100% found this document useful (1 vote)

206 views75 pages

BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (C1) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study Report

Uploaded by

Phani Kumar G S

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

100% found this document useful (1 vote)

206 views75 pages

BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (C1) Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study Report

Uploaded by

Phani Kumar G S

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

You are on page 1/ 75

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.

Mangala Development Pipeline Project

Bhogat Terminal Marine Facilities Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) Study Report Single Point
Mooring (SPM) Loading, Onshore and Offshore
Pipelines

CEIL DOCUMENT NUMBER: BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014

INTECSEA DOCUMENT NUMBER: 402020-00123-MX-REP-0014

19th Floor, Sunway Tower 2, No 86, Jalan Ampang, 50450 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Telephone: +60 3 2032 2488
Facsimile: +60 3 2032 2488
www.worleyparsons.com

© Copyright 2010 WorleyParsons

Page 1 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

CONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................6

1.1 ABBREVIATIONS.............................................................................................................7

2. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................8

3. OBJECTIVES .................................................................................................................10

4. SCOPE OF WORK .........................................................................................................11

5. PIPELINE FACILITY AND OPERATING CONDITION ...................................................12

6. STUDY METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................16

6.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................16

6.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria ................................................................................................17

7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION............................................................................................19

7.1 Threats ...........................................................................................................................19

7.2 Damage of Pipeline due to Dropped/ Dragged Anchor ...................................................20

7.2.1 Anchor Drag/ Drop .............................................................................................20

7.3 Damage to Pipeline due to Other Impacts ......................................................................20

7.3.1 Fishing Activity ...................................................................................................20

7.3.2 Dropped Objects ................................................................................................21

7.3.3 Wreckage / Sinking Ships ..................................................................................21

7.3.4 Excavation / Third Party Damage.......................................................................21

7.3.5 Ship collision ......................................................................................................21

7.4 Spontaneous Failure of Pipeline .....................................................................................22

7.4.1 Internal / External Corrosion...............................................................................22

7.4.2 Mechanical Defects............................................................................................22

7.5 Natural Hazards..............................................................................................................22

7.6 Operational Hazard ........................................................................................................23

8. FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT........................................................................................24

8.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................24

Page 3 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

8.2 Hole Size Distribution for Operating Steel Lines .............................................................25

8.3 Leak Frequency for Operating Pipelines and Flexible Hose ...........................................25

8.4 Leak Size Distribution .....................................................................................................26

8.5 Isolatable Sections .........................................................................................................26

8.6 Pipeline Parts Count and Leak Frequency Result...........................................................26

8.7 Main Contribution to Pipeline Loss of Containment ........................................................30

9. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .........................................................................................31

9.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................31

9.2 Consequences................................................................................................................31

9.2.1 Onshore Section Pipeline Leak ..........................................................................31

9.2.2 Offshore Section Pipeline – Oil rise through Water ............................................32

9.2.3 SPM – Oil leak on Water....................................................................................32

9.3 Pressurised Crude Oil Release.......................................................................................32

9.3.1 Release Location ...............................................................................................32

9.3.2 Release Rates ...................................................................................................32

9.3.3 Released Quantity .............................................................................................33

9.4 Pool Fire .........................................................................................................................33

9.5 Gas Plume Release........................................................................................................36

9.5.1 Flash Fire ...........................................................................................................37

10. EVENT TREE AND RISK ANALYSIS .............................................................................38

10.1 Ignition Probability......................................................................................................45

10.2 Immediate / Delayed Ignition......................................................................................46

10.3 Event Tree Branches .................................................................................................46

10.4 Summary of Outcome Frequencies............................................................................46

10.5 Risk Assessment........................................................................................................47

11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION....................................................................48

11.1 Conclusion .................................................................................................................48

11.2 Recommendation .......................................................................................................48

Page 4 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

12. REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................50

Appendices
APPENDIX 1 - ASSUMPTIONS REGISTER

APPENDIX 2 - FREQUENCY DATABASE

APPENDIX 3 - OIL SPILLS IN INDIAN WATER

APPENDIX 4 - EVENT TREE

Page 5 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cairn Energy India Pty. Ltd (CEIL) is planning to install twin 24-inch downstream pipelines as part of
the marine loading facilities. The proposed facility will include pipelines from onshore Bhogat COT,
offshore pipelines, a Pipeline End Manifold (PLEM), connecting subsea hoses, a Single Point
Mooring (SPM), floating hoses and reject water pipeline. The pipelines will be used to load tankers
with RJ Crude oil from COT once a week. As part of this project, a Quantitative Risk Assessment
(QRA) has been conducted for the subsea pipelines including the marine facilities by
WorleyParsons Services, Kuala Lumpur.

The study analyses threats for the facility damage, frequency assessment based on the historic
databases and consequence modelling based on the material handled. The frequency assessment
utilizes PARLOC (Ref: 2) and Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics (Ref: 3) databases to
complete a generic estimate of the leak frequency for the proposed pipeline and marine facilities
design.

The frequency analysis based on data provided in PARLOC (Ref: 2) finds that the dominant cause
contributing to pipeline damages are internal and external corrosion. This is followed by other
impacts from dropped objects / third party damages. The estimated failure frequencies due to
corrosion and impact are 3.85 x 10-3 per year and 2.82 x 10-3 per year respectively.

Pool fire is basically a fire burning above a pool of vaporizing hydrocarbon fuel. Since the RJ Crude
mainly consists of heavy hydrocarbons, potential spillage is not expected to result in pool fire if
release offshore (on water) and onshore leak from buried pipeline. Based on the RJ Crude
properties, on accidental release to atmosphere it will not result in to pool fire. Part of the loading
operation involves handling of LFO. In absence of Company specified LFO composition, a typical
LFO was used for the study purpose Based on this composition of LFO, accidental LFO release
may cause flash / pool fire. For small leaks flash/pool fire may be unlikely.

Although leaks due to fullbore release might result in a large sea pool and potential sea pool fire of
-7
LFO, the frequency of sea pool fire occurring is very low of the order of 1.73 x 10 per year. The
-6
total frequency for flash fire is also very low occurring at 1.56 x 10 per year.

Referring to the Risk Assessment Matrix (Section 6.2) and low probability of habitation along the
onshore and offshore facility, the overall fatality risk from the proposed pipeline facilities is very low
and considered tolerable.

In order to maintain the current level of risk and further improve the pipeline systems safety levels,
the following recommendations are made:

1. The risk of flash fire and subsequent pool fire can be minimised by using diesel or equivalent
Light Flushing Oil composition with very low light ends. This will help lowering the risk further
and make operation inherently safer.

Page 6 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

2. The exclusion zone around the SPM should be conspicuous by installing buoys around SPM.

3. Emergency response plan should be developed based on the consequences determined in this
report clearly identifying resources, personnel and communication requirements.

4. Hold back tugs which may required for the loading operations can be provided with means of
fire fighting depending on the quality of LFO being utilised for the operation. The fire fighting
provision should be in line with NFPA 1925: Standard on Marine Fire-Fighting Vessels.

1.1 ABBREVIATIONS
API American Petroleum Institute
CEIL Cairn Energy India Pty. Ltd
COT Crude Oil Tankfarm
CWC Concrete Weight Coating
FB Fullbore
FBE Fusion Bonded Epoxy
HAZOP Hazard Operability

HCRD HSE Hydrocarbon Release Database (UK HSE)

HDPE High Density Polyurethane
LCL1 Leighton Contractor India Ltd.

LFL Lower Flammability Limit

LFO Light Crude Flushing Oil
LFP Land Fall Point
MBC Marine Breakaway Coupling
NIO National Institute of Oceanography
PARLOC Pipeline and Riser Loss of Containment Database
PLEM Pipeline End Manifold
PUF Polyurethane Foam
QRA Quantified Risk Assessment
SEHMS Skin Effect Heat Management System
SPM Single Point Mooring
TPD Third Party Damage

Page 7 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

2. INTRODUCTION

Cairn Energy India Pty. Ltd. (‘CEIL’) is the operator of block RJ-ON-90/1 (the ‘Block’) in the State of
Rajasthan, India, and operates the Block on behalf of itself and its Joint Venture (JV) Partners Cairn
Energy Hydrocarbons Limited and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. The Block contains a number
of major oil discoveries, including the Mangala field, the largest onshore oil discovery in India since
1985. CEIL and its JV Partners are currently in the process of implementing a pipeline to transport
crude oil from the Block at Barmer, Rajasthan to a costal terminal facility.

The pipeline project involves an Oil Evacuation Pipeline and Gas Pipeline of approximately 675 km,
pumping / export terminals and related facilities (such as pumping stations, blending facilities,
pigging stations, metering skids, etc.) for transportation of at least 150, 000 barrels per day of crude
oil from the upstream process terminal at the Mangala field to the downstream terminal point as
designated.

The Marine Facilities for Bhogat Terminal shall comprise of pigging facilities at Crude Oil Tankfarm
(COT) located off Bhogat, 24” twin loading buried pipelines (onshore 8.0km and offshore 6km),
Pipeline End Manifold (PLEM), Single Point Mooring (SPM) System and other associated
components for crude oil loading from Bhogat Terminal to the export oil tankers;
recirculation/flushing system using Light Flushing Oil (LFO); and LFO import through SPM system
from marine tankers to Bhogat Terminal.

In order to support the operations at Bhogat COMPANY proposes to abstract saline ground water
from the aquifer and treat the water for further consumption. The rejects of the water treatment
system (Desalination Plant) will be discharged through a marine reject water pipeline system into an
outfall diffuser to the Arabian Sea.

INTECSEA has been appointed by Leighton Contractors India Pvt. Ltd. (‘LCL1’) as the design
engineering consultants to execute detailed engineering design of the twin 24-inch pipelines and a
reject water pipeline for the Mangala Development Pipeline Project. As part of the scope of work,
Worley Parsons is required to perform a Pipeline Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA).

The overall field layout is shown in Figure 1.1.

Page 8 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Figure 1.1 Overall Field Layout

Page 9 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

3. OBJECTIVES

This report presents the methodology and results of the onshore pipeline, subsea pipeline and
PLEM/SPM Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA).

The objective of the study is to assess the risks associated with the onshore, subsea pipeline
including PLEM and SPM facilities during the operational phase. The following task will be carried
out for the QRA Study:

• Identify the hazards associated with the pipeline facility based on historical data and project
specific hazards;

• Estimate the likelihood of identified scenarios based on historical statistical data available
for pipeline and associated facilities;

• Determine the effects of the consequences associated with loss of containment/ damage to
the pipeline facilities;

• Estimate the risk levels;

• Evaluate the risk against acceptable risk criteria; and

• Provide recommendations for control and mitigation measures, if required, based on the
highest risk contributors identified in the risk assessment.

Page 10 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

4. SCOPE OF WORK

The scope of work for the QRA covers the onshore pipeline, Land Fall Point (LFP) to offshore
subsea pipeline, PLEM, SPM facilities including floating hoses.

The facilities within the COT are outside the scope of this study. The QRA study assesses Loss of
Containment (LOC) and related safety aspects; environmental aspects are addressed separately.

