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G.R. No. 185647.  July 26, 2017.*

 
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., petitioner, vs. PETER C. DY,
JOHNNY C. DY and RAMON C. DY, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts;

Jurisdiction; Intra-Corporate Disputes; Section 5 of the Securities
Regulation Code transferred the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) over intra-corporate disputes to
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) designated by the Supreme Court
(SC) as commercial courts.—Section 5 of the Securities Regulation
Code transferred the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) over intra-corporate disputes to RTCs
designated by the Supreme Court as commercial courts. The
existence of an intra-corporate dispute must be properly alleged
in a complaint filed before a commercial court because the
allegations in the complaint determine a tribunal’s jurisdiction
over the subject matter. This means that the complaint must
make out a case that meets both the relationship and the nature
of the controversy tests.

_______________

*  THIRD DIVISION.

 
 
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534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Intra-Corporate Disputes;

Relationship Test; Under the relationship test, a dispute is intra-
corporate if it is: (1) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (2) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the state insofar as its franchise,
permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the
corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders,
partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves.—Under the relationship test, a
dispute is intra-corporate if it is: (1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the public; (2) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between
the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders,
partners, members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves.
Same; Same; Same; Nature of the Controversy Test; The
nature of the controversy test requires that the dispute itself must
be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation,
partnership or association.—The nature of the controversy test, on
the other hand, requires that the dispute itself must be
intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation,
partnership or association. In Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation v. Star Infrastructure Development Corporation, 635
SCRA 380 (2010), we explained that the controversy “must not
only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship,
but must also refer to the enforcement of the parties’ correlative
rights and obligations under the Corporation Code as well as the
internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation.”
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Injunction; Our jurisdiction
recognizes a civil action for injunction.—Our jurisdiction
recognizes a civil action for injunction. It is a suit brought for the
purpose of enjoining the defendant, perpetually or for a particular
time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his
or her compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. As
a civil action, it falls within the general jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Same; Same; Raffle of Cases; When an ordinary civil case is
mistakenly raffled to a branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, the remedy is to refer said case to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing and re-raffling among “all courts of the
same Regional Trial Court (RTC) (including its designated special
branches which,

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

by statute, are equally capable of exercising general

jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under
existing rules.”—That DTTI’s civil action for injunction was
raffled to, and heard by, an RTC sitting as a commercial court, is
more an issue of procedure than one of jurisdiction. Gonzales v.
GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.), 774 SCRA 242 (2015),
in fact, directs that when an ordinary civil case is mistakenly
raffled to a branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, the
remedy is to refer said case to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing and re-raffling among “all courts of the same RTC
(including its designated special branches which, by
statute, are equally capable of exercising general
jurisdiction same as regular branches), as provided for under
existing rules.” In any case, we find that respondents have waived
any objection on this issue when they submitted to the authority
of the RTC, asked for remedies therein, and participated in the
proceedings. They are not allowed to raise this question of
procedural propriety only on appeal.
Due Process; Right to Cross-Examination; In our adversarial
system, the right of a litigant to cross-examine a witness is
essential to the principle of due process.—No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Due process is fundamental in our judicial system. In court
litigation, it is upheld through the establishment of, and strict
adherence to, procedural rules that govern the behavior of party
litigants. In our adversarial system, the right of a litigant to
cross-examine a witness is essential to the principle of due
process. The right to cross-examine a witness does not imply,
however, an absolute command that an actual cross-examination
be had. The right is sufficiently protected when there is a real
opportunity to conduct a cross-examination. What our laws
proscribe is the absence of a chance to cross-examine.
Same; Same; The right to cross-examine a witness does not
imply an absolute command that an actual cross-examination be
had.—The waiver of the right to cross-examine a witness may be
expressed or implied. In these instances, no violation of the
constitutional right to due process is committed as the party
himself or herself has opted not to exercise the right. The validity
of a waiver of the right to cross-examine is recognized in our
jurisdiction. The difficulty, however, is in cases where the waiver

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of the right is only implied. An implied waiver may take various

forms. In ascertaining whether a

 
 

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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

party has waived his or her right to cross-examine a witness,

this Court has identified a general standard that depends, for its
application, on the surrounding facts of each particular case. In
Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 62
SCRA 258 (1975), this Court said that a party may be deemed to
have waived his or her right to cross-examine a witness when he
or she was given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine an
opposing witness but failed to do so for reasons attributable to
himself or herself alone.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Postponements; A party
moving for postponement should be in court on the day set for trial
if the motion is not acted upon favorably before that day.—Courts
possess the duty and authority to control the proceedings before
it. This includes the setting of trial dates and allowing
postponement of hearings. Lawyers, in turn, as officers of the
court, are duty-bound to obey and respect court orders. Hence,
when courts set trial dates and a lawyer finds that he or she may
not be able to attend the hearing, the proper course of action is to
move for the court to set the hearing at another date. However,
even when a motion for postponement is filed before the court,
there is never an obligation for the court to grant it. Far from
being a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a
privilege addressed to the court’s sound discretion. Hence, a party
filing such motion must not assume that it will be granted. In
Spouses Santos v. Alcazar, 718 SCRA 636 (2014), we reminded
that: “[A] party moving for postponement should be in court on
the day set for trial if the motion is not acted upon favorably
before that day. He has no right to rely either on the liberality of
the court or on the generosity of the adverse party.” As for a
lawyer who finds himself or herself in a predicament when he or
she has two hearings set on the same day, this Court has also
stated that he or she has no right to assume that the court will
grant him or her a continuance: The most ethical thing for him to
do in such a situation is to inform the prospective client of all the
facts so that the latter may retain another attorney. If the client,
having full knowledge of all the facts, still retain[s] the attorney,

