them equal in height with the tall men accompanying the groom.
16. After this arrangement was made, the groom, Abba Gommol, and his men
proceeded to the wedding and safely brought the bride to Jimma.
17. Yanfo protected the wedding procession from the threatening Gumma
people by advising the bride and the groom and their companies to remove
all their ornaments and travel in pairs as ordinary people. By so doing, he
enabled them to safely pass through all the check points in Gumma
territory without difficulty. And when they arrived at the place called
Malka Urgessa, which is the boundary between Jimma and Gumma, they
reformed themselves as procession and put on their ornaments and
wedding costumes and continued to Jimma. Yanfo thus enabled the bride
and the groom to safely arrive in Jimma.
18. Long after the wedding, the king of Gomma, the father-in-law of Abba
Gommol of Jimma, sent a message to the latter expressing his admiration
to the man who had worked out the successful plan to safely take the
wedding procession to Jimma. He expressed his wish to meet the man in
his palace.
19. Then Abba Gommol summoned Yanfo and told him about the message of
the king of Gomma. Yanfo said he would not mind going alone to Gomma
and meeting the king in his palace, if Abba Gommol provided him with a
horse and the necessary provisions for his journey. When all was arranged
as per his wishes, Yanfo galloped to Gomma.
20. He arrived at the palace in Gomma, alighted, and tied his horse to a tree.
He then sat down nearby the palace and began smoking a special tobacco
with a very strong scent.
21. When the king smelled the strong tobacco, he ordered his men to bring
him the man who was smoking it.
22. And the king’s soldiers found Yanfo, who was leisurely sitting smoking
his tobacco, disguised as an ordinary person. When he was brought to the
king, he gave his tobacco to the king.

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 23. The king began to smoke the strong tobacco admiringly and asked the
man where he was from.
24. Yanfo did not want to reveal his true identity so he said that he was from a
nearby village known as Ganda Abba Garbu in Gomma.
25. While the king was smoking the strong tobacco and talking in a relaxed
mood, Yanfo cleverly picked up the king’s whip with a gold handle and
hid it under his shirt.
26. Then he went out of the palace unnoticed and galloped back to Jimma, and
reported his adventure to Abba Gommol.
27. Abba Gommol could not believe Yanfo; so he asked him to produce some
sort of evidence, upon which the latter proudly showed of the golden
whip. He said, “Your Excellency, does an ordinary man like me come to
possess such a precious thing?”
28. Abba Gommol was surprised by the astute and courage of Yanfo and gave
him a lot of rewards.
29. When the king of Gomma found that his golden whip was missing, he
notified Abba Gommol of his loss.
30. Abba Gommol sent back the whip to the king of Gomma with explanation
of how the smart man of Jimma, Yanfo Sephin, took the whip as a display
of his cleverness [Laughter of the audience].13

The adventure of Yanfo Sephin was narrated by a man called Dirib Abba Macha,
from the Saqqa Choqorssa district of Jimma zone, where Yanfo was said to have lived
all his life. The narrative was presented as evidence to show the Jimma are smarter
than the other local groups in the Gibe region. There was a common understanding
among the participants of the narrative performance, who were five in number
including myself, that the Jimma are better off than any of the local group within the
Gibe region in every aspect of life: intellectually, morally, economically, socially and
spiritually.

The narrator commences his narration by emphasizing the fact that Yanfo was
one of the wise men of Jimma (1). He stresses that there were many of them in Jimma
and mentions two, Jolombis and Abba Diko Abba Bilo, to validate his assertion. These
legendary figures were generally presented and accepted as wise men who had actually
lived in Jimma in a certain historical time: when Abba Gommol Abba Magal married

13
Dirib Abba Macha, November 16, 2006, Saqa Chaqorssa, Jimma.
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the daughter of Gomma’s king. Hence the narrator and the audience identified
themselves (the Jimma) with such wise and astute dramatis personae.

Apart from identification with these wise men of Jimma, the narrative reveals
the rivalry between the Jimma, the Gumma and the Gomma and the self-perceived
superiority of the Jimma above other groups. First, it is said that the king of Gomma
refused to give the hand of his daughter to the king of Gumma in marriage (3) and
consented to give her to the king of Jimma on the basis of proximity. It is interesting to
note the culturally acknowledged suspicious attitude towards neighboring groups,
indicated in the popular Oromo proverb given in line (4).

The rivalry is also evident in the riddle posed by the king of Gomma as a
precondition for giving his daughter’s hand in marriage to Abba Gommol and the
incidents that followed the wedding celebration. Yanfo Sephin not only solves the
riddle exhibiting intellectual prowess to the Gomma, but also overcomes the hurdle
posed by the rival Gumma group that threatens the wedding procession of Abba
Gommol. What is more, Yanfo outsmarts the king of Gomma and proves his
astuteness by taking the king’s golden whip to the king of Jimma. In short, the Jimma
come out as the smartest of all the groups mentioned in the narrative.

As indicated earlier, the identity narratives discussed above were recorded in

the towns of Jimma and Yabbu, in the central part of the former Jimma Abba Jifar
kingdom. The narrators being in the center of the zone tend to attach much more
importance to the larger sub-regional level of Jimma identity, encompassing several
local groups that were merged into Jimma since the third decade of the 20 th century.
The wider Jimma identity is constructed and articulated more often in relation to other
sub-regional groups such as the Illu Abba Bor, Wollega and Shoa, rather than to the
smaller local groups within the present-day Jimma zone. Among local groups such as
the Gera and Gomma, however, the construction of identity takes a different course; it
is more often done in contrast with the Jimma and the other local groups (formerly the
five Gibe state identities) than with the other sub-regional groups (which are rarely

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mentioned at all). Discussion of a few examples of identity narratives of the Gera may
help to explain this situational and shifting aspect of local identity construction.

Narrative 6.5: “We are like a handful of pepper”: identity narrative of the Gera 14

1. Seenaa says that this area, Gera, got its name from the Oromo word gera,
which means ‘spear.’ It is said that our forefathers were continuously
fighting with their neighbors in which they used the traditional spear
(gera) and always defeated their enemies.
2. There is also another seenaa which says that Gera is the name of the man,
our forefather, who was the first to come and settle in the area.
3. I do not exactly know which of the two stories is correct. However, I
learnt from my own father that the designation of this area as Gera and its
state formation took place before the formation of the other states in the
Gibe region. The state of Gera was well known to exist before Jimma,
Gomma, Limmu and Gumma came into existence.
4. When our forefathers first came to this area from Bisil, they were fifteen
in number. They came to this area where there was a mineral water source
(Hora). Among the fifteen men, Gera was said to be the first to see the
water. So the mineral water as well as the area as a whole was designated
after him as Gera.
5. Later on the other groups, the Jimma, Limmu, Gomma, and Gumma came
to settle in the adjacent areas.
6. These groups wanted to have a share of the land where the mineral water
was found. When they heard that fifteen men (the Gera) had settled in the
area, they decided to chase them away.
7. Accordingly, first the Jimma sent some one hundred men to chase away
the fifteen Gera men and take control of the area.
8. The Gera, however, had heard about the Jimmas’ plan and prepared
themselves, and worked out a strategy on how to counter attack the
numerically larger enemy. They divided themselves into five groups of
three men each and ambushed the enemy in different places.
9. When the Jimma men came to the outskirts of the area, the Gera men
attacked them from their hidden places; they killed and wounded many of
the enemy. Taken by surprise, the remaining Jimma men fled for their
lives, carrying their wounded fellowmen.
10. When the other three groups learnt what happened to the Jimma men, they
sent a large number of fresh soldiers to fight the Gera. However, the Gera
14
Told by Abba Faji Abba Bulgu (50), November 21, 2006, Cira, Gera.
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 were too clever for them. They sent a group of three men to each of the
four groups to set fire to their houses at the same time in the night.
11. So, many of the houses of the Jimma, Gumma, Gomma, and Limmu were
burned down at the same time in the night.
12. Then the four groups thought that the Gera were too many and too strong
to defeat and decided to leave them alone to live independently in their
own territory and under their own government. It was in this way that
Gera became an independent state in the area and the people gradually
grew in number.
13. Gera resisted the military force of Menilik II for a period of two years.
Even after the rest of the Gibe states submitted to Menilik, the Gera fought
strongly.
14. After two years of fierce fighting, the Gera were betrayed and tricked by
the Jimma to submit. It was only because of the Jimma that the brave Gera
men were subdued.
15. Then the king of Gera was Abba Simal Karamo. He was a brave man.
There are a lot of songs in which his bravery is expressed. One song runs
as follows:
16. Caccabaa galaakoo midhaan dulli nyaatuu,
Gaggabaa Karaamoo Simal dulli waamuu.
Small pieces are provision of the army,
It is Karamo’s son, Simal, that the army turns to at a time of defeat.
17. During the war against Menilik, the Gera inflicted a lot of loss on the
enemy force. For example, there was this Ras Emiru, who was one of the
prominent war generals of Menilik. Ras Emiru, who was able to subdue
the Gomma and others with little resistance, was captured and taken war
prisoner by the Gera. It was the Gera that captured Ras Emiru. The Gera
are well known for their military prowess and bravery.
18. There was also a brave man of Gera called Jagan Abba Liban. He had a
horse named Fayyisa. The horse does not drink water like an ordinary
horse, but honey mead. It drinks mead and often jumps big trenches. Once
the horse was wounded in a battle but managed to carry his master safely
to his home. And the people sang in praise of the horse.
19. Fayyisa ya Fayyisaa,
Luka bitaa harkisaa,
Yaa isa gaafa Kamisaa.
Yaa isa mataakootii,
Yaa isa imimaankootii.

Fayyisa, oh, Fayyisa,

It drags its left leg,
Wounded in the battle of Thursday.

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 I am so furious about it,
I am filled with tears.
20. The Gera fought the Jimma even after their incorporation into the
Ethiopian state. Seenaa says that the king of Gera accused Abba Jifar for
his aligning with Menilik’s forces against Gera.
21. King Abba Jifar became furious at the allegation and sent his troops to
punish Gera. But the brave Gera men defeated the Jimma and drove them
back. Abba Jifar sent two other groups of soldiers and Gera beat them
again.
22. Then Abba Jifar was surprised at how the numerically smaller Gera men
could defeat the larger Jimma. So he decided to settle the problem with
Gera peacefully.
23. He sent his delegates to Gera for reconciliation; he sent his delegates with
a bowl of teff to show the numerical dominance of the Jimma over the
Gera.
24. When the delegates arrived at Gera and delivered their message, the king
of Gera sent them back to Abba Jifar with a handful of pepper.
25. The message was clear: the Gera are like a handful of pepper, few in
number but ferocious and unbeatable in battle [laughter of the audience].

The above narrative was told during a focus group discussion in the town of Chira,
the capital of Gera. Five men of Gera and I participated in the discussion. The topic of
the discussion was similar with that in Jimma - “Who are the Gera?” The narrator as
well as his audience (the four Gera men) all said that “The Gera are one of the Oromo
people in the Gibe Region; they are well known for, and different from the Jimma as
well as the other Oromo groups, …. because of their history of bravery.” The
narrative, which consists of several fragments of different narratives, was performed as
an exemplum to validate this claim of bravery and difference from other groups in that
respect. Hence, militant local patriotism becomes a major element for construction of
self-perceived difference and local identity of the Gera.

As indicated above, the Gera are considered and also consider themselves as
ferocious fighters. The metaphor “We are a handful of pepper” signifies the Gera as a
people small in number but ‘fierce and invincible in battle’. The very self-
identification of ‘Gera’ (spear) (1) also suggests their self-perception as a warrior
people. What is more, the very genesis and independent existence of the Gera, in the
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same manner as that of the Jimma as mentioned above, is constructed and expressed
on the historical basis of being the ‘first-comers’ (2-3) and ‘triumphant’ over the other
Gibe groups - fifteen men of Gera beat hundred men of Jimma and later on more men
from the other three groups (12).

The argument for being recognized as the ‘first-comers’ to an area seems to be

a widespread and recurrent cultural theme in many African societies. To put it in
Donham’s words, “The way that African frontiersmen typically constructed new
societies was by claiming (and having their claim at least partially recognized) as
‘first-comers’: “The argument for being recognized as having come first rested upon
an idiom common to much of Africa: namely, the power to promote the fertility of
people, animals, and land in the area, often through sacrifices to ancestors” (Donham
2000: 23).

In line with this, the narrator and his audience defined themselves (the Gera)
and constructed their identity on the basis of local patriotism - Gera’s ‘history of strong
resistance’ against Menilik’s project of incorporation of the region into the Ethiopian
state in the end of the nineteenth century (13). As evidence to this, the narrator
mentions one of the prominent war generals of Menelik, Ras Emiru Haile Selassie,
who was captured and taken war prisoner by the Gera (17). Here it is interesting to
note how the ‘history’ of Ras Emiru is modified and used as a rhetorical resource to
amplify and authenticate the positive self-presentation (bravery) of the Gera. It is
common knowledge that Ras Emiru (b. 1892) was not one of the military generals of
Menelik who led the conquest of the southwestern region at the end of the 19th
century. He was the commander of the patriotic forces in the Shire front during the
Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935–1936 and leader of the Black Lion Resistance operations
in southwestern Ethiopia, who was captured by the Italians in late 1936 and
imprisoned in Italy for seven years (Bahru 2001).
The patriotism of the Gera was concretized by oral songs about the brave kings,
Abba Simal Karamo (16) and Jagan Abba Liban (21). Abba Simal Karamo, who was

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said to have been king of Gera during the war against the army of Menilik, is glorified
as someone to whom an army turns to for assistance at times of defeat. He was said to
have been a military strategists and a powerful military man, a single powerful man
equivalent to and as powerful as an army of hundred fighters. Correspondingly, the
bravery of Jagan Abba Liban is expressed in the praise song to his horse, Fayyisa,
which was able to bring his master safely home though wounded in a battle field. The
horse was praised for its loyalty to its master, which seems a projection of the narrator
and his audience’s strong sense of belonging to the same local group and locality,
Gera.

The last episode of the war Gera fought against the numerically larger Jimma
(22) is additional evidence to substantiate the local patriotism of the Gera. It presents
the Gera as militarily superior to the larger Jimma group and hence symbolically
establishes their sense of identity as “a handful of pepper, few in number but ferocious
and unbeatable in battle.”

This sense of local identity and belonging to Gera is also often expressed in
their popular jokes about the ‘cowardice’ of the Jimma, a widespread stereotype. In
one joke, a Gera man quarrels with a Jimma man over price of an item in the market.
After exchanging a few heated words, the Gera snatches his knife and slashes at the
Jimma man. Taken by fear and unable to defend himself, the Jimma says, “What are
you doing, man, do you think I am the sheath of your knife?” Unable to defend
himself, leave alone to take an equal and opposite offensive action, the Jimma appeals
for mercy, reducing himself to a status of a helpless object - the sheath of a knife.

In another story a Gera man was said to have caught a leopard and brought it to
King Abba Jifar, who became afraid of the beast and ordered the man to take it back to
his home in Gera. The story runs as follows.

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Narrative 6.6: The leopard and Abba Jifar 15
Once there was a Gera man called Abba Sesey, who bare-handedly caught a
leopard. The leopard was first reported to have blocked the way from Gera
to Jimma. The news of the leopard reached Abba Jifar, the then king of the
whole Gibe region, and he brought the matter to his councilors. And there
was this Gera man, Abba Sesey, among the council of Abba Jifar, who said
that he would catch and bring the leopard alive to Abba Jifar’s palace. Then
no one believed him. After the meeting Abba Sesey went to Gera and
caught the leopard and took it to Abba Jifar’s palace. The guards at the gate
reported the arrival of the man with the leopard to the king. Abba Jifar
pondered over the matter for a while; “Where is he going to place the
leopard? And what will happen if it attacks me?”[Laughter of the audience].
Having considered the pros and cons of the matter, the king decided that the
man should take the leopard back to its home, Gera. Abba Jifar said to his
guards, “Tell the man to take his leopard back to Gera, hurry up!” [Laughter
of the audience].

The laughter of the audience and their comments at the end of the narration
confirms the stereotyped image of the Jimma among Gera and other Macha-Oromo
sub-groups as ‘cowards.’ The audience took their time laughing and interjecting funny
comments, such as: “I can imagine how much Abba Jifar was terrified, visualizing the
leopard jumping on him. You can sense the urgency of his order to avoid the leopard
in his voice, ‘hurry up!” And each comment was followed by a mirth of laughter and
another narration of similar stories. At the end of the laughter and comments invoked
by this particular story, one member of the audience remarked that the brave Gera men
used to benefit much from cowardice of the Jimma men and recounted the following
story to illustrate his point.

15
Told by Jamal Abba Gissa (40), November 21, 2006, Cira, Gera.
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Narrative 6.7: The reward of bravery 16

Once Abba Jifar assembled his men and asked them to kill elephants and
bring him their tusks. He ordered them to kill twenty-three big elephants.
All of his fellow Jimma men protested against his order. They said that they
could not find such a large number of elephants in the area. Among the
assembled men was one Gera man called Abba Waji, who stood up and said
that he would kill the elephants and bring the tusks to the king. When Abba
Waji said so, the Jimma men laughed at him. They said, “Your bald head
[Abba Waji’s head] would grow hair if you killed the elephants.” They
made fun of him. Then Abba Waji made his preparation and went out to the
forest to kill the elephants. After six months of tiresome efforts, Abba Waji
found and killed thirty-five elephants (instead of the required twenty-three
elephants) and brought their tusks to Abba Jifar. Abba Jifar was very
surprised at the determination and bravery of the Gera man, and asked him
what he would like to have as his reward. Abba Waji said that he would like
to have some portion of the land of the Jimma men who made fun of him
when he had said he would kill the elephants. Accordingly, Abba Jifar took
some plots of land from each man who had made fun of Abba Waji and
gave it to the latter. So, Hawas, Gajara, Sayyo, Awule, Ashadash, and
Walensuu all lost some portion of their land to Abba Waji Abba Qorbi of
Gera [Laughter of the audience].

This text shows again how an identity narrative can function in the construction and
expression of sense of local identity on the basis of self-perceived differences from
and superiority to others. It is interesting to note here that this narration was followed
by a commentary of the audience which revealed that Abba Waji, by implication the
brave men of Gera in general, deserved the reward. The commentary was expressed in
a form of a proverb: “It is the brave who always takes the land of the coward” (Laffa
dabeessaa jagnatu fudhata). Hence the narrator and the audience define themselves
and construct their sense of identity as brave men who accomplish something that the

16
Told by Abba Faji Abba Bulgu (50), November 21, 2006, Cira, Gera.
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other group, in this case the Jimma, could not accomplish. They thus deserve better
treatment and reward than that of the undeserving others.