Page 11 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

5. PIPELINE FACILITY AND OPERATING CONDITION

As part of the Mangala field development, twin 24-inch downstream pipelines are planned to be
installed to complete the proposed marine loading facilities in the Arabian Sea which shall comprise
of a Single Point Mooring (SPM) with a provision of a future SPM, a Pipeline End Manifold (PLEM),
connecting subsea hoses, floating hoses, the twin pipelines and a reject water pipeline. The
pipelines are divided into two (2) main sections i.e. onshore and offshore. The onshore section is
designated for pipelines traversing from the COT at Bhogat Terminal down to the LFP while
offshore section is designated for pipelines from LFP traversing to the subsea PLEM with estimated
distances of 8.0km and 6.0km respectively. The marine facilities scope of work covers from the
onshore hook-up point (at a distance of 600m upstream of the LFP) up to the floating hose system.

The twin pipelines will be electrically heated using Skin Effect Heat Management System (SEHMS)
and fully insulated to maintain the flow integrity of the crude oil by reducing its high viscosity. The
transported product will be sweet crude.

AFRAMAX tanker class with an assumed capacity of 700,000 bbl of oil is envisaged to be
evacuated in 24 hours period including the berthing/de-berthing time.

CEIL also plans to install water treatment plant to support its future project clusters. The plant with a
water intake capacity of approximately 1680 m3/day will discharge approximately 840 m3/day of
reject water offshore off Bhogat via reject water pipeline system. A diffuser system will disperse the
reject water into the surrounding offshore water and be at ambient at some distant away from the
discharge point.

A summary of pipeline characteristics and fluids properties are provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Pipeline Characteristics [Ref: 1]

Parameter 2 x 24 inch Pipelines

Design Life 25 years
Design Pressure 47.0 barg
Hydrotest Pressure 58.75 barg
Design Temperature 85.0°C
Design Flowrate 2 x 2318 m3/hr
Crude Inlet Temperature 70.0°C
Tanker Manifold Pressure 3.0 barg

The onshore and offshore pipelines are designed in accordance with DNV-OS-F101 standard
whereby the Location Class for Submarine Pipelines are classified as Zone 1. Near Shore and
PLEM area are classified as Zone 2 while Onshore Pipelines are classified as Zone 3.

Page 12 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Pipelines design takes into account earthquake loads as appropriate based on the relevant zone
specified in IS Code IS 1893:2002 Criteria for Earthquake resistant Design of Structure.

The onshore and offshore pipeline data are presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Pipelines Data [Ref: 1]

24 inch Crude Oil Pipeline

Description Units
Onshore Offshore

Material Grade - API-5L X65, PSL2

Wall Thickness mm 14.3

Internal Corrosion Allowance mm 1.2 1.5

Class Rating - 300# Class

Offshore pipelines are provided with weight coating for on bottom stability of the pipeline and
mechanical protection due to dropped objects. Fusion Bonded Epoxy is used as corrosion coating
while Polyurethane Foam is used for insulating the pipeline. External coatings details of the
pipelines are presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Typical Pipelines External Coating [Ref: 1]

Description Units FBE PUF HDPE CWC Note 1

Corrosion Insulation Concrete

Type of coating - Casing
Coating Coating Coating

Coating Thickness mm 0.5 90 5 100

Note 1: Onshore pipeline is without CWC

Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 present the composition and characteristics of the RJ Crude.

Page 13 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 5.4: RJ Crude Composition

Material Balance Year

Component Year 2 Year 4 Year 6 Year 17
(mol%) (mol%) (mol%) (mol %)
Nitrogen 0 0 0 0
CO2 0.113 0.114 0.098 0.022
H2S 0 0 0 0
Methane 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.016
Ethane 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.022
Propane 0.03 0.034 0.046 0.12
i-Butane 0.038 0.046 0.074 0.284
n-Butane 0.059 0.071 0.099 0.323
i-Pentane 0.064 0.079 0.125 0.553
n-Pentane 0.074 0.089 0.136 0.588
n-Hexane 0.163 0.196 0.304 1.517
n-Heptane 0.116 0.14 0.226 1.226
n-Octane 0.141 0.165 0.256 1.408
Benzene 0.015 0.019 0.031 0.161
Toluene 0.025 0.03 0.048 0.272
CycloPentane 0 0 0 0
Mcyclopentane 0.012 0.014 0.019 0.075
Cyclohexane 0.022 0.026 0.039 0.185
Mcyclohexane 0.013 0.016 0.025 0.133
H2O 6.951 6.938 6.893 6.460
NBP (0) 110°C – NBP (0) 943°C 92.109 91.972 91.529 86.594

Page 14 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 5.5: RJ Crude Characteristics [Ref: 1]

Parameters Units Value
Wax Content wt% 20-38
Crude API - 22-28 (Mangala~ 28)
12 at 90°C
20 – 23.3 at 70°C
Viscosity cP
22.6 – 27 at 65°C
93.5 -288 at 42°C
90°C - 840
65°C - 873
Density kg/m3
50°C - 879
30°C -887
65°C - 2185
Heat Capacity J/kg-°C 50°C -2130
30°C -2050
50-65 (Normal Operating -
Wax Appearance Temperature WAT °C
65)
Wax Dissolution Temperature WDT °C 70
Pour Point, untreated °C 40-45

As can be seen from the crude properties, the crude is highly viscous and is expected to form gel at
ambient conditions due to high pour point. There are no components within the crude oil which may
pose toxic hazard.

Page 15 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

6. STUDY METHODOLOGY

6.1 Overview
This section describes the methodology used in the pipeline risk assessment. The traditional
quantitative risk assessment methodology was employed to establish the risks. The risk
assessment seeks to address the following questions:

• What can happen?

• What are the effects of the event?

• How likely is the event going to occur?

The risk assessment methodology thus generally involves the following steps.

• System definition – this stage involves setting the scope and boundary limits of the study
and is defining the facilities layout, protection systems such that they can be used to
develop the risk model;

• Hazard identification – this is a key step in risk analysis. It is an important step in safety
studies. It involves identifying the various causes or events that have the potential to cause
a Major Accident Event e.g. gas release, fire, explosion, etc. Each cause/ event is then
developed into various possible outcomes;

• Frequency analysis – the likelihood of occurrence of the identified hazard or event is

estimated from historical data, taking into account location-specific and design-specific
details, and event trees;

• Consequence modelling – once the hazards have been identified, consequence modelling
involves the determination of the effects of such hazards happening. Estimation of
consequences is typically based on software modelling of the outcome events of the Major
Accident Event. However, consequences may be estimated qualitatively based on the
events identified.

• Risk integration – the frequencies and consequences of the various outcomes of the
identified hazard scenarios are integrated at this stage to determine the risk levels;

• Risk evaluation – risk criteria are used to assess the significance of the risks estimated.

Page 16 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

6.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria

In order to measure if the level of risk is acceptable or not, a risk acceptance criteria needs to be
defined.

Generally for onshore and offshore fixed hazardous installations tolerable risk levels are between
1x10-6 per year to upper limit of 1x10-3 per year, risk level above 1x10-3 per year is not acceptable to
the public outside the site boundary [Ref: 9]. These risk guidelines cannot be applied directly for
transport operations, in this case, pipeline transport. As transport operations extend over several
kilometres, they cannot be compared with risks from fixed installations which have a defined impact
zone.

Further for offshore pipelines, there is no specific individual risk criterion defined and used
worldwide. For the purpose of this assessment, in absence of Company Risk Assessment Matrix
(RAM), the matrix as defined below in Figure 6.1 is utilised to assess the risk.

Page 17 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Probability
A B C D E
Frequent/
SEVERITY People Asset Environment Improbable Unlikely Infrequent Occasional
Likely
1 in 100,000 1 in 10,000 1 in 1000 1 in 100
1 in 10 years
years years years years
Medium Medium High High High Risk
Multiple Widespread damage - Massive
CATASTROPHIC 5 fatalities total loss of production environmental
(10+) (>50MMUSD) damage in large area.
Single Low Medium Medium High High
Major effect to
fatality (1+)
Major damage/ Partial environment,
or
CRITICAL 4 shutdown (10 to extensive measures
permanent
50MMUSD) required for
total
restoration
disability.
Environmental Low Medium Medium Medium High
damage,
Major injury/
contamination
irreversible Major damage in one
MODERATE 3 affecting nearby
health area (2 to 10MMUSD)
facilities,
damage
spontaneous
recovery in long term
Serious damage to Low Low Medium Medium Medium
major component of Local environmental
MARGINAL 2 Minor injury.
equipment (0.5 to 2 damage
MMUSD)
Minor damage to Low Risk Low Low Low Medium
Illness/ First Minor effect to
NEGLIGIBLE 1 equipment
aid. environment
(<0.5MMUSD)

Figure 6.1 Typical Risk Assessment Matrix

Page 18 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

7. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Main hazard for the facilities under discussion is pressurised crude oil contained in the pipeline.

This section discusses possible threats / causes which may lead to accidental events i.e. Loss of
Containment and subsequent consequences.

The possible threats or causes leading to a loss of containment event in the pipeline are identified
based on the historical database and summarised below.

The most comprehensive database on pipeline failure data is PARLOC 2001 (Ref: 2) published by
the UK Health and Safety Executive which compiles failure data by incident causes, types, etc. The
latest update covers data up to year 2000, with a total pipeline length of 24,837 km and operating
experience of 328,858 km-years. Information recorded in this database has been obtained from
regulatory authorities concerned with the North Sea pipelines and operators in the UK, Dutch,
Norwegian and Danish sectors. Incidents to operating steel pipelines, flexible steel lines as well as
associated fittings are recorded.

Appendix 2 presents the causes of incidents to operating steel pipelines resulting in loss of
containment as recorded in the PARLOC data.

Though some details about spills in the Indian waters are available (Appendix 3), the type of
incidents, failure causes, leak sizes etc are not known which are required for the risk assessment.
Considering immense operating experience in the PARLOC database it is selected for the current
study. It may be noted that in absence of any site or region specific database, PARLOC provides
acceptable basis for the failure frequency and is utilized in the studies worldwide. For SPM piping
components, Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics database is utilized which provides failure
frequency for various pipework components encountered in offshore oil and gas industry.

7.1 Threats
The generic causes for loss of containment from the pipelines facilities are as follows:

• Dragged / Dropped anchor;

• Other Impacts – Trawl, dropped object, wreck and construction, excavation/third party
damage, potential impact to SPM by tanker collision;

• Spontaneous failures - Corrosion – Internal and external corrosion, Material defects;

• Natural hazards – earthquakes, ground movement, vibration and storm; and

• Others – Design errors whereby incorrect material of construction are used, inadequate
engineering analysis and inadequate specification of operating parameters.

2
Page 19 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

It is noted that pipeline failures due to design errors or mal-operation will be discussed and
designed out during the HAZOP study. Except dropped object, trawl and dragged anchor, the
threats are also applicable to onshore pipeline section and SPM. These causes for loss of
containment are discussed in the following section:

7.2 Damage of Pipeline due to Dropped/ Dragged Anchor

7.2.1 Anchor Drag/ Drop

Ships may drop and drag along the anchor due to accidental release of the anchor or loss of
position during adverse weather. If there is a subsea pipeline along the anchor drag path, it may
cause localised buckling or denting of the pipeline. On retrieval of the anchor, should the anchor be
hooked, lifting of the pipeline may be possible.

