5. What are the conceptions of the following philosophers on virtue and virtuous life?

5.1 early naturalists

5.2 Immanuel Kant
5.3 David Hume
5.4 Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill
5.5 T. H. Green
5.6 John Rawls

3. Virtue and moral character after the Greeks

Since the publication of Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958 (see

Introduction above), it has become routine to say that virtue and moral character have been
neglected topics in the development of western moral philosophy since the Greeks. Rather than
thinking about what it is to flourish and live well, moral philosophers, it is argued, became
focused on a different set of notions: obligation, duty, and law.

Anscombe and others have suggested how such a move might have taken place. The
Stoic ideas outlined above may have influenced early Christians such as St. Paul to develop the
idea of a natural law that applies to all human beings. Once Christianity became more
widespread, natural law could be understood in terms of God’s directives in the Bible. Still later,
after the European political revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, there was intellectual room
for secularized versions of the same idea to take hold: duty or obligation was understood in
terms of obedience to moral law(s) or principles that do not come from God but are devised by
human beings. Morally right action was action in accord with moral law(s) or principles. On such
a view, where the central focus is on obedience to moral law, the virtues and moral character
are secondary to action in accordance with law. Someone who acts rightly may develop
standing habits or dispositions of doing so, and these habits then constitute the virtues or good
character.

This section of the entry on moral character will provide a brief summary of some
important developments both in this “modern” approach to moral character and in what appear
to be revivals of the pre-Christian Greek interest in the psychological foundations of character.

3.1 Early natural law theorists

In the writings of the early natural law theorists, Greek views of virtue sometimes came
under strong criticism. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), for example, objected to Aristotle’s approach
to virtue and especially to his attempts to find a mean in terms of which to understand justice. It
does not matter, Grotius complained, what moves someone to act unjustly – the only thing that
matters is that unjust action violates the rights of others. Grotius acknowledged that one may
develop emotional habits that support right action, but he thought this was a matter of having
reason control passions and emotions so that they do not interfere with right action. That reason
should control passions indicates that the desired state is for one part of us to rule the other, not
for both parts, in Aristotle’s words, to speak with the same voice. On this view, moral character
is a state closer to what the Greeks considered self-mastery or continence than it is to what they
considered virtue.

Even though the natural law theorists tended to assimilate virtue to continence, they still
admitted that that there was an area of moral life in which motive and character mattered. That
was the area of “imperfect duty” (as contrasted with “perfect duty”). Under a perfect duty what is
owed is specific and legally enforceable by political society or courts; but action in accord with
imperfect duty cannot be compelled, and what is owed under an imperfect duty is imprecise.
Generosity is an example of the latter, justice of the former. In the case of generosity, one has a
duty to be generous, but one cannot be legally compelled to be generous, and when or how
generosity is shown is not precisely specifiable. But in the case of generosity, the motive of the
agent counts. For if I give money to a poor person I encounter on the street and do so because I
want others to think well of me, I have not acted generously and performed my imperfect duty.
When I give generously, I must do so out of concern for the good of the person to whom I give
the money.

For more detailed discussion of Grotius and the natural law theorists, and of the modern
developments Anscombe attacked, see Schneewind (1990, 1998). For a discussion of the
persistence of Aristotelian ethics in the early modern period and a response to Schneewind, see
Frede (2013).

3.2 Kant

The tendencies to find room for motive and character in the area of imperfect duty, and
to assimilate virtue with continence, resurface in the writings of several moral philosophers of
the 17th and 18th centuries. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is an illustrative case. In the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant divides moral philosophy into two domains, that of justice or law on
the one hand (the Doctrine of Right), and that of ethics or virtue on the other (the Doctrine of
Virtue). The duties that form the subject matter of the Doctrine of Right are like the natural law
theorists’ perfect duties: they are precise, owed to specifiable others, and can be legally
enforced. They require that we take or forego certain actions. Other duties (which form the
subject matter of the Doctrine of Virtue) are duties to adopt certain ends. Many of them are
imperfect, in that they do not specify how, when, or for whom (in the case of duties to others)
they should be achieved. Examples are the duty not to let one’s talents rust or the duty not to
deny help to others. Because we cannot be compelled to adopt ends, but must do so from free
choice, these duties are not legally enforceable. They require inner, not outer, legislation, so we
must impose them on ourselves. Because, according to Kant, we are always fighting against the
impulses and dispositions that oppose the moral law, we need strength of will and self-mastery
to fulfill our imperfect duties. This self-mastery Kant calls courage.

That virtue is a form of continence for Kant is also suggested by his treatment of other
traits such as gratitude and sympathy. Although Kant thinks that feelings cannot be required of
anyone, some feelings are nevertheless associated with the moral ends we adopt. If we adopt
others’ happiness as an end, we will not take malicious pleasure in their downfall. On the
contrary, we will naturally feel gratitude for their benevolence and sympathy for their happiness.
These feelings will make it easier for us to perform our duties and are a sign that we are
disposed to do so. Kant remarks of sympathy that “it is one of the impulses that nature has
implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish” (Kant,
Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 457).

Thus it matters to Kant that we perform the duties of virtue with the properly cultivated
emotions. But to do so is not to develop our nature so that the two parts of us, reason and
passion, are unified and speak with the same voice. Rather, if we perform our duties of virtue in
the right spirit, one part of us, reason, retains control over the other part, passion. Kant writes
that virtue “contains a positive command to a man, namely to bring all his capacities and
inclinations under his (reason’s) control and so to rule over himself … for unless reason holds
the reins of government in its own hands, man’s feelings and inclinations play the master over
him” (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 408).