The bravery of the Gera was further expressed in a popular heroic praise song
(Or.: geerarsaa), widely known in the area and sang by one of the audience in that
particular performance event as evidence to the same:

Geerartuun Gera jira,

Geerri gamoojjii jira,
Namni geeraree hinquufine gooda Geraati jira.

A man of gerarsa is found but in Gera,

He is a Gera man in a desert,
It is only the Gera that will never tire of Gerarsa.

This song was followed by an explanation from the singer. Accordingly, the
song shows that the Gera are well known for their tradition of geerarsaa, which is the
song of the brave men. Wherever there is a Gera man, there is a geerarsaa song, for no
one else dares sing the geerarsaa in the presence of Gera men. Even in Jimma,
Gomma, Gumma and Limmu, the Gera men are always given priority to sing the
geerarsaa songs. Traditionally, only those who proved their manhood in battle or
killing big game have the prerogative to perform geerarsaa. In taking turns in
performing the gerarasa songs, priority was given to those who killed enemies (human
beings), to be followed by those who killed a giraffe or another big animal.

There is another story about a Gera man called Abba Bulgu Abba Gidoo, who
was well-known in the Jimma area for his bravery. Once he shot and wounded a lion.
Then the lion dashed against Abba Bulgu and the man tackled the wounded beast bare-
handed and wrestled it to the ground. He threw the lion into a river and went after it
swimming and wrestling against it. Finally he was able to free himself from the claws
of the lion and came out of the river, and taking up his gun killed the lion. Then he
fainted from exhaustion and fell down to the ground. Long after, Abba Bulgu was said

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to have recounted his adventure and the traumatic experience he had on that particular
day by singing the following geerarsaa song:

Guyyatti guyyaa tokkoo,

Guyyattii guyyaa tokkoo,
Allaattiin mukaa baddee
Qamaleen mukaa baddee
Abjuunkeen lafa baddee.
Natii ajeesse Abba Gidoo,
Kan funyaan uuraa gindoo,
Doroon lon borasiseen,
Lenca abjuun absisee.

On one cruel day,

On one cruel day,
The crow fled the tree,
The ape left the tree,
The land was devoid of hope and dream.
Then it is me, the first born of Abba Gido,
Who killed a lion with a hole-like nose,
I made him to sleep forever,
Deprived him of his dreams.

In Gera narratives and other folkloric expressions, the themes of bravery, local
patriotism, the pride in the fertility and resources of the ancestral territory are
constantly recurring issues in the construction of local identity. These are resuscitated
in the context of today’s local (sub-ethnic) politics. As in the above stories, the
narrator and the audience show and reaffirm how they attach value to their land,
evoking it is a nostalgic reference point for present-day collective group-positioning
and developmental prospects vis-à-vis others, obviously not seldom exaggerating their
homeland virtues beyond realistic proportions. This is most evident in the following
autobiographical narrative.

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Narrative 6.8: ‘Gera is the land of abundance’17

Gera is endowed with invaluable natural resources. It is rich in its forestry

and wild life. The dense forest of Gera makes it very favorable for honey
production. Gera is the major source of food crops, honey, cattle and wood
products to Oromia and Ethiopia as a whole. The Jimma as well as all the
other Oromo of the south-west have nothing but Gera as their source of food
crops, milk and milk products, meat, honey and the like. In the old days,
tusks of elephant and civet were all imported from Gera. Gera has got fertile
soil and favorable climate for growing all types of food crops, grains and
cereals. It has also great tourist attraction sites. Take for example the
Gomma: we are neighbors and we know each other. Currently the Gomma
have coffee plants. But if you want the truth, only the third generation of the
Gomma got the coffee plant. The older generations, their fathers and their
grandfathers, did not have coffee plants.
The Gera always had coffee plants. You know that not only we and our
sons have owned coffee plants, but our fathers as well as their fathers and
grandfathers and forefathers all were rich in coffee plants. The problem is
that the resources of Gera are abused by the government officials. The
government does not give any attention to Gera and its resources. There is
no beautiful country like Gera. However, Gera does not have all-weather
roads; nor does it have a hospital, electricity and such social facilities and
infrastructures that the Jimma and the Gomma have.
In the recent past there was a man called Sheikh Mohammud Fedlu in
Gera. This sheikh was known for his knowledge of traditional medicine.
Once he was looking for a medicinal plant when he came across a small
spring of hot, ‘holy water’, which appeared to have high medicinal value.
He found the hot spring of holy water in a village called Walla. He tasted
the water and immediately discovered that it had medicinal value. Then he
went to king Abba Jifar and told him that he found a spring of mineral water
which could heal many types of disease. He said that he wanted tools to
enlarge the spring and make it accessible to users. Abba Jifar provided the
sheikh with all the tools he demanded. The sheikh toiled to build the way to
the spring and made it accessible to the public. It took him a total of ten
years to do so. Now the spring is used by a large number of people from
Jimma and the country as a whole. The hot spring heals stomach
disturbances and all sort of dermatological problems. It heals all sorts of

17
Told by Jemal Abba Gissa (40), November 21, 2006, Cira, Gera.
207
 disease. I myself benefited a lot from the mineral water. I used to suffer
from gastritis for a long period of time, for which I was often treated at the
hospital in Jimma. But the medical doctors could not give me any relief
from the pain. Finally I was advised by certain friends to try the spring. I
went to the spring and drank the holy water for a week. As a result I have
been completely cured from the disease. Today I eat whatever I want to eat
without any inhibition. I even chew ch’at (Catha edulis), which I could not
do previously. The spring is today being visited and used by thousands of
people from the whole Jimma and Ethiopia at large. In fact it would have
benefited much more people if it were accessible by motor transportation.
But the government has so far paid hardly any attention to develop the
necessary infrastructures and facilities in Gera. We have no all-weather
road, electricity, hospitals and other services. It is a pity that we are a much
neglected people.

Fig. 8. A Gera elder narrating, October 2006

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 The narrator and the audience define their own group here again in terms of an
inextricable interconnection to the land and its resources. Important is the
manipulation of physical as well as economic features of the locality so as to
discursively construct the shared local history and identity of this Oromo sub-group,
done in response to their18 urge for self-realization and recognition by ‘others’ as a
community with its own shared historical memory and with its own territory (Gera)
endowed with ‘abundant natural resources’ and much potential for development. 19

Finally, it should also be noted that the narrator used an ambivalent tone of
voice in defining his own group as well as the others (the Jimma and the Gomma): on
the one hand, he seems to take pride in and describes the Gera people with reference to
their connection to their own land and its many attractions. Interesting is also the
elevation of Gera as a land of ‘holy water’, which takes on symbolic significance as it
makes Gera potentially attractive for many Ethiopians - Gera as a healing land to be
used by all. On the other hand, the narrator effectively employs the negative strategy
of self-identification to define his own group as ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘marginalized’
people, as expressed in the reflexive comment at the end of the narration: ‘It is a pity
that we are much neglected people’. Needless to say, the lack of infrastructure and
social services which are more accessible to groups such as the Jimma and Gomma
seems to be a contemporary source of resentment and is interpreted as
‘marginalization’ and ‘underdevelopment’ of the Gera of today. In so doing, the
narrator is expressing his and his audience’s sense of shared identity and belonging to
the same local group or community on the basis of shared ‘experiences of

18
Or perhaps primarily the Gera elite’s urge.
19
Some 90% of the Gera people are sedentary farmers whose livelihood mostly depends
on the production of subsistence food crops such as teff, wheat, barley, maize, and
sorghum, and on cash crops like coffee, spices and honey. There is also some livestock
husbandry.
According to a report compiled by Department of Finance and Economic Development
of Jimma Zone (2005), the district of Gera is indeed still endowed with natural forest,
woodland, plantation forest, wildlife, abundant water resources, hot springs. They also
produce high quality honey.
209
marginality’: in spite of their ‘abundant natural resources and potential for
development,’ they are ‘undeservingly marginalized’ and ‘less developed’ than others.
The narrator in this context also articulates the previously ‘neglected, legitimate
demands’ of his group for change, recognition and respect.

Concluding remarks

The folkloric expressions and identity narratives examined in this chapter construct
and articulate perceived durable properties of local identity and differences among the
several local groups within the southwestern Oromo. As identity is relational, the local
identity of each group is constructed, negotiated, and expressed through the relation to
and difference from the ‘other,’ i.e., the relation to what it is not (Moriarty 2005).
Hence local identities are constituted and the self and other dichotomies are (re-
)produced in the narrative performances of each group. Apart from providing historical
information, definitions, and explanations of shared local traditional values and
experiences needed for security and continuity of social life, identity narratives serve
as models for future action aimed at advancing common interests and transformation
of the group in which they are enacted.

The several southwestern Oromo groups in general and the Jimma and the Gera
in particular define themselves in terms of certain commonly recognized and shared
‘essential’ elements such as local history, ancestral territory, genealogical affiliations,
and values. These elements, considered to be the most important distinguishing
features of local identity, are repeatedly communicated in the narrative performances
of each group so as to establish the group members’ sense of shared identity and
belonging to a specific locale based on an unassailable ‘natural’ closure of solidarity
and allegiance. Based on this ‘objective’ foundation, most of the folklore forms and
oral narratives define the performers’ ‘self’ and their respective groups and locales as
having some things ‘special’ that ‘others’ do not have; i.e., defining the ‘self’ through

210
clarifying the perceived difference from others. In this contex a recurring theme is the
intended or unintended ethnocentrism of most of the stories, which feed on creating
oppositions with morally or politically inferior ‘others’. One notable example was in
story 6.3 (above) in the attitude of the Jimma Oromo towards the indigenous Yem
people, who were in the land before they arrived, but who are completely marginalized
in their discourse.

In the contex of ‘producing difference’ with other Oromo sub-groups, the role
of local Oromo elites, the narrators, seems to be paramount in (re-)producing local
cultural ‘variations’ - (re-) producing and articulating a (desired) common cultural
identity of the southwestern Oromo20 - in order to ensure recognition of their own and
their group’s importance. By doing so, as an indirect response to contemporary
political relations and challenges, these elites create grounds for the pursuit of
collective interests and meaningful local leadership roles, and enhance their
participation not only in local and (sub-) regional affairs but also in matters of the
larger ethno-federal state structure of the country.

20
And perhaps of the Oromo in general.
211
Chapter 7

“We are like a handful of sand”: narrative construction of local

identity and difference in Eastern Wollega

Repeated performances… have the cumulative effect of

normalizing their own assertions. The less we question these
norms the more successful they become at achieving authority as
natural or ideal.…the enactment of narrativity is concurrently a
mode of knowledge creation, the transmission of knowledge and
the product of such power/knowledge systems. In this sense
narratives are constitutive of the way we experience life, and…
are also transformative, because in constructing the self, they can
also bring about a transformation of society.
Elaine Moriarty 2005: 6

Introduction

This chapter explores narrative construction and negotiation of shared senses of local
identity and difference among the eastern Wollega Oromo, with particular emphasis on
the Leqa Neqemte and the Sibu Sire (see Map 4). It examines on what bases and how
and to what end informants from each group narrate and historicize their sense of
‘groupness’ and relation to others within contexts of social interaction. In so doing, I
adopt the relational, situational and goal-oriented approach to narrative construction of
locality-based (space-based) group identity. As noted by Schachter (2010: 5), the
empirical study of identity “should be focused on finding better ways to understand the
underlying goals and constraints that guide narrative identity construction-and the way
that longstanding and local stories interact” (see also, Bauman 2004; Bamberg 2010;
Somers 1994; Tylor 1994). Before going into the discussion, presenting a brief socio-
historical overview of the research area may help to understand what is to follow.

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The Eastern Wollega Oromo

East Wollega is one of the four current administrative zones of Oromia Regional State.
It is bounded on the east by West Shoa, on the west by the Didessa River, which
separates it from West Wollega, on the south-east by Jimma, on the south-west by Illu
Abba Bor, and on the north and north-west by the Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State
(see map 4). The total population of the zone in 2007 was given as 1, 213,503 (CSA
2010: 7), about 86.6 percent of which lived in rural areas and subsist on mixed
agriculture

The Wollega Oromo are constituted of a large number of local groups with
defined local territories. Some of these live in the north-eastern part of Wollega, 1 in the
vast area between the Abay, Anger and Didessa river valleys. The central Wollega
area between the upper Gibe, Anger, Wama and Didessa rivers is settled by the several
Leqa groups (Warra Leqaa) of which the important ones are the Leqa Neqemte, Leqa
Gida, Leqa Bilo, and Leqa Qumba. The further north-western area between the
Didessa and the Dabus rivers is populated by the large Sibu groups. 2 To the south of
the Sibu, in the lowland area of the present-day Qellem-Wollega administrative zone,
live the Sayyo and Leqa-Qellem groups, which were ruled by the family of Jote Tullu3
before their incorporation into the Ethiopian state in the end of the nineteenth century.

1
These include: the Horro, Guduru, Limmu, Jimma Geneti, Jimma Rare, Jarte, Amuru,
Gida and Ebantu inhabiting the large north-eastern part of Wollega, the formerly Horro-
Guduru woreda, which became one administrative zone (Horro-Guduru Wollega Zone)
since May 2006.
2
The Sibu consisted of several sub-groups such as the Jarso Sibu, Mana Sibu, Nejo
Sibu, Boji Sibu, Gimbi Sibu, and Aira Sibu, all of whom are found in the present north-
western Wollega.
3
Ruler of Leqa-Qelem in the second half of the nineteenth century.
213
 Map 4. Wollega in the mid-20th century

Source: Donham and James 1986: 53.

214
 Members of these Wollega groups are all said to be descendants of a common
primordial ancestor, Macha, who originated in a mythical place called Hooda Bisil (or
Tute Bisil)4 in the present West Shoa administrative zone of Oromia State.
Accordingly, “Wollega,” which refers both to the people and the large area of land
they inhabit today,5 is an eponym coming from “Waalagaa”-the pioneer Oromo settler
in the area. 6 The leaders of the first pioneers to clear and settle the frontier areas are

4
It has not been possible to pinpoint the exact location of the place called Hooda Bisil
(Tute Bisil). Neither my own informants nor other written sources seem to be certain of
the whereabouts of the place, as well as of the dates of the early migrations and
settlements of the Oromo in Wollega. Many of my informants in the study areas
testified that they only learned from their elders that Hooda Bisil was the name of the
place their forebears had emigrated from long ago and it was located in an area east of
the Gibe River. Some informants in Jimma said that it was found in the Wolqitte area,
while others mentioned that it was in Shoa. Tesema Ta’a (1980: 23) says that Bisil ‘is
located in the upper Gibe basin between Gedo and Bilo, well within view from the
Addis Ababa-Neqemte road at the small town of Ejaji.’ He also estimates that the
settlement of the Oromo in the Wollega area was completed by 1680-1772 (Ibid. 27).
Mohammed Hassen (1994: 42) suggests a similar location of Bisil, ‘between the Gedo,
Billo, and Gibe rivers,’ though he makes a minor mistake in mentioning Gedo and Billo
as names of rivers, while they are place names. As to the date, Mohammed claims that
the Oromo occupied the whole south-western Ethiopia by the end of the sixteenth
century (ibid.: 48). Here it should be noted that though I am well familiar with Gedo and
Bil(l)o areas, as well as Ejaji town, I have never heard or come across of any place
known by the name of Bisil in those localities (the authors’ spellings have been
retained).
5
Following the incorporation of the region into the Ethiopian state in the end of the
nineteenth century and up to the fall of the monarchic rule in 1974, the Wollega
province was divided into three administrative regions (awraja). These were Leqa
Neqemte and its environs under the rule of the Bakare family, Qellem and its
neighbouring lowlands bordering Illu Abba Bor and the Sudan, under the Jote Tullu
family, and Arjo and Horro-Guduru administered by Ras Demissew Nesibu, who was
appointed by the central government. After 1974, the Military government (Dergue)
changed the political organization of the country and thus the province of Wollega was
broken down into two administrative regions (Astedader Kililoch), namely Wollega
(with six of the highland awrajas) and Asossa. As per the current ethno-federal structure
of Ethiopia, Asossa happens to be one administrative zone of the Benishangul-Gumuz
Regional State, and the former Wollega province was reorganized and broken down into
two administrative zones, East Wollega and West Wollega, in the Oromia Regional
State.
6
This kind of explanation about group and place names is common to many of the
Oromo groups in the south-western region. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, for
instance, the people and the territories known as Jimma and Gera were said to have been
215
considered as cultural heroes and designated with the honorific title of ‘Daggal Saqi,’
which literally means ‘the opener of the forest.’ Where and how the Mecha Oromo
groups came to settle in the area long ago, the wars they fought against the pre-existing
peoples, the subsequent internal conflicts and rivalry between the several local groups,
and the eventual annexation of the area by Menelik are among the most recurring
themes of contemporary narratives of the eastern Wollega Oromo in general and the
Leqa Neqemte and the Sibu in particular. In such narrative performances, hence, the
various eponyms (of places and groups) are understood and used as means of enacting
and legitimizing the interlocutors’ self-identification with a local group (with all its
history, territory, heroes and moral values) and differentiation from others.

The Leqa Neqemte

The Leqa Neqemte (the Leqa of Neqemte), as distinguished from the Leqa Sayyo,
Leqa Qelem and Leqa Gimbi in western Wollega, inhabit the central and the south-
eastern region in the highlands of Wollega. Established in the first half of the
nineteenth century, Leqa Neqemte was one of the Oromo monarchic states in the
south-western region. During the monarchic period Neqemte was the state capital and
political center, which later on became that of the province of Wollega. Today
Neqemte is one local administrative district and the zonal capital of east Wollega zone.

