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Master's Theses Graduate College

12-1994

The Encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun: An Assessment of the

Winners and Losers
Joseph Kent Lutes

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THE ENCIRCLEMENT AT CHERKASSY-KORSUN:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WINNERS
AND LOSERS

by
Joseph Kent Lutes, Jr.

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of History

Western Michigan University

Kalamazoo, Michigan
December 1994
 THE ENCIRCLEMENT AT CHERKASSY-KORSUN:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WINNERS
AND LOSERS

Joseph Kent Lutes, Jr.

Western Michigan University, 1994

During the winter of 1944, two Russian armies encir-

cled two German corps on the Dnieper River. The Germans

managed to break out of the encirclement after an attempt

to relieve them failed. The battle lasted only three

weeks, but cost both sides greatly. Both sides carried

out a successful airlift to keep their troops in action.

The Germans carried out a brilliant campaign, while the

Russians demonstrated that they still needed to perfect

their encirclement doctrine and their propaganda.

Each side was hindered by its leaders. Hitler

forced the Germans to hold ground, while Stalin forced

his generals to fight a battle they should not have

fought. Both men failed to follow military doctrine, and

ignored the larger picture of the war.

Both sides won, and both sides lost. the Germans

recovered their men, but lost ground and the use of the

divisions used in the operations for a time. the Rus-

sians drove the Germans off the Dnieper, but failed to

capitalize on the gains they made.

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Keil und Kessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Technique in Practice ........ . 1

The Russians Learn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Hitler at Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Dilemma at Cherkassy-Korsun .. . 3

II. RETREAT TO THE DNIEPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

December 1943-January 1944 .......... . 5

Withdrawal Behind the River ...... . 5

A Conference With Hitler ......... . 10

Russian Breakthroughs ............ . 14

The Impending Disaster ........... . 17

Kirovograd Encircled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Battle for the City .......... . 21

Continuing Russian Offensives .... . 23

German Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

The Dnieper in Retrospect ........ . 26

III. THE ENCIRCLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

January 23-February 3, 1944 ......... . 29

Forming the Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

ii
 Table of Contents-Continued

CHAPTER

The German Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Further Russian Advances ......... . 32

The Pocket at Olschana ........... . 34

Inside the Cherkassy-Korsun

Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The First Rescue Attempt ......... . 38

Planning for a Second Relief

At tempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Hitler Meddles in the Relief

Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Support for the Relief Attempt ... . 44

Matters Within the Pocket ........ . 46

Beginning the Airlift ............ . 48

Russian Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

New Problems Within the Pocket ... . 51

Hitler Meddles Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

IV. MOUNTING THE RELIEF EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

February 3-15, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

The German Breakthroughs ......... . 58

Objections to the Conduct of the

Relief Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Problems for the Forty-Seventh

Panzer Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Third Panzer Pushes On ........... . 61

Weather Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

iii
 Table of Contents-Continued

CHAPTER

Resistance Toughens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Defending the Pocket ............. . 64

The Relief Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

To Keep the Airlift Alive ........ . 67

The Russians Step Up the Pressure. 69

Appraising the Pocket of the

Chances for Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Two Separate German Airlifts ..... . 71

Stemmermann Must Break Out ....... . 72

Stemmermann in Jeopardy .......... . 72

Stepping Up the Relief Effort .... . 75

Consolidating the Pocket ......... . 77

Across the Stream . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

The Pocket Continues to Shrink ... . 79

One More Barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Toward Korsun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

New Innovations in the Airlift ... . 82

Russian Reactions and the Russian

Airlift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

The Final Supply Drops ........... . 85

To Take Lissyanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

V. THE BREAKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

February 15-22, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

iv
 Table of Contents-Continued
CHAPTER
The Breakout Order................ 91
One More Supply Drop to the Pocket 94
To Take Hill 239.................. 94
The Final Orders.................. 96
Final Preparations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Dash for Freedom.................. 99
Utter Chaos....................... 105
Crossing the Gniloy Tikich........ 110
Final Preparations for the
Belgians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Lissyanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

The March Back to the German Lines 117

Conclusions....................... 121
VI. IN RETROSPECT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5
German and Russian Conclusions....... 125
On the Airlift.................... 125
German Conclusions................ 129

VII. PROMISES, THREATS, CANDY AND CIGARETTES.. 136

Russian Propaganda at Cherkassy
Korsun. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6

The Free Germany Committee........ 136

The Committee at Cherkassy-Korsun. 140
Propaganda Against the Pocket..... 141

V
 Table of Contents-Continued

CHAPTER

Addressing the ss................. 142

The Leaflets Arrive............... 144

A Note to von Manstein......... ... 151

Allaying the Fears of the ss... ... 152

Some German Prisoners............. 153

The Campaign Against the men in
the Lines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

Differing Stories................. 156

An Assessment of the Campaign..... 161
VIII. DEEP BATTLE AND BROAD FRONT CONCEPTS..... 165
And the Russian Operation at
Cherkassy-Korsun..................... 165
Developing the Concepts........... 165
Problems Develop.................. 168
Publishing the Results............ 169
The Death of Deep Battle.......... 171

Deep Battle Concepts Employed..... 172

Deep Battle and Cherkassy-Korsun.. 174

Russian Mistakes.................. 176

ENDNOTES. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 0
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

vi
 LIST OF MAPS

1. General map of Russia.

Source: Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin.

2. The lines of Army Group South, .24 December 1943 and

January 1944.
Source: Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin.

3. The Cherkassy Pocket, with several phases of the

pocket illustrated.
Source: Operations of Encircled Forces.

4. Relief attempts.
Source: Operations of Encircled Forces.

5. Final extent of the relief attempts, and Russian

troop movements to contain the relief attempts and
liquidate the pocket.
Source: Carell, Scorched Earth.

6. The Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket 7 February 1944.

Source: Carell, Scorched Earth.

7. The Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket 11-15 February 1944.

Source: Carell, Scorched Earth.

8. The Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket on the night of the

breakout 16-17 February 1944.
source: Carell, Scorched Earth.

vii
 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Keil und Kessel

The Technique in Practice

During World War II, the German Panzerwaffe deve-

loped a technique they called "keil und kessel". In this

two phase operation they stormed through the lines of

their enemies, and encircled large portions of the enemy

army.

In the "keil" or wedge stage of the operation, the

German troops drove through the enemy lines on a small

scale. Follow up tank and motorized infantry forces

drove into the gap to add their numbers to the spearhead

and to hold the breach in the enemy lines open. German

air force stuka dive bombers acted as the artillery for

the tank troops, by diving in on targets, such as forti-

fications or gun emplacements designated by the tank com-

manders. The stukas destroyed the line of fortifications

or enemy guns before the German tanks reached them.

In the "kessel" or cauldron stage of the operation,

the German troops split into two groups after entering

1
 2

the enemy lines and encircled large numbers of enemy

troops. Follow up troops pouring through the gap in the

enemy lines sought to keep the encircled troops from

breaking out of the cauldron and allowed the troops of

the spearhead to continue to drive into the interior of

the enemy country.

The Germans made good use of this technique during

their conquest of Poland and later during their conquest

of France. To a greater extent, the Germans made use of

the technique in their campaign against Russia. The

Germans managed to encircle hundreds of thousands of

Russian troops irt their cauldrons and introduced to the

world this new technique for armored warfare.

The Russians Learn

Unfortunately for the Germans, the Russians learned

the keil und kessel techniques all too well. When the

Russians finally gained overwhelming superiority over

the Germans in all types of equipment and men, the

Russians began trapping the German armies in cauldrons

of their own. Later in the war, the American and

British armies trapped the German armies in cauldrons of

their own.
 3

Hitler at Fault

One might believe that the army that developed the

new technique would not allow themselves to be trapped in

their own trap. The fault for falling into the cauldrons

rarely lay with the German generals. Most of the time

Hitler was to blame, by forcing his armies to hold the

ground they .were on, even while the enemy armies were

moving to encircle them.

In the last months of 1942, Hitler ordered Sixth

Army to stay in Stalingrad, while Russian armies moved to

encircle them. During the beginning of the encirclement,

the German generals believed they might have had a chance

to escape, but the longer Hitler forced them to stay in

the city, they lost hope of a successful escape, as their

supplies and ammunition dwindled. Sixth Army ceased to

exist in early 1943, when the Russians finally forced the

remnants of the army to surrender.

The Dilemma at Cherkassy-Korsun

At Cherkassy, in 1944, Army Group South faced a

situation similar to the one Sixth Army faced just a year

earlier at Stalingrad. The Russians began encircling a

group of German troops on the Dnieper River, and the

German generals of Army Group South went to Hitler to get

permission for them to withdraw. Hitler would not

 4

listen, and a new disaster began to overtake the men of

Army Group South. The men of the two German corps

encircled at Cherkassy began their many days of suffering

because Hitler wanted to hold the land they were on.

Hitler cause the German disaster at Cherkassy by not

listening to his generals when they told him to withdraw,

but the German generals were able to lessen the disaster

through their tenacity, and because of ineptness on the

part of the Russians encircling the troops at Cherkassy.

 CHAPTER II

RETREAT TO THE DNIEPER

December 1943-January 1944

Withdrawal Behind the River

The story of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket begins not

on the night the Russians formed the pocket, but with the

German withdrawal to the Dnieper River Line. Army Group

South had staved off the main Russian offensives through-

out the war in Russia and had paid dearly for their suc-

cesses. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the commander

of Army Group South, continuously argued that he needed

more infantry and armored divisions to hold the Dnieper

Line, or he would have to give up the river. He wanted

permission to withdraw to a shorter line on the Bug

River. Hitler argued that he must hold the Dnieper

River, or that the Russians would cut Army Group A off

in the Crimea. The fact that Hitler insisted on holding

the river and would not listen to the requests von

Manstein put before him, led to the crisis on the Dnieper

River that culminated in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

According to von Manstein, his army group might have

5
 6

held the Russians off at the Dnieper River for a period

of time. His chances would have been better though, if

Hitler had allowed the fortification of the Dnieper River

Line to continue during the Autumn of 1943. But, Hitler

felt that his commanders would fall back to the fixed

fortifications as soon as they were finished, surrender-

ing all the territory on the eastern bank of the river to

the Russians. So, instead of falling back to a defend-

able line, von Manstein withdrew behind a river with very

few fortifications, and his men had to dig in, in order

to have any chance of holding the river. 1

Unfortunately for von Manstein, and the other com-

manders on the Russian Front, Hitler decided that he

should make most of the decisions concerning the German

Army for himself. He not only made the strategic deci-

sions that affected the whole front, but the tactical

decisions for armies that were hundreds of miles away as

well. 2

A second problem for von Manstein lay in the fact

that his army group needed to hold a front of 440 miles.

In order to hold a front that long his divisions would

need to stretch themselves to the limit. He had a total

of thirty-seven infantry divisions to hold the front. 3

His infantry divisions were each responsible for a front

of twelve miles. At full strength, this would not have

been a problem, but each of the divisions had a front

 7

line fighting strength of only 1,000 men. This meant

that von Manstein needed to hold the front assigned to

his army group with an average of only 83 men per mile. 4

According to von Manstein, Hitler expected the units

of Army Group South to hold entirely too much territory.

The Russians had battered his four armies, and each re-

tained only a fraction of it's total fighting strength.

None of the divisions of Army Group South had been out of

the front line long enough for a total refit. The army

group's equipment was not in tip top condition, and the

men were tired from weeks in the front lines. Von

Manstein sent a message to the high command informing

them of his situation, and asking for help to hold his

front. 5

Von Manstein argued that he must use the panzer and

panzer grenadier divisions available to his army to pinch

off the Russian armored breakthroughs, not hold terri-

tory. He wanted his tanks as a mobile reserve that he

could send wherever they were needed. He argued that he

could not tie his armored units down to the land, that

they were at their most dangerous when on the move. 6

Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, chief of staff for von

Manstein, referred to this as an elastic defense theory.

The Russians would break the German lines, but the panzer

divisions would seal the breakthrough off and restore the

original front. 7 Von Manstein believed that even though

 8

his armored divisions were very weak that they could

provide the punch needed to at least stop the Russian

spearheads. He could then use his infantry to contain

the armored columns, and defeat the Russians where they

stood. Army Group South did not possess enough tanks to

distribute them among the infantry divisions, and still

have enough tanks left over to fight off strong Russian

attacks. 8

Hitler disagreed with von Manstein and ordered him

to use the armored elements of his armies, as well as the

infantry to hold key bridgeheads on the eastern bank of

the Dnieper. Hitler hoped that the Russians would not

attack his lines while the armored elements of his armies

still held these key points. He felt that while his

armies still held the bridgeheads they used to attack

Russia in prior years, that the Russians would believe

that the German Army might still have one offensive

left. 9

Von Manstein informed the OberKornmando der Wermacht,

high command of the armed forces, that Army Group South

held their front of 440 miles with thirty-seven infantry,

and seventeen armored divisions. He went on to state

that without several more follow up infantry divisions

(more than the three that were on their way) that he

could not hold the front against an organized Russian

 9

attack. He also argued that Army Group South should

receive the most new equipment, since at the time they

were bearing the brunt of the fighting in the east. 10

Instead of sending von Manstein more divisions,

Hitler sent him his best wishes, and an experimental

weapon . During the time Army Group South retreated to

the Dnieper, the Germans began experiments mounting a

twenty to thirty millimeter cannon on a Junkers JU. 87

and 88 for hunting tanks. The experiments on the JU. 88

came to naught, but the Germans finally succeeded in

mounting twin thirty-seven millimeter cannons on the JU.

87's. Colonel Hans Rudel, at that time on convalescent

leave, first tested the plane. He liked the plane, and

took it with him back to his squadron. As one of the

highest scoring aces in a Ju. 87, he was accorded the

honor of first flying the cannon plane in combat. His

group was put under command of Army Group South to help

stabilize the situation on the Dnieper River. 11

Army Group South now faced the Russians on a river

line, but each day brought new Russian forces within

striking distance of the German lines. Three armies com-

prising twenty rifle and two tank or mechanized corps

faced First Panzer Army. Two armies of fifteen divisions

and one tank army of two tank and one mechanized corps

advanced on the Dnieper between Dnepropetrovsk and

 10

Kremenchug. Two armies of twelve rifle divisions, two

tank and one mechanized corps were moving towards the

Dnieper between Cherkassy and Rzhishchev. Theses two

armies were followed by a tank army of three more armored

corps.u

A Conference With Hitler

On December 27, 1943, von Manstein left for a con-

ference with Hitler, hoping to convince Hitler of the

need to withdraw his forces from the huge bend in the

Dnieper River. Von Manstein also suggested that Hitler

allow the evacuation of Nikopol. The limited withdrawal,

and the evacuation of the town that he proposed would

have shortened his front by 125 miles. Hitler refused to

listen to von Manstein's suggestion citing that if he

allowed the withdrawal, the Russians would concentrate

against the Crimea. Hitler felt that the loss of the

Crimea would seriously hinder relations with Rumania and

Turkey. At this point, General Zietzler, one of Hitler's

advisors, pointed out that the Crimea would eventually be

lost anyway and that relations with Turkey and Rumania

were on shaky ground as it was. 8

Von Manstein then brought up the subject of German

de-fensive strategy and questioned the wisdom of forcing

the German troops on the Eastern Front to hold the land

 11

they stood on. He also questioned the practice of

turning surrounded cities into fortresses. Hitler re-

torted that the Russians must lose steam soon and that

retreating would only force the Germans to conquer more

land when they took the offensive again. He then defend-

ed his practice of declaring fortress cities by saying:

Just wait and see. We've lived through a cou-

ple of those cases when everybody said things
were beyond repair. Later it turned out that
things could be brought under control after
all. Now, I am worrying myself sick for having
given permission for retreats in the past.~

Hitler never really answered the questions brought up at

the meeting, he only generalized about past successes and

never addressed the problems his generals brought up.

Hitler would continue to force the German troops to hold

on to untenable ground. Von Manstein left the conference

not being able to secure a better situation for his

troops . 15

New Russian Offensives

At the end of 1943, the Russians began operations to

cross the Dnieper River. Thousands of Russian troops

rowed or paddled small crafts across the river. Others

rode on improvised rafts made of barrels, planks or

benches they strung together. Russian artillery stood by

on the east bank of the river to deal with any serious

German resistance. 16
 12

Near Kiev, in several places, the Russians puttied

up the openings on sixty of their tanks and sent them

under the water. Two brigades of paratroopers were drop-

ped in to reinforce the infantry and tanks. General

Colonel Vatutin managed to hold most of these bridgeheads

and even managed to merge a few of them into one large

one. 17

General Colonel Koniev set up no less than eighteen

bridgeheads in this fashion. In the first few days of

their existence, he lost seven of them though with very

heavy casualties. Koniev did manage to merge eleven of

his bridgeheads into one large one. As soon as he estab-

lished this large bridgehead the Germans attacked it by

air, but Russian fighters managed to drive the German

fighters off before they caused any serious casualties

within the bridgehead. 18

Throughout January, the Russians attacked the front

of Army Group South relentlessly. Because of Hitler's

orders, at times, the German armies needed to hold not

only the river front, but their flanks, as they protected

the bridgeheads on the Dnieper that Hitler demanded held.

Sixth Panzer Army held the Dnieper Front, as well as the

Nikopol Bridgehead to their south, which in actuality

belonged to Army Group A. 19

Von Manstein was not the only commander in his army

 13

group that felt the task assigned his men was unrea-

sonable. The commander of Eighth Army, Colonel General

Wohler, sent urgent messages to von Manstein, expressing

grave doubts about continuing to hold the curving line of

positions northwest of Kirovograd to which he must commit

an excessive number of men. He recommended withdrawal of

the interior flanks of Eighth Army and First Panzer Army

by retirement to successive positions, first behind the

Olshanka-Ross River Line, and eventually to the line

Shpola-Zvenigorodka-Gniloy Tikich Stream. Hitler denied

permission for the withdrawal citing the need to hold the

salient for future offensive operations in the direction

of Kiev. 20

At this time, Colonel General Wohler found himself

with an overextended army short of reserves available to

carry on an active defense. The armored elements of two

panzer divisions formed the only true reserves available

to Eighth Army. All of the divisions in the army were

all well under strength, and therefore no division could

count on another to ease the pressure on their front.

After Hitler's refusal to withdraw, Wohler informed von

Manstein that if the Russians kept up pressure on his

front that he could not hold without new forces or a

shorter front. 21
 14

Russian Breakthroughs

The order to stay on the Dnieper River line also

caused von Manstein trouble on the northern wing of his

front. Fourth Panzer Army withdrew from Berdichev after

intensive enemy pressure. Fourth Panzer Army withdrew

further west and southwest in order to preserve some sort

of continuity between the elements of the army. 22 The

Fifty-Ninth Corps, at this time very weak from so long at

the front, alone made a fighting withdrawal toward

Rovno. 23 The Russians launched an attack towards Rovno

with Sixtieth and Thirteenth armies.~

At a conference with Hitler, von Manstein brought up

the need for the appointment of a commander-in-chief for

the Eastern Front. Von Manstein argued that a commander-

in-chief had already been appointed for the Italian The-

atre and for the Western Front, but that Hitler had never

appointed a military man to command the forces of the

Eastern Front. Hitler then commented that none of the

commanders on the Eastern Front obeyed his commands. He

then asked if von Manstein expected the commanders to

obey a mere field marshall. Von Manstein retorted that

he had always obeyed Hitler's commands. Unfortunately

for von Manstein, the argument ended here, without the

appointment of a military commander-in-chief. Hitler

then dismissed von Manstein, and ordered him to hold his

 15

lines, ordering him not to give up any more land.~

During the morning on January 5, General Koniev

launched his Second Ukrainian Front in a massive attack

against the German lines near Kirovograd. Koniev had

been on the defensive since December 20, while waiting

for the reinforcements that Stavka had ordered for him.

Since the twentieth he had received 300 tanks and 100

self propelled guns. The Russians hoped that Koniev

could break through the German Front, and ravage the rear

of the German forces in the Kirovograd-Pervomaisk area. 26

The Russians launched their attack at 0600 jumping

off from two principal concentration areas. The attacks

were preceded by half an hour's artillery preparation and

several air strikes. Massed infantry then poured through

the gaps the artillery and air strikes created in the

German lines. Follow up infantry and anti-tank units

widened the breaches in the German lines and secured the

flanks for the advancing Russian armor. n

By the time the infantry attack began, the Russian

fire had destroyed most of the German artillery batter-

ies. The continuous fire also inflicted heavy casualties

on the German forces in the area of the artillery bar-

rage. The divisions covering the front facing the Rus-

sian attack were further reduced in fighting strength.

Before the offensive began, Second Parachute Division

 16

held a twelve mile front with 3,200 men. The Tenth

Panzer Grenadier Division held an eleven mile front with

3,700 men. The Russians attacked these two divisions

with seven infantry divisions supported by armored

groups. The Russians managed an advance of six miles on

a four mile front. On the northern sector of their at-

tack, the Russians hit the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps,

and advanced thirteen miles on a ten mile front. 28

The Russian armored forces then attempted to exploit

their breakthroughs, mainly in the south on the front of

the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps. The German corps reserve

im-mediately counterattacked, and with heavy anti-tank

support, managed to destroy ninety some tanks in the pro-

cess. The Germans estimated that they managed to contain

two-hundred enemy tanks with their counterattacks and

anti-tank gun concentrations. After stopping the initial

Russian penetration in the north, Tenth Panzer Division

reported the loss of 620 men in one day, while destroying

153 enemy tanks. However, it quickly became evident that

the forces of Eighth Army could not contain the break-

throughs on the northern wing of their front alone.

Colonel General Wohler sent desperate pleas for help to

Army Group South. 29

 17

The Impending Disaster

Von Manstein answered the request for help by trans-

ferring the Third Panzer Division to the Forty-Seventh

Panzer Corps. The Third Panzer Division sought to help

the Eleventh Panzer Division stop the Russian armored

forces driving southwest. This enemy thrust threatened

to envelop Kirovograd from the north and west. The Ger-

mans feared the loss of Kirovograd because all their sup-

ply lines to Army Group A, and the southern wing of Army

Group South went through or close to the town. 30

During his attack on Kirovograd, Koniev received new

instructions from Marshall Zhukov, to launch a secondary

attack with the objective of reaching Uman. This oper-

ation, conducted jointly with General Vatutin, sought to

create a pocket of German soldiers in the Kanev-Zveni-

gorodka-Uman area. Koniev assigned the Fifty-Second and

Fifty-Third Armies to the secondary operation against

Uman. 31

On January 6, the Russians pierced the front of Army

Group South between First Panzer Army and the right wing

of Fourth Panzer Army. The Russians stopped just after

piercing the army group front in order to exploit the ex-

posed flanks of Fourth Panzer Army, hoping to destroy the

army. 32 The Russians sought to demolish Fourth Panzer Ar-

my with three armies: the Eighteenth, First Guards and

 18

First Guards Tanks Army. 33

Koniev launched his attack on Uman between the First

Panzer Army and Fourth Panzer Army. The First Tank Army

and Fortieth Army drove southward, their spearheads

reached a point only twenty miles from Uman, threatening

the supply base of First Panzer Army. The Russians also

closed on Vinnitsa, where Army Group South Headquarters

had previous-ly been located. The Russians managed to

block the German railhead at Zhmerinka temporarily.~

Koniev's attack against Kirovograd met with success

right away. On the night of January 7, General

Kirichenko's Twenty-Ninth Tank Corps (part of the Fifth

Guards Tank Army) broke into the southern suburbs of

Kirovograd, followed closely by two rifle divisions. At

0900, the following morning, Russian forces cut the

Kirovograd-Novo Ukrainka road and railway line, cutting

the Germans in the town off from supply. During the

morning, the Eighteenth Tank Corps swept around the town,

and attacked the German def enders from the south. 35

Kirovograd Encircled

Major General Fritz Bayerlein, the commander of the

Third Panzer Division had his headquarters in Kirovograd,

during the time of the Russian attack on the town. The

divisional history quotes him as saying: "We've got to

 19

get out, Kirovograd sounds too much like Stalingrad to

me". 36 His communications section had been decimated dur-

ing a Russian artillery bombardment, and his division

never received the order turning Kirovograd into a fort-

ress city. 37

Bayerlein called the rest of the commanders in the

city together, and outlined his plans to escape from the

city. The other commanders agreed with him in principle,

but would not disobey the order from Hitler turning the

city into a fortress. Bayerlein stressed the fact that a

panzer division was a mobile formation, and could not be

tied to a city, and forced to fight a static battle. 38

Bayerlein arranged for the Tenth Panzer Grenadier

Division to occupy the line his division held. He then

formed his division, and gave the order to attack north-

ward. His division broke through the Russian lines, and

drove northward, until they finally made contact with el-

ements of the Eleventh Panzer Division.~

Orders from von Manstein placed the Third Panzer Di-

vision under the control of Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps.

After fighting their way out of the encirclement, Third

Panzer Division turned around, and attacked the Russian

flank, in support of Forty-Seventh Panzer Division's at-

tempt to free the rest of the men encircled in

Kirovograd. His units received no rest, and spent the

 20

ensuing days attacking real and imagined enemy positions

around the city. 40

The Sixty-Seventh Tank Brigade of Rotmistrov's Fifth

Guards Tank Army burst through the lines of Forty-seventh

Panzer Corps, and attacked the headquarters unit in

Malaya Viska. Nikolaus Von Vormann, and the elements of

his headquarters unit barely escaped from the city. Von

Vormann's adjutant, Major Maase, organized the rear guard

action of the headquarters unit, and fought to the death

in order that his commander survive. 41

After leaving the town in flames, the Sixty-Seventh

Tank Brigade struck the airfield of Lieutenant Colonel

Hans Rudel's Immelmann squadron. Rudel, at that time on a

mission with his squadron escaped destruction at the

hands of the Russians. Upon their return to the base,

his squadron chased the Soviet tanks across the Russians

hinterland. The tanks he did not destroy himself, he

drove into the tank busting parties of the Forty-seventh

Panzer Corps, none of the Russian tanks survived the

encounter. Few of the tankers survived the attack to

tell of the disaster they faced on the steppes. Rudel

destroyed seventeen tanks and seven assault guns on his

own. 42
 21

The Battle for the City

Colonel General Wohler of Eighth Army managed to set

up a cohesive front, and began attacks to free the men

surrounded at Kirovograd. In his effort to destroy the

Russian forces facing his army, he received a great deal

of help from the Luftwaffe field divisions. A detachment

of the Forty-Third Flak Regiment destroyed thirty-three

Russian tanks during a six hour period on January 9,

blunting a Russian attack. The Russians launched a

second attack against the men of the Forty-Third Flak

Regiment, which ended in a Russian retreat, leaving

forty-one more T-34's burning on the field.~

By January 9, the Third Panzer Division under Major

General Bayerlein, had reached a point only nine miles

from Kirovograd. Koniev's armored elements had become

more and more dispersed, making them more vulnerable to

swift counterattacks by German forces. The success of

the attack by Bayerlein forced Koniev to divert forces

from his encircling ring around the city, to stop

Bayerlein's advance.~

On January 9, elements of the 331st Regimental Group

of the 167th Infantry Division had battled their way into

the village of Gruzskoye, only seven miles west of

Kirovograd. The infantrymen dug in for the night, plan-

ning to continue their attack against the Russians in the

 22

morning. Before they could bed down for the night, or-

ders came to them that they continue their attack to

reach Kirovograd during the night.~

During the whole of the encirclement, Colonel Gen-

eral Wohler and Major General von Vormann had pleaded

with Hitler to release the men of Kirovograd, and let

them withdraw from the city. Their pleas met with suc-

cess, and Hitler ordered the three divisions in the for-

tress to break out during the night on January 9. The

Russians west of the pocket were caught in a vice between

the three divisions breaking out of the pocket, and the

men of the 331st Regimental Group who had launched a

night attack to free the men in the pocket.~

According to Lieutenant General August Schmidt of

the Tenth Panzer Grenadier Division, only one enemy tank

attempted to stop the breakout, and it was unsuccessful.

His division managed to bring out all their wounded, and

all their weapons. The Germans of the Tenth Panzer

Grenadier Division left no weapons for the Russians, and

according to Schmidt, the story was the same with the

rest of the divisions in the pocket. The Russians moved

in the next day, and occupied the town, ending the German

bid to hold on to Kirovograd.~

After Koniev met with his ''success" in Kirovograd,

Vatutin decided that he needed to submit an adjustment of

 23

his own plans to stavka. Vatutin sent his plans which

contained the following ideas to stavka:

Right wing: move up to the River Goryn, and on

to Slutsk, Dubrovitsa and Sarny. Center and
Left: Eliminate German concentrations in the
Zhmerinka and Uman area, and to take Vinnitsa,
Zhmer ika and Uman. 48

Stavka approved of the changes Vatutin desired and au-

thorized him to implement them. But, Stavka could pro-

vide no further reinforcements at the time. 49

Continuing Russian Offensives

On the northern wing of the First Ukrainian Front,

Vatutin managed to push General Pukhov's Thirteenth Army

on to Sarny. Forward elements of the army reached the

Goryn and styr Rivers by January 12. General

Chernyakhovskii's Sixtieth Army drove for Shepetovka, but

after initially making headway ran into stiff resistance.

General Pukhov also began running into stiff resistance

soon after reaching the rivers. Both armies met German

defenders dug into protected river lines, whose flanks

were protected by other trench lines and soldiers in de-

fensive positions in ravines. The ruggedness of the land

negated the Russian tank superiority and allowed the

German infantry to face the Russians on their own terms. 50

The stiffening German resistance forced Vatutin to

bring his First Ukrainian Front to a halt. Fighting had

 24

spread his armies over a distance of 300 miles. The mov-

ement on the left wing, which had advanced more rapidly

than the rest of the army, created a large gap in

Vatutin's front. At Zhmerinka, the Eighth Guards Mech-

anized corps (of the First Tank Army) became cut off by

a German counter-thrust. Vatutin cited lack of fuel and

supplies and the need to reestablish a cohesive front as

the reasons he ordered the halt. 51

German Reactions

Von Manstein believed he possessed enough forces to

tackle one of the breakthroughs at a time, and chose to

tackle the breakthrough between First Panzer Army and

Fourth Panzer Army first. He chose this course of action

because if this spearhead reached the upper reaches of

the Bug River, the Russians stood a good chance of cut-

ting off Sixth Army and Eighth Army entirely. 52

On January 12, Stavka issued orders to Vatutin and

Koniev to wipe out the German salient at Zvenigorod-

Mironovka. In order to achieve the liquidation of the

salient, Vatutin and Koniev had to bring their flanks to-

gether at Shpola. If successful, the junction of the two

fronts would have put the Russians in a good position to

launch a new offensive to attain the southern part of the

Bug River.B
 25

Neither Vatutin or Koniev could make headway against

the German salient in the Cherkassy-Korsun area. The

Germans used the hills and gullies in the area to set up

a viable defense against the Russian infantry. The area

was not well suited for tanks, and the Russian armored

forces caused only slight problems for the Germans in the

area. 54

Hitler hoped to stop the Russians on the Dnieper

River for another year. He believed that if the Russians

broke through the German lines on the Dnieper, that the

Russian offensive would peter out as the other offensives

had in the past. According to Colonel General Walter

Warlimont, Hitler desired that the Russians should break

through on the front of Army Group South.

Hitler: "It is rather to be hoped that the

enemy will try to break through between
Cherkassy and Kirovograd and thereby finally
exhaust himself. 1155

Warlimont could not figure out why Hitler hoped the

Russians would break through on any front. He also

questioned as to why the Russians would choose the front

of Army Group South for their breakthrough when they

could achieve the same end just as easily on the fronts

of the other two army groups. 56

Hitler felt it necessary that the Germans hold on to

the bridgeheads they held at Cherkassy and Nikopol on the

Dnieper River. He felt that the bridgehead at Nikopol

 26

held strategic importance even at this point of the war.

He still felt that his armies were capable of carrying

out an offensive, which he planned to launch from

Nikopol. He wanted Nikopol held at all costs because he

felt that even if he would not carry out an offensive

soon, that as long as the Germans held the bridgehead,

the Russians would not feel safe attacking on the army

group front. The Russians would also tie down consid-

erable forces keeping the Germans in the bridgehead, and

guarding against future German offenses. 57

The Dnieper in Retrospect

Many of the predictions Hitler's generals made upon

reaching the Dnieper River came true. Von Manstein and

later the generals of Army Group South came to the con-

clusion that they had no chance of holding on to the

Dnieper River line. They all complained that they had

too few men to hold the amount of territory assigned to

them against the insurmountable odds which they faced.

Hitler insisted on holding the territory, especially

the bridgeheads for future attacks into the Soviet heart-

land. The insistence on holding the bridgeheads tied

down the small amount of armor that von Manstein could

field against the Russians, and pinch off their armored

thrusts into the rear areas of Army Group South. The

 27

German Army never launched a major attack against the

Russians after Kursk in 1943. Hitler lived in a fantasy

world concerning future German attacks against the Rus-

sian Army. His armies were in no condition to carry out

future attacks, but Hitler would not take the advice of

his generals, and try to hold on to the territory that

they had conquered, and negotiate for peace from a pos-

ition of strength.

