Morfe Vs Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968
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Gi NoMorfe Vs Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968
Uploaded by
Gi NoJesus P. Morfe Vs Amelito R. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, G.R. No.
L-20387, January 31, 1968
Facts:
Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and
employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public
service. One of the specific provisions of the said act is that every public officer, either within
thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of
January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his
income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid
for the next preceding calendar." Said provision was challenged for being violative of due
process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of an official is
violative of the petitioner’s constitutional rights.
Ruling:
No. The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.
It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public office must indeed
be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent
of all.
When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily
assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his
assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. While in the
attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there
must be a showing, clear, categorical, and undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns,
the statute allows. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a reproach. There was
therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. It cannot also be said that the
challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of
a person to privacy. It is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such compulsory
revelation, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private
sphere.
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom
from testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement. Nor does the
contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of
the non-incrimination clause. The court stresses that it is not aware of any constitutional
provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from
justice.