For more detailed discussion of Kant’s views on virtue, see O’Neill (1996).

Yet there are other philosophers for whom an interest in virtue or good character takes a
turn more reminiscent of the Greeks. This revival of Greek ideas can be seen in philosophers
who show an interest in the psychological foundations of good character.

3.3 Hume

David Hume (1711–1776) explicitly professes a preference for ancient ethics (Hume,
Enquiries, 318), claiming that morals are the one science in which the ancients are not
surpassed by the moderns (Hume, Enquiries, 330). Like some of the Greek moralists, Hume
thought morality must be rooted in our passional nature. For morality moves us to action
whereas reason alone, Hume thought, does not. His preference for ancient ethics is most
obviously seen in his focus on the nature of the virtues and in his efforts to explain how virtues
arise from our feelings and desires.

Hume divides the virtues into two types: artificial and natural. Artificial virtues include
justice, promise-keeping, and allegiance to legitimate government. Natural virtues include
courage, magnanimity, ambition, friendship, generosity, fidelity, and gratitude, among many
others. Whereas each exercise of the natural virtues normally produces good results, the good
of artificial virtues is indirect in that it comes about only as a result of there being an accepted
practice of exercising these virtues.

Hume’s discussion of justice illustrates how the artificial virtues emerge from our feelings
and desires. Hume notes that following the rules of justice does not always produce good
results. Consider the judges who “bestow on the dissolute the labour of the industrious; and put
into the hands of the vicious the means of harming both themselves and others” (Hume,
Treatise, 579). Hume thinks that as persons become aware that stability of possessions is
advantageous to each individually, they also realize that stability is not possible unless everyone
refrains from disturbing others’ possessions. As this awareness becomes more widespread and
effective in people’s behaviors, there arises a convention to respect the possessions of others.
This redirection of self-interest, aided by our natural tendency to sympathize with the feelings of
others who benefit from stability of possession, gives rise to our approval of justice. In this way,
Hume argues, the virtue of obeying laws arises naturally from our feelings and desires.

Hume’s indebtedness to Greek ethics can be seen even more clearly in his discussion of
the natural virtues. Of these, one important group (consisting of courage, magnanimity,
ambition, and others) is based on, or may even be a form of, self-esteem: “[W]hatever we call
heroic virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either
nothing but a steady and well-established pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely of that
passion. Courage … and all the other shining virtues of that kind, have plainly a strong mixture
of self-esteem in them, and derive a great part of their merit from that origin” (Hume, Treatise,
599–600). Yet these virtues based on self-esteem must be tempered by a second group that
includes generosity, compassion, fidelity, and friendship; otherwise traits like courage are “fit
only to make a tyrant and public robber” (Hume, Treatise, 603). This second group of virtues is
based on broadly-based feelings of good will, affection, and concern for others.

Hume acknowledges that his second group of natural virtues owes a debt to the Stoic
view that a virtuous person ought to be concerned with the welfare of all human beings, whether
they be intimate or stranger; and in describing the first group of natural virtues, Hume looks to
Socrates as someone who has achieved a kind of inner calm and self-esteem. In addition, his
general approach to the natural virtues, that some are based on self-esteem and others on
friendly feelings and good will, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s exploration of the psychological
foundations of virtue.

Hume believes that we develop self-esteem from what we do well, if what we do well
expresses something distinctive and durable about us, and he seems to recognize that realized
deliberative abilities are among the most durable features of ourselves. As we gain a facility at
deliberation, we come to develop self-esteem and enjoy who we are, like Aristotle’s virtuous
person who enjoys most the exercise of his developed deliberative powers. Moreover, Hume’s
recognition that self-esteem must be tempered by benevolence is reflected in Aristotle’s
argument that the development and preservation of proper self-love requires friendships in
which persons come to care for others for others’ own sakes.

In addition to exploring these psychological foundations of virtue, Hume seems to accord

them a role that is reminiscent of the Aristotelian view that virtue is a state in which reason and
passion speak with the same voice. Instead of making virtue and good character subordinate to
the requirements of reason, as we saw in the natural law theorists and in Kant, Hume appears
to give virtue and good character room to guide and constrain the deliberations of agents so as
to affect what they determine to be best to do. By doing so, Hume goes some way toward
indicating how good character is different from continence.

Hume’s account of how we determine what is right and wrong illuminates the role
character plays. When Hume’s “judicious spectator” determines what is right and wrong, she
fixes on some “steady and general” point of view and “loosens” herself from her actual feelings
and interests. It appears that someone who has developed an enjoyment in the activities of
deliberating and reflecting, and whose self-esteem is based on that enjoyment, will be more
likely to take up the point of view of the judicious spectator and to perform the subtle corrections
in response that may be necessary to loosen oneself from one’s own perspective and specific
passions. Someone whose self-esteem is based on an enjoyment taken in deliberation will be
attuned to wider complications and will have the wider imaginative powers needed for correct
deliberation from a steady and general point of view. Hume’s view of the relation between
passion and deliberation is reminiscent of the Aristotelian view that someone with proper self-
love will also be practically wise, in that his self-love will enable him to size up practical
situations correctly and determine correctly what it is best to do.

For more detailed discussion of Hume’s view of the virtues, see Baier (1991). On
Hume’s indebtedness to Greek ethics, see Homiak (2000).