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he assumes the risk himself and cannot complain of the

consequences if the postponement is denied and finds himself
without attorney to represent him at the trial.
Same; Same; Court Litigations; An adversarial system of
litigating cases is in place as it allows for opposing parties to
present their claims and adduce evidence.—Court litigation is a
search for

 
 
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VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 537

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

the truth. An adversarial system of litigating cases is in place

as it allows for opposing parties to present their claims and
adduce evidence. There is a recognized utility to this system as an
adversarial system sharpens the presentation of issues before the
courts. This, in turn, allows courts to ferret out the truth. Thus,
while our procedural rules allow instances when a case may be
decided after one party presents evidence ex parte, this Court has
nevertheless consistently reminded lower courts that orders
denying one party the right to present evidence must be rendered
with great caution.
Same; Evidence; Waiver of Right to Present Evidence; As in
the case of the right to cross-examine an opposing witness, the
right to present evidence may also be waived expressly or
impliedly.—As in the case of the right to cross-examine an
opposing witness, the right to present evidence may also be
waived expressly or impliedly. Further, similar to the right to
cross-examine a witness, an implied waiver of the right to present
evidence may take various forms. In Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
267 SCRA 543 (1997), this Court explained: [T]he postponement
of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a
party is a matter which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but
it is a discretion which must be exercised wisely, considering the
peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a
view to doing substantial justice. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied, citation omitted) In ascertaining the presence of this
implied waiver, this Court’s consistent rulings call for a balancing
of interests relating to the administration of justice and an
examination of the unique facts of each particular case.
Same; Same; Same; Courts must also keep in mind that it
must hold a party to have impliedly waived his or her right to
present evidence when he or she has been consistently given the
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right to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so without

any justifiable reason.—The interplay among the right to due
process, the value of speedy disposition of cases, and an
adversarial system as a mechanism to ferret out the truth goes
into the interests that courts must consider in holding a party to
have waived his or her right to present evidence. On one hand,
waiver orders aid in hastening litigation when it is apparent that
one party is attempting to delay a case or is unable to present
evidence for the trial. On the other hand, speed is not the
overarching goal in a trial. Paramount interests of justice should
not be sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency. Further,
courts must also keep in mind that it must hold a party to have

 
 

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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

impliedly waived his or her right to present evidence when he

or she has been consistently given the right to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so without any justifiable reason.
Courts must be wary of attempts to delay trial. Moreover, courts
have the duty to regulate the proceedings before it and must not
allow the trial of a case to depend on the negligence or dilatory
tactics of parties and their lawyers. It is in instances where the
courts have neutrally afforded the parties sufficient opportunity
to exercise their right to participate in the trial but persistently
failed to do so that courts are justified in holding them to have
waived their right to present evidence without violating the
essence of due process. Trials cannot be held hostage by the
whims of one party. All other parties involved have the right to a
speedy disposition of the case.
Due Process; While parties to a case possess the right to due
process, they have the correlative duty to exercise it properly and
not use it as an excuse for their negligence or deliberate tactics to
delay a case.—Trial courts successfully perform their duty to
afford a party his or her right to due process when he or she is
granted meaningful and sufficient opportunity to participate in
the proceedings. Trial courts, however, do not have the duty to
submit to unreasonable, dilatory, or negligent acts of the parties
in handling their own cases. While parties to a case possess the
right to due process, they have the correlative duty to exercise it
properly and not use it as an excuse for their negligence or
deliberate tactics to delay a case.

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PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Wilfred D. Asis for petitioner.
   Noriega, Bazar, Noriega Law Offices for respondents.

JARDELEZA, J.:
 
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.
(DTTI)

_______________

1  Rollo, pp. 4-225.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

seeks the reversal of the Decision2 dated December 17,

2008 (Decision) of the Court of Appeals (CA) which nullified
the Orders dated June 18, 20073 and May 26, 20084 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Butuan City.
DTTI is a domestic closed corporation owned by the Dy
siblings. It has its principal office at Concepcion St.,
Butuan City and a branch in Montilla Boulevard.5 Due to
certain disagreements relating to its management, DTTI
instituted an action for injunction against Peter C. Dy,
Johnny C. Dy and Ramon C. Dy (respondents) before the
RTC on September 7, 2004. This was docketed as an intra-
corporate case. Respondents, on the other hand, filed an
action for dissolution of the corporation.6
In its petition before the RTC, DTTI alleged that Johnny
C. Dy (Johnny), an employee in its Montilla branch, had
“squandered cash sales and stocks” from the branch either
for his personal benefit or that of Peter C. Dy (Peter) and
Ramon C. Dy (Ramon).7 To prevent further losses, DTTI
decided to close its Montilla branch and had the doors of
the branch store welded shut. This notwithstanding, DTTI
claimed that respondents forcibly opened the branch store
and have continuously deprived it of the use of the same.8
Both actions were raffled to Branch 33 of the RTC
which, incidentally, was also the designated commercial