The pipeline and SPM facilities under study are not located near the port. Only the vessels
approaching SPM for loading / unloading will be moored to the SPM. Furthermore, the entire
offshore pipeline is buried and backfilled. Besides that, 500m around SPM is also treated as a
safety exclusion zone. Thus frequency of anchor drop which can potentially lead to pipeline damage
is considered very low.

7.3 Damage to Pipeline due to Other Impacts

7.3.1 Fishing Activity

There might be fishing activity along the pipeline mid-line section. Pipeline damage from fishing
gear can occur due to impact, snagging of fishing trawl door on the pipeline or a “pull over”
sequence. Impact loads mainly cause damage to the coating whilst pull over situations can cause
much higher loads, which could lead to damage of the pipeline itself.

CEIL has conducted route analysis studies considering environmental factors. Based on the field
study carried out by NIO, Goa in January 2008, it is reported that the proposed land fall and
terminal location does not contain environmentally sensitive areas such as national parks / marine
parks, sanctuaries, wildlife habitats and mangroves. It also does not include breeding and spawning
grounds of fish and other marine life, areas of outstanding natural beauty/ historically/ heritage
areas. The coastal area of Bhogat to Dwarka is a traditional fishing zone and gill-netting is fairly
active during the fishing season from September to May. [Ref: 4].

Based on this, the project area is not considered as active site using trawl gears for fishing.
Furthermore, the entire offshore pipeline is buried and backfilled. Therefore, frequency of trawl
impact is considered low.

2
Page 20 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

7.3.2 Dropped Objects

Other dropped objects from passing vessels may also damage the subsea pipeline. However, the
likelihood of dropped objects will be low as the facility is away from the nearby ports and no other
fixed offshore installations are located in the vicinity which may call for shipping movement.

7.3.3 Wreckage / Sinking Ships

Vessels sinking nearby the pipeline may cause major damage to the subsea pipeline. Severely
damaged vessels may stay within the shipping channel and then may sink onto the pipeline. All
sinking vessels that impact the subsea pipeline are assumed to result in major damage to the
pipeline (i.e. full bore rupture of pipeline).

Since the facility is not in proximity to the port or shipping lane, the frequency of impact by sinking
ship is considered low. The impact frequency in PARLOC includes sinking ship impacts.

The average water depth around the SPM is 30m. Loading of crude would be prohibited in typhoon/
storm conditions. It is expected that the tanker will sail away from the facility and shore in case of
weather not favourable to the operation. Furthermore, the offshore pipeline is buried. Thus, vessel
grounding affecting the pipeline is not considered a credible scenario.

7.3.4 Excavation / Third Party Damage

Third party interference due to work on other underground utilities, drilling for ground sampling,
construction work on adjoining areas, etc are one of the major contributors to the onshore pipeline
facilities.

The onshore segment of the pipeline passes through mainly wheat fields or barren land. There are
some road / river / creek crossings in the pipeline route. There are isolated dwellings / buildings
along the pipeline route. No rail crossings are observed across the pipeline. The pipeline will be
buried and protection as per the industry practices will be provided across various crossings.
Pipeline identification marker tape will also be provided to alert and prevent damage by third party.
Periodic line walk would also minimise potential third party activities which may harm health of the
buried pipeline. In addition, it is envisaged that Company will educate the nearby population on the
hazards of the pressurised hydrocarbon pipelines and incident reporting. Hence, although third
party damages are major percentage contributors towards pipeline damages, the absolute risk of
damage by third party to the onshore pipeline is considered low.

7.3.5 Ship collision

The tanker to be loaded will be moored to SPM. Changes in wind and surface current may cause
the tanker to ride over the SPM and cause damage to the SPM. In many ports where required, a
‘hold back’ tug is fixed to the stern of the vessel to keep it away from the buoy. Accurate wind and
surface current data also assist vessel pilots in predicting the movement of the tanker during oil

2
Page 21 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

loading/unloading operations. It is envisaged that for loading / unloading well established

procedures will be followed to avoid damage to SPM by ship impact.

There are no specific frequency data / incidents reports available for such incidents which may also
be interpreted as case occurrences of such incidents.

7.4 Spontaneous Failure of Pipeline

7.4.1 Internal / External Corrosion

Corrosion is a major contributor to pipeline failures. Corrosion can result due to the surroundings
the pipeline is in (external) and the material that the pipeline carries (internal). The 24” crude oil
pipeline is coated with 5mm Fusion Bonded Epoxy external corrosion protection coating [Ref: 1]. In
order to protect the pipeline against internal corrosion, it is designed with a corrosion allowance of
1.2mm for onshore section and 1.5mm for offshore section. The crude oil which is transported by
the pipeline is sweet crude. Therefore, the probability of internal corrosion causing pipeline failure is
low. However, pipeline loss of containment due to corrosion is included in the frequency analysis
based on the historic frequency.

7.4.2 Mechanical Defects

Mechanical defects such as material defect, weld failure, etc can result in mechanical failure and
subsequent loss of containment of the subsea pipeline. Strict method statements and stringent
procedures for pipeline material procurement, welding and hydro-testing should help mitigate
against such hazards. Nevertheless, loss of containment due to mechanical defects is included in
the frequency analysis.

7.5 Natural Hazards

Natural hazards such as subsidence, earthquake and typhoon may cause varying degrees of
damage to pipelines.

Environmental loads such as currents and waves due to tropical storms on the pipeline during the
construction phase can compromise the lateral and vertical on-bottom stability of the pipeline on the
seabed. Tropical cyclone records have been inspected for the last 32 years and in general, there
are occasional tropical cyclones at tropical storm stage, however, none of these have passed
directly over Mangala Field [Ref: 10]. The pipeline and marine loading facilities have a design life of
25 years and will be designed to withstand these environmental loads [Ref: 1]. Hence, pipeline and
marine loading facilities damage due to natural hazards is considered negligible and is not
assessed further in this study.

Although the loading operation will not take place during stormy weather condition, there is a
possibility of change in wind and currents which may result into buoy/tanker excursion potentially
overstressing the flexible hoses and hose/MBC failure. For under-buoy hoses this may happen

2
Page 22 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

irrespective of loading / unloading operations. MBC failure consequences which may be the
outcome of natural /operational hazard is analyzed in the study.

7.6 Operational Hazard

Loading / unloading of the crude to/from the tanker is expected to follow set procedures. Hence the
likelihood of operational errors is very low and may not result in loss of containment except for
scenarios such as sudden valve closure at the tanker end without prior intimation. Such an
eventuality is of low probability considering strict adherence to the procedures and operator training.
In case of mechanical failure leading to loss of containment, COT booster and export pumps can be
stopped immediately. This can be achieved by communication [Ref: 11] between the tanker and
COT as part of the standard operating procedure during the loading operation of crude.

In the worst case such operational errors may result in hose/MBC failure. The consequences of
these events have been assessed in the study.

2
Page 23 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

8. FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT

8.1 Overview
The generic frequency assessment is carried out by utilising the PARLOC database [Ref: 2] for
pipeline and Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics database [Ref: 3] for SPM to estimate the
overall leak frequency of the pipeline and offshore loading facilities. The PARLOC database is
based on riser and pipeline incidents that have occurred in the North Sea. PARLOC is the most
extensive database for the pipeline incidents.

Based on PARLOC 2001, a total of 542 incidents to risers, pipelines and associated fittings have
been recorded up to the end of year 2000, of which 396 occurred to operating lines. These incidents
are summarised in Table 8.1 below:
Table 8.1: PARLOC 2001 Incidents to Operating Lines

Number of Incidents to Number of Incidents

Operating Pipelines Resulting in a Loss of
Containment

Steel lines 209 65

Flexible lines 39 31

Fittings 148 92

In case of the pipelines, there have been 18 incidents involving loss of containment within the safety
zone. One third of the incidents within the safety zone are related to impacts from anchors while
50% of the incidents are related to corrosion and material defect issues. There was one incident
related to an impact whilst the remaining 2 incidents have been recorded as resulting from “other”
issues.

Whilst these historical data provide a basis for establishing the likelihood of a release from the
pipelines, clearly the potential for an incident is related to the activities which are performed close to
the pipelines which may result in damage to the lines. Based on the historical data, the major
concern is from corrosion and material defects. Potential presence of corrosive component in the
crude oil represents a concern from internal corrosion, while salt water environment presents a
threat in terms of external corrosion.

With a total of 65 incidents which have been reported on steel lines resulting in loss of containment,
the total number of incidents has been further expressed in terms of damage based on equivalent
hole diameter as presented in Appendix 2.

2
Page 24 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

The data for fittings in PARLOC, while substantial, does not include operating experience data to
enable an assessment of leak frequencies. Therefore the PARLOC fittings data has not been used
in this assessment. Instead the contribution of fittings (e.g. flange connection between the spool
piece and the pipelines, valves and piping) has been calculated separately based on data from the
Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics 2001 as presented in Appendix 2. The fittings failure
frequency is applied to SPM components.

8.2 Hole Size Distribution for Operating Steel Lines

Based on the probability distribution of equivalent hole sizes (Appendix 2), distribution of equivalent
hole sizes is then determined for operating steel lines, as presented in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 PARLOC 2001 Equivalent Hole Size Distributions for Operating Steel Lines

Equivalent hole diameter (mm)

<20mm 20 – 80mm >80mm Rupture

57% 14% 9% 20%

The highest percentage of the leak is categorized under ‘small’ leaks. It can also be seen that the
percentage of rupture is higher then medium leaks.

8.3 Leak Frequency for Operating Pipelines and Flexible Hose

Steel pipelines and flexible lines will be installed to supply the crude oil from COT to the tanker
through SPM. PARLOC provides data on the location of the loss of containment incidents to
operating steel pipelines and flexible lines. Safety zone indicates the incidents which occurred
within 500m of the installation and mid line indicates incidents on the pipelines beyond the safety
zone. The pipeline operating experience in terms of km-years for flexible and steel pipelines
(Appendix 2) and derived leak frequencies are presented in the Table 8.3 below.
Table 8.3 Leak Frequency for Operating Steel Pipelines

Number of Incidents Operating

Leak Frequency/ km
Location Resulting in a Loss Experience (km-
year
of Containment years)

Mid Line 27 79380 3.40 x 10-4

Safety Zone 18 275 6.55 x 10-2

2
Page 25 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT
SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

8.4 Leak Size Distribution

Leak frequencies are required to be distributed over the possible hole size spectrum for the QRA.
Hence different leak sizes are selected for leak rate calculation. The representative leak sizes
proposed for this Project are as below:

• 10 mm for small leak;

• 50 mm representing medium leak;

• 100 mm for large leak; and

• Full bore rupture – size corresponding to full pumping rate release.