3.4 Marx and Mill

Another illustration of the use of Greek views of character can be found in the writings of
Karl Marx (1818–1883) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). Although Marx is best known for his
virulent criticism of capitalism and Mill for his exposition and defense of liberal utilitarianism,
these philosophers are treated together here because their approach to character is at crucial
points deeply Aristotelian. Both Marx and Mill accept Aristotle’s insight that virtue and good
character are based on a self-esteem and self-confidence that arises from a satisfaction taken
in the fully realized expression of the rational powers characteristic of human beings. They also
accept Aristotle’s recognition that the production and preservation of this type of self-esteem
require that individuals be part of specific socio-political structures. Aristotle emphasized the
need for a special type of political community. Marx attended to smaller democratic workplaces.
Mill’s focus, still different, was on political equality and equality in the family.

Marx’s early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 is famous for the
discussion of how the organization of work under capitalism alienates workers and encourages
them to accept the values of capitalist society. Workers who are committed to capitalist values
are characterized primarily by self-interested attitudes. They are most interested in material
advancement for themselves, they are distrustful of others’ seemingly good intentions, and they
view others primarily as competitors for scarce positions. Given these attitudes, they are prone
to a number of vices, including cowardice, intemperance, and lack of generosity.

Marx’s discussion of alienated labor suggests how work can be re-organized to eliminate
alienation, undermine commitment to traditional capitalist values and goals, and produce
attitudes more characteristic of Aristotle’s virtuous person. The key to this transformation lies in
re-organizing the nature of work so that workers can express what Marx calls their “species-
being” or those features of the self that are characteristically human. Very much like Aristotle,
Marx seems to mean by this an individual’s ability to reason, and in particular his powers of
choosing, deciding, discriminating, and judging. If work is re-organized to enable workers to
express their rational powers, then each worker will perform tasks that are interesting and
mentally challenging (no worker will perform strictly monotonous, routine, unskilled tasks). In
addition, workers will participate in deliberations about the ends to be achieved by the work they
do and how to achieve those ends. And, finally, these deliberations will be organized
democratically so that the opinions of each worker are fairly taken into account. When these
conditions are put into place, labor is no longer “divided” between skilled and unskilled or
between managerial and non-managerial. Marx suggests that if work is reorganized in these
ways, it will promote feelings of solidarity and camaraderie among workers and eventually
between these workers and those in similar situations elsewhere. For the fact that workers can
express their characteristic human powers in action, coupled with the egalitarian conditions in
the workplace, can upset competitive feelings and promote respect by removing the bases for
inferiority and superiority. Workers then come to exhibit some of the more traditional virtues
such as generosity and trustfulness, and avoid some of the more traditional vices such as
cowardice, stinginess, and self-indulgence.

That Marx’s views seem derivative of Aristotle’s in important ways is not surprising, for,
unlike Hume whose knowledge of Aristotle is not fully known, Marx explicitly drew upon
Aristotle’s works. For further discussion of the extent to which Marx drew on Aristotle, see
DeGolyer (1985).

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) defended a version of liberal utilitarianism, but scholars
disagree about what kind of utilitarianism that was. We can safely say that, as a utilitarian, Mill
thought human conduct should promote the happiness or welfare of those affected. But was Mill
an act-utilitarian, who thought that right acts are those that promote as much happiness as can
be done on the particular occasion, given the alternatives available to the agent? Or was he a
rule-utilitarian, who thought that right conduct was conduct permitted by rules that, when publicly
known to be generally accepted or followed, would maximize happiness or welfare? Or was he
a motive-utilitarian, who thought that one should act as the person with the motives or virtues
most productive of happiness should act? (For a discussion of these interpretive questions, see
the related entry on Mill’s moral and political philosophy.) Although this entry will steer clear of
these interpretive hurdles and will concentrate on Mill’s discussion of the nature of happiness
and of some of the institutional structures that can promote happiness, these questions of
interpretation will be relevant to a final assessment of Mill in Section 4, below.

In his essay On Liberty Mill claims that his version of utilitarianism rests on a conception
of happiness that is appropriate to people as “progressive” beings (Mill 1975, 12). And in
Utilitarianism he suggests that this conception is focused on the “higher pleasures” that serve to
distinguish humans from animals (Mill 1979, 7–11). These higher pleasures turn out to be the
activities and pursuits that exercise what in Aristotle’s view are our powers of practical
deliberation – of choosing, judging, deciding, and discriminating. In On Liberty, Mill writes: “He
who lets the world … choose his plan of life for him has no need of any other faculty than the
ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself employs all his faculties. He must
use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for
decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold
his deliberate decision” (Mill 1975, 56). As a person develops his powers of practical
deliberation and comes to enjoy their exercise, he gains the self-esteem that is the basis of a
virtuous and well-lived life.

For further discussion of Mill’s view of happiness, see Brink (1992).

Mill argued that seriously unequal societies, by preventing individuals from developing
their deliberative powers, mold individuals’ character in unhealthy ways and impede their ability
to live virtuous lives. For example, Mill argued, in deep disagreement with the views of his own
time, that societies that have systematically subordinated women have harmed both men and
women, making it almost impossible for men and women to form relationships of genuine
intimacy and understanding. In The Subjection of Women, Mill wrote that the family, as
constituted at his time, was a “school of despotism,” which taught those who benefited from it
the vices of selfishness, self-indulgence, and injustice. Among working class men, the fact that
wives were excessively dependent on their husbands inspired meanness and savagery. In
chapter IV of The Subjection of Women, Mill goes so far as to claim that “[a]ll the selfish
propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, which exist among mankind, have
their source and root in, and derive their principal nourishment from, the present constitution of
the relation between men and women” (Mill 1988, 86). Women who have been legally and
socially subordinated to men become meek, submissive, self-sacrificing, and manipulative. In
brief, men evidence the vices of the slave master, while women evidence the vices of the slave.
For moral lives and psychologically healthy relationships to be possible, Mill called for altered
marital arrangements, supported by changes in law, that would promote the development and
exercise of women’s deliberative powers along with men’s. Only under such conditions could
women and men acquire feelings of real self-esteem rather than feelings of false inferiority and
superiority.