The Leqa, like the several Oromo groups in the region, had been governed by
the traditional gada system before they began to be ruled by the powerful family of
Bakare Godana in the early nineteenth century. Oral sources indicate that Neqemte had
long been an important gada center, a meeting square of the gada assembly and a

named after their respective progenitors and/or pioneers, who were believed to have
been the earliest settlers in the areas and founders of the local groups. This seems to be
generally the case among many of the regional Oromo groups such as Wollo, Rayya,
Mecha, Tulama, Karrayyu, Arsi, Borana, Illu Abba Bor, Guduru, Horro, Leqa, Sibu, etc.
Hence such Oromo areas are believed to have been named after and to serve as living
monuments to their founders.
216
sacred site where political and religious rituals took place before the formation of the
state. As already indicated in the foregoing chapters, several socio-historical factors
and internal dynamics led to the breakdown of the traditional gada system. Among
these were the wide range of contact and interactions the Oromo had with other
peoples and cultures in the years subsequent to their sixteenth century expansion,
internal dynamics and class stratification within the Oromo themselves that resulted
from the introduction and expansion of mixed agricultural economy and trade, the
protracted internal conflicts and wars that brought about accumulation of power and
wealth in the hands of a few warlords (Abba Dula). These elements also contributed to
the gradual formation of a monarchic state among the Leqa Neqemte.7

Leqa folklore abounds with narratives, songs and sayings about the conflicts
and warfare among the Oromo groups in Wollega, up to the annexation of the region
by Menelik in the 1880s. Among the stories people tell today are those about how
Bakare Godana fought and defeated all his rivals in the area and became the first king
(Motii) and founder of the ruling house of Leqa Neqemte (r. 1841-1868); and about
how Bakare’s successors, Moroda Bakare and Kumsa Moroda, were able to extend
Leqa’s territory and dominance over the Sibu and other groups in the south-eastern
Wollega area. Prominent is the story on how Kumsa (r. 1889-1923) peacefully
submitted to Menelik and thereby maintained internal autonomy of the Leqa state,
while most of the south-western Oromo groups fell under harsh neftegna rule
beginning from the late nineteenth century and up to the fall of Emperor Haile Sellasie
I in 1974. Such stories are told and retold in the current context of the repressive
political space that motivates the process of creation of “otherness” not only among
and between different ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups, but also within the same
groups on the basis of specific local history and values.

7
For detailed discussion of the processes of state formation among the Leqa Neqemte,
see Tesema Ta’a (1980, 1986).
217
 Before his becoming king, Bakare Godana was said to be a very shrewd man
and ferocious fighter, able to beat all his rivals (local chiefs of neighboring Oromo
groups) who were engaged in prolonged conflict and fighting with each other. The
way he came to power clearly indicates his astuteness. It is said that the gada system
required the election of a physically and spiritually ‘pure’ (qulqullu) man for blessing
an in-coming gada class. The chosen man was not only supposed to be of perfect and
sterling character, but also expected to avoid all sort of physical exercise including
farming, fighting and traveling. In return, it was customary that he could ask for
anything he wished as a reward for his blessing services, and he would be granted his
heart’s desire if he got unanimous vote of the gathering. When Bakare Godana was
elected for the blessing function in about 1841, he asked for the private ownership of
uninhabited forest lowland area known as Handaq, extended between the Didessa and
Anger rivers, so that he and his heirs would command all the wealth on it, including
the ‘Shanqilla’ people who had become an important source of labor force. As the land
Bakare asked for was largely uninhabited forest and full of wild animals, no one of the
assembled gada members seemed to understand why he wanted to own such a
‘valueless’ thing; and hence his ‘strange’ request was granted with little thought and
much mocking laughter. Then Bakare placed a restriction on the use of ‘his land’ and
levied a sort of tax (buqqisii) on all people who grazed their cattle, collected wild
honey, and hunted the big game such as lions, buffaloes and elephants on his land. As
a result, he became rich and powerful in a short time, and won the respect and support
of many people in his fighting against the warlords (Abba Dulaa) of the neighboring
Oromo clans. Many informants in Leqa Neqemte still tell stories about the ‘shrewd’
and ‘farsighted’ Bakare Godana, how he tricked his enemies into deadly traps, how he
organized and led strong fighting forces, and how he forged effective alliances with
powerful men and clans. Hence, he was able to defeat all of his rivals, such as Fido
Bokisa of Wayyu, Bushan Miju of Sibu, Garbi Jilo of Bilo, and Bera Ota of Qumba,
and to bring the whole of Leqa region under his control and become the first king and
founder of the ruling family of Leqa Neqemte.

218
 Bakare ruled the region for about thirty-three years and was succeeded by his
son Moroda Bakare (r. 1875-1889). In oral tradition Moroda is said to have been the
wisest king of all the ruling family of Leqa Neqemte. The state of Leqa Neqemte was
believed to have grown stronger and more powerful under Moroda’s rule. He was able
consolidate his father’s territory and to defeat the chiefs of neighboring Oromo groups,
bringing their territories under his control. Moroda established the town of Neqemte
and the great market of Leqa at the place called Bakke Jama, which eventually became
the center for trade and caravan routes coming from the whole south-western region
and other regions such as Shoa and Gojam. He welcomed all outsiders who came to
his land to trade and work and provided them with the necessary protection in
exchange for taxes.

Fig. 9. Dajjazmach Kumsa Moroda’s palace in Neqemte, 2007

219
 When the army of King Tekle-Haymanot of Gojam, led by his general Ras
Darasso, attacked the Oromo states south of the Abbay River in the late 1870s,
Moroda who realized that his military force was poorly armed and by far inferior to
the army of Gojam, decided to submit peacefully. He paid tribute to the king and saved
his state and people from bloodshed and plunder. Following his submission to the
Gojam’s king, Moroda was baptized and then encouraged his people to follow his
example and accept Christianity. Later on he brought the Church ark (Tabot) from
Gojam and initiated the building of the Yesus Church, the first Orthodox Christian
church in the south-western region.

When Menelik’s general Ras Gobena fought against the army of Ras Tekle-
Haymanot of Gojam at the Battle of Embabo (6 June 1882) in north-eastern Wollega,
Moroda allied himself with Menelik and persuaded all the rulers of the south-western
Oromo to follow his example. For my Leqa informants, Moreda’s decision to side with
the more powerful king of Shoa proved him more than wise and capable of
anticipating the future. By so doing, he established a lasting alliance with the
victorious and future ‘King of Kings’ of Ethiopia, and thereby maintained the political
power and internal autonomy of his state for years to come. What is more, he was able
to extend his control over all of the neighboring south-eastern Wollega Oromo groups
and territories, including the Sibu, which had been independently governed by their
own local chiefs. Menelik conferred the title of Dajjazimach on Moroda and later on
baptized his son, Kumsa Moroda, as Gebre-Egziabher. Menelik himself became the
godfather of Gebre-Egziabher, and this marked the establishment of a lasting political
relationship between the ruling house of Leqa and the central government of Ethiopia.
Moroda died in 1889 and was succeeded by his son, Gebre-Egziabher Moroda.

Gebre-Egziabher (r. 1889-1923) is remembered today for his achievements in

social and educational development. He is said to have made the Orthodox Christian
Church the official religion of his state, and permitted the teaching of foreign
missionaries, among which especially the Swedish Evangelical Mission was active

220
during his reign. Most of the Leqa Neqemte people became Christians and many
churches were built in different parts of the area following his official conversion in
1889.

Gebre-Egziabher contributed much to the development of Neqemte town,

which became an important trade and urban center during his reign. In this respect the
construction of the large three-storied palace in 1898 is worth mentioning. It still
stands and is one of the important historical heritage and tourist attraction sites in the
area,. Gebre-Egziabher is also credited for the expansion of coffee and other
agricultural plantations that eventually became among the most important items of
export to Shoa, Gojam and other areas. In order to encourage trade and the travels of
traders and visitors in his region, Gebre-Egziabher initiated the construction of a
bridge over the Didessa River on the route between Neqemte and Gimbi, which,
according to Bairu Tafla (1969: 13), also became important source of income for the
state as all passers-by were required to pay a mallaq (about a sixteenth of a dollar). As
noted by Tesema Ta’a (citing several writers such as Weld Blundell, the British
traveler who passed through Neqemte in the late nineteenth century), the state of Leqa
Neqemte and the town of Neqemte were very rich and in a flourishing condition under
the rule of Gebre-Egziabher (1994: 674). After Gebre-Egziabher’s death in 1923, the
region was governed by two other members of the ruling house: Dajjazmach Habte-
Mariam Gebre-Egziabher (r. 1924-1935), and Dajjazmach Fiqre-Silassie Habte-
Mariam (r. 1955-1958).

The relative internal autonomy of the Leqa Neqemte, which had been
maintained for about half a century following the incorporation of the south-western
region into Ethiopia, was brought to an end by Haile Selassie’s program of political
centralization and direct control in the early 1940s. When the emperor recovered his
throne from the Italians in 1941, he appointed Ras Kebede Tessema as the first royal-

221
appointee governor of Leqa Neqemte.8 Until the final days of imperial rule, however,
most of the district governors, the landlords, local government officials and other
representatives of the state in large parts of eastern and western Wollega, were made
up of the Leqa Oromo - Bakare’s descendants and their clients from Leqa Neqemte.
Unlike in western Wollega (Qelem, Mana Sibu, Gimbi, etc.), Illu Abba Bor, Shoa and
other southern Oromo regions that were forcefully incorporated into Ethiopia and put
under direct control and exploitation of the centralized feudal government, there had
been few neftegna landlords (Amhara soldier-settlers) in the Leqa territory until the
1940s. There were only a few civil servants and government employees in some
administrative towns and market villages (Hultin 2003; Tessema 1986).

In this connection it is interesting to note that though the majority of the Leqa
people suffered longstanding domination and exploitation at the hands of their fellow-
Leqa rulers and landlords, the pre-state incorporation period and the subsequent semi-
autonomous days are remembered today as the ‘heyday’ of the Leqa Neqemte. On the
contrary, the post-incorporation periods are generally resented as a time of continuous
downslide in every aspect of life. This is a basic theme that runs through the whole
gamut of contemporary Leqa identity narratives. It is often times ascribed to
misbehavior and dividedness of the people themselves, and more subtly to the external
forces of the successive oppressive political systems of Ethiopia. In fact, most of my
informants from the south-western region in general and the Wollega area in particular
defined themselves, their local community and their position (social, political and
economic) both within the current ethno-regional state of Oromia and the wider ethno-
federal state of Ethiopia as marginalized and underdeveloped. It was argued that, on
top of the deep-rooted lack of political unity, the precursory roles the educated
Wollega elites played in the establishment and subsequent political activities of the

8
Successively following Ras Kebede, centrally appointed provincial governors of Leqa
up to 1974 include: Abiy Abebe, Asrate Kassa, Mekonnen Desta, Mangasha Jembere,
Dereje Mekonnen, Kassa Wolde Mariam, Berhane-Meskel Desta, Woldesemayat
Gebrewold, and a few others.
222
OLF, the major Oromo nationalist political organization which has been banned by the
Ethiopian government and EPRDF-led OPDO since its withdrawal from the June 1992
local elections.9

The Sibu Sire

Traditionally the Sibu Sire constitute a small branch of one of the three major tribal
Oromo groups (Sibu, Leqa and Sayyo) in south-eastern and western Wollega.
Combined with the other three groups, they constitute a large part of the Wollega
Oromo, who all trace descent from an alleged common ancestor, called Obo Macha.10
Among these, all of the Sayyo and the majority of the Sibu (with the exception of the
Sibu Sire) inhabit the vast territory between the Didessa and Dabus rivers in West
Wollega zone. The smaller Sibu Sire live in the south-central area of the present East
Wollega administrative zone; i.e. the wäräda known as Sibu Sire, one of the seventeen
wärädas in the zone. Located along the main asphalt road connecting the Wollega
region and Addis Ababa, Sibu Sire wäräda is bordered on the south by the wäräda of
Wama Bonaya, on the north and east by Bila Sayyo, and on the west by Guto Wayu
and Neqemte town. Sire is the wäräda capital, situated approximately 250 km west of
Addis Ababa and 56 km east of the zonal town, Neqemte. At the time of my field
research (2007-08), it was a rather derelict town situated at the end of a badly
maintained road, and the area in general looked neglected. Named after the eponymous
ancestor, Sibu Sire Horo, Sibu Sire refers both to the people and the territory they
occupy today. According to the 2007 national census report, the total population of

9
From the internal point of view, OLF and OPDO are totally ‘incompatible’
organizations; the former is believed to be ‘truly nationalist’ and the latter ‘an
opportunist lapdog of TPLF.’ Similarly, the International Crisis Group has commented:
“The Wollega zone is widely considered an anti-government stronghold, where many
relatively well- educated Lutheran Oromo of the Mekane Yesus Church sympathize
with the OLF…” (ICG, Africa report 153, 4 Sept. 2009, p. 27).
10
One version of oral narrative has it that Obo Mecha had six sons from two different
women. These are Leqa, Sayyo, Cheliya, Tumme, Sibu, and Nonno. The mother of the
first three was Dadhi, while that of the rest three was Basso.
223
Sibu Sire was 102,228 of which 90% lived in rural areas, subsisting on mixed
agriculture (CSA 2010: 7).

According to oral sources, the Sibu and Leqa groups had been together when
they first came to the Wollega area. They made their first camp in the present Sire
area, where they were separated from each other and moved further in different
directions. While some Leqa groups settled in the eastern Wollega area, others moved
further west-ward and took a large part of the territory in west Wollega. Similarly, a
small part of the large Sibu tribe claimed and remained in the Sibu Sire area, where
their descendants still live.

The Sibu Sire people in the early 19th century were said to have been governed
by a man called Genda Busan, who, in the same way as Bakare Godana of the
neighboring Leqa Neqemte, came to permanently exercise power over the people
following his election as a gada leader. Today Genda is remembered as a great warrior
who repeatedly fought against and defeated his rivals, especially Bakare Godana of
Leqa. The two local groups led by their own chiefs were engaged in warfare against
each other and against other local groups in the region. Though his people constituted
the smallest group in the area and his territory was very limited, Genda was one of the
powerful local chiefs in the region. Using the strategically advantageous geographical
location of his territory, Sibu Sire, Genda was able to control the old trade route
connecting the Wollega region with the central and northern regions of Shoa and
Gojam.

Genda is said to have been a courageous leader who was able to maintain the
independent existence of his territory and people resisting the continuous attempts of
the Bakare family to control the area. It is said that Moroda Bakare of Leqa, who was
unable to beat Genda, sought the assistance of the Amhara and brought the armies of
Ras Tekle-Haymanot of Gojam, led by his military general, Dajjazimach Darassu, to
conquer the north-eastern Wollega region in the late 1870s. Though the brave Sibu

224
men led by Genda lost the battle, they put up a strong resistance against and inflicted a
considerable loss over the Amhara (see Narrative 7.5 below).

It is also remembered today that the Sibu, unlike the Leqa Neqemte, refused to
collaborate with the military architect of Menelik, Dajjazmach Gobena Dache, both in
the war against king Tekle-Haymanot of Gojam (the 1882 battle of Embabo) and the
subsequent conquest of the south-western Oromo in the late nineteenth century. As a
result, they were militarily conquered by Gobena Dache and brought under control of
the ruling house of Leqa Neqemte, which was made to represent the central
government and its ‘indirect rule.’ Menelik confiscated most of the Sibu land and
granted it to the ‘outsiders’ from Leqa - descendants, members and clients of the
Bakare family who were to become landlords, provincial and district governors and
local government officials in large parts of the Wollega area. The policy of
confiscation and land grants was said not only to have deprived the Sibu of their own
land and the produce of their labor, but also turned them into gabbar (tribute-paying
peasants) and subservient to their new landlords from Leqa, which continued to be the
cornerstone of the imperial polity until its demise in 1974 (Hultin 2003).

Identity narratives of the Leqa Neqemte and the Sibu Sire

In the literature it has been cogently argued that ethnic identity is constructed at the
boundaries between groups; i.e., people become conscious of their identity and
difference when they engage with others and others’ culture (Barth 1969; Cohen
1982). Accordingly, such boundaries and differences are not natural phenomena, but
relational and processual cultural constructs that may be invoked or ignored in
different situations and for different purposes. More often than not, however, ethnic
identity is rhetorically depicted as something ‘natural’ and ‘inherited,’ and it finds
narrative expression in the essentialist way of reasoning: ‘We’ have common territory,

225
common history, common origin, common culture, common values and common
experiences that distinguish ‘us’ from ‘others’ (Amundsen 2000: 6). This argument
holds true for local identity too, as both ethnicity and locality are matters of cultural
construction - a rhetorical reality.

In line with this, the present chapter aims to show how and in what situations
and to what end the Leqa and the Sibu evoke their local identity and difference from
each other and/or from familiar others within and beyond the eastern Wollega Oromo.
The assumption is that a sense of local group identity and difference lies at the heart of
the in-group members’ conceptions, expectations, understandings and valuing of their
selves, groupness, history, worldview, style of life and landscape. This ambivalent
sense of in-group ‘sameness’ and out-group ‘difference’ is negotiated and articulated
within and through socially situated narrative practices of each group. This does not
mean that this study is concerned with definitions of group identity that overtly and
explicitly offset ‘self’ against ‘others.’ Nor does it mean that the two eastern Wollega
Oromo groups, or the south-western Oromo groups as a whole, are as such distinct in
any significant or objective way, as patterns of subsistence activities, communication
(language use), religious observances, customary practices, styles and habits of daily
life are largely similar. It is simply to say that members of the two groups evoke
‘specificity’ or ‘uniqueness’ of their own group so as to achieve self-knowledge, self-
fulfillment, and of course recognition of their importance by others, which seems
lacking in the current ethno-regional and ethno-federal states of Ethiopia. As indicated
earlier, the Leqa and the Sibu speak the same dialect of Afan Oromo; share core
culture, value orientations and systems of social organization. Drawing upon the
common Mecha myth and genealogical traditions, they even identify Leqa and Sibu as
tribal segments (qomoo) of the same order (the Macha) within the larger Oromo and
that they were originally half-brothers-descendants of the same ancestor (see narrative
7.1 below). What is more, today the two local groups together with other Oromo as
well as non-Oromo groups are intermixed and living harmoniously and

226
interdependently in their respective localities (wäräda) within the same administrative
zone of the Regional State of Oromia, and considerably integrated into the wider
ethno-federal state of Ethiopia. The two groups, like large parts of the Ethiopian rural
people, also subsist on similar economic activities of mixed agriculture, characterized
by the common techniques of sedentary farming of agricultural crops and cattle
rearing. The majority of the two groups, rather the eastern Wollega Oromo as a whole,
also adhere (at least formally) to the Christianity of the Orthodox Church and the
Protestant Church. In short, one can hardly observe any overt form of differentiation
and/or discrimination among the Leqa and the Sibu in social, cultural, economic and
political activities or in their participation at all levels of the so-called ‘democratic’
and ‘decentralized’ state of the present-day Ethiopia.

