10. RACHEL C. CELESTIAL V.
JESSE CACHOPERO
FACTS:
Petitioner Rachel Celestial is the sister of defendant Jesse Cachopero. They had
a dispute over a piece of land which was a dried-up creek, as Cachopero was trying to
obtain a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) alleging that he had been the owner of that land whereon he
built a house and other improvements. However, Celestial protests that she has
preferential right over the land because it is adjacent to and is the only outlet from her
house. According to the Bureau of Land, the land in dispute was a creek and is therefore
outside the commerce of man. The first MSA was denied by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) prompting Cachopero to obtain another MSA which was granted by the DENR.
Due to conflicting interests of the parties, the land in dispute must be sold in a public
auction.
Cachopero then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against
the DENR with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) but was denied. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
Celestial contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Cachopero‘s petition for
certiorari as it is in the nature of an appeal falling within the jurisdiction of the CA and
that the Cachopero has not exhausted all administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
(a) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition
(b) Whether or not the land in question owned by one of the parties when it
is classified as outside the commerce of man
HELD:
RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and SC over original
petitions for certiorari, prohinition and mandamus.
Celestial has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e.
through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court).
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to
issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process
which is a continuation of the original suit and not a commencement of a new action. In
contrast, to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires
the commencement of a new and original action therefore, independent of the
proceedings which gave rise to the questioned decision or order. As correctly held by the
Court of Appeals, the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
under Section 21 of B.P. 129.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant
case falls under the recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies, which provides “that such is inapplicable if (1) it should appear that an
irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking
court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter as a
result of a patently illegal order or (2) where appeal would not prove to be speedy and
adequate remedy”.
This requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there
being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly
resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim
involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 9) in
quo warranto proceedings.
A dried up creek is property of public dominion and not susceptible to
acquisitive prescription
As for Celestial‘s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of
the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of
her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when
she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession
under Art. 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code,
the same must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible
to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may
be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to
alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government
has declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of
entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of
an imperfect tit
11. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY
alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE
DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving
the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is
not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse
decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons.
Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for
the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or
of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not
because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason
that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease
vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S.
127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative
relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591,
September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men
Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs.
Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take
cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law
then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the
merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of
this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded
that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x
UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.