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court. The RTC heard the cases jointly.9 The action for the
dissolution of

_______________

2   Id., at pp. 227-244, penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez,

with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez, concurring.
3  Id., at pp. 250-252.
4  Id., at pp. 349-353.
5  Id., at p. 228.
6  Id., at p. 1062.
7  Id., at p. 578.
8  Id., at pp. 578-580.
9  Id., at p. 16.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

the corporation was, however, eventually dismissed due to

the respondents’ failure to pay the proper docket fees.10
During the trial, DTTI presented Lorencio C. Dy
(Lorencio) as a witness on June 28, 2005. Lorencio’s cross-
examination by respondents did not push through on the
same date but was scheduled to continue on August 30,
2005.11 During this hearing, however, the scheduled cross-
examination did not proceed as Atty. Dollfuss R. Go (Atty.
Go), one of respondents’ counsels, could not make it due to
certain health problems. Atty. Clementino C. Rabor (Atty.
Rabor), respondents’ other counsel, moved in open court for
the postponement of Lorencio’s cross-examination. The
RTC granted this motion and issued an Order12 setting the
next hearing to September 22, 2005. Since respondents
were being represented by two lawyers, the RTC warned
that the scheduled cross-examination must proceed
regardless of Atty. Go’s absence, otherwise respondents’
right to cross-examine Lorencio will be deemed waived.13
The trial was further delayed when then Presiding
Judge Victor A. Tomaneng died and his cases ordered
transferred to the sala of Judge Eduardo S. Casals who set
the case for hearing on January 17, 2006.14 As the parties
needed to clarify with this Court whether the transfer of
cases included intra-corporate disputes, the hearing
scheduled on January 17, 2006 did not push through and
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Lorencio’s cross-examination by respondents twice

rescheduled to May 9, 200615 and October 16, 2006. When
Atty. Wilfredo Asis (Atty. Asis), counsel for DTTI, could not
make it to the October 16 hearing due to health problems,
the RTC granted DTTI’s motion for post-

_______________

10  Id., at p. 1068.
11  Id., at p. 542.
12  Id.
13  Id.
14  Rollo, p. 1065.
15  Id., at p. 543.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

ponement without objection from respondents’ counsel and

the hearing was again reset to March 5, 2007.16
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Asis marked three additional
documents in connection with Lorencio’s testimony. Atty.
Go thereafter moved in open court that he be given time to
study the documents and adequately prepare for the cross-
examination. The RTC thus issued an Order17 setting the
cross-examination on June 18, 2007.
On June 18, 2007, however, neither Atty. Go nor Atty.
Rabor attended the hearing for respondents. No motion for
postponement was also filed. Atty. Asis thus moved that
respondents be declared to have waived their right to cross-
examine Lorencio, who was DTTI’s last witness. He also
asked for 15 days within which to file his written formal
offer of evidence. The RTC granted this motion and issued
an Order18 which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby

considers Atty. Dollfuss R. Go to have waived his right to cross-
examine witness Lorencio C. Dy. Accordingly, Atty. Wilfred D.
Asis is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from today within
which to file his written formal offer of exhibits. The defendants
are given the same number of days reckoned from their receipt of
a copy of plaintiff’s formal offer of exhibits within which to file

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their comment or opposition thereto, after which the said formal

offer of exhibits shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.19

_______________

16  Id., at p. 544.
17  Id., at p. 546.
18  Id., at pp. 250-252.
19  Id., at p. 252.

 
 

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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

Respondents, through Atty. Go, filed a motion20 seeking

reconsideration of the Order. They argued that the RTC, in
declaring them to have waived their right to cross-examine
Lorencio, deprived them of their right to due process.
Respondents also alleged that Atty. Go had, on June 16,
2007 or two days prior to the June 18, 2007 hearing, called
Atty. Asis to inform him that he could not make it to the
hearing because he had to fly to Cebu for another case.
While Atty. Go recognized that he should have filed a
motion for continuance before the court, he explained that
he was only informed of the necessity of attending the
hearing in Cebu on June 16, 2007, a Saturday.21 Since
there was no more time to draft a motion, he called Atty.
Asis to ask him to accommodate another resetting of the
cross-examination. Atty. Go claims that Atty. Asis agreed
to his request over the phone. To his surprise, however,
Atty. Asis, during the June 18, 2007 hearing, instead
moved that respondents be declared to have waived their
right to cross-examine Lorencio.22
In an Order23 dated October 10, 2007, the RTC denied
respondents’ motion for reconsideration. It explained that,
as early as August 30, 2005, it had already warned
respondents that failure to conduct the cross-­examination
on the scheduled dates will lead to a declaration that they
have waived their right to cross-examine DTTI’s witness.
The RTC also found Atty. Go’s explanation insufficient,
stating that he should have filed a formal motion for
postponement before the court. Any alleged agreement
with DTTI’s counsel is irrelevant insofar as the court is
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concerned. The RTC also noted that Atty. Go could have

requested his co-counsel, Atty. Rabor, to appear before the
court and request for postponement. It then highlighted
that granting continuance belongs