8.5 Isolatable Sections

Five (5) isolatable sections have been identified along the pipelines from onshore pipeline through
Land Fall Point up to the Single Point Mooring (SPM). These isolatable sections are numbered from
1 to 3 as presented in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 Isolatable Sections

Isolatable Section Description

1 and 1a Land Fall Point to Subsea Pipeline (up to 1st subsea Actuated Valve)

2 and 2a PLEM to SPM (underbuoy hoses)

3 SPM including floating hoses

The isolatable sections are designated as sections in between two actuated valves along the
pipeline. There are a total of 5 actuated valves along the pipeline up to the SPM. Isolatable Section
1 and 2 are duplicated based on two 24 inch pipeline installed parallel.

8.6 Pipeline Parts Count and Leak Frequency Result

Table 8.5 presents the “parts count” for the pipeline which includes pipeline section, number of
flanges, valves, instruments and piping. Based on this parts count and historical leak frequency for
each component (Appendix 2), the total release frequencies by isolatable sections are presented in
Table 8.6.

Table 8.7 presents the leak frequencies based on small, medium, large and full bore leak sizes,
which is based on the historical leak size distribution.

2
Page 26 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)
CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 8.5 Parts Count Summary by Isolatable Section

Pipeline Flexible Hose Piping Flanges Actuated Valve Manual Valve Instruments

No Failure Cases
3" < D 3" < D 3" < D
D< D> D< D> D< D>
<= <= <= D<= 3" < D < D> D< 3" < D < D> D< 3" < D < D>
= 3" 11" = 3" 11" = 3" 11" All Sizes
11" 11" 11" 3" = 11" 11" = 3" = 11" 11" = 3" = 11" 11"
(km) (km) (km) (km) (m) (m)
(km) (km) (m)
Land Fall Point to
Subsea Pipeline (up
1 13.8 1
to 1st Actuated
Valve)
Land Fall Point to
Subsea Pipeline (up
1a 13.8 1
to 1st Actuated
Valve)
PLEM to SPM
2 0.05 3 5 2 2 1 1
(underbuoy hoses)

PLEM to SPM
2a 0.05 3 5 2 2 1 1
(underbuoy hoses)

SPM including
3 0.5 100 19 18 15 3 12
floating hoses

Page 27 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 8.6 Summary of Total Release Frequency by Isolatable Section

Isolatable Isolatable Section Total Release % Contribution to

Section No. Description Frequency for Facility Total Leak
Isolatable Section Frequency

1 Land Fall Point to 4.79 x 10-3 7%

Subsea Pipeline (up to
1st subsea Actuated
Valve)

1a Land Fall Point to 4.79 x 10-3 7%

Subsea Pipeline (up to
1st subsea Actuated
Valve)

2 PLEM to SPM 5.71 x 10-3 8%

(underbuoy hoses)

2a PLEM to SPM 5.71 x 10-3 8%

(underbuoy hoses)

3 SPM including floating 5.00 x 10-2 70%

hoses

Total 7.10 x 10-2 100%

Page 28 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 8.7 Summary of Total Release Frequency by Leak Size

Leak Size
No. Isolatable Section Description
Small Medium Large Fullbore
Land Fall Point to Subsea Pipeline (up to 1st Actuated -3 -4 -4 -4
1 2.76 x 10 6.61 x 10 4.22 x 10 9.46 x 10
Valve)
Land Fall Point to Subsea Pipeline (up to 1st Actuated
1a 2.76 x 10-3 6.61 x 10-4 4.22 x 10-4 9.46 x 10-4
Valve)
2 PLEM to SPM (underbuoy hoses) 5.13 x 10-3 5.66 x 10-4 2.95 x 10-4 6.89 x 10-4
-3 -4 -4
2a PLEM to SPM (underbuoy hoses) 5.15 x 10 5.42 x 10 2.95 x 10 7.01 x 10-4
3 SPM including floating hoses 3.40 x 10-2 5.21 x 10-3 2.95 x 10-3 7.71 x 10-3
Total 4.99 x 10-2 7.64 x 10-3 4.38 x 10-3 1.10 x 10-3

Page 29 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

8.7 Main Contribution to Pipeline Loss of Containment

PARLOC provides breakdown of the factors based on historic data which causes pipeline failures.
This breakdown of causative factors is presented in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8 Main Contributors to Pipeline Failure

Failure Causes No. Of incidents (% contribution)

Anchor 2 (7%)

Impact 8 (30%)

Corrosion 11 (41%)

Material defects 2 (7%)

Other 4 (15%)

Total (Pipelines) 27

Based on Table 8.8 the pipeline failure frequency for each failure cause is derived and presented in
Table 8.9.
Table 8.9 Failure Frequency Based on Each Failure Cause

Failure Causes Failure Frequency

Anchor 6.57 x 10-4

Impact 2.82 x 10-3

Corrosion 3.85 x 10-3

Material defects 6.57 x 10-4

Other 1.41 x 10-3

Total (Pipelines) 9.39 x 10-3

The frequency data in this chapter are utilized further to calculate event outcome frequencies in the
following chapters of the study.

Page 30 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

9. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

9.1 Overview
The consequence modelling of pressurised crude oil releases has been conducted by using DNV
software Phast version 6.54. The results from the modelling exercise are used to evaluate the
effects of loss of containment due to leaks in the pipeline.

9.2 Consequences
The nature of failure depends on the causative factor. Small / pinhole leaks usually result from
corrosion, medium size holes generally result from third party damage (TPD), while ruptures may be
caused by dropped anchor, ship impact, weld failure, material failure or natural hazards.

The types of hazardous consequences that could develop following a release are discussed in this
section.

A release of pressurised crude oil (stabilised) from the oil pipeline is expected to occur in one or two
phases:

• Onshore/Sub-sea - Initial release, maximum flow limited to the flow rate of the pipeline (i.e.
driven by the pumps) until the section is isolated or pump is shutdown;

• Sub-sea - Release to equalise the hydrostatic head of the pipeline and the sea; and
Subsequent release of crude oil due to natural buoyancy until “u-bend” section of the
pipeline is emptied. However the release rate due to natural buoyancy would be very low
compared to pumping rates for the liquid.

For onshore pipeline, flow from leak will cease once section is isolated or pump(s) is stopped.

9.2.1 Onshore Section Pipeline Leak

The RJ Crude on release is expected to form gel due to high pour point. No fire hazards are
expected from the release of RJ Crude.

The Light Flushing Oil on release from the buried pipeline may channelize and rise to surface
depending on the soil characteristics. This is possible only when the pumping is ON. Furthermore,
the released oil may form localised oil pool if the pipeline is exposed. The onshore section of the
pipeline will be buried and hence it is more likely to form pockets of oil soaked soil rather than large
oil pool. Large oil pool may form only if leak is undetected for a long period.

Page 31 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

9.2.2 Offshore Section Pipeline – Oil rise through Water

For offshore section of the pipeline, a release of pressurised crude oil (stabilised) is expected to
result in a plume rising to the sea surface, which is then dispersed to the marine environment by
weathering. The release is expected to occur in two phases as indicated earlier.

Release of RJ Crude from a sub-sea pipeline would result in the lumps of oil rising to the surface
due to waxy nature of the crude. No fire hazards are expected from the release of RJ Crude.

Release of LFO liquid from a sub-sea pipeline would result in the liquid rising to the surface in a
plume. The liquid would form an unconfined pool on the sea surface and the gas fraction would
flash and evaporate from the liquid pool with little or no momentum. The liquid pool is likely to drift
with the current and may start to form an oil slick; if the vapour above the pool were to subsequently
ignite the resulting sea fire may occur some distance from the initial leak point which under
unfavourable wind conditions may lead to a fire surrounding the SPM or tanker. The size of the pool
fire will depend on the amount of inventory released.

9.2.3 SPM – Oil leak on Water

A release of heated RJ Crude or LFO from SPM will form an unconfined pool with consequences
similar to LFO spill as discussed in the section above.

9.3 Pressurised Crude Oil Release

9.3.1 Release Location

The consequence modelling was carried out at pipeline pressure expected around LFP which is
approximately 14 barg and these results are assumed to be representative for a leak anywhere
along the pipeline. For leak at SPM, maximum 7 barg is assumed for consequence modelling.

9.3.2 Release Rates

The results of the release rate calculations using consequence modelling software Phast are
presented in Table 9.1.

Page 32 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 9.1: Instantaneous release rate (m3/s) by Scenario

Equivalent Hole
< 20 mm 20-80 mm > 80 mm Rupture
Diameter (mm)

Representative
10 mm 50 mm 100 mm 596 mm (pipe ID)
Hole Size (mm)

Release Rate 557.75

1.64 40.94 163.76
kg/s (@7barg) (Pumping Rate)

Release Rate 557.75

2.31 57.89 231.56
kg/s (@14barg) (Pumping Rate)

9.3.3 Released Quantity

The unignited releases from the crude oil pipeline would produce an oil slick initially floating on the
surface or leak into the soil. The total quantity of liquid released can be estimated from the release
rate and time to detect and isolate the pipeline. After isolation, liquid inventory remaining in the
pipeline may continue to leak at significantly reduced rates until the pipeline pressure is equal to the
water head pressure at the seabed. Subsequent to isolation of the pipeline i.e. by shutdown of the
supply pump, remaining liquid in the line will rise through water. Onshore leak will cease once the
supply pump is stopped. Table 9.2 presents the release quantity of the crude based on the release
rate from the section above and assumed time to detect and isolate pipeline. The time to isolate are
assumed for each leak size (Assumption Sheet 8 in Appendix 1).
Table 9.2 Release Quantity (kg) by Time to Detect and Isolate Pipeline

Representative Release Hole Size

10mm 50mm 100mm Full Bore
(mm)

Detection Time (Minutes) 120 60 30 5

Release Quantity for (7barg) in (kg) 11,808 147,384 294,768 167,325

Release Quantity for (14barg) in (kg) 16,632 208,404 416,808 167,325

Release Quantity for MBC failure (kg) –

NA NA NA 22,698
closure in 20 seconds

9.4 Pool Fire

Pool fires are burning liquid that have collected on a horizontal surface. Leaks on subsea pipeline
will result in a pool of crude oil forming at the sea surface due to the lighter density of crude
compared to water. The evaporation of light hydrocarbons from a pool forms a cloud of vapour
above the pool surface. If ignited, a flame will flash through the vapour to the liquid surface thus

Page 33 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

generating a pool fire. The unconfined pool on sea surface will burn back to a smaller pool diameter
which represents steady state diameter corresponding to leak rate and burning rate. If liquid leak
ceases, the pool fire will diminish with time.

Sub-sea release of RJ Crude will not result in pool fire due to waxy nature of the crude. Heated RJ
Crude release at SPM is not generating vapours or flash fraction and is not expected to ignite.
Release of Light Flushing Oil will result in a flammable cloud being formed due to flashing of the
light ends. If the flammable cloud is ignited, a flash fire followed by pool fire can potentially be
developed.

The pool fires have been modelled for 14 barg and 7 barg release pressure to represent the release
from subsea pipelines and SPM respectively. The modelling also includes assessment on
breakaway couplings whereby the release is assumed to last for 20 seconds before the couplings
closes. The modelling results representing the pool diameter and thermal radiation contours for
LFO releases from the pipeline and SPM are presented in Table 9.3. Modelling results representing
breakaway couplings are presented in Table 9.4.

