PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
ROGELIO
BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
G.R. NO. 102007 (SEPTEMBER 2, 1994)
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was convicted with Rape. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to
hepatic encephalopathy secondary hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering.. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of
May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However,
it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged and insists that the appeal should
still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his
criminal and civil penalties invoking the ruling of the Court of Appeals
in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability.
RULING:
Yes. From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely
on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law, b) Contracts, c)
Quasi-contracts, d) x x x, e) Quasi-delicts.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or
the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction,
the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death
of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
