Turkey in Europe

Is Turkey’s EU accession process grinding to a halt?

Did open opposition to Turkish membership by some
European leaders cause the slow-down of Turkey’s
reform process in recent years, or was it the Ankara Breaking the vicious circle
government’s lack of resolve? Is there a danger of
“creeping Islamisation” in Turkish society? What are
the chances for solving the Kurdish question, the
Cyprus problem and the differences with Armenia?
Can Turkey’s important new geo-political role in the
region be an asset for the European Union?

These and other questions are answered in this

report of the Independent Commission on Turkey.
The Independent Commission was established by
prominent European politicians for the purpose
of analysing some of the most pressing aspects of
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Its first report Turkey
in Europe: More than a Promise? was issued in
September 2004.

Members of the Independent Commission on Turkey would like to thank the

Second report of the Independent Commission on Turkey
Open Society Foundation and the British Council for their support to this report. September 2009
Turkey in Europe
Breaking the vicious circle

Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey

September 2009
Independent Commission
on Turkey

Martti Ahtisaari (Chairman) Anthony Giddens

Former President of Finland Former Director of the London School of Economics and
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2008 Political Science

Kurt Biedenkopf Marcelino Oreja Aguirre

Former Prime Minister of Saxony, Germany Former Foreign Minister of Spain
Former Secretary General of the Council of Europe
Emma Bonino Former European Commissioner
Former European Commissioner
Former Minister for International Trade and European Affairs, Italy Michel Rocard
Vice-President of the Italian Senate Former Prime Minister of France

Hans van den Broek Albert Rohan (Rapporteur)

Former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands Former Secretary General of Foreign Affairs, Austria
Former European Commissioner

Bronisław Geremek († 13 July 2008) The Independent Commission on Turkey is supported

Former Foreign Minister of Poland by the Open Society Foundation and the British Council.
The Independent Commission on Turkey thanks Hugh Pope
for his assistance in the preparation of this report.
Contents

6 Introduction

8 I Treating Turkey fairly?

13 II Turkey’s missed opportunities for reform

17 III A new urgency in Cyprus

21 IV The Kurdish problem

25 V Turkey and its region

30 VI Turkey’s opening with Armenia

34 VII Islam and the secular Turkish state

38 VIII Economic resilience

43 Conclusions

48 Annex: Conclusions of the Independent

Commission on Turkey’s 2004 Report
 Introduction welcome, even if it were to fulfil all membership conditions.
Moreover, the process itself has been hindered by the effective
blockage of more than half of the negotiating chapters.
Support in Turkey has faded for both the EU accession process
and the implementation of difficult and sometimes expensive
reforms. This was aggravated by internal political difficulties, in
which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) found itself
under serious pressure from emboldened Turkish Euro-sceptics
who, partly under the guise of defending secular
Negative reactions
principles against a supposed advance of Islamism,
from Europe have given
attempted to delay the implementation of political
Turkey the impression
The Independent Commission on Turkey was established in March and social reforms needed for EU membership.
that it is not welcome.
2004 by a group of concerned Europeans, deeply committed to Lack of Turkish reforms triggered more European
the integration process and having held high public office, for the opposition to Turkey’s accession. The sense of being excluded further
purpose of contributing to a more objective and rational debate on demoralized Turkish reformers, thus creating a vicious circle.
Turkey’s accession to the European Union. This vicious circle is now undermining the many achievements
In its first report, Turkey in Europe: More than a Promise?, over the past decade inspired by Turkey’s convergence with the EU.
published in September 2004, the Independent Commission In particular, progress has stalled in strengthening democracy,
examined the long history of Turkey’s convergence with Europe broadening respect for human rights and building up a free and
as well as the major opportunities and challenges connected with vibrant civil society. The new dynamism experienced by the
Turkey’s possible EU membership. It concluded that accession Turkish economy has slowed, aggravated by the global economic
negotiations should be opened without delay upon fulfilment by crisis, as has the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment
Turkey of the Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey’s European vocation experienced after the talks started. On the other hand, Turkey’s
and its eligibility for membership in the EU having been re- new charisma and prosperity have made it increasingly attractive
confirmed by European governments many times during past to nearby countries and its proactive regional policy has proved
decades, any further delay would have been seen as a blatant breach that an EU-anchored Turkey can project stability into volatile
of commitments made and would have seriously damaged the areas of its neighbourhood in the Caucasus and Middle East. This
Union’s credibility. Moreover, while the accession of a country with is the backdrop of the present report, in which the Independent
the size and specific characteristics of Turkey would doubtlessly Commission analyses developments in the EU and Turkey since
present the EU with substantive challenges, it argued that these the opening of negotiations as well as issues important for Turkey’s
were by no means insurmountable. On the other hand, the accession process.
accession of a transformed, democratic and modern Turkey, a As with its first report in 2004, the present publication by
country in a unique geo–strategic position with great economic the Independent Commission represents the personal views
potential and a young and dynamic workforce, would bring of its members, and does not intend to duplicate the European
considerable benefits to the European Union. Commission’s forthcoming annual progress report.
The Independent Commission welcomed the European Finally, it is with great sadness that the Independent
Council decision in December 2004 to open accession negotiations Commission on Turkey records the untimely death in 2008 of its
with Turkey and the start of talks in October 2005. Regrettably, fellow commission member Bronisław Geremek, former Foreign
negative reactions since then from European political leaders Minister of Poland, whose valuable contribution to the work of the
and growing hesitation by the European public about further Independent Commission was highly appreciated.
enlargement, have given Turkey the impression that it is not

6 7
 I Treating Turkey fairly? made to blame Turkey’s EU accession process for difficulties within
the Union and making it seem as though an eventual Turkish
accession would render the Union unmanageable.
This public rhetoric was backed up by efforts to re-interpret
the Negotiating Framework formally agreed by all governments,
on the basis of which Turkey started negotiations on EU
membership in October 2005. The framework clearly stated that
“the shared objective of the negotiations is accession.” However,
some leaders took the sentence that followed – “these negotiations
are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be
guaranteed beforehand” – to mean that EU-Turkey negotiations
In December 2004, the European Council, comprising the heads of could also be aiming at several alternative possibilities other
state or government of all EU member states, decided unanimously than membership.
to start accession negotiations with Turkey. This unambiguous A few governments began arguing in favour of a “privileged
decision was fully in line with repeated affirmations made over partnership” or “special relationship” instead of the treaty-based
many decades of Turkey’s eligibility and its future welcome as prospect of membership held out to Turkey for decades. None
a member, as soon as it fulfilled the required conditions. The of the proponents of this formula, however, have succeeded in
decision was firmly approved the same month explaining what additional privileges or partnership might be
The European Council
in the European Parliament, with 407 Members on offer for Turkey, the non-EU state with the oldest and closest
declared that Turkey
voting in favour and 262 against. Already in 1999, relationship with Brussels, including an Association Agreement in
should be treated like any
the European Council had declared that Turkey 1963 and a Customs Union since 1996. Moreover, NATO-member
other candidate state.
should be treated like any other candidate state. Turkey is already broadly integrated into almost all pan-European
Turkey therefore had every reason to expect that this process would institutions, from the Council of Europe, including the European
be conducted in the same manner as previous enlargement rounds, Court of Human Rights, and the Organization for Security and
and that its duration and outcome primarily depended on Turkey’s Cooperation in Europe to football leagues. Indeed, advocacy of
fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, adoption of the body of EU “privileged partnership” appears to be a populist excuse to deny
law and other conditions of accession. Turkey access to EU political mechanisms, even though Turkey is
Unfortunately, within months Turkey was confronted with already bound by many EU political decisions in which it has
statements by European leaders that undermined this unanimous had no say.
decision, as well as negative actions by EU member states to block These negative attitudes and policies of European leaders
the talks. These attempted to overturn the agreed course and are in clear contradiction to all previous EU decisions and
fundamental nature of the negotiations. In several countries, such commitments. They put in question EU credibility, reliability
public discourse coincided with elections, giving the impression and the principle of pacta sunt servanda, that agreements are to be
that domestic political calculations were involved. Attacks on the honoured. As in any negotiation, the EU-Turkey accession process

I Treating Turkey fairly?

EU-Turkey process became a proxy for popular concerns about is by definition open-ended, and may not be concluded if either
immigration, worries about jobs, fears of Islam and a general side is not satisfied with the end result. Undermining these talks
dissatisfaction with the EU. Some politicians argued that Turkey in advance by substituting alternative arrangements for the goal
is intrinsically un-European, that even if Turkey fulfilled all of membership constitutes a breach of faith with Turkey, stokes
conditions it should not join the EU and that Turkish accession up a nationalist backlash in the country and creates the wider
would flood Europe with Turkish migrants. Through language impression that the EU has discriminatory double standards
conjuring up a uniquely Turkish threat to the EU, attempts were when dealing with a Muslim country. In any event, the process