Based on the modelling result, the largest pool fire diameter of approximately 94m is expected to
form if there is a full bore pipeline failure. Since the breakaway couplings are expected to close in
approximately 20 seconds, the inventory released due to this scenario will be limited, hence not
expected to create a large pool and subsequent potential pool fire. The probability of pool fires
being formed due to small leaks is very low since the quantity of release is small.

Page 34 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 9.3 Pool Fire Consequence Modelling Results for SPM and Pipelines

Distance to Radiation Intensity

Pool Diameter (m) Flame Length (m)
Scenario 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4.7kW/m2
10 50 100 10 50 100 10 50 100 10 50 100 10 50 100
FB FB FB FB FB
(mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
Leak on
4 28 59 94 9 39 66 91 4 N.R N.R N.R 8 17 31 48 12 34 58 86
Pipeline
Leak on
4 25 51 94 11 36 60 91 4 N.R N.R N.R 9 16 27 48 14 32 52 86
SPM
Note: N.R represents No Radiation.
Table 9.4 Pool Fire Consequence Modelling Results for Marine Breakaway Couplings

Distance to Radiation Intensity

Scenario Pool Diameter (m) Flame Length (m)
37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4.75kW/m2
Breakaway Couplings Fail 56 81 N.R 30 58

Radiation Impact Criteria towards Personnel [Ref: 6]

kW/m2 Impact Criteria
4.75 Limiting radiation intensity for evacuation actions lasting more than a few minutes.
12.5 Limiting radiation intensity for escape action lasting a few seconds.
37.5 Criterion used for immediate fatality.

Page 35 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

9.5 Gas Plume Release

In the event of a LFO release from the subsea pipeline, the LFO is expected flash on the surface of
the sea. A simple cone model is widely used for dispersion of subsea gas releases, in which it is
assumed that the bubble plume is represented by a cone of a fixed angle. This model is illustrated
in Figure 9.1.

FIGURE 9.1 – SIMPLE CONE MODEL FOR SUBSEA DISPERSION

The value of the cone angle is generally given as between 10-12°, with some sources quoting
values of up to 23°. Billeter and Fannelop suggested that the ‘release area’ (where bubbles break
through the surface) has approximately twice the diameter of the bubble plume. Hence, a cone
angle of 23° has been adopted for this assessment.

The water depth for the subsea pipeline is approximately 30m, giving a release area of 12m in
diameter.

When the gas reaches the sea surface, it will begin to disperse into the atmosphere. The gas
buoyancy with respect to air and the momentum of release at the sea surface will affect the nature
of the dispersion. At low release rates and deeper water depths, the release momentum will be
small and the gas dispersion will be governed by its buoyancy within air and the ambient wind

Page 36 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

speed. At high release rates and shallower water depths, the momentum of the release becomes
significant compared to gas buoyancy and the dispersed plume will, initially, be more vertical than
the previous case.

9.5.1 Flash Fire

Depending on the LFO composition, small fraction of vapour may flash from the liquid on release of
LFO forming a vapour cloud above the liquid which can then drift with the wind. The mass of gas
may be further increased due to evaporation effects over time. If the gas ignites then a flash fire
would occur. The flame may then travel back to the liquid surface resulting in a subsequent pool fire
fed by the liquid on the sea surface. Note that RJ Crude contains non volatile and high boiling
components which will not result in flammable gas plume anywhere along the pipeline/ SPM/
floating hose.

LFO with the properties as indicated in the report (Assumption No. 6) would result in gas cloud for
subsea leak, leak at SPM and floating hose as well. The gas dispersion results for the release of
LFO at the SPM and pipeline are presented in Table 9.5. The largest gas cloud that could
potentially be developed due to fullbore release might cover a distance up to 105m. Flash fire is not
expected for small releases due to the low release rate whereby the flammable gas cloud is
expected to be diluted by air upon release.

Table 9.6 presents the gas dispersion results for the release if breakaway couplings fail. Based on
the result, the flammable gas plume is expected to disperse up to a maximum distance of
approximately 72m.
Table 9.5 Flash Fire Consequence Modelling Results for SPM and Pipeline

Distance to LFL (m)

Scenario
10mm 50mm 100mm FB
Leak on Pipeline N.F 22.00 44.00 67.00
Leak on SPM N.F 5.00 41.00 105.00
Note: NF represents no flashing of liquid is expected.
Table 9.6 Flash Fire Consequence Modelling Results for Marine Breakaway Coupling

Scenario Distance to LFL (m)

Marine Breakaway Couplings Fail 72

Page 37 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

10. EVENT TREE AND RISK ANALYSIS

This section summarises qualitative assessment of the risk from the pipeline facilities followed by
quantitative account of the risk based on data and analysis in the previous chapter.

Table 10.1 catalogues various threats, top events, event outcomes with the existing safeguards.

Page 38 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 10.1 Qualitative Risk Assessment

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity
Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
1 Dropped Subsea Marine activities are Medium to FB rupture RJ Crude Subsea pipelines are buried and concrete Low / Critical - Low
and dragged pipeline closely monitored and - release of RJ Crude lumps coated to minimize the impact due to
anchor/anch subsea pipeline is away LFO - oil pool, flash/pool fire dropped and dragged anchors. Safety
or chain, from the anchorage zones. exclusion zone around SPM. Offshore and
Emergency Even though very low no permanent habitation/population.
anchoring, probability, anchors may
be dropped onto the
pipeline or dragged across
the pipeline. During
emergency, vessels may
drift into area due to
propulsion or steering
systems/ machinery failure.
In the event of repair failure
and unavailable tug
assistance, emergency
anchoring may happen.
This may result in potential
damage to pipeline.
Damage of pipeline may
lead to leaks/failure.

Page 39 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity

Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
2 Other Subsea May result in impact and Medium to FB rupture Offshore pipelines are buried and concrete Low / Critical - Low
Impacts - pipeline pull-over damage. The RJ Crude - release of RJ Crude coated to minimize the trawl impact.
Trawl board proposed project area does lumps Safety exclusion zone around SPM.
impact, pull- not include breeding and LFO - oil pool, flash/pool fire Offshore and no permanent
over or spawning grounds of fish habitation/population.
hooking due and other marine life.
to trawling Fishing activates are by gill
activities netting. Thus trawling
operation by fishing
vessels damaging or
hooking onto the services
is not considered to be
very likely. The impact by
trawl may result in potential
damage to pipeline leading
to leaks/failure.
~1km of the pipeline is on
the sea bed.
3 Other Subsea Dropped object will be Medium to FB rupture Offshore pipelines are buried and concrete Low / Critical – Low
Impacts - pipeline unlikely as the facility is not RJ Crude – release of RJ Crude coated to minimize the trawl impact.
Vessel in the shipping lane. For lumps Safety exclusion zone around SPM.
collision container ships, the LFO – oil pool, flash/pool fire Operating procedures are in place. Hold
leading to likelihood of dropping a back tug boats for the loading tankers.
dropped container is highest when Offshore and no permanent
object, the vessel is at port habitation/population.
Dropped performing loading/
object from unloading operations. The
passing facility is far away from the
vessels, nearest container port.
Sunken ship Marine activities are
(e.g. after closely monitored and

Page 40 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity

Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
collision with anchorage zones are far
other ships), away from the
etc. LFP/pipeline. Thus
grounding and eventual
collision is not considered
to be very likely.
The probability of dropped
object right on the pipeline
is therefore very low.
Hence, it is not likely that a
dropped container scenario
can cause damage to the
subsea pipeline.
Although of very low
probability, if occurs may
result in leaks/failure.
4 Other SPM Changes in wind and Medium to FB rupture RJ Crude Operating procedures are in place. Hold Low / Catastrophic –
Impacts – surface current may cause – release of . Oil pool LFO – oil back tug boats for the loading Medium
Vessel the tanker to ride over the pool, flash/pool fire tankers.Mooring tension monitoring system
collision to SPM and cause damage to to alarm and shutdown.Personnel in loading
SPM, the SPM. Although of very tanker / tug boats.
Collision low probability, will result in
(either damage to the SPM
powered or leading to leaks / rupture.
drifting)

Page 41 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity

Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
5 Other Onshore Excavation / construction Small to medium leak Onshore pipelines are clearly marked along Likely / Moderate –
Impacts – pipeline can cause damage to the RJ Crude – oil soaked soil its route. Medium
rd
3 party onshore pipeline. LFO – oil soaked soil, localised Pipeline marker tapes
damage Although of very low fire along the pipeline. No habitation in close proximity to the
probability, will result in pipeline.
damage to the pipeline. Regular inspection / line walk to identify
Damage of pipeline may activities which may damage the lines.
lead to leaks. Education to local population on the
hydrocarbon pipelines hazards.

6 Internal / All Spontaneous failure of Small leak Internal Corrosion Allowance (1.2mm for Likely / Marginal –
External pipeline For onshore: onshore pipeline, Low
corrosion RJ Crude – oil soaked soil 1.5 mm for offshore pipeline)
LFO – oil soaked soil. External Corrosion Coating Protection on the
For offshore: pipeline.
RJ Crude – release of RJ Crude Periodic maintenance / Corrosion monitoring.
lumps
LFO – oil pool

Page 42 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity

Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
7 Mechanical All Spontaneous failure of Small to medium leak Design Safety Class for Onshore and Low / Moderate –
defects pipeline/ mooring hawser / For onshore: Offshore Pipelines in Accordance to DNV- Low
hoses / SPM / MBC, RJ Crude – oil soaked soil OS-F101
LFO – oil soaked soil, localised Pipeline material API-5L X65, PSL2.
fire along the pipeline. Testing as per the codes/ standards.
For offshore: QA/QC during construction /commissioning.
RJ Crude – release of RJ Crude Personnel competency.
lumps The SPM fitted with a single grommet type
LFO – oil pool, Flash/pool fire mooring hawser arrangement connected to
the buoy’s uni-joint. The mooring uni-joint
fitted with a load pin to allow remote
monitoring of the hawser load in order to
avoid over stressing of the hawser.
SPM Leaks on swivel which will For offshore: The swivel is equipped with leak detection Low / Moderate –
result in loss of RJ Crude – release of RJ Crude ports which are connected to a leak Low
containment. lumps collection vessel. The leak collection vessel
is fitted with a visual level gauge and level
LFO – oil pool, Flash/pool fire switches to detect swivel seal leak.
Leak detection tank shall be designed as per
ASME VIII div 1.

Page 43 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Hazard Top Events with Events Outcome / Likelihood/ Severity

Threats Location Existing Safeguards
ID. comments Consequence - Risk
8 Natural All Natural hazards such as Medium to FB rupture Pipelines are Designed for Earthquake Low / Critical – Low
hazards subsidence, earthquake, For onshore: Loads Based on IS 1893:2002.
storm / typhoon may cause RJ Crude – oil soaked soil The pipeline is designed for the
potential pipeline damage. LFO – oil soaked soil, localised environmental loads due to earthquake,
The pipeline is designed fire along the pipeline. waves and currents as per codes.
taking into account For offshore: Meteorological & Ocean Monitoring.
environmental loads due to RJ Crude – release of RJ Crude
earthquake, waves and lumps
currents. LFO – oil pool, Flash/pool fire.
Thus pipeline damage due
to natural hazards is
considered negligible.
There is a potential for
Over stressing of hose and
MBC breaking apart during
severe weather condition.
9 Operational All Operational error. Small to medium leak for Safe Operating Procedures in place, Low / Critical – Low
hazards However the likelihood of onshore: RJ Crude – oil soaked Operator training.
that is very low and may soil LFO – oil soaked soil,
not result in loss of localised fire along the pipeline.
containment from the For offshore: RJ Crude –
pipeline for all the release of RJ Crude lumpsLFO
operational errors. – oil pool, Flash/pool fire

Page 44 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Based on the qualitative analysis presented in Table 10.1, all the risk identified are in LOW or
MEDIUM category whereby none of the risk are in HIGH category.

To determine event outcome frequency for risk quantification, event trees are constructed for a
range of consequence. The basic event tree structure is shown in Figure 10.1.
Immediate
Ignition/
Leak Frequency Ignition Outcome
Delayed
Ignition

Yes Immediate Ignition, Pool Fire

Yes

No Delayed Ignition, Flash Fire

No Unignited hydrocarbon release

Figure 10.1: Basic Event Tree Structure for Pipeline Facilities

The event tree branches account for:

• Likelihood of ignition; and

• Likelihood of immediate/ delayed ignition.

10.1 Ignition Probability

Based on E&P Forum Data [Ref: 5], the ignition probability depends on the release rate; larger
release rate have higher ignition probability. The probability for subsea pipeline ignition based on
E&P Data is presented in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Ignition Probability
Release Release Rate (kg/s) Subsea Ignition Probability
Small <2 0
Medium 2 - 20 0.001
Large >20 0.005

Page 45 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

10.2 Immediate / Delayed Ignition

This gate represents the split between ignitions which occur immediately after release, and delayed
ignition which occurs after some time from the release event. The event outcome for immediate
ignition is pool fire while delayed ignition will lead to flash fire. It is assumed that for subsea
releases, 90% will be delayed ignition as presence of continuous ignition source over the sea are
not foreseen and highly unlikely.

10.3 Event Tree Branches

The final events are broken down into 3 different event tree branches that are developed in the
consequence modelling to estimate the outcome frequency. Brief description on the event tree
branches are summarized in Table 10.3.
Table 10.3 Event Tree Classes
Title Description
Immediate Ignition, Pool Fire Immediate ignition of LFO due to a leak on the
pipeline will result in a sea pool fire.
Delayed Ignition, Flash Fire Release of LFO to the sea surface will eventually
lead to a small fraction of vapour flashing from the
liquid hence creating a flammable gas cloud.
Therefore, a delayed ignition will result in ignition
of the flammable gas cloud creating a flash fire.
Unignited Hydrocarbon Release Release of LFO from the pipeline which is
unignited.

10.4 Summary of Outcome Frequencies

The summary of event outcome frequencies calculated based on different leak sizes are
summarised in Table 10.4.
Table 10.4 Summary of Event Frequencies
Outcome Frequency
Leak Size Un-ignited Total Event Outcome
Pool Fire Flash Fire
Release Frequency Note 1
Small 4.99 x 10-6 4.49 x 10-5 4.98 x 10-2 1.19 x 10-3
-7 -6 -3
Medium 7.64 x 10 6.87 x 10 7.63 x 10 1.82 x 10-4
Large and
1.54 x 10-6 1.38 x 10-5 1.54 x 10-2 3.66 x 10-4
Fullbore
Total Note 1 1.73 x 10-7 1.56 x 10-6 1.73 x 10-3 1.73 x 10-3
Note 1: Total event outcome frequencies are multiplied by the correction factor based on the LFO pumping duration
(4 hours – Appendix 1 Assumption no. 2) has been factored into the total frequency.

Page 46 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

10.5 Risk Assessment

The present QRA study considered possible threats which may damage the pipeline facilities
resulting in loss of containment ultimately resulting in safety consequences with the potential for
fatality. Considering properties of the RJ crude which is high boiling and waxy, flash/pool fire is not
envisaged. Hence fatality risks are not considered for the RJ Crude loading operations. Fatality risk
from RJ Crude loading operations only therefore can be considered as acceptable.

Light Flushing Oil (LFO) or equivalent material will be utilised to flush out the pipeline during RJ
crude loading operations cycles. Hence the worst case consequences are determined based on
pumping of the Light Flushing Oil. In absence of Company supplied properties of the light flushing
oil, a typical Malaysian light crude oil composition (Appendix 1 Assumption no. 6) was utilised for
the study. Depending on the properties of the LFO, flash/pool fire hazards will be encountered.

Based on historic leak frequencies and consequence modelling, the event outcome frequencies as
determined in the preceding sections are very low. Highest contributors to leak frequencies are
corrosion and other impacts. Event frequencies of the flash fire are higher than the pool fire events.
It may be noted that unlike fixed installation probability of habitation along the pipeline installation
onshore and offshore is very low. Therefore the risk which is combination of the frequency and
consequences to people from the proposed pipeline facilities is very low, of the order of 10-6/year
and lower (Table 10.4).

With facility design as per the industry standard codes / standards, compliance to local rules and
regulations, the risk reduction measures are considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP). Comparing the fatality risk against the RAM (Section 5.2), the risk levels from the
proposed Bhogat COT to SPM pipeline loading/unloading facilities are very low and tolerable.

Page 47 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

11.1 Conclusion
A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is conducted to for the RJ crude oil pipeline facilities
from Bhogat COT up to the PLEM and SPM of Cairn Energy India Pty. Ltd.

Based on the assessment, the following conclusions have been drawn:

• Based on the historic data (PARLOC and Offshore Hydrocarbon Release Statistics), the
dominant causes contributing to pipeline damages are internal and external corrosion. This
is followed by other impacts from dropped objects / third party damages. The estimated
failure frequencies due to corrosion and impact are 3.85 x 10-3 per year and 2.82 x 10-3 per
year respectively.

• Based on the RJ Crude properties on accidental release to atmosphere, it will not result in to
pool fire. Part of the loading operation involves handling of LFO. Based on the LFO
composition utilised, accidental LFO release may cause flash / pool fire. For small leaks
flash/pool fire may be unlikely.

• Although leaks due to fullbore release might result in a large sea pool fire of LFO, the
frequency of sea pool fire occurring is very low of the order of 1.73 x 10-7 per year. The total
frequency for flash fire is also very low occurring at 1.56 x 10-6 per year.

• Referring to the Risk Assessment Matrix (Section 6.2) and low probability of habitation
along the onshore and offshore facility, the overall fatality risk from the proposed pipeline
facilities is very low and considered tolerable.

11.2 Recommendation
For all the Quantitative Risk Assessment studies, the underlying assumption is that the facilities are
designed as per the good engineering practices, operated as per the safe operating procedures by
trained Operating Personnel and maintained by following preventive maintenance practices.

Attention is drawn to the local rules / guideline and it is assumed that Company will follow applicable
rules for this facility especially those listed below.

1. Petroleum and Natural Gas (Safety in Offshore Operations) Rules, 2008

2. OISD Standards:

Page 48 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 11.1 List of OISD Standards

Standard Name of Standard
OISD-STD-113 Classification of Area for electrical installations at Hydrocarbon
processing and handling facilities
OISD-STD-117 Fire Protection Facilities for Petroleum Depots, Terminals, pipeline
installations and Lube oil installations
OISD-STD-135 Inspection of loading and unloading hoses for petroleum products
OISD-STD-138 Inspection of cross country pipelines – Onshore
OISD-STD-139 Inspection of pipelines – Offshore
OISD-STD-141 Design and Construction requirements for cross country
hydrocarbon pipelines
OISD-STD-177 Inspection & Maintenance of Thermal Insulation
OISD-GDN-178 Guidelines on Management Of Change
OISD-STD-188 Corrosion Monitoring Of Offshore & Onshore Pipelines
OISD-GDN-200 Guidelines For Preparation Of Oil Spill Response Contingency Plan
OISD-STD-226 Natural Gas Transmission Pipelines and City Gas Distribution
Networks
OISD-GDN-227 Emergency Response and Preparedness in E&P Industry

In order to maintain the current level of risk and further improve the pipeline systems safety levels,
the following recommendations are made:

1. The study is carried out with assumed LFO composition. The risk of flash fire and subsequent
pool fire can be minimised by using diesel or equivalent Light Flushing Oil composition with
very low light ends. This will help lowering the risk further and make operation inherently
safer. It may be noted that the use of diesel will result in only pool fire hazards that too if
ignited by ignition sources in the close vicinity of the pool.

2. The exclusion zone around the SPM should be conspicuous by installing buoys around SPM.

3. Emergency response plan should be developed based on the consequences determined in

this report clearly identifying resources, personnel and communication requirements.

Page 49 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

12. REFERENCES

1. Design Basis Memorandum – Onshore & Offshore Pipelines, Doc No. 402020-00123-MX-BOD-
0001, January 2010.

2. Pipeline and Riser Loss Of Containment Database (PARLOC) 2001, 5th Edition, July 2003.

3. Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases Statistics, 2001.

4. Environmental Impact Assessment for the Proposed SPM and Associated Activities in Arabian
Sea off the Coast of Bhogat, Kalyanpur in Jamnagar District Gujarat, Volume B.

5. E&P Forum QRA Data Directory.

6. A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations (CMPT), John Spouge.

7. Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Turret Buoy System, Doc No. PE-B-840-DP-0008 001, Rev
B.

8. Onshore and Offshore Pipeline Alignment Sheets (various nos.)

9. UK HSE, Reducing Risks Protecting People, 2001.

10. Mangala Development Pipeline Project Metocean Conditions Study, Report No. L24532, Rev 0,
December 2009.

11. Functional Design Specification – SPM System, Doc No. BSPL-1540-LCL1-IN-SP-3056,

Rev A1.

Page 50 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Appendix 1 - ASSUMPTIONS REGISTER

Page 51 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 1

Description
LFO and RJ Crude Pump Discharge Pressure

Assumptions

1. The worst case pump discharge pressure considered is approximately 22barg for LFO flushing
operation with pumping rate of 2300 m3/hr [1].

2. Pressure loss from pump discharge to Land Fall Point is assumed to be approximately 5 barg
thus pressure in the pipeline at LFP being 17 barg. With 30m water depth, 3bar hydrostatic
head is assumed to act on the sub-sea pipeline [2].

Reference
1. Steady State Hydraulics Study Report, Doc No. 402020-00123, Rev A1.

2. Information from INTECSEA.

Page 52 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 2

Description
Frequency of Loading Crude into Tanker

Assumptions
1. The frequency of loading the RJ Crude into the tanker is assumed to be once a week with each
loading lasting for one day [1].
2. At the end of loading operation, the pipeline will be flushed with Light Flushing Oil (LFO) to
expel RJ Crude; Pumping of LFO will last for approximately 2 - 4 hours. Pipeline will be filled
with LFO and in non-flowing condition (COT pump shut down) for approximately 6 days [2].

Reference
1. Information from INTECSEA.

