2021 BAR REVIEW CRIMINAL LAW

Revised Penal Code (Book One)

CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Republic Act (RA) No. 10951 sought, among others, to help indigent prisoners and individuals
accused of committing petty crimes. It also increased the fines for treason and the publication
of false news; and likewise increased the baseline amounts and values of property and damage
to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses committed in relation to
them.

This Court modifies the penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant pursuant to Republic Act
No. 10951, in view of the other details of the case, as established during trial. xxx Basic wisdom
underlies the adjustments made by Republic Act No. 10951. Imperative to maintaining an
effective and progressive penal system is the consideration of exigencies borne by the passage
of time. This includes the basic economic fact that property values are not constant. To insist on
basing penalties on values identified in the 1930s is not only anachronistic and archaic; it is unjust
and legally absurd to a moral fault. People vs. Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January
10, 2018

Republic Act (RA) No. 10951 specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive
effect.

Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. It likewise
specifically stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. Section 100 adds that this
retroactivity applies not only to persons accused of crimes but have yet to be meted their final
sentence, but also to those already “serving sentence by final judgment.” This retroactivity is in
keeping with the principle already contained in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that “[p]enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony.” Given
these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to adjust the penalty to be imposed on accused-
appellant. Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal
properties, it is critical to ensure that the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and
not merely on the Information or uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution.
Here, a perusal of the records leads to the conclusion that while the Regional Trial Court reduced
the value of the stolen jewelry from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 on the basis of the
complainant’s social standing, such determination is devoid of evidentiary basis. People vs.
Mejares, 850 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 225735 January 10, 2018

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 2021 BAR REVIEW CRIMINAL LAW
Revised Penal Code (Book One)
CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

The prime purpose of a criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others
from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished was
wrong. Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message
that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different
levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a
person’s will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater
or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality. People vs. Quintos, 740
SCRA 179, G.R. No. 199402 November 12, 2014

Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to
do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent.

“Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea.” Mens rea is defined as “the non-physical
element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the crime charged. Most
frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]” Crimes mala in se presuppose that the
person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not
require knowledge or criminal intent: In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a
punishable offense, for the person doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and
to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as “knowingly” and
“willfully” are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. In
other words, a person morally quite innocent and with every intention of being a law-abiding
citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penalties, if he does an act prohibited by these
statutes. ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 195956 March 11, 2015

All that accused-appellant had offered in defense were denial and alibi — defenses that
jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.

It is hardly a relief to accused-appellant that two (2) witnesses have testified in his defense. Even
their testimonies failed to definitively establish that accused-appellant neither raped nor killed
AAA. Defense witness Flordeliza Baron even admitted that during the critical time between 5:00
and 6:00 p.m. of May 4, 1999, when the rape and killing most likely took place, she was never
really aware of accused-appellant’s whereabouts. People vs. Baron, 779 SCRA 110, G.R. No.
213215 January 11, 2016

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 2021 BAR REVIEW CRIMINAL LAW
Revised Penal Code (Book One)
CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

A person invoking self-defense (or defense of a relative) admits to having inflicted harm upon
another person — a potential criminal act under Title Eight (Crimes Against Persons) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).

However, he or she makes the additional, defensive contention that even as he or she may have
inflicted harm, he or she nevertheless incurred no criminal liability as the looming danger upon
his or her own person (or that of his or her relative) justified the infliction of protective harm to
an erstwhile aggressor.

The accused’s admission enables the prosecution to dispense with discharging its burden of
proving that the accused performed acts, which would otherwise be the basis of criminal liability.
All that remains to be established is whether the accused were justified in acting as he or she did.
Velasquez vs. People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

Matters that Must be Established by the Accused In Order to Successfully Invoke Self-defense.

To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: “(1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-
defense.”

Defense of a relative under Article 11(2) of the Revised Penal Code requires the same first two
(2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third, “in case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein.” Velasquez vs. People,
820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

Justifying circumstance of defense of stranger

To properly invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, it must be shown that
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to repel the
victim were reasonably necessary, and that the accused was not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive. Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 224102 July 26,
2017

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CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying
circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.