8 9
 alone – adopting the EU acquis communautaire with thousands basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.”
of regulations – would make much less sense if it was geared Since then, the bar for accession has been raised steadily higher
towards anything short of membership. High-level European than for previous candidates. Psychologically, this has been one
talk of a “privileged partnership” lacking substance thus works of the most de-motivating aspects of EU conduct, especially when
against the key EU goal of building up its soft power beyond its Turks felt that the Europeans had prioritized former Soviet-bloc
current borders, a process that is visibly promoted through Turkish states over their long-standing NATO ally, and were disregarding
adoption of EU rules, values and political standards. Turkey’s arguably stronger performance in governance and
Just as damagingly, formal and informal actions by some EU economic and social indicators.
member states have targeted the negotiating process itself. More European politicians who aim to deny Turkey access to the
than half of the 35 negotiating chapters are blocked, either formally EU often seem to follow attitudes in their respective countries
because of Turkey’s failure to implement the as reflected in opinion polls – an incomplete way of deciding the
Substituting alternative
Ankara Protocol, or informally by one or more future of a complex EU-Turkey accession process that will take
arrangements for
member states. Nearly a dozen chapters are another decade or more. European public opinion in turn tends
membership constitutes a
frozen in connection with the Cyprus problem, to follow the views expressed by political leaders. There is a clear
breach of faith with Turkey.
including eight chapters formally blocked correlation between falls in support for Turkey’s EU membership
by the December 2006 European Council. France has publicly and high-levels of anti-Turkey speech-making in some countries.
declared that it will not allow five key areas of the negotiations to In other states, where leaders have articulated the benefits of the
go forward, specifically because the current French leadership EU-Turkey process, support for Turkish accession has remained
opposes Turkish accession and believes Ankara should be offered higher. It is obvious that many Europeans are in two minds about
“partnership, not integration”. There are informal blocks on Turkey’s future with the European Union. Much of the confusion
other chapters and eleven chapters are held up in the Council by results from a lack of clear information, and an assumption
member states for political reasons. Paradoxically – given the fact that accession or aspects of it are imminent. In fact, some of the
that Turkey aligned itself with 109 of 124 EU joint statements, Europeans’ greatest concerns – free movement of Turkish labour,
declarations and demarches in 2008 and participates in important agricultural subsidies and structural funds – have already been
EU missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – the blocked made subject to possible permanent derogations. The more open
chapters include three of the most important and promising areas debate there is on these matters, the better. After all, back in 1954,
for joint EU-Turkish action, namely External Relations; Energy; 51% of French people told pollsters that they had a negative view
and Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. of the German people and only 29% thought a Franco-German
Other indirect efforts to derail Turkey’s EU membership goal have alliance would work.
included the suggestions that the definitive borders of Europe In Turkey, media and politicians have tended to focus
be drawn by a “group of wise men”, and that a Union for the on antagonistic messages from Europe and to disregard the
Mediterranean should be established. Turkey was not mentioned considerable support for Turkey’s EU membership in many
in these proposals, but was widely seen as the target. Due to timely European countries. This has contributed to a backlash in Turkey,
intervention by member states in favour of a Turkey integrated into resulting in resentment against Europeans in general, a helpless

I Treating Turkey fairly?

the EU, the mandates for these initiatives were then formulated feeling that Turkey will never be accepted as an EU member
in such a broad manner that they have had little real impact on and a decline in support for EU accession. In autumn 2008,
Turkey’s European ambitions. Eurobarometer found that Turks stating that membership would
Politicians who oppose Turkish membership of the EU be a good thing fell to 42%, down from well over 70% in 2004. Lack
have nonetheless succeeded in diluting the spirit of the Helsinki of faith in a positive outcome of the accession process de-motivates
European Council of 1999, which, in a watershed decision, declared Turkish leaders and means the population puts less pressure on
that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the them to carry out the necessary reforms, which in turn feeds the

10 11
 arguments of Turkey-sceptics in the EU. The EU is losing leverage
in Turkey, just as Turkey is becoming a real regional power. II Turkey’s missed
opportunities for reform
The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view
that the European Union, in the interest of its credibility, must
respect its own decisions and firmly stand behind commitments
it has made. European leaders should break the vicious circle that
has resulted from the reversal of European
Turkey-EU convergence
attitudes, a reversal for which they are
has done much evident
partly responsible. It was the positive lead
good for both sides
from Europe in 1999 that encouraged an
and this virtuous circle
unprecedented wave of reforms in Turkey and
must be re-established.
this sense of EU leadership can be resurrected. The sweeping reforms in Turkey that followed the EU’s 1999
Few of the 27 governments in the EU are currently clearly against recognition of Turkey as a candidate state count as one of the
eventual Turkish accession, and a majority of EU governments most impressive transformations in the country’s history, and
support it, some strongly. Turkey has been an associate member of bear comparison to the adoption of European laws in the 1920s
the EU for almost fifty years, is an important and respected partner under republican founder Kemal Atatürk. The 2000-2005 golden
in European and transatlantic organizations, straddles a vital age of reform produced eight legal reform packages to comply
geo-strategic crossroads and deserves to be treated with fairness with Copenhagen Criteria and harmonize Turkish legislation
by its European partners. As the European Council stated in 2004, with the EU acquis communautaire. These changes rewrote one
the goal of the negotiating process is accession, and it cannot be third of the constitution, enacted international human rights
anything else. Whether that goal can be reached will depend on the legislation, abolished the death penalty, improved women’s rights,
outcome of negotiations, the transformation of Turkey, and, at the brought new safeguards against torture and ushered in reform
end of the talks, on decisions by Turkey and the EU member states. of the prison system. New laws curtailed formerly draconian
Turkey-EU convergence is a positive process that has done much restrictions on freedom of expression, association and the media.
evident good for both sides and it is this virtuous circle that must The Turkish armed forces stepped further back from their once-
be re-established. dominant role, accepting more transparent defence budgets, the
reduction of National Security Council powers and the end of
state security courts. A sense that Turkey was now part of a real

II Turkey’s missed opportunities for reform

European project made the country feel more secure, alleviating
the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, encouraging a more open debate
about the Armenian question and reducing incidents of militant
violence. The new confidence anchored six years of 7% economic
growth and an unprecedented wave of foreign investment. Outside
Turkey, this partnership with the EU encouraged Ankara to make
strong contributions to international peacekeeping missions and
to sponsor a chance to settle the frozen Cyprus conflict.
Ironically, the dramatic slow-down of this reform era can be
dated to the start of accession negotiations in October 2005. There
are a number of reasons for this unexpected development. On one
hand, blame can be laid on the negative attitudes of some European
leaders, confusion in Europe about constitutional arrangements

12 13
 and further enlargement, and the increasing obstacles that arose (MHP) should demonstrate their stated support for Turkey’s
in the negotiating process, as described in the previous chapter. EU ambitions by working in good faith with AKP on such a new
On the other hand, the AKP government missed opportunities basic document.
and failed to sustain the momentum of reforms before it was To conform with EU law, Turkey must push ahead with
challenged by a plethora of domestic distractions. passing legislation to establish a functioning ombudsman, an
From 2007 onwards, the ruling AKP had to fight off multiple institution which, in another sign of Turkey’s long European
challenges from an ad hoc coalition of old guard opponents interaction, is originally an Ottoman idea adopted by a passing
including the military, parts of the judiciary and the main Swedish king three centuries ago. It must
If Turkey wants to align
opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP). These attacks were also adopt EU standards on procurement as
fully with European
based on the allegation that AKP was acting against the secular another step to full transparency and reducing
democracies it must
principles of the republic. They included an April 2007 warning by corruption in government, one of the main
recommit to the
the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces that it might “openly reasons ordinary Turks support the EU accession
transformation process.
display its reaction” and a March 2008 demand by the Supreme process. Freedoms of organization, equal
Court of Appeal’s chief prosecutor for the closure of AKP and the rights in education and access to seminaries must be extended
banning from politics of 71 politicians, including to all religious faiths. Freedom of expression must be secured by
The slow-down of
President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister convinced public support for free speech from political leaders,
reforms can be dated
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another disruption was by narrowing the definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terror Law
to the start of accession
the discovery in 2007 of arms caches that seemed and ensuring European standards in the interpretation and
negotiations.
to be part of a plot to topple the government, implementation of restrictive regulations by the courts and
the Ergenekon conspiracy. Although the prosecutors appear security services. In April 2008, Turkey made it harder to open
to have had every reason to pursue the Ergenekon case, further cases against dissidents and intellectuals under controversial
controversy resulted from more than 100 subsequent arrests and Penal Code Article 301 and changed its wording to make it less
investigations of high military officers and establishment figures. unacceptable to liberal and international opinion, but even in its
The government’s freedom to enact reforms for ethnic Kurds in amended form it appears open to abuse. A new Political Parties
the post-2005 period was also limited by renewed clashes between Law is also vital to strengthen intra-party democracy, encourage
the Turkish military and militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party youth to enter mainstream politics, bring transparency to party
(PKK), recognized as a terrorist group by the EU and many others. financing and end a system in which party leaders are too easily
Such internal ferment led to a regrettable slow-down in able to crush dissent. The military has withdrawn further from

II Turkey’s missed opportunities for reform

the reform process. While this political drama has largely politics since 47% Turks voted for AKP in July 2007, three months
been seen as a sign of political instability, it in fact included the after the army published a threat to the government on its website,
steps necessary for Turkey to become a more open society. The but it must do more to be non-partisan, for instance by ending the
Independent Commission is convinced of the need for Turkish practice of lengthy public political speeches by senior generals.
re-engagement with a number of important projects to bring If Turkey wants to align fully with European democracies
itself into line with European norms. First among these should it must recommit to the transformation process and shed
be a broad-based process leading to a new constitution to replace authoritarian legacies and an outdated hostility to external
the restrictive document drawn up under military rule in 1982. A influences. Turkish leaders must do their part to speed up the
new constitution is not a requirement to join the EU, but drawing tempo of efforts to adopt the EU acquis communautaire, a rhythm
up one would both remove obstacles to other vital reforms and in which the two sides have mostly opened two negotiating
also make a clear statement of Turkey’s intent to become a truly chapters in each six-month EU presidency.
democratic society and a modern EU state. The opposition The Independent Commission is encouraged by the re-launch
Republican People’s Party (CHP) and National Action Party of the reform efforts in December 2008, when, after more than four

14 15
 years’ delay, Turkey enacted a new National Programme that sets
out a formal legislative road-map. In January 2009, it appointed III A new urgency in Cyprus
a first full-time EU negotiator, State Minister Egemen Bağış. In
the same month the government introduced a Kurdish-language
state television channel, serious discussion of Kurdish institutes
in universities and new steps to include the concerns of the Alevi
faith alongside mainstream Sunni Islam in religious education
and other official domains. The government has announced
plans for a new round of constitutional and legal reforms, notably
trying to find a way to spread parliamentary representation to
smaller political parties. In July 2009, Turkey further restricted
the jurisdiction of military courts with new legislation enabling The Cyprus problem is approaching a new and critical crossroads.
civilian courts to prosecute military personnel for non-military After five years in limbo following the Republic of Cyprus’s entry
offences. Prime Minister Erdoğan made his first trip to Brussels in into the EU, developments over the next year will likely determine
four years, soon followed by President Gül, the first Turkish head of whether or not the island will be indefinitely divided. The EU
state to visit the seat of the EU. Opposition leader Deniz Baykal also member states bear a political responsibility for the current
made a journey to Brussels. situation. It also faces a political imperative to do its utmost to
The Independent Commission is convinced that encourage Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reach a satisfactory
comprehensive, consistent and sustained progress towards more conclusion to the ongoing talks, which look like the last chance
democracy at home is the best way to persuade more Europeans of for a federal settlement. The difficulty of reaching this objective
Turkey’s EU compatibility. The government now has two years free is small compared to the likely complications of failure. EU
of elections in which to focus on the EU convergence process as an governments will be caught between loyalty to a
Failure in the talks
absolute priority, and it should make the most of this opportunity. member state and their important strategic interests
could bring EU-Turkey
in Turkey. Failure in the talks will mean further
negotiations to
hindrance of cooperation between the EU and
a standstill.
NATO because of Cyprus-Turkey differences, and
continued blockage in opening more chapters that could bring
the EU-Turkey negotiations to a standstill. Cyprus has remained
peaceful for decades, but the EU has unfastened the balances of the
old status quo and, with tens of thousands of troops on the island,
this is a conflict that might unfreeze.
The EU brought this problem upon itself by accepting
Cyprus’s one million inhabitants into the Union even though they

III A new urgency in Cyprus

had yet to resolve their inter-communal differences. It has thus
imported the whole tangled history of the island into its inner
councils. The troubles started in earnest after independence from
Britain in 1960, when the 80% Greek Cypriot community and 20%
Turkish Cypriot community set up a joint republic, guaranteed
by Britain, Greece and Turkey. The republic broke down in 1963,
when the Greek Cypriots excluded Turkish Cypriot leaders from
government and drove the Turkish Cypriots into barricaded

16 17
 quarters of towns and isolated villages. After the colonels’ regime communities and leaderships on both sides of the island, to raise
in Athens backed a Greek Cypriot coup in Cyprus in 1974 that their morale and attract positive popular attention to the process;
aimed to unite the island with Greece, Turkey invoked its right to by sponsoring eye-catching bi-communal projects and interaction
intervene as guarantor and staged a military invasion, eventually between two communities that can rekindle enthusiasm for
occupying the northern 37% of the island. reunification; by regular visits to Ankara to underline that Turkey
Impending membership of the EU in 2004 changed many is on track to membership of the EU and that continuation of its
Cypriot dynamics. Years of UN-mediated talks on a deal to existing support for a Cyprus settlement will
Talks risk succumbing
reunify the island and remove Turkish troops had not progressed help it reach the EU goal; and by persuading
to complacency and are
far due to continued old-style nationalist grandstanding on Greece to use its influence to intercede with
running short of time.
both sides. But at a referendum, the Turkish Cypriots, backed by the Greek Cypriot community, explaining the
Turkey, voted 65% in favour of the UN-brokered deal, known as benefits of compromise and normalization with Turkey. EU leaders
the Annan Plan, whereas 76% of Greek Cypriots voted against should also make clear how wrong the Republic of Cyprus and
it. Even though the EU had publicly and insistently backed the Turkey both are to believe that pressure from Brussels alone can
Annan Plan, it nevertheless allowed the Greek Cypriots to enter force changes in the other’s antagonistic positions. For a Cyprus
as the sole representatives of the island. One of the Republic of settlement to gain traction, officials from the Republic of Cyprus
Cyprus’s first actions as a member was to force the EU to break and Turkey will also have to meet and learn to trust each other.
its political promise to reward the Turkish Cypriots for their Failure to reach a settlement this year will be costly to all
“yes” vote, blocking a Direct Trade Regulation that would have sides. EU leaders must challenge the apparent view in both Cypriot
allowed Turkish Cypriots direct access to EU markets. Greek communities that the status quo is sustainable indefinitely and
Cypriot embargoes on Turkish Cypriots were first criticized by UN show that peace through compromise can bring many benefits.
Secretary General U Thant as a “veritable siege” in 1964, and in Turkish Cypriots will win full citizenship rights and integration
2004 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said “the Turkish Cypriot into the EU, with all the economic and political advantages that
vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them”. entails. Greek Cypriots will be able to live without fear of Turkish
In response to the perceived unfairness, Turkey then back-tracked soldiers manning a line through the middle of their divided capital,
on its obligation under the Additional Protocol to the 1963 EU- will see the island become a real east Mediterranean hub through
Turkey Association Agreement to open its airports and sea ports to full access to Turkey, the region’s biggest economy. According to
Greek Cypriot traffic. a study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Cypriot
The situation is not hopeless, however. The Greek Cypriot economy will grow by an additional ten percentage points within
community registered a notable change of heart in presidential seven years. Both Greece and Cyprus will gain a more pro-
elections in February 2008. In the first round, two-thirds of the European Turkey as a neighbour that will be inclined to settle
electorate voted for candidates who campaigned on compromise conflicts over the Aegean and Mediterranean territorial waters.
strategies for reunification. The ultimate winner, President Turkey will win a more open negotiating road for EU membership,
Demetris Christofias, soon embarked on a promising new round greater stature in Europe and official language status for Turkish

III A new urgency in Cyprus

of talks with his counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, who had led the in the EU. At the same time it will lose the financial burden of its
Turkish Cypriots to vote “yes” to the Annan Plan. Cyprus garrison and the subsidy consumed by the Turkish
These talks are registering significant progress, but risk Cypriot administration.
succumbing to complacency and are running short of time. Since the EU and Turkey are currently paying the political
First and foremost, responsibility for reaching a settlement lies cost of the Cypriots’ failure to compromise, EU leaders should
with Cypriots themselves. But they need the full support of engage more actively to prevent the Cyprus problem derailing
EU governments and Turkish decision-makers in Ankara. EU Turkey’s accession process. This process is essential for Turkey’s
leaders can achieve this through frequent visits to the Cypriot transformation and is of vital importance to the EU and Cyprus as

18 19
 well. Alongside their efforts to support a settlement on the island,
the EU should search for ways and means that lead to the fulfilment IV The Kurdish problem
of Turkey’s commitment to open its airports and sea ports to Greek  
Cypriot traffic, a development that would immediately release
eight chapters to the Turkey-EU negotiating process and win time
to reach a fuller Cyprus settlement. The EU could do this through
reviving its 2004 promise to end Turkish Cypriot isolation through
direct trade and try to overcome obstacles to direct international
flights to the Turkish Cypriots’ own airport. The EU must assume
its responsibility for the injustices and absurdities of the situation.
The whole of Cyprus is theoretically now part of the European
Union; on the other hand, the acquis communautaire of the Union The Kurdish question is a perennial problem in Turkey due to a
is officially suspended in the north; at the same time, the European mix of regional under-development, denial of cultural rights,
Court of Justice has ruled that Greek Cypriot court judgments human rights abuses by Turkish state security forces and 25 years
about the north are enforceable throughout the Union. of terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The
A Cyprus settlement, and the need for all sides to Kurds number about 12 million people or 15% of the inhabitants
avoid provocations and work for a solution, is now urgent. of Turkey. About half live in the Kurdish-majority areas of
Grandstanding between gunboats and oil survey ships in the the southeast, the rest in western Turkey and metropolises
waters around Cyprus, Turkey and Greece in November 2008 like Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul. Most Kurds share the same
shows where deepening frustrations may lead: similar frictions Sunni Muslim religious tradition as the majority of Turks, with
between Turkey and EU-member Greece very nearly resulted in whom intermarriage is common, and there is a substantial
armed conflict in 1987 and 1996, crises which the EU was powerless overlap in history and customs. As among the Turks, some 10%
to solve and which had to be settled by the United States. The of Kurds adhere to the Alevi faith. A sense of national identity is
Turkish Cypriots in April 2009 voted in a new, more nationalist growing among Kurds but lacks political weight due to significant
government, signalling that without a settlement Mehmet Ali differences of region, dialect, tribal identity and attitudes toward
Talat may lose his seat in the April 2010 presidential elections to a the Turkish state. Some Kurds talk of autonomy and a few of
candidate less committed to a solution. Non-solution and never- independence for the Kurdish majority-areas of the southeast,
ending negotiations in Cyprus will raise tensions on the island and but this would be both impractical and counter-productive for
will indefinitely block the EU-Turkey process. If old friends like a variety of reasons. There would be explosive arguments
Talat and Christofias fail to reach a federal settlement, it is hard to about where the boundaries of this area might be, and autonomy
see how anyone either inside or outside Cyprus will ever mobilize could have negative consequences for the many Kurds living
behind a new effort. Yet managing the alternative, the partition in western parts of the country.
of Cyprus, will be extremely divisive for the EU. European leaders There is no easy answer as to who represents Turkey’s
have compelling interests to work with priority commitment for Kurdish citizens. Kurds in mainstream Turkish parties already

IV The Kurdish problem

a negotiated Cyprus settlement in 2009, because the chance of a make up about one sixth of parliament and the Cabinet. The
federal solution and demilitarization of the island will certainly Kurdish nationalist party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP),
not come again in this political generation. seems to command about half of the vote in Kurdish-majority
areas. Its legitimacy in the eyes of many Turks is however
compromised by the fact that its leaders voice sympathy for the
PKK, officially labelled as a terrorist group by Turkey, the EU
and many others. The DTP has been the subject of a court case

 
20 21
 to close it down since 2007, charged with organizational links reopen some cases of Kurds who disappeared in those
to the PKK and because some of its demands for autonomy years. Restrictions on expressions of Kurdish culture were
are perceived as an attack on the constitutional unity of the liberalized. A few private Kurdish language centres opened their
country. Nevertheless, DTP is fully part of Turkey’s political doors, although most soon succumbed to bureaucratic harassment
culture. Many of its demands for more Kurdish rights and respect and a lack of local demand. In the mainly Kurdish southeast and
for the Kurdish identity are also privately made by leading Kurdish elsewhere, Kurdish-language bumper stickers, music, publications,
parliamentarians in AKP and other parties. The possible banning festive days, radio and television all became first legal, then
of DTP by the Constitutional Court is unlikely to contribute to the tolerated and then broadly accepted. The government successfully
solution of the Kurdish problem. began implementing a World Bank poverty relief program.
The PKK itself, and its jailed leader Öcalan do not constitute These positive developments are not always noted or
a legitimate political party, and they have committed too many appreciated in Europe. Some EU states have been too lenient on
terrorist acts to have a legalized future in Turkey. With about the PKK, allowing their intelligence agencies to do deals with
5,000 armed militants, perhaps half of them in Turkey and half the organization’s operatives in return for information, letting
in remote mountainous areas of northern Iraq, the PKK pursues identified PKK operatives escape justice after breaking EU states’
an agenda of national liberation. But it uses terrorist and criminal laws and withholding cooperation with Turkey on repatriation
methods, including extortion, drug-running, attacks on conscript- or proper trials in the relevant country. In the Independent
manned outposts and bombings of civilians and European tourists Commission’s view they should do demonstrably more to prevent
inside Turkey. PKK fund-raising and organization in their countries, work to
The ruling AKP has proved to be a party with strong overcome the inter-EU mismatch in judicial systems in this context
support among both Turks and Kurds, winning half of the and not allow the PKK’s secrecy and skill at camouflaging its
vote in the southeast, and has arguably done more to improve operations to defeat differing levels of political will in EU states.
the situation of the Kurds than any previous government. It More generally, Turkey-EU convergence helps a fundamental
was helped by the capture of PKK leader European interest to encourage broader respect for human rights
AKP has done more
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, a subsequent PKK and cultural freedoms in Turkey, not just to create a more secure
to improve the situation
cease-fire and the decision to commute the environment in the European neighbourhood but also to prevent
of Kurds than any
Kurdish militant’s death sentence for terrorist the kind of blowback violence inside the EU among immigrant
previous government.
acts, another achievement of Turkey’s EU communities of Turks and Kurds seen in the 1990s. A more stable
convergence. The brutal repression of all signs of Kurdishness and prosperous Turkey integrated into EU mechanisms would
of the 1980s faded, and mainstream Turkish commentators also be a better partner in dealing with EU concerns about other
now openly criticize defunct official propaganda about Kurds offshoots of the Kurdish problem, drug trafficking and illegal
being “mountain Turks”. Turkey started accepting international immigration.
legal oversight and honouring rulings of the European Court of Turkey has seen considerable progress in terms of economic
Human Rights. A third of the 350,000 Kurds officially counted as development and political reforms that have relieved Turkish-
having been forced from their villages by the government during Kurdish tensions. However, given how much
More has to be done

IV The Kurdish problem

the 1990s clashes received some compensation and returned further Turkey has to move from the bitter
to secure enduring social
to their homes. A group of Kurdish nationalist politicians in legacies of the past, more has to be done
peace throughout Turkey.
jail since 1994 on charges of PKK links were released in 2004. in order to secure enduring social peace
Several members of the armed and security forces long mentioned throughout Turkey. The opening of a Kurdish-language 24-
in Turkish media as suspects in death-squad killings of Kurdish hour state television channel in January 2009 was a good step
nationalists in the 1990s were jailed after 2008 in the Ergenekon forward, showing once again what Turkey could have achieved
conspiracy trial, and new evidence allowed prosecutors to more painlessly if such moves had been made decades ago.

 
22 23
 Such liberalization should be backed up with full legal and
constitutional protections for the use of Kurdish languages, in V Turkey and its region
broadcasting, public buildings, schools and political speeches.
Kurdish place names should be unbanned and Kurdish institutes
should be permitted in universities desiring to found them.
Constitutional articles that appear to privilege one ethnicity over
another should be rewritten to give all citizens of Turkey genuine
equality. Continuing to deny Kurdish citizens in Turkey the full
use of their language and identity is incompatible with Turkey’s
EU membership. It also contravenes the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne
that founded the Turkish republic, which unequivocally states in
Article 39 that “no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use Twenty years ago, wariness or hostility defined Turkey’s relations
by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in with all of its many neighbours. Today, ties with only two of the
commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind eight states bordering Turkey remain problematic, Cyprus and
or at public meetings”. Armenia, and Turkey has initiated promising processes to settle
outstanding problems with both. Having been absent for many
decades from the Balkans, Central Asia, Middle East and Africa,
Turkish diplomacy is now active and appreciated on several fronts.
Turkey’s new neighbourhood policy made its first
breakthrough in 1998. After Ankara persuaded Damascus to expel
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish militant was captured
following an odyssey that included extended stays in Italy and
the Embassy of Greece in Kenya. Greece changed policy after this
exposure of its officials’ complicity, aided by an outpouring of
mutual solidarity after twin earthquakes in Turkey and Greece
in 1999. Just three years after the two sides had nearly gone to war
over claims to a rocky islet in the Aegean Sea, Greek and Turkish
foreign ministers led a process of Greece-Turkey normalization
that cleared Turkey’s path to official EU candidacy status in
December 1999 and later brought great economic benefits and
lower defence spending to both sides.
The turnaround in Turkey’s relationship with Syria was
equally dramatic. Trade, flights and tourism between the two
countries all rose rapidly, as did mutual visits between the

V Turkey and its region

leaderships. Whereas the regime in Damascus had previously
opposed NATO-member Turkey’s few overtures to the Arab
world, it now became its ally, helping Turkey become an observer
at the Arab League, despite the fact that Turkey had cemented its
long-standing ties with Israel with a military training agreement
in 1996. In 2008, Turkey’s relationship with both Syria and Israel
brought about several rounds of proximity talks between Syrian

24 25
 and Israeli diplomats in Istanbul, a contribution to the Arab- contributing troops and commanders to the EU’s Balkan and
Israeli peace process that goes beyond what is normally achieved NATO’s Afghan missions. Further afield, Turkey has also become
by the EU. Furthermore, Turkey was able to back up Egyptian an observer in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the African
and French initiatives – at their requests – with its own talks with Union, and its candidate won the first democratic election to
Hamas to help broker an end to the Gaza crisis in January 2009. head the 57-nation Organization of the Islamic Conference. This
Strong criticism of the Israeli assault on the Palestinian territory productive activism was crowned with success when 151 states
by Turkish leaders damaged Turkey’s image as a neutral broker in voted for Turkey to become a non-permanent member of the UN
Israel, and worried Arab leaders that the Turks might be seeking a Security Council in 2009-10.
populist limelight, but at the same time it confirmed to regional Perhaps the most notable example of Turkey’s new and
populations that, among non-Arab actors, it was not just Iran that successful engagement with its region has been the development
felt and articulated their concerns. of a carefully balanced Iraq policy. As it repaired relations with the
Turkey has a level and frequency of access to the Iranian United States – damaged after the Turkish parliament declined to
leadership that is greater than that of EU countries, and allow U.S. troops to invade through Turkish territory, a democratic
consistently supports the EU position on Iran’s nuclear reflex that any European state might have been proud of – one of its
programme and on halting any weaponisation. This is not the first contributions was to help reconcile Sunni Muslims to the new
only dynamic by which a Europeanizing Turkey can influence Iraqi order. It has also built up ties with factions in the Shia Muslim
Iran’s Islamic Republic. Iranians do not need visas to enter Turkey, majority, giving them some alternative to their main relationship
and one million visit each year to sample Turkey’s free-wheeling with Iran. From 2003 onwards, Turkey initiated meetings of
beaches and hotels alongside two million Russians and four Iraq’s neighbours, whose foreign ministers met a dozen times
million Germans. There is nothing fundamentally un-European to reduce chances of a break-up of Iraq. Above all, it overcame
about the prospect of having the EU’s eastern edge in eastern old taboos and started working publicly with Iraq’s Kurdistan
Turkey, where the frontier of the Roman Empire lay, and neither is Regional Government. The policy has helped Iraq and reined in
it destabilizing. The dividing line between Turkey and Iran is one the PKK, whose chief bases are in northern Iraq. Turkish products
of the oldest national borders in the world, having stayed the same and contractors, long dominant in the Iraqi Kurdish market, are
since the time the two countries ended the last war between increasingly prominent all over Iraq, and potential partners for
them in 1639. European companies seeking business there.
Newly confident and respected by its neighbours thanks Many Muslim leaders, intellectuals and opinion-makers
to its accession negotiations with the EU, AKP has built up the perceive the EU’s treatment of Turkey as an indicator of European
Turkish regional policy it inherited as a major achievement of its attitudes towards the Muslim world. The presence of more than
government. Supported by President Gül and Prime Minister 200 Middle Eastern journalists to witness the decision to open
Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s name in particular accession negotiations with Turkey at the Brussels European
has been associated with a “zero-problem” policy of peace- Council of December 2004 well illustrates this resonance. But it
promotion in the region, and, through “maximum cooperation”, would be wrong to see Turkey’s intensified relationship with its
to reverse a tendency of previous Turkish external policy to focus eastern neighbours as an “Islamic” foreign policy, even if President

V Turkey and its region

on perceived foreign enemies or foreign scapegoats for domestic Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan have been more open towards
ills. Beyond its Syria-Israel mediation Turkey has made significant the Middle East than earlier generations of Turkish policy-makers.
contributions to regional peace-making by fostering a trilateral Moreover, Turkish leaders’ interventions in Islamic meetings often
process with Pakistan and Afghanistan, by helping solve the 2008 highlight European concerns about reforms, women’s rights and
Lebanon presidential election crisis, by initiating a Caucasus the need to end the habit of blaming all the region’s ills on Israel.
Stability and Cooperation Platform as a framework for all sides The rebalancing of Turkey’s international profile is not just
to communicate after Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and by between east and west: It may be a NATO member, but Russia

26 27
 is now its biggest single trading partner and energy supplier, democracy, national pride and Muslim traditions. The example of
and Turkey has avoided being caught in any tensions between its transformation has acted to project the soft power of core EU
Russia and the West. European policy-makers have been slow values eastward. Turkey has thus helped push problems further
to appreciate the extent to which Turkey and especially Istanbul away from the borders of the European Union, demonstrating
have become an all-round regional hub since the end of the Cold that an EU-member Turkey with borders on Syria, Iran and Iraq is
War, which had cut off NATO-member Turkey from much of its not a liability but makes a good partner to help manage and assist
natural commercial hinterland in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus European interests in the Middle East and elsewhere. In Central
and Middle East. European visa policies mean even European Asian states, for instance, most of whose populations speak Turkic
companies find it useful to base regional operations in Istanbul, languages, Turkish businessmen are often the single biggest
and many contracts signed by multinationals in Russia or Central group, the most experienced contractors and the
Without Turkey, the EU’s
Asia would not be won or completed without the diligent support companies that are able to perform most quickly
task in the region becomes
of Turkish sub-contractors. and effectively. An EU-empowered Turkey could
a harder uphill struggle.
Turkey’s geography already makes it important for European add Europe as a player to a region currently
energy security, with major energy transport routes criss-crossing dominated by Russia, China and the United States.
the country. These include tankers passing through the Turkish There is no other country whose leaders can and do travel so
Straits, oil pipelines to the Mediterranean from often between capitals as varied as Moscow and Damascus, Tehran
Turkey contributes to
Iraq and Azerbaijan and natural gas pipelines and Jerusalem, and be received with respect and be able to advocate
crisis-solving, and serves
from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. Natural important policy goals so widely. Turkey cannot solve any crisis or
as a world crossroads
gas already transits westward to Greece and problem for the EU single-handedly, but without Turkey, the EU’s
for energy transport.
an onward connection to Italy is planned. task in the region becomes a harder uphill struggle.
There were those who dismissed each of these pipelines as pipe
dreams at the beginning, but the network has steadily grown.
Implementation of the theoretically promising Nabucco natural
gas pipeline project from Turkey to the EU has been delayed by a
lack of politically easy gas supplies and excess transit and profit
demands by Turkey. The planned pipeline also suffers from a lack
of European sense of purpose, even though Nabucco offers the real
chance of new non-Russian gas supplies from the Caspian basin,
Iraq and Iran, if Tehran’s relationship with Washington improves.
The signing of the key inter-governmental agreement in July is
an important step forward. In view of Turkey’s role as a possible
energy hub, it is ironic that Cyprus is forcing the EU to block the
opening of the Energy chapter in the accession negotiations. While
Turkey and the EU will both clearly remain dependent on Russia’s

V Turkey and its region

huge oil and gas reserves, Ankara could be a key EU energy partner
if European leaders were more ready to commit funding to such
projects and consistency to the Turkey relationship. Russia has
been the only winner from dissent on this matter so far.
Turkey contributes to crisis-solving; is building up its role
as a world crossroads for energy transport; and inspires regional
imitators of its relatively successful mix of market economy,

28 29
 VI Turkey’s opening genocide recognition resolutions from more than 20 parliaments,
including several in Europe.

with Armenia
In the past decade there has been remarkable change in
Turkey on the Armenian issue, in parallel with a new national
self-confidence generated by the virtuous circle of EU outreach
to Turkey and EU-backed domestic reforms. The trend was
led by academics, the Turkish community first exposed to the
full range of international scholarship about the Armenian
question. Novelists began to explore a sense of loss and guilt
about the once vital Armenian pillar of Ottoman society. Broader
sources of information became available to the general public
The relationship between Turkey and Armenia is burdened by too, through travel, translations of books and the internet. In
a number of inter-connected problems. Turks and Armenians 2005, Turkey’s leaders called for the matter to be turned over to
have disagreed about how to describe the Ottoman-era massacres a Turkish-Armenian joint commission of historians, a proposal
committed against Armenians in the First World War. On top regrettably not accepted by Armenia. Turkish official statements
of this, Turkey, which has a close partnership with Azerbaijan and schoolbooks began avoiding the use of the old term “so-called
based on linguistic ties and now major oil and gas pipelines, has genocide” in favour of more neutral terminology like “the events of
long linked any improvement in its relationship with Armenia to 1915”. In 2008, reflecting a growing sense that it was time to come
a negotiated settlement of the Armenians’ 1992-1994 conquest of to terms, 200 intellectuals, later joined by 30,000 other Turkish
Azerbaijan’s Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. citizens, signed an online petition apologizing in their personal
These disputes meant that Turkey and Armenia failed to open capacity for the “great catastrophe” that befell the Armenians
diplomatic relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union. in 1915.
Turkey also closed the Armenia border in 1993 to put pressure on There was also movement on bilateral relations between
Armenian forces to withdraw from the 13.5% of Azerbaijan they the two countries. Air links have remained open for much of the
currently occupy. period despite the closure of the border. Each month Turkish
The young Turkish Republic, feeling threatened from all sides businessmen truck some ten million dollars worth of exports
in its fight for national survival, never faced up to the atrocities to Armenia through Georgia and Iran. Tens of thousands of
committed during the dying days of the Ottoman Armenians have been informally allowed to stay
The Turkish Republic In April 2009, the
Empire. It was also alarmed by territorial claims in Turkey to work. Over the last years, secret talks
never faced up to two sides announced
and demands for reparations by Armenians, and progressed between Turkish and Armenian officials.
atrocities committed agreement on
resented that Turkish casualties and war-time After the election of Armenian President Serzh
during the dying days a “comprehensive

VI Turkey’s opening with Armenia

conditions in eastern Anatolia as the Ottomans Sarkisian in February 2008, a new page was turned.
of the Ottoman Empire. framework” for
fought invaders on three fronts were not taken into Turkish President Gül accepted an invitation to
normalization.
account. To question the official line became a criminal offence attend a Turkey-Armenia football match in Yerevan
and the issue a taboo. in September 2008. This encounter was followed up by intense
Armenia, meanwhile, requested that the events be recognized but discreet diplomatic contacts including on the level of Foreign
as “genocide” by Turkey. The large Armenian diasporas in Europe Ministers. In April 2009, the two sides announced agreement on
and America have been radical in pursuing this demand. Diaspora a “comprehensive framework” for normalization. Without being
terrorists killed 30 members of the Turkish diplomatic service publicly spelled out, it was widely known to foresee the establishing
and their families between 1973 and 1984. On the political front, of diplomatic relations, the re-opening of the border and the
diaspora lobbyists, with the moral support of Armenia, have won setting up of a bilateral commission including a sub-commission

30 31
 to deal with the events of 1915. Regrettably, Turkey appeared to the European Parliament, which has in the past shown sensitivity
step back from the deal a few weeks later, publicly linking any about the Armenian issue.
Turkish movement to the Nagorno Karabakh situation once again. The Independent Commission is convinced that a
There is a complex triangle that connects the three main normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia remains
issues in play: the events of 1915, Turkey-Armenia normalization within reach and that it would symbolize much of the regional
and the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Progress on any of these good that Turkey’s policy of neutrality in the neighbourhood has
matters would have a positive impact on the others. Not allowing been trying to achieve, setting an example of statesmanship that
progress on any of them, on the other hand, would just prolong can help to calm the volatile situation in the south Caucasus.
past stalemates. It is a fact, for instance, that keeping the Turkey-
Armenia border closed for 16 years has not helped Azerbaijan win
back any territory occupied by Armenia. An Armenia made to
feel more secure by a normalized relationship with Turkey, on the
contrary, could start the ball rolling for progress in settling this
conflict, which has defied international mediation for almost
two decades.
Turkey-Armenia normalization will make the process of
reconciliation with the past easier and vice-versa. Coming to terms
with its history, however, is a task to be carried out by Turkish
society itself. Historians from both sides can prepare the ground,
preferably working together and with third parties so that their
research can be fully credible to the other side. Legislation by
foreign parliaments, on the other hand, has been and remains
counter-productive to this process, provoking nationalistic
reactions and holding up change. Furthermore, genocide
resolutions stand little chance of persuading Turkey, since these
usually seem to be products of domestic political pressures rather
than high moral concerns, and ignore the way most legislatures
tend to be silent on their own past national short-comings.
With considerable political courage, Turkey’s President Gül
and Armenia’s President Sarkisian have broken the taboos that
ruled out progress for too long. Both sides should make best use

VI Turkey’s opening with Armenia

of the dynamics thus created and return as quickly as possible
to the road-map that treats Turkey-Armenia normalization
separately from other issues in the Caucasus. For Armenia this will
end its blockaded isolation, its near-total dependence on Russia
and open a western gateway to Europe. In Turkey’s case, while
not a formal criteria for eventual EU accession, honest work to
settle the controversy will send a powerful message to Europeans
about Turkey’s readiness to reconcile itself with its past. Good
relations with all neighbours are expected from an EU candidate
country and any accession treaty must ultimately be ratified by

32 33
 VII Islam and the secular The AKP, for its part, sees itself as the Muslim equivalent of
a Christian Democrat party in Europe. AKP says its secularist

Turkish state
opponents use charges of Islamism as a pretext to keep hold of the
levers of bureaucratic power, using methods from the Republic’s
authoritarian past. If the party had an Islamist agenda, its leaders
add, they would be advocating the imposition of Islamic law, which
they do not. Indeed, AKP’s concern is clearly to win elections and
to stay in office, and leaning towards Islamism would alienate
more votes than it attracts in Turkey. The country does have an
even more explicitly religious and conservative party, from which
AKP’s more centrist leaders split off in 2001, but it won only 5.2%
From its foundation in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has modelled of the vote in March 2009. Furthermore, Turkish society now has
itself on the French ideal of a secular state and aimed to remove a secular bedrock. This was demonstrated again when the people
religion from any role in government and politics. Individual of western Turkish cities, who have historically determined the
freedom of religion is protected, while legal sanctions block any country’s direction, staged peaceful mass demonstrations in
advocacy of a return to Shariah Islamic law. The state meanwhile support of secular principles in 2007 and gave strong support for
keeps control of an established Sunni Muslim hierarchy, paying the secularist parties in the 2009 municipal elections.
country’s prayer leaders as civil servants, owning most mosques Clearly, there is an increase in the importance of religion in
and centrally directing the content of sermons. This system is a Turkish society, a phenomenon that can be seen in other countries
main foundation of the modern Turkish state. and other faiths. This is partly a consequence of the more open
Secular Turks and some Europeans are concerned with what atmosphere as Turkey evolves; partly due to the migration of
they perceive as a progressive “Islamisation” of Turkish society people from traditionally more religious rural areas to the western
in recent years. More women appear to wear headscarves in city cities; and partly because of a struggle for power between the
centres, and in conservative neighbourhoods it now seems more newly urbanized, upwardly mobile, observant conservatives of
common to see women wearing black çarşaf AKP and the old guard secularists in the establishment, military
Secular Turks and
cloaks covering their heads and bodies. They and judiciary. A typical example of this polarization is the
Europeans are concerned
relate this to the AKP government and its alleged question over whether Turkey should lift a ban on women wearing
with what they perceive as
“hidden agenda” to turn Turkey into a state headscarves in universities. Outsiders too have taken both sides
progressive “Islamisation”
based on Islamist principles. Opponents of the in this debate. Human Rights Watch, for instance, supports the
of Turkish society.
ruling party point to the way the government right of adult women to wear what they want, while the European

VII Islam and the secular Turkish state

has recruited civil servants with a more observant religious Court of Human Rights has backed the Turkish Constitutional
culture. They also complain that AKP-run municipalities cultivate Court’s ban. At the same time, 70% of Turks support women
a “neighbourhood pressure” that intimidates women against college students’ right to use headscarves. Turkish women face
wearing what they want in religious neighbourhoods, deters people much worse difficulties of concern – including honour killings,
from eating or drinking in public during the Ramadan month family obstacles to girls’ education, arranged marriages and low
of Muslim fasting and has effectively driven the sale of alcohol representation in the upper reaches of the work force – but these are
out of the centres of provincial towns. One consequence of this problems of poverty, tradition and education, not AKP or Islam.
perception was that ten of the eleven judges of the Constitutional It is difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion on these sensitive
Court, a bastion of Turkish secularism, found the AKP guilty in issues, which are of importance for many Europeans. For instance,
2008 of being “a focal point of anti-secular activities”. The court while many people have the impression that more Turkish women
did not, however, find enough evidence to close the party down. are wearing headscarves on city centre streets, a study by Turkey’s

34 35
 Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) showed that in government should address their concerns with greater
fact the wearing of headscarves has decreased in absolute terms. urgency too.
What can be said is that the secular system is not in doubt. Polls Turkey is already today the most democratic, secular state in
show that less than 10% of Turks support Shariah law as an ideal, the Muslim world. The Independent Commission is convinced
and, when the more outdated injunctions such as polygamy and that to anchor Turkey firmly in the EU would provide additional
corporal punishment are spelled out, the support level drops to a protection to the secular principles of the Republic.
Secularism is a
fraction of that. There is no question that after
well-founded pillar of the
80 years, secularism is a well-founded pillar of
Republic of Turkey.
the Republic of Turkey, even if making the state
equidistant from the religions of all Turkish
citizens is still a work in progress. Nevertheless, media speculation,
court cases and political rhetoric about the orientation and
intentions of the AKP, while part of a political power struggle, also
reflect the real concerns of liberal civil society, and require careful
observation. It is regrettable that AKP leaders have not done more
to soothe the legitimate anxieties of secularists in Turkey.
Of particular interest to European opinion, too, is the status
of non-Muslims in Turkey. Armenian, Jewish, Greek Orthodox
and other Christian communities amount to about 0.2% of the
Turkish population, or 150,000 people, and have suffered periods
of discrimination and harassment during the country’s history.
The tragic murders of a Roman Catholic priest, an Armenian
Turkish newspaper editor and three members of a provincial
evangelist congregation in the past three years appear to be
isolated incidents that have as much to do with xenophobic gangs
as religious discrimination. Individual freedom of worship has
long been guaranteed in theory and practice in Turkey, but the
main problem is of a different nature. Turkey must modernize its
approach to the legal personality of and ownership of property by
religious communities; give freedom to the training of priests of

VII Islam and the secular Turkish state

all legal denominations; liberalize the granting of work permits for
foreign clergymen; and end indirect local bureaucratic difficulties
in the maintenance and improvement of churches and prayer halls
for non-mainstream faiths. In order to mitigate some of these
problems, the government in 2008 enacted a Law on Foundations
that aims to restore non-Muslim property rights and allow
religious communities to own properties. This law, however, can
only be seen as a first step in the right direction.
The 4.5 million Turks living in Europe enjoy wide freedoms
to exercise their religion, including the building of thousands
of mosques. As more and more EU citizens live in Turkey, the

36 37
 VIII Economic resilience Overall, Turkey kept up an average 7% GDP growth between 2002-
2007, although the rate slowed down to 1.1% in 2008 amidst the
global downturn. The IMF has warned Turkey to brace itself for a
5% contraction in 2009, due to a fall in exports, consumption and
investment, but the IMF expects a return to 1.5%
Both the budget
growth in 2010. Both the budget deficit and debt
deficit and debt stock
stock – 2.2% and 39.5% of GDP based on EU
of Turkey now meet
definitions in 2008 – now meet the Maastricht
the Maastricht criteria.
criteria. The crisis has also taken pressure off
Turkey’s current account deficit, running at 5.7% of GDP in 2008
and predicted by the IMF to fall to 1.2% in 2009. Turkey’s relatively
Turkey has a functioning market economy, and its resilience to high inflation of 10.4% in 2008 – down from 45% in 2003 and
the global financial crisis demonstrates the considerable progress 84% in 1998 – was still lower than several EU members including
made during the past decade of convergence with Europe. Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Estonia. The IMF and Turkish
High economic growth in 2002-2007 was achieved alongside Central Bank expect inflation to drop to around 7% in 2009.
successful disinflation. Debt levels in the national accounts fell, Exports rose 23% to reach $132 billion and imports 19% to $202
thanks to primary budget surpluses, International Monetary billion in 2008. In 2009, however, the government expects a 7%
Fund-backed fiscal discipline and buoyant conditions in pre- drop in exports and 10.4% fall in imports.
crisis international markets. Historically large amounts of direct
investment continue to flow into the country, further supporting Exports and Imports
stability and development in the economy. A key anchor of this Export (US$ Billion) Import (US$ Billion)
rising prosperity has been the increasing security of investment 150 250
and policy predictability provided by the transformation aimed at 132
202
EU membership. Turkey remains an economy with great potential 120 200
107.3
170.1
for European business, with its young and fast-growing market, 90 85.5 150 139.6
its proven base for high-quality manufacturing and its companies 73.5 116.8
63.2 97.5
familiar with a wide and developing region of which Turkey is a 60
47.3
100
69.3
principal commercial hub. 36.1
51.6
30 50

Real GPD growth (2002 – 2007 average) 0 0

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
%
8
7
7 The banking sector has proven particularly strong, thanks
6 5.5
5.1 5.1
4.7
to a shake-out during a domestic Turkish financial crisis in 2000-

VIII Economic resilience

5 4.6 4.3
4 3.7 3.5 2001 and the new Banking Act of 2005. Bank capital adequacy
2.8
3 2.6
1.96
ratios were higher than Poland or Hungary in 2008 and total
2
1
capital actually rose 9% in September 2008-March 2009, the worst
0 months of the global financial crisis, to which no Turkish bank
has yet succumbed. The quality of loans to Turkish corporate
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h

Lu

Eu
ec

lira terms in the first quarter of 2009 compared to a year earlier.

Cz

38 39
 In a typical example of the country’s growth potential, Turkish FDI in Turkey 2000 – 2008
households borrow only one seventh as much as in the EU. At (in US$ Billion)

the same time, Turkey is a young country, with 61% of Turks 25

22
under 35 years old. Since 2002, the financial sector has attracted 20.2
20 18.2
considerable foreign investment, with Italian, British, French,
Belgian, Dutch and Greek banks taking major stakes in Turkish 15

banks, putting European banking brand-names and interests on 9.8

10
the high street of every town in Turkey.
Such purchases were part of a first major inflow of foreign 5
1.7
3.4
1.8
2.8
1.1
direct investment that began pouring in when accession talks 0
opened in 2005. After decades in which investment lingered at 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
an annual level of $1-2 billion per year, it reached a peak of $22
billion in 2007. EU-based entities accounted for two thirds of this The 1996 Customs Union agreement with Turkey represents
investment during the decade, led by Greece, Austria, Germany, the deepest economic and trade relationship that the EU has
France and the UK. At the same time, the number of German with a non-member. There are shortcomings in this partnership,
companies operating in Turkey more than doubled to 3,000 in however. Turkey has particular grievances about the Free Trade
the three years after 2005, as Turkish German businesspeople Agreements that the EU negotiates with third countries, which,
moved quickly to take advantage of Turkey’s new potential. under customs union rules, gives them tariff-free access to the
Despite roughly halving after the onset of the global crisis in Turkish market without forcing them, at the same time, to open
mid-2008, investment into Turkey continued at a steady pace in their markets to Turkey.
the last quarter of 2008 ($3.8 billion). Further privatizations of The Turkish economy is not without its own problems.
state enterprises and a large state bank will likely attract still more Unemployment in 2008 was officially 10.6%, and in reality it is
European funds in the near future. probably even further above the EU average of 7.6%. In 2005, Turkey
Such privatizations netted about $50 billion for the Turkish had the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s
state this decade and helped transform and internationalize the largest inter-regional differences in productivity levels and female
Turkish economy. Additionally, EU-based companies like France’s participation in the economy, disparities that have
Turkey has large
Carrefour, Austria’s OMV, Germany’s Bosch and Siemens and the caused disruptive, large-scale flows of migrants
inter-regional differences
UK’s Vodafone all made major investments in manufacturing, to more prosperous cities in the past. Agriculture
in productivity levels
retailing, energy and telecommunications. The investment goes provides 8.7% of GDP, compared to an average
and female participation.
both ways, with Turkish firms raising their commitment to 1.6% in the EU, and some 26% of Turks still
Europe. Major European household brand-names like Godiva work on farms, compared to 5.4% in the EU. However, the number
chocolates, Grundig televisions, Blomberg household appliances of farmers has decreased from 33% in 2002. Turkey has begun
and Villeroy and Boch tiles are now Turkish-owned product lines reforming its large, fragmented and inefficient agricultural sector,
whose parent companies increasingly do the relevant design, and has started work to register farmers, reduce direct subsidies,

VIII Economic resilience

engineering and manufacturing. Furthermore, the reality of Turks remove artificial incentives and tackle problems of low productivity.
in Europe is now much removed from their 1960s-1980s images Aside from the EU candidacy, the other great anchor that
as guest workers. In 2008, over 130,000 Turks in Europe were secured Turkish policy and investor confidence in Turkey from 1999
entrepreneurs, with total investments worth approximately €14.4 onwards was an IMF program that reached a successful conclusion
billion in businesses that employed around 600,000 people. in May 2008. Although Turkey has so far managed to cope with the
global financial crisis due to the sudden drop in its current account
deficit, structural problems remain. Rating agencies and Turkey’s

40 41
 own business community advocate the conclusion of a long-
discussed, two-year, $20 billion new IMF program deal before Fall Conclusions
2009. Failure to do so could well trigger a new vicious circle in which
weaker market confidence results in increased outflows of foreign
capital and downward pressures on the currency, leading to higher
interest rates.
Nevertheless the resilience of the Turkish economy has given
it options that it never had before, underlining the inherent and
growing strength of Turkey. It is, however, a regional power that
must give priority to its relationship with Europe. Taken as a bloc,
the EU is by far its most important trade partner. Trade with EU-27
in 2008 made up 48 per cent of Turkey’s total exports and 37 per 1 The European Council’s decision to begin accession
cent of imports (down from 56 per cent and 40 per cent in 2007 negotiations with Turkey in 2005 opened the way for the country’s
respectively). For the EU, Turkey is the fifth biggest export market, full integration into European structures, an ambition pursued by
ahead of Japan, and demand from the Turkish market can be very the Republic of Turkey since its foundation and which accelerated
lucrative for European companies, as demonstrated by Turkish after World War II with Turkey’s membership of the Council of
Airlines’ tender in January 2009 for 105 new airplanes. Europe and many other European organizations. Unfortunately,
The Independent Commission is convinced that the mutual negative statements by some European leaders soon after the
economic benefits of Turkey-EU convergence, the volume of EU’s Heads of State or Government had taken their unanimous
trade, the multiplicity of EU-Turkey business relationships and the decision, efforts to substitute alternative arrangements to
potential for growth make a compelling case for further integration. accession as the agreed objective and obstacles put in the way of
Half-measures and talk of alternative arrangements to membership the negotiations have all but derailed the process. In Turkey, this
cannot persuade Turkey that it is a full player on the EU team led to a dramatic drop in support for EU convergence from the
and will harm EU companies in their attempts to win the future Turkish public and reinforced the government’s
European governments
contracts they need. On the Turkish side, half-heartedness will hold lack of resolve in proceeding with Turkey’s
must honour their
up the regulatory changes it has to make in order to stay competitive transformation. This, in turn, fed arguments to
commitments and treat
and delay the transformation Turkey must undergo to deliver the sceptics in European countries for whom the
Turkey with fairness.
economic growth to its young and expanding workforce. In short, lack of reforms presented the proof that Turkey
the goal of membership, sincerely embraced, is a major driving force was unworthy of EU membership. The Independent Commission
that can deliver prosperity in both the EU and Turkey. is of the view that the vicious circle thus created must be broken
urgently, in the interest of both Turkey and the European Union.
A comparison of economic indicators (2008) This will require a change of attitude of both European and
Turkish leaderships. European governments must honour their
Units Turkey Croatia Bulgaria Romania Euro Area EU-27
commitments and treat Turkey with fairness and the respect it
GPD Billion Euro 498.4 47.4 34.1 137.0 9.209 12.507
deserves. Turkey, including both its government and opposition,
GPD per cap at PPS* (forecast) EU-27=100 44.3 63.0 39.2 44.9 111.2 100.0
has to encourage its many supporters in Europe through a
Inflation (consumer prices, year-end) % (change) 10.4 5.8 7.2 6.3 1.6 3.7
dynamic, broad-based reform process, thus confirming that it is
Gross government debt % (of GPD) 38.8** 37.7** 14.1 13.6 69.1 61.5
willing and serious in its ambition to join the EU.
Budget surplus % (of GPD) -1.8 -1.6** 1.5 -5.4 -1.9 -2.3

Purchasing Power Standards, **2007 data

2 The decision by the European Council was very clear: the
Sources: Eurostat, AMECO, IMF, Republic of Turkey Investment Support and Promotion Agency. shared objective of negotiations with Turkey is accession, not any

42 43
 alternative such as “privileged partnership” or an unspecified to a successful conclusion. Moreover, Turkey must implement
“special relationship”. Such concepts would exclude Turkey from its obligations under the Additional Protocol and open its ports
participating in the EU’s political decision-making but offer to Greek Cypriot traffic. At the same time the EU has to fulfil
little added value to its present status as an associate member and promises made in 2004 to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot
partner in a customs union. Moreover, these negotiations, by their community and allow it direct trade with the EU.
nature, have to be geared towards membership. No country would
take upon itself the large number of difficult reforms needed to 5 Helped by a new openness and greater tolerance in the wake
adopt the acquis communautaire if full integration was not the of the 2000-2005 era of EU reforms, the ruling AKP has presided
objective. As in other negotiations, however, there is no guarantee over more progress on Turkey’s long-running Kurdish problem
that the agreed goal can be reached. In that sense Turkey’s than any previous government. Kurdish culture is now more
accession negotiations are certainly an open-ended process. broadly tolerated, a Kurdish-language 24-hour state television
station was opened earlier this year and the government began
3 After the golden era of Turkish transformation in 2000-2005, implementing a poverty relief programme sponsored by the World
Turkey failed to sustain the reform momentum. The slow-down Bank. Old taboos about dealing with the Kurdistan Regional
was partly a reaction to negative attitudes towards Turkey and a Government in Iraq have been put aside, bringing Turkey more
general loss of direction in the EU, but was also due to AKP’s lack of genuine cooperation in combating the PKK. These are certainly
resolve and domestic disruptions. A plot to topple the government, positive developments. However, in the interest of Turkey’s
a Constitutional Court case to close AKP down and a public threat stability, more has to be done and with greater urgency. To grant
of intervention by the military were all linked to secularist factions Kurds the full use of their language and respect for their identity,
in the army, judiciary and political parties. Such problems have securing genuine equality for all citizens of Turkey, combined with
now abated, and the ruling party has been strongly endorsed by the continued efforts to overcome social and economic deficiencies
electorate in 2007 and 2009. The government has drawn up a new in the South-East, is the only way to eliminate dangerous tensions
National Programme of EU reforms. It should now make good on and to uproot this problem once and for all.
its promises to both the EU and its own people to renew the reform
process, in particular enacting a new constitution, a functioning 6 The importance of Turkey’s geo-strategic position for Europe
ombudsman, full freedoms for religious organizations, respect for is highlighted by its role as hub for vital energy supplies from
cultural liberties and wider freedom of expression. the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and the Middle East. In addition,
Turkey has the potential of offering European economies easy
4 The ongoing talks between the leaders of the two communities access to markets in Central Asian states, where it retains a strong
in Cyprus present the best and probably last chance to end the presence based on geography, language and ethnic ties. In recent
division of the island and come to a mutually acceptable federal years, Turkey’s new regional policy allowed it to settle outstanding
solution of this long-lasting dispute. A positive outcome would disputes with most of its neighbours and to actively engage in crisis
not only bring major benefits to both sides, it would also remove a solving efforts in the wider region. The Independent Commission
pernicious obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession process and enhance believes that Turkey’s full integration into Europe would not lead
the stability of this part of the Mediterranean region. Failure to further entanglement of the EU in dangerous situations in the
would likely lead to a long-drawn out partition of the island that Middle East and South Caucasus, but on the contrary enable it to
would prove highly divisive for the EU. EU negotiations with better help solve these problems and to project stability into its
Turkey would come to a halt. While the prime responsibility volatile neighbourhood.

Conclusions
for an agreed settlement rests with the two communities and its
leaders, European governments, in particular those of Greece and 7 Turkish-Armenian relations have long been burdened
Turkey, should use all their influence to bring the negotiations by differences over the nature of Ottoman-era massacres of

44 45
 Armenians, the lack of diplomatic relations, the closure of the character. The government has taken certain measures recently
border and – indirectly – the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between to improve the situation. Nevertheless, more determined action is
Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a consequence of dynamics triggered required to address these problems in a fully satisfactory manner.
by Turkey’s EU candidate status and the opening of accession
negotiations, progress was achieved on most of these issues. In 10 Turkey’s economy demonstrated considerable resilience
Turkey, the process of coming to terms with the past has begun during the recent global financial crisis. No Turkish bank failed,
in earnest and the events of 1915 are now being openly discussed. partly due to a shake-out during a domestic 2000-2001 financial
This is a task, however, which has to be carried out by Turkish crisis, and partly due to structural transformations anchored
society itself. Outside pressure, in particular resolutions by foreign by the accession process and a strict IMF programme. Until
parliaments labelling the events of 1915 as genocide, is counter- 2008, Turkey’s economy grew by an average of 7%, and attracted
productive and should be avoided. On bilateral relations, last unprecedented foreign investments, much of it from European
year’s visit of President Gül to Yerevan has opened the way for full banks and businesses. On the other hand, regional imbalances, a
normalisation. The Independent Commission is of the view that large agricultural sector and a high rate of unemployment continue
this path should be continued by both parties without further to be of serious concern.
delay and without linking it to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Ending Armenia’s isolation and establishing friendly relations 11 The Independent Commission remains convinced of the
between Turkey and Armenia would surely have a positive impact huge benefits of Turkish convergence with Europe and an eventual
on that conflict which has defied international mediation for EU membership of a transformed Turkey, both for the country
almost two decades. itself and the European Union. The impressive progress Turkey
has made in all fields over the last ten years was
To ensure a continuation
8 During past years the importance of religion in Turkish clearly linked to the country’s EU candidate
of Turkey’s transformation
society has been on the increase and the observance of religious status and the accession process. To ensure
its European perspective
practices and traditions by the faithful has become more visible. a continuation of Turkey’s transformation
must be preserved.
The secular establishment perceives this development as “creeping its European perspective must be preserved.
Islamisation” instigated by the ruling AKP and as a threat to Nobody can predict the outcome of the accession process and
Turkish secularism. For others it is the consequence of a more open whether the stated goal can be reached. To give it a fair chance,
atmosphere as Turkey evolves and of massive migration of people however, is a matter of the EU’s credibility, of self interest and of
from traditionally more religious rural areas to western cities. For fairness due to all candidate countries.
the overwhelming majority of Turks the secular system which
constitutes one of the main pillars of the Republic of Turkey is not
in doubt and no relevant political factor in Turkey advocates a state
based on Islamic principles. In addition, as Turkish supporters of
accession to the EU have pointed out, firmly anchoring the country
in Europe would be the best protection for secularism in Turkey,
and highlight Turkey’s positive experience of the modernization of
Islam for Muslims in Europe and in the broader Muslim world.

9 Individual freedom of worship has long been guaranteed in

Conclusions
theory and practice in Turkey. However, non-mainstream Muslim
communities as well as the much smaller Christian churches
are faced with a number of difficulties, some of them of a legal

46 47
 Annex status. No government can claim that these decisions, including
the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of 2002
on accession negotiations, were not taken in full knowledge of all
circumstances.

3 The decision the European Council is taking in December will

not be on Turkey’s membership to the EU, but on the opening of
accession negotiations. Their duration and outcome will depend
on progress made, in particular with regard to economic criteria
and the acquis communautaire. It is expected that this process will
take a long time, reflecting the scale of difficulties faced by such a
Conclusions of the Independent Commission on Turkey’s 2004 Report large and complex country and the need for consolidation of the
Union following the accession of ten new member states. This
1 The Independent Commission on Turkey is of the view interval will present an opportunity for both sides to address the
that accession negotiations should be opened as soon as Turkey most urgent problems and to mitigate any negative effects Turkey’s
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. Further delay would accession could have. In other words, by the time a final decision is
damage the European Union’s credibility and be seen as a breach taken both Turkey and the European Union will have profoundly
of the generally recognised principle that “pacta sunt servanda” changed.
(agreements are to be honoured). Turkey, on the other hand,
must accept that fulfilment of the political criteria includes the 4 Turkey’s accession would offer considerable benefits both to
implementation of all legislation passed by parliament. Accession the European Union and to Turkey. For the Union, the unique
criteria apply to all candidate countries alike and there can be no geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans,
shortcuts in individual cases. Equally, fairness demands that no the wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond,
candidate state should be submitted to more rigorous conditions its importance for the security of Europe’s energy supplies and
than others. It is incumbent on the European Commission to its political, economic and military weight would be great assets.
assess whether Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria Moreover, as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the
has reached the critical mass necessary to recommend opening European Union, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe’s
accession negotiations. relations with the Islamic world.

2 As far as Turkey’s European credentials are concerned, Turkey For Turkey, EU accession would be the ultimate confirmation
is a Euro-Asian country, its culture and history closely entwined that its century-old orientation towards the West was the right
with Europe, with a strong European orientation and a European choice, and that it is finally accepted by Europe. EU membership
vocation which has been accepted for decades by European would also ensure that the country’s transformation into a modern
governments. In this, Turkey is fundamentally different from democratic society has become irreversible, enabling Turkey to
countries of Europe’s neighbourhood in both North Africa and the fully exploit its rich human and economic resources.
Middle East. Its accession to the European Union would therefore
not necessarily serve as a model for the Union’s relations with A failure of the Turkish accession process would not only mean the
these states. Any objections in principle against Turkey joining the loss of important opportunities for both sides. It could result in
European integration process should have been raised in 1959 at a serious crisis of identity in Turkey, leading to political upheaval

Annex
the time of Turkey’s first application, in 1987 when Turkey applied and instability at the Union’s doorstep.
for the second time, or in 1999 before Turkey was given candidate

48 49
 5 In spite of its size and special characteristics, and although 7 Turkey’s economy has traditionally been plagued by
it would unquestionably increase the Union’s heterogeneity as a macroeconomic instability and structural deficiencies, many of
member, Turkey would be unlikely to fundamentally change the which persist today. But the crisis of 2001 has shown the resilience
EU and the functioning of its institutions. Turkey’s entry may of the Turkish economy, leading to a swift recovery and to far-
accentuate existing divergences on the future of the integration reaching reforms of the institutional and regulatory frameworks.
process, but it would not cause a qualitative shift in the debate. It It is now of vital importance that the Turkish Government persists
should be borne in mind that the decision-making process in the with the economic reform process in close cooperation with the
European Union is based on ever-changing alliances, and that the International Monetary Fund and the European Union.
political influence of member states depends at least as much on
economic power as on size or demographic weight. In view of the country’s size, geographic location and young and
dynamic workforce Turkey’s economic potential is undeniable. It
As far as the costs of Turkish membership are concerned, Turkey is is equally evident that EU membership would be highly beneficial
likely to require financial assistance from the European Union for for the Turkish economy, providing a firm link to a stable system.
many years, the level of transfers depending on the EU’s financial The opening of accession negotiations by itself would considerably
policies and the economic situation in Turkey at the time of strengthen confidence in Turkey’s economic stability.
accession.
8 Migration pressure from Turkey, which raises concern in some
A considerable problem could develop in several European countries, would depend on several factors, including economic
countries in connection with the ratification of an accession treaty and demographic developments in Turkey and the European
with Turkey, should public resistance persist and government Union. Free movement of labour is likely to apply only after a long
policy continue to diverge from popular opinion. This issue must transitional period, so that governments would retain control
be addressed in a common effort by governments concerned, of immigration for many years after Turkish accession. Based
Turkey and the European Commission. on the experience of previous enlargement rounds, migration
flows from Turkey are expected to be relatively modest, at a
The best answer to the fears in parts of Europe about Turkey’s time when declining and aging populations may be leading to a
different religious and cultural traditions and perceptions of a serious shortage of labour in many European countries, making
danger that Turkey could become a fundamentalist Muslim state is immigration vital to the continuation of present generous systems
to ensure the continuation of the ongoing transformation process, of social security.
and to protect Turkey’s long-standing secular political system by
firmly anchoring Turkey in the union of European democracies. 9 Turkish eligibility for EU membership having been confirmed
on many occasions over the past decades, Turkey has every reason
6 Unprecedented reform efforts undertaken by the Turkish for expecting to be welcome in the Union, provided it fulfils the
Government and substantial support for EU membership in relevant conditions. The Independent Commission therefore feels
Turkish public opinion should not hide the enormous task that strongly that in dealing with this issue the European Union must
the ongoing and far-reaching transformation of the country’s treat Turkey with all due respect, fairness and consideration.
legal, political and societal system represents for Turkey. It would
be wrong to underestimate the latent resistance to such profound
changes in many parts of Turkish society. Sustaining the reform
process will to a large degree depend on whether the momentum of

Annex
Turkey’s accession process can be maintained.

50 51