_______________

20  Id., at pp. 685-699.

21  Id., at p. 695.
22  Id., at pp. 694-698.
23  Id., at pp. 647-652.

 
 
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VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 543

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

to the sole discretion of the court. Lawyers must not

assume that any motion for postponement will be granted.
Aggrieved, respondents, on November 16, 2007, went to
the CA through a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (certiorari case). Their
petition, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02051-MIN,
challenged the June 18, 2007 and October 10, 2007 Orders
of the RTC but did not include a prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order (TRO).24
On July 11, 2007, DTTI filed a motion for admission of
its exhibits.25 This was granted in an Order26 dated March
3, 2008. In the same Order, the RTC set respondents’
initial presentation of evidence on May 26, 2008.
Respondents filed a supplemental petition27 dated April
2, 2008 in the certiorari case challenging the RTC’s March
3, 2008 Order. This included an application for the
issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 26, 2008, the scheduled hearing proceeded but
neither respondents nor their counsel appeared. Instead,
they filed an urgent motion for continuance,28 arguing that
the presentation of evidence should be postponed because
of the pendency of the certiorari case before the CA. They
also highlighted that they have an existing application for
the issuance of a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction
which the CA has yet to resolve.
During this hearing, DTTI moved for the denial of the
urgent motion for continuance. It argued that Section 7,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires that the case must
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proceed within 10 days from the filing of a petition for

certiorari where no TRO or preliminary injunction has been
issued.

_______________

24  Id., at pp. 51, 227.

25  Id., at pp. 550-553.
26  Id., at pp. 279-283.
27  Id., at pp. 259-278.
28  Id., at pp. 925-928.

 
 
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544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

DTTI also stressed that the case is an action for injunction

which, by its very nature, requires speedy disposition. As
the case has already been pending for four years, it asked
the RTC to declare respondents to have waived their right
to present evidence. In an Order29 dated May 26, 2008, the
RTC held:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the motion for

continuance of the defendants is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The defendants are hereby declared to have waived their
right to present their evidence and that this case is now deemed
submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.30

 
On August 5, 2008, the CA denied the application for a
TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.31
On August 22, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision,32
ruling in DTTI’s favor. Basing its findings solely on
Lorencio’s unchallenged testimony and the documentary
evidence presented by DTTI, the RTC granted the
injunction and ordered respondents to pay compensatory
damages in the amount of P2,000,000 for loss of stocks,
P160,000/month for unrealized income from September
2004 until respondents vacate the building, P150,000 as
damages under Article 2205(2) of the Civil Code, P150,000
as nominal damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages,
P500,000 as attorney’s fees, and P500,000 as litigation
expenses.33
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On October 8, 2008, DTTI filed a motion for execution of

the RTC Decision.34 Respondents, on the other hand, filed a
second supplemental petition35 before the CA in the
certiorari

_______________

29  Id., at pp. 349-353.

30  Id., at p. 353.
31  Id., at p. 445.
32  Id., at pp. 430-454.
33  Id., at p. 454.
34  Id., at pp. 949-960.
35  Id., at pp. 321-348.

 
 

545

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 545

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

case to challenge the RTC Decision. This, however, was

ordered by the CA to be stricken off the records.36
In a Decision37 dated December 17, 2008, the CA held
that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 Orders. It held:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the twin Orders of 18

June 2007 and of 26 May 2008 and the Decision of 22 August
2008 rendered in Civil Case No. 1235 by public respondent are
hereby ordered ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the case
REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate
proceedings conformably with the above discussions.
SO ORDERED.38

 
DTTI thus filed this petition for review on certiorari39
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA’s
Decision. It insists that the RTC correctly declared as
waived respondents’ right to cross-examination and
presentation of evidence. DTTI argues that respondents not
only failed to file a written motion for postponement of the
scheduled cross-examination, the reason invoked to justify
the postponement was also not valid. Moreover, DTTI adds
that respondents were not entitled, as a matter of right, to
the grant of their motion for continuance. Similarly, DTTI

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argues that the RTC correctly found that respondents

waived their right to present evidence when they failed to
appear on the scheduled date.
In their comment,40 respondents challenge the
jurisdiction of the RTC in taking cognizance of the action
for injunction as an intra-corporate case. According to
respondents, since the action for injunction does not involve
an intra-corporate dis-

_______________

36  Id., at pp. 942-944.

37  Id., at pp. 227-244.
38  Id., at pp. 243-244.
39  Id., at pp. 4-225.
40  Id., at pp. 1060-1102.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

pute, the RTC, sitting as a commercial court, lacked

jurisdiction. Its decision on the case is therefore void.
Finally, respondents argue that the CA properly reversed
the RTC. They claim that they were deprived of their right
to due process when the RTC haphazardly declared them to
have waived the right to cross-examine DTTI’s witness and
to present their evidence.
The issues thus presented are:

Whether the action filed before the RTC was an

intra-corporate case properly heard by the RTC
acting as a special commercial court; and
Whether the CA was correct in reversing the orders
of the RTC and holding that respondents were
deprived of their right to present evidence and to
cross-examine DTTI’s witness.