The first requisite — unlawful aggression — is the condition sine qua non of self-defense and
defense of a relative: At the heart of the claim of self-defense is the presence of an unlawful
aggression committed against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have
a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the
other elements are present. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense. Velasquez vs. People,
820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

An attack showing the aggressor’s intention is enough to consider that unlawful aggression
was committed.

Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered as unlawful aggression for purposes of
invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301,
G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017

Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression — requires a
reasonable proportionality between the unlawful aggression and the defensive response: “[t]he
means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.” This is a matter that depends on the
circumstances: Reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the
reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend
upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury . . . As WE stated in the
case of People v. Lara, 48 Phil. 153 (1925), in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not
act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences. Velasquez
vs. People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

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Revised Penal Code (Book One)
CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

The state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or defense of a stranger
must be considered in determining whether a person’s means of repelling an aggressor were
reasonable.

In Jayme v. Repe, 314 SCRA 117 (1999), this Court explained: Consequently, we rule that
petitioner employed reasonable means to repel the sudden unprovoked attack of which he was
the victim. “Reasonable necessity does not mean absolute necessity. It must be assumed that
one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make
comparisons which can easily be made in the calmness of the home. It is not the indispensable
need but the rational necessity which the law requires. In each particular case, it is necessary to
judge the relative necessity, whether more or less imperative, in accordance with the rules of
rational logic. The defendant may be given the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether he
employed rational means to repel the aggression.” “The rule of reasonable necessity is not
ironclad in its application; it depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. One who is
assaulted does not have the time nor sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose
the weapon to be used. The reason is obvious, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does
not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and
when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the
courts to sanction the act and to hold the actor irresponsible in law for the consequences.”
Mariano vs. People, 833 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 224102 July 26, 2017

Lack of Sufficient Provocation

Lack of sufficient provocation — requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably

blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault.
This also requires a consideration of proportionality. As explained in People v. Boholst-Caballero,
61 SCRA 180 (1974), “[p]rovocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the aggression, that
is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the person claiming self-defense.” Velasquez vs.
People, 820 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 195021 March 15, 2017

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Elements of Passion and Obfuscation

To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the
accused must be able to prove the following elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the obfuscation

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CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during
which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. In People v. Lobino: It has been held
that “[T]here is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason.” “The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The
turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with
the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to
deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition of mind must
necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense.” Moreover, “the act producing the
obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
of time, during which the accused might have recovered his normal equanimity.” People vs.
Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015

The provocation and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable
length of time has passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to
reflect on the consequences of his or her actions.

There is no uniform rule on what constitutes “a considerable length of time.” xxx What is
important is that the accused has not yet “recovered his normal equanimity” when he committed
the crime. To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be
examined on a case-to-case basis. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18,
2015

This court has ruled that acts done in the spirit of revenge cannot be considered acts done with
passion and obfuscation.

In People v. Caber, 346 SCRA 166 (2000), Francisco Caber was seen chasing Teodoro Ramirez with
a bladed weapon, locally known as a pisao, and stabbing Ramirez twice, which resulted in his
death. Caber tried to argue that he stabbed Ramirez in a fit of passion and obfuscation and
alleged that Ramirez raped his wife three (3) days before the incident. This court rejected the
claim: Even assuming, however, that he really killed Ramirez because of passion or obfuscation
in order to avenge the wrong done to his wife by the victim, still he cannot be credited with this
circumstance as he would then have acted “in the spirit of revenge.” Furthermore, although
accused-appellant’s wife was allegedly raped by Ramirez on November 17, 1994, the stabbing
incident in question took place three days later or on November 20, 1994. Thus, the act which
was supposed to have caused passion or obfuscation on the part of the accused-appellant was
so far removed from the date of the stabbing. In United States v. Sarikala, the Court ruled that

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CHAIR’S CASES
Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

the lapse of more than 24 hours, reckoned from the commission of the act which produced the
passion or obfuscation up to the time of the commission of the felony, constituted a considerable
period of time after which such circumstance would no longer be deemed present. People vs.
Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015

Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity.