2. Information from CEIL.

Page 53 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 3

Description
Leak Hole Size Distribution for Fittings

Assumptions

Representative Leak Size Representing Hole Size

10mm <10mm - <25mm

50mm >25mm - <75mm

100mm >75mm – 100 mm

Corresponding to leak size resulting in leak

Full Bore
equivalent to full pumping rate

Reference
1. Offshore Hydrocarbon Releases 2001.

Page 54 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 4

Description
Leak Hole Size Distribution for Pipelines

Assumptions

Leak Size Representing Hole Size

10mm <20mm

50mm 20mm – 80mm

100mm >80mm

Corresponding to leak size resulting in leak

Full Bore
equivalent to full pumping rate

Reference
1. PARLOC 2001.

Page 55 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 5

Description
RJ Crude and Light Flushing Oil Event Outcomes

Assumptions
1. RJ Crude leak at ambient temperature is not envisaged result in potential pool and
subsequent fire.
2. LFO leak onshore is not envisaged to result in liquid pool.
3. For pool fire and flash fire scenarios, LFO is considered for consequence modelling
representing worst case scenario for the pipeline operation handling both RJ Crude
and LFO, though LFO pumping is at fraction of time compared to RJ Crude. LFO will
remain in the pipeline in the blocked condition longer than RJ Crude.

Reference
1. Assumption based on the properties and buried pipeline.

Page 56 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 6

Description
Light Flushing Oil Composition

Assumptions
1. The composition for LFO is taken as below:

Component Mol Fraction

Methane 0.0215

Ethane 0.0215

Propane 0.0314

i-Butane 0.0177

n-Butane 0.0219

i-Pentane 0.0203

n-Pentane 0.0148

n-Hexane 0.1208

n-Heptane 0.0486

n-Octane 0.0828

n-Nonane 0.0676

n-Decane 0.2401

n-C14 0.1423

n-C18 0.0365

n-C24 0.0818

CO2 0.0039

Nitrogen 0.000

H2O 0.006

Page 57 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 6

C10+ 0.0258

Reference
1. Information from Worley Parsons (typical Malaysian sweet and light crude).

Page 58 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 7

Description
Event Tree (Ignition Probabilities)

Assumptions
1. It is assumed that for subsea releases, 90% will be delayed ignition, as presence of
continuous ignition sources over the sea are not foreseen [1].

2. The subsea ignition probability based on different release rates are presented below [2].

Release Release Rate (kg/s) Subsea Ignition Probability

Small <2 0

Medium 2 - 20 0.001

Large >20 0.005

Reference
1. Assumption by WorleyParsons.

2. E&P Forum QRA Directory.

Page 59 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 8

Description
Time to Detect Leak

Assumptions
The consequence modelling was performed based on pump discharge pressure and shutdown time
when the leak is detected.
Leakages due to small and medium leaks usually are difficult to detect and remains undetected for
long time therefore it is assumed that it can only be detected through visual check and patrolling
during loading / unloading of the crude.
Leakages due to large leaks and pipe rupture can be easily detected through difference in the pump
discharge pressure.

1. The time to detect leak based on different leak sizes are presented below [1]:

Leak Size (mm) Time to Detect Leak (mins)

10 120

50 60

100 30

Full Bore 5

Reference
1. Assumption by Worley Parsons.

Page 60 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

ASSUMPTION SHEET

Assumption Number 9

Description
Impact Criteria for Radiation Contour

Assumptions

The radiation impact criteria towards human are presented below [1]:

2
Radiation Level (kW/m ) Impact Criteria

Limiting radiation intensity for evacuation actions

4.75
lasting more than a few minutes.

Limiting radiation intensity for escape action lasting a

12.5
few seconds.

37.5 Criterion used for immediate fatality.

Reference
1. A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installation (CMPT).

Page 61 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Appendix 2 - FREQUENCY DATABASE

Page 62 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 1 Size Of Damage Expressed as an Equivalent Hole Diameter to Operating Steel Pipelines
Pipeline Diameter Range
0 to 9 10 to 16 >16
Location of Incident
Equivalent Hole Diameter (mm) Equivalent Hole Diameter (mm) Equivalent Hole Diameter (mm)
0-20 Rupture 20-80 Rupture >80 Rupture? 0-20 Rupture 20-80 Rupture >80 Rupture 0-20 Rupture 20-80 Rupture >80 Rupture
Platform Total
Piping 1
Splash
1 1 1 1 1 1
Zone
Riser Subsea 1 1
Unknown 1 1 2 1 1 1
Total 2 0 0 0 2 2 4 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Near 5 3 1 1
Safety Far 1 1 1 2 2 1
Zone Unknown 1 2 1
Total 6 3 1 2 1 1 4 3 1
Mid Line Total 14 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2
Subsea
Total 4 1 1 1
Well
Shore Total
Land Total
SPM Total 1
Total 65 26 0 8 3 5 3 7 0 2 0 9 5 4 0 2 0 2 2

Page 63 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

CAIRN ENERGY INDIA PTY. LTD.
BHOGAT TERMINAL MARINE FACILITIES QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (QRA) STUDY REPORT SINGLE POINT MOORING (SPM) LOADING, ONSHORE AND
OFFSHORE PIPELINES
MANGALA DEVELOPMENT PIPELINE PROJECT

Table 2 Failure Rate and Hole Size Distribution for Flanges, Piping and Valves
Failure Rate / Hole Size Distribution (mm)
Equipment Diameter (in.)
Year < 10 10 – 25 25 – 50 50 – 75 75 – 100 > 100 N/A Note 1
-5
D≤3 3.95 x 10 78% 10% 8% 2% 1% 1% 0%
-5
Flanges 3 < D ≤ 11 5.56 x 10 84% 5% 4% 1% 0% 6% 0%
-5
> 11 9.85 x 10 85% 4% 0% 4% 0% 7% 0%
-3
D≤3 1.07 x 10 75% 4% 11% 4% 0% 0% 7%
-4
Valve, Actuated 3 < D ≤ 11 8.00 x 10 74% 0% 16% 0% 0% 11% 0%
-4
> 11 8.44 x 10 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
-5
D≤3 6.99 x 10 65% 23% 4% 8% 0% 0% 0%
-4
Valve, Manual, Block 3 < D ≤ 11 1.08 x 10 77% 10% 6% 0% 0% 3% 3%
> 11 3.95 x 10-5 82% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 0%
-4
D≤3 2.00 x 10 79% 13% 6% 1% 1% 0% 1%
-5
Piping, Steel 3 < D ≤ 11 5.87 x 10 75% 5% 2% 2% 0% 10% 6%
-5
> 11 5.49 x 10 64% 8% 0% 0% 0% 17% 11%
-4
Instruments 5.85 x 10 79% 17% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1%

Page 64 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Table 3 Pipeline Operating Experience in km-Years to end of 2000

Line Type Contents of Pipeline
Total
Diameter (m) Oil Gas Other

Flexible Lines 2576 1959 3620 8155

Steel Lines 79380 188194 39672 307246

0 to 9 10364 8907 33702 52973

10 to 16 16566 27861 3109 47536

18 to 24 20292 37989 562 58843

26 to 40 31862 113412 2297 147571

Unknown 296 24 2 322

Total 81956 190153 43292 315401

Table 4 Riser Operating Experience in Riser-Years to end of 2000

Line Type Contents of Pipeline
Total
Diameter (m) Oil Gas Other

Flexible Lines 275 229 548 1052

Steel Lines 4449 8432 3924 16776

0 to 9 1244 1240 3506 5990

10 to 16 1530 3243 385 5158

18 to 24 780 2497 27 3304

26 to 40 878 1441 5 2324

Unknown 17 11 1 29

Total 4724 8661 4472 17857

Page 65 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Appendix 3 - Oil Spills In Indian Water

Page 66 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Page 67 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Page 68 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Appendix 4 - EVENT TREE

Page 69 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

Immediate
Leak Ignition/ Event
Ignition Outcome
Frequency Delayed Frequency
Ignition

0.1 Immediate Ignition, Pool Fire 4.99E-06

0.001
SMALL

0.9 Delayed Ignition, Flash Fire 4.49E-05

4.99E-02 N

0.999 Unignited hydrocarbon release 4.98E-02

N
sum 4.99E-02

0.1 Immediate Ignition, Pool Fire 7.64E-07

0.001
MEDIUM

0.9 Delayed Ignition, Flash Fire 6.87E-06

7.64E-03 N

0.999 Unignited hydrocarbon release 7.63E-03

N
sum 7.64E-03

0.1 Immediate Ignition, Pool Fire 1.54E-06

Y
LARGE + FB

0.001
Y

0.9 Delayed Ignition, Flash Fire 1.38E-05

1.54E-02 N

0.999 Unignited hydrocarbon release 1.54E-02

N
sum 1.54E-02

Page 70 of 70 BSPL-1520-LCL1-SS-REP-2014 (Rev C1)

LNG Risk Assessment Guide
No ratings yet
LNG Risk Assessment Guide
10 pages
OilandGas DecommissioningReport (NoAppen)
No ratings yet
OilandGas DecommissioningReport (NoAppen)
263 pages
L&T-Valdel Engineering Private Limited: TH ST
No ratings yet
L&T-Valdel Engineering Private Limited: TH ST
23 pages
Pipelines LOC
100% (1)
Pipelines LOC
28 pages
Hazards On An Offshore Platform A Review
No ratings yet
Hazards On An Offshore Platform A Review
8 pages
Subsea Drop Object Analysis: Understanding of The DNV Approach
100% (1)
Subsea Drop Object Analysis: Understanding of The DNV Approach
13 pages
ALARP Guidance for Petroleum Safety
No ratings yet
ALARP Guidance for Petroleum Safety
43 pages
Offshore Subsea Dropped Object Impact
No ratings yet
Offshore Subsea Dropped Object Impact
15 pages
Construction Risk For Offshore Units: Risk Assessment Data Directory
No ratings yet
Construction Risk For Offshore Units: Risk Assessment Data Directory
20 pages
6.EER Analysis External
No ratings yet
6.EER Analysis External
8 pages
Offshore Technical Safety FAQ
100% (15)
Offshore Technical Safety FAQ
12 pages
QP - phl.S.001 R1 - Corporate Philosophy For Fire & Safety
No ratings yet
QP - phl.S.001 R1 - Corporate Philosophy For Fire & Safety
17 pages
GF-WMOD-X-RE-0002 Hazop Close Out Report PAGE 1 / 12: Prepared BY Checked BY Reviewed BY Approved BY Pcihbv Comment
100% (1)
GF-WMOD-X-RE-0002 Hazop Close Out Report PAGE 1 / 12: Prepared BY Checked BY Reviewed BY Approved BY Pcihbv Comment
11 pages
FLNG Safety Design Challenges
100% (1)
FLNG Safety Design Challenges
11 pages
Part V-PRD-1-MMS-PLA-01-0001-0 - Maintenance & Inspection Plan For Offshore Structures (Rev.0)
No ratings yet
Part V-PRD-1-MMS-PLA-01-0001-0 - Maintenance & Inspection Plan For Offshore Structures (Rev.0)
66 pages
Ai SP Man 803
No ratings yet
Ai SP Man 803
271 pages
RP-E305 On-Bottom Stability Pipeline
No ratings yet
RP-E305 On-Bottom Stability Pipeline
50 pages
Float Over Engineering Design and Installation
100% (1)
Float Over Engineering Design and Installation
31 pages
Dropped Object Reference Report
No ratings yet
Dropped Object Reference Report
18 pages
OGUK Guideline COVID 19 Safe Working On UKCS Offshore Installations PDF
No ratings yet
OGUK Guideline COVID 19 Safe Working On UKCS Offshore Installations PDF
22 pages
Project Construction Management SP
No ratings yet
Project Construction Management SP
41 pages
Portable Accommodation Modules Guide May14
No ratings yet
Portable Accommodation Modules Guide May14
46 pages
UKOOA - Oil Amp Gas Uk Guidelines On Risk Related Decision Making Issue 2 July 2014 PDF
No ratings yet
UKOOA - Oil Amp Gas Uk Guidelines On Risk Related Decision Making Issue 2 July 2014 PDF
25 pages
The Role of QRA in Offshore Safety Cases
No ratings yet
The Role of QRA in Offshore Safety Cases
13 pages
Shg-Sf-Ep-800-0006 - Rev0 - Afd - Passive Fire Protection Philosophy (Phase 3 Feed)
No ratings yet
Shg-Sf-Ep-800-0006 - Rev0 - Afd - Passive Fire Protection Philosophy (Phase 3 Feed)
27 pages
TOS-HSE-SAAX-RA-L-0009 - (Rev.X1) HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING (ADDENDUM) 26.3.2024-SIGNED BY FA
100% (1)
TOS-HSE-SAAX-RA-L-0009 - (Rev.X1) HAZID FOR OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING (ADDENDUM) 26.3.2024-SIGNED BY FA
54 pages
QRA Rule Set
100% (1)
QRA Rule Set
3 pages
HIPPS Is An Abbreviation of "High Integrity Pressure Protection System"
No ratings yet
HIPPS Is An Abbreviation of "High Integrity Pressure Protection System"
11 pages
Otc 10979 MS PDF
No ratings yet
Otc 10979 MS PDF
8 pages
G+ Safe by Design Workshop Report: WTG Access To The Transition Piece (Below Airtight Deck)
No ratings yet
G+ Safe by Design Workshop Report: WTG Access To The Transition Piece (Below Airtight Deck)
37 pages
RAM Study Design Basis - Rev. A (Revised)
No ratings yet
RAM Study Design Basis - Rev. A (Revised)
82 pages
Buckling Oil and Gas
No ratings yet
Buckling Oil and Gas
197 pages
Process Safety Check List 1
No ratings yet
Process Safety Check List 1
2 pages
00251034BFPT85210 Cdfe00 11 PDF
100% (1)
00251034BFPT85210 Cdfe00 11 PDF
11 pages
Offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment
No ratings yet
Offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment
9 pages
Offshore Fire & Risk Assessment Guide
No ratings yet
Offshore Fire & Risk Assessment Guide
54 pages
Risk Based Offshore Decommissioning Report 5 3
100% (1)
Risk Based Offshore Decommissioning Report 5 3
37 pages
Module 1 - Lecture 1 (Introduction)
No ratings yet
Module 1 - Lecture 1 (Introduction)
9 pages
Dropped Object Analysis
No ratings yet
Dropped Object Analysis
34 pages
Brent Delta Topside Close Out Report
100% (1)
Brent Delta Topside Close Out Report
53 pages
C5000 16 G28 B V04 B02 PDF
No ratings yet
C5000 16 G28 B V04 B02 PDF
321 pages
Mooring Integrity Management: Guidance Notes On
No ratings yet
Mooring Integrity Management: Guidance Notes On
26 pages
Oss 301
No ratings yet
Oss 301
60 pages
2012 01 - Pipeline Route Selection Right of Way - Mustang PDF
No ratings yet
2012 01 - Pipeline Route Selection Right of Way - Mustang PDF
3 pages
MP-HSEQ-JD - Batch 2 Topside HSE Supervisor - Offshore
No ratings yet
MP-HSEQ-JD - Batch 2 Topside HSE Supervisor - Offshore
3 pages
Journal of Loss Prevention in The Process Industries: O.N. Aneziris, I.A. Papazoglou, M. Konstantinidou, Z. Nivolianitou
No ratings yet
Journal of Loss Prevention in The Process Industries: O.N. Aneziris, I.A. Papazoglou, M. Konstantinidou, Z. Nivolianitou
13 pages
Best Practices in Operational Risks Management
No ratings yet
Best Practices in Operational Risks Management
44 pages
Mothballing Manifold Pipeline Installati Good
No ratings yet
Mothballing Manifold Pipeline Installati Good
15 pages
Sample Dropped Object Report
100% (1)
Sample Dropped Object Report
36 pages
Correct Hazid Checklister
No ratings yet
Correct Hazid Checklister
16 pages
New Guidance On Fire and Explosion Engineering
No ratings yet
New Guidance On Fire and Explosion Engineering
11 pages
N05-A Pipeline Risk & Object Analysis
No ratings yet
N05-A Pipeline Risk & Object Analysis
45 pages
Risk Assessment of Subsea Pipeline Due To Installa
No ratings yet
Risk Assessment of Subsea Pipeline Due To Installa
15 pages
Sample RRA Report
No ratings yet
Sample RRA Report
132 pages
Ideal QRA PDF
No ratings yet
Ideal QRA PDF
81 pages
Pipeline Risk Assessment Report-2024.Oct.25-Rev.00
No ratings yet
Pipeline Risk Assessment Report-2024.Oct.25-Rev.00
26 pages
OE CORP ENG TN 0001 Rev C1 Pre Commissioning Overview Pipelines
No ratings yet
OE CORP ENG TN 0001 Rev C1 Pre Commissioning Overview Pipelines
20 pages
11 Cor 25 1mdr0470 Phil Crossthwaite Qra Final
No ratings yet
11 Cor 25 1mdr0470 Phil Crossthwaite Qra Final
10 pages
Subsea Pipelines Pre Commissioning 1687771720
No ratings yet
Subsea Pipelines Pre Commissioning 1687771720
19 pages
LNG Terminal Risk Assessment
No ratings yet
LNG Terminal Risk Assessment
149 pages
Spool Lift and Loadout Procedure
100% (1)
Spool Lift and Loadout Procedure
75 pages
Spool and Riser Flooding & Hydrotest
100% (1)
Spool and Riser Flooding & Hydrotest
30 pages
Spool Deployment and Laying Procedure
No ratings yet
Spool Deployment and Laying Procedure
86 pages
Seabed Preparation
100% (1)
Seabed Preparation
16 pages
Side Tap Protection Cover Installation
No ratings yet
Side Tap Protection Cover Installation
17 pages
Don't Tell Mum
No ratings yet
Don't Tell Mum
111 pages
Offshore Installation Manual FOR Loggs Platform Installation
No ratings yet
Offshore Installation Manual FOR Loggs Platform Installation
10 pages
BSPL-1540-LCL1-CM-MS-0007 (C5) Method Statement For Under Buoy Hose Stringing, Testing and Installation
80% (5)
BSPL-1540-LCL1-CM-MS-0007 (C5) Method Statement For Under Buoy Hose Stringing, Testing and Installation
20 pages
BSPL-1540-LCL1-CM-MS-0003 (A2) Method Statement For Anchor Chain Pre Tensioning
No ratings yet
BSPL-1540-LCL1-CM-MS-0003 (A2) Method Statement For Anchor Chain Pre Tensioning
16 pages
(Ebook) Vikings: The North Atlantic Saga by
100% (1)
(Ebook) Vikings: The North Atlantic Saga by
72 pages
Lesson Six Sea Freight and Tarrifs
No ratings yet
Lesson Six Sea Freight and Tarrifs
4 pages
Vietnamese Hashiriya
No ratings yet
Vietnamese Hashiriya
72 pages
Ee6801 Eeguc
No ratings yet
Ee6801 Eeguc
26 pages
Defense Vehicle Offer for Ministry
No ratings yet
Defense Vehicle Offer for Ministry
2 pages
JSS1,3 & SS1-3 English
No ratings yet
JSS1,3 & SS1-3 English
38 pages
Logistics Management: Prepared By:Narendrasingh Chaudhary
100% (1)
Logistics Management: Prepared By:Narendrasingh Chaudhary
56 pages
Ms Offshore Supply Vessels Brochure Jun2011 Printhouse - Original - 46666
No ratings yet
Ms Offshore Supply Vessels Brochure Jun2011 Printhouse - Original - 46666
4 pages
Sample Data
No ratings yet
Sample Data
48 pages
MXP-01 (E) (V2) - Sub Antisub Exer Manual (Janv2015)
No ratings yet
MXP-01 (E) (V2) - Sub Antisub Exer Manual (Janv2015)
356 pages
List of Agencies Empanelled in IRCTC For NRC Projects
No ratings yet
List of Agencies Empanelled in IRCTC For NRC Projects
2 pages
540 CAAV FSSD PEL Validate or Conversion License 32023
No ratings yet
540 CAAV FSSD PEL Validate or Conversion License 32023
1 page
Starting Air System For Diesel Engine Man B&W
100% (1)
Starting Air System For Diesel Engine Man B&W
5 pages
GE CEO Larry Culp Shareholder Letter
100% (1)
GE CEO Larry Culp Shareholder Letter
10 pages
Amadeus Reservas y Emision Tarifas 2
No ratings yet
Amadeus Reservas y Emision Tarifas 2
28 pages
Dobrinja - Ilidža: 38 Bus Time Schedule & Line Map
No ratings yet
Dobrinja - Ilidža: 38 Bus Time Schedule & Line Map
3 pages
LTFG/GZP Gazipasa, Turkey: P EB TO
No ratings yet
LTFG/GZP Gazipasa, Turkey: P EB TO
10 pages
Immigration Powerpoint
No ratings yet
Immigration Powerpoint
18 pages
Psychology of Hope Snyder C. R Download
100% (2)
Psychology of Hope Snyder C. R Download
37 pages
Las Vegas McCarran Airport Terminal Maps
No ratings yet
Las Vegas McCarran Airport Terminal Maps
2 pages
X-DF: Latest References, Service Experience - Plus Future Outlook
No ratings yet
X-DF: Latest References, Service Experience - Plus Future Outlook
66 pages
CPEC Opportunities for Pakistan & China
No ratings yet
CPEC Opportunities for Pakistan & China
8 pages
Operator Manual: Front Loader
No ratings yet
Operator Manual: Front Loader
142 pages
ABB Traction Rectifiers Brochure en
No ratings yet
ABB Traction Rectifiers Brochure en
16 pages
22209/NDLS DURONTO Third Ac Economy (3E)
No ratings yet
22209/NDLS DURONTO Third Ac Economy (3E)
2 pages
Civil Engg Exam: Math & Analysis
No ratings yet
Civil Engg Exam: Math & Analysis
147 pages
Aircraft CG & Stability Calculator
No ratings yet
Aircraft CG & Stability Calculator
1 page
IFR Comms Plane
No ratings yet
IFR Comms Plane
18 pages
Old Farm Tools & Machinery History
No ratings yet
Old Farm Tools & Machinery History
191 pages