I
 
Section 5 of the Securities Regulation Code41 transferred
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) over intra-corporate disputes to RTCs designated by
the Supreme Court as commercial courts.
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The existence of an intra-corporate dispute must be

properly alleged in a complaint filed before a commercial
court because the allegations in the complaint determine a
tribunal’s jurisdiction over the subject matter.42 This
means that the complaint must make out a case that meets
both the relationship and the nature of the controversy
tests.
Under the relationship test, a dispute is intra-corporate
if it is: (1) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (2) between the corporation,
partnership or asso-

_______________

41  Republic Act No. 8799 (2000).

42   See Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction,
Inc., G.R. No. 194024, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 461.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

ciation and the state insofar as its franchise, permit or

license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners,
members or officers; and (4) among the stockholders,
partners or associates themselves.43
The nature of the controversy test, on the other hand,
requires that the dispute itself must be intrinsically
connected with the regulation of the corporation,
partnership or association.44 In Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation v. Star Infrastructure
45
Development Corporation, we explained that the
controversy “must not only be rooted in the existence of an
intra-corporate relationship, but must also refer to the
enforcement of the parties’ correlative rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code as well as the
internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation.”46
Applying the foregoing tests, we agree with the CA that
the complaint filed by DTTI before the RTC was a civil
action for injunction and not an intra-corporate dispute.
First, a reading of the complaint will reveal that it
contains no allegation that the defendants therein
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(respondents in the present petition) are stockholders of

the corporation. Notably, the complaint even identified
Johnny as a DTTI employee. The complaint also does not
allege that the other defendants therein have acted in their
capacity as stockholders in depriving DTTI of access to its
Montilla branch.
Second, the nature of the controversy does not involve
an intra-corporate dispute. The complaint for injunction
asks the RTC to order respondents to cease from
controlling DTTI’s Montilla branch and allow DTTI to use
the same. In claiming

_______________

43  Abejo v. De la Cruz, No. L-63558, May 19, 1987, 149 SCRA 654, 671.
44  Lozano v. De los Santos, G.R. No. 125221, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA
452, 457-458.
45  G.R. No. 187872, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 380.
46  Id., at p. 391. Citation omitted.

 
 
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548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

that respondents illegally possessed the branch store, the

complaint does not allege that it arose out of a
disagreement between the stockholders. Rather, the
complaint states that Johnny, DTTI’s employee, colluded
with corespondents Peter and Ramon in forcibly opening
the Montilla branch store and preventing DTTI from using
the property.
Third, DTTI, in its complaint, asked the RTC to: (1)
prevent respondents from physically possessing its branch
store; and (2) allow DTTI to have access and control of the
building.47 Nowhere in its complaint did DTTI ask for a
determination of the parties’ rights under the Corporation
Code, its articles of incorporation or its bylaws.
Our jurisdiction recognizes a civil action for injunction.
It is a suit brought for the purpose of enjoining the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the
commission or continuance of a specific act, or his or her
compulsion to continue performance of a particular act.48
As a civil action, it falls within the general jurisdiction of
the RTCs.49
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Nevertheless, we disagree with respondents’ contention

that the RTC, sitting as a commercial court, had no
jurisdiction over the civil action for injunction filed by
DTTI. This matter has already been clarified by this Court
in Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.).50
There we held:

[T]he fact that a particular branch which has been designated as

a Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC’s general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of
statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 129. To restate,
the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely
intended as a procedural

_______________

47  Rollo, pp. 582-583.

48   Manila Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45961,
July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 138, 144-145.
49  BP Blg. 129, Sec. 19; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hong, G.R.
No. 161771, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 71, 78-79.
50  G.R. No. 202664, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 242.

 
 
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Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the

court’s exercise of jurisdiction. x  x  x The RTC’s general
jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by
an internal rule streamlining court procedure.51 (Emphasis and
italics in the original, citations omitted)

 
Thus, that DTTI’s civil action for injunction was raffled
to, and heard by, an RTC sitting as a commercial court, is
more an issue of procedure than one of jurisdiction.
Gonzales, in fact, directs that when an ordinary civil case is
mistakenly raffled to a branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, the remedy is to refer said case to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing and re-raffling among “all
courts of the same RTC (including its designated
special branches which, by statute, are equally
capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as
regular branches), as provided for under existing
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rules.”52 In any case, we find that respondents have waived

any objection on this issue when they submitted to the
authority of the RTC, asked for remedies therein, and
participated in the proceedings. They are not allowed to
raise this question of procedural propriety only on appeal.
 
II
 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.53 Due process is fundamental
in our judicial system. In court litigation, it is upheld
through the establishment of, and strict adherence to,
procedural rules that govern the behavior of party-
litigants.54 In our adversarial system, the right of a litigant
to cross-examine a witness is essential to the principle of
due process. The right to cross-

_______________

51  Id., at pp. 269-271.

52  Id., at p. 273. Emphasis supplied.
53  Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1.
54   Paredes v. Verano, G.R. No. 164375, October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA
264, 273.