The accused’s act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the
acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to “save the authorities the trouble and expense that may
be incurred for his [or her] search and capture.” Based on the evidence on record, there is no
showing that petitioner’s act of submitting his person to the authorities was motivated by an
acknowledgement of his guilt. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCVRA 525, G.R. No. 204544 July 3, 2017

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in
the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not
be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for
all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. People vs. Feliciano,
Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused
were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an
aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance
is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the
information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of
the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity. People vs.
Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

As to evident premeditation, the following must concur to ascertain its presence: (1) [T]he time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. xxx In this case, the
prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that the acts of the assailants “were
preceded by a reflection that led to a determined plan to kill [Diego] after sufficient time had
passed from the [inception] of the plan.” “In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are
insufficient.” People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also
People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017

There is abuse of superior strength “whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s
and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.”

Abuse of superior strength means “to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.” Thus, in considering this aggravating
circumstance, this Court looks into “the age, size and strength of the parties.” Diego was 72 years
old when he was killed. His assailants, namely, Pastor, Rene Boy, and Junnel were respectively
50, 27, and 18 years old. Given the disparity in their ages, the assailants were physically stronger
than the victim. Additionally, the manner by which the assailants killed Diego reflects how they
“took advantage of their superior strength to weaken the defense and guarantee execution of
the offense.” It is, therefore, apparent that the victim “was besieged by [their] concerted acts.”
People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also Marasigan vs.
Fuentes, 778 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 201310 January 11, 2016

Treachery exists “when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.”

For treachery to be appreciated, two (2) elements should be proven: (1) [T]he employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Diego went
to Pastor’s house, believing in good faith that Pastor would just borrow his tricycle. Diego was
never forewarned that danger awaits his destination. He even assured Magdalena that he would
immediately return since he would be sending off his brother to Mindoro. Not expecting any peril
for his life, he proceeded to Pastor’s house “unarmed and alone.” People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA
514, G.R. No. 210802 August 9, 2017; see also People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159
March 18, 2015; People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017; People
vs. Ambatang, 822 SCRA 118, G.R. No. 205855 March 29, 2017

When treachery and abuse of superior strength coincides, abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery.

Given that there was neither any aggravating nor any mitigating circumstances that attended
Diego’s killing, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. People vs. Dimapilit, 836 SCRA 514, G.R. No. 210802
August 9, 2017

The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the sole basis in finding treachery. There must
be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or consciously adopted the means of
execution to ensure its success.

At the time of the incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Accused-appellant was standing
behind him. He already had the advantage of surprise with Gulane’s back turned. Gulane’s
advanced age and position would have ensured his death as it would have prevented him from
being able to retaliate. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015; see
also People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014; People vs. Magallano,
Jr., G.R. No. 220721 December 10, 2018

The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the
attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental.

A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on “clear and convincing evidence.” Such
evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its existence “cannot be presumed.”
As with the finding of guilt of the accused, “[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be
resolved in favor of the accused.” The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position
was merely accidental. The means adopted must have been a result of a determination to ensure
success in committing the crime. In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner
consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack to secure his unfair
advantage. The attack might “have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or
imagined provocation offered by the victim.” Cirera vs. People, 730 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 181843
July 14, 2014

A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of defense, is
treacherous.

Hubay, who was then unarmed, was casually outside of his residence when accused-appellant
suddenly stabbed him. There was no opportunity for Hubay to retaliate or to parry accused-
appellant’s attack. The facts also establish that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted the mode of attack. Accused-appellant lurked outside Hubay’s residence and waited for
him to appear. When Hubay emerged from the house, accused-appellant called him “Pare” while
walking towards him with a bladed weapon and immediately stabbed him. Although the attack
was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly,
leaving the victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. The second stabbing also
indicates treachery. At that time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a
defense. People vs. Ordona, 840 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 227863 September 20, 2017

ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused

must neither be “habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony.”

Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were
impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused’s capacity to understand the wrongful
nature of his or her acts. The bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission
of the crime is insufficient. There must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of
intoxication on the accused. There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that
petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount of
time had lapsed from petitioner’s drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which
he could have regained control of his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance in this case. Bacerra vs. People, 828 SCVRA 525, G.R. No. 204544 July 3,
2017

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Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen Handout No. 43

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

Conspiracy presupposes that “the act of one is the act of all.”

This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there
was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so. In any case, the
accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime
have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved
in the offense. People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission
of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that
“when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical
volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone.” Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his
own, “when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all
the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy.” The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held
that ... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the
act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible. Verily, the moment
it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each
of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. xxx People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 724 SCRA 148,
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014; see also Marasigan vs. Fuentes, 778 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 201310
January 11, 2016

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So long as the evidence presented show a “common design or purpose” to commit the crime,
all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one (1) or more of them
did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Proof of
conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence presented show a “common
design or purpose” to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as
coprincipals even if one or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of
the crime. For this reason, the fact of conspiracy “must be proven on the same quantum of
evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties,” that is, proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Benito vs. People, 750 SCRA 450, G.R. No. 204644 February 11, 2015

Conspiracy does not have to be established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused taken collectively.

Conspiracy happens “when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Furthermore, conspiracy does not have to be
established by direct evidence since it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused taken
collectively. However, it is necessary that a conspirator directly or indirectly contributes to the
execution of the crime committed through the performance of an overt act. The Sandiganbayan
found that there was a common design among the petitioners to make it appear that bidding
took place to effect the release of funds for the purchase of overpriced construction supplies and
materials. Granada vs. People, 818 SCRA 381, G.R. No. 184092, G.R. No. 186084, G.R. No.
186272, G.R. No. 186488, G.R. No. 18657 February 22, 2017

It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred.

The conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta to commit the crime
was also sufficiently established. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is a conspiracy “when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.” It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 406
SCRA 311 (2003): Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the
parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common
design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from
the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some

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complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Thus, the proof of conspiracy, which
is essentially hatched under cover and out of view of others than those directly concerned, is
perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. Escobar vs. People,
845 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 205576 November 20, 2017; see also People vs. Saunar, 836 SCRA 471,
G.R. No. 207396 August 9, 2017

Conspiracy does not require that all persons charged in the information be found guilty.

It only requires that those who were found guilty conspired in committing the crime. The
acquittal of some of the accused does not necessarily preclude the presence of conspiracy.
People vs. Feliciano, Jr., 799 SCRA 375, G.R. No. 196735 August 3, 2016

PENALTIES

Penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the individual, with due
regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the basic goal is “to uplift and redeem valuable human
material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness[.]” However, it has also been held that “penalties shall not be standardized but fitted
as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting
the social order.” Matalam vs. People, 788 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 221849-50 April 4, 2016

With the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346, the imposition of death was prohibited, and
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole should be imposed instead.

With all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the Court of Appeals was correct
in modifying the trial court’s decision. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
penalty to be imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of death was prohibited, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for

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parole should be imposed instead. People vs. Buclao, 726 SCRA 365, G.R. No. 208173 June 11,
2014

In People v. Gambao, 706 SCRA 508 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) took occasion to require an
increase in the minimum award of damages where the death penalty would have been
imposed, were it not for a law preventing it.

We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this
case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because
of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346: 1. P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. P100,000.00 as moral
damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and 3.
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall
be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but
is not imposable under present law. Thus, for the sheer heinousness and depravity of accused-
appellant’s acts of raping and drowning a seven-year-old girl to death and in accordance with
People v. Gambao, we exercise our judicial prerogative and increase the award of damages to
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. People vs. Baron, 779 SCRA 110, G.R. No. 213215 January 11, 2016

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the maximum term of the penalty that may be
imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On the other hand, the minimum term of the
penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for
the offense.