Like Aristotle, Mill recognized the power of political institutions to transform individuals’
desires and aims and to improve them morally. In chapter III of Considerations on
Representative Government, Mill writes approvingly of the democratic institutions of ancient
Athens. He believed that by participating in these institutions, Athenians were called upon to rise
above their individual partialities and to consider the general good. By co-operating with others
in governing their community, he wrote, each citizen “is made to feel himself one of the public,
and whatever is their interest to be his interest” (Mill 1991, 79).

And like Marx, Mill recognized the morally disturbing effects of a life limited to routine
and unskilled labor. In Principles of Political Economy, he recommended that relations of
economic dependence between capitalists and workers be eliminated in favor of cooperatives
either of workers with capitalists or of workers alone. In these associations members were to be
roughly equal owners of tools, raw materials, and capital. They worked as skilled craftspersons
under self-imposed rules. They elected and removed their own managers. By elevating the
dignity of labor, Mill thought such cooperatives could convert “each human being’s daily
occupation into a school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence” and bring
people as close to social justice as could be imagined (Mill 1900, vol. 2, 295).

3.5 T. H. Green

T. H. Green (1836–1882) began as a student and teacher of classics before turning to

philosophy. He knew Plato’s and Aristotle’s Greek texts well. In developing his view of a
person’s good in Book III of his Prolegomena to Ethics, Green finds his own views anticipated in
Plato and Aristotle and especially in Aristotle’s treatment of happiness, the human good, and the
particular virtues. Green aims to show that a person’s good consists in his “self-satisfaction” or
“self-realization.” To realize the self requires that one fully develop his capacities as a rational
agent. And that requires aiming at the good of others for their own sake. Green thought Aristotle
was right about the nature of the virtuous person’s motive. In Prolegomena 263 he notes
Aristotle’s view that the virtuous person acts tou kalou heneka (for the sake of the fine), and he
recognizes that acting in this way requires that the agent have concern for the good of the
community. So the agent’s good is connected to the good of others.

To illustrate his reading of Aristotle, Green discusses two of Aristotle’s virtues: courage
and temperance. He notes that both virtues appear to be more restricted in scope than
commonsense would suggest. In discussing courage, Aristotle limits courage to facing fear in
danger of death in defense of one’s city (Nicomachean Ethics 1115a25–29). A man who faces
death by drowning or disease is not courageous. Courage is restricted to facing death in battle
for one’s city because such action aims at the common good and is the finest form of death.
Green uses these points in Aristotle’s discussion to show that Aristotle’s view rests on a general
principle that can widen the circumstances of courage in a way that Green accepts. In Green’s
view, courage is a matter of facing the danger of death “in the service of the highest public
cause which the agent can conceive” (1969, 260).

Green explains Aristotle’s restrictions on temperance in a similar way. Not every form of
restraint counts as temperance for Aristotle. It is limited to restraint of the pleasures of appetitive
desires for food, drink, and sex, the pleasures we share with non-human animals. The
intemperate person is like the gourmand who prayed that his throat might become longer than a
crane’s: he is interested in sensation and does not value the exercise of his rational capacities.
Green recognizes that Aristotle needs to check these appetitive desires because intemperance
is a danger to the common good. He writes: “such a check should be kept on the lusts of the
flesh as might prevent them from issuing in what a Greek knew as hubris – a kind of self-
assertion and aggression upon the rights of others … which was looked upon as the antithesis
of the civil spirit” (1969, 263).
 Green was right to find his views anticipated in the Greeks. He saw, as Aristotle did, that
living well requires the exercise of one’s developed rational powers, and that persons who have
realized their powers and have formed virtuous traits of character aim at the common good,
which is a part of their own good. Like Aristotle, Green thought that such development required
that one be a participant in a special kind of political community – one “where the free
combination of mutually respecting citizens” enact equal law and the common good (1969, 263).

For further discussion of Green’s interpretation and use of Aristotle’s views, see Irwin
(2009).

3.6 Rawls

As indicated in the introduction to this entry, a renewed philosophical interest in

questions of virtue and character was indirectly the result of the publication in 1971 of John
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. In contrast to many of his contemporaries who focused on meta-
ethical questions and the meaning of moral terms, Rawls (1921–2002) moved moral and
political philosophy in a practical direction and stimulated modern philosophers to explore the
psychological grounding of good moral character. Early in Part II of A Theory of Justice, Rawls
makes what he calls a “perfectly obvious” point – that the social system shapes the wants and
aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines “in part the sort of persons they want to
be as well as the sort of persons they are” (1999a, 229). These points, Rawls claims, have
always been recognized.

How do just institutions shape our wants and aims and affect the sort of people we
become? The institutions of interest to Rawls are those that make up a society’s “basic
structure”. These are the institutions that make social cooperation possible and productive. They
include the political constitution, the structure of the economy, legalized forms of property
ownership, the family in some form, and others. Rawls defends two principles of justice as
regulations for the basic structure of his just society: (1) the equal liberties principle, according
to which each person has the same claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties. (2) and
a second principle that specifies two conditions that must be satisfied in order for socio-
economic inequalities to be permissible. These conditions are fair equality of opportunity and
the difference principle.

