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The Operations of The 1st Battalion, 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) at Fort Koenigsmacher, North of Thionville, France, 9-11 November, 1944 (Rhineland Campaign)

Decribes the operations of a battalion in a river crossing and assault of a fortified area.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
980 views42 pages

The Operations of The 1st Battalion, 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) at Fort Koenigsmacher, North of Thionville, France, 9-11 November, 1944 (Rhineland Campaign)

Decribes the operations of a battalion in a river crossing and assault of a fortified area.

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General Subjects Seotion AQADEMIC DEPARTMENT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL Fort Benning, Georgia ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE 1947-1948 THE OPERATIONS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 358TH INFANTRY (90TH INFANTRY DIVISION} AT FORT KOENIGSMACHER, NORTH OF THIONVILLE, FRANCE. 9~ll-November 1944 (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN) (Personal experience of a Heavy Weapons Company Exeoutive Officér, @ of Operation desoribed: BATTALION IN A RIVER GROSSING AND ASSAULT OF A FORTIFIED AREA Captain Harry W. Barnes, Infantry ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS OLASS NO & 6 e TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1 INGOX ss rscerceescsicecreseceebeeeereescrereesseninseeues BADLLOGTEPhy cecsccsecerscccnseecrevseesersnsessscarseges EMtroductson cecesecceccecvecesteessesseenecescersesenegs The Fortified Region of Metz scaeesucsnecsrcenccrersseves The Plan of the Third ArMY seossessecsscseuesrevenvesscee ea aw wo The XX Corps Plan wessesscsecscccccccccrescacnsersenestee Tho Enemy Situation sssscsceseccccscsccscsvsscevcccsseses 10 The Division Plan .cecessevesscscceecencceneesescecsseese Lb The Division Preparation secsccccresccncsceceensonessaees 16 The Battalion Plan .sssccesecsssscosscvscevcscesneesecses LD The Assault seresees ooeee a6 Analysis and Criticism .. 36 Lessons Learned .. 41 Map A Battle Route of the 90th Infantry Division Map B The XX Corps Plan Map © The 90th Division Plan Map D The Battalion Plen and Exeoution Mep E The Assault of Fort Koenigsmacher -1- 6 e BIBLIOGRAPHY The Reduction of Fortress. Metz XX Corps Operational Report, 1 Sep. to 6 Deo, lead ‘An Operational Report (TS Library} The Ghost Corps Thru Hell and High Water A short history of the XX Oorps (TIS Library) The Battle of Metz, by General Brosse! Military Review, January, 1946, Vol. XXV, No. 9, page 9 (TIS Library) After Aotion Report of the 90th Infantry Division 1 November to 1 December 1944 Franoe-Metz Area (Personal copy of Ase't Div, Commander) A History of the 90th Division in World War IT 6 June 1944 to 9 May 1945 (TIS Library) After Action Reports of the Thira U.S, Army (78 Library) wRe é e THE OPERATIONS. OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 358TH INFANTRY, (90TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT FORT KOENIGSMACHER, (Personal experience of a Heavy Weapons Company Executive Officer) INTRODUCTION This monograph oovers the operations of the let Battalion, 358th Infantry, 90th U, 8, Division in the asseult and capture of Fort Koenigemacher, one of the forte of the outer defenses of Metz, north of Thionville, France. The battalion was com= manded by Lieutenant Oolonel c. A, Lytle, Ag @ matter of introduotion I would like to go back to Uteh Beach on the Chearbourg peninsula. It was at 10 o’olook in the morning on D-Day that the first elements of the 90th U.S. Division placed, their feet on French soil. It was here that the epic of the 90th will begin to unravel itself, until we reach the action covered by this monograph, (1) The path ran as follows: (Map 4) FORET DE MONT CASTRE,PER~ IERS and then the breekout of the Ohearvourg peninsula. The action following was the mad dash aoross France, passing through AVRANGHES, MAYENNE, LE MANS and then north to ALENGON and CHAN BOIS to the part in the Falaise pocket episode, after this comparative brief diversion, the division then resumed ite dash across France, in conjunction with Patton's Armor, as a part of the XX Corps (2) This path followed the course of CHARTES, FONTAINBLEAU, REIMS and then THIONVILLE, (Map a) The Germans at this point, in the 90th Division sector were forced across the Moselle, It Was at this point, generally along the west bank of the Moselle, that the 90th Division was ordered to halt and assume the atti- tude of aggressive defense. The date was 12 September 1944, (1) B, p.5s (8) Personal knowledge. ~s 6 e This condition was caused to exist because of the extended sup- ply lines oreated by General Patton's Third Army pursuit across Franoe.(3) Another reason for the halt was the factor of Fort- ress Metz to the south of Thionville in the Sth Infantry Divis- ton sector. (4) After this thrust across France, the Germans in the Third U.S, Army sector, had moved back to a strong defensive position whioh extendsd from Luxembourg, in the north, to the foothills of the Vosges mountains, in the south. The strongly fortified oity of Metz was in the center of this defensive works, Metz had a strong ring of 43 interoommunicating forts for its de~ fense, as well as the high hills thet cradled the Moselie.({5) The Germans had reached a line at whioh they chose to fight. The stronghold of Metz was to be held at all oost. The XX Corps! Mission, however, was to reduce the Metz fortificat- fone ond capture the olty. Something was going-to have to give, (6) The assault of the fortifications and the oity could ‘not begin immediately due to the critical situation. exiating with supplies. xm Cor, had dengerously stzotohed ite supply lines . phe sete from ‘the ‘time ‘ot the ‘preaktont Sew Normandy to this time.(7) As supplies were building up an effort was made to reduce Fort Driant and Fort Verdun and strike Metz from the south, This was begup on 7 September, ‘The attempt on Fort Drient and Fort Verdun failed; however, a bridgehead in the vioinity of Dormat was held to keep their attention, while another orossing was jwede et Arnaville, 4,000 yards to the south, This oper= ation was successful and the Sth Division and the 7th armored (3) Ay v.33 (4) A, pelg (5) 0, p-O3s (6) B, p12; (7) 4, Pele 40 e e Division had succeeded in reaching a point on the Seille River, and out-flanked several of the Metz positions,(@} {Map B} By 10 October the American Third army front formed an obtuse angle, the sides extending along the Moselle, north to the Luxembourg border and south to Chateau Salins with Metz cooupying the ‘apex, (9) (Map B) THE FORTIFIED REGION OF METZ As gan now be seen, the big job in front of XX Corps was the reduction of Metz and its outlying forts, This would have to be done before XX Gorps could accomplish any further missions to the east and to the Saar River, A brief word as to the strength of the fortified area is as follows; It oonsisted of an inner ring of forte, of which there are 15 in number, These were begun beck in the 16th Century and completed in 1866 under Napoleon III, They, however, had been reconditioned, reinforoed and equipped for modern warfare, The outer ring of forte, 28 in number, were located out about 6 miles from the oity of Metz, in ‘all directions, in which Metz wes the hub. (10) In oonjunotion with this group of forts, of the Metz group, was a series of forts of the Maginot line further to the north. These inoluded Fort Koenigsmacher and Dillangs. Th seemed to tie in perfeotly with the over all plan ‘tor the defense of Metz. (11) THE FLAN OF THE THIRD ARMY g The sole mission of the Third Army in the XX Corps seotor was, not that of taking the city of Metz alone, but in conjunction with the over-all effort of expelling the Germans from French soil and hurling them back to the Rhine, (12) {a) A,p.43 (9) 6,p.93; (10) A,p.6; (11) A,pO; (18) C,p.94, -o e e The best plan was to execute a pincer movement from the north and south, to close somewhere in the rear of the oity, ‘The right, or south wing was in very favoreble positions to exeoute their portion of the plan, They ocoupied a dominant position with fine observation, The left, or north, wing had quite @ different situation facing it. It would have to force @ orossing of an obstacle, the Moselle, establish a bridgehead end expand it before the necessary support equipment could be orcssed.(13} This being the situation, there would, of necessity, have to be a different time schedule set for each wing of the pincer, The south wing would move out initially on a broad front while the north wing mede local actions, whioh would be exploiteds The south would then hold up while the north wing would initiate an aggressive offensive. (14) ‘TRE XX CORPS PLAN The XX Corps plan for the carrying out of its portion of the Third Army plan is well pictured in Field Order #18, Hq XX Corps, ‘APO 340, U.S. Army- portions of which "I quote" "$0 12 (Map 3) 2, XX Corps atke on D-Day, to encirole and deatroy the gar- vison of METZ fortified area, and to seize brhd over the Saar Rs vie SAARBURG. To reconnoiter in foros and seize erossings over the Saar R. intact. Prepare to resume atk to the NE, DeDay: to be announced Formation, bdries and obj opns overlay S.a.5 Int Div (1)0n Corps 0, atk to seize high ground (overlay) mak- (13) 6,p.94; (14) 6,p695. ~6=

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