Kashmir

Its Aborigines and Their Exodus

Colonel Tej K Tikoo, Ph.D.
 Published in the United States by

Lancer Publishers LLC

855 Peachtree St, Suite 2602
Atlanta, GA 30308

under arrangement with Lancer Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi

© Colonel Tej K Tikoo, 2013

All rights reserved.

eISBN: 978-1-935501-58-9

www.lancerpublishers.us

Painting on the Cover by Veer Munshi: “Hope Against Hope” depicts Kashmiri Pandits in a queue
for registration as ‘migrants’ in Jammu. Oil on Canvass 4/8 feet, year 1990.
 BOOK OVERVIEW

Exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir in 1989, was their seventh such
exodus since the arrival of Islam in Kashmir, in the fourteenth century. This was
precipitated by the outbreak of Pakistan-sponsored insurgency across Kashmir
Valley in 1989. The radical Islamists targeted Pandits - a minuscule community
in Muslim dominated society, creating enormous fear, panic and grave sense of
insecurity. In the face of ruthless atrocities inflicted on them, the Pandits’ sole
concern was ensuring their own physical safety and their resolve not to convert
to Islam.

Over 350,000 Kashmiri Pandits were forced to flee en masse leaving their
home and hearth. This was the single largest forced displacement of people of a
particular ethnicity after partition of India.

Pandits’ travails did not end with the exodus. The obstructive and intimidating
attitude of the State administration towards the Pandit refugees, made their post-
exodus existence even more miserable. The Government at the Centre too
remained indifferent to their plight.

This book traces the Pandits’ economic and political marginalization in the
State over the past six decades and covers in detail the events that led to their
eventual exodus.

In the light of ethnic cleansing of Pandits from the Valley, the book also
examines some critical issues so crucial to India’s survival as a multi-cultural,
liberal and secular democracy.
 This book is dedicated to my parents;
Pandit Radha Krishen Tikoo, a pious and a holy man
and
Smt Somawati Tikoo, an epitome of courage; an ocean of love
and compassion.
 CONTENTS

Preface

Acknowledgement

Abbreviations

1Ancient Kashmir: A Brief Historical Sketch

2Transition to Islam

3Mughal and Afghan Period

4Sikh and Dogra Rule

5Land, its People and Communications

6Kashmiri Pandits

7Kashmiriyat

8Genesis of Kashmir Problem and how it got Complicated: Events between

1931 and 1947 AD

9Article 370

10An Uneasy Truce

11Gathering Storm

12Pakistan’s Obsession with and Intervention in Kashmir

13Pandits Targeted

14Militants Shed Kashmiri Pandit Blood

15Exodus

16Myths Perpetuated to Justify Violence

17Aftermath of Exodus

18Return and Rehabilitation

19Critical Issues

Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

Appendix D

Appendix E

Appendix F

Appendix G

Appendix H

Appendix I

Appendix J

Index

Author
 PREFACE

Anyone setting sights on Kashmir for the first time is instantly captivated by its
natural beauty. Ringed by tall, majestic and snow covered mountains, Kashmir
valley is endowed with natures’ bounty. Over the centuries, its temperate
climate, icy blue lakes, shimmering-white mountain streams, lush green
meadows, fruit-laden trees and flower decked gardens have attracted millions
round the globe to enjoy its enchanting beauty. From times immemorial poets,
historians, travellers, adventurists and conquerors have sung paeans to its beauty.
Some have called it a heaven on earth, while others have described it as the
Switzerland of the east; and yet others as Venice of Asia. In the modern
discourse on Kashmir, characterised by discord and disagreement, Kashmir’s
beauty is its only aspect on which there is complete unanimity. This then is the
land, whose inhabitants Kashmiri Pandits have been since the dawn of history.

Being surrounded by some of the world’s tallest mountain ranges, with its
rugged terrain and harsh climate, the Valley has historically remained cut off
from the outside world. It was only in the early years of 19 century that the
th

modern means of transportation opened it up. Till then, the famous passes over
its mountain ranges provided the only access to invaders, conquerors, travellers
and traders into Kashmir valley. Those approaching it from the west, preferred
the route leading upstream along Jhelum river, which was less steep and
provided easy entry into the Valley. After motorised transport became common,
the Valley gradually got integrated into the sub-continental communication
system, particularly with the north-western and western part of the country.
However, in 1947 the communication system in Kashmir and the remaining part
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was rather rudimentary. Since then, huge
investments in effort and resources have considerably improved the state of
communications.

Today, looking at Kashmir’s existing demographic profile, it is difficult to

believe that it took only seven centuries to turn Kashmir’s 100 per cent Hindu
population into nearly 100 per cent Muslim population. Whereas Islam had
conquered Sindh in eighth century and established itself firmly in north-west
India by the middle of 12th century, in Kashmir it could do so only by the
middle of 14th century. Extensive use of sword, coupled with aggressive
proselytising helped establish Islam in Kashmir at a time when the power of
Hindu kings was in decline. Ever since that decline, Kashmir valley has rarely
seen peace for any appreciable length of time in its history. Bloodletting,
persecution of Hindus, sectarian violence among Muslims, ruthless adventurers
and its conquest by alien rulers have kept the Valley burning for major portion of
the past seven centuries. Brief periods of respite during the reign of tolerant and
enlightened kings, were only exceptions.

The aborigines of the Kashmir valley, locally called Bhatta, (otherwise known
as Kashmiri Pandits the world over), were converted and assimilated into the
new faith, Islam. But despite that, those who retained their original faith,
continued to maintain their distinct identity with their own religious rituals and
social customs, based on Kashmiri Shaivism, which are a shade different from
those observed by the Hindus of rest of India. Kashmiri Pandits’ religious
thought and rituals, social customs and cultural moorings are deeply influenced
by the philosophy of Kashmir’s great Shaivite philosophers, Abhinavgupta (10th
century) and Kshemaraja (11th century). Kashmiri Shaivism’s Trika (three-fold)
philosophy, basically states that the ‘Reality’ is represented by ‘transcendental’
(ara), ‘material’ (apara) and a combination of the two (paraapara). The
secluded location of Kashmir valley, its temperate climate and natural beauty,
allowed great mystics, saints, Sufis and Rishis to delve deep into this philosophy
and explore the mysteries of ‘reality’ and the ‘purpose’ of life. Over the
centuries, Kashmiri Pandits produced a galaxy of such mystic poets,
philosophers and Rishis, who further enriched this religious thought. It was the
Kashmiri Pandits who carried Buddha’s philosophy and Buddhist religious
tenets to far away Tibet, centuries ago. It was Pandit Kalhana who wrote one of
the most authentic and earliest known historical records of the events in
Kashmir, called Rajtarangini.

Despite all these attributes, history has not been kind to Kashmir. From 14th
century onwards, and for many centuries thereafter, Kashmir has rarely been left
alone by invaders and adventurists, who tore apart the fabric of its society.
Needless to say, the Pandits — its aborigines, bore the brunt of the ruthless
religious persecution that resulted in their mass killings and many exoduses from
Kashmir. Between the first quarter of 14 century and till the end of Afghan rule
th

in Kashmir (1819), there were six major exoduses of Hindus from Kashmir.
Almost all exoduses occurred when cruel Muslim rulers, driven by religious zeal
and the spirit of Jehad, carried out ruthless genocide of members belonging to
this community. The Pandits were offered three choices; to flee, die or convert to
Islam. Lakhs got forcibly converted to Islam. By the time the British left India in
1947, Kashmiri Pandit population in the Valley had reached abysmally low
figures. Even after that, due to several reasons, their migration outside the state
continued. When the last forced exodus of Hindus of Kashmir took place in
1989–1990, there were less than half a million Pandits left in the Valley.

This is not to suggest that every Muslim ruler indulged in persecution of

Pandits. Some kings and princes treated Pandits well, while others left them
alone. The greatest among these was Zain-ul-Abedien (1420–1470 CE), who not
only brought the exiled Pandits back, but also bestowed honors on them. While
all this was going on, the religious synthesis that took place between the
Buddhists, Hindu and Islamic philosophies, gave rise to the Rishi/Sufi order,
which exercised enormous influence over the people, cutting across the religious
divide. Hindu-Muslim synthesis, particularly, flowered as never before. Noor-
ud-Din Noorani and Lalleshwari (former a Muslim and latter a Hindu, popularly
called Nund Rishi and Lal Ded, respectively) were among its most renowned
and revered proponents. Their message was, by and large, same; peaceful co-
existence, disregard for material pursuits and unraveling the true meaning and
purpose of life. This synthesis gave rise to the adopting of a tolerant form of
Islam by large segment of Kashmiri Muslim population. In due course, this ethos
of peaceful co-existence between the two communities, though short-lived, gave
rise to a syncretic culture, called Kashmiriyat. Alas! This synthesis was frowned
upon by many Muslim rulers and preachers, who felt that the interests of Islam
in Kashmir could best be served by aggressive proselytising, even if it meant
converting Hindus to Islam at the cost of death. These radical rulers and
unrelenting preachers, who mostly came from outside the Valley, laid the
foundations of radical Islam in Kashmir, which has survived to the present day.

Prior to their latest forced exodus in 1989–1990, Kashmiri Pandits had last
witnessed a mass exodus of their community from Kashmir during the Afghan
rule (1753–1819). After that, for nearly two centuries, during which Kashmir
came to be ruled by the Sikhs, followed by Dogras (under the paramountcy of
the British rulers), Kashmiri Pandits did enjoy some respite. After India gained
independence from Britain, Kashmiri Pandits could not be faulted for thinking
that ‘exoduses’ were now a thing of the past. They assessed that even though
they had been reduced to a minuscule minority in the sea of Muslim majority,
being part of democratic, multi-cultural and secular India, was guarantee enough
of their safety and security. Their belief in the Indian Government to safeguard
their future was so strong that they took no precautions whatsoever to cater for
any emergency. They even failed to organise themselves in a manner which
could give them some degree of protection from the upcoming onslaught. Even
after seeing the writing on the wall during the events of 1986, when large scale
violence broke out against them in Anantnag district in south Kashmir, their
faith in the justice of Indian democracy did not waver. Alas! Such thinking
proved to be a fantasy.

After 1947, persecution of Kashmiri Pandits did not always manifest itself in
violence against them; it could be in the form of subtle discrimination on daily
basis; be it while seeking a job or admission in higher classes of learning; or a
taunt directed against their religion or against India, etc. Nevertheless, Kashmiri
Pandits continued to live in the Valley, even though migration in smaller
numbers outside Jammu and Kashmir, particularly for seeking livelihood,
remained a regular feature of their existence in Kashmir.

The latest exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley in 1989–1990, can be
directly attributed to the unresolved issue of Kashmir problem. Its genesis lies in
the partition of India, the British (and later United States) manipulations in
furthering their own geo-political interests in this part of the world and
Pakistan’s repeated interventions in Kashmir. Taking the case to the United
Nations (UN) by India ensured that the geo-political realities created by the Cold
War proved decisive to finally seal this stalemate. India contributed in no small
measure in complicating the issue. It was then that the seeds of the conflict
which would eventually allow radical Islam to claim Kashmiri Pandits as its
victims, were sown.

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which gives the State a special status,
prevented its total constitutional merger and created a permanent psychological
barrier between the people of the State and the rest of India. In the long run, it
provided an ideal breeding ground for the radical elements to strengthen
themselves. The demand for preserving Muslim identity of the State, which
Article 370 recognized, metamorphosed into the demand for autonomy; then it
took the shape of demand for independence; and finally into a crusade for
turning it into an Islamic State, to be governed by Sharia. By 1989, the situation
in the Valley deteriorated to such an extent that Pakistan felt bold enough to
embark on a proxy war to grab Kashmir. This led to the minorities, mostly
Kashmiri Pandits, being threatened, killed and eventually being thrown out of
the Valley.

Many countries in the world face the scourge of secession on the part of their
various states/provinces, etc. Corsica in France, Basque in Spain, Falkland from
Britain, Chechenya from Russia and Xinjiag from China — all want to secede.
But none of these countries are willing to even discuss their secession, leave
alone allow it to be pressurised by interested quarters. Compared to all of these,
Kashmir has better credentials to be part of India, no matter what yard stick is
applied to measure such credentials.

The long standing political problem of Kashmir was always an Islamic

problem, but it was not an Islamist one. It was the success of Islamic revolution
in Iran and the ousting of Soviet troops from Afghanistan a decade later, that
encouraged Pakistan and its proxies in Kashmir to launch a violent Jehadi
movement in Kashmir. When the insurgency broke out in 1989–90, the radical
Islamists held complete sway. Killings of prominent Kashmiri Pandits on the one
hand and targeting ordinary Pandits in unknown and far flung areas on the other,
created enormous fear, panic and overwhelming sense of insecurity. Through
sustained campaign with the help of posters, hoardings and public address
systems blaring out from pulpits of the mosques, Pandits were offered the same
three choices that their forefathers had been offered centuries ago — ralive,
galive ya tsalive - meaning, join us (implying conversion to Islam), die or run
away. State machinery was totally subverted, paralysing those instruments of the
administration which could be used to prevent their killings and instill a sense of
security among the beleaguered community. Ensuring their own and their family
members’ survival became their top-most priority. This led to mass exodus of
Kashmiri Pandits. When they reached across the Pir Panjal Range, carrying with
them whatever little they could on their person, they heaved a sigh of relief,
thanking the almighty for sparing their lives, when many of their kith and kin
had not been so fortunate.

After the exodus, Government of India’s actions were dictated by the

compulsions of unprincipled politics; not wanting to be seen as providing help to
one religious group, which they felt would dent their ‘secular’ credentials. Be it
as it may, the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir Valley has put a
question mark on the secular credentials of India. Government and media
indifference to the plight of the exiled community could perhaps be explained as
being held hostage to the political and financial considerations, but the
indifference of general public cannot be explained. May be the reason lies in
what Sandhya Jain writes in the Pioneer of June 24, 2008, “Subordination
induced by centuries of oppression led Kashmiri Hindus to adopt a peculiar self-
apartheid and insist on having a distinct identity from other Indian Hindus; price
was a chilling Hindu indifference to their predicament.”

In the post-war decolonised world, India has all along been a shining example
of a stable, democratic and secular country, with its unique diversity and
commitment to multi-culturalism. Justifiably, India had all along flaunted these
credentials to reinforce its position on Kashmir, both within and without. Exodus
of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley was a severe blow to this very ‘idea of
India’. It was to save its face that every Indian institution underplayed the
exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley. Their acceptance of truth would
amount to India itself approving what it repudiated all along — the ‘Two Nation
Theory.’

Nevertheless, old civilisations and ancient nations like India have a

permanency about them. Yet both are not static. Imbued with dynamism, they
change and evolve with the passage of time as past gives way to present, which
in turn is the harbinger of future. It is, therefore, the responsibility of the present
generation to record the truth, as it sees it, so that future generations know what
the media and the government deliberately hid from them. Suppressing truth
never helps, as Benjamin Disraeli once said, “The more extensive a man’s
knowledge of what has been done, the greater will be his power of knowing
what to do.” It is for this reason that I undertook this project; when the memories
of exodus are still fresh and a large number of displaced still alive. It is my
sincere hope that through this book, general public in India and abroad too gets
exposed to the untold story of Kashmiri Pandits’ forced displacement from the
Valley. More importantly, despite many setbacks, India and its countless
millions still believe in Satyam eva Jayate — ‘Truth always prevails’. I am sure,
as far as the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits is concerned, it will.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the past over two decades, it has not been uncommon for Kashmiri
Pandits to be accosted by people with queries about our exodus from Kashmir.
Most queries by people, whom one met while travelling in a train or in the work
place, etc., betrayed their ignorance about the actual happenings in Kashmir
prior to and immediately after the forced displacement of Kashmiri Pandits from
the Valley. While some peoples’ queries were based on the flawed
understanding of the reasons behind the outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir in
late eighties, others did not seem to be aware of the fact that Kashmiri Pandits
were forced to move out of Kashmir at gun point; that they had to leave behind
everything in order to save their lives and the honour of their womenfolk. It was
usual to hear innocent questions like: ‘How often do you go back to Kashmir
every year?’ ‘Did you lock-up your houses before leaving Kashmir?’ Who is
taking care of your houses and property there?’

While in the Army, one was often at the receiving end of typical barbs,
directed at me, particularly by senior officers. “Oh! You guys are…; you should
have stayed on and fought back and not run away from Kashmir.” In one of the
seminars conducted by an Army organisation, I was horrified to hear a senior
retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army say, “Oh, Kashmiri Pandits were
thrown out because they had persecuted the Muslims for decades.” Similarly,
during an official briefing of the Instructors from the prestigious Army War
College, Mhow, at Headquarters ‘Victor Force’ (a top formation responsible for
conducting anti-insurgency operations in south Kashmir), the General Officer
Commanding of the Formation said in reply to a question, “Kashmiri Pandits left
the Valley of their own accord in 1989–1990; they left in search of greener
pastures.” When asked what is going to be the fate of their houses left behind in
the Valley, the pompous General rubbed it in further by adding sarcastically, “In
due course, their houses will fall under their own weight…” The group of
instructors consisting of Colonels, Brigadiers and one Major General, of which I
was a part, were on familiarisation visit to various formations of northern and
western Command of Indian Army during ‘Operation Parakram’.

It was apparent that general public was unaware of the true story of Kashmiri
Pandits’ exodus, while others were victims of calibrated disinformation
campaign launched by the Muslim insurgents and their radical supporters. It was
then that I decided to write an account of the exodus. Compiling details about
the event was not a difficult task as the stories connected with the exodus of
Pandits are now part of the community’s folk-lore. I also talked to many people
who had witnessed the events first-hand. For factual data, I relied heavily on the
Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic conditions of
Kashmiri Displaced People, prepared by Jammu and Kashmir Centre for
Minority Studies (also known as the M.L. Koul Committee Report). White Paper
on Kashmir prepared by Dr M.K. Teng and Sh. C.L. Guddu for Joint Human
Rights Committee, also came handy in gaining proper understanding of the
events leading to the exodus. I would also like to thank Sh. TN Razdan,
President, Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch, for allowing me to use some of the
material published by his organisation on various aspects of the exodus of
Kashmiri Pandits.

Having been born, brought up and educated in Kashmir, I have been a witness
to and a participant in a few of the historical events that shaped the State’s
politics during the past 60 years. Experiencing some of Kashmir’s vicissitudes
after the merger of the State with India in 1947, I gained first-hand knowledge of
the impact such vicissitudes had on the Valley’s population in general and on
Kashmiri Pandits in particular. While in the Army, being an infantryman, I spent
over a decade in the State, mostly on the Line of Control (LoC). My last tenure
there (1998–2001) exposed me to the ruthless Jehadis being infiltrated by
Pakistan into the State to cause mayhem and murder. I must confess that at
times, I felt sympathy for them on purely humanitarian grounds, because almost
every one of them was eventually killed in the ensuing gun-battles with our
troops. It was a sheer waste of young lives. They were, however, so brain-
washed that they willingly served as gun fodder to satisfy their religious zealots
and all-powerful Army back home, who had declared Jehad on India. Pakistani
Army had its own axe to grind; most of its top ranking officers had experienced
defeat in the 1971 war, first hand, when they were young officers with
impressionable minds. Now, as decision-makers in Pakistan’s most powerful
institution, they could not let go of this opportunity to bleed India, and thus,
avenge their humiliation.
 I must put on record my debt of gratitude to many people who contributed
with their generous assistance in helping me write this book. It is their precious
contribution that made this book possible. Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkani, a well-
known literary figure and an authority on Kashmiri culture, reviewed the
contents of the book and gave many valuable suggestions to enrich its contents. I
cannot thank him enough for it. Dr MK Teng, an astute observer of the political
developments of Jammu and Kashmir, gave valuable insights into the political
developments in the State which had great bearing on the gradual political
disempowerment of Kashmiri Pandits since independence and their eventual
exodus from Kashmir. I sincerely thank him for his contribution. I am also
grateful to my brother-in-law, Sh. Bansi Pandit, a US-based author of many
books on Hinduism, for having reviewed the manuscript and for editing the same
so meticulously. His painstaking effort and his valuable inputs are greatly
responsible for this book seeing the light of the day.

I would also like to sincerely thank Dr K.N. Pandita, a former Director of The
Institute of Central Asian Studies and author of many books on Kashmir. His in-
depth knowledge of Kashmir’s culture, its past and present history, is well-
known. Dr Pandita provided many valuable and authentic pieces of information,
whose inclusion in the book has added to its readability. I would also like to
express my sincere gratitude to my elder brother, Captain S.K. Tikoo (Retd.), a
well-known figure in the political and social circles of Kashmir, for his many
inputs. Being an authority on the grass-roots politics of the State and an active
participant in nearly all contemporary political developments in Kashmir during
the last six decades, his contribution in compiling this book has been immense.

I express my grateful thanks to one of India’s renowned artists from Kashmir,

Sh. Veer Munshi who, despite his hectic and busy schedule, agreed to design the
jacket of this book, and that too at a short notice. I remain deeply indebted to
him. I am also thankful to Colonel US Rathore (Retd.) for having allowed me to
use some of his pictures in my book. Having spent many years of his service in
Kashmir, his objective and dispassionate views on various developments in the
State proved quite valuable.

I express my sincere appreciation and thanks to my friends Manoj Kumar and

Mahesh Bisht; the former for having helped me with the logistics involved in
writing this book during the last four years, and the latter for having spent hours
in giving it a presentable shape. But for their diligent effort this book could not
have been completed.
 This book would certainly have remained just a medley of disjointed thoughts
in my mind but for the consistent support and encouragement I received from
my wife, Usha, who persistently egged me on to give a shape to these thoughts.
My sons too helped a great deal; Shehjar, my elder son, provided many relevant
and valuable inputs in improving the content, particularly of the post-exodus
period; and my younger son, Dr Manik, who helped by teaching me how to
handle the computer efficiently while writing this book. I cannot thank them
enough.

At the end I would like to thank Bharat Verma of Lancer Publishing House for
having agreed to publish this book. I must accept that his ready willingness to do
so took a lot of load off my back. I would also like to thank his staff, including
Jitender, Sanjay and Birendra, who worked tirelessly on the production of this
book.

The account given herein is the story of exodus as told by one of the refugees
(the author) himself, whose family had fled from Kashmir while he himself was
fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka, as part of Indian
Peace Keeping Force.

I hope this book is able to leave behind a record for future generations of
uprooted Pandits, who are now spread in far corners of the world; a record of
important events which eventually resulted in their flight from the land of
Kashyap Rishi, Lalleshwari and Nund Rishi, whose inhabitants they have been
from times immemorial. I hope this account sets the record straight because until
now, only the Muslim majority, the more influential and the more vociferous
voice, has been heard, over and over again and has attracted media attention,
while the story of the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, the miniscule minority voice,
has either been misreported or buried.
 ABBREVIATIONS

Following abbreviations occur frequently in the book. These are appended

below:

AD After Death
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AJKMC All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
ATM Asia Transport Mafia
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCE Before Christian Era
BPL Below Poverty Line
CAPF Central Armed Police Force
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CFL Ceasefire Line
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CPI Communist Party of India
CM Chief Minister
CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator
CMS Centre for Minority Studies
CNN Cable News Network
CPO Central Police Organisation
DGP Director General of Police
DNC Democratic National Conference
ECG Education Guarantee Scheme
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area
 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HAJY Acronym for four Militant Commanders, namely, Hamid, Ashfaq,
Javed, Yasin
HM Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
HMT Hindustan Machine Tools
IAS Indian Administrative Service
IB Intelligence Bureau
ICS Indian Civil Service
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ISI Inter Services Intelligence
JKLF Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
JKVM Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch
JeI Jamat-e-Islami
JKSRTC Jammu Kashmir State Road Transport Corporation
KAS Kashmir Administrative Service
KP Kashmiri Pandits
LET Lashkar-e-Toiba (Tayyeba)
LoC Line of Control
MC Muslim Conference
MUF Muslim United Front
NHRC National Human Rights Commission
NA Northern Areas
NC National Conference
NCM National Commission for Minorities
NGO Non Governmental Organisation
NSSO National Sample Survey Office
NWFP North West Frontier Province
OGW Over Ground Workers
PHE Public Health Engineering
PF Plebiscite Front
PoK Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PDP Peoples’ Democratic Party
 PPP Pakistan People’s Party
PRA Public Rural Appraisal
PTI Press Trust of India
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
REC Regional Engineering College
R&R Rehabilitation and Resettlement
SRO Special Routine Order
SSC Staff Selection Committee
SBI State Bank of India
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation
SKMIS Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences
SKUAST Sher-i-Kashmir University of Agricultural Science and
Technology
SMHS Sri Maharaja Hari Singh
TJP Tehreek-e-Jaffaria Pakistan
UN United Nations
UNO United Nations Organisation
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observes Group in India and Pakistan
UNCIP United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
US United States
UNSC United Nations Security Council
VOs Voluntary Organisation
 ANCIENT KASHMIR: A BRIEF
HISTORICAL SKETCH
“Even the gods must die; But sovereign poetry remains, Stronger than death.”
—Kalhana

Many scholars believe that the earliest human settlements in Kashmir date back
to the Neolithic age. This fact has been scientifically established by putting the
human skeletons found in Burzhom (near Srinagar) to carbon dating test. These
findings place the human settlements in Kashmir around 2300–1500 BCE. These
“skeletons have a corporeal resemblance to the skeletons of a significant portion
of the contemporary Kashmiri population.” Though, some findings in Shopian
1

(a district of Kashmir) date the human beings in the Valley to the Upper
Paleolithic period.

Kashmir valley is dotted with pre-historic pilgrimage centers and ancient ruins
of Hindu temples and Buddhist Stupas and Viharas. The imposing structures of
these ruins, as seen today, establish the fact that since times immemorial,
Kashmir has been an epicentre of ancient Indian civilisation. Two great Indic
religions, namely, Hinduism and Buddhism, thrived here and interacted with
each other in a manner that affected their outlook on spiritual and temporal
matters. The tall snow-covered mountains, icy streams, lush green meadows,
resplendent water bodies, its splendid isolation and seclusion, and above all its
temperate climate provided an ideal environment for deeper spiritual
introspection and examination of existential realities. The evolution of pure
monistic philosophy of Shaivism, known as Trika Shastra, is a unique product of
this environment. Kashmiri Sufism, that emerged centuries later and barely
survived the onslaught of rabid Islam can also be attributed to the same
environment.

Antiquity
A fascinating narration in Nilmat Purana, a sixth century Sanskrit text,
mentions that the name of Kashmir valley at one time was Satideva. At that time,
it was a huge lake named Satisar (Lake of Goddess Sati, the consort of Lord
Shiva, third member of Hindu Trinity). According to the popular legend, there
lived a demon by the name of Jhalodabhava, (water borne). As a child he had
been blessed by Lord Brahma (first member of Hindu Trinity, and god of
creation) with the boon that his physical safety was guaranteed as no one would
be able to destroy him when he remained confined under water. However, when
he grew up, he became cruel, merciless and a law unto himself, causing
widespread death and destruction that created sense of insecurity and fear among
the inhabitants, the Nagas , the aborigines of the land, who lived in the high
2

mountains surrounding Satisar.

Even Nila, son of Kashyap Rishi (grandson of Lord Brahma), under whose
care Jhalodabhava had been brought up, was thoroughly exasperated. Nila,
therefore, sought help from his father, Kashyap, who approached the Trinity. As
a result, Lord Vishnu (second member of Hindu Trinity, and god of preservation
of the universe) decided to kill Jhalodabhava. But the latter proved too clever.
Knowing that he could not be killed under water, he took refuge in Satisar.
Vishnu then decided to drain out the waters of Satisar in order to deny
Jhalodabhava an indestructible refuge. He directed his brother, Balbhadra, to cut
the mountain towards the west of the lake near Khaddanyar in Varhamulla,
present day Baramulla, which he did. Thereafter, as Nilmata Purana describes,
“the water flowed out in violent rush with ferocity and great speed creating
terrifying sound. It overflowed the tops of the mountains in huge waves literally
touching the sky.” With water having flowed and drained out, Jhalodabhava had
no secure place to hide himelf in. He, therefore, played his last trick by resorting
to magic. He created darkness all around to blind his detractors. Shiva now
appeared on the scene. He removed the darkness, holding the sun and the moon
in his hands. Jhalodhabava’s last gamble had failed. On being spotted he was
beheaded by Vishnu. It now began to be inhabited by people other than the
original inhabitants. This resulted in the intermingling of the Nagas, Peshachs
and Saraswat Brahmins.

It is believed that on the onset of first Manvantra, the nine ancient Vedic
3

rishis namely Kashyap, Maricha, Atri, Angira, Pulastya, Vishvamitra,

Bhardwaja, Gautama and Jamdagni were the first to inhabit the new drained out
land which came to be known as Kashyap Mar, meaning the abode of Kashyap.
Over a long period of time, this name got corrupted to Kashmir, its present
name. From the earliest times people from various countries have called it by
different names, though all variants of the same name, Kashmir. The Greeks
called it Kaspatyros or Kasperia; the Chinese called it Ki-pin, that included
Gandhara too. Huen Tsang called it Kia-shi-mi-lo.

Even though a legend, the above-mentioned events are consistent with the
principles of geological facts. The draining of the water from lakes is a common
occurrence during a violent earthquake. Temporary darkness and re-emergence
of light is a phenomenon that accompanies a particularly inclement phase of
weather, cloud burst, etc. Based on the Valley’s physical features, geologists
believe that a major volcanic tremor occurred 100 million years ago, which
opened the mountain wall at Baramulla, draining away the former great lake.
The huge discharge of water must have flowed with terrifying speed washing
away and submerging big towns and villages that came in its way.

It would, therefore, not be out of place to suggest that after bursting through
the Kashmir mountains, the gushing waters from this Pleistocene lake, covering
the entire valley, flowing at tremendous speed, entering the plains of Punjab and
completely submerging the civilisations of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro, in the
process destroying all human life. This perhaps, could be the reason why
Harappa and Mohenjo Daro civilisation disappeared. It is also being conjectured
that most of the streams that fed Satisar also fed Saraswati River, with waters
from the valley flowing in the southerly direction. However, once the cleft
materialised at Baramulla, the water of Satisar flowed out in the opposite
direction, leaving Saraswati basin dry. Some geologists argue, “That it is
practically impossible for the feeders from Satisar to have flowed underneath
four major rivers, namely, Chanderbhaga (Chenab), Irwati (Ravi), Bipas (Beas)
and Stardu (Satluj), before discharging their waters into Saraswati. They further
insist that desiccation of Satisar and drying up of Saraswati were not
simultaneous events but separated by a period of ten to twelve millennia.” 4

On September 10, 2011, Micheal Brookfield, Professor at the University of

Boston, Massachusetts, said in Srinagar, “The geological evidence in Guryal
ravine in the vicinity of Srinagar city indicates the possibility of Tsunami.”

“Brookfield said Guryal section closely resembles the K-T boundary section
in Texas and may have been formed in the same way from a waning Tsunami.
Guryal ravine site is one of the world’s richest fossil sites, being rated by
geologists as the world’s premier sites for the study of species from the Permian
period (299–251 million years ago).” 5

Be that as it may, the drying of Saraswati resulted in Aryan Saraswat

Brahmins, living on the banks of Saraswati, to disperse in various directions,
with one large group entering Kashmir valley on the invitation of Nila, who
followed his father’s advice in the matter. Some historians have placed these
events somewhere around the beginning of Saptrishi Samvat, 5084 years ago.
With the passage of time these people came to be known as Bhatta in Kashmir.
The word is derivative of the Sanskrit term Bhartri, which means doctor, scholar
or intellectual. It is much later that they came to be called Kashmiri Pandits or
the Aryan Saraswat Brahmins of Kashmir.

As mentioned earlier, recent excavations at Burzahom, indicate that there was

habitation in the Valley around 2000 BCE. Geological discoveries of aquatic and
plant life confirm that Kashmir valley was once a huge lake. The existence of
Karewa or plateaus (locally called wudar), mostly to the west of river Jhelum
and protruding towards the east, also point to their long submerged existence
under water. The karewa is flat topped, plateau-like mud formation, whose
height rises to about 366 metres from the surrounding ground level, with sides
sloping and separated from each other by ravines. Likewise, the Archeological
Survey of India‘s national museum in New Delhi confirms the existence of
Saraswati River before it dried up. As Michel Danino writes, “Since 1889,
generations of Indian and non-Indian geographers, archeologists, indologists
believe that river Ghaggar’s bed was that of Vedic Sarasvati.” He further says
“…Sarasvati was major life line of the Harrappan civilisation, suggesting a
connection between it and Vedic culture.” He also explains the crucial role that
6

this river played in sustaining the Indus Valley Civilisation, which he calls by its
other names, Indus Swaraswati Civilisation, Harrappan Civilisation and Indus
Civilisation. According to some experts, the present day seasonal Ghaggar River
is what the mighty Saraswati River once was. The fact that River Swarswati 7

dated back to Vedic period is established by the fact that Rig Veda (10.75.5)
mentions it over several times, and asserts that the river lay between Yamuna
and Sutlej.

Early History
Though Kalhana’s account of Kashmir in Rajtarangini begins with the
8

‘Mahabharata’ war, it does not throw much light on the events prior to 273 BCE
(Emperor Ashoka era). It is mentioned in Vanaparva of Mahabharata that
Pandavas spent some time in Kashmir during their long exile and even went to
Varshaparva Ashram in China from there. It is believed that during Vedic era,
bulk of Kashmir was still under water but retained its importance because
“Mujavant mountain, where Soma grew, was located here.” 9

Based upon Kalhana’s description Gonanda I seems to have been the first
known king of Kashmir who ascended the throne in circa 2449 BCE. He was a
relative and friend of Jharasandha, King of Magadh. The latter was the father-in-
law of Krishna, King of Mathura. Gonanda went to the assistance of
Jharasandha, but was defeated and killed by Krishna. Jharasandha’s son,
Damodara, then became king of Kashmir. To avenge his father’s death, he
proceeded to fight Krishna. But he too was killed. Yashovati, Damodara’s
widow, who was pregnant at that time, ascended the throne with the support of
Krishna. When a son was born to her, he was formally crowned as the king
under the name of Gonanda II. Being an infant he was not asked for help either
by Kauravas or Pandavas during the great Mahabharata war. Nilmat Purana
states that when Yashovati was made to sit on the throne by Krishna, the latter
declared that “Kashmir is Parvati and a portion of Shiva is its king.” This points
to the high esteem in which Lord Krishna himself held Kashmir as an abode of
Shiva and his consort, Parvati. It is believed that Pandavas also ruled Kashmir
after defeating Kauravas in the Mahabharata war. Even today, some ruins in
Kashmir, are known as Pandav Lari, meaning, “the houses of Pandavs.” Thus
ancient Kashmir was ruled by Gonanda II in due succession. His rule was
followed by 43 weak and inefficient kings who left no footprint on the history. It
may be mentioned that the Naga (snake) worship was a dominant religion in
Kashmir in the fourth and third century BCE.

Ruins of houses where Pandavas are believed to have lived, locally called Pandav Lari (Houses of
Pandavas,) at Awantipur.
273–232 BCE: Buddhism
Ashoka: Ashoka came to Kashmir with 5,000 Buddhist monks to preach his
newly embraced religion, Buddhism. He founded the capital town of Srinagar
(City of Wealth) around 250 BCE at Pandrethan, where a centuries’ old temple
in the middle of a spring still exists in excellent shape (the present day Badami
Bagh cantonment area). The original name appears to have been either
Puranadhistan or Pandavsthan, meaning an ancient place or the abode of
Pandavas. As late as 1905 CE, the Archeological Survey of India, during
excavations, found Buddhist idols and Hindu images just a short distance
towards the hills near Pandrethan.

A massive granite sculpture of Shiva that has been placed in the Sri Pratap
Museum in Srinagar was also excavated during the same period. Ashoka had
great reverence for Shaivism and constructed a Shiva temple at Vijeshwari, the
present day Bijbehara. However, the arrival and rise of Buddhism in the Valley
created an expected reaction among Brahmans of Kashmir. This gave rise to a
long struggle between the two rival ideologies. Nevertheless, Buddhism
flourished in the valley during the reign of Ashoka, Kanishka Sureonadeo,
Simhadeo, and Sundarasen. Ashoka’s son, Jaloka, followed thereafter, and
became independent King of Kashmir. He reverted back to Hinduism and tried
to revive the religion by building many temples. He was succeeded by his son
Damodar II. He ruled the Valley from Damodar Karewa (where the present day
Srinagar airport is located). He also constructed a magnificent palace there.
 Shiva temple at Pandrethan

100–631 CE: Kushan Dynasty

Kanishka of Kushan dynasty from Gandhar ruled north-west and parts of
central India, with his capital at Purushapur, the present day Peshawar. He held
the Great Council of Buddhists (also called the Fourth Buddhist Conference) at
Kanishpur in Kashmir. Some historians and archeologists believe that the
conference was held at Harwan, located on the fringes of Srinagar city towards
its northwest. This conference fixed and expounded the sacred canon that led to
the foundation of Mahayana Buddhism. It was presided over by two eminent
scholars, Asvaghosha and Vasumitra and was attended by 500 monks. A number
of Kashmiri scholars like Kumarajiva (384–417 CE), Shyakyashri Badra (405
CE), Ratnavajr, and Shyama Bhatta (fifth century CE) and others went to China
and Tibet to preach Buddhism. The greatest Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjun,
also lived in Kashmir. Subsequently, Huvishka founded the town of Usar,
located to the south-east of Baramulla. It was during his rule that Greek
influence, so evident in the Valley, made inroads here.

436–497: King Ranaditya ruled from his capital at Rainawari, Srinagar.

 515: Mirakhula the white Hun, rose to power in north India after the decline
of Gupta Empire. Following his defeat in the war against the confederacy of
chieftains, he ran away to Kashmir and seized power there and ruled for some
time, after which the local rulers came back into reckoning.

600: Meghavana and Pravarasena, part of Gonanda II dynasty, are the two
noteworthy rulers who left their imprint on the history. The former was a
virtuous king of Buddhist leanings who made great efforts to prevent killings of
birds and animals. The latter moved his capital to present day Srinagar, which at
that time was known as Pravarasenapura. He was the first to build a bridge
across Jhelum with boats. During his time, King Vikramaditya, whose capital
was located at Ujjain in central India, exercised loose suzerainty over Kashmir.
It was during this period that the struggle between Buddism and Hinduism came
to an end. With there-emergence of Hinduism, Brahmans regained their
supremacy during the reign of Nara I.

631–855 CE: Karkotta Dynasty

The Hindu Kingdom of Kashmir reached great heights with the ascendance of
the Karkotta dynasty founded by Dhurlabhavardhana in 631. During this period
Kashmir became a great power, commanding respect and tribute from its
neighbouring kingdoms. He extended his empire to Poonch, Rajouri, Taxila and
Hazara and controlled the trade routes between Afghanistan and Kashmir.
During his rule, the celebrated Chinese traveller, Huein Tsang visited Kashmir
and stayed there for two years (631–633). He was extended all hospitality and
assistance by the king to study Hindu religious scriptures in Sanskrit. King
Harshavardhana, who ruled India from Kannauj during this period, exercised
loose suzerainty over Kashmir. Historians are unanimous that Kashmir at that
time possessed four Ashok Chaityas, each containing a small relic of Bhuddha’s
body. The sacred tooth relic of Buddha was also with the King, but was taken
away by Harshvardhana.

724–761: Lalitaditya Muktapida (mo-to-pi in Chinese) one of India’s greatest

10

soldier-statesmen, ruled during this period. He was the greatest ruler of Karkotta
dynasty who presided over his empire for 37 years. Though a staunch Hindu, he
was also sympathetic to Buddhism. His conquests were mind-boggling, with his
territory extending as far as River Cauvery in the south, Afghanistan in the west,
Gaud (modern north Bengal) in the East and Ladakh and portion of Tibet in the
north. Some historians even credit him with the conquest of Iran and Badakshan.
He had a brilliant Chinese general in his service, named Cankuya. During his
rule, Kashmir’s power and prestige truly reached its zenith.

Besides being a great warrior, Lalitaditya was also a great builder. The
imposing ruins of Parihaspura (city of pleasures) in Ganderbal district of
Kashmir bear witness to the magnificent capital he built for presiding over his
vast empire. However, Parihaspura soon lost its importance as Lalitaditya’s son,
Vajraditya “removed the royal residence from there and later the drainage
operations by Suyya brought the confluence of Vitasta and Sindhu from
Parihaspura to Shadipur, which naturally affected the importance of the town.” 11

His other great legacy was the construction of the sun temple at Martand in south
Kashmir. Built over Mattan Karewa, the imposing ruins of the temple, also
called the Cyclops of the east, even today present a picture of splendour.
Lalitaditya also built the town of Phalpura and Parontsa; the former is today a
village near Shadipur in Kashmir and the latter, the present day Poonch. He is
also credited with having built the towns of Lalitapura (modern Latapur),
Lokpunya (modern Lukbhavan).

He patronised and encouraged great scholars of his time, like Bhavabhuti,

Manorath, Sakhdanta, Damodar Gupta and Udhata Bhata. This bears testimony
to the fact that he was great patron of art and literature. His death is shrouded in
mystery. Some historians say, “He perished through excessive snow storm in a
country called Aryanaka (modern Iran). Another version made him end his life
by suicide in order to escape being captured when separated from his army and
blocked on a difficult mountain route.” Lalitaditya was followed by a chain of
12

weak and inefficient kings who proved unworthy successors of this great king.
This led to dethronements, political turmoil and general state of chaos. However,
there was one exception to this sorry state of affairs; that was Jaypida who ruled
from 764–795 and brought about some semblance of stability.
 Ruins of Sun temple at Martand.

855–939 CE: Utapala Dynasty

855–883: Avantivarman was the first Vaishnavite ruler of Kashmir. He built
the new capital of Awantipur, where he constructed two magnificent temples,
the ruins of which exist even to this day. He brought back normalcy and restored
stability to the chaotic conditions prevailing in Kashmir at the time. He carried
out great engineering works through his chief engineer, Suyya, reclaiming large
tracts of land from Wullar Lake, by redirecting the course of Vitasta River (later
renamed Jhelum). Many villages were created on this reclaimed land, chief
among them being Suyapur, present day Sopore. He put into place numerous
anti-flood measures and dug out many canals that increased food production.
During his rule prosperity once again returned to Kashmir. He was a pious man
who would often listen to Bhagvad Gita. In fact, he is said to have died while
listening to the epic. The great Shavite philosophers of his time were
Kayatacharya, Somananda, Muktakantaswami, Shiva Swami, Anandvardana and
Kallata.

883–902 Shankarvarman indulged in unnecessary military expeditions.

During one such expedition he defeated Lalliya, the Brahman ruler of Kabul.
Thereafter, he lost no opportunity to humiliate Brahmans. He confiscated their
temples and properties, resulting in a prolonged struggle between Brahmans and
Kayasthas (people specialising in scribal/literate occupations). Though he
created markets for trade by conquering neighbouring states, he nullified these
gains by levying additional taxes. He also resorted to forced labour, called
Begaar. He disturbed peace by ignoring the interests of agricultural feudal
13

chiefs, known as Damar who, as a result, rose in revolt. At his death he left a
legacy of a society at war with itself. Shankarvarman founded the city of
Shankarpur, where he constructed a temple. The place is today known as Pattan.

922–933: For 20 years after Shankarvarman’s death, instability reigned

supreme in Kashmir when one weak king followed another. However, situation
seemed to stabilise when Chakravarman, with the help of Damars and King’s
bodyguard (Ekangas) seized power. The peace, nevertheless, was short-lived as
Damars rose in revolt and killed the King. This set in motion the decline of
Utpala dynasty.

Despite all the political turbulence of the period, Shavism flourished, with
scholars such as Mahadev, Prajnarjuna, Pradyuman Bhatta, Utpalacharya and
Rama Kantha making significant contributions to further enrich its literature.

939–1128 CE: Didda and Lohara Dynasty

950–1003: Didda, daughter of great Lohar Chief, Simhraj, the ruler of Lohara
(Lohrin in present day Rajauri district) and granddaughter of Shahi king of
Kabul, was one of the most remarkable women of her time. She was Kshatriya
and married second Gupta King, Ksemagupta. She dominated the scene in
Kashmir, first as queen and then as a regent for her son and grandsons, and
finally as a direct ruler.

Didda had complete sway over her husband and king, Kesmagupta, who
consulted her on every matter concerning the governance of the state. Gradually,
without her consent, the state administration did not move. In due course, the
reins of the king came to rest so completely in the hands of Didda that
Kesmagupta came to be known as Diddaksema (henpecked). When the king died
in 958, Didda wanted to commit Sati, but the courtiers prevailed over her, as
they were jealous of the chief minister, who would have otherwise taken over the
kingdom. She, therefore, became the regent of her minor son, King Abhimanyu,
and vanquished her adversaries one by one. She ruled ruthlessly, though
effectively, for 14 years as the regent. When Abhimanyu died in 972, she
installed his son Nandigupta on the throne, though she kept the reins of power
firmly in her hands. After the death of her son, Abhimanyu, she devoted a great
deal of her time to developmental activities, constructing a number of temples
and monasteries. In 975, she installed Bhimagupta, the second son of
Abhimanyu, and her grandson, on the throne. Bhimagupta soon became upset
with her grandmother’s ruthless ways and started actively opposing her. Didda,
without losing any time, put him under arrest. In 980, Bhimagupta died in jail.
Didda now ascended to the throne herself, assuming the title of Empress.

Didda was extremely beautiful, highly intelligent, but wayward and

headstrong. She captivated many courtiers by showering many favours,
including getting physically intimate with them, and then would get them killed
secretly, when the opportunity presented itself. Her last paramour was a young
horseman, Tunga, who was later made commander-in-chief. He outlived her
when she died in 1003.

Didda was one of the most enigmatic characters of history, attracting

condemnation and admiration at the same time. She survived the politics of
intrigue, murder and debauchery for about 50 years and held the troubled
kingdom together by sheer competence and courage. But the incalculable harm
that she caused by sinister and sinful ways and by spreading moral pollution all
around had grave consequences later. After ruling for 25 years, when she
became too old to rule, she was able to manipulate the crown for Sangramrajha,
son of her brother Udairaj, ruler of Lohara. Thus a new dynasty, Lohara, came to
power. They were also known as Lohana, a short form for Lohar Ranas. History
records their rule in Kashmir under two dynasties, namely Lohara Dynasty I and
Lohara Dynasty II. Effectively, Lohara Dynasty II lasted till 1286, beyond which
followed decades of anarchy and mayhem, resulting in the invasion of Muslim
rulers and establishment of Muslim rule in the valley by 1338.

1003–1101 CE: Lohara Dynasty-I

1003–1028: One of the greatest warriors the Loharas produced was Dada
Jasraj (970–1000). His life was an embodiment of courage and valour. He killed
Sabuk-Tigin, father of Mahmud Ghazni in 997 CE in his own court in Kabul, in
presence of his courtiers and still managed to escape along with his companions.
It was to avenge his father’s assassination that Mahmud Ghazni attacked
Loharpradesh (present day Lohriin in Rajouri district of Jammu region) thrice,
but failed to capture it every time. It was in one of these attacks that Dada Jasraj
lost his life.

After conquering Iran, Turkey, Punjab and other parts of India, Mahmud
Ghazni captured Nagarkot Fort in Kangra (in present-day Himachal Pradesh). It
was from here that Ghazni launched his first major attack on Kashmir in 1015.
He camped in Tosha Maidan, near Lohkot fort. However, his forces were
14

surrounded by Sangramraja’s troops under their able Commander-in-Chief,

Tunga on one side and the army of Afghanistan, led by Trilochanpal, King of
Afghanistan himself, on the other. In the mountainuous terrain Ghazni’s troops
suffered heavily and he beat a hasty retreat. Ghazni, however, could not take his
eyes off Kashmir. In 1021, he again attacked Kashmir; this time, making Lohkot
fort his base. He was again defeated comprehensively, bringing to an end his
dream of capturing Kashmir. However, Ghazni did succeed in capturing Swat
Valley, known as Udyana (garden) under its Bhuddhist kings. Ghazni settled two
tribes there, namely, Swati and Dalazak. Swati being a larger tribe, the place
thereafter, came to be known as Swat.

It was during the regime of Sangramraja that Kashmir came into contact with
Muslim invaders. When Mahmud Ghazni annexed Punjab, most of the tribes on
the borders of Kashmir embraced Islam. Even after their conversion to Islam,
these people continued to visit Kashmir as traders, wanderers and even
missionaries. Some of these tribes settled in the valley and ventured into
propagating their new religion.

1028–1063: Ananta was married to beautiful princess Suryamati alias

Subhata, daughter of King of Kullu of Kangra. Her two brothers, Rudrapala and
Didapala came to Kashmir, where they earned the trust and confidence of the
king. However, being extremely unscrupulous and dishonest, they soon indulged
in embezzling the state treasury. Coupled with his own extravagant habit of
chewing betel leaves which cost him a huge amount of money; his treasury
became empty soon enough. But his wise and assertive wife took hold of the
affairs and rebuilt the state finances. The death of the two worthless princes
during the same period proved providential. Soon, the king achieved his past
glory to the extent that he now started annexing the neighbouring territories.
After some time, Suryamati insisted that the king should abdicate in favour of
his son, Kalasha. After initial hesitation, he did so in 1063. But no sooner did
Kalasha get the throne, he started ill-treating his father and forced him to leave
the palace and seek shelter in Parnotsa (modern day Poonch). This led to many
altercations between the king and his queen over the actions of his son. On one
such occasion, the king could not tolerate something that the queen had said and
committed suicide by thrusting a dagger through his abdomen. Suryamati,
overtaken by remorse, followed suit by jumping on his pyre. It was during this
period that Kashmir came under the influence of Shahi princes of Punjab, who
took refuge there from Ghazni’s attacks.

1063–1089: Kalasha ascended the throne, followed by Utkarsha.

1089–1101: Harsha, though a poet and lover of fine arts, will be remembered
for his extravagance and profligacy. To support his over indulgence in luxury, he
plundered temples and looted their wealth, particularly their gold and silver
idols, which he got melted. In the process, he dishonored deities, getting urine
and excrement poured over them by naked mendicants. Some attribute it to the
influence of Islam. Kalhana describes him as a Rakshasa, meaning ‘demon’. For
carrying out these despicable acts he made use of Muslim generals, whom
Kalhan called Turushkas. It was during this period that Muslims appeared as a
class in the political field and thereafter, began to consolidate their hold. To add
to the peoples’ woes, natural calamities like famine and plague struck in quick
succession to fill the cup of their miseries, which now overflowed. As a result,
they rose in revolt under Uchala and Sussala, the two princes, who seized power
after assassinating Harsha and his son, Bhoja.

1101–1286 CE: Lohara Dynasty II

1101–1111: The duo (Uchala and Sussala), particularly the latter, tried to
undo the damage done by Harsha. They reformed administration, removed
corrupt officials and amended the criminal code by making delinquents do social
work, thus attempting to reform them rather than sending them to jail. However,
Sussala proved to be highly conceited and vain and given to fits of anger. In due
course, the duo was succeeded by some inefficient and incompetent rulers who
did more harm than good. History records nothing much about their reign.

1128–1155: One of the great kings of Lohara dynasty, Jaisimha, despite

taking over the reins in politically unstable conditions, when civil strife was the
order of the day, succeeded in restoring law and order. He repaired temples and
restored to them their old glory. His reign was considered an age of Vedic
Renaissance in Kashmir. Shakti upasana, (worship of Shakti, another name of
Divine Mother) was very common and many shrines were built during this
period.

1155–1301: This period saw the beginning of the decline of Hindu kings of
Kashmir. During the reign of Gopadeva (1171–1180) Brahmans gained great
supremacy and consolidated their position. This, however, was short-lived as
Damaras, the feudal chieftains, joined hands with Lavanyas and other smaller
tribes to hit at the very roots of Brahman dominance. The latter strove to regain
their lost glory by trying to capture power through two of their prominent
community members, Kshuksa and Bhima. But the threat of Damara feudal lords
prevented them from succeeding in their mission. This event took place during
the reign of Jassaka (1180–1198).

Rama Deva then ascended to the throne (1252–1273) with the help of
Brahmans. But the first thing the king did after assuming power was to humiliate
the same Brahmans. They, therefore, conspired against him, but to no avail.
Prompt reprisal followed immediately in the form of reign of terror that was let
loose against them. They were looted, plundered, killed and crushed in the most
barbarous manner. In the history of Kashmir, it was the first direct assault on
them.

The next dynasty that we see on the historical horizon of Kashmir is that of
Damaras, (1286–1301) the feudal chieftains who made Lukbhavan as their
headquarter. Their reign, instead of arresting the decline in the fortunes of
Kashmir, contributed even more, through their actions of omission and
commission, to its further decline.

1301–1320: Suhadeva ascended to the throne in 1301. He married Kota Rani,

daughter of his Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief Ram Chandra. Kota, an
exceptionally beautiful woman, helped her father in managing the affairs of the
state. Some of the most momentous events of Kashmir’s history, which had far-
reaching and irreversible consequences later for the Valley and its people, took
place during this period. First was the invasion by ferocious Mongol warrior and
adventurer, Zulqadar Khan or Dulcha, who hailed from Turkistan. His army of
70,000 Mongol and Turkish soldiers consisted of both foot soldiers and
horsemen. In the face of impending danger, Suhadeva exhibited woeful
cowardice. He tried to buy off the invaders by paying a huge sum of money, but
failed. He then fled to a neighbouring province of Kishtwar, across Pir Panjal
Range, leaving his people to the mercy of the marauding invaders.

According to Baharistan-i-Shahi, people of Kashmir died like “Insects in

15

fire,” as Dulcha and his soldiers killed everyone they could lay their hands on.
Those who fled to the forests and mountains were pursued, captured and killed.
Men were put to the sword and women and children were sold to the merchants
of Khita (Turkistan), whom the invaders had brought along. All the houses in the
villages and cities were burnt along with the grains. Dulcha dealt a fatal blow to
Hindu kingdom. In the words of Jonaraja, Kashmir became almost like region
before creation. Dulcha took with him 50,000 Brahmans as slaves. But while
crossing Devsar Pass, God’s wrath now intervened. Heavy thunder storms, rains
and snow buried them all. Not a soul survived; neither the soldiers nor the
Brahmans. The gloom and despondency of the valley was further aggravated as
winter arrived soon thereafter. Chaos and confusion reigned supreme.
Lawlessness became the order of the day.

N OTES

1. Dr Upender Fotedar, Daily Excelsior, Jammu, April 06, 2000.

2. “In Hindu mythology, Nagas are serpant people born of the union of Mata Kadru and Rishi Kashyap”
says Amish Tripathi, author of The Secret of the Nagas (part of Shiva Triology), in an interview to
Sucheta Dasgupta, carried by Pioneer of September 18, 2011.
3. Manvantara, meaning ‘the age of Manu’; it is an astronomical period of time measurement.
4. MM Munshi, Kashmir Sentinel, September 2007, p. 5.
5. Guryal is located 7 km to the east of Srinagar. The Times of India; September 19, 2011.
6. Michel Danino, “The Lost River: On the Trail of Sarasvati,” Pioneer, May 31, 2010.
7. In ancient times, Saraswati River flowed in the north-western region of India (present day Pakistan).
There are several references to this river in the Rig Veda, the oldest scripture of the human race
arising from present-day India. Although the exact date of the origin of this river is in question, the
majority of modern scholars agree that this river became dry around 1900 BCE.
8. Rajatarangini (lit. “River of Kings”) is a historical chronicle of early India, written in Sanskrit verse by
Kalhana (a Kashmiri Pandit) in 1148 CE. It covers the entire span of history in Kashmir from the
earliest times to the date of its composition and is considered to be the best and most authentic work
of its kind.
9. Bansi Pandit, Explore Kashmiri Pandits, (Dharma Publications, Delhi, 2008)
10. “Auriel Stein in his translation of verse 42 in Book IV of Rajatarangini says: “Subsequently, Queen
Narendraprabha, wife of King Durlabhvardhana, bore the King a second son. Muktapida might be
 interpreted to mean ‘he whom diadem is taken off.”’ Hence Kalhana, bearing in mind the greatness of
the ruler (Muktapida) says ‘his name ought to have been Avimukhtapida. However, the proper
translation of Muktapida is, ‘he whose diadem contains pearls’ (See Bughler). Muktapida is an
adjectival suffix to the name of the King Lalitaditya Muktapida. Mukta could also be the Prakritized
version of Ou-Kong’s (Chinese traveller) Moung-ti from which Kashmirian mutto is derived. Dr KN
Pandita.
Sir Marc Auriel Stein was a Hungarian Jew, born at Budapest on November 26, 1862. He was
baptised as a Christian by his parents and later took British citizenship. He was an archaeologist,
primarily known for his explorations and archaeological discoveries in Central Asia. He was
knighted for his discovery of rare Buddhist manuscripts at Magao caves near Danhuang in China in
1907. Whenever he returned from his tiring expeditions to Central Asia, he made a tent in Gulmarg
as his home, where he would stay all alone, except for his dog, called Dash. He was also a Professor
at some Indian universities. He died in Kabul on October 26, 1943 and is buried there.
11. Keys to Kashmir, (Gandhi Memorial College, Lala Rookh Publications, Srinagar, 1957). p. 47.
12. Ibid.
13. Begaar is the name given to forced labour in which the ruler’s/government agents would forcibly get
men from villages to do forced labour without being paid for it. At times, “…It consists of
requisitions for village produce, and is a form of purveyance on behalf of officials.” The worst
assignment for Begaar was to accompany troops to Gilgit, carrying their baggage, etc… “I have seen
inhuman punishment dealt out to men who demurred to leaving their homes for two or three months
with the prospect of death from cold and starvation. I have seen villagers maimed from frostbite or
shriveled and paralysed from exposure to cold.” Sir Walter Lawrence: The Valley of Kashmir: (Henry
Fowde, London, 1895). The practice of Begaar was prevalent in mediaeval times and continued till as
late as the end of 19th century.
14. Original Tousi Maidan. Tousi means a stream and Maidan is an open field. Here, a stream joined River
Jhelum in an open field. It was, therefore called Tousi Maidan, which, with the passage of time,
became Tosha Maidan. This magnificent and vast grassy highland of immense beauty lies to the north
of Pir Panjal Range. For centuries, it has served as pristine pasture for the shepherds, who graze their
flock of cattle here in the summer months.
15. Baharistan-i-Shahi, a chronicle of mediaeval Kashmir in Persian manuscript by an anonymous 17th
century author: translated by Dr KN Pandita.
 TRANSITION TO ISLAM
“Be chary of shedding blood, for blood does not sleep.” “I have only reached my present position by
conciliation.” —(The above advice was given by Islam’s greatest warrior, Saladin, to his son, Abu
Mansur Al Zahir and to his Amirs on October 6, 1123).

Early Rulers
Some rulers of Kashmir encouraged Muslim influx into the valley to counter
the supremacy of Brahmans. Some other Muslims arrived as traders from north-
west India which had already embraced Islam; while others came from far off
Persia, having been persecuted there by its rulers. One of these was Sayyid
Sharfud’Din Abdur Rahman (d.1327 CE), later known as Bulbul Shah. He was a
Syed of Turkistan and a Muslim missionary. Others included Shahmir, who
came from Swat in 1313 along with his numerous relatives to seek employment.
Suhadeva gave him a jagir (small territory) near Baramulla. Suhadeva also
gifted a jagir to Lankar Chak, a Damara chieftain. Similarly, Rinchen, a pseudo
1

Buddhist, who hailed from Ladakh (some historians say from Tibet), migrated to
Kashmir after his father, a local chieftain, had been killed in the power struggle
with Baltis (ethnic inhabitants of Baltistan, now part of northern areas under
Pakistan control, recently renamed Gilgit-Baltistan). He was employed by
Ramchandra and given a jagir at Lar, near Baramulla. In due course, all of them
played a major role in establishing Islamic rule in Kashmir.

From 1286 to 1320 the feudal land-owning class, the Damars, had either ruled
themselves or had been a big factor as part of the ruling class. Hindu dynasty of
Loharas was decidedly in decline. It was during such unstable times that Dulcha
invaded the valley. Chaos and depredations caused by Dulcha had left Kashmir
in a precarious condition. Suhadev’s cowardice and his effeminate compromises
with those who posed great threat to Kashmir made it worse. Rather than
confronting his enemies resolutely, he tried to buy peace by doling out lollipops
to them.

1320–1323 CE: Rinchen

Taking advantage of such disorderly conditions in the valley and its spineless
ruler, Rinchen struck. Unmindful of the good deed done to him by his
benefactor, Rinchen attacked Ramchandra, who had succeeded Suhadeva, but
was defeated and had to beat a hasty retreat. Ramchandra did not pursue the
retreating army of Rinchen and hence did not deal a coup de grace. It was not
for the first time that such magnanimity was to prove costly to Hindu kings.
Realising well enough that he would not be able to capture Kashmir as long as
Ramchandra was at its helm, Rinchen thought of a ruse to get rid of the latter. He
invited Ramchandra to a feast at his camp. When the king arrived, Rinchen
prevented his bodyguards from entering the venue, Ramchandra was thus left
with only some of his courtiers inside the huge tent erected for the purpose.
Once inside, the carefully and tactically placed troops of Rinchen pounced on
Ramchandra and killed him and his courtiers.

Having got rid of the king, he descended into the valley and captured it. He
now married Suhadeva’s wife, Kota Rani. After some time he realised that in
order to gain wider acceptability among the people and strengthen himself
politically, he needs to embrace their faith. He, therefore, decided to get initiated
into Brahamanical fold. At this time Shaivism was the most practiced religion in
the Valley. So he called Devaswami, the religious head of Shaivas to initiate him
into Shaivism. Devaswami called a meeting of the prominent Brahmans who
enjoyed religious authority and recognition at that time. But the revolting
manner in which Rinchen had conducted himself all through weighed heavily
against him. Having totally forgotten the good deed done to him by Suhadeva
and Ramchandra, but for whose benevolence he would not even be living, the
fleeing desperado had turned venomously against them. Devaswami and the
prominent assembly refused to accept Rinchen as a Brahman.

Howsoever justifiable the verdict may have appeared at that time, politically,
it proved to be a disaster. Jonaraja explains the action of Pandits thus, “By virtue
of this gruesome blunder, Brahmans not only destroyed their own ascendancy
but spelt ruin to their very existence.” 2

Feeling hurt and humiliated, Rinchen wanted to create a new faith which
would treat all sects and factions uniformly, but Shahmir and Bulbul Shah
manipulated his conversion to Islam, alongwith nearly 10,000 other Brahmans.
He was now given a new Islamic name, Malik Sadarudin. As the first Muslim
king of Kashmir, Rinchen now set on the expected course of avenging the
humiliation heaped on him by the Brahmans who had refused his request to
permit his conversion to Hinduism. With all the resources available to him as the
king, Rinchen left no stone unturned to unleash a reign of terror on the
Brahmans. In this, he was greatly helped and motivated by Bulbul Shah. No
methods were considered too demeaning to achieve this goal of mass
conversion. Brutal use of force saw thousands put to sword. Heavy taxation,
forced inter-marriages and discriminatory laws were liberally used to break the
will of the people. Thousands, including Ramchandra’s son Ravanchandra, were
converted to Islam. It goes without saying that Bulbul Shah and Rinchen were
instrumental in establishing Muslim rule in Kashmir. For the first time in its
history, a Muslim ruling class came into being.

1339–1354 CE: Rinchan died in 1323, as a result of the head injury suffered
by him during a minor rebellion launched by Udyanadev, brother of Suhadeva,
who had returned to the Valley from Kishtwar, where he had fled when Dulcha
had raided Kashmir. Rinchen left behind an infant son, Hyder Shah. Being a
minor, the son could not be entrusted with the kingdom. Therefore, courtiers
invited Udyanadev to accept the throne, which he did. To strengthen his
position, he married Kota Rani. She thus kept the power in her own hands. She
also appointed Bikshana Bhatta as prime minister while retaining Shahmir as the
commander-in-chief. This way she ensured that all warring factions had a stake
in the stability of the kingdom. However, the situation took a drastic turn when
another Tartar, by the name of Achala, a Turk, invaded the Valley. Udyandev
fled to Tibet. But Kota Rani and Shahmir joined hands and defeated Achala.
Shahmir became a hero. His popularity among the people rose tremendously. He
further strengthened his position by entering into matrimonial alliances with the
nobles and influential gentry of Kashmir. His two sons, Jamshed and Allaudin
were given important posts and he himself became the de facto ruler. However,
on return from Tibet, Udyanandev was offered the throne again. He died in 1339
leaving behind a minor son who could not ascend to the throne. He thus became
the last Hindu king of Kashmir.

Shahmir was watching the situation carefully. Kota Rani, in order to prevent
mischief from Shahmir, kept her husband’s death a secret for four days. After
moving into the relative safety of Indrakot fort, she proclaimed herself a ruler.
However, Shahmir decided to seize the opportunity and rallied his forces in the
name of Islam. In the ensuing struggle, Shahmir came out victorious and ruled
by the name of Sultan Shamasudin (The Light of the Religion). Shahmir then
asked Kota Rani to marry him. She made pretence of acceptance, but in the
bridal chamber she stabbed herself and pointing to her intestines said “Here is
my acceptance.” She thus bled to the death.
3
 1339–1342 CE: Shahmir or Shamasudin was the second Muslim king of
Kashmir. He became the architect of a long line of Muslim kings known as
Sultans who ruled Kashmir for the next 200 years. With the establishment of
Muslim rule in Kashmir, Islam became the court religion. Islamic missionaries
from far off places, particularly Persia, started pouring into the valley. Royal
patronage made their stay enjoyable and their proselytising easy and successful.
All of them, however, were not driven only by their missionary zeal alone. Some
actually sought refuge after escaping from the wrath of Taimur in Iran, but found
conditions ripe for proselytising in their new abode. Among the prominent ones
were Samnani brothers who were sent by Syed Ali Hamadani to explore the
possibility of finding suitable refuge for Syeds from Persia and also if they could
carry out their proselytising activity in the valley. Syeds were keen to escape
their own country where they were under serious threat from Taimur for whom
they had become a nuisance. Those who came included Syed Hussein Samnani,
Syed Jalal-ud-Din, Syed Tajudin, Syed Masood and Syed Yusuf. It was one of
the Samnani brothers who converted Salar Sanz, Nund Rishi’s father to Islam.
Subsequently, they were joined by the most prominent refugee, Syed Ali
Hamadani, later known as Shah Hamadan, who had fled from Hamadan, a town
in Persia with 700 of his ilk, to be followed by his son, Mir Muhhamad
Hamadani, with another 300.

The story of Hamadani is very interesting. It is briefly recapitulated here.

Taimur, like many monarchs of his time, was in the habit of moving around his
capital during night in disguise. This he did to acquaint himself with the
conditions of his subjects and more importantly, get to know about their opinion
of himself. One night he eavesdropped on the house of a poor man. The whole
household appeared in a miserable condition, with children crying for want of
food. The wife of the poor man was pleading with him to go out and beg, but the
man refused as he felt it was below his dignity to do so. The king, overhearing
their conversation felt sorry for them and quietly threw a few gold mohurs (gold
coins) into the house. In the morning, when they woke up, they were overjoyed
to see gold mohurs lying in their house. After many days they fed themselves
well.

On seeing their changed situation, their neighbours, the Syeds, descendants of

Hazrat Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Mohammad, suspected them of theft and
accordingly reported the matter to the local authorities. Being of high position
they could have easily got the poor man punished, but to the latter’s good luck,
the king got to know of it. He summoned both parties in front of him. The poor
man told the truth, which in any case was already known to the king. But the
Syeds contradicted his story and declared on oath that the poor man had robbed
them. The king, who was looking for an opportunity to confront the Syeds,
became furious and ordered a horse of seven metals to be made. He made it red
hot and asked the Syeds to ride it in order to prove that they were truly Syeds.
According to Mohammedan tradition fire cannot harm the Syeds. In this manner
those who obeyed him were burnt to death and those who did not, were killed by
his soldiers. “But Syed Ali Hamadani managed to escape this ordeal and fled to
Kashmir. It was through his and his son’s instigation that Hindus of Kashmir
were ruthlessly persecuted by Qutub-ud-Din and his successor, Sikandar the idol
breaker,” writes C E Tyndale Biscoe. 4

1354–1373 CE: Shihab-ud-Din, grandson of Shahmir, has been described as a

good general and an efficient administrator. In fact, his rule is considered the
best in the history of Muslim Sultanate in Kashmir. Nevertheless, the rapid
Islamisation of the society and frantic proselytisation during his rule, created a
sense of insecurity among the Brahmans. This resulted in a weak rebellion by
Brahmans, which was crushed with a heavy hand. To break their will, almost all
the temples in Srinagar were destroyed, and the Sun Temple at Bijbehara greatly
damaged. The iconoclastic zeal with which the proselytisers went about
wrecking havoc on the Brahmans and their places of worship, clearly establishes
that the Sultan now considered it important to wipe out everything that did not
have the imprint of Islam written on it. This he felt was a prerequisite for
consolidation of his power. Despite facing such atrocities and terror, Brahmans
continued to follow their religion. Nevertheless, Hindus from other castes
converted to Islam either out of fear, or in order to gain royal favours, or out of
social discrimination. Some historians contend that this was not sociologically
possible. Such conversions created animosity between the new converts and
5

those who refused to be terrorised into changing their religion. The latter
considered the converts as turncoats.

1373–1389 CE: Hindal, younger brother of Sihab-ud-Din, succeeded the latter

and ruled under the title of Qutub-ud-Din. Syed Ali Hamadani came during this
period and the Islamic practices were now enforced rather strictly.

1389–1413 CE: Sultan Sikandar

Sultan Sikandar is known to the history as Butshikan, meaning, iconoclast. He
was a religious fanatic, the like of whom would put any bigot to shame. In order
to achieve his aim of Islamising the complete valley, he took advantage of the
animosity between Suha Bhatta, a Brahman, who had recently converted to
Islam and renamed himself Saif-ud-Din, and other Brahmans who refused to
convert, despite facing serious threat. Sikandar appointed him the prime
minister. He also offered positions of pelf and power to new converts in order to
consolidate his position. He now roped in Syed Ali Shah Hamadani in his
mission to convert the remaining Brahmans to Islam. Hamadani was rather too
willing a tool in this mission. All three joined hands to Islamise the valley at the
earliest, even if it involved letting loose a reign of terror, the like of which had
not been witnessed even during Rinchen’s time. The Muslim historian Hassan
describes it as an orgy of cruelty, violence and terror let loose on the hapless
Brahmans. All their temples in every city, town and village were vandalised,
their magnificent idols, creation of unparalleled workmanship, were destroyed.
The material collected from these destroyed temples was utilised to construct
mosques and khanqahs. The one at Bijbehara still bears the name of
Vijiveshvara khanqah as the same was built with the salvaged material of
Vijiveshvara temple.

The imposing and magnificent temple at Martand received his special

attention. All his efforts to demolish it, which went on for one year, failed. He,
therefore, thought of an ingenious method of destroying it. He dug out stones
from its base and burnt wood in the gaps thus created. Even though this hideous
treatment failed to destroy the temple completely, it did inflict irreversible
damage on the temple. The outer walls were completely destroyed and so were
the gold gilded paintings. Its ruins even today fill a lay visitor with awe and
wonderment. “Besides Martand, the other temples of note which were either
completely demolished or damaged beyond repair included those of
Chakradhara, Tripureshwara, Sureshwara, Awantipur and Paraspor. The material
of these temples was used for embankments of the city and for laying the
foundation of Jama Masjid.” 6

Sikandar’s assault on Hindus and their temples is best summed up in 17 th

century Persian chronicle, Tarikh-i-Kashmir, which says that Sikandar “was

constantly busy in annihilating the infidels and destroying most of their
temples…” In order to establish Nizam-e-Mustaffa and keep his patrons, the
7

Syeds, in good humour, he banned all Hindu celebrations, including playing of

music. He went to the extent of banning Hindus from putting on even their
customary tilak (a mark worn on the forehead). Hindu religious texts were
collected and disposed off by either throwing these into Dal Lake or burying
these under the earth.

Among other atrocities heaped on Hindus by Sikandar, were the royal edicts
he issued, directing Hindus to either convert to Islam or be prepared to get killed.
Many converted out of fear, thousands fled the valley and many preferred to
poison or burn themselves to death. So many of them were killed that seven
maunds (one maund equals approximately 37 kg) of the sacred thread they wore,
was collected from their dead bodies and burnt to ashes. When Suha Bhatta
learnt that the Brahmans were fleeing the valley, he had his border guards placed
on the mountain passes, where many unfortunate escapees were caught and
pushed down from high cliffs to meet a gory death. Such was the relentless
campaign of vicious barbarity, unparalleled brutality and genocide perpetrated
by Sikandar on Brahmans that even his accomplice in the process of
proselytsing, Hamadani, was moved to appeal to Sikandar to put a stop to such
gruesome methods and instead, levy taxes on them in the same way as his co-
religionists did in the rest of India.

As a result, he levied a jaziya (tax levied on non-Muslims in an Islamic state)

of two pals (about 94 gms) of silver on them. He also introduced an institution of
Sheikh-o-Islam, to ensure that the injunctions of Islam are strictly followed.
Many Brahmans preferred to go into exile rather than accept conversion,
resulting in the first mass exodus of Brahmans from the valley. Ruins of many
grand temples that dot the valley even today speak volumes about their
magnificence in the bygone era and stand as mute testimony to the savagery with
which Sikander destroyed such priceless work of art. According to Jonaraja, “…
Just as fledgling pigeon is surrounded on all sides by crows, so was the king
surrounded by Yavannas, who became his retainers, his servants, his favourites
8

and even his relatives.” He further adds, “As the wind destroys the trees and
locusts destroy shali (paddy), the yavanas destroyed the usages… There was no
city or town, no village or forest where any abode of gods escaped the
destruction by Suha Bhatta.”

The level of persecution against the Pandits was such that even the foremost
Sufi saint of Kashmir, Nund Rishi was forced to write, “We belong to the same
9

parents; then why this difference? Let Hindus and Muslims (together) worship
God alone. We came to this world like partners. We should have shared our joys
and sorrows together.” 10

It is believed that by the time he died; only 11 Brahman families were left in
the entire valley. This period is considered to be among the darkest chapters of
Kashmir’s history. It is widely accepted by historians that Sikandar allowed
himself to be used by the fanatical Sayyeds. The degree of their commitment to
fanaticism can be gauged from the fact that “Sayyed Ali Shah Hamadani handed
over to Sultan Qutub-u’d-din in the fourteenth century a book named Zakhirat-
ul-Mulk, containing 21 most humiliating conditions which a Muslim ruler must
enforce upon his non-Muslim subjects, just to let them live.” 11

1413–1420 CE: Sultan Ali Shah, who succeeded his father Sikandar, on the
latter’s death continued with his father’s policies with renewed vigour, while
retaining Suha Bhatta, the convert, as his prime minister. He completed the work
of destruction which his father had undertaken. Jonaraja captures the pathos of
the times when he writes, “The Sultan crossed the limit by levying jaziya on the
twice born. This evil-minded man forbade ceremonies and processions on the
new moon. He became envious that the Brahmans, who had become fearless,
would keep up their caste by going to foreign countries. He, therefore, posted
guards along the roads and directed them not to allow anyone to proceed unless
he possessed a passport. Thus, as the fishermen torment fish, so did the low born
man torment the twice born in this country? The legendry Brahmans burnt
themselves along with their families by setting their homes on fire through fear
of conversion and to save their Dharma. Some killed themselves by taking
poison; some hanged themselves with rope and others by drowning themselves.
Some even jumped off the precipice. The country was contaminated by hatred
and the king’s favourites could not prevent one in a thousand from committing
suicide.” 12

The untold privations that Brahmans suffered during this period led to their
second exodus as recorded by many historians, including renowned Muslim
historians like, Hassan, Fauq and Nizam-ud-Din. The heat, lack of food, difficult
terrain, and snake infested tracks ensured many died during their escape out of
the valley. Payment of jaziya made life even more miserable for Brahmans who
could barely manage to survive. In fact, most of them had to go from door to
door to beg for food to ensure their survival. The Sultan and his cohorts, in order
to ensure the destruction of their ancient learning, literature, education, art and
culture, burnt many books and rare manuscripts. The Brahmans, despite paying
jaziya, could neither apply tilak nor pray in their temples, nor even carry out any
of their religious ceremonies.
1420–1470 CE: Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin
Sultan Zain-ul-Abadin, whose real name was Shahi Khan, ascended to the
throne in 1420. Son of Sultan Sikandar, the iconoclast, and brother of Sultan Ali
Shah, Zain-ul-Abidin had imbibed the qualities of tolerance, liberalism,
secularism and broad mindedness due to various reasons; his sojourns to Central
Asia where he had been exposed to a liberal form of Islam; influence of
Lalleshwari and Nund Rishi (see chapter 6) and his own stepmother, Shoba
Devi, a Hindu princess of Jammu. A great connoisseur of arts and crafts, a
13

scholar of varied literature and tolerant by nature, Zain-ul-Abidin’s years spent

during his youth in Central Asia, had introduced him to the fine arts and
literature.

On ascending to the throne, he reversed the cruel and intolerant policies of his
father and brother towards the Brahmans. He reached out to the Hindus who had
fled the valley and called them back. For reconstructing the demolished temples
of Hindus and Buddhists, he employed a renowned sculptor, Rupay Bhanda. The
latter also supervised the construction of two new temples at Srinagar and
Ishber. He encouraged art and literature and allowed full freedom of religion to
Hindus. He encouraged them to join his administration. The Sultan put a stop to
killing of cows and fishing from sacred ponds. He adopted personal laws for
Hindus which were consistent with those laid down in Shastras (Hindu
scriptures). He removed all restrictions on the performance of their religious
ceremonies and celebration of their religious festivals. As a matter of fact, he
himself attended a number of such celebrations.

Sultan Zain-ul-Abadin issued edicts through which the learned Brahmans

were granted lands. He also opened royal kitchen for Hindu pilgrims visiting
holy places. One such kitchen was constructed at Rainawari, near Srinagar,
which even today is known as Jogi Lankar (Lankar being corrupted word for
Langar, meaning kitchen). On auspicious days he would even entertain
Brahmans and Sadhus. State intervention ensured that Hindus got economic
14

benefits in terms of employment, cash grants, restoration of their lands and

estates. “As a gesture of goodwill he also banned cow slaughter and exempted
all Hindus from cremation tax which his father had imposed.” The learned
15

among them were bestowed with special honours at the king’s court. For these
reasons, Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin came to be called Badshah (great king).

He built the first permanent bridge at Srinagar, the present day Zaina Kadal or
the fourth bridge. Badshah also established control over Ladakh, Baltistan,
Naushera, Rajouri and Lohara. His primary concern always remained the welfare
of his subjects, which had been neglected, nay, destroyed by his father. Some of
the administrative measures that he undertook benefited the whole population
immensely. By creating a network of new canals (Kakpor, Uchdan, Karla,
Avantipur, Shahkul, Lachhmankul, Mar, Lalkul, Safapur, Martand, Nor,
Sonakul, etc.) and repairing those which were lying in disuse, he increased the
food grain production three times. He encouraged the local silk industry and
made it competitive in international market by importing designers from as far
away as Samarkand, Herat, Khurasan, Gilan, Balkh and Bukhara.

The Sultan laid great emphasis on education. “The famous university around
which intellectual activity of this period was organised was located at Naushar.” 16

Some of the educational institutions that he established continued to function till

the arrival of Mughals in the sixteenth century. “The other two colleges which
provided education in Kashmir were located at Zainagiri and Seer near Achhabal
in Anantnag district.” 17

The great Kashmiri historian, Jonaraja, was the court historian of Zain-ul-
Abidin.

1470–1472 CE: Hyder Shah, the prodigal son of Zain-ul-Abidin, ascended the
throne on the death of his father. With that ended the Brahman’s newly acquired
brief respite. He was an unlettered man given to frequent bouts of drinking and
was under the wicked influence of Purni (a barber, who had converted to Islam).
Purni led and organised religious fanatics and other elements which had been
kept at bay by Zain-ul-Abidin. The king, with the help of Purni and his
malcontents brought back the old cruel ways through which they wrecked havoc
on the Hindus again. The repression was so abominable that the tolerant
Brahmans lost their patience and rose in rebellion. They destroyed a few
mosques that had been built with the material collected from the temples
demolished by Sikandar. However, the short-lived rebellion was put down with a
heavy hand, to be followed by most cruel reprisals. Desecration, destruction, loot
and plunder of temples was resorted to with renewed vigour. Many had their
noses and arms cut; many were mercilessly put to sword; many preferred to
drown themselves in Vitasta (now River Jhelum) to escape from torture. 18

1476–1487 CE: This period witnessed even greater genocide under the rule of
Hassan Khan, who ruled only in name, with the actual Power resting with
Shamas Chak, Shringar Raina and Musa Raina (originally Soma Chandra, a
Hindu, converted to Shia sect of Islam). The Hindus were subjected to such
brutality that many of them gave up their religion screaming Na Bhattoham (I
am not a Hindu). To avoid persecution, many went into seclusion and avoided
contact with outsiders, as much as possible.

1477–1517 CE: The arrival of Mir Shamasuddin Araqi, a Shia missionary and
an emissary of the King of Herat, during the reign of Hassan Khan, was the most
notable feature of this period. He visited Kashmir twice (1477 and 1496) and
stayed for a total period of 20 years. This period coincided with the founding of
the Noorbakshiya order (Shia Sect) in Kashmir by Sayyed Noorbaksh. The sect
had attracted numerous followers, though the founder himself had fallen foul of
the Mullahs, as he found them corrupt and depraved. He often entered into
debates with them. Through such debates, he succeeded in showing the Ulema
(Muslim legal scholars) in poor light, for what he called their idolatrous ways,
which he denounced. He thus created conducive atmosphere to “raise high the
banner of Islam, demolish the customs and traditions of idol worshippers and
eradicate all symptoms of infidelity and ignorance from the misguided people of
this land,” writes Tej N Dhar. Being a personal acquaintance of Sayyed
19

Noorbaksh and having been deeply influenced by his thought, Araqi decided to
use his sword against the infidels. His mindset can be gauged from his criticism
of Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin, whom he blamed for having led people towards
infidelity. At the same time, he extolled the ways of Sultan Sikander and the two
Hamadanis.

On his second visit, he became a close confidant of Malik Musa Raina, a

powerful Damara chief. Mohammad Shah, the reigning king, granted many
favours to Araqi. Such favours emboldened him to become even more
aggressive in his behaviour towards the Hindus and others who did not follow
his dictat. As a result, he fell out with the Governor Mian Muhammad Baihaqi,
who sent him to Skardu, a town in Baltistan. However, as luck would have it,
Fateh Shah, with the support of Musa Raina, replaced the king soon thereafter.
Musa Raina, consequently, achieved tremendous clout. Araqi was now called
back.

On his return, he once again inflicted atrocities on the Hindus with renewed
zeal and ruthlessness. With the help of Musa Raina, he ensured that 2,000
Brahmans were brought to his palace every day, where they were administered
Kalima (confirming conversion to Islam) after removing their sacred thread. The
ritual was then followed by circumcising them and finally feeding them with
beef. Precious Hindu religious scriptures, many dating back to seventh century
CE, were destroyed. Additionally, 18 prominent ancient temples were destroyed,
properties confiscated and women abused. In the unending genocide over 800
Hindu leaders were put to sword during Ashura. This resulted in Third mass
20

exodus of Hindus from the valley.

Sunnis fared no better, though not on the same scale, with many of them being
converted to Shiaism by the most brutal methods. According to Baharistan-i-
Shahi, “All traces of infidelity and idol worship were replaced by Islamic
symbols and the infidels and holy thread wearers of Kashmir were converted to
Islam.” Araqi then turned his attention to Kargil, where Buddhists became the
21

victims of his conversion zeal in the similar manner. This is why Kargil even
today is a predominantly a Shia district, the only such district in the whole state
of Jammu and Kashmir. The reign of terror let loose by Araqi was such that
Fateh Shah, a Sunni Muslim, who ruled between 1510 and 1517, was rendered
totally ineffective. Araqi built a Khanqah in Zadibal, which to this day, retains
its Shia concentration in the valley. “After completing the task of destroying
what he called the traces of infidelity and urging people to follow the ways of
faith, Araqi left Kashmir for good.” 22

1519 CE: The Harmukh Tragedy

As if the manmade disasters were not enough, nature intervened to quench its
own thirst with the blood of Brahmans. Approximately 10,000 Kashmiri
Brahmans died during the pilgrimage to Harmukh Ganga, where they had gone
to immerse the ashes of 800 of their community members who had been killed
during Ashura the previous year. Poet-historian, Shuka, records the tragedy thus,
“Ganga was oppressed with hunger as it was after a long time that it devoured
bones: she surely devoured the men also who carried those bones.” Ironically, it
23

was after a gap of many years that people had been allowed to proceed on
pilgrimage to Lake of Harmukh, that ended in this great tragedy.

1540–1551 CE: Mirza Hyder Dhughlat

The chaotic and unsettled conditions left behind by Araqi in Kashmir were
such that Mirza Hyder Dhughlat, a Mughal general and a relative of Humayun
arrived with barely 400 troops and met with practically no resistance. He was in
Humayun’s service when the latter was defeated and forced into retreat by Sher
Shah Suri at Kannauj in 1540. Mirza Hyder Dhughlat established himself in
Kashmir and ruled in the name of Humayun.

1553–1586 CE: Chak Rule

After the death of Mirza Hyder, local chieftains scrambled for power. In the
ensuing melee Chaks gained an upper hand. Qazi Chak, the founder of Chak rule
in Kashmir, was a Shia who carried on the merciless religious persecution of
Hindus and succeeded in converting many of them to Shia faith. In order to hurt
the religious sentiments of Brahmans and satisfy his vain ego, he ordered the
killing of 1,000 cows everyday. Brahmans were made the object of laughter and
ridicule by being publicly abused and humiliated. Yaqub Chak, the last Chak
ruler, had even more sinister designs on them, but could not implement these as
Kashmir was annexed by Mughals before he could put his plans into practice.

N OTES

1. Fuedal chieftains who seized power in Kashmir briefly, between 1286 and 1301 CE.
2. “Jonaraja was a 15th century Kashmiri historian, Sanskrit poet and a court historian of Sultan Zain-ul-
Abidin, who supplemented Kalahana’s Rajatarangani to cover post-Kalahana era from 12th to 14th
century.”
3. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, (New Delhi, Allied Publishers. Third Ed, 1993) p. 50.
4. CE Tyndale Biscoe, Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, p. 71. CE Tyndale Biscoe was a missionary and an
educationist who arrived in India in 1890. He stayed in Kashmir for 30 years and is considered to be a
pioneer in the spread of modern education in Kashmir. One of the earliest schools in the heart of
Srinagar bears his name.
5. Hindus in Kashmir did not appear to have taken the caste-system seriously and the system neither had
any stranglehold on its social hierarchy nor did it play an important role in its division into various
classes. As the adage goes, “Caste in Kashmir was not cast in stone”. It was quite in contrast with
what was visible in the Hindu society elsewhere. Therefore, some historians contend that this was not
socially possible.
6. Hasan, History of Kashmir. Hasan, whose actual name was Pir Ghulam Hasan Khuihami (Khuihami,
because he belonged to Khuihom — Khuihom is a combination of Sanskrit words, Khrish+Ashrama,
which is present-day Bandipore). Hasan wrote Tarikh-i-Kashmir in Farsi in three volumes in circa
1889. After being edited by Moulvi Ibrahim of Khanyar, Srinagar, it was published by Jammu and
Kashmir Cultural Academy in Farsi in three volumes. The book, whose Volume II is political history
and is considered most authentic, has not been translated into Urdu or English.
In his introduction to the book, Hasan mentions that his grandfather’s name was Ganesh Kaul. Hasan
will certainly rate as the only unbiased Muslim historian of Kashmir. He had met and exchanged
notes with Auriel Stein, the celebrated translator of Kalhana’s Rajatarangini. Hasan is the only
historian who has tried to trace the missing kings in Kalhana’s Rajatarangini. He claimed that he had
 laid his hands on a Persian manuscript, a translation of the original Sanskrit or Sharada, of
Rajtarangini, done during the reign of Zain-ul-Abidin around 1350 CE.
7. HM Chadurah, Tarkh-i-Kashmir, translated by Razia Bano, (Delhi, 1991), p. 55.
8. The term refers to Muslims.
9. Nund Rishi or Sheikh Nur-Ud-din (name given to him by Mir Mohammad Hamadani), was born at
Kaimu, near Bijbehara in 1377. A younger contemporary of Lalleshwari, his family had migrated
from Kishtwar to Kashmir earlier. His father SalarSanz, had been converted to Islam by Sufi saint,
Yasman Rishi. Even at a young age, Nund Rishi’s saintly attributes were quite visible. Finally, he
gave up the world and lived in a cave for 12 years. His highly meaningful utterances, full of spiritual
insight, spread far and wide and attracted great number of followers. These sayings have been
preserved in two volumes, namely Rishi NamaandNurNama.
Nund Rishi exercised and continues to exercise enormous influence on the People of Kashmir. His
funeral after his death at a ripe age was attended by the King, Zain-ul-Abidin, himself. His grave at
Tsrar-e-Sharief is, perhaps, the most frequented pilgrimage centre in Kashmir.
10. Sultan Shaheen: Kashmiriyat, “Gift of Rishi-Sufi order,” Speaking Tree, Times of India, April 19,
2007.
11. Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani, Koshur Samachar, April 2010.
12. Dr Satish Ganjoo, ‘Satanic Holocaust of Kashmiri Pandits; downloaded from KP Network
@yahoogroups.com, on March 31, 2006.
13. Jonaraja, Rajtarangini, (see chapter 6). English translation by JC Dutt, 1998. Vol III, St. 44.
14. Indian holy man, sage, or ascetic revered by Hindus for their renunciation and for being concerned with
higher goals of life.
15. Dr Rattan Lal Hangloo, Department of History, University of Hyderabad, Kashmir under Sultan Zain-
ul-Abidin, “Badsha.”
16. Jonaraja; Rajtarangini and English Translation by JC Dutt 1998. Vol III, St. 722–726, 770.
17. GMD Sufi: Kashir, Being a History of Kashmir, Vol. I & II (Lahore, The University of Punjab, 1948),
p. 348.
18. Dr Satish Ganjoo, n. 11.
19. Tej N Dhar, Koshur Samachar, March 2010, p. 40.
20. Mourning period observed by Shia Muslims, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at
Karbala.
21. Baharistan-i-Shahi: an account of Mediaeval history of Kashmir by an anonymous author. Translated
into English by Dr KN Pandita.
22. Tej N Dhar, n. 18.
23. Shuka was a historian, who alongwith Jonaraja and Shrivara, updated Rajtarangini (see chapter 6).
 MUGHAL AND AFGHAN PERIOD
“Few regions in the world could have had worse luck than Kashmir in the matter of Government.”
—Vincent and Smith

1586–1752 CE: Mughal Period

The conditions continued to deteriorate during the Chak rule in the valley. As
a result, some Kashmiri nobles decided to invite the Mughal king, Akbar to
annex Kashmir in 1586.

Taking a leaf out of Zain-ul-Abidin’s rule, Akbar exercised immense religious

tolerance in dealing with Kashmiri Pandits. He considered them as a respectable
class of people, who were true believers of God. They were described as lovers
of nature, given to planting fruit trees and being a source of inspiration to others.
Akbar respected their customs and traditions and in fact, when in Kashmir,
himself participated in their annual festival, the birthday of Vitasta (present day
Jhelum), which falls on 13 day of Bhadrapada (August-September), He also
th

ordered the illumination of the whole city on this occasion. The King took
immediate steps to redress the grievances of Kashmiri Pandits by abolishing
jaziya imposed on them, and issued appropriate edicts to rehabilitate them. He
even went to the extent of creating rent free villages for Hindus. He appointed
one of them, Adhitya Pandit, to put into practice the allocation of these villages
and their lands.

As Shuka, the historian records, “the King announced that he would, without
delay, reward those who would respect the Pandits and that he would demolish
the houses of those who would demand annual tribute from them (Pandits).” 1

This order was necessitated by the fact that Pandits could carry out their
religious practices only after paying a tribute to the rulers at that time. “They
(Pandits) identified themselves with Mughal manners and modes of
administration. Their proficiency in Persian, the court language, proved a great
asset. The Pandits became the backbone of the structure of governance at the
middle level. Their prestige in society was also enhanced by Emperor Akbar’s
visit to the Martand Temple and offering a cow, with garlands of gold and
jewels, as a gift. From insignificant number of 11 families, their number also
increased.” According to Abu Fazal’s Ain-e-Akbari, Kashmiri Pandit population
2
in the valley during Emperor Akbar’s rule was 2,000 and the Emperor held them
in high esteem for their erudition, intelligence and learning.

Akbar built a massive wall around the hill of Hari Parbat and created a new
city of Nagar Nagar near it. Though Akbar did visit Kashmir, it was largely
3

ruled through his governor, called Subedar.

Akbar’s rule is also remembered for the so called romance of Habba Khatoon
with young Yousuf Shah Chak, inspired more by colourful imagination than
based on hard historical facts. Habba Khatoon was a Kashmiri poetess born in
1553. She was known for her romantic songs in the vatsan style. These songs,
4

having come down through oral tradition, have been preserved by folk singers in
their repertoire. Because of this reason, these songs can hardly be distinguished
from folk songs.

Born as Zoon to her parents, Habba Khatoon was extremely beautiful with a
very sonorous voice. However, as her biography is mostly based on legends,
very little is known about her real life. Till nineteenth and twentieth century, no
written account about her life appeared. Hassan, Khoihami, Birbal Kachru and
Mohammad Din Fouq were among the first to give some details about her life.

It is possible that having heard about her reputation as a great beauty and
singer, courtiers of the Chak ruler may have brought her to his court, as was the
custom, where he had a fling with her, as the Persian historians say, “bestowed
on her the favour of sharing his bed.” Yusuf Shah was a profligate, given to
sensuous pleasures, and he may even have appointed her as a singer at his court.
To bestow the title of Queen on Habba Khatoon would be rather far-fetched.

Akbar finally arrested Yusuf Shah Chak for his dilly-dallying about an
agreement that both were honour bound to implement and banished him to
Bihar, where he died and lies buried. With that Habba Khatoon’s affair with him
came to an end. Habba Khatoon died in 1605.

Despite his positive contribution to Kashmir, Akbar did not seem too
impressed by Kashmiris. At one point he remarked, “You Kashmiris have
stomachs to eat but not to fight.” He further elaborated, “Men? Faint-hearts, not
lion hearts.”5

Akbar was followed by Jahangir, who visited the valley 13 times,

accompanied by a retinue of courtiers, princes, generals and other dignitaries of
the kingdom. Jahangir seemed to have been captivated by the scenic beauty of
the valley. He built famous Nishat and Shalimar gardens on the outskirts of
Srinagar and similar such gardens at Achhabal and Verinag in south Kashmir. In
fact, Jahangir died on the way back from Kashmir. (see chapter 5)

1627–58 CE: Shahjahan: Next in line of Mughal succession was Shahjahan.

He too continued his love affair with the valley, visiting it a number of times. He
added Chashmashahi garden at the foothills of Zabarvan Hills close to the
gardens built by Jahangir. But both Jahangir and Shahjahan treated Kashmiri
Pandits and their religious places with contempt. Describing Shahjahan’s
Kashmir summer palace, French historian and traveller, Francoi Bernier writes,
“The doors and pillars were found in some of the idol temples demolished by
Shah-Jehan and it is impossible to estimate their value.” 6

1658–1707 CE: Some respite that Pandits had gained came to a sudden end
with the ascension of Aurengzeb to the Mughal throne. He was a religious bigot
who sent his governors to the valley with the specific instructions to convert
Pandits to Islam. Therefore, religious fanaticism and narrow mindedness were
the two principle characteristics of his governors. Iftikar Khan, Muzzafar Khan,
Nissar Khan and Ibrahim Khan who ruled Kashmir as Mughal governors
unleashed a reign of terror on Kashmiri Pandits, resulting in their fourth exodus.
It is possible that this time all Pandits would have been killed or converted, but
for the audacious sacrifice of Guru Teg Bahadur, the Ninth Sikh Guru.

1720 CE: It was now the turn of Mullah Abdul Nabi, also called Muhat Khan,
a non-resident Kashmiri Muslim, to be appointed as Sheikh-ul-Islam (superior
authority concerning issues of Islam). He ordered the deputy governor, Mir
Ahmed Khan to begin persecution of kafirs (infidels, referring to Hindus). The
Mullah issued the following six specific commandments for this purpose:

1. No Hindu should ride a horse, nor should he wear shoes.

2. They should not wear Jama (Mughal costume).

3. Should not move out with their arms covered.

4. They shall not visit any garden.

5. Are not permitted to have a tilak mark on their foreheads.

 6. Their children should not be educated.

But Ahmed Khan refused to execute the mischievous decree. The Mullah then
incited his followers against the Pandits. He established his seat in a Mosque,
assumed the duties of the administrator under the title Dindar Khan and let loose
a reign of terror. Hundreds of Pandits were killed and maimed, their properties
looted and their honour trampled under the relentless and unmerciful hordes let
loose by the Mullah. This resulted in their fifth exodus. Those who were left
behind had no respite either. They had to undergo most inhuman torture at the
hands of the cruel and barbarous fanatics. The Mullah, however, was soon
assassinated by his rivals. His son, Shariefuddin, now succeeded him as the
Sheikh-ul-Islam. He improved upon his father’s cruel methods and devised more
heinous ways to torment the Pandits. Their cup of misery was now overflowing.

1746–47 CE: Nature too played its part in inflicting further misery on the
hapless people of the valley. Devastating floods were followed by a horrible
famine in which nearly 75 per cent of the population is believed to have
perished.

Time, therefore, was ripe for further subjugation of the valley by those who
wielded a longer, stronger and sharper sword than the disintegrating Mughals.

1753–1819 CE: Afghan Rule

Ahmad Shah Abdali brought Afghan rule to Kashmir. He sent forces under
Abdullah Khan Ishqe Aqasi who easily brought the valley under his brutal
control. Though Aqasi himself ruled only for five months, he left behind a trail
of terror and destruction. He handed over the charge of Kashmir to Abdullah
Khan Kabuli, with Sukhjivan Mal, a Hindu Khatri adventurer, as his chief
advisor. A local noble, Abdul Hassan Bandey, hatched a conspiracy with
Sukhjivan Mal to rid Kashmir of cruel Afghan rule. He persuaded Sukhjivan to
do away with Kabuli. This he did and Sukhjivan declared independence with
Bandey as his chief minister. But Abdali would not give up. He immediately
sent Khwaja Kijah to regain control of Kashmir from Sukhjivan. However, he
was defeated. Aqasi now decided to take matters in his own hand and arrived
personally to achieve what the Khwaja could not. But he too was defeated. In a
bid to gain time and strengthen his position, Abdali now declared allegiance to
the crumbling but still powerful Mughal Empire. At the same time, he resorted
to a well-conceived strategy. Through his agent, Mir Muqim Kanth, he poisoned
the relationship between Bandey and Sukhjiwan. Taking advantage of the
situation, Abdali sent a force in 1762 under the command of Nurrudin Khan
Bamzai. A major part of Sukhjivan’s force deserted him. He was captured,
blinded, tortured and sent to Abdali at Lahore, where he was mercilessly killed
under the feet of an elephant.

According to WR Lawrence , Afghan rule in Kashmir was a period of brutal

7

tyranny which continued during the rule of Lal Khan Khattak (1762 CE) and
Faqirullah. Amir Khan who replaced the latter did no better. He was Shia, and as
cruel as some of the earlier Shias that Kashmir had known. His only worthwhile
contribution to Kashmir was the construction of Amira Kadal, bridge over river
Jhelum. Assad Khan, who arrived in 1784 CE, too continued with the policy of
murder and plunder. He declared himself independent, taking advantage of the
considerably weakened central authority in India. Ingenious methods were
adopted to humiliate the Pandits. For example an earthen pitcher filled with
ordure would be placed on the head of a Pandit and onlookers goaded to throw
stones on the pitcher till it broke and the unfortunate Pandit became drenched
with filth. He confiscated all Hindu scriptures and had a bund constructed with
these along a tributary of Jhelum called Tschunth Kol, at present known as Suth.

When the Afghans got tired of killing Hindus with sword, they devised other
methods. Hindus were tied up in grass sacks in pairs, and drowned in the Dal
Lake. Mir Hazar, the Afghan governor, then replaced these hay sacks with
leather sacks, to make the ordeal of Hindus even more horrifying. The place in
the valley, where these horrendous acts were carried out, is still called Bhatta
Mazar, (graveyard of Pandits). To trample upon their dignity and humiliate them
further, any Muslim could jump on the back of a Pandit and take a ride. This
practice was called “Khos.” Pandits were forbidden to put on shoes or tie turbans
or use tilak mark on their foreheads. Many parents were compelled to shave off
the heads of their daughters or even cutting off their nose and ears to prevent
them from becoming the target of Afghan lust. Thousands of victimised Hindus
were killed or converted to Islam. Those who survived were forced to flee
resulting in the sixth exodus. Many covered the long distance on foot suffering
untold miseries enroute.

Due to their education and integrity, Afghans had found it useful to appoint
Pandits as kardars, who were responsible for collecting ‘agricultural tax’ from
the peasants on behalf of the governor. A kardar would collect half the produce
as agricultural tax, pay the Governor his dues and retain the rest. When produce
was abundant, the kardar stood to gain a lot. But when crops failed, the kardar
had to face the brunt of the governor’s wrath. Such a state of affairs resulted due
to the distant and remote location of the king, who ruled from Kabul and hence
could not keep a close watch on Kashmir. Consequently, the governor was
largely left to his own whims and fancies, allowing him to become autocratic
and ruling with a heavy hand. When this happened, the kardars had to face
immense cruelties. As a consequence, many of them migrated out of the valley.

Twenty-eight Afghan governors ruled Kashmir during the 67 years of their

despotic occupation. It can safely be said that the corner-stone of Afghan rule in
Kashmir was terror and the only legacy they left behind was their resort to
brutality and savage torture. As one historian said, “They thought no more of
cutting off heads than of plucking a flower.” Most historians agree that it was the
darkest period in the history of Kashmir even by its own standards of darkness
which it had seen in the past. Though almost all sections of people suffered at
the Afghan hands, the main victims of their brutal rule were the Shias, Hindus
and Bombas. 8

In the meanwhile, in a blow to Afghan power, young Ranjit Singh, whom the
Afghan king, Shah Zaman, had appointed as the governor of Punjab, declared
independence in 1801. Soon thereafter, Maharaja Ranjit Singh became a
powerful regional king.

An interesting episode which had far-reaching consequences for Afghan rule

in Kashmir and clearly establishes their unprincipled governance, cunning,
avarice and greed, which formed the bedrock of their rule, is narrated here.

Three distinguished Pandits, namely Sukhram Safaya, Mirza Pandit and

Birbal Dhar had been appointed by Afghan governor, Azim Khan as revenue
collectors. Due to crop failure, Birbal Dhar could not collect the expected
revenue. The governor insisted that Birbal would have to pay one lac rupees (
100,000) to make good the loss. In the coming few days, Birbal, along with
many other Pandits, was threatened and browbeaten. Expecting brutal reprisal in
keeping with Afghan track record, particularly in the existing intolerable
conditions, some distinguished Pandits resolved to turn to the rising power of
Sikh empire, headed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh, to save Kashmir from further
disaster. Accordingly, Birbal Dhar and his minor son, Raja Kak Dhar left for
Lahore in disguise, with a petition signed by prominent Pandits, inviting him to
take over the valley. However, the Afghan governor got wind of it. He unleashed
a reign of terror and had many distinguished Pandits killed, their properties
confiscated and jaziya imposed on them.

He sent his forces to look for Birbal Dhar but to no avail. He, therefore, turned
his attention to the latter’s wife and his daughter-in-law, who had taken shelter in
the house of a trustworthy Muslim, Qadus Gojwari, on the advice of another
distinguished and trustworthy Kashmiri Pandit, Vasakak Harkarabashi. The
governor tasked Vasakak to look for the two unfortunate women. However, even
though Vasakak knew their location, he did not disclose it. All stratagems were
tried to make him spill the beans, but he did not budge. A fine of rupees 1000
per day was imposed on him. Yet he maintained his silence. He was subjected to
inhuman torture and untold atrocities, but it did not break his resolve. Finally, his
abdomen was ripped open and he was brutally murdered. Despite this sacrifice,
Azim Khan succeeded in digging out the information about the secret hiding
place of these unfortunate women from Birbal Dhar’s son-in-law, Tilak Chand
Munshi, who had learnt about the whereabouts of his mother-in-law and his
sister in law from his wife. The older woman committed suicide by swallowing a
piece of diamond and the younger one was violently converted to Islam and
handed over to an Afghan noble who took her to Kabul.

Finally, came the turn of Vasakak Harkarabashi. His abdomen was ripped
open and his dead body trampled upon. To quench his thirst for retribution,
Azim Khan continued with the terror that he had let loose on the innocent and
peaceful Pandits. In his paranoia he rounded up all those whom he suspected of
being in league with Birbal Dhar. He sent them all to a concentration camp
established near Nishat garden, where numerous atrocities were committed on
them. The kind of torture inflicted on them knew no bounds. Azim Khan left
Kashmir in 1816 with 20 million rupees, leaving the Valley in the care of his
younger brother, Jabbar Khan, who perhaps, was the cruelest of all Afghan
governors.

As if this was not enough, between 1812 and 1816, many unsuccessful
attempts were made by Shahmirs and Chaks to annex Kashmir. This resulted in
continued strife which tore the fabric of Kashmiri society and left deep scars on
it.

Birbal Dhar, in the meanwhile, succeeded in convincing Maharaja Ranjit

Singh to annex Kashmir and bring to an end the cruel rule of the Afghans. He
promised to compensate the Maharaja if the Sikhs were unable to take Kashmir.
As a guarantee, he left behind his son Raja Kak Dhar with the king. However,
the guarantee remained un-cashed as the Sikh forces finally entered the valley
under Mirsa Dewan Chand on July 15, 1819, and annexed the Valley. Jabbar
Khan’s defeat brought to an end the inglorious rule of Afghans.

The magnanimity of Kashmiri Pandits and their regard for religious tolerance
can be gauged from some incidents that took place immediately after the Sikhs
annexed the Valley. In those troubled times there appeared no guarantee for the
safe treatment of Afghan women, particularly when seen in the background of
the treatment meted out to Pandit women in general and to the wife and daughter
of Birbal Dhar in particular. However, Afghan womenfolk were saved only
because of the intervention of an illustrious Pandit, Sahajram. On his advice they
were sent to Kabul, escorted by Sahajram himself. That was how a Kashmiri
Pandit saved the honour of Afghan women, when their own women had been
treated so shabbily.

Another incident concerns the impending demolition of the mosque of Shah

Hamadan. Some Sikhs were determined to knock down this mosque. When
Muslims learnt of it, they sent a delegation under Sayyed Hassan Shah Khanyari
to Birbal Dhar to plead with him to use his influence with the Sikhs to dissuade
them from going ahead with the destruction of this mosque. Birbal Dhar moved
swiftly in the matter and convinced the Sikhs that it was not the right thing to do
and thus saved it from being destroyed. Historian, GMD Sufi, acknowledges it to
the lasting credit of the true character and nobility of the distinguished Kashmiri
Pandit.

Subsequently, Diwan Moti Ram was appointed by the Sikhs as their first
governor, with Birbal Dhar as his Peshkar (Chief Local Advisor).

N OTES

1. Shuka: Rajtarangini.
2. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir. (Allied Publishers. Third Edition, 1993), p. 499.
3. “Abul Fazl, Akbar’s courtier and historian has mentioned Nagar Nagar in Ain-e-Akbari as a new habitat
close to what is known as Badam Waer, in the northern foothill of Sharika Parvata (Hari Parbat).
Very recently, a trend has emerged in Kashmir Valley among the so-called intellectuals and
historians, to suppress the name Srinagar and use Nagar Nagar instead. Even in a formal public
speech Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah said a township would be raised in Nagar Nagar.” Dr KN
Pandita.
4. According to Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani, “Vatsan is a form of short lyric peculiar to Kashmiri, and
 Habba Khatoon is said to have composed some very melodious vatsans with love, longing and pangs
of separation as their theme.”
5. Maud Diver, Royal India: (Appleton Country Company, New York, 1942), p. 274.
6. Francoi Bernier (1625–1688) was a French physician and a traveller. He was a personal physician of
Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb, who visited Kashmir in 1665. His Travels in India contains a series of
letters about his journey to Kashmir in Aurangzeb’s suite (edited by Archibald Constable in 1891).
Second edition was revised by Vincent Smith: (Oxford University Press, London, 1914).
7. Sir Walter Lawrence was an able and objective scholar who visited Kashmir in late 19th century and
wrote about Kashmir and its people.
8. Bombas were a turbulent and volatile people who mainly lived in the Jhelum gorge, below Baramulla.
 SIKH AND DOGRA RULE
“History is indeed a collection of crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind. But what history and
experience teach is this; that peoples and governments have never learned from history or acted on
principles deduced from it.”
—George Wilhelm Fredrick Hegel

1819–1846 CE: Sikh Rule

(See Appendix ‘A’; p. 629)

By the time Sikhs arrived in Kashmir, bulk of the population had embraced
Islam (some estimates put the figure at nine tenths of the total population).
During their rule of the Valley for 27 years, the Sikhs rescued the handful of
Pandits from their oppressors. Initially, they were rather harsh towards the
general population of Kashmir, whom they “did not consider anything more
worthy than cattle.” However, Pandits got a long awaited respite, which served
1

as a balm on their festering wounds. Some prominent places were restored to

them. In the process; they partly regained a bit of their lost prestige and dignity.
Banning of cow slaughter and renovation of temples sent a strong message to the
fanatical elements which had tormented the Pandits.

In the meantime, natural calamities continued to keep their date with Kashmir.
Sikh rule too witnessed its share of these calamities in the form of heavy and
premature snowfall that destroyed almost entire crop, giving rise to famine and
outbreak of cholera. To add to the people’s woes, it was now the turn of deadly
plague to break out. This caused enormous loss of life, forcing large sections of
people to migrate to the plains of India in search of livelihood. During this
period, Kashmir valley presented a picture of devastation; widespread starvation
and abject poverty. Moorcroft, an English explorer, who visited the Valley in
1835, presents a grim picture of the conditions prevailing at that time. He
mentions that only one sixth of the cultivable land was under crop, multitudes of
people lacked the means of sustenance; villages had been deserted by most of
the inhabitants and those who had been left behind, eked out a miserable living,
with most of them resorting to begging as a means to survival. “Rural folk on the
whole were half naked and miserably emaciated and presented a ghastly picture
of poverty and starvation.” Historical records make it abundantly clear that Sikh
2
rulers were too preoccupied with the happenings in the Punjab and the goings-on
at Lahore, to be distracted by the happenings in Kashmir, that lay on the fringes
of their empire. Historical records suggest that Sikh rulers were harsh on
Muslims. “The penalty imposed on a Sikh for slaying a Muslim was only twenty
rupees.” 3

Maharaja Ranjit Singh died in 1839, without ever having visited Kashmir,
despite his strong desire to do so.

1846–1947 CE: Dogra Rule

For centuries, Jammu region consisted of a number of smaller principalities,
constantly at war with each other. People living in one such hilly principality,
located in the south-east, were known as Dogras. Compared to the indolent
Kashmiris, Dogras displayed extraordinary fighting qualities. Raja Ranjit Deo,
whose family had ruled Jammu region from 1742 to 1780, had brought 22 small
Dogra chieftains under his control after the collapse of Mughal empire. The
Dogra dynasty itself ended when it got irresistibly sucked into the rising Sikh
power under Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The re-emergence of Dogra rule in the Jammu region and its subsequent
extension to Kashmir is intimately connected to the genius and cunning of Gulab
Singh, who traced his ancestry to the family of Raja Ranjit Deo. An intrepid
Rajput, he owed his meteoric rise to his gifted foresight and determination.
Gulab Singh was a rare combination of a soldier and a statesman, who at an
early age of 16 years distinguished himself in the battle of Gumat, during an
attack on Jammu in 1808, by Sikh forces. Thereafter, Maharaja Ranjit Singh,
taking note of his potential as a courageous fighter, took him under his wing. He
also employed his brothers, Dyan Singh and Suchet Singh. In 1819, Gulab Singh
was granted a number of estates, including Jammu by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He
was also granted the title of Raja that enabled him to raise his own force. Gulab
Singh made the best use of this generosity by bringing Reasi, Kishtwar, Rajouri,
Chenani, and other smaller areas under his control by using all means, fair and
foul. He further extended his territories in 1834, when his most brilliant soldier,
General Zorawar Singh, brought Ladakh province into his dominion. At that
time Ladakh was an independent kingdom under the suzerainty of grand Lamas
of Tibet. Later in 1840, he captured Gilgit, Baltistan and Zanskar regions.
Formation of Jammu and Kashmir State
After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839, the Sikh empire did not
have a visionary and strong ruler to hold the kingdom together. This resulted in
the weakening of the Sikh empire at a crucial stage when British advance
towards the north-west inevitably brought it in direct confrontation with the Sikh
empire. On September 15, 1843, due to court intrigues and a scramble for power,
the powerful and highly influential Dogra Wazir Dhyan Singh was brutally
murdered. Dogras suffered steep decline in their prestige and influence. Efforts
were also made to cut Gulab Singh to size. But he proved too shrewd for his
opponents and turned this great adversity into an opportunity. This situation was
being closely watched by the British.

The Dogras, Sikhs and the British, the three protagonists of this unfolding
drama, had their own objectives. Their peculiar strengths and weaknesses had a
deep impact on the interplay of forces let loose by the emerging geo-political
realities in the region. These peculiarities proved historically crucial. The
British, imbued with a modern outlook, were better organised and were clear
about their strategic objectives, which they had formulated with precision. The
Dogras, under Gulab Singh, though feudal in their outlook and militarily ill-
equipped, were tough, ambitious and well-prepared. Their biggest strength lay in
being led by an able and experienced leader. The Sikhs, on the other hand, were
brave but reckless. They had a fine army but were divided and weakened by
factionalism, jealousy, indiscipline and lack of worthwhile leadership.

It was an opportunity that British had been waiting for in their quest of getting
the whole of India under their sway. With considerable help from Muslims
(which sealed the Sikh-Muslim animosity for ever), the British finally
confronted the Sikhs, resulting in a series of Anglo-Sikh wars.

The Sikhs suffered a crucial defeat on December 13, 1845 at Har-ka-Patta and
in the next battle, which was fought at Sobraon on February 10, 1846, Sikhs
were comprehensively defeated and their empire virtually disappeared. The
result of these wars was officially formalised by the protagonists by signing of
two treaties; the first, Treaty of Lahore, was signed on March 9, 1846. Under this
treaty, Sikhs were required to relinquish the Jallandhar Doab and both banks of
the Sutlej River and further pay an indemnity of 1.5 crores, failing which they
would have to cede additional area to the British. The Lahore Durbar could not
pay the full amount of the indemnity. Gulab Singh sensed an opportunity by
visualising the future scenario in the absence of Sikh empire and saw the
benefits of making peace with the British. He therefore, came forward to pay
75 lacs (175,000 US $ in present currency) on behalf of the Sikhs out of the
above amount. This resulted in the signing of Treaty of Amritsar on March 16,
1846, by virtue of which, the British Government transferred ‘ever independent
possession,’ of some of the ceded areas to Gulab Singh, in return for the above
amount. These areas included the hilly tracts falling between east of Indus and
west of Ravi Rivers and Kashmir. Thus Kashmir passed into the hands of Gulab
Singh, who became the first Maharaja of the Dogra rule in Kashmir.

In the years to come, repeated attempts were made by Sheikh Abdullah to

ignite the passions of Kashmiris against the Maharaja by rubbishing the Treaty
of Amritsar by calling it “a sale deed in which Kashmiris were sold like cattle
because the British wanted to fill their coffers.” However, the fact of the matter
4

is that when Sikhs had conquered Kashmir, it was Gulab Singh who had done it
for them. Therefore, he was the de-facto ruler of the Valley, which the Treaty
turned de-jure. Francis Younghusband writes:

Map of Jammu and Kashmir during Dogra Rule

“Raja Gulab Singh is already mentioned as accompanying Ranjit Singh’s

troops on their victorious march to Kashmir in 1819. On the death of Ranjit
Singh, there was much violence among the Sikh soldiers and the Governor of
Kashmir was surrounded by them. Therefore, about 5,000 men, nominally under
the command of Sher Singh, Ranjit Singh’s successor, was sent to Kashmir to
restore authority. This was the year 1841, when the British were still behind the
Sutlej, but were engaged in the fruitless and disastrous expedition to Kabul,
which resulted in the murder of their envoy. Gulab Singh quelled the mutiny in
Kashmir, placed a Governor of his own and from this day became a virtual
master of the Valley, though till 1846, it nominally belonged to Sikh rulers at
Lahore.” 5

With Sikh empire in a disarray and Gulab Singh firmly entrenched in Jammu,
the former could do little to rein in latter, who correctly assessed that aligning
with the British was a far better option than confronting them on behalf of Sikhs.
In the given circumstances, “Any sense of obligation he may have felt towards
Sikhs for establishing his rule over Jammu vanished before his realistic appraisal
of the eventual outcome of the struggle.” 6

Even though the Treaty had been signed and the mutiny quelled, another twist
to the tale was yet to unfold. Due to internecine struggle among the claimants to
Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s throne at Lahore, Lal Singh of Lahore Durbar
instructed Sheikh Imam-ud-Din, the last Sikh Governor of Kashmir, not to hand
over the possession of Kashmir to the Maharaja. However, Gulab Singh would
have none of it. He sent a Dogra force, alongwith some British soldiers, under
the young prince, Yuvraj Ranbir Singh, to subjugate the rebellious governor.
Professor Somnath Wakhlu writes, “The force came sweeping with relentless
fury and the governor surrendered Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh; hence in a
way, his conquest of Kashmir.” 7

In due course of time, the state became one of the most important and the
biggest princely states, with its Maharaja holding an honorary rank of Major
General of the British Indian Army, who was entitled to a 21-gun-salute (one
among five such rulers), whenever he visited a British army formation during the
Raj.

It has remained a mystery as to why the British did not rule Kashmir directly,
but handed it over to Gulab Singh in return for a paltry sum of 75 lacs. Were
the British over-stretched? Did they merely want to reward Gulab Singh for his
contribution to their victory, particularly for having protected their northern
flank during their wars with Sikhs? Perhaps, the answer lies in the dispatch of
Governor General, Lord Hardinge to the Secret Committee of East India
Company. The dispatch, written on March 19, 1846, states:
 “I request your honourable committees attending to the treaty made with
Maharaja Gulab Singh, by which a Rajput principality of the hill districts has
been constructed, extending from the Ravi to the Indus and including the
province of Kashmir. The Maharaja is declared by the treaty independent of the
Lahore state and under the protection of the British Government. As it was of
utmost importance to weaken the Sikh Nation before its Government could be
re-established, I considered the appropriation of this part of ceded territory to be
the most expedient measure I could devise for that purpose, by which a Rajput
dynasty will act as a counter poise against the power of a Sikh prince, the son of
late Ranjit Singh and both will have a common interest in resisting attempt on
the part of any Mohammedan power to establish an independent state on this
side of Indus or even to occupy Peshawar.” 8

In the existing situation, the British put up Rajputs against Sikhs and
interposed both between the ‘Empire’ and the Muslims in the north-west.
Besides, by treating the Rajput dynasty independent of Sikhs; it restricted the
degree of their sovereignty.

It was widely believed that Gulab Singh had borrowed 75 lacs, to be paid to
the British, from Diwan Jawala Sahai, a rich Punjabi from Aminabad. He was,
therefore, indebted to the latter for having raised this amount at a short notice.
Sahai then became the first Prime Minister of the state. His office remained
hereditary for many years, thereafter. Consequently, Sahai and his successors
imported many people from their own area to fill-up various administrative posts
in the state. In due course, these people, locally called Khatri, inundated the
Valley.

In 1852, the British forced an officer on special duty on Gulab Singh, who
now became the eyes and ears of the British and a virtual second centre of
power. In due course of time, British Residents were also posted in Poonch,
Ladakh and Baltistan. Nevertheless, Maharaja Gulab Singh proved to be a tough
administrator who restored law and order and instilled trust among the people in
the administration. He launched a ruthless campaign against the lawless
marauders like Galwans, Khokhas and Bombas and disciplined them with an
iron hand. He introduced a number of reforms in the distribution of land and
begaar (see n.13, p.47). He ensured that a shawl weaver was no longer a serf.
The Maharaja also rationed the food grains, as its monopoly by some vested
interests during times of scarcity, had created enormous suffering among the
people. It was said of his times that, “a bride laden with jewellery could walk in
the dead of night in a street of Srinagar without any fear.” 9

Maharaja Gulab Singh died in 1857, to be followed by Ranbir Singh. It was

during the latter’s rule in 1867 that British Trade Agency was established at Leh,
the capital of Ladakh. This was done to establish British control over the trade
routes to Central Asia. During the 1857 uprising, the Maharaja sided with the
British. But despite this vital assistance rendered to the British, the latter
surreptitiously incited the Muslim majority of the valley against their ‘Hindu’
Maharaja. Ranbir Singh, realising the potential of this insidious propaganda,
decided to shift his capital to Srinagar during the summer months. This would
enable him to address their grievances expeditiously, besides creating a sense of
belonging among the Kashmiri Muslims.

In 1838, the capital shifted from Jammu to Srinagar for the first time, when
the Maharaja moved there alongwith his retinue of nearly 200 people in summer.
This shifting of the State’s capital, known as Durbar Move, has now become a
yearly routine. The state capital moves from Srinagar to Jammu in winter (first
week of November) and returns to Srinagar in summer (first week of May).
Ranbir Singh was followed by Pratap Singh in 1885.

“In 1889, the British, wary of increasing Russian pressure towards the Pamirs,
instituted the Gilgit Agency under the direct rule of the British political agent,
and from that time Gilgit paid even less allegiance to the Maharaja of
Kashmir.” Pratap Singh did not have a male issue of his own, which led to great
10

deal of court intrigues. Coupled with the fact that Russian presence in the north
was getting worrisome for the British, the Maharaja’s rule was replaced by a
council, which lasted till 1905, when the Maharaja was re-installed. A cart road
was constructed between Jammu and Srinagar by Maharaja Pratap Singh, which
served as his personal pathway to Srinagar. However, it was thrown open to
public in 1922, and today serves as the main link between Srinagar and Jammu.

During Maharaja Pratap Singh’s reign, most of the senior appointments in

administration were filled by educated, well-trained and experienced officers
from outside the state, mainly from Bengal and Punjab. Bengali ministers and
officers played important role in giving shape to social life and in developmental
activities. “Among Bengali officials, the well-known names were Sir Albion
Banerjee (Administration), LC Bose (Chief Engineer Electrical for 11 years), JC
Chatterjee (Archeology) and Dr Mitra (Health Services). Many of the engineers,
judicial officers and administrators came from Punjab. KB Abdul Qayoom was
Chief Justice of State High Court and Bodh Raj Sawhny, a Barrister from
Lahore, was charged with creating the higher judiciary structure. Later, when
High Court was set up, he was appointed as officiating Chief Justice.” 11

Pratap Singh was succeeded by his nephew, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh
Bahadur, in 1925. It was during his rule that Kashmiri Pandits became the
vanguard of the movement that finally brought in the state-subject law. This
movement, launched by Kashmiri Pandits, was mainly aimed to forestall any
attempt by the British to acquire land in the state. Ironically, Kashmiri Muslims
who consider the state-subject law an article of faith, opposed it tooth and nail.
The monopoly of the administrative machinery of the state by outsiders had also
created a strong resentment among the native nobility and the feudal class.
Sensing the political implications such an emotional issue would have for his
rule in the state, the Maharaja acted swiftly. He promulgated a notification in
1927, which later became the State-Subject Law. This law created three
categories of State subjects; category ‘A’ included those who were hereditary
citizens of the state and had landed property. Category ‘B’ included those who
came from outside, but had acquired landed property in the state, and category
‘C’ was formed of those people who were either employed in Jammu and
Kashmir State Government Service or had been living in the state for the past ten
years, but did not own any landed property.

Dogra rule witnessed significant developments in the field of communication.

Many post and telegraph offices were opened throughout the state. The
administrative machinery was toned up by completely overhauling it, wherever
required. Criminal justice system too was modernised by applying British
practices to the state with appropriate modifications. Significant developments in
the field of industry and agriculture during this period benefited all sections of
the society. By now, British advisors were placed in various departments like,
army, public works department, and those dealing with state accounts, land
settlement issues, etc. However, the Maharaja was kept on a tight leash by the
British who exercised strict control on his administration. It can safely be
concluded that it now became a British-Dogra rule rather than a purely Dogra
rule.

About the state of Kashmiri Pandits during this period, it can safely be said
that whereas they enjoyed complete religious freedom, they were politically and
otherwise confined to the margins. With outsiders filling-up the administrative
appointments, Pandits were deprived of the legitimate means of earning their
livelihood, which happened to be through a government service.

N OTES

1. Dr Satish Ganjoo, Satanic Holocaust of Kashmiri Pandits: downloaded from KP Network@

yahoogroups.com, on 31 March, 2006.
2. W Moorcroft and G Trebeck, Travels in the Himalayan Provinces (1819–1835), two Volumes, edited
by H.H Wilson, (London: John Murray, 1841). Moorcroft was a veterinary doctor posted in the
military stud farm department of East India Company. He travelled extensively in Kashmir, Kullu,
Mansarover, Ladakh and Bokhara.
3. Sir William Barton, The Princess of India: (Nisbet and Company, London, 1934), p. 121.
4. Prof Som Nath Wokhlu, Daily Excelsior, December 25, 2000.
5. Sir Francis Younghusband, Kashmir (Black, London, 1909): Francis Younghusband was a British
Political Resident in Kashmir. An extensive traveller and explorer, he roamed widely in Himalayas,
Kashmir, Central Asia and China.
6. Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 13.
7. Prof Som Nath Wokhlu, Daily Excelsior December 25, 2000
8. Joseph Korbel, n. 6, and Francis Younghusband, n. 5, quoted here by Jagmohan in My frozen
Turbulence in Kashmir.
9. Francis Younghusband, n. 5.
10. Joseph Korbel, n. 6, p. 13.
11. Sati Sahwney, Kashmir Sentinel, December 2006.
 LAND, ITS PEOPLE AND
COMMUNICATIONS
“Dawn first appears with a golden radiance on the eternal snows and in the evening, the light
renders homage to the peaks of the towering mountains.”
—Kalhana

State of Jammu and Kashmir is located in a rectangular area in the extreme

north-west corner of the Indian sub-continent. Before the partition of India in
1947, it was spread over an area of 263,717 sq km, making it the largest princely
state in size. It lay between 32.17 and 36.58 degrees north latitude and 73.26 and
80.30 degrees east longitude. However, being mountainous in much of its huge
geographical area, it was sparsely populated at about 17 people/sq km, with its
total population of approximately 4 million, living in its 39 towns and 8,903
villages. Its urban population was estimated to be 362,314 and rural population
as 3,503,929. However, Kashmir valley itself was densely populated.

Apart from its size, in the context of changing international situation in mid
and late forties, the state had and continues to have great geo-strategic
importance. It was surrounded on three sides by foreign states. To its east lay
Tibet; in the north it had Chinese Turkmenistan or Sinkiang (Xinjian) as its
immediate neighbour; in the west lay Afghanistan. After the British left in 1947,
its south and south-west was bordered by another state, Pakistan.

For administrative purposes, the state, during the Dogra rule, was divided into
four provinces, each headed by a governor. These were Jammu, Kashmir, Gilgit
and Ladakh. During British rule, the government of undivided India had taken
Gilgit on lease in 1931. On termination of such lease, Maharaja regained its
possession in 1947. The respective governors administered their territory
through the Wazir-e-Wazarat, who headed each district. Some medium sized
districts, like Mirpur, Rajouri, Anantnag and Baramulla were well populated;
whereas Ladakh, comprising thousands of sq km of barren rock and snow, was
sparsely populated. Poonch, on the other hand, was a special case in itself, as it
was a feudal jagir belonging to a Raja. The most ubiquitous feature of the state’s
topography is the sweep of towering mountain ranges which occupy major part
of its geographical area. A traveller approaching the state from south will come
across following mountain ranges as he traverses till its extreme north.

Main Mountain Ranges

Shivalik Range: Moving north from the plains of Jammu region, the
topography gradually gives way to low hills, with an altitude of between 610 m
to 1,220 m, running in numerous ridges parallel to the Pir Panjal Range. “Made
up of usual sandstone, these ridges often sloped up gradually from the south and
presented a sheer cliff face from the north.” “The southern slopes of these spurs
1

are covered with forests of sub-montane variety.” These spurs finally merge
2

with the parent range, the Pir Panjal Range.

Pir Panjal Range (3050–4550 m): This range emanates to the south from the
Great Himalayan Range at the western border of Spiti and runs for about 480 km
to the west, parallel to the mother range up to Baramulla/Uri and the gorge of
Jhelum. This continuous and unbroken range, that forms the southern wall of
Kashmir valley is cut at only one place, i.e., at Kishtwar by River Chenab. The
eastern half of the range also serves to divide the drainage of Chenab from those
of two other big rivers, namely Beas and Ravi. It separates Kashmir valley from
Jammu and the outer hills, which have big towns like, Akhnur, Kotli, Mirpur,
Bhimber, Naushera, Rajouri and Poonch. Two of the few important passes
located over it are, Rohtang Pass (3978 m), which joins Kulu with Lahaul in
Himachal Pradesh and the Banihal Pass (above 2743 m), over which passes the
highway from Jammu to Srinagar, called National Highway 1A (NH1A).

The other passes include the Pir Panjal Pass (3494 m) connecting Rajouri
district with Shopian in the valley and Nilkantha Pass (3636 m) that provides
access from Poonch to Gulmarg. Some of the famous peaks located within Pir
Panjal Range are, Kaunsar Nag (3902 m), Trattakoti (4732 m — highest on the
range) and Romesh Thong (later named as Sun set Peak by Dr Arthur Neve , 3

after he had climbed it). Tosha Maidan, the magnificent and vast grassy highland
of immense beauty, lies further to the north of Pir Panjal Range. For centuries, it
has served as pristine pasture for the shepherds who graze their livestock here in
the summer months (n. 14, p. 47). On the north-west lies the 3847 m high Kazi
Nag Range, famous for Markhor, an endangered species of wild goat. Further
ahead stands the towering peak of Nanga Parbat, which at 8114 m, is among the
tallest in the world.

In the east of the Valley stands the formidable and religiously significant
mountain called Harmukh, with its peak standing at5152 m. Sir Walter
Lawrence records that according to local legend, “The gleam from the vein of
green emerald in the summit of mountain renders all poisonous snakes
harmless.” Another prominent peak in the east, which is visible from all over the
city is Mahadev(3966 m). On the south of the valley are located Amaranth (5280
m) and Kolhoi (5425 m). In the local language the peak is known as Gwash
Brari, meaning ‘Goddess of Dawn.’ Kashmiri word ‘brär’ is derived from
Sanskrit bhattarika, meaning ‘goddess.’

The beauty of the extensive mountain ranges and their peaks that ring the
Valley, is aptly summed up Sir Walter Lawrence, thus:-

“…In the early morning sun they are often delicate semi-transparent violet
relieved against a saffron sky and with light vapour clinging round their crests.
Then the rising sun deepens the shadows, and produces sharp outlines and strong
passages of purple and indigo in the deep ravines. Later on, it is nearly all blue
and lavender, with white snow peaks and ridges under a vertical sun…” 4

The Great Himalayan Range (4550–6050 m): The Great Himalayan Range
extends in the north-westerly direction from the point where the Pir Panjal
Range emanates from it, and serves to act as a watershed between the catchment
of Chenab/Jhelum on one side and Indus on the other. In the east, it separates
Lahaul in Himachal from Rupshu in the south-east Ladakh, and in the west it
separates Kishtwar and Kashmir valley from the Ladakh highlands and Baltistan.
This range too has some strategically important passes over it, namely, the
Barachala Pass (4890 m) on Kulu-Leh road, Umasi La (5294 m) joining
Kishtwar with Zanskar valley, Chilung La (4401 m) that leads to the watershed
between the headwaters of Zanskar and Suru Rivers of Ladakh. Then there is
Zoji La (3529 m) on the Srinagar-Leh road and Kamri and Burzil Passes (4198
m) that permit access from Srinagar to Gilgit. This mighty range finally ends at
the massif of Nanga Parbat (8126 m), though a spur continues to run in west-
south-west direction till it reaches the right bank of Jhelum near Muzzafarabad.
It is here that it faces the end point of Pir Panjal Range on the other side of the
deep gorge of the Jhelum. Beyond the great Himalayan Range lie Ladakh and
Baltistan.

The eastern wall of the valley is formed by one of the two major branches
(4572 m) that takes off from the Great Himalayan Range at Zoji La and extends
south towards Chenab, separating the drainages of Chenab and Jhelum in the
process. Close to Kishtwar, it veers to the west and finally meets the Pir Panjal
Range near Banihal Pass. The access from the valley to Kishtwar across this
range is restricted due to the non-availability of passes except a few difficult
ones at heights over 3353 m. Importance of this range is also due to the fact that
from the root of one of its major southern spurs, near Amarnath cave, emanates a
minor spur that runs due west, forming the southern wall of the famous Sindh
valley. The famous peaks of Kolahoi (5425 m) and Mahadev (3966 m), so
prominently visible from the valley, are located on this minor spur.

A view of imposing Himalayan Range

The second major branch that takes off from Zoji La runs west, separating
Kashmir Valley from the Kishenganga Valley. The most prominent pass over it,
namely the Rajdhani Pass (3638m), connects Srinagar with Gilgit. It moves
along the left bank of the Kishenganga River over some distance, finally turning
south and joining Jhelum near Uri. The southern extension of this range, also
known as the Kazinag mountains, forms the western wall of the Kashmir valley.
These mountains are also famous for the big Markhor.

Zanskar Range (4000–5750 m): It runs parallel to and just north of the Great
Himalayan Range. With an average height of 6096 m, when viewed from the
north, this range appears smaller, as the plateau on which it is located, is itself
3810 m above mean sea level. Zanskar River, that joins Indus River a few km
west of Leh, after piercing through the Zanskar Range, is formed by numerous
snow-fed mountain streams that lie in the desolate region between the Zanskar
and the Great Himalayan Ranges. This vast region of squandered rock and snow
is one of the most desolate areas in this part of the world, inhabited by only some
wandering herdsmen and their flock. The region has only one long and difficult
route that connects Kulu and Simla in Himachal with Leh over passes at
altitudes of over 4877 m. Zanskar Range, bounded by Suru River, joins the Great
Himalayan Range in the west near Zoji La. The Indus River runs along the
Zanskar Range, through a constricted valley. The towns of Leh, Kargil and
Skardu lie in the interior valleys formed by the tributaries that feed Indus River.
Before India’s independence in 1947, Leh, the capital of Ladakh, drew its
importance from the fact that it was located at a central point on the caravan
routes to Yarkand, Lhasa, Simla, Srinagar and Gilgit.

Ladakh Range (4550–57500 m): It runs north of the Indus valley, separating
it from the Shyok valley, till a few km above Skardu where the Shyok River
joins Indus, through a gap between Ladakh Range and Haramosh Range of the
mighty Karakoram.

The Great Karakoram Range (5150–7300 m): Beyond Indus and Shyok,
towards the north lie even mightier mountains, that form the hub of the
enormous Karakoram Range, also called the Mustagh. These mountains contain
a series of sky touching heights, within which are located the world’s most
gigantic and ancient glaciers. There are also huge swathes of utter desolation
which have remained unexplored even till today. Even the most courageous
explorers and mountaineers visit these isolated, barren and inhospitable
surroundings, rarely. Besides K2, which at 8610 m is the second highest
mountain peak in the world, next only to Mount Everest, the Karakoram Range
has many other tall peaks of over 7620 m. Some of the world’s greatest and
longest glaciers lie within its vast and barren interior regions. The highest
battlefield in the world today, spread over Siachen, Boltoro, Hispar and Biafo
glaciers stretching for roughly 80 kms, is situated in the Karakoram. In the olden
days, on both sides of this mountain mass, ran famous caravan routes. One was
from Leh to Yarkand over the Karakoram Pass at 5575 m and the other from
Gilgit to Kashgar over the Mintaka Pass, at 4709 m.

Regions Comprising the State

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is divided into three well-defined
geographical regions, each having the status of an administrative division,
namely, Jammu, including the outer hills; Kashmir valley in the central part and
the high mountainous region of Ladakh in the north. Historically, the mighty
mountain ranges dividing these three regions, determined not only the diversity
in topography, but also its cultural heritage, economy, social organisation,
language, ethnic composition and even flora and fauna. Later, such diversity
gave rise to diverse political aspirations, too. These mountain ranges also
determined the administrative divisions of the state. Its climatic regions also,
roughly coincide with the administrative divisions; Ladakh, having arctic cold
desert conditions, Kashmir, having mild temperate climate and the Jammu
division having sub-tropical conditions. Annual rainfall too is determined by
these mountain ranges. Ladakh receives the least rainfall of all, viz., 92.6 mm
(3.7 inches), Srinagar, 650 mm (25.6 inches) and Jammu 1115.9 mm (44 inches).

It is interesting to see that in no Indian state does geography so deeply impact

the diversity of race, language, ethnicity, economy, climate, politics,
administration, etc, as it does in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Its different
parts have little in common with each other. Frankly, it was merely an accident
of history that brought them together as a single state. Frederic Drew once
remarked, “The territories of Jammu and Kashmir have no other bond of
cohesion than the fact of Maharaja’s rule; no simple name for it exists.” 5

Despite being the largest state of pre-partition India in 1947, today large parts
of the state are under the illegal occupation of China and Pakistan. In fact, with
barely 139,443.92 sq km under its control, India administers approximately 46
per cent of its geographical area. Pakistan occupies 86017.81 sq km in Jammu
and Kashmir, China has under its occupation 38256 sq km in Aksai Chin,
through which passes its National Highway 219, connecting Lazi and Xinjiang
in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though the region is barren and nearly
devoid of habitation, it has great strategic significance for China, as it connects
its two restive regions, Tibet and Xingjian. The construction of this road started
in 1951 and was completed in 1957, without India getting a whiff of it; or that is
the general perception.* An additional 5480 sq km was ceded to China on 99
years lease by Pakistan from its occupied areas, in 1963. As a quid pro quo
Pakistan received from China all it needed for building a nuclear bomb. This
stretch of land falls in the Shaksgam and Muztagh Valley, which lies north of
Siachen and close to Karakoram Pass. In the pre-partition days, it lay in Shigar
in Baltistan and is approximately 25 per cent of the Northern Areas (now
renamed Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan, under whose illegal occupation it is). This
area has since been incorporated into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region by
China. Incidentally, Pakistan harnessed two small glaciers north of Sia Kangri in
the Shaksgam Valley and diverted them to Indus, upsetting China in the process.
 The State’s boundaries with other countries are a medley of nomenclatures
that more than anything else distinguishes its different occupiers. With China, it
shares a border running to 860 kms, out of which International Border (IB)
covers 270 kms, Line of Actual Control (LAC) — area bordering Aksai Chin,
covers a distance of 530 kms, and remaining 60 kms covers the borders of area
ceded to it by Pakistan. In the Ladakh/Kargil region, it covers 322 kms of its
border with Pakistan; 198 kms of LoC and 124 kms of AGPL (Actual Ground
Position Line). In the Valley, the LoC covers a distance of 520 kms, whereas in
8

Jammu region, it covers a distance of 225 kms. Jammu region also covers a
distance of 265 km of international border along which runs the Punjab province
of Pakistan. So, Jammu and Kashmir’s borders with Pakistan and China add up
to 2062 kms, known by different names.

Ethnic and Linguistic Composition of the State

Jammu and Kashmir is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and a multi-lingual state
with a shared historical past. A large number of ethnic diversities, cutting across
the religious divide, make up the State’s current population.

In 1947, an overwhelming majority of the people in the Valley were Muslims

by faith. The only Hindus left in the valley were of Brahmanical caste, known as
Kashmiri Pandits. Historically, ethnically and culturally, the Kashmiri Pandits
are closer to Kashmiri Muslims than to the Dogra Hindus of Jammu. They differ
greatly from Hindus in Jammu region or even from Hindus in rest of India.
Some of the religious and social practices of Kashmiri Pandits are very unique
and are exclusively observed by them. Some of these differences are so great
that they form a distinct group in themselves. As H Sender says, “The
differences between the two are so great that it would be more sensible to view
them as Kashmiris, rather than to view them as Brahmins.” A gifted community,
9

“Kashmiri Brahman had been most famous as a highly intelligent and gifted
community. They were the only community of the state to go out in large
numbers and earn their livelihood in the far corners of India.” Today the valley
10

is almost entirely Muslim, with Pandits having been reduced to not more than
3,000, all told (census figs., 1991).

Nearly half of Kashmiri Muslim population is formed of several ethnic

minorities. These include over 800,000 Kashmiri Shias, almost the same number
of nomadic Gujjars and Bakerwals, and over 200,000 Dar and Balti Muslims
(mostly Shias). Despite professing the same faith, they still maintain their
specific ethnic identities. The other half of the population is Sunni Muslims who
form a majority in Kashmir valley, though they have their own social divisions.
To start with, they freely inter-married with those Muslims who came to the
Valley from outside. Socially, however, the two groups have their distinctive
identities. One group traces its ancestry to the thousand odd Syed families who
came to the Valley with Syed Mir Ali Hamadani and his son Mir Muhammad
Hamadani. During the Muslim rule, the Syeds, being direct descendants of
Prophet Mohammad, enjoyed the privileges of the ruling class. Socially, they
could be considered the Brahmans among Muslims. Those families which had
inter-married with the Syeds, too claimed this exclusivity. Even today, they
enjoy this social exclusivity. The other group consists of the descendants of
original Hindu converts. To some extent, they still display the social divisions of
their original faith, while at the same time suffer from a sense of social
inferiority compared to Syeds.

At the time of partition, 12.5 per cent of the population of Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (PoK) comprised of Hindus and Sikhs. Both are non-existent there
today. At that time, Sikhs were mainly concentrated in Muzzafarabad district.
Pakistani occupation of that part of the State during 1947–48 war, forced them to
migrate to other parts of the state. “Most of them were originally Brahmins
imported by Raja Sukhjivan (see chapter 3) and were converted to Sikhism in
the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh.” At present, “There are around 80,000 Sikhs
11

living in 121 villages spread in eight districts of Kashmir valley.” 12

Gujjar Muslims in Jammu have closer ethnic ties with Hindu Gujjars of
neighbouring states than with their co-religionists of Kashmir. Same is the case
with Buddhists and Muslims of Ladakh, who share a common heritage and racial
background. Jammu region and Kargil have nearly 100,000 Shia Muslims each.
Gujjars in Jammu region are not specifically concentrated at only one place, but
are spread out in various districts like, Poonch, Rajouri, Udhampur, Kathua and
Doda.

As far as languages spoken are concerned, apart from Kashmiri, which is

spoken with minor variations in different parts of the valley, other languages
widely spoken in the state are; Dogri, Pothwari, Balti, Ladakhi, Gojri, Punjabi
and lately Urdu.

Regional Diversity
Each region of the State has its own geographical, climatic and ethnic
diversity, which is difficult to find in any other state of India. The same are
described below.
Jammu Region
This is the southern region of the state, bordering Punjab, including within it 8
to 24 km wide tract of plains, generally arid and stony. These consist of a
number of dry river beds through which numerous streams, coming down from
the hills, flow. Kalidhar Range of mountains, the southern-most range, varying
in height between 900 and 1350 m, separates the hill region of Jammu from its
plains sector. With an average elevation of 366 m, Jammu region contains a
number of fertile tracts which are heavily populated.

The huge network of hills and narrow valleys in the Jammu region are
inhabited by sturdy and war like peasants of the Rajput stock, having wiry and
tough physique with sharp features. The eastern parts around Jammu are mostly
inhabited by Hindus, called Dogras. In the western parts, these Hindus had
largely converted to Islam, with Chibs predominant in Bhimber and Mirpur and
Sudans in Poonch. After conversion to Islam, they continued to retain the Rajput
characteristics of honesty, bravery, courage and simplicity. Their women are
famous for their fine features. In fact, the Dogra royalty selected their Maharanis
from Hindu Chibs. Agriculture and soldiering are their main professions. The
Dogra rulers showed great fondness for both Hindu and Muslim Rajputs of this
region due to their uprightness and martial spirit and they were allowed to wear
arms while others were forbidden. The army of the Dogra rulers was largely
composed of them. Some of the finest soldiers of the British Indian Army came
from this region. The tradition continues to the present day.

Historically, the outer hills of Jammu region were inhabited by the turbulent
and volatile Khokhas and Bombas in the Jhelum gorge, while the higher reaches,
right upto the Pir Panjal Range, were and continue to be inhabited by the
Gujjars. The Gaddis are mostly found in Kishtwar. Both, Gujjars and Gaddis are
peaceful shepherds leading a nomadic life. Except Gaddis, all others are of
Muslim faith.

Doda, which is contiguous to Kishtwar in the south-west and to Kashmir

valley in the north-west, was made a separate district by carving it out from
Hindu majority Udhampur district some years back. In the present situation, its
strategic importance lies in its unique location, as it is ideally situated in the
outer hills of Jammu region; with its northern periphery touching the valley,
southern bordering Udhampur, south-west adjoining Kathua and east and south-
east bordering Ladakh. Fifty-five per cent of its population of approximately
500,000 is Muslim.
Baltistan-Gilgit and Ladakh Region
Before 1947, the state’s largest region happened to be Ladakh, with a total
area of 174,376 sq km (approx 78.5 per cent), with Jammu and Kashmir regions
occupying 11.5 per cent and 10 per cent of its geographical area respectively.
After the 1947–48 war, Pakistan occupied 77,675 sq km of its area in Gilgit-
Baltistan region. Ladakh was left with 96,701 sq km. Then China nibbled away
38,000 sq km of this left over area in Aksai Chin. Later still, it got 5,138 sq km
on lease from Pakistan from its Gilgit-Baltistan occupied region. At that time,
this region was divided into six districts for administration; Hunza-Nagar, Gilgit,
Koh-e-Ghizer, Ghanche, Diamir and Skardu. These were further grouped into
three agencies or divisions; Diamir, Gilgit and Baltistan, with headquarters at
Chilas, Gilgit and Skardu town, respectively. The region is characterised by the
world’s biggest mountain ranges, desolate and uninhabited areas and sparsely
populated valleys. To the north of The Great Himalayan Range lie the massive
Karakoram and Kunlun Ranges; in the west is Hindukush and Afghanistan, and
to the east lies the high plateau that stretches into Tibet, known as the roof of the
world.

The Great Himalayan Range serves as a barrier between the northern areas
and rest of the state. The main mountain chain and the river valleys that drain
into Indus and its tributaries follow the grain of the country from north-west to
south-east. The topography of the ground provides a natural access to the region.
This access takes off from its south-west corner, and moves eastwards along the
Indus valley. While doing so, it skirts the Nanga Parbat and enters the nearly
unexplored area between the Himalayan and Karakorum Ranges, in the process,
avoiding the huge barrier created by the mountains of the former. Except for the
eastern region and the provincial capital Leh, the easiest and the shortest route
from Srinagar continues to be the one over Zoji La.

The most important geographical feature of this sprawling desolation remains

the Indus River. It enters the region in the east, runs all along its length and exits
at its south-west corner into North West Frontier Province (NWFP) — now
renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan. For most of its length, it is a raging
torrent, falling with great speed over steep gradients, entering and exiting from
deep gorges with fury, and at places, occupying large spaces while spreading
over wide plain river beds. “Near the Kashmir-Tibet boundary in the east, it runs
at an unbelievable height of 4,200 m. Thereafter, it loses its altitude, as it moves
downstream and opposite Leh, 208 kms upstream, it flows at an altitude of 3230
m. Flowing further down, 128 km upstream, it is joined by Shyok River at an
altitude of 2350 m, before reaching the junction point with Gilgit River, at an
altitude of 1,310 m.” In the eastern region, because of the generally uniform
13

height of the mountains (6400 m) and the river valley (3960 m), Indus is not as
furious as in the west.

Eastern Ladakh
This is characterised by broad and shallow valleys, relatively low rolling hills
and level stretches of rocky plains. Numerous salt water lakes of large size dot
this region. These are formed by the accumulating waters of the melting snows
in summer which have no outlets, thus turning the water brackish and green in
color. In the north-east corner of this area, lie the district of upper Changchenmo
River and the plains of Lingzitang, at an altitude of 4880 m. For bulk of its
course below Leh, Indus becomes a raging torrent as it meanders its way
between sheer walls of smooth granite. In the olden days, this forced even the
hardy travellers with the caravans on the silk route, to abandon the river bank
route and cut across the spurs to the elevated plateau. The nature of the terrain is
further influenced by the vast difference in the altitude of the river, particularly
in the west, where the terrain is exceedingly steep and broken. This can easily be
gauged by the incredible difference of over 7000 m in height between the lowest
point near Chilas (1015 m), and the highest point, the peak of Nanga Parbat,
(8126 m), over a short distance of 51 kms (as crow flies). This region is,
therefore, characterised by fast flowing rivers, gushing through deep narrow
valleys, precipitous slopes with razor-sharp edges and extremely difficult and
rough terrain that tests even the most renowned mountaineers and explorers.

The landscape and the climate of Ladakh region and the rest of the state are
quite different from each other. The great barrier of Himalayan Range prevents
the rain clouds from moving beyond Kashmir Valley, resulting in scanty annual
rainfall of about 15 cm in the west and 5 cm in its eastern region. The landscape
is devoid of any vegetation except in areas close to Indus, where it traverses
wide stretches in relatively gentle stream. Bare rocks, icy cliffs, long slopes,
plains and highlands of stony waste and gravel make up the rest of the
landscape. The monotony is broken only by the small fast flowing rivers that line
the bottom of many narrow valleys.

In summer and autumn months, the sky is clear blue without a speck of cloud
visible anywhere, though in winter, the cloud cover sometime does not lift for
days on end. The rarefied atmosphere of the region, besides making the
atmosphere dry and bracing, allows the mid day sun to beat down fiercely
through it. During night, as the desolate rocks lose heat quickly and became
cold, the night temperatures drop to freezing cold. Ladakh is indeed beautiful,
but its beauty is not of the soft and soothing variety that would beckon an idle
pleasure seeker or shelter a jaded traveller. Its beauty lies in its mighty
mountains that stand haughty and aloof in their desolate, barren and cold
solitude. The grandeur of such magnificence is simply breathtaking at one plane,
and awe inspiring on the other. These eternally silent mountains have an
enormous humbling effect on the human spirit; the tenuousness of his ambitions,
the futility of his efforts and the insignificance of his individuality.

Ladakh is also called the ‘Land of the Moon’, because under the glare of full
moon at night, the whole landscape turns magical, like a fairy land of heavenly
light and sharp and long shadows. Its half frozen lakes, glistening like bright
silver ornaments over it, add to its great beauty. Of late, Ladakh has emerged as
a favourite destination for tourists and mountaineers from different parts of the
world. The number of expeditions has also increased to nearly 500 of late. “Due
to easy accessibility and a few regulations, Stok Kangri in the Zanskar Range
and Mentok Kangri in the Korzok valley, among other peaks, have been popular
with mountaineers. Stok Kangri is famous among the mountaineers for viewing
Nanga Parbat, Mount Kailash and the Nun Kun peaks,” writes Dr KN Pandita.
14

There are some other significant rivers in this region; Dras River originates
south of Kaobalgali near Zoji La and flowing in northerly direction, it joins
Indus River south of Marol. Shingko River flows from north-west to south-east,
joining Dras River north-west of Kargil, before it joins Indus. Similarly, Zanskar
River flows from south-west to north-east and finally joins Indus south of Saspol
Gompa.

Inhospitable climatic conditions, high altitude and desert conditions render the
ecology of Ladakh very sensitive. Green cover provided by plants, shrubs and
grasses, plays a vital role in maintaining the ecology of the place. Numerous
glacial streams feed a wide variety of plants. “The arid region, in fact, is a
treasure trove of more than 1,000 local varieties… about 50 per cent of these
have medicinal and aromatic properties.” The traditional system of Healing
15

(Sowa Rigpa) is based on the medicines (Amchi) provided by these plants. The
system revolves around Nespasum (three humours) and Jungwaina (five
elements) which involves the judicious mix of plants, traditional knowledge and
specific ailments. “Even today, in the modern age, the average Ladakhi swears
by the Amchi.” 16

Gilgit-Baltistan
Far removed from the plains of Punjab, and resting under the shadows of the
great Karakoram Range, this region has generally remained cut off in its
splendid isolation from the hustle and bustle of the mainland politics. With some
of the world’s tallest mountains forming its backdrop, the imposing Karakorum,
Hindukush, Himalaya and Ladhakh ranges converge here. Indus covers nearly
700 kms of its long journey in this region. The land is characterised by numerous
blue-water lakes, some of the world’s longest glaciers, white sand dunes and
deepest ravines, not seen anywhere else in the world. However, such ruggedness
of terrain has not lessened its geo-strategic importance due to the fact that it is
nestled in between four countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and India. The
availability of vast reserves of natural resources enhances this importance.
During the British rule, its importance lay in its usefulness as a listening post in
the Great Game. Thereafter, it provided access to energy-rich Central Asian
17

region.

Being a part of the pre-1947 State of Jammu and Kashmir, and bordering
Afghanistan in the present situation, it continues to remain in focus. In addition,
its geo-strategic importance has further got a boost due to the Karakoram
Highway, which connects Xinjiang with Pakistan, through Khunjerab Pass, over
Karakoram and passes through this region. This Highway provides easy access
to China to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar in the Arabian Sea, besides
permitting it to keep a close watch on the movement of militants from ‘Af-Pak’
region to its restive Xinjiang province. Recent media reports indicate that
Chinese troops from the People’s Liberation Army have been stationed in this
area with multiple strategic objectives; chief among these being to encircle India
from the north, while at the same time, constitute a ‘threat in being’ to Indian
18

forces in Kashmir.

There is practically no difference between the Baltis, Ladakhis and Purig-pas

of Kargil, as all of them are of Tibetan origin and speak the most ancient form of
Tibetan language even today. Their music, dress, food, folklore, epics, etc. are
same. That is why radio programmes of Leh and Kargil are popular across the
border. Ladakhis and Baltis are peaceful and devoid of any inner conflict. And
left to themselves, they would prefer to live with each other in peace. It is only
the sub-continental association that has created mistrust among them. For
centuries, Ladakh has represented genuine secularism, unlike its theocratic
neighbour, Tibet.

The concept of Buddhist/non-Buddhist dichotomy did not exist, though to an

outsider, the traditional Ladakhi divide between Nang-pa (insider) and Chi-pa
(outsider) might convey a different impression. The concept merely meant “we”
and “they” or a “native” and a “foreigner” and in fact, conveyed a deeper
philosophical distinction between Nang-pa (internal) and Chi-pa (external) truth
seeker. This concept had its roots in deeper Buddhist philosophy and denoted the
difference between believer in Nirvana and Samsara. It was the responsibility of
the ruler to provide full security to both the practitioners, “even if it required
forging security alliances with the Mughal emperors, to repel successive Tibetan
forays.” In Baltistan, it was the Mons, an Indo-Aryan group, who made it a hub
19

of Buddhism, leading to a triangular relationship among Kashmiri, Gandhara and

Turfan Schools.

Baltistan was ruled by Tibetans until 9–10th century, after which the power
shifted into the hands of a local Skardu chieftain. In the 13th century, a young
Egyptian adventurer, Ibrahim Shah, reached Baltistan and married the last
princess of Skardu. He later founded the Makpon Dynasty. It was during
Makpon Bokha’s reign in 15th century, that Mir Shamsuddin Araqi (see p. 61)
introduced the Noorbakshiya order in Baltistan. It was around this period, that
Mughal rulers, Sultan Syed Khan Kashgari (1531) and Mirza Haider Dughlat
(1532), invaded the region. Some historians believe that in 16–17th century,
Persian Twelver Shia clerics made forays into Baltistan, while others believe that
Baltis followed Noorbakshiya faith right until 19th century, when Sayyid Abbas
Al-Musawi (1900) converted them to Shia sect. According to Prof Stobdan,
“Baltistan’s most powerful Makpon, Ali Sher Khan Anchan (1590–1625),
conquered Ladakh and took Gyalpo Jamyang Namgyal to Skardu under
captivity. Anchan later gave his daughter, Gyal Khatoon, in marriage to
Namgyal. Anchan’s descendents ruled the Balti kingdom and maintained close
political and cultural ties with Ladakh. He also conquered areas up to Chitral and
brought many Shinas/Dards to serve for him.” Though the Afghans invaded
20

Skardu in 1779, their rule over the area did not last long enough to leave any
imprint.

“Baltistan region is identified by some with the Aparytae of Herodotus, with

its reference being found in the ancient ‘Inner Asian Epic’ of King Kesar and in
Ptolemy’s Byaltae. Being at the crossroads of many countries, cultures and
civilisations, different people called it by different names. The Chinese called
the region Palolo and the Dards called it Balor. Arabs named it Baloristan and
Tibetans called it Nang-kod. It finds mention in the works of Mughal historians
too. They called it Tibet-i-Khurd or Little Tibet,” says, Prof Stobdan (n. 5).

In 1840, the region became part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, when
Baltistan, along with Ladakh, was captured by the legendary Dogra General
Zorawar Singh. For Britain, its importance was purely strategic in nature. The
21

only exception was opening of a Pashmina processing unit in the region. It

served to keep an eye on the Soviet moves in the region. During British rule,
Baltistan, Ladakh and Gilgit were one ‘Frontier District’. Ladakh Wazarat was
separated in 1901, with Skardu as its winter capital. In 1947, Pakistan annexed
Baltistan by force under “Operation Sledge.” With an artificial and forced
division between two ‘Little Tibets,’ this ancient land remained a cul de sac
since the intertwining relationship between the two came to an abrupt end. After
1947–48, Indo-Pak war, the Ceasefire Line (CFL), that came into being, divided
a thriving Himalayan region.

Subsequently, Baltistan particularly suffered ruthless cultural and political

purges under Pakistani occupation. Unfortunately for its inhabitants, its vast
natural resources fill the coffers of Islamabad rather than being utilised for the
benefit of the locals. This has resulted in the people of the region being deprived
of even the basic necessities of life. Says Ali Engineer, Rinchen, “…The natives
of Gilgit-Baltistan continue to live in Stone Age. The occupiers have deliberately
neglected to develop the land according to the needs of its people.” 22

Due to the difference in altitude, terrain and accessibility, people living in the
eastern and western parts of this region differ greatly from each other. Gilgit area
is inhabited predominantly by Muslims, who resemble the hardy Pashtuns of
Afghanistan in their dress, features and habits. The area east of Kargil is
dominated by the Buddhists, with their prayer wheels, imposing monasteries and
gompas being a common sight. Kargil is mostly inhabited by Muslims of Shia
persuasion. The inhospitable and barren eastern region is sparsely populated,
though further west, population density increases to some extent. In the valleys
people carry out a precarious agriculture and the higher regions are frequented
by shepherds with their flock of livestock. At the time of partition of India, 50
per cent population of Gilgit-Baltistan region used to be Shias, 25 per cent
Ismailis (akin to Shias) and 25 per cent Sunnis. Though Sunnis in the Diamer
district are in majority, in the other five districts they are in a minority.

Zia-ul-Haque, the former military dictator of Pakistan, made strenuous efforts

to change the demographic profile of this region by settling Sunnis (mainly
Punjabi and Pushtun ex-servicemen) there. Such blatant attempts at reducing the
Shia population in their traditional area into a minority, led to a movement
demanding the creation of an autonomous and separate (but not independent)
Karakoram province, which would have Shia/Ismaili majority. However, the
movement was ruthlessly suppressed by Zia. This created a resentment that is
believed to have cost him his life in the mysterious plane crash which remains
unexplained to the present day. Nevertheless, the policy continued even after he
left the scene.

AGPL and Siachen Glacier

Since 1984, India and Pakistan have been locked in a most difficult conflict in
the highest battlefield of the world, the Siachen Glacier — the largest glacier
outside the Polar region. It is located in the north-eastern corner of Gigit-
Baltistan of PoK, with China on its North. India occupies the Soltoro Ridge, 15
to 20 kms west of the Glacier at a height of about 6,060 m, in temperatures that
range between 35 and 70 degree Celsius below the freezing point. This ridge
forms the western wall of the Siachen Glacier, whereas the Karakoram Range is
on its east.

According to the Karachi Agreement, the LoC, (see chapter 8) terminated at

grid point NJ 9842. Pakistan insists that the LoC from this point goes north-east
wards to Karakoram Pass, putting the glacier in Pakistan territory; while India,
on the other hand, says that the LoC must follow a well-defined geographical
feature, viz., the Soltoro Ridge, which Indian troops dominate. This puts the
Siachen Glacier in Indian territory.

The dispute, however, was created by a series of sustained and suspicious

cartographic depictions in various atlases and maps published by some leading
western geographical societies that showed the LoC extending from NJ 9842 in
the north-easterly direction right upto the Karakoram Pass; thus putting Siachen
Glacier within Pakistan. Even Pakistani maps had not done so till then! Indian
suspicions got further strengthened in 1985, when Pakistan published its official
‘Atlas of Pakistan’. This map did not depict Gilgit Agency as a disputed
territory, which it had always been depicting as such. Baltistan, on whose eastern
edge, according to Pakistan, lies the Siachen Glacier, was left unchanged as the
disputed territory.

The erroneous depictions of the maps were, probably, the result of the
“translation” of the Air Defence Information Zone (ADIZ) marking, which
provides zoning boundaries to air traffic controllers in civil and military aviation.
However, as strategic expert, Mahroof Raza says, “There can be several ADIZs
that could pass through one country, and these do not necessarily identify a
boundary line.” Nevertheless, publication of such maps only hardened
23

Pakistan’s rigid stand on the issue. In early the 1980’s, intelligence reports,
coupled with activities on the Pakistan side of the Soltoro Ridge, established
without doubt, that Pakistan was planning to occupy the Siachen Glacier. Having
learnt its lesson in 1962, India pre-empted Pakistani moves and occupied the
Soltoro Ridge in April 1984, before Pakistan could do so. Thereafter, Pakistan
tried to wrest the positions on the ridge by launching numerous attacks, but
failed to dislodge the Indian troops. On the other hand, in one of the most daring
attacks in the annals of military history, Indian troops captured their ‘Quaid’ post
located at a height of about 6,100 m. As a result, India today holds 110 km of the
AGPL in the Siachen Glacier and dominates the Pakistani posts militarily at the
northernmost tip of the Indo-Pak border.

Siachen’s strategic importance lies not so much in its military value but in the
fact that it holds approximately 100 million cu m of fresh water. It costs India
roughly 1000 crores annually to hold it. Further south, lies the Ladakh plateau
whose mineral wealth, including gold, according to some geologists, has yet to
be exploited. Besides, in the present strategic environment, when Chinese
presence in PoK has become a reality, Soltoro Ridge provides an access for link-
up between Chinese troops Karakoram Pass and Pakistani troops in Siachen.
Therefore, Siachen is not a useless piece of ground on which ‘not a blade of
grass grows’ as Nehru famously described Aksai Chin during a debate in
Parliament. Construction of Karakoram Highway and its renewed upgradation
by China and its flexing of military muscle of late, make Siachen a ‘Must Hold’
area.

Kashmir Valley
If there is one issue concerning Kashmir on which there is complete
unanimity, it is Kashmir’s natural splendor. Firdaus described it thus:
 Agar firdaus bar ruye zamin ast/hamin ast o hamin ast o hamin ast. (If the 24

paradise is anywhere on earth it is here; it is here, it is here)

Kalhana says in Rajtarangini: “It is a country where sun shines mildly, being
the place created by Rishi Kashyap, for His glory — big and lofty houses,
learning, saffron, icy cool water and grapes rare in heaven, are plentiful here —
Kailasha is the best place in the three worlds (Trilok), Himalayas the best place
in Kailasha, and Kashmir the best place in Himalayas.” 25

Its broad Himalayan valleys, lush green meadows, icy streams, impressive
chinars, snow-capped mountain peaks, many accessible and non-accessible
glaciers, silvery waterfalls, cool and icy springs, terraced paddy fields, lakes, big
and small, different types of water bodies (including mars ), rivers and thick
26

forests, make it a place full of vibrant nature at its best. No wonder a Persian
poet was moved to write:

Har sokhteh jani kih be Kashmir dar aayad Gar morgh-e-kababast kih ba
baal o par aayad.

(Every burned body that comes to Kashmir, even if a grilled rooster; it will
revive with wings and feathers). 27

Kashmir valley is a level stretch, with a length of 135 km and breadth of 32 to

40 km that runs from south-east to north-west at an average elevation of 1,829
m. River Jhelum, its most prominent physical feature, flows right across the
entire length of the valley, encompassing a catchment area of roughly 10,360 sq
km. Kashmir fulfills the geographical description of a valley, enclosed as it is on
all sides by huge snowy mountain ranges, viz, the Pir Panjal in the south, the
Himmalayan Range in the north, and the massive spurs of these two gigantic
ranges in the east. In west it is enclosed by the Shamsabari Range, with its height
varying between 3,353 to 4,572 m. The other peculiar physical features of the
valley are the flat and arid hill tops with steep sides called the Karewa that
mostly appear at places where hills peter out into the valley. Geologists believe
these to be dating back to the period when Kashmir valley was a huge lake (refer
to chapter 1). Kashmir valley and its surrounding mountain ranges are dotted
with a number of lakes, with Wullar being the largest (see chapter 5). Besides
this, Dal Lake in Srinagar is the most famous and Manasbal and Nagin Lakes,
perhaps the most beautiful.
 The Valley boasts of many snow-fed streams and springs; though, the famous
ones among these, namely, Kishenganga, Liddar and Sindh could actually
qualify as rivers in their own right. All these and other snow-fed streams flowing
through numerous side valleys, keep its rich alluvial soil well watered, before
finally discharging their waters into Jhelum. The main crop of the Valley is rice
of a fine variety. Saffron is cultivated around Pampore (pp. 117-118). Different
varieties of fruit like, apple, apricot, walnut, peaches, almonds, cherry and many
others are produced all over the Valley. Similarly, different types of trees like
poplar, willow, walnut and the magnificent chinar turn the Valley into a veritable
feast of greenery and add great variety to its already rich landscape. At heights
above 2000 m, maize and millet are the main crops. Due to abundance of forests,
timber has been its chief produce; though, of late, logging has considerably
slowed down due to the constraints imposed by the necessity to prevent
ecological degradation.

Trees like fir, pine, deodar and willow, which thrives in the temperate climate
of the Valley, can be found in numerous forests that cover the mountain ranges
at the lower altitude. As one approaches the tree line, birch, maple and horse
chestnut trees become more predominant. Most of these forests are generally
found on the northern slopes as the severe sun and hot winds coming from the
plains, make it impossible for these delicate trees to survive on the southern
slopes that take the brunt of the heat and the accompanying winds. These slopes
are covered with shrubs and wild grass. In the higher reaches, where the climate
is no longer suitable for cultivation of maize and millet, the nomadic tribes
cultivate buckwheat and Tibetan barley. As the elevation increases, bare rocks
and glaciers became predominant. And beyond these, tower the glistening snow
peaks that almost touch the vast blue sky.

In 1947, Kashmir valley’s only city was Srinagar, the summer capital of the
State, situated on both banks of River Jhelum. At that time, its two banks were
connected to each other by seven bridges (now there are many more). The
connectivity between various localities in the hinterland over backwaters and
canals joining Jhelum with Dal Lake, was provided by numerous smaller bridges
and arches. In those days, the foreign tourists, the royalty and the English ruling
class lived in the more modern, clean surroundings, having broad roads and
well-kept lawns and stately mansions, with fashionable shopping areas catering
to their needs. However, bulk of its population of roughly 250,000 lived in the
old city in squalid hovels, where many of them made the exquisitely designed
colorful shawls that draped the shoulders of the rich and the powerful, while
squatting on the floor in dark, dingy and damp rooms. Others worked as small
traders or skilled artisan. There were many other towns like Baramulla,
Anantnag and Bandipore. Some of these have developed into cities today.
Tourist destinations like Pahalgam, Gulmarg, etc, were as popular then as these
are today. In villages, the chief vocation of the common masses was agriculture,
though today, other occupations like tourism, government service, trade, petty
business, etc, have made significant inroads.

Gardens, Lakes, Springs and Meadows

From times immemorial, paeans have been sung to Kashmir’s natural beauty.
Those who are born there, perhaps, do not appreciate it as much as those coming
from outside. The former, having grown up in the environment, take it for
granted and the latter, particularly those coming from the scorching plains of
India, cannot have enough of it. Even though global warming and ecological
degradation have resulted in quite a bit of damage to the Valley’s rivers, lakes
and mars, Kashmir still mesmerises the tourist with its beauty, which is both
breathtaking and bewitching.

Mughal Gardens
Mughal rule in Kashmir is synonymous with Mughal gardens. These
magnificent, broad stretches of flower bedecked, green patches were constructed
with great aesthetic taste and meticulous planning by Mughal emperors and their
governors. These gardens dot the foothills of Zabarwan Mountains, skirting the
famous Dal Lake and are incomparable in their beauty, layout, location and
charm. Almost all of these have terraced flower beds, towering chinars and
fountains located in the centre of the flowing water channels that carry
shimmering waters before discharging the same into Dal Lake. For hundreds of
years, the local folk and visitors from outside have thronged these gardens to
soothe their nerves and for seeking refuge away from the hustle and bustle of
city life. As has been mentioned elsewhere in chapter 3, after the annexation of
Kashmir by the Mughals in 1586, Emperor Akbar’s visits to Kashmir were
followed by Shahjahan and Jahangir during their rule, and their lesser ranked,
but important officials. The captivating beauty of Kashmir provided an ideal
refuge to escape the scorching plains of India in summer.
Pampore and Saffron
Pampore is synonymous with saffron. Situated on the outskirts of Srinagar at a
distance 16 km from there on NH IA, it is the home of saffron industry of
Kashmir. About 74 per cent of the total annual production of 12,500 kg of
saffron (botanical name, cocus stavia kashmiriana) is produced in an area of
4,500 hectares spread over 200 villages of Pampore belt. The remaining 26 per
cent is produced in parts of Budgam in central Kashmir and in Kishtwar region
of Jammu division. Saffron is a dried reddish-purple stigma that is extracted
delicately with great diligence from billions of flowers grown in autumn
(October/November). It is prized for its medicinal properties and as a coloring
ingredient for South Asian cuisine. In ancient times, it was used by the royalty as
a scented salve or emollient. “The streets of Rome were sprinkled with saffron
when Nero made his entry into the city.” It is believed that saffron was
28

cultivated in a small town, named Walden, a short distance away from London
in England, where its cultivation was introduced by a pilgrim from Tripoli.
Rajtarangini too has recorded a legend about saffron.

According to the legend, a Naga, by the name of Takhshaka, once developed

some eye ailment. He went to a physician, Waghabhatta, who lived in village
Zewan near Pampore. Despite being administered the appropriate medicine,
Takhshaka could not be cured. On investigating the cause, Waghabatta found
that Takhshaka was a Naga (snake), whose poisonous vapours issuing from the
mouth, were nullifying the effect of the medicine being applied to his eyes.
Waghabhatta, therefore “bound his eyes with a cloth and the Naga was restored
to health. In his gratitude, the Naga gave the physician a bulb of saffron and the
cultivation sprang up at Pampore.” In the olden days a pilgrimage used to be
29

taken to a pool of water where Takhshaka Naga was worshipped at the

commencement of the saffron cultivation. So closely is Pampore identified with
Saffron that local women sing the following folk song:

“Yar drayom pompari watae Kong poshan wati rot tattea.”

(My friend hath taken the pampore road; but was held-up by the saffron
flower.) 30

Of late, the production of saffron has come down appreciably even though it
costs roughly 200,000 per kg. As large tracts of land are sold off at attractive
prices to realtors, the cultivable acreage keeps shrinking with every passing year.
The Government of India has announced the formation of National Saffron
Mission to address all these issues.

Fruits, Trees and Forests of Kashmir

Kashmir is famous for its delicious fruits. Most fruits bear local names:
Tsunth for Apple, Tang for Pear, Tser for apricot, Doon for walnut, Aeliche for
wild cherry, Aer for plum, Dachh for grapes and Glass for cherry. According to
a survey conducted in 1945, Kashmir Valley grows 113 varieties of apples, 62 of
pears, 31 of plum and 14 of cherry. Its temperate climate, abundance of water
and four distinctly different seasons provide ideal condition for growing a
variety of fruit trees and flowers.

Kashmir is very rich in forests that abound on its mountains and in the valleys.
Forests constitute nearly 47 per cent of the state’s geographical area. However,
in the absence any effective mechanism to save these forests, “approximately
14,359 hectares of forest land had been encroached upon illegally…” Jammu
31

accounts for 9,482 hectares and Kashmir 4,877 hectares of this encroached land.

Among the variety of trees and spruce, the emperor is without doubt, the
Chinar, which is both beautiful and majestic. Its size, longevity, thick foliage
(that gives perfect shade from sun and shelter against rain) and its rarity makes it
the most venerable of the trees in Kashmir. Locally called boony or Oriental
Plane (Platanus Orientalis Kashmiriana), it is a deciduous tree that grows to a
height of 100 ft. Its magnificent palmate leaves reach a length of 10 inches.
Though there is a generally held belief that the tree was introduced in Kashmir
by the Mughals, the fact is that its references can be found in ancient Hindu and
Buddhist literature and customs. “Etymologically, the word boony is a corrupt
form of Sanskrit word ‘Bhawani’, the name of ‘Bhava’ (Shiva’s) consort. Indeed
with its size and cool shade that its thick foliage provides, it can be likened to a
benevolent and loving mother,” says Rajinder Raina. Even Lal Ded refers to it in
one of her Vaakhs:

Kentsan råñ chhay shihij boony,

nerav nyabar shuhul karav.
Kenstan ran chhay bar pyatha boony,
nerav nyabar t zang kh eyav
Kenstan råñ chhai adal t vadal;
Kenstan råñ chhay zadal tshay.

Some have wives like a shady chinar tree,

 Some have wives like a shady chinar tree,
let us go under it and cool ourselves
some have wives like the bitch at the door,
let us go and get our legs bitten
Some have wives always in confusion,
and some have wives like a leaking thatched roof.
(Rajinder Raina, Praznath, April-September 2012, p. 40)

Its red leaves in autumn make a picture perfect scene as the fading red hue of
the setting sun creates an illusion of the tree being on fire. “Its original name is
Boony and it existed long before the Mughals came to Kashmir. It got its new
name Chinar from an Afghan or a Mughal emissary who visited the valley in
autumn when the Boony leaves had all turned red. This emissary was so
overawed by the grand sight of a huge ‘burning’ tree in front of him that he
exclaimed, che-nar, meaning ‘Look Fire.’ Then, onwards, it came to be called
chinar.” Its wood is used for the manufacture of furniture and oil-presses.
32

Besides this, willow, poplar, blue pine (its wood makes excellent charcoal and
its resin is used for medicinal purposes), silver fir (has durable wood free from
knots), Himalayan spruce, birch, maple, beech, hazel, wild oak are also found in
the valley. Francois Bernier (see chapter 3) described the forests of the valley
thus:

“I saw hundreds of trees plunged into abysses and mouldering with time;
while others were shooting out of the ground and supplying their places.” 33

A large variety of wildlife is found in these forests. Some of the wild animals
that can be spotted are, leopard, wild boar, Barasingha (Hangul), black bear,
Markhor, red bear, fox, wolf, musk deer, snow leopard and ibex. A great variety
of birds can also be found. These are, duck, goose, chakor, monal pheasant,
partridge and snipe and many more.

State of Communications in 1947

In 1947, modern means of communications did not exist in the state and these
were barely rudimentary. The difficult and rough mountainous terrain further
accentuated the problem. In 1950–51, the total road length available in the state
was 2,003 km. The only railway line that existed in the State prior to the
partition was the few kilometers long line that connected Jammu with Sialkot in
the Punjab. There was not even a single fully equipped airfield in the state,
though emergency landing strips did exist at Jammu, Srinagar, Gilgit and
Chillas, which could only take light planes.

There were only two major roads in the state, though only one of these was
all-weather road; the one that connected Rawalpindi in Punjab with Srinagar.
Despite the fact that at one point this too passed through the narrow Jhelum
gorge, it did provide an easy access to the valley. In fact, it was the main route to
the valley from the plains of Punjab and was extensively used for trade and
tourism. At Kohala bridge, this 205-km-long road entered within the state
boundary, hugging the left bank of the river. From Kohala, it ran north towards
Domel, where on the opposite bank of river Jhelum ran the Abbotabad-
Muzafarabad road. The main road, with macadamised surface, thence continued
to follow Jhelum that took a sharp turn towards west on its journey to Wullar
Lake. From there, it reached Baramulla via Chakoti and Uri. At Baramulla, the
terrain became easier and flat as the valley opened up, and this flat stretch
continued till Srinagar.

The second major road led from Srinagar to Jammu over a distance of 320
kms, passing mostly through picturesque, though difficult mountainous terrain.
For its initial 96 kms it ran over the plain stretch of magnificently straight limbed
poplar lined road till lower Munda. Thereafter, the road started its laborious
climb over the Pir Panjal Range till the tunnel, which was situated at 4000 m at
Banihal. Here, it crossed over to the other side and started descending towards
Ramban, and crossed the Chenab River over a narrow bridge, and thence
climbed again to Batote. From there, it gently descended towards Udhampur and
finally to Jammu.

A number of smaller roads to various places in the valley took off from
Srinagar. One of these connected Srinagar with Tangmarg, which was the
debussing point for the famous tourist resort of Gulmarg. The other ran on a
level stretch between Srinagar and Bandipur. A road originated from Jammu-
Srinagar Highway at Anantnag, and moving along the Lidder Valley, reached
Pahalgam. An important artery in the north Kashmir passing over Shamshabari
Range connected Srinagar with Tangdhar.

In the Jammu region, the most important fair-weather road connected Jammu
with Poonch in the north-west, though at many places it was barely jeepable.
Enroute, it first touched Akhnur town situated on the banks of River Chenab,
then Naushera, Jhangar and Kotli, before reaching Poonch. Poonch itself was
connected by a fair-weather road over Haji Pir Pass (2638 m) with Uri on the
Rawalpindi-Srinagar road. A few rough and difficult tracks ran northwards from
Poonch and Rajouri over the Pir Panjal Range into Kashmir valley. In the south,
tracks also connected Poonch with Mirpur and Kotli, though compared to
northern tracks, these were better. The latter two towns were easily accessible
from the Punjab plains. The other fair-weather road connected Jammu with
Pathankot, where it joined the Indian road system. This 112-km road link that
passed through two big villages, namely Samba and Kathua, crossed Ravi
(which had no bridge) enroute. This road was the only tenuous link between the
State and India at the time of partition.

In the Ladakh region, the most celebrated non-motorable track was the 389-
km-long caravan route from Srinagar to Leh. This was used by the Central Asian
trading caravans moving between Srinagar and Yarkand in the Sinkiang
(Xinjiang) province of China. From Srinagar, this track entered the beautiful
valley of Sindh River and then climbed steeply up the saddle at the end of the
valley, before crossing the Great Himalayan Range at Zoji La at 3,528 m. A
gentle slope beyond Zoji La, took the track down to Dras (second inhabited
coldest place in the world) and then to Kargil, which happened to be a Tehsil
headquarter. From here, the track turned east, reaching Fatu La (4,094 m) over
an intervening ridge, before reaching the Indus River near Khalatse (also
Khalsi). From here it hugged Indus all along, crossing it by a cantilever bridge,
before reaching Leh through a side valley. This route had undergone no change
since the period of Mughals. The route was so difficult that, leave alone
vehicular traffic, only the sure-footed yak or pony could traverse it.

From Leh, the caravan route continued up north into the Shyok Valley over
the high mountain range and continued further up the valley across the
Karakoram Range, through Karakoram Pass (5,575 m). After that, the track
encountered a gentle slope and thence, following the Yarkand stream, it reached
Yarkand town, a distance of 771 kms from Leh. Beyond Leh, there were other
extremely difficult and tough tracks. One of these extended to Gartok and Lhasa
in Tibet and another moved southwards over Zanskar Range crossing further
over a number of passes, including the Baralachha Pass and finally opening into
Kulu Valley of Himachal Pradesh. However, a travel on this route needed
pioneering spirit, as this route was too difficult even for the hardy people that
traveled on the caravan route. Though it was extremely difficult route, yet it did
provide a backdoor entry into Leh from India.
 The strategically important route from Srinagar to Gilgit covered a plain
stretch till Bandipur, but beyond it, this route was as precarious as the Leh route.
Covering a distance of 365 kms, this was the only available route in 1947, to
move troop reinforcements, relief and supplies to Gilgit. Beyond Bandipur, the
climb started towards the higher reaches of the watershed between the Jhelum
and the Kishenganga Rivers, crossing it at Rajdhani Pass (Rajdianghan) at 3,638
m, offering an unparalleled view of the Nanga Parbat from a very close distance.
The track then descended into the Kishenganga Valley. After traversing the lush
meadows of Gurez, it crossed over to the right bank of Kishenganga River
(named after Karishi), before moving up the steep and difficult slopes of the
main Himalayan Range. Here, the track bifurcated into two tracks, both
eventually crossing the range; one through Kamri Pass, situated at 4,075 m, and
the other through Burzil Pass at 4,198 m. After covering some distance, both
tracks joined on the far side. Thence, the single track, following the gorge of the
Astor River, crossed it over a bridge at Ranghat at a height of 1,158 m.
Thereafter, the track reached Bunji, and crossed the Indus by another rickety
bridge before moving along Gilgit River to reach Gilgit, without encountering
any major obstacles.

The big garrison town of Gilgit was of strategically great significance; not
only was it the headquarters of a volatile district, it also connected the State with
Kashgar and Sinkiang (Xinjiang) through another caravan route. This route
crossed the Karakoram Range at Mintaka Pass (4,709 m), after going up the
gorge of the Hunza River. Gilgit was further connected with Abbotabad and
Murree in Pakistan via Chilas. Another route from Gilgit moved eastwards up
the Indus Valley, along the Indus River, leaving it only at places where the River
ran between high and smooth, but steep granite walls. Here, the track went over
the mountain spurs and rejoined the riverside after the river had crossed the
difficult terrain. After crossing Skardu enroute, it split into two, with the
southern arm joining up with the Leh-Srinagar route near Kargil and the northern
arm moving up the Shyok Valley, and finally linking up with Leh-Yarkand
route.

In 1947, if the state lacked in road and rail communication, it more than made
up the deficiency by a wide network of telegraph stations and wireless network
that covered important villages, tourist resorts and even the remote areas, like the
Shyok Valley. The wireless communication was controlled by the army
authorities except at Naushehra and Gilgit that had civil W/T
(wireless/telegraphy) stations. This widespread network of modern
communication played a crucial role during the tribal invasion of the state.

Present State of Communications

The state of communications today is a far cry from the situation that existed
at the time of Pakistani invasion in 1947. Today, the road network in the state is
not only widespread but also modern. Besides, with latest means of maintenance,
and a host of facilities catering for the travellers’ convenience existing at most
places, the road communication in the state has improved considerably.

Many smaller, but important roads have been constructed in the hinterland in
all three regions of the state for better connectivity and easy access. One of
these, connecting Bandipur with Kangan via Ghuri and Tulel provides an
alternate link between north and central Kashmir.

After partition, the only reliable, and all weather link to the valley from the
plains of Punjab, via Muzaffarabad, was lost to Pakistan. This left India with
only the more difficult and not-so-reliable road between Pathankot and Srinagar
via Jammu, going through the tunnel over the Banihal Pass at 4,000 m, called
(NH1A). In 1955, another 3-km-long tunnel was constructed at a lower altitude,
which marginally reduced the distance between Jammu and Srinagar by 23 kms.
However, it did not end the two major problems that travel on this route entailed;
heavy snowfall in the stretch between Banihal and the valley during winter, and
landslides at many places throughout the length of the mountainous segment of
the route. Both these problems causing the blockage of the road, sometime for
days on end, resulting in huge losses of perishable items, cost escalation of
goods and freight, and great inconvenience to the passengers.

To overcome this problem, an ambitious plan is under way to develop this

highway into a four-lane-all-weather road to link the valley with Jammu. The
project, estimated to cost about 8000 crores, was to begin in 2007 and was
expected to be completed by 2010. But it has been delayed due to various
reasons. The road is going to be an engineering marvel, with India’s longest
tunnel connecting Batote with Kud, being constructed enroute. This will obviate
the ascent to Patni Top, which gets covered by snow in winter. This will be
among 13 tunnels on the entire stretch between Jammu and Srinagar. The other
big tunnel, measuring 8.5 km will connect Nowgam with Qazigund. The road
will also have 34 bridges and 24 viaducts and reduce the distance between
Jammu and Srinagar from 302 kms to approximately 250 kms.
 On May 23, 2011, a foundation stone was laid to construct north India’s only
cable-stayed 592 m long bridge over River Ravi to restore communication to
Basohli town in Jammu region, access to which had got restricted due to the
construction of Ranjit Sagar Dam. It will provide another route to Kashmir
Valley via Basohli, Bani, Bhadarwah, Kishtwar, Chhatroo and Anantnag. The
bridge will also connect the state with Himachal and Punjab. A permanent
bridge at Ravi will help restore the glory of Basohli, founded by Raja Bhupat Pal
in 1635, and known outside for its world famous miniature paintings called
‘Basohli School of Painting’.

Another road starting from Pathankot proceeds to Manali and thereafter,

crossing the Rohtang Pass, it reaches Upshi, and then culminates at Leh. This
road, however, remains blocked for five months in a year due to heavy snowfall
and inclement weather. Construction of the Rohtang tunnel, which will connect
Manali with Lahaul Spiti, has already started. The tunnel, likely to be completed
by middle of 2015, will reduce the traveling time to Leh by four hours and the
distance by nearly 50 kms. With its length at 8.8 kms, it is going to be the
longest tunnel at such altitude in the world. In fact, there is none above 2,500 m.
By all accounts, it will be an ambitious project, to be constructed in hostile
environment at an altitude between 3,053 and 3,083 m.

There is another major road between Madhopur (a few kms from Pathankot)
and Udhampur via Dhar. Similarly, the western and north-western districts of
Poonch and Rajouri are connected to Jammu by another road that runs parallel
and not far from LoC. It is an all-weather road touching Akhnur, Rajouri and
Poonch.

Within the Pir Panjal Range itself, an all weather road connects Batote,
situated on NH1A, to Doda and Kishtwar. Another one starting from Ramban on
the NH1A, goes to Mohore, Gulabhgarh, Budhal; finally ending at Naushehra.
Recently, the construction of link between moutainous Kishtwar district with
Anantnag, through Sinthan top has been taken up on priority.

Jammu too has extensive network of roads. One road takes off from Dhar and
via Basohli, goes to Udhampur. The other one also originates at the same place
and ends at Kishtwar, after touching Basohli, Badharwah and Doda. Then there
is one connecting Kishtwar with Anantnag in the Valley. In the north-west, one
road starts from Domel, passes through Reasi, Kalakote and Rajouri, before
reaching Thanamandi.
Mughal Road
About five centuries ago, this route, then a pony track running across the Pir
Panjal Range, was used by Emperor Akbar to conquer Kashmir. Starting from
Jhelum town, now in Pakistan, it passes through Kotli (in PoK), Thanamandi
(near Rajouri), and Chandimarh (in Pir Panjal mountains). From there, one
branch goes to Bafliaz (a town in Poonch). The other branch, which is a 89 km
stretch, passes through huge mountain barrier, ranging in height between 3400
and 4000 m, till it reaches the apple-rich town of Shopian, across Pir Panjal. The
construction of this road started in 2002 and is likely to be completed in 2017. It
connects Poonch and Rajouri districts of the State with Kashmir, through an
alternate route. The mountain stretch of the road passes through valleys and
ridges of pristine beauty, dotted with snow-fed streams, unexplored valleys,
meadows that are incomparable for their grandeur and lush velvet greenery. It
also passes through Hirpur, the last inhabited place on Kashmir side, which is a
wildlife sanctuary and home to Markhor and Himalayan brown bear. From 34

there, the road passes through Pir ki Gali, (named after Pir Baba), the highest
point and pass on the road.

There are three interesting places en route that deserve specific mention.
Hastvanj derives its name from hast, meaning elephant and vanj meaning ‘to
go’. Kalhana, in Rajtarangini mentions that once the cruel and barbarian Hun
ruler of Kashmir, Mirakhula (see chapter 1), was returning to Kashmir from a
campaign in north India, on this route, when an elephant suddenly lost its
balance and hurtled down the cliff into a deep gorge. The poor elephant met a
ghastly death, shrieking and as it fell. The gruesome sight and painful sound of
the unfortunate beast delighted the sadistic king so much that he ordered one
hundred of his elephants to be thrown off the precipice in the same manner.

The other interesting place, Noor-i-Chhamb, is situated on Mughal Road near

Behramgala village in Panjsaran Valley, at a distance of 45 kms from Poonch
city. Surrounded by snow-covered peaks, this beautiful waterfall lies on foothills
of Pir Panjal Pass (3,535 m). Waters from Laksar and Kolsar lakes, located at an
altitude of 3,962 m near Panjtarimarg in Panjal range, feed this waterfall through
a stream. Near Behramgala village, this stream falls from a 30 m high sheer
drop, forming a misty waterfall. As the legend goes, this waterfall was
constructed for powering a water mill by Pandavas during their exile in these
forests. After diverting the water, they dressed a big stone for watermill in
nearby Parnai stream. But their project remained incomplete as they left this
place after staying here for only one day, for unknown reasons. For centuries
thereafter, the water fall went into oblivion. Mughal Emperor Jahangir, during
his visit to Kashmir, brought it into limelight. Thirteen times that he visited
Kashmir, he made it a point to stay here. When Jahangir visited this place for the
first time, he was so enchanted by the beauty of this magnificent waterfall that
he named it as Noor Chhamb after his beloved wife, Noor Jahan. In due course
of time, it changed to Noor-i-Chammb.

According to Iqbalnama Jahangiri, in 1627, Jahangir was sick and in a

serious condition, while returning to plains from his sojourn to the valley.
Keeping in view the deteriorating health of the Emperor, his hakims advised him
a few days rest here. One day, while resting close to the waterfall, his eyes soon
fell upon a beautiful deer. He immediately ordered his best horseman to hunt the
deer. The horseman manoeuvered his horse and followed the deer at galloping
speed. The deer reached the edge of the waterfall and disappeared. The
horseman, unable to control his horse at that speed, fell off the edge of the
waterfall into the deep Chhamb below and met a gruesome death. Jahangir, who
was already sick, could not bear the shock of seeing his best horseman meeting
such cruel fate. Besides, the horseman was the only son of a widow, who wailed
plaintively for her dead son. As a consequence, Jahangir’s condition worsened.

Noor Jahan, his wife, realising the gravity of the situation, decided to leave for
Lahore at the earliest. However, Jahangir died en-route, between Noor-i-Chhamb
and Rajouri. Noor Jahan did not want the news of the Emperor’s death to leak
out, for it would have resulted in a serious succession war among the claimants
to the throne. She, therefore, directed that her husband’s intestines be removed,
in order to preserve the body. Thereafter, the royal caravan journeyed back to
Lahore only during night. She got the intestines buried in a sarai (inn), located
24 kms from Rajouri, towards Jammu. This place is now called Chingus, Persian
term for intestines. It was only after reaching Shahadra, near Lahore, that
Jahangir’s death was announced.

Rail Link to the Valley

About two decades back, it was decided to undertake the construction of
railway track between Jammu and Srinagar in two phases; the first phase
between Udhampur and Katra was sanctioned in 1995, and the second phase
between Katra and Qazigund in 2002. It was decided to treat this 292-km-long
railway line, estimated to cost 3000 crores, as a national project, with its
completion deadline set for 2007.

This ambitious project would test the skill of railway engineers to the limit,
even with the availability of most modern scientific know-how. One hundred
twenty kms or 41 per cent of its entire length is made up of 20 tunnels, with the
longest, the Pir Panjal tunnel, connecting Qazigund in the valley with Banihal in
Jammu region, being approximately 11 kms long, with an overburden of 1100
m. This tunnel would be constructed 440 m below the existing Jawahar tunnel,
in a region where no habitation or road exists. Therefore, a 67-km approach road
had to be constructed to reach the inaccessible area. The great challenge that
Qazigund-Katra setion of this railway line poses can be gauged from the fact that
out of 129 kms of this section, 103 kms pass through tunnels of varying length.
By the middle of 2009, approximately 70 per cent of the work on this tunnel had
been completed.

This will be India’s longest and one of the world’s deepest tunnels, providing
all-weather communication between the two regions of the state. By May 2011,
10.4 km of the tunnel had been completed. This will reduce the distance between
Qazigund and Banihal to mere 16 kms from the existing 42 kms. The railway
line will have to pass over 158 bridges. At places, it passes through weak soil
resulting in the newly constructed tunnels collapsing, and at other places the
tunnels getting waterlogged. At some places, engineers find it difficult to drill
through the hard rock. As one former chief of the celebrated Konkan Railway
said, “…the line passes through a geological fault line, which meant that extra
care should be taken…” This has resulted in three-fold cost escalation over the
35

original estimate. This galloping escalation occurred as “detailed survey could

not be completed due to highly difficult, inaccessible terrain and adverse
situations/conditions in the area.” 36

At places the railway bridges over deep gorges of Chenab River and other
smaller mountain streams are as high as Qutab Minar; at other places, even
higher than that. One such bridge being constructed between Katra and Dharam
sections will have a height of 359 m, which is five times the height of Qutab
Minar and 35 m taller than Eiffel Tower. Situated at a distance of 65 kms from
Katra, the bridge on river Chenab at Kauri, in Reasi district, will be 1,315 m
long. It will consume a whopping 25,000 million tons of steel and will have the
distinction of being the world’s highest rail bridge. The terrain restrictions had
imposed alignment and other difficulties, which resulted in the work being
stopped on the project for two and a half years. However, the matter has been
resolved by using heavy lift helicopters of Indian Air Force for ferrying heavy
equipment to inaccessible areas in order to hasten the project. It is now believed
that the project will be completed by the end of 1217. In the meantime, Srinagar-
Baramulla and Qazigund-Anantnag sections of the railway line were
commissioned in November 2008 and February 2010 respectively, and ever
since, are functioning normally.

N OTES

1. Fredrick Drew, The Jammu and Kashmir Territories, (Stanford, London, 1875), pp. 28–40. Fredrick
Drew was a renowned geographer who visited Kashmir in 1875.
2. Dr SN Prasad and Dr Dharam Pal, Operations in Jammu and Kashmir, (Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, Thompsons Press, New Delhi, 1987).
3. Dr Arthur Neve was born in Brighton, Sussex (England) in 1859. After completing his medical
education at Edinburgh University, he joined the Royal Infirmary. In 1882, he went to Kashmir as
part of the Church Missionary Society. He wrote several books on Kashmir. After serving in France
during World War I, he again came to Kashmir, where he passed away in 1919.
4. Keys to Kashmir, Gandhi Memorial College, (Lala Rookh Publications, Srinagar, 1957), p. 94.
5. Prof P Stobdan, downloaded from http://kashmirtimes.com. Prof P Stobdan is Director, Centre for
Strategic Affairs and Regional Studies, University of Jammu.
6. Claude Arpi, Pioneer, New Delhi, June 7, 2012.
7. Ibid.
8. AGPL (Actual Ground Position Line) is the name given to the imaginary line drawn north towards the
glaciated region from Grid Point NJ 9842, in the Siachen Glacier area.
9. H Sender, The Kashmiri Pandits — The Study of Cultural Choices in North India (Oxford University
Press, 1988).
10. Dr SN Prasad and Dr Dharampal, n. 2.
11. Keys to Kashmir, n. 4, p. 29.
12. Downloaded from SikhNet: Source www.dnaindia.com on September 10, 2011.
13. Imperial Gazetteer of India: Provincial Series, Kashmir and Jammu, p. 15.
14. Down-loaded from http://Koshur.org, http://iKashmir.net on September 9, 2011.
15. Stanzin Kunzang Angmo, “Ladakh: A Treasure Trove of Medicinal Plants;” Pioneer, September 7,
2011.
16. Ibid.
17. Listening Post - in military terminology, it implies a place occupied to keep a watch on the enemy
activity without being noticed or getting involved in any firefight or skirmish.
Great Game- The British-Russian struggle to extend their influence over Central Asia and East
Turkmeinistan (present day Xinjiang) was, in strategic discourse, referred to as the Great Game.
 Many renowned explorers/travellers/geologists who contributed immensely to exploring this part of
the world and helped fill up the blank spots on the maps, were either supported by British or Russian
empires. These include MA Stein, Sven Heidin, Sir Francis Younghusband and Nikkolai
Przhevalsky. Their expeditions to these forbidden areas too became a part of this intense rivalry.
18. ‘Threat in being’ means an existing threat that can materialise without much warning or preparation.
19. Prof P Stobdan, downloaded from [email protected] on August 26, 2009.
20. They are an ancient people who are referred to as Darada in Sanskrit literature. They inhabited the
entire region between the Hindu Kush and the frontiers of India. Dr Leitner who visited the region in
1886, writes, “Whether we judge from language or from physiognomy, the conclusion is inevitable
that the Dards are an Aryan race.” Keys to Kashmir, p 35. They were Buddhist before most of them
converted to Islam. Dards are also sometimes referred to as Drokpas or Brogpas. Nearly 1,000 of
them, still professing Buddhist faith, live in Darchik in Kargil District of the State and speak a
language very akin to Vedic Sanskrit. They are said to possess pure Indo-Aryan features. Perhaps,
Dards and Brokpas are racially the same people. However, scholars differ on this. Brokpas, they say,
are Shins (Shina speaking people) who have migrated to Ladakh from Chillas. Shina is a Dardic
language. Some say they are descendants of the remnants of Alexander’s army that stayed on in the
area after Alexander left. Their language is akin to Vedic speech anyway, but they are mostly
Muslims.
21. In earliest official records of Dogra rulers, the nomenclature of northern areas annexed by Maharaja
Gulab Siangh was Riyasat-e-Jammu-wa-Kashmir-wa-Ladakh-wa-Tibbet ha. “ha” is plural sign in
Farsi. Hence it means “Tibbets”, which is interpreted as present day Gilgit, and Baltistan, locally
called Balawaristan.
22. Ali Engineer Rinchen, Pioneer, July 26, 2010,
23. Mahroof Raza, USI Journal, July-Sept 2006, p. 389.
24. “It is a Persian couplet engraved in Diwan-e-Aam of Red Fort, Delhi, built by Shah Jahan. But Persian
romantic poets attributed it to Kashmir because Kashmir was the only place similar to climate of
Tehran and Central Asia or Afghanistan (non-tropical) with mild summer but plentiful of wetness,
vegetation, greenery and spectacular flora and fauna”. Dr KN Pandita.
25. Quoted by Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir.
26. A typical water body, peculiar to Kashmir, with its whole surface covered by microscopic plants called
plankton.
27. “The couplet in question is the opening (matla’) of a panygeric (qasida) composed by a Persian poet
named Urfi at the court of Akbar, the Mughal Emperor, when he accompanied the royal entourage on
a visit to Kashmir. Urfi is generally considered a philosopher-poet, and has been the author of many
well-known qasidas”. Dr KN Pandita.
28. Keys to Kashmir, n. 4, p. 133.
29. Ibid. p. 134.
30. Ibid. p. 163.
31. Statement of Mian Altaf Ahmad during his press conference held in Jammu: reported by Pioneer of
January 1, 2011.
32. Capt SK Tikoo (retd) in a personal communication to the author.
33. Keys to Kashmir, n. 4, p. 96.
34. The construction of the road was objected to by various NGOs, who felt that such construction activity
and use of the road thereafter, will spell doom for the wild life in general and the precious endangered
species in particular. It was only after the Supreme Court cleared the project that the work could
recommence.
35. Statement made by R. Velu, the Minister of State for Railways in Parliament: quoted by K Narayan
Kumar in Mint of September, 11/12 2007.
36. Ibid.

__________________________
* To say that Nehru and the Government of India did not know about this road, is not borne out by some
recently declassified documents and various articles and books written by those who dealt with the
subject.

In 1953, the Chinese had succeeded in forcing Nehru to close the Indian Agency in Tibet, as a
prelude to the commencement of the construction of Tibet-Xinjiang road that would pass through
Aksai Chin, the undisputed territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Around the same time,
Indian Military Attache in Beijing, Brig SS Malik had, in his report to the Government of India,
made references to this road construction activity. A year later, he confirmed this by adding that the
road passed through Indian territory of Aksai Chin.

The information about the construction of this road was further confirmed by a British adventurer,
Sydney Wignall, who led the first Welsh Himalayan Expedition to climb Mount Gurla Mandhata,
close to Mount Kailash (height 25,355 ft), overlooking Mansarovar and Rakshastal lakes in Tibet, in
1955. He had been contacted by the Indian Military Intelligence officers in London, prior to the
commencement of the expedition, and asked to collect information on this road.

During the expedition, Wignall collected vital information about the feverish construction activity on
this road. He was, however, detained by the Chinese PLA on the suspicion of being a CIA spy and
kept in prison. The Chinese eventually released him after some weeks on a high altitude pass, hoping
that lack of oxygen, intense cold and snow-blizzards would kill him. However, the redoubtable
adventurer somehow, made it back to India and reported the matter to his ‘contact’ in the Military
Intelligence Directorate. Through, General KS Thimmaya, the soon-to-be-made the Chief of the
Army Staff, the matter reached the highest levels of the Government, but it was treated with disdain.
In his book Spy on the Roof of the World, Wignall writes that he was later told by his ‘contact’ in
Military Intelligence, “Our illustrious Prime Minister Nehru, who is so busy on the world stage
telling the rest of the mankind how to live, has too little time to attend to the security of his own
country. Your material was shown to Nehru by one of our senior officers, who plugged hard. He was
criticised by Krisna Menon in Nehru’s presence for lapping up ‘American CIA agent-provocateur
propaganda.’ Menon has completely suppressed your information.” “so it was all for nothing?” I
(Wignall) asked. “Perhaps not, we will keep working away at Nehru. Some day he must see the light
and realise the threat that communist Chinese occupation of Tibet poses to India,” replied the contact.

No wonder, General Thimmaya on the eve of his retirement in 1961, said while speaking to his
officers, “I hope that I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese communists.”6
After the Chinese aggression of 1962, the Official Report published by the Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, stated, “China started constructing motorable road in summer 1955. …On
October 6, 1957, the Sinkiang-Tibet road was formally opened with a ceremony in Gartok and 12
trucks on a trial run from Yarkand reached Gartok.”7

Though the existence of this road was discussed in Parliament (Lok Sabha) in August 1959, it was
actually in 1955, that the Government had information about this road.
 KASHMIRI PANDITS

Saraswati mahabhage vidye kamala locane/

Viswarupi visalaksi vidyam dehi saraswati //

(“O highly exalted Goddess of Learning, O lotus-eyed Saraswati, O you, who

exists in various forms, and who has large eyes, grant us the boon of
knowledge.”)

The above hymn is recited in praise of the Goddess of Knowledge, Saraswati,

whose other name is Sharda Devi. The ancient temple of Sharada is located in
PoK’s Neelam Valley (Kishenganga Valley), at a distance of approximately 100
kms from Baramulla and about 76 kms inside the LoC. The temple takes its
name from village Shardi located near the confluence of Kishenganga and
Madhumati Rivers. After the occupation of this area by Pakistan in 1947,
piligrimage to this sacred place was stopped.

The Saraswat Brahmans of Kashmir, also known as Kashmiri Pandits, are the
original inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir, with a history of more than 5000
years, dating back beyond the Neelmat era, almost contemporaneous to the
Vedic civilisation of India. Ancestors of Kashmiri Pandits lived on the banks of
the mighty Saraswati River which flowed in the north-west region of India (see
chapter 1). Subsequent to its drying up around 1900 BCE, these people moved
north and found shelter in Kashmir Valley. This period, perhaps, coincided with
the time when Satisar was drained of its water. Due to a very conducive
environment during the reign of Hindu kings in the first two millennia after they
settled in Kashmir, these people developed a distinct literary culture that
survives to the present day. Originally, they were and continue to be known as
‘Bhattas’. The term “Bhatta is derived from ancient Sanskrit (Prakrit) name
bhartri, which means doctor, scholar or intellectual.” Pandit too means a learned
1

person. In Bahristan-e-Shahi, the author says that the local population held
Kashmiri Brahmans in high esteem. In fact; the foreign clerics would tell the
locals that the Muslim ulema (clerics) are actually Muslim-Brahmans.

When did Bhattas come to be known as Kashmiri Pandits? The answer to this
question seems to be shrouded in mystery because such change of nomenclature
is quite uncommon among Indian communities. It is possible that living in
Kashmir, surrounded on all sides by huge mountains, with few means of
communication, enforced on them a certain degree of isolation. This isolation,
perhaps, enabled Kashmiri Brahmans to develop certain distinctive
characteristics in physical appearance, language, culture, religion, traditions, etc.
This was quite in contrast to other communities in the plains of India, who could
easily move from one place to other. It appears that Kashmiri Brahmans’
distinctive culture and appearance, differentiated them from people living in rest
of India. Since they migrated in large numbers from Kashmir to escape
persecution in the valley after the arrival of Islam there in fourteenth century,
they came to be looked at as a distinctive ethnic group, with many of their rituals
and traditions different from the Brahmans of the plains. That, perhaps, resulted
in the change of their nomenclature from Bhattas to Kashmiri Pandits, most
likely during the Mughal period.

Nevertheless, it will not be out of place to refer to the celebrated and oft
quoted story of a poor Kashmiri Bhatta by the name of Jai Ram Bhan, who lived
in the valley during the reign of Mughal Emperor, Mohammad Shah (1719–1747
CE). His widowed mother helped run the household with her own meager
income by working as a maid in the house of an astrologer, known locally as
Jotshi. This astrologer had predicted a bright and rich future for Jai Ram Bhan.
Many years later Jai Ram migrated to Delhi to look for some means of
livelihood. However, despite trying hard, he could not find any work. One day,
frustrated with his state, he sat near the entrance of the palace just wondering
what to do next. Not having anything to do particularly, he started counting the
number of people going in and coming out of the palace. From then on, in the
absence of any worthwhile preoccupation, this then became his routine pastime.

One day a favourite courtesan of the king went missing. Jai Ram made quick
calculation and concluded that the missing person would be inside the palace. A
thorough search based on his assessment proved him to be right. The Mughal
emperor was so impressed by Jai Ram’s ability that he employed the latter in his
palace. Taking advantage of the Emperor’s benevolence, Jai Ram asked to be
granted another favour. He wanted Saraswat Brahmans to be set apart from other
Brahmans of the country. His wish was granted and the honorific title, Pandit, as
a prefix to Kashmiri Saraswat Brahmans was bestowed on the community. As
Bansi Pandit writes, “initially this Pandit title was meant for Kashmiri Saraswat
Brahmans connected with the Mughals, but later, it was used by all Kashmiri
Brahmans.” “Thus the Kashmiri Pandit took his birth in his modern shape,
2
though till then the name Kashmiri Pandit was not coined to describe this
community which was described as Bhatta. Even now a Kashmiri Pandit at
home describes himself as a Bhatta and it is by this term that he is described by
others in Kashmir.” 3

Recent research, however, points out a much earlier use of the term ‘Kashmiri
Pandit’ for Bhattas of Kashmir, though it needs to be corroborated by other
independent research scholars. According to Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani, it
was Lama Taranath who used this term much earlier. In his personal
communication to the author, Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani writes, “Taranath
was the author of the famous work History of Buddhism in India. He wrote it in
1608. Taranath was a Tibetan and was born with the Tibetan name Kun-dga-
sñin-po. He is, however, best known as Lama Taranath — the name that he got
on his ordainment as a Lama. In his work, he has throughout used the term
Kache Pachen for Kashmiri Brahmins. It has been translated as ‘Kashmiri
Panditas’ by his translators.”

During Zain-ul-Abidin’s rule in Kashmir, when he introduced Persian as the

official court language, Brahmans had to quickly devise a way to keep Sanskrit
alive. They decided to train the eldest son of the eldest daughter to be a Sanskrit
scholar so that he could take on the responsibilities of looking after the religious
needs of the family. He thus became a purohit (priest). Such purohits came to be
known as Bachibhat, meaning those who study Bhasha (language), i.e., Sanskrit.
Others were called Karkun, derived from Persian word Karinda, which roughly
translates into ‘an educated government employee’. In due course of time, this
arrangement became a tradition in the Brahman families. Needless to say, this
division was indirectly forced on the Brahmans, as they had to devise ingenious
ways of ensuring preservation of their language, religion and cultural heritage.

A few words about the Sharda script will be in order. It is an ancient western
Himalayan script, which evolved from the Brahmi script, used in the
northwestern region sometime in the 9 century. It was a popular language and
th

served as a link language among the peoples of north-western region of ancient

Kashmir. Being akin and close to Hindi, people in Kashmir used it till the arrival
of Nastaliq (variation of Persian script). Before the advent of Islam, Kashmiri
language was written in Sharda script. As Sharda had a wide usage during that
period, accounts of various dynasties, including those of Hindu Shahi dynasty of
Kabul, Ohind and Gilgit and legends of Mahmud of Ghazni were also written in
Sharda script. The original Sharda script, which was in vogue in Kashmir till
later part of Sultans of Kashmir, was found most suited for Kashmiri
expressions. However, after conversion of nearly the entire population of
Kashmir to Islam, Sharda script lost its dominance as foreign invaders
introduced Persian language in their administration.

It seems that all Kashmiri Pandits, being Shaivites, were Kauls, a name
derived from ‘Mahakaul’, one of the many names of Shiva. During the Mughal
and Sikh rule in Kashmir, nicknames came to be associated with all families to
differentiate between them. The nicknames given to or adopted by a family
reflected things like the family’s profession/occupation, religious, official or
academic epithet/locality where the family lived/peculiar circumstance or
incident/abnormal physique or temperament. Over a period of time these
nicknames got so deeply and permanently associated with the family name that
these evolved into surnames. Today, Kashmiri Pandits are believed to have over
700 different surnames.

Some of the Kashmiri Pandit surnames reflect a deep-rooted sense of

Kashmiri humour that the Pandit did not give up even in the most trying
circumstances. While others reflect their innate sense of ingenuity. Though
Hazlitt calls a nickname as the hardest stone that the devil can throw at a man,
yet Kashmiris love their nicknames and continue to devise new ones based on
ordinary everyday happenings and circumstances. Even Kalhana devotes some
space in the Rajtarangini to this unusual fondness for nicknames among
Kashmiris. It sticks to a person till as long as he is alive, and on most occasions,
it even survives him/her. Following oft quoted example illustrates how a
nickname associated with a family changed its form but never left it, finally
becoming its surname.

“…For instance a man named Wasdev had a mulberry tree (tul) growing in his
courtyard. Therefore, he was called Wasdev Tul. He, in order to get rid of the
nickname, cut down the tree. But a mund (trunk) remained and people began to
call him Wasdev Mund. He then removed the trunk of the tree, but its removal
resulted in a khud (depression) and henceforth people called him Wasudev
Khud. He then filled up the depression but the ground became a Teng (mound)
and he was called thereupon Wasdev Teng. Thus exasperated he gave up any
further attempt to remove the cause of his nickname and it continued to be teng
which is now attached to the names of his descendants.” 4

That Kashmiri Pandits too imbibed some of the prejudices of the so-called
Brahmanical superiority is evident from some of the incidents recorded in
history. Treatment of ‘Lejibhatta’ is one of them. The term refers to those of
their community (numbering about 50 families), who would disguise themselves
as Muslims to escape ruthless persecution at the hands Afghan rulers. After
putting on the disguise, they used to cook their food in earthen pots, which they
would hide in hay stacks or thick leaves of trees during the day. Thus, having
ensured their survival in difficult times, they would come back to the Pandit
fold, once the Afghans were gone and persecution had subsided. Rather than
being welcomed back to the fold they were derogatorily called ‘Lejibhatta’
(meaning Pandits of the earthen pot). Even as late as 1937, the Purohits raised a
hue and cry when a wealthy person’s son among these people (Lejibhattas)
distributed prasada after a mahayagya. They called the prasada as having been
desecrated by the touch of this boy, despite the fact that the Purohit class, called
Buhru, was itself not treated fairly.

Being literate and proficient in the official language of the rulers; be it

Sanskrit, Persian, or English, many kings found it useful to utilise the Kashmiri
Pandits’ talent in administering their states. During Sultan Zain-ul-Abidin’s
period, Kashmiri Pandits came to occupy important positions in his court after
he had succeeded to some extent in bringing them back from outside the state,
where they had fled during Sikander’s persecution.

Kashmiri Pandits’ association with Afghan kings at Kabul is also well-known.

Nanda Ram Tikoo had joined the services of the Prime Minister, Wafadar Khan,
during the reign of Durrani King, Shah Zaman (1793–1800). By dint of his
competence, loyalty and hard work he rose to the position of Diwan of Kabul.

Pandit Birbal Dhar’s role, alongwith that of Mirza Pandit Dhar, in ending the
cruel Afghan rule has been mentioned in chapter-3. Whereas the former showed
exemplary courage and made tremendous sacrifice in persuading the Sikhs to
annex Kashmir, the latter did so by standing up to the Afghan governor at a
particularly difficult period. He then became the first Peshkar of Moti Ram, the
first Governor of Kashmir appointed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. During this
period, all official work was carried out in Persian. It was the job of a Peshkar to
translate the Governor’s orders into Persian. Peshkar also appointed his own
Ahalkar to run the administration.

Though illiterate himself, Maharaja Ranjit Singh had filled a number of

positions in his administration with capable and qualified people from various
religions, other than his own. Among these were Muslims, French, Germans,
Americans and Kashmiri Pandits. His army boasted of French Generals like
Allard, Ventura and Avitabile and Germans like Steinbach and an American,
named Gardener. Kashmiri Pandits were also prominently placed at the court of
Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

Kashmiri Pandit’s association with Maharaja Ranjit Singh starts with Pandit
Ganga Ram, who was instrumental in getting many talented Kashmiri Pandits
appointed at Maharaja’s court. Son of Pandit Kishan Das (belonging to
Rainawari), who had migrated out of the valley during the cruel Afghan rule,
Ganga Ram had distinguished himself in the Court of Maratha warrior, Mahadji
Scindia, during his military campaigns. The French military advisors of Mahadji
were so impressed by Ganga Ram that Mahadji entrusted the latter with many
sensitive political missions. In all these assignments, Ganga Ram distinguished
himself by his skill, honesty and loyalty. His association with the Scindias came
to an end when the grand nephew of Mahadji Scindia, Daulat Rao, began his
campaign against the British. Ganga Ram quietly shifted to Sitaram Bazar in
Delhi, where he purchased a house for 1,100.

When Ranjit Singh consolidated his position in Lahore, Ganga Ram’s name
was recommended to him for inclusion among his administrators, who would
help him to run the affairs of his fledgeling empire. In 1813, Maharaja Ranjit
Singh summoned him to Lahore. Pandit Ganga Ram, on reaching the palace
presented the Maharaja with a pitcher of Ganga Jal (Holy water from River
Ganga). In return, the Maharaja handed him his own royal seal, which Ganga
Ram was authorised to use as the head of military office. He was comfortably
settled in Kashmiri Mohalla, Lahore. “Ganga Ram obtained considerable power
and position, when he impressed the Maharaja by his sheer ability, diligence and
knowledge.” 5

In 1821, Ganga Ram was made the Governor of Gujrat district of Punjab,
where he developed Akbari system of accounting. It was through him that many
Kashmiri Pandits became part of the Lahore Durbar. Prominent among these
were, Raja Dina Nath Madan, who was a member of the council of ministers,
and his son, Dewan Amar Nath Madan, who wrote Zafar Nama. Other
prominent Kashmiri Pandits included the two sons of Ganga Ram; Ayudhya
Prasad and Lachman Prasad, the former being an adopted son of Ganga Ram.
The two brothers, with the title of Dewan, were paymasters at Lahore and
Peshawar respectively. Being excellent horsemen, both brothers would
accompany the Maharaja’s army during their deep incursions into Pashtuns
heartland in Afghanistan, taking care of the expenditure incurred, as also
disbursing money to bribe and neutralise the hostile Pathan tribes. Being adept at
many languages, they acted as the Maharaja’s interpreters also.

After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, Kashmiri Pandits continued to

occupy influential positions during the British rule that inevitably followed. It
speaks volumes of their survival skills, due to which they emerged unscathed
through the chaos of the war of succession that followed Maharaja Ranjit
Singh’s death. The British found the Kashmiri Pandits more cosmopolitan in
outlook and from a completely different background than the ruling elites of the
Maharaja. As a result of this new equation between the British and Pandits, the
latter came to occupy important positions after the events of 1857, particularly in
the Punjab and Awadh. The most prominent Pandits during this period were
Dewan Ganga Ram, Pandits Daya Ram, Hari Ram, Gopi Nath, Ram Kishen and
Ganga Bishen.

Despite this cosmopolitan outlook, some Kashmiri Pandits did suffer from the
conceit of Brahamanical superiority. As late as late nineteenth century, they
would refuse to touch a football, as it was made of leather. Likewise, they would
not take part in sports activity, as that would lead to their growing muscles,
indicating their having performed physical work; derogatory for the twice born.
When Tyndale Biscoe asked the Brahman boys in his school for their reasons for
not playing football or taking part in athletics, the boys replied, “If we play
football, or row, etc., we shall grow muscles on our bodies, and then we shall
become low-caste folk like the boatmen and coolies. Moreover, if we play
games, we shall have to run about and be energetic, and people will laugh at us,
for gentlemen must not hurry.” Biscoe faced great resistance when he
6

introduced game of football in his school, as the boys said, “We cannot kick this
ball, for it is an unholy ball and we are holy Brahmans.” However, it is also
7

interesting to note the progressive outlook of Pandits, around the time of this
incident in 1891. Kashmiri Pandits were the first in the valley to take to modern
education. In fact, “There were only 250 scholars in Kashmir and all of them
were Pandits.” 8

Religion
Worship of Shiva in Kashmir dates back to remote times. The earliest system
or form of Shaivism prevalent in the Valley was Pashupata. Its concept revolved
around that of Pati or the Ultimate Reality, Shiva, Pasha, meaning fetters or
bonds of ignorance and its variant Pashu or the fettered individual. The origin of
this sect being too remote in time, it is impossible to pinpoint when exactly it
come into existence. However, the Mahabharata clearly refers to it as a very
ancient form of Shaivism. “It was an Agamic philosophy, dualistic in nature,”
says Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani.

Non-dual or monistic Shaivism, also known as Kashmir Shaivism or Trika,

evolved in the ninth century. This happened when its first seminal text, the Shiva
Sutras, is said to have been revealed to Vasugupta. As a result, Hindus of
Kashmir became the progenitors of Shakht and Shaivite monism. Their religious
philosophy springs from Shaivism, also known as Trika Shastra, the philosophy
of the triad (Trika), Shiva, Shakti and Nara (individual self). The fundamental
principle of this philosophy rests on three-fold existence; Shiva (the Ultimate
Reality or Supreme Lord), Shakti (the universal energy) and Nara (the individual
self). According to this philosophy, an individual’s divine nature gets shrouded
by ‘Maya’, his intrinsic ignorance, which wraps him up in a perpetual bondage
and prevents him from realising the divine truth, that he is no different from its
Shiva. Trika philosophy endeavours to obliterate this ignorance and enables a
human being to realise his true divine nature.

According to a noted Historian, RC Majumdar, “The province of Kashmir in

the far north of India produced in the 9 and succeeding centuries, a number of
th

teachers who are reckoned among the greatest exponents of the Shaiva doctrine
and philosophy.” This religion, popularly called Kashmiri Shaivism, reached its
9

zenith between 10 and 11 century, through the philosophy of Abhinavgupta

th th

and Kshemaraja. Its origins, however, could be traced to a school of philosophy

that originated in the high Himalayas, circa 400 BCE. History and tradition
records Tryambakaditya, a disciple of sage Durvasas, as the first propagator of
this unique philosophy. But it was his 16 descendent, Sangamaditya, who
th

settled in Kashmir valley around 800 CE, and actually turned this philosophy
into a people’s religion and made it enormously popular. Up to this period, only
a father could initiate a son into Shaivism. Subsequently, his fourth descendent,
Somananda is credited with the formulations of basic doctrines of monistic
Shaivism, which he culled from the relevant scriptures. These doctrines were
incorporated in ‘Shivadhristi’, the first systematic work on the philosophy of
Kashmir Shaivism, written by Somananda. Over a period of time, this
philosophy was periodically refined by great sages and masters like Vasugupta,
Kallata, Utpaladev and Abhinavgupta. After Somananda, the initiation into
Shaivism took place from master to disciple.

Trika literature can be divided into three categories, viz, Agma Shastra,
Spanda Shastra and the Pratyabhijna Shastra. Pratyabhijina Shastra deals with
unity of self with the universal consciousness. Spanda Shastra was presented in
Kashmir by Vasugupta (860–925 CE) in his famous treatise, Shiva Sutras; one
of the most sacred scriptures of Kasmir Shaivism. This Shastra explains the
“extrovertive and introvertive divine volition of God, which is responsible for
the creation and dissolution of the manifest world.” Kashmir Shaivism
10

emphasises that one’s spiritual freedom (moksha or mukti) can only be attained
by identifying completely with Shiva, the Supreme Lord. In a way, this
philosophy develops non-dualism by synthesising pluralism, dualism and the
Buddhist doctrine of Shuniya (void). It is devoid of any restrictions imposed by
caste, creed, colour or gender. It lays emphasis on practicing religion rather than
theorising and debating on its theological aspects. According to its basic tenets,
Shaivism does not recommend renunciation. On the other hand, it recommends
an active life of a house-holder. It does not even lay emphasis on outward
symbols of religiosity, like saffron robes, matted hair, ash covered body or
applying a Tilak mark on their foreheads. It recognises the essence of worldly
life; but at the same time, recommends its harmonising with spiritual pursuit.
From 9 century onwards, Shaivism defined the Kashmiri Pandit faith. Almost
th

all its religious life revolves around its dynamic philosophy.

The influence of this unique religious philosophy has had deep impact on the
Kashmiri Pandits’ world view and his culture and traditions. No aspect of his life
has been left untouched by it. As Dr Subhash Kak says, “The rite of Shaivism
was responsible for the progress in all sciences and arts. It helped them to
cultivate a scientific and rational attitude to life. It is this philosophy that helped
them to bear the brunt of foreign invasion and fierce onslaught of the Muslims
from thirteenth century onwards. It became the basis of the Tantric religion,
which was the practical and ritualistic side of this religion.” 11

In keeping with their basic philosophy, all religious practices of Kashmiri

Pandits emanate from their worship centred on Shiva and Shakti. According to
them, all other deities worshipped in the traditional Hindu pantheon are also
various manifestations of Shiva and Shakti. That is why there are numerous
shrines in Kashmir devoted to Shiva and Shakti.

The Kashmiri Pandit’s approach to the world is largely shaped by the central
concept of their religious tradition, Kashmir Shaivism, deeply influenced by the
Tantric thought, which visualises human body as a microcosm of the universe
and stresses on looking for divinity within the person. According to this central
concept, the objective world is a manifestation of Shiva and, therefore,
celebration of beauty and nature is a part of their religious tradition.

Doing pooja (preypuin in Kashmiri) on all religious festivals, birthdays and

other important occasions is a traditionally accepted practice. Preparing taher 12

on such occasions and also on Tuesdays and Saturdays, is again a well

established practice. On such occasions, after offering taher to the house deity,
some of it is placed on a specially chosen place, such as an attic for feeding birds
and animals. Another tradition being followed from times immemorial involves
leaving behind a handful of food at the start of a meal, as hyun meth (morsel for
dog) for feeding stray dogs. This indicates the Kashmiri Pandits’ concern of
living in harmony with other creatures of God. Taher is also made on other
happy occasions like birth of child, school graduation, getting employment,
finding a suitable match for a son/daughter and even recovery from illness. In
some cases, the ritual is repeated on same days, year after year.

Observing fast (vrat) on many occasions throughout the year is another

Kasmiri Pandit tradition. Some observe fast every month on Amavasya,
Puranmashi, Ekadashi and Ashtmi. Some even observe fast on occasions like
Chandan Shashthi, Bhimsen Ekadashi, Kali Ashtami, Shiva Chaturdashi, and
Kumar Shashthi, etc. Besides these, observing fast on the anniversaries of
ancestors and sages and Rishis is also a well established practice among
Kashmiri Pandits.

Use of water, milk, curd, flowers, rice, tikka, fruit, and fresh grass (in some
cases) during preypiun is a common practice. On some occasions, food is offered
to ghosts and goblins. On these occasions, non-vegetarian delicacies are
prepared and offered to propitiate these ghosts and goblins. Walnuts are also an
essential ingredient of preypiun, be it during an important festival like Shivratri
(where it is, perhaps, the most important ingredient of the ritual), zarkasay (first
tonsure of the boy), Mekhal (sacred thread ceremony), marriage and even the
anteshti (the last rites). Most texts are silent on the significance of the use of
walnuts during these rituals. One can only surmise that, perhaps, because
walnuts can easily be broken into four distinct parts, representing the four
Psashrathas, (the four goals of existence), Dharma (duty), Artha (wealth), Kama
(gratification of desire) and Moksha (final emancipation).
 Kashmiri Pandits have produced numerous saints and sages who have
influenced and enriched their religious thought. Most important of these was
Laleshwari, whose vaakhs continue to inspire and guide the community even
today. A brief description of the saint is given below:

Lalleshwari (Lal Ded) (1335–1376 CE)

Lalleshwari, lovingly called Lalla Ded by Kashmiris, was born at Pandrethan,
near Srinagar, in Kashmir, over 600 years ago. She was born in most critical and
turbulent times, when the indigenous beliefs and the alien value systems were
clashing ominously with the advent of Islam into the valley. She was married at
an early age as was the custom those days. However, disillusionment soon set in,
as her in-laws ill-treated her. Consequently, she gave up all worldly pursuits and
found her guru in Sidh Srikanth, who initiated her into Shaivism. It is also
possible that she did study a wide range of the seminal texts of Kashmir
Shaivism. Soon thereafter, she experienced divine bliss and started reciting
vaakhs in Kashmiri language, that manifested her deep spiritual experiences. As
time went by, her vaakhs became more intensely laden with her anguished
outpourings, reflecting her profound mystical insight into reality and deep
understanding of human surroundings. Her vaakhs became a mirror of her
compassionate vision for the spiritual liberation of mankind through Shaivic
world-view. “Through her simple but spontaneous utterances she attunes our
mind to the presence of the divine, as the one consciousness pervading the whole
universe.” It appears that she was aware of the profound effect her vaakhs had
13

on the minds of the people, as one of her most poignant vaakhs mentions:

“Dress yourself in the clothes of knowledge

And on your heart inscribe what Lalla said in verse
For through meditation on sacred symbol, Om,
Lalla became absorbed in the light of consciousness
And thus she overcame the fear of death.”

For her, the whole universe represented consciousness, vibrating at every level
and in every atom. She played a remarkable role in saving the indigenous culture
from collapsing and ensured its continuity by conveying the essence of Kashmiri
Shaivism to masses, in their own natural tongue. Lal Ded had a keen intellect,
sharp observation and a clear expression, which she used effectively to present a
vivid account of her experiences, while seeking the truth. She graphically
describes the phenomenon of experiencing an intense ecstasy while
synchronising the energies of the physical body with that of the nature, in
various vaakhs, thus:

“Neerith gachann, teelith evaan

lall bo paaniiy dayee chas”

(“I transform myself into vibrational (energy) form, and through it I travel into
the cosmos and then come back to my physical form again. Lo! I am the
embodiment of the Lord.”)

“Dam dam man omkaar pranvoom

Paniiye paraan paaniiye bozaan”

(“I recited the blissful word Omkaar with such zeal that it created an ecstasy of
bliss.”)

“Dammaa dam kormas daman haalaiy

Pkazlyome deep ta nanaiyam zaat.”

(“On breathing at ease with complete rhythm of the word, I trained my mind to
enter into the visionary gleam and realised the essence of my spirit.”)

“Ajapaa gaayatri hamsa hamsa zapith”

(“While indulging in meditation, take deep breaths and pay close attention to
your exhaling and inhaling, in a calm and composed manner.”)

In the above vaakh, Lalla is urging the Sadhak to focus on ‘soo’ and ‘ham’
sounds produced during deep breathing. These sounds produce energy levels in
wave form which help achieve a divine bliss.

By practising meditation in the manner as done by Lal Ded, it is possible to

realise the merger of one’s spirit with the infinite. These vaakhs give an insight
into her spiritual attainment.

“Lalleshwari was not the first Yogini of the Kashmir Shaivism. Others, like
Keyuravati, Madanika and Kalyanika before her, were such adepts of the
‘Doctrine of the Krama’ school of philosophy, that they imparted its knowledge
to famed aspirants like, Yogaraja, Bhanuka and Eraka, who in turn, took this
philosophy down south into the Chola empire.” But, undoubtedly, she was
14
Kashmir’s greatest saint mystic. Her vaakhs, which ooze spirituality and
practical emotions, are a happy blend of spirituality and poetic mysticism, which
have immortalised her. In these, we hear the first heart beat of Kashmiri poetry.
“Her four-line verses were crisp and aphoristic and easy for common Kashmiri
to memorise. The imagery of her poetry was taken from everyday life of
Kashmiri Pandits.” These have retained their freshness and purity to this day.
15

She was a symbol of the continuity of 5000 years of Kashmir’s civilisational

ethos. As a tradition, all Kashmiri Pandit music functions begin with Lalla
Vaakhs.

Towards the end of her short life she became a wandering mystic giving
expression to the universal truths. She eulogised the path of Yoga for achieving
Moksha, attracting followers from both, Hindu and Muslim faiths. During her
life time, she became a saint, mystic, a poet and a Yogini, all rolled into one.
Rajanaka Bhaskara penned down 60 of her Vaakhs for the first time in Sharda
and translated them into Sanskrit in the eighteenth century.

“She bequeathed her legacy of spiritualism, ascetism and religious tolerance

to the younger saint Nunda Rishi, who admired her as an Avatar.” 16

Kashmir’s Contribution to Indian Literature and Fine Arts

“For upward of 2000 years, Kashmir has been the house of Sanskrit literature
and from this small valley they have issued masterpieces of history, poetry,
romance, fable and philosophy.” 17

Kashmir’s secluded location in a bowl-shaped valley, surrounded by mighty

Himalayan ranges, located not too far away from the hot and humid plains of
India, its temperate climate, enchanting beauty and calm environment have
inspired numerous saints and sages, historians and philosophers, litterateurs and
writers to ponder over the mysteries of life. Kashmir and its people were
fortunate enough to practice and experience the theories and rituals of some
major religions of the world, eg., Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Despite the
depredations caused by the Islamic onslaught on the local Hindus over a long
period of time, it could not prevent the synthesis between Hinduism’s Shaivaic
philosophy, Brahmanical quest for the unknown, Buddhism’s search for truth
and the essential fundamentals of Islam’s Sufi cult, from flourishing in the
Valley. This synthesis created a legion of people who vigorously followed
intellectual pursuits in their respective domains, like arts, literature, theology,
religion, culture, history, science, etc. Kashmir’s philosophers, historians, saints
and sages contributed immensely to the Indian culture and philosophy. It is
believed that the only manuscript of Pippalda, a version of Atharaveda, was
found in Kashmir. As is well known, Buddhism travelled to China and many
other places in southeast Asia from here and carried with it Kashmir’s own
philosophical hue. This couldn’t be better summed up than to quote the
following:

“Benaras and Kashmir are the two great seats of Hindu sciences. It is Kashmir
that has produced the greatest historians, poets and Philosophers.” 18

History
Kashmir’s contribution to Indian historiography is unique. Whereas Bana’s
Harsacharita can be classified as a novel rather than history, or for that matter,
Hemchandra’s Kumarapala Carits (1088–1172 CE) as more of a grammar than
a history, it is the work of Kalhana, Shrivara, Jonaraja and Shuka, which can
truly be termed as genuine works of history. It is Kalhana’s Rajtarangini that
throws light on the political, economic and cultural life of those times. It is one
of the rare accounts of the history of that period, available anywhere in the
world. His contribution is particularly valuable, because despite a huge body of
existing literature, very little of actual history is chronicled. In fact, in the entire
period dominated by Sanskrit literature, no writer can seriously be considered a
historian. Kalhana’s Rajtarangini contains 8,000 verses classified under eight
Tarangas (waves). It is a monumental piece of work in the Sanskrit literature
and no Indian historical work can even remotely be compared to it. Kalhana was
a poet-seer (Kavi) whose Rajtarangini is not merely a serious contribution to
history but also an outstanding work of literature. The entire concept of
Kalhana’s work can be summarised in his own words, “Worthy of obeisance is
that indefinable virtue of good poets which is superior (in sweetness and
immortality) to a stream of nectar, and whereby they preserve their own bodies
of glory as well as those of others.” Elaborating further, he says, “If a poet can
realise with his genius, things which everybody cannot comprehend, what other
indication is wanted that he has the divine sight.”

Kalhana wrote Rajtarangini in the metrical verse. He began writing it in Saka

1070, corresponding to ‘Laukikta’ era 4224, or 1148 CE and finished it in 4225
or 1149 CE. Kalhana’s eye for topographical detail and his accurate description
of the events helps the reader to feel the local milieu of that era. His
dispassionate account, unbiased approach to his work, and the high standards
that he set for himself can be assessed by what he himself wrote:

“That noble-minded (poet) is alone worthy of praise whose word, like that of a
judge, keeps free from love or hatred in relating the facts of the case.”

Other historian of repute includes Jalahana, who lived during the rule of King
Alankara. He recorded events during the reign of Somapala, King of Rajapuri, in
his work titled Somapala Vilasa. Then there was Shambu, whose Rajendra
Karanapura recorded the tumultuous events during King Harsha’s rule. In
addition to these, there were Jonaraja, who updated the Rajtarangini till 1470,
and Shrivara, who added four more chapters, covering the events between 1459
and 1486 (end of Zain-ul-Abidin’s rule). They were followed by Shuka, who
further updated it till the annexation of Kashmir by Mughals in 1586, and Birbal
Kachroo, who covered the Mughal and Afghan rule. Another historian of note
during this period was Prajna Bhatta, whose Rajvalipataka gave a historical
account of Kashmir from the time of Zain-ul-Abidin till it became part of
Mughal empire under Akbar in 1586.

In the modern era, historians like A Kaul, Gwash Lal, and PN Kaul left their
imprint. The last two wrote Tasvir-e-Kashmir (Picture of Kashmir) and
Buddhism in Kashmir, respectively.

Literature
A large body of literature from the Vedic period did bear a distinct Kashmiri
imprint. At that time, Kashmir was part of the larger north-west India. The world
renowned ancient university at Takshishila, located in north-east Punjab, and
now in Pakistan, had emerged as a great centre of learning. Kashmir was not
located too far away from there. This region was a beehive of intellectual
activity in the first millennium BCE and Kashmiri perspective, which actually
gained recognition much later, formed an important part of this activity.

Kashmiri Pandits produced a galaxy of scholars who achieved great eminence

in the field of literature. Sage Patanjali, who compiled Yoga Darshana
(Philosophy of Yoga), is believed to have been born at Gonarda, in second
19

century BCE. His mother’s name was Gorika. He was educated at Takshishila
(circa 800 BCE). According to Dr Subhash Kak, Patanjali’s commentary
(Mahabhashya) on Pannini’s grammar, Ashtadhyayi “remains one of the greatest
achievements of human intellect.” Patanjali categorised the Sanskrit grammar
20

by a system of 4,000 algebraic rules; an unparalleled feat by even the most

stringent yardstick. It proved to be a milestone in the field of scientific studies,
as it laid emphasis on algorithmic explanation. Patanjali also contributed to the
ancient Indian medicinal treatise, Ayuerveda.

Others who wrote famous commentary on Panninii’s grammar included

Jayaditya and Varman who wrote Karika Vritti. Kariyata, another Kashmiri
grammarian, wrote a running commentary on Patanjali’s Mahabhashya called
Mahabhashya Pradipa.

Chandra school of grammar, which flourished in the reign of King

Abhimanyu in 400 BCE, was founded by another Kashmiri scholar,
Chandragomin. Kashmiri scholars also developed various schools of science of
poetics, namely, Rasa Alankara, Riti, Dhvani and Vakrokti. These great works of
literature remain unparalleled to the present day. Similarly, Kosh Shastra, a work
on the science of sex, second only to Kamasutra, was written by a Kashmiri
Hindu, named Kosh.

Kashmir’s importance as the centre for poetic literature can be gauged from
the fact that most debates on the nature of the Rasa or aesthetic experience took
place there. Mammata, an eleventh century authoritative rhetorician of Kashmir,
synthesised different schools of Indian poetics. “He firmly supported the Rasa-
Dhvani theory propounded by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, which
finally helped in establishing it as the universally accepted theory of Indian
aesthetics,” says Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani. Mammata is considered to be
the last word on Sanskrit poetics. Some scholars have mentioned that India’s
greatest Sanskrit Grammarian, Pannini, was a Kashmiri. Manimohan Dhar writes
in his book Kashmir – Crown of India, that Pannini was born in Saltoor, in
Kashmir. However, it is now well established that Panini was not a Kashmiri. He
was born in a village called Shalatur, in North West Frontier Province (now
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) of Pakistan. However, he possessed great knowledge
about Kashmir.

Kashmir’s own script Sharada was also developed by Kashmiri Hindus. It

was based on Brahmi script. Recent research suggests that Brahmi script, which
was used in India and south-east Asia, half a millennium before the advent of
Christ, had itself evolved from Indus (or Saraswati) scripts that were in use in
India in 2500 BCE. “Pandits had adapted it to peculiar Kashmiri phonetics like
broken and half-broken vowels which are not adequately or scientifically
represented either by Roman or by Arabic script. Sharada script was used by the
Pandits till as late as early nineteenth century. Even the copy of Rajatarangini
which Auriel Stein translated into English was in Sharada script and carried
21

precise Kashmiri pronunciation”, Says Prof K N Pandita.

Many scholars aver that the Vishnudharmottasra Purana that details various
innovations of the ancient Rajsuya and the Ashmavedha sacrifices, (the latter of
which was responsible for much of bloodshed due to its mediaeval
interpretation), was written by a Kashmiri Hindu during the reign of Karkotta
kings.22

It is noteworthy that Kashmir produced some of the greatest Sanskrit scholars

of India. Among these were such luminaries, as Abhinavgupta, Anand Vardhan,
Bilhan, Kalidas, Kshirswamin, Kalhana, Kshemendra, Mammat, Rajanak
Shitinanth and Vaman, besides many others. One of the most illustrious pupils of
Abhinavgupta, Kshemendra (1100 CE) is called the Ved Vyasa of Kashmir. His
condensation of the two great epics, the Ramayana and Mahabharata into
poetical works, Ramayana Manjari and Bharata Manjari respectively, is
considered to be a great contribution to ancient Indian literature. He also turned
Brihatkatha into poetical condensation, Brihat Katha Manjari. The Sanskrit
University at Vijeshwara (Bijbihara) later emerged as a great institution of
Sanskrit scholarship after the Universities of Takshishila and Patliputra lost their
sheen. However, nothing much is left of the university or its library, after it was
destroyed by Sikandar Butshikan.

Bharat Munni talks of rasa as the essence of artistic expression. In the ninth
century, Bhatta Lollatta, the oldest commentator on Natya Shastra, mentions it
in the poetic tradition. Though Bharat Muni had mentioned only eight rasas,
Abhinavgupta adds the ninth rasa, the rasa of peace. In addition to this,
Anandvardhana wrote a great masterpiece of aesthetic theory in ninth century,
namely, Dhavanyaloka (Light of Suggestion). In this, he disagreed with the
earlier theories of Alankara and Guna propounded by Dandin and others,
according to which it was the ornamental qualities and figures of speech that
distinguished poetry from ordinary speech. Anandvardhana, who was a member
at the court of Avantivarman, asserted that the difference was of a quality called
Dhvani which indirectly communicated the meaning by suggestion. This famous
commentary on Dhavanyaloka is known as Lochna, Rasa and Dhvani.
 In the field of Ayurveda also Kashmiri Hindus made their contribution felt. It
was only natural that the abundance of forest cover and availability of numerous
herbs, having curative powers, would attract the highly educated Pandits to study
their application. It was, Charaka, a Kashmiri Pandit at the court of King
Kanishka, who documented the science of herbs in Charaka Samhita, the first of
its kind in the world. “This Samhita was later revised and further improved upon
by another Kashmiri Hindu, Dridhabala, who added seventeen chapters to the
sixth section and the whole of new eighth section. He belonged to a small
village, ‘Panchanadapura,’ now known as ‘Panjor,’ situated seven miles north of
Srinagar, at the confluence of Jhelum and Sindhu rivers.” 23

Dance, Drama and Music

Kalhana in his Rajtarangini narrates a story about King Lalitaditya. While
exercising his horse, the King noticed two beautiful girls dancing and singing at
the same spot every day. On further query he was informed by the girls that they
did so on the instructions of their mother. The king had the spot dug in and
found the remnants of two decayed temples with two doors, with the images of
Rama and Lakshmana inside these. He got a new temple constructed at the spot.
This clearly established that the tradition of temple dancing existed in the ancient
times. In fact, the Indian classical dance in various forms originated from this
tradition of dancing before the temple deities.

Bharat Muni is the first name that comes to mind when one considers
Kashmir’s contribution to drama and stagecraft. He is credited with having
developed Natya Shastra, the world’s first book on stagecraft, in Kashmir.
Though there is no direct evidence to suggest that the book actually came to be
written in Kashmir, there are however, many pointers towards that conclusion.
The debate on the book involving a number of scholars from Kashmir is a first
pointer in this direction. Second, the division of Natya Shastra in 36 chapters
conforms to the later day Shaivite system that postulated the theory of 36
Tattavas. Third is its undoubted connection with the Kashmiri folk dance Baand
Pather that exists to the present day. This is based on Bharat Munni’s
description of Bhana, the one actor play. Baand Pather is corruption of the
Sanskrit term Bhana Patra. Besides, the only extant complete commentary on
Natya Shastra is written by the renowned Shaivite philosopher, Abhinavgupta.

Similarly, Kashmir has left its imprint on the Indian music also. Sharangadeva
was the author of the famous work on music, Sangitaratnakara or the ‘Ocean of
Music and Dance’ in thirteenth century. Sharangdeva’s grandfather belonged to
Kashmir, from where he had migrated to Devagiri in Karnataka, in the twelfth
century. Sangitaratnakara forms the basis of Carnatic music. This thirteenth
century composition is considered to be an important landmark in the history of
music in India, and a very comprehensive treatise on Indian music. “A large part
of this work is devoted to Marga, the ancient music that includes the system of
Jatis and Grama-ragas.” Kalhana’s Rajtarangini also contains references to the
24

temple dances that prevailed during tenth century, when the temple paintings
became a common feature of such architecture.

Cosmology and Science

Many scholars believe that Yoga Vasisht, one of the masterpieces of ancient
Indian philosophy, that greatly influenced the Indian thinking, was actually
composed in Kashmir. Traditionally, this philosophical work, containing
instructions given by Sage Vasisht to Lord Rama in 29,000 verses, was written
by Valmiki, the author of Ramayana. This book is considered to be a
compendium of instructions on the nature of consciousness, with fascinating
description of time, space, matter, cognition and their relationship. These
instructions are not merely a reflection of the prevailing thinking in Kashmir, but
also in rest of India. “Starting with a position that seeks to unify space, time,
matter and consciousness, an argument is made for relativity of space and time,
cyclic and recursively defined universes and a non-anthropocentric view.” 25

Architecture and Painting

The ruins of numerous ancient temples, viharas and stupas that dot the
landscape of Kashmir valley are manifest testimony to the excellence of ancient
Kashmiri architecture and art. The magnificent temple at Martand, the enormous
stupa and Chaitaya in Parihaspura, the Shiva temple at Pandrethan, the
wonderful architecture of temples at Pattan, Avantipur, Mattan and many other
places, are awe inspiring even in their present ruinous state, hundreds of years
after these were constructed. These ruins speak of their grandeur in the bygone
era and testify to the fact that these must have been among the most magnificent
temples ever constructed in India. The Parihaspura monuments actually became
a trend-setter for Buddhist architecture in south Asia, south-east Asia and the far
East.
 Ancient Kashmiris also seemed to be well-versed in the art of painting. This is
evident from the paintings on the walls of ancient temples. Some of these, like
the eighth century paintings in Gilgit survive to the present day. Other places in
Ladakh where these paintings survived the onslaught of the local king who
converted to Islam, is a set of five temples forming Dharma-Mandala at Alchi.
Most ancient and well-preserved of these is the Dukhang that depicts Kashmiri
Buddhist Pantheon, as also the Buddhist representation of the Hindu Pantheon.

“The wall paintings of Mangnag and manuscript painting of Thagling

discovered in western Tibet are generally accepted to have been created by
Kashmiri painters.” Kashmiri craftsmen had attained fame in the ancient times.
26

The Buddhist art work that got transmitted to central Asia is proof of the fact
that Kashmiri craftsmen were well-accomplished and famous for their skill. Art
historian Susan Huntington mentions that the source of imagery and influence in
the Buddhist art, when it moved north and east, was sourced from Kashmir. The
paintings in Yukang caves of China, wall paintings of Qizil and Tung-huay in
inner Asia and iconographic manuscripts of Japan point to Kashmir, as a
possible source. However, this knowledge of Kashmir art has not been
thoroughly researched and many grey areas remain to be explored.

Religion and Philosophy

Kashmir’s greatest contribution to the religion and religious thought of India
is the development of its unique philosophy of Kashmiri Shaivism. The basic
postulate of this (Shaivism) philosophy is that the phenomenal world is the
manifestation of Shiva (cosmic consciousness), which is made possible by
Shakti, his divine energy, the formal cause of the objective universe.

Kashmir’s Contribution to Buddhism

It was Emperor Ashoka who brought Buddhism to Kashmir in 273 BCE. It
was further consolidated by the Kushan King, Kanishka (100 BCE), who held a
major council of Buddhists in Kashmir that was attended by nearly 500 monks
and scholars from various parts of this sub-continent (see chapter-1). This
council codified the yet to be codified portion of the Buddhist teaching, besides
getting the entire Buddhist canon (Tripitaka) inscribed on copper plates, which
were then deposited in a stupa. Kashmir also witnessed the further development
and refinement of various schools of Buddhist thought, like Sarvastivada,
Mahayana, Madhyamika, and Yogachara. This council also saw the emergence
of famous Buddhist logicians like Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, Vinitadeva and
Dharmottara.

The council served as a catalyst for spreading Buddha’s message beyond

Kashmir’s borders. It was from the seminaries established during this period that
Buddhism travelled to central Asia, Tibet and China. One group of missionaries
to Tibet and China was led by a Kashmiri Pandit, Shyam Bhatta. Kashmir’s own
reputation as a renowned centre of Sanskrit learning and scholarship attracted
many Buddhists from faraway lands to train here as teachers and translators.

One of the most illustrious of these was Kumarajiva (344–413 CE), whose
mother, a Kuchean princess had become a nun. Kumarajiva was barely seven
years old when he followed his mother in adopting a monistic life of a monk. He
then decided to come to Kashmir to learn the Mahayana scriptures from
Buddhayasa, a well-known Buddhist scholar hailing from a Kashmiri Brahman
family. By the time he was 19 years of age, Buddhayasa could recite millions of
words of Hinayana and Mahayana texts. However, he did not join holy order till
the age of 27. Instead, he decided to move to Kashgar for higher learning. Here,
the Crown Prince, Dharmaputra, much impressed with Buddhayasa’s learning,
asked him to stay in the palace.

In the meantime, Kumarajiva, who had also come there, studied the whole of
Abhidharmapitaka under Buddhayasa for a year. Buddhayasa continued to stay
in Kashgar, even after Kumarajiva left for Kucha. However, in 382 CE, Chinese
forces captured Kucha and carried away Kumarajiva to China as a captive.
Buddhayasa persuaded the Kashgar ruler to send an army to Kucha in 383 CE, to
fight Chinese aggression; more for the sake of the security of his friend
Kumarajiva. Buddhyasa personally accompanied the force. Later on, he too left
secretly and quietly for China to join Kumarajiva, ignoring the advice of the
ruler.

From 401 CE onwards, the two outstanding Buddhist savants settled down at
the Chinese Court in the Capital Chany’an, the present day Xinxiang. They spent
their time teaching Buddhism and translating nearly 100 Buddhist scriptures into
Chinese. These included The Yogachara, Dirghagama and Dharma-guptaka-
Vinaya. Some of the greatest Chinese Buddhist canons are attributed to them.
They influenced the Chinese Buddhist thought like no one else did, not only
because they translated the previously unknown important texts, but also made it
easy for Chinese to understand the Buddhist terminology and thought. They and
their disciples were instrumental in establishing ‘Sa-Lun’, the Chinese branch of
the Madhyamika, known by its other name, Three Treatises School. Later,
Buddhayasa received the honorific Maha-Vibhasa. But eventually,
Buddhayasa’s love for his homeland brought him back to Kashmir, where he
spent his last days.

Gunavarman was another famous Buddhist scholar who hailed from a princely
family of Kashmir. His father Sanghananda and grandfather Haribhadra had
been banished from Kashmir for their acts of omission and commission. Even
though Gunavarman had been offered to rule his kingdom as his hereditary right,
he chose a different course of action. Gunavarman left home at the age of 20, to
become a monk. He mastered the Buddhist cannon, including the agamas. His
first stop was at Ceylon, where he converted the Royal family to Buddhism.
Then he landed at Java. By now he had earned a name for himself. This attracted
the attention of the Chinese emperor, who personally invited him to his
kingdom. Gunavarman reached Nanking (China) in 431 CE. During his short
stay of one year at the Jetavana monastery, he was able to translate 11 works into
Chinese. It was here that another Kashmiri scholar Dharmamitra collaborated
with him in these translations.

The close relationship that existed between India and Xinjian has been
established by unearthing of fifth century Sanskrit manuscripts written on birch
bark. Aurial Stien, collected numerous antique pieces and other archeological
evidence, that point to the place being an important centre of Buddhism, which
had undoubtedly travelled there from Kashmir.

The Tantric philosophy of Kashmir also left its imprint on Buddhism as many
Buddhist Tantric teachers had close association with Kashmir. Among these
were Naropa and Padmasambhava, who according to some Tibetan sources,
were Kashmiris. It was they who introduced Tantric Buddhism into Kashmir. It
is noteworthy that Tibetan script is derived from Kashmir’s Sharda script. This
was made possible by one Thonmi-Sambhota who had been sent to Kashmir
during the reign of Durlabhavardhana in seventh century to study with
Devatitasimha.

Arrival of Islam in Kashmir in fourteenth century and the large-scale

depredations it caused to the society in its zeal to erase the past, brought an
abrupt end to the classic arts and sciences. Not only were the great monuments
of human ingenuity, effort and the unparalleled skill destroyed, but also the
invaluable literary works in private collection and in public libraries burnt to
destruction. Iconoclastic rulers with their fatwas against sculpture, dance, music,
painting and other fine arts, put an end to the creative genius of the people. In the
subsequent decades, the creative urges at the folk level found expression in
devotion through poetry and other literary forms.

Food Habits
Kashmiri Pandit’s food habits are quite different from that of other Brahmans
from the plains of India. Most Kashmiri Pandits are non-vegetarian; whereas the
Brahmans from the plains are strictly vegetarian. Perhaps, it had something to do
with the severe cold climate of the region in which Kashmiri Pandits lived. Here,
eating meat was both a necessity and even compulsion. But more than the
compulsion imposed by the climate, the non-vegetarianism is directly related to
influence of Tantric philosophy on their religious thought, their rituals and their
belief in Tantric Shaivism. Though Kashmiri Pandits’ meat preparations are not
as exotic as the Muslim wazwan, these are nevertheless, numerous in variety and
unique in taste. Their food is spicy, with liberal use of cooking oil. On a routine
basis, hak-bata (green leafy vegetable, peculiar to Kashmir, and boiled rice)
formed the staple food of Kashmiri Pandits.

Kashmiri Pandit Costume

In the Indian context, with great diversity in ethnicity and cultural traditions of
its diverse races, living in vastly different climatic conditions, it is quite natural
that such diversity is reflected in their traditional costumes too. Kashmir Valley,
nestled within snow-covered mountains, is located within the colder region of
Asia. Except for summer (June-August), when it is relatively warm, its climate is
either cold or at best temperate. Therefore, costume worn by Kashmiris covers
both the upper part of the body, as also the lower limbs. Though today, in the
shrinking world, modern clothing is as visible in Kashmir as it is anywhere else,
yet it has had its distinct dress, that was different from others and dated back to
ancient and mediaeval periods.

Male costume consisted of the lower and upper garment and a headgear of
different designs, locally called ushneek/shirahshat. Literary records and
archeological findings suggest that due to Kushan influence, both men and
women wore long tunic and trousers. Women are also supposed to have dressed
themselves in sari and blouse. According to Chinese traveller, Huein Tsang, use
of doublets and white linen was very common. “In winter, however, they
covered their bodies with a warm cloak, which the Nilamata Purana calls
Pravarana. The rich among them were also draped in fine woolen shawls, while
the ordinary people had to rest content with cheaper woollen articles like the
coarse sthulkambala.” 27

For both, men and women, braiding of their hair and wearing tassels of
different colours, was a fashion statement. Wearing of ornaments by men and
women was universally prevalent in early Kashmir. Some of the commonly
worn ornaments were gold necklaces, earrings, arms/wrist bands and rings.
Besides these, women also wore bracelets, anklets and pearl necklaces. They
would also hang a pendent on their forehead and gold chains from the end of
their hair locks. The dress of Kashmiri Pandits remained, by and large, same till
the advent of Islam. “Pheran, described as Pravarana in Nilmat Purana, became
traditional attire for both men and women.” It was made up of two layers; the
28

inner layer, called potz, was made up of white linen and the outer layer of some
woollen material, to provide warmth. However, between the pheran worn by
men and women, there is a difference.

The pheran worn by women has wide overturned sleeves, whose fringes are
either brocaded or embroidered with gold coloured silk thread. Similar type of
red bordered stripe is stitched on the open collars and on the front shoulders,
going quarter way down the length and also along the skirt, all around. A
coloured sash, called loongey, is tied around the waist. Men’s pheran, on the
other hand, is quite plain, with narrow sleeves, open collar on the left, having a
lapel/lace coming out therefrom. The males also wear a turban, similar to the one
worn by Muslims, except that unlike the Muslims, they do not wear a skull cap.
The Pandit priests wear turban which is similar to the one worn by Namdhari
Sikhs. Women too wear a headgear, which according to Nilmat Purana,
underlines the fusion of two early races that inhabited Kashmir; the Aryans and
Nagas. “It symbolises the decorative hood of the celestial serpent (Nag), having
a flowing serpentine body that tapers into a double tail, almost reaching the heels
of the wearer.” 29

The garment is too complicated for the modern times and is made up of many
smaller but significant parts. To start with, it has a conic shaped cap, called the
kalaposh. “It is made of a decorative brocade or silken embroidery which is
attached with a wide and round band of pashmina in crimson, vermilion or
scarlet. The conic shape covers the crown and the band is shortened threefold
around the forehead.” On top of the crown is worn a delicately made network
30

cloth topped by embroidery motifs, which tapers down to the small of the back,
called zooje. Then there is taranga, which consists of three continuous wraps
over and around the head. Its final wrap has a starched and glazed moharlath,
which is glazed with an agate stone, crystal or soft giant shell. The whole length
is then rolled and wrapped inwards to take on the shape of the long bodies of a
pair of snakes. It has a pair of tapering tails at the lower end and a hood at the
other end (top), that opens up and covers the crown of the headgear, while going
down the back, nearly touching the heels.

Another typically Kashmiri Pandit tradition is the wearing of a dejihor by

married women. No married Hindu woman in India puts on this decorative
golden ornament, except a Kashmiri Pandit woman. Dejihor is composed of two
words, dwej + hor. Dwej itself is a combination of two Sanskrit words, dwe + Ja
(dwe meaning twice and ja, meaning born), i.e., a twice born person. The literal
meaning of hor in Kashmiri language is pair. Dejihor is also used in pairs, one
on each ear lobe. The ornament is called dwej because it signifies that after
marriage, a girl enters her in-laws house, which for her, is a totally alien place.
For a girl, it is as good as taking a new birth. With this ornament on, it is
expected to give her in-laws a message that the person with this ornament on, is
a new born child in their family and she should be treated accordingly, till such
time she becomes a part of the family. The shape of this ornament is that of
yantra of Goddess of Hari Parbat. Possibly, it is to ensure protection of the
Goddess for the girl, at all times.

N OTES

1. Bansi Pandit, Explore Kashmiri Pandits, (Dharma Publications, Delhi, 2008).

2. Ibid.
3. Jia Lal Kilam, A History of Kashmiri Pandits, (Gandhi Memorial College, Srinagar, Kashmir, 1955).
4. Pandit Anand Koul, The Kashmiri Pandit, (Thackers, Calcutta, 1924).
5. Dr CK Atal, Koshur Samachar: December 2009, p. 22.
6. CE Tyndale Biscoe, Kashmir in Sunlight and Shade, (Gulshan Books, 2005) p. 262.
7. Ibid., p. 264.
8. Ibid., p. 262.
9. Majumdar. RC, Ancient Indian History, (Moti Lal Banarasi Das, 8th Edition, 2007).
10. Swami Laxman Joo (Ishwar Ashram Trust, Ishber, Nishat, Srinagar, Kashmir 1996).
11. Bhatt. S, (Ed.), Kashmiri Pandits: A Cultural Heritage, (Lancer Books, New Delhi, 1994).
12. Rice cooked with turmeric and mixed with mustard.
13. Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani, Koshur Samachar, December 2008.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Dr PL Ganjoo, Koshur Samachar, Oct 2008.
17. Sir George Abraham Grierson, Linguistic Surveys of India – 1903–1928 (Oxford University Press, New
York).
18. Al Beruni (973–1048 CE), a Persian Mathematcian and Astronomer.
19. Dr Subhash Kak: in his introduction to Bansi Pandit’s Exploring Kashmiri Pandits. “Opinions differ on
this subject. Some scholars have identified Gonarda province as Gonda district of Uttar Pradesh.
However, some other scholars, including Kalhana, quote Gonarda as the name of the ruling dynasty
of which three kings ruled Kashmir and contend that Gonardiya was suggestive of the country that
they ruled. Thus, contentions in regard to Patanjali’s birth-place keep swinging from Uttar Pradesh to
Kashmir,”says Bansi Pandit in personal communication to the author.
20. Bansi Pandit, n. 1.
21. Sir Marc Auriel Stein is described at p. 7.
22. “In the ancient times, a king would let a horse free to roam around for a year. The king’s soldiers would
then try to establish their rule in all the areas visited by the horse. This led to much bloodshed and
wars among the kings. “The Vishudharmottara Purana replaced these ancient rites by the
Rajyabhishekha (royal consecration) and Surapratishtha (fixing of the divine abode).” Dr Subash
Kak, The Wonder that was Kashmir (International Journal of Indian Studies, Vol 3, 1993).
23. http://hinduonline.co/Scriptures/Samhita/CharakSamhita.html.
24. Dr Subash Kak, n. 22.
25. Ibid.
26. Dr Subash Kak in foreword to Bansi Pandit’s Explore Kashmiri Pandits (Dharma Publications, Delhi,
2008).
27. Source: http://unmesh.com/may98.html downloaded from [email protected] on February
8, 2009.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
 KASHMIRIYAT
“Popular saint singers became the apostles of a synthesis and rapprochement, aided by common
points in Advaita and Sufism.”
—Anon

Kashmiriyat is an expression that is often used in political and other discourse to

define Kashmiri identity; social, cultural, ethnic and otherwise. Simply put, it
means peaceful coexistence between the Muslim majority and the Hindu
minority sections of Kashmiri society. However, the term Kashmiriyat
represents so much of fact and fiction that the ground reality seems to have been
completely lost sight of.

General Perception
Essentially, Kashmiriyat means a common and shared identity of the two main
communities of the valley, the Pandits and the Muslims. The essence of this
commonality has been brought out by Iffat Malik, who quotes Munshi, thus:
“Truly it was said that Pandits and Muslims were two brothers, pursuing two
different faiths in perfect mutual affection, respect and trust. They shared each
others joys and sorrows, respected equally the sufis, saints and sages, traditions
and rituals and places of worship… In essence, they lived a common community
life, keeping the core of religion outside the circle of day to day life…These
shared values were rooted in common stock, ethnicity and perceptions of good
and evil, which they took pride in, as an invaluable inheritance from the past.” 1

How did these shared values come about? Kashmir has been a centre of
Buddhism, Hinduism and later Islam. Historically, the influence that these three
major religions of the world had over the region and its people, resulted in some
of the practices and rituals of previous religion, finding their way into the new
faith, to which people got converted. The fact that most of the Muslims in the
Valley are converts, it is only natural that they would have carried a fair number
of practices from their former faith into the new one, to which they converted.
For example, a process of synthesis between Kashmir Shaivism and Islam
resulted in the latter inheriting a number of rituals and practices from Hinduism.
Going further back into history, Hinduism itself had inherited many precepts and
practices from Buddhism. Proponents of Kashmiriyat hold this synthesis
responsible for giving rise to a composite culture by stating that it has imbibed
the best of each of these three religions. Balraj Puri says something similar when
he writes, “Kashmir has been a melting pot of ideas and races. It received every
new creed with discrimination and enriched it with its own contribution, without
throwing away its earlier accretions.” Bamzai too reinforces the same theory
2

when he writes, “As in religion, so in philosophy, arts and literature, Kashmir

evolved a composite culture… The fusion and assimilation of varied faiths and
cultures had resulted in their particular and specific ethnicity.” 3

One of the most distinct features of this assimilation and common culture is
the degree of reverence that Kashmiri Muslims show towards Hindu shrines.
Hindus also showed similar respect for Muslim shrines and dargahs. Shared
superstitions, beliefs and other religious practices further reinforce this
perception. In fact, something typical to Kashmiri Muslims is the manner in
which they pray in the mosques. This is similar to the manner in which the
Kashmiri Hindus pray. Such practice was carried by the Hindus when they were
coerced into converting to Islam. Bazaz writes, “Islam, as practiced in the
valley… has been deeply influenced by the ancient Kashmir culture… A
Kashmiri Muslim shares with his Hindu compatriots many inhibitions,
superstitions, idolatrous practices, as well as social liberties and intellectual
freedoms, which are unknown to Islam.” 4

The other commonality is the Pir Parasti, meaning reverence for spiritually
evolved sages and their shrines; a practice that is an essential part of Hindu
belief. However, this phenomenon is not peculiar to Kashmiris only, but is
prevalent all over the sub-continent. Nevertheless, among the commonalities; it
is an important shared practice. It is noteworthy that religion forms a big part of
Kashmiriyat or this common identity of Kashmiris. R C Tremblay writes, “In
fact, it is a significant aspect of Kashmiris’ regional identity… Its emphasis on
the syncretistic world view and tolerance for other religions has given rise to
development of indigenous practices and philosophies, and such traditions of
both Hinduism and Islam in the valley, that they tend to differentiate both
religious communities from their counterparts elsewhere.” 5

Another factor that adds to the common identity is their shared ethnicity and
history. Kashmiri Hindus have a lot in common with Kashmiri Muslims, while at
the same time; they differ greatly from Hindus in rest of India.
 The faith in Rishi-Sufi traditions in Kashmir is the heart and soul of what is
known as Kashmiriyat. The Sufi order of Islam arrived in the valley from Persia,
central Asia, north and central India, after the emergence of Khanqahs and
Silsilas. This happened almost simultaneously with the arrival of Islam, though
much before the establishment of Muslim rule in these regions. But the
organised and institutionalised Sufi activities began only towards the end of
fourteenth century. Rishi order, on the other hand, evolved indigenously in the
valley itself in the fifteenth century.

When Islam arrived in Kashmir, its ethos got permeated with Hindu tradition
of asceticism and the Buddhist belief in renunciation. This was something akin
to Sufi world view. Sufi itself derives from saf, an Arabic word meaning wool;
for the only earthly possession of these inspired men and women was a coarse
piece of woollen cloth; rest everything else having been renounced.

Additionally, many Sufis found similarities between the Hindu philosophy of

Advaita (non-duality) and the Islamic philosophy of divine unity, represented by
the two main streams, Wahadut-u-Wajood of Ibn Arabi and Wahadat-ul-
Shohood. This divine unity of entire mankind was propounded by Rishis and
Sufis by speaking in simple language that was understood by the common
masses. This synthesis is poetically conveyed by Sarfi, one of the well known
Sufi of Kubravi order, who wrote:

“O, Sarfi! What are you going to gain from the pilgrimage?
If Ka’ aba, temple and tavern are not identical with you,
O, Sarfi! As on every side a ray has
Fallen from his face to light up the night,
Impossible it is for you to say that Somnath
Has not the light of Kaaba.” 6

The synthesis at times appeared complete when some of the Sufis justified and
accepted idol worship as a manifestation of mystical love. Sheikh Yaqub, a Sufi
7

of Kubravi order challenged the Ulema on this score. Same thing can be said
about the belief of Sufis in the core Hindu belief of re-incarnation. The following
verses from the Masnawi by Hazrat Jalaludin Rumi are quite well-known in
Kashmir:

“I died as mineral and became a plant,

I died as plant and rose to animal,
 I died as animal and was man,
Why should I fear?
When was I less by dying/
Yet once more I shall die as man, to sore with angels blest;
but even from
Angel-hood I must pass on…” 8

It is pertinent to mention that some religious figures and authors did not
approve of such interpretation of Islam and considered these Sufis as being anti-
Shariat. This would be evident from the writings of Mirza Haider who wrote
about the “Un-Islamic and anti-Shariat ways of Sufis.” Even Sheikh Noor Udin
9

Noorani (n.9, p.65) had a running battle with such critics. He was unsparing in
his criticism of those mullahs who preached hatred through their sermons, rather
than propagate the true message of their religious faith. Looking ahead, he
prophetically said:-

“The people of Kalyug in every house will pretend to be saints,

As a prostitute does when dancing, they will pretend to be innocent and
extremely gentle.
They will excel thieves in living by unlawful means,
To hide themselves they will repair to forest.”

Even in meditative practices, the Sufi methodology of using various variations

of Pass-e-Anfas (watching the breath) is pretty similar to Prannayama as
practiced in Hath Yoga and made popular in Kashmir by Shaivite sages. “The
Sufis have added the repetition of the word Allah, Allahoo or Huwwa to their
meditative technique.” 10

Sultan Shaheen writes, “Nund Rishi faced restrictions during the reign of Suha
Bhatta (see chapter-2) who had started persecuting non-Muslims in his new
found Islamic zeal after conversion to the new faith.” Spartan and frugal life
11

style of Rishis, Sufis and Buddhist and Jain monks added greatly to this religious
synthesis. Many chroniclers have even written about this similarity. Emperor
Jahangir writes of them, “…They neither eat meat nor marry. They always plant
fruit bearing trees in uninhabited parts, so that they may benefit people, but they
themselves do not hope to reap any advantages from these trees.” According to
12

G.M.D. Sofi, it was the Syeds and their followers who planted the seed of
mysticism in the valley. He writes, “…These Syeds and their followers seemed
to have stimulated the tendency to mysticism for which Buddhism and
Vedantism had already paved the way.” The chief schools of Sufi order were
13

Suhrawardi, Kubravi, Naqshbandhi and Qadri. Among some well known Sufis,
perhaps the foremost was Bulbul Shah (see chapter-2), a well-known disciple of
Shah Nimatullah Wali Farsi, a Suhrawardi Sufi. Sufism survived and flourished
in the Indian sub-continent, particularly in Kashmir, due to “long period of
interaction between Islam and the esoteric strains of Hinduism and other faiths
of India.” However, whereas in most Muslim societies Sufis lived on the
14

margins of society and Sufi order remained confined in its spread and reach; in
Kashmir, they became a predominant force, exerting great influence on the
society in general and enriching the true concept of Kashmiriyat in the region.
However, the concept of Kashmiriyat never became a reality in Kashmir for
various reasons which are enumerated below.

Re-visiting the Concept of Kashmiriyat

Though many have extolled the virtues of this unique phenomenon,
Kashmiriyat needs to be examined afresh in the light of irrefutable evidence
presented by Kashmir’s history; past and present, that goes against the
fundamental concept of Kashmiriyat. Ever since the arrival of Islam in the
valley, the continuous persecution of Kashmiri Pandits at the hands of Muslim
rulers, with few exceptions, proves beyond doubt that if at all there existed
something like Kashmiriyat; it remained totally subservient to the dictates of
radical elements within Kashmiri Muslims. The events of late eighties and early
nineties, only reinforces this argument; Kashmiriyat was nowhere in evidence. It
is, therefore, worthwhile to revisit this concept.

The radicalisation of Muslims in Kashmir in the late eighties was complete

antithesis of the moderate Islam whose outward manifestations were anti-clergy
exhortations of Sufis and fusion between the accommodating form of worships
and peoples’ reverence for divine institutions. The collective display of passion
at dargahs was a manifestation of this belief. However, history proves that the
more radical strain of Islam has always lurked around, waiting to take advantage
of the slightest change of public mood and the emergence of favourable political
undercurrents. In the modern era, the radicalisation of Islam can, to a large
extent, be attributed to the thoughts and writings of the renowned Islamic scholar
and chief of Jamat-e-Islami, Abul Ala Maududi. His passionate advocacy of the
puritanical form of political Islam (opposed to the Sufi form) converted sizeable
sections of the sub-continent’s Muslims to this ideology. Though this was visible
largely in Pakistan, Kashmir did not remain untouched by the new trend in that
country. Nevertheless; it was Zia-ul-Haque who used the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, to turn this fertile idea into a groundswell of political Islam, whose
consequences are being felt by the whole world, not least by Pakistan itself.
Kashmiriyat, or whatever little was left of it by the middle of eighties itself
receded into background, as the radical Islamic thought and deed became more
fashionable.

Besides, these events proved that the concept of Kashmiriyat based on their
similarities and commonalities, are only skin deep. TN Madan explains in his in-
depth analysis of life in rural Kashmir, “the traditional clothing of Pandit men,
women and their children is different from that of their Muslim co-villagers.
Pandit homes look different from those of others… both from inside and outside.
Their places of worship are also distinctive in appearance, as are their weddings,
religious and funeral gatherings… Though they speak Kashmiri, Pandit speech is
more laden with Sanskrit as compared to Muslim speech. Personal and family
names, with few exceptions, are also different.” 15

As far as the social interaction is concerned, beyond the superficial,

Kashmiriyat did not exist. Part of this superficial interaction was the result of
Pandits being dependent on Muslims for some of the basic services. Among the
Pandits, there was no lower class or other backward classes (these having
converted to Islam centuries earlier), which could provide services, such as
blacksmiths, cobblers, potters, washer men, barbers, sanitary workers, etc. Hence
the tasks which they were prohibited from doing themselves, were performed by
Muslims. This ensured almost daily contact between the two communities at the
common man’s level. This inter-dependence created a sort of social bond that
defined the relationship between the two communities. Nevertheless, this
compromise did not breach the superficial similarity and social interaction
remained, by and large, thin. They neither inter-married nor inter-dined.

Though modernisation had broken some barriers between the two, resulting in
socialising between two communities, particularly in urban environment, most
intimate form of social interaction still remained a taboo. The superficial
bonhomie that existed between the Pandits and Muslims at the individual level
would always be over-shadowed by the Kashmiri Muslim’s religious
compulsions. No matter what an individual Muslim in Kashmir might think, it is
their collective will that always prevails. This collective will is moulded almost
entirely by the dictates of the radical fringe. As Winston Churchill said,
“Individual Muslims may show splendid qualities, but the influence of the
religion paralyses the social development of those who follow it…” 16

It is a big misnomer that no communal killings took place in Kashmir at the

time of partition. There were gory massacres of Kashmiri Pandits, Sikhs and
Khatris in Muzaffarabad, though Srinagar escaped that fate. “Thirty eight
thousand Hindus and Sikhs were massacred by the invaders in the territories
overrun by them. Twelve thousand Hindus including Kashmiri Pandits perished
in the town of Rajouri alone.” The absence of communal conflict in Srinagar is
17

also wrongly attributed to Kashmiriyat. It is said that the regional identity had
overshadowed the religious identity and hence no religious strife resulted.
However, this is a false assumption. For one, it takes two religious groups to
indulge in communal violence. Kashmiri Pandits have never confronted the
overt manifestations of Muslim communalism, which would result in a
communal clash. On the other hand, they have always yielded, preferring to
suffer in silence.

Besides, some other realities of Kashmir’s social and political life also
contributed to the absence of communal clashes between the two communities.
The Pandits were completely dependent on Kashmiri Muslims for almost
everything, because Kashmiri Muslims dominated and controlled every aspect of
social, economic and political life in Kashmir. In order to adopt mainstream
politics as a preferred choice, Kashmiri Pandits had wholeheartedly supported
Sheikh Abdullah after he had turned Muslim Conference (MC) into National
Conference (NC). Both, Kashmiri Pandits and NC, were in the forefront of
campaign against the tribal invasion of Kashmir and to bring to an end the feudal
dispensation represented by the Maharaja. To cap it all, the possibility of a clash
between the two in socio-economic spheres also did not exist, as both occupied
separate niches. It was only after the competition in the same activity, i.e., job
market increased, that the relationship started deteriorating.

The other thing that contributed to this deterioration was the mass
mobilisation of Muslims using the platform of political Islam. Sheikh Abdullah
must have been aware of the consequences of such mobilisation. He was himself
confronted with a dilemma, while deciding to make choice of accession between
the dominions of India and Pakistan. On the one hand, he felt that Kashmiris
would be better off in secular and progressive India and on the other, he was
aware of the fanatical nature of Kashmiri Muslims. Joseph Korbel brings out this
contradiction in his book, Danger in Kashmir, thus, “He (Shiekh Abdullah) was
a Muslim leader who believed, as India did, in non-communal, secular state, but
who was aware of the fanatical devotion of his followers to Islam. What then
should he do? Pakistan was a reactionary country, he said and he was convinced
that a union of Kashmir with Pakistan would finally go against the interests of
his people. They would be better off with India, but what could he do if the
sentiments of his people pushed them in a direction against his better
judgement.”

After the Afghans were replaced by Sikhs in Kashmir, the fortunes of Pandits
had turned for the better after decades of brutal suffering. And such
improvement continued during the Dogra rule. This led to their being identified
with the ruling class itself. Pandits thus became direct and automatic targets of
Muslims during the anti-Maharaja stir of July 1931. This cemented the divide
between the two communities.

At this point in history, Sheikh Abdullah was trying to emerge as a leader of

Kashmiri Muslims, which would enable him to stake a claim to represent the
whole state. But to achieve this objective, he faced two distinct challenges. On
the one hand, he had to confront the radical elements in MC, and on the other,
meet the challenge posed by Hindus of Jammu. “When the discourse on
common citizenship did not produce a consensus due to the entrenched religious
identity, Kashmiriyat was conveniently used to sustain the majority
nationalism,” says Chitralekha Zutshi. It was in this background that the term
18

Kashmiriyat was devised by Sheikh Abdullah. This would enable him to kill two
birds with one stone; in addition to taking care of the political contradictions
within the State, it would also help him to win the support of liberal democrats
within Congress, with whom he was trying to establish a close relationship.
Writing about the concept of Kashmiriyat, Chitralekha Zutshi further mentions,
“It did not emerge from the soil of Kashmir; it was a product of the collusion of
Kashmiri and Indian majoritarian nationalism, both of which needed to obscure
the inner contradictions.” However, even after Kashmiriyat became the byword
of NC, the minority community of Kashmir was apprehensive and gave vent to
these apprehensions from time to time. Nevertheless, it goes to the credit of
Sheikh Abdullah that he succeeded to a great extent in presenting “Kashmiriyat
as uncomplicated and all encompassing entity.” 19

After the events of 1947, with power firmly in the hands of NC headed by
Sheikh Abdullah, the upsurge among Kashmiri Muslims greatly marginalised the
Pandits, both economically and socially. Thus, while this created a gulf between
the two, the subsequent increase in religious orthodoxy and its ever-enlarging
scope created a crisis of trust and confidence between the two communities.
While Kashmiriyat did not produce common citizenship due to Kashmiri
Muslims’ entrenched religious identity, it was conveniently used to sustain
majority nationalism.

Under the circumstances, it will be naive to suggest that a single Kashmiri

community, whose identity is defined by Kashmiriyat, does really exist.
Undoubtedly, there is much in common between the two, that differentiates them
from non-Kashmiris, but there is no similarity between the two as far as the
critical indicators of social and religious interaction are concerned. Indeed, both
communities are distinctive, with their own social obligations, religious practices
and other core beliefs and values. If at all Kashmiriyat really existed, it did so
only prior to the arrival of Islam in the valley, when the entire Valley’s
population was Hindu. As early as seventeenth century, only three centuries after
the arrival of Islam in the valley, fanatical tendencies among Kashmiri Muslims
were quite visible. Francisco Paelsaert, who was in India between 1621 and
1627, while in service of the Dutch East India Company, describes Kashmiris as
“Fanatical Muslims.” 20

In reality, Kashmir’s Hindus and its Muslims were part of a pluralistic society
and some degree of harmony did exist between the two in the past. Both shared a
strong sense of regional identity and mutually respected religious practices.
Given the right environment and thoughtful direction, it could have led to a
common Kashmiri identity, true Kashmiriyat. This did not happen. On the other
hand, these differences got accentuated, with Muslims getting increasingly
radicalised, finally resulting in the genocide of Kashmiri Pandits and their
exodus. No matter from what angle one looks at it; it is a failure of the noble
concept of Kashmiriyat and secular experiment in Kashmir.

Some Recent views of Eminent People

It is interesting to note that in a recently published book, Kashmiriyat Through
the Ages, which contains essays on the subject by eminent politicians,
21

academics, journalists, etc, no one has been able to define authoritatively what
Kashmiriyat means. As Professor Mohammad Aslam writes, “They talk about
Kashmir history, politics, society, religion, etc., without really telling us what
Kashmiriyat means.”

Following are the views of some of these eminent people on the subject:
 Dr Gul Wani finds Kashmiriyat in the unique and rich culture of Kashmir.

Professor Riaz Punjabi finds Kashmiriyat in the unique way religion is

practised in Kashmir — Muslim, Hindu and Sikh shrines located within close
vicinity of each other. “The Hari Parbhat… has become the focal point where
people of diverse faiths, coming from many directions, converge on one point, to
provide a living instance of the adage that ways might be different, but they lead
to one goal.” He believes that for various political and economic factors, the
Kashmiri people “abandoned their indigenous beliefs and traditions, and started
merging with the traditions and beliefs of India’s majority,” – and this has come
under strain for the last more than two decades (referring to the period of
insurgency in the Valley).

Professor Hassnain in his essay gives us a historical account of the land, its
people and their rulers from time to time. He believes that it refers to “our roots,
our culture, our traditions and our Kashmiri language,” which have evolved
“over all these centuries up to the present times, into a full-bloomed flower.” He
finds that Kashmiriyat (whatever that means) had been assaulted from time to
time, but Kashmiris have never allowed it to die. He further mixes up
Kashmiriyat with the disappearance of the holy relic from Hazratbal Shrine and
writes, “The theft of the holy hair of the Prophet was in reality an assault on
Kashmiriyat. It was a conspiracy to obliterate and destroy the focal point of unity
of Kashmiri Muslims.” The theft made Kashmiri Muslims go against India.
However, miraculously, the relic was found and Kashmiriyat was saved. One of
the effects of this assault was the “dismissal of the State government led by
Shamshuddin, and subsequent release of Sheikh Abdullah from prison.”

Professor Saifuddin Soz’s essay talks about the alien rulers of Kashmir
between 1586 and 1947. He gives credit to Kashmiri Pandits for keeping
Kashmiriyat alive, “though most of [them] remained part of the establishment
and manned the administration during these centuries of alien domination…
there are shining examples of how Pandits strengthened Kashmiri identity.”

Ghulam Nabi Khayal finds Sufis as builders of the Kashmir identity, while
Professor Ishaq Khan holds Rishism responsible for laying a strong foundation
of Kashmiriyat. He says, “Nothing explains the crucial issue of Kashmiriyat or
Kashmiri identity as explicitly as the gradual transition of Kashmiris to Islam
over a period of five centuries, thanks to the role of the Sufis and Rishis.”
However, about Kashmiriyat, he writes that “the term Kashmiriyat is not of local
origin. When and where was it coined, needs to be explored; but it is certain that
in the aftermath of the Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975, the NC leadership sought
to vindicate and reinforce its faith in Kashmiriyat against the background of the
emergence of Bangladesh.” According to him, the term was used by the NC to
perpetuate its rule after the Indira-Sheikh Accord in 1975.

Professor Ahad in his essay The Genesis of Kashmiriyat, says that it was
coined during Farooq Abdullah’s rule in eighties.

According to Professor Mohammad Aslam, the essays contained in

Kashmiriyat Through the Ages, are as confusing as the term Kashmiriyat itself,
and no authentic or reliable definition is given by any of the authors. In fact,
Rishism and Rishis’ contribution to Kashmir has been alluded to by almost all
writers. The book contains many contentious issues to debate on. Since a review
has no place for such a debate, it is better to leave it for Kashmir historians. It is
certain that Kashmiriyat through the Ages offers nothing new on the subject.” 22

N OTES

1. Iffat Malik, Kashmir, Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute, (Oxford University Press, 2002).
2. Balraj Puri in a newspaper article titled, Visibility of Kashmiri Identity.
3. Bamzai, Prithivi Nath Kaul, A History of Kashmir: Political, Social, Cultural; from the Earliest Times
to the Present Day, (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Co, 1962).
4. Bazaz, PN History of the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, (Kashmir Publishing Company, New
Delhi, 1954).
5. Tremblay, RC; Kashmir: The Valley’s Political Dynamics, Contemporary South Asia, 1995.
6. Sultan Shaheen, Kashmiriyat: Gift of Rishi — Sufi order, Speaking Tree; The Times of India, April 20,
2002.
7. “Hindus are not idol worshippers. The ‘idol’ was coined by the British in India to denigrate Hindus and
their religion/culture. Hindus worship Murtis. Based upon the definition of idol in English Dictionary,
the Sanskrit word Murti should not be translated as ‘idol’. The correct translation would be ‘image’ or
‘icon.’” Bansi Pandit.
8. Sultan Shaheen, n. 6.
9. HN Rafiabadi, An Excursion into Kashmir’s Mystical Past, Tribune, April 24, 2002.
10. Sultan Shaheen, n. 6.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Rafiabadi, HN n. 9.
14. Nadeem F Paracha, Pioneer, April, 2010.
15. Madan TN, The Family and Kinship: The Study of Pandits in Rural Kashmir, (Oxford University Press,
Second Edition, 1984).
16. Winston Churchill (as war correspondent): The River War, First Edition, Vol. II, (London), p. 248–50.
17. Dr MK Teng and CL Guddu, White Paper on Kashmir, (Gupta Print Services, Delhi) (Distributor
through Jeoffry & Bell Inc, Publishers).
18. Chitralekha Zutshi: Language of Belonging, Islam, Regional Identity and Making of Kashmir,
(Permanent Black, 2003).
19. Ibid.
20. Dr GMD Sufi: Kashir; Being a History of Kashmir, vols. I & II, (University of Punjab, 1948, Lahore, p.
348).
21. Kashmiriyat through the Ages: An anthology of seventeen essays. The book is edited by Professor
Hassanain; (Gulshan Books, Srinagar).
22. Downloaded from ‘Kashmir-Interchange@ googlegroups.com’ on Wednesday, December 21, 2011.
 GENESIS OF KASHMIR PROBLEM AND
HOW IT GOT COMPLICATED: EVENTS
BETWEEN 1931 AND 1947 CE
“If there is one place on the face of the earth where all the dreams of living man have found a home
from the very earliest days of man’s existence on earth, it is India”.
—Romain Rolland

Forces, that got unleashed in the sub-continent after the departure of the British,
resulted in a paradigm shift of political processes at the national and regional
levels. It took in its sweep a number of well-entrenched notions of social
hierarchies and hitherto unquestioned political equations. These changes, set into
motion much before the departure of the British, reached their crescendo when
the British departed. With the sub-continent left without a strong central
authority, the vacuum thus created, was filled-in by the Indian National
Congress and Muslim League at the national level and local and regional leaders
at the sub-national level. These sub-national movements representing narrow
regional and local aspirations, were led by charismatic leaders. Something
similar happened in Jammu and Kashmir State too, where Muslim politico-
religious consolidation played an important role. This ensured that all along the
movement retained its Islamic character rather than a nationalistic one, which
would embrace all communities of the state.

Rise of Kashmiri Majoritarianism

First signs of the rise of Muslim politico-religious consolidation were visible
in 1927 when the Maharaja, bowing to the demands of some professionals and
white collar workers, allowed the recruitment of Kashmiris into army and
government services. Subsequently, this informal group formed itself into the
Muslim Reading Room Party, which held its meetings in mosques and with the
help of mullahs tried to reach out to the people. From there, the meetings shifted
into the open, reaching out to the middle classes and the peasants.

Sheikh Abdullah was only twenty-five when he led the movement against the
Maharaja. Born at Soura, on the outskirts of Srinagar, his father, Sheikh
Mohammad Ibrahim was a shawl dealer. One among five children; he studied in
Islamic College, Lahore, and Aligarh Muslim University. Having a Masters'
degree in chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University, Sheikh Abdullah, on his
return to the valley, applied for a teaching job in Sri Pratap College at Srinagar.
“According to the famous film maker, Arun Kaul, Sheikh Abdullah, who had
secured a third division in his MSc degree, had to compete with Niranjan Nath
Kak, (brother of RC Kak), who had received a gold medal for topping (securing
first class first position) in MSc chemistry from Banaras Hindu University. Kak
was naturally selected for the post of a lecturer in the subject and Sheikh had to
rest content with a teacher’s job in the local Islamia School.

Sheikh Abdullah was beside himself with jealousy and anger. He attributed
his rejection to his being a Muslim and gave vent to his chagrin by joining
communal politics,” says Dr Shashi Shekhar Toshkhani. It was left to the famous
Ahmadiya intellectual, Moulvi Abdullah Vakil to introduce Sheikh Abdullah to
his audience at Reading Room, Fateh Kadal, where the Sheikh started his speech
with reciting the Quranic verses to infuse new blood into the struggle against the
Maharaja. According to Dr KN Pandit, “Moulvi Abdullah Vakil was a known
Ahmadiya intellectual who first introduced Sheikh Abdullah to Kashmir
audience when the Sheikh began his political career after resigning as a
government teacher in 1932. By this time the political consolidation among the
Muslims had reached a stage where its leadership could now openly challenge
the Maharaja.” However, without the connivance of the British resident, it was
nearly impossible to revolt against the Dogra ruler.

For its own reasons, Britain was rather too happy to lend its helping hand to
Sheikh Abdullah in his rebellion against the Maharaja. The Maharaja had taken a
highly patriotic stand at the First Round Table Conference in London by
opposing British rule in India. He had even refused to hand-over Gilgit to
Britain. The latter made no secret of their disapproval of such a stand adopted by
the ruler of one of their biggest and most important princely states. They were
unlikely to overlook it for the serious political consequences it would entail for
the ‘empire’ if left un-responded. Clipping the Maharaja’s wings would serve
their immediate political purpose. Besides, it would serve its other strategic
purpose; coerce him to submit to the British demand for lease of Gilgit, the all
important strategic outpost in the Great Game (n. 17, p. 133). Wakefield,
Maharaja Hari Singh’s Prime Minister and the British Resident in the state, was
ideally placed to implement the conspiracy on the ground. The events of July 13,
1931, were so orchestrated that the state’s Muslim subjects would be provoked
into indulging in communal violence against Kashmiri Hindus, which would
eventually destabilise Maharaja’s government. Some historians have even gone
to the extent of calling these events a conspiracy hatched by the British Political
Department against Maharaja Hari Singh.

The communal elements of the Muslim Reading Room Party incited the
Muslim mobs to set themselves on the hapless Pandits. Outwardly, however,
they projected that the ostensible purpose of their movement was to rise in revolt
against the Dogra rule. The communal violence that broke out saw the shops and
houses of Pandits not only looted but also burnt. Similar incidents were also
reported from other parts of the valley. Nine members of a Pandit family in
Kanikoot were axed to death by Muslims of a neighbouring village. The village
located in Budgam district had a sizeable Kashmiri Pandit population. The lone
survivor was a young boy who was not sleeping in the house during the night
when it was attacked.

During the day-long riots, Kashmiri Pandits bore the brunt of Muslim fury. To
control the situation, the police had to resort to firing on the violent mobs, which
resulted in the death of 21 rioters. Since then, every year Muslim organisation of
Kashmir, including those that profess to be secular, observe July 13, as The
Martyrs Day. However, Pandits recall the day as Bhatta Loot, meaning, the day
when Pandits were looted. From then on, contrary to what is being preached,
communalism in the state politics got entrenched and institutionalised, with
communal propaganda taking a centre stage. It attained a momentum of its own
and conditions only got aggravated with the passage of time.

In October 1932, the Muslim Reading Room Party was turned into Jammu
and Kashmir Muslim Conference (MC) by Sheikh Abdullah, who, by now had
been bestowed with the title of Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir). He became
its first president. Initially, its sole aim was to seek justice for Muslims, but with
the passage of time it became a strong political movement against the Dogra
rule. In 1933, another revolt, led by Ahrar Party, exclusively composed of the
Muslims of Punjab broke out. These elements had slipped into the State through
its porous borders to fish in Kashmir’s troubled waters.

Pressed by the open revolt of his subjects and ‘advised’ by his British masters,
the Maharaja passed ‘Constitutional Act, Regulation No-1’ in 1934 to create a
diarchic form of Government, which stipulated the formation of a 75-member
‘Praja Sabha’ (People’s Assembly); 40 of which would be elected and 35
nominated. In the first ever elections held in the state, the MC captured 14 of the
21 seats allotted to Muslim voters. However, the Assembly had only consultative
powers and voting was not based on universal adult suffrage. The rules of voting
were such that only eight per cent of the population formed the total electorate.
When these facts became known, all the members walked out, forcing a new
election in 1936. This time, the communal rhetoric indulged in by the MC
ensured its victory in 19 of the 21 seats.

Having allowed the communal rhetoric of his party to dominate the political
movement to gain immediate advantage in the elections, Sheikh Abdullah started
showing signs of discomfort with the increasingly mediaeval and theocratic
thinking dominating the political discourse in his party. He was particularly
upset with its excessive pre-occupation with the Hindu-Muslim question, being
propagated by Chudhary Ghulam Abbas, another important leader of the MC.
Having drawn inspiration from the secular and progressive thought that
permeated the independence movement launched by Indian National Congress,
Sheikh Abdullah felt that MC was losing focus of the true significance of its own
political struggle, by adopting an extremely communal position on every issue.
By this time differences had also arisen in the working committee of Muslim
Conference concerning the constitutional reforms introduced by the Maharaja.

The differences between the two factions; one led by Sheikh Abdullah and the
other by Chudhary Ghulam Abbas, representing a more extreme faction within
the party, created further friction between the two leaders. These differences
enlarged the gulf that separated the two personalities. As a consequence, Sheikh
Abdulah and Chowdhary Abbas parted ways; the former now forming All
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and the latter assuming the powers of
the sole dictator of MC. Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, a colleague of Sheikh
Abdullah, with distinct left leanings, became its first president. MC now became
a staunch pro-Muslim League party, while Sheikh Abdullah came closer to the
Indian National Congress.

Sheikh Abdullah had an imposing presence and was a gifted orator. This
enabled him to convince and sway his audience, which gave him tremendous
confidence. But at the same time; it also inflated his ego and made him haughty.
The tremendous applause and ovation that he received from the public, his
unparalleled popularity among the Kashmiris, and the love and obsession of
Nehru for him, further accentuated this defective trait in him. Be it as it may,
with Sheikh Abdullah receiving increasing support for his movement against the
Maharaja from Indian National Congress, particularly from Pandit Nehru,
proximity between the Sheikh and Congress grew steadily. After forming the
more secular sounding All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference,
membership of the new party was now thrown open to all people, irrespective of
religion, though its agenda was heavily tilted to satisfy Muslim sentiment. Many
Kashmiri Pandits, including some prominent ones, also joined the Party.

In 1944, resolution of Naya Kashmir was adopted by the NC. During the same
year, Mohammad Ali Jinnah visited Kashmir to preside over the annual session
of the MC. It gave him an opportunity to wean away Kashmiris from Sheikh
Abdullah and establish his hold over Kashmiri Muslims. It did have some effect
as many people left the ranks of NC and flocked towards the MC. It may be
recalled that the Muslim League leaders, particularly Jinnah, had consistently
opposed Sheikh Abdullah’s movement against the Maharaja, calling it a goonda
movement. During this visit, the Sheikh personally welcomed him to the valley
and held long private talks with him. On the second day of the visit, Jinnah
asked Abdullah at a huge public gathering at Jama Masjid, Srinagar, to wind up
his NC. Using very intemperate language, Jinnah also accused the Sheikh of
doublespeak. He appealed to the people to join MC and, to make matters worse;
he called Sheikh Abdullah and NC workers as “malcontents” and a “band of
gangsters.” An infuriated Sheikh lashed out at Jinnah and asked NC workers to
see him out of the valley. After this incident, Mohammed Ali Jinnah was not
able to address any public gathering in Kashmir and was forced to leave the
valley much before his scheduled departure.

This created a permanent political gulf between the two pre-eminent Muslim
leaders of the sub-continent and convinced the Sheikh that his political future
would be bleak if he joined Pakistan. Nevertheless, Jinnah’s visit certainly
threatened his popularity. To regain the initiative and establish himself as the
lone voice of Kashmiris, he now adopted a maximalist position. Initially, he had
wanted to establish a democratic government under the aegis of the Maharaja
and had left the door open for negotiations. But now, he wanted the abdication of
the Maharaja. To achieve this, he launched a mass civil disobedience movement
called ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’ on May 10, 1946. To rouse people’s passions,
he made use of ‘The Treaty of Amritsar’ (see chapter-4) by calling it a ‘sale
deed’, in which the Kashmiris were ‘sold to the Dogras like cattle’.

At that time, Pandit RC Kak was the Prime Minister of the State, having risen
from the post of a librarian in a local college. Being knowledgeable and
politically conscious, he realised the implications of the seditious utterances of
Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues. He, therefore, put Sheikh Abdullah under
arrest. Nehru dramatised the event by immediately arriving in Kashmir to plead
his case, but was detained, though released the next day. This event prevented
any further improvement of relations between the Maharaja and Nehru, which
were already strained due to Nehru’s support to Sheikh Abdullah against the
Maharaja.

In the meanwhile, in October 1946, MC, now a sister organisation of the

Muslim League, under the leadership of Maulvi Yousuf Shah, the Mirwaiz
(religious leader of Kashmiri Muslims), launched ‘Direct Action’ campaign,
heeding the call given by Muslim League in Calcutta. MC also wanted Kashmir
to join Pakistan, though its president, Chaudhary Hamid-Ullah Khan, was in two
minds and wanted the state to remain independent.

British Withdrawal Turns Partition into a Complex Exercise

During British Raj, India was divided into two distinct entities, British
Provinces and Princely States. Princely states, under the Government of India
Act 1935, included any territory, whether described as a state, an estate, and a
jagir or otherwise. These were under the suzerainty of ‘His Majesty’ and not a
part of British India. In practice the princely states were semi-independent and
protected by United Kingdom under the ‘Paramountcy Doctrine’. This entitled
the King of England and Emperor of India to provide protection to the princes,
in return of their pledge of fealty to him. These 584 princely states were
scattered over roughly 1.88 million sq km, or 45.3 per cent of the undivided
India’s surface area, and inhabited by nearly 99 million people. The code of
conduct governing the relations of the princely states with the British
Government was, therefore, different from that which governed the relations
between provinces and the British Government. In the case of the provinces, the
authority of the British Government was direct; it was exercised through the
British Parliament, the Secretary of State for India, Governor General in Council
or Provincial Governors. In the case of the princely states, the authority was
indirectly exercised by various treaties, engagements and sanads, supplemented
by usage and sufferance.

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee announced in the House of Commons

in February 1946, that a Parliamentary delegation would visit India with a view
to meeting the national leaders and discuss various problems connected with
self-government in India. All members of the Cabinet Mission belonged to the
British Government and consisted of Lord Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps
and Mr. AV Alexander. They arrived in India on March 23, 1946, and held
meetings with four representatives, two each of the Congress and the Muslim
League. But the conference failed to devise an agreed formula and the Mission
announced its own proposals in the State Paper of May 16, 1946. Their plan
rejected the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan and proposed a federal union
of India, including British India and Indian princely states. It provided for the
establishment of a Constitutional Assembly to frame the future Constitution of
India, which was to be based on the principle that the ‘Centre’ would control
only three subjects, viz, foreign affairs, defence and communications. All other
subjects were to be administered by autonomous provinces and states.

It was proclaimed by the secretary of state for India that paramountcy was to
lapse after India had achieved independence and that the future relationship of
the states with the rest of India was to be decided by the parties themselves,
through consultations and negotiations. In the meantime, 200 delegates of All
India State People’s Conference, representing the people of princely states from
all over India, met to discuss the Cabinet Mission Plan on June 8–11, 1946.
During his speech in the meeting, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru insisted on
democratisation of the states in order to bring them at par with the rest of India.
He said, “Rulers alone cannot decide the fate of nearly 100 million people.” 1

The Cabinet Mission Plan was accepted by the princes, but they wanted to
make some proposals during interim period. These proposals had no relevance to
issues concerning the people of the states, but mostly concerned their own
future. The situation, however, changed when the Muslim League, after joining
the Interim Government at the Centre, refused to join the Constitutional
Assembly and continued to insist on its demand for Pakistan. It was felt all over
the country and in England that events in India were leading towards a
dangerous impasse. In order to face the situation effectively, the British
Government appointed Lord Viscount Mountbatten in place of Lord Wavell as
Governor General of India.

Lord Mountbatten, plunged himself into the negotiations with the leaders of
different political parties and announced that long before June 1948, the
Dominions of India and Pakistan would be established and that the question of
princely states would be dealt with in the light of the Cabinet Mission’s
memorandum of May 12, 1946. Accordingly, to approve the British plan, a
meeting between Mountbatten and several Indian leaders was held on June 2,
1947. It was approved on June 3. The plan stated, “While paramountcy will
lapse, according to His Majesty’s Government’s declaration of May 12 and 16,
1946, His Majesty’s Government will not enter into military or any other
agreement with the Indian (princely) states.” 2

Deteriorating communal situation in the country, coupled with haze created by

the fast changing political developments, created an impression in most princely
states that the lapse of paramountcy meant independent status for them and they
could either join the Constitution Assembly or remain independent. Seeing this
attitude of the rulers, Pandit Nehru said on June 15, 1947, in the All India
Congress Committee: “We will not recognise the independence of the states in
India and any recognition of such independence by any foreign power will be
considered as unfriendly act.” Mr. Jinnah contested this view. On June 17,1947,
he said, “Constitutionally and legally, the Indian states will be independent
sovereign states on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to
decide for themselves and adopt any course they like; it is open to them to join
the Hindustan Constitutional Assembly or decide to remain independent. In case
they opt for independence, they would enter into such agreements or
relationships with Hindustan or Pakistan as they may choose.” 3

Throughout the negotiations on the Cabinet Mission proposals, as well as the

subsequent question of partition and transfer of power, the eventual fate of
princely states and right of their people was never lost sight of by the Congress.
Assurances were extracted by Congress from the British Government that on the
lapse of paramountcy, the princes would not become sovereign rulers.
“Sovereignty must reside in the people and not in any individual. The claim of
the State People’s Conference to represent the people of the princely states is
justified and we will see to it that they are heard. And certainly their rulers
cannot speak for them,” said Nehru on June 8, 1947, before the delegates of
State People’s Conference.” The application of the principle of partition to the
4

states had been rejected by the Indian National Congress and it had consistently
supported and pleaded for letting the people of these states to determine their
affiliation. Sheikh Abdullah’s views were similar.

In March 1946, Sheikh Abdullah sent a memorandum to the British Cabinet

Mission, stating, “The fate of Kashmir nation is in the balance and in that hour
of decision we demand our basic democratic right to send our selected
representatives to the constitution making bodies that will construct the frame
work of free India. We emphatically repudiate the right of the princely order to
represent the people of Indian states or their right to nominate their personal
representatives as our spokesmen.” Whereas Congress consistently supported
5

the cause of the people of the states to determine their relations with the
dominions; the Muslim League’s attitude towards them was hostile. British
rejected the very idea of letting people of the states to determine their own
affiliation. On the other hand it vested the princes with that power after the
paramountcy was restored to them.

By and large, the demographic and geographical contiguity itself seemed to

make this choice easier and workable. Kalat and Bhawalpur, the two Muslim
majority states fell within the boundaries of Pakistan and the remaining princely
states, with predominantly Hindu majority, came within the geographical limits
of India. Nevertheless, the accession of Bhawalpur was forced on the ruler of the
state by Pakistan. This is borne out by the proceedings of West Pakistan High
Court. Similarly, the Khan of Kalat revolted against accession and was arrested
and detained in 1958 by Pakistan authorities.

Jammu and Kashmir was, however, a peculiar case in itself. It was a Muslim
majority state that bordered both the dominions, India and Pakistan.
Nevertheless, its minorities (quarter of its population), along with Kashmiri
Muslims (more than half of Muslim population of the state) under the leadership
of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, had made a common cause with the All India
States People’s Conference and had been opposed to Jinnah’s ‘two-nation
theory’. Therefore, the Congress had presumed that all of them would support
the inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian dominion. In the haste to quit
India, the British left certain issues vague and ambiguous. On the one hand, they
made it clear to the princes that they would not be admitted to the British
Commonwealth, and on the other, the Viceroy gave assurance to the princes that
Britain would consider any offer of bilateral relations. This created an
impression that perhaps, Britain was not averse to providing assistance to any
princely state that did not want to affiliate itself with any of the two dominions.
However, as events unfolded, by the time the British left, all princely states
except, Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagarh had acceded to India or
Pakistan.

Jinnah was confident that not taking the wishes of their subjects into
consideration, Muslim rulers of predominantly Hindu states, like Hyderabad and
Junagarh would opt to accede to Pakistan. He also felt that some other Hindu
rulers of predominantly Hindu states, from whom he had received positive
feelers, would thus be facilitated to accede to Pakistan without having to take
into consideration the wishes of their subjects. This became apparent when
Jinnah made the following observations, as far back as 1940: “The only
important states which matter are not in the eastern but the ones in the north-
western. They are Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Patiala, etc. If these states willingly
agree to come into the federation of the Muslim Homeland, we shall be glad to
come to a reasonable and honorable settlement with them. We, however, have no
desire to force them or coerce them in any way.” 6

As far as Jammu and Kashmir was concerned, he felt that its Muslim majority
and geographical contiguity to Pakistan will compel it to be part of Pakistan,
irrespective of what the Maharaja did or did not do. As Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd),
the former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir said during one of his speeches,
“Jinnah wanted that on the withdrawal of the British power from the sub-
continent and the lapse of paramouncy, the rulers should be allowed to decide
the future of their kingdoms. His hidden agenda was that Hyderabad, which was
the richest and largest state in India, of the size of France, and which had a
Muslim ruler with over 90 per cent Hindu subjects, would opt for Pakistan. He
even tried to get the Maharajas of Jodhpur and Jaisalmer to accede to Pakistan,
promising them the world. As for Kashmir, which had 70 per cent Muslim
population with a Hindu ruler, he was confident that both geography and
demography were favourable for Pakistan and the State would fall like a ripe
plum in his lap.”

Irrespective of the stands adopted by the Congress or the Muslim League, the
legal position was that the partition of India was confined to British India. The
decision regarding the princely states’ future was to be determined by the rulers
of these states without any reference to the religious composition of the
population of the States. The British government’s announcement of June 3,
1947, made it amply clear.

It is ironic that Pakistan insisted on self-determination for the people of

Jammu and Kashmir, when all along it had opposed the Congress’ open stand to
allow the people of the princely states to determine their affiliation, rather than
allow their rulers to do so. Pakistan took this stand knowingly and with a
purpose. According to its calculation, considering the existing situation in
Junagarh and Hyderabad, both their Muslim rulers were expected to accede to
Pakistan. And as far as Jammu and Kashmir was concerned, it supported the
Maharaja, who they felt was not keen to join India, but wanted to remain
independent. Accordingly, Pakistan conveyed these sentiments to the Maharaja.
As a result of this stand adopted by the Muslim League, its proxy in the State,
the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, openly declared its support for
an independent Jammu and Kashmir. It is a different matter that Pakistan had to
soon change its stand after the Maharaja signed a ‘Standstill Agreement’ (see
page 198-205) with it. Pakistan now openly asked for the State’s accession to it.

With the passing of Indian Independence Act 1947, all the states were
released from their obligations to the Crown. They became free to align their
future with either of two Dominions. Negotiations held on Cabinet Mission
proposal of 1946, and the transfer of power and Independence Act 1947, made it
evident that if Indian states became separate independent entities, it would create
a serious problem between the Central Government and the States; this would
adversely affect not only political but also economic and other relations between
the two. Taking into consideration these problems, Heartley Showcross, the
Under Secretary of States for India, in a speech, emphatically maintained that the
British Government would not recognise any state as a separate international
entity, and British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, speaking on India
Independence Bill, hoped that no irrevocable decision to stay out prematurely
will be taken.

Accordingly, State Department of Government of India was set up on June 27,

1947, to deal with matters concerning states. It was divided into two sections;
the Indian section was headed by a Congress leader, Sardar Patel, and the
Pakistani section by a Muslim League leader, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. Sardar
Patel issued an agenda for the conference of rulers of princely states to be held
on July 25, 1947. It included, firstly; accession of the states on defence, external
affairs and communications, and secondly; Standstill Agreement. The two
sections of the state department were also tasked with laying down the
provisions/procedures for the accession of princely states to the two dominions,
as the Indian Independence Act had not done so, specifically. It was
enthusiastically welcomed by states. The same was repeated by Lord
Mountbatten in his capacity as Crown Representative, when the special session
of Chamber of Princes was held on July 25, 1947. He assured the princes that
7

their accession on these three subjects would involve no financial liability and
that in other matters; there would be no encroachment on their sovereignty.
Finally, he appealed to them to join any one of the two dominions before August
15, 1947.
 In order to expedite the work, the Negotiating Committee of Chamber of
Princes prepared the draft of Instrument of Accession and Standstill Agreement
which were approved by the General Conference of the Chamber of Princes on
August 1, 1947. The Standstill Agreement, vide Independence Act, Section 7,
Sub-section 1(c), envisaged that till new agreements were made, all existing
agreements and administrative arrangements would continue. This would ensure
the temporary continuation of existing provisions concerning posts and
telegraphs, transit, communications and customs, to ensure that existing
administrative arrangements did not suffer as a result of the changes forced on
these matters by the partition of India. The provision also envisaged that any
dispute concerning this issue would be settled by arbitration and as stated
“nothing in this agreement includes the exercise of any paramountcy functions.”
It was felt during the conference that some rulers were inclined to execute the
Standstill Agreement but were inclined to wait before executing the Instrument
of Accession. It was, however, made clear to such rulers that the Government of
India had decided to execute Standstill Agreement with only those who had
already signed the Instrument of Accession. Therefore, the only agreements
which constituted the basis of relationship between the Indian states and the
successor government in British India were the Instrument of Accession and the
Standstill Agreement. Thus, before August 15, 1947, all the states except
Hyderabad, Junagarh and Kashmir had acceded, either to India or to Pakistan.

Hyderabad, the largest (but landlocked), richest and the most powerful of the
Indian states, had a Muslim ruler, the Nizam, reputed to be the richest man in the
world (rumoured at that time to be negotiating with the Portugese to buy Goa in
order to have an access to sea). Nizam presided over a state whose Muslim
population, which favoured accession with Pakistan, was less than 10 per cent of
the entire state; while the majority, who were Hindus, favored accession with
Indian Union. The Nizam’s backbone was the Muslim elite of the state that was
prosperous, rich and relatively sophisticated. A powerful minority under the
leadership of Kasim Rizvi wanted an independent Muslim state of Hyderabad,
and was aggressively hostile to Indian Union. His armed Muslim Razakars,
numbering nearly a lakh, and youth brigade armed with an assortment of
weapons, posed a serious threat to the people living within the territory of Indian
Union. The Government of Hyderabad failed to check the frequent raids of these
Razakars and the militant communists of Telangana into the territorial
boundaries of India. Nizam’s indecisiveness in such a crisis situation made
matters worse.
 The Nizam did not follow the advice given to him by Mountbatten to accede
to India before August 15, 1947. On the other hand, he procrastinated by
appointing a brilliant negotiator, Sir Walter Moncton to extract as many
concessions for his state from India as possible, before deciding to accede to it.
In the process, he allowed the matters to drift. This let the initiative shift into the
hands of Kasim Rizvi and his band of armed Razakars. “Rizvi was the type of
thug who flourishes in conditions of uncertainty; his followers were
undisciplined, highly communal and took advantage of any opportunity to
oppress and threaten the majority Hindu population.” With every passing day
8

the press carried a steady stream of reports that pointed to the increasingly
violent activities of these Razakars. All these reports increased the pressure on
the Indian government to bring an end to Hyderabad’s pretentions. Pakistan’s
attitude was not helpful either. For purely communal reasons, as also because of
the pressure exerted by a large number of Hyderabadi refugees occupying high
places in Pakistan, it grossly misrepresented facts to its own people and even
exaggerated the chances of Hyderabad offering stiff resistance to India.

In the meantime, on November 1, 1947, Mountbatten flew to Lahore to meet

Jinnah to resolve the conflict in Kashmir which had begun by then. He presented
the formula “which stated that the Governments of India and Pakistan agree that
where the ruler of the state does not belong to the community to which the
majority of his subjects belong and where the state has not acceded to that
dominion whose majority community is the same as the state’s, the question
whether the state should finally accede to one or the other of dominions should,
in all cases, be decided by an impartial reference to the will of the people.”
Jinnah replied that “a plebiscite was redundant and undesirable. He also refused
to include Hyderabad in the reckoning.” Pakistan knew very well that if Indian
invasion came, it was in no position to intervene militarily (a leading Karachi
daily Dawn had warned the Pakistani authorities of the true value of its ‘Trojan
Horse’ inside Indian Territory.) Sardar Patel, who was holding fort in Delhi in
the absence of Nehru, who was on a trip abroad, did not pay heed to the advice
rendered by his Army Chief, Sir Roy Buchher, who had warned Sardar that
opening another front in Hyderabad when the Indian troops were embroiled in
Kashmir, was fraught with danger.

The strength of the Hyderabad State’s army was reported to be 30,000 strong,
supported by some tanks and artillery and led by an able Turkish General, Al
Androos. In the mean time, reports were pouring in that some British
mercenaries, involved in gun-running, were bringing in weapons from Pakistan
into Hyderabad. Sardar Patel felt that India could not let this state of uncertainty
to continue any longer. Having been assured by General Carriappa that he would
defend the Kashmir front under all circumstances, the Sardar ordered the army
into Hyderabad. Within a week the resistance was overcome by General
Chaudhary’s troops, who subdued the Razakars. True to their reputation, the
Razakars disintegrated. The Nizam consented to accede to the Indian Union.
Ironically, the Hyderabad action also brought a great relief to Pakistan
government, as it could now devote time to its own affairs.

In Junagarh, 85 per cent of its total population of 700,000 was Hindu, though
its ruler was a Muslim. Around 279 Kathiawar states encircled it geographically.
The ruler had declared that it would go along with the decision of these
encircling states, as far as the matter of accession was concerned. Besides these,
there were some autonomous states within Junagarh which had announced their
accession to India and as a result, had asked India for protection. There were two
other relevant factors that could not be lost sight of. First, at no point was the
state contiguous with Pakistan, and secondly, its railways, posts and telegraph
were deeply integrated with the Indian communication network systems. To pre-
empt any decision that the Nawab of Junagarh might take on accession to India,
a successful coup de tat was carried out by a group of pro-Pakistan Sindhi
Muslims on August 10, 1947, under the leadership of Bhutto (father of Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, late prime minister of Pakistan). The Nawab became a virtual
prisoner in his palace. On September 15, 1947, he eventually acceded to
Pakistan.

Nevertheless, it would have been a geographical monstrosity if the accession

to Pakistan had come about. To end this farce, the volunteers of the local Arzee
Hukumat (temporary government) rushed into the state and chased away the
Nawab. Even though India had stationed troops outside Junagarh, it did not, at
any stage, feel the necessity of intervening militarily, as the popular uprising
against the Nawab forced him to flee to Pakistan by the end of October. Later,
the Prime Minister of Junagarh wrote to Jinnah explaining the difficulties of
Junagarh. He also requested the Government of India to take over the
administration, which was done on November 9, 1947. Subsequently, a
plebiscite was held on February 24, 1948. An overwhelming majority voted for
accession to India. In January 1949, Junagarh was finally merged with
Saurashtra, which was a union of princely states of Kathiawar.

Consequent to the application of Government of India Independence Act,

Maharaja Hari Singh, was now solely responsible to decide the future of the
state. Before the announcement of Radcliffe Award, Mountbatten visited
Srinagar on June 19, 1947, and spent four days there. During his parleys with the
Maharaja, Mountbatten conveyed to him and his Prime Minister, RC Kak that,
“the newly created State Department of India was prepared to give an assurance
that if Kashmir went to Pakistan, this would not be regarded as an unfriendly act
by the Government of India.” Similar sentiment was recorded by Philip Zeigler
9

when he quoted Mountbatten to have told the Maharaja that, “Sardar Patel had
assured him that if the choice of the people of the state were to be for Pakistan,
Indian Government would not object to it. However, Jinnah, with an eye on
Hyderabad, was firm that in princely states, the decision about the future was the
exclusive right of the Ruler and people had no role in the matter.” Jinnah was10

too ambitious; he felt he could have Kashmir because it had a Muslim majority
and Hyderabad because it had a Muslim ruler. According to M Asghar Khan
(former Chief of Pakistan Air Force during 1965 war with India) who was
quoted by English daily Dawn to have said “It is on record that Vallabhbhai
Patel, the powerful minister in Jawahar Lal Nehru’s government, had offered to
Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan in 1947, that Pakistan should keep Kashmir and let
India have Hyderabad. This offer was refused. Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan and
presumably, the Quaid-e-Azam, felt that they could have both, Kashmir, because
it had a Muslim majority, and Hyderabad because it had a Muslim ruler.” 11

The Maharaja did not heed Mountbatten’s advice, nor did he accede to India
before August 14, 1947. Had he done so, it would have legally and factually
brought to an end the whole matter of accession. While speaking before the East
India Association in London, after his return there, Mountbatten, in order to
clear his position on the issue, explains it thus, “In case of Kashmir I went up
personally and saw the Maharaja. I spent four days with him… I persisted with
the same advice: ‘Ascertain the will of your people by any means and join
whichever dominion your people wish to join by August 14, this year.’ He did
not do that… Had he acceded to Pakistan before August 14, the future
Government of India had allowed me to give His Highness an assurance that no
objection, whatever, would be raised by them. Had His Highness acceded to
India by August 14, 1947, Pakistan did not exist, and therefore, could not have
interfered. The only trouble that could have been raised was by non-accession to
either side, and this was unfortunately the very course followed by the
Maharaja.” 12

Maharaja’s position was none too happy either, as he faced a great dilemma.
On the one hand, the option of joining Pakistan foreclosed itself; firstly, because
a Hindu ruler could not be safe in a theocratic Muslim state; and more
importantly, such a decision would have gone against the wishes of his people.
These wishes were clearly represented by the NC led by Sheikh Abdullah, who
by then, had emerged as the undisputed leader of Kashmir. On the other hand,
accession to India would result in his not only losing his throne, but would also
bring his bête noire, Sheikh Abdullah, to power. Nehru had, in the meanwhile,
divested Sardar Patel of the Kashmir portfolio and had shifted it to External
Affairs Ministry, which he himself headed. The Maharaja now had to deal with
Nehru, whom he considered the alter ego of his nemesis, Sheikh Abdullah.
Besides, Nehru was not too well-disposed towards the Maharaja, in fact any
Maharaja for that matter. As Walter Crocker, Australia’s High Commissioner in
India in early sixties, writes in his book, Nehru: A Contemporary’s Estimate. It
reveals that among other things, Maharajas also fell in the category of Nehru’s
‘blind hates’. Crocker mentions that among Nehru’s prejudices were,
“Maharajas, Portugal, money lenders, certain American ways, Hinduism and the
whites in Africa…” The Maharaja, therefore prevaricated.
13

To make matters worse, the British played their own games. Some British
officials sincerely believed that Hari Singh would opt for an arrangement in
which he was not required to accede to any of the dominions, if he was
guaranteed peace on his frontiers. Therefore, with the support and active
cooperation of his Prime Minister, R.C. Kak, and his Raj Guru, Sant Dev, who
exercised great influence on him, he toyed with the idea of independence. Some
historians claim that his Prime Minister had actually assured the British that Hari
Singh would pursue a policy which would enable him to retain his independence
rather than join India. For the Maharaja to have allowed his coterie, the
geography and demography of the state, and the British encouragement to
convince him that he would be allowed to live in splendid isolation to enjoy the
paradise on earth as its independent ruler, was to overlook the lessons of history.
And, more importantly, he overlooked the geo-political compulsions of the
major powers of the post-colonial and post-war era, that had already divided the
world into two irreconcilable blocks in the newly begun cold war. Be it as it
may, his ambivalence had disastrous consequences for the state in particular, and
for the whole sub-continent in general.

To tide over the immediate crisis, the Maharaja offered a ‘Standstill

Agreement’ to both India and Pakistan on August 12, 1947. This would allow
the routine administrative facilities and normal amenities of life, such as post
office, communications, etc., to run smoothly, till he took a final decision.
Pakistan immediately accepted the agreement on August 15, through a
telegraphic communication. But the Government of India asked the Prime
Minister of the state to fly to Delhi to negotiate the agreement; or to send any
other authorised minister for the purpose. The non-acceptance of the Standstill
Agreement by India immediately, aroused suspicion in the minds of Pakistan and
it complained that India’s failure to conclude the agreement was indicative of
some plan to affect the accession immediately. However, its contention that
India wanted accession and therefore, did not sign Standstill Agreement was
totally untenable. Had that been its intention, it would have concluded the
Standstill Agreement without wasting any time as a prelude to accession proper.
Pakistan thought that by accepting agreement, it was in a better position to
persuade the state to accede to it. In the process, it totally forgot that it was
purely provisional in nature aimed at facilitating the continuance of the existing
administrative functions of routine nature, pending final accession. Pakistan
signed the Agreement, hoping to upstage India, but felt dissatisfied when it
learnt that it guaranteed only the continuation of existing administrative
arrangements, without prejudice to the signing of the ‘Instrument of Accession’.
Sheikh Abdullah attributed India’s non-acceptance of Standstill Agreement
offered by the Maharaja, to the belief that “it could not consider any agreement
entered into by the Government of the State valid until it had the approval of the
people’s representatives.” 14

While decisions taken (or not taken) by the Maharaja or for that matter by
India and Pakistan, were creating a situation of uncertainty, the British were
working to a plan. Secret documents declassified recently clearly establish the
British plan to divide the country before they left, with the specific aim to retain
a foothold in the north-west of the country. This open secret so exasperated
Krishna Menon that he mentioned it to Mountbatten, “Is this frontier (North
West of India abutting Afghanistan and Iran) still the hinterland of imperial
strategy? Does Britain still think in terms of being able to use this territory and
all that follows from it?” As a consequence, Britain was in a hurry to implement
15

its plans before it was too late, as “Jinnah was in the terminal stage of
tuberculosis: a closely guarded secret. The British Intelligence knew about it and
this fact influenced the pre-poning (sic) of the grant of independence from 1948
to 1947.” Therefore, with Mountbatten in a hurry to leave, August 14, 1947,
16

saw the birth of a new Muslim State, Pakistan, in the Indian sub-continent. This
was followed by India getting independence the next day, i.e. August 15, 1947.
 No one seemed to have any time for the Maharaja due to the cataclysmic
events that accompanied the partition of the country, which left more than half a
million people dead in the communal holocaust that accompanied it. Or, to put it
differently, the Maharaja took advantage of the pre-occupation of the two
governments with the communal holocaust and history’s greatest mass exodus
that the maelstrom had created. He did not want to exercise his option
immediately, as he found himself on the horns of dilemma, created as much by
the number of existing contradictions, as also by his own ambivalence and lack
of clarity.

Pakistan has, on many occasions, accused India of having planned the forceful
acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir, irrespective of which way the Maharaja
would tilt. In support of this thesis, it points out that Radcliff had awarded the
district of Gurdaspur, which had a slight Muslim majority, to India. This,
according to Pakistan, was done to provide an alternate link between Jammu and
India in place of the only other communication link to the state which, after
partition, would be through Pakistan. It further accuses India of starting work on
the construction of the road between Pathankot (in Gurdaspur district) and
Jammu, and establishing a boat bridge over a major obstacle like River Ravi,
immediately after Gandhi returned from his trip to Kashmir in July 1947.
(Incidentally, this top secret project had remained under wraps till news about it
first appeared in a newspaper published by Kashmiri Pandit Sabha!)

It is preposterous to suggest that Radcliff buckled under Indian pressure to

award Gurdaspur to India. The above-mentioned link could not have been
established without the express consent of the Maharaja. If he was keen on
accession with India at that stage, he was free and had all the powers under the
Independence Act to do so. As mentioned earlier, for their own geo-strategic
reasons, partition of the country was a necessary pre-requisite for the British
before they left India. Therefore, they had carried out a detailed assessment of
the geographical division of the country. As early as January 29, 1946, Lord
Wavell was reminded by his Secretary of State in London, about his blue print
for partition through a telegram, which stated, “It would help me to know when I
may expect to receive your recommendation as regards definition of genuinely
Muslim areas, if we are compelled to give a decision to this (partition).” Lord 17

Wavell’s partition plan forwarded to London on February 6/7, 1946, has this to
say about Gurdaspur District, “…In the Punjab, the only Muslim majority
district that would not go into Pakistan under demarcation is Gurdaspur.
Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being
the sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan…” 18

From perusal of other records and happenings, some of which have been
recorded here, it is clear that India had actually resigned itself to Kashmir
eventually becoming part of Pakistan. In 1940, Muslim League propounded the
name for an independent and a separate country as ‘Pak-i-stan’ (Pak-meaning
‘pure’; i-meaning ‘of’; and stan-meaning land – Land of the Pure). As an
explanation for what the new name stood for, it proclaimed that each alphabet in
the name ‘Pakistan’ stood for something distinct; ‘P’ for Punjab, ‘A’ for Afghan,
the inhabitants of North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa),
‘K’ for Kashmir, ‘S’ for Sindh, and ‘Tan’(corruption of Hindi word sthan,
meaning place) the last three letters of Baluchistan. The Indian National
Congress did not protest despite an open political interpretation of the alphabet
‘K’ in the name of Pakistan.

The dispatch with which India airlifted its troops into Kashmir has also been
attributed to India’s prior planning for military intervention in the state. This
accusation was forcefully refuted by all the three Chiefs of Indian Army, Navy
and Air Force, namely General R.M. Lockhart, Air Marshal T.W. Elmhirst and
Rear Admiral J.T.S. Hall respectively (all three of whom were British officers).
In a joint statement issued by the three highest ranking officers of the three
services, they gave a day to day account of the activities of their forces that
clearly nailed this lie (full text available in Asiatic Review, Vol. 45, January
1949, p. 469, under the topic ‘Kashmir’ written by General Sir Frank Messervy).
Besides, saving Kashmir and the state was a touch and go affair, as the troops
from 1 SIKH established contact with the raiders when they were barely four
and a half miles from the airfield, which they were in the process of encircling at
that time. If India had done any prior planning, it would not have come so close
to losing Kashmir, as the capture of the airfield by the raiders would have sealed
the fate of the state, perhaps for good.

The fact is that this accusation is an afterthought, because Pakistan’s grand

plan to capture Kashmir failed miserably.

For India as well as Pakistan, Kashmir did not only represent dispute over
territory, but much more. To Indian National Congress, it represented the core of
national unity based on common history of cultures and customs of its diverse
people, dating back to centuries. As Vincent Smith said, “India beyond all doubt
possesses a deep underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that
produced either by geographical isolation or by political suzerainty. That unity
transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress,
manners and sect.” Nehru did not overlook the differences between Hindus and
19

Muslims. However, he attributed these to dispute over sharing the spoils of

power, created by the British, in keeping with their principle of divide et
imperia.

On the other hand, Jinnah had no time for such philosophy. He believed that
Hinduism and Islam were not just two distinct religions but two distinct social
orders, which could not be welded into one nation. He went as far as to suggest
that they belonged to two different civilisations, based on conflicting ideas. To
him the Hindu-Muslim unity was a mirage as the differences between the two
had created bitter sentiments resulting in unbridgeable gulf between the two. To
him “The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies,
social customs and literatures. They neither inter-marry nor inter-dine and,
indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on
conflicting ideas and conceptions.” Nehru believed in ‘unity in diversity’, and
20

Jinnah disbelieved political unity due to conflicting ideas.

There appeared no meeting ground between the two, who held in their hands
the fate of the two nations. The difference between the two is summed up by no
less than one of sub-continent’s greatest poets, Allama Iqbal, who said to Nehru
in 1938, a few months before his (Iqbal’s) death, “What is there in common
between Jinnah and you? He is a politician, you are a patriot.” Nehru also gave
21

vent to his frustration with Jinnah on another occasion, when he gave a dinner in
honour of the United Nations Commission in July 1948. Joseph Korbel quotes
Nehru as having told him, “Jinnah abandoned us (the National Congress) thirty
years ago and founded the League — not to defend Islam, as he asserts, but to
defend privileged materialistic rights. It has nothing to do with religion; he
himself is not a religious man.” 22

As the Maharaja mulled over his future, time did not stand still. Horrifying
events accompanying the partition brought about a definite shift in Maharaja’s
thinking. He became concerned with the safety of the minorities in a
predominantly Muslim state. He was now keen to accede to India, but Nehru
would have none of it. Right from September 1947, onwards, Maharaja made all
efforts to see that India accepted the accession of his state, but Nehru wanted to
put the cart before the horse; in that, he wanted the Maharaja to handover power
to Sheikh Abdullah, who would then hold an election and only after that, India
would accept the accession. The Maharaja, by wanting to implement the reverse
of it, was actually in tune with the provisions of the Indian Independence Act.
Nehru procrastinated and in the process wasted precious time, till it was too late.
The Pakistan sponsored and Jinnah approved tribal invasion was well on its way
and Nehru and future generations will be left to rue his indecision, because as
time would tell, they would have to pay a heavy price in the years to come.

As a grand strategy to prepare the ground for an invasion of the state, Pakistan
clearly violated the procedure laid down by the Indian Independence Act for the
transfer of power in India. Having been emboldened by the success of its ‘Direct
Action’ launched in 1946, to force the issue of partition, it now indulged in
vicious propaganda to raise the religious passions of Muslims of the state by
indulging in communal rhetoric of the worst kind. Success of ‘Direct Action’
had also made Jinnah over-confident about getting what he desired. Ignoring the
Kashmiri leadership completely, neither he nor Liaqat Ali Khan, or for that
matter, anyone in authority in Pakistan, made any effort to contact either Sheikh
Abdullah or the Maharaja. On the other hand, when Kashmir seemed to be
slipping away from their grasp, they unleashed the tribal raiders to get it by
force. As M Asghar Khan writes in Dawn “…that Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah,
the Chief Minister of Kashmir, asked to see the Quaid-e-Azam in 1947, but was
not given an interview. It is also known that the Maharaja of Kashmir was
indecisive about acceding to India or to Pakistan. Without making any efforts to
make contact with him, Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, the Chief Minister of NWFP,
was allowed to unleash a tribal invasion of the State. With the approval of the
Pakistan government, regular Pakistan Army officers and men were allowed to
join the government sponsored tribal attack on the Valley.” 23

Pakistan Decides to Grab Kashmir by Force

In September 47, an over-confident Pakistan, eager to get Kashmir at the
earliest, approved of a secret plan to disperse the State Forces of Jammu and
Kashmir by manipulating skirmishes at several points along the border and then
launch a full scale offensive. As a prelude to the invasion, Pakistan fomented
trouble in the Muslim majority districts of Jammu region which resulted in large-
scale killing and uprooting of Hindus and Sikhs. Some estimates put the death
toll at 30,000, with another 100, 000 migrating to Srinagar and Jammu (still
awaiting rehabilitation).

On September 4, 1947, the British Chief of Staff of Jammu and Kashmir State
Forces submitted a report to the State Government, stating that on September 2
and 3, 1947, armed Muslim residents, mainly of Rawalpandi district in Pakistan,
had infiltrated into the state. On receipt of this report the Prime Minister of
Jammu and Kashmir sent a prompt telegram to the Chief Minister of West
Punjab on September 4, 1947, requesting him to take prompt action. The deputy
commissioner of Rawalpandi replied to this note on behalf of the Chief Minister,
West Punjab, denying that the raiders had moved into Kashmir. “No infiltration
has been seen by any of my officers or village officials anywhere at various
points. I do not expect any trouble of any kind.” On September 9, 1947, the
Jammu and Kashmir Government, in a further communication, this time to the
Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, repeated the charges, urging immediate
action. Many more telegrams were exchanged, but Pakistan denied knowledge of
any invasion.

Pakistan suggested negotiations between the representatives of Jammu and

Kashmir and itself. The Jammu and Kashmir Government reiterated its demand
that infiltration should stop before any discussions could begin. The Prime
Minister repeated “…shall gladly discuss matters when this trouble is
controlled.” But it did not change the attitude of Pakistan, and ultimately the
Government of Jammu and Kashmir conveyed to Pakistan that if raids were not
stopped and blockade of essential commodities not lifted immediately, it would
be left with no alternative but to seek help from others to protect the life and the
property of his subjects. This made Pakistan suspect that the State might ask for
assistance from India, as a prelude to its eventual accession to the Indian
Dominion. On October 19, 1947, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan wrote to
Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, “We are astonished to hear your threat
to ask for assistance, presumably meaning thereby assistance from an outside
power. The only object of this intervention by an outside power, secured by you,
would be to complete the process of suppressing the Muslims to enable you to
join the Indian Dominion.” Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan, reiterated the
same. It appears that the Pakistan Government at this stage was attempting to
apply pressure on the Maharaja.

While all this was happening, the Indian government failed to see through this
stratagem, at least, in its formative phase. “Indian leaders did not even get the
wind of the secret preparations in Pakistan for military intervention in the
Jammu and Kashmir State, in the name of the Jehad for the liberation of the
Muslims from their subjection to the Dogra rule. While Gandhi went on an
indefinite fast to prevent communal violence in India, which threatened the
Muslims, Pakistan prepared feverishly for the invasion of the state. He did not
know that an armed rebellion was being encouraged in the Muslim majority
districts of the Jammu province, where arms and ammunition were being
dumped by the elements of the Muslim League from across the border of the
state with the Punjab. Pakistan planned to reduce the state by military force and
then, deal with India from a position of strength, as far as the states of Junagarh
and Hyderabad were concerned.” Writing about the preparations underway in
24

Pakistan to grab Kashmir militarily, Vincent Sheean mentions in his book,

Nehru-10 Years of Power, “…By early September of that year (1947), the
Pathan tribesmen had been converging on the borders of Jammu and Kashmir
State and the western part of Jammu (Poonch area) was soon in their hands. In
mid October they began the infiltration of Kashmir proper armed with modern
equipment which could only have come from the Army.”

Pakistan’s other important consideration of launching the tribal invasion of

Kashmir was to achieve multiple objectives in one stroke. During their rule of
the Indian sub-continent lasting 200 years, the British, despite the availability of
enormous resources, a modern and efficient army and a well-oiled administrative
network, could not effectively subdue the restless and volatile tribals in its North
Western Frontier Agency (NWFP), inhabited by warlike tribes of Afridi, Wazirs,
Mehsuds, Pashtuns and Swatis. The British had used the carrot and stick
approach towards these turbulent tribes; resorting to violence on one hand and
spending millions of rupees in appeasing them on the other, without much
success. When the British left, Pakistan inherited the problem. Having carved
out Pakistan in the name of Islam and for the emancipation of Muslims of the
sub-continent, it could not use the British tactics of employing force against their
co-religionists to subdue them. Such tactics would expose them to ridicule in
front of the whole world. And they could also not afford to spend their limited
resources on them to keep them in good humour. To add to their woes, Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan had started his movement in NWFP to achieve an
autonomous Pashtunisthan. Such a movement had the potential of uniting the
Pashtuns of Pakistan and of neighbouring Afghanistan in a rebellion against the
nascent nation. This would have sounded a death knell to the idea of ‘two-nation
theory’ that provided the ideological justification to Jinnah for carving out
Pakistan.

Therefore, the tribals were to be diverted to something more attractive, if

Pakistan was to be spared the resultant ravages of their likely revolt, just when
the new Muslim nation had taken birth. They were promised plenty of land,
bountiful of goodies and much more, if they embarked upon Jehad to liberate
Kashmir, where they were told, the Hindus were perpetrating gruesome
atrocities on the Muslims. By spreading this falsehood, the tribesmen were
worked to a feverish pitch before being launched on this mission. “They were
led by seasoned soldiers who had been demobilised from the British Indian
Army. They organised the smuggling of arms. Messengers were sent to the tribal
areas of NWFP, where manufacturing of small arms and ammunition had been
practiced for years.” Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, a young Kashmiri,
25

played a significant role in arousing the communal passions of his co-religionists

for waging Jehad in Kashmir. Later, he laid the foundation for creating the
movement for ‘Liberation of Kashmir’, which subsequently grew into ‘Azad
Kashmir Government’.

Pakistan saw in the whole enterprise a win-win situation. They felt that this
way they could secure Kashmir, finish off the Pashtunistan movement and divert
the tribal rebellion away from Pakistan. It is now well-known that Jinnah had not
expected his dream of creating Pakistan to fructify so soon, nor had he visualised
the great administrative difficulties that the new nation would face in those
chaotic initial days after the partition. Besides, his own sickness did not help
matters. He rarely ventured out of Karachi except to visit Quetta, whose climate
suited his state of physical health. As a result he did not get involved with the
day to day running of the fledgeling state. No one will probably know for sure
the extent of Jinnah’s responsibility for launching the invasion of Jammu and
Kashmir. From various historical records, interviews by those who were close to
him and through various newspaper reports, it can safely be said that Jinnah was
taken into consideration, only when all planning and preparations were over and
execution had either commenced or was about to begin.

The invasion was planned and executed by Liaqat Ali Khan, the Prime
Minister of Pakistan, who also held the defence portfolio, and his close group of
confidants, namely Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary (later President of
Pakistan), Khan Abdul Qayum Khan, the Chief Minister of NWFP and Ishaq
Ahmed Khan (later President of Pakistan), who as the provincial civil servant,
was on the staff of the Chief Minister. According to Jinnah’s secretary, KH
Khursheed, who was a Kashmiri himself, “it appeared that Jinnah was informed
of the invasion plan only a few days before it was to be launched and was invited
to be at Abbottabad for triumphal drive to Srinagar.” He further mentions that
26

the “tribal invasion of Kashmir was a criminal folly which sealed the fate of
Kashmir. Pakistan’s folly in permitting the tribal invasion had promoted a
situation in which only the use of Indian troops could have prevented the sack of
Srinagar and legally, only accession by Kashmir to India could permit their
deployment.” Another version of the events is given by Sir George
27

Cunningham (recorded as an entry in his diary) ‘1947’ — it states, “Apparently

Jinnah first heard of what was going on about 15 days ago. But said, “Don’t tell
me anything about it. My conscience must be clear.” 28

Irrespective of his level of involvement or responsibility, one fact is certain;

Jinnah did not veto the move, which he could have easily done, being the
paramount leader of the country. On the other hand, he not only acquiesced with
the whole plan, but wanted to up the ante by using regular Pakistani troops right
at the early stages of the war. After Kashmir acceded to India and Indian army
moved into the state, Jinnah realised that it would be unacceptable to Pakistanis
to see the subjugation of their co-religionists in Kashmir, without any attempt
being made to help them. Therefore, as the Governor General of Pakistan, he had
to be seen to be doing something to salvage the situation. Besides, “the mainly
Muslim area of Kashmir, with Poonch as its centre, contained the headwaters of
the rivers running into the west Punjab, Pakistan’s main agricultural province,
and which was greatly dependent on irrigation for its prosperity.” 29

“Jinnah, therefore, gave orders through the defence ministry in Karachi for
regular Pakistani troops to be moved into Kashmir.” “He also asked the
30

Governor of Punjab, Mudie, to pass this order on to Douglas Gracy, the acting
Commander-in-Chief (due to temporary absence of Frank Messervy).” Gracy 31

received this order on October 26. There was heated exchange on the phone
when Gracy did not agree. Finally, realising the serious implications of the
order, he replied that he would not issue any instructions without the approval of
Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander. “…. Auchinleck arrived in Lahore on the
morning of October 27, 1947; he told Jinnah that to send Pakistani troops into
Kashmir, now that the state had acceded to India, would constitute an act of
aggression. In such circumstances, he, the Supreme Commander, would have no
option but to order automatically and immediately the withdrawal of every
British officer serving with the Pakistan Army.” Jinnah, realising that such an
32

option would paralyse the command structure of the Pakistan army, dependent as
they were on the British officers to man crucial assignments, was left with no
alternative but to cancel the order. However, to overcome this technicality, the
operation was made the responsibility of the local militia, called the Azad (Free)
Kashmir Force, commanded by regular Pakistan army officers. As General
Wilson and General Chhiber mention, “Both Masservy and Gracy were aware of
the progressive reinforcement of the Azad Kashmir Forces from the regular
Pakistan army. Neither, however, gave any instructions nor advice to General
Tariq, who dealt directly with Iskander Mirza, the Defence Secretary, and
through him, with Liaqat Ali Khan.” 33

The 1947–48 Indo-Pak war was unique in many respects. To start with, the
invasion of Kashmir in October 1947, though planned at the highest level in
Pakistan, had limited physical participation of Pakistan’s regular army; but as the
conflict wore on, it degenerated into a full-fledged war between two newly
independent states. Both armies, at that time, were commanded by the British
generals. In addition, India still continued with a British Governor General,
Mountbatten. Bulk of the officer cadre of Pakistan army was based on British
officers (700 in all) and Indian army too had a substantial number of 300 officers
on its rolls. Sir Roy Bucher was the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army and
General Douglas Gracy, his Pakistani counterpart. All the three Services in both
countries were also commanded by British officers. Therefore, India exercised
limited sovereignty in executing its war plans. The same could, perhaps, be said
about Pakistan, but in their case, Britain’s own interests coincided, to a large
extent, with theirs. The British, therefore, ensured that the war was brought to an
inconclusive end (as far as India was concerned), once their own objectives were
met to as great an extent as possible. Chandershekhar Dasgupta, a career
diplomat and author of War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947–48, mentions in
an interview with Rashmi Sehgal, “The British clearly did not want the whole of
Jammu and Kashmir to go to India. There was a widespread feeling in London
that if India was in control of areas contiguous to Pakistan, the latter would not
survive. If the Indian army was within close striking distance of Rawalpindi,
then Pakistan would face a serious problem.”

The British perfidy can be gauged from the fact that the new Commander-in-
Chief of the Indian Army, General Lockart, did not consider it important to
inform India about the crucial information that he was aware of, viz. that the
invading forces were on the way to Kashmir. This fact came to light two months
after the invasion. He did not even carry out the instructions of providing
military equipment to Maharaja’s forces to enable them to resist the invaders.
Consequently, he had to resign.

Despite having signed the Standstill Agreement with the Maharaja, Pakistan
imposed an economic blockade on the state, cutting off supplies of essential
commodities like, food-grains, salt, sugar, tea, fuels, etc. It was a clear violation
of the Standstill Agreement, meant to force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan.
However, the pressure tactics did not work.

Invasion and Accession

Having created a huge scarcity of essential commodities that people needed
on daily basis, Pakistan sent in its hordes before the crack of dawn on October
22, 1947. The invading force mostly consisted of Afridis, Mehsuds, demobilised
Pakistan army personnel, serving army personnel in plain clothes, desperadoes
and volunteers. Equipped with modern weapons, they poured into Poonch,
Mirpur, Bhimber and Kotli areas of Jammu, and Muzzafarabad, Uri and Karen
sectors of Kashmir. Later, as the war wore on, these forces were organised into
32 battalions of seasoned and well-equipped army. The overall command of the
force was placed with Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan, DSO. He later
adopted a rather romantic name, General Tariq, while leading the invasion,
34

named ‘Operation Gulmarg’. The biggest incentives offered to the tribesmen

who invaded Jammu and Kashmir, were goodies like women and money, and the
most potent of all motivational tools for a Muslim, the opportunity to be part of a
Jehad. If any more justification was required to motivate the invading force, it
was provided by the fact that in “Islam, every believer, wherever he may be, can
serve any and all Muslim princes on the same terms and according to the same
uniform law. In Islam, in consequence, the idea of frontiers has no juridical
meaning….” 35

Prithvinath Wanchoo, a young divisional engineer, was stationed at Domel, on

the fateful morning of October 22, 1947, when the invasion commenced. He was
awakened by his servant’s hysterical shouting. Describing this incident in his
book, Betrayal in India, DF Karaka, a famous author, writes “…Wanchoo runs
barefoot into the verandah and sees the village of Nalochi across Kishenganga
Bridge, in flames. The Dogra garrison, caught unawares by the suddenness of
the invasion, loses its hill top positions and trenches and falls back to organise a
new defensive position.” “No one, especially the Hindus and Sikhs, was safe
36

before their barbarous fury. The avalanche of looting, pillaging, burning and
abductions pushed irresistibly forward along Jhelum river road.” Andrew
37

Whitehead records in his book How Kashmir Crises Began — Mission in

Kashmir, “The Khan Shah Afridi, a veteran of the invading force, said he was
instructed to go to Kashmir by a Muslim holy man. ‘The Pir told us’, said Afridi,
‘we will fight and we should not be afraid. It’s a war between Muslims and
infidels, and we will get Kashmir freed.’ These ragtag Lashkars (Forces) were
led by officers like Major Anwar Khan, a demobilised emergency commissioned
officer of the Army Service Corps, who was commander of the Lashkar that was
tasked to capture Srinagar. The only remuneration that was agreed to with the
Lashkars was ‘to loot the non-Muslims.” Therefore, loot and rape occurred at
38

almost all places that fell to the invaders. However, Baramulla and Mirpur
received special treatment, as would be evident from the happenings there.

Maharaja’s army comprised of a total of eight infantry battalions — each

having about a thousand personnel and one mountain battery. These were thinly
spread out on the ground along the entire boundary with Pakistan, stretching
along Mirpur, Poonch, Nowshehra, and Rajouri in Jammu and Kohala-Domel in
Kashmir. Its broad deployment was in the following manner:-

• Army Headquarters at Srinagar was headed by Chief of Staff, Brigadier

Rajender Singh of the State Forces. He had taken over this post after
independence from his British predecessor, Major General HL Scott, CB,
DSO and MC.

• He had at his disposal a total of four brigades:-

• The Jammu brigade commanded by Brigadier NS Rawat, with its

Headquarters at Jammu.

• The Mirpur Brigade, with its Headquarters at Janghar, commanded by

Brig Chhatar Singh.

• The Poonch Brigade, under Brigadier Krishna Singh, was deployed in

the Poonch-Rawalkot sector.

• The Kashmir Brigade comprised of Bodyguard Cavalry and 7 Jammu &

Kashmir Rifles at Srinagar, with its other infantry battalions committed in
Kohala-Domel area and north of Bunji to Leh. Besides these troops, there
were some garrison police companies and animal and mechanical transport
elements. Deployed in penny packets over huge area, it presented a great
tactical nightmare for its commander.

Ironically, the whole force was dependent for arms and ammunition on the
Northern Command Headquarters at Rawalpindi, which was now in Pakistan. To
add to its woes, its only wireless link connected it to Rawalpindi and none
existed with New Delhi. Needless to say, Maharaja’s troops were totally
unprepared for the war that was thrust upon them.

The vital link between Kashmir and Pakistan, connecting Muzzafarabad city
with district Hazara and Abbotabad, was used by the invaders from NWFP.

The strategically important bridge at Muzaffarabad on Kishenganga River was

defended by 4 Battalion of the Jammu and Kashmir Infantry, commanded by
th

Lieutenant Colonel Narain Singh. Plans had been drawn to blow up this bridge,
as and when the situation so demanded. The class composition of this battalion
was; two companies each of Dogra Rajputs and Mirpuri Muslims. The Maharaja
had not been too comfortable with idea of defending this most crucial link of his
state, with the battalion having 50 per cent of its troops comprising Muslims
from Mirpur. However, having been assured of their loyalty by the commanding
officer, himself, the Maharaja did not consider it advisable to make any changes.
Colonel Narain Singh’s assessment of these troops was based on World War II
where these troops had fought an enemy in a totally different environment in
Alexenderia. As it disastrously turned out, his assessment was terribly
inaccurate. On getting the signal from across the bridge, the Muslim troops
mutinied. The commanding officer was the first to be shot dead in his tent, thus
providing the raiders a free run, thereafter. The town was captured on October
23, 1947. Mahaura fell immediately thereafter. Here, the raiders destroyed the
power house, plunging the valley into darkness.

On October 24, 1947, it was the turn of Baramulla, further to the south-east,
the first and the only big town on the road to Srinagar, 56 kms away. Its entire
population of 14,000 comprised entirely of ethnic Kashmiris, predominantly
Muslim. “Dirty, blood-stained, ill-kempt with ragged beards and hair; some
carrying a blanket, most completely unequipped,” wrote Father George Shanks,
a missionary priest in Baramullah, describing the ill-disciplined tribal army as it
entered the town. They were armed “with rifles of Frontier make, double-
barrelled shotguns, revolvers, daggers, swords, axes and here and there a sten
gun. Jostling one another, shouting, cursing and brawling, they came on in a
never-ending stream.” The tribesmen ransacked the mission, looted Muslim
homes and businesses, and abducted Sikh girls and women. The quest for booty
delayed their advance towards the Kashmiri capital.” The raiders indulged in
39

loot and massacre not heard of in many decades. They created such mayhem that
only 3,000 people were left in the town. Baramulla provided a gold mine of
goodies to the invaders, bulk of whom, as mentioned earlier, had been roped into
the enterprise on such a promise. The operation was halted to let the desperadoes
indulge in loot and rape to their heart’s content. Many returned to their homes
carrying tons of booty loaded on horses, donkeys and whatever means of
transport they could lay their hands on.

The aim of the invaders had been to time their campaign in a manner that
would enable them to celebrate Eid festival at Srinagar. Margaret Parton of the
New York Herald Tribune, who was on the scene wrote to her mother at that
time, “the buses which were to sweep them into Srinagar on Eid day were
commandeered instead, by the looting groups and loaded with stolen goods of
the poor Kashmiris, and sent off in the opposite direction.” According to Robert
Trumbull of the New York Times these numbered “280 truckload of loot and
captive women.” This story is corroborated by M Asghar Khan, who wrote in
Pakistani daily, Dawn, “When the tribesmen reached the valley, they began loot
and plunder and after filling their vehicles began to return to the tribal area of
North West Frontier leaving the small number of regular Pakistani army officers
and men and few tribesmen to mount an attack on Srinagar. Since this attack was
delayed for a week, and because of return of large number of tribesmen to their
homes, the Indian army got the opportunity to rush troops to Srinagar.” In doing
so, the invaders wasted precious time, which not only saved Srinagar from
similar fate but also ensured that they could not annex Jammu and Kashmir, the
very aim of the operation. In the absence of any forces available at that time to
defend Srinagar, the raiders could have had a free run to the town. They could
have captured the airfield and with that the only hope of rushing a sizeable
number of troops to Srinagar at short notice would have ended. As subsequent
events would show, the availability of Srinagar airfield for safe landing of Indian
troops on October 27, 1947, proved decisive to the outcome of the 1947–48
Indo-Pak war.

Same story of loot, rape, abduction, torture and much worse was repeated on
other fronts too. One of the saddest was the sacking of Mirpur by the invading
Pathans who torched it on November 26, 1947. “They killed several hundred
soldiers and civilians and captured hundreds of women who were taken as war
booty. Many of them were sold for 150 after being paraded naked through the
streets of Jhelum by the exultant Pathan tribesmen.” The story of this shameful
40

episode is narrated by one of the survivors, Inder Singh Bali, son of Sardar Tehil
Singh, State Jagirdar of Mirpur proper:

“…Out of our party, about 300 girls were forcibly taken away and when we
reached Thatala camp, we heard from the Hindus that had already reached there,
that their 500 girls had also been taken away. At Thatala we found that not less
than 2,000 Pathans, all with 303 rifles were present.” Such utter disregard for
41

human life and dignity attracted the attention of the Indian leaders at the highest
level. Pandit Nehru took up this matter with Pakistan authorities on almost daily
basis. Shortly after the fall of Mirpur, he sent the following telegram to Pakistani
authorities:

“For Prime Minister Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India”.

“…I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have been
brought to Gujrat from the Bhimber area and they are being sold like cattle at
150 each. I am asking an officer on the staff of the Deputy High Commissioner
at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to Gujrat district and I hope you
will ask Punjab Government to give him all the facilities.” 42

The very next day, on December 2, 1947, Nehru sent another telegram:-

“For Liaqat Ali Khan from Jawahar Lal Nehru.”

“I have received information that Mirpur town has been completely destroyed
and out of 13,000 (half of 26,000)non-Muslims, only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have
reached within 15 miles of Jhelum. Fate of these refugees, as well as of about
3,000 (half of 6,000) from the rest of Mirpur, is not known. But there are reports
that a large number of abducted Hindu women have been brought to Jhelum
district by Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslim refugee
pockets, are firing indiscriminately…” 43

This was followed by another telegram the very next day-December 3, 1947:

“I have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and

others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir state and to the abduction of
large numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West
Punjab…” 44

Such depredations caused by the invaders are corroborated from several other
sources. Given below is an extract from the report sent by a civil Intelligence
Officer of the Government of India in Pakistan:

“In Jhelum, no Hindu except our staff is left. The district liaison officer, who
has to depend either on the information received from high district officials or
from some of his Muslim friends, reports that in Jhelum, girls abducted from
Mirpur side are sold in Jhelum city at 20 each. The local police refuse to
interfere on the ground that the girls were not removed from the Punjab, and also
they express their helplessness, because of the attitude of the armed Pathans
possessing these girls.” 45

While these depredations were going on, the operational situation on the
Baramulla-Srinagar axis was turning grave for the Maharaja. On October 25,
1947, when the invaders were nearing Srinagar, Mehar Chand Mahajan, the
Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, flew to Delhi. He tried to persuade
a reluctant Nehru to send the army to save the valley from further loot, arson and
rape, as meted out to the residents of Baramulla. A graphic account of this
meeting is recounted by Sisir Gupta, while quoting Mehar Chand Mahajan, thus,
“I met the Prime Minister of India and the Deputy Prime Minister and apprised
them of the serious and dangerous situation in the State. I solicited army help
and said that the army must be flown in at once; otherwise the whole town of
Srinagar and all we hold valuable would be completely destroyed. I was asked
how an army could be sent at a moment’s notice. I was assured that even if
Srinagar fell into Pakistani hands, it would be retaken. I was not impressed and
took up a firm attitude and said, ‘Give Army, take accession and give whatever
power you want to the popular party. But army must fly to Srinagar this evening;
otherwise I will go and negotiate terms with Jinnah, as the city must be saved.’
On this, the Prime Minister (Nehru) flew into a rage and gave an exhibition of
his temper and told me to get out. Just as I was getting up, an incident happened
that saved me and saved Kashmir from falling into Pakistan’s hands. Sheikh
Abdullah, who was staying in the Prime Minister’s house, was overhearing the
talks. The Prime Minister (Mehar Chand Mahajan) read it and said, ‘what I was
saying was also the view of Sheikh Sahib’ and his attitude completely changed. I
have always felt grateful to Sheikh Abdullah for his help at most crucial time. It
was thus that Kashmir was saved from falling into the hands of Pakistan.” 46

However, Nehru continued to dither. Even after the Instrument of Accession

was signed and the army waited for Nehru’s orders to move into the valley
without wasting any more time, he appeared indecisive. Rather than issuing a
clear cut directive to the army to move its forces into Kashmir at the earliest, he
was heard referring to some perceived reaction of the various countries. This has
been graphically recounted by the late Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw, who
was posted in the Military Operations Directorate at Army Headquarters, at that
crucial period in history and had a ringside view of the events. Given below is
his account of those momentous events of which he was not only a witness, but a
participant too.

He says: “At about 2.30 in the afternoon, General Sir Roy Bucher walked into
my room and said, ‘Eh, you, go and pick up your toothbrush. You are going to
Srinagar with VP Menon. The flight will take off at about 4 o’clock.’ I said,
‘Why me, Sir? “Because, we are worried about the military situation. VP Menon
is going there to get the accession from the Maharaja and Mahajan.” I flew in
with VP Menon in a Dakota…”

“…Since I was in the Directorate of Military Operations, and was responsible

for current operations all over India, West Frontier, the Punjab, and elsewhere, I
knew what the situation in Kashmir was. I knew that the tribesmen had come
in…”

“…Fortunately for us, and for Kashmir, they were busy raiding, raping all
along. In Baramulla they killed Colonel D.O.T. Dykes. Dykes and I were of the
same seniority. We did our first year’s attachment with the Royal Scots in
Lahore, way back in 1934–5. Tom went to the Sikh regiment. I went to the
Frontier Force regiment. We’d lost contact with each other. He’d become a
lieutenant colonel. I’d become a full colonel… Tom and his wife were
holidaying in Baramulla when the tribesmen killed them.”

“The Maharaja’s forces were 50 per cent Muslim and 50 per cent Dogra. The
Muslim elements had revolted and joined the Pakistani forces. This was the
broad military situation. The tribesmen were believed to be about seven to nine
kilometers from Srinagar. I was sent in to get the precise military situation. The
army knew that if we had to send soldiers, we would have to fly them in… But
we couldn’t fly them in until the state of Kashmir had acceded to India.”

“…Anyway, we were flown in. We went to Srinagar. We went to the palace. I

have never seen such disorganisation in my life… The Maharaja was coming out
of one room, and going into another saying, “Alright, if India doesn’t help, I will
go and join my troops and fight (it) out …Eventually, I also got the military
situation from everybody and discovered that the tribesmen were about seven or
nine kilometres from what was then that horrible little airfield.”

“VP Menon was, in the meantime, discussing with Mahajan and the Maharaja.
Eventually, the Maharaja signed the accession papers and we flew back in the
Dakota late at night. There were no night facilities, and the people who were
helping us to fly back, to light the airfield, were Sheikh Abdullah, Kasimsahib,
Sadiqsahib, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, and DP Dhar with pine torches, and we
flew back to Delhi. I can’t remember the exact time. It must have been 3 o’clock
or 4 o’clock in the morning.”

“(On arriving at Delhi) the first thing I did was to go and report to Sir Roy
Bucher. He said, ‘Eh, you, go and shave and clean up. There is a cabinet meeting
at 9 o’clock. I will pick you up and take you there.’ …Roy Bucher picked me up
and we went to the cabinet meeting. The cabinet meeting was presided over by
Mountbatten. There was Jawaharlal Nehru, there was Sardar Patel, and there was
Sardar Baldev Singh. There were other ministers whom I did not know. Sardar
Baldev Singh I knew because he was the Minister for Defence, and I knew
Sardar Patel, because Patel would insist that VP Menon take me with him to the
various states.”

“At the morning meeting, he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten
turned around and said, ‘Come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of
Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the military situation,
and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost
Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to
the airport and Srinagar, we couldn’t fly troops in…”

“As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God
almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do
you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of course,
I want Kashmir (emphasis in original). Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your
orders.’ And before he could say anything, Sardar Patel turned to me and said,
‘You have got your orders.’”

“I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o’clock or 12

o’clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to
be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about
what happened…” 47

Campbell Johnson recalls… “He (VP Menon) reported that he had found the
Maharaja unnerved by the rush of events and the sense of his lone helplessness.
Impressed at last with the urgency of the situation, he had felt that unless India
could help immediately, all would be lost. Later in the day, on the strong advice
of VP, the Maharaja left Srinagar with his wife and son. VP had impressed upon
him that as the raiders had reached Baramulla, it would be foolhardy for His
Highness to stay on in the capital. The Maharaja also signed a letter of accession
which VP was able to present to the Defence Committee.” The letter
48

accompanying instrument of accession, inter alia, stated, “…With the conditions

obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it
exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian dominion. Naturally
they cannot send the help asked for by me without my acceding to the dominion
of India. I have, accordingly, decided to do so, and I attach the Instrument of
Accession for acceptance by your Government…” 49

The Instrument of Accession, signed by the Maharaja on October 26, 1947,

alongwith the letter accompanying it, was discussed in the Defence Committee.
On October 27, 1947, Mountbatten wrote back to the Maharaja, accepting the
accession, but significantly adding, “… It is my Government’s wish that as soon
as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of invaders,
the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the
people.” According to Campbell Johnson, Mountbatten was permitted to
50

include this caveat by the Defence Committee, wherein it had been unilaterally
proposed by Nehru and accepted by others.

On November 1, 1947, Lord Mountbatten, during his visit to Lahore to

resolve the issue, received an offer from the Governor General of Pakistan,
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, which, among other things stated, “The two Governors
General to be given full powers to restore peace, undertake the administration of
the State and arrange for plebiscite without delay under their joint control and
supervision.” Jinnah had clearly overlooked the fact that Mountbatten was
answerable to the Union Cabinet in India and did not enjoy the same sweeping
powers that Jinnah had in Pakistan. Therefore, Mountbatten rejected the
proposal. However, he in turn suggested a plebiscite under United Nations
auspices. But Jinnah rejected the proposal insisting that the two Governors
General should organise it.” On November 2, 1947, Nehru made a radio
51

broadcast in which he repeated the proposal offered by Mountbatten to Jinnah

concerning India’s willingness to hold plebiscite in the state under the auspices
of United Nations.

It is apparent that both, Muntbatten and Nehru, exceeded their brief when they
tinkered with the Instrument of Accession by attaching conditionality. In this
regard, the observations of the former Chief Justice of India, Justice AS Anand,
are quite apt, “The Indian Independence Act did not envisage conditional
accession; it could not envisage such a situation as it would be outside the
Parliament’s policy. It wanted to keep no Indian State in a state of suspense. It
conferred on the rulers of the Indian States absolute power in their discretion to
accede to either of the two dominions. The dominion’s Governor General had
the power to accept the accession or reject the offer, but he had no power to keep
the question open or attach conditions to it.” Justice Anand further adds, “There
can be no question of accession having been conditional as the Instrument of
Accession and the Indian Independence Act were the only documents relevant to
the accession and the constitutional documents did not contemplate any
conditions to it. Any moral grounds could not override constitutional and
statutory provisions.” 52

It would be pertinent to mention here that some people with vested interests
and those not conversant with the intricacies of the accession confuse the very
meaning and purpose of Instrument of Accession and the Instrument of Merger.
They argue that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has only acceded to India and
not merged with it. The fact is that the British Government divided the ‘States
Department’ into two sections and made these responsible for the two respective
Dominions of India and Pakistan. The two state departments were headed by
Sardar Patel and Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, respectively. Besides other issues,
they were required to work out the modalities and finer details of accession, as
these concerned their own dominions. These provisions would lay down the
terms and conditions on which the accession would take place. Both sections in
due course, formulated the Instrument of Accession, which laid down the
procedures, terms and conditions, according to which the princely states would
accede to either of the dominions. The Instrument of Accession drawn by both
dominions left no option for the princely states but to accede to either of them on
the terms and conditions formulated as stated heretofore.

The Instrument of Accession prepared by the Indian section of the State

Department laid down different sets of terms and conditions: one for the larger
states and the other for smaller principalities, jagirs, etc., purely on account of
administrative reasons. The procedure envisaged the integration of smaller
princely states, principalities, jagirs, etc., into larger and administratively viable
states in which these were geographically located, before the latter would be
required to sign the Instrument of Accession to the Union of India, to complete
the process of accession. The Indian section of the State Department drew up an
Instrument of Attachment (erroneously called Instrument of Merger) for smaller
states for this purpose. As a result, 275 smaller states were integrated into five
unions, namely, Madhya Bharat, Patiala and East Punjab State Union, Rajasthan,
Saurashtra and Travancore-Cochin. As is evident, the State of Jammu and
Kashmir was not required to sign any Instrument of Attachment/Instrument of
Merger, as the provision did not apply to it.

Irrespective of what Mountbatten wrote or what Nehru said, the signing of the
Instrument of Accession now opened the path for the Indian government to
render military assistance to the state at the earliest, before the invading forces
reached Srinagar.

India Intervenes Militarily

The first batch of Indian troops landed in Srinagar the next day i.e. October
27, 1947. “Before dawn on Monday, 27 October 1947, soldiers from the Indian
Army’s Sikh Regiment gathered at short notice at Palam airport outside Delhi.
Their mission — to spearhead an urgent military airlift intended to secure the
Kashmir Valley for India.” “I arrived at Palam airport at 0300, an hour before
53

the Sikhs were expected. The aerodrome was floodlit to facilitate loading and we
had tea ready for the troops… We were racing against time but fortunately
things somehow worked all right. The Dakota planes could take at most 17
soldiers along with personal bedrolls and ammunition. The airfield at the capital,
Srinagar, was basic — no fuelling or servicing facilities, no tarmac landing strip,
no lighting for night-time flights. The first Indian troops reached there about 9
am on that morning. By the end of the day, 28 military flights had been
completed and 300 Indian servicemen had landed.” 54

Andrew Whitehead adds, “They were the first ever Indian troops in Kashmir,
and the following morning — as they sought to check the advance of invading
Pakistani tribesmen — Indian soldiers fired their first shots in a conflict which
still remains unresolved.” Vincent Shean writes, “…The Maharaja’s accession
55

to India…and the dispatch of first Indian troops (27 October, 1947)… were the
direct inevitable consequences of this invasion…” 56

From October 22, 1947, till the time Indian troops landed in the valley, the
NC leaders utilised its cadres to galvanise the population of the valley into
action. As the organisation was entrenched at the grass-roots level, it became
easier for the party to harness enough manpower, which acted as some sort of a
civil defence force. Though in military terms its contribution was minimal, its
most visible effect was to keep up the morale of the people at large and prevent
breakdown of law and order which would have resulted into an uncontrollable
chaos.

On the ground, the situation was perilous. Maharaja’s inadequate forces were
thinly spread out without much planning. To make matters worse, large-scale
desertions by Muslim troops from some of his infantry units further aggravated
the problem. Lieutenant Colonel Hari Singh, one of his commanding officers
was murdered in his sleep. Brigadier Ghansara Singh, who was sent to Gilgit,
once the British paramountcy expired on October 30, 1947, met with a similar
fate. Muslim officers and men mutinied and with the active connivance of the
Garrison Commander, Major Brown, hoisted the Pakistani flag on November 4,
1947. Major Somnath Sharma, commanding a small force of Kumaon Regiment
and Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai, commanding 1 SIKH Regiment, got killed at
Badgam and Baramulla respectively, in the very first phase of the Indian Army’s
riposte. The 1947–48 Indo-Pak war was a saga of great sacrifices and exemplary
courage — at both unit and individual level — that saved the day for India.
Many of these acts can be written in golden letters in the annals of military
history. Three of these are:-

• Air Commodore Meher Singh’s flight to Leh over uncharted course,

flying at a height of 23,000 ft without oxygen and landing at a rough air
strip at Leh at a height of 11,555 ft on May 24, 1948.

• Major General KS Thimayya’s moving of tanks to Zoji La at a height of

11,578 ft, on November 1, 1948. First time tanks had been taken to such a
height.

• Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa’s staunch leadership at Skardu,

while refusing to surrender despite the siege laid to his post by numerically
superior Pakistani forces, without any hope of receiving any
reinforcements. His strong and dogged determination to hold out for six
months against overwhelming odds, beating back one assault after another,
right till the end, can only be termed as militarily exceptional.

Pakistan initially denied any role in the invasion of the valley and termed it
purely as the rebellion by the Muslim subjects of the state against the Hindu
Maharaja. This line was also adopted by Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sir
Mohammad Zaffar Ullah Khan even at the UN. However, he later admitted that
Pakistan army got involved only after May 1948. These blatant lies were later
exposed by what Pakistani generals themselves wrote a few years later. Some of
the publications that carried these explicit admissions include, memoirs of
General Mohammad Akbar Khan himself entitled Raiders in Kashmir and his 57

interview carried in Defence Journal. And in General Musa’s memoirs, Jawan

58

to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier.” During the interview given to

59

Brigadier (Retd) AR Siddiqi, General Akbar Khan is quoted thus, “A few weeks
after partition, I was asked by Mian Iftikharudin on behalf of Liaqat Ali Khan to
prepare a plan for action on Kashmir. I found that the Army was holding 4,000
rifles for the civil police. If these could be given to the locals, an armed uprising
in Kashmir could be organised at suitable places. I wrote a plan on this basis and
gave it to Mian Iftikharudin. I was called to a meeting with Liaqat Ali Khan at
Lahore where the plan was adopted, responsibilities allotted and orders issued.
Everything was to be kept a secret from the Army.”

Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India at that
time, flew into Srinagar accompanied by Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister.
After assessing the grim situation, he returned to Delhi and ordered the stoppage
of all civil aircraft on airline duties and ordered these aircraft to bolster the
strength of Indian Air Force planes to ferry troops to Srinagar. This ensured that
the offensive against the raiders got a boost despite earlier setbacks. As a result,
the tide started turning slowly, but surely. By December 1947, Pakistanis had
been thrown back and evacuated from most parts of the valley and from Poonch
and Rajouri districts of Jammu. As Indian troops continued their advance,
Pakistan army directly assumed the control of the operations, committing its
regular troops as part of normal formations. With the onset of winter in
November 1947, progress of the operations became difficult and laborious.
Nevertheless, forward movement was maintained on all fronts.

However, inexplicably and much against the existing military situation on the
battlefront, Nehru allowed his idealism to get the better of his sense of
pragmatism. He decided to refer the case to the UN. Nehru rejected Army’s
advice to let them take their counter offensive to its logical conclusion. He paid
more heed to the advice offered by the Governor General, Lord Mountbatten,
than to the one offered by his own Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel. In fact
the latter’s disagreement with Nehru on this issue was so strong that Sardar Patel
sent in his resignation from the Council of Ministers to Nehru on December 22,
1947. However, under Gandhi’s pressure, he later withdrew it.
 On January 1, 1948, India took the case to UN, where it continued to be
discussed for bulk of the next year.

Proceedings at the UN
The UN passed four resolutions; the most significant of which was the three-
part resolution of August 13, 1948, which stated:

• Part I: This related to the cessation of hostilities by implementing the

ceasefire orders. Both India and Pakistan were required to issue ceasefire
orders within four days of the acceptance of the resolution. The
Commission to be set up to mediate between the two countries, agreed upon
by both countries vide resolution passed on April 17, 1948, would appoint
military observers to monitor the ceasefire.

• Part II: This consisted of a number of sub-parts. These were:

(a) Pakistan would withdraw its troops from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.

(b) Tribesmen and Pakistani nationals too would withdraw.

(c) Territory evacuated by Pakistani troops would be administered by local

authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

(d) India would begin withdrawing bulk of its troops from the State once
the Commission had notified it that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals
had withdrawn and Pakistani troops were beginning to withdraw.

(e) India would maintain minimum force required for the assistance of the
local authorities for maintaining law and order, within the lines existing at
the time of coming into effect of the ceasefire.

• Part III: This stated that “The Government of India and Pakistan
reaffirm their wish that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be
determined in accordance with the will of the people. To that end, upon the
acceptance of the said agreement, both countries agree to enter into
consultation with the Commission to determine fair and equitable
conditions, whereby such free expression of the will be assured.”
 One of the important assurances given by the “UN Commission for India and
Pakistan (UNCIP) was that “the plebiscite proposal shall not be binding upon
India, if Pakistan does not implement Part I or Part II of the Resolution of
August, 1948.”

Militarily, as the winter of 1947 set in, the raiders had been cleared off the
valley and were now entrenched on the high mountains. By spring, when the
Indian army’s renewed offensive began, the Pakistan army had dropped its
pretensions of innocence and the war now embroiled the two newly independent
countries. By the summer of 1948, the Indian army’s offensive, though slow,
was inexorably inching towards Pakistan’s borders. UN was, in the meantime,
pressing both countries to stop fighting as a first step towards formalising the
methodology for holding a plebiscite. Pakistan had been all along rejecting the
proposal as it wanted the plebiscite modalities to be worked out first before it
could accept the ceasefire. The UNCIP, was, however, convinced that accepting
Pakistani condition would amount to putting the cart before the horse. It was
keen to break the logjam. Indian spring offensive, in which it gained some
significant victories, provided this window of opportunity to convince Pakistan
to accept the ceasefire. Reflecting on this important opportunity, which the
situation on ground provided, Joseph Korbel writes, “Certainly, now that Indian
army was on the offensive, advancing closer and closer to her border, Pakistan
might find it very much in her interest to stop fighting, particularly, if by the
establishment of a Ceasefire Line (CFL), this advance would be terminated.

Nehru did not appear at this stage to be well-disposed to the idea of ceasefire.
When Joseph Korbel broached this subject with him, Nehru reminded the former
that he could not put the owner and intruder on the same platform and demanded
that Pakistan be first condemned as an aggressor and concluded by a terse
comment, “You treat the thief and the owner of the house as equals. First the
thief must get out, and then we can discuss steps further.” 60

Documents declassified lately throw enough light on how Nehru was

manipulated into offering a ceasefire on December 30, 1948, much against the
logic of military situation on ground and the likely impact the ceasefire would
have on the future of India. It did not strike Nehru that the ceasefire would leave
Pakistan in occupation of nearly one-third of the state’s territory, giving rise to
an irresolvable dispute and a permanent source of tension between the two
states. As is mentioned elsewhere, Indian and Pakistani Army Chiefs were both
serving British Army officers, who in turn were commanded by one overall
Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Claude Auchinleek, who again was a
British officer. Manipulating the end result, as it suited the British strategic
interests of that period, was not all that difficult. As Colonel SK Bose writes, “…
the whole thing was a put up job, stage-managed by British and Nehru was
neatly manipulated…” That the offer of ceasefire should have been made by
61

India soon after securing of Zoji La makes it even more intriguing.

Earlier, Pakistani forces had captured a vast territory in Ladakh-Gilgit-

Baltistan region by bold and innovative tactical manoevure.” …In a brilliant
manoeuvre, a young Pakistani Lieutenant Colonel Aslam Khan, had by-passed
Skardu and captured Zoji La, Dras and Kargil simultaneously on May 10, 1948.
The besieged garrison of Skardu under Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa,
MVC, was completely isolated. However, it held on for another three months
and surrendered on August 14, 1948, after holding out for six months and three
days.” As it was of utmost importance that this vital pass is recaptured at the
62

earliest, the battle for securing it started as soon as the snows melted in the
region. By November 1948, the pass was in Indian hands.

Ceasefire, however, was offered a month later when Nehru was jolted by the
reverses suffered in Janghar. How did Janghar happen? In December 1948, after
spending many months quietly in Jammu, General Kalwant Singh, much against
his will, was ordered by the Army Headquarters to move towards Poonch. The
key to this advance was a road junction at Jhangar, otherwise of little
consequence. According to Lieutenant General James Wilson, “The Indian
advance had made it a traffic shamble with far too many lorries and
establishment crammed into a confined space. It was an obvious artillery target
and being just inside the Kashmir border, could be engaged from gun positions
from Pakistan territory.” Pakistan fully exploited the tactical opportunity that
63

presented itself. About 200 medium and field guns which had been quietly
assembled, targets registered and ammunition placed in position, opened up
suddenly on the hapless convoy at Jhangar, which proved to be a sitting duck.
This had a devastating effect, with immediate consequences. General Wilson
writes, “…That very afternoon, the British Commander-in-Chief in Delhi, came
on the telephone. He told us that he had the Indian Government’s approval to
suggest an immediate ceasefire in Kashmir on existing positions: he proposed a
meeting on January 1, 1949 between the two C’s-in-C and their staffs to record
these arrangements and convert the truce into a formal ceasefire, pending
outcome of the negotiations for the future of Kashmir through the United
Nations Commission.” 64
 Since May 1948, Pakistan was now officially at war with India, as it had
acknowledged the deployment of its army formations in active combat. It could
no longer take refuge under the excuse that the raiders were an autonomous
entity, who would refuse to listen to their orders. It was now entirely upto it to
accept or reject the offer of ceasefire.

It is apparent from the above episode that firstly, whereas Pakistan seemed
aware of the movement of Indian troops to Poonch and pile up of the transport at
Jhangar, India was totally unaware of the assembly of about 200 Pakistani
artillery guns and its ammunition, just across the frontline. Secondly, move to
Poonch appears to have been the result of a sudden brainwave at Army
Headquarters, which even caught General Kalwant Singh unawares. Thirdly,
General Roy Bucher said on the phone that he had the approval of the Indian
Government for the proposed ceasefire. This clearly establishes that the initiative
for offering ceasefire came from him and he had not been directed by the
Government of India to offer a ceasefire. Fourthly, the ceasefire came into effect
on General Roy Bucher’s last day in the office, as on the very next day, he was
handing over the charge to the first Indian Commander in Chief, General KM
Carriappa.

Air Marshal KC Carriappa (Retd), son of Field Marshal KM Carriappa,

writes, “Father was GOC-in-C Western Command and Major General Thimayya
was the operational commander in Jammu and Kashmir. They were convinced
that capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent. The Army,
however, was ordered to suspend all operations with effect from January 1,
1949, even though the enemy continued fighting. Field Marshal Carriappa had
later said that Army had its tail up and was ‘confident of clearing most of
Kashmir and re-investing Gilgit.’ But orders were received to ceasefire. The
Field Marshal further said, ‘The Army was very disappointed by this decision,
but orders were orders.’” As Air Marshal Carriappa writes, “a few years later,
65

the Field Marshal asked Nehru for the reasons for enforcing ceasefire. Nehru
replied, ‘Quite frankly, looking back on it now, I think we should have given
you few more days, ten or fifteen days more. Things would have been
different.’” This assertion is further confirmed by Lieutenant General SK Sinha
(Retd), till recently the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir and the man who had
been involved with the military planning of this operation from the first day. In
an interview to weekly magazine, Week, (August 24, 2008), he said, “…Thrice
we were in a position to capture Muzzafarabad, but each time Nehru ordered us
to withdraw…”
 What is even more intriguing is the fact that India did not ask the UN to deal
with the issue of Pakistan’s aggression under chapter VII of the UN Charter,
which specifically deals with ‘Acts of Agression’, but under chapter VI, which
deals with ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes. It was either a serious error of
judgement, or a deliberate ploy to let Pakistan off the hook. Irrespective of the
cause of this faux pas, it clearly pointed to the lack of awareness of India’s core
concerns.

It can be surmised from the above that the Jhangar debacle was manipulated
by General Roy Bucher to offset the gains made by the capture of Zoji La by
Indian troops and present an alarming situation to Nehru, so that a ceasefire
proposal could be extracted from him, before Roy Bucher relinquished his
office. This diabolical deviousness of the British is not surprising when we look
at the involvement of their officers in the treachery perpetrated by them in the
fall of Skardu and Gilgit. As is well-known, at critical stages General Roy
Bucher controlled the Kashmir operation in a manner that suited the British; he
ensured that Pakistani army was not driven out completely from Kashmir.
Undoubtedly, Nehru was no match to the clever and devious manipulations of
the British who had mastered this art while ensuring that sun never set on their
empire.

Major General Hira Lal Atal writes, “…It was under the command of Major
General KS Thimayya, who succeeded Major General Kalwant Singh, that the
position in the conflict was stabilised and the Indian army got the upper hand
and enemy was pressed hard on all fronts. It was only a matter of time when we
would have pushed the Pakistan Army out of our territory.” General Atal
66

further adds, “While the situation in Kashmir was under control and to our
advantage, we heard on the radio in the morning of December 31, that a
ceasefire had been agreed to by both countries…” Atal goes so far as to say,
67

that leave alone the military leadership, Nehru did not even consult Sheikh
Abdullah, on whose intervention Nehru had agreed to send the army to Kashmir,
in the first place. He writes, “This (ceasefire) was evidently agreed to by our
Prime Minister without even consulting operational commanders in the field or
Sheikh Abdullah, who was very much an interested party. This was a staggering
blow to all of them.” Writing about Sheikh Abdullah’s reaction to his being not
68

consulted by Nehru on an issue as important as this, General Atal continues,

“Within a couple of days thereafter, Sheikh Abdullah blew into my house at
Akbar Road, at breakfast time, and was fuming at the monstrosity of ceasefire
that had been committed without even consulting him as he put it and… He was
terribly agitated and annoyed.” 69

Even sixty years after the event, not a single piece of evidence has surfaced
which could indicate that Nehru either sought or obtained any military advice
before rushing to the UN. Even worse, no senior army general or any of the
operational commanders were consulted by Nehru before accepting ceasefire.
Military leadership at that time, though professionally outstanding, was moulded
in the true British tradition, wherein it was the political leadership that took such
decisions, irrespective of whether military advice was sought or not. Almost all
senior military commanders are unanimous that calling a halt to military
operations was a folly.

The CFL (Later, LoC)

The Ceasefire Resolution, which came into effect on January 1, 1949, was
formalised by the Karachi Agreement that delineated the CFL. In due course of
time, it became the LoC. Ceasefire ensured that complete districts of Mirpur and
Poonch jagir of Jammu region, complete district of Muzzafarabad and part of
Baramulla district in the valley, and the entire district of Baltistan, Gilgit, Gilgit
agency and its Dardic agencies, remained under Pakistan’s occupation. In the
meanwhile, Hari Singh transferred the state power to NC on October 29, 1947.

The Indo-Pak border is approximately 2500 kms long, stretching from

Karakoram in the north to Rann of Kutch in the south. The area south of Chenab
is demarcated as the International Border. However, area north of it till grid
point NJ 9842, short of Siachen Glacier, measuring roughly 776 kms, is
delineated as the LoC. The Karachi Agreement became the first agreement to
amicably resolve various disputes and arrive at mutually agreed CFL. It was
signed by both sides in July 1949, on the behest of UNCIP. The Indian side was
represented by Lieutenant General Srinagesh, Major General KS Thimayya and
Brigadier SHFJ Manekshaw. The Pakistan delegation was composed of Major
General WJ Cathorn and Nazir Ahmed. After ten days of hard bargaining, the
agreement was signed on July 27, 1949. The CFL was delineated based on the
general line occupied by respective countries on January 1, 1949. The essential
features of the agreement were:-

1. Troops on both sides were to remain at least 500 yards on either side of
the CFL.
 2. Both sides were free to adjust their defences behind the CFL, subject to
no laying of wire/mines.

3. No additional military potential would be introduced into J&K by

either side.

4. UNCIP would station observers where deemed necessary.

The CFL remained operative in terms of Karachi Agreement till Pakistan

violated it on August 5, 1965, by launching ‘Operation Gibraltar,’ which led to
Indo-Pak war and consequently the signing of the Tashkent Agreement. This
restored the Karachi Agreement by stipulating that the status quo ante of August
5, 1965 will prevail. Pakistan vacated some areas in Chhamb-Jaurian and India
returned a very strategic Haji Pir pass; a most valuable piece of ground jutting
into the Uri-Poonch bulge.

Map of Jammu and Kashmir depicting CFL/LoC

The last link in the genesis of the present day LoC is the Simla Agreement of
July 2, 1972. The essential issues pertaining to the LoC in this agreement were:

• The LoC resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be
respected by both sides.
 • Neither side shall alter the LoC unilaterally or by force.

• All differences will be resolved by bilateral negotiations or by any other

peaceful means, mutually agreed upon.

UN Resolutions Serve British Interests

The decisions taken by the UN served the British interests eminently. As
Pakistan’s officer corps was dangerously depleted, British officers in Pakistan
army came to play a decisive role as the war got prolonged. In the process, they
implemented an agenda that suited their parent country. They ensured that Indian
troops did not proceed beyond where they intended the CFL to be. This line was
so thoughtfully decided that it seemed to serve everyone’s immediate purpose.
They then went on to manipulate the halting of forces on this CFL, which in due
course, would become a de facto border.

Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru looked at the CFL from their individual
perspective; mostly as it suited their political goals. Sheikh Abdullah appeared
satisfied with the CFL, as that part of Jammu and Kashmir, which remained
under Pakistan’s occupation bore no or very little resemblance to the valley;
ethnically, linguistically and culturally. His political support base was entirely on
Indian side of the CFL. This, he thought, would be seriously eroded if the whole
state were to remain a single entity. Sheikh’s political thinking is clearly borne
out by the manner in which the Kotli town, situated on the banks of River
Poonch, was inexplicably vacated by Indian army, despite succeeding in lifting
its siege and entering the town on November 24, 1947. This withdrawal greatly
disappointed the locals, who had held out till then, after making numerous
sacrifices. Vishwamitter states in his article, How Kotli was left for PoK,
“Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who had become the Prime Minister of the State,
never wanted the Pahari and Punjabi speaking Muslims to be the residents of his
territory.”

One of Sheikh Abdullah’s old associates, Krishen Dev Sethi, has mentioned in
his biography that late SM Abdullah was never a sympathiser of Jammu
Muslims and that is why he had intrigued with Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru and
sent prominent Muslim leaders of Jammu, like Allah Rabba Sagar and
Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, etc., to Pakistan, because he considered them to be
his main rivals in Jammu region.” Sheikh Abdullah’s willingness to accept the
division of Kashmir as the best available option to ostensibly, prevent future
conflict between India and Pakistan, was actually meant to help him consolidate
his political hold in Kashmir. This is confirmed by Joseph Korbel, to whom the
Sheikh made this statement during a reception given to the UNCIP in Kashmir.
Joseph Korbel quotes Sheikh Abdullah to have told him, “There is, in my
opinion, only one solution open; that is the division of the country. If it is not
achieved, the fighting will continue; India and Pakistan will prolong the quarrel
indefinitely and our people’s sufferings will go on.” 70

Nehru too did not seem to be averse to a divided Kashmir, with its two parts
under two dominions. This seems to be confirmed by Joseph Korbel, who, while
writing about Nehru’s attitude towards the idea of Kashmir’s division, says, “…
And (Nehru) expressed the thought that he would not be opposed to the idea of
dividing the country between India and Pakistan. To one delegate he displayed a
map on which the Indian border stretched far west towards Pakistan, including
the crucial Valley of Kashmir and even part of west Jammu.” 71

Historically, Britain had always been apprehensive of the Russian desire to

extend its influence southwards and in Central Asia. These apprehensions did
not lessen later, after the success of Bolshvik Revolution, as Soviet Union
continued with the same policy. With China too heading for a communist
revolution, Britain felt that the two communist nations would form a formidable
alliance and pose a serious threat to its interests in West and South Asia.

Olaf Caroe, the last foreign secretary for the British Raj in India (1939–45),
became apprehensive about the safety of the oil resources of West Asia, which
he termed as the “Wells of Power”. For this and other reasons, he facilitated and
then welcomed the partition of India. Jinnah-led Pakistan, the British felt, would
be a more suitable shield to protect these wells and its interests in this part of the
world. Nehru was all along aware of the British interest in creating Pakistan. He
once told UNCIP Chief, Joseph Korbel, “Pakistan is a mediaeval State with an
impossible theocratic concept. It should never have been created, and it would
never have happened, had the British not stood behind this foolish idea of
Jinnah.” 72

Despite this awareness about British manipulations, Nehru and other Congress
leaders did not assess correctly the geo-political implications that the creation of
a theocratic Muslim state in the north-west of India would have for the country.
For centuries, this area had served as an ingress route of the invaders into the
Indian heartland. As Dr MK Teng mentions,“ The Congress leaders, were
perhaps, oblivious of the elemental change the creation of Pakistan would bring
into the civilisational boundaries of India and the far-reaching effect the
establishment of a Muslim power in India, would have on its northern frontiers.
Jammu and Kashmir formed the central spur of the great Himalayan uplands.
Poised as the State was, it stood as a sentinel for an eastward expansion of any
power from the west as well as the north. That the security of Jammu and
Kashmir State was crucial to the security of the Himalayas was ignored by the
Indian leadership. Pakistan was, however, keenly conscious of the strategic
importance of Jammu and Kashmir.” 73

To them (the British), the State of Jammu and Kashmir, geographically

located in between the southern fringes of two communist giants, had enormous
geo-strategic significance. Even though greatly weakened by the enormous effort
needed to win the war (World War II), they held enough aces to ensure that their
direct/indirect influence in this region did not end completely and permanently,
even when they were winding up their Raj. Britain, therefore, encouraged talk of
independence of Jammu and Kashmir whenever opportunity arose. The US
followed its closest ally, Britain, in toeing the same line. According to their
perception, independent Kashmir was easy to pull into the orbit of their geo-
strategic influence. As a result, the UN proceedings were hijacked, to a large
extent, by Noel Baker, Britain’s pro-Pakistan representative, during Clement
Attlee’s regime. His devious machinations, which he put into practice tirelessly,
succeeded in undermining the Indian stand. He succeeded in getting Resolution
39 passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on January, 20, 1948.
This envisaged setting up of three-member UNCIP. The Commission was tasked
to visit both India and Pakistan and report back on the situation existing on
ground. Subsequently, through Resolution 47, the number of members of
UNCIP was increased to five. This too was manipulated by Noel Baker, who
seized upon the opportunity to have the Chinese draft amended. He felt that a
five-member team would present a report more in tune with his own perspective.
On the British attitude towards India and that of Noel Baker in particular, Sardar
Patel candidly told Aurthur Henderson, the British Under Secretary of State,
“Unfortunately, it is my experience that the attitude of an average Englishman in
India is instinctively against us… not only has the dispute been prolonged, but
the merits of our case have been completely lost in the interaction of power
politics… It was, we maintain, the attitude of Noel Baker that tilted the balance
against us.” 74

The Commission visited India and Pakistan in July 1948. By the middle of
1948, the ground situation had undergone a radically significant change, as
Pakistan had deployed its regular troops in the occupied areas since May 1948.
This was admitted by Pakistan Prime Minister to the UNCIP. The UNCIP
findings, its reports and its subsequent Resolutions (of August 13, 1949 and
January 5, 1948), recognised that the entry of Pakistani army in Jammu and
Kashmir was a violation of UNSC Resolution 38, and demanded that Pakistan
withdraw its forces from the state, since their presence constituted a “material
change in the situation.” It further conceded primacy to the ceasefire based on
withdrawal of the invaders. Pakistan violated the resolutions blatantly. For
example, Pakistan had agreed to withdraw its troops, armed personnel, tribesmen
and its citizens from Gilgit-Baltistan within seven weeks. Later, it requested the
UN to allow it 12 weeks to do so, but still failed to do so. In fact, Pakistan
refused to demilitarise any of the occupied territories, as envisaged in the UN
Resolution. On the other hand, it retained 30,000 strong militia which had
entirely been raised from Muslim deserters of the Maharaja’s army, ex
servicemen of Mirpur, Poonch and Sudhunti, who had been demobilised from
the British Indian army after the end of World War II. The militia also included
those who had been recruited by the Pakistan army prior to the invasion of the
state.

The UNCIP spelt out the terms of the truce on April 28, 1949, stating,
“Pending the final solution, the territory evacuated by Pakistani troops will be
administered by local authority under the surveillance of the UNCIP. The
commission and/or the plebiscite administrator may request the government of
India to post a garrison at specified points.” However, Pakistan, the occupying
authority, turned local authority on the same day by installing a puppet president
in PoK (a minion of the MC), and got him to sign an agreement that gave
Pakistan the right to administer Gilgit-Baltistan. With armed forces of both
countries stationed in the state, the first task of the UN should have been the
demilitarisation of the state, rather than plebiscite, as the former was a
prerequisite for achieving the latter. This aspect was, however, completely lost
sight of.

That was not the only flawed aspect of the UN Resolutions. With bulk of the
people illiterate, villages spread out over enormous distances in vast and rugged
terrain, “the mere technicality of carrying out plebiscite seemed beyond the
scope of reality.” In any case, the futility of the plebiscite, wherever such
75

exercise had been held, was well-established. Plebiscites conducted in Europe

had only served as instruments of Hitler and Communism to carry out massive
propaganda through falsification and exerting pressure.

The UN Resolutions were more a reflection of the emerging geo-strategic

interests of those who dominated the UN, rather than an impartial verdict
announced by a non-partisan judge. The resolutions failed to indict the aggressor
and legitimised the aggression. N Gopalaswamy Iyenger reminded the Security
76

Council during the debate, that while they had condemned Yugoslavia, Albania
and Bulgaria for giving assistance to the rebels fighting the government forces in
Greece, they had failed to do so when Pakistanis were fighting a lawfully
constituted government in Kashmir. Dr Shyama Prasad Mukerjee, the founding
President of Bhartiya Jana Sangh, too referred to the injustice done to India,
when he stated in the Parliament during a debate on August 7, 1952, “…But it is
a matter of common knowledge that we have not got fair treatment from UN
which we had expected. We did not go to the UNO with regard to the question
of accession, because accession then was an established fact. We went there for
the purpose of getting quick decision from the UNO regarding the raids which
were then taking place by persons behind whom there was Pakistan
Government…” 77

The UNSC did not condemn Pakistan as an aggressor; and it avoided touching
upon the legality of the State’s accession to India. The commission appointed by
it for the state, too did not have any juridical powers, but was only a mediatory
agency that could not impose its will. As Joseph Korbel writes, “Its approach
was timid. Its evaluation of the situation in Kashmir was far from realistic.”
78

Further, a glaring example of the double standards adopted by the UN while

dealing with Pakistani invasion of Kashmir, is mentioned here. While Kashmir
was still a current subject under discussion in UN, Korean war broke out in June
1950. The UN reacted differently, condemning North Korea for similar
transgression as Pakistan had done in Kashmir, but failed to condemn Pakistan.

On March 12, 1949, Admiral Nimitz was designated as Plebiscite

Administrator, and United Nations Military Observer Group in India and
Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deputed to enforce ceasefire and supervise it. On
March 14, 1950, Sir Owen Dixon was appointed representative of the
Commission. From 1951 through 1958, five representatives appointed by UN
(three of those were US citizens) discussed the modalities of demilitarisation; the
first pre-requisite that would lead to holding of plebiscite. They, however, could
not reach an agreement on this crucial issue. It was apparent from their reports
submitted to the UNSC that, in their view, holding of plebiscite would create
more problems than solving any. Since 1958, no UN representative has been
appointed, thus conveying in unmistakable terms the futility of the UN
Resolutions. Though UN Resolutions helped bring the war to an end, these also
created a festering sore that refuses to heal. In the meantime, in 1953, having
been dissatisfied with the policy of UN, both India and Pakistan decided to by-
pass UN and try to resolve the issue bi-laterally.

Despite Pakistan itself having violated the Karachi Agreement, and later
having signed the Simla Agreement, it continued to harp on the Karachi
Agreement as the basis for supporting the existence of UNMOGIP and its right
to internationalise the Kashmir dispute. On the other hand, India has been
categorical in its assertion that Karachi Agreement was operative in relation to
CFL, whereas Simla Agreement refers to the delineation of LoC, which was
formalised by the exchange of fresh set of maps in 1972. India further points out
that Simla Agreement commits both parties to resolving the dispute bilaterally
79

and UNMOGIP has become irrelevant as India no longer recognises it.

Britain’s Reasons for Manipulating UN Debate

Britain had been conscious of the implications of the desire of Czarist Russia
to expand southwards, towards Afghanistan; this would have posed a direct
threat to its Indian empire. Historical evidence suggests that Czarist Russia had
eyed India’s riches for long. Czars Paul and Elexander I, had an additional
objective, i.e., to weaken Great Britain. Paul at one stage invited France to join
him in this enterprise, which would weaken their common enemy. He wrote, “…
The French Republic and the Emperor of Russia must send a combined force of
70,000 men to the borders of India… to liberate India from the barbarous and
tyrannical yoke of the English.” However, this could not be accomplished, as
80

Napolean’s disastrous campaign in Russia put paid to any such move. Therefore,
to safeguard its interests, Britain fought two Afghan Wars (1839–1842 and
1879–1881) to pacify the unruly Afghan tribes. But more importantly, its aim
was to occupy strategically dominant geographical features in the rugged terrain,
which would give its troops the much required tactical advantage, if ever the
Russians tried to enter Afghanistan.

In the second half of nineteenth century, Czars had helped a number of

warlords in Sinkiang in their internecine wars to gain influence over the region,
on which China exercised a loose control. By 1891, Russia had gradually
brought this region under their control. Czarist Russia also enjoyed a great
advantage in carrying out trade with the region, as the Chinese government had
no effective control over Sinkiang. In addition, mainland China’s access to it
existed only through Russian territory. This restricted accessibility had rendered
Sinkiang increasingly dependent on Russia, economically. Indeed, Russian
desire and its attempts to reach the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea on the one
hand and expand towards Chinese Turkestan on the other, brought it in direct
confrontation with the British Empire.

With Czarist troops on the Pamirs, Britain realised the strategic importance of
Jammu and Kashmir, ideally placed, as it was, like a wedge in Central Asia. In
fact, Britain was so alarmed at the reported correspondence between Maharaja
Pratap Singh and Russia (later proved to be a forgery) that it divested the
Maharaja of all his powers and constituted a council to rule the princely state. By
the beginning of thetwentieth century, the state of mistrust between Russia and
Britain had somewhat eased as both were now facing a common threat from
Germany. Consequently, in 1905, the Maharaja’s rule was restored with full
powers that he enjoyed before.

After the successful Bolshvik Revolution in the Soviet Union, the communist
threat loomed even larger over the British possessions in South Asia. Now that
Germany had been subdued in the World War I, the old threats resurfaced,
though in a different garb. In 1919, Britain fought another war to help Afghan
rulers to consolidate their power. This enabled the British to create a solid buffer
between India and the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the Communist take over
of China, which appeared a distinct possibility at that time, confirmed these
apprehensions when Nikolai Bhukharin said, “…Victorious Chinese revolution
will find an immediate echo in the neighbouring colonial countries — India,
Indonesia and Dutch India. All this makes China mighty and of attraction for the
colonial periphery.” 81

The Soviet Union took advantage of the Czarist presence and actually sent its
troops into the region in 1933. Subsequently, the Soviet Union consolidated its
influence in the area to such an extent that their consular representatives
continued to function there, despite the fact that the diplomatic relations between
China and Soviet Union remained cut off between 1927 and 1932. After the
Communists seized power in China, the Soviet activity in Sinkiang got a boost.
A large number of Soviet engineers, economists, military and technical
personnel now came to be stationed there, primarily with the aim of exploiting
the rich mineral resources of Sinkiang. The Great Game (n. 17, p. 113) that was
being played in Sinkiang (Xinjiang) through Central Asia, created apprehensions
in the minds of the western powers about the real intensions of the Soviet Union,
their new rival in the ‘balance of power’. Later, these developments led to the
construction of railway line across Sinkiang, connecting Soviet Turkestan with
China.

In 1952, China moved about a million Han Chinese from mainland China and
settled them in Sinkiang. In autumn next year, China refused to grant recognition
to Indian and Pakistani consulates on the specious plea that Sinkiang was a
closed territory. By the beginning of the fifties, extensive rail and road network
connected some industrial areas in Russia with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, on
the borders of Sinkiang. The events taking place at the international level
between 1945 and 1955 only confirmed such threat. To counter this threat to its
empire from the north, Britain made attempts to make its presence felt in the
autonomous Sinkiang, by developing trade and commercial ties with the region.
Besides, it took Gilgit on lease from the Maharaja in 1935 and stationed its
troops there on permanent basis. This military post was meant to serve as eyes
and ears of the British in the region.

In 1930, Indian communists in their Draft Programme of Action asked for the
violent overthrow of the Indian government. However, in 1931, on orders from
Moscow, Indian communists started joining Indian National Congress in droves.
By 1942, they occupied 50 leading party positions. The fear of communism
establishing its hold over Kashmir through sombre, behind the scenes Soviet
activities in the north and east of the States’ frontiers had always induced fear
and caution among the British policy-makers. Nehru’s left-leaning posture had
also convinced the west that eventually he would end up as Soviet ally after the
decolonisation of India. This is apparent from Winston Churchill’s missive to
Nehru on February 11, 1955. It said, “I hope you will think of the phrase, ‘The
light of Asia’. It seems to me that you may be able to do what no other human
being could, in giving India the lead, at least in the realm of thought, throughout
Asia, with the freedom and dignity of the individual, as the ideal, rather than
communist party drill book.”

Utterances of some of the NC leaders in Kashmir and the fact that known
communists formed part of Sheikh Abdullah’s cabinet, further confirmed British
apprehensions. Prominent among the communist sympathisers was Ghulam
Mohammad Sadiq (held the posts of President of Jammu and Kashmir
Constituent Assembly, Minister of Development, Education, and Prime Minister
of the State, at various stages of his political career). He once declared, “The
Anglo-American block does not want peace in the world and it wants to control
all the strategic places of the world and Kashmir is one of them.” DP Dhar
82

(Deputy Home Minister) and Girdari Lal Dogra (Finance Minister) were the
other two left-leaning figures in the NC. The Land Reform Act, under which the
communist style radical land reforms were carried out by the newly formed NC
government, was formulated under the guidance of Mirza Afzal Beg, the
Revenue Minister, who was closely advised on the issue by Ghulam Mohammad
Sadiq. Beg once said, “In so far as the State of Jammu and Kashmir is
concerned, we have decided to own that system which gives no quarter to
production for private profit… Building of socialistic order is our objective and
capitalist system is the biggest barrier to human progress.” 83

Other prominent communists holding influential positions in the state were;

Niranjan Nath Raina (owner of the New Kashmir Book Shop, that published a
popular weekly magazine Azad); BPL Bedi (widely believed to have authored
the famous Naya Kashmir programme); his European wife, Fredda (member of
the committee that prepared school text books), and General Secretary of the
NC, Maulana Syed Masoodi, who once declared, though not without some
justification,“In regard to the Kashmir issue, the imperialist powers like America
and Britain had made out Pakistan as an innocent party. This was being done to
further their own ends with a view to establish bases here for coming war.” 84

At this stage (while the matter was being discussed in the UNSC), it seems
that US was following a strictly correct and legal interpretation of the Instrument
of Accession, without taking into consideration the British concerns or their
counsel. This is evident from what the US representative, Warren Austin, said in
the Security Council on February, 4, 1948, “The external sovereignty of Kashmir
is no longer under the control of the Maharaja… With the accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is
exercised by India and that is why India happens to be here (at the UNSC) as a
petitioner…” However, Britain continued with its efforts to get US to toe its line
on Kashmir.

Britain’s stand on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir was also influenced by
their predicament in West Asia. The Arabs and their supporters were openly
accusing Britain of having failed to stem the flow of Jews to Palestine, which
was in violation of the Palestine Mandate. Britain was also accused for having
been unable or unwilling to prevent the outbreak of ‘Civil War’ between Israelis
and Palestinians. “Britain took the Palestine issue to UN in April 1947 and
announced its decision to abandon its mandate by May 1948. The UN General
Assembly immediately adopted a resolution for dividing Palestine into separate
Jewish and Arab states, paving the way for Israel’s rebirth as the homeland for
Jews in Palestine and the diaspora. The Arab reaction was vicious, instantaneous
and directed in bulk against Britain.” 85

To reduce the Arab anger, Britain’s foreign office asserted that Britain would
have to adopt a pro-Pakistan policy on Kashmir, being a Muslim state. This is
evident from the foreign office minute prepared for Clement Attlee, the Prime
Minister, “The Foreign Secretary has expressed anxiety lest we should appear to
be siding with India in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir,
which is now before the UNSC. With the situation as critical as it is in Palestine,
Mr Bevin feels that we must be very careful to guard against the danger of
aligning the whole of Islam against us, which might be the case were Pakistan to
obtain the false impression of our attitude in Security Council.” Britain, thus,
tried to short change India to appease Muslim sentiment.

Philip Noel Baker, who was not particularly well-disposed towards India, got
convinced by Bevin’s perspective and wasted no time in working on the US and
other non-permanent Security Council members to bring them around to his
point of view in order to toe a pro-Pakistan line in the UNSC. Initially, he did
not succeed in convincing the US representative of his stand, but gradually he
succeeded in doing so, largely as a result of the fast changing international geo-
political situation. With the cold war having set in, America now wanted to
maintain ‘balance of power’ in the post-War world.

With Pakistan already identified as an ally against Soviet expansionism in

south Asia, the U.S. decided to toe the British line on Kashmir. “The US State
Department’s Pakistan desk officer in 1949, excoriated India’s ‘inflexible
attitude with regard to Jammu and Kashmir’, suggesting, ‘National traits which
in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan’s successor in Asiatic
imperialism. In such circumstances, a strong Muslim block under the leadership
of Pakistan, friendly to US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South
Asia.’” Subsequent induction of Pakistan into the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and
86

SEATO can be explained as a direct result of this perception. Hal Gould, a South
Asian scholar at the University of Virginia, recently wrote, “America’s strategy
was its decision to nourish the Megalomaniacal fantasies of Pakistan’s anti-
democratic elites by sucking the country into its militarised cold war grand
strategy. Each infusion of anti-communist armaments reinforced the power of
Pakistan’s authoritarian ruling classes, fed their anti-Indian inferiority complex
and resulted in wars and a perpetual pattern of military provocations, state-
sponsored cross-border terrorism and the development of nuclear weapons.” 87

Pakistan exploited to the hilt the American phobia of Communism, which the
latter were convinced would engulf South Asia in its fold sooner than later.
Hussein Haqqani confirms this in his much acclaimed book, Pakistan; Between
Mosque and Military, wherein he states, “In one of its first overtly political
initiatives, Pakistan’s intelligence community fabricated evidence of a
Communist threat to Pakistan to get US attention.” 88

To further ingratiate itself with the US and receive their continued backing on
Kashmir, Pakistan had been concocting stories of the nascent Communist Party
of Pakistan making efforts to destabilise Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal writes in The
State of Martial Rule, “Since the ceasefire in Kashmir, the Joint Services
Intelligence (precursor of ISI) had been fabricating increasingly bizarre reports
about the fledgling Communist Party and its purported plans to destabilise
Pakistan.” This not only ensured US support to Pakistan on Kashmir but also
89

huge economic and military aid. Nevertheless, US could never get from Pakistan
what it desired, a landing site that was centrally positioned to take on both USSR
and China. The carrot of such offer was always dangled by Pakistani rulers, right
from Ayub Khan, in front of the drooling Americans. But they never got to eat it.
This trend became a norm for other Pakistani rulers. Haqqani further wrote, “The
United States had to be content with looking upon its investment in Pakistan as
one that would bear fruit only over time. Ayub Khan’s bargaining for greater
military and economic assistance became a norm for its successors.”

The Commonwealth Relation Office too formulated its own political

perspective of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, in keeping with its desire to
protect British interests. It was deeply influenced by the British Foreign Office’s
assessment of the emerging political crises in West Asia, at that time.

Keeping in mind the necessity of protecting its own geo-political interests,

Britain felt that handing over the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir, including
the Northern Areas, to India would not be in their interests. Thus, through their
own people placed in influential positions in India and UNO, they manipulated
events to suit their own vision. Creation of Pakistan, manipulating Nehru into
referring the Pakistani invasion in Kashmir to the UN and India offering the
Ceasefire Resolution; all flowed out of Britain’s desire to address its own geo-
political and geo-strategic concerns as stated above. The UN Resolutions
actually reflected how Britain wanted to reshape this part of the world to suit
their strategic interests, rather than being a fair adjudicator of the dispute,
resulting from Pakistan’s invasion of the state.

Though Mountbatten had played a significant role in furthering British

interests by convincing Nehru to take the case to UN, even he expressed his
reservations about the British stand on the issue in the UN. In one of his reports
he records, “Everybody here (in India) is now convinced that power politics and
not impartiality are governing the attitude of the Security Council… Indian
leaders counter this (attempt to dispel this conviction) by saying that the Anglo-
American block apparently attaches so high a value on the maintenance of
Muslim solidarity in the Middle East, that they are even ready to pay the price of
driving India out of the Commonwealth, into the arms of Russia…”

That the subsequent events did not exactly take place in the anticipated
manner reflects poorly on the myopic view of the British policy-makers, when
the empire was winding down. The consequences of their policy, on which they
wanted to shape the post-war world, have been quite contrary to their
expectations; the same area that British was instrumental in separating from
India, has turned into an irredentist and revisionist state and an epicentre of
Islamic terrorism, that threatens the same powers which created it in the first
place. Many years down the line, the same sentiment is reflected in a different
context by Premen Addy. Nearly sixty years after the events, he writes, “…
Meanwhile in the north and west of India was created an Army cantonment
called Pakistan where are today seeded myriad agonies that wait to blight
England’s once green and pleasant land. Islamic terrorism, incubated in the very
dominion whose seed was blessed with the holy water of the Raj, stalks the
United Kingdom. The bomb plot designed to destroy trans-Atlantic airliners in
mid flight and the long gaol sentence awarded to the plotters — Tanvir, Hussein,
Abdullah, Ahmed and Assad Sarwar — by London court, are further evidence of
the looming Pakistan bred Islamic monster…” 90

UN did not particularly cover itself with glory while deciding on the issue. By
not ordering the invader to vacate areas occupied by it as result of its naked
aggression, it legitimised such occupation by means of various resolutions that
neither reflected the facts of the case brought before it, nor any realistic
assessment based on the principle of natural justice and International law.
Acceptance of the UN Resolutions by India ensured the permanent division of
the state that would come to haunt it in the years to come. Accepting and
implementing the UN resolutions only to the extent these suited various
stakeholders, ensured that the seeds of abiding dispute were sown right then. The
state of Jammu and Kashmir remains divided between the two belligerents;
Pakistan has not reconciled itself to this position; India cannot let go of it, for
that will negate the very foundations of its nationhood. There are other interested
parties and the more the parties there are, more complicated becomes the
problem.

Although India had committed to the UN to hold a referendum in Jammu and

Kashmir, such an exercise was dependent on certain conditions which Pakistan
was required to fulfill; it was dependent on the withdrawal of invaders and
regular Pakistani troops from areas occupied by it. Pakistan did not honour that
commitment. People’s will had to be ascertained in the whole of the state once
“law and order had been restored”. With Pakistan firmly in control of a part of
the state, including the Northern Areas (now renamed Gilgit–Baltistan), there
was no way people’s will could be ascertained in an impartial manner. The
incontrovertible fact is that Pakistan never fulfilled a single commitment to
facilitate the process of a plebiscite. In due course of time, quite a number of
developments took place afterwards, which rendered the UN Resolutions
redundant and insignificant. This fact was acknowledged by none other than the
Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, who, during his visit to Pakistan and
India in 2003, categorically stated in front of the waiting newsmen that “UN
Resolutions of 1948 on Jammu and Kashmir had become irrelevant in the
changed situation.” Besides, whereas PoK continues to be ruled directly from
Islamabad, people in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir have freely taken
part in elections to choose their own government. Despite some of these
elections having been flawed (like in many other states of India), the fact
remains that many elections (1977, 2002 and 2008) in the state have been free
and fair, in which people participated in great numbers. Lately, the Panchayat
elections held in 2011, too recorded a very high voters’ turn-out.

Influential Leaders show Little Vision

Some important leaders exercised great influence on the political
developments concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir at this crucial
juncture in history. Their thinking, individual traits and their perceptions had far-
reaching consequences on the emerging scenario. Some of these leaders were
carried away by the rush of historical forces at play; while others turned into
mute spectators, waiting for the events to unfold. Some even became willing
accomplices and catalysts of events which created problems that defy solutions
to the present day.

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

Under Sheikh Abdullah, NC, had made deep inroads into the rural areas of
Kashmir and had a huge support base in the entire valley. However, it did not
enjoy much support in either Ladakh or Jammu. On August 15, 1947, Sheikh
Mohammed Abdullah and other NC leaders and workers were behind the bars.
They had been imprisoned for launching the “Quit Kashmir” movement against
the Maharaja. On persistent intervention of Mahatma Gandhi, who visited the
state from August 1 to 4, 1947, and other Congress leaders, the Sheikh and his
supporters were released on September 4, 1947. Prime Minister RC Kak became
the first casualty of this visit, when his services were terminated soon thereafter.
Whether Gandhi’s visit had anything to do with this development, cannot be
proved conclusively. Nevertheless, it was too much of a coincidence.

As mentioned earlier, Sheikh Abdullah had developed close rapport with the
leadership of Indian National Congress, particularly with Nehru, to whom he had
presented his NC as an anti-feudal mass movement, believing in the principles of
socialism and secularism. But his relations with Muslim League were
characterised by lack of trust, bordering on hostility. In fact, Sheikh Abdullah
perceived the growing influence of Muslim League among the Muslims of
Jammu region as a threat to his NC. Meanwhile, NC leaders, Ghulam
Mohammed Sadiq and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who were in Lahore in the
first week of October 1947, were asked to act as emissaries and contact Muslim
League leaders and communist supporters of Pakistan. As these two leaders had
good rapport with the latter, they were asked to bring about rapprochement
between Sheikh Abdullah and Mohammed Ali Jinnah. However, Jinnah and
Liaquat Ali Khan did not condescend to meet Sheikh Abdullah, due to their
existing strained relations with him. Writing about Jinnah’s attitude towards
91

him Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah writes in Atish-e-Chinar, “At that time Jinnah
was intoxicated by power. He thought it below his dignity to meet the
representative of a poor and resourceless nation. When this equation of power
went against him, he woke up in panic from his dream. But by this time the
snake had passed; only its line remained.” 92
 By leading a mass movement against the Dogra Maharaja, Sheikh Mohammad
Abdullah had consolidated his position as the most popular and important leader
in the Valley. His rise, nevertheless, had something to owe to the British, from
whom he had received enough encouragement and support against the Dogra
ruler. The British had their own reasons for creating problems for the Maharaja.
Hari Singh had taken a lead in the Chamber of Princes in the Round Table
Conference in England, to plead for Indian Independence. This stand of the
Maharaja had thoroughly annoyed the British. As a consequence, they were
instrumental in engineering an uprising against him in the Valley under the
leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. It was the first of its kind in the princely states.
Though, to the Congress, Sheikh Abdullah represented the leadership of the anti-
feudal forces, persistently fighting the feudal system of the Maharaja for almost
two decades, yet within the valley, the communal content and rhetoric of his
politics could scarcely be hidden.

At a more personal level, Sheikh Abdullah was dictatorial and brooked no

dissent. He treated his opponents not as political rivals but as enemies, who had
to be crushed. Many of his contemporaries felt that he looked at himself as some
kind of a Sheikh leading a Sheikhdom, much in vogue in the Arab world of that
period. Besides, having opposed the state’s accession to Islamic Pakistan, Sheikh
Abdullah tried his best, both by deed and word, to prove that he was more
Islamic than the Pakistan itself. In the process, he laid the foundations of Muslim
communalism becoming a state policy under the garb of so called secularism.

His shifting stands all through his life left everyone, particularly the
Kashmiris, in a state of limbo. While addressing a huge gathering of people at
Hazratbal on October 5, 1945, he gave expression to his desire to acede to India,
by stating, “…We cannot desire to join those (in Pakistan) who say that the
people must have no voice in the matter (referring to Jinnah’s opposition to let
people of princely states decide their future). We shall be cut to pieces before we
allow our alliance between this state and the people of this type…” At one stage
he even suggested to Nehru’s emissary, Gopalaswamy Iyenger, that his interim
government in the state be incorporated in the Constitution of India (Article 306
A- later Article 370) as a government in perpetuity. Later, when Pakistan was
insisting on replacing him as a pre-condition for holding an impartial plebiscite,
Sheikh Abdullah, who was member of the Indian delegation, said, rather
undiplomatically, “There is no power on earth which can displace me from the
position which I have there. As long as people are behind me, I will be there.
The dispute arises when it is suggested that, in order to have free vote, the
administration must be changed. To that suggestion, we say – No.” His 93

psychological aberrations pushed him into a web of contradictions. His political

moods changed rapidly with devastating consequences.

By now, Sheikh Abdullah’s anti-Pakistan stance was so pronounced that chief

of Pakistan’s delegation, Sir Zaffar Ullah Khan, referred to his (Sheikh’s)
assertion (“We shall prefer death rather than join Pakistan. We shall have
nothing to do with such a country”) as a justification to reject holding plebiscite
while Sheikh was running the administration of the state. No wonder, one of
India’s most renowned and respected journalists of that era, Frank Moraes had as
early as 1951, noted, “Power had gone to Sheikh Abdullah’s head. He struck me
as a highly egocentric individual… He talked disdainfully of New Delhi… I
have a feeling that even at that time, his mind was moving towards independence
for the Valley of Kashmir, with himself as the Kashmiri equivalent of the Grand
Moghul.” 94

Sheikh Abdullah had at no stage questioned the legality of accession nor had
he justified Pakistan’s aggression, which resulted in the present dispute. On the
other hand he was quite categorical on both issues. In 1948, Sheikh Abdullah,
with Nehru by his side, recited the following Persian verse, in front of thousands
of Kashmiris in the heart of Srinagar at Lal Chowk: “Man Tu Shudi, Tu Man
Shudi; Ta Kas Na Goyad, Man Dekram Tu Degri” (I became you and you
became I; so none can say we are separate). He reiterated the same in May 1949,
while addressing himself to Nehru in Srinagar. He said, “I want you to believe
that Kashmir is yours. No power in the world can separate us. Every Kashmiri
feels that he is an Indian and that India is his homeland.” Speaking in the
95

Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly on November 5, 1951, he said, “…

Firstly, was Pakistan’s action in invading Kashmir in 1947 morally and legally
correct, judged by any norm of international behavior? Sir Owen Dixon’s verdict
on this issue is perfectly plain. In unambiguous terms he declared Pakistan the
aggressor. Secondly, was the Maharaja’s accession to India legally valid or not?
Legality of accession has not been seriously questioned by any responsible or
independent authority…”

Speaking about the arrival of Indian military forces in Kashmir, Sheikh

Abdullah is on record to have stated, “When for the first time people of Srinagar
saw the incoming planes from India and the tanks of the Indian Army passing
through the streets here, their disappointment and anguish was turned into joy
and happiness. The people here, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, heaved a sigh of
relief, knowing that their honour and dignity could now be safeguarded. We
must not forget that time…” One day he would assert that the relationship
established between Kashmir and India was irreversible by categorically stating
that the relationship was “irrevocable and no force on earth can render us
asunder.” The next day, his ambivalence would be all too apparent. Sheikh
96

Abdullah, on whose assurance and support Nehru agreed to accept the accession,
turned hostile even before the ink had dried on the Instrument of Accession. He
reneged on almost all issues on which he had assured Nehru and Sardar Patel,
personally. His shifting and alarming stance can be gauged from what he said in
March 1952, “…neither the Indian Parliament nor any other Parliament outside
the State has any jurisdiction over our State…” A few days after he had said
97

this, he came out with another astounding proposition suggesting that “India and
Pakistan could again get re-united and becoming one country,” with Kashmir
98

serving as a bridge between the two. In fact, he shoulders the greatest

responsibility for preventing the state’s integration with the rest of the country.
Unfortunately for India, he alone had the stature and authority to do that. But he
chose prevarication and ambivalence, with grave consequences for all
concerned. India could not do much, as Nehru had put all his eggs in NC’s
basket, controlled firmly by Sheikh Abdullah.

Having earned the unquestioned loyalty of his people, Sheikh Abdullah

became dictatorial and intolerant of dissent. He fell victim to the manipulations
of international power-play. Sheikh Abdullah’s inconsistent stand, which
resulted from his political opportunism, got him entangled into a web of
contradictions. These contradictions created grave political instability in
Kashmir and mistrust between India and Pakistan. In due course, this trust deficit
led to lack of confidence between the two neighbouring countries, which
prevented rapprochement between the two. Complexity involved in resolving the
Kashmir dispute has a lot to do with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s attitude
during those crucial days.

The story of Sheikh Abdullah is that of a “patriot, once passionately devoted

to his people’s welfare, but one whose patriotism was too shallow to reject the
temptations of power. Once a fighter, he turned into an opportunist and, worse, a
dictator who at the end found himself entangled in the web of his own methods
and policy” . It is conceded even by his admirers, that he died a bitter man.
99

Maharaja Hari singh

 Due to their eccentric behavoiur and lavish life style — while their subjects
eked out a miserable poverty-stricken lives — a large number of princes, rajas,
nawabs and maharajas, ruling various states had become a butt of ridicule among
their subjects and were viewed with derision. But Maharaja Hari Singh did not
fall into this category. He was a man of great Rajput character, possessing true
royal dignity. Born on September 23, 1895 at Jammu; Hari Singh was son of
Raja Amar Singh, brother of Maharaja Pratap Singh. The latter had no children
and hence Hari Singh ascended to the throne. Having studied in Mayo College,
Ajmer, he had been exposed to the modern values and liberal British thought.
From his early days as a ruler, he displayed a reformist streak while
administering his state. He respected all religions and treated people of different
castes and faiths equally. In his first public speech after ascending to the throne
in 1925, he said, “If I am considered worth governing this state, then I will say
that for me all communities, religions and races are equal. As a ruler I have no
religion… All religions are mine and my religion is ‘Justice.’” He introduced
100

several reforms in economic, social, legal, educational and agricultural fields.

The ‘Agricultural Relief Act’ that he enacted set free thousands of peasants
and rural poor from the clutches of moneylenders and creditors. Similarly, the
‘Land Alienation Act’ bestowed ownership rights on the tiller. Through this
‘Act’ the landless were also given ownership rights over state land. The forced
labour called begaar (n. 13, p. 47) was totally abolished. The department of rural
development established in 1937, was made responsible for implementing plans
for rural development. He established industries which utilised raw materials
available within the state for manufacturing various goods. By exempting these
industries from various taxes, he ensured that their produce remained
competitive in the market. The goods manufactured included matchboxes,
carpets, tents, woodwork articles, silk yarn and tannery products. By setting up
emporia in Srinagar and Jammu, he provided ready markets for the traders. He
got tourist facilities developed at some tourist resorts, like Pahalgam and
Gulmarg. By establishing the Jammu and Kashmir Bank, which took over the
functions of the state treasury, he took a path-breaking step. With its branches at
many places in the state, the bank played a crucial role in the state’s economy in
the years to come. He also provided essential food items at controlled prices to
the poor through rationing; when World War II created their scarcity. Thus
Maharaja Hari Singh did his best to improve the economic condition of his
subjects.

Health care in the state, which at that time was rather rudimentary and mainly
taken care of by the foreign missionaries with their limited resources, also
attracted his attention. In 1943, he opened Sri Maharaja Gulab Singh (SMGS)
Hospital in Jammu, and in 1945, Sri Maharaja Hari Singh (SMHS) Hospital at
Srinagar. With a capacity of 320 beds, it was arguably the biggest hospital in the
country at that time. With tuberculosis taking a heavy toll of life during those
days, he established a separate Tuberculosis Department for better management
of the disease. To prevent recurrence of outbreak of cholera epidemic, which had
killed many people in 1935, The Maharaja got a special branch opened in the
Public Health Department, whose specific task was to provide potable water to
the people. He also got a large number of tanks constructed, and bore-wells dug
up for this purpose.

Realising that education would determine the future of the state’s population,
he made primary education compulsory for all children in 1930. A large number
of schools were opened in many towns under this scheme. These were called
Jabri (compulsory) schools locally. In addition, education till secondary level,
was made free. Deserving students from poor families were selected by
scholarship selection boards for grant of scholarships.

The Maharaja seemed fully conscious of the age old social evils that has been
the bane of India from times immemorial. He introduced reforms in his
administration to address these issues; prominent among these being
untouchability, female infanticide, trafficking of women and child marriage.
Two committees established in 1926 and 1929 to address the menace of female
infanticide recommended severe action against the guilty. Similarly, through an
ordinance, the lawful age for marriage was fixed at 14 and 18 for girls and boys
respectively. Legislation to declare prostitution and other social evils illegal, was
introduced. Dhandevi Memorial Fund was established for performing the
marriage of poor girls. To encourage widow remarriage, he removed certain
legal provisions which encouraged this social evil.

He fought the evil of untouchability by taking bold steps. In 1932, he

permitted access to all schools, colleges and wells to ‘untouchables’. The doors
of temples were thrown open to them on November 2, 1932. In 1941, as a logical
culmination of this process of reform, untouchability was declared a crime. To
set a personal example; the Maharaja took the lead by worshipping Harijan 101

girls during Navratras. Another sensitive reform he introduced in the state was
102

to bring Rajputs and Brahmans at par as far as the application of laws of the state
were concerned. Prior to his reign, people belonging to these two communities
could not be handed out death sentences. He removed this disparity by making
capital punishment equally applicable to them also. Maharaja Hari Singh treated
his Muslim subjects with with care and dignity. In the princely states, his
administration was among the best. He never treated Muslims of the state as a
‘purchased commodity’ as Sheikh Abdullah and other Kashmiri Muslims were
apt to call him. Personal lives of Dogra rulers were also above board.

The Maharaja, as the head of the civil administration and commander-in-chief

of the army, was a repository of all powers. However, many constraints had been
imposed on him by the British. Being the paramount power, the British exercised
their veto through the Crown Representative, called the British Resident. This
had severely curtailed the Maharaja’s powers. As long as the British ruled India,
the Maharaja could not even appoint his own prime minister, without the
approval of the Viceroy. To complicate matters further, he was a poor political
negotiator, unlike his great-grandfather, Maharaja Gulab Singh. Indeed, at this
point in time, the Maharaja was clearly on the wrong side of history. He found
himself in quite a bind, having burnt his boats with all those who mattered. On
the one hand, The Muslim League leaders did not trust him, and on the other,
Kashmiri masses led by Sheikh Abdullah had been fighting his rule for the past
two decades. He had some support in Jammu region as he was considered one of
their own. But the popular mood among the majority of the population in his
state had, irrevocably, turned against him. He could never see eye to eye with
Jawahar Lal Nehru, who had all along supported his nemesis, Sheikh Abdullah.
His dislike for Sheikh and Nehru was therefore mutual and permanent.

He also faced the scourge of the paramountcy. Hari Singh had rebuffed
Mountbatten, the first Governor General of the Dominion of India, as “Hari
Singh had refused to abide by Mountbatten’s advice to join Pakistan.
Mountbatten, as later events proved, had not forgotten the slight Hari Singh had
caused to him. The Maharaja did not allow himself to be arraigned before the
man, who had spared no efforts to push his state into Pakistan.” Therefore, at
103

critical moments, he found himself totally abandoned and isolated.

The Maharaja was faced with another dilemma. According to his thinking,
acceding to India would mean sharing with or handing over power to his arch
enemy, Sheikh Abdulla. If he acceded to Pakistan, he was sure that the position
of minorities under the rule of Muslim theocratic government would be
intolerable. Also, he was under tremendous pressure from Hindus of the state,
not to accede to Pakistan. Left to himself, he would have, like many other rulers
of princely states acceded to India in good time. But the advice rendered by
Mountbatten, Nehru and other Congress leaders to the effect that the
Government of India would not object to his acceding to Pakistan, was a broad
hint to him to actually do so. This unsolicited advice created further confusion in
his mind. For him, the only alternative left was to remain independent. This led
to his prevarication and indecision, which in due course, played an important
role in the creation of ‘Kashmir problem’. His misfortune lay in the fact that he
was fated, as many kings before him, to preside over the dissolution of his own
empire over which he exercised little control.

Jawahar Lal Nehru

Nehru strode India like a colossus. At the time of independence, the
mysterious death of Subash Chandra Bose in an air crash in 1945, had removed
one of the two persons who could come in the way of his becoming independent
India’s first prime minister. The formidable Sardar Patel, was neutralised by
Gandhi by making known his preference for Nehru. Nevertheless, Sardar’s
presence in Nehru’s cabinet as his deputy prime minister, also holding the home
portfolio, did, to some extent, act as a check on Nehru’s romantic idealism. But
the Sardar did not live long enough and his exit from the scene in the early years
of Nehru’s rule, removed even that moderating influence on Nehru. Gandhi’s
death, before that, had removed from the scene the only person who could rein in
Nehru.

As the darling of Indian masses, who was synonymous with the long struggle
for independence alongwith Gandhi, Nehru enjoyed absolute power in running
the affairs of the Republic. Partition of the country, communal holocaust and the
history’s greatest mass exodus that followed it, Gandhi’s death and Pakistani
invasion in October 1947, could have tested even the best of leaders, leave alone
an inexperienced leader of a newly independent country. Nehru faced these and
many other challenges in his life with courage and weathered every storm
effectively. Justifiably, he is considered the builder of modern India. In his life
time and after, he received great admiration from every corner of the globe.
Undoubtedly, he was one of the most remarkable persons of twentieth century.
Speaking at the 23 Jawahar Lal Nehru Memmorial IFFCO (Indian Farmers and
rd

Fertilizers Corporation) lecture, Dr Karan Singh said of him, “Nehru was a

unique personality of twentieth century — an ardent freedom fighter, a
competent administrator, a planner and a visionary thinker, an author and a
world statesman, who had left behind a remarkable legacy.” Nehru, indeed,
104
was all that and much more.

Nehru, however, was not pragmatic enough in his approach to international

affairs. His handling of Kashmir and China left much to be desired. Indus Water
Treaty, which he signed during his visit to Karachi on September 19, 1960, was
nothing short of a sell-out, as it deprived us of our legitimate rights over the
waters of Indus, Jhelum and Chenab for generation of hydroelectricity,
navigation and irrigation. This agreement was signed despite Pakistan’s
unilateral abrogation of River Waters Treaty of May 1948. Nehru himself
confessed as much, when on November 30, 1960, he stated in parliament, “We
purchased a settlement if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is
good for both countries.” Much after he left the scene, generations of Indians
have known no peace whatsoever. About China, Nehru was, clearly off the mark
by a mile. At one point, he said, “It is not easy to imagine even any aggression…
from that great country, China.” 105

One of the classic examples of his flawed judgement was the manner in which
he dealt with China, as far as Tibet was concerned. Close links that existed
between India (through Jammu and Kashmir) and Xinjiang are well-known.
Aksai Chin plateau, which is as big as Switzerland, was always part of Kashmir,
long before Xinjiang became part of China, during the Manchu rule. The title of
Dogra rulers of Jammu and Kashmir, right uptil the last Maharaja, Hari Singh,
clearly mentions this. The close relationship between India and Xinjiang has
106

been well-established by explorations of Aurial Stien who called it Serindia;

seres being China’s old name. His collection of archeological evidence clearly
points to the fact that Buddhism had undoubtedly traveled there from Kashmir
Valley. In fact, Hinduism, Buddhism, Kharoshti and Sanskrit, that thrived here,
were all India’s contribution to Xinjiang. Kanishka (see chapter-1), the
celebrated Kushan King who ruled Kashmir in 100 BCE and whose empire
spread till Mathura, came from Xinjiang. Ashok Malik writes, “Over centuries,
India and China have rarely cross-fertilised. At two points they did intersect —
Xinjiang (Serindia) in the west and Vietnam-Cambodia region (Indo-China) in
the east.”107

During the British rule, from 1890 onwards, India had its own consulate at
Kashgar, its main trading hub, which fell on the famed silk route. The head of
the consulate, a member of the Indian Political Service, used to report to the
Viceroy’s Council and not to Britain. The arrangement continued till as late as
1951; for four years after the British had left. It was during the tenure of Sir
George Macarteny in 1904, that he was granted full diplomatic recognition.
Before that, he was named as the Special Assistant for Chinese Affairs for the
British Resident in Kashmir. The Consulate served the purpose of acting as eyes
and ears of the British government for keeping a close watch on Russians in the
Great Game (see n. 17, p. 133). Its other important function was to assist the
Indian traders there as trade between India and Xinjiang flourished those days.
How the Indian consulates in Kashgar and Lhasa got closed despite such close
relationship is again a tragic story.

It can be attributed to Nehru’s lack of understanding and appreciation of

India’s geo-strategic compulsions. The Chinese Prime Minister had given a
verbal assurance to Nehru that friendly China would take care of India’s
interests. “The closure was the precursor to the stealthy construction of
Karakoram Highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet and the formal occupation of
Aksai Chin.” All this happened due to the policy of appeasement adopted by
108

Nehru towards both, Pakistan and China. This is confirmed when Nehru refused
the US offer to India of a permanent seat in the UNSC, which till then had been
held by Taiwan. In Shashi Tharoor’s words, “He (Nehru) insisted that the seat be
given to China.” Nehru’s preposterous reason for declining the offer was that he
did not want US to marginalise China. Incidentally, in the UNSC, it was
Nationalist Chinese delegation (representing Taiwan at that time) that came to
India’s rescue on number of occasions during the Kashmir debate, despite the
fact that India was and continued to be in the forefront of unseating it and
replacing it by communist China.

During the debate in the UN on Korean war too, when the UN branded China
an aggressor, India refused to go along with the world body, on the specious plea
that it will serve no purpose. After helping China in getting a permanent seat in
the Security Council, how did China pay back the debt of gratitude? It invaded
us in 1962; it strongly opposed and continues to oppose a similar seat for India.
Such hostile Chinese policy continues to the present day; perhaps, a direct result
of the policy of appeasement followed by Nehru.

Nehru ran India’s foreign policy according to his own vision, based more on
his own view point rather than on the national consensus on India’s vital
strategic interests. Krishna Menon says in his autobiography, “We had no
precedent to fall back on because India had no foreign policy of her own until
she became independent… our policy therefore necessarily rested on the
intuition of one man, who was Foreign Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru.” The 109
British took full advantage of Nehru’s discomfort with politico-military affairs
and succeeded in manipulating him in the manner that suited their interests.
According to Lieutenant General EA Vas, “Nehru hoped to create a world where
nations, instead of forming groups to act against each other, would learn to
eschew conflict and settle their disputes in a peaceful manner. He felt that India,
with its philosophy and idealistic past, could provide a lead in this direction. He
placed his faith in UNO. Overlying his idealism was his hatred for war and of all
things military. Thus his intellectual make-up lacked an important dimension; he
gave no deep thought to politico-military matters. This prevented him from
making sound security decisions.” Nehru’s thinking permeated the whole
110

Congress Party, which chose to follow Nehruvian model that lacked appreciation
and understanding of India’s strategic interests. The British found it easy to deal
with Congress leaders when it came to protecting/furthering their own geo-
political interests.

After the accession of the state to India, Nehru had to repeatedly give in to
Sheikh Abdullah’s intransigence and arm-twisting, because India had nowhere to
go. Nehru had ignored the Maharaja as the legitimate representative of the
people of the state, who alone had the powers of signing the Instrument of
Accessions, as per the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Nehru had thoughtlessly
brought Sheikh Abdullah into the deal by bestowing on him the status of
representing his people. The Sheikh had neither asked for any such favour nor
was he an elected representative of his people. Such unique authority was
bestowed on him by Nehru, and by implication, by the Government of India. To
complicate the matters further, Nehru gave assurances which lacked legal
sanction and were too complicated to be implemented. Writes Sandhya Jain,
“Nehru, like Burbon, forgot nothing and learnt nothing. For reasons that defy
cogent analysis, the Maharaja’s accession was not treated as final, at par with the
accession by other princes. The Hindu king of the critical state was treated like a
pariah and a dangerous concept of ‘Muslim precedence’ was granted to this
Muslim majority region, laying foundations for the erosion of India’s
civilisational ethos in the critical Himalayan frontier, and subsequently across
the land…” 111

Jinnah
Jinnah’s strength lay in his intellectual brilliance and force of his arguments.
When carried out along narrow lines, he turned himself into a formidable
political opponent. He was the face of Muslim League and an undisputed leader
of the newly emerged Pakistan. A decade before independence, no one could
have imagined that a new nation, Pakistan, would be a reality in such a short
time; but here it was. Its coming into being was a tribute to Jinnah’s persistence
and dogged determination to see it through. All those who subscribed to his
viewpoint looked up to him as the chief protagonist of their independent country.
Allama Iqbal described him as “The only Muslim in India today to whom the
community has a right to look for safe guidance…” But the forces let loose by
112

Jinnah’s confrontationist policy, executed through ‘Direct Action’, based on

purely communal agenda, played havoc with both Hindus and Muslims. After
partition, there was little trust left between the two nations to resolve the
complicated Jammu and Kashmir problem, through mutual dialogue and a spirit
of give and take. Pakistan complicated the problem further by launching its
invasion to wrest the state by force. It foreclosed any option of negotiated
settlement of the state’s accession by opting for military solution that ruined its
own case. Whatever chances there still existed to resolve the issue, even after
this conflict was over, were permanently buried in the UN, that worked more as
a handmaiden of Britain and its allies, rather than as a neutral judge.

Jinnah, therefore, played no small role in creating the Kashmir imbroglio. His
successors have kept up the tradition.

Others
The other influential leaders whose politics impacted the developments in
Kashmir were, Mirwaiz Maulvi Yousuf Shah, Chaudhary Abbas and Ghulam
Ahmed Dar who made Islam and, therefore, Pakistan, as their rallying cry.
Yousuf Shah, as the religious head of a segment of population mainly residing in
downtown Srinagar, had a fanatical following. They were antagonistic to both
NC and Congress and close to the ideology of Muslim League. Chaudhary
Abbas, who at one time was close to Sheikh Abdullah, broke off from him after
Sheikh Abdullah formed the NC. He now headed MC. His party had little
influence in the valley, though it had gained some strength among the Muslims
of Jammu region due to its affinity with Jinnah’s Muslim League. Subsequently,
he went to PoK, where he headed the so-called ‘Azad Kashmir Government’, till
1951, when he resigned.

Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, who had raised the banner of revolt in Jammu
earlier, too became an important voice in the PoK, later. However, both he and
Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas became strong critics of Pakistan for lack of
democracy prevailing in PoK. Ghulam Ahmed Dar, alongwith Syed Shahabudin,
had established Jammat-e-Islami (JeI) at Shopian, three years after the creation
of NC. Though JeI of Kashmir was not part of JeI of India, it had the potential to
incite religious passions, whenever the situation demanded. In due course of
time, all the three above mentioned parties/persons became Pakistan’s proxy in
the state, to be put to use whenever the need was felt. Despite little support in the
state, their fortunes rose and fell to keep pace with the fortunes of Pakistan, their
mentor across the border. Their leader was Jinnah.

Refugees: The Inevitable By-products of War

The 1947–48 war, like any other war before or after it, was not devoid of its
human dimension. Number of people turned refugees overnight, with Pakistan
becoming home to nearly 525,000 refugees (3,75,000 of these in PoK) and India
receiving 226,000 (181,000 in Jammu and Kashmir). Hindu and Sikhs refugees
faced great difficulties. Those who fled from areas of the state, which now came,
under Pakistan’s occupation, were never rehabilitated. They left behind
everything at places they fled from and received nothing when they crossed over
to this side of the state. On the other hand, huge estates and properties left
behind by those Muslims who chose to migrate to PoK and Pakistan, were taken
over by the state government. Over a period of time, these were handed over to
Muslims or the trusts owned by them, surreptitiously. The Hindus and Sikhs
were left high and dry despite the fact that properties and temple estates left
behind by them in Pakistan and PoK, were taken over by the Muslims there or
appropriated by the Pakistan government.

A large number of religious places were put to mundane use by razing these to
the ground. Even worse was the fate of those who had migrated to the Jammu
and Kashmir state from that part of Punjab which had now become part of
Pakistan. These refugees had been provided shelter by the Maharaja during the
communal holocaust of 1947. After the Maharaja was removed from the scene,
Sheikh Abdullah did not permit thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from
Pakistan and PoK to settle in Kashmir in 1947–48. Even today, they are
stateless, not even counted among the state population. On the other hand,
Muslim refugees coming from far and wide were all received by the state
administration with open arms and quietly settled in the state. These included
refugees from Tibet and Xinjiang, (where they had migrated two centuries ago),
those from PoK, who had trickled into the border districts of Jammu region
during the 1965 and 1971 wars, and Afghan refugees who had settled in the
Valley at the end of World War II. As a matter of fact, most of the cadres of
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in the
Jammu region were provided by these refugees, when militancy spread to this
region in the middle of 1990s. Their resettlement and rehabilitation in the state
was done to sustain and further strengthen the dominance of Muslims in the
demographic composition of the state. Between 1947 and 1950, thousands of
Dogra Rajputs and Punjabi speaking businessmen were forced to leave the
valley, despite the fact that they had been living in Kashmir for over ten decades.
During the same period, assistance was provided to a large number of Muslim
refugees from Sinkiang and adjoining areas to settle in the valley.

N OTES

1. Ramkrishen Bhat, Kashmir News Network (KNN); downloaded from ‘[email protected]

on May 17, 2008.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Opening address by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah,
November 5, 1951, (Craxton Press, New Delhi), p. 14. Reproduced in Danger in Kashmir, p. 22.
6. Ibid.
7. Constituted by the princes at Delhi in 1921. Its members comprised of 108 rulers and 12 other
delegates, representing 127 minor States.
8. Lt Gen Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL (Retd) and Lt Gen (Dr.) M.L Chhiber, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd),
Jammu and Kashmir Problem: The Truth, Part II, USI Journal April-June 1997 and July-September
1997.
9. Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, (New York: EP Dutton and Co., Inc., 1953), p. 140.
10. Philip Zeigler: Biography of Mountbatten, quotes Lord Birdwood’s Article in International Affairs Vol
XXXVIII, No 3 (July 1952).
11. M Asghar Khan in Dawn — reproduced in The Times of India, “Kashmir: The Only Solution” — letter
from Pakistan.
12. Speeches of Lord Mountbatten, Time Only to Look Forward, (London, Nicolson Kaye, 1949), pp. 268–
69.
13. Walter Crocker, Nehru, A Contemporary Estimate (Random House, 1965).
14. n. 5. pp. 15–16.
15. Narinder Singh Sarilla, Untold Story of India’s Partition, (Harper Collin, New Delhi, 2005), pp. 15–16.
16. Lt Gen Sir James Wilson and Lt Gen (Dr.) ML Chhiber, n. 8.
17. Narinder Singh Sarilla, n. 15, pp. 194–195.
18. Ibid.
19. Smith, The Oxford History of India, quoted by Joseph Korbel in Danger in Kashmir (Oxford University
Press, 2002).
20. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Jamal-ud-din Ahmad, (ed), (Kashmir Bazaar,
Lahore, 1942). Quoted in Joseph Korbel’s Danger in Kashmir p. 26 (Oxford University, London,
1952), p 26.
21. Jawahar Lal Nehru: The Discovery of India, (John Day Company, London, 1946), p. 355.
22. Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, p. 128 (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 128.
23. M Asghar Khan, Kashmier, “The Only Solution,” Dawn (Pakistan), reproduced in the The Times of
India, letter from Pakistan.
24. Dr MK Teng, Kashmir Sentinel, December 2006 and March 2007.
25 Joseph Korbel, n. 22.
26. KH Khursheed Memories of Jinnah, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1990) and audio recording of
discussions on BBC on November 25, 1999, in the series “Conflicting opinion in Jammu and
Kashmir” — participants were Prof Alistair Lamb, author of ‘Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy’, Sir Mark
Tully and Dr Waqar Ahmed of BBC, Urdu Service.
27. Ibid.
28. AG Noorani, Frontline, November 27, 1992, in review of Alistair Lamb’s Kashmir: A Disputed
Legacy.
29. Lt Gen Sir James Wilson and Lt Gen (Dr.) ML Chhiber n. 8.
30. Ibid., Part I.
31. Lt Gen Gul Hassan; Memoirs (Karach: Oxford University Press, 1995). Lt Gen Gul Hassan had
recently relinquished the appointment of ADC to Jinnah, but was again asked to act as Jinnah’s ADC
during the Latter’s visit there.
32. Lt Gen Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL (Retd) and Lt Gen (Dr.) M.L Chhiber, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd),
n. 8.
33. Ibid.
34. Tariq had been a Moore General who had led the Muslim forces in Spain, over a thousand years ago.
Maj Gen Mohamad Akbar Khan, DSO, subsequently rose to the high office of Pakistan’s Chief of
Army Staff. However, later he was imprisoned for his anti-government activities.
35. Robert Montague, Modern Nations and Islam, Foreign Affairs, July, 1952, p. 581, Quoted by Joseph
Korbel in his book, Danger in Kashmir (Oxford University Press, London,1952) p. 75.
36. DF Karaka, Betrayal in India, (Victor Collanz, London, 1950) (this is a quote from pamphlet by K
Ahmad Abbas, named Kashmir Fights for Freedom: Kutub.
37. Joseph Korbel, n. 22, p. 76.
38. Mohammad Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi, Pakistan Publishers, 1970) and his interview
with Brig AA Sidiquee in Defence Journal (Karachi) Jun-July 1985.
39. Andrew Whitehead: How Kashmir Crises Began - Mission in Kashmir (Penguin, 2007).
40. Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd): USI Journal, July-September, 2008. References (218–221 are also taken
from the same source).
41. White Paper on Kashmir: Government of India, 26 February 1948, New Delhi, History Division, MoD
File No 601/14189/H, p 47.
42. Ibid., p. 87.
43. Ibid., p. 55.
44. Ibid., p. 115.
45. Appendix ‘A’ — J&K Div ISUM (Intelligence Summary), No. 43 for the period from 29 August to 08
September. (USI Journal, July- September, 2008).
46. Sisir Gupta: Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan relations, p. 125 (Asia Publishing House, New Delhi,
1966).
47. Prem Shankar Jha: Rival Versions of History, (Oxford University Press, 1996).
48. Campbell Johnson, n. 9., p. 224.
49. Ibid., p. 225.
50. Ibid.
51. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 89.
52. Dr AS Anand, retired Chief Justice of India: The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.
53. Andrew Whitehead, n. 39.
54. Lt Gen SK Sinha, A Soldier Remembers.
55. Andrew Whitehead, n. 39, and discussion on BBC, 26 October, 2007.
56. Vincent Shean: Nehru: Ten Years of Power (Random House, New York, 1959).
57. Maj Gen Mohammad Akbar Khan: Raiders in Kashmir, (Pakistan Publishers, Karachi, 1970).
58. Defence Journal Karachi, June–July 1985.
59. Gen Musa, Jawan to General: Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier (ABC Publishers, New Delhi 1985).
60. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 130.
61. Col SK Bose: USI Journal, July-September 2003, Volume XXXIII No 553.
62. Lt Gen Sir James Wilson, KBE, MC, DL (Retd) an Lt Gen (Dr.) M.L Chhiber, PVSM, AVSM, (Retd),
n. 8.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Air Marshal KC Karriappa (Retd), Biography of Field Marshal KM Karriappa (Prabhat Prakashan,
2009).
66. Major General Hira Lal Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir, (Army Education Store, New Delhi,
1972), pp. 146–147.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Joseph Koebel, n. 22., p. 147.
71. Ibid., p. 131.
72. Ibid., p. 130.
73. DR MK Teng; Kashmir Sentinel, December, 2006 and March, 2007.
74. Captain SK Tikoo (Retd), “Sardar Patel — The Bismarck of India.” Koshur Samachar, December,
2010.
75. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 136.
76. He was a leading statesman and former Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who later headed the
Indian delegation to the United Nations.
77. Kashmir Problems (1952–1992)- Unsolved-Unattended: Iona Enterprise, New Delhi, July 30, 1992.
78. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 117.
79. One of the clauses of this Agreement states, “That the two countries are resolved to settle their
differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means agreed
upon between them…”
80. Edward H Sutherland, Russian Projects against India (Remington and Company, London, 1885), pp.
34-36.
81. Command Paper 2895: referred to by Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 47.
82. Delhi Express, September 8, 1952.
83. Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg: On the Way to Golden Harvest, (Government of Jammu and Kashmir),
pp. 4–5).
84. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., pp. 19-20. Refering to Rajbans Krishan.
85. Ibid.
86. Premen Eddy, Pioneer, March 14, 2008.
87. Qouted by Chidanand Rajaghatha, The Times of India.
88. Hussein Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2005).
89. Ayesha Jalal, State of Martial Rule - The State of Pakistan’s Economy of Defence. (Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
90. Premen Addy, Pioneer, September 28, 2009.
91. According to C. Bilqees Taseer, wife of Prof M D Taseer, a top Muslim League member and author of,
The Kashmir of Sheikh Abdullah, even Sheikh Abdullah had secretly visited Lahore around the same
time to seek an appointment with Jinnah. But Jinnah refused to meet the Sheikh, saying, “ I don’t
need to meet this man. Kashmir is in my pocket. Who is Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah? I am prepared
to discuss Kashmir only with Maharaja or a senior government official from Kashmir.” Kashmir
 Sentinel, December, 2006.
92. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Atish-e-Chinar (Ali Mohammad and Sons, Srinagar, 1986).
93. Security Council Official Records, Third Year. Nos; 16–35, pp. 23–25.
94. Frank Moraes, Witness to an Era. (Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973).
95. Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Oxford University Press, 1952) p. 206.
96. Speech in the State Constituent Assembly on April 14, 1952.
97. Joseph Korbel, n. 22., p. 206.
98. The Hindu, April 12, 1952.
99. Joseph Korbel, n. 22.
100. VK Wattal: Koshur Samachar, July 2010, p. 23.
101. This is the name given to ‘Untouchables’ by Mahatma Gandhi. Harijan is combination of two words:
Hari - one of Lord Krishna’s many names and Jan, meaning people. When combined, it means
people of the God.
102. Nine days devoted to the worship of Goddess Durga. The event which falls in October-November
every year is named and celebrated differently in various parts of India.
103. Ram Kishen Bhat: Kashmir News Network (KNN): downloaded from [email protected]
on May 17, 2008.
104. Pioneer, November 21, 2010.
105. The New York Times, February 11, 1954.
106. Maharaja Hari Sigh’s official title as it appears in the ‘Instrument of Accession’ was-“Shriman Indar
Mahandar Rajrajeshwar Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet
adi Deshadhipati”.
107. Ashok Malik, Pioneer, July 11, 2009.
108. Swapan Dasgupta, The Times of India, November 2009.
109. Pioneer, February 16, 2010.
110. Role of Armed Forces in a Democracy: A Review of 50 years of Politico-Military Decision-Making:
USI Journal, October-December 1998.
111. Sandhya Jain, Pioneer, January 5, 2010.
112. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, (Kashmir Bazaar, Lahore), p. 19.
 ARTICLE 370
“There is nothing sacrosanct about Article 370”.
—Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

Maharaja Hari Singh signed the standard ‘Instrument of Accession’ on October

26, 1947, which other rulers too had signed. Therefore, he was bound by the
same obligations as other states. All such states reserved the right to convene
their own Constituent Assemblies, in order to formulate their own respective
constitutions. Indeed, Mysore and Saurashtra States’ Union did institute such
Constituent Assemblies. After Sheikh Abdullah and other NC leaders were
released from jail (nearly two months after the British had left), they did not
specify any conditionality that would, in any way, impinge upon the state’s
accession to India. The only condition they had laid was to ensure that the “State
power be handed over to the people — a condition to which the Government of
India had already committed itself.” Therefore, the subsequent assertion by
1

some vested interests that the NC had agreed to a conditional accession of the
state to India is a distortion of history. The contention of these vested interests
that the state had been assured of its autonomous status due to its Muslim
majority was an afterthought and pure fabrication. No assurances on any such
special provision were either sought or given.

Matters concerning the accession became complicated as the British were

keen to protect some of the powers and privileges of the princes after the
former’s withdrawal from India. Therefore, Lord Mountbatten had convinced the
Indian political leadership to accept the accession of the States based on the
Cabinet Mission Plan. This envisaged only defence, communication and external
affairs being handed over to the Union, leaving a vast segment of residuary
constitutional powers with the princes. This emboldened Pakistan, which went a
step further and “expressed its willingness to accept accession on just two
counts, i.e., defence and foreign affairs and leaving communication as well as
state troops, within the control of the states!” 2

The integration of the states into the Indian Union was not as smooth as
anticipated. Even the constitution of Constituent Assemblies of the states was
delayed. Finally, in May 1949, a conference was held in Delhi to smoothen the
process. This conference was attended by prime ministers of the states and the
Negotiating Committee of the Constituent Assembly. The Conference decided to
entrust the Constituent Assembly of India with the task of drawing up the
constitution of the states. Consequently, during a separate meeting on May 14,
1949, attended by Jawaharlal Lal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Sheikh Abdullah and
some officials, it was proposed that the Instrument of Accession alone should
form the basis of the constitutional relationship between Jammu and Kashmir
and the Union of India. These leaders further opined that this relationship will
continue till the State’s own constituent assembly evolved a fresh set of
constitutional provisions to replace the existing relationship. Nehru pleaded with
the leaders of the state that the Constituent Assembly of India will formulate a
set of constitutional provisions which will protect and safeguard the equality,
liberty and freedom of the people of the States, as envisaged in the Objective
Resolution adopted by it.“He readily agreed to modify the scheme of the federal
division of powers, the Constituent Assembly had evolved, in respect of Jammu
and Kashmir and accepted to reserve wider orbit of powers, including residuary
powers, for the State government.” 3

In their protracted negotiations with Indian leaders, the NC leaders even went
to the extent of rejecting the basic feature of the Indian Constitution, which
guaranteed the right to equality and duty of the government to protect the
minorities on the plea that such a guarantee was contrary to the spirit of the
reforms undertaken by the Interim Government, which Sheikh Abdullah now
headed.

“After protracted negotiations, an agreement was finally reached between the

state leaders and the representatives of the Constituent Assembly of India which
underlined the inclusion of the state in the basic structure of the Indian
Constitution and the application of the provisions of the Constitution of India to
the state, pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of the Union of India, Indian
citizenship, rights and related constitutional safeguards, principles of state policy
and the jurisdiction of the Supreme court.” 4

Besides other things, it was also agreed that the Constituent Assembly will be
empowered to determine, with the approval of the President of India, the
extension of any other provision of the Constitution of India, to the State. Nehru
followed this up by forwarding to the leaders of the NC a written document that
contained the gist of the agreement. Nehru was confident that the document
would find favour with the NC, as the party at its session in Srinagar held in
1948, had passed a resolution that categorically stated, “After mature
consideration of the issue, it (National Conference) is definitely of the opinion
that Kashmir with its unflinching faith in ‘New Kashmir’ and with a very
advanced outlook of the fundamental issue, cannot find its proper place in
Pakistan, which today has become the main citadel of reaction and decaying
feudalism…” However, the whole exercise proved futile as the NC leaders went
5

back on their commitment after they reached Srinagar.

The issue came to a head when Gopalaswamy Aiyangar reached Srinagar with
the draft provision of what had been agreed upon, for the approval of the NC
leaders. After closed door meetings and much dilly-dallying, these provisions
were placed before the Working Committee of the NC. However, the Working
Committee produced an alternate draft, which Sheikh Abdullah sent to Aiyangar.
This alternate draft reiterated his old position, i.e., that the constitutional
relationship between the State and the Union be determined by the Instrument of
Accession. A new set of proposals were, therefore, prepared by Aiyangar in the
hope that these would be acceptable to the NC leaders. But they rejected these as
well. Around the same time, the UN, due to its biased approach, was creating an
adverse situation for India by insisting on demilitarisation of the state and
preparing conditions for inducting a Plebiscite Administration there. Nehru,
therefore, could ill-afford to have Sheikh Abdullah adding to his difficulties.
Consequently, a revised draft proposal was prepared by Gopalaswamy Aiyangar
in consultation with Mohammad Afzal Beg. This proposal envisaged inclusion
of the State in the First Schedule of the Constitution of India, that describes its
territorial bounds and the Seventh Schedule, which corresponds to the provisions
made in the Instrument of Accession. The revised draft provisions were
incorporated in Article 306 A of the draft Constitution of India. The Article 306
A subsequently became Article 370 at the revision stage.

Nehru accepted the concept of NC as if it was the only opinion that mattered
in the whole state. His giving in to Sheikh Abdullah and his coterie at the very
beginning of the accession of the State to India, emboldened the Sheikh to
further demand that Article 306 A should “incorporate a clause that will
recognise the present Interim Government of the State as a Government in
perpetuity!” However, this suggestion was strongly opposed by many members
6

of the Constituent Assembly of India. They pointed out the anomalous

constitutional absurdity this would create in a democratic dispensation. After
Aiyangar had conveyed his inability to include this provision in the said article,
there was much sulking and threatening by the Sheikh and other NC leaders.
However, they eventually fell in line and the grossly undemocratic provision was
not included in the constitutional provision.

The Instrument of Accession signed on October 27, 1947, and Article 1 of the
Indian Constitution, adopted on January 26, 1950, made Jammu and Kashmir
State an integral part of India’s territorial and constitutional jurisdiction. Article
370 was incorporated to mainly provide for gradual development of
constitutional and legal relationship between the State and the Union. According
to Jawaharlal Nehru, “we all wanted to leave it in a fluid condition because of
various factors and gradually to develop the relationship. As a result of this, a
rather unusual provision was made in our Constitution.” That provision is now
7

in Article 370, in Part XXI in ‘Temporary and Transitional Provisions.’ Article

370 provides that:

(a) The provisions of Article 1 and Article 370 apply to Jammu and
Kashmir by their own force. Other provisions of the Constitution will apply
as the President may by order specify with the concurrence of the State
Government.

(b) The power of Parliament to make laws for Jammu and Kashmir will be
limited to:

(i) Those matters of the Union List and the Concurrent List which the
President may decide as corresponding to matters specified in the
Instrument of Accession.

(ii) Such other matters as the President may decide with the concurrence of
the State Government.

(c) The President may declare that this Article shall cease to be operative
or shall operate with such modification, but recommendation of the
Assembly should be obtained before issuing such an order.

It is a well-known fact that Article 306 (370) had to be incorporated because

of the following circumstances that existed at that time:

• The UNSC was seized of the matter at that time.

• The war was still on.

• A huge chunk of state’s territory was under the occupation of the

 aggressor.

• Kashmiris had been given an assurance that a Constituent Assembly

would be formed and opportunity given to the people of the state to
ascertain their views through a plebiscite, after certain pre-conditions had
been met.

Article 370 was intended to be a purely temporary measure that reflected the
existing realities of those turbulent times. This is clearly evident from the fact
that the Article was included in the ‘Transitional Provisions of the Constitution
of India’. Indeed, such provisions were included in Article 370 which
empowered the President of India to modify or even terminate the operation of
its provisions by a notification, provided the recommendation to that effect were
made by the Constituent Assembly of the State. Similarly, the President of India
was empowered to extend to the state other provisions of the Constitution of
India, with the concurrence of the state government. It is safe to say that the
temporary provisions envisaged by Article 370, were meant to remain in
operation during the existence of the Constituent Assembly of the State. Surely
the founding fathers of the Constitution could not have visualised the permanent
existence of the Constituent Assembly!

“The Constituent Assembly of India consisted of 299 members, of whom 229

were elected from the Provinces and 70 from princely states, including Jammu
and Kashmir. The Constitution was passed on November 26, 1949. It superseded
all other agreements including the Instruments of Accession signed by the rulers
of princely states, by which the states, including Jammu and Kashmir, had only
surrendered defence, foreign affairs and communication to the Union
Government. Besides, the rulers of Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir
adopted the Indian Constitution by proclamation.” This should have finally put
8

the legal seal of approval on the matter of the State’s accession with the rest of
the country. But that was not to be.

Sheikh Abdullah was able to blackmail India into giving numerous

concessions to Jammu and Kashmir State, quoting various provisions of its
special status. Joseph Korbel writes, “Kashmir has also undergone radical
development in her constitutional position. Principally, through the shrewd
manipulation of Sheikh Abdullah and his associates, she has succeeded in
securing privileged rights within the Republic of India which no other Indian
State enjoys.” In due course, Article 370 created more problems than resolving
9
any. Sandhya Jain writes, “…The special status granted to Sheikh Abdullah and
his NC drove the nascent Republic crazy with their shifting stands on every
negotiated issue. Article 370 is the enduring legacy of that poor exercise in
statesmanship.” 10

In 1954, the constituent assembly of the state ratified the accession of the state
with India and made an internal Constitution for Jammu and Kashmir (in lieu of
Part VII of the Indian Constitution that is meant for administering other States).
On November 17, 1956, it made a written commitment in the preamble to its
newly framed Constitution, that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of
India. Article 3 of the said Constitution also clearly and definitely stated, “The
State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of
India.” Ram Gopal writes, “The promise of ascertaining the wishes of the
people, in a way, stood fulfilled with the ratification of the State’s accession to
India finally and irrevocably by the duly elected Constituent Assembly of
Jammu and Kashmir.” However, it may be mentioned that despite a number of
provisions of the Indian Constitution having been extended to the state over the
last sixty years, it still retains absolute jurisdiction over vast areas of legislative
power. Whereas citizens of Jammu and Kashmir are ipso-facto citizens of India,
the vice versa is not the case; they cannot exercise the right of vote in the
Panchayat or state elections. Non-state subjects do not have any right to settle
there, nor can they own any property there. A woman citizen of the state loses
her status as state subject and all other rights that it bestows on her, if she
marries outside the state. Article 360, that allows for the declaration of state of
financial emergency is not applicable to the state. Similarly, whereas Article 365
is not wholly applicable, Article 352 too has limited application.

The Legal Position

Kashmiri leaders, including those from mainstream political parties, state that
abolition of Article 370 will result in the annulment of the state’s accession to
India. However, this is neither borne out by facts nor by legal interpretation of
Article 370. The inclusion of the state within the First Schedule of the
Constitution of India resulted from the signing of the Instrument of Accession
itself, which in turn, was the product of Indian Independence Act, 1947. Legally,
constitutionally or otherwise, the inclusion of Jammu and Kashmir State within
the territorial bounds of India was independent of the Article 306A/370. “The
accession of the states had brought about an irrevocable unification of the
Princely States with the Union of India.” There is a misconception prevailing
11
that it was the Constitution of India that constituted the State of India. The fact
of the matter is that it was only declaratory of the State of India, which existed
prior to the adoption of the Constitution and would not stand dissolved even if
the constitution were to be abrogated. The same applies to Article 370, which
even if rescinded, would not dissolve the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article
370 only defines the special relationship, in whose absence, the state would have
been part of the constitutional organisation of India in the same manner in which
other princely states (forming part of Group ‘B’ States) would have been placed.
The fact is that Article 370 is not an enabling act; that definition applies only to
the Instrument of Accession.

Questioning Union Parliament’s powers to amend or repeal Article 370

appears to be based on the preposterous conclusion that Article 370 is more
sacrosanct than the Constitution itself. Article 368, read with Article 13(2) and
Article 355, empower the Union Parliament to amend or repeal any Article of
the Constitution, including Article 370. Perhaps, the confusion created is directly
related to the President’s powers to abrogate or modify Article 370, before the
Constituent Assembly was formed or during its lifetime. In such an eventuality,
he had to obtain its recommendation. However, after the constituent assembly
was dissolved in November 1956, President’s powers to abrogate this temporary
Article can no more be impeded, leave alone being questioned. Clause (3) of
Article 370 of the Constitution of India clearly states, “Notwithstanding anything
in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public
notification, declare that this Article shall cease to be operative, only with such
exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify.” The
restriction placed on the operability of this clause is added by the proviso, “The
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause
(2) shall be necessary before the President issues such notification.” However,
this constitutional bar on the President has automatically been rendered
ineffective, because the Constituent Assembly has ceased to exist.

The myth perpetuated by vested interests, driven by deep-rooted prejudice,

that Article 370 is an enabling Act, is a ploy to mislead the Indian masses in
general and our ill-informed political leaders in particular. This is done with the
sole objective of perpetuating the unrestricted powers of the vested interests in
the state and their rule by decree, vested in them by Article 370. Even the
convocation of the separate constituent assembly of the state was projected by
these vested interests as proof of the state’s autonomous existence. The fact is
that the constitution of the constituent assembly of the State was the creation of
the Constitution of India and drew all its powers therefrom. At one time, the NC
leaders had even demanded plenary powers for the State’s constituent assembly;
a demand that was entirely unconstitutional. Such powers would have vested the
Jammu and Kashmir’s Constitutional Assembly with the authority to veto not
only the constitutional relationship between the State and the Union of India, but
also the very accession itself.

The Union Government’s relationship with the State Government is regulated

by Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954, under the
provisions of Article 370 itself. As per this order, the jurisdiction of the
Parliament on Jammu and Kashmir is exercised through the President of India.
Once Article 370 is done away with, the 1954 order will automatically stand
annulled and Jammu and Kashmir will constitutionally come at par with other
states. Notably, the demand for retaining Article 370 is confined to valley alone
and even there, not everyone subscribes to this demand. The people of Jammu
and Ladakh want abrogation of this divisive provision.

Circumstances of the State’s accession with the Indian Union, which were
preceded and followed by unusual and challenging events, cast their deep
shadows on Kashmir issue. India should have been conscious of the
machinations of Pakistan and its proxies in the valley on the one hand, and the
attitude of Britain and its allies, due to their own geo-political interests, on the
other. Rather than taking every step with great caution and vision, Nehru
allowed his fears, self-doubt and idealism to get the better of him. India had
rejected the two-nation theory, based as it was, on establishing a theocratic state.
It had, on the other hand, adopted democracy and secularism as the pillars of its
sovereignty. Therefore, India did not have to be too defensive about the
acceptance of the Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to it. It unnecessarily gave
written and verbal assurances to project to the world that the accession did not
even remotely appear as usurpation and in fact, appeared to be morally and
legally correct. It failed to gauge the difficulties involved in implementing those
assurances which depended on formulating an acceptable frame work by
disparate parties, whose mutual suspicions and clashing interests would never let
that happen. Therefore, it was with this mind-set that India went about the
process of assimilation of the State into the larger Union; over-cautiously,
gradually and with measured steps. The first step in this gradual assimilation was
the creation of special provision in its newly adopted constitution, namely,
Article 370 (306A).
 Article 370 has, over the years, become a bone of contention between those
who advocate its abolition and those who want it to be retained on the statute.
Kashmiri opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to its abolition; but that is mostly a
result of being waylaid by the state’s self serving political leadership, which has
exploited the age-old sentiment of “Islam is in danger,” by propagating that
India will settle non-Muslims into Kashmir, thereby changing its Muslim
majority demographic profile forever. In rest of the country, as far as the stand of
various political parties on the issue is concerned, it is mostly dictated by their
pandering to their respective vote banks. The fact of the matter is that, it was a
temporary provision meant to serve a temporary purpose and, therefore, cannot
be allowed to achieve a permanent status. As long as the provision remains
operative, there will never be total integration of the state with the rest of the
country, emotionally or otherwise.

Impact of Article 370

Article 370 was clearly meant to be a temporary provision included in the
Constitution to cater for the specific requirements of the troubled times
immediately after India’s independence and the State’s accession to India. It was
meant to remain in operation during the existence of the State’s Constituent
Assembly. As time passed, the vested interests within Jammu and Kashmir and
the compulsions of various political parties outside the state to appease their vote
banks, ensured its retention. No thought was spared by the votaries of ‘the
retention of Article 370’ for the enormous potential this would have to wreak
havoc on the unity and integrity of the country. It is the only state in India which
has a constitution of its own.

To begin with, Article 370 has built emotional and psychological barriers
between the people of Kashmir and the rest of India, thus fostering a psychology
of separatism. Existence of this statute is used by Pakistan and its proxies in the
valley to mock at the very concept of ‘India being one from Kashmir to
Kanyakumari’. It has kept alive the two-nation theory. Over a period of time, the
separatist lobby in the state has used this barrier to build a mind-set of alienation.
Such a possibility had been clearly visualised by many political stalwarts who
comprised the Constituent Assembly of India. While speaking in the Constituent
Assembly of India on October 17, 1949, one of its distinguished members,
Hasrat Mohani had said, “The grant of special status would enable Kashmir to
assume independence afterwards.”
 The vested interests in Kashmir, be these politicians, bureaucracy,
businessmen, judiciary, etc., have misused Article 370 for their own nefarious
purposes, by exploiting the poor and the down-trodden people of the state. The
rich have consistently used Article 370 to ensure that no financial legislation is
introduced in the state, which would make them accountable for their loot of the
state treasury. These include the provisions dealing with Gift Tax, Urban Land
Ceiling Act, Wealth Tax, etc. This has ensured that the rich continue to grow
richer and the common masses are denied their legitimate share of the economic
pie.

Article 370 has also helped create power elites and local Sultans, who wield
enormous power, which they use to trample upon the genuine demands of
common people for public welfare. As no outsider can settle in the state and own
any property there, the politically well-connected people stand to gain
enormously. It is these influential people who make the rules, decide the price
and determine the buyer, since any competition from an outsider is completely
ruled out. This way, land resources are cornered by the rich and mighty, causing
huge revenue losses to the state. These vested interests have gained much
financial assistance from India which they have used to build separatist mindsets
and secessionist lobbies with which they blackmail India.

To the gullible people of Kashmir, the abolition of Article 370 is projected as

a catastrophic event that will sound the death knell of Kashmiri Muslim culture,
but in actual fact, this argument is a ploy to prevent assimilation of Kashmiris
into the national mainstream. That way, these power brokers continue to expand
their fiefdom, perpetuate their hold on political and economic power and build a
communal and obscurantist mindset, which in due course, serves as a breeding
ground for creating a separatist mentality. The bogey of threat to the Kashmiri
identity that the abolition of Article 370 will pose is merely a ploy to camouflage
the political ambitions of the leaders. Actually, these very people cause great
damage to Kashmiri culture, as no culture can survive without the stimulus of
outside contact and opportunity to cross-fertilise. It was this mindset that has
been responsible for creating the violent communal upsurge of 1989, which
finally led to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits. One of the main reasons for the
failure of the state administration to respond to the anguished cries of the
Kashmiri Pandits to provide them with adequate security in 1998–90, was that
the state administration had been completely subverted from within by the
radical anti-national elements, who had infiltrated into the system over a period
of time. This infiltration had been made possible by the existence of Article 370.
“Within the broad framework of the special status envisaged by Article 370,
which isolated the state from rest of India, it was far easy for secessionist
elements to infiltrate into the administrative cadres of the government.” 12

One of the worst human tragedies the state faces is the denial of basic
democratic and citizenship rights to nearly 600,000 refugees from Pakistan who
entered the state at the time of partition or as a result of wars between India and
Pakistan, thereafter. These refugees have made the state their home for the last
over six decades, yet neither they nor their children can get citizenship rights in
the state, as result of the applicability of Article 370. They can neither vote nor
fight election; they cannot get loans from the state nor seek admissions into
various professional colleges of the state.

Article 370 has also been misused by political oligarchs to perpetuate their
hold on power by preventing various democratic legislations from being applied
to the state. Take the case o f‘anti-defection law’, which is a useful provision for
preventing defections. This legislation vests the powers of deciding whether a
legislator has defected or not, with the Speaker. However, in Jammu and
Kashmir, the power has been vested with a party chief, thus turning the leader
into a virtual dictator. Article 370 has also been used to deny a fair share of
economic pie to both Ladakh and Jammu region (see chapter 18). Violent
agitations that rocked Ladakh in July-September 1989, were the result of the
resentment felt by Ladakhis at being treated unfairly by Kashmiris Muslims,
who have a stranglehold on political power in the state. It is ironic that whereas
Article 370 provides all the political, economic, cultural and other safeguards to
Kashmiris, the same provision is misused by Kashmiris to deny these very
safeguards to the people of other regions of the State.

The citizens of Jammu and Kashmir become citizens of India automatically;

whereas the citizens of India have no such right when it comes to their claiming
a similar right in the state. Consequently, the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir can
own property and settle anywhere in India. On the other hand, Article 370
prevents any Indian from claiming any such right. As early as 1932, Bertrand
Glancy, Chairman of the Grievances Committee was compelled to write in his
report: “The present definition of State Subject appears to be unduly rigid;
domiciles in a state for a thousand years cannot, according to this definition,
qualify a man. It would seem both unfair and inexpedient to deny the right to
franchise to a man who has so far identified himself with local interests as to
make his domicile in the state over a consecutive period of five years.” Dr BR 13
Ambedkar had forewarned the country on this score in reply to Sheikh
Abdullah’s demand for a special status in the Constituent Assembly of India. He
had said, “You want India to defend Kashmir, give Kashmir equal rights over
India, but you deny India and Indians all rights in Kashmir. I am Law Minister
of India, I cannot be a party to such betrayal of national interests.” 14

N OTES

1. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, White Paper on Kashmir, Joint Human Rights Committee for Minorities
in Kashmir, (Jeoffry and Bell Inc., Delhi), p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 10.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Oxford University Press, 1952).
6. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, n. 1.
7. Josef Korbel, n. 5.
8. Ram Gopal, online article, downloaded from KPNetwork@ yahoogroups.com on July 21, 2009.
9. Josef Korbel, n. 5.
10. Sandhya Jain: Pioneer, January 5, 2010.
11. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, n. 1.
12. Ibid.
13. Jagmohan: My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir; p. 249. After the communal disturbances of July 1931,
the British appointed a one-man commission headed by Bertrand Glancy to probe the happenings and
look into the grievances of the people and suggest remedial measures.
14. Hari Om, former head of Maharaja Gulab Singh Chair, Jammu University, in Pioneer… and Hum
Hindustan Ke-Kashmir Hindustan Ka, (Muslim Rashtriya Manch, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi).
10
 AN UNEASY TRUCE
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And if
you gaze long enough into an abyss, the abyss will gaze back into you.
—Friedrich Nietzsche

Formation of Interim Government

Sheikh Abdullah became the Head of the Emergency Government, with the
somewhat exalted title of the Chief Emergency Administrator, on October 29,
1947, after Maharaja Hari Singh had left the State. On June 9, 1949, the
Maharaja abdicated and vested all his powers in his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh.

The emergency administration constituted by the NC immediately after the

accession, to meet the serious situation created by Pakistan’s invasion, was
dissolved in March, 1948, and replaced by an interim government formed by NC
and headed by Sheikh Abdullah. This effectively brought to an end the rule of
Dogras, and at the same time, introduced an era of gradual oppression of
Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley. The interim government ruled for nearly a
decade, mostly by decree and ordinance. It gave precedence to the Muslims in
almost every sphere of state, be it governance, politics, economy, administration,
education, etc. Balraj Puri, a renowned journalist of Jammu wrote, “The system
was so regimented that office bearers of ruling NC were appointed as
government officers and vice versa. The Sheikh dismissed my suggestion that
government officers should not hold party office by citing how successfully the
system worked in Soviet Union.” Joseph Korbel added, “The NC ceased to be a
1

party but became a state within a state. It decided everything; who is going to get
elected to what office? Who will get a job? Who will receive the supplies, which
it alone distributes?” 2

In keeping with its preference for socialistic (read communist) reforms, the
interim government ensured that Kashmir became the first and the only state in
post-independent India to have witnessed the most radical land reforms,
reminiscent of a communist state, involving 220,000 acres of cultivable land.
There were three categories of land holders; Jagirdars, Muafidar and Mukarari.
Jagirdars owned vast stretches of land. Muafidars were mostly institutions like
mosques and temples which received a part of their land revenue. Mukararies
received meagre payments from the state itself. In September 1950, the Big
Landed Estate Abolition Act introduced sweeping land reforms. The landlord
was permitted to retain not more than 20 acres of agricultural land, 1.5 acres for
orchard, 1 acre for residential and 0.25 acre for kitchen garden, making a total of
22.75 acres. The overriding condition was that the landlord had to work on the
land; otherwise his land would be expropriated. The new owner of the land was
required to pay to the government the ‘Land Tax’ and ‘Land Development Cess’
and the original owners, who were divested of their holdings, were to be paid
compensation at a rate significantly below the market value. All lands which
were not under cultivation or not given to a tenant were to be transferred to the
government for redistribution, or for collective farming, in the true communist
style.

The government redistributed the land but did not receive any tax or
development cess from the new owners, as they expressed their inability to pay.
On the other hand, the divested owner was not paid any compensation. Finally,
the Constituent Assembly decided on March 26, 1952, to confiscate all landed
estates without any compensation. By the end March 1953, 188,775 acres was
redistributed among 153,399 tenants. This should have resulted in each of the
tenants receiving at an average 1.23 acres of land. However, the end result was
entirely different. Many tenants received considerably lesser, as influential
politicians of NC and corrupt and well-connected bureaucrats cornered a lion’s
share of this land. Some, even got more than the maximum permissible limit of
22.75 acres. The undistributed land was turned into collective farms at various
places, namely, Gopalpura, Shalteng and Harvan. By April 1953, the Jammu and
Kashmir government owned nearly 87,500 acres of land, which was used for
dishing out favours and in due course, became a perpetual source of corruption.

The implementation of this Act soon made the government’s communal

agenda evident. In Jammu, the land reforms were implemented across the board,
affecting both Hindus and Muslims equally. However, in Kashmir, the same
yardstick was not applied. All Hindus, mostly Kashmiri Pandits, were
dispossessed of their land with impunity. Large chunks of the Mukhrari and
Muafi land belonging to the Pandit religious endowments generated enough
income to sustain their activities. These were nibbled away by communal
Muslim elements, with the active connivance of the local administration. This,
despite the fact that the religious endowments had been exempted from such
reforms. The NC cadres, with the help of a biased administration, carried out the
‘land grab’ operation against the Pandits with great fervor, rendering thousands
of them landless, overnight. Pandits were pushed from pillar to post in order to
seek justice. A number of tribunals set up for this purpose turned out to be a
mere eye-wash. Having been denied even a legal remedy, they finally gave up.

In its continued zeal to carry-out radical economic reforms, the government

now ordered the nationalisation of industry, communications, transport and all
other commercial enterprises. This was done with the ostensible purpose of
fulfilling the promise made in the Naya Kashmir manifesto of NC. These radical
economic reforms were invariably implemented in a partisan manner, ensuring
that its victims were always Hindus and its beneficiaries Muslims. On the one
hand, the administration went out of its way to protect the property rights of
Muslims and on the other, it established such licensing system, which only
enabled Muslims to establish industry, organise private transport, indulge in
trading and purchase property in commercial enterprises. Marketing agencies
were sponsored by the state to ostensibly, eliminate ‘middlemen’, but in actual
fact, these ended up providing all facilities and means to certain influential
Muslim entrepreneurs who soon monopolised the trade and commerce in the
state. Ironically, by the time the interim government was dissolved in 1953, the
much acclaimed socialism, that was meant to be ushered in by these economic
reforms, was nowhere to be visible. In its place, a new rich class came into
existence, which was anything but socialist in thought and deed. The
government also ended up creating a powerful Muslim middle class, which was
avowedly communal in its outlook and anti-Indian in its leanings. “The rapid
transformation of the whole economic organisation of the state, the interim
government accomplished, ostensibly to eliminate exploitation and poverty, led
directly to the emergence of the new Muslim middle class, which in the years to
come formed the mainstay of the Muslim separatist movement in the State.” 3

Similar measures were taken to remove Hindus from state government

services arbitrarily, while at the same time, imposing a virtual embargo on their
further recruitment. The same policy was applied to their admission into
educational institutions. A limitation was placed on their admission into
technical training institutes and nomination and grant of scholarship. Region-
wise quotas were fixed in an arbitrary manner. For example, in Kashmir, where
Hindus formed nine per cent of the population, the quotas fixed were in
proportion to their population. However, in Jammu region, the yardstick was
changed to suit the government’s communal agenda. There, though the Muslims
formed only a small percentage of the population, the quotas were fixed on the
basis of educational backwardness and economic status. To make matters worse,
in Ladakh, the Buddhists were completely excluded from all reservations, thus
depriving them of any quota in educational institutions. It was such communal
policies which were responsible for the growth of separatist mentality and
Muslim fundamentalism in the state.

Sheikh Abdullah’s hypocrisy and his communal agenda were evident from the
fact that besides being the head of the interim government, he also headed the
Auqaf Islamia, the Muslim Endowment Trust. But at the same time he demanded
the dissolution of the Dharmarth, the Hindu Endowment Trust, which had been
established by Maharaja Ranbir Singh to manage the Hindu places of worship
and for providing assistance to the needy.

As far as the Pandits were concerned, their exclusion from the state
administration, their economic strangulation and restrictions placed on their
admission to various educational institutions, compelled them to abandon the
valley gradually in search of livelihood. It is estimated that more than 200,000
Pandits migrated to places outside the state in order to secure their future.

Constituent Assembly of the State

Irrespective of what the UNSC said or did, elections to the state’s constituent
assembly were announced by Yuvraj Karan Singh through a proclamation on
May 1, 1951. This envisaged holding of elections in September/October 1951 on
three consecutive days, in which all adult citizens of the state, over the age of 21
could vote. The elections were to be held for 75 seats; 45 in Kashmir valley and
Ladakh and 30 in Jammu. Forty-three of the candidates in Kashmir/Ladakh were
elected unopposed, a week before the actual election. The remaining two were
made to withdraw from the elections. In Jammu, the election papers of 13
opposition party candidates belonging to Praja Parishad were rejected on the
4

flimsiest of grounds. Therefore, even before the elections were held, the NC had
already won 58 seats. Whatever legitimacy was still left of these elections, was
further eroded when Praja Parishad, announced the boycott of the elections
because of what it termed as the “illegal practices and official interference and
wholesale rejection of its candidates.” As a result, NC got additional 15 seats. In 5

the end, all 75 seats were won by NC — 73 unopposed and 2 uncontested. Fifty-
two of the 75 members were Muslims. These farcical elections played straight
into the hands of anti-national elements who questioned the very basis of the
ratification of the Instrument of Accession by the Constituent Assembly, whose
members were thus elected.
 The delimitation of constituencies too was based on distribution of population
in a brazenly disproportionate manner. It ensured that Muslim majority valley
had a larger number of seats than Jammu province. NC leaders created,
perpetrated and guarded the communal character of the political set-up in the
state that was based on Muslim precedence as its core characteristic. It was not a
propitious beginning for democratic process in the state. If Sheikh Abdullah was
responsible for it, Nehru too was complicit. As events subsequently proved, such
disregard for democratic norms became an essential feature of Sheikh
Abdullah’s politics. This was not the first occasion when Nehru allowed the
Sheikh to have his way, further boosting his already oversized ego and proclivity
to bully. Such capitulation actually set the trend of outright appeasement by
central government as a standard reaction to bullying tactics adopted by the state
leaders over the years. Besides, such clear disregard for democratic norms
continued to be part of the ruling party’s politics in the state in the years to
come, except in the assembly elections of 1977, 2002 and 2008. During the first
meeting of the Constituent Assembly of the State on October 31, 1951, Sheikh
Abdullah declared, “…It is well-known that the NC had gone to the people of
the State with a programme of accession to India and this programme of
accession had been ratified by every single adult voter of the State.” 6

As mentioned earlier, Sheikh Abdullah had deep political differences with

Jinnah. They did not see eye to eye with each other. Sheikh was close to the
Congress leaders, as the latter had supported his struggle against the Maharaja.
In fact, Nehru particularly, had supported him wholeheartedly. Sheikh Abdullah
felt that Muslim League was a party totally dominated by mullahs and feudal
elements, who were using Jinnah for attaining their own ends and would
abandon him once those ends were achieved. As a result, he had, at a crucial
time, thrown his lot with India. But post-accession, he developed second
thoughts. Many people feel that he allowed himself to be manipulated and, in
fact, became a pawn in the hands of big powers that had their own geo-political
interests to safeguard in the emerging world order, now being increasingly
influenced by the cold war that had already set in. “Abdullah openly began to
flirt with ambivalence. While he had little sympathy for Pakistan, he began to
warm up to the idea of independence, an option promoted by America without
the camouflage of subtlety.” Dr S Gopal writes “Some Indian leaders believed
7

that it was Mrs Loy Henderson, wife of the United State’s Ambassador, and CIA
agent, who encouraged Abdullah to think in these terms.” 8

British and US intelligence agencies played on his hidden desire to see

himself as the unquestioned ruler of Kashmir. They perhaps, were able to
convince him that they would be able to make him one in the form of a King, an
Amir, a Sheikh, a President, etc., as they had successfully done in many
countries of Arabia, North Africa, West Asia and Africa, after the break-up of
the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. Sheikh Abdullah may have also
felt that Jammu region would always remain out of his political grasp, as its
polity had been adversely affected by the communal holocaust that took place in
Calcutta as a consequence of the call for ‘Direct Action’ issued by Muslim
League on August 16, 1946. It is also possible that he foresaw his position as
one of the many chief ministers in India, rather than a leader of equal standing
with Nehru; a status that he always sought for himself.

Be it as it may, as time passed, Sheikh Abdullah’s belligerence continued to

grow, and he became vehemently anti-Indian. His rhetoric became poisonous
and he started delivering fiery speeches that undermined the very accession of
the State to the Indian Union. It may be mentioned that he alone did not nurture
such an ambition, as Dr MK Teng writes, “Influential section of the leaders and
cadres of the NC also favoured a reconsideration of the commitment of the NC
to the unity of India, independent of the Indian constitutional organisation.
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and other NC leaders claimed that they had been
assured that Jammu and Kashmir would not be integrated in the constitutional
organisaion of India and that such assurances were incorporated in the
Instrument of Accession. They stressed that they had agreed to accede to India
on the specific condition that the Muslim identity of the state would form the
basis of its political organisation.

The Indian leaders, overwhelmed by their own sense of self-righteousness,

helped overtly and covertly in the falsification of the history of the integration of
the princely states with India and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir with the
Indian Dominion in 1947. Many of them went as far as to link the unity of India
with the reassertion of the sub-national identity of Jammu and Kashmir, which
the Muslim demand for freedom for a separate Muslim state symbolised. Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah who headed the Interim Government instituted in March
1948, disclaimed the Instrument of Accession executed by Hari Singh, as merely
the ‘Kagzi Ilhaq’ or ‘Paper Accession’ and claimed that the ‘real accession of
the State to India’ would be accomplished by the people of the state, more
precisely, the Muslim majority of the state. In his inaugural address to the
Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly convened in 1951, Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, who was the Prime Minister of the Interim Government,
claimed that the Constituent Assembly was vested with the plenary powers,
drawn from the people of the state and independent of the Constitution of India.
He claimed that the Constituent Assembly was vested with the powers to opt out
of India and assume independence or join the Muslim state of Pakistan. There is
no doubt that Sheikh was only indulging in falsehood to put pressure on the
Indian leadership.

The fact of the matter is that the lapse of the paramountcy did not underline
the independence of the states nor did it envisage the reversion of any plenary
powers to the princes or the people of the states. The States were not
independent when they were integrated in the British Empire in India. They did
not acquire independence when they were liberated from the British Empire in
1947. They were not vested with any inherent powers to claim independence to
which Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah referred to in his inaugural address to the
Constituent Assembly.”

Elaborating on the argument further, Dr Teng says, “The convocation of the

Constituent Assemblies in the states was provided for in the stipulations of the
Instrument of Accession, which the princely states acceding to India had
executed. The Instrument of Accession devised by the States Department of
Pakistan for the accession of the states to that country, did not envisage
provisions pertaining to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The
power to convene separate Constituent Assemblies was reserved for all the
major states or the union of the states, which acceded to India. The Jammu and
Kashmir State was no exception. In fact, Constituent Assemblies were convened
in the states of Cochin and Mysore and the state union of Saurashtra, shortly
after their accession to the Indian Dominion. The Constituent Assembly of
Jammu and Kashmir was a creation of the Instrument of Accession. It exercised
powers which were drawn from the State of India and its sovereign authority. It
did not possess any powers to revoke the accession of the state to India, or bring
about the accession of the state to Pakistan or opt for its independence, as Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah in his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly
claimed. The truth of what happened during those fateful days of October 1947,
when the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was accomplished, was
concealed by a irredentist campaign of disinformation which was launched to
cover the acts of cowardice and betrayal, subterfuge and surrender, which went
into the making of the Kashmir dispute. And such campaign took place both at
the state level, as also in Delhi.”
 Talking about the right of self-determination of the people of the state and the
irrelevance of the very idea itself, Dr Teng writes, “The Indian Independence
Act, an Act of the British Parliament, which laid down the procedure for the
transfer of power in India, did not recognise the right of self-determination of
either the people of the British India or the people of the states. The transfer of
power was based on an agreement among the Congress, the Muslim League and
the British. The British and the Muslim League stubbornly refused to recognise
the right of the people of British India and right of the people of the princely
states to determine the future of British India or the Indian states. The Muslim
League and British insisted upon the lapse of the Paramountcy and its reversion
to the rulers of the states. Accession of the states was not subject to any
conditions and the Instrument of Accession underlined an irreversible process
that the British provided for the dissolution of its empire in India.”

Dr Teng further asserts, “No assurance was given to the NC leaders that the
Constituent Assembly of the state would be vested with plenary powers or
powers to ratify the accession of the State to India, revoke it, opt for its
independence or its accession to Pakistan. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the
other NC leaders did not seek the exclusion of the state from the Indian political
organisation as a condition for the accession of the state to India. Nor did the
Indian leaders give any assurance to them that Jammu and Kashmir would be
reconstituted into an independent political organisation, which would represent
its Muslim identity.” 9

Dismissal of the Interim Government

Sheikh Abdullah’s intransigence and doublespeak created a dangerous
situation in the sensitive border state, which even his best friend, Nehru, could
not ignore. His movement against the Maharaja, which he had always presented
as an anti-feudal upsurge of oppressed Kashmiris, appealed to socialist-minded
Nehru and other Congress leaders, who in turn gave him and his movement
unstinted support, much to the chagrin of the Maharaja. Nehru, influenced as he
was with the 1917 communist revolution of Russia and his antipathy towards the
Maharaja, failed to see through Abdullah’s communal agenda. But once the
Maharaja was gone, Sheikh had to increasingly rouse the Islamic fervor of
Kashmiri Muslims to suit his new mindset that preferred independence. This
strengthened the foundations of present communal politics in the valley, the first
signs of which had become visible during the July 1931, anti-Maharaja stir,
whose victims were Kashmiri Pandits for no fault of theirs.
 Sheikh Abdullah’s communal rhetoric, which became shriller by the day,
could not be ignored. Reports about his dropping broad hints about Kashmir’s
independent status to Norman Dixon, the UN representative, added to the mutual
suspicion between the two leaders. Abdullah’s communication to Nehru dated
July 10, 1950, further aggravated the situation. In this letter, Abdullah criticised
Nehru for advising him on issues other than defence, communication and
external affairs. By now, it was apparent that either Abdullah did not consider
India secular enough, which led to his change of heart, or Nehru increasingly felt
that Abdullah was not as Indian as he had considered him to be all along.

Abdullah, in his speech on April 10, 1952, at Ranbirsinghpura, ridiculed the

idea of Kashmir’s full accession with India by stating that such thought was
“unrealistic, childish and savoring of lunacy”. Nehru’s letter to Maulana Azad
dated March 1, 1953, clearly establishes the degree of apprehension in Nehru’s
mind about the Sheikh. He wrote, “My fear is that Sheikh Sahib, in his present
frame of mind, is likely to do something or take some step, which might make
things worse.”

Delhi Agreement signed in July 1952, had formalised certain legal and
constitutional measures to smoothen the working arrangements between Delhi
and Jammu and Kashmir, in the political as well as administrative areas. The
agreement signed between the representatives of the State and the Union
provided for:

1. The abolition of the hereditary ruler-ship.

2. Vesting of the residuary and concurrent powers in the state.

3. Continuation of the special citizenship rights for the state subjects,

while at the same time conferring Indian citizenship on all persons
domiciled in Jammu and Kashmir.

4. Flying of separate flag for the state with the National flag also finding a
‘supremely distinct place’.

5. The powers to grant reprieve and commute death sentences, etc., to

remain with the President of India.

6. The Head of the State, or Sadr-e-Riyasat, shall be recognised by the

President on the recommendations of the State Legislature.
 7. Detailed and objective examination of the financial arrangement
between the State and the Union needs to be carried out before the
provisions are formalised.

8. The Centre would have full authority as far as defence of the State
against external aggression is concerned, but as far as internal disturbances
are concerned, such powers can only be applied with the concurrence of the
State Legislature.

9. Application of the Article 324 (elections to the Parliament) of the

Constitution of India to the state would be restricted to the elections to the
Parliament, President and Prime Minister.

Many provisions of the agreement attracted severe criticism within and

outside the Parliament. The critics pointed out that the state needed to be
integrated with the rest of the country like any other state, but the agreement
only served to increase and perpetuate the gulf dividing the two. They were also
concerned with the fate of Hindus in both Jammu and the Valley. They were also
not happy with the privileged status that Sheikh had carved out for himself,
which would expose India to blackmail in future. Nehru, however, pointed out
“the necessity of having confidence in Abdullah’s friendship towards India and
of acting in good faith.” But as the events would prove, he was to be
10

disappointed soon.

In Jammu, Praja Parishad leaders were agitated with the provision of separate
flag for the state, included in Delhi Agreement. This led to a serious agitation in
Jammu region.

To make matters worse, rumours about American support to independent

Kashmir started flying thick and fast, after Sheikh Abdullah met Adlai
Stevenson (the Democratic opponent of General Eisenhower in the US
Presidential elections and later its ambassador to the UN). The two met a number
of times between May 1 and 3, 1953, with the specific purpose of discussing the
formation of independent Sheikhdom of Kashmir, which would help US check
Chinese advance in Xinjiang and Russian in Afghanistan. Their meetings ended
with a seven-hour conversation at which no one else was present.

Earlier too, Indian Government had been aware of a similar meeting between
Sheikh Abdullah and Mr Austin, the US ambassador to UN. This happened at
Lake Success in January, 1948, when Sheikh Abdullah had gone to the UN as
part of India’s delegation. Though a member of the official Indian delegation,
Abdullah had met Austin secretly on that occasion. Austin later reported to the
US Secretary of State, “It is possible that the principal purpose of Abdullah’s
visit was to make clear to US that there is a third alternative, namely,
independence… he made quite a long and impassioned statement on the subject.
He said, in effect, that whether Kashmir went to Pakistan or India, the other
dominion would be always against a solution… (Kashmir) is a rich country. He
did not want his people torn by dissension between Pakistan and India. It would
be much better if Kashmir would be independent and would seek American and
British aid for development of the country.” 11

Around the same time, the New York Times published a map showing
Kashmir as an independent country.

In Kashmir, the NC government was accused of corruption and

maladministration by a large section of its own workers and leaders. Al Haque
newspaper, which was banned five months later, wrote in one of its issues, “It
appears that human feelings and gentlemanliness are being sacrificed at the altar
of barbarity as if law is helpless before these corrupt and barbaric officers.
Money is being illegally extracted from the poor in every town and village.” 12

Disenchantment with Sheikh Abdullah’s strong-arm methods of governance

soon set in. As discontent started to simmer, the Sheikh’s popularity, as well as
his political base, began to erode fast.

Unable to stem the rot in the state (own creation), Sheikh Abdullah started to
think loudly about getting the state out of Indian Union. He went to the extent of
extolling the new leadership that had emerged in Pakistan after the death of
Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, his personal enemies. He started
denigrating India and conveyed to the Kashmiri Muslims that his woes were not
due to misrule or corruption, but due to accession to India. He started telling
foreign reporters and even some of Nehru’s colleagues that the issue of
accession needed to be looked into again. Many in the NC, like Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed, GM Sadiq, Maulana Syed and DP Dhar resented Sheikh Abdullah’s
anti-India stance and addressed many public meetings. His own party workers
who opposed his stand and several Congress leaders, came to Srinagar to talk to
Sheikh, but in vain.

In his arrogance, the Sheikh went as far as insulting Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad, an iconic figure of the independence movement, and the most prominent
Muslim leader of the Congress Party, publicly at a gathering at Idgah, in
Srinagar. In May 1953, Nehru flew to Kashmir and tried to patch up the
differences within the government, without much success. He then invited
Sheikh to Delhi to talk things over. But the latter did not oblige. Sometime later,
the invitation was again renewed both by phone as well as in writing. Though
Sheikh promised to come, but he did not.

In the meantime, Praja Parishad and some other parties which had launched an
agitation against Sheikh Abdullah’s anti-national utterances heeded to Nehru’s
appeal and called off their agitation.

Dr Shyama Prasad Mukerjee, founder of Jan Sangh (predecessor of India’s

main opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party) defied the existence of the
permit system, which allowed entry into the state. He was arrested on June 8,
1953. He died at Srinagar, on June 23, 1953, while Nehru was in London. His
death at a young age of 51, while in custody, gave rise to the possibility of foul
play and deep suspicions about the circumstances of his untimely death. It
inflamed the passions in Jammu and in the rest of the country, further sullying
Abdullah’s secular image.

Throughout June and July 1953, Sheikh Abdullah continued to fulminate

against India and play on anti-India sentiments, refusing even to meet the Prime
Minister of the country.

To add to this state of distrust, it was increasingly being felt in New Delhi that
the Sheikh was not sincerely implementing the provisions of July 1952, Delhi
Agreement.“Sheikh Abdullah implemented whatever suited him. But when it
came to implementing those provisions which made for greater integration of the
State with the Union, he resorted to subterfuge of referring them to one
committee or the other of the Constituent Assembly. His tactics upset even
Nehru, who wrote to Abdullah, “To me it has been a major surprise that
settlement arrived at between us should be by-passed or repudiated. That strikes
at the root of all confidence. My honour is bound up with my word.” 13

On July 13, 1953, Sheikh Abdullah gave a clear indication of his desire to be
independent, when he publically declared, “Kashmir should have the sympathy
of both India and Pakistan…. It is not necessary for us to become an appendage
of either India or Pakistan.” Suspicion about his intentions grew even more when
a leading newspaper quoted him to have said, “Though the accession of Kashmir
to India is complete in all aspects, it is conditional and temporary in the sense
that the people of the state have to ratify it. Therefore it is not final.” In the days
to come, he continued to question the accession and went back on almost all
things he had said and done. He went as far as to say that Kashmir’s prosperity
was tied up with Pakistan as its people had cultural relations with West Pakistan
and NWFP. He even said that Kashmir’s rivers and roads connected it to
Pakistan, with its nearest railway station being Rawalpindi, and Karachi being
the nearest port. Signs of his desperation were now quite visible. The import of
his irresponsible utterances was not lost on his colleagues.

On August 6, 1953, Maulana Syed Masoodi, General Secretary of the NC

issued a statement that clearly outlined his demand for an independent state. He
said, “The real issue it should be realised is that there are people in India, who
are not prepared to see Kashmir maintain its existing position. They are angry
that Kashmiris should remain aloof both from India as well as from Pakistan:
one should not work oneself up unnecessarily to see this view being expressed.
Instead, it should be examined dispassionately. Then only can there be possible,
a correct appraisal of the situation in Kashmir. If Kashmiris rose as one man
against Pakistan, it was because they saw that country wanted to force them into
a situation which they were not prepared to accept. If today demands are made in
India which endangers the autonomous position of the state and realising this
danger, the people of Kashmir feel inclined towards a third alternative, it is not
they who should be blamed for it but those who are the root cause of it.” He
14

even advised the Indian people to organise public opinion against the state’s
merger with India.

The Sheikh’s intransigence continued unabated. In early August, 1953, he

made a surprising statement that, “Kashmir’s initial accession to India was
forced on her because of India’s refusal to give any help without the state’s
accession.” The CPI (undivided) flayed the Sheikh for playing into the hands of
15

imperialist powers. Several people demanded action against him for his
irresponsible statements and sought his removal from power.

Three of his cabinet colleagues, led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, accused

him of despotism, inefficiency and sheer waste of public resources. In a
memorandum submitted to the Head of the State, Dr Karan Singh, they said,
“You have tended to act in an arbitrary manner that has generated uncertainty,
suspense, and doubts in the minds of the people of the state in general and those
in Ladakh and Jammu in particular… you have arbitrarily sought to precipitate a
rupture in the relationship of the State with India… You have thus strengthened
and encouraged the forces of disruption.” As a consequence, the Head of the
16

State suggested that an emergency meeting of the cabinet be held. But the
Sheikh refused the request.

Two Intelligence Bureau reports that reached Delhi, however, sealed

Abdullah’s fate. The first, which was discussed in a closed door meeting
between Nehru and his Intelligence Bureau chief, stated that Abdullah was
preparing to sack his pro-India cabinet colleagues, including the Deputy Prime
Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. The second one was a clear SOS from the
Intelligence Bureau officer looking after Kashmir, BN Malik, which stated that
Shiekh Abdullah had left for Gulmarg on the morning of August 8, 1953, with
the sole objective of secretly meeting a representative of Pakistan. Nehru could
not ignore this development coming as it did after many of Sheikh Abdullah’s
anti-national actions and utterences. Using the powers of Sadar-e-Riyasat, Dr
Karan Singh, dismissed the government of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Bakshi
Ghulam Mohammad was sworn as the new Prime Minister (the second interim
government). The next day, August 9, 1953, Abdullah was put under arrest.
Subsequently, he was put under trial in the case known as ‘Kashmir Conspiracy
Case.’

Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest did not cause much resentment in the state, as large
sections of its left-leaning workers and leaders had started accusing his
government of corruption and maladministration. Coupled with this, the strong-
arm methods of governance caused great deal of disenchantment among the
general public. His popularity was already showing signs of waning when he
was arrested. Therefore, when Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad replaced him, the latter
received total support from two important leaders, GM Sadiq and Mir Qasim,
and a sizeable section of NC workers and from people of Ladakh and Jammu
regions.

It may sound unbelievable today, but the fact is that while the Muslims, who
supported Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s installation as the head of the interim
government, did not come out in his open support, it was left to Kashmiri
Pandits to bear that cross. Openly supporting Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad on the
streets of Kashmir served as a morale booster for Bakshi to initiate a campaign
against the disruptionists and anti-Indian forces. But at the same time, such open
defiance of anti-national forces by Pandits earned them the perpetual hostility of
some influential sections of NC cadres and other pro-Pakistan elements. This
hostility towards Kashmiri Pandits contributed in no small measure to their
genocide and final eviction from the valley, some decades later.

On February 6, 1954, members of the Constituent Assembly unanimously

ratified the state’s accession with India. Bakshi, among other things said, “…
Kashmir had irrevocably acceded to India more than six years ago and today we
are only fulfilling the formalities of our unbreakable bonds with India.” In the17

same session, the members stated that Delhi Agreement should find appropriate
place in the State’s Constitution, in order to let the Government of India
discharge its responsibilities towards the State. On May 14, 1954, the President
of India issued an order under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, endorsing
the relationship as formulated in the Delhi Agreement. As a first step, the custom
barrier was removed, resulting in the complete economic integration of the state
with the rest of the country. India agreed to pay 2,000,000 a year to the state to
compensate it for the loss of custom revenue.

After Sheikh Abdulla’s dismissal, events moved at a fast pace. The NC

government, which was embroiled in controversy and uncertainty, now began to
govern; much to the relief of the common man. Bakshi immediately took some
important and people-friendly decisions which were well received by the public.
Some of these included; partial restoration of free trade, abolishing import duties
on salt, raising salaries of government employees, making education free from
elementary to college level, abolishing levy on peasants, subsidising food
articles and introducing planned development. He also sought and obtained loans
and other financial assistance from the Central Government. In December, 1953,
the Government of India advanced a loan of 14.49 million dollars to the State
Government. Other welfare measures included the provision of scholarships to
students to enable them to pursue education; executing many developmental
works, like building roads and commissioning irrigation and hydro-electric
projects, etc. An engineering college, a medical college, an Ayurvedic/Unani
college and industrial training institutes and polytechnics were established in the
Valley for the first time. One of the most ambitious projects executed during
Bakshi’s time was the construction of a new tunnel at Banihal, at an altitude of
2134 m. The older one, located at approximately 4000 m, was prone to getting
frequently blocked in inclement weather, resulting in disruption in the free flow
of traffic between Jammu and Srinagar (after partition, India’s only surface link
to Kashmir). Named Jawahar Tunnel, the new tunnel, constructed in 1955, not
only reduced the distance between Jammu and Srinagar by nearly 40 km, it was
no longer prone to frequent closures. This ensured that Kashmir Valley did not
remain cut off from rest of the country for long periods of time, as used to be the
case earlier.

These developmental activities resulted in corruption and nepotism; creating

many vested interests. Consequently, money played an important role in not only
keeping political supporters in good humour, but also winning over Bakshi’s
opponents as well. This gave rise to many extra-constitutional centres of power.
To meet their ever-increasing demand, Bakshi resorted to financial blackmail of
the Central Government by telling it that such financial assistance was necessary
to keep Kashmiri Muslims away from Sheikh Abdullah’s supporters. Officials
and politicians worked hand in glove to perpetuate corruption and extend its
reach. They consistently propagated that to ensure peace in the valley, it was
necessary to overlook and condone these financial and other irregularities.

This situation created a gulf between Bakshi and his leftist supporters, led by
GM Sadiq, DP Dhar, Mir Qasim and GL Dogra. These leaders got disillusioned
with the rampant corruption and some of Bakshi’s supporters who would use
high-handed methods against their political opponents. The final break came in
October 1957, when these leaders left the party and joined hands to form a new
political party called Democratic National Conference (DNC). This new outfit
attracted a large number of youth to it. The most positive fallout of the creation
of DNC was the birth of a genuine opposition political party, which was pro-
India and also non-sectarian in its composition, ideology and goals. The
formation and popularity of DNC posed a challenge to Plebiscite Front (PF),
whose cadres became eager to join the new outfit to wage a political struggle
based on economic issues.

The existence of DNC was short-lived, as some of its top leaders rejoined
Bakshi camp on Nehru’s advice and insistence. The party was dissolved and its
cadres went back to NC. The DNC experiment was path-breaking in the politics
of the state. In due course of time, it would have served as a strong pro-India
platform for all those Kashmiris who believed in the idea of India as a secular,
multi-cultural democracy. It would have served to wean away Kashmiri youth
from the infructuous anti-India political platform that has only brought misery
and sufferings to the common people of Kashmir, while at the same time, served
to fill-up the coffers of those leaders who have misled them in the name of
Pakistan, Azadi and autonomy. It would have also served as a safety valve to let
out political steam on many issues of concern to people, without letting the
vested interests to steer it towards India-bashing. But Nehru’s myopic political
vision put paid to such experiment, with grave consequences for the future.

Formation of the Plebiscite Front (PF) and its Impact

The disintegration of the NC after the dismissal of the first interim
government in 1953, presented Pakistan with a window of opportunity to make
its presence felt in Kashmir. It took advantage of the uncertain political situation
that resulted as a consequence. The pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir, which
were lying low, started receiving open support from Pakistan. They started
demanding the implementation of the UN Resolution and the right of self-
determination for Kashmir.

Taking advantage of the situation, Sheikh Abdullah’s supporters in the NC,

under the leadership of his second-in-command and alter ego, Mirza Mohammad
Afzal Beg, formed the PF in 1954, with Sheikh Abdullah as its acknowledged
supreme leader, though technically he was not even its member. Declaring
plebiscite as its objective, the PF spread its organisational roots throughout the
length and breadth of the valley and created a huge membership for the
fledgeling party. It gathered substantial and widespread support among the
Muslim masses in the valley. It attracted anyone and everyone who was anti-
Indian. This included the pro-Pakistan over ground and underground cadres;
Muslim intelligentsia, bureaucracy and the ever burgeoning middle class. It was
a well-known fact that the party was financed mostly by Pakistan, though local
people also made substantial contributions. “It is believed that some of its
important functionaries received financial help and concessions from even
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.” 18

Its propaganda machinery worked overtime to spread venom against India. It

appealed to the people to boycott the elections. The movement was responsible
for fuelling the phenomenal growth of anti-India forces and fomenting a great
deal of trouble for India in the valley. It also contributed immensely to the
growth of the culture of political dishonesty and corruption. But India could do
very little as it had allowed its support base to be eroded by turning a blind eye
to the perpetuation of Muslim majoritarianism and had buckled in front of
Abdullah’s policy of blackmail and intimidation.

To add to this general state of political discontent, Sheikh Abdullah was

released from prison in January 1958. Presuming that it was international
pressure on India that forced it to release him, he lost no time in launching a
scathing attack on the Government of India. What was worse, he spoke in
positive terms about Pakistan. His interview (given in Kud) appearing in the
Bombay Weekly, Blitz, was particularly venomous. While continuing with his
tirade against India, he lashed out at Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad for having
been “unfaithful.” He did not even spare the DNC and its leaders, calling them
“Indian agents” and “greater enemies” of Kashmir. The fact is that he had been
alarmed by the seemingly popular perception of DNC among the people,
particularly among the youth, and that too on non-sectarian issues; a
development totally new to the valley. Therefore, his rallying against the DNC
was to stifle the emerging voice of pro-India elements, while at the same time,
projecting the Plebiscite Front to be the lone voice and platform of Kashmiris.
This was one more instance of Sheikh’s intolerant attitude towards political
dissent. He was re-arrested after sometime and charged with subversion and
sedition against the State. However, in keeping with his policy of appeasement,
Nehru, in January 1962, persuaded the state government to withdraw the
Kashmir Conspiracy Case, making the way clear for letting Sheikh Abdullah off
the hook.

As if this was not enough, the Chinese invasion of 1962 further exposed the
hollowness of India’s claims to a leadership role in Asia, without the
commensurate military and economic strength. Further, it seriously dented
Nehru’s image and credibility. Seeing India in such a weakened state was a
matter of great satisfaction and joy to both Pakistan and the PF, who sensed an
opportunity to exploit the situation to achieve their objectives. As a first step, the
PF immediately modified its stand to demand that Kashmir issue be settled
between India and Pakistan! The party felt that a weakened India would not be
able to stand upto Pakistan and would eventually be compelled to let go off
Kashmir.

To add to the overall uncertain political situation in the state, Bakshi Ghulam
Mohhamad was made to resign from the prime ministership, as part of the
Kamraj Plan, despite the fact that this plan was applicable only to Congressmen
and Bakshi was not one. Nevertheless, Nehru’s writ ran and Bakshi had to
resign. But the wily Bakshi got one of his lieutenants, Shammasudin, elected as
the leader of the NC parliamentary party, much against the wishes of the
Congress party. Bakshi, therefore, was well-placed to do backseat driving.
Shamasudin, however, lasted only for 99 days, as an event of great magnitude,
with far-reaching consequences, that shook the Indian establishment, took place
in the valley during his reign.

During Bakshi’s rule the process of Islamisation in the state continued

unabated, even after a separate constitution was promulgated in 1957. Muslim
precedence dominated the political and economic scene. Bakshi continued to
head the Muslim Auqaf Trust. The Legislative Assembly was also constituted
based on the delimitation carried out to serve the purpose of electing the
Constituent Assembly. The heavier weightage for Kashmir Valley, and
consequently for Muslims was thus perpetuated. The administrative
reorganization was carried out under the pretext of correcting the so-called
imbalances. In the process, the government removed some high-ranking officers
on the plea that they favoured the Dogra rulers. But in actual fact, it was a ploy
to remove Hindu officers from administration and replace them with loyal party
men. It was a purely communal agenda camouflaged by subterfuge.

It may be mentioned that Dogra political elite was far from being Hindu in its
composition. It was primarily composed of narrow agrarian middle class, which
was equally Muslim. Besides, the state services were dominated by the British,
with most administrators owing their origin to Indian Civil Service. Though the
19

members of the Dogra ruling class had a large presence from the dynasty, nearly
half its size was made up of Muslims. The non-Kashmiri Muslims subjects of the
Dogra rulers formed 45 per cent of its army; the remaining 55 per cent were
Hindus. The fact is that Hindus of Kashmir and Jammu had taken up English
education much before the State’s Muslims had and, therefore, had been
employed in State Subordinate Services. But most of them occupied unimportant
and ordinary posts with insignificant role in decision-making. “Even under
Dogra rule Kashmiri Pandits were not favoured in the matters of recruitment to
government service,” writes India’s former Foreign Secretary, MK Rasgotra.
20

The partial application of the Constitution of India in 1954, and the

promulgation of the Constitution of the State in 1957, were both used to
perpetuate the Islamisation of various sectors of governance. Many exceptions
and reservations were placed on the application of fundamental rights envisaged
by the Constitution of India, which became effective by virtue of the Presidential
Order of May, 1954. Thus, arming itself with arbitrary powers, the state
government ruthlessly put into effect the reservations for some sections of the
people in order to promote Muslim interests.

This blatant communalisation of state policies had a far-reaching effect on the

politics of the state in the years to come. With delimitation of the constituencies
and permanently depriving the refugee population of any voting rights, the NC
government ensured a heavier weightage to the Valley in the Legislative
Assembly. During the delimitation of constituencies done before the holding of
elections to the State Constituent Assembly in 1951, gerrymandering was
carefully carried out to neutralise the non-Muslim vote in at least three
constituencies, namely, Habbakadal, Baramulla and Anantnag in Kashmir
Valley, and another three constituencies in Doda and Udhampur districts of
Jammu region. This process resulted in Kashmir having no constituency which
was not a Muslim majority seat, from where the Hindus could elect a
representative of their choice. As a result, the Hindus and Sikh representatives
elected to the State Assembly from Kashmir did not represent the aspirations of
their own respective communities. Most of those who got elected proved to be
men of straw, who did the bidding of the majority community. This was
apparent during debate on various bills in the Legislative Assembly, particularly
on the ‘Resettlement Bill,’ introduced by NC, headed by Sheikh Abdullah.

Over the years, the heavy weightage given to Kashmir Valley has also ensured
that it is a Kashmiri Muslim who has always been the chief minister of the state,
irrespective of which party formed the government. “Council of Ministers is also
packed with Muslims, with Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists having a representation
of roughly 26 per cent.” Kashmiri Pandit politicians have occupied no
21

significant position worthy of name, in any political party.

In the government machinery too, “almost all the heads of various

departments have been Muslims …an average of less than 26 per cent, including
the lent officers of the Government of India and the officers of the Indian
Administrative Services, were Hindus. At an average 68 per cent of the higher
posts in the State Government were always monopolised by Muslims.” These
22

included major public sector enterprises, educational institutes, colleges,

technical institutes, state corporations, etc. “Despite having an average literacy
level of 88 per cent, Kashmiri Hindus occupied a dismal 4.8 per cent of the State
Services, including those in the public sector enterprises, corporations and
government undertakings.” In the Central government services, including
23

Jammu and Kashmir Bank, Central government undertakings, the defence

services, the Beacon organisation of the Border Roads, and the communication
system of the Central government, “the Kashmiri Hindu share was only 12 per
cent of the available employment, against 38 per cent of the Kashmiri
Muslims.” 24
 During the ten-year period (1980–1990), when radical extremism incubated in
the Valley, “the recruitment of Kashmiri Hindus in the State Services and
services in other corporate bodies was reduced to an average of 1.7 per cent.” 25

Even though many communal orders were struck down by higher judiciary,
ways and means were found by the state government to bypass these legal
hurdles and continue to exclude the Pandits from state employment. Strict
embargo was placed to exclude them from teaching staff of higher secondary
schools, colleges, and post-graduate departments of Kashmir University,
Agricultural University, medical and engineering colleges and Sher-i-Kashmir
Institute of Medical Sciences, despite being eminently qualified to hold these
appointments.

Almost the same policy was adopted for the admission of Kashmiri Pandit
students to various professional colleges and technical institutes. “Generally, the
Pandit admissions have been in the range of eight per cent of the yearly
admissions. Even when looked at from purely population proportion angle,
Kashmiri Pandits formed more than eight per cent of the population. Out of this
minuscule share of eight per cent, only two per cent were nominated for higher
studies or provided grants to study outside the state. The comparison becomes
even more stark when you note that on an average seven per cent of the
Kashmiri Pandits were admitted to technical institutes, even though 63 per cent
of the applicants among them possessed 60 per cent and above marks, whereas
76 per cent of the Muslim candidates got admission, though only 31 per cent had
secured 60 per cent and above marks. In the Technical Training Institutes, 12 per
cent Hindus got admission, though 66 per cent applicants possessed first class
with 60 per cent or more marks in the qualifying examination, whereas 82 per
cent Muslims were admitted in technical training colleges, though only 28 per
cent of them had 60 per cent marks or above. In admission to the post-graduate
institutes, 14 per cent Hindus were admitted, though 41 per cent of applicants
had first class, with 60 per cent or more marks, whereas 78 per cent of the
Muslim candidates were admitted to the same classes, though only 14 per cent of
them possessed first class with 60 per cent or above.” This forced the Pandit
26

students to migrate outside the state in droves.

The monopolisation of the media by the Muslims of the state has also ensured
that their viewpoint always received prominence. “Seventy-two per cent of the
daily newspapers, news journals, weekly news magazines, and other periodicals
were owned by Kashmiri Muslims. In contrast, Hindus owned four newspapers,
news magazines and journals.” One of these was in English, not published
27
regularly, and had little effect on the public opinion. Besides, Muslim-owned
media received widespread state patronage and financial backing from within
and without.

The vernacular newspapers, owned as these were by Muslims, carried out

persistent communal and separatist propaganda, advocating secession, losing no
opportunity to denigrate Hindus and India. Most newspapers advocated the
application of Nizam-e-Mustaffa. Many newspapers openly instigated the
Muslim masses against the Kashmiri Pandits, whom they projected as the
instruments of their own perceived enslavement. As for Kashmir history, they
refused to own it, since it was not theirs anyway. The past did not concern them
and they were disinterested in it.

Indian political leaders, by and large, ignored the rising consolidation of anti-
Indian forces in the state, for reasons that are not too difficult to discern. To start
with, Nehru had put all his eggs in one basket; that of NC in general and Sheikh
Abdullah in particular. Therefore, when Sheikh showed his true colours, India
had nowhere to look. As far as the leftists (who exercised enormous influence,
far in excess of their numbers) were concerned, they rationalised the Muslim
precedence by equating it with the resurgence of the oppressed masses. On
numerous occasions, Sheikh Abdullah exploited this communist sentiment to the
hilt.

The Mo-e-Muqadas (the Sacred Relic) Agitation

The decade of sixties proved most fruitful for the anti-Indian forces in the
state. The secessionist forces which had been emboldened by the humiliating
loss India suffered at the hands of Chinese in 1962, got a further fillip during the
massive and prolonged agitation that rocked the valley in the winter of 1963.
This event proved to be watershed in the post-accession history of Kashmir; such
was its fallout. In December 1963, sacred relic of Prophet Mohammad (called
Mo-e-Muqadas; meaning sacred hair), kept in Hazratbal Shrine, and displayed
every Friday after the prayers, went missing from its sanctum sanctorum. The
theft triggered gigantic upheaval in the valley, with lakhs pouring into the streets
of major and minor towns of Kashmir to register their protest. This
unprecedented turmoil literally brought life to a standstill. Their demands
basically included the restoration of the relic and naming the real culprit (Asli
mulzim ko pesh karo). People’s anger turned towards Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad whom the agitating people considered the real culprit. As the
agitation took place in the extreme cold of winter; the agitators used kangris as 28

effective missiles against the law enforcement agencies.

The hurt religious sentiment that resulted from the theft, coupled with anti-
India sentiment, inflamed passions as never before. Shamasudin, the Prime
Minister, who was largely seen as Bakshi’s proxy, became its first casualty as he
was swept off power. Nevertheless, while these political developments were
taking place, the relic continued to remain untraceable. During this period, there
was absolutely no let up in either the number of people joining the protests every
day, or in the intensity of their anger. Kashmir was literally hanging by the
thread. Finally, the relic was traced and restored to its sanctum sanctorum after
its genuineness had been authenticated by a widely respected Muslim cleric,
Mirakh Shah. But for the deft handling by Lal Bahadur Shastri and the wise
counsel provided by two Kashmiri leaders, Maulana Syed Masoodi and the
veteran politician, GM Karra, Kashmir was on the edge and very close to
witnessing a holocaust. Though the restoration of the relic saw the end of street
protests and apparent return to normalcy, the whole episode left deep scars on
the political situation of the state and had far-reaching consequences on its future
politics.

The prolonged agitation led to the rejuvenation of anti-national forces, besides

irreversibly communalising the polity further. Pakistan’s proxies in the state
worked overtime to exploit the mass upsurge and channelise people’s anger
against India. They succeeded to a great extent in doing so. These elements got a
fresh lease of life and were so emboldened that most of them now came over
ground. They now set to work to destroy the last vestiges of India’s influence in
the state. Indian Government’s reaction was on the expected lines; it chose to
compromise with the anti-national forces. As a consequence, Sheikh Abdullah
was released from prison and Nehru initiated a dialogue with him. At that time,
reports started appearing that Nehru was prepared for a compromise, according
to which Kashmir would become a Muslim autonomous entity within India. It
was further reported that Nehru had even made such an offer to the leaders of the
PF. This would have entailed withdrawing all provisions of the Constitution that
had been extended to it after 1953. It is believed that Nehru was even prepared
for this.

However, Sheikh Abdullah insisted that Pakistan be made a party to the

dispute. It was in these circumstances that Nehru died on May 27, 1964.
 In the meantime GM Sadiq, who now took over the reins of power, promised
liberalisation of the political discourse in order to win over even those
representing the anti-national sentiment. According to this policy, no one, not
even those belonging to the Plebiscite Front, were to be treated as untouchables.
In fact, most of them were provided with largesse. Some degree of acceptable
and transparent basis for admission to professional colleges was also devised.
Seventy per cent of the seats were reserved for the majority community and 30
per cent for non-Muslims. This had a positive impact on the overall situation,
and to some extent, the rhetoric of the anti-Indian forces was blunted. Efforts
were made to provide youth with jobs and other avenues of self-employment.

At the same time, Sadiq took a number of steps to bring the state into the
national mainstream. Some of these measures included; change in the
nomenclature of the head of the state from Sadr-e-Riyasat to governor and from
prime minister to chief minister. Besides, the governor was now to be appointed
by the President of India, instead of being elected by the State Legislature. The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India was extended to the state and several
sections of the Constitution of India were made applicable to the state. Though
these measures helped strengthen political integration, the emotional integration
remained a distant dream.

Similarly, even though political liberalisation had a positive impact on the

general atmosphere, it had an unwelcome flip side too. A large number of anti-
national elements who had been compelled to go underground earlier, surfaced
in large numbers. They now had a field day and exploited the liberty of working
over ground by inflaming anti-Indian sentiment. Demonstrations and agitations
with anti-Indian slant grew in intensity and scale and became the order of the
day. For the first time slogans like, ‘Indian dogs go back’ were heard. Much
against the promise of creating a liberalised political atmosphere, Sadiq too
resorted to the old stratagem of getting the election papers of his opponents
rejected and having his own partymen elected unopposed. As a result, the
political situation in the state deteriorated. The PF cadres were now joined by
another virulently anti-Indian organisation, called the Awami Action Committee;
a party formed in the backdrop of the theft of Mo-e-Muqadas, to coordinate the
agitation. Many youth organisations and students bodies which had been formed
in the valley under the direct patronage of Pakistan during this agitation lent
their wholehearted support to these anti-Indian protests.

In the meantime, in February 1965, Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg,
went on a pilgrimage to Mecca for performing Haj. During their sojourn abroad,
they toured many places, including Europe and Algeria, facilitated by the
diplomatic corps of Pakistan. In Algeria they met the Chinese Prime Minister,
Chou en Lai. This meeting, coming so close to the Chinese aggression of 1962,
raised hackles in India. Their passports were impounded and both of them were
arrested on their return to India. The Valley, consequently, erupted into protests
and agitations again. These protests were more communal and intensely anti-
Indian in nature. Pakistan exploited the situation to the hilt, as it saw a new
opportunity to fish in Kashmir’s troubled waters.

The Two Wars and their Impact

The first half of the decade of sixties saw a decline in India’s stature and
prestige. A humiliating defeat at the hands of China, Nehru’s loss of standing as
a consequence, brought down India’s profile at the international level.
Conditions of strife in the country created due to the loss of the holy relic in
Kashmir and its accompanying turmoil in the valley, language riots in Madras
State (now Tamil Nadu), besides a Thousand Mutines throughout the length and
breadth of India created A Siege Within. Nehru’s death at this crucial juncture
only made matters worse. Around the same time, Pakistan was getting
strengthened by receiving enormous economic and military assistance as a
member of the anti-communist US alliances, CENTO and SEATO. This
emboldened Pakistan in its approach to India. Convinced that Chinese
aggression and Nehru’s death had weakened India as never before, Pakistan saw
an opportunity that it was looking for, to make another bid at grabbing Kashmir.
The threat of war therefore, loomed large on the horizon.

What was about to happen in Kashmir has been clearly recounted by Duane R
Claridge in book, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA: “In 1964, Nehru
released Sheikh Abdullah from prison. Abdullah immediately left for Paris. I
flew to see him. He seemed a bit tentative, and nothing much came of the
meeting, except for an agreement to meet again, this time in Jidda, Saudi Arabia,
during the Hajj”… “Later I flew to Jidda and contacted him. This time Abdullah
really had something to say, and it was explosive. During his pilgrimage to
Mecca, Saudi Arabia, for the Hajj, and before my arrival in Jidda, Abdullah
claimed he had been briefed on Pakistan’s next moves in Kashmir, which would
result in the first Indo-Pak war, in the fall of 1965”… “The Lion of Kashmir
basically gave me the whole plan of the Pakistanis for Kashmir. The Pakistanis
were going to begin infiltrating small guerrilla units out of ‘Azad Kashmir’ into
Kashmir proper. Those units would then begin to stir up things. Once the
insurrection got underway in Kashmir, regular Pakistani military forces would
come to Kashmir’s aid.”

The success of their strategy depended upon the expected uprising of

Kashmiris against India at a crucial moment, to coincide with the arrival of
infiltrators that Pakistan was to push into the valley, in the first phase of the
operation called, ‘Operation Gibraltar’. This uprising was planned to be
synchronous with the Pakistan’s armoured thrust into Chhamb-Jaurian Sector,
that would cut off the valley from rest of the country, at the most crucial stage in
the second phase of the overall operation.

1965 War
The infiltrators did succeed in getting into the valley in large numbers, as
Indian intelligence agencies did not, as usual, get the wind of it. Armoured thrust
too succeeded, with the vanguard of Pakistan’s 1 Armoured Division, which
st

spearheaded this thrust, reaching as far as the vital Akhnoor Bridge over River
Chenab. But that was about all. Thereafter, Pakistan only witnessed reverses.
The anticipated mass uprising did not occur, and the armoured thrust petered out
as India launched a counter-thrust in Lahore-Sialkot sectors. The war ended
inconclusively, with both sides claiming victory. However, India had a decisive
edge, though it had been caught totally unawares and unprepared. Whereas India
registered territorial gains of nearly 1,800 sq km, Pakistan held about 550 sq km
of Indian territory.

In Pakistan, this war is regarded as something of a milestone. It has

consistently propagated to its own people that Pakistan had achieved a great
victory over India. But the truth is entirely different. Altaf Gauhar, who was
Pakistan’s Secretary of Information and Broadcasting at the time of this conflict
and worked closely with the Pakistani Military Dictator, General Ayub Khan,
put Pakistan’s performance in proper perspective. He says, “Ayub Khan may
have a lot to answer for, for authorising Kashmir operations, but in agreeing to
ceasefire, he acted with… realism… patriotism… though he had to pay a terrible
price in personal terms.” 29

The territories captured by both the countries were eventually vacated as a

result of the Tashkent Agreement. India had to vacate the most strategically
located Haji Pir Pass that dominated the Uri-Poonch bulge, captured by Indian
troops during the war. This Pass was put to great use by Pakistan in pumping in
infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir, two decades later. The agreement,
midwifed by the Soviet Union to bring about reconciliation between the two
belligerents, virtually brought to an end the UN mediation in Kashmir.

The PF, which had insisted on Pakistan playing a decisive role in solving the
dispute, now, insisted that Kashmiris will have to be a party to the final
settlement of the issue, even if India and Pakistan were to reach any accord. As
mentioned earlier, after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest in 1953 and his long absence
from the state during such incarceration, certain provisions of the Indian
Constitution had been extended to the state. These measures had been taken for
purely practical considerations of governance and also in the interests of the
common citizens of the state. However, the vested interests and separatists used
these measures to emotionally blackmail Kashmiri Muslims whenever it suited
them. They instigated the masses to launch violent and prolonged agitations by
propagating that extension of above mentioned provisions of Indian constitution
to the state, had resulted in the erosion of the essence of Article 370. Pakistan’s
so-called ‘victory’ in the 1965 war and the sustained propaganda by PF over the
years, created a generation of militant Muslim youth, for whom freeing the
‘subjugated Muslims of Kashmir from the clutches of Hindus of India,’ became
an ideological imperative and a rallying cry. Their ideology was based on the
following four essential ingredients:-

• That NC did not represent the will of the people when they acceded to
India.

• It was only the use of force that would compel India to withdraw from
Kashmir.

• They felt that the PF, with its way of politics, would not be able achieve
this objective.

• Kashmir being a Muslim majority state was a natural part of Pakistan,

which had been created exclusively for the Muslims of south Asia.

1971 War
In Indira Gandhi’s chequered career, 1971 war against Pakistan was, perhaps,
her finest hour. Her entire diplomatic and military strategy prior to and during
the war was a masterstroke of a seasoned statesman. Among the serious
obstacles she faced in her determination to end Pakistani military atrocities on
Bengalis in their own eastern wing of the country, none were as formidable as
the hostility she faced from US President, Richard Nixon and his redoubtable
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Both hated her and were strongly allied with
Pakistan. MV Kamath, being posted in Washington those days had a ringside
30

view of their relationship. He recalls, “The United States under President

Richard Nixon was strongly on the side of Pakistan. Nixon hated India with the
intensity of a burning sun. His unprincipled Secretary of State was ever-willing
to back his boss to the hilt. If Nixon showed anger against India, Kissinger
would happily fan it. If Nixon abused India, Kissinger was willing to go all the
way to insult it… The plane in which she (Mrs Gandhi) travelled (to the US) was
ordered to come to halt at New York’s Kennedy Airport close to a stinking
urinal, deliberately. One had to hold one’s nose while passing by. According to
the lowest level of protocol, she was received by a junior State Department
official. I was one of those present on the occasion… The first meeting between
her and Nixon was fixed. Punctual to the point, Mrs Gandhi presented herself,
but Nixon deliberately made her wait for some 40 minutes to show his contempt
for his visitor…”

China too was a firm ally of Pakistan. Nevertheless, Mrs Gandhi neutralised
both with the deftness of an accomplished strategist by signing the Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with USSR. She gave specific instructions to
her Army Chief, General SHFJ Manekshaw (later Field Marshal) to liberate
Bangladesh in a lightning strike within the shortest possible time that would give
America practically no time to react. According to her thinking, it would present
the separated eastern wing of Pakistan as a fait accompli to the rest of the world.
During the war, Henry Kissinger did suggest to Huang Hua, China’s
representative at the UN to open another front against India in order to draw off
pressure from their common ally. The US further assured China that its own
Seventh Fleet would be readily available in the backwaters of Bay of Bengal to
lend whatever assistance was required by China. But with Soviet troops massed
on its border, China balked and the rest, as the cliche goes, is history. As Patrice
Tyler writes, “The episode was a humiliation for Nixon and Kissinger… Nixon
and Kissinger were left like brides at the altar waiting for China to act. When
ceasefire took effect, West Pakistan’s Army limped back home. East Pakistan
emerged as an independent Bangladesh. India’s hegemony in South Asia
significantly enhanced,” 31
 In the meanwhile, in Kashmir, Sadiq passed away a couple of days before
India achieved a resounding victory over Pakistan, which resulted in its break
up, and emergence of Bangladesh. Syed Mir Qasim now became the Chief
Minister. His tenure saw the growth of rabid communal and fundamentalist
forces, which were provided with overt and covert assistance by those in power.
The extent of their growth can be gauged from the fact that a communal party
like JeI won five seats in the state assembly. This gave a fillip to the demand for
plebiscite, which grew louder and more frequent. However, Pakistan’s defeat at
the hands of its arch enemy, India, dealt a severe blow to the secessionist forces
in the valley. Sheikh Abdullah’s release from jail thereafter, led to a further
positive development, which saw the dissolution of PF in 1975. During the last
stages of Mir Qasim’s tenure, the political situation took an interesting turn,
when Sheikh Abdullah was elected as the leader of the Congress Legislature
Party. However, he had neither forgotten the past nor forgiven his detractors. He
assessed correctly, “that being in power, he could create difficulties for the
Centre. And this he did, in right earnest.” His first act was to induce defections
32

in the Congress party by luring some of its Muslim legislators to his side. Next,
he cut off the subsidy given by the Centre on food rations, asking people to
tighten their belts and thus free themselves from the condescending and
patronising attitude of New Delhi. He also reverted to his old game of speaking
with two voices; criticising India in front of his Kashmiri audiences and being
his sweet reasonable self while speaking to Indian newsmen or addressing
Jammu audiences. No wonder, Pandit Prem Nath Dogra, a respected leader from
Jammu, said of Sheikh Abdullah, that he was, “A communalist in Kashmir, a
communist in Jammu, and a nationalist in India.” 33

As late as 1968, Sheikh Abdullah reiterated his position concerning accession

to India. In an interview to Organiser, he said, “We of the NC preferred India to
Pakistan because we had a progressive socio-economic programme which we
could implement only in the more liberal air of India.” In the positive political
34

environment created by the events described above, both India and Sheikh
Abdullah thought it prudent to start negotiations, which would examine afresh
the relevance and legal basis of the applicability of all provisions of the Indian
constitution extended to the state after the accession in 1947, keeping in mind its
special status derived from Article 370.

Consequently, in 1972, negotiations were started with Sheikh Abdullah and

Mirza Afzal Beg to examine all the provisions. During several rounds of talks
over prolonged period of time, each such provision was critically examined, but
not a single provision was found objectionable. In fact, the Sheikh Abdullah
Government could not formulate even one proposal for withdrawal of any such
provision. It is obvious that such critical examination would have revealed to the
representatives of the State that each one of those provisions (extended to the
state after 1947) was essential for the welfare and development of the people of
the state. In fact, it must have also become obvious to the negotiators that
without such provisions, the state would suffer a great deal. For example,
without financial integration with the Union, the state would have no resources
for development, because the entire funds for five-year plans and substantial part
of non-plan expenditure, are provided by the Union. Similarly, in the absence of
Article 356 (dealing with the imposition of President’s rule), what legal recourse
is available to the Union if the state refuses to comply with any directions
concerning defence, communications or foreign affairs? The fact of the matter is
that irrespective of the lies perpetuated by vested interests about the erosion of
the essence of Article 370, these negotiations established that the larger interests
of the people of the state were inextricably tied-up with full integration of the
State with the Union.

These discussions finally led to Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Abdullah signing
the Kashmir Accord in February, 1975. As a result, Mir Qasim, the incumbent
Chief Minister, stepped down and power was handed over to the Sheikh without
affecting any change in the composition of the State Legislature, in which
Congress enjoyed majority. It may be recalled that prior to this, Sheikh Abdullah
had spurned all efforts at reconciliation. But now the whole political
environment had undergone a qualitative change. His arch foes, Bakshi and
Sadiq, were dead and more importantly, with Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war,
and the emergence of Bangladesh, he was left with no alternative but to come to
terms with reality and accept the accord that best suited the interests of the state,
and perhaps, his own interests.

While all these developments concerning Kashmir were taking place, the
political situation in the rest of the country was coming to a boil. The decade of
eighties was one of unremitting strife for the country. It faced unprecedented
challenges to its integrity. Its army was stretched to the limit fighting both
internal and external threats; from Siachen in the north to Sri Lanka in the south,
from the Seven Sisters in the north-east to Punjab in west.
35

Indra Gandhi had imposed a nation-wide emergency consequent to Allahbad

High Court upholding the petition filed by her political opponent, Raj Narain,
pleading for declaring her election to the Lok Sabha null and void. The general
election of 1977, which was held after the emergency had been lifted, brought
Janata Party to power. In the 1977 State Assembly elections, Sheikh Abdullah
“refused to come to an electoral understanding with the Janata Party, as that
would compromise his anti-India posture that he wanted to exploit during the
electioneering. Some of the issues that he raised during the campaigning
included; the opening the Jhelum Valley Road, withdrawal of Indian Army from
Kashmir and defeating “political parties of India.” He revived the old Sher-
36

Bakra feud to further gain political mileage. A colleague of his would ask for
37

vote with a piece of rock-salt in his hand. After winning the elections, Janata
38

Party supporters were given a rough time by NC workers: Bakras had to flee
their homes and seek shelter in safer places to escape the wrath of the furious
Shers. As for Congress supporters, the choicest epithets were hurled at them.

During the second phase of the Sheikh’s rule (1977–1982), obscurantist forces
got a boost and the administration was Islamised with renewed vigour. Friday
prayers were offered in offices, cinema shows on Fridays were cancelled during
the day for Namaz (prayers). Every conscious effort was made to undermine the
authority of the Indian Union. Income tax officials who came to inquire into
income and tax evasion by some politically well-connected big business houses
in Kashmir, were not only denied police assistance, but were also physically
manhandled by violent mobs, organised by NC workers. IAS officers from
outside the state were given insignificant postings, except a few who did the
bidding of the ruling party bigwigs. The JeI schools were not taken over as
Sheikh Abdullah had promised earlier. On the other hand, large funds started
pouring in from Pakistan and Arab countries for JeI and Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Hadis
and their front organisations.

In March 1980, the JeI played host to a delegation from Medina University.
Later, a member of the delegation, Prof Abdul Samad, felt bold enough to say at
an open meeting in Srinagar, “For an Islamic revolution we have to prepare the
people individually and collectively. To achieve this we have to give
sacrifices.” The same year in September, Amir of JeI of PoK, Maulana
39

Abdullah paid a visit to Kashmir and publicly proclaimed that Kashmiris were
not a party to the Simla Agreement. It is believed that the Maulana had come to
brief his counterpart in Kashmir on General Zia’s prospective plan to grab
Kashmir by launching Operation Topac (see chapter-12 and n. 41). However,
this alarmed the Central Government and he was asked to leave Kashmir within
twenty-four hours. During the same period, under one pretext or the other, a
number of new police battalions were raised. Some of these battalions recruited
JeI activists and even persons believed to be from across the LoC.

On the one hand, NC leaders consolidated their hold on the power structure of
the state, and on the other, they hobnobbed with the anti-Indian and secessionist
forces. Whenever it suited them politically, the NC leaders would out-do these
anti-India elements by indulging in competitive communal politics. This was to
prove to Pakistan’s proxies in the state that under NC, Kashmir could be more
Islamic than Islamic Pakistan itself. Every effort was made by the NC
government to weaken the secular and nationalist minded political parties. In this
manner, the NC government encouraged and strengthened the communal and
secessionist forces, who continued to grow and consolidate their position as
months rolled by. Such politics had a disastrous effect on the secular and
nationalist forces that found the task of strengthening the bonds between the
Union and the State, increasingly difficult.

To prove himself to Kashmiri Muslims, the Sheikh indulged in unabashed

appeasement of Islamic sentiment. State and Muslim Auqaf funds were spent on
building impressive mosques and religious institutions on government land. A
special routine order (SRO) was issued to change the name of hundreds of
Kashmir villages so as to obliterate the traces of past history and culture. By this
policy, the Sheikh directly or indirectly, helped forces inimical to India and its
secular character. His last years in power were spent in leaving no stone
unturned in making India look suspect in the eyes of Kashmiri Muslims. He even
went to the extent of describing all Kashmir Pandits as Intelligence Bureau
agents in his autobiography Aatsh-e-Chinar. Forgetting the praise he had
lavished on India’s liberal, secular and progressive environment, not very long
ago, he now castigated Indian secularism and Congress leaders.

As his megalomania was gradually getting the better of him, he had stopped
trusting even those who had stood by him through thick and thin, throughout his
political journey. He fell out with Mohammad Afzal Beg, his most trusted
colleague of long standing. He did not have any confidence even in his son-in-
law, GM Shah. So he declared his son, Dr Farooq Abdullah, as his heir and
made him the president of NC. Addressing a public gathering to mark this
occasion, he said, “I trust him and request you too to help him in doing the job.
Like me, he won’t betray your trust. What I have not been able to achieve, he
will.” This he said despite having himself expressed doubts about Farooq
40

Abdullah’s abilities. DD Thakur, a minister in Sheikh Abdullah’s cabinet writes

that once Farooq Abdullah wanted to accompany DD Thakur during the latter’s
visit outside the state. Farooq Abdullah requested him to speak to Sheikh
Abdullah and seek his permission to permit him (Farooq Abdullah) to
accompany DD Thakur on this visit. When DD Thakur broached the issue with
Sheikh Abdullah, the latter replied, “I think you are doing a disservice to him.
He is not capable of running a small polyclinic, how do you expect him to do
well in politics?” 41

In September 1982, Sheikh Abdullah passed away and Dr Farooq Abdullah

was made the chief minister, ignoring the claims of Sheikh Abdullah’s senior
colleagues and without consulting the party legislators. Everything was done
silently and swiftly, with the blessing of Indira Gandhi, as Farooq was close to
her son, Rajiv.

N OTES

1. Balraj Puri, The Times of India, October 19, 2009. Balraj Puri is one of the most renowned journalists
of Jammu and Kashmir State.
2. Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Oxford University Press, 1952) p. 208.
3. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, White Paper on Kashmir for Joint Human Rights Committee for
Minorities in Kashmir, (Jeoffry and Bell Inc. Publishers, Delhi).
4. Praja Parishad was a Jammu-based political party with widespread support in Jammu region and
opposed to the NC. It believed in complete integration of the State with India, unlike NC, which
resisted such integration. It was led by a charismatic leader, Prem Nath Dogra.
5. The Times, (London), October 13, 1951.
6. The Hindu, (Madras), November 1, 1951.
7. MJ Akbar, The Siege Within (Penguin, 1976).
8. Dr S Gopal’s Biography of Nehru: while referring to volume 5 of the papers of Adlai Stevenson.
(Edited by W. Johnson and Dr S Gopal).
9. Dr MK Teng, Kashmir Sentinel, March 2008.
10. Joseph Korbel, n. 2, p. 225.
11. Dr S Gopal, quoted by Claude Arpi in Pioneer, August 27, 2008.
12. Joseph Korbel, n. 2, p. 214.
13. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, (Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1991).
14. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, n. 3.
15. The Hindu Weekly Review (Madras), August 10, 1953.
16. The Times of India, (Bombay), August, 10, 1953.
17. Indiagrams (The Embassy of India, Washington, D.C.), No 388, February 9, 1954.
18. Kashmir; Crises in Perspective (Indian Research Institute for Kashmir Affairs).
19. Precursor to the Indian Administrative Service of today, Indian Civil Service was an elite service
created by the British during their rule in India, to administer this huge and diverse colony of theirs. It
was the British Indian Army and the Indian Civil service, through which Britain ruled British India.
Initially, entry to the service was open only to the British; later on, it was thrown open to Indians too.
20. Indian Express, August 26, 1995.
21. Dr MK Teng and CL Gaddo, n. 3.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. It is a fire pot, or a portable stove, which is typically Kashmiri. It consists of an inner earthen pot, called
Kundal, placed inside an outer casing consisting of a wicker basket with handles to hold it. To
strengthen the basket, a mesh of straight wicker lining is added at the back of the basket. A little
wooden or metallic spatula, called Tsalan, is tied to the back of the basket to enable turning over of
the burning charcoal inside the earthen pot. Kangri is held under Pheran and carried by a person
wherever he or she goes, to provide continuous warmth in winter. In the absence of any other
economic source of heating available, Kashmiris have traditionally relied on Kangri to provided a
portable heating system. The charcoal used in the Kangri is made by burning Chinar leaves or Pohu
wood, as the hot embers are required to yield constant heat. Keys to Kashmir says that, “Kashmiris
learnt the use of Kangri from the Italians in the retinue of the Mughal Emperors.”
29. Kashmir Sentinel, December 2005.
30. Madhav Vittal Kamath, a well-known Indian journalist, was the former chairman of Prasar Bharati. He
worked as the editor of The Sunday Times (India) for two years during 1967–69 and as Washington
correspondent of The Times of India during 1969–78. He has authored nearly 40 books on various
topics. He was awarded Padma Bhushan in 2004.
31. Patrik Tyler, A Great wall, Six Presidents and China: An investigative History (New York Public
Affairs, 1999).
32. SS Toshakhani, BL Koul and ML Raina; Kashmir: Crises in Perspective (Indian Research Institutes for
Kashmir Affairs, Jain Printing System, New Delhi, 1990).
33. Statement given in Madras, quoted in The Hindu, October 15, 1952.
34. Sheikh Abdullah’s interview carried by Organiser of February 4, 1968.
35. The seven North-eastern states of India which are geographically contiguous and share many things in
common are called Seven Sisters. These states are; Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur,
Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya. For the past many decades, most of these States have been hit by
insurgency in vaying degrees.
36. SS Toshakhani, BL Koul and ML Raina, n. 32.
37. Supporters of Mirwaiz, the religious head of Kashmir. This appointment is hereditary. At this point in
time, Maulvi Farooq was the Mirwaiz. Supporters of Mirwaiz are historically referred to by their
nickname, Bakras (meaning goats), whereas supporters of Sheikh Abdullah’s NC are called Sher
(meaning lions). The rivalry goes back to the years of break-up of Muslim Conference, with NC
becoming a separate party opposed to Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan and the Mirwaiz (at that time
Mohammad Yusuf Shah) supporting Jinnah.
38. Rock-salt, like other goods, used to come to Kashmir through Jhelum road, its only link with undivided
India and was extensively used in Kashmir before the partition. In the minds of Kashmiri Muslims,
rock-salt came to be identified with Pakistan after Kashmir’s accession to India.
39. SS Toshakhani, BL Koul and ML Raina, n. 32.
40. Ibid.
41. DD Thakur, My Life and Years in Kashmir Politics; (Konark, New Delhi, 2005). p. 247.
11
 GATHERING STORM
“To sin by silence when they should protest makes cowards of men.”
—Abraham Lincoln

Farooq takes Centre Stage

Farooq Abdullah studied in England where he came into contact with
members of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), including its leader
Ammanullah Khan, whom he met in London, in 1971. Ammanullah Khan had
reached there after fleeing with his friends from Pakistan, to evade arrest. This
relationship grew further till 1973, when “Farooq went to PoK and not only took
an oath to ‘Liberate’ Kashmir in a ceremony organised by JKLF, but himself
administered the same oath to other young men assembled there.” In a massive
1

reception accorded to Sheikh Abdullah in Srinagar on his return to power in

1975, Farooq Abdullah joined the procession alongwith a number of his JKLF
colleagues whom he had brought along from England. In this procession,
proudly witnessed by his father, he coined a new slogan, “Chyon Desh, Myon
Desh — Kashur Desh Kashur Desh” (Your and My Country is Kashmir).

These then were the political leanings and mindset of Farooq Abdullah when
he took over the reins of the state administration in September 1982. Farooq was
also non-serious, whimsical and cavalier in his attitude to governance and
devoted little time to attending to his onerous tasks as chief minister of this
crucial state at a difficult time. Throughout his tenure he allowed these qualities
and his mindset to govern his conduct. On assuming the office of the chief
minister, with the help of his father’s ministerial colleagues, his first action was
to denounce the same people in their presence, in a public meeting. He exhorted
the people to give him the approval to have a brand new team of ‘honest and
trustworthy’ people to run the state. The people shouted their approval in one
voice, fed up as they were with the level of corruption prevailing in the state. To
keep the anti-India forces in good humour, he assured the gathering that he
would ‘never compromise with the dignity and honour of Kashmiris, even if it
meant fighting the mighty India.’

Within three months of assuming power, he joined hands with the political
parties opposed to Indira Gandhi and took an anti-Centre and anti-Congress
stand. Politically, this was a tactical ploy which suited him and made him
politically comfortable in the prevailing conditions in Kashmir. He allowed the
state to become a sanctuary of Punjab militants who found themselves safe and
welcome in the state. During his first tenure, a large number of Sikh youth from
the state joined the ranks of militants. Many believed that he allowed these
militants to run training centres in Kashmir by providing them with required
facilities. This attitude of the administration emboldened the extremists and their
over-ground supporters to take out processions and hold demonstrations in the
state. When Bindranwale was killed, Farooq Abdullah rushed to Khir Bhawani
2

temple at Tulamulla, where a huge Kashmiri Pandit gathering was observing a

festival on Ashtami, and advised the people assembled there to rush back to
Srinagar as the situation was likely to get out of control as “the Sikhs had lost
their Guru.” He further warned them that the situation in the state, as also in the
rest of the country, was bound to get worse. Having himself assessed the
situation, he failed to take adequate measures to save the Hanuman Mandir and
the Nirankari Bhavan and many houses in Jawahar Nagar and Wazir Bagh
localities of Srinagar, which were targeted by the agitating Sikhs. The police was
sent much after the damage had been done and 15 precious lives were lost. This
was his way of getting back at the Congress and the Centre.

To appease and encourage parochial elements in Kashmir, he exhorted

students of Kashmir University to preserve their Islamic identity. He patronised
those Kashmiri intellectuals who were known for their anti-Congress views, and
encouraged them to spread the message of Kashmiri identity among the
intellectual class of rest of India. Such a stand showed Farooq Abdullah’s typical
hypocrisy, as his well-known flamboyant life style was far removed from what
Kashmiri culture and ethos represented. He further accused India of fomenting
communal riots and stated that Muslims were not safe in India. In his
doublespeak, he merely followed his father.

To the Indian media he presented himself as a patriot who was being hounded
by Indira Gandhi, unnecessarily; while in Kashmir, he joined hands with an
avowed anti-Indian and his political arch rival, Maulana Farooq, in order to
foster Muslim unity and brotherhood. He exhorted the youth wing of NC to be
prepared for the ‘battle of freedom’. His rhetoric reached a feverish pitch as the
1983 elections drew closer. Addressing one of the election meetings he said,
“We are fighting the Congress. Its defeat will mean the defeat of the Central
power that wants to subjugate Kashmiris.” What is even worse, one of Indra
Gandhi’s public meetings was not only disturbed but she was insulted right in
front of the big contingent of local police, when NC workers took off their
trousers and exposed themselves before her. The crowd then set fire to the
Congress office in Srinagar and those named in the first information report were
all NC activists. When the elections finally took place, the NC activists were let
loose in the localities known for voting against the NC where they resorted to
bogus voting in favour of their candidates. At one polling booth, a former
inspector general of police was told that his vote had already been cast. Farooq
Abdullah won most of the seats on the anti-India plank. Being in majority, he
formed the government.

One of the worst anti-India events that occurred during his second tenure as
the chief minister, was the riotous situation witnessed during the India–West
Indies One Day International cricket match, held at Srinagar. During the match,
choicest invectives were hurled at the Indian players. The whole stadium
reverberated with anti-Indian and Pakistan Zindabad (long live Pakistan)
slogans throughout the match. An attempt was also made to dig up the pitch.
There was total pandemonium in the stadium. All this happened in front of the
chief minister, who remained a mute witness to this anti-India drama throughout
the day.

To the political parties outside the state, he projected himself merely as an

anti-Congress chief minister, but in the valley his politics were out and out anti-
national in both word and deed. His doublespeak served him well as he managed
to befool a large number of opposition leaders. He attended many conclaves of
opposition parties and organised some within his own state. The opposition
parties were taken in by his shrewd manipulation of their anti-Congress stand to
derive maximum political mileage for himself in the Valley. However, his anti-
centre politics and persistent anti-India fulminations gave a fresh lease of life to
anti-national forces in the state and they got a much needed fillip during his
tenure. With the induction of fresh cadres into NC, mostly with an anti-Indian
mindset, these elements organised and strengthened themselves within the party
under the patronage of their benefactor, Farooq Abdullah. Farooq’s poor
administrative acumen further created a sense of despondency among the public,
whose daily needs his government could not meet. The rise in the activities of
forces inimical to India, coupled with disenchantment of the public with routine
governance, created an alarming situation that could be allowed to continue only
at grave risk to the country. Indira Gandhi eased him out of office by
engineering defections in his party, with the help of his own brother-in-law, GM
Shah, who now became the chief minister with the support of Congress, in the
middle of 1985.

Farooq left no stone unturned to endear himself to the opposition parties in

India, with whom he had already developed a close rapport while in power. He
now projected himself as a victim of Indira Gandhi’s high handedness and
another casualty of her propensity to dismiss state governments opposed to her
and imposing President’s rule there. Since there was some truth in the fact that
Mrs Gandhi often dismissed state governments opposed to her on the flimsiest of
grounds, Farooq, being a shrewd manipulator, did succeed to a large extent in
gaining sympathy of the opposition parties.

Shah’s installation as the chief minister proved to be a remedy worse than the
disease. His misrule created chaos and confusion. Even those opposed to Farooq
Abdullah did not feel happy with Shah. The hitherto unheard of phenomenon of
bomb blasts and subversion became the order of the day. Frequent imposition of
curfew brought life to a grinding halt. Many people felt that all this was being
engineered by Farooq Abdullah through JKLF, to get back at his estranged
brother-in-law, who was instrumental in divesting him of his chief ministership.
With every passing day, the law and order situation was deteriorating further.
GM Shah’s government was dismissed in March 1986 and Governor’s rule was
imposed.

Governor’s Rule
Governor’s rule came as a soothing balm to the people of the state who had
been reeling under the mis-governance of Farooq and GM Shah, ever since
Sheikh Abdullah’s death in September 1982. Governor Jagmohan wasted little
time in redressing the grievances of the people and putting the wheels of state
administration in motion after these had ground to a virtual halt over the past few
years. He made officers accountable after setting them targets which they were
expected to achieve in a time-bound manner. He made valiant attempts to
remove corruption. He improved the state of availability of water and power,
which had become a major source of discontentment among the public.
Governance became transparent. Roads, public transport, healthcare, education,
public works, etc.; all showed considerable improvement during the Governor’s
rule. Jagmohan earned gratitude of people cutting across regional and religious
divide for his administrative acumen and tireless efforts to address people’s
grievances. But the vested interests felt threatened. The disgruntled politicians,
smugglers, drug peddlers, corrupt bureaucrats, black marketers and power
brokers, all ganged up to defame the Governor. They started a smear campaign
by calling him a Muslim baiter of the ‘Turkman Gate’ fame and a Hindu
chauvinist. Jagmohan was not deterred by these allegations hurled at him and
continued to deliver good governance. People, for the first time, saw and
experienced an efficient and a responsive government.

Having experienced life without power, Farooq Abdullah now started

mending fences with the centre by making use of his friendship with Rajiv
Gandhi. Vested interests too started playing their role in bringing back an
unpopular government, as their sources of ill-gotten wealth were drying up as a
result of the Governor’s rule. By then Rajiv too had decided to bring Farooq
Abdullah back to power in coalition with his own Congress party. As a first step
Rajiv eased out Mufti Mohammad Syed, who was opposed to Farooq Abdullah,
from the presidentship of the state Congress party by inducting him into Central
cabinet. Farooq need not have entered into an electoral understanding with the
Congress, as he would have won the elections on his own. Nevertheless, he
chose to fight these elections in collaboration with Congress, as an insurance
against any future challenge to his government from the centre, where Congress
was in power (once bitten twice shy). Congress, on the other hand, just wanted
to share power, used as it had got to its loaves and fishes! Therefore, for both, it
was a marriage of convenience — a marriage between strange bed fellows. In
due course, this coalition had a serious fall-out, particularly for the Congress.
Being part of the ruling alliance with NC, the entire opposition space was filled -
in by the sectarian forces. Besides, being a junior partner of NC, without much
power, Congress could not retain its support base, as the Congress cadres were
too enjoying the power and pelf that comes with wielding power. Farooq
Abdullah shrewdly exploited this disgruntled state of Congress workers to poach
on its cadres, and in due course of time, almost got party’s influence wiped out
from the state.

It was in these circumstances that the 1987 state assembly elections were held.
Though the two leaders, namely Farooq Abdullah and Rajiv Gandhi had entered
into an electoral alliance, it did not get translated into a joint working
arrangement at the grass-roots level. Not too long ago NC workers had burnt the
Congress office and indulged in subversive activities on the bidding of the same
leaders who were now singing paeans to the alliance. Therefore, the disgruntled
elements joined hands with sectarian forces to form a new alliance, called
Muslim United Front (MUF). The Front comprised of Jammat-e-Islami (JeI), as
its main component, besides People’s Party, Itehad-ul-Muslimeen, Awami
Action Committee, a breakaway faction of National Conference led by Ghulam
Mohammad Shah and some youth groups. The MUF put up a united and
impressive show in the run up to the elections. This unnerved the NC-Congress
combine. It is now generally accepted that the MUF would not have won more
than 8–10 seats in the elections. But, being bent upon regaining power at any
cost, the NC-Congress combine did not want to take any chances. It indulged in
large-scale electoral malpractices. It used police and other organs of the
administration to contrive the results, beating and humiliating its opponents in
the process.

It would be worthwhile to examine the election in one such constituency in

some detail, as the allegations of electoral malpractices indulged in by the
officials on the orders of NC leaders, and widely believed to be true, had a far-
reaching effect on the developing situation in the valley. Mohammad Yousuf
Shah, who had been appointed Amir of the Srinagar district of JeI in 1986, was
the candidate of the MUF from Amira Kadal constituency. His campaign
managers were Yasin Malik, Javed Mir, Ashfaq Majid, Abdul Hamid Sheikh and
Aijaz Dar. The NC candidate was Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Shah, a close relative of
Farooq Abdullah. It is widely believed that the actual counting of votes that took
place in Degree College Bemina, clearly established the MUF candidate to have
won the election. However, when the results were announced, Ghulam Mohi-ud-
din Shah was declared as the winner.

People were shocked and the naked undoing of people’s verdict resulted in
wide-spread and sullen resentment. Some of the youngsters got terribly
infuriated and vowed to avenge the humiliation. One of those was Aijaz Dar,
who was thrown out of the counting centre by the police and the NC candidate.
He was so incensed that he shouted right outside the counting hall that he would
shoot Farooq Abdullah and other NC leaders, as well as other top police and
civil officers. As things turned out, Dar was killed in a police ‘encounter’
sometime later. Mohamad Yousuf Shah, alongwith all his polling agents, was
arrested and imprisoned for nine months, during which he was allegedly tortured
and humiliated. This particular act by the Congress-NC alliance is considered to
be a turning point in the modern history of Kashmir and the single biggest reason
for the turmoil that engulfed the Valley soon thereafter.

In keeping with the old tradition of blaming India for all of Kashmir’s ills,
Delhi this time was seen as a direct accomplice in the electoral mal-practices,
and worse, in the elimination of Aijaz Dar. The arrest, torture and humiliation
meted out to Mohamad Yousuf Shah and his colleagues further fuelled the
anger. This served as a spark that ignited the fire; a fire that engulfed the state in
its flames for the next two decades. Mohamad Yousuf Shah later
metamorphosed into Syed Sallah-ud-din and his election agents formed the
vanguard of JKLF and were known by the acronym HAJY, formed by taking the
first letter of their respective names. They decided to take up arms, which were
made available from across the LoC by Pakistan. In the first year of militant
turbulence that broke out in the Valley in 1989–90, Mohamad Yousuf Shah
confined his activities to the JeI work, though many believe that it was during
this period that he quietly devoted his efforts to building its military wing, the
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). It was in April 1991 that he became Sallah-ud-din
and was appointed the Amir of HM (chapter-12, p. 420).

Terrorist activity that began in earnest got an impetus during Farooq

Abdullah’s second term in the office. In fact, it was New Delhi’s indulgence of
Farooq Abdullah that served as a trigger to usher in full-scale insurgency in the
state in early 1990’s. Initially, the militants indulged in bomb blasts and sniping
at police officers. Later, they targeted buses, tourist coaches and central
government offices. Some conscientious police officers took it as a challenge
and succeeded in arresting quite a number of them, including some self-styled
“Area Commanders” in the early days of militancy. “But in 1989, Farooq
Abdullah released as many as 23 top militants on the plea that this would give
them a chance to join the mainstream and claimed that this had the approval of
Rajiv Gandhi.” This action of Farooq Abdullah dealt a severe blow to the
3

morale of police officers who had carried out their responsibilities in arresting
these militants, at great risk to their lives. Some of them started receiving threats
by the released militants on the phone. “They were advised by the terrorists to
stay away and not to ‘burn their fingers,’ unnecessarily. The message being loud
and clear had its desired effect. Some Police and civil officers were even seen
saluting them.” 4

The militants, now emboldened by the government inaction, started burning

the National Flag right under the nose of local police. They openly celebrated
Pakistan’s independence day on August 14, 1989, with great pomp and show.
The next day, on August 15, 1989, they made a bonfire of Indian flags. They
also observed a complete black-out in the evening, by burning transmission
stations or by enforcing it by not letting the common people to switch on their
lights. “Indian flag could be unfurled only in Ganpathyar temple in the heart of
Srinagar after Hindus had sought protection of the police.” Such defiance of
5
authority became a visible manifestation of their bolder expression of anti-
national sentiments. In the meantime, introduction of gun culture started taking
its toll. As the VIPs were adequately protected, it was the softer targets that bore
the brunt of the fury let loose by the gun wielding militants. The victims
included an odd political worker, a petty police officer, and more importantly, a
number of defenceless Kashmiri Pandits. While all this was going on, the
personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) on duty watched
helplessly, as they waited for orders from local police officers under whom they
had been placed for operational matters.

In the next phase of increased violence, which started immediately thereafter,

a number of school buildings were burnt and several business establishments had
their godowns looted and ransacked. The rot that had set in was so deep that a
Kalashnikov gun and some hand grenades and time bombs were recovered from
the house of the then law minister’s son-in-law: a junior engineer. The junior
engineer’s younger brother was arrested by the police in this case, but was bailed
out on the intervention of Farooq Abdullah. Bars and wine shops were