Consider Rawls’s discussion of the guarantee of equal liberties under the first principle
of justice. This principle covers two types of liberties, personal liberties and political liberties.
Under this principle, each person is entitled to liberties of both kinds as a basic right. But Rawls
goes further to argue that political liberties must be assured their “fair value” (1999a, 243). This
means that chances to hold office and to exercise political influence must be independent of
socio-economic position. Otherwise, “political power rapidly accumulates and becomes unequal”
(1999a, 199). To preserve fair value, Rawls does not follow Aristotle’s strategy of making
political participation a requirement of all citizens. Yet he shares with Aristotle the view that the
guarantee of fair value has the aim of promoting and sustaining citizens’ common status as
equal citizens (1999a, 205–206). Moreover, Rawls agrees with Mill that political participation
contributes to the moral development of citizens. As noted in Section 3.4 above, when praising
Athenian democracy, Mill writes that when a citizen participates in public deliberation, “he is
called upon … to weigh interests not his own, to be guided, in case of conflicting claims by
another rule than his private partialities; to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have
for their reason of existence the general good … . He is made to feel himself one of the public,
and whatever is their interest to be his interest” (1991, 79). The guarantee of political liberty both
strengthens citizens’ sense of their own value and enlarges their moral sensibilities.

In part III, Rawls turns to the question of how individuals acquire a desire to act justly,
and to do so for the right reasons, when they have lived under and benefited from just
institutions (1999a, 399). Rawls’s account is indebted to Aristotle’s views in several ways. First,
Rawls holds, as Aristotle did, that if proper institutions are in place, then the attitudes and
behaviors associated with the desire to act justly will emerge naturally, as a result of
psychological tendencies persons experience in ordinary life. For, other things being equal, it is
part of human psychology to enjoy most the exercise of one’s realized powers (see Rawls’s
discussion of what he calls the Aristotelian Principle), to enjoy the realization of others’ powers
(see his discussion of the “companion effect” to the Aristotelian principle), and to form ties of
attachment and friendship to persons and institutions who promote one’s good. Second, and
again like Aristotle, Rawls argues that if citizens are fortunate to live in a community that
provides the basic goods they need for realizing their powers and that offers them opportunities
to develop and use their abilities in shared activities with others, then they will develop a stable
sense of their own value that is based on their own accomplishments and their status as equal
citizens, rather than on a position more advantaged relative to others. With a stable sense of
their own value and a reasonable hope of achieving their aims, citizens will want to act justly for
the right reasons. They will not be prone to rancor, jealousy, and hostile envy, “one of the vices
of hating mankind” (1999a, 466).

Only a brief discussion of these points of coincidence is possible here. Consider, first,
sections 72–75 of A Theory of Justice, where Rawls outlines what he calls the three stages of
moral development, governed by three psychological laws. These laws explain how individuals
come to have new, non-derivative, final ends as they acquire ties of love, friendship, affection,
and trust. As Aristotle recognized, these ties are caused to occur in individuals as they come to
recognize others’ evident intention to act for their good, and to enjoy what they and others can
do.

At the first stage of moral development, on the assumption that family institutions are
just, children come to love their parents as a result of their parents’ demonstrating clearly that
their children are enjoyed and valued. At the second stage, on the assumption that cooperative
associations are fairly arranged and known to be so, members of reasonably successful
cooperative associations (Rawls’s “social unions”) come to enjoy and value their cooperative
partners. This happens when members do their parts responsibly, each contributing to a
mutually recognized goal, and where all participants display appropriate abilities. Under these
conditions, participants come to enjoy their own participation, to enjoy the display of others’
skills and abilities, and to form ties of friendship and trust with their cooperative partners.
Because the activities are complementary, individuals can see themselves in what others do. In
this way, individuals’ sense of what they are doing is worthwhile. Their self-love, to use
Aristotelian language, becomes a group achievement.

Finally, at the third stage, as individuals come to realize how the institutions regulated by
the principles of justice promote their good and the good of their fellow citizens, they become
attached to these principles and develop a desire to apply and to act in accordance with them.
Like the major institutions of Aristotle’s ideal polis, the institutions regulated by Rawls’s two
principles of justice have as their aim to promote citizens’ good by providing the social bases of
individuals’ self-worth (Rawls’s primary good of “self-respect”). The provision of equal liberties in
accordance with the first principle of justice enables citizens to form the associations in which
their common aims and ideals can be pursued. As we have seen, these associations are
necessary for self-respect to be produced and maintained. The guarantee of the fair value of
political liberty, along with fair equality of opportunity under Rawls’s second principle of justice,
prevent excessive accumulation of property and wealth and maintain equal opportunity of
education for all, enabling everyone with similar motivation and ability to have roughly equal
prospects of culture and achievement (1999a, 63). Taken together, these two principles ensure
that persons have reasonable hopes of achieving their aims. Finally, the difference principle
serves to ensure everyone a decent standard of living, no matter what individual citizens’ social
position, natural talents, or fortune may be. The difference principle, Rawls writes, corresponds
to the “idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who
are less well off” (1999a, 90). In these various ways, the two principles, in combination, amount
to a publicly acknowledged recognition that each citizen has equal worth.

Once these just institutions are in place, Rawls thinks that the worst aspects of the social
division of labor can be overcome. No one, he writes, “need be servilely dependent on others
and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to
human thought and sensibility” (1999a, 464). Here Rawls notes the same problems with many
types of paid labor that so disturbed Aristotle. Paid labor often limits the worker’s exercise of her
decision-making powers and requires her to conform to the direction of others. Of course, Rawls
does not suggest solving these problems as Aristotle did. But he thinks that they need to be
solved, and that a just society can solve them, perhaps by adopting Mill’s proposal (see Section
3.4 above) to restructure workplaces to become worker-managed cooperatives (2001, 178).

