PP vs Cagoco

FACTS:

about 8:30 on the night of July 24, 1932 a father and son witnesses saw a man passed back and
forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, the man that had been passing back the forth behind Yu Lon
approached him from behind and suddenly and without warning struck him with his fist on the back
part of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the
lower part of his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailants immediately ran away. Yu Yee pursued him
through San Fernando, Camba, and Jaboneros Streets, and then lost sight of him. Two other
Chinese, Chin Sam and Yee Fung, who were walking along Calle Mestizos, saw the incident and
joined him in the pursuit of Yu Lon's assailant. The wounded man was taken to the Philippine
General Hospital, were he died about midnight. A post-mortem examination was made the next day
by Dr. Anastacia Villegas, who found that the deceased had sustained a lacerated wound and
fracture of the skull in the occipital region, and that he had died from cerebral hemorrhage; that he
had tuberculosis, though not in an advanced stage, and a tumor in the left kidney.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagoco is liable for the killing of the victim?

RULING:

Yes. Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provide that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended; but in order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from
that which he proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to
wit: (a) That a felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the
direct consequence of the crime committed by the offender. U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U.S. vs.
Mallari, 29 Phil., 14 U.S. vs. Diana, 32 Phil., 344.)

We have seen that under the circumstances of this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu
Lon, because his death was the direct consequence of defendant's felonious act of striking him on
the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in a treacherous manner. he would
nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend to kill the deceased; and since
the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the presence
of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

US vs Valdez

FACTS:

The crew of a boat passing through Pasig river consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and
six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the
men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the
bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them.
The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused
had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and
immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no
more.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable for the death due to drowning of the victim?

RULING:

Yes, for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience to
the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him
it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same
circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in
another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape, and
in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide.

PP vs Quianzon

FACTS:

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a deceased

person was being held in the house of Victorina Cacpal in a barrio, near the
poblacidn, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual
attendance of relatives and friends. The incident that led to the filing of
these charges took place between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres
Aribuabo, one of the persons present, went to ask for food of Juan
Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in
his care. Aribuabo was a sexagenarian and so was Quianzon. It was the
second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with the same
purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and
applied it to the neck of the man who so pestered him. Aribuabo ran to the
place where the people were gathered exclaiming that he was wounded and
was dying. Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his
abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound on the
tenth day after the incident.

There is no conflict between the prosecution and the defense as regards the
foregoing facts. The question to be determined is who wounded Aribuabo.
The prosecution claims that it was Juan Quianzon and, to prove it, called
Simeon Cacpal, Roman Bagabay, Gregorio Dumlao and Julian Llaguno to
the witness stand.

The first witness, Simeon 'Cacpal, claims to have witnessed the wounding of
Andres Aribuabo in the abdomen by Juan Quianzon. However, we find the
testimony of this witness so improbable, incongruent and contradictory
that we consider meritorious the claim of the defense that it was an error of
the lower court to have taken it into consideration in formulating the
findings of its judgment. Not so with respect to the testimony of the other
witnesses. Roman Bagabay, one of the persons present at said gathering,
testified that he saw Juan Quianzon apply a firebrand to the neck of Andres
Aribuabo who shortly afterwards went toward the place where the witness
and the other guests were gathered, telling that he was wounded and was
going to die and naming Juan Quianzon as the person who wounded him.
He also testified that Juan Quianzon, upon being asked immediately by him
about the incident, admitted to him having attacked Aribuabo with a
bamboo spit. Gregorio Dumlao, a barrio lieutenant, who, upon being
informed of the incident, forthwith conducted an investigation, questioned
Aribuabo and the latter told him that it was the accused who had wounded
him. He likewise questioned the accused and the latter, in turn, stated that
he had wounded the deceased with a bamboo spit. Upon being brought
before Julian Llaguno, chief of police of Paoay, for questioning, Quianzon
confessed to Llaguno that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck
and had later wounded him with a bamboo spit. Before the chief of police
could put this confession of Quianzon in writing, the latter retracted,
denying that he had wounded Aribuabo, for which reason in the affidavit
Exhibit B the fact of having applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck appears
admitted by Quianzon but not that of having wounded the deceased with a
bamboo spit.