Under such circumstances what remains to be important material for recurrent

constructions and expressions of local identities and local stereotypes within the same
ethno-regional-linguistic groups like the southwestern Oromo of Ethiopia, is the
‘differences’ the people themselves ‘see’ or construct in their own local history, moral
values, and interactions within the immediate and wider socio-political space.
Needless to say, the differences are more of subjective understandings or evaluations-
than objective representations-of one’s own group experience and social worth. These
may even sound superficial or dubious to a cultural outsider who observes apparent
similarities in formal life and everyday interactions between local communities. What
matters is the meanings the people themselves perceive in and the values they attach
to, and thereby the difference (s) they ‘see’ in those ‘important’ things they consider
theirs and those of others. As noted by Kane (2000: 312), “How individuals and
collectives respond, and the specific action they take, depends on how they interpret
events using symbolic systems of understanding,… Meaning construction is thus at the
nexus of culture, social structure, and social action, and must be the explicit target of
investigation…” This lauds the importance of narrative both as a social practice and a

227
condition for identity-meaning-construction, and hence a productive entry point into
the cultural meanings generated thereof.

In this connection, I would like to raise one more point of widespread academic
currency and direct relevance to understand the case at hand. It is that references to
(sub-) ethnic identity, as well as stereotypes and prejudices frequently made of
perceived local differences, are rarely overtly expressed or made directly relevant to
relationships and interactions between individuals from ‘different’ backgrounds (Blom
1969; Knutsson 1969; Cohen 1982; Dundes 1989). Paradoxically, this seems
especially valid in ethno-federal states like present-day Ethiopia, where ethnicity and
ethnic identity have won importance nearly in all spheres of the internal political
processes at all levels. In practice, however, questions of ethno-regional or local
identity and autonomy are strongly suppressed and stigmatized both by the incumbent
regional and federal governments. It is common knowledge that one who dares to
openly raise questions on regional or local identity and autonomy runs the risk of
accusation of being ‘narrow-nationalist,’ ‘divisive’ and ‘threatening’ both to the
internal ‘unity’ of the ethno-regional member states and the wider ethno-federal state
of Ethiopia. Hence it remains to be a covert subject of close-group discourses. The
observation Barth made on similar aspects of ethnicity and collective identity in the
Middle East – but before the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts of 2011-2013 - makes a worthwhile
quotation to illustrate my point:

In states like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Iran we see powerful

organizational apparatuses... the distortion of public information and its
possible effects on self-assignment and ascription; the centralized
suppression of all internal political processes based on collective
identities, linked to a selective favoring of certain forms of individual
ambition; the enhanced scope, in technically modern civil society, for
simultaneous disfranchisement of a population and the delivery of welfare
services to its members. Under such conditions, when the regime
succeeds, ethnic identity can manifest itself in subtle and covert forms
only. It loses its saliency to us as analysts. But how the experience of
identity may be constructed by the members of such societies, in the

228
 privacy of their hearts and minds, is a matter that needs to be appraised
with acuteness and care, since for many purposes ethnic processes simply
disappear from the view of anyone without access to the most intimate and
trustful forums (1994: 28-29).

I understand narrative to be among ‘the most intimate and trustful forums,’ an

important cultural vehicle for the construction and articulation of local identity.
Narratives are, indeed, “configurations of meaning, through which an individual
and/or community comes to understand itself” (Kane 2000: 315). It is in cognizance of
the power of narrative that the commitment to address the human quest for self-
understanding and self-realization, the common interest in giving voice to human
feelings and experiences has become the shared concern of narrative studies since the
end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s.

In the discussion that follows, thus, sample identity narratives of the Leqa and
the Sibu are examined from within and in their own logic. The aim is to understand the
internal strategies, structural semantics and functions of the narrative constructions and
negotiations of collective self-identifications - how the narrators from the two eastern
Wollega Oromo groups go about making sense of their history, origin, locality and
relations to other groups within the context of present life conditions.

229
 Fig. 10. A discussion with Leqa-Neqemte elders narating history, October 2006.

Contemporary identity narratives of the Leqa Neqemte

As with the other groups, contemporary identity among the Leqa is defined
with reference to memorable socio-political events that exemplify and/or account for
achievements and failures of distant and recent past. In other words, the putative social
boundary that defines as well as separates the Leqa from other groups (both Oromo
and non-Oromo) is discursively constructed and negotiated in a way that allows
offsetting current dominant discourse. Thus sharing of and participation in the
production and negotiation of local historical narratives happens to be an important
way of creating and presenting positive image of one’s own group vis-à-vis contending
others within the present ethno-federal state of Ethiopia. For the Leqa, in fact for any
other south-western Oromo group, current (re-) construction of local history and

230
memories of the old good days allows for authentication of the positive collective
identity being claimed thereof, a safe way of grappling with and commenting on the
meaning of problematic life experiences in the present. In line with Ricoeur’s
theoretical formulation, the common history-based identification of the Leqa can be
understood as “the who of a history (story), the one upon whom the story confers a
sort of identity, …a self whose temporalisation shapes itself in accordance with a
narrative model” (as cited by Villela-Petit 2009: 3).

In line with this, the following origin narrative purports to establish the
precedence of the Leqa within the wider socio-historical world of the eastern Wollega.
In a self-conscious attempt to understand ‘who we are,’ the interlocutors strive towards
connecting themselves and the living performance context to the narrated events,
places, social actors and relationships within the historical context of the Macha
Oromo origin, expansion to and settlement in the eastern Wollega area. The goal is the
location and embedding of the Leqa within the wider historical and ethno-regional
space of the Macha Oromo. In this folkloric fashioning of their own self-
understanding, the group-oriented interlocutors grapple with the question of how they
came to be what they are today, defining their origin and relation to other groups in the
present-day eastern Wollega area.

Narrative 7.1. How our forefathers settled in this Wollega area 11

1. As you know, our forefathers came and settled in this Wollega area so
many generations ago.
2. They came from Hooda Bisil in the east, crossing the Gibe River.
3. Our forefathers belong to the Macha Oromo, you know that?
4. Yes, we know [Audiences’ agreement].
5. Five were the children of Mecha. These are: Obo, Liben, Jawi, Jida and
Hulle.
6. We the Wollega Oromo are all descendants of Obo Mecha.

11
Told by Obbo Emiru Gebre (72), in a focus group discussion on 2 March 2007, in
Neqemte.
231
 7. Obo begot nine sons from three different wives. These are: Leqa, Sibu,
Sayyo, Cheliya, Tumme, Limmu, Guduru, Ebantu and Nonno.
8. The mother of Leqa, Sayyo and Cheliya is Dadhi. The mother of Sibu,
Tumme and Nonno is Basso. And that of Limmu, Guduru and Ebantu
was…..[prolonged silence].
9. You know that Leqa and Sibu are half-brothers? [Audiences nod in
agreement]. Yes, we are offspring of the same father.
10. In Hooda Bisil all of the children of Mecha were living together under one
gada administration. Then the gada leader was the wise and the law-giver
Makko Bili. You know the laws of Makko, don’t you? [Yes, we know].
11. They lived together peacefully and productively. The people and the cattle
multiplied in large number; and the land became too small to
accommodate all of them.
12. Therefore, they were forced to separate from each other and move in
different directions in search of more land and pasture.
13. The movement was made in gosa12 (clan), each led by its own head and a
special bull (korma karabicha). Wherever the bull comes to lie down, its
owner takes possession of large areas of the land and settle down; and the
rest groups move on to find another land.
14. First Leqa and Sibu came together and took the two adjacent areas that
were to be known as Leqa Neqemte and Sibu, respectively. The two are
first-comers.
15. Leqa took all the beautiful land extending from the Anger River to the
Wama River and from the Gibe River to the Didessa River. Whereas the
Sibu occupied the adjacent area between the Didessa and Dabus River.
16. Later on, Sayyo and the other groups came and settled in the area. They
came after Leqa and Sibu. They are latecomers (Galaa).13
17. It is said that road, land, sun and water are all gifts of God to be shared
and used by everybody who comes along, regardless of his genealogical
origin.
18. However, it is the first-comer who becomes father of the land (abbaa
lafaa).
19. You know the old Oromo saying, ‘Father of the land is the one who takes
it first, and owner of the mineral water is who discovers it first’ (Lafti kan
abbaa qabeeti; horri kan abbaa argeeti).
20. When our forefathers came here, most of the land was uninhabited and
covered with dense forests swarming with threatening wild animals. There

12
An agnatically related grouping.
13
This seems to be the etymological root of the name “Galla” that has been considered
derogatory since the last three or more decades.
232
 were also a few Shanqilla14 peoples such as the Gumuz, Mao, Sinicho,
and... umm… What was the other? …
21. They chased away both the wild animals and the Shanqilla into the hot
lowland area, and took possession of the land and became lords of the
large territory to be named Wollega.
22. Then there was that malicious king of Gumuz, Abba Misqano.
23. When Abba Misqano learnt the coming of our Oromo forefathers, he was
afraid to face them. He instructed his men to ambush on top of a mountain
and wait for them.
24. As you know, the Gumuz are adept at using the deadly arrow and bow to
attack others in ambush.
25. Whereas the Oromo are known for facing and fighting their enemies on
horse backs.
26. Aware of the malice of the Gumuz, the wise Makko Bili instructed his
men to block all the way to the mountain so that the enemy would find no
way to escape.
27. After a week of siege, Abba Misqano sent a messenger to Makko: “I have
decided to surrender; I do not want my people to die of thirst and hunger. I
kindly request you to personally come and take my hand as a prisoner.”
28. Upon receiving the message, Makko asked his people whether or not to
accept the enemy’s request.
29. The people warned Makko against the malicious behavior of the Gumuz.
30. But Makko was over confident too heed their advice. He said, “The enemy
is too desperate to do me any harm.”
31. On the way to the enemy, he assigned a couple of his men to keep watch
on him and alert the people in case something went wrong.
32. When Makko arrived at the mountain, Abba Misqano locked him in a
room. Then he assembled his people and asked them: “Your enemy has
fallen into my hands. What do you want me to do with him?”
33. And they sentenced Makko to death.
34. Makko was not disturbed the least. As a last wish, he told the enemy that
he would like to cleanse himself and pray to his God in a private corner.
35. As soon as he was left alone, he began to speak loud in Oromo to be
understood only by his men in the nearby watch point.
He said, “Listen carefully and pass on my message to the people. I am
trapped by the enemy. Make sure to defeat them. Build fires of wet wood
in different places around the mountain. Then tie two horses [a stallion
and a mare] beside each fire and let the enemy hear their continuous
neighs. Thinking of our horsemen coming after them, they will be terrified

14
A pejorative nickname which was used in the past to collectively refer to peoples of
darker complexion in the area.
233
 and run into the fire. From now onward, let the celebration of the Cross be
every year and the gada ritual every eight years.”
36. Then Makko was hanged on the mountain, which thenceforward was to be
known as Tullu Makko (the Mountain of Makko).
37. Following his advice, our forefathers defeated the Gumuz by driving them
into the trap of desperation and death in fire.
38. They killed many of the enemy; they also adopted and made the friendly
ones into Oromo. Only a small number of them escaped to the hot lowland
area beyond the Didessa River, where their descendants still live.
39. You see Makko Bili was not only a great leader, but also a selfless hero
who proudly died for the common good of his people. You never find
such kind of a leader these days.
40. Oh, not at all! …..Never! [Audiences’ agreement].
41. It is a shame that the unity and vitality of our forefathers has been lost on
their descendants several generations down the line.

The above transcribed narrative was performed in a focus-group discussion I

conducted and narrated by a retired man of 72, Obbo Emiru Gebre, who served in
various governmental administrative posts in the Wollega area. Two Leqa men 15also
participated in the discussion which occasioned the narration of and reflection on the
subject of Leqa identity vis-à-vis others within the wider south-western region. This is
to say, as repeatedly indicated in the foregoing chapters, the rhetorical situation for the
production of the above and other narrative performances was created by the
ethnographic research situation that stimulated respondents to talk about their identity,
about their own understanding of what it means to be and/or not to be Leqa.

From the outset, the narrator indicates that what he is about to tell is shared
knowledge and a concern to the entire group. That is to orient participants toward the
narration of the story as a factual account of common origin, history, genealogy and
territory, which is tantamount to creating and affirming their shared identity (group-

15
Obbo Amsalu Keno, 45, and Obbo Yadeta Daba, 54, both from the Leqa group. The
former was a teacher of history in Neqemte high school, known for his interest in
collecting and documenting oral traditions of his people. In the field, Amsalu was my
first contact, who assisted me in identifying and introducing me to key informants, and
arranging meetings with them. Obbo Yadeta worked as Head of the Archive Section in
the Zonal Museum of East Wollega.
234
ness) on the basis of natural closure. The opening lines (1-4), thus, constitute what
Labov calls ontological orientation, “information on the time, place of the events of a
narrative, the identities of the participants and their initial behavior” (1997: 400). This
enables the participants to position themselves in the story world of the past and the
present performance context, which is intellectually and emotionally rewarding. Hence
evoking shared knowledge is used as an effective strategy for contextualizing and
authenticating the discursive construction of group identity, reifying connectedness of
the interlocutors within historically and spatially anchored social networks.

Once this has been achieved, the door to the narrative performance is opened in
the minds of the participants and they proceed to interactively define who they are and
their relations to each other and others in the area they inhabit today. They assert
themselves as successors of the ‘first-comers’ to and ‘conquerors’ of the beautiful
Leqa area. It is in the making of this claim to being recognized as legitimate
proprietors of the land and members of the upper echelons of the local society therein
that the interlocutors join together, which is a common discursive practice among the
African people as a whole. In positioning the Leqa as one major segment and of the
same order within the ascending levels of the Macha Oromo, the common
genealogical and migration myth of the Macha is adaptively used as a rhetorical
strategy to render the identity discourse as an authentic historical representation of
social evolution and mobility in extended time and space. What is at issue is the self-
reflexive definition and reaffirmation of the Leqa identity in terms of its constructed
historical, genealogical and spatial specificity and relations to others (Oromo and non-
Oromo groups); its evolvement into and existence as an enduring community of shared
experiences over long span of space-time and through series of change.

The narrative is effectively configured to epitomize the alleged specificity of

the Leqa identity and at the same time their fraternal alignment within the larger
Wollega Oromo. While the former is grounded in the genealogical and spatial
separation within, the latter is cast against the backdrop of the common ‘difference’

235
from and ‘enmity’ with the so-called black peoples-cultural others-in the historical
context of the Macha Oromo migration to and settlement in the Wollega area. This
may become clear with identification and explication of the formal and thematic
elements of the narrative production of self-knowledge. Three fragmented sequences
construct the narrative.

The first sequence is built of a blend of the origin myth and genealogy of the
Macha Oromo, in which the Wollega Oromo consist of nine patrilineal descent groups
with defined territories that together constitute one of the five major segments. Here
descent from a common eponymous ancestor and attachment to an ancestral territory
provides the basis for definition of the local identity of each group. The same holds
true for identification with the wider ‘imagined community’ of Wollega Oromo.
Notwithstanding their genealogical and spatial demarcations, the several Wollega local
groups are ‘unified’ by virtue of their common ancestry and history of origin, which
stretches many generations back to the alleged first ancestor, Obo Macha.

The narrative contains several symbolic elements of origin myth; e.g., the
coming from the east - Hooda Bisil - the origin of life, the crossing of a river, the birth
of a people and re-birth in general (see also Hultin 1987). Of course, it incorporates
not only simplified story of origin of the people, but also of the subsequent momentous
events. These include the story of the mass movement to the new world and taking
possession of virgin land and transforming it, what hitherto was uninhabitable territory
full of wild animals, and of ‘strange’ peoples (enemies), into the country of Oromo
people and cattle. And the journey to the frontiers area is accomplished by the
guidance of the bull (the instrument of Waaq) and leadership of the heroes, the nine
eponymous ancestors and the gada leader, Makko Bili. The story of the fight against
the pre-existing peoples, the enemy armed with the ‘deadly’ arrows and bows, is also
of crucial importance in conferring shared meaning, moral value and identity to the
people in today’s context. Here I take Duncan Bell’s definition of myth, “a story that
simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its place

236
in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary
meaning through (re)constructing its past” (2003: 75).

The second sequence is constructed of the story about the Macha expansion,
with particular emphasis on the social motivation for and procedure of the mass
movement to and settlement in what is today the Wollega area. As a background, the
pre-expansion life in the ancestral place of origin (Hooda Bisil) is described as
peaceful and productive (11), the ideal world of the Oromo society. The relocation
from such a ‘heavenly’ place-where the Macha Oromo brethren were living together
peacefully under common gada administration and blessed with high fertility both in
human and cattle-is dictated only by the demographic pressure created from within
(12). Then, the migration to the ‘Promised Land’ is made in small family groupings
one after another and each led by its own head and a special bull, an instrument of
God. Accordingly, Leqa and Sibu are first-comers (14), and hence the former have
become lords of ‘all the beautiful land…’ and the latter of that of the adjacent area
(15). Note here how the claim to being and becoming the ‘first-comers and lords’ of all
the beautiful land is well grounded in the authority of tradition; i.e. in the “old Oromo
saying”: “Road, land, sun and water are all gifts of God…” (17); and, “Father of the
land is the one who takes it first…” (19). Evoking the wisdom of the past as significant
to the present, the traditionalizing strategy, effectively legitimizes the interlocutors’
claim to the land as exclusive corporate property of their own group, at the same time
delegitimizing any form of claim from ‘outsiders.’ Related to this is the reflexive
remark about the wilderness of the area prior to the coming of their forefathers:
“…most of the land was uninhabited and covered with dense forests swarming with
threatening wild animals. There were also a few Shanqilla peoples…” (20). Here not
only is the preexistence of the people who constitute ‘the significant others’ in the
worldview of the eastern Wollega Oromo today deliberately underplayed, their image
is also presented in an ingeniously dehumanizing way parallel to that of the
‘dangerous’ wild animals. On the one hand, killing and chasing away those

237
threatening elements (enemies), and adopting and making Oromo of those who
peacefully-submitted, friendly ones, on the other,16 the pioneers triumphantly take
possession of the land and transform the wilderness into beautiful Oromo country.
This brings us to the last and most important sequence of the whole narrative, the self-
glorifying story about the Oromo conquest of the Gumuz and their settlement in the
Wollega area, showing a narrative of hegemonism and local’ imperialism’.