 
 
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550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

examine a witness does not imply, however, an absolute

command that an actual cross-­examination be had. The
right is sufficiently protected when there is a real
opportunity to conduct a cross-examination. What our laws
proscribe is the absence of a chance to cross-examine.55
Further, the right to cross-­examination is a personal right
that may be waived. In Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
Manggagawang Pilipino,56 this Court explained:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing

witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature,
or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-
judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due
process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a

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renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a

party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of
the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.57
(Citations omitted)

 
The waiver of the right to cross-examine a witness may
be expressed or implied. In these instances, no violation of
the constitutional right to due process is committed as the
party himself or herself has opted not to exercise the right.
The validity of a waiver of the right to cross-examine is
recognized in our jurisdiction. The difficulty, however, is in
cases where the waiver of the right is only implied. An
implied waiver may take various forms. In ascertaining
whether a party has waived his or her right to cross-
examine a witness, this Court has identified a general
standard that depends, for its appli-

_______________

55  Equitable PCI Banking Corporation v. RCBC Capital Corporation,

G.R. No. 182248, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 858, 892.
56  No. L-38964, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 258.
57  Id., at pp. 263-265.

 
 
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cation, on the surrounding facts of each particular case. In

Savory Luncheonette, this Court said that a party may be
deemed to have waived his or her right to cross-examine a
witness when he or she was given an opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed
to do so for reasons attributable to himself or herself
alone.58
The petitioners in Savory Luncheonette questioned the
trial court’s order to strike out the testimony of its witness
due to the impossibility of conducting cross-examination (as
the witness has since died). Petitioners contended that
private respondents should be deemed to have waived their
right to cross-examine due to their repeated failure and

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refusal to cross­-examine despite all the time and

opportunities granted them.59 We set aside the trial court’s
order and held that “[b]y such repeated absence and lack of
preparation on the part of the counsel of private
respondents, the latter lost their right to examine the
witness x  x  x and they alone must suffer the
consequences.”60
This is also the tenor of our ruling in SCC Chemicals
Corporation v. Court of Appeals61 where this Court held
that petitioner’s repeated failure to conduct the cross-
examination despite the numerous opportunities granted to
it amounts to a waiver of the right to cross-examine the
opposing witness.62
This Court finds that the facts here are similar to the
facts in the foregoing cases. The RTC initially set
Lorencio’s cross-examination on August 30, 2005. It was
reset at respondents’

_______________

58  Id., at p. 265.
59  Id., at p. 267. Respondents in Savory Luncheonette were given five
opportunities to cross-examine the witness but they failed to do so due to
counsel’s absence or unpreparedness, notwithstanding the court’s
persistent admonition that further failure to cross-examine will be deemed
a waiver of this right.
60  Id.
61  G.R. No. 128538, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 70.
62  Id., at p. 76.

 
 

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552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

instance to September 22, 2005. Although they had at that

time two lawyers, one of whom was present during the
hearing, respondents still moved for postponement because
of their second counsel’s illness. In fact, as early as August
30, 2005, the RTC had warned respondents that further
failure to conduct the cross-examination by reason of Atty.
Go’s absence will warrant a ruling that they have waived
their right to cross-examine. On March 5, 2007, (the sixth
time the hearing was reset and third time at respondents’
instance), respondents’ counsel Atty. Go again asked for a
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resetting as he claimed that he needed to study three

additional documents marked by DTTI during the hearing.
The RTC granted this motion. However, on June 18, 2007,
the date set for the cross-examination, no counsel for
respondents appeared. Neither was a motion for
postponement filed.
We find that the RTC had consistently given
respondents several opportunities to cross-examine
Lorencio. In fact, the trial court had been lenient in
granting their motions for postponement even if, as this
Court finds, the reasons for such postponements were
unmeritorious. This notwithstanding, respondents still
failed to attend the hearing set on June 18, 2007 without
any explanation as to why no counsel appeared. To the
mind of this Court, there was never any insurmountable
obstacle to respondents’ conduct of Lorencio’s cross-
examination. On the contrary, their failure to actually
cross-examine Lorencio arose out of reasons attributable to
their counsel. Unfortunately for respondents, counsel’s
negligence binds the client.63
This Court further finds Atty. Go’s explanation
unmeritorious. He claims that he missed the June 18, 2007
hearing because he had to attend another hearing in Cebu.
He further claims that he called DTTI’s counsel, Atty. Asis,
to request that

_______________

63  Building Care Corporation/Leopard Security & Investigation Agency

v. Macaraeg, G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 643, 648.