After discarding the testimony of Simeon Cacpal, the evidence presented by

the prosecution relative to the appellant's criminal liability for the death of
Andres Aribuabo, briefly consists, first, in the victim's statement
immediately after receiving the wound, naming the accused as the author of
the aggression, and the admission forthwith made by the accused that he
had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him, besides,
with a bamboo spit. Both statements are competent evidence in law,
admissible as a part of the res gestx (sections 279 and 298, No. 7, of the
Code of Civil Procedure; U. S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil., 170; People vs. Portento
and Portento, 48 Phil., 971). Second, in the extra judicial confession of the
accused to the barrio lieutenant, Dumlao, and later to the chief of police
Llaguno, in the same afternoon of the crime, that he was the author of
Aribuabo's wound and that he had inflicted it by means of a bamboo spit.
Inasmuch as this confession, although extrajudicial, is strongly
corroborated and appears to have been made by the accused freely and
voluntarily, it constitutes evidence against him relative to his liability as
author of the crime charged (U. S. vs. So Fo, 23 Phil., 379; People vs.
Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64, 82; U. S. vs. Jamino, 3 P. R. A., 52; Francisco's
Quizzer on Evidence).

The defense of the accused consisted simply in denying that he had

wounded the deceased and that he had confessed his guilt to the witnesses
Bagabay, Dumlao and Llaguno. But such denial cannot prevail against the
adverse testimony of these three veracious and disinterested witnesses, all
the more because neither the accused nor any other witness for the defense
has stated or insinuated that another person, not the accused, might be the
author of the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, and because it is
admitted by the defense that it was the accused, whom Aribuabo had been
pestering with request for food, who attacked the latter, burning his neck
with a firebrand, after which Aribuabo appeared wounded in the abdomen,
without the accused and the witnesses for the defense explaining how and
by whom the aggression had been made.

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused
who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's death, he should not
be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said
wound was not necessarily fatal and the deceased would have survived it
had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to
control or isolate the infection. This contention is without merit., According
to the physician who examined and attended him, the "wound of the
deceased was very serious and it was difficult to determine whether he
could survive or not." It was a wound in the abdomen which occasionally
results in traumatic peritonitis. The infection was caused by the fecal
matter from the large intestine which had been perforated. The possibility,
admitted by said physician, that the patient might" have survived said
wound had he not removed the drainage, does not mean that that act of the
patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal
consequence could have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted
in a paroxysm of pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the
punishable act of the accused.

"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of

homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of
such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not
relieve the actor of responsibility. * * *" (13 R. C. L., 748.)

Furthermore, it does not appear that the patient, in removing the drainage,
had acted voluntarily and with the knowledge that he was performing an
act prejudicial to his health, inasmuch as self-preservation is the strongest
instinct in living beings. It must be assumed, therefore, that he
unconsciously did so due to his pathological condition and to his state of
nervousness and restlessness on account of the horrible physical pain
caused by the wound, aggravated by the contact of the drainage tube with
the inflamed peritoneum. "When the peritonitis is due to traumatism, or to
a perforation of the stomach, intestine, or gall-bladder, etc., it is indicated
by violent shivering and pain first localized at a point in the abdomen,
extending later to the entire abdominal wall; acute intolerable pain, which
is aggravated by the slightest movement, becoming unbearable upon
contact with the hand, a rag, or the bedclothes. , The pain is continuous but
it gives frequent paroxysms. The abdomen is swollen, tense. Vomitings of
greenish matter, which are very annoying and terribly painful, take place
from the beginning and continue while the disease lasts." (XVI Spanish-
American Encyclopedic Dictionary, 176; see also XXI Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1911 ed., 171.) If to this is added the fact that the victim in this
case was mentally deranged, according to the defense itself, it becomes
more evident that the accused is wrong in imputing the natural
consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused is liable for the death of the victim?

RULING:
Yes.

the seriousness whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means

employed, but by the result actually produced; and as the wound which the
appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his
death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the
act in question should be qualified as homicide, etc."