The story tells how the Oromo frontiersmen tactfully defeated the Gumuz and
took possession of the land on which their descendants live today. In so doing the aim
of the interlocutors is not simply to codify the remembered past of their forefathers’
achievements, but to amplify their own group comportment as militarily and morally
superior to that of the rival group. As noted by Ochs and Capps (2001: 47), group
experience narratives are basically permeated with moral judgments of one’s own
group (self) and others proclaimed in light of local notions of goodness. To this end,
narrators use various rhetoric strategies of positive self-presentation. This is clearly
evident in the binary oppositional depiction of the two named personas of the above
story: Abba Misqano and Makko Bili. The former, Abba Misqano, is consistently
characterized with negative affect markers and actions such as “malicious,”
“dangerous,” “enemy,” “cowardice,” “ambuscading,” “reneging,” “defeated,” “dead-
ender,” “dead duck,” “unfriendly.” Note how these attributes are used to
antagonistically position the Abba Misqano-represented adversary group as an epitome
of all that is believed to be ‘evil’ and ‘threat’ to the Makko-represented we-group (the
Wollega Oromo).

16
Note the implication of the ‘criterion’ for inclusion into and/or exclusion from group-
membership - the distinction between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ - for understanding how
group identity is a matter of inter-subjectivity, meaning-making and boundary-building
(we/they, us/them) process, instead of ‘natural’ feature of social organization as defined
from the essentialist perspective. At issue is that discourses in the narrative are used to
create cultural understanding of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ to forge and reinforce alignment with
and/or differentiation from others.
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 On the contrary, Makko Bili, the Oromo hero with whom the interlocutors
identify themselves, is presented throughout, and in typical ethnocentric fashion, as a
“wise,” “fearless,” “selfless,” “confident,” “honorable,” “victorious,” “virtuous,” etc.
The depiction of Makko as a ‘farsighted and selfless leader’- who martyrs himself for
the common good, who devises an ingenious military stratagem to defeat the common
enemy-allows the interlocutors, who consider themselves as his successors, to lend
antiquity to their cohesive presence and power amongst the other people (the Gumuz)
in the area. With all his extraordinary qualities and achievements, thus, the heroic
figure of Makko Bili represents the community’s ideal of a leader, 17 an archetypal
symbol representing the shared cultural values, ethos and mores that bind the people
together into a community of competent social actors. Folklore of the Macha Oromo
abounds with such exemplary narratives and songs about outstanding cultural and
political heroes that are used as sources of inspiration and reference frames for
contemporary construction of a shared sense of group-ness, history and identity.18

In this connection it is interesting to note that the narration of the story about
the Oromo forefathers’ fight and victory against the Gumuz during their westward
expansion, which was recorded during my field research in Neqemte in 2007, came on
the brink of the violent conflict that erupted between the two groups in 2008. 19 Of

17
Among the several local heroes remembered in the eastern Wollega area, Makko Bili
is also widely known as the prophetic leader (raajjuu), lawgiver and founder of the
society (see also, Alessandro Triulzi 1990; Mohammed Hassen 1994; Negaso Gidada
2001).
18
The significance of stories about local heroes for collective identity construction in
African societies has long been recognized (see, for example, Finnegan 1970, 2007;
Furniss 1996; Okpewho 1998).
19
A report by the Sudan Tribune (May 23, 2008, online at
www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article27265) shows that the ethnic clash started on
May 18, 2008, caused the death of over 130 people and internal displacement of about
8000 people. In fact this is not a new phenomenon. There has been a long-standing
boundary and resource conflict between the Wollega Oromo and their Gumuz
neighbours, the logic and details of which often find expression in group-experience
narratives currently told in the area (see also Asnake 2009; Schlee 2003).
In another narrative, for example, there were no Gumuz people in the Wollega area
prior to and during the Oromo settlement in the same. It was King Kumsa Moroda of
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course this cannot be surprising as what people talk about in public is generally
assumed to reflect what is of shared concern and utmost importance to the group in
terms of accounting for the present and anticipating the future. The story can be seen,
nonetheless, as one good showcase of how narration is a powerful communicative and
creative social practice whereby selected experiences (imagined or real) are rendered
relevant for understanding and shaping of the past and the present, as well as for
reflecting on implication of those experiences for the future. I think this is what Rüsen
meant when he said “… narration is an act of de-mortalization of human life” (1987:
88).

As is evident from the foregoing, the narration of stories about common origin
and ancestry helps the group-oriented interlocutors to make sense of their present
problematic life situation (in comparison with the past) and envisage the way forward.
In other words, narration as a situated social practice offers moral guidelines for
understanding how to behave in similar circumstances and deal with problematic
situations in the future, so as to achieve betterment for themselves and their
community (Brockmeier 2002, Bruner 1987, Ochs and Capps 2001). Accordingly, the
above narrative interweaves the narrated life experiences, the social and
spatiotemporal world of the pre-and post-expansion Macha Oromo into a coherent
self-identification story of ‘who we are, where came from, and how we have come to
be what we are today.’ By showcasing the value of standing together and acting as a
group (unity) in the face of crisis, thus, the narrative serves the interlocutors to forge
shared sense of group identity-feeling of groupness, interconnectedness, and
belonging together to form the ‘imagined community’ of Wollega Oromo. Hence the
symbolic and ideological significance of the narrative lies in counterbalancing the
often lamented lack of unity, the characteristic feature of the post-expansion history of

the Leqa Neqemte who ‘imported’ them from the Sudan, where they had been living
before they were sold into slavery by their own brethren and brought to be used as farm
hands on cotton and coffee plantations of the king in the lowland area.
240
the Macha Oromo and their eventual loss of territorial integrity and political autonomy
at the turn of the nineteenth century.
As shown above, the narration commences with origin story of the ideal Macha
world order (unified, harmonious and fertile), then proceeds to recounting the
progressive course of the social and territorial expansion, and comes to an end with the
prelude of a new story of downward trend (regression). This is succinctly and
resentfully revealed in the concluding remark: “It is a shame that the unity and vitality
of our forefathers has been lost on their descendants several generations down the
line” (41).
In contrast to the above story of the old ‘cohesive, peaceful and thriving’
Wollega Oromo identity, based on common origin, common goal and common enemy
(non-Oromo) in the context of the southwest-ward expansion, the following critical
narrative depicts the post-expansion Macha, particularly the eastern Wollega Oromo,
as internally divided, contending and self-destructive groups.

Narrative 7.2. We are like a handful of sand

1. Upon their settlement in this Wollega area, the several Oromo groups
began to live in their own territory and under their own gada leaders.
2. Subsequently, however, the gada leaders began to cling onto power.
They ignored the traditional gada system [the eight-year periodical
election and power transfer] and began to declare themselves as kings
(motii).
3. This was because of the death of Makko Billi, and lack of wise leaders
who could make laws and lead the people on the right track.
4. On top of this, the people were dispersed over the vast territory. That
made it difficult for them to maintain the unity and unified
administration and harmonious life of the old days. Then there was no
telecommunication and postal services like today, nor had the people a
writing system to communicate with each other.
5. This must be the major reason for the decline of the gada system and the
subsequent emergence of monarchs of the Wollega Oromo.
6. It must also be the influence of the Amhara who were ruled by kings. I
think our forefathers learnt how the Amhara were ruled by kings. That

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 must have influenced the gada leaders to hold onto power and
eventually to declare themselves as kings.
7. Then social disorder began to be pervasive. The several Oromo groups
began to fight each other over land and political power. They began to
kill each other.
8. The Leqa fought against the Sibu and the Sayyo. Even the two ruling
houses of Leqa, the Bakare and Bera Ota families, were fighting each
other. You know the Leqa are comprised of two clans, the Wayyu and
the Hordaa.
9. The Bakare families belong to the Wayya, and the Bera Ota to the
Horda. These two Leqa clans were often fighting each other. The Leqa
and the Sibu were fighting each other.
10. As you know, Leqa and Sibu are stepbrothers; sons of the same father
but of different mothers. They are children of the two malevolent co-
wives (masaanuu) of Obo Macha, namely Dadhi and Basso. The two
have always been rivals.
11. In the past they often fought and killed each other. They do not like each
other. The Leqa look down on the Sibu and vice versa.
12. The Leqa perceive themselves as morally, politically and economically
superior to the Sibu; as endowed with the best land and abundant natural
resources, and hence destined to enjoy all the joys and luxuries of life.
13. On the contrary, they consider the Sibu as less moral and ill-fated
people, destined to lead the life of toil and hardship.
14. You know the old saying, “Leqa’s mother is blessed with joyful life,
Sibu’s mother is cursed with destitution” (Haatii Leqaa bashaatuudha,
Haatii Sibuu dhamaatuudha).
15. The two are stepbrothers, children of the same father but of different
mothers, and hence rivals.
16. It is because of this that they do not like each other. This is the major
source of strife between these two and other Oromo groups in this
Wollega area. In fact the most destructive situation among the Oromo in
general is the masaanuu relationship; i.e. the animosity between co-
wives and their offspring.
17. It is this negative relationship that always puts them at daggers drawn
with each other. This is why they are always at war with each other.
They often consign each other to external enemies. In the past, they
always quarreled and fought over land.
18. While they were at war with each other, the Amhara came and took their
land. It is but the Oromo themselves who handed over the Oromo land
to the Amhara. The Amhara could never beat the Oromo. The one who
defeated and put the Oromo under control of the Amhara are the Oromo
themselves, not the Amhara (Oromooti Oromoo cabse male Amaarri
Oromoo hinmoone).

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19. It is the same even now. The numerous Oromo groups do not like each
other. Even in the present-day, there is conflict between the various
Oromo groups over political power, especially since the establishment
of the regional government of Oromia.
20. For instance, during the time of Emperor Haile Selassie and even during
the military rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam, there were many higher
government officials from Wollega.
21. But since the Tigre and OPDO came to power, very few Wollega
Oromo have held important political position both at the federal and
regional governments.
22. Presently most of the higher government officials of Ethiopia and
Oromia are from the llu Abba Bor and the Arsi. Even the current
administrator of this East Wollega zone is from Illu Abba Bor.
23. The Tigre and OPDO higher authorities do not like intellectuals from
Wollega Oromo for they consider them as precursors and supporters of
OLF.
24. I think it is because of this conflict and competition over power that the
several Oromo groups hate each other as if they were enemies.
25. The same is true of the Leqa and the Sibu and other Wollega Oromo
groups. We are all rivals. One does not like the betterment of the other.
26. Each group is interested only in its own advantages and always
considers itself as superior to the other, and even as the best of all
groups in the region in all aspects of life. And each group considers
itself as deserving special treatment and better position and political
power. The root of all our problems is that we are disunited and self-
centered.
27. We are like a handful of sand, which falls apart the moment you let it
out of your hand (Akka bassoo cirachaa walhinqabattuu). It is due to
our dividedness that we came to lose the greatness of our forefathers.
28. Even today, we are divided along the opposing political lines of OPDO
and OLF. We the Wollega Oromo are blindly accused of being
supporters of the OLF, for which we have been marginalized from
government positions and development projects under the Tigre-led
OPDO government of Oromia.
29. Our disunity and rivalry is the root of our problems.
30. You know there is a well-known gerersa song of the old Leqa, which
shows how divided and rival we the Wollega Oromo are:

I would have settled in Horda,

In the country of Bera Ota;
They appoint you to a high position in the morning,
And put you in handcuffs in the evening.
That is why I decided against settling there,

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 I could never get used to it.

I would have settled in Qelem,

In the country of Jote Tullu;
It is the mothers, who light the tobacco pipe,
For their daughters to smoke.
That is why I decided against settling there,
I would never get used to it.

I love Leqa Neqemte, the country of Kumsa Moroda;

Where even chickens have their own cages,
And social order prevails.
That is why I like it most,
I have lived all my life here.

The above narrative text narrative text was recorded in an interview I held with
the elderly Leqa man, Obbo Emiru Gebre, whom I cited before, on 3 March 2007, in
Neqemte. The interview was a follow-up on the topic of Leqa identity raised in the
focus-group discussion conducted on 2 March 2007. In the narration of the above
story, the narrator takes a critical and argumentative stance on the social, economic
and political crisis the Leqa Oromo experienced since the decline of the gada system
and the monarchic state formation in the Wollega area, and latter on the incorporation
of the area into the Ethiopian empire. Specifically, the narrator attempts to understand
the ‘diminished’ political and economic status of the Wollega Oromo within the ethno-
federal state structure of present-day Ethiopia and explicitly refers to today’s politics.
While in deed not a ‘folkloric’ oral tradition but more of a political narrative, it refers
to traditional notions of collective identity and enactment in contexts of group
interaction.

In reaction against the present problematic life conditions of the Leqa, and the
perceived marginalization of the people under the incumbent ethno-federal
government of Ethiopia (21, 28), the narrator purposely distances himself both from
his own group (the Leqa) and the wider Wollega group, as evident in his choice of the
third person plural narrative point-of-view, “their settlement…,” “their own

244
territory…,” “their own gada leaders…” (1), “they are…” (10), and so on. This
enables him to present himself as a neutral, ‘stand-alone’ person that critically and
‘objectively’ reflects on the problem and its possible causes. There and then, the
narrator proceeds to explicate how the Wollega Oromo have become divided and
contending groups, competing over resources and political power following their
settlement in the area what is known today as Wollega. It is interesting to note how the
narrator understands the ‘root’ of the present-day socio-economic and political crisis
of the Oromo in general and the Wollega Oromo in particular to be lack of unity
among and rivalry between the various local groups. He mentions several historical
and social factors in support of his thesis, whereby historical accuracy is secondary.

The first factor is said to have been the gradual decline of the traditional socio-
political system of the Oromo, the gada, and its replacement by a monarchic system,
which was caused by “the death of Makko Billi, and lack of wise leaders who could
make laws and lead the people on the right track” (3). The narrator also mentions the
dispersal of the people over the vast Wollega area and the lack of communication
system needed for unified administration and peaceful interaction (4), as well as the
influence of the Amhara people, who were ruled by kings (6). Needless to say, the
decline of the gada system and the subsequent monarchic state formation, which in
other circumstance is often mentioned as positive and great achievement of the people,
is understood as a ‘negative’ change that came as a result of the Amhara influence and
brought social disorder and fighting and killing each other among the brotherly Oromo
groups (7). The narrator here purports to externalize the cause of the widespread
conflicts and fighting among the Oromo to the decline of the gada system and the
influence of the Amhara culture, while downplaying all internal factors and problems,
which include the dictates of the gada system itself that requires each leading gada
class to wage war against a neighboring locality every eight year (see chapter 4). In

245
fact, the resentment to the decline of the traditional gada system seems common to the
wider south-western Oromo.20

The narrator also resents the traditional polygamous marital custom

(masaanummaa) as the cause of disunity and conflict among the Oromo, which allows
for men taking multiple co-wives and thus producing of siblings that turn into rivals
and competitors over limited family resources.21 More importantly, the major but
opposing political organizations of the Oromo, the OLF and OPDO, are considered as
causes of disunity of the people within the present-day ethno-federal state of Ethiopia.
And the Wollega Oromo are additionally marginalized and became ‘powerless’
because they are accused of being supporters of OLF, the ‘avowed enemy’ of the
EPRDF-led government of Ethiopia, specifically, the “Tigre-led OPDO government of
Oromia” (28). Hence the metaphor, “We are like a handful of sand” (27), concretizes
the narrator’s resentment and understanding of the Wollega Oromo as numerous but
scattered and divided and marginalized within the regional state of Oromia. Within the
past socio-political condition of the wider Wollega Oromo, however, the Leqa are
rated the ‘best’ and the ‘blessed,’ while the Sibu are ‘cursed’ (14). The gerersa song at
the end of the narrative also depicts the Leqa as a most cultured and orderly people,
and, in contrast, the Sibu as ‘negative’ and ‘absurd’ people. There is also another story
which idealizes the Leqa people and the Leqa Neqemte land as blessed with moral
excellence and happiness, while depicting the neighboring Sibu and other local groups
as ‘immoral,’ ‘wicked’ and ‘cursed’:

20
Bartels (1983) expressed a similar view in his far-reaching Catholic-missionary
observation of the western Oromo.
21
This is a common theme in theme in many historical narratives of the south-western
Oromo, particularly in areas such as East Wollega, Illu Aba Bor and West Shoa, where
Christianity (the Orthodox Christianity and Protestantism) has been widely accepted. It
might be in confirmation of the religious teaching of Christianity that the narrator
laments against the polygamous relationship among the Oromo.
246
 Narrative 7.3. The nature of Leqa and Sibu22

Once four (female) individuals from the west moved towards the east
seeking a suitable land to settle on. They were named Alami [Happiness],
Hi’i [No], Hammina [Cruelty], and Sobduu [Liar]. They had agreed to
travel together until they found good place to live in. Accordingly, they
traveled for many days and nights and arrived in the country we now call
Leqa Neqemte. They camped at the outskirt of Neqemte and stayed there
for a few days. Having had some rest, they began to continue their
journey. However, Alami refused to travel further and told her friends that
she decided to stay in the country of Bakare Godana: “I am tired and, in
fact, I do not want to go out
of this beautiful area.” She said goodbye to her friends and settled there,
which remained to be the country of Leqa. That is why the Leqa are
friendly and cheerful people in their country of happiness, peace and
prosperity.

The remaining three traveled further for so many days and arrived
and camped in the land we now call Sibu Sire. When they were ready to
continue their journey, Hi’i [No] told her friends that she had chosen Sibu
Sire for her lifelong settlement. And she lived all her life there. That is
why the Sibu have a negative attitude towards everything. They never
reach an agreement with each other on anything. They always say ‘no’ to
each other and to others as well. A Sibu woman never sleeps facing her
husband; nor does she give in to her husband’s manly desires. She gives in
only when he forces her.

The other two resumed their journey and after many days and
nights arrived in the area now known as Jimma Rare. They camped and
stayed there for a few days. Then they were supposed to travel further
until they got land of their choice to settle on. However, Hamtuu [Cruelty]
told his friend that he would like to settle and live the rest of his life in
Jimma Rare. That is why Jimma Rare is the land of cruel and wicked
people.