 
 
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the hearing be moved to a later date, which, according to

him, Atty. Asis agreed to. He did not file a motion for
postponement. Instead, he merely hoped that the opposing
lawyer will make the motion for him on the day of the
hearing. In other words, Atty. Go simply relied on the
generosity of the RTC and Atty. Asis that his request for
postponement will be granted.
Jurisprudence is replete with standards as to the proper
course of action a lawyer must take in instances similar to
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this case.
Courts possess the duty and authority to control the
proceedings before it. This includes the setting of trial
dates and allowing postponement of hearings. Lawyers, in
turn, as officers of the court, are duty-bound to obey and
respect court orders. Hence, when courts set trial dates and
a lawyer finds that he or she may not be able to attend the
hearing, the proper course of action is to move for the court
to set the hearing at another date. However, even when a
motion for postponement is filed before the court, there is
never an obligation for the court to grant it. Far from being
a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a
privilege addressed to the court’s sound discretion. Hence,
a party filing such motion must not assume that it will be
granted. In Spouses Santos v. Alcazar,64 we reminded that:
“[A] party moving for postponement should be in court on
the day set for trial if the motion is not acted upon
favorably before that day. He has no right to rely either on
the liberality of the court or on the generosity of the
adverse party.”65 As for a lawyer who finds himself or
herself in a predicament when he or she has two hearings
set on the same day, this Court has also stated that he or
she has no right to assume that the court will grant him or
her a continuance:

The most ethical thing for him to do in such a situation is to

inform the prospective client of all the facts so that the latter may
retain another attorney. If the client, having

_______________

64  G.R. No. 183034, March 12, 2014, 718 SCRA 636.

65  Id., at p. 655. Citation omitted.

 
 
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554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

full knowledge of all the facts, still retain[s] the attorney, he

assumes the risk himself and cannot complain of the
consequences if the postponement is denied and finds himself
without attorney to represent him at the trial.66 (Citation omitted)

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The facts of this case and the relevant jurisprudence

warrant an affirmation of the trial court’s order that
respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
DTTI’s witness Lorencio. Atty. Go’s explanation for his
failure to attend the hearing, after years of persistent
resetting of the cross-examination, merits no consideration.
He cannot rely on his claim that he had allegedly called
Atty. Asis to agree to the resetting. As counsel for
respondents, he had, at the very least, the duty to file a
motion for postponement before the court instead of
shifting the burden to the opposing lawyer. Further, he had
no right to expect that the trial court will grant
postponement given that as early as August 30, 2005, it
had already warned respondents that further resetting of
the hearing on account of Atty. Go’s absence will lead to a
waiver of their right to cross-examine.
To repeat, there was never any insurmountable obstacle
to the conduct of the cross-examination. If respondents
failed to exercise their right, this failure arose out of
reasons purely attributable to them and their counsel.
Hence, in accordance with this Court’s consistent rulings,
the trial court correctly declared them to have waived their
right to cross-examination.
 
III
 
We also find that respondents have waived their right to
present evidence.

_______________

66  Id., at p. 656.

 
 
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VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 555

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

Court litigation is a search for the truth.67 An

adversarial system of litigating cases is in place as it allows
for opposing parties to present their claims and adduce
evidence. There is a recognized utility to this system as an
adversarial system sharpens the presentation of issues
before the courts. This, in turn, allows courts to ferret out
the truth. Thus, while our procedural rules allow instances
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when a case may be decided after one party presents

evidence ex parte, this Court has nevertheless consistently
reminded lower courts that orders denying one party the
right to present evidence must be rendered with great
caution.
As in the case of the right to cross-examine an opposing
witness, the right to present evidence may also be waived
expressly or impliedly. Further, similar to the right to
cross-examine a witness, an implied waiver of the right to
present evidence may take various forms. In Reyes v. Court
of Appeals,68 this Court explained:

[T]he postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation

of evidence of a party is a matter which lies in the discretion of
the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be exercised
wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.69
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citation omitted)

 
In ascertaining the presence of this implied waiver, this
Court’s consistent rulings call for a balancing of interests
relating to the administration of justice and an
examination of the unique facts of each particular case.
The interplay among the right to due process, the value
of speedy disposition of cases, and an adversarial system as
a

_______________

67   People v. Almendras, G.R. No. 145915, April 24, 2003, 401 SCRA
555, 574.
68  G.R. No. 111682, February 6, 1997, 267 SCRA 543.
69  Id., at p. 550.

 
 

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556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

mechanism to ferret out the truth goes into the interests

that courts must consider in holding a party to have waived
his or her right to present evidence. On one hand, waiver
orders aid in hastening litigation when it is apparent that
one party is attempting to delay a case or is unable to
present evidence for the trial. On the other hand, speed is
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not the overarching goal in a trial. Paramount interests of

justice should not be sacrificed for the sake of speed and
efficiency.70 Further, courts must also keep in mind that it
must hold a party to have impliedly waived his or her right
to present evidence when he or she has been consistently
given the right to participate in the proceedings but failed
to do so without any justifiable reason. Courts must be
wary of attempts to delay trial. Moreover, courts have the
duty to regulate the proceedings before it and must not
allow the trial of a case to depend on the negligence or
dilatory tactics of parties and their lawyers. It is in
instances where the courts have neutrally afforded the
parties sufficient opportunity to exercise their right to
participate in the trial but persistently failed to do so that
courts are justified in holding them to have waived their
right to present evidence without violating the essence of
due process. Trials cannot be held hostage by the whims of
one party. All other parties involved have the right to a
speedy disposition of the case.71
These interests serve as guideposts in ascertaining
whether the facts of each particular case require a finding
that a party has waived his or her right to present
evidence.
Thus, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,72 a civil case for
quieting of title, we affirmed the holding of the CA that
petitioners waived their right to present evidence. In this
case, the petitioners had filed three prior motions for
postponement on

_______________

70  Id., at p. 554.
71   See Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 163494, August 3, 2016, 799
SCRA 216; Palanca v. Guides, G.R. No. 146365, February 28, 2005, 452
SCRA 461; and Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28,
2004, 430 SCRA 353.
72  Bautista v. Court of Appeals, id.

 
 

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three separate occasions which the trial court granted. This

notwithstanding, petitioners still chose to file a fourth
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motion for postponement on the day of the hearing itself.

We agreed with the RTC that the petitioners waived their
right to present evidence. We explained:

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the

proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation
of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional
guarantee.73 (Citation omitted)

 
Trial courts successfully perform their duty to afford a
party his or her right to due process when he or she is
granted meaningful and sufficient opportunity to
participate in the proceedings. Trial courts, however, do not
have the duty to submit to unreasonable, dilatory, or
negligent acts of the parties in handling their own cases.
While parties to a case possess the right to due process,
they have the correlative duty to exercise it properly and
not use it as an excuse for their negligence or deliberate
tactics to delay a case.
In Bautista, we also explained that the grant of a motion
for postponement is not a matter of right. As we have said
earlier, neither a party nor his lawyer has the right to
expect that the filing of a motion for postponement will
suffice to prevent a hearing from pushing through. The
grant of a motion for postponement depends upon the
discretion of the court. The court has the power and duty to
control the proceedings before it, including the power to
deny a motion for postponement. Parties and their lawyers
must not assume that their motion for postponement will
be granted. Even when such a motion is filed, parties must
make sure that their lawyers appear and ready to proceed
with the hearing in the event that their motion for
postponement is denied.

_______________

73  Id., at p. 357.

 
 
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Applying these principles, we rule that the CA erred in

reversing the RTC’s Order declaring respondents to have
waived their right to present evidence.
As earlier shown, the proceedings before the RTC have
already been delayed several times due to repeated
postponements. In fact, the RTC was compelled to declare
that respondents had already waived their right to cross-
examination. Respondents challenged this Order through a
special civil action for certiorari before the CA. However,
since no injunction or TRO was issued by the CA, the RTC
proceeded with the trial and, during the course thereof,
admitted DTTI’s offer of exhibits on March 3, 2008.
Respondents again challenged this order by filing a
supplemental petition for certiorari dated April 2, 2008
before the CA. The RTC, which remained bound to proceed
with the case in the absence of a TRO or a writ of
injunction, set respondents’ presentation of evidence on
May 26, 2008.
We emphasize that the CA never issued a TRO or an
injunction to halt the proceedings before the RTC. Despite
this, respondents and their lawyers still chose not to
appear in the hearing set for presentation of their evidence.
Instead, they merely filed an urgent motion for
continuance, arguing that their presentation of evidence
should be postponed due to the pendency of the certiorari
case before the CA. There is, however, no law or rule
requiring the RTC not to proceed with the case because of
the pendency of a special civil action for certiorari involving
an interlocutory order issued by the trial court during the
course of the proceedings. On the contrary, Section 7, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is unequivocal. This provision
states:

Sec.  7.  Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.—

x x x
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case
within ten (10) days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with
a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order
or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the
public respon-

 
 
559

VOL. 832, JULY 26, 2017 559

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy

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dent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an

administrative charge.

 
Thus, as the motion for continuance put forward no
valid ground, and taking into consideration the clear
procedural requirement that the RTC must proceed with
the case as well as the fact that the proceedings have
already been unduly delayed, the RTC was warranted in
holding that respondents waived their right to present
evidence.
We find that respondents were given sufficient
opportunity to participate in the proceedings. The order
setting the case for hearing for the presentation of their
evidence was issued with enough time for respondents to
prepare. While they had the option to file a motion for
continuance as a matter of strategy, respondents had no
right to expect that it will be granted. Prudence should
have impelled respondents (and their lawyers) to appear
before the RTC prepared to present their evidence in the
event of a denial of their motion. This they failed to do. The
RTC thus cannot be faulted for refusing to allow the case to
be delayed any further. As in Gohu v. Gohu,74 the RTC’s
Order actually “upholds the court’s duty to ensure that
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed on the part of one party.”75
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The Decision dated December 17, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Butuan City dated August 22, 2008
and its Orders dated June 18, 2007 and May 26, 2008 are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Tijam and Reyes,

Jr., JJ., concur.

_______________

74  G.R. No. 128230, October 13, 2000, 343 SCRA 114.

75  Id., at p. 122.

 
 
560

560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Dy
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Petition granted, judgment reversed.

Notes.—A case, once raffled to a branch, belongs to that

branch unless re-raffled or otherwise transferred to
another branch in accordance with established procedure.
(Castro vs. Guevarra, 671 SCRA 425 [2012])
It is only when the officer claiming to have been illegally
dismissed is classified as such corporate officer that the
issue is deemed an intra-corporate dispute which falls
within the jurisdiction of the trial courts. (Cosare vs.
Broadcom Asia, Inc., 715 SCRA 534 [2014])
 
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