For further discussion of Rawls’s views on how institutions shape our characters, see
Freeman (2007, ch. 6) and Edmundson (2017, ch. 3).

4. Contemporary Questions About Character

Marx, Mill, and Rawls suggest how character can be molded by antecedent
circumstances – Marx by economic structures; Mill by paid work, political life, and family
relationships; Rawls by the institutions regulated by the two principles of justice. Yet these
insights about the effect of institutions on character seem to raise other, more troubling
questions: if our character is the result of social and political institutions beyond our control, then
perhaps we are not in control of our characters at all and becoming decent is not a real
possibility.

Among contemporary philosophers, Susan Wolf is one of several who address these
worries. In her Freedom Within Reason Wolf argues that almost any morally problematic
upbringing could be coercive and could render a person unable to see what he ought morally to
do or render him unable to act on that recognition. As examples, Wolf cites ordinary citizens of
Nazi Germany, white children of slave owners in the 1850s, and persons brought up to embrace
conventional sex roles. Wolf thinks that there is no method for determining which upbringings
and influences are consistent with an ability to see what should be done and to act accordingly,
and hence she thinks there is always the risk that we are less responsible for our actions than
we may hope.

Such skepticism may be misplaced. For if good character is based on naturally occurring
psychological responses that most people (including persons brought up to embrace racist and
sexist beliefs) experience without difficulty, then most people should be able to become better
and to be responsible for actions that express (or could express) their character.
 Still, this is not to say that changing one’s character is easy, straightforward, or quickly
achieved. If character is formed or malformed by the structures of political, economic, and family
life, then changing one’s character may require access to the appropriate transforming forces,
which may not be available. In modern societies, for example, many adults still work at
alienating jobs that do not afford opportunity to realize the human powers and to experience the
pleasures of self-expression. Women in particular, because of unequal domestic arrangements,
nearly total responsibility for childcare, and sex segregation in the workplace, often endure low-
paying, dead-end jobs that encourage feelings of self-hatred. In a family where economic, and
hence psychological, power is unequal between women and men, affection, as Mill recognized,
may harm both parties. Thus many women and men today may not be well-positioned to
develop fully the psychological capacities Aristotle, Marx, Mill, and Rawls considered
foundational to virtuous character.

These considerations indicate why character has become a central issue not only in
ethics, but also in feminist philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of education, and
philosophy of literature. If developing good moral character requires being members of a
community in which citizens can fully realize their human powers and ties of friendship, then one
needs to ask how educational, economic, political, and social institutions should be structured to
make that development possible. Some contemporary philosophers are now addressing these
issues. For example, Martha Nussbaum uses Aristotelian virtues to outline a democratic ideal in
(1990b). In (1996) Andrew Mason explores how capitalist market forces make it difficult for
virtues to flourish. In (1987) Jon Elster interprets Marx as offering a conception of the good life
that consists in active self-realization, which can be promoted or blocked by economic and
political institutions. In (1993) John Bernard Murphy reconstructs Aristotle’s views on practical
deliberation and decision-making to show how they can yield a theory of productive labor that
helps us see what is wrong with work in the contemporary world and how to re-organize it.
Rosalind Hursthouse applies an Aristotelian view of the emotions to an investigation of racist
attitudes in (2001). In (2010) Marcia Homiak develops Aristotle’s and Mill’s views on the
transformative power of institutions to explore the possibilities for living virtuously in an imperfect
world. Laurence Thomas (1989) uses Aristotle’s discussions of self-love and friendship to argue
that friendship helps to develop and maintain good moral character. And if one is interested in
understanding what the nature of moral character is and the extent to which it can be altered,
one will find useful examples of both good and bad moral character in literary writers. For
philosophical discussion of literary writers’ use of character, see Taylor (1996) and Nussbaum
(1990a).

Finally, it might be useful to note that this brief discussion of the history of philosophical
views of character indicates that character has played, or can play, an important role in a variety
of western ethical traditions, from Greek virtue-centered views to Kantianism to utilitarianism to
Marxism. So Anscombe’s provocative claim with which this entry began – that the two major
traditions in modern moral theory (Kantianism and utilitarianism) have ignored questions of
virtue and character to their detriment – does not seem altogether true. Nevertheless, some of
the views surveyed here seem to give a more prominent role to character and virtue than do
others. It is not easy to explain precisely what this prominence consists in. Although a full
treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this essay, a preliminary indication of how they
might be addressed can be provided. For further discussion of these questions, see Trianosky
(1990), Watson (1990), Homiak (1997), and Hursthouse (2001).

As this entry has indicated, Kant’s views do provide a role for virtue, for it matters to Kant
that we perform our imperfect duties with the right spirit. The virtuous person has the properly
cultivated tendencies to feel that make it easier for her to perform her imperfect duties. These
feelings support her recognition of what is right and are a sign that she is disposed to perform
her duties. Because Kant views the emotions as recalcitrant and in continual need of reason’s
control, virtue amounts to a kind of self-mastery or continence. One might put this point by
saying that, for Kant, virtuous character is subordinate to the claims of practical reason.

Aristotle’s view, on the other hand, is usually considered a paradigm example of a “virtue
ethics”, an ethical theory that gives priority to virtuous character. To see what this might mean,
recall that Aristotle’s virtuous person is a genuine self-lover who enjoys most the exercise of her
abilities to think and know. This enjoyment guides her practical determinations of what actions
are appropriate in what circumstances and renders her unattracted to the pleasures associated
with the common vices. Her properly cultivated emotional tendencies are not viewed as
recalcitrant aspects of her being that need to be controlled by reason. Rather, her practical
decisions are informed and guided by the enjoyment she takes in her rational powers. One
might put this point by saying that, in Aristotle’s view, practical deliberation is subordinate to
character.

One might then ask of other ethical views whether they take practical deliberation to be
subordinate to character or vice versa. As this entry has indicated, Hume appears to side with
Aristotle and to give character priority over practical deliberation. For he suggests that someone
with the natural virtues based on self-esteem will have the wider imaginative powers needed for
correct deliberation from the standpoint of the judicious spectator. Whether character is
subordinate to reason for Mill may depend on what sort of utilitarianism Mill can be shown to
espouse. If he is a motive-utilitarian who thinks that one should act as the person with the
motives or virtues most productive of happiness would act, then a case could be made for his
giving character priority over practical reason. If, on the other hand, he is an act- or rule-
utilitarian, he would seem to give character a role that is subordinate to reason. These brief
remarks indicate that the question of whether an ethical theorist gives priority to character can
only be determined by a thorough analysis of the various critical elements of that philosopher’s
view.

5. Moral Character and Empirical Studies

5.1 The challenge posed by situationism

This section will begin with a brief discussion of some recent philosophical work on
character that relies on results in experimental social psychology. This philosophical work calls
into question the conceptions of character and virtue that are of concern especially to the
ancient Greek moralists and to contemporary philosophers whose work derives from ancient
views. Philosophers impressed by this tradition in experimental social psychology – which is
often labeled “situationism”– have denied that traits of character are stable, consistent, or
evaluatively integrated in the way that ancient or contemporary philosophers suggest. The
ancient moralists assumed that virtues are, in John Doris’s description, “robust traits: if a person
has a robust trait, they can be confidently expected to display trait-relevant behavior across a
wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even where some or all of these situations are not
optimally conducive to such behavior” (2002, 18). Doris and others argue that traits are not
robust in this sense. They are not stable or consistent and are wrongly invoked to explain why
people act as they do. Rather, these philosophers argue, and as the experimental tradition
indicates, much of human behavior is attributable to seemingly trivial features of the situations in
which persons find themselves. Hence the appropriateness of the label “situationist” for the
philosophers espousing these views. For variations on this view, see Harman (1999, 2000),
Doris (2002), and Vranas (2005).

It is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss this work in detail. Some summary
remarks, however, are in order. (For a detailed discussion, see the entries on empirical
approaches to moral character, section 1, and moral psychology: empirical approaches, section
4.)

Skepticism about robust traits of character emerges from some famous experiments in
social psychology. For example, in one experiment persons who found a dime in a phone booth
were far more likely to help a confederate who dropped some papers than were those who did
not find a dime. Another experiment involved seminary students who agreed to give a talk on
the importance of helping those in need. On the way to the building where their talks were to be
given, they encountered a confederate slumped over and groaning. Those who were told they
were already late were much less likely to help than those who were told they had time to spare.
These experiments are taken to show that minor factors without moral significance (finding a
dime, being in a hurry) are strongly correlated with people’s helping behavior.

Perhaps most damning for the robust view of character are the results of the
experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s. In these experiments the great
majority of subjects, when politely though firmly requested by an experimenter, were willing to
administer what they thought were increasingly severe electric shocks to a screaming “victim.”
These experiments are taken to show that if subjects did have compassionate tendencies, these
tendencies cannot have been of the type that robust traits require.

Philosophers influenced by the experimental tradition in social psychology conclude that

people do not have the broadly based, stable, consistent traits of character that were of interest
to the ancient and modern moralists, or to contemporary philosophers working with some
version of those views. Rather, the psychological studies are taken to show that persons
generally have only narrow, “local” traits that are not unified with other traits into a wider
behavioral pattern. Persons are helpful when in a good mood, say, but not helpful when in a
hurry, or they are honest at home but not honest at work. This skepticism about robust traits
thus poses a challenge to contemporary philosophers, especially those who work with some
version of the ancient views, to develop an account of character that is consistent with empirical
results.

5.2 Some replies to situationism

These interpretations of the experiments in social psychology have been challenged by

both psychologists and philosophers, especially by philosophers working in the tradition of virtue
ethics (see related entry on virtue ethics), who claim that the character traits criticized by
situationists have little to do with the conception of character associated with the ancient and
modern moralists. The objectors say that the situationists rely on an understanding of character
traits as isolated and often non-reflective dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways. They
wrongly assume that traits can be determined from a single type of behavior stereotypically
associated with that trait.

Consider again the payphone and seminarian studies. It may seem obvious that one
cannot respond to all appeals for help, and it may seem doubtful that any reflective person
thinks one should. This suggests that being a helpful person requires some thinking about what
is most important in one’s life, for calls of help can justifiably go unanswered if the individual
believes that responding will interfere with her doing something else that she takes to be of
higher moral importance. So we should not expect helping behavior to be wholly consistent,
given the complex situations in which persons find themselves. Some of the philosophers
discussed in this entry, such as the natural law theorists (in section 3.1) and Kant (in section
3.2), might make this point by reminding us of the distinction between perfect and imperfect
duties. Unlike perfect duties, which require that we take or forego certain actions, the duty to
assist others in need is imperfect, in that how, when, and whom we assist is not precisely
specifiable and so is within the individual’s discretion. The general point, on which most of the
ancient and modern moralists would agree, is that being helpful cannot be understood in
isolation from other values, aims, and traits that the individual has. (For discussion of how
values can be unified, see Wolf 2007.)

Or consider the Milgram experiments. During the experiments, many of the subjects
protested even while continuing to obey the experimenter’s commands. In post-experiment
interviews with subjects, Milgram noted that many were completely convinced of the wrongness
of what they were doing. But the presence of conflict need not indicate an absence, or loss, of
character. On a traditional conception of character, as examined in this entry, many of Milgram’s
subjects are best described as incontinent. They have character, but it is neither virtuous nor
vicious. Many of us seem to fall into this category. We often recognize what it is right to do but
we nevertheless do not do it.

In short, the objectors say that the situationists rely on a simplified view of character.
They assume that behavior is often sufficient to indicate the presence of a trait of character, and
they ignore the other psychological aspects of character (both cognitive and affective) that, for
most of the philosophers discussed in this entry, form a more or less consistent and integrated
set of beliefs and desires. In particular, the objectors say, the situationists ignore the role of
practical deliberation (or, in the case of virtuous character, practical wisdom).

For variations on these replies to the situationists, see Kupperman (2001), Kamtekar
(2004), Radcliffe (2007), Sabini and Silver (2005), Sreenivasan (2013), and cf. von Wright
(1963,136–154).

5.3 Some empirical approaches to Aristotelian views of character

Some recent philosophical work on character aims to meet the skepticism of the
situationist challenge directly, by developing a theory of virtue grounded in psychological studies
that are compatible with the existence of robust traits. This section provides a brief summary of
two such approaches to virtue.

For extensive and nuanced discussion, see Miller (2013, 2014) and Section 2 of the
entry on empirical approaches to moral character, section 2.

One approach is inspired by the “cognitive-affective personality system” (the so-called

CAPS model) that has been developed by social and cognitive psychologists. Rather than
looking for empirical evidence of robust traits in behavioral regularities across different types of
situations, the CAPS model (and philosophers impressed by this model) focus on the
importance of how agents understand the situations they are in. The model views the structure
of personality as the organization of relationships among “cognitive-affective units”. These units
are clusters of dispositions to feel, desire, believe, and plan that, once activated, cause various
thoughts, feelings, and behavior to be formed. Philosophers who ground their understanding of
virtue in this type of psychological theory extend the CAPS model to cover robust virtuous traits
of character. These traits are viewed as enduring dispositions that include the appropriate
clusters of thinking (practical reason), desire, and feeling, manifested in cross-situational
behavior.

For detailed discussion of the CAPS model and its possible value to philosophers, see
Miller (2003, 2014), Russell (2009) and Snow (2010).

Other philosophers do not find the extension of the CAPS model especially helpful, for it
does not seem to move us past what we commonsenically recognize as virtue. We are prepared
to begin with the idea that being virtuous is not just being disposed to act, but also to feel,
respond, and to reason. And not simply to reason, but to reason well. For this approach to be
helpful, we need some account of what excellent practical reasoning consists in.

Some philosophers aim to provide what is needed by looking to psychological studies of

enjoyment. They propose that virtues are analogous to (some) skills, in that the kind of
habituation involved in developing and acting from virtuous character is like the sort of intelligent
habituation typical of the development and exercise of (some) complex skills. The empirical
studies of enjoyment show that, other things being equal, we enjoy the exercise of developed
abilities, and the more complex the ability, the more we enjoy its exercise. If the acquisition and
exercise of virtue is analogous to the development and exercise of complex ability, we can, this
approach suggests, explain a variety of central points about virtuous activity – for example, that,
like (some) skills, virtuous activity is experienced as being its own end, as being enjoyable in
itself, and thus as valued for its own sake. For discussion of virtue as similar to complex skill,
see Annas (2011), Bloomfield (2014), Stichter (2007, 2011), and cf. Sherman (1989).

Situationists might nevertheless reply that to emphasize the role of expertise in practical
reasoning is to make good moral character an ideal that too few of us, if any, can achieve. On
some conceptions of moral knowledge, such as that proposed by Plato in the Republic,
acquiring the knowledge necessary for virtue takes over 50 years of psychological and
intellectual training. And on Aristotle’s view, as this entry has indicated in Section 2.4 above, the
full realization of our rational powers that is required for good moral character is not something
that we can achieve on our own. The development and preservation of good moral character
requires political institutions that promote the conditions under which self-love and friendship
flourish. The situationist might wonder how useful traditional conceptions of good character can
be, if acquiring virtuous character is a long and difficult process made possible by social
institutions that do not yet exist. The situationist may take these problems as support for his
view that we are better off thinking in terms of local traits rather than robust traits.

In ending, it is appropriate to recall the discussion in Section 4, above. On the one hand,
on a view of character such as Aristotle’s, which relies on ordinary capacities to experience the
pleasures of self-expression and to respond with friendly feelings to others’ efforts to help,
almost everyone is capable of becoming better. On the other hand, if Aristotle and others (such
as Marx, Mill, T. H. Green, and Rawls) are correct that character is shaped by the institutions of
political, economic, and family life, then becoming good will require access to the appropriate
institutions. Yet this is not to suggest that becoming good is out of our reach. It may be helpful
here to recall Rawls’s description of a “realistic utopia” in The Law of Peoples when, following
Rousseau in The Social Contract, he writes that just institutions take “men as they are” and
“laws as they might be.” (Rawls, 1999b, 7) Our psychological natures and the institutions that
promote good qualities of character are, in his view and in the views of others discussed