Then Sobduu [Liar], the last one of the group, was forced to
continue her journey alone. She traveled for so many days and nights, but
could not find a good land to settle on. She was too tired to travel further.
Then she arrived at the vast lake of Abay Chomen. As she was so
exhausted and desperate, she wanted to end her miserable life by
drowning herself in the deep lake. She was just to jump into the water

22
Narrated by Obbo Ayyana Giddi (54), March 4, 2007, Neqemte.
247
 when an old man miraculously appeared out of the blue and asked her
why she decided to commit suicide. Sobduu told him her story about how
all of her friends found settlement of their choice; and how she lost hope
in life after her long unsuccessful search for settlement. The old man
listened to her and advised her that one should not lose hope in life. He
said, “There is nothing that cannot be achieved by forbearance and
persistence. If you have a bit of courage to take some more steps forward,
you will get a land of your heart’s desire.” Sobduu gratefully accepted the
old man’s advice and arrived in the country of Guduru, which was in fact
a walking distance from the lake of Abay Chomen. And she remained
there all her life. This is why the Guduru Oromo are all liars and cursed,
whose entire life is nothing but hard toil, tilling the land that yields little.

The above story – showing anthropomorphism and telescoping - purports to

allegorize and mythologize both the present settlement pattern of the eastern Wollega
Oromo and the Leqa’s own understanding of themselves and other rival groups within
the Wollega area. Accordingly, the Leqa Neqemte group is defined as ethically and
morally superior to the others and inhabitants of the best of all places in the Wollega
area. On the contrary, the neighboring local groups such as the Sibu, Jimma Rare, and
Guduru are all identified with certain ‘wickedness’: negativity, cruelty, and
untruthfulness, respectively. It is not surprising that each group, in a familiar
ethnocentric fashion, defines itself most favorably, in terms of morality and excellence
in performance, and in contrasts with the familiar others. Considering identity
narratives of the Sibu Sire of East Wollega Oromo may help to further understand this
point.

Identity narratives of the Sibu Sire

Of course, the Sibu Sire Oromo, like any other local group within the south-western
Oromo region, define themselves in positive terms of a ‘glorious past’, and as
hardworking, wise and well-to-do people, and often in contrast with the Leqa, whom
they consider in their turn as ‘deceitful’ and ‘shrewd’ (Their self-image is a mirror of

248
that of the Leqa on them). This might be not only because of the historical power
relation between the two groups, the overtaking of the Sibu administration by the
ruling house of Kumsa Moroda of Leqa Neqemte during the incorporation of the
Macha Oromo into the Ethiopian empire in the end of the nineteenth century, but also
because of the ‘marginal’ position the Sibu claim to hold in the current ethno-regional
administration of Oromia, in which the Leqa Neqemte have a relatively ‘better’ zonal-
center position. Hence, prevalent is the center-periphery relation. The following story,
for instance, relates how the eponymous settler of the area wisely bought the land
which his descendants occupy today from the preexisting local Oromo groups.

Narrative 7.4. How Sibu Sire was established23

As my grandfather told me, Sire Horo was the man who first came to
settle in this area we now call Sibu Sire. He was the son of Horo Batte of
Sibu group. Sire Horo was a rich merchant. He had 40 mules and a lot of
servants. He was an itinerant merchant. He moves from place to place. He
even goes to Sheger [Addis Ababa]. Once, Sire Horo Batte went to a
village called Wenni. He went and passed the night there. It was the
village of a man called Guddu Kussa. When he passed the night there, the
people tried to chase him out of the area. Then he asked them why they
wanted to ban him. They told him that they were instructed by their chief
(Qoroo). He learnt that the chief, Guddu Kussa, did not trust strangers in
his land. Then Sire went to see Guddu in his place. He took a bar of salt
with him. Then salt was very valuable and used as money. There was no
birr then. A bar of salt was enough to feed five families for a year. Sire
took the bar of salt to Guddu and asked him to befriend with him. He said,
“I came to visit you, sir” [Gooftaa]. And Guddu asked why he wanted to
visit him. Sire answered that he was seeking protection from thieves and
robbers. He said, “I need your protection for myself and my property; I am
a merchant of salt and own 40 mules and a lot of salt to trade. I would pay
you and serve you in every way I can for whatever you do for me.” Guddu
attentively listened to Sire and invited him to a lavish lunch.
Then he advised him to seek also the protection of a neighboring
chief. He said, “Go and visit Jilo Garbi as well. You also need his
protection.” Sire thanked Guddu for his warm reception and willingness to
23
Interview with Obbo Bekele Amanu (52), March 7, 2007, Sibu Sire.
249
 protect him. Then he went to visit Jilo Garbi. He took a bar of salt to Jilo
too. Jilo received Sire warmly and accepted his gift. When Jilo learnt the
purpose of Sire’s visit, he agreed to give him all the protection he needed
and advised him to visit another chief by the name of Shuru. “You also
need to meet Shuru; he is important. You ought to pay him a visit,” Jilo
said to Sire. Sire thanked Jilo Garbi for his warm reception and advice.
Then he went to see Shuru. He took a bar of salt to Shuru and told him
that he came to seek his protection. Shuru also accepted
Sire’s gift and request. Then he advised him to visit the warlord of the
area, Genda Busan. Sire did as he was advised and gave the usual bar-of
salt-gift to Genda as well. Then he said to Genda, “I came to see you on a
matter of much importance. And I want to know when you are holding
your consultative meeting with your councilors because I would like to
plead officially.” Genda replied, “Our next meeting will be held two
weeks from tomorrow.” Sire agreed to come back on the day of the
meeting and went away. In the meantime he made a trip to Gimbi to sell
his merchandise.
On the day of the meeting, Sire Horo approached the councilors
and appealed to them. He said, “I am a merchant and have a great deal of
property. I would like to settle among you and establish a great market. To
this end, I want a large plot of land. This will be of much benefit to you
and the community at large. Therefore I hereby humbly request you to
provide me with a stretch of land.” When members of the council heard
Sire’s request, the leader, Genda Busan, replied that it was a good idea and
asked Sire to leave them for a moment so that they could deliberate on the
matter and let him know their decision.
In Sire’s absence, the councilors discussed the matter thoroughly
and agreed to provide him with ample plot of land to settle on and
establish a market for the community. As Sire had already established a
good friendship with all, presenting each with gift of a bar of salt, and as
they also understood the importance of having a rich merchant and a
market in the area, no one hesitated to share his land. There and then, Sire
settled in the land and established the market we now call Sibu Sire (Sire
of Sibu). And Sibu Sire was to be widely known in the Wollega area for
its riches and trade of coffee, pepper, salt, cattle and crops, until Bakare
Godana of Leqa brought the Amhara to defeat the brave Genda Busan and
his men and control their land. That marks the beginning of the end of the
good old day of our Sibu Sire.

The above narrative depicts the ‘glorious’ past of the Sibu Oromo, when they
were known for their trading and cattle rearing. The narrator reflects on how Sire
Horo, the founding father of the Sibu Sire, was a rich merchant who could afford to

250
present a gift of a bar of salt, which was said to have been very valuable and “enough
to feed five families for a year,” to the local chiefs so as to possess the land for
establishing the town-market of Sibu Sire. It is interesting to note the ‘history’ of the
establishment of Sibu Sire district is invoked simply to foreground the ‘greatness’ of
the people, which came to an ‘end’ when they were ‘subdued’ and their land was
confiscated by the Amhara-supported Leqa. This is also evident in the closing of the
story: “That marks the beginning of the end of the old good day of our Sibu.” As it has
been repeatedly indicated in the foregoing chapter, there had been neither landlords
nor farmers from Amhara in Sibu in the imperial period from the end of nineteenth
century to the 1970s. Most of the landowners were ‘outsiders’ from Leqa (Hultin
2003: 411). The rivalry between Leqa and Sibu went far, as evident from the following
narrative, which relates how the Leqa sought the support of the ‘alien’ Amhara forces
to defeat the Sibu.

Narrative 7.5. The war between Sibu and Leqa

In old times Sibu and Leqa were fighting each other. The Sibu were ruled
by Genda Busan. Genda was a very brave and militant man. Then the ruler
of Leqa was Moroda Bakare. Moroda repeatedly fought Genda, but he
could not defeat him. So he devised a trap for Genda. Once he went to
Genda and told him that the Amhara are unfriendly people and that he
should not approach them by any means. “The Amhara are very bad; do
not even think of talking to them, leave alone establishing friendship with
them,” Moroda advised Genda. However, Moroda himself had already
approached the Amhara and established a strong alliance with them. He
sought military assistance of Ras Dilnessaw of Gojam to defeat Genda.
Then Genda Bussan sent a Muslim man called Abba Digga to approach
the Amhara and buy a plot of land on his behalf. Genda gave a lot of
money, gold and elephant tusks to Abba Digga and sent him to the
Amhara to buy a plot of land. Then Abba Digga went to the Amhara and
bought the plot of land and reported back to Genda. Then girls of Sibu and
Leqa sang songs commenting on the behavior of Abba Digga and Moroda
Bakare, respectively. The Sibu girls sang at the sycamore tree on the shore
of the river in the village of Choba. The Sibu girls sang as follow:
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 Of different color is the ape,
Like Abba Digga and Moroda;
The former came home early,
Why did the latter stay behind?

Then the Leqa girls sang in response to the Sibu girls’ song:

Yes, he will come back soon,

But in the rainy season of June,
To wipe out his enemies.

The Sibu girls’ song refers to Moroda’s longer stay in the land of the
Amhara to get their support in his fight against Genda. Moroda sought
assistance from the Amhara. He brought the Amhara to defeat Genda.
Then the Amhara were armed with guns known as Wajigra and Nas
Maser. They were led by Memire Berhanu. It was an Amhara called
Dubale, the father of Teshome and Memire Berhanu, who defeated the
Sibu and captured Genda. Genda and his men had only spears and swords,
but the Amhara had guns and shot them from afar. The Sibu could not
even understand what was hitting and throwing them off their horses.
They thought that they were being struck by the thunder. They were so
brave and fearless, running forward to attack their enemy; but only few of
them even came near the enemy armed with the thundering guns that
strike from afar. A lot of Sibu men led by Genda were killed in the battle,
though they fiercely fought their enemy singing a ‘heroic’ song:

The sons of Walatte,

Came from Gojam,
They tell us to give them our land;
Why do we give them our land?
While we can chase them away,
We will kill them all.

The Sibu men fought bravely singing this heroic song; but they could not
defeat the enemy armed with guns. A large number of men died in the
fight. So they assembled and counseled among themselves. They
discussed what they should do to defend themselves from the massive
killings of the enemy. One man refused to participate in the meeting and
hid himself climbing a tree far from the meeting place. He was afraid of
his own men to speak what he thought about the war. He heard his fellow-
men saying that they would rather all die than hand over their land to the
enemy. When the man on the tree heard what his fellow-men were saying,

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 he shouted that they should stop playing the futile game and admit that
they lost the battle.
He said, “I denounce your meeting; I denounce your plan to continue
fighting the lost battle from which no one will come back alive. Are you
intending to chase the enemy armed with the thundering guns by using
your spears and knives? That is nonsense! Stop fighting and surrender.
Genda should surrender to the enemy; let us not allow him to get us all
killed.” He said so and ran away from them. Then Genda agreed to
surrender. He said, “I do not want my men to be killed by the merciless
enemy. I would rather be taken as a war prisoner. You all go back home
and take my horse with you. I will go and surrender.” There and then,
Genda handed himself over to the enemy. He was imprisoned and stayed
handcuffed without having any meal for three days. Then he yawned in
hunger and anger and sang a gerarsaa song:

Oh, my horse, Boje,

What else could I do to reverse my fate?
How can I stop a horse running into barley farm?
It was a dark day that never ceased to be darker and darker,
It was Dubale who brought bad luck to me,
It was Qomche who tied my hands with a piece of rope
And Belay ordered his men to shoot us all,
So what else could I do, but surrender?

It was in this way that the brave Sibu men lost their land and their
independence to the Amhara-supported Leqa. They took all our land and
made our fathers their tenants.
During the Dergue regime, the Sibu and the Leqa reconciled. But still we
the Sibu have grievances against the Leqa. It was Moroda Bakare of Leqa
who brought the Amhara and caused death of so many Sibu men and loss
of our land. Even there is a saying, “Oh, Leqa, the Amhara did not do us
as much harm as you did to us” (Ya Leqaa kan ati nuu gotee, Amarri nuu
hingoonne).24

The narrative gives details of the age long conflict between the Leqa and Sibu.
Though the event is set in the remote past of the pre-incorporation period, the narrator
relates it with elaborate details about the ‘trick’ the Leqa leader, Moroda Bakare,
played on the Sibu leader, Genda Busan: how the Sibu girls sang a song exposing the
trick (where they sang the song), and how the Leqa girls responded in defense of and

24
Interview with Obbo Ayyana Yadata (46), March 6, 2007, Sibu Sire.
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glorifying Moroda, how Moroda sought the support of the Amhara who came with
guns to fight and defeat the brave Sibu men who were armed but with the traditional
spear and sword, etc. The narrator even ‘remembers’ the names of the enemy leaders
who defeated the Sibu and captured their leader, Genda, the heroic song the Sibu men
sang in their fight against the aggressor and ‘well armed’ Amhara, as well as the
melancholic song Genda Busan sang in justification of his defeat and surrender to the
enemy. By so doing, he enhances the credibility of his narration and presents it as ‘true
history’ of his group. As noted by Oring, providing details is one of the most efficient
strategies of establishing narrative veracity: “If dates are the button on the fly of
history …, then details are the anchors of narrative veracity. A narrative without
specificity as to character, locale, or time is of diminished plausibility” (2008: 147).
It should be noted here that the above narrative has little to do with the Leqa;
rather it seems the Sibu version of the ‘history’ about the resistance the Sibu put up
against the military forces of King Tekle-Haymanot of Gojam in the late 1870s. As
indicated earlier in this chapter, the Leqa king, Moroda Bakare, peacefully submitted
to the army of Tekle-Haymanot so as to save his state and people from bloodshed.
After a decade, he allied with Emperor Menelik against King Tekle-Haymanot in the
battle of Embabo (June 6, 1882), and later on supported Menelik’s general, Ras
Gobena, in the conquest of other local Oromo groups. As a result he was able not only
to maintain internal autonomy of his state, but also to extend his control over all of the
neighboring south-eastern Wollega Oromo groups, including the Sibu, who had been
independently governed by their own local chiefs. This event established a new
relationship of landlords and share-croppers between the Leqa and Sibu, which
remained nearly the same until the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Though the
provincial governors of Wollega were appointed by the central government of Haile
Selassie I after the imposition of direct rule since the 1940s, the local administration of
eastern Wollega remained mostly in the hands of the ruling house of Leqa. There were,
thus, few Amhara landlords or settlers in the area.

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 The same is true of the current situation. Following the 1994/95 ethno-
regionalization policy of the EPRDF government, the National Regional State of
Oromia banned all non-Oromo speaking civil servants from the region, and called in
Oromo-speaking personnel from other parts of the country. As a result – and perhaps
due to rampant corruption - competition for regional and local offices and government
positions has completely centered on and between the Oromo elites. 25 This may
explain why the Sibu today still consider the neighboring Leqa, instead of the Amhara
or any other ethnic group, as the ‘enemy.’ The cited saying, “Oh Leqa, the Amhara did
not do us as much harm as you did to us,” denotes the Sibu’s view of the Leqa group
both in the past but present.
The following narrative reinforces the ‘otherness’ and ‘villainy’ of the Leqa in
the contemporary perception of the Sibu.

Narrative 7.6. The deceitfulness of the Leqa

The Sibu are very silent people. They do not speak loudly. They respect
each other and they respect their culture as well. The Sibu do not like
thieves. They also hate adultery. They do not like thieves and adulterous
persons. They know how to settle conflicts among themselves. They do
not take their internal problems to the outsiders. Whereas the Leqa are
very deceitful and crafty (abshaala). They are unreliable people. You
cannot trust them. They do not keep their promises. Let me tell you a story
that shows how deceitful the Leqa are.

Once Genda Busan of the Sibu killed a man called Kuta Dhihanno
in rage. Genda had confronted Kuta in a meeting of elders. The meeting
was held on the river shore, umm… Oh, I forgot it. What was the name of
that river? [Borji, it was called Borji, an audience’s reply]. Yes, it was at
the shore of the Borji. While they were in the meeting, Kuta teasingly said
to Genda that he was not a very kind person. Genda was infuriated by

25
The Urban Local Government Proclamation No. 65/2003, Article 13 (7) of the
National Regional State of Oromia clearly states that candidates that run for seats of the
local government, and there of civil services, “shall comply with the requirements stated
in the electoral law and comprehend the language of the region (Oromiffa) (emphasis
added).
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Kuta’s words. Genda had quite a temper. He asked Kuta, “Are you
insulting me?” He drew his sword at a lightning speed and severed Kuta’s
neck by a single blow. Then he was arrested and taken to the court in
Addis Ababa. There was a man called Dhuguma Qare then. He served in
the court as a prosecutor. Dhuguma was said to have been a hard-hearted
man (garaa-jabessa) who enjoyed getting death penalty even for minor
offences. Dhuguma was to handle the case of Genda.