At many times during the year, von Manstein had pro-

posed moving his army group to a shorter line in between

the Bug River and the Dnieper River, which would have al-

lowed him to shorten his lines and allow his divisions to

defend the sectors assigned to them with more men. Dur-

ing the time Army Group South occupied this line, German

engineers would construct a defensive line behind the Bug

River. Von Manstein believed that his army group could

hold the Bug River line against almost any attack the

Russians could mount against it, if Hitler allowed the

construction of a fortified line. He felt that if the

Germans could show the Russians the cost of attacking a

fortified river line, that the Russian generals would

force Stalin to make peace with the Germans, a peace

which would give up the land in Russia that the Germans

had taken, but guarantee them a secure frontier to their

east.
 28

Hitler refused to listen to the advice of his gen-

erals, and the Russians forced a crossing of the Dnieper

River. They then consolidated their troops into a large

bridgehead the Germans could not eliminate. Even after

the break in the line, Hitler demanded that the Germans

hold on to the Dnieper River. After further attacks, the

Russians forced the Germans off the Dnieper River at

every point but Cherkassy, and assaulted three of the

flanks of the troops which remained at Cherkassy.

After the Russians advanced from the river and push-

ed the Germans back in the northern section of Army Group

South's line, Hitler forced von Manstein to turn the city

of Kirovograd into a "fortress". He refused to allow the

men trapped in the city to retreat, until they were sur-

rounded. Even after the hard lesson learned at

Kirovograd about forcing troops to hold on to territory

after the enemy had surrounded them, Hitler still demand-

ed that his armies hold their positions at all costs.

Hitler forced the German troops in the Cherkassy Korsun

Pocket to hold on to the territory while the Russian

forces around them consolidated their positions. His

decision to hold the pocket caused the disaster the

Germans faced at Cherkassy.

 CHAPTER III

THE ENCIRCLEMENT

January 23-February ·3, 1944

Forming the Pocket

On January 23, 1944, strong Russian forces broke

through the German lines on the Dnieper River. The Rus-

sian thrust hit the German lines just north of the pro-

jecting wing which the First Panzer Army held on the

Dnieper between the Seventh and Forty-Second Corps. The

Russian motorized and armored divisions managed to drive

as far south as the Zvenigorodka area. 1

The Russians then attacked on the Eighth Army front,

at first launching only a reconnaissance in force. The

attack came on a twelve mile front, which Eighth Army

held with no more than one man for every fifteen yards of

front. After finding the weakness in the German lines,

the Russians launched deep probing attacks to ascertain

the German reserve situation in the rear areas. When no

reserves were found in the immediate area, orders were

given for the Fourth Ukrainian Front to launch a massive

attack the next morning. 2

29
 30

The Fourth Guards Tank Army, and later, the Fifth

Guards Tank Army broke through the Eighth Army front and

drove westward to link up with the Russian fighting units

near Zvenigorodka. 3 Russian forces in the north under

General Vatutin and in the south under General Koniev

joined west of Cherkassy completing the encirclement of

the German forces there. 4 This action left the Russians

some eighty miles to the rear of the Germans encircled at

Cherkassy. The Russian rear lay only fifteen miles west

of Korsun, giving the Russians a sixty-five mile corri-

dor.5

The German Response

Hitler began looking seriously at the situation

around Cherkassy on the evening of January 23, 1944, just

after the Russian breakthroughs. Colonel General Walter

Warlimont kept a diary of the meetings Hitler conducted

in his headquarters. On that evening he recorded this

conversation:

Borgmann: "There are 27 rifle divisions and

four armoured corps in the area. Here at
this point there are seventeen rifle div-
isions. Then northwest of Krivoirog there
are sixteen rifle divisions and one armoured
corps. At Kirovograd there are twenty-four
rifle divisions and five armoured corps."

Hitler: "Is that here? That comes into it

too."

Borgmann: "In the area of the break-in here

 31

there are thirteen rifle divisions and one

armoured corps, at Cherkassy four rifle di-
visions, one armoured brigade. In the area
of this break-in, forty two rifle divisions,
nine armoured corps, one cavalry corps in
the first wave and two armoured corps - in
there; three armoured corps not yet ident-
ified."

Hitler: "How many identified armoured corps

has he in this area?"

Zietzler: "He's got nine. The other may

possibly come along if they come up by rail." 6

The conversation goes on to cover the reserves the Ger-

mans could send into the area. The nearest true reserves

were at Korosten. The Germans employed the division

there to guard the railhead against partisan actions en-

couraged by the Russians. This division consisted of

three experienced battalions and four battalions of new

recruits. The nearest experienced reserve divisions not

actively engaged in some duty were in Poland. Hitler al-

so discussed the possibility of bringing troops from as

far as France. He also considered committing the Fourth

Mountain Division, employed at the time in the Alps bat-

tling partisans in Italy. He considered the divisions

stationed in the west rested, and believed they could

help in the fighting. 7

Even at this point, Hitler had determined to hold on

to the bridgehead at Cherkassy. He complained to his

headquarters staff that his generals were retreating

without reason, and causing hysteria among the troops.

 32

Hitler cited the retreat from Stalingrad, complaining

that the troops were out of control, and retreated much

farther then they should have. Hitler called the retreat

from the Dnieper to their new line east of the Bug River

by Army Group South, idiotic. 8

Further Russian Advances

During the day on January 25, follow up Russian for-

ces launched a large-scale attack against the Seventh

Corps. The right flank division fell back toward the

southeast and south, and by the end of the day, the Rus-

sians held the roads leading to the flank and rear of the

Forty-Second Corps. The Russians used these roads to

press forward via Medvin toward Boguslav and Ssteblev. 9

In order to protect their rear and flanks, the

Forty-Second Corps established a new rearward facing

front along the line of Boguslav-Ssteblev. Colonel Gen-

eral Theobald Lieb, the commander of Forty-Second Corps,

believed that the Seventh Corps might still close the gap

that yawned between his corps and the Seventh. But, this

hope proved fleeting as more Russian forces moved into

the area . 10

The Russians attacked the center and flanks of the

Eleventh Corps later in the day on January 25. Following

repeated attacks, the Russians broke through the front of

 33

Eleventh Corps on the right flank and in the center. In

order to prevent an encirclement of his corps, Colonel

General Stemmermann ordered his men to withdraw to the

west and northwest, toward the Forty-Second Corps. 11

On the night of January 27, the SS Panzer Division

Wiking received conformation that enemy units had oc-

cupied Schpola, in their rear areas. General Gille im-

mediately sent out a reconnaissance in force, which con-

firmed the fears of the division: enemy tank units

northwest of Schpola and near Zvenigorodka. 12

General Gille immediately ordered his communication

section to make contact with the rest of the elements of

his division. More alarming news reached the divisional

headquarters when the communications section established

contact with the division's Replacement Training Batt-

alion and Pioneer Combat School, located at Ssteblev.

Upon contacting the school, Gille learned that individual

enemy tank units were moving into Boguslav. After this

report and the recon action, Gille determined that two

enemy tank forces were operating to his rear, and that

they had come from two different directions. Gille de-

termined that the Russian forces were moving from north

to south, and vice versa. Gille sent word to the High

Command and to the commander of First Panzer Army that

the Russians were attempting to encircle the German

 34

forces standing between Smela and Kanew. Only later, did

the German High Command understand the magnitude of the

encirclement the Russians were attempting. 13

The Pocket at Olschana

Later, during the night, Gille received word that

the divisional supply services, located south of 01-

schana, had come under attack from enemy tanks. The di-

visional supply services had formed a hedgehog defence

during the night, as had the combat school at Ssteblev.

Both areas had experienced fierce attacks by enemy tanks

and had been involved in heavy fighting throughout the

night. The two groups merged early in the morning for-

ming Kampfgruppe Reder and having been reinforced by an

engineer battalion and the Narwa Battalion of the Es-

tonian Brigade, held their ground defending Olschana. 14

Along with the small pocket of defenders at 01-

schana, the Russians created a large pocket of German

defenders anchored on the Dnieper River and extending

west past Korsun. The pocket contained elements of the

First Panzer Army's Forty-Second Corps and elements of

the Eighth Army's Eleventh Corps. Von Manstein desig-

nated the large encirclement the "Cherkassy Pocket'' after

the bridgehead the Germans held on the Dnieper River

there. 15 At this point, von Manstein assembled the forces

 35

of Forty-Second Corps and Eleventh Corps which managed to

avoid encirclement. This group contained mostly the sup-

port and reserve elements of the two corps, but small

groups of infantry and other combat personnel managed to

outrun the Russian divisions trying to encircle them. 16

Inside the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket

At the time of the encirclement, Eleventh Corps con-

sisted of three infantry divisions: the Fifty-seventh,

Seventy-Second and the 389th. None of these divisions

contained tanks, assault guns or adequate anti-tank

weapons. Of these three divisions, only the seventy-

Second could carry on offensive operations. The other

two divisions, with the exception of one regiment of the

Fifty-seventh Division, were unfit for offensive opera-

tions. The artillery complement attached to the corps

comprised one assault gun brigade of two battalions

totaling six batteries and one battalion of light ar-

tillery.n

The Forty-Second Corps included: Corps Detachment

B, the Eighty-Eighth Division and the Fifth SS Panzer

Division Wiking. Von Manstein combined three infantry

divisions to form Corps Detachment B, under the command

of the commander of the 112th Infantry Division. He de-

signated the new unit Corps Detachment Bin order to

 36

cover the identity and weakness of the unit. Von

Manstein had combined the remnants of the Saar-Palantine

112th Infantry Division, the Saxon 255th Infantry Di-

vision and the Silesian 332nd Infantry Division in order

to form the division sized unit. Although the unit car-

ried a corps standard and contained three divisions, it

possessed the fighting strength of one infantry division,

containing three regiments with the normal complement of

artillery, a strong antitank battalion, but no tanks or

assault guns. The Eighty-Eighth Division consisted of

two regiments totaling five battalions, but the ar-

tillery complement of the division had been badly maul-

ed. The Wiking Division was by far the strongest divi-

sion in the corps, and in the pocket as a whole, with two

armored infantry regiments, one tank regiment with a to-

tal of ninety tanks and the Belgian volunteer brigade

Wallonien, which contained about 1,000 men. 18

The pocket contained the remnants of many divisions

which had become attached to the two corps and others

which had just been caught in the wrong place at the

wrong time. The Russians managed to trap part of the

Silesian 417th Grenadier Regiment, the Engineer Battalion

of the 168th Infantry Division as well as the 331st Ba-

varian Regiment of the 167th Infantry Division. The poc-

ket also contained a battalion of the Silesian 213th Lo-

 37

cal Security Division and the Ski Battalion of the 323rd

Infantry Di vision. 19

On January 28, Lieb sent word to Eighth Army about

the situation within the pocket. Lieb requested per-

mission to withdraw his forces from _ the Dnieper River.

Mission requires maintaining northeast front

against strong enemy pressure. Russian advance
against Ssteblew necessitates main effort on
southern sector. Request authority for imme-
diate withdrawal of northern and eastern
fronts. This will permit offensive action
toward southwest and prevent further encir-
clement and separation from XI Corps. 20

Lieb wanted to prevent a second encirclement from taking

place. He wished to keep in contact with Stemmermann

hoping that as one unit, the two corps had a chance to

survive the encirclement and they would have a better

chance to break out together than separately. 21

At first the Russians believed that they had trapped

the entire Eighth Army and the army command element, a

total of ten and a half divisions containing 100,000 men,

within the pocket. According to Colonel Kvach, the chief

of Koniev's command train, General Koniev, the Commander

of the Third Ukrainian Front, determined that the Cher-

kassy Pocket contained the entire German Eighth Army

under Colonel General Wohler. Koniev correctly estimated

the strength of Eighth Army at nine armored divisions, an

ss panzer division, and an attached brigade. Koniev had

wanted to destroy Eighth Army for a long time, the army

 38

had caused him trouble since he took command. Eighth

Army contained nine of the best armored divisions the

Wehrmacht had to offer, and the destruction of the SS

formations would have only added to his victory. There-

fore, the Russians decided to do everything in their pow-

er to destroy the Germans, because they greatly respected

the fighting capability of Eighth Army and the commander

of the army. Only later did they realize the mistake

they had made.n

The First Rescue Attempt

Colonel General Hans Hube of the First Panzer Army

made the first attempt to free the men of the pocket. He

sent a radio-telegram into the pocket, saying simply "I

am coming." In two days, his units had reached a point

only nine kilometers from the pocket and in the process

destroyed 100 Russian tanks. 23 According to Lieutenant

Leon Degrelle of the Wallonien Brigade, this message

lifted the spirits of his men, they now believed that the

German High Command would not abandon them in the pocket

as the Belgians believed the German High Command had done

with the German troops at Stalingrad a year earlier.

Degrelle also greatly respected Hube as a leader and be-

lieved that he, if anybody, could carry off the attempt

to free them.~
 39

Hube's attack almost succeeded in freeing the Ger-

mans in the pocket. Elements of the 108th Panzer Gren-

adier Regiment of the Fourteenth Panzer Division actually

broke into the pocket, on the second night of their at-

tack.25 Unfortunately for the Germans within the pocket,

strong new Russian forces came up to attack Hube. The

Russians attacked the Fourteenth Panzer with the Elev-

enth, Twelfth and Sixty-Third Cavalry Divisions. The men

of the Fourteenth Panzer following up the 108th Panzer

Grenadier Regiment could not hold the breach in the So-

viet lines open and had to fall back. The rest of Hube's

men had to give up their positions only nine kilometers

from the pocket and withdraw. With the new forces, the

Russians managed to set up a fifty mile wide security

zone around the pocket. The Russian commanders also

brought several reserve formations with them to help

guarantee that they could hold the pocket against any

relief attempt the Germans might mount. 26

The Russians immediately began attacks to eliminate

the German forces within the pocket. The Russians mount-

ed the heaviest attacks from the south and southeast.

These attacks pushed the surrounded Germans farther from

the lines of Army Group South and farther from a possible

relief effort.v
 40

Planning for a Second Relief Attempt

Von Manstein issued orders immediately to release

forces from his front in order to launch a relief effort

to save the men in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. He would

not allow the men of his army group to face another di-

saster, such as the one faced at Stalingrad a year ear-

lier. He issued orders to release two panzer corps for

the relief attempt. 28

Von Manstein sent word to First Panzer Army to end

their defensive battle with the First Soviet Tank Army,

on their left wing, and release Third Panzer Corps with

utmost speed. Third Panzer Corps would move to Cherkassy

with Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Divisions, the

First ss Panzer Division Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler and

Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke. First Panzer Division would

follow the other three divisions as soon as the situation

permitted. 29

Eighth Army received instructions to release the

headquarters element of Forty-seventh Panzer Corps and

the Third Panzer Division from the army's front. Von

Manstein sent orders to the commander of Sixth Army to

turn Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division over to Forty-Seventh

Panzer Corps for use in the relief operation. Hitler

also gave von Manstein permission to use Eleventh Panzer

Division in the relief attempt if it arrived from the re-

 41

serve areas in time. Hitler then delayed Eleventh Panzer

at the Bug River, hoping that it would not be needed and

that he could use it elsewhere. Eleventh Panzer Division

joined the relief attempt only after the other divisions

had broken through the Russian lines. 3 ° Fourteenth Panzer

Division joined Forty-Seventh Panzer in the concentration

area coming out of the front lines of the army group.

Fourteenth Panzer had been in the front line trying to

contain the new Russian thrust which sought to keep

Eighth Army from freeing the men trapped in the pocket.

The division had already lost a full panzer grenadier

regiment, and none of the other units were at full

strength having just come out of the front lines after

months of continuous fighting. 31 Twenty-Fourth Panzer

arrived in the concentration area of Forty-seventh Panzer

Corps ready for combat, having come out of the reserve

area of the army group. This division arrived in the

best shape to carry out the relief effort, all the other

divisions in the corps had not received rest, and two of

them came out of heavily contested battles.n

Two of the panzer divisions of Eighth Army desig-

nated for the relief effort were still in the midst of a

heavily contested battle in the area of Kapitanovka. The

commander of Eighth Army decided to replace them with in-

fantry divisions, but to do so, would stretch the fight-

 42

ing power of the infantry divisions to the utmost. The

other two divisions were on the march toward the left

flank of Eighth Army. Of the four divisions only one was

at full strength, after weeks of continuous fighting, the

other three divisions were in actuality only tank

supported combat teams.n

According to the diary of the Sixteenth Panzer Divi-

sion, the division had endured continuous defensive

fighting for over four weeks. After pulling out of the

line, the division moved south, and into the rear areas

of First Panzer Army. They arrived in their concentra-

tion areas during the day on February 1. Fortunately for

the men of the division, their concentration area lay in

a town. The diary tells of the happiness the men felt

having a roof over their heads and a chance to shave and

get a hot meal after almost continuous fighting. The

division received two days of rest before having to begin

the attack to reach Group Stemmermann.~

Lieutenant Colonel Doctor Franz Baeke led his heavy

panzer regiment into the concentration area of Third Pan-

zer Corps. His group came directly out of the front

lines and received no rest before going back into battle

in order to relieve Group Stemmerrnann. Baeke commanded a

group of thirty-eight Tiger tanks and Forty-seven Panther

tanks."
 43

Hitler Meddles in the Relief Effort

Von Manstein had ordered Sixth Army to release

Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division in order to help Eighth

Army's Forty-seventh Panzer Corps with the relief effort.

After traveling almost 200 miles to ·take part in the at-

tack, Hitler changed the orders of the panzer division.

Hitler ordered Twenty-Fourth Panzer to turn around and

repeat the grueling 200 mile trek it had just undertaken

to take part in the relief effort.M

Hitler ordered von Manstein to turn Sixth Army over

to Army Group A, under the command of Field Marshall

Ewald von Kleist. He made von Manstein give Twenty-

Fourth Panzer back to Sixth Army in order to keep the

fighting ability of this unit intact. Hitler then or-

dered Sixth Army into the Nikopol Bridgehead in order to

hold it open for an offensive into the Caucasus. Hitler

also needed the Nikopol, because it protected Army Group

A. The loss of the Nikopol Bridgehead would force Army

Group A to evacuate the Crimean Peninsula.~

Von Manstein contacted Field Marshall von Kleist and

expressed his interest in trading an infantry division

for Twenty-Fourth Panzer. Von Kleist agreed to accept

the trade, because he needed a division to hold ground

and he knew that an infantry division could do the job as

well as a panzer division. Hitler's generals argued with

 44

him continuously that a panzer division needed mobility

and that the infantry should hold ground. The arguments

always fell on deaf ears and Hitler ordered von Manstein

to turn Twenty-Fourth Panzer Division over to Army Group

A as planned. 38

Twenty-Fourth Panzer fought it's way through the mud

and arrived at the Nikopol Bridgehead. After travelling

over 400 miles round trip, the division needed time in

the reserve areas to refit. Almost every single tank

broke down on the way to the Nikopol and because of the

mud, the troops ended up pushing the trucks and un-

tracked self propelled guns. The troops arrived in the

bridgehead in as poor condition as the equipment of the

division. By the time the Twenty-Fourth became battle-

worthy again, Army Group A had pulled out of the Nikopol

Bridgehead. Twenty-Fourth Panzer traveled to Nikopol for

nothing, but the Germans could have made good use of the

fire power of the division during the Cherkassy relief

attempt. 39

Support for the Relief Attempt

In order to support the relief attacks, von Manstein

assembled his ground attack squadrons. Hans Rudel led

his Immelmann Squadron of Junker-87 dive bombers to sup-

port the Eleventh and Thirteenth Panzer Divisions of the

 45

Third Panzer Corps. 40 Rudel attacked not only the tanks

barring the way, but also the slower Russian dive bombers

attacking the divisions he supported.

Here there are plenty of good targets for us;

air activity on both sides is intense, the Iron
Gustavs in particular trying to emulate us by
attacking our tank divisions and their supply
units. With our slow Ju. 87s we always do our
best to break up and chase away these IL II
formations, but they are a little bit faster
than we are because, unlike ourselves they have
a retractable undercarriage. 41

Rudel mainly went after the tanks, the sheer number of

tanks involved made them much more inviting targets, and

the tanks were his assigned mission.G

During the Cherkassy operation, Rudel flew the only

cannon carrying Stuka available to his squadron. Early

in the operation Rudel found himself with no tanks to at-

tack, but spotted a squadron of IL 2's in formation with

P-39 Aircobras and other Russian fighters. Rudel

contacted his wingman, at that time who was circling with

him looking for targets, and ordered him to support his

attack on the IL 2's. He dove on the squadron and ac-

tually managed to gain on the planes during his dive. He

downed one IL-2 with his cannon before the Russian fight-

ers came after him forcing him to return to Uman. 43

Von Manstein transferred his headquarters train to

Uman, so that he could better oversee the progress of the

two corps involved in the relief attempt. Colonel Gen-

 46

eral Hube of First Panzer Army had his headquarters at

Uman, von Manstein made use of some of Hube's staff to

help him oversee the relief attempt. Colonel General

Wohler of Eighth Army had his headquarters near Uman and

was easily accessible from there.~

Von Manstein tried twice to travel to the fronts of

each of the two panzer corps of the relief effort, each

time in vain. His vehicles bogged down in the mud and he

had to turn around. Since he could not travel by ground,

he decided to use the air arm attached to his assault

groups to obtain the information he needed in order to

better command the troops under his command. He utilized

the airport at Uman not only to supply the pocket and to

receive the wounded, but to command his assault groups,

as well as to recon the area in front of his attack

groups.~

Matters Within the Pocket

Colonel General Lieb received orders from von

Manstein to consolidate his forces on the morning of

January 29.

Prepare withdrawal in direction Rossava up to

Mironovka-Boguslav. Be ready to move by 1200
on 29 January upon prearranged signal. Auth-
ority for further withdrawal likely within
twenty-four hours. Report new situation. 46

This withdrawal moved Forty-Second corps closer to

 47

Eleventh Corps. Von Manstein, without Hitler's per-

mission, also granted Lieb permission to withdraw his

corps from the Dnieper river. During the communication,

Lieb reported his need for additional ammunition and ad-

vised his superiors that the evacuation of the wounded

from Korsun airport progressed too slowly. He reported

2,000 casualties so far within the pocket. 47

Lieb recorded the situation facing Eleventh Corps in

his diary on the 29th of January. He reported that Stem-

mermann's men faced strong Russian tank forces to the

front of his corps. According to Lieb's diary, several

of the regiments of Eleventh Corps were reduced to only

100 men. Lieb also recorded that his units were now re-

ceiving supplies, but that even at this time he foresaw

shortages.u

On January 31, Hitler ordered von Manstein to con-

solidate the chain of command within the pocket. Von

Manstein gave control of all the men within the pocket to

Colonel General Stemmermann, the commander of Eleventh

·corps. His new command, renamed Group Stemmermann, con-

tained all the units within the pocket. His new command

had neither a staff or a signal corps. He received no

help from outside the pocket, but received the disturbing

order to hold his old positions on the Dnieper river.

Stemmermann now had to hold the original sixty mile front

 48

his two corps had held before the encirclement, along

with a new two-hundred mile front the Russians created on

his flanks and in his rear. His groups had barely held

the sixty mile front originally assigned to them, and the

outlook for holding an extra front over three times the

length of the old front seemed dismal. 0

Beginning the Airlift

During their encirclement of the Cherkassy-Korsun

Pocket, the Russians cut the supply roads leading to the

Forty-seventh and Eleventh Corps. The only roads avail-

able to carry supply traffic led through Schpola and

Zvenigorodka. Colonel General Stemmermann requested sup-

ply by air, and the Luftwaffe rose to the challenge. 50

Group Stemmermann needed supply right away, most of

their supply depots had fallen into Russian hands before

the Russians completed their encirclement. According to

Degrelle, large stores of gasoline and munitions fell in-

to Russian hands on January 28, as the two encircling ar-

mies came together in the rear of Group Stemmermann. 51

In order to supply group Stemmermann fully by air,

the Luftwaffe established a goal of delivering seventy

tons of ammunition, gasoline, tank parts, weapons, food

and other supplies per day. The Luftwaffe also delivered

specialized medical personnel to help care for the wound-

 49

ed within the pocket. In order to protect the transport

flights, the Germans flew light anti-aircraft batteries

to the airport at Korsun during the first few days of the

airlift operation. The planes also flew experienced

ground personnel into the pocket to help lessen the turn

around times of the planes and possibly repair some of

the lightly damaged planes upon landing. 52

The planes began landing in the pocket on January

31, 1944. The Eighth Air Corps of the Fourth Air Fleet

flew from Uman in order to supply the surrounded men.

Three air transport wings took part in the supply effort.

They flew from three different air fields: Golta,

Proskurov and Uman. The only supply depot available to

the Germans in the area lay near the airfield at Uman.

Planes taking off from the other two airfields flew to

Uman first to pick up the necessary supplies before going

to the airfield at Korsun, within the pocket. 53

The planes flew the first few missions in close

formation at hedgehopping altitude. Unfortunately for

the pilots, the Russians had set up their anti-aircraft

defenses almost immediately after their armored forma-

tions had completed the encirclement. Some German planes

were shot down and others were heavily damaged early on

in the supply operations. In order to cut their losses,

the Germans varied their supply and return routes from

 50

the pocket.~

On one occasion the commander of the third group of

the Third Transport Wing decided to lead his group back

to Uman at a higher altitude. He wished to avoid the

heaviest of the anti-aircraft fire, but led his group

into a different kind of trouble. Russian fighters jump-

ed his group and managed to down twelve Junker 52 trans-

port planes."

Russian Air Support

The Russians had assigned the Second and Fifth Air

Armies to destroy the encircled men of Group Stemmermann.

These two air armies were attached to the First and Se-

cond Ukrainian Fronts, respectively. 56 The two air ar-

mies contained a combined strength of 997 aircraft (772

were operational) when the operations against the encir-

cled forces began.fl

Two more air armies were assigned to attack the

German air fields at Uman and to attack any relief ef-

forts the Germans mounted to rescue the men in the pock-

et. The Seventeenth and Eighth Air Armies, attached re-

spectively to the Third and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts were

assigned these two tasks. These two air armies contained

a strength of 1,363 aircraft.~

Russian fighter coverage was especially heavy over

 51

the airfield at Korsun. The Russian fighters came only

when the German transports lacked fighter coverage. Even

when the transports did have fighter coverage, it was in-

adequate for normal operations. But, even the light

fighter coverage the German transports did have, managed

to scare most of the Russian fighter pilots away. 59

New Problems Within the Pocket

On February 1, Lieb recorded the following entry in

his diary: "Fighter protection inadequate. Ammunition

and fuel running low." He made his concerns known to his

immediate commander, and hoped the situation would im-

prove.w

On the night of February 1-2, fifty Russians who

manned the heavy mortars of the Wallonien Brigade began

to move towards the Russian lines around Olshanka. Only

one Belgian sentry from the Wallonien Brigade stood in

the way of the Russians and they killed him during their

escape. The desertion not only meant the loss of an ar-

tillery battery, but the Russians gained men with knowl-

edge of the Belgian defenses within the pocket. 61

The next day, February 2, the Russians launched an

attack in the Wallonien sector. The Russians utilized

the information they gained from their fellow Russians

who had defected from the Belgians the night before. The
 52

Russians attacked between Losovok and the Dnieper River

at the very extremity of the Wallonien lines. Only a few

dozen Belgians defended the front at this point in the

line. The Russians managed to take Losovok during the

day on the second, forcing the Wallonien Brigade to re-

quest permission to withdraw the Second Company which had

held the line from Losovok to Moshny. The Belgians re-

ceived orders denying the request to withdraw, and or-

dering them to retake the town. 62

Lieutenant Degrelle led the counterattack against

the Russians at Losovok and received two panzers to help

him with the endeavor. The tanks managed to help the

Belgians, but ran into problems of their own:

Through great rivers of mud, along routes

flooded with water spreading to a breadth of a
hundred meters, we pushed eastward. Overturned
automobiles and the hooves of dead horses were
everywhere, half sunk in the slime near the
trails.m

The mud, as well as the obstacles in the road, hindered

the movement of the tanks.M

The Germans fired eighteen artillery shells to sup-

port the Belgian attack. The Belgians did manage to take

most of the town, but just as success seemed in their

grasp, General Gille gave them orders to evacuate the en-

tire sector. Degrelle had to move his men fast because

the infantry on his flanks had completed their withdrawal

and he was still on the river, surrounded on three sides.

 53

The Belgians were also running frightfully low on ammu-

nition and other supplies. Most disturbing to Degrelle

was the fact that he found the rest of the pocket too,

had become low on ammunition and supplies. 65

During their withdrawal from Losovok, the Belgians

faced many problems. the Germans had withdrawn the rest

of their troops from the Dnieper River line and the Rus-

sians had infiltrated men into the section of Losovok

still held by the Belgians. The Belgians not only faced

the Russians directly to their front, but the enemy also

had men on their flanks and in the town to their rear.

The Belgians only vehicle, an old volkswagen, kept stall-

ing and getting stuck, due to the mud and terrible weath-

er conditions. The Belgians managed to evacuate the town

and continued their retreat along with the rest of the

Germans who had held the Dnieper.M

After the third day of the airlift operations both

the approach and return flights were made at higher al-

titudes. The groups flew between 7,640 and 9,550 feet

with an escort of three Messershmitt Me-109 fighters per

group. At some times, no fighters were available for the

return flight. At these times, the transport planes de-

layed their departure until after dark, hoping to avoid

most of the Russian fighters. 67

The Russians also attacked the airfield at Korsun in

 54

order to hinder the German supply efforts. The Russians

used their IL-2 low level bomber to attack the field. On

February 3, the Russians launched fourteen low level at-

tacks against the field at Korsun.~

All of the diary entries Lieb made for the first few

days of the pocket express concern at the progress of the

airlift. Since his entry on February 1, he noticed a

gradual improvement in the amount of supplies delivered

by the airlift. The heavy Russian attacks on the pocket

put a strain on the ammunition supply within the pocket.

On February 4, Lieb recorded a daily expenditure of over

200 tons of ammunition per day for his corps alone. He

requested the airlift of 2,000 men to replace his cas-

ualties, which he reported at 300 per day. Lieb also

requested the delivery of an extra 120 tons of ammunition

per day.~

By February 3, 1944, the Germans had been pushed off

the Dnieper River and forced to retreat toward the west.

At the same time, the Russians continued their attacks

from south and southwest of the pocket. The Russians

widened their corridor from around fifty miles when the

pocket closed, to an average distance of eighty miles. 70

Stemmermann gave orders on February 3, to prepare

the equipment of the pocket for the expected withdrawal.

stemmermann decided that as soon as Hitler issued the or-

 55

der to evacuate the pocket, that his men could begin the

evacuation, instead of having to collect their equipment.

Stemmermann detailed over two-thirds of the men in the

pocket to begin preparing the heavy equipment and ve-

hicles for the breakout. Unfortunately for the Germans,

the columns of stalled trucks were very inviting targets

for the Russian fighters circling overhead.

Already the road from Gorodishche to Korsun,

our last chance to breakout, was jammed by an
incredible column. Thousands of trucks, spread
over twenty kilometers, followed three front
vehicles and skated in the black frogholes of
the road, which had become a prodigious cloaca.
The most powerful artillery tractors struggled
painfully to open a passage. This enormous
mass of vehicles was an incomparable target for
planes. The Soviet machines, like strident
swarms of wasps, would circle over the Kessel
and dive down in squadrons every ten minutes
onto the bogged-down column. Everywhere trucks
were burning. 71

The Germans faced the elements and the Russians in trying

to consolidate their vehicles for the breakout. Many of

the vehicles had to be abandoned later, because they

could not move through the mud. The Germans destroyed

the abandoned vehicles so they would not fall into the

hands of the Russians. 72

Later, the road became totally unusable due to the

one thousand vehicles that could no longer move. At

first, the Germans tried using the fields, but within

one-hundred meters of the road, the trucks bogged down in

the endless mire. The Germans then made use of their

 56

last hope for moving the vehicles, the railroad line be-

tween Gorodishche and Korsun. The Russians continued

their attacks against the German vehicles on the railroad

line. In order to continue using the railroad, the Ger-

mans had to continuously push the burning and wrecked ve-

hicles from the rail-line.TI

On February 3, Lieb reported to Eighth Army the

continual improvement of the air supply effort. He also

reported that several of the transport planes making

their return trip from the pocket, carrying wounded, were

shot down by Russian fighters. Lieb requested that ei-

ther the transports receive adequate fighter coverage for

their return trip or take wounded out of the pocket only

at night.~

Lieb and Stemmermann both agreed that the main focus

of their defense should face south. They needed to hold

as much territory in this direction, because the relief

forces were approaching the pocket from the south and

southwest. Korsun, the assembly area of the pocket, lay

al-most in artillery range of the Russian artillery bat-

teries south of the pocket. If the Russians managed to

push the Germans any farther north, they could shell the

airfield at Korsun, hindering the effort to supply the

pocket, and endangering the wounded at the hospitals

there. For these two reasons, Stemmermann issued orders

 57

to weaken his northern and eastern flanks in order to

strengthen his defenses facing south.TI

Hitler Meddles Again

Von Manstein had hoped that the two corps he

assembled to relieve the pocket could launch their at-

tacks on the night of February 2-3 and no later than the

night of February 3-4. But, Hitler meddled in the af-

fairs at the front once again. He ordered that neither

of the two armies releasing units for the relief attempt

could give up any territory. This order forced the army

commanders to postpone the attacks of the relief columns

from the night of the 2-3 to the day of February 3, in

order to reshuffle their troops, so as not to give any

ground. Unfortunately, a warming trend began on February

3, causing a heavy fog which delayed the attacks of both

corps until late in the morning.n

 Chapter IV

MOUNTING THE RELIEF EFFORT

February 3-15, 1~44

The German Breakthroughs

Third Panzer Corps launched an attack from a point

west of the pocket, taking the Russian forces surrounding

the pocket in the rear. Forty-seventh Panzer Corps at-

tacked the Russian flank, attacking from a point south-

west of the pocket. Von Manstein hoped that the attacks

of the two panzer corps would meet with success. He be-

lieved that the disparity in the number of units utilized

in the attack would be partially offset, because the Rus-

sian forces that faced his units had been in the lines

for a long period of time and were well below their nor-

mal strength, as were the units he was using in the re-

lief corps. 1

Von Vormann launched attacks with his Forty-Seventh

Panzer Corps with Third and Fourteenth Panzer Divisions.