The grounds for this rule of jurisprudence are correctly set forth in 13 R. C.
L., 751, as follows:

"While the courts may have vacilated from time to time it may be taken to
be the settled rule of the common law that one who inflicts an injury on
another will be held responsible for his death, although it may appear that
the deceased might have recovered if he had taken proper care of himself,
or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper
treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death
was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the
condition of the wound. The principle on which this rule is founded is one
of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be
responsible for the natural consequences of his own acts. If a person inflicts
a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy,
and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does
not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-
operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of
the wound or its unskilful and improper treatment, which are of themselves
consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case,
must in law be deemed to have been among those which were in
contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held
responsible. But, however, this may be, the rule surely seems to have its
foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to
give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the
uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries,
it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the
immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which
persons guilty of the highest crime might escape conviction and
punishment."
Assuming that we should disregard Simeon Cacpal's testimony, there is no
evidence of record that the crime charged was committed by means of the
knife, Exhibit A, and we only have the extrajudicial admission of the
accused that he had committed it by means of a bamboo spit with which the
wound of the deceased might have been caused because, according to the
physician who testified in this case, it was produced by a "sharp and
penetrating" instrument.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of

intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be taken
into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating
circumstances adverse to him, we modify the appealed judgment by
sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty with a minimum of four years
of prision correctional and a maximum of eight years of prision
mayor, affirming it in all other respects, with costs to said appellant.
PP vs Martin

FACTS:

Between four and five o' clock in the morning of August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found
inside the family toilet, which was at a certain distance from their home, with a maguey rope, six
meters long and one centimeter in diameter, around her neck, leaving a circular mark around it with
the exception of the nape which was unmarked undoubtedly due to her long and thick hair covering
it. The corpse was first seen by Anselma Martin, sister of the accused, who was living in the same
house, and Saturnino Tumaneng, brother-in-law of Laura, who happened to be passing by. The
defendant was absent from home.

The appellant contends that the death of Laura was not due to the strangling, but to her heart
disease. It should be noted, however that the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by
the strangling, and consequently, the defendant was responsible for the death, notwithstanding the
fact that the victim was already sick. Had not the defendant strangled the deceased, the latter,
notwithstanding her illness, would not have died. In other words, the defendant directly caused her

ISSUE:

Whether or not Martin is guilty of the death of Laura?

RULING:

Yes. Where death results as the direct consequences of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact
that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.

Urbano vs IAC
FACTS:

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his
ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the
tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water
coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion
of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass.
He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that
he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A
quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle,
by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by
Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing
a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences.
Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980,
the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable
settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:

22 days after Javier was rushed to hospital and was pronounced dead due to Tetanus infection.
Urbano was then charged for the death of Javier.

ISSUE:

Whehter or not Urbano is guilty for the death of Javier?

RULING:

Yes.

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused
is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).

The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result of
which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981 which
was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and
that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due
to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with
tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound,
which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow
got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.

In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:

xxx xxx xxx

... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696
of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as
an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

ISSUE:

whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his
death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus-

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of
patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates
severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality
rate approaches 100 percent.

Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache

are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain
and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty
opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and
is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As more muscles are
involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus
sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the region of
the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups
affected.

Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval
referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset
 time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and
causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists.
Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease progresses, minimal or
inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms with increasing
frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction of
respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.

Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an

onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent
and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia
and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate even during
spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity and frequent
prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine,
1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo
which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or
on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been
more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a
rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct
and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
 injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause
and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of
the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)

It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very
least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's
criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident,
Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement
where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement
of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508,
Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).

We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the
criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also
free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be
civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July
29, 1987), we said:

xxx xxx xxx

... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes
the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 559).

The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act
or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil
liability cannot be demanded.

This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to

unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
 punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public
action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity
the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is
also punishable by the criminal law?

"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the

reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It
will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."

The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

People vs Palola

FACTS:

The defendant was treated in an insolent manner by the boy, who

said: "Why do hurry me? Are you to one who pays my wages? You
are cross-eyed." The defendant lost his temper and struck the boy
on the mouth with the back of his hand. According to the testimony
of the witnesses for prosecution the boy fell on his back on a
tramway rail, with his nose and mouth bleeding; the witnesses for
the defense, on the other hand, state that he did not fall down; that
his mouth did not bleed; and that the incident occurred at a
considerable distance from the tramway.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Notwithstanding the blow the deceased continued to work on the

plantation until about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the following day,
when he was taken sick with fever and was after some delay carried
home by his father. Two and one-half days later he died.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:

Whether or not Palalo is guilty for the death?