The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances
are considered. The imposable penalty for bigamy is prisión mayor. The penalty next lower to
that is prisión correccional. Prisión correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years; hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range. As for the maximum
penalty, it should be within the range of prisión mayor in its medium period, there being no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prisión mayor in its medium period ranges from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to 10 years. Vitangcol vs. People, 780 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016

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Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that “in all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.”

Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating circumstances of

minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua
under the law. xxx In view of the depravity of the acts committed by accused-appellant against
his daughter, we increase the amounts awarded to AAA, in accordance with jurisprudence.
People vs. Armodia, 826 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 210654 June 7, 2017

EXECUTION AND SERVICE

Preventive Imprisonment

In accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the time undergone by accused-
appellant under preventive imprisonment shall be credited to his service of sentence, provided
that he has given his written conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners. People vs. Oloverio, 754 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 211159 March 18, 2015

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

A compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the
extinction of criminal liability.

Despite paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Compromise Agreement, Solar Team cannot be deemed to
have violated it for failing to cause the dismissal of the criminal cases for estafa Tieng filed against
Co. It is settled that criminal liability cannot be the subject of a compromise. “[A] criminal case is
committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal
liability that the law imposes for its commission.” This explains why “a compromise is not one of
the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.” Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), and Benedicto v. Board
of Administrators, 207 SCRA 659 (1992), ironically cited by Team Image, are both clear that
compromise is encouraged only in civil cases. Chavez explicitly stated that “[w]hile a compromise
in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal
liability.” Team Image confused the Presidential Commission on Good Government’s power to
grant criminal immunity with the act of compromising criminal liability. Granting criminal
immunity is allowed because no criminal case has yet been filed in court, and therefore, there is

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no criminal liability to compromise. On the other hand, compromising criminal liability

presupposes that a criminal case has already been filed in court, the dismissal of which is already
based on the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the dismissal cannot be
automatic, regardless of the agreement between the private complainant and the accused to
dismiss the case. As discussed, the real offended party in a criminal case is the State and the
outcome of the criminal case cannot be based on the will of the private complainant who is a
mere witness for the prosecution. Team Image Entertainment, Inc. vs. Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc., 839 SCRA 501, G.R. No. 191652, G.R. No. 191658 September 13, 2017

Parameters of prescription

In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 470 SCRA 754 (2005), this Court defined the parameters of
prescription: [I]n resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should
be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. With regard
to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the offense
charged under City Ordinance 003-2000. Jadewell Parking System Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr., 706
SCRA 724, G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

The commencement of the prescription period of offenses is governed by Article 91 of the

Revised Penal Code.

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.—The period of prescription shall commence

to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall
commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The offense was
committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same
day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. Jadewell
Parking System Corporation vs. Lidua, Sr., 706 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013

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The death of accused extinguishes his criminal liability; Likewise, the civil liability of the accused
arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death.

Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.] Likewise, the civil liability of the accused
arising from his criminal liability is extinguished upon his death. In People v. Bayotas, 236 SCRA
239 (1994): 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore.” 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding
the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-
contracts d) . . . . e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate
of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above. Tuano vs. People, 804 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 205871 September 28, 2016

CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL CASES

Civil indemnity ex delicto

Civil indemnity ex delicto, as a form of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim,

attaches upon a finding of criminal liability because “[e]very person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.” People vs. Divinagracia, Sr., 833 SCRA 53, G.R. No. 207765 July 26, 2017

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"Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal." This notion is rooted in
the fundamental theory that when a criminal act is committed, two (2) different entities are
offended: (1) the State, whose law has been violated; and (2) the person directly injured by the
offender's act or omission.

As explained in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.: Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100,
The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a
person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the
political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what
gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. Guy vs. Tulfo, G.R. No.
213023 April 10, 2019

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