At the time of the attack, both panzer divisions still

had units heavily embroiled in battle, so von Vormann

could only use a portion of his two division strength at

58
 59

the beginning of his attack. Neither of the two divi-

sions had received any rest before starting their at-

tacks.2

The relief effort met problems from the start.

First snow and then mud delayed the _assembly of the two

panzer corps. Fog delayed the attack and Hitler had just

stripped it of one of it's finest divisions and delayed a

second division until long after the relief attacks star-

ted. But, the relief forces did the best they could con-

sidering the weather and the assets available to them.

The two corps launched attacks first to cut the commun-

ication network of the enemy and then to surround them as

well. He hoped to destroy the forces surrounding the

Forty-Second and Eleventh Corps with concentric attacks. 3

Hitler ordered the two attacks so that he could create a

pocket of his own and destroy the whole of the Russian

forces involved in the two breakthroughs. Hitler also

hoped that the two corps could reinforce the troops in

the pocket and regain a favorable jump-off base for his

projected counteroffensive to retake Kiev. 4

Objections to the Conduct of the Relief Attempts

During a conference General Wohler, the commander of

Eighth Army, expressed his doubts about the success of

two relief attempts. He cited the problems with the mud

 60

and the limited forces which von Manstein could employ to

launch his attack. He recommended that instead of having

Third panzer Corps attack due north, that they turn east

as soon as possible to join forces with the advance ele-

ments of Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps. 5

Colonel General Wohler then went to von Manstein to

request that he change the direction of attack of the

Third Panzer Corps. Wohler felt that the men in the

pocket could not hold out long enough for a plan of the

magnitude Hitler wished to execute to work. Wohler

wished to combine the two relief attempts and attack

along the shortest route to the pocket in order to

guarantee the survival of Group Stemmermann. 6

Problems for Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps

New Russian attacks further hindered the relief

effort by Forty-seventh Panzer Corps from south of the

pocket. The Russians committed strong new infantry and

armored forces in an attack toward Novomirgorod. Von

Vormann shifted elements of two of his divisions from the

relief attempt to defend the town against the Russians. 7

In the evening on February 3, General von Vormann

reported that his Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps could no

longer carry out offensive operations. His already weak-

ened divisions had gained a bridgehead at Izhrennoye, but

 61

Russians attacks continually whittled down his combat ef-

fective strength. After the days offensive, von Vormann

reported his corps contained only twenty-seven tanks and

thirty-four assault guns still operational. Von Vormann

believed that he could still hold his ground and that his

divisions were tying down considerable Russian forces. 8

Third Panzer Pushes On

Third Panzer Corps attacked toward the north in

order to take advantage of favorable tank terrain. The

pocket also lay due north of Third Panzer Corps, an at-

tack in this direction meant that Third Panzer Corps lost

no time in advancing in other directions. 9 Third Panzer

Corps launched their attack on February 3, with only the

Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Divisions and Heavy Pan-

zer Regiment Baeke. Advanced elements of the Leibstan-

darte joined the attack on February 4, while the rest of

the division, as well as the First Panzer Division could

not join the attack until much later. 10

Weather Problems

The weather hindered the Russian efforts to destroy

the German pocket as well. Only three airfields remained

operational after the thaw. The Russians had only sta-

tioned between 50 and 100 aircraft at each airstrip.

 62

That meant that only around 150 to 300 aircraft were

available to the Russians during the beginning of the

thaw, but later the Russians managed to transport most of

the strength of the two air armies to the three service-

able fields. Even with the reduced air power due to the

loss of use of the other air fields in the area, the

Russians managed to fly 3,800 sorties against the Germans

within the pocket between January 29 and February 3. 11 In

order that all forms of aircraft keep flying, the Rus-

sians concentrated several air regiments at each open

field. The regiments each contained a different type of

plane, each airfield had a fighter, ground attack, trans-

port, dive bomber and heavy bomber regiment. 12

According to Soviet sources, Russian planes launched

an attack against the German supply wing based in the

Vinnitsa region. The Soviets claim eighty transport air-

craft destroyed on the ground. They claim that the de-

struction of these transports seriously hindered the Ger-

man effort to supply their troops within the pocket. 13

Resistance Toughens

During the day on February 4, the men of the Leib-

standarte Panzer Division managed to take a key position

known to the Germans as Height 246.3, some two miles

north of Tinowka. The Russians assaulted the German po-

 63

sitions on the height and managed to wipe out most of the

sixth Company which held the left flank. Four survivors

held the flank against thirty-four Russians and three T-

34 tanks. Two of their number were killed and the other

two, reduced to using their service pistols held the

flank until a battalion counterattack drove off the

Russians. 14

Von Manstein ordered Third Panzer Corps to change

the direction of their attack due east. The attack would

advance via Lissyanka moving toward Morentsy. Von Man-

stein ordered that the Third Panzer Corps launch their

final attack to relieve the pocket as soon as the ad-

vanced element of the group reached Lissyanka. 15

After the first day of the relief attack, the Third

Panzer Corps had moved several miles towards the pocket.

The fog set in during the night and movement the next day

became near impossible for either side. Because of the

difficulties associated with moving through the mud, the

tanks had burned up a considerable amount of gasoline.

They not only burned extra fuel due to having to pull

themselves out of the mud, but burned fuel trying to find

ground suitable to even move across. Since trucks were

unable to move through the mud, Third Panzer Corps re-

ceived orders to mobilize civilian help to carry gasoline

to the front. Brieth issued orders to requisition all

 64

horses, carts and sleds in the area to aid them in moving

supplies. 16

Defending the Pocket

At dawn on February 5, the Wallonien Brigade receiv-

ed orders to occupy the trench line between Staroselye to

Derenkovez. This line, dug by Ukrainian volunteers in

early January, extended southeast to northwest along high

crests which overlooked valleys and bogs. The trench

line had firing emplacements, but had been dug too deep

and lacked fascines. The Belgians defended the trench

with an average of ten men for each kilometer of front.

In order to preserve their fighting strength at key

points, Degrelle placed his men in groups and posted them

along the line. 17

During the day on February 5, Lieutenant Heder

decided that his Kampfgruppe could no longer hold 01-

schana against the superior forces of the Russians that

had assailed them since January 28. On the night of Feb-

ruary 5-6, Reder ordered his men to abandon their posi-

tions, and withdraw to the line of the Wiking Division.

At 02.30 hours, the men of the kampfgruppe broke through

the Russian lines and rejoined their division in the

Cherkassy Korsun Pocket. 18

Hitler decided on February 5, that the two corps

 65

trapped in the pocket might have to breakout of the pock-

et and come part way to meet the relief columns. On the

same day the O.K.W. decided to award both of the command-

ing generals within the pocket the Knight's Cross of the

Iron Cross "to boost morale". Von Manstein thought that

the commanders should receive the award after an actual

order for the breakout came, in order to avoid compar-

isons with January 1943."

During the morning on February 6, the Russians began

attacks against the Belgian trenchline near Staroselye.

According to Degrelle, the Russians managed to scale the

counterscarp during the night, crossing the Belgian

trench line at a point directly between two posts. The

Russians surprised and then strangled the men in these

posts and moved to a windmill which dominated the high

ground at this point in the trench line. The Russians

managed to take the entire trench line after some hours

of fighting and moved into Staroselye. The artillery of

the division became useless, because of the sheer number

of troops crossing the front of their lines. 20

The Belgians regrouped outside the town and attacked

the Russians in Staroselye and also in the trenchline.

They reentered the trenchline below the town and fol-

lowed it uphill towards the Russians. Two German tanks

arrived later to lead the rest of the Belgians directly

 66

up the hill. Many of the Russians took to their heels as

soon as the noise of the German tanks became audible. By

16.00, the Belgians managed to retake the hill and the

rest of the trench line. 21

On February 6, 1944, von Manstein decided that the

two panzer corps could not reach the pocket under their

own power and that the men in the pocket would have to

move to meet their rescuers. The reports he received

from the two commanders were still optimistic, but he had

to accept the truth that the mud and Russians might prove

too much for his six divisions to overcome (Eleventh

Panzer Division was still in route to the front lines

from the Bug River). The after action reports he

received from the commanders of the two panzer corps

showed the abundance of equipment the Russians now had in

their army stores.

Between the two corps, they reported the cap-

ture of more than 700 tanks, over 600 anti-tank
guns and about 150 field pieces, but only just
over 2,000 soldiers. This indicated that the
enemy forces had been largely made up of motor-
ized formations. 22

This indicates that the Russians had no shortage of e-

quipment they could employ in their divisions.

Even though the Russians suffered terrible losses,

they still managed to keep the men of the relief forces

from being successful in their attempt to free the forces

of Group Stemmermann. On February 6, the day von Man-

 67

stein ordered Stemmermann to concentrate his forces, the

pocket measured thirty miles from north to south and

twelve miles from east to west . . Von Manstein took his

own initiative and ordered Group Stemmermann to make a

breakout towards the southwest. Von Manstein set a date

for the breakout at this point, but due to the problems

the relief forces met, he kept having to move the date

back.n

The Relief Continues

February 6, saw the troops of Third Panzer Corps

still making some painfully slow progress towards the

pocket. Tank crewmen carried buckets of fuel back and

forth to their tanks in order to insure that they could

continue operations. Infantrymen walked barefoot, with

their boots in their packs. They found that their boots

hindered movement, while wearing boots, they had to stop

every few times they lifted their foot to retrieve their

boot, which stuck fast in the mud.M

To Keep the Airlift Alive

Lieutenant Leon Degrelle recorded that around se-

venty Junkers 52 transport planes landed within the pock-

et per day. In the seven days that the planes were able

to land in the pocket, they managed to empty the hospi-

 68

tals of wounded men. 25 In all, the planes took 2,825

wounded men out of the pocket. The closest hospital to

the pocket lay at Uman. Along with stopping at Uman for

supplies, all the planes leaving the pocket stopped at

Uman to unload the wounded they brought with them out of

the pocket. Unfortunately for the Germans a thaw set in,

making landings at first difficult, and later impos-

sible.u

During the first few days of the thaw, German engi-

neers were able to drain the field so that the planes

could land. Later, the Germans used earth moving equip-

ment to raise a landing strip out of the water on the

field. But, the mud and rain became too much for them

and they could no longer clear the landing strip to in-

sure a safe landing. According to Degrelle's memoirs,

the last plane to attempt to land in the pocket flipped

over, after burying a wing in the mud. The plane lay on

the raised air strip in mud a meter deep.v

The rapidly changing weather conditions, frost at

night, followed by a thaw during the day, made landing at

the Korsun airport very difficult, if not impossible.

The Luftwaffe chose to temporarily suspend landing oper-

ations until the weather improved for landing and the

ground stayed frozen all the time. The Germans made the

necessary preparations for the procurement of parachute

 69

canisters for supplying the troops of Group Stenunermann. 28

The Russians Step Up the Pressure

During the morning on February 7, the Russians

assaulted the Belgian trench line near Staroselye once

again. The German tanks which had supported the Belgians

in retaking the trenchline had already been recalled and

the 250 some survivors of the first battle of the trench-

es stood no chance against the attacking Russians. The

Russians, after taking Staroselye, now had a clear path

into the flank of the columns of Germans retreating

towards Korsun.~

The Belgians spent the rest of the day trying to

reestablish a cohesive line on the flank of Group Stem-

mermann. The Belgians sent patrols into the forests in

the area, hoping to discourage the Russians from attack-

ing through the German lines there. Skirmishes broke out

throughout the forest between the Belgian patrols and the

Russians in the forest. The Belgian artillery now had to

fire without rest to try to guarantee that the Russians

would not break through the Belgian lines which had been

hastily established between Staroselye and the flank of

the German column heading towards Korsun. 30

Because of the proximity of the Russian advance

units to the German columns, many of the Germans lost

 70

hope of retrieving their heavy equipment from the pocket.

The most powerf~l of the German artillery tractors spent

an entire day and night moving just over thirty kilo-

meters along the rail line. Wrecked automobiles and

trucks littered the railway line to Korsun. The Bel-

gians, the rearguard of Group Stemmermann, fired all the

trucks that could no longer move through the mud. 31

Appraising the Pocket of the Chances for Success

On February 7, Group Stemmermann received news that

had mixed blessings for them. the O.K.H. sent

Stemmermann the following message:

Relief advance by III. Panzer Korps toward

Morentzy. Gruppe Stemmermann will shorten the
front lines and move with the pocket in the
direction of Schanderowka in order to be able
to break out toward the relieving forces at the
proper time. 32

Stemmermann felt relief that he could withdraw his lines,

but hoped that the relief attempts still would succeed,

for he had mixed feelings about the success of a breakout

attempt. 33

The Sixteenth Panzer, following directly behind

Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke, reported that they made only

twenty kilometers per day progress towards the pocket.

After only a few days of fighting through the mud, the

artillery complement of the division reported only two

functioning artillery tractors. Therefore, the division

 71

decided to leave their artillery behind, instead of hav-

ing to destroy the guns when the engines on the last of

their artillery tractors burnt out.~

Two Separate German Airlifts

February 7, stretched the German air lift effort,

because two separate groups desperately needed supply on

that day. During his assault on the Gniloy Tikich,

Brieth informed the headquarters of Eight Army of his

acute shortage of supplies. The mud had stopped all of

his wheeled supply vehicles and the amount of supplies

his troops could carry to the front could not meet the

demands of his units."

Brieth was told to expect an air drop late in the

afternoon. Low clouds and heavy rain dominated the bat-

tle field, and Brieth doubted the ability of the German

airmen to deliver supplies in foul weather. Some German

aircraft, however, managed to reach Brieth's group, and

delivered enough supplies to keep his men fighting until

troops could cut the bogged down trucks out of the mud.

Adequate supplies reached Brieth during the night of the

seventh. The small airlift to Third Panzer Corps met the

needs of the German troops, and kept the relief effort

going one more day.M

 72

Stemmermann Must Break Out

On February 8, Colonel General Brieth informed von

Manstein that he must delay the attack he planned to

reach the Gniloy Tikich Stream today because of the mud.

At this point, von Manstein informed Hitler that the

planned reinforcement of the pocket was no longer pos-

sible and that the forces within the pocket would have to

drive further than originally planned to meet their res-

cuers.n

Stemmermann in Jeopardy

The Wallonien Brigade faced a serious threat to its

flanks on February 8. Russian forces had breached the

German line on the right flank of the Wallonien and

caused their headlong retreat. The Russians had also

smashed the line that elements of the Wiking Division

held on the left flank of the Wallonien Brigade. 38

The Russian spearheads, on both sides of the Wall-

onien Brigade managed to take the little village of

Skiti, in the rear area of the brigade. The brigade com-

mand post now stood as the only area between the two Rus-

sian spearheads held by friendly troops. The men of the

Wallonien Brigade managed to recapture Skiti later and

managed to force an escape route through the Russian

lines. The brigade received orders to abandon the vil-

 73

lage of Skiti the next morning, February 9, and received

orders to move off towards Derenkovez and set up a new

defensive line on the flank of Group Stemmermann there. 39

February 9, saw the Wiking Division facing dire

straits in their attempt to hold the front assigned to

them. General Gille issued orders to form an infantry

company out of elements of the Wiking Division not in-

volved in combat. Four officers and two-hundred-twenty

men formed the company. Armaments for the company con-

sisted of twelve machine guns (the rest of the men car-

ried submachine guns, rifles, side-arms and grenades).

Gille deployed this unit to contain the enemy bridgehead

at Ambrusino. This unit saw action between February 11-

17, suffering two dead, seventeen wounded and thirty-five

missing.~

The Russians began attacking the Belgian positions

around Derenkovez on February 9. The Belgians had set up

a defensive horseshoe facing north, northeast and east.

This horseshoe protected the road from Korsun, which

started off to the south in the Belgian rear. The SS

Nordland Regiment of the Wiking Division took positions

to the east and southeast of the Wallonien Brigade in

order to help them protect the convoys leaving from Der-

enkovez and moving to the collection point at Korsun. 41

The Russians attacked the lines of the Nordland Reg-

 74

irnent and drove it into headlong flight. General Gille

of the Wiking Division immediately ordered the regiment

to retake their old lines, because the Russian thrust

threatened the Belgian rear areas. The Germans began

using the men from the retreating column, who no longer

had their trucks, or equipment, as infantry. 42

Men of the Wallonien Brigade, reinforced by the new-

ly created infantry, began attacks to reestablish the

line the Nordland Regiment held. The Belgians forced the

Russians to retreat two kilometers, and even took "num-

erous" prisoners. Later in the day, men from the Nord-

land Regiment, corning from the opposite direction, man-

aged to force the rest of the Russians in the area to re-

treat, and reestablished the protecting ring around the

road to Korsun. According to Degrelle, by the time the

men of the Nordland Regiment arrived in the town, the

Belgians were already sitting around drinking coffee and

warming themselves by their fires. 43

The Russians reported the fall of Gorodische inside

the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket on February 9. On February

14, Korsun fell to the Russians, according to their

sources, and on February 15, the Russians reported that

they had destroyed the last of the relief forces.~

Von Manstein received disturbing news from Colonel

General Sternrnermann on February 11. This message stated

 75

that his Eleventh Corps was now on the verge of totally

collapsing under continuing Russian pressure. His two

weak, and one average strength divisions had been in the

German front lines since September and were now on their

last legs. Stemmermann stated that his troops needed the

relief efforts to reach them fast, or there would be

nothing left of his group to relieve.~

Stepping Up the Relief Effort

In desperation, von Manstein ordered that Third

Panzer Corps launch their final drive for the pocket on

February 11. The advanced elements, Heavy Panzer Reg-

iment Baeke and Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, fought their

way into the southern quarter of Lissyanka. Hindered

more by mud than by the Russians, they managed to force

their way to the banks of the Gniloy Tikich Stream.

O.K.W. ordered that they ford the stream immediately

while they still had momentum. Colonel General Brieth

reported back that his units could not possibly cross the

stream today, that they were so short of supplies that

they would have to stop until more gasoline and ammu-

nition could reach them. Brieth reported that the mud

made movement next to impossible and that his tanks were

burning fuel at three times the normal rate. His units

were also running short of food and other supplies nee-

 76

essary to carry out a successful attack. 46

With the arrival of the Eleventh Panzer Division,

Von Vormann decided that his Forty Seventh Panzer Corps

could once again carry out offensive operations. Von

Vormann launched the Eleventh Panzer and Thirteenth Pan-

zer Divisions through a gap in the Russian armies. The

Germans turned west and then north and reached Zveni-

gorodka during the day on February 12th. Von Vormann

reported that his corps had now reached a point only

thirty kilometers from the pocket and only twenty-five

kilometers from the Third Panzer Corps.~

Once more, von Vormann reported that his corps could

no longer carry out offensive operations. The elements

and the Russians had again robbed his corps of any of-

fensive capacity. He once again formed a hedgehog and

defended his gains. At this time, he tied down the for-

ces of the Fifth Guards Tank Army to his front and the

better part of a whole Front on his flanks. The Russians

sought to hold the German troops within the town and not

to let them join forces with the troops of Third Panzer

Corps."

Von Manstein ordered Third Panzer Corps to resume

their attack on February 12. Brieth remained stalled

south of the stream, because rain and rising temperatures

during the day continued to hinder the trucks bringing

 77

supplies and ammunition to the forces of his spearhead. 49

With the supplies that managed to reach his corps,

Brieth forced the stream with Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke

and the First SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler on

February 13. His spearhead stopped late in the day due

to heavy snow and lack of supplies. Brieth had forced

the stream crossing, but could move no further. Brieth

had received only enough supplies to keep his spearhead

moving. The supply system could not keep up with his

needs and he determined that he could only support the

remnants of Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke and Leibstandarte

Adolf Hitler on the north side of the river. At this

time, Baeke was down to his last six operational tanks.so

Late in the day on the 13th, as more supplies reached his

group, Brieth managed to force two more bridgeheads

across the Gniloy Tikich, including a bridge across the

stream which the First Panzer Division and elements of

the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler managed to seize intact. st

Consolidating the Pocket

At 01:30 on February 13, the Wallonien Brigade began

abandoning their forward positions around Derenkovez.

The Russians had already infiltrated their positions and

the men of the Wallonien had to face danger from all

round them. Russian tanks arrived on the scene and Leon

 78

Degrelle utilized the last two of the brigade's anti-tank

guns to stop them. The Russian tanks came to a halt and

the Russian infantry halted behind them. The Wallonien

Brigade continued with their evacuation, even loading the

two anti-tank guns on the last of the trucks. 52

When the last of his men boarded the trucks, De-

grelle contacted the Nordland Regiment and informed them

that the Wallonien had cleared their positions and were

falling back. The Nordland Regiment set fire to what

was left of Ambrusino and took up new positions behind

the fire.n

Across the Stream

During the day on February 13, Brieth ordered the

rest of his corps to cross the Gniloy Tikich. In order

to fully make use of all the divisions in his corps,

Brieth ordered the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Panzer Di-

visions, along with the 198th Infantry Divisions, which

protected the left flank of his corps, to take Hill 239.

Both divisions, the Seventeenth Panzer on the left, and

the Sixteenth Panzer on the right made good progress dur-

ing the night on the Thirteenth and into the morning on

February 14. By 10:30, the Seventeenth had taken all the

Russian trenches on the left approach to Hill 239. The

Sixteenth broke through three Russian trench lines and

 79

stormed Frankovka, near the base of the Hill. The 198th

Infantry Division moved up behind the Seventeenth Panzer

Division and occupied the trench lines which the Russians

had just evacuated. Both panzer divisions met tough res-

istance later in the morning and Brieth needed to add

some fighting power to his bid to take the hill.~

The Pocket Continues to Shrink

At dawn of February 14, the Wallonien Brigade stood

on the outskirts of Korsun. At this point the Belgians

got down from their trucks and marched into the city, as

if on parade. During the day, the Wallonien began bury-

ing the dead of the brigade. Every man killed up to this

point in the pocket received burial at Korsun."

Russian planes made the German attempt to supply the

troops with parachute dropped supplies very difficult.

The German pilots had to slow down and fly at very low

altitudes in order to insure success. The Russian pilots

would wait until the German pilots began their drop runs

and then dive on them from above, either shooting them

down when they pulled out of their dive, or while they

tried to complete their supply run. The Germans stopped

the practice of dropping supply containers fitted with

parachutes because even when dropped from a low altitude

and in little wind, the parachutes tended to drift. Many

 80

of the parachutes were carried so far off course, that

the troops within the pocket could not even pick them up.

Some drifted behind the Russian lines, while others ended

up in the Dnieper River. Enemy ground fire made the ten

minutes it took to drop the canisters very difficult for

the pilots to survive the drop.~

According to Degrelle, the day the Belgians arrived

in Korsun, they witnessed a German airdrop. At first,

the startled Belgians believed the parachutes belonged to

Russian airborne troops and prepared to meet their end,

but when the chutes hit the ground, they noticed thick

silver canisters attached to the chutes. Each of the

canisters contained twenty-five kilograms of ammunition

and or little boxes of chocolate concentrate. The troops

used the bitter chocolate to help them fight off sleep. 57

Later in the day, General Gille of the Wiking Divi-

sion received news that Ambrusino had fallen. He stormed

out of the command post, hopped into his volkswagen and

tore off in the direction of Ambrusino. Under Gille, the

Wiking Division managed to retake the town and reestab-

lished their protecting screen around Korsun. 58

One More Barrier

On February 14, Baeke and the Leibstandarte moved

off again in an attempt to take either the town of Dzhur-

 81

zhentsy or Hill 239, just six miles from the western most

point in the pocket. Hill 239 commanded the ridgeline

just south of Dzhurzhentsy and was the highest point west

of the pocket. Despite all attempts by the Germans, the

Russians managed to hold on to Hill 239 and the entire

ridgeline, all the way to Dzhurzhentsy.w

In order to stiffen resistance against the German

Third Panzer Corps, Marshall Zhukov moved the Fifth

Guards Tank Army into position to stop Brieth's advance.

The Fifth Guards Tank Army began their attacks against

Third Panzer late in the day on February 14. Fifth

Guards Tank Army succeeded in slowing the German advance,

only ten kilometers from the men of Group Stemmermann.~

Toward Korsun

Colonel General Stemmermann ordered his group to

prepare for the final withdrawal from Korsun. He no

longer had a large number of wounded in his hospitals at

Korsun and felt that further resistance against the

Russians trying to force him out of the city would cost

him too many men. The 50,000 men of Group Stemmermann

which still survived were forced into an area that mea-

sured seven kilometers by eight kilometers. 61

Colonel General Wohler, the commander of Eighth

Army, ordered Stemmermann to prepare his group for a

 82

breakout. His order stated that Group Stemmermann would

have to reach Dzhurzhentsy or Hill 239. The message

further instructed him to mass all his artillery on the

breakout front in order to help force the Russian lines.

The order named Colonel General Theobald Lieb of Forty-

Second Corps as the commander of the assault force of

Group Stemmermann, and left Stemmermann to command the

rear guard. Wohler ordered Stemmermann to begin his

breakout at 23:00 hours on February 16.fil

At 23:00 on February 14, the men of Group Stem-

mermann completed the evacuation of Korsun, in prep-

aration for the coming breakout. Winter had returned to

the Ukraine and instead of watery mud, the retreating

Germans had to deal with mud the consistency of putty.

Trucks that had move through the mud, became bogged down

and were pushed off the road by their former passengers.

Most of the soldiers abandoned their trucks, wished their

former drivers luck and made their way out of the pocket

on foot.s

New Innovations in the Airlift

After the problems associated with dropping can-

isters with parachutes to retard their descent failed,

the Germans tried dropping the supply canisters without

parachutes. The planes had to reduce speed and fly at

 83

very low altitude to give the canisters a chance of sur-

viving the impact. The ammunition (seventy-five and

eighty-eight millimeter shells) had no problems surviving

the impact. The low height and added cushion of the snow

guaranteed successful drops of ammunition. The Germans

dropped gasoline in twenty-six point five gallon drums,

the most stable drums they could find. On average, two

out of every ten drums burst on impact, but the Germans

within the pocket received most of the gasoline they

needed. 64

The Germans also decided to try to land their air-

craft during the night. The frosts at night allowed the

aircraft to land in relative safety, as long as they

could see the field. In order to aid the pilots, the

ground crews parked trucks and cars along the sides of

the runway and when the planes came in, they started

flashing their headlights down the landing strip. Land-

ing at night took away most of the need for escorting

fighters and made shooting down the German planes harder

for the Russian pilots. 65

Russian Reactions and the Russian Airlift

The Russians also made use of their night fighters,

to lessen the chances that German antiaircraft and

fighters would shoot down their planes. Since many of

 84

the supply drops took place at night, the Russians had to

fly then to have any chance of interdicting supplies to

the pocket. The Russian air commanders made extensive

use of Il-2 Shturmoviks fighters and Po-2 night bombers.M

The thaw caused the Russians to launch an airlift

effort of their own. Fuel and ammunition supplies became

critically low in the formations fighting the German re-

lief attempts now nearing the pocket. The Russians as-

signed the task of supplying units of the Second and

Sixth Tank Armies to the 326 Night Bomber Air Division.

The Russians assigned this division the task, because

their airfields lay close to a railroad, which could

bring supplies directly to the airfield, negating the

need to send the supplies over road by truck. This

division flew the Po-2 night bomber, making 822 flights

over a period of nine days, in very bad weather. The

bombers managed to supply the two tank armies with forty-

nine tons of gasoline, sixty-five tons of supplies and

525 rockets.~

While the planes of the Second and Fifth Air Armies

supplied the troops and hindered German efforts to supply

the pocket, planes of the Seventeenth and Eighth Air Arm-

ies disrupted supply movements behind the German front

lines. These air armies attacked German supply trains

and any vehicles that attempted to move towards the Ger-

 85

man front lines along the main highways in the area. The

Soviets claim that on February 4, alone, they flew 117

sorties and destroyed one-hundred vehicles and carts

along with the men and material they carried. 68

The Final Supply Drops

When the area of the pocket became tenuously small,

the Germans initiated a new way of marking their posi-

tions. Instead of marking the drop zones the planes were

to use, the Germans marked the four corners of the pock-

et. As the German planes circled in the air, the men de-

fending the pocket fired flares into the air to mark the

sixty square kilometers where the planes were to drop the

supplies. A successful drop meant that the men of the

pocket could defend themselves for that day. 69

During the last few nights of the existence of the

pocket, the Luftwaffe flew extra missions to insure that

the breakout forces would have adequate supplies to fight

their way to freedom. On the night of February 13-14,

the Luftwaffe made their supply drop right on time, but

off target. The supply drop that night fell into the

hands of the encircling Russian forces. According to

Lieb, the fault lay with the Luftwaffe, the pilots mis-

judged their approach and just dropped their supplies in

the wrong area. Lieb recorded in his diary the fact that
 86

the Luftwaffe tried to blame the forces within the pocket

for the errant supply drop, claiming that the encircled

forces had not adequately lit the drop zone. In any

case, the men of Group Stemmermann received no supplies

for the night of the 13-14.~

To Take Lissyanka

Colonel General Brieth decided that he needed to

take a town closer to the pocket on the Gniloy Tikich

Stream, in order to better the chances of Group Stem-

mermann reaching his lines. Brieth order the First Pan-

zer Division, along with the Seventeenth Panzer Division

to take the section of Lissyanka which lay on the eastern

bank of the Gniloy Tikich Stream. The Germans stormed

the eastern section of town, but met considerable resist-

ance from the Russian defenders. Brieth then order the

Sixteenth Panzer to move into Lissyanka and the Germans

succeeded in taking the town. After securing the eastern

half of Lissyanka, Brieth ordered the Sixteenth Panzer to

leave a regiment to guard the airfield there. 71

Final Preparations for the Breakout

In the early morning of February 15, the men of

Group Stemmermann stormed the village of Sanderovka, but

met determined Russian resistance after taking only half

 87

of the town. During a later attack, the Germans with

several panzers managed to take the town, though with

extreme difficulty.TI

In order to increase the chance of a successful

breakout, Colonel General Stemmermann ordered that the

Wiking division hold the town of Novo-Buda, which

elements of the Second SS Panzer Division Das Reich had

taken during the night. Two regiments of the Das Reich

Division had stormed the town and drove the Russians off

in surprise. Das Reich captured twenty Ford trucks and

several Russian heavy artillery batteries. The only

major usable road leading towards the relief forces

passed by Novo-Buda. The Germans wanted to hold the town

in order to use it as a concentration area for the break-

out and to protect the road they would use to leave the

pocket. Novo-Buda also contained a fortified line the

Ukrainians had built for the Germans earlier in the war.

The 3,000 men of Das Reich moved off to take the next

town in the path of the breakout, turning Novo-Buda over

to the follow up forces of Group Stemmermann. 73

Stemmermann believed that a relatively small force

could hold the fortified line at Novo-Buda against a

sizeable force of Russians. However, Hitler had not al-

lowed the fortified line to be started early enough and

several gaps remained when the Russians attacked the

 88

town. The Wallonien Brigade, attached to the Wiking

Division, took part in holding the town. The 1,000 men

of the Wallonien received support in holding the town

from a rag tag collection of cooks, accountants, drivers,

mechanics, quartermasters and telephone operators.~

At 05:00 on February 15, the Russians assaulted the

Belgian positions at Novo-Buda. The German line held

where the fortifications stood, but Russian armored units

punched holes in the German lines where there was no

cover. Fifteen Russian tanks supported the attacks,

which the Germans could counter with only five of their

own. The five German Panthers retreated beyond the town

to take up new, more defendable positions. During the

withdrawal, one of the German Panthers came gun to gun

with a Russian T-34 and the two tanks destroyed each

other. Degrelle rallied the retreating Belgians south of

the town with the remaining Panthers. He also succeeded

in gathering the last of the Belgian anti-tank guns to

help him hold their new positions. The fall of the town

meant that the Russians now had a clear path to attack

the columns of Group Stemmermann as they moved down the

road and out of the pocket. 75

One group of Belgians under Lieutenant Colonel

Lucien Lippert, the last of the Belgian staff officers,

still held the northwest corner of the town. He began an

 89

attack to retake the section of town lost to the Rus-

sians. Lippert crossed into the Russian held southwest

corner of town and seized a group of houses near the cen-

ter of town. Lippert charged into a house in the Russian

section of town and was killed by the Russians defending

the position. The Belgians retreated and tried to set up

new positions near the center of town. The Russians then

launched an attack and drove the Belgians back into their

corner of town.n

The Belgians then requested permission to evacuate

the town entirely, citing heavy casualties and the pres-

ence of Russian tanks within the town proper. Without

tank support in the town, the Belgians had to use their

hand portable anti-tank weapons to destroy the T-34's.

The Belgians made use of the panzerfaust, within the town

to knock out the tanks, but the weapon caused them many

problems.n

Stemmermann ordered the Belgians to hold the town at

all costs, at least until the breakout began. Stemmer-

mann wanted to hold Novo-Buda, because men in this town

could protect the only road available to him to use in

his breakout attempt. Only a muddy plain stood between

Novo-Buda and the escape route Group Stemmermann would

use to leave the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.n

Colonel General Stemmermann assigned the capture of

 90

Sanderovka to General Gille of the Wiking Division.

Gille managed to free the Germania Regiment from his di-

vision's perimeter and assigned them the task of cap-

turing the town. Lieutenant Colonel Werner Meyer, the

commander of the Germania Regiment, decided to attack the

Russian lines to the left of the town, and then attack

the town from the right. His first company stormed the

town and managed to force the Russians holding the town

to flee. The second and third companies, which followed

up the attack, managed to hold the town until the break-

out began. 79

Germania gained full control of Sanderovka early in

the morning of February 15. During the day, the rest of

the Wiking Division passed through Sanderovka, and man-

aged to force the Russians back three kilometers towards

the men of the Third Panzer corps. 80

Once again, the Third Panzer Corps tried to break

through the Russian lines to Group Stemmermann. While

moving his troops forward, the bridge through Lissyanka

collapsed. Brieth assigned his engineers the task of

building a new bridge through the town, while the rest of

his corps moved against Hill 239. His attack broke down

due to the weather, and the Russian forces defending the

hill. 81
 CHAPTER V

THE BREAKOUT

February 15-22, 1944

The Breakout Order

At 11:05, on February 15, Colonel General Stem-

mermann received the breakout order over the radio. The

breakout order read, in part:

Capabilities of III Panzer Corps reduced by

weather and supply difficulties. Task Force
Stemmermann must accomplish break-through on
its own to line Dzhurzhentsy-Hill 239 where it
will link up with III Panzer Corps. The break-
out force will be under the command of Colonel
General Lieb and comprise all units still cap-
able of attack. 1

Unfortunately for the corps within the pocket, the mes-

sage never told the commanders of Group Stemmermann whe-

ther they would meet German or Russian forces upon reach-

ing Hill 239. The message also failed to tell Stemmer-

mann that Brieth had taken control of Lissyanka, or that

he had captured a bridge over the Gniloy Tikich. These

omissions would cause serious problems for the troops

within the pocket as they escaped from the pocket. 2

Late in the evening on February 15, Stemmermann

called the division and regiment commanders together to

91
 92

give them his orders for the breakout. He issued, in

part, the following orders:

At 23:00, on 16 February, Task Force B, 72nd

Division and 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking will
attack in a southwesterly direction from the
line Khilki-Komarovka, break the enemy's res-
istance by a bayonet assault, and throw him
back in continuous attack toward the southwest
in order to reach Lissyanka and there to join
forces with elements of III Panzer Corps. Com-
pass number 22 indicates the general direction
of the attack. This direction is to be made
known to each individual soldier. The password
is: "Freiheit" (Freedom).

For the attack and breakout each division will

be organized in five successive waves, as fol-
lows: First Wave: one infantry regiment re-
inforced by one battery of light artillery (at
least eight horses per gun, plus spare teams)
and one engineer company. Second wave: anti-
tank and assault gun units. Third wave: re-
mainder of infantry (minus one battalion), en-
gineers, and light artillery. Fourth wave:
all our wounded that are fit to be transported,
accompanied by one infantry battalion. Fifth
wave: supply and service units.

The entire medium artillery and certain spe-

cifically designated units of light artillery
will support the attack. They will open fire
at 23:00 on 16 February, making effective use
of their maximum range. Subsequently, all ar-
tillery pieces are to be destroyed in accor-
dance with special instructions.

The radios of each division will be carried

along on pack horses. To receive signal com-
munications from corps, each division will, if
possible, keep one set open at all times, but
in any event every hour on the hour. The corps
radio will be open for messages from the divi-
sions at all times.

The corps command post will be, until 20:00, 16

February, at Shenderovka; after 20:00 at
Khilki. From the start of the attack the corps
commander will be with the leading regiment of
 93

the 72nd Division. 3

Stemmermann covered the rear guard actions with special

care to make sure that his group received all the pro-

tection possible during the breakout. He gave special

coverage to the relief of the Wiking ss Division near

Komarovka by the 57th Infantry Division. Most of the

staff officers of this division attended the meeting to

make sure that they knew each phase of the plan for re-

lief of the ss. At this time, Stemmermann turned all

decisions dealing with the lead elements of the group to

Colonel General Lieb. 4

Soon after receiving command of the lead elements,

Colonel General Lieb had to make many decisions concern-

ing the breakout attempt. He went to talk to Colonel

General Stemmermann about what to do with the wounded men

that were too hurt to move. Their transport could not

negotiate the muddy roads and even letting them try would

mean backing traffic up behind them when they became

bogged down in the mud. Lieb decided that 2,000 of the

wounded men of the pocket would have to remain where they

were. He called for the medical personnel of the pocket,

along with one doctor from each division to stay with the

wounded and surrender to the Russians when the time came. 5

 94

One More Supply Drop to the Pocket

The German pilots flew the greatest number of mis-

sions on the night of February 15-16, the night before

the breakout. The crews flew an average of four to five

missions on that night alone. The transports took extra

ammunition and gasoline supplies to the encircled men, to

aid them in their breakout attempt. 6 According to Lieb,

the air drops put them in good shape, at least well sup-

plied with ammunition. Lieb just worried about the abil-

ity of his corps to carry ammunition with them, because

of the conditions of the roads. He doubted the ability

of the vehicles to move through the mud carrying full

loads of ammunition. 7

The missions to supply the men in the Cherkassy-

Korsun Pocket ended on the night of February 15-16. How-

ever, the mission to aid the men of the pocket continued

until the night of February 19-20. The transports flew

missions to supply the relief forces, bringing their ad-

vance elements rations of food and ammunition to last

them until they returned to the German lines. 8

To Take Hill 239

During the day on February 16, Heavy Panzer Regiment

Baeke and the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler made one more

attempt to take Hill 239. At one point in the day, Baeke

 95

actually managed to take three other tanks to the height

of the hill. The four tanks were no match for the Rus-

sian counterattacks and they were again driven off the

hill and back 400 yards. 9

The Sixteenth Panzer Division launched an attack

against the Russian screening line in front of the

heights south of Dzhurzhentsy. Seven T-34's and 400

supporting infantry stood in the first line facing the

Sixteenth Panzer. This attack met with little success

and the Russians maintained control of the heights south

of the town, including Hill 239. The second company of

the Sixteenth Panzer Division stood between the rest of

the division and Dzhurzhentsy, protecting the flank of

the division. 10

Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke left the lines of Group

Stemmermann in Lissyanka and launched an attack against

the Russians at Oktyabr. This move brought the men of

Third Panzer Corps closer to the men of Group Stemmer-

mann. It also gave the Germans a position north of the

Russians between them and the pocket. Baeke then turned

the town over to flanking divisions and moved again

against the heights around Lissyanka. 11

The First Panzer Division brought their hospital

trains to a point directly behind the front lines of

Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke during the day, in order to

 96

take the wounded from Group Stemmermann to Uman. Ju.

52's stood by on a leveled field on the line of the re-

treat to take the wounded back to the airport at Uman. 12

The Final Orders

Further messages concerning the breakout attempt

reached Stemmermann during the day on February 16. The

new instructions emphasized the importance of surprise

and coordination:

During initial phase of operation tonight hold

your fire so as to achieve complete surprise.
Maintain centralized fire control over artil-
lery and heavy weapons, so that in the event of
stronger enemy resistance, especially at day-
break, they can be committed at point of main
effort in short order.a

The orders went on to give the time for the last expected

supply drop for the troops in the pocket and to tell

Stemmermann that he could expect air support at dawn, to

protect his flanks.M

General Gille summoned Degrelle from Novo-Buda and

informed him that Stemmermann planned to breakout of the

pocket at 23:00 that night. Degrelle received orders to

hold Novo-Buda until all the elements of Group Stemmer-

mann, except the rear guard, had passed his positions.

After Group Stemmermann moved past Novo-Buda, the Bel-

gians would abandon their positions and march to the head

of the column to take part in spearheading the breakout

 97

attempt. 15

Final Preparations

The two corps in the pocket sought to breakout on

the night of February 16-17 1944. Stemmermann ordered

that the artillery in the pocket fire off their remaining

rounds in support of the breakout effort. The two corps

had no chance of moving their heavy artillery through the

mud to take them out of the pocket. The prime-movers of

the guns had enough trouble moving through the mud

without a heavy gun to drag behind · them. 16

Stemmermann stationed Corps Detachment Bon the

northern flank of the breakout and the SS Wiking Di-

vision, with the Wallonien Brigade attached, in the

south. Each division in the pocket placed a regiment of

artillery in the vanguard and echeloned two approximately

regiment sized artillery units behind the vanguard.

Stemmermann took command of the rearguard himself, lead-

ing the Fifty-Seventh and Eighty-Eighth Divisions as they

withdrew to each new phase line. 17

On the evening of February 16-17, the Leibstandarte

Adolf Hitler once again tried to cut their way through

the Russian defenses and take Hill 239. In a separate

effort, they tried to take Hill 222, in order to help

protect the flank of the relief effort, as it returned to

 98

the German lines after linking up with Group Stemmermann.

These two key positions stood between the escaping men of

Group Stemmermann and the German lines. The Germans were

unable to take the two hills, due to the ice and the ten-

acity of the Russians defenders. The troopers of the

Leibstandarte at one point managed to seize the crest of

Hill 239, but were forced from the trenches they had just

taken by a Russian counterattack. 18

Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke joined the Leibstandarte

Adolf Hitler in another attempt to take Hill 239. Al-

though they made some headway, they were not able to take

the hill from the Russians. Other units of Third Panzer

Corps took up screening positions around Pochapintsy, to

the south of Hill 239. They took up these positions in

order to keep the Russians in the town from launching at-

tacks against Group Stemmermann as it passed the Russian

concentrations in the town. The attack into Pochapintsy

also served to scare off the Russians assigned to defend

the Gniloy Tikich Stream near the town. In their retreat

they panicked the troops guarding the stream further

south and scared them into leaving their positions be-

tween the men of Group Stemmermann and the stream. 19

Shortly before the breakout began, a crisis arose

among the rear guard of Group Stemmermann. The Russians

attacked the junction between the Fifty-Seventh and

 99

Eighty-Eighth Divisions. The Russians tanks broke

through between these two infantry divisions because the

German divisions here had no tanks or sufficient anti-

tank guns to stop the Russians. General Gille of the

Wiking Division launched an attack with tanks and some of

his armored infantry. The attack threw the Russians back

and reestablished the rear flank of Group Stemmermann.

The tanks and troops of the Wiking Division moved across

the whole of the pocket to take part in spearheading the

breakout attempt.w

Dash for Freedom

Group Stemmermann broke out of the Cherkassy-Korsun

Pocket at 23:00 on February 16. At the time, Stemmermann

commanded about 45,000 men, including many Russian aux-

iliaries, the pocket also contained 1,500 wounded fit for

transport, which Stemmermann hoped could be rescued.

Stemmermann ordered the artillery not to fire until the

lead elements met resistance, so the breakout attempt

began in silence and the three assault regiments cut

through the Russian outpost line and the main screening

line before the Russians knew what happened. 21 Lieb, on

horseback, witnessed the events as they unfolded:

By 23:00 the regiment (105th Grenadier Reg-

iment of the 72nd Infantry Division) two bat-
talions abreast-started moving ahead, silently
and with bayonets fixed. One-half hour later
 100

the force broke through the first and soon

thereafter the second Russian defense line.
The enemy was completely caught by surprise.
Prisoners were taken along. n

Lieb noted the lack of defenders in the Russian lines and

was puzzled. He later (after consulting members of the

rear guard over the radio) came to the conclusion that

the Russians had withdrawn a significant number of men

from their southern trench line to take part in the at-

tack on Ssteblev, which they launched the morning of Feb-

ruary 17. n

Along with the fighting, Lieb recorded the effect of

the elements on the breakout attempt.

The advance toward the southwest continued. No

reports from either Task Force Bon the right
or the 5th SS Panzer Division on the left.
That they were making some progress could only
be inferred from the noise of vehicles due
north and south of us, and from the sounds of
firing that indicated the location of their
leading elements. Over road-less, broken
terrain traversed by numerous gullies our march
proceeded slowly. There were frequent halts.
Here and there, men and horses suddenly dis-
appeared, having stumbled into holes filled
with deep snow. Vehicles had to be dug out
laboriously. The slopes were steeper than
could be presumed from looking at the map.
Gradually the firing decreased until it broke
off entirely by 02:00. About two hours later
the leading elements of the 72nd Division were
approximately abreast of Dzhurzhentsy. Still
no reports from Wiking and Task Force B. I
could not give them my position by radio be-
cause by now my headquarters signal unit was
missing and could not be located.~

Lieb reported the same problems throughout the night that

Stemmerrnann would face, no communication with other ele-

 101

men ts of the group. 25

Later during the night another regiment of the

Seventy-Second Infantry Division reached a road running

into Dzhurzhentsy from the southeast. The vanguard of

the regiment encountered four Russian tanks and a column

of trucks moving up the road. One of the Germans yelled

"stoi" (halt) and the Russians allowed the Germans to

pass unmolested. The Russians realized their mistake,

after German cannon began moving across the road, but

could not stop the vanguard, because they became heavily

embroiled with the follow up units. 26

The ss spearhead regiment ran into trouble as it

passed east of Dzhurzhentsy. There they encountered

heavy machine gun, antitank and tank fire from the edge

of the village. General Gille diverted one battalion to

drive the Russians back and turned his main effort due

south. His troops had charged across the open plain in

front of Dzhurzhentsy and Hill 239, thinking they would

meet fellow German troops there. The Wiking Division

then came under fire from the Russians who still occupied

Hill 239. Confusion reigned among the Wiking Division,

the unexpected fire from the hill threw the division into

confusion and allowed the Russians extra time to fire in-

to the ranks of troops. Gille then turned his men fur-

ther south to avoid the heavy tank fire coming from Hill
 102

239. This placed the column east of the Gniloy Tikich,

and forced the column to cross the stream.v

The 72nd Division too, faced problems as it passed

through Dzhurzhentsy. The Russians had stopped firing as

the regiment neared Dzhurzhentsy, but the Russians in the

area took up the battle again as the division left the

town.

Shortly after 04:00, enemy tanks ahead opened

fire. They were joined by Russian artillery
and mortars operating from the direction of
Dzhurzhentsy, at first without noticeable
effect. The firing increased slowly but stead-
ily, and was soon coming from the south as
well. We began to suffer casualties. The ad-
vance, however, continued. By about 06:00 the
leading units reached a large hollow southeast
of Dzhurzhentsy. Enemy fire, getting constant-
ly heavier, was now coming from three direc-
tions. Elements of Wiking could be heard on
the left, farther back. No message, and not a
trace of Task Force B. Day was dawning. The
difficult ascent out of the hollow began. The
climb was steep and led up an icy slope.
Tanks, guns, horse-drawn vehicles, and trucks
of all kinds slipped, turned over, and had to
be blown up. Only a few tanks and artillery
pieces were able to make the grade. The units
lapsed rapidly into disorder. Parts of the
Wiking Division appeared on the left.~

The Russians had chosen to defend Dzhurzhentsy, because

the town lay in a direct line with Lissyanka. If the

Russians could force the men of Group Stemmermann to turn

south around the town, they would have to cross the

Gniloy Tikich Stream in order to make contact with the

Third Panzer Corps.~

While the men of the vanguard fought to reach the

 103

lines of Third Panzer Corps, Stemmermann kept order among

the remainder of his group. He delayed the second wave

for ten minutes after the vanguard moved out, in order to

give the first wave time to pierce the Russian lines. He

then ordered all vehicles other than tanks, self-propel-

led assault guns, tracked prime movers and enough horse

drawn carts to transport the men wounded during the

breakout destroyed.~

The destruction of the vehicles alleviated some of

the transportation problems, but the vehicles the Germans

utilized still caused monumental traffic jams. Some

units chose to disregard Stemmermann's order to destroy

their trucks and tried to move them through the mud.

Others overloaded their wagons with wounded men and sup-

plies, trying to save everything they possessed when the

Russians closed the pocket. These trucks and overloaded

carts promptly got stuck in the mud and caused problems

for the vehicles behind them. 31

Sanderovka fell exactly one hour after the breakout

began. Russian tanks stormed the town and overwhelmed

the Germans who were the rear guard of the column in this

area. The Russian tanks then attacked the rear element

of the two columns. The last twenty Panthers of the

Wiking Division shot out of the column and took positions

in a gully, bringing fire against the Russian tanks.

 104

These tanks, outnumbered ten to one, provided time for

Stemmermann to move his columns and for him to set up a

viable defense against the tanks with part of his infan-

try.32 According to the men who witnessed the tanks mov-

ing into battle, the tankers proudly wore their silver

trimmed uniforms and the black and silver "Ritterkreuz"

(knights cross to the iron cross) around their throats.

The last of the panzertroops of the Wiking Division died

to a man on the morning of February 17, defending the

rear guard of Group Stemmermann. 33

stemmermann kept his command post at Khilki, trying

to keep in contact with his subordinate commanders. His

telephone lines had been severed during the night by mov-

ing tanks and troops, and had been shelled by the Rus-

sian artillery. Stemmermann resorted to sending messages

by horsemen and by runner later during the night in order

to even keep control of the rear guard elements.~

Stemmermann ordered the two rearguard divisions to

withdraw to the second and third phase lines within three

hours of the start of the breakout. At 00:30 hours,

Stemmermann followed the last wave of Corps Detachment B

out of Khilki and moved with his command group to set up

a new post at Dzhurzhentsy. 35

 105

Utter Chaos

Sometime during the move to Dzhurzhentsy, Stem-

mermann became separated from his command group and be-

came lost. Later during the night, an ss soldier report-

ed that Stemmermann and his car had - been blown to pieces

by a Russian antitank shell. 36

Colonel General Lieb, at that time riding a horse

behind the last echelon of the Seventy-Second Infantry

Division, never heard of Stemmermann's fate until after

leaving the pocket. Soon after passing Dzhurzhentsy, the

order among the breakout forces deteriorated rapidly.

The final phase of the breakout, turned into a wild surge

of men heading westward to freedom.n

The Belgians to the south of Lieb ran into problems

of their own during the breakout. A wave of Russian

tanks hit the column from one of the rear flanks and be-

gan driving over the horse drawn carts carrying the woun-

ded. Without tank support, Degrelle led a group of his

Belgians to try to avert imminent catastrophe. The Bel-

gians began pulling the undamaged carts out of the way

and taking as many of the walking wounded as possible

with them. They consolidated the wounded on the undam-

aged carts and piled the rest of the carts in the road,

as a temporary barrier against the Russian tanks. The

broken carts caught in the treads of the Russian tanks

 106

bringing many of them to a halt and created an impassable

bottleneck that stopped the rest of the Russian tanks be-

hind them. 38

Degrelle and his Belgians, with the wounded in tow,

rounded a woods, leaving the Russian tanks behind. At

this point, the Belgians began climbing a hill. Across

the valley, hundreds of Cossack cavalry began urging

their horses down the opposite hill and into the rear and

flanks of the Belgians. Three tanks charged down the

hill in front of the Belgians. At first, the Belgians

thought the tanks were German, until they lowered their

guns and fired into the Belgian ranks. Degrelle ordered

his men to follow him and fell fifteen meters into the

meter and a half of snow at the bottom of the slope and

buried himself in it. The rest of the Walloons joined

him in the gully and waited for some miracle. The mir-

acle came in the form of two Germans, each carrying a

panzerfaust. Two Belgians grabbed the weapons and each

destroyed an enemy tank. The Belgians charged across the

open plain towards the last of the three tanks. The tank

charged through the Belgians and began destroying the

carts containing the wounded men. The Belgians escaped

into the woods at the end of the plain and left the tanks

and the Cossacks behind them. The Russian tanks and cav-

alry could not follow the Belgians through the dense

 107

thickets of the woods. 39

At 01:00, the rear guard of Group Stemmermann began

disengaging platoon by platoon and leaving their pos-

itions in Novo-Buda. At 05:00, the last platoon left

their final position in Novo-Buda and moved along the

route that the rest of Group Stemmermann had already pas-

sed. These men had no problems following the trail, they

moved from burning wreck to burning wreck along the road

back to the German lines.~

The command group of Army Group South sat in their

command train at Uman awaiting news from Group Stem-

mermann. At 01:25 hours on the morning of February 17,

von Manstein received news that first contact had been

made between the forces of Group Stemmermann and Third

Panzer Corps. 41

Lieb by-passed the Russian troop concentration a-

round Dzhurzhentsy and mounted an attack against the

ridgeline southeast of Hill 239.

Between 07:00 and 10:00 the 72nd Division made

several attempts to mount a coordinated attack
toward the southwest. It did not succeed. The
few guns and most of the tanks that were still
firing were soon destroyed by the enemy. Ar-
mored cars and motor vehicles suffered the same
fate. Except for a few tanks that had managed
to keep up, there were now only soldiers on
foot and on horseback, and here and there a few
horse-drawn vehicles, mostly carrying wound-
ed. 42

The first attempt at the ridgeline failed, but Lieb

 108

mounted others at different points along the ridgeline

looking for a weak point in the Russian lines.

In the protection of a ravine I was able to

collect a small force of about battalion size,
mainly stragglers from Task Force Band the
Wiking Division. With them I moved on toward
the line Hill 239-Pochapintsy, which was vis-
ible from time to time despite the heavy snow-
fall, and from where the enemy was firing with
great intensity. Russian ground support planes
appeared, opened fire, and disappeared again.
They were ineffective, and did not repeat their
attack, probably because of the difficult
weather conditions.

There was no longer any effective control;

there were no regiments, no battalions. Now
and then small units appeared alongside us. I
learned that the commanding general of the 72nd
Division was among the missing. My corps staff
still kept up with me, but the aides who had
been sent on various missions did not find
their way back.~

Lieb witnessed first hand the break down of order in the

vanguard of Group Stemmermann. His group still contained

fighting power, but he was struggling to assemble the

needed forces for the final attack.~

Lieb finally assembled enough men for a concentrated

attack against the ridgeline southeast of Hill 239. He

led the assault, that finally broke through the Russian

lines.

During a lull in the firing I readied my bat-

talion for the attack across the line Hill 239-
Pochapintsy which unfortunately could not be
bypassed. My staff and I were still on horse-
back. After leaving the draw that sheltered us
against the enemy, we galloped ahead of the
infantry and through the gaps between our few
remaining tanks. The enemy tank commanders,
 109

observing from their turrets, quickly recog-

nized our intention, turned their weapons in
our direction, and opened fire. About one-half
of our small mounted group was able to get
through. From the eastern edge of the forest
south of Hill 239 came intensive enemy fire. I
led my battalion in an attack in that direction
and threw the Russians back into the woods.
Rather than pursue them into the depth of the
forest, we continued advancing southwest, still
harassed by fire from the Russian tanks. 45

Lieb had finally broken through the last Russian line

standing between Group Stemmermann and the Gniloy Tikich.

Between 13:00 and 15:00 large groups of troops from the

three divisions in the vanguard {Wiking, 72nd Infantry

Division and Corps Detachment B} reached the bank of the

stream. Only a handful of medium tanks reached the

stream, no heavy tanks or other heavy equipment managed

to make it that far.~

Lieb's group reached the stream at a point below

Lissyanka, where the stream was thirty to fifty feet

wide, had a rapid current and reached a depth of ten feet

in most places. Heavy fire from the Russian tanks lo-

cated southeast of Pochapintsy forced the Germans into

the stream.~ Several of the officers tried to create an

emergency crossing using the carts which had made it to

the stream, but the current proved too powerful for the

few carts that had made it that far and they were swept

downstream."
 110

Crossing the Gniloy Tikich

By 16:00, the firing against the Germans on the

stream bank had ceased. Lieb crossed the stream swimming

next to his horse and made his way to Lissyanka. 49 In

Lissyanka, he found the commander of the First Panzer Di-

vision and learned that there were now no more than one

company of armored infantry and three companies of tanks

of the First Panzer Division at Lissyanka. One armored

infantry battalion consisting of two weak companies had

moved out of Lissyanka and established themselves at

Oktyabr.ffl

General Gille and the Wiking Division reached the

stream next. He reached the Gniloy Tikich just south of

where Lieb had crossed earlier. Gille had managed to

preserve the strength of his division to this point and

wanted to cross the stream with as many men as possible.

Gille ordered the artillery tractor to move into the

stream, to serve as a breakwater. At this point, the

stream measured fifty meters across and had a very stiff

current. Gille's hopes to cross the Gniloy Tikich down-

stream of the artillery tractor were dashed by the

stream, as the heavy current swept the tractor away. 51

The panje wagons carrying the wounded were then

shoved into the stream in masse, in hopes of building a

temporary bridge, but the wagons suffered the same fate

 111

as the artillery tractor. Gille then singled out the

non-swimmers in the division. He then began forming a

human chain across the river, alternating the swimmers

and non-swimmers. Half-way across the stream, the third

man in the chain let go. Most of the non-swimmers in the

chain were swept downstream, but the swimmers in the

chain managed to make the opposite shore. Some of the

swimmers in the chain even managed to save the non-swim-

ming man next to them. 52

Lieutenant Colonel Dorr arrived with the rearguard

of the division, dragging the wounded he found along the

way on poles and boards. He also led a group of foot

soldiers of the 108th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the

Fourteenth Panzer Division, which had helped to protect

the wounded men who travelled with his group. 53 The men

of the Wiking Division used the poles and boards brought

by Dorr to move the wounded across the stream. Gille

then sent his men across the stream in groups, with the

swimmers helping the non-swimmers across the stream.~

Final Preparations for the Belgians

Degrelle assembled his men in a forest three kilo-

meters to the southwest of Lissyanka. The forest pro-

vided his Belgians and the few thousand Germans travel-

ing with him protection from the Russian tanks and

 112

cavalry which had harassed his group since it left the

pocket. Several hundred men lay in the snow outside of

the forest pinned down by heavy machine gun fire. 55

Degrelle found a French speaking soldier among the

Germans and asked for volunteers among all the men with

him to attempt to rescue the soldiers pinned down in the

snow. Degrelle organized the volunteers into ten men

combat teams, with a Walloon in each to act as an inter-

preter and messenger. He used the combat teams to form a

square around the forest until nightfall when he would

attempt to rescue the men pinned down, and make the last

break for freedom toward Lissyanka. 56

From the woods, Degrelle studied the valley beyond.

A column of Russian tanks sat on a hill three-hundred

meters away facing the woods in which the Belgians sought

refuge. The hill provided the Russian tanks with a com-

manding view of the valley the Belgians needed to trav-

erse to reach Lissyanka. Degrelle observed that one

group of Russian tanks was firing on another of the es-

cape groups in the next valley. 57

Degrelle moved from position to position ordering

his men to stay within the tree line and not to move from

their positions until the tanks moved on. Degrelle man-

aged to control his Belgians, but some of the Germans

with him charged into the valley under the guns of the
 113

tanks. Not one of the Germans managed to cross the val-

ley under the withering fire from the Russian tanks and

infantry which appeared among the tanks just after the

Germans left the woods. The Russian infantry then

charged into the mass of dead and dying men cutting off

their fingers to take the rings off the German soldiers.

The Belgians took no action against the Russian infantry,

Degrelle had ordered them not to fire, because their fire

would have only given away their positions, it could not

have helped the wounded men.Y

From the woods, Degrelle witnessed the Russian tanks

bringing their guns to bear on another group of German

soldiers charging through the next valley. An even lar-

ger group of soldiers began crossing the plain to the

southeast of the forest trying to reach Lissyanka. De-

grelle decided to follow the group moving to the south-

east toward Lissyanka, but decided to wait for nightfall

to give his men the best chance possible of reaching the

town. He wished to spare his troops a trip across the

Gniloy Tikich Stream, in the fifteen to twenty degree

below zero weather.B

While waiting for total darkness, the noncommis-

sioned officers among the Belgians began rounding up the

men in the forest to make the final break to cross the

stream. The Belgians also rounded up the thirty Russian

 114

prisoners they brought with them out of the pocket. The

Russian prisoners had just run along with the Belgians

fearing death at the hands of the Cossack Cavalry and

Russian tanks more than the Belgians who had captured

them. The Belgians also sheltered many Ukrainian civil-

ians in the woods with them. Among them, many blond

haired blue eyed women who did not wish to fall under

Russian control again for fear of the abuse at the hands

of the average soldiers and Asian Russians. The Belgians

had also managed to save a number of their walking wound-

ed and even some of the men who were confined to the

carts, who were now shivering with cold and fever. De-

grelle wished to take all the soldiers and other groups

in his charge out of the forest, and across the stream to

freedom.w

The Belgians moved from the woods under cover of

darkness and moved toward the marshes to the southeast.

They moved along a path their scouts had marked earlier

in the night with white stakes. Degrelle then formed his

men to cross the stream, utilizing a wide beam they had

brought with them out of the forest. 61 Four of the best

swimmers in the Wallonien Brigade swam across the stream,

supporting the makeshift stretcher carrying the body of

their slain commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lucien Lip-

pert.62 Just after crossing the stream, the Belgians came

 115

to the first German outpost.fil

Lissyanka

The rear guard moved according to plan and crossed

the lines of Third Panzer Corps, as planned, even before

many of the groups which had left the pocket ahead of

them. They made use of the bridge which First Panzer and

the Leibstandarte held and suffered none of the losses

the other groups suffered while crossing the Gniloy Tik-

ich Stream. The rear guard rejoined the rest of Group

Stemmermann after passing through Lissyanka.M

While in Lissyanka, Lieb received word that a re-

inforced regiment of Corps Detachment B had driven into

the town from the north. The commander of this group re-

ported that the commander of Corps Detachment B had been

killed in action. He received more distressing news from

the Chief of Staff of Eleventh Corps: "Eleventh Corps

had lost contact with Colonel General Stemmermann during

the morning, while marching on foot to Dzhurzhentsy".

Lieb also received the report that the rear guard had

crossed the Gniloy Tikich, and would soon join him in

Lissyanka. 65

Lieb assumed command of Group Stemmermann after re-

ceiving word of Stemmermann's disappearance. He recorded

his situation in his diary:

 116

The 72nd and Wiking Divisions were completely

intermingled. No longer did they have any
tanks, artillery, vehicles, or rations. Many
soldiers were entirely without weapons, quite a
few even without footgear. Neither division
could be considered in any way able to fight.
One regiment of Task Force B was intact and
still had some artillery support. However,
this regiment also had no vehicles and no ra-
tions left. All wounded, estimated at about
2,000 were being gradually sheltered in the
houses of Lissyanka, and later were evacuated
by air.~

Out of three divisions, one regiment remained battle wor-

thy. Lieb had other men who retained the ability to

fight, but for the most part, his corps was no longer fit

for battle, but he had reached the lines of the relief

effort and now the only thing left to accomplish was the

withdrawal to the main German lines on the Bug River. 67

Colonel General Brieth appraised Lieb of the situa-

tion his corps faced and that he lacked gasoline for his

vehicles and extra weapons or supplies for Group Stem-

mermann. His front line troops had enough food to get

by, but absolutely no extra rations. Brieth had been

forced to assume a defensive posture around Lissyanka, in

order to fend off the Russian attacks which were increas-

ing in potency as well as frequency. Lieb immediately

requested supply by air and evacuation of his wounded.

He also requested that vehicles and weapons be brought up

from the rear areas to the main rescue area, just west of

Lissyanka, for his men.~

 117

During his stay in Lissyanka, Degrelle heard of the

Russian news releases that announced the complete and to-

tal destruction of Group Stemmermann. According to the

men of Third Panzer Corps, the Russians began transmit-

ting the news of the destruction of Group Stemmermann

just after the fall of Korsun. The Russian commanders

decided that they would destroy Group Stemmermann before

it could reach the lines of Army Groups South and bring

some truth to their communiques. 69

The March Back to the German Lines

Since Third Panzer Corps had no extra vehicles for

the transportation of his men, Lieb once again issued

orders for the men of Group Stemmermann to march west-

ward. Group Stemmermann reached the main rescue area in

the afternoon on February 18. Renewed Russian attacks

against the flanks and rear of Third Panzer Corps forced

the Germans to withdraw further the following day. 70

During the time the combined forces of Group Stem-

mermann and the Third Panzer Corps returned to the main

lines of Army Group South, the German air force delivered

supplies to them at airfields set up along the route. On

the return trips from supplying the men of the relief

forces, the transport planes picked up 2,000 wounded men

from the pocket and relief forces. The Germans had

 118

reconnoitered two landing strips along the retreat route.

The wounded were taken to the hospitals around the air-

port at Uman. Men who were too tired to march, were

taken to the airstrips to await transport to Uman. 71

The Russians attacked the Sixteenth Panzer Division

in regimental strength, hoping to take the airfield the

division held. The Russians attacked in the midst of a

blizzard and managed to get closer to the German lines

than would have been possible on a clear day. The Ger-

mans fought off the Russian attack and managed to hold

the field until the wounded men of Group Stemmermann

could be flown out.n

The men of Group Stemmermann and Third Panzer Corps

set off towards the German lines of Army Group South.

The Russians continuously shelled the column on the way

back to the German lines. With Tiger and Panther tanks

to protect them, the men of Group Stemmermann moved with

much less difficulty. The tanks would charge towards the

haystacks along the route and flush out the Russian in-

fantry hiding behind them. The tanks would then herd

them along with the column.n

The men of Group Stemmermann marched many miles be-

fore they came upon the first of the supply depots. The

Germans had brought up extra field kitchens to help feed

the men along the route. According to Lieutenant De-

 119

grelle, forty thousand men of Group Stemmermann had come

this far and they were all hungry and thirsty. One or

two thousand men would "beseige" one of the field kitch-

ens and fight for the front of the line and food. The

unlucky cooks at the field kitchens risked being tumbled

back into their fire and pots by the hungry men. 74

During the advance toward the German lines, the men

of Group Stemmermann could see the cost of the advance of

Third Panzer Corps. Degrelle counted some 800 Russian

and 300 German tanks destroyed along the route. He also

observed some of the rocket launchers the Germans refer-

red to as "Stalin's Organs" abandoned in the snow, some

still brandishing their double rows of rockets. 75

The thaw which had hindered movement within the

pocket had also hindered the movement of the relief

forces. During the time of the breakout though, winter

had returned to the Ukraine bringing snow and gale force

winds, freezing the mud around the treads of the tanks.

The men of Group Stemmermann and Third Panzer Corps need-

ed to keep the tanks going to help insure the success of

re-turning to the lines of Army Group South. First, the

tankers needed to light small fires under the gas tanks

and engines of their tanks, to bring the gasoline and en-

gines up to operating temperatures. The tankers then cut

the snow around their treads with axes and poured

 120

gasoline under the treads. The men of Group Stemmermann

lit fires around the tanks to help thaw the mud enough to

allow the tanks to move.%

Early in the day on February 20, the storm broke and

the men of Group Stemmermann moved along unhindered by

the weather. The artillery which had plagued them since

leaving the pocket ceased, as the corridor through which

they were travelling grew wider. The Germans now began

to sort out the men, which had arrived all mixed togeth-

er. The Germans from the rear areas of Third Panzer

Corps held placards in the air with the names and numbers

of each division of Group Stemmermann. The Germans even

demanded order within the divisions and separated the men

of Group Stemmermann down to their companies and even to

platoons.n

On February 20, Lieb felt that he had dealt with all

the major problems facing Group Stemmermann. The supply

situation had been dealt with and his men were now

receiving much needed transportation and weapons. Lieb

received instructions from O.K.H. to proceed to headquar-

ters in East Prussia. A Fieseler Storch arrived, taking

Colo-nel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant De-

grelle, first to East Prussia and later to Berlin to meet

with Hitler.n

The Russians began assaults against the German po-

 121

sitions around Frankovka. The men of the Pioneer Bat-

talion of the Sixteenth Panzer Division fought off the

assaults all through the day and into the night. In the

mist of the early morning of February 22, the Russians

launched a massive attack and managed to take the town.

The Seventeenth Panzer Division assaulted the town and

managed to retake it from the Russians after heavy at-

tacks. The Germans also managed to take Hill 239. Al-

though the hill was now to their rear, the Germans wished

to hold it, because from the hill the Russians could fire

on the Germans still in the section of Lissyanka on the

east bank of the Gniloy Tikich Stream. With no more ob-

stacles in their way, the men of the Third Panzer Corps,

and Group Stemmermann fought their way back to the German

lines on the Bug River.~

Conclusions

Von Manstein received word later that between 30,000

and 32,000 men escaped from the encirclement. Von Man-

stein regretted only that most of the wounded had to be

left in the pocket. 80 Many of the groups brought out

wounded men, but many of the trucks the wounded needed

for transportation stuck fast in the mud. 81 Only the

shock units, such as the SS Wiking Division and the Wal-

lo( n Assault Brigade of Group Stemmermann suffered

 122

heavy losses. Between the six divisions and the attached

brigade, Group Stemmermann suffered some 8,000 casualties

during the breakout. 82

The mud also caused the loss of most of the heavy

equi_pment in the pocket. Only 1,000 of the 15,000 vehic-

les in the pocket made the trek through the mud. The men

of Group Stemmermann destroyed all the vehicles left to

them on the night of the breakout that could not travel

through the mud. The men of Group Stemmermann managed to

extricate the vehicles they managed to bring with them

out of the pocket only through "superhuman" effort. 83

According to one Russian source, the First and Se-

cond Ukrainian Fronts encircled and destroyed nine infan-

try, one panzer division, a motorized brigade, engineer

units and a sizable force of artillery. This encircle-

ment ended the German presence on the Dnieper River and

forced the Germans to retreat as far as the Bug River, in

some cases. 84

Russian claims for the German losses in the Cher-

kassy-Korsun Pocket exceed the number of men the Germans

claim were there. The Russians claim 55,000 dead and

18,000 prisoners. For equipment losses, the Russians

claim 500 tanks, 300 planes and most of the German artil-

lery, including all the heavy artillery pieces. 85 The

Russians do concede the fact that the Germans managed to

 123

extricate 3,000 men from the pocket by air. The Russians

claim that only the officers and the lead elements of the

ss managed to escape. They believed that only 3,000 men,

due to the blizzard like conditions on the night of the

breakout, managed to escape. The Russians state that

Colonel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant De-

grelle boarded a plane during the breakout and escaped

from the encirclement by leaving their men to their fate.

According to the Russians, the Germans inflated the num-

ber of escapees to lessen the demoralizing impact on

their men. The Russians go on to claim that the loss at

Cherkassy Korsun had a very demoralizing effect on all

the other units of the German army in the Ukraine. 86

By examining the number of survivors from each

group, the German claim comes closer to the truth. The

105th regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division came out of

the pocket with three officers and 216 men, out of 1062

encircled. General Gille of the Wiking Division lead

4,500 men of his division out of the pocket, seventy per-

cent of his divisional strength when the Russians formed

the pocket. General von Trowitz led his Bavarian 57th

Infantry Division and the remains of the 389th Infantry

Division to freedom, bringing 3,000 men of the rear guard

out of the pocket. Trowitz also brought 250 wounded men

out of the pocket with him, men Stemmermann had reluc-

 124

tantly ordered left in the pocket. Lieutenant Leon De-

grelle, the leader of the Wallonien Brigade brought 632

of his Belgians out of the pocket, along with 3,000 other

men. 87 The Russians claim that only one percent of the

men escaped. 88 Von Manstein ordered that the men of Group

Stemmermann go into the reserve areas in Poland. Before

Group Stemmermann moved to the rear, von Manstein per-

sonally visited the men who escaped from the pocket. Ar-

my Group South had to hold their front, now minus the six

and a half divisions the Russians almost destroyed in the

Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. He managed to save the men, but

had to give them a chance to rest and refit before put-

ting them back into the line. 89

 CHAPTER VI

IN RETROSPECT

German and Russian Conclusions

On the Airlift

After the return· of Third Panzer Corps and Group

Stemmermann to the lines of Army Group South, both sides

drew their conclusions on the successes and failures dur-

ing the Cherkassy-Korsun encirclement. The Germans man-

aged to save most of their men, but saw valuable lessons

about holding territory that had no military value, a-

gainst very superior forces. But, the Germans failed to

act on most of their lessons and continued to follow Hit-

ler as a military leader. The Russians drew many differ-

ent lessons from the encirclement, but many of their con-

clusions could not be put to use, because they failed to

accept the truth about what the Germans actually managed

to accomplish in their attempt to free their trapped com-

rades. Both sides should have drawn lessons relating to

operations with encircled forces and about airlifts to

troops on isolated battlefields.

From January 31, to February 18, 1944, Soviet Air

125
 126

Force sources claim that 210 sorties were flown against

the German airfields used to supply the Cherkassy-Korsun

Pocket. Further, they claim that they fought seventy-

five air battles over the airfields, Korsun within the

pocket and the three airfields the Germans flew from to

supply the pocket. The Soviets claim that German losses

during the attacks on airfields for this period amounted

to 200 planes, of which 125 were destroyed on the ground,

they also claim to have damaged a significant number of

planes on the ground, and in the air. 1

According to the reports from the commanders of the

German air transport wings, thirty-two Junker Ju-52

transport planes were lost due to enemy action, technical

failures and weather conditions, a significantly smaller

number than claimed by the Russian sources. Russian

anti-aircraft fire and fighters damaged one-hundred-

thirteen more Junker Ju-52 transports, bu~ the Germans

claim to have flown these later during the operation,

after the ground crews repaired them. The Germans pro-

vide no numbers for aircraft lost on the ground when

their airfields came under attack and do not even mention

attacks against airfields outside the pocket. They do

concede losses on the ground at Korsun, but count these

losses in the number of planes lost to enemy action, and

damaged during the fighting. 2

 127

The men in the pocket complained several times that

they lacked sufficient supplies to carry out their daily

operations. Although at times the men ran out of food

and the supply of ammunition became critically low, the

airlift managed to keep the men in the pocket supplied

with enough ammunition and food to successfully break out

of the pocket. The men in the pocket were able to alle-

viate the food problem by trading certain items with the

Russian peasants for their livestock. The German offi-

cers talk of the trades, but maintain that the German

troops gave the Russians peasants something of value in

exchange for the livestock they received from them.

The Germans can count the airlift to Cherkassy-

Korsun as one of the few successful airlifts to encircled

forces during World War II. The planes managed to deliv-

er 2,026 tons of supplies to the troops in the pocket

during the twenty days they flew missions into the pock-

et.3 The transports also managed to extract 2,825 wounded

men during the first week of the pocket. When added to

the 2,000 men the transports picked up along the lines of

the retreat, the Luftwaffe managed to save 4,825 of the

encircled men from death at the hands of the Russians or

life in Russian captivity. The fact that so many men

were saved by the Luftwaffe would tend to cast doubt on

the Russian claim that the German officers ordered the

 128

men of the ss to slaughter and then burn the wounded men

that could not march along with the column, instead of

surrendering them into the "care" of the Russian troops. 4

The Russian airlift during the Cherkassy-Korsun

Pocket was successful as well. The Russians were able to

supply their two tank armies, which ran out of supplies

during the encirclement operation and keep them on the

move and fighting. The loss of the two tank armies could

have compromised the hold the Russians had on the pocket

and would have seriously hampered the operations against

Third Panzer Corps. The airlift supplied the tank armies

with 114 tons of supplies and 525 rockets. The airlift

negated the need for the Russians to move their supplies

by rail, or across mud choked roads which hindered the

movement of trucks and moved the supplies faster than

would have been possible by using any other means of sup-

ply available to them. 5

The German airlift succeeded in keeping the men of

Group Stemmermann supplied during the time the Russians

held them in the pocket and on their trip back to the

main lines of Army Group South. Although the men in the

pocket complained several times that they never received

enough supplies, the German air force delivered enough

supplies to keep them alive and to allow them to fight

off the Russians. The air force met or exceeded the

 129

goals which the German High Command set. These goals

were for the average expenditures of ammunition and food

of a group the size of Group Stemmermann in the field for

a day and were established based on the strength of Group

Stemmermann at the beginning of the encirclement.

Group Stemmermann wanted a higher tonnage of sup-

plies delivered daily. The group would naturally wish to

have more than the average expenditure of supplies deliv-

ered for a days worth of fighting, in case they had a

harder than average day in the field. But in evaluating

the airlift, one must ask what makes a successful air-

lift: delivering enough supplies to kill every one of

your enemies facing you, or delivering enough supplies to

guarantee the survival of the group you are supplying?

German Conclusions

The Germans drew many lessons from the encirclement

near Cherkassy-Korsun. Although the German Army came to

many conclusions concerning the encirclement, the Rus-

sians and later the Americans managed to encircle large

portions of the German Army. The later encirclements all

came about for the same reasons the Germans were trapped

at Cherkassy, because Hitler issued orders to save the

land he had captured and not to guarantee the existence

of his armies. 6
 130

The first lesson came from the realization that the

circumstances leading to the pocket only came about be-

cause the High Command (Hitler) insisted that von Man-

stein hold Cherkassy. Even after the High Command real-

ized the full extent of the danger the two corps faced,

they waited to give the breakout order until the Russians

held strong positions around the entire pocket. Each day

the breakout was delayed, the Russian forces encircling

the pocket grew stronger while the German forces within

the pocket grew weaker. The Germans lost all their heavy

equipment within the pocket because they were forced to

stay in their positions on the Dnieper River instead of

being able to withdraw when their commanders thought it

necessary. 7

Although the two corps within the pocket belonged to

different armies, Hitler placed the entire command and

control of the forces within the pocket under one man,

Colonel General Stemmermann. However, Hitler insisted

that two separate corps from two different armies carry

out the relief attempt. The absence of unity of command

also made itself felt at the army level because the pock-

et force came under the command of Eighth Army, while the

third Panzer Corps belonged to First Panzer Army. The

two army commanders needed to stay in constant commu-

nication to find out what each force was doing and the
 131

progress each relief attempt was making. A unified com-

mand, over both the forces of the pocket and the relief

forces, would have greatly reduced the problems the

breakout force faced. A commander over a unified force

would have known of the deviation in course Colonel Gen-

eral Lieb made around Dzhurzhentsy. He could then have

notified Third Panzer Corps of the need to meet them in

another place and thus avoided the fiasco of the Gniloy

Tikich Stream crossing. 8

The plan for the breakout also failed to allow

enough freedom of action at the time the two corps were

to meet. Hitler ordered Third Panzer Corps to occupy the

high ground around Hill 239 on February 17 and tie down

the strong Russian forces standing between Group Stemmer-

mann and freedom. The failure of Third Panzer Corps to

take Hill 239 allowed the Russians to concentrate their

full weight against the forces of Group Stemmermann e-

merging from the pocket. A commander with full freedom

of action could have issued order to guarantee the meet-

ing point of the two groups at a place where the Russians

did not have a large enough concentration of troops to

beat off any attacks mounted against them. Brieth could

have changed the direction of his attack and met Lieb as

he led his men around the Russian concentrations on the

high ground near Hill 239. Brieth would also have been
 132

able to move his forces to the Gniloy Tikich Stream at

the point Lieb decided to force a crossing. A meeting of

the forces would have meant that the men lost in crossing

the Gniloy Tikich might have had a chance to make it

across the stream. 9

The High Command also failed to guarantee sufficient

support for the breakout. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe

to stand ready to support the breakout effort at dawn on

the February 17, if Lieb contacted them. The Luftwaffe

had been given no instructions to act on their own, or

what to do if Lieb could not contact them. Lieb faced e-

nough problems during the breakout, just trying to keep

control of his own men and preserve the fighting strength

of his group. He could not worry about directing air

support against every concentration of Russian troops

that his men ran across. The High Command never made

provisions to allow the Luftwaffe to support the break-

out, by attacking the Russian concentrations around the

pocket. No provisions were made for the Luftwaffe to

support the attack of Third Panzer Corps against Hill

239. Hitler also failed to use the Luftwaffe in a recon-

naissance role, which could have alerted Third Panzer

Corps as to the location of Group Stemmermann and could

have helped in insuring that the two groups meet in a

place of safety and not near the concentrated group of

 133

Russians around Hill 239. 10

The situation with Eleventh Panzer Division presents

quite a puzzle. Hitler held the division up, until too

late to help Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps make good early

progress. Then when Hitler did release the division, he

still sent it to the stalled Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps.

Von Vormann had already reported that he was down to only

twenty-seven functioning tanks and thirty assault guns

and that all he could do now was hold the Russian Front

attacking him. Instead of sending a fresh panzer divi-

sion to support a failed attack, Hitler might have order-

ed Eleventh Panzer to join in the attack of Third Panzer

Corps which was still making some headway towards the men

of Group Stemmermann and which had come to a point closer

to the pocket than the Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps had

reached when Eleventh Panzer joined in the relief at-

tempt.

Hitler violated "mass", the first law of military

operations, which calls for assembling enough troops at

the crucial spot, in order to reach their goal. Hitler

divided his relief force into two groups, even though his

generals protested the division. His generals believed

that as one force the relief attempt had a chance, but in

two groups, they could not reach the troops within the

pocket. History proved his generals right, the two

 134

groups did not succeed in reaching the pocket and this

failure forced the men of Group Stemmermann to fight

their way out of the pocket themselves.

Hitler wanted two groups, so that he could trap the

Russians in an encirclement of his own. By trying to

trap the Russians, Hitler violated "objective", these-

cond law of military operations. Hitler should have

sought to achieve only the relief of the troops within

the pocket, the original objective of the relief attempt.

He changed the objective of the relief force, to trying

to encircle the Russians between Army Group South and

Group Stemmermann. The few forces available to the re-

lief attempt could not achieve both of the objectives

Hitler set for them and ultimately failed in both objec-

tives.

Hitler forced the German soldiers of Army Group

South to endure the encirclement at Cherkassy-Korsun.

Hitler refused to listen to the advice of his generals

and withdraw from the area. The generals knew that Army

Group South could no longer carry out offensive opera-

tions, but Hitler refused to listen. He chose not to

heed the advice of men with many years of military expe-

rience behind them and chose to make the disastrous de-

cision for himself. This decision which cost Army Group

South the use of the two corps within the pocket and the
 135

use of the two corps employed in the relief attempt. The

Germans had to send these units into the rear areas for a

rest and refit.

 CHAPTER VII

PROMISES, THREATS, CANDY AND CIGARETTES

Russian Propaganda at Cherkassy-Korsun

The Free Germany Committee

During their attempt to liquidate the Cherkassy-

Korsun Pocket, the Russians began three propaganda cam-

paigns. One addressed all the soldiers in the pocket,

the second dealt solely with the Freewilling Volunteers

of the SS and the third dealt with the German troops in

the front lines in Russia. The Russians wished to make

the Freewilling volunteers rethink their reasons for

joining the German armies and hopefully get them to stop

fighting and go home. The Russians also tried to get the

non-Germans of the ss to join the allied cause and fight

on the side of the French troops in the Anglo-American

armies. The Russian commanders sought to use their vic-

tory at Cherkassy-Korsun to demoralize the men in the

German front lines in the East. The Russian propaganda

campaign proved inept against the Germans in Army Group

South, mainly because the Russians used lies to try to

get the German troops to desert. The Russian commanders

136
 137

and the men of the National Committee for a Free Germany

and League of German Officers in Captivity tried many

means to elicit the surrender of the men within the pock-

et and to make the volunteer ss divisions desert their

German allies and later tried to use their victory to de-

moralize the whole German Army, but all their attempts

ended in failure.

The inception of the Free Germany Committee and the

League of German Officers came at a dark moment for the

German Army. The two groups came into existence when

Sixth Army was going through it's death throes at Stalin-

grad.1

Sixth Army had been in the front lines since the be-

ginning of the war. It had fought with distinction in

Poland, France and during the first two years of the cam-

paign against Russia. 2 The final deployment of Sixth Army

came at Stalingrad. Hitler employed Sixth Army to pro-

tect the flanks of Fourth Army in their drive to the Cau-

casus. The Russians encircled Sixth Army at Stalingrad

and sought to eliminate the Germans in the town. Hitler

ordered the five corps staff and twenty two combat divi-

sions of Sixth Army to hold Stalingrad at all cost and to

wait for a relief effort to break through to them. 3 The

relief attempt to free Sixth Army at Stalingrad ultimate-

ly failed and the Russians destroyed the army. Field

 138

Marshal von Paulus, the commander of Sixth Army surren-

dered to the Russians, he became the first German Field

Marshal to surrender his command. The losses for sixth

Army at Stalingrad included 150,000 dead or missing and

90,000 prisoners. 4

The Soviets realized that the men of Sixth Army of-

fered new possibilities for their propaganda campaign a-

gainst Germany. These men could attest to the fact that

Hitler would allow the soldiers of Germany and her allies

to die for land. The Russians needed the men of Sixth

Army, because all prior attempts aimed at undermining the

fighting power of the Wehrmacht in the east had failed. 5

The Free Germany Committee and League of German Officers

were formed of the men captured at Stalingrad and also

contained many of the men who had sought political asylum

in Russia. The two groups merged and worked together to

strengthen their movements and gain respect among their

new Russian comrades. 6

The League of German Officers in Captivity first

sought new recruits in the prisoner of war camps desig-

nated for officers. Their recruitment was limited to the

camps at Yelabuga, Oranky, susdal and Camp 150. 7 The

League of German Officers consisted of nineteen men after

their recruitment campaign. 8

Members of the National Committee for a Free Germany

 139

went into the camps of the enlisted men. The men of the

League of German Officers directed the work of the Free

Germany Committee, but stayed out of the recruitment pro-

cess.9 Twenty five men in all joined the National Commit-

tee and both groups worked on turning the rest of the

German prisoners against Nazi Germany, hoping to make

them pro-Communist. 10

The men of the Free Germany Committee and the League

of German Officers then began to take their message to

the troops in the German front lines. Their slogan of

the day read: "Orderly withdrawal to the frontiers of

the Reich." 11

The Tehran Conference seemed to mean the end of the

Free Germany Committee and the League of German Officers.

At Tehran, the Allies agreed that the only peace with

Germany would be an unconditional peace. The Allies also

used this conference to determine the spheres of influ-

ence they would have in Germany. At Tehran, they carved

Germany into the zones that they controlled after the

war. The conference meant that the Free Germany Commit-

tee and the League of German Officers could no longer

fight for the return of German troops to the borders of

Germany. The Russians still believed they could use the

German prisoners of war though. The Russians believed

that the Free Germany Committee and the League of German

 140

Officers could still reinforce their propaganda. They

also believed that if the Wehrmacht revolted against

Hitler, that their officers might pave the way for an

understanding with the revolting officers of the Wehr-

macht.12

The Committee at Cherkassy-Korsun

The first real test of the propaganda value of the

Free Germany Committee and the League of German Officers

occurred at Cherkassy-Korsun. The men in the Cherkassy-

Korsun Pocket faced the same situation that the founders

of the Committee and League faced at Stalingrad, but here

the propaganda met with utter failure. 13

On January 31, 1944, Colonel General Alexander Shcher-

bakov arrived at the dacha the Russians had provided for

Colonel General van Seydlitz, the leader of the League of

German Officers in Captivity. Scherbakov headed the Po-

litical Administration of the Red Army as a member of the

Soviet War Cabinet, also known as the Council of Five.

The Fact that Scherbakov went to the meeting with van

Seydlitz shows the importance of the meeting.~

Shcherbakov informed van seydlitz of the German sit-

uation at Cherkassy and asked whether or not Hitler would

order the defense of the pocket as in the case of Stalin-

grad. Von Seydlitz answered in the affirmative, relying

 141

on Hitler's past decisions about holding land. Shcher-

bakov then asked Seydlitz if he would help convince the

German troops within the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket to cease

fighting and save them the fate which befell Sixth Army

on the banks of the Volga. Von Seydlitz agreed immedi-

ately and began to gather his assets behind the Russian

lines on the Dnieper River.~

Propaganda Against the Pocket

Von Seydlitz immediately contacted Colonel Steidle

and Major Buchler, who served as the representatives of

the League of German Officers with the Second Ukrainian

Front, telling them to act in his behalf. 16 Von Seydlitz

did his part in the propaganda campaign by addressing the

German soldiers over radio "Free Germany. 1117

Von Seydlitz broadcast the message that if the Ger-

man soldiers surrendered that they would be treated well.

He promised that they would receive "the best treatment

possible" while in captivity. The troops also received

the promise that the Russians would do anything humanly

possible to ease the lives of the troops during their

captivity and that they would be returned home after the

war. The Russians demanded one condition, that the

troops surrender as whole units with their officers. 18

 142

Addressing the ss

The Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket contained not only Ger-

man troops, but troops from countries Germany conquered

earlier in the war. Two of the ss formations in the

pocket were made up of men from conquered countries. The

Wiking Division contained men from Norway, Denmark, Fin-

land, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The second SS for-

mation, the Wallonien Brigade, came solely from Belgium.

Leon Degrelle, of the Wallonien Brigade, described

the reasons many of the Freewilling Volunteers from Bel-

gium, joined the SS:

We had left for the anti-Bolshevik crusade so

that the name of our mother country, besmirched
in May, 1940, would resound, glorious and hon-
ored, once more. Soldiers of Europe, we wanted
our ancient country to rise again as brilliant
as before in the new Europe which was being so
painfully born. We were the men of the country
of Charlemagne, of the dukes of Burgundy, and
of Charles the Fifth. After twenty centuries
of soul-stirring radiance this country could
not be allowed to sink into mediocrity or ob-
livion."

Degrelle and his men hated the Russians and all they

stood for. He saw Hitler, as the new hope for Europe

against the Russians and Bolshevism and still believed

that he could guarantee the safety of Europe, even as

late as 1944.w His men were in high spirits as the Rus-

sians closed the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. But the Rus-

sians tried to break them of their hatred of Bolshevism

 143

and their love for Hitler.

The Russians directed a radio campaign solely a-

gainst the Belgian volunteers of the Wallonien Brigade.

A powerful transmitter broadcast messages in "honeyed

French" describing the marvels of Stalin's regime. The

speaker would then "charitably" inform the Belgians of

their situation telling them they had no hope. The voice

would then invite the Belgians to join General DeGaulle,

the true hero of Europe, if they would approach the Rus-

sian lines carrying a white flag. None of the Belgians

took the Russians up on this offer. 21

When the radio broadcasts failed, a Russian General

decided to take matters into his own hands. He began his

own plan designed to strip Germany of her Freewilling ss

Volunteers of the Wallonien Brigade from Belgium. He

took the two Belgians he had captured earlier in the

fighting to close the pocket and "invited them to dine

with him." He stuffed his "guests" with all the food he

could find, their meal included candied meats, bread,

wine, cakes and jellies. He then gave the Belgians candy

and cigarettes to take back to their comrades and give

them his invitation to join him at his table. n

The two Belgians were driven back to a point oppo-

site their lines and allowed to cross back into German

held territory. The Belgians shared their candy and cig-

 144

arettes with their comrades and laughed with them about

the invitation the Russian General made to them. The

Belgians loved the candy and cigarettes and dreamed of

sitting down to a table that their two freed comrades

described. None of the Belgians took the General up on

his invitation though, leaving the Russian where they had

been before, with no deserters. Degrelle says that the

General was very popular with his men (Degrelle's), "but

the hook was too visible under the bait for them to fall

for the invitation."n

The Leaflets Arrive

The Russians decided that their propaganda was

reaching too few men, so they printed up leaflets and

dropped them into the pocket. The leaflets began drop-

ping into the pocket as early as February Tenth and con-

tinued until the night of the breakout. The leaflets de-

scribed the desperate situation of the encircled men and

suggested that the only way to save themselves was to

join the Free Germany Committee. 24

This first leaflet told the purpose of the Free Ger-

many Committee, who made up the committee and how to con-

tact the committee should the troops within the pocket

wish to surrender.

There exists in Russia a powerful German free-

dom movement, which has taken as its task, the
 145

freeing of Germany from the tyranny of Hitler

and the opening of peace negotiations. Also
marching in this "Free Germany" movement is the
League of German Officers in Captivity under
the command of Artillery General Walther von
Seydlitz. The undersigned (Steidle and Buch-
ler) are empowered as members of the League of
German Officers opposite your sector to make
contact with you. We have gone through the
hell of Stalingrad and therefore know your
misery. 25

At first, none of the officers within the pocket took the

leaflet seriously. They knew that von Seydlitz had been

at Stalingrad, but were not aware of his fate. At first

they believed the Russians had fabricated the whole or-

ganization (Free Germany Committee) . 26 The leaflets also

told the Germans within the pocket how to make contact

with the members of the Free Germany Committee, and prom-

ised their return after negotiations.

Come to us and take protection under the League

of German Officers. Make contact with us.
Send emissaries to us to whom we can give exact
instructions. Each emissary should make him-
self recognizable at the front with a white
cloth and demand to speak with one of the un-
dersigned officers. We guarantee every emis-
sary an unhindered return to his unit. The Red
Army staff have appropriate instructions.v

No sources within the pocket, or even among the authors

writing from the Russian point of view, speak of any em-

issaries sent to the Russians to discuss surrender

terms. 28 The instructions spoken of in the leaflet, were

to escort the emissaries to the members of the League of

German Officers, and to return them to their lines when

 146

they wished to go. 29 The leaflets failed miserably to

provide the Russians with any deserters. 30 The represent-

atives of the League of German Officers at the front be-

lieved that the leaflets failed because they possessed so

few of them. They complained that their message still

reached too few men of the pocket. 31

Along with the leaflets, the Russians began sending

German prisoners into the pocket under flags of truce.

The German prisoners carried letters addressed to the

German officers in the pocket. The hand written letter

from General von Seydlitz proposed that the Germans in

the pocket surrender honorably to the Russians. They

also carried pictures of the men that the Russians had

captured the day before. The pictures showed the cap-

tured men sitting at a table with General von Seydlitz.

The captured men had food and their wounds were cleaned

and dressed.n

The German generals could not deny the authenticity

of the letters, or the fact that they came from General

von Seydlitz. The letters contained too many facts that

only von Seydlitz could know." The letters also served

to reinforce the Russian and Anglo-American news broad-

casts they heard, telling them of the existence of the

National Committee for a Free Germany and the League of

German Officers in Captivity.~ The generals now knew

 147

that the Free Germany Committee and League of German Of-

ficers existed, but they did not know whether the prom-

ises they made about their captivity was true. 35 None of

the German officers in the pocket took von Seydlitz up on

his offer to surrender and join the Free Germany Commit-

tee.Y

On January 9, the Russians dispatched a lieutenant

colonel to the pocket to carry their demands for the un-

conditional surrender of the men within the pocket. The

Russian officer arrived at the front of Corps Detachment

B with his driver and an interpreter. The Germans treat-

ed the Russians to champagne and cigarettes, but offered

no reply to the demands he gave them. 37

On February 10, Colonel General Lieb received a let-

ter from General von Seydlitz, that the Russians deliver-

ed by aircraft. Lieb had served under von Seydlitz in

1940 and although he respected him he could not under-

stand how von Seydlitz could serve Zhukov. Lieb saw von

Seydlitz as serving as sort of a G-2 for Zhukov and al-

though he believed that Stalingrad could have changed

him, he could still not understand von Seydlitz's motives

for helping the Russians. Von Seydlitz implored Lieb to

act as Yorck acted during the campaign of 1812. Von Sey-

dlitz wanted Lieb to "go over to the Russians with his

entire command." Lieb decided not to answer von Sey-

 148

dlitz's demand, signifying his refusal by his silence. 38

The Russians dropped leaflets into the pocket on a

regular basis until February 10. At eleven o'clock in

the morning of Friday, February 11, 1944, the Russian

commanders delivered a second ultimatum to Colonel Gen-

eral Stemmermann. The Russians demanded that the Germans

surrender and promised to treat them as courageous sol-

diers, or they would unleash an attack at 1300 hours and

they would exterminate the Germans. 39

The Russian ultimatum stated that the troops within

the pocket had no hopes for rescue. 40 The ultimatum told

of the troubles the Germans were having even getting

started in their relief attempts and of the ability of

the Russians to keep the troops of Group Stemmermann en-

closed within the pocket:

The units of the Red Army have enclosed this

Heeresgruppe in a firm ring. The encircling
ring will be drawn ever tighter. All of your
hopes of salvation are in vain. The German 3.,
11., 16., 17., and 24. Panzerdivisions which
were rushing to your aid, were smashed during
the attempt and their remnants encircled and
wiped out. 41

The Russians had told the truth about their ring around

Group Stemmermann. The German troops of the relief ef-

fort could go no further and the ring around Group Stem-

mermann stayed intact. The Russians did not know however

that the 24 Panzer Division had been turned over to Army

Group A. The Russian message also failed to mention the

 149

First Panzer Division, the First SS Panzer Liebstandarte

Adolf Hitler, or Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke. 42

Stemmermann instantly and categorically rejected the

ultimatum. Colonel General Lieb and General Gille, the

two other German Generals present when the Russians de-

livered the ultimatum, were in total agreement with Col-

onel General Stemmermann. The Russians reported to their

superiors, telling them that the Germans did not even

wish to discuss terms of surrender with them. 43

Fortunately for the German troops in the pocket, the

German High Command sent General Stemmermann their own

appraisal of the relief effort. General Speidel sent

Stemmermann a more encouraging message:

Brieth's leading elements have reached Liss-

janka. Vormann advancing from Jerki bridgehead
in direction of Swenigorodka. How is the sit-
uation there? All the best for a successful
outcome.~

Stemmermann could not allow himself to become too hopeful

about a relief effort breaking into the pocket though,

Four Russian tank armies and an elite cavalry corps stood

in the way of the relief attempts.~

The League of German Officers implored Stemmermann

to accept the Russian ultimatum. The League drafted an-

other letter signed by three junior officers and sent it

into the pocket with German prisoners of war. The note

reiterated the Russian views of the success of the relief

 150

attempts, and told of the consequences of rejecting the

ultimatum:

On behalf of Artillery General Walther von Sey-

dlitz, President of the League of German Offi-
cers, we call on you most forcefully to under
all circumstances accept the ultimatum of the
Red Army and immediately cease all resistance.
Time is running out! Your situation is hope-
less!

The Red Army's ultimatum is absolutely honour-

able since any further resistance has nothing
to do with soldierly fighting. Or do you wish
to throw away your life senselessly for Hitler,
who has written you off long ago?

We fighters of Stalingrad know from our own ex-

perience what it means to reject a Russian ul-
timatum. Only as a result of rejecting such an
ultimatum, which also followed Hitler's order,
an additional 120,000 men died at Stalingrad! 46

The letter went on to guarantee that the Russians would

treat the surrendering Germans well in captivity. The

League promised to meet the surrendering soldiers and of-

ficers soon after they were taken prisoner. The League

went on to promise that the men would be provided with

food and medicine directly after leaving the pocket. 47

on February 13, a message arrived at the headquar-

ters of Colonel General Lieb, addressed to the commander

of the 198th Division. The letter was attached, as

usual, to a red, black and white pennant (the colors of

the German flag). The message demanded the surrender of

this division, with all the officers present at the time

of surrender. Lieb found this message interesting for

 151

the fact that the 198th Division was not even in the

pocket.~

A Note to von Manstein

Since none of their efforts directed at the com-

manders within the pocket proved fruitful, Colonel Gen-

eral Seydlitz decided to address a letter to Field Mar-

shal von Manstein. He implored von Manstein to allow

Generals Lieb and Stemmermann to surrender their troops,

calling further resistance futile.

The encirclement and the destruction, at pres-

ent under way, of ten divisions of your army
group one year after the catastrophe of Stalin-
grad is not only a military defeat, it is also
an incomprehensible and irresponsible sacrifice
of an irreplaceable part of our people. I
know, my dear Field Marshal, that you are not a
faithful National Socialist. You are also not
one of the so-called "Party Generals.'' All the
service positions you have filled during the
war you received on the basis of your military
abilities. And that is also the reason why you
must surely see the over-all military picture
for what it is--Hopeless!

Even before this latest catastrophe you must

have known that the arc of the Dnieper front
was untenable, jutting out as it does--and you
did know it. But nevertheless bowed to Hit-
ler's orders, the predictable results of which
were the senseless slaughter of tens of thou-
sands of German soldiers.

The German people do not ask their military

commanders to continue a hopeless fight against
their better knowledge simply because an adven-
turer (Hitler) wants them to. The German
people expect and demand that the military com-
manders and that also includes you, my dear
Field Marshal have the courage and determin-
 152

ation to act according to their best knowledge

and conviction. 0

This attempt to make von Manstein order the surrender of

his troops also proved futile. Von Manstein believed

that he had assembled a rescue force powerful enough to

break through to the lines of Group Stemmermann and wish-

ed to give his troops the chance to do so.so

Allaying the Fears of the SS

On February Ninth, a messenger delivered a letter to

General Gille, the top ranking SS officer in the pocket

and leader of the Wiking ss Division. Major General Kor-

fes of the League of German Officers drafted this letter

on behalf of General von Seydlitz, designed to strip the

German troops of their SS comrades. With the letter, he

hoped to allay the fears of the ss men in the pocket.

Your desperate hope, that a breakout with help

from the relief attack by the German forces
from the southwest will succeed is delusive.
General von Seydlitz gives you the assurance
that the National committee for a Free Germany
and the League of German Officers in Captivity
are in the position to have all proceedings
against you and your troops struck down. Of
course this is on the condition that you and
your troops voluntarily lay down your weapons
and join the National Committee in its fight.

In the interests of protecting the lives of

your soldiers, it is your duty to agree to Gen-
eral von Seydlitz' suggestion. I would add
that today many officers and soldiers of the
Waffen ss are already fighting in our ranks. st

The crimes talked about in the letter come from early in

 153

the war when Hitler issued an order that soldiers would

kill all the commissars they overran. The troops of the

Waffen ss followed Hitler's orders, while many regular

troops refused to kill the commissars in cold blood. 52

The letter went on to talk of other crimes the Russians

wished to try members of the ss for:

At Hitler's orders, German soldiers destroy and
ravage .Russian cities and villages in the
course of evacuating them; the population is
being robbed and forcibly abducted to Germany.
In all this, units of the SS and Special com-
mandos excel.n

The letter sent to General Gille tried to allay his fears

of Russian reprisals against his surrendering troops.

Gille refused to surrender because he doubted the power

of the League of German Officers to make good their prom-

ises to his men. Along with his doubt, Gille refused to

surrender, because along with his troops and the other e-

lite units of the Waffen SS, he felt a deep hatred to-

wards the Russians.~

Some German Prisoners

While breaking out of the pocket, many men fell, too

exhausted to carry on. These men were taken prisoner,

with the wounded. Although the Russians did manage to

take 15,000 prisoners, these surrendered because of the

hardships of the escape attempt and not because of the

 154

work of the Free Germany Committee and the League of Ger-

man Officers." Many of these men carried the leaflets

from the Free Germany Committee and the passes that the

Russians issued guaranteeing them safe passage through

their lines. These men were treated no differently than

any other German prisoners. This fact caused many of the

Germans to believe that the Free Germany Committee and

the League of German Officers had been lying to them all

along.~

The Campaign Against the Men in the Lines

During the breakout a Fieseler Storch came to pick

up Colonel General Lieb, General Gille and Lieutenant De-

grelle. They flew to East Prussia, where Hitler congrat-

ulated them on their breakout and escape from the Rus-

sians.~ During their stay in Prussia, Lieb, Gille and

Degrelle were told of a Russian news release detailing

the liquidation of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. The re-

lease stated that Lieb, Gille and Degrelle had deserted

their men and that only 2,000 to 3,000 men of the SS in

the spearhead of the breakout attempt had escaped. 58

After the breakout attempt succeeded, the Russians

tried to use their victory at Cherkassy-Korsun, to de-

moralize the Germans still in the front lines. They

twisted the numbers of prisoners taken and of the losses

 155

in men the Germans suffered to try to turn the German

soldiers against their commanders and against Hitler. 59

The Russians claimed a great victory, similar to the

one they achieved at Stalingrad, during their liquidation

of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. The Russian account of

the battle stated that the pocket contained over 88,000

men and that only around 3,000 men, mainly the officers

and lead elements of the ss, escaped during the breakout

attempt. 60

The Russians publicized the fact that Colonel Gen-

eral Lieb, General Gill and Lieutenant Degrelle were res-

cued by plane during the relief attempt. Since the Rus-

sians repudiate the German claims of a breakout, they

claim that the officers were flown out before the men of

Group Stemmermann reached the German lines and that the

officers deserted their men to their fates at the hands

of the Russians. 61

The Russians also made a great deal of the death of

Colonel General Stemmermann. According to the Russian

sources, the Germans denied Stemmermann's death and

claimed that he was with them in Germany. According to

the Russians, the German officers did not want their men

to know of Stemmermann's loss and wished to downplay

their losses in the battle. 62 Von Manstein admits to the

loss of Colonel General Stemmermann during the breakout

 156

attempt. He states that other than the loss of the

wounded that this was his only regret. 63 The Russians

wished to show that no matter what rank a German held,

that Hitler would let him sacrifice his life for him.M

Differing Stories

The German accounts claim that the pocket contained

between 54,000 to 56,000 men and that between 30,000 and

32,000 escaped. 65 Two factors contributed to the mistake

the Russians made in estimating the strength of the pock-

et. The Russian mistakenly identified the groups within

the pocket and the strength of the formations involved.

At first, the Russians believed that they had trap-

ped the entire Eighth Army and the army command element

within the pocket. General Koniev, the commander of the

Third Russian Front, believed that the pocket contained

ten and a half divisions, mainly panzer divisions, with

over 100,000 men.~ The Russians found out the truth, la-

ter, that the pocket contained the German Forty-Second

and Eleventh Corps, but they claimed that in truth, the

pocket still numbered around 88,000. The Russians ar-

rived at this number, because at full strength two corps

of eleven formations would number around 88,000 men. 67

But, the German corps within the pocket had been in the

front lines for months and according to all the German

 157

sources, were well below their full strength. The German

claim that the pocket contained between 54,000 and 56,000

men can be proven by looking at the histories of the

groups encircled in the pocket and of the units taking

place in the relief attempts. 68

Field Marshal von Manstein claimed that the pocket

contained six and a half divisions. 69 He began with ten

divisions and a brigade in the area, but in order to pre-

serve the fighting strength of his divisions, von Man-

stein had combined them into new forces as they became

too weak to exist on their own. He combined the saar-

Palantine 112th Division, the Silesian 332nd Division and

the Saxon 225th Division under the command of the 112th

Division forming a unit called Corps Detachment B. 70

The Russians also overestimated the strength of the

pocket due to the fact that the pocket contained the rem-

nants of many divisions. The pocket contained part of

the Silesian 417th Grenadier Regiment, the Engineer Bat-

talion of the 168th Infantry Division as well as the

331st Bavarian Regiment of the 167th Infantry Division.

The pocket also contained a battalion of the Silesian

213th Local Defence Division and the Ski Battalion of the

323rd Infantry Division. Tanks of the 108 Panzer Regi-

ment of the 14th Panzer Division broke into the pocket

during the first few days of its existence.TI After look-

 158

ing at what the pocket actually contained, the German

claim of 54,000 to 56,000 men seems more reasonable then

the Russian claim of 88,000 men.

Out of the 54,000 to 56,000 men in the pocket, the

Germans claimed that 30,000 to 32,000 men broke out of

the encirclement, 72 while the Russia~s claim only 3,000

men escaped. 73 By examining the number of survivors from

each group, the German claim comes closer to the truth.

The 105th regiment of the 72nd Infantry Division came out

of the pocket with three officers and 216 men, out of

1062 encircled. General Gille of the Wiking Division

lead 4,500 men of his division out of the pocket, seventy

percent of his divisional strength when the Russians

formed the pocket. General Trowitz led his Bavarian 57th

Infantry Division and the remains of the 389th Infantry

Division to freedom, bringing 3,000 men of the rear guard

out of the pocket. Trowitz also brought 250 wounded men

out of the pocket with him, men Stemmermann had reluc-

tantly ordered left in the pocket. Lieutenant Leon De-

grelle, the leader of the Wallonien Brigade brought 632

of his Belgians out of the pocket, along with 3,000 other

men.~ The Russians claim that only one percent of the

men escaped. 75 This line of propaganda failed, because

the men in the lines were told the German version of the

truth by their officers.

 159

The Germans intercepted a radio transmission from

Moscow, released by the "Information Bureau":

In the course of the offensive at the beginning

of February from the area north of Kirowograd
in a westerly direction and from the area
southeast of Belaja-Zerkow in an easterly di-
rection, the troops of the Second Ukrainian
Front and the First Ukrainian Front broke
through the strongly manned German defensive
zone and in daring and skillful maneuvers en-
circled a large group of German-fascist troops
north of the line Swenigorodka-Schpola.

As a result of this operation our troops have

surrounded: the German 11 Army Corps under
Generalleutnant Stemmermann and the German 42
Army Corps under General der Infanterie Matten-
kloth.

The surrounded German Corps include: the 112

Infantry Division of Generalmajor Lieb, Oberst
Barman's 88 Infantry Division, Generalmajor
Heine's 82 Infantry Division, Oberst Honn's 72
Infantry Division, Generalleutnant Traunberg's
167 Infantry Division, Generalmajor Schmidt-
Hemmer's 168 Infantry Division, Generalmajor
Darlitz' 57 Infantry Division Generalleutnant
Geschen's 332 Infantry Division, the SS Panzer
Division Wiking under Brigadefuhrer Gille and
the SS Motorized Brigade Wallonien under Major
Lippert. The strength of the surrounded units
is 70-80,000 soldiers ....

The surrounded German units left 52,000 dead on

the battlefield, 11,000 men surrendered. The
Germans succeeded in removing scarcely more
than 2-3,000 officers from the number of sur-
rounded German troops ....

During the same period 329 German aircraft, in-

cluding 179 three-engine Ju-52 transport air-
craft, more than 600 tanks and 374 guns were
destroyed. Our troops captured 256 tanks, and
134 guns from the enemy. 76

The Russians broadcast this message across Europe, hoping

to force the Germans in the front lines to surrender.

 160

Their hope proved fleeting, as no groups of Germans sur-

rendered en masse to the Russians after these news re-

leases. The Russians did make many mistakes in their

newsreleases, misstating ranks, divisions involved and

the commanders of the groups, not to mention the number

of men in the pocket and amount of material lost.n

In order to hopefully further demoralize the Ger-

mans, the Russians released another excerpt about the

German defeat at Cherkassy:

As stated by the captured officers from the

surrounded units, following the failure of the
attempted relief of the German forces who were
in the "sack", Hitler gave another order de-
manding that the surrounded officers and men
sacrifice themselves in order to hold up the
Russian divisions for some time, since this was
ostensibly necessary in the interests of the
German Front. The mentioned order of Hitler's
contained a direct order for the surrounded
German officers and soldiers to commit suicide
if their situation became hopeless. In addi-
tion the captured Germans stated that during
the last 3-4 days plenty of suicides were ob-
served. On orders from German commanders
wounded officers and men were killed and burn-
ed. During the occupation of the villages of
Steblew and Schanderowka for example, our
troops discovered a large number of burned out
trucks which were filled with the corpses of
German soldiers and officers.n

Here again, the Russians wanted to show that Hitler sac-

rificed men for land. They also tried to instill the

fear of the ss in the regular German troops, claiming

that they carried out the order to kill all the wounded.

According to one Russian source their men came across

 161

trucks full of burnt corpses. The Russians could tell

that they were the German wounded because of the plaster

of paris on the limbs and torsos of the men. The plaster

of paris would not burn in the fires, so they could tell

these men had been treated for their wounds before they

died.~

An Assessment of the Campaign

Throughout the existence of the pocket, the Russians

compared the German troops there to those at Stalingrad a

year earlier. The Russians wanted to show that Hitler

felt that land was more important than the lives of his

soldiers and wanted to show the average German soldier

that they might meet the same fate as the German wounded

met at Stalingrad. The Russians also claimed that the SS

troops were carrying out orders issued by Colonel General

Stemmermann to execute the wounded of the pocket, so that

none of them would fall into Russian hands. 80

Many factors explain the failure of the League of

German Officers in Captivity and the National Committee

for a Free Germany to convince the men of the Cherkassy-

Korsun Pocket to surrender. The members of the League of

German Officers blamed the officers within the pocket for

not allowing the men who wished to surrender to do so.

The League of German Officers interviewed the men cap-

 162

tured during the breakout who carried the leaflets and

the passes. Some (perhaps with calculated opportunism)

admitted that only their officers prevented them from

surrendering. 81

Some of the members of the League of German Officers

admitted that their failure stemmed from the fact that

Russian captivity meant hardships and many times even

death. The members of the League of German Officers knew

that some of the surrendering German troops would spend

time in special camps, where they would have to endure

bitter hardships in order to survive.~ The German troops

may not have known of the hardships of Russian captivity,

but they had witnessed many of their comrades put to

death as soon as the Russians captured them. 83

The League of German Officers believed that the men

in the pocket refused to surrender because they still be-

lieved in Hitler as a warlord. The members of the League

believed that Germany had already lost the war and that

prolonged fighting would only prolong Germany's agony.M

The League believed they had to force the troops of the

Wehrmacht to give up this belief in Hitler.~

The campaign to demoralize the troops in the front

lines failed because, in order to work the German sol-

diers had to lose faith in their officers. From the

beginning of training in the German Army, the soldier

 163

learns to respect and listen to his officer at all times,

if he wishes to survive. The Free Germany Committee ad-

mitted that this line of propaganda ultimately had to

fail because it asked the German soldier to do something

that was unthinkable to him, go against the orders of his

officer.~

The Russians aimed part of their propaganda entirely

against the Belgians of the Wallonien Brigade. The fact

that the Belgians continued fighting during the existence

of the pocket and the fact that they broke out with the

Germans shows the measure of the Russian failure to

strip the Germans of their allies. swiss newspapers car-

ried the story of the Cherkassy Pocket to the rest of

Europe and if it had been truly successful, would have

kept other non-Germans from joining the German cause.

According to Degrelle, the ss Division Wallonien crossed

the Belgian Dutch border. Degrelle waited on the road

and surveyed the seventeen kilometer long armored column,

which he would lead back into Russia, only two months af-

ter the encirclement at Cherkassy.n

The Russian propaganda, at Cherkassy-Korsun, de-

signed to cause the surrender of the German troops, to

strip Germany of the Freewilling volunteers of the ss

within the pocket and to demoralize the German troops in

the front lines, failed miserably. Although the Russians

 164

managed to take 15,000 prisoners, these were mainly

wounded, or men too tired to fight their way back to the

German lines. The morale of the Germans in the pocket

remained high, because they knew how close the relief at-

tempts really came to succeeding. The men in the pocket

hated the Russians and knew they would face a hard life

in captivity. The two ss units in the pocket, the Wal-

lonien and the Wiking were part of the German elite and

hated the Russians even more than their German comrades

in the pocket. The propaganda ultimately failed because

it contained mostly lies dreamed up by the Russians and

because the men of the pocket knew they would suffer

greater hardships at the hands of the Russians than if

they could hold out and try to make it safely back to the

German lines. This was especially true for the men of

the SS, because the Russians usually showed them no mercy

when captured. Russian prisoners had faced the same mis-

treatment at the hands of the ss when they surrendered to

them during the war. The men fighting in the front lines

did not fall the for the propaganda the Russians designed

to demoralize them. No German troops surrendered en

masse directly after the encirclement at Cherkassy-

Korsun. The German troops never lost faith in their

officers, and fought to the end of the war.

 CHAPTER VIII

DEEP BATTLE AND BROAD FRONT CONCEPTS

And the Russian Operation at Cherkassy-Korsun

Developing the Concepts

Before World War II, the Russian Army developed a

concept for penetrating enemy lines and then destroying

the surrounded armies which they called "deep battle".

This concept remained doctrine, until the Spanish Civil

War showed problems in attaining the goals the doctrine

set forth. During the Cherkassy operation, the Russian

Generals involved in the operation found themselves in a

situation similar to the one described in the deep battle

doctrine. But, the Russian Generals ignored the concepts

of deep battle. General Koniev in particular expressed

great interest in destroying the pocket, before contin-

uing operations against Army Group South. The Germans of

Army Group South mounted a relief attempt to rescue the

men at Cherkassy and eventually succeeded in their en-

deavor. The Germans succeeded in rescuing their comrades

at Cherkassy mainly due to the influence of Stalin on the

decisions of the Russian commanders.

165
 166

In the 1920's and 1930's a group of Soviet officers

led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii developed the con-

cept of "Broad Front". Tukhachevskii envisioned an at-

tack on the enemy's entire front, in order to expose the

weak points in the enemy defensive positions. After

finding a weakness in the enemy lines, the attacking ar-

mies forced a breach in the defenses. A "shock army"

then penetrated the breach and began attacks into the

flanks and rear of the enemy forces. Broad front allowed

the commanders on the scene to make their own decisions

during the battle and gave them freedom to follow up the

attacks that they felt would provide the best results. 1

Upon testing his broad front theory, Tukhachevskii

realized that the attacks into the flanks and rear of the

enemy required a very strong force. The strengthening of

the shock army required thinning out the units on the en-

tire front. Further, the strengthening of the shock army

demanded that the main axis of attack take place on a

narrow front and that the high command take more control

over the armies and objectives. Tukhachevskii then went

on from this focused attack to develop the concept he

called "Deep Battle". This concept sought to employ in-

fantry, cavalry and mechanized divisions in concert with

aviation to decimate the rear areas of the enemy and

bring the war to a speedy conclusion. 2

 167

Tukhachevskii designed deep battle as a two part en-

gagement. First, a massed all arms attack would pene-

trated the defensive line of the enemy. Upon rupturing

the front, armored units attacked targets of opportunity,

including reserve artillery, supply dumps and headquar-

ters units. The second phase of the operation called for

an attack by mobile units to outflank the enemy and to

penetrate deep into the operational zone of the enemy. 3

A close associate of Tukhachevskii, Marshal Vladimir

Triandifillov, took the second phase of deep battle one

step further and sought to define exactly what elements

would participate in the attack. Triandifillov also

sought to coordinate the attacks of each service as they

penetrated the depths of the defenses of the enemy. 4

Triandifillov based the divisions of the shock group

on a field army consisting of: four to five rifle corps

with attached artillery, four to five artillery divis-

ions, sixteen to twenty mechanized artillery regiments

and eight to twelve tank battalions. Ideally, an en-

gagement using a field army of this size, would last

thirty days. The first phase of the operation called for

an advance of thirty to sixty kilometers in five to six

days. This phase of the operation depended on quickness

and a violent attack to guarantee that the enemy not re-

form a cohesive front. A reserve unit consisting of mo-

 168

bile artillery sought to break up any efforts of the en-

emy to re-establish their front line. The next phase of

the operation would build on the successes of the first

operation and in eighteen to twenty days destroy the en-

emy formations to a depth of 150 to 200 kilometers. 5

Problems Develop

At the time Tukhachevskii developed this plan, Rus-

sia could not support an army in the field, of the size

this plan required. 6 In order to alleviate the trouble

with supplies, the High Command developed a three ech-

eloned attack plan for the shock army. First, a mobile

formation penetrated the enemy line. The second echelon

consisted of an all arms attack on the enemy's exposed

flank. The third echelon penetrated the enemy reserve

areas to prevent any counter attack. The High Command

set a goal of a two-hundred mile penetration for the

three echeloned attack. 7

In 1931, the development of the deep battle concept

received a mortal blow. Marshal Triandifillov, one of

the fathers of deep battle died in a plane crash on the

way to deliver a paper in the Kiev Military District.

The death of Triandifillov left Tukhachevskii to carry on

his work on deep battle alone. He did have the help of

other generals who believed in the success the concept

 169

could bring, but he had lost one of the great tactical

minds in the Russian Army. 8

Publishing the Results

The efforts associated with defining the concept of

deep battle culminated in the Field Regulations Manual of

1936. 9 In this manual, Tukhachevskii finally defined ful-

ly, his plan "Deep Battle" and presented it for the ap-

proval of his fellow officers.

First, a massed, echeloned attack on a narrow

front would rupture the defender's conventional
infantry-artillery-antitank defense. Artillery
and mortars suppress defending artillery and
especially defending antitank guns. Tanks move
a few meters in front of the attacking in-
fantry, just meters behind the artillery bar-
rage, crushing wire, overrunning machine gun
posts, and reducing other centers of enemy re-
sistance. Once through the enemy lines, the
attacking tanks take advantage of local oppor-
tunities to penetrate and attack enemy re-
serves, artillery, headquarters and supply
dumps. Not tied to the infantry advance, the
tanks take advantage of their speed to exploit
local opportunities. 10

The attack on the enemy lines consisted of using artil-

lery to soften his defenses and then used tanks followed

by infantry to overrun his forward positions. The manual

then went on to describe the operations the Soviets would

undertake while in the rear areas of the enemy.

'Mobile Groups' composed of cavalry, mechanized

formations, or both, would exploit their mobil-
ity advantage to outflank the enemy or develop
penetration in order to reach the enemy rear
areas. The object: to attack the entire depth
 170

of the enemy defenses simultaneously, with

frontal attacks, long range artillery fires,
deep penetrations by mobile forces, and bombing
and parachute attacks of key points. Smoke and
deception operations distract the enemy from
the real intentions of the attack. 11

Tukhachevskii believed in launching the attack with tanks

just after an artillery barrage to lessen the losses to

his armor. The tanks would move in before the defenders

could recover to repel them. The tanks, then loose in

the enemy rear areas would cause as much havoc as pos-

sible, destroying the ability of the enemy within the

sector of the attack to continue the battle. 12 Of his

plans to reduce the enemy on a narrow front, he wrote:

The impossibility of destroying the enemy's ar-

my at one blow with contemporary broad fronts
forces us to achieve this by a series of con-
secutive operations, combined by constant pur-
suit; this can replace the destructive engage-
ment which was the best form of encounter in
previous armies. 13

Tukhachevskii saw that the tank and airplane had revo-

lutionized modern warfare and that the massed infantry

attacks used during the first World War, had become ob-

solete. Tukhachevskii envisioned a time when the Red Ar-

my would use a material and technical based army which

would permit a more effective method of achieving the ar-

my's goals, and not the fighting for each separate posi-

tion, as had taken place in World War I.~

 171

The Death of Deep Battle

On June 12, 1937, before the Red Army instituted his

ideas, Stalin had Tukhachevskii put to death. Stalin al-

so ordered the execution of eight of Tukhachevskii's high

ranking assistants and ordered that the rest of them go

to prison. Stalin feared the commanders of the Red Army.

After his purge of the civilians, the Red Army stood as

the only possible hinderance to his power and represented

the largest group of possible conspirators against him.~

In all, Stalin executed or replaced over 500 of his com-

manders from the rank of marshal all the way down to the

officers at brigade level, replacing the officers with

men politically acceptable to him, replacements which

would prove disastrous in the first few years of the war

with the Germans. 16

Stalin replaced the experienced thinkers and plan-

ners of the Red Army with politically acceptable offic-

ers. Some officers were promoted well above their pre-

vious levels of experience, causing disastrous effects on

unit development and tactics.n

Soon after the death of Tukhachevskii, his idea of

deep battle came to an end during the Spanish Civil War. 18

The Russians aided the Republican forces in the Spanish

Civil War, by providing them with tanks, aircraft and

military advisors. General D. G. Pavlov, a tank expert,

 172

reported to Stalin on his assessment of the tank: "The

tank can play no independent role on the battlefield

... the tank must be relegated to an infantry support

role. 1119 Without Tukhachevskii to def end the independent

role of the tank on the battlefield, Stalin put Pavlov's

recommendations into practice. Pavlov chose to ignore

the problems with coordinating armies of different na-

tionalities ·with different weapons and training. He

chose to ignore the inherent problems in the Spanish army

and came down very hard on the new concept. He knew lit-

tle of deep battle and chose to blame the problems on a

new theory. 20

By late 1939, the High Command reformed the massed

mechanized corps into fifteen separate divisions rele-

gated to infantry support roles. The reforming of the

divisions and change in roles for the armored elements of

the Soviet Army eliminated most of Tukhachevskii's plans

for deep battle.

Deep Battle Concepts Employed

Late in 1939, General Georgi Zhukov employed Mar-

shal Tukhachevskii's theory of deep battle. On May 20,

Japanese troops overwhelmed the Soviet forces at the

Khalkhin-Gol River along the Mongolian-Manchurian border.

After the initial success, the battle became indecisive,

 173

and served to expose very serious flaws in the command

and control structure of the Soviet forces. 21

To remedy the situation, Soviet forces were trans-

ferred to the theatre and the High Command placed Zhukov

in charge of the First Army Group. Zhukov received rein-

forcements and launched a counterattack on August 20.

Zhukov attacked exactly according to the plan Tukhachev-

skii laid out in PU-36 and smashed the Japanese forma-

tions facing him between two assault groups. Zhukov com-

pletely encircled the forces of the Japanese Sixth Army

by August 24. He managed to contain this force until a

cease fire was declared on September 16.n

Even after the success Zhukov managed using the deep

battle doctrine, the Red Army High Command still would

not rescind their decision to reorganize the tank forces

and change their thoughts on deployment and battle. The

Red Army tank forces remained tied to their role of in-

fantry support. But, even if the Red Army High Command

had decided to reinstate the deep battle doctrine, in-

herent problems in the army might still have stood in the

way of true success using the deep battle doctrine. The

Red Army may not have been developed enough to carry out

the deep battle doctrine as Marshall Tukhachevskii envis-

ioned.

The problems associated with the Red Army implemen-

 174

ting deep battle doctrine became apparent even before the

adoption of PU-36. In . September of 1936, Colonel Giffard

le Q. Martel, Assistant Director of Mechanization at the

War Office in England witnessed an exercise involving el-

ements of the Byelorussian Military District. The sheer

number of troops and the massed material involved in the

exercises impressed Martel.

Martel chronicled the events he witnessed, but also

reported many obvious flaws in the Soviet plan. He re-

ported his findings to the War Office

The Russian Army was still a bludgeon, quite

incapable of rapier work; it had the armoured
spikes put on the head of the bludgeon and
would strike a deadly blow when it landed; but
an active and well-equipped enemy should often
be able to avoid or counter the blow and would
at least inflict heavy damage on a clumsy op-
ponent. n

Martel believed that the Soviet Union had become a potent

military force, but that the army needed many refinements

before the Red Army became a real military power. Deep

battle came to an end after the death of Tukhachevskii

and under Stalin, the Red Army implemented new programs

to carry it into the next decade, but never implemented a

plan to take the place of deep battle.

Deep Battle and Cherkassy-Korsun

The operation at Cherkassy in many ways resembled

the operation that Tukhachevskii described in deep bat-

 175

tle. The Russians penetrated the German lines and man-

aged to keep their lines open to allow other groups to

enter the rear areas of two German corps. But, the Rus-

sians failed to put the second phase of Tukhachevskii's

plan into effect. The failure to put the second phase of

the deep battle operation into effect and the fact that

the Russian commanders chose to ignore some of the laws

of warfare contributed to the fact that the Germans es-

caped from the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. Marshal Zhukov

was at Cherkassy and he had used the doctrine of deep

battle before to defeat the Japanese, but could not put

it into effect in the Cherkassy operation. Although he

did not command all the troops involved in the operation,

he could have suggested how best to carry on the opera-

tions against the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

The first stage of deep battle calls for an initial

advance of sixty miles into the rear areas of the enemy.

At Cherkassy the Russians succeeded in advancing the in-

itial sixty miles, but then a German counteroffensive al-

most succeeding in rescuing the trapped force. A further

Russian offensive regained the lost territory and left

the Russians eighty miles in the German rear area. But,

the Russians stopped after the first advance and chose to

eliminate the men in the pocket, instead of continuing

with the deep battle doctrine.

 176

Russian Mistakes

The decision on the part of General Koniev to elim-

inate the men in the pocket violated two of the laws of

warfare, the law of mass and the law of economy of force,

which directly correlate to each other. The law of mass

dictates that a commander concentrate most of his forces

against the critical point. The critical area in the

Cherkassy operation should have been aimed against Army

Group South, since it contained the most men and pre-

sented the biggest problem for the Russian generals. Ar-

my Group South proved strong enough to carry out small

offensive operations during the Cherkassy operation due

to the limited number of men facing them. According to

von Manstein, he was able to free the two corps for re-

lief operations because the Russians suspended offensive

operations against his group while they sought to elimi-

nate the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. The Russians should

have employed the law of mass against Army Group South,

while employing the law of economy of force against the

men of Group Stemmermann in the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

The law of economy of force goes hand in hand with that

of mass. Economy of force means that while massing

troops for the critical attack, a commander leaves enough

of his troops in the non-critical part of the line to

hold it against an attack by his enemy. The Russian

 177

commanders should have employed the law of economy of

force against the least dangerous of the German forces,

the men of Group Stemmermann, which they had already sur-

rounded and cut off from supply on the ground, and had

proved to no longer be capable of offensive operations.

The second phase of deep battle calls for a second

advance to take the attacking armies 200 miles into the

enemy rear areas. This second advance was to make sure

that the enemy could not mount an attack to retake the

land they had lost, and to reform a viable defense a-

gainst them. In the Cherkassy-Korsun operation though,

the Russians did not mount the second offensive against

the men of Army Group South.

By suspending offensive operations against Army

Group South, the Russians allowed the Germans to mount an

operation to free their trapped men. Von Manstein claim-

ed that if the Russians had not suspended their opera-

tions, that he could not have freed up the troops from

his front to mount the relief attacks. The Germans

mounted a relief attempt when the Russian attacks stopped

and man-aged to drive most of the eighty miles separating

them from Group Stemmermann and ended up being stopped by

the weather and the Russians within six miles of the

pocket. The men of Group Stemmermann were then able to

drive the remaining six miles to the lines of Third Pan-

 177

commanders should have employed the law of economy of

force against the least dangerous of the German forces,

the men of Group Stemmermann, which they had already sur-

rounded and cut off from supply on the ground, and had

proved to no longer be capable of offensive operations.

The second phase of deep battle calls for a second

advance to take the attacking armies 200 miles into the

enemy rear areas. This second advance was to make sure

that the enemy could not mount an attack to retake the

land they had lost, and to reform a viable defense a-

gainst them. In the Cherkassy-Korsun operation though,

the Russians did not mount the second offensive against

the men of Army Group South.

By suspending offensive operations against Army

Group South, the Russians allowed the Germans to mount an

operation to free their trapped men. Von Manstein claim-

ed that if the Russians had not suspended their opera-

tions, that he could not have freed up the troops from

his front to mount the relief attacks. The Germans

mounted a relief attempt when the Russian attacks stopped

and man-aged to drive most of the eighty miles separating

them from Group Stemmermann and ended up being stopped by

the weather and the Russians within six miles of the

pocket. The men of Group Stemmermann were then able to

drive the remaining six miles to the lines of Third Pan-

 178

zer Corps. The first attack drove Army Group South back

only eighty miles, and the two separated groups proved

just strong enough to fight their way across the eighty

miles which separated them.

The Russian Generals made some poor decisions about

the conduct of operations at Cherkassy, but Stalin must

be held responsible for the strategic and timing decis-

ions. Stalin pushed his generals to eliminate the Cher-

kassy-Korsun Pocket to prove to the German soldiers that

Hitler cared about land, instead of them, hopefully caus-

ing some of them to desert from the German army. Stalin

chose the objective of destroying this one group in hopes

of causing some desertions, when he could have commanded

his generals to keep up their attacks against Army Group

South. The attack they launched to create the pocket had

already caused a gap between Army Group South and Army

Group Centre and caused a sixty mile gap in the lines of

Army Group South, where the men of Group Stemmermann had

been. Further attacks had a good chance of rupturing the

front of Army Group South entirely.

Although Marshall Zhukov was at Cherkassy, he did

not implement the deep battle doctrine, even though he

had used the doctrine to defeat the Japanese years ear-

lier. The Russian generals did not obey the laws of war-

fare in their operation against the Cherkassy-Korsun

 179

Pocket. Stalin chose to put non-military considerations

in front of military ones. All these factors helped con-

tribute to the Russian failure to bring the Cherkassy op-

eration to a successful end and to the partial German

success in the freeing of their troops trapped within the

Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket.

Cherkassy-Korsun can be shown as one of the prime

examples of what happens when politics dictates strategy

and tactics on the battlefield. Politics can decide when

to fight a war, whether the war be conditional or uncon-

ditional and what weapons are used. But, decisions af-

fecting the conduct of the army must be left up to the

commanders on the scene. Both Stalin and Hitler chose to

allow political considerations to dictate what land to

hold and which group to destroy, against the better judg-

ment of their generals. Unfortunately for the German and

Russian armies during World War II, the leadership of the

respective countries did not follow these rules.

 ENDNOTES

CHAPTER II

Retreat to the Dnieper

1. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency co. 1958), 472.

2. Ibid, 474-475. Von Manstein talks only about

his front, but he does show that Hitler interfered in
military decisions.

3. Ibid, 473. Three of the divisions available to

the army group were still on their way from the reserve
areas.

4. Ibid, 473. Von Manstein states that even with

the arrival of the three reinforcing divisions, the av-
erage strength of the divisions did not rise above 2,000
men. He states that his men might have held the river
line until winter. The river would then freeze, allowing
the Russians to drive their tanks over the ice on broad
fronts, instead of having to fight for a bridge, or shal-
low crossing spot.

5. Von Manstein, Victories, 473. Von Manstein had

just regained control of Sixth Army at this point in
time. Sixth Army passed in and out of his control at the
whim of Hitler. He and Field Marshall Ewald von Kleist
each commanded this army at points, each got control when
their army group faced the greatest danger. Von Manstein
finally lost control of the army for good later, when he
wanted to withdraw an armored division from the army to
commit to the relief attempt of the Cherkassy-Korsun Poc-
ket. Hitler argued that if he moved the Twenty-Fourth,
that Army Group A could not hold the Crimea, and might
even be cut off there if von Manstein weakened Sixth
Army.

6. Ibid, 474-476.

180
 181

7. F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, (New York:

Ballentine Books, 1956), 327.

8. Ibid, 473.

9. Ibid, 474-476.

10. Ibid, 473-474. He believed that the extra di-

visions could come from Army Group Centre, since the
withdrawal had reduced the front that army Groups Centre
held. This memorandum also requested more shipments of
ammunition, van Manstein hoped that his army group would
not face another ammunition shortage, as they had during
the withdrawal to the Dnieper River. On January 27, Hit-
ler ordered van Manstein to remain after a meeting with
his commanders on the Eastern Front. Hitler accused van
Manstein of writing this just so that he could clear his
name in the war diary, and put the blame on someone other
than the one at fault.

11. Hans Rudel, Stuka Pilot, (New York: Ballentine

books, 1958), 76-80. During his career as a Stuka pilot,
Rudel destroyed over 500 Russian tanks, and even sank a
Russian battleship on his own. His record of 2,530 oper-
ational flights was unequaled by any other pilot during
the war. he was shot down more than a dozen times, and
ended the war flying a Focke Wulf FW 190 with a freshly
amputated leg (he lost everything below the knee), and
the other leg in a cast.

12. Von Manstein, Victories, 475. The thirty-seven

infantry, and seventeen armored divisions of Army Group
South faced a total of forty-seven rifle divisions and
eleven armored corps. Von Manstein earlier relates (p.
457) that the Russian divisions were nearly as depleted
as his own. They still outnumbered him in numbers of di-
visions available though, and he constantly feared that
the Russians would receive an abundance of reserve divi-
sions from their reserve area near Orel, and begin an of-
fensive that he could not stop.

13. Von Mellenthin, Battles, 327.

14. Ibid, 327.

15. Ibid, 327. According to von Mellenthin, all

the disasters the German army faced in the Ukraine in the
next three months were the fault of Hitler. Specifically
he spoke of the disasters at Kirovograd, and later at
Cherkassy.
 182

16. Alexander Werth, Russia At War 1941-1945 (New

York: E.P. Dutton & co., 1964), 771-772.
17. Ibid, 772.

18. 772.

19. Von Manstein, Victories, 506.

20. Operations of Encircled Fores: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 33. This section, 33-
42 of the manual was prepared by a German staff officer
of Army Group South. He bases the section on his per-
sonal recollections, and the documents which were saved
by the army group.

21. German Defense Tactics Against Russian Break-

Throughs (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army,
1951) , 72.

22. Ibid, 506. This meant that Army Group South

withdrew south, and away from Army Group Centre. Von
Manstein tried to argue with Hitler that the Germans
could no longer hold the Dnieper River line. He argued
that an attack between the two army groups would meet
with no significant resistance, and that the Russians
could drive a considerable difference before the two army
groups could mount a counterattack to stop them.

23. Ibid, 506.

24. Ibid, 507.

25. Von Manstein, Victories, 504-505.

26. John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing

the History of Stalin's War with Germany (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), 164.

27. Break-Throughs, 72.

28. Ibid, 72-73.

29. Break-Throughs, 73. Throughout the paper, I

mention the number of losses reported by each side. The
casualty figures each reported suffering probably come
close to the truth, but are probably low, because the
commanders would want to down play the losses to their
 183

forces. The casualties they reported causing are prob-

ably high, because of the confusion on the battlefield,
and the desire to look good for their superiors. Battle-
field casualty reports will always be inaccurate, if a
tank fires on an enemy and hits it, the commander will
probably report a kill, many tanks could fire on the same
one, resulting in a high report of kills. I have report-
ed the numbers, because somewhere in them, at least a
partial truth can be found.

3 0. . Ibid, 7 3 .

31. Erickson, Road, 164.

32. von Manstein, Victories, 506-507.

33. Ibid, 507.

34. Ibid, 507. Von Manstein notes that this

railhead served his Army Group the best out of the
railroads in the area. He states that the railroads
through Rumanian territory had a lower efficiency.

35. Erickson, Road, 164.

36. Paul Carell, Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1943-1944 (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 396.

37. Ibid, 396. According to Carell, Bayerlein

withdrew because of his experiences with Rommel in the
Africa Corps. Bayerlein had seen the consequences of
Hitler's ''last man" directives, and had no intention of
spending the rest of the war in a Russian prisoner of war
camp.

38. Pat McTaggart., World War II, "Soviet Encir-

clement Thwarted", (January 1994), 40.

39. Ibid, 39.

40. Ibid, 39.

41. Ibid, 39.

42. carell, Scorched, 397.

43. McTaggart, "Soviet", 40.

44. Ibid, 40.

 184

45. Ibid, 40.

46. Ibid, 40.

47. Ibid, 40.

48. Erickson, Road, 164. Vatutin fell short of his

expectations, failing to take Uman.

49. Ibid, 149.

50. Ibid, 164-165.

51. Ibid, 165.

52. Von Manstein, Victories, 507.

53. Erickson, Road, 165. Stavka used Zvenigorod-

Mironovka to refer to what would later become the Cher-
kassy-Korsun Pocket. These two cities (Zvenigorod and
Mironovka) were the cities on the two flanks (which lay
on the Dnieper River) of the German salient.
54. Ibid, 165. The Russian tanks were able to op-
erate well on the flanks of the German troops. Only one
German division in the salient contained any tanks at
all, the Fifth Waffen SS Panzer Division Wiking.

55. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters,

1939-1945 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1962),
539.

56. Ibid, 539.

57. Ibid, 539.

 185

CHAPTER III

THE ENCIRCLEMENT

1. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency co., 1958), 514.

2. Earl Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German

Defeat in the East (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army), 1968, 227-228.

3. Von Manstein, Victories, 515.

4. Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945 (New

York: E.P. Dutton & co., 1964), 773.

5. Leon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen

SS on the Eastern Front (Torrance, California: Institute
for Historical Review, 1985), 163. The Russian corridor
reached sixty-five miles only at it's widest point. In
some places the corridor measured only fifty miles. De-
grelle plays such a large part in the story because the
only officers left were he and Lieutenant Colonel Lucien
Lippert. Lippert led at the front, while Degrelle mo-
tivated the men, and tried to keep morale high.

6. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters,

1939-1945 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1962),
556. Unfortunately this quote comes from the fragments
of a conversation. This part of the diary may have been
part of the chronicle burned during the last few days in
the bunker. Other parts of the diary were destroyed in
various air attacks that Warlimont survived. However,
this quote does show the massive forces the men in the
pocket had to face. Even after seeing the massive num-
bers of enemy his men faced, Hitler still would not allow
von Manstein to order the withdrawal of the men in the
pocket .

7. Ibid, 557. The fact that Hitler wanted to use

divisions from the west shows that he did not see the
Russian offensive near Cherkassy as a problem, at least
at this point.

8. Ibid, 556.
 186

9. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia, (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 17. The information
in this sections comes from Colonel General Theobald
Lieb's personal diary.

10. Ibid, 17-18.

11. Ibid, 17.

12. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5th SS

Panzer Division Wiking (Winnipeg: JJ Fedorowicz, 1988),
135. Most of the information in this book concerning the
Wiking Division comes directly from the Truppenkamerad-
schaft Wiking (Viking Division Historical Society). The
Viking Society also published a book Der Kessel von
Tscherkassy. to tell of the experiences of the division
during their encirclement. The Wiking Division was made
up of volunteer troops from Norway, Finland, Denmark and
Sweden.

13. Ibid, 135.

14. Ibid, 135. Lieutenant Heder commanded the

school at Ssteblev. His battlegroup consisted of two ex-
perienced battalions, one of engineers and the other of
infantry, and two battalions which were in the middle of
their training. One of the training battalions consisted
of engineers, the second consisted of a collection of
various personnel which were to fill out the ranks of the
under-strengthed battalions of the division.

15. Von Manstein, Victories, 515.

16. Ibid, 515.

17. Encircled, 19.

18. Ibid, 19-20. The Wiking Division contained a-

round 7,830 men when the Russians closed the pocket. The
records of the Wiking Division do not tell whether or not
this number included the men in the Wallonien Brigade or
not. As the Wallonien Brigade was only attached to the
Wiking Division, I do not believe the men of the Wallon-
ien were included in the strength total for the division
at the time.

19. Paul Carell, Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1943-1944 (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 403. The 213
Local Security Division, was not even a front line for-
 187

mation. The Germans formed the local security divisions

to fight partisans just behind the front lines. The men
were either young, or very old, and were lightly equip-
ped. The units in the division were normally well under
the normal complement of men for the front line divi-
sions.

20. Encircled, 20. Earlier in his diary, Lieb made

mention of the fact that his communications with First
Panzer Army had been cut. Lieb remained under the com-
mand of First Panzer Army, but Eighth Army may have been
the only unit outside the pocket he could contact.

21. Ibid, 20.

22. Carell, Scorched, 403.

23. Degrelle, Campaign, 163.

24. Ibid, 163. Degrelle also states that his Bel-

gians had been in tight spots before, including another
small encirclement years earlier, and had gotten out of
them. He believed that the situation was not as bad as
it looked. The Germans were successfully driving in to
relieve the pocket, and the men in the pocket were not in
any immediate danger.

25. Strassner, Volunteers, 140.

26. Degrelle, Campaign, 163-164.

27. Ibid, 164.

28. Von Manstein, Victories, 515. The German com-

manders added Korsun to the name of the pocket, because
this town became important to the relief effort because
the only major airfield in the pocket lay there.

29. Ibid, 515. Every one of these formations was

top notch. Von Manstein tells that each of the divisions
had performed well, and he believed that under normal
circumstances, this corps could stand up to the two
Ukrainian Fronts that stood between it and the pocket.
Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler literally meant Bodyguard of
Adolf Hitler. This Waffen ss formation was the first one
to receive arms, and first saw limited action in France
in 1940.

30. Ibid, 515. Von Manstein believed that Hitler

intended to use Eleventh Panzer to help hold the Nikopol
 188

bridgehead. Hitler wanted the Nikopol Bridgehead because

this bridgehead protected his army in the Crimea. Von
Manstein believed that the army had no chance of holding
the Crimea and that he should cut his losses, and use the
divisions freed by giving up the bridgehead to help hold
the lines of Army Group South. Hitler also wanted Nik-
opol to launch an attack into the Caucasus. He wanted
the Caucasus for the oil that was there. Von Manstein
believed that Ploestie in Rumania could provide the Ger-
mans with the oil they needed, and that synthetic oil
could meet the needs of the German Army, and that an at-
tack into the Caucasus was not worth the effort.

31. Nikolaus von Vormann, Tscherkassy (Heidelberg,

Germany: Scharnhorst Buchameradschaft, 1954), 56. Major
General Nikolaus von Vormann commanded the Forty-seventh
Panzer Corps during the relief attempt.

32. Strassner, Volunteers, 141.

33. Encircled, 35. Only the Liebstandarte Adolf

Hitler Panzer Division possessed it's full fighting
strength, having just returned from a long refit in the
west.

34. Wolfgang Werthen, Geschichte Der 16. Panzer-

Division (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Verlag Hans-Henning
Podzun, 1958), 196-197.

35. Strassner, Volunteers, 142.

36. Gefuhrt von Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst

Schramm, Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wermacht
(Wermachtfuhrungsstab): 1940-1945 vol 4. (Frankfurt am
Main, Germany: Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen,
1961), 108-109.

37. Ibid, 108-109.

38. Ibid, 109. According to Warlimont, Hitler lost

faith in von Manstein during this period. See Warlimont,
Headquarters, 389. He believed that von Manstein was
making excuses for his poor generalship. Many in the
Nazi hierarchy felt the same way, including Himmler and
Goebbels. Interestingly enough, men on both sides of the
line still held great respect for von Manstein. Von Vor-
mann and Degrelle both expressed their faith in von
Manstein. Von Manstein had always performed well for
Hitler, he devised Sichelschnitt, the plan for attacking
France, and took the Caucasus when other commanders had
 189

failed in the past. He also held Army Group South to-

gether after the Stalingrad disaster.

39. Von Manstein, Victories, 515.

40. Hans Rudel, Stuka Pilot (New York: Ballentine

Books, 1958), 110.

41. Ibid, 110-111. Rudel refers to the IL II as

"Iron Gustavs" throughout the story. He comments that
these planes were also more heavily armored then their
German counterparts the Ju.87. In fact the IL II was
faster, the only advantage the Germans had was maneuver-
ability. The Ju.87 could out dive an IL-2, a fact Rudel
used to shoot down the planes during his pursuits.

42. Ibid, 111. Rudel chalked up over 500 kills

during the four years he flew in the war, including sin-
gle handedly sinking a Russian battleship. Most of his
kills though were tanks, including many he destroyed dur-
ing the fighting at Cherkassy.

43. Ibid, 111.

44. Von Manstein, Victories, 516.

45. Ibid, 516. Von Manstein believed in staying in

contact with his troops at all times. He travelled to
the front throughout the war, in order to find out what
his troops faced, and what shape his units were in.

46. Encircled, 20. Hitler would not allow von Man-

stein to give further permission for Lieb to further
withdraw his troops.

47 . Ibid, 2 0.

48. Ibid, 20.

49. Strassner, Volunteers, 137. Stemmermann's old

staff, that of Eleventh Corps had enough problems just
trying to keep control of the divisions assigned to them.
He had to pass messages himself to the signal corps of
the divisions under his control.

50. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 18.
 190

51. Leon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen

ss on the Eastern Front (Torrance, California: Institute
for Historical Review, 1985), 164.

52. D. Fritz Morzik, German Air Force Airlift Oper-

ations (New York: Arno Press, 1961), 220. The Germans
delivered light thirty-seven millimeter antiaircraft guns
to the airfield at Korsun. These guns were so light that
they had no effect on the Russian bombers. Morzik writes
from his own recollections, and from a postwar report
prepared by Lt. Colonel D. Baumann, Former commanding of-
ficer of the Second Group, Third Air Transport Wing, and
from original documents from the files of the Second
Group, Third Air Transport Wing. During World War II,
Morzik headed the transport and airborne supply division
of the Luftwaffe. He would have been familiar with all
the reports coming from the pocket, and received the af-
ter action reports of all groups taking part in the sup-
ply operation.

53. Ibid, 221-A. Later, as time went on, and

transportation got better, all the aircraft were able to
take off and land from Uman. Uman was the largest and
closest airfield in the area, and was best suited for
storing supplies.

54. Ibid, 221-A.

55. Ibid, 222. See also Leon Degrelle, Campaign in

Russia: The Waffen ss on the Eastern Front (Torrance,
California: Institute for Historical Review, 1985), 165.
Degrelle witnessed the shooting down of the planes, he
lists the number as between ten and fifteen, and claims
that the screams of the wounded men, who were being
roasted alive were awful to hear.

56. Ray Wagner, The Soviet Air Force in World War

II (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973), 230. This
work was originally written as the official history of
the air force, and published by the Ministry of Defense
of the USSR.

5 7 . Von Hardesty, =R=e-d~P~h=o_e=-n=i=x~=-~T~h=e~R=i=s~e~o~f~S~o=-v--'-=i'--"e'-=t

Air Power. 1941-1945 (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian In-
stitution Press, 1982), 185.

58. Wagner, Soviet, 230. No numbers are given for

operational aircraft for this group, but it is probably
considerably less that the full strength of the two air
armies. The Germans had just over 1,460 aircraft in-
 191

volved in the Cherkassy operation. Many of the 1,460

were transports, so the Russians had a considerable ad-
vantage over the Germans in number of fighters available.

59. Morzik, Airlift, 222.

60. Encircled, 31.

61. Degrelle, Campaign, 166-167. Degrelle comments

that the Russians from the artillery battery had spent
the last three months in the area around Moshny. The
Russians knew the Belgians trench system, the placement
of their artillery batteries, and the telephone and radio
posts of the brigade and corps within the pocket.

62. Ibid, 167.

63. Ibid, 167.

64. Ibid, 168.

65. Ibid, 168-169.

66. Ibid, 173. Degrelle commented that a Russian

patrol actually preceded them out of the town. According
to his memoirs, the Russians robbed the peasants of the
cities and towns they freed from the Germans. While in
Losovok, Degrelle came across a family that the Russians
had "princely" traded a box of matches with the hammer
and sickle on it to the family for all of their poultry.
He comments that the German troops were strictly watched
by their superiors. According to Degrelle, whenever the
Germans took something from the Russian peasants, they
compensated them fairly. The Germans mainly traded their
extra food for the warm clothing the Russian peasants
possessed. The Russians soldiers however, would take al-
most everything of value the peasant families had, De-
grelle believed that if the Russians left the peasants
with anything, the soldiers had overlooked it while
searching the houses.

67. Morzik, Airlift, 222.

68. Ibid, 222.

69. Operations, 31. His diary entry for the day

shows some of the despair he felt, and that his hopes for
the ability of his corps to hold out were dwindling.
Part of the entry for the day contains the line "This
cannot go on much longer." Lieb saw the number of cas-
 192

ualties per day, and the disparity in the amount of sup-

plies used to the amount delivered per day, and knew that
the numbers meant ill for his corps.

70. Degrelle, Campaign, 170-171.

71. Ibid, 171.

72. Ibid, 171. The Russians managed to destroy a

large number of the vehicles within the pocket. The Ger-
mans had to destroy most of them though, because they
could not move them. The engines of the artillery trac-
tors, which the Germans counted on for mobility, burnt
out from being overworked. The vehicles which could not
move through the mud on their own, were destroyed by the
Germans rather than letting them fall into Russian hands.

73. Ibid, 171-172.

74. Encircled, 21.

75. Ibid, 36.

76. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 228.

 193

CHAPTER IV

MOUNTING THE RELIEF EFFORT

1. Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency co., 1958), 515. He stated that the strengths of
the Russian units involved in the attack earlier in his
memo to the O.K.W. The Russians still possessed a great
advantage in both men and equipment - in the area, but the
difference between the two forces was not as large as the
units involved might suggest. The two panzer corps still
faced an almost impossible task, but one he was confident
they could fulfill.

2. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5th ss

Panzer Division Wiking (Winnipeg: JJ Federowicz, 1968),
141.

3. Von Manstein, Victories, 515-516. Hitler or-

dered the two attacks, rather than launch a single attack
to break into the pocket as von Manstein wanted. Von
Manstein believed that one attack might stand a chance,
but that two attacks would hinder the effort.

4. Operation of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1951), 35.

5. Ibid, 36.

6. Wolfgang Werthen Geschichte Der 16. Panzer

Division (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Verlag Hans-Henning
Podzun, 1958), 197.

7. Encircled, 36.

8. Ibid, 37. According to this source, the Germans

began their attack late in the day of February 2, 1944.
The Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps carried out operations for
the day of the attack, and for the full day on the third.
This corps managed to tie down one full Russian Front
while continuing to hold the bridgehead.

9. Ibid, 37.

10. Paul Carell Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1939-1945 (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 408-409.
 193

CHAPTER IV

MOUNTING THE RELIEF EFFORT

1. Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency co., 1958), 515. He stated that the strengths of
the Russian units involved in the attack earlier in his
memo to the O.K.W. The Russians still possessed a great
advantage in both men and equipment in the area, but the
difference between the two forces was not as large as the
units involved might suggest. The two panzer corps still
faced an almost impossible task, but one he was confident
they could fulfill.

2. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5th SS

Panzer Division Wiking (Winnipeg: JJ Federowicz, 1968),
141.

3. Von Manstein, Victories, 515-516. Hitler or-

dered the two attacks, rather than launch a single attack
to break into the pocket as von Manstein wanted. Von
Manstein believed that one attack might stand a chance,
but that two attacks would hinder the effort.

4. Operation of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1951), 35.

5. Ibid, 36.

6. Wolfgang Werthen Geschichte Der 16. Panzer

Division (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Verlag Hans-Henning
Podzun, 1958), 197.

7. Encircled, 36.

8. Ibid, 37. According to this source, the Germans

began their attack late in the day of February 2, 1944.
The Forty-Seventh Panzer Corps carried out operations for
the day of the attack, and for the full day on the third.
This corps managed to tie down one full Russian Front
while continuing to hold the bridgehead.

9. Ibid, 37.

10. Paul Carell Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1939-1945 (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 408-409.
 194

11. M.N. Kozhevnikov, Komandovaniye i shtab VVS

Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945
(Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 168. Cited in Hardesty, Phoenix.
The title means Soviet Army Air force command and staff
in the Great Patriotic War. This would mean that the
planes flew an average of ten sorties per day (if the
Germans could not manage to down a single plane. But as
losses took place, the planes would have to fly even more
missions per day to equal the 3,800 mark). The distance
and turn around times for the planes makes the average of
ten sorties per aircraft per day seem very improbable.
Either the Russians had more planes available to them
during these days, or the number of sorties became ex-
aggerated somehow, probably the same way that the number
of kills became exaggerated later. Wagner, Soviet, 234,
lists the 2,800 as the number of sorties flown for this
period. He also comments that the Germans flew only half
as many sorties. He states that the Soviet fliers en-
gaged in 120 air battles, shooting down 130 German
planes.

12. Ray Wagner, The Soviet Air Force in World War

II (New York: Doubleday & co., 1973), 233.

13. Wagner, Soviet, 236. German accounts of the

airlift operation differ greatly from the Soviet ac-
counts. The Soviets would have been trying to impress
Stalin, and therefore would inflate their kill figures.
The German sources might have been trying to cover up the
extent of their loss, but, the fact that they met their
transport goals (discussed later) seems to somewhat dis-
prove the Soviet numbers. If so many planes had been
lost, the Germans would have had serious trouble supply-
ing the pocket.

14. U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication.

Microcopy No. T-354. Miscellaneous SS Records: Ein-
wanderezantralstelle, Waffen-SS and SS-Obershschnitte.
T-354/623/000073. Cited in Weingartner, Guard, 108.14.

15. Encircled, 38.

16. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 229.

17. Leon Degrelle campaign In Russia: The Waffen

SS on the Eastern Front, 175. "fascines'', a term De-
grelle uses for the wooden or metal bridging units the
Germans used to allow tanks to cross trench lines from
behind. Only 300 of the Belgians took positions in the
trench, the other two companies, along with the brigade
 194

11. M.N. Kozhevnikov, Komandovaniye i shtab WS

Sovetskoy Armii v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945
(Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 168. Cited in Hardesty, Phoenix.
The title means Soviet Army Air force command and staff
in the Great Patriotic War. This would mean that the
planes flew an average of ten sorties per day (if the
Germans could not manage to down a single plane. But as
losses took place, the planes would have to fly even more
missions per day to equal the 3,800 mark). The distance
and turn around times for the planes makes the average of
ten sorties per aircraft per day seem very improbable.
Either the Russians had more planes available to them
during these days, or the number of sorties became ex-
aggerated somehow, probably the same way that the number
of kills became exaggerated later. Wagner, Soviet, 234,
lists the 2,800 as the number of sorties flown for this
period. He also comments that the Germans flew only half
as many sorties. He states that the Soviet fliers en-
gaged in 120 air battles, shooting down 130 German
planes.

12. Ray Wagner, The Soviet Air Force in World War

II (New York: Doubleday & co., 1973), 233.

13. Wagner, Soviet, 236. German accounts of the

airlift operation differ greatly from the Soviet ac-
counts. The Soviets would have been trying to impress
Stalin, and therefore would inflate their kill figures.
The German sources might have been trying to cover up the
extent of their loss, but, the fact that they met their
transport goals (discussed later) seems to somewhat dis-
prove the Soviet numbers. If so many planes had been
lost, the Germans would have had serious trouble supply-
ing the pocket.

14. U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication.

Microcopy No. T-354. Miscellaneous SS Records: Ein-
wanderezantralstelle, Waffen-SS and SS-Obershschnitte.
T-354/623/000073. Cited in Weingartner, Guard, 108.14.

15. Encircled, 38.

16. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 229.

17. Leon Degrelle Campaign In Russia: The Waffen

SS on the Eastern Front, 175. "fascines", a term De-
grelle uses for the wooden or metal bridging units the
Germans used to allow tanks to cross trench lines from
behind. Only 300 of the Belgians took positions in the
trench, the other two companies, along with the brigade
 195

artillery and support sections retreated towards Korsun

with the rest of the German forces.

18. Strassner, Volunteers, 140.

19. Earl Ziemke Stalingrad to Berlin: The German

Defeat in the East (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army), 232. Hitler had awarded von
Paulus and his officers awards for bravery. He had also
promoted von Paulus to Field Marshal. No German Field
Marshal had ever surrendered his command on the field of
battle. See von Manstein, Victories, 364.
20. Degrelle, Campaign, 175-176.

21. Ibid, 177-178.

22. Von Manstein, Victories, 516.

23. Ibid, 516.

24. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 231.

25. Degrelle, Campaign, 164-165.

26. Degrelle, Campaign, 165.

27. Ibid, 165.

28. D. Fritz Morzik German Air Force Airlift Oper-

ations (New York: Department of the Army Arno Press,
1962), 222. The supply operations with the air dropped
canisters could not begin immediately. The parachutes
and canisters became available a few days after the air-
port at Korsun became unusable. In order to guarantee
the success of the drops, the canisters had to be dropped
from a low altitude. This caused the loss of several
aircraft, damage to many others, and the loss of many
crew members due to deaths and injury.

29. Degrelle, Campaign, 178.

30. Ibid, 178-179.

31. Ibid, 179 .

32. Der Kessel von Tscherkassy, (Hanover, Germany:

Trupenkameradschaft Wiking, 1963), np. Reprinted in
Strassner, Volunteers, 137. Stemmermann received no word
at this time as to when the proper time to break out
 196

would arrive. The High Command had set dates for the be-
ginning of the breakout as early as February 1, but kept
moving the date back as the relief efforts ran into prob-
lems due to the Russians, but mainly due to the weather.

33. Strassner, Volunteers, 137.

34. Werthen, Sixteenth, 199.

35. Werthen, sixteenth, 199.

36. Ibid, 199.

37. Encircled, 38.

38. Degrelle, Campaign, 180.

39. Ibid, 180-181.

40. Strassner, Volunteers, 137. The casualty

figures for six days of heavy fighting show how rela-
tively few losses this group suffered during the break-
out. This company provided security for the right flank
of the division. See also Degrelle, Campaign, 190.
Sternmermann ordered the Nordland Regiment to hold Ambru-
sino as the rear guard for his group as they moved out of
Korsun on the night of February 12, 1944.

41. Degrelle, Campaign, 186.

42. Ibid, 186-187.

43. Ibid, 186-187. The Belgians who retook the

line of the Nordland Regiment were made up of ex-artil-
lery men, and the truck drivers whose trucks could no
longer move through the mud. These men had lost their
heavy guns during the first few days of the thaw, because
the Germans had no tractors powerful enough to pull them
through the mud. Degrelle gives no indication as to the
number of prisoners the Wallonien Brigade took during
this action, but states that his group retreated from the
pocket with 200 prisoners in tow.

44. Werth, Russia, 774. Gorodische did fall to the

Russians on February 9, as they claimed. However, the
Germans abandoned Korsun after the airfield became un-
usable, and to make their way out of the pocket. The
Russian claim of the destruction of the relief forces is
an outright lie.
 197

45. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 232.

46. Ibid, 232.

47. Werthen, Sixteenth, 200-201. Hitler released

this division only after von Vormann reported that he
could no longer carry out offensive operations. The
Eleventh Panzer Corps had then fought through the mud
from the Bug River, in order to take part in the attacks.

48. Ibid, 201.

49. Ibid, 232-233.

50. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 233. Baeke began with 85

tanks. Many of his tanks were in the German repair yards
though, awaiting treads and wheels, which they lost in
the deep mud. During the relief effort, his unit re-
ported the destruction of 400 enemy tanks. They probably
destroyed less, but the number grew due to errors in ac-
counting kills during the heat of battle. Several tanks
joined Baeke after he forded the Gniloy Tikich, and more
became operational during the drive back to the German
lines.

51. Encircled, 38.

52. Degrelle, Campaign, 190-191.

53. Ibid, 191. Most of Ambrusino was ablaze al-

ready, due to the heavy fighting in the area. The Rus-
sians had also deliberately fired certain houses to cause
trouble for the Nordland Regiment. The commander of
Nordland had received orders to leave nothing of any
value to the Russians, so he fired the last of the homes.
Most of the villagers had already retreated towards one
side or the other. In fact, many villagers within the
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket followed the Germans in their
retreat, fearing impressment into the Russian army, or
reprisals at the hands of the Asian Russians, because
they looked rather European, and feared rape or death at
the hands of the more uncivilized troops.

54. Werthen, Sixteenth, 200.

55. Degrelle, Campaign, 191.

56. Morzik, Airlift, 224. Although Morzik paints a

very dismal picture for the chances of surviving an air
drop, the German losses (cited later) were very minimal.
 198

Many of the planes took damage during their supply drops,

but most survived to fly again.

57. Encircled, 193.

58. Ibid, 192. According to Degrelle, and to the

historical society of the Wiking Division, Gille greatly
inspired the men under his command. According to them,
his presence decided the outcome of this battle.

59. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 233.

60. Werthen, Sixteenth, 201.

61. Werthen, Sixteenth, 202.

62. Ibid, 233.

63. Degrelle, Campaign, 193-194. This action, as

well as others take on February 15 served to take Group
Stemmermann closer to the southwest corner of the pocket.
stemmermann spent the days of February 14 and 15 consoli-
dating his troops in the southwest corner of the pocket,
in order to launch his attack from the closest point to
Hill 239.

64. Morzik, Airlift, 224.

65. Ibid, 224.

66. Von Hardesty Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet

Air Power. 1941-1945 (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian In-
stitutuion Press, 1982}, 185.

67. Wagner, Soviet, 236.

68. Wagner, Soviet, 237.

69. Degrelle, Campaign, 203.

70. Encircled, 24.

71. Werthen, Sixteenth, 200.

72. Degrelle, Campaign, 195.

73. Strassner, Volunteers, 137. Das Reich just

appears in Strassner's book, and in Degrelle's memoirs.
See Degrelle, Campaign, 196. Das Reich was not among the
divisions of Group Stemmermann, and was not mentioned in
 199

the divisions of the relief attempts. Das Reich was sta-

tioned with the Panzer Grenadier Division Gross Deutsch-
land in the lines of Army Group South near Novo-Buda
before the Russians broke through the German lines. Das
Reich probably helped support the 198th Division which
held the flanks of the Third Panzer Corps during the re-
lief attempt.

74. Degrelle Campaign, 195-196.

75. Ibid, 199-200.

76. Ibid, 200-201. An explosive bullet tore a gap-

ing hole in Lippert's chest, killing him as he entered an
enemy occupied house. His men buried him in the house,
and retreated back to their lines. Later during the
night, a group of Belgians went back to the house and re-
trieved the body of their commander. They carried the
corpse of their commander with them as they broke out of
the pocket, and buried him in Belgium.

77. Ibid, 199. This was one of the first type of

panzerfaust. In order to destroy a tank, the man needed
to close to within a few meters of the tank and shoot for
one of the vulnerable points (the treads, gas tank or am-
munition storage). The rocket shot a flame four to five
meters out of the rear of the weapon, which would carbon-
ize anything in the path of the flame. The weapon could
not be used in a trench for the fear that the flame would
bounce off the wall of the trench, and in Degrelle's
words, "carbonize" the user.

78. Ibid, 202-203.

79. Strassner, Volunteers, 144.

80. Degrelle, Campaign, 201-202. At this point,

the pocket measured sixty square kilometers.

81. Werthen, Sixteenth, 202.

 200

CHAPTER V

THE BREAKOUT

1. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Exoer-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 38.

2. Ibid, 38.

3. Ibid, 26. Stemmermann issued this order orally,

and went over each phase of the order with the commander
effected by the plans. He wanted to make sure the nobody
got left behind, and that each commander knew the break-
out plan in case communications broke down among Group
Stemmermann.

4. Ibid, 27.

5. Ibid, 25. Lieb called strictly for volunteers

among the medical staff and doctors to stay with the
wounded. He received more than enough volunteers, even
though volunteering meant surrendering to the Russians,
and possibly spending the rest of the war in captivity.

6. D. Fritz Morzik, German Air Force Airlift Oper-

ations (New York: Department of the Army, Arno Press,
1962), 224.

7. Encircled, 25.

8. Ibid, 224.

9. Earl Ziemke Stalingrad to Berlin: The German De-

feat in the East (Washington D.C.: Center of Military His-
tory United States Army, 1968), 234.

10. Wolfgang Werthen, Geschichte Der 16. Panzer Di-

vision (Bad Nauheim, Germany: Verlag Hans-Henning Podzun,
1958), 202.

11. Ibid, 203.

12. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 234.

13. Encircled, 38.

14. Ibid, 38.

 201

15. Leon Degrelle, Campaign in Russia: The Waffen

ss on the Eastern Front (Torrance, California: Institute
for Historical Review, 1985}, 207.

16. Erich von Manstein Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency co., 1958), 516-517.

17. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 234.

18. James Weingartner, Hitler's Guard: Inside the

Fuhrer's Personal SS Force (New York: Berkley Books,
1974}, 107.

19. Werthen, Sixteenth, 203.

20. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers: 5th ss

Panzer Division Wiking (Winnipeg: JJ Federowicz, 1968},
145.

21. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 234.

22. Encircled, 27. Lieb wrote these entries in his

personal diary after the breakout from the pocket suc-
ceeded. He wrote trusting to his memory, and the mem-
ories of the other officers. The German officers pre-
paring this pamphlet copied his exact words from the
diary.

23. Ibid, 27.

24. Ibid, 28-29.

25. Ibid, 29.

26. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 234-235.

27. Ibid, 235.

28. Encircled, 29. Lieb commanded the tanks of the

108th Grenadier Regiment of the Fourteenth Panzer Division
which had broken into the pocket during Hube's attempt to
relieve Group Stemmermann. The parts of the Wiking Divi-
sion that appeared were the regiment which Gille led south
to avoid the Russians around Dzhurzhentsy.

29. Ibid, 28. The men of Heavy Panzer Regiment

Baeke and the Leibstandarte had captured a bridge in Lis-
syanka that led across the Gniloy Tikich. The Germans
would have had a much easier time if they could have
crossed the bridge in Lissyanka under the protection of
 202

Third Panzer Corps, and the Russians knew this, and

wanted to make as much trouble for the Germans as pos-
sible.

30. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 235.

31. Ibid, 235.

32. Degrelle, Campaign, 212-213. Degrelle describe

these men and likened them to Gods. He knew most of the
men well, (the Wallonien Brigade had been assigned to the
Wiking Division for quite some time) he had fought with
them during the life of the pocket, and in numerous other
battles throughout the Russian campaign.

33. Paul Carell, Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1939-1945 (New York: Doubleday, 1970), 380.

34. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 235.

35. Ibid, 235. This command post would have aided

a successful breakout and helped the men of Third Panzer
Corps gain control over his escaping troops.

36. Ibid, 235-236.

37. Encircled, 40.

38. Degrelle, 213.

39. Ibid, 215-216.

40. Ibid, 210-211. The Russians managed to destroy

many of the vehicles of Group Stemmermann, but the Ger-
mans destroyed all the slow ones, and the ones that bog-
ged down in the mud.

41. Encircled, 29. This contact must have been with

elements of Corps Detachment B. The other two groups were
still a few hours away from making contact with Third Pan-
zer Corps. Some units of Corps Detachment B actually
fought their way into Lissyanka, and crossed the bridge
held by First Panzer. These men reached freedom first,
not having to force the stream, but crossing through
friendly lines.

42. Encircled, 29.

43. Ibid, 29.

 203

44. Ibid, 29.

45. Ibid, 30.

46. Ibid, 30. All of the men of Group Stemmermann

who crossed the stream on their own without the aid of
Third Panzer Corps, must have come to the stream south of
Pochapintsy. They found it easier to cross the terrain
south of the town, rather then fight their way over the
heights north of Pochapintsy or through the town itself.

47. Ibid, 30.

48. Ibid, 30-31.

49. Ziemke, Stalingrad, 236-237.

50. Encircled, 31.

51. Strassner, Volunteers, 150.

52. Ibid, 150.

53. Ibid, 150.

54. Ibid, 150-151.

55. Degrelle, Cam2aign, 216.

56. Ibid, 216-217. Degrelle spoke German, but due

to the length of the talk he gave, he requested that the
German soldier translate for him to shorten the time
spent conveying the orders to the assembled men.

57. Ibid, 217.

58. Ibid, 217. Only a few hundred Germans charged

out of the woods, Degrelle managed to keep between 3,000
and 4,000 of the Germans with him under control, and in
the woods.

59. Ibid, 218.

60. Ibid, 219.

61. Ibid, 221.

62. Strassner, Volunteers, 151.

63. Degrelle, Cam2aign, 221.

 204

64. Encircled, 41.

65. Ibid, 31.

66. Ibid, 31.

67. Ibid, 31.

68. Ibid, 31.

69. Degrelle, Campaign, 222. ·

70. Ibid, 31.

71. Ibid, 224-225.

72. Werthen, sixteenth, 203-204.

73. Degrelle, Campaign, 223.

74. Ibid, 222-223.

75. Ibid, 223. If these numbers are correct, the

disparity between the numbers might be explained by the
fact that some of the German tanks that were destroyed
may have been towed into the German rear areas for repair
or parts.

76. Ibid, 223.

77. Ibid, 224.

78. Encircled, 31-32. Degrelle was taken mainly

because he led the Belgian "Rexist" Party in the years
before World War II. The Rexist Party shared many of the
same views as the Nazis. Hitler wished to save Degrelle
since he felt that Degrelle could help recruit more Bel-
gians to the Nazi cause.

79. Werthen, Sixteenth, 204.

80. Von Manstein, Victories, 517. Russian accounts

of the breakout state that the Germans killed their
wounded rather than leave them behind, citing the burnt
out trucks along the way as evidence of this. It is hard
to determine which side is telling the truth, but the
fact that the Germans did bring many wounded out of the
pocket lends credibility to their story.
 205

81. Ibid, 517. According to von Manstein's chief

of staff, Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, 35,000 men
escaped from the pocket. See F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer
Battles (New York: Ballentine Books, 1956), 328. Von
Mellenthin may be counting the wounded in his number.
Von Manstein only counted the men who went into the
reserve areas in Poland when assessing the breakthrough.
In all, around 4,825 men were flown out of the pocket,
and about 30,000 to 32,000 escaped during the breakout.
For the official German records, see Gefuhrt von Helmuth
Greiner and Percy Ernst Schramm, Oberkommandos, 856. The
official history of the O.K.W. lists -the number of
escapees at around 30,000.

82. Degrelle, Campaign, 222.

83. Von Manstein, Victories, 517.

84. Grigorii Deborin, The Second World War (Moscow:

Progress Publishers, nd), 346.

85. Alexander Werth Russia at War 1941-1945 (New

York: E. P. Dutton & co., 1964), 774. Considering the
fact that only one of the units at the time the pocket
closed contained tanks, and only the lead regiment of the
Fourteenth Panzer broke into the pocket, 500 tanks seems
quite a high number. This number might included the
tanks lost by the relief forces. If so, the assertion
that they destroyed 500 tanks seems more plausible.

86. Ibid, 776. Many German soldiers did not know

the truth about what happened at Cherkassy. See Peter
Neumann, The Black March, . Neumann escaped from the
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket with three companies of the
Wiking Division, before the Russians fully closed the
pocket. His group was sent to Poland before the
survivors from the pocket returned. He heard the Russian
side of the story from "Radio Free Germany", and from
Swiss newspapers. The news seemed to have no effect on
the fighting will of the German soldiers, and no large
scale desertions took place at the front. The German
papers never printed the truth about the losses, and many
Germans are still in the dark about the truth today.

87. Von Manstein, Victories, 518. For the numbers

on the Wallonien brigade, see Degrelle, Campaign, 222.
For a partial breakdown by formation, see Carell,
Scorched, 427, 430-431.

88. Werth, Campaign, 776-777.

 206

89. Von Manstein, Victories, 517.

 207

CHAPTER VI

IN RETROSPECT

1. Ray Wagner, The Soviet Air Force in World War II

(New York: Doubleday & co., 1973), 236.

2. D. Fritz Morzik, German Air Force Airlift Oper-

ations (New York: Department of the Army, Arno Press,
1962), 225. The Germans managed to repair all the planes
the Russians damaged. The Germans managed to fix many of
the planes during the airlift operation. According to
Hardesty, Phoenix, 186-187, the Russians claimed to have
downed 457 fascist aircraft. He claims these numbers
seem exaggerated considering the reduced inventory of
planes the Luftwaffe could field in 1944. The number of
aircraft include the thirty-seven transport planes and
any German fighters the Russians managed to shoot down
during the operation. The Germans probably deflated the
numbers of supply air craft lost, so the true number for
losses should come somewhere between the two numbers.

3. Ibid, 225. The tonnage of supplies delivered

into the pocket works out to just over 110 tons per day
(if the Luftwaffe flew the same number of missions each
day). The large number of missions flown the last night
of the existence of the pocket probably means that the
average per day supply came out to less than 110 tons.
The average of seventy tons per day was met during the
entire time the pocket existed.

4. Ibid, 225.

5. Wagner, Soviet, 236.

6. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 41.

7. Ibid, 41.

8. Ibid, 41.

9. Ibid, 41.

10. Ibid, 42.

 208

CHAPTER VII

PROMISES, THREATS, CANDY AND CIGARETTES

1. Bodo Scheurig, Free Germany (Middletown, Con-

necticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1969), 6.

2. Kurt von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten

Weltkriegs (Bonn: np, 1951), 81, a1, 95, 100, 102, 211,
218, 231, 287.

3. Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago: H.

Regency, 1958), 520. Von Manstein gives the strength of
Sixth Army as fifty two divisions. He has included in
his number the Fourth Panzer Army, and the Third Rumanian
Army, and two attached Rumanian divisions. Sixth Army
only contained twenty two divisions, but von Manstein ad-
ded the other formations to the numbers for Sixth Army to
show the total extent of the loss of men.

4. Gunter Toepke, Stalingrad: wie es wirklich war

(Stade: 1949), 42, 52. These numbers seem more correct
than any given. Around 270,000 soldiers were encircled
at Stalingrad, and a little over 30,000 sick and wounded
were flown out of the pocket. Von Manstein gives a much
lower number in his memoirs: von Manstein Victories,
328. Von Manstein states that only around 220,000 men
were lost at Stalingrad. This number seems a little low,
possibly due to the confusion associated with taking com-
mand on a new front. Von Manstein had just arrived from
a very successful campaign in the Crimea, and might not
have known exactly how many troops each unit at Stalin-
grad contained. The Russians put the number at over
200,000 dead and wounded plus the 90,000 prisoners, these
numbers are quite high, and possibly come from the desire
of the Russian commanders to look good in Stalin's eyes.
Toepke's numbers fall in the middle, and seem the most
unbiased of the three accounts.

5. Wolfgang Leonhard, Die revolution entlasst ihre

Kinder (Berlin: 1955), 120, 158, 297. Leonhard, and
other Germans sought refuge in Russia after the Nazi
takeover in Germany. Some were well known, such as
Theodore Plivier (author of many books, including The
Kaiser Goes the Generals Remain, an anti-war book about
the hardships Germany faced due to World War I. He had
been exiled because of his writings, and chose to go to
Russia). The Russians employed these political refugees
 209

in their propaganda campaign, but their efforts to under-

mine morale, and create deserters among the German ranks
failed.

6. Scheurig, Free, 32-33.

7. Erich Weinert, Das Nationalkomitee "Freies

Deutschland" 1949-1945 (Berlin: 1957), 29.

8. Scheurig, Free, 89.

9. Ibid, 89.

10. Weinert, Nationalkommittee, 26. The lack of

any talk of progress in further recruitment in the camps
probably means there was none. Neither of the groups
witnessed any large gains in membership, and it is never
examined whether the men joined the movement to better
their life in captivity, or if they really believed in
what they were doing. When the Russians liquidated other
pockets, such as Army Group Centre in White Russia, and
the one containing Army Group Southern Ukraine, men from
the pocket joined the two movements. Some letters sent
out by the League of German Officers in Captivity contain
as many as fifty signatures. Scheurig, Free, 252-255.
But, when taking into account the signatures, such as
those mentioned in note 53 below, some of the signatures
are doubtful.

11. Count Heinrich Graf von Einsiedel, Tagebuch der

Versuchung (Berlin: 1950), 88. This slogan does not
seem to have achieved the results the National Committee
and League of German Officers intended. The extensive
propaganda campaign was met with rejection and silence
along the whole German front.

12. Scheurig, Free, 142-143.

13. Scheurig, Free, 158-159.

14. Ibid, 145. General of Artillery Walther van

Seydlitz, Commanding General LI Army Corps. Seydlitz was
captured at Stalingrad, and helped found the League of
German Officers in Captivity. He led the League until
the end of the war.

15. Jesco van Puttkamer, Irrtum und Schuld (Berlin:

1948), 72. Shcherbakov went on to hint that Stalin wan-
ted Seydlitz to head the campaign against the men at
Cherkassy himself. Shcherbakov desired a successful
 210

propaganda campaign against the men in pocket, he wanted

an easy victory over the two German corps.

16. von Puttkamer, Irrtum, 72. Major Buchler com-

manded the first flak battalion of Flackregiment 241.
Captured at Stalingrad, he became a member of the Manag-
ing Board of the League of German Officers in Captivity.
Colonel Steidle commanded the 767th Panzer Grenadier
Regiment of the 376th Infantry Division. Also captured
at Stalingrad, he became the Vice President of the League
of German Officers.

17. Scheurig, Free, 146.

18. Heinrich Gerlach, Die verratene Armee (Munich:

1957), 274.

19. Degrelle, 227.

20. Ibid, 227-228.

21. Ibid, 165.

22. Ibid, 165.

23. Ibid, 165.

24. Nikolaus von Vormann, Tscherkassy (Heidelberg:

Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft, 1954), 112.

25. Leaflet from the National Committee for a Free

Germany and the League of German Officers in Captivity to
the men of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. From Truppen-
kameradschaft Wiking, reprinted in Strassner, Volunteers,
255.

26. Verrater-Das Nationalkomitee "Freies Deutsch-

land" as Keimzelle der sog. DDR (Munich: np, 1960), 258.
The title of this work in English: Traitor-The National
Committee "Free Germany" as germ cell of the so-called
German Democratic Republic. Just the title shows the un-
derlying hatred many of the (West) Germans felt towards
Communism, during and even after the war, and all those
Germans who joined communist groups. Probably an under-
ground publisher, who did not want to be know for print-
ing a book on such a dark subject.

27. Leaflet from the National Committee for a Free

Germany and the League of German Officers in Captivity to
the men of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. From Truppen-
 211

kameradschaft Wiking, reprinted in Strassner, Volunteers,

255.
28. Degrelle, Campaign, 189. von Vormann, Tscher-
kassy, 112.

29. Strassner, Volunteers, 255-256.

30. Verrater, 258.

31. Scheurig, Free, 132.

32. Degrelle, Campaign, 189.

33. Personal communication from Colonel General

Lieb to Field Marshal von Manstein. Reprinted in:
Scheurig, Free, 147.

34. Scheurig, Free, 147.

35. Personal communication from Colonel General

Lieb to Field Marshal von Manstein. Lieb's communication
told of the demands of the National Committee for a Free
Germany, and his own reservations about accepting the de-
mands.

36. Ibid, 147. See also Degrelle, Campaign, 189.

37. Operations of Encircled Forces: German Exper-

iences in Russia (Washington D.C.: Center of Military
History United States Army, 1982), 22. The information
in this pamphlet concerning the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket
comes directly from the personal diary of Colonel General
Lieb, the commander of the German Forty-Second Corps. He
carried the diary with him out of the pocket.

38. Encircled, 23.

39. Degrelle, Campaign, 189.

40. Peter Strassner, European Volunteers

41. Ultimatum from Marshal of the Soviet Union

Giorgy Zhukov to Colonel General Stemmermann. Truppen-
kameradschaft Wiking (Historical Society of the Viking SS
Division), reprinted in Strassner, Volunteers, 257-258.

42. von Manstein, Victories, 515.

43. Ibid, 189-190.

 212

44. Rolf Stoves, Die I. PanzerDivision, 1935-1945

(Dad Nauheim, Germany: np., 1961), 506. Although the
advance of the two groups had gone a ways, the two points
mentioned in the message were still far from the pocket.
Stemmermann did however know that the relief efforts had
not been destroyed as the Russians had told him, but that
they were still moving, and that the High Command still
held some hopes for a successful outcome to the · relief
attempts. The Russian message does not mention the Leib-
standarte, First Panzer, Fourteenth Panzer or Heavy Pan-
zer Regiment Baeke. Stemmermann knew these divisions
would be added to the attempt, and hoped that the might
of these renowned groups (Leibstandarte, First Panzer and
Heavy Panzer Regiment Baeke) would help the relief at-
tempt succeed. In his book, Degrelle tells the story of
why his Belgians held out. Degrelle, Campaign, 163. He
says that he and his Belgians believed that the relief
attempts could succeed right up till the end. He tells
of his ability to hear the roar of the guns (these were
the guns of the Third Panzer Corps, then only six miles
away, and the Russians that were fighting them). His men
never gave up hope, right up till the end, when the or-
ders came down to begin breaking out to the west.

45. Ibid, 141.

46. Letter from officers of League of German Offi-

cers in Captivity to the officers and soldiers of the
Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket. From Truppenkameradschaft
Wiking, reprinted in Strassner, Volunteers, 259.

47. Ibid, 259.

48. Encircled, 24.

49. Letter of February 12, 1944, from Colonel Gen-

eral Seydlitz of the League of German Officers in Cap-
tivity to Field Marshal von Manstein. Seydlitz had been
at Stalingrad, and knew how hard von Manstein had pushed
to relieve the German troops in the pocket, and that he
fought Hitler tooth and nail to get his permission to
allow von Paulus to breakout of the encirclement. The
letter goes on to state that the German people will pro-
nounce judgment over all responsible for the tragedy at
Cherkassy (Manstein included), and that history would
find them guilty of sacrificing an army for their belief
in National Socialism. The people of Germany would for-
get that von Manstein despised National Socialism, and he
would be blamed just like all the other top National Soc-
 213

ialists for the tragedy of German arms at Cherkassy.

50. Von Manstein, Victories, 515. Von Manstein

blamed the failure of the rescue attempt at Stalingrad as
being too little, too late. He believed that his eight
panzer divisions and the heavy panzer regiment would be
enough to break through the Russian lines. The caliber
of troops he had assembled also boosted his confidence,
the Liebstandarte, I Panzer and Heavy Panzer Regiment
Baeke were battle tried formations, _ that had proved their
worth many times.

51. Ibid, 256. Dr. Korfes headed the medical con-

tingent of sixth Army. Hitler did not trust him with a
field command, because he had "questionable" views of
anti-semitism. Korfes became one of the members of the
Board of the League of German Officers in Captivity.

52. Strassner, Volunteers, 140.

53. Letter from the League of German Officers in

Captivity to General Gille of the Wiking Division. Par-
tially reprinted in Scheurig, Free, 231-232. This let-
ter, in different copies, was sent out to all the troops
of the Wehrmacht fighting in Russia. The letter ends in
a plea to stop these actions because the League of German
Officers believed that Germany would lose the war, and
all the killing, raping, kidnapping, looting and burning
served to do was to anger the Russian people against the
Germans. This warning proved correct, the Russian troops
entering Germany behaved sometimes worse then their Ger-
man counterparts entering Russian towns and villages.

54. Scheurig, Free, 150.

55. Von Vormann, Tscherkassy, 123. The Russians

put the number of men surrendering as high as 18,000, see
Weinert, Nationalkomitee, 91. Weinert goes on to state
that he believes the men who surrendered did so just to
join the League of German Officers or the Free Germany
Committee. He offers only the fact that some of the cap-
tured Germans carried the leaflets and passes as evidence
for his assertion. The fact that the officers of the
League believed their only hope for an end to the war was
a putsch in Germany, Scheurig, Free, 158, shows that even
the officers of the League did not agree with Weinert.
Most believed they had failed, and looked for new ways to
bring an end to the war.
 214

56. Ibid, 24. Von Vormann goes on to tell that

most of the men who were captured during the escape from
the pocket died in Russian captivity. Even those who
were carrying the passes and leaflets were denied per-
mission to join either organization. He states that the
reason for this lay in the fact that they did not sur-
render as units, and were not accompanied by their of-
ficers.

57. Encircled, 32. Degrelle was flown out of the

pocket over any of the other generals, because he led the
Belgian Rexist Movement. The Rexists mirrored the Nazis
in many ways, and Hitler thought of Degrelle as a "Bro-
ther in Fascism". Hitler did not wish to see him fall
into Russian hands, fearing the propaganda value of De-
grelle's capture.

58. After the Russian "liquidation" of the Cher-

kassy-Korsun Pocket, the Free Germany movement began a
letter campaign designed to make the German troops on the
Eastern Front rethink their reasons for fighting. On
July 30, 1944, the League of German Officers in Captivity
drafted a letter to the soldiers in the German front
lines. Scheurig, Free, 245-247. The interesting thing
about this letter stems from the fact that Major General
Trowitz, the commanders of the Fifty Seventh infantry di-
vision signed it. He led the rear guard out of the Cher-
kassy-Korsun Pocket, and his unit went into the rear ar-
eas, and finally to Poland. Most of the units that es-
caped from the pocket saw no action until the late summer
or early fall of 1944. Although the Russians might have
captured him behind the German lines in Poland, I find
this highly doubtful. The League also signed the name of
Field Marshal von Paulus to many letters sent to the Ger-
man troops, leaving them to wonder at that fact that he
belonged to the League, but held no position of auth-
ority, but yet outranked all the other members of the
League. The use of names of men who had not been cap-
tured and the name of von Paulus seemed to take cred-
ibility away from the letters the League of German Of-
ficers in Captivity drafted.

59. Paul Carell, Scorched Earth: The Russo-German

War 1943-1944 (New York: Doubleday, ) , 433-434.

60. Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945 (New

York: E.P. Dutton & co., 1964), 774.

61. Ibid, 778.

 215

62. Ibid, 781.

63. Von Manstein, Victories, 517.

64. Werth, Russia, 781.

65. Von Manstein, Victories, 515. See also Gefuhrt

von Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst Schramm, Kriegstage-
buch des Oberkommandos der Wermacht (Wermachtfuhrungs-
stab0: 1940-1945 vol 4 (Frankfurt am Main, Germany:
Bernard & Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1961), 856. The
War Diary of the high command of the Wehrmacht tells that
around 50,000 men were surrounded and around 30,000 men
escaped from the pocket.

66. Carell, Scorched, 403. Carrell cites part of a

conversation involving the chief of General Koniev's com-
mand train, Colonel Kvach. In the conversation, the col-
onel states that Koniev has determined that the Cherkassy
Pocket contained the entire German Eighth Army under Gen-
eral Wohler. Koniev correctly estimated the strength of
Eighth Army at nine army armored divisions, an SS panzer
division, and an attached brigade. Koniev had wanted to
destroy Eighth Army for a long time, the army had caused
him trouble since he took command. Eighth Army contained
nine of the best armored divisions the Wehrmacht had to
offer, and the destruction of the ss formations would
have only added to his victory.

67. Werth, Russia, 776-777.

68. Carell, Scorched, 403.

69. Von Manstein, Victories, 515.

70. Carell, Scorched, 403. The fact that three

units with the strength of a division came under the com-
mand of a colonel shows a great loss in the officers of
the divisions involved. The three divisions barely equ-
aled the combat strength of one regular infantry divis-
ion.

71. Ibid, 403.

72. Von Manstein, Victories, 517.

73. Werth, Russia, 776. Werth claims that the Ger-

mans managed to extricate 2,000 to 3,000 men by air dur-
ing the existence of the pocket. He claims that the Ger-
man officers within the pocket abandoned their troops,
 216

and escaped on armored cars and tanks during a blizzard.

He tells that if the blizzard had let up, that none of
the Germans would have escaped from the encirclement.

74. Von Manstein, Victories, 518. For the numbers

on the Wallonien brigade, see Degrelle, campaign, 222.
For a partial breakdown by formation, see Carell,
Scorched, 427, 430-431.

75. Werth, Campaign, 776-777.

76. Strassner, Volunteers, 263-265.

77. Ibid, 265.

78. Ibid, 265.

79. Werth, Russia, 781.

80. Ibid, 265. Since most of the groups escaping

from the pocket brought their wounded with them, it seems
that the Russians fabricated this order.

81. Scheurig, Free, 152.

82. Von Einsiedel, Tagebuch, 86. Einsiedel de-

scribes some of the miseries he experienced during his
time in captivity before he joined the League of German
Officers in Captivity.

83. Ibid, 153-154.

84. Ibid, 132.

85. Weinert, Nationalkomitee, 91.

86. Von Vormann, Tscherkassy, 50.

87. Degrelle, Campaign, 228. Hitler decreed that

Degrelle could now raise a full armored division among
the Walloons.
 217

CHAPTER VIII

DEEP BATTLE AND BROAD FRONT CONCEPTS

1. Richard Simpkin, Deep Battle {London: Brassey's

Defense Publishers, 1987), 34.

2. Jonathon House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A

survey of 20th Century Tactic, Doc~rine, and Organiza-
tion. No. 2 Research Survey, Combat studies Institute.
(Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General
staff College, 1985), 65.

3. Simpkin, 40.

4. James J. Schneider, "The Rise of the Red Army

and its Path to Operational Art," Strategy and Tactics,
August 1991, 51.

5. Ibid, 52.

6. James J. Schneider, "The Rise of the Red Army

and its Path to Operational Art", Strategy and Tactics.
August 1991, 51. The army would require twenty-five to
twenty-eight trains which would haul 650-850 boxcars per
day. This number took into account only the food and am-
munition requirements of the armies, the forces would
truly require more trains to bring in replacement per-
sonnel, clothes, and other supplies needed to keep them
in the field.

7. Simpkin, Deep, 41.

8. Richard Simpkin, Red Armour {Oxford: Brassey's

Defense Publishers, 1984), 142.

9. Field Service Regulations of the Red Army, 1936

(Moscow: Commissariat of Defense, 1937). Translated
from Russian by Charles Berman.

10. Ibid, 83-84. Tukhachevskii's ideas mirror

those of Guderian, but his ideas were accepted practice,
long before Guderian's gained acceptance in Germany.
Guderian did not rely as heavily on artillery as Tuk-
hachevskii did though, he relied on the Stukas to clear
pockets of enemy resistance. His use of planes as ar-
tillery speeded up the German advance in France in 1940.
 218

11. Ibid, 84.

12. House, Warfare, 66.

13. Mikhail Tukhachevskii, Pokhod za Vislu, (Smo-

lensk: np., 1923}, 25. Cited in House, Warfare. His
book Campaign for the Vistula, talks of the tactics used
during World War I, in the Russian battles against the
Germans. He analyzes the strategy and tactics used, and
tells why the same principles are n_o t applicable to mod-
ern warfare.

14. V. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational

Art and Tactics (A Soviet View) (Washington D.C.: United
States Air Force Publishing, 1972}, 42. Cited in House,
Warfare.

15. House, Warfare, 68.

16. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Red Army Before Bar-

barossa," History of the Second World War, 22 (September,
1972}, 572.

17. John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Sta-

lin's War With Germany, Volume I (New York: Harper and
Row, 1975}, 19-20.

18. Ibid, 68.

19. John Milsom, Russian Tanks 1900-1970 (Har-

risburg: Stackpole Books, 1971}, 50.

20. Ibid, 50-51.

21. Erickson, 533.

22. Ibid, 533.

23. Charles Messenger, The Art of Blitzkrieg, (Lon-

don: Ian Allan Ltd., 1976}, 60.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

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219
 220

Von Vormann. Tscherkassy . Heidelberg, Germany:

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German Defense Tactics Against Russian Breakthroughs.

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House, Jonathon. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survev

of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization.
No. 2, Research survey, combat Studies Institute.
Fort Leavenworth, Ks: U.S. Army Command and General
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Morzik, D. Fritz. German Air force Airlift Operations.

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U.S. National Archives Microfilm Publication. Microcopy

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T-354/623/000073.
 221

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Secondary Sources

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Erickson, John. The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War

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Hardesty, Von. Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air

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Leonhard, Wolfgang. Die revolution entlasst ihre Kinder.

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 222

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Stade, Germany: np, 1949.
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Wagner, Ray. The Soviet Air Force In World War II. New
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Articles

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McTaggert, Patrick. "Soviet Encirclement Thwarted"

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Schneider, James. "The Rise of the Red Army and its Path
to Operational Art". Strategy and Tactics. (August
1991) : 49-55.
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