RULING:

There is no question as to the fact that the defendant struck the

deceased a blow on the mouth. But it is extremely doubtful that the
blow either directly or indirectly caused the death. It is not denied
that fever was prevalent in the locality in July, 1925, and it is quite
probable that the death of the deceased was due entirely to natural
causes. The theory of the prosecution is that the deceased, in falling
down, received fatal internal injuries, and bases its conclusions on
the testimony of Dr. Jose V. Valero, who stated in substance that he
examined the body of the deceased on the day following the death
and found ecchymosis on the right shoulder and on the stomach
and that, as a result of the former, there was a congestion of the
right lung, which was the principal cause of the death; that the
blows causing the ecchymosis must have been of such force as to
have made its effect felt immediately; and that the victim could not
have continued working.  chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No proper autopsy of the body was made, and through the

testimony of the boy's father and that of the witnesses for the
defense, it has been proven conclusively that the deceased,
contrary to the doctor's theory of the case, continued to work for
more than a day after he received the blow. The ecchymosis
testified to by the doctor may have been nothing but suggillations
or "death spots" formed after the death; the fact that the marks
were found both on the stomach and on the back of the deceased so
indicates. Upon this subject Wharton and Sittle say: ". . . As the
blood settles by gravity into the dependent parts of the body, new
color changes, due to this hypostasis and diffusion of the blood from
the blood vessels into the surrounding tissues, take place. The
dependent tissues in from three to ten hours begin to show spots or
purplish or bluish discoloration, and to become edematous. The
areas where pressure is exerted, as by creases in the clothing,
remain pale. Lourdes claims that these spots may be made to
disappear if the position of the body is changed at the end of four
hours; then the spots will be found in the parts that, after the
change of position, become dependent. After twelve to fifteen hours
the areas that at first showed hypostatic discolorations may, if the
body be turned, grow pale, but they do not disappear. And after
thirty hours the primary hypotatic discolorations may grow pale, but
secondary spots will not be formed in other places. These hypostatic
probably take place in all bodies, though they are less marked in the
bodies of person who have died of hemorrhage or from some other
cause of depletion, as in the cases of cholera. The appearance of
these spots may possibly lead to the suspicion that they have been
caused by injuries before the death, which have led to ecchymosis;
but the hypostatic spots, if incised, allow of the escape of merely
bloodstained serum, not fluid blood or blood clots; while, if the spot
has been caused as an ecchymosis, there will be found traces of
fluid blood or clots, which could not have been formed post
mortem except in the veins." (Wharton & Stille's Medical
Jurisprudence, 5th ed., vol. III, sec. 401.) chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case the examination of the body took place over
twenty-four hours after the death and appears to have been very
incomplete; no incisions were made and the examining physician, a
young man of limited experience, admitted that his conclusions
were partly based upon the statements of the members of the
family of the deceased. In these circumstances the conclusions
cannot have been much more than mere guesses. In this connection
we may say that cases of death under suspicious circumstances it is
the duty of the physician performing the post mortem examination
to exercise the utmost care and not draw unwarranted conclusions
from external appearances susceptible of different
interpretations.  
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In our opinion there is more than a reasonable doubt as to the
cause of he death of the deceased, and the appellant must therefore
be acquitted of the charge of homicide. He might perhaps be
convicted of lesiones  under article 588 of the Penal Code, the
maximum penalty for which is fifteen days of arresto menor, but it
appears from the record that he has been detained in prision for a
period much in excess of that penalty and it is therefore unnecesary
to provide for further punishment.   chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant-

appellant is hereby acquitted of the crime charged in the
information, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

commence the commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt
acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a
genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real
unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said
ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which
is a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, 1947, and
presenting the said ticket so falsified on said date, September 22, 1947, in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said
number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so
won by said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29, 1947, but the
said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of
estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this
spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused
presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as
presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman
who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there.

ISSUE:

Whehter or not accused is guilty of estafa?

RULING:

Yes.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone
and would not constitute a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-
winning number. So in the ultimate analysis appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit
estafa (punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically and legally he has to suffer for
the serious crime of falsification of a government obligation. We realize that the penalty is too
severe, considering all the circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a lower
penalty than authorized by law. The exercise of clemency and not in this court.

We are constrained to affirm the sentence appealed from, with costs against the appellant.

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house
in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be
killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived
at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that
Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the
accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to
constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition,

ISSUE:

Whehter or not Petitioner is guilty of attempted murder?

No.