Genda was disturbed and unable to know what to do to escape from

Dhuguma’s death penalty. Then in desperation he decided to seek the
assistance of Moroda Bakare. Moroda promised that he would help him on
one condition. He said, “I will save your life if you are willing to assist me
in vanquishing the Shanqilla.” [I am to show you how deceitful Moroda
was]. Genda agreed to fight the Shanqilla in assistance of Moroda. He
said, “I will wipe them off the surface of the earth, just make sure to spare
my life.” Then Moroda went to see Dhuguma Qare, who was acting as a
prosecutor. He met Dhuguma in the court and tricked him out of asking
for death sentence to Genda by giving him a wrong and misleading
advice. [You know how Moroda was a very influential person in the court
of Menelik. Moroda’s son, Kumssa Moroda, was baptized by the king
Atse Menelik himself]. [Yes, we know; audiences’ reply]. Moroda said to
Dhuguma: “The case of Genda will be decided by your ability to choose
from two puzzling alternative punishments. The judge will ask you to
choose from ‘beating hundreds’ or ‘beating the blood.’ ‘Beating hundreds’
means beating the offender and cutting down his body into hundred pieces
by a sword. Whereas the second choice, ‘beating the blood,’ means to ask
him to pay some amount of money in compensation for the murder he
committed. So you have to choose the first alternative if you really want
the death sentence for Genda.” The prosecutor thanked Moroda for his
insider’s knowledge and advice, which he accepted without any suspicion.
When Genda was brought to the court and the judge asked the prosecutor
for his choice from the two alternatives, he went for the first, ‘beating
hundreds,’ which according to the then customary law meant to ask the
accused to give compensation for his wrong deeds. Accordingly, Genda
was freed upon giving four hundred horses, four hundred heifers and four
hundred bulls to the bereaved family in compensation.
Genda was very grateful to Moroda for saving his life. He
immediately marched to fight the Shanqilla and easily defeated them on
behalf of Moroda. At that time, Ras Gobena was administering the
western part of Wollega. When he heard that Genda had vanquished the
Shanqilla, he wanted to appoint him governor of the area; and he told
Moroda of his intention. Then Moroda went to see Genda in his place and
misinformed him about Gobena’s intention. Moroda said to Genda,

256
 “Gobena heard about your bravery and became afraid of you. He decided
to execute you for a fabricated crime you never committed. Therefore, I
advise you as a good friend to run for your life.” Taking Moroda’s advice
with much gratitude, Genda mounted his horse and fled the area. When
Ras Gobena asked Moroda to take him to Genda, he told him that Genda
had gone to a far off place to kill other people. Moroda said, “Oh, Your
Excellency, Genda is like a mad dog; he always runs here and there killing
people.” Then Ras Gobena reversed his decision to appoint Genda and
conferred the governorship of the whole Wollega region on Moroda
Bakare. You see how the wicked Moroda double-crossed both the
prosecutor Dhuguma and Genda? [Laughter of the audience in
confirmation of Moroda’s deceitfulness].
After some time, Moroda went to visit Genda in his place in Sibu.
He asked Genda, “Whom do you think is more powerful, a brave or a
smart man?” Genda responded, “The brave is by far powerful than the
smart.” And Moroda said, “No, a smart man is much more powerful and
better off than a brave one. Even a slave may give birth to a brave man,
but a smart man is hard to find. Your bravery earned you governorship,
but I took it over from you because of my smartness. So, I hereby give
you the title of Fitawrari in compensation for tricking you into running
away from taking the title of governorship.” It is in this way and because
of the deceitfulness of Moroda Bakare that Genda and the Sibu people in
general came under the control of the Bakare family of Leqa. The Leqa
are well known for their deceit. They are very cunning people. [Laughter
and murmur of agreement from the audience].26

26
Narrated by Obbo Nagassa Ebba, 52, in a focus-group discussion held on March 8,
2007, Sibu Sire. In addition to myself, two Sibu men, Obbo Galata Kaba, 44, and Obbo
Tufa Dida, 48, participated in the discussion.
257
 Fig. 11. A Sibu-Sire elder narrating, March 2007

The above narrative purports to naturalize the moral excellence of the Sibu, in
contrast to the ‘deceitfulness’ of the Leqa. To this end, the narrator marshals several
pieces of ‘evidence.’ Having clearly stated his thesis - that the Sibu are morally
superior to the Leqa - he relates the story about the ‘opportunism’ of Moroda, how he
responds to Genda’s ‘genuine’ and ‘desperate’ plea for help out of a life-and-death
situation to achieve his own selfish interest of subduing other people (the Shanqilla).
In this opportunistic venture, Moroda not only misleads the prosecutor, Dhuguma
Qare, but also thwarts justice. It should be noted how Genda shows his ‘gratefulness’
and ‘keeps his promise’ to Moroda, by fighting and beating the Shanqilla, and thereby
displaying bravery. On the contrary, Moroda ‘lacks the courage and prowess to fight
hid enemy,’ for which he seeks and cunningly secures assistance of the ‘able’ and
‘brave’ Genda. What is more, Moroda double-crosses and lies both to Ras Gobena and

258
Genda, thereby tricking the latter out of his ‘legitimate’ appointment to the position of
‘governor’ of the Wollega area, depriving the Sibu their ‘rightful’ ownership of their
land and their local autonomy. The end point of the narrative forcefully comes out in
the concluding remark of the narrator to which the audience confirms by laughter. “It
is in this way and because of the deceitfulness of Moroda Bakare that Genda and the
Sibu people in general came under the control of the Bakare family of Leqa.” Hence
recollection of local ‘history’ of past grievances and conflict serves as important
cultural backdrop and resource for creation of distinct local identity in the time of
social, economic and political crisis, in ways, as noted by Donham, “often
unanticipated by policy-makers in centers of power and wealth” (2003: 460).

For the Sibu, the present is nothing but time of perpetual gloom, crisis and
deprivation, for which the Leqa and the current, ‘discriminatory’ political system are
responsible. However, such ill-feelings against the government and its repressive
policies are often implied (indirectly) in folkloric discourses, rather than explicitly
expressed in formal statements. This is in line with Ethiopian political culture, where
direct political debate is hardly entertained or tolerated. In conclusion of the discussion
on the above narrative, and in illustrating the general view that the Sibu “have long
lost their greatness,” one member of the audience, Obbo Galata Kaba, 44, sang the
following gerersa song:

Guyyaan sif haabariyu Sibu

Siree goggolboo lafaa,
Birriin boqqolloo dhakaa.
Ijoollee Sireen horee,
Hammam geessi yoo tolee.
Siree maseena jawwee,
Namni itti seene fayyee.
Ijoolleen Siree kooti,
Anaaf kokobii kooti.
Ka'een Siree koo bu'aa,
Siree biyya siraataa,

259
 Dhaba keessa jiraata.
Biyya daadhiin burqitu,
Ishee hunda gudiftu.
Handaaqoon Siree qabdii,
Dubbiin siraata qabdii.
Akkas nama gootii,
Qacceen warra mootii.
Gaafatanii dhabuun,
Yartuu nama gootii.
Jeffe asmaarii dhaalatii,
Gurri gaarii jaalatti.
Nagaheera tollikee,
Daadhii hin dhabiin goollikee.
Nagaan hafi yaadholle,
Wal-agara yoo tole.
Ijoollee Sibuu Siree,
Inni akka durii dhibee.
Inni booka dhuganii,
Inni cooma muranii,
Inni cookaa bulanii.

May better days come for Sibu

Sire, the bowl of land,

Rich in wealth,
Enumerable as maize.
The children of Sire,
Enormous in number,
Strong in character,
Matchless, if things went smooth.
Sire, giant like the python,
All are relieved of worry,
Who sought your shelter.
My fellowmen of Sire,
We are all of the same destiny.
Let me go to my Sire,
Sire, the country of social order and justice,
That survives times of adversity.
The spring of honey mead,
Where everything grows big.
Where even chickens have their cages,

260
 All is well and just.
This is the way of the royals,
It is shame to request for something,
What’s worse, to get a negative reply,
The ear likes to hear kind words.
I have seen your kindness,
May your home remain,
The fountain of honey mead.
May you live long and peaceful,
Children of my homeland,
We may get together and celebrate our Sibu,
If this dark day dawns to our restoration.
Children of Sibu Sire,
No more is the good old time,
Of drinking the purified hone mead,
Of eating the fatty fresh meat,
Of enjoying nights of merrymaking.

The above gerersa song shows the concern and hope of the singer, by
extension, of the Sibu group. Sibu Sire is depicted as endowed with beautiful land and
people of strong character, where social order and justice reside and where even
“chickens have their cages.” The people are also great, “matchless, if things went
smooth,” and survive times of adversity. However, the singer resents that all this glory
in the past. Moreover, he does not seem confident that things will go smooth in the
future, except that he wishes for a better day. For him and for the Sibu he represents,
the present is something hardly to be talked about. It is a dark time in which the people
have lost their pride in being Sibu; it is a dark time of diminished social and economic
status. No more is possible for the Sibu to enjoy the pleasure of drinking ‘purified
honey mead,’ eating ‘fatty fresh meat,’ and of nights of partying and ‘merrymaking.’
These are but the luxuries (ideals) of ‘old good days,’ cultural symbols of high social,
political and economic status, to which the singer aspires and hopes to achieve and
celebrate only if “this dark day dawns.”

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Concluding remarks
This chapter has dealt with the question on what bases and in what context the Leqa
Neqemte and Sibu Sire of the Eastern Wollega Oromo narrate their local identity in
relation to each other and others within the wider regional and national social world. It
has been shown how each of the two local groups constructs and articulates its
‘distinctive’ local identity on the bases of ‘shared’ local history, geographical
connection, and local moral values. Though the two groups speak the same dialect and
share much of the same culture, and even trace descent from a common eponymous
ancestor, the cultural homogeneity does not automatically guarantee the articulation
and re-affirmation of any unified ethnic and/or sub-ethnic identity. As demonstrated in
this chapter, each group perceives and defines itself as different from and ethically
superior to the other, hence deserving more power, recognition and better social,
economic and political status than it has both within the present-day ethno-regional
state of Oromia and ethno-federal state of Ethiopia.
What matters most is to understand the how and why of discursive construction
of local meanings and values - people’s own understanding of themselves and their
place in the social world - within a particular socio-political context. To this end, in
this present chapter an attempt has been made to search for the meanings and the
rhetoric of local identity narratives by relating them both to their immediate and wider
social and political contexts. Somers has clearly noted the importance of examining
identity narratives within their own social contexts: ‘…all identities …must be
analyzed in the context of relational and cultural matrices because they do not ’exist’
outside of those complexes. … identities are forged only in the context of ongoing
relationships that exist in time, space, and emplotment…. (1994: 622). This is in line
with the dominant theoretical position in the tradition of modern cultural studies,
which is that “neither local, regional nor national identity do exist as such, as objective
cultural elements, but that they are the results of people’s way of thinking of their own
social and cultural conditions or the results of specific strategic articulations of
common elements of a geographically limited area” (Amundsen 2000: 4-5).

262
Chapter 8

Conclusion

Introduction
This thesis set out to examine how and to what end the various local groups in
the south-western Oromo of Ethiopia perceive and define themselves in relation to
others within and out of the regional Oromo grouping; and what the role of folklore
(oral narrative) is in constructing, refashioning, negotiating and articulating collective
(local) identities within contexts of inter-group relations. This goal has been achieved
through an extensive empirical study, ethnographic presentation and data analysis.
Indeed, one of the aims of this thesis has been to present a corpus of narratives on
Oromo segmentary group identity, which is rarely highlighted but is strongly present
in the minds of the people.
In contemporary Ethiopia, since the EPRDF-led government came to power in
1991, ethnic groups were recognized and nominally ‘empowered’ as units in local
administration and in linguistic-cultural matters. As a result, the discourse of ethnicity
and (sub-) ethnic identity has been strongly politicized, much more than ever before,
and created ‘realities’ that did not previously exist (cf. Abbink 1997: 160).
Correspondingly, much more importance has been attached to discourses of ethnic as
well as sub-ethnic (local) identities – based on a putatively shared sense of identity and
difference - among (sub-) regional and local groups within one and the same cultural
group, reifying local history, traditional values and connections to specific patrilineal
descent group and its ‘ancestral’ territory on the one hand, relations and positions
within the wider social world on the other.

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 The present Conclusion draws together the main findings of the thesis, and
presents implications of the study by way of a comparative review of narrative
constructions and expressions of local identity of the four groups (Jimma and Gera,
Leqa Neqemte and Sibu Sire) within the south-western Oromo region discussed in this
thesis. In addition, a reflection of theoretical framework of the study, as well as
contribution of the thesis to knowledge of identity construction is also presented.

Narrative construction and negotiation of local identity

This study has shown (chapter 5, 6 and 7) that the folkloric, discursive forms currently
produced among the several Oromo groups within the south-western region clearly
etch out the ‘significant’ differences the members of each local group ‘see’ between
‘us’ and ‘them’, between ‘here’ and ‘there’, and so on, thereby highlighting the
differing valuation or comparison of whatever is perceived of the ‘inside’ and the
‘outside.’ In this discursive construction and essentialization of local identity, recurrent
narrative performances of ‘shared’ past experiences, ideologies of genealogy and
connection to a specific geographical area are selectively manipulated and interwoven
into a meaningful self-identification stories. As noted by Donham, although somewhat
instrumentally: “The past is contested terrain. Selectively remembered or conveniently
forgotten, sometimes invented, it can justify and legitimize present actions and may
provide the model for a future to be created according to tradition. Not simply a
sequence of completed events, the past can be seen as a creation of the present, with
traditions invented to serve certain needs” (1992: 227).
As demonstrated in chapter 6 and 7 of this dissertation, currently local identity
overrules the larger regional and/or ethnic identity among the south-western Oromo of
Ethiopia, interestingly, in a very similar way gender identity and class solidarity
overrule ethnic identity among the Creoles, Hindus, and Muslims in Mauritius
(Eriksen in Kaarsholm 1994: 312-14). The very existence of various forms of folkloric
performances (oral narratives, songs, proverbs, etc.) among the several south-western
Oromo groups - in and through which shared sense of identity (group-ness) and

264
difference from ‘others’ is enacted and articulated- shows the especial importance
and/or strong sense of belonging participants of each performance, by extension
members of the local group, attach to their own respective locality and local traditional
values as they define them. The elites within each group express and ‘perform’ shared
histories of a ‘glorious past’ and moral superiority to others, while simultaneously
claiming marginalization in almost every aspect of contemporary life. By so doing
they aim to alter the ‘ethnic hierarchy’ and to advocate for a larger share of resources
(like budget, infrastructure, education, etc.), and at more political power and autonomy
within the ethno-regional and federal state structures. It is not, however, a discourse on
universal rights such as gender equity, rule of law, economic equality, or protection of
minorities; these issues are not discussed or expressed in narratives.
If we accept that folklore finds its emergence and value among small groups of
people interacting in a specific situational context - who share or claim to share at least
one common factor, e.g., language, historical memory, or a belief system (Dundes
1983) - we accept that such groups assume some sort of collective identity, a ‘local
group identity,’ to be precise. This social construction and expression of local identity
among the various south-western Oromo groupings is set in and shaped both by the
wider regional, national and ethno-regional and specific local contexts and factors -
historical, political, and economic, based on a specific, locally based livelihood
system.
Ethnic and/or local identity is a socio-cultural construct, a rhetorical reality,
created and ‘naturalized’ in response to these particular social, economic and political
conditions. In this creative endeavor, the lived or imagined ‘past’ experience is re-
constructed and used as a reference frame to create or negotiate a better-wished-for
social world. The same is true of genealogical connection and belonging to a particular
locality or ‘ancestral’ territory. As shown in this dissertation (chapter 3, 4, 6, 7),
neither the wider ethnic identity nor the smaller local identity of the Oromo, or of any
other social group for that matter, is a natural phenomenon that can be defined in terms
of ‘unbreakable’ primordial ties, as some Oromo nationalists argue. It is rather a

265
situational and processual creative project that is socially constructed and invested
with meaning under circumstances of state failure “to deliver social goods and to
remain meaningful foci of allegiance” (Eriksen, as cited by Yeros 1999: 3). This ties in
with the structural feature of Ormo society throughout the ages as being strongly
segmentary.
As repeatedly stated, the Oromo have undergone considerable differentiation
and fragmentation since their northward expansion in the sixteenth century. Their
dispersal and settlement over vast and diversified geographical areas, and thereby the
contacts and interaction with the diverse peoples and cultures of Ethiopia, as well as
the particular socio-historical and political experiences of each of the several regional
Oromo groups within its own local area and under the successive repressive political
systems, seem to have contributed to the production of regional and local identitie
narratives. More importantly, the post-1991 institutionalization of ethnicity as basis for
socio-political organization constitutes the situational context for the discursive
construction, negotiation and the articulation of a sense of ‘distinctiveness’ and of
(sub-) ethnic and local identities. In addition, the pervasive state propoganda on
democracy, self-determination, decentralization, regional and local autonomy and
development do their work as well. The wider setting that feeds perceived grievances –
couched in (sub-)ethnic terms due to the prevailing system - is that of existing social,
economic and political crises, as seen or claimed in the violation of rights, lack of
meaningful autonomy, and repressive and discriminatory policies of the government.
The narrative construction of local identity offers evaluative opportunities for
distilling or making sense of one’s own group and values in relation to those of others,
which in turn is needed to manage the immediate social world and the local landscape
in the minds of the narrators as well as the listeners. In other words, it gives
opportunity for venting and channelling negative experiences and conflicting relations
into ideological bases and guidelines for counteracting dominating discourses and for
promoting local interests. This is achieved through interconnecting seemingly separate
events, experiences, actions, places, etc. into identity narratives, and infusing them

266
with new situational, relational meaning and importance. As noted by Gunnell,
narratives of group experience imbue the social and geographical landscape of the
group with meaningful stories and a historical past that even might not exist outside of
that communicative situation. They work “to transform the entire local landscape in
the minds of the listeners. …adding life to old ruins and rocks, danger to pools and
lakes, and mystery and wonder to other parts. They underline routes to be taken and
routes to avoid, and draw clear borderlines between the cultured and the raw, the
civilized and the wild…” (Gunnell 2006: 16).
It has become abundantly clear that the narratives presented in this thesis are
used by Oromo community actors and sub-groups as a cultural means of enacting both
self-assertion and identification with their own group, and differentiation from other
groups. Situated in in-group social interactions, participants in narrative performance
events (the narrators and their audience) interactively construct and articulate their
sense of group identity on the basis of allegedly shared experiences, aspirations and
meanings that they value most about themselves and believe to set them apart from
others. These are selected from the repertoires of identification and expressive
resources available to the members, and used with necessary modifications to meet the
immediate identificational need of the interlocutors.
More often than not, identity narratives are constructed within locally available
and understandable discourse that is rendered relevant to construct and authenticate
collective self-understandings and values of its subjects (peoples, places, spaces) -
establishing connectedness and/or disconnectedness - within temporally and spatially
imagined social networks. In this respect, the identity narratives also serve to
normatively construct, negotiate and transmit shared values and cognitive symbols that
constitute ideological foundation for unifying the local people towards struggling for
their ‘common good’.
Narration of local identity is therefore nothing else but a sense-making exercise
whereby important life events and experiences (both real and imagined) of each group
are invested with meaning and coherence. Accordingly, as life is never lived or

267
manifested in a neat and predetermined order, neither is narration of group
experiences, worldviews, values and identities practiced in the conventionalized
(ready-made) story structure. Rather, it takes the form of conversational interaction,
which is open-ended and adjustable (flexible) to the social and situational contexts that
occasion, constitute and shape its production in a specific spacio-temporal frame.
Hence, identity narratives are constructed out of situationally chosen local events,
experiences, actions and actors, and rendered meaningful and relevant to the way the
interactants want to reveal themselves and their views to others in a given situation.
As the social occasions in which narratives can emerge are multifarious and
many (chapter 5), so are the contents and ways of narrative performance. These can
take the form of description (of events, places, objects, individuals/groups), argument,
extended or fragmented narration, summary, and so on. What seems the general rule is
that what is chosen to be told and the way of telling are only what is deemed important
and appropriate to the definition and presentation of ‘who we are’ and ‘who we are
not’ to self and others in a specific situation of social interaction. What is good/bad,
right/wrong, valid/invalid, etc. is largely determined by the individual members of an
interacting group and their interpersonal relationships and the purpose of their
interaction.

Comparative notes on identity narratives of the south-western Oromo

Comparing the group-experience narratives of the four south-western Oromo groups
(Jimma, Gera, Leqa Neqemte and Sibu Sire) reveals both similarities and differences
in the self-relevant content elements used for enacting identification with a local group
and differentiation from others.
The narratives examined in this dissertation exhibit similar patterns of narrative
form, meaning and function. The narrative performances among the south-western
Oromo groups offer forums for grappling with the meaning of shared life experiences
and concerns of each group in relation to that of others. In this respect, there is no
difference between the narratives from the several local groups. Each group-

268
representing narrator tends to base the narration of his group’s identity on allegedly
shared knowledge of those aspects of life considered important to the group. These
include local history of the ‘good old days’, exploits of local heroes and leaders, notion
of descent from a common ancestor and belonging to common ‘ancestral’ territory
(locality), moral values. This helps to establish relative authority of the narrator and
credibility and acceptability of the narrative to the in-group members of the audience.
The difference in identity narratives of the groups lies only in the perceived
specificity of their content elements (of course, due to their different histories) and the
sense the narrator-audience collaboratively make out of them. For the Jimma, for
instance, the monarchic state formation of early nineteenth century, and the wise and
peaceful submission of the king Abba Jifar to the military forces of Menelik II at the
end of the century and thereby the maintenance of internal autonomy of Jimma until
the beginning of the 1930s constitute important content elements of their identity
narratives, and major sources of pride and identity. For the Gera, on the other hand, it
is the formation and existence of Gera as an independent state in the nineteenth
century and the patriotic resistance the courageous Gera people put up against the
expansion of Menelik II that defines them as a local Oromo group and ‘different’ from
the Jimma and others within and out of the south-western Oromo groupings. If the
Jimma consider their peaceful submission as wise and pragmatic decision, the Gera
understand it as ‘cowardice’ and even ‘treason.’ The same is true of the Leqa Neqemte
and the Sibu Sire of eastern Wollega. Each group perceives and defines itself as
‘different’ from others on the bases of selectively re-constructed and articulated local
historical experiences (imagined or real) and derived moral values.
This does not mean that these Oromo groups are socio-culturally different from
each other in any substantial way. Indeed, they exhibit little difference in their ways of
life, general value orientations and belief systems. They speak the same language
(although with dialectical differences) and trace descent from ultimately common
ancestors. They also have a shared history of immigration to and settlement in their
respective local areas. The point is, however, that the elites of each group create and

269
articulate the ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ ‘distinctiveness’ (who we are and/or who we are
not) of their group in and through folkloric (narrative) performances so as to enhance
their self-understanding and place within their surrounding social world. Hence local
identity construction in the case of the western Oromo is not about ‘objective’
differences, but about a creative project of subjective difference situated in specific
socio-historical and political contexts and segmentary group histories. This echoes
what William A. Wilson noted about the basic similarity in human cultural experience:
…folklore usually is expressed in and is given colour by the groups to
which we belong; it can serve, as a means of understanding and increasing
sympathy for these groups. But the source of the lore, we should always
remember, lies not in our differences, but in our common humanity, in our
common human struggle to endure (1988: 165-166).

From studying the folklore of missionaries, or railroaders, or college

professors, we will, to be sure, discover what it means to be a missionary, a
railroader, or a college professor. But if we learn to look, we will discover
also what it means to be human (1981: 22).

Final reflections on theoretical framework and contribution of the study

The relationship between narrative and identity, be it personal or collective, has amply
been recognized. Rivka Tuval-Mashiach noted:
…the relationship between story and identity is reciprocal; identity infuses
the life story with content and meaning even as it is changed and shaped by
the story being told. The story is one's identity, a narrative created, told,
revised and retold throughout life. We know or discover ourselves, and
reveal ourselves to others, through the stories that we tell (2006: 250).

Accordingly, the contribution of this dissertation lies in its emphasis on the

importance of shifting the theoretical focus of identity study from the broader national
and inter-cultural levels to the narrower and more manageable local and intra-cultural
levels, and from the static primordial and instrumental perspectives to the processual,
situational, relational, constructivist and interpretive approach. This move in focus
allows for in-depth understanding of the dynamic, interactive and situational
production of narrative discourses as a powerful means of enacting identification with

270
a specific group and differentiation from others. That is understanding how narratives
serve as a cultural means of orienting the interlocutors on how to deal with their social
as well as temporal and spatial surroundings.
The present local-group-oriented study of folklore discourse of the south-
western Oromo revealed processes of production, negotiation and interpretation of a
shared sense of local identity and of belonging to a community with a noteworthy
history, territory, practices, potentials, aspirations and values that ‘endured’ over time
while going through series of changes. As discussed in chapter 5, 6, and 7, narration of
local group- and local space-related experiences allows the interlocutors at least
momentarily to ‘escape,’ to ‘disassociate,’ to ‘shut off’ themselves from their present
life, often seen as ‘diminished’ in status and ‘dissatisfying’ in its relation to their wider
surrounding social world. More importantly, by allowing for establishing a sense of
connectedness to and identification with the locally cherished ‘glorious’ past, local
heroes and values, the production and sharing of group-oriented narratives provides
the participants with a performative opportunity for fashioning and displaying of
socially and emotionally rewarding self-knowledge and infusion of collective
potential.
In oral societies like the Oromo, the collaborative production or performance of
cultural knowledge, traditions, rituals, names of objects, communities, heroes, places,
etc. not only serves as ‘objective’ identity markers but also as ‘reliable’ and ‘durable’
means for forging the ‘shared’ sense of identity or group-ness. Correspondingly,
individuals recognized as active repository of and leading participants in the re-
construction and articulation of their respective groups’ ‘history’, values and traditions
- myths, genealogies, legends, memoirs, chronicles, etc. - are generally held in high
regard and given much prestige within social and political life of their group.
As demonstrated in this dissertation (chapter 5, 6, 7), verbal performances in
general and narrations of identity in particular often cross generic and contextual
boundaries. Group experience narrators rarely limit themselves to a single form and/or
context; rather, they selectively and adaptively blend various formal, thematic and

271
pragmatic elements of locally available discourse forms to fit into the ongoing
conversational interaction. Seen from this perspective, what seems more important to
our understanding of identity discourse is not to know the content and veracity of the
discourse (‘the cultural stuff’), but to identify in what situational contexts it occurs and
what discursive strategies allow for rendering it relevant for and/or fit into a specific
situation of social interaction. In other words, studying the creative endeavors that
allow people to contextualize and authenticate their identity discourses-how they link
their discourses with those of others within wider and immediate social, spatial and
temporal contexts-seems a more productive line of enquiry than making a futile
attempt to identify and document the endless and never-fixed ‘natural’ identity
markers of a group.

272
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Etniciteit en Lokale Identiteit in de Folklore van de Oromo in Zuidwest-Ethiopië: een
Vergelijkende Studie

Samenvatting

Het doel van deze studie was een vergelijking van ‘folklorische’ constructies en
expressies van etnische en lokale identiteiten van vier belangrijke Oromo-groepen
(behorende tot de grote Mach’a-sectie) in Zuidwest Ethiopië teneinde interne
diversiteit, rivaliteiten en verbindingen tussen deze groepen in kaart te brengen. Zij
spreken wederzijds verstaanbare dialecten van dezelfde taal (Afan Oromo), delen een
zelfde kerncultuur, en traceren in een aantal gevallen dezelfde afstammingslijnen naar
gedeelde Oromo voorouders.

De onderzoeksfocus was op de identificatie, documentatie, beschrijving en

analyse van vooral mondelinge tradities en verhalen over Zelf en anderen op basis van
de onderscheiden subgroepen die men ziet binnen de meta-etnische categorie ‘Oromo’.
De vergelijking van de folklore-producten – waarbij de verhalen of narratives gezien
worden als lokale vertogen over groepsvorming, groepsidentiteit en collectieve
handeling – was bedoeld om nieuwe in zichten te verkrijgen in de processen en
redenen waarom ‘lokaliteit’ zo belangrijk kon worden binnen de grotere eenheid van
de zuidwestelijke Oromo. Daarbij worden de groepen ook geplaatst binnen de
complexe realiteit van post-1991 Ethiopië als multi-etnische federale staat.

De diverse Oromo-subgroepen en hun ‘woordvoerders’ presenteren zich in

publieke en performatieve contexten vaak als ‘verschillend en ‘speciaal’ tegenover
andere Oromo, ondanks de overwegend gedeelde taal, lokale cultuur en gewoonten.
Via een presentatie en analyse van de verhalen en andere orale traditie-producten
wordt gepoogd na te gaan hoe, wanneer en waartoe dit gebeurt. Dit vereist een
duidelijke conceptualisering van etniciteit en (sub-)etnische identificatie, die wordt
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uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk 2. Etniciteit wordt hier vooral gezien als een culturele
interpretatie van (groeps-)afkomst onder een bepaalde groep mensen, en de studie
hanteert een constructivistisch perspectief: in essentie wordt daarom behandeld de
constructie en expressie van zulke etnische en lokale groepsidentiteiten, zoals
specifiek te zien in hun discursieve zelfpresentatie.

Een basisassumptie van het project was, dat vanuit een intern gezichtspunt gezien
er duidelijke lokale grenzen worden ‘ge(re-)produceerd’ die groepen apart houden als
‘wij’ en ‘anderen’, de nominale ‘pan-Oromo’-identiteit ten spijt. Aangezien de Oromo
geen noemenswaardig ontwikkelde geschreven literaire traditie hebben, worden die
grenzen en concepties van relevante identiteit op lokale groepsbasis geconstrueerd,
onderhandeld en uitgedrukt via narratieve vertolkingen en uitingen, waarvan de variëteit
en dramatiek aanzienlijk kunnen zijn.

In grote delen van Afrika en met name in Ethiopië is de studie van folklore
versus (sub-)groepsidentiteiten enigszins verwaarloosd – ondanks haar empirische
rijkdom, diversiteit en toenemende ‘politieke’ relevantie. Ook zaken als het
voortbestaan van lokale identiteiten en interne grenzen binnen grotere etnische
eenheden/volken weren meestal over het hoofd gezien. Dis is zichtbaar in het geval
van de Oromo, die weliswaar het grootste volk binnen Ethiopië zijn (ca. 35% van de
totale bevolking) maar waarvan het label ‘Oromo’ een grote diversiteit verhult. De
diverse folklore-tradities van de Oromo en hun vele subgroepen zijn tot nu toe een rijk
maar weinig benut reservoir van lokale kennis en orale tradities gebleven, verweven
met de alledaagse cultuur en samenleving van de diverse groepen. Ook de dynamiek
zelf van de culturele folklore en het belang van meer vergelijkende studie ervan zijn
vaak onderbelicht. Het onderzoek van de lokale orale tradities en vertogen kan ons
echter veel duidelijk maken over de percepties en het begrip dat – in dit geval, Oromo
- groepen hebben van hun geschiedenis, hun plaats tussen andere groepen, hun
relatieve marginalisering of dominantie in de opkomende administratieve structuur, en
hun relaties met andere Oromo en niet-Oromo bevolkingsgroepen. De

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groepscategorieën die nu bestaan zijn ook deels versterkt door bemoeienis van de staat
en door de ‘etnische’ politiek. Ze zijn dus meer ‘politiek relevant’ dan vóór 1991. In
feite heeft de vaak sterk gepolitiseerde omgeving van intra- and inter-etnische relaties
in hedendaags Ethiopië – vastgelegd in de administratieve structuren - de constructie
en uitvergroting van etnische identiteit en in-group bewustzijn aangewakkerd. Er staat
als het ware een premie op het creëren van een sterk en positief zelfbeeld van de groep
om zich in een betere positie te manoeuvreren binnen het etno-regionale en federale
systeem. Hierbij moet men denken aan de strijd om bepaalde hulpbronnen en middelen
die via de staat toegankelijk zijn - politieke macht via vertegenwoordiging in de
regionale of federale staten, meer budget voor de lokale politieke eenheid of zone, of
bepaalde privileges. Maar het etno-federale politieke model op zich is niet
verantwoordelijk voor alle vormen van subgroepsvorming en differentiatie.

De gegevens werden verzameld onder vier locale Oromo-groepen: the Jimma en

Gera in de Jimma Administrative Zone, en de Leqa-Neqemte en Sibu-Sire in de Oost
Wollega Zone (Oromia National Regional State). Deze subgroepen duidden zichzelf
nadrukkelijk aan als apart, anders dan anderen, ‘uniek’, etc. Veldwerk werd verricht
gedurende de periode 2006-2008. Een groot corpus van folklore en etnografische
gegevens kwam beschikbaar. Een belangrijk aantal narratieve teksten werd
getranscribeerd en vertaald in het Engels voor gebruik in dit proefschrift. Ook werd een
aantal autobiografische verslagen, spreekwoorden, liederen en idiomatische
uitdrukkingen verzameld en deels hier weergegeven. Specifieke methoden van onderzoek
waren ongestructureerde (informele) interviews, sleutel-informant interviews,
focusgroep-discussies en participerende observatie van dagelijkse ritmes, activiteiten en
narrative performances in vier locaties.

Theoretisch gezien heeft deze studie een combinatie nagestreefd van diverse
perspectieven, met een nadruk op een constructivistische benadering van ‘etniciteit’ en
etnische identificatie. Verder werden als centraal gezien de rol van ideeën van ‘locatie’
(place) en cultural narrative als determinant van identiteit; de assumptie hier is dat

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narrative of het vertellen zelf (narrating), a.h.w. een ontologische conditie is van het
sociale leven. Sommige auteurs spreken daarom over de storied nature of identity Deze
identiteit van (etnische) groepen of subgroepen is dus sterk relationeel en situationeel
geconstrueerd.

De verkregen verhalen en commentaren werden steeds gezien in de context van

het vertellen (de performance context), en teruggekoppeld naar de sociale condities en
politieke verhoudingen waarnaar de sprekers/vertellers refereerden. Aspecten van
strategische zelf-presentatie in de narratives maakten vaak duidelijk dat ‘historische
waarheid’ in veel verhalen niet een primaire zorg is - en ook vaak niet achterhaald kan
worden.

In de vergelijking van de verhaaltradities en zelf-presentaties van de vier

besproken Oromo-groepen wordt duidelijk dat ze werken via een zelfde discursief
patroon van ingroup–outgroup contrasten, van rangordening, van zinspelingen op
cultureel prestige en anciënniteit als groep. Culturele idealen in (voornamelijk mannelijk)
gedrag worden steeds geëtaleerd om de relatieve zelfpositionering van de groep uit te
werken en rhetorisch in te zetten tegenover de toehoorders, zowel groepsleden als
buitenstaanders.

De orale tradities maken vaak evaluatieve vergelijkingen van de lokale

geschiedenis, van morele waarden, en van genealogische connecties en het behoren tot
een gemeenschappelijk voorouderlijk territorium. Aldus wordt, via hun eigen folklore,
door leden van de subgroepen hun lokale identiteit versterkt en vaak als ‘superieur’
geformuleerd tegenover de andere groepen binnen en buiten de etno-regionale context.
Dit soort processen van differentiatie hebben zelfs geleid tot intense gevoelens en
tactieken van competitie en rivaliteit.

Deze studie heeft veel nieuw, en intrinsiek interessant, cultureel materiaal

opgeleverd over de Oromo, het grootste volk in Ethiopië, en kan verder etnografisch en
vergelijke onderzoek naar de diepte en rijkdom van culturele tradities en lokale kennis in

296
ruraal Ethiopië stimuleren. Verder, aangezien het bredere analytische kader werd
gevormd door de sociaal-economische en politieke condities die het ‘etno-federale’
Ethiopië van na 1991 kenmerken en de relaties tussen de tientallen etno-linguïstische
groep een heel ander karakter gaven, kunnen hopelijk bepaalde nieuwe inzichten uit deze
studie het wetenschappelijk en beleidspraktische begrip van de constructie van subgroep-
identiteiten, het strategisch manoeuvreren van groepen (en hun elites), en de bijna
onvermijdelijke opkomst van groepsrivaliteiten en conflict onder dit soort condities
vergroten – in Ethiopië en in de vele andere multi-etnische staten in Afrika.

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This study presents a comprehensive overview of Oromo identity
discourse in Ethiopia. In its comparative approach to the local cultural
tradition of narrative self-representation, four of the most important
Oromo sub-groups in Southwest Ethiopia – the Jimma, the Leqa-
Neqemte, the Sibu-Sire and the Gera - are shown to be both
complementary and competing in their positioning vis-à-vis each other
in the wider nominal whole of ‘Oromo identity’ discourse within
Ethiopia, and towards state narratives. The remarkable variety in
stories, epic poems and narratives reflects a dynamic history and free
articulation of local rivalries of groups in a large geographical and
ethno-cultural domain. The rich folklore traditions of the Oromo, the
most numerous people in Ethiopia, are shown to be deeply concerned
with ‘historical’ claim-making, prestige ranking, (sub-)ethnic identity
assertion, and rehearsing cultural core values around courage, personal
valour, integrity, and survival. The study presents many examples of
expressive narratives, which are annotated and analysed so as to draw
a larger picture of the internal differentiation and the interactive
complexities within the Oromo.

Abreham Alemu Fanta (b. 1963 in Shambu, Oromia Region, Ethiopia),

is a folklore and oral literature teacher and researcher. He was a
WOTRO-funded PhD student at the VU and the African Studies
Centre, Leiden, from 2006 to 2010. Until May 2012 he was a lecturer
at Addis Ababa University (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), and later at the
University of California, Los Angeles. Currently he is a visiting
assistant professor at the Department of Anthropology, California
State University, San Bernardino, USA.