RULING:

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in
the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an
attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus
factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had
the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible
of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the
accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done
without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent
and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower
court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of
impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is
consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such
provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law.
Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt
irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot
escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It
appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible
crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility
as a defense to a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent
is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment.
And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening
cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an
element of attempted and frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles
4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43530             August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At
that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused
had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.

The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the
trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense constitue attempted robbery?

RULING:

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does
not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales,
59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the
Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of
another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to
commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the
information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board
and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did not
succeed in entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who
upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ."
Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs.
Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21
Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused
must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions,
— inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been
rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The
breaking of the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance
inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to
dwelling.

HE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BASILIO BORINAGA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Sometime prior to March 4, 1929, an American by the name of Harry H. Mooney, a resident of the
municipality of Calubian, Leyte, contracted with one Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish
corral. Basilio Borinaga was associated with Lawaan in the construction of the corral. On the
morning of March 4, 1929, Lawaan, with some of his men, went to Mooney's shop and tried to collect
from him the whole amount fixed by the contract, notwithstanding that only about two-thirds of the
fish corral had been finished. As was to be expected, Mooney refused to pay the price agreed upon
at that time. On hearing this reply of Mooney, Lawaan warned him that if he did not pay, something
would happen to him, to which Mooney answered that if they wanted to do something to him they
should wait until after breakfast, Lawaan then left with his men, and Mooney, after partaking of his
morning meal, returned to his shop.

On the evening of the same day, Mooney was in the store of a neighbor by the name of Perpetua
Najarro. He had taken a seat on a chair in front of the Perpetua, his back being to the window.
Mooney had not been there long when Perpetua saw Basilio Borinaga from the window strike with a
knife at Mooney, but fortunately for the latter, the knife lodged in the back of the chair on which
Mooney was seated. Mooney fell from the chair as a result of the force of the blow, but was not
injured. Borinaga ran away towards the market place. Before this occurred, it should be stated that
Borinaga had been heard to tell a companion: "I will stab this Mooney, who is an American brute."
After the attack, Borinaga was also heard to say that he did not hit the back of Mooney but only the
back of the chair. But Borinaga was persistent in his endeavor, and hardly ten minutes after the first
attack, he returned, knife in hand, to renew it, but was unable to do so because Mooney and
Perpetua were then on their guard and turned a flashlight on Borinaga, frightening him away. Again
the same night, Borinaga was overheard stating that he had missed his mark and was unable to give
another blow because of the flashlight. The point of the knife was subsequently, on examination of
the chair, found embedded in it.

The foregoing occurrences gave rise to the prosecution of Basilio Borinaga in the Court of First
Instance of Leyte for the crime of frustrated murder. The defense was alibi, which was not given
credence. The accused was convicted as charged, by Judge Ortiz, who sentenced him to fourteen
years, eight months, and one day of imprisonment, reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties
and the costs.

ISSUE:

Whehter or not accused is guilty of the crime of frustrated murder?

RULING:

The homicidal intent of the accused was plainly evidenced. The attendant circumstances
conclusively establish that murder was in the heart and mind of the accused. More than mere
menaces took place. The aggressor stated his purpose, which was to kill, and apologized to his
friends for not accomplishing that purpose. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed
treacherously toward vital organs of the victim. The means used were entirely suitable for
accomplishment. The crime should, therefore, be qualified as murder because of the presence of the
circumstance of treachery.

The only debatable question, not referred to in the briefs, but which must be decided in order to
dispose of the appeal, is: Do the facts constitute frustrated murder or attempted murder within the
meaning of article 3 of the Penal Code? Although no exact counterpart to the facts at bar has been
found either in Spanish or Philippine jurisprudence, a majority of the court answer the question
propounded by stating that the crime committed was that of frustrated murder. This is true
notwithstanding the admitted fact that Mooney was not injured in the least.

The essential condition of a frustrated crime, that the author perform all the acts of execution,
attended the attack. Nothing remained to be done to accomplish the work of the assailant
completely. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of forces independent of
the will of the perpetrator. The assailant voluntarily desisted from further acts. What is known as the
subjective phase of the criminal act was passed. (U. S. vs. Eduave [1917], 36 Phil., 209; People vs.
Mabugat [1926], 51 Phil., 967.)

No superfine distinctions need be drawn in favor of that accused to establish a lesser crime than that
of frustrated murder, for the facts disclose a wanton disregard of the sanctity of human life fully
meriting the penalty imposed in the trial court.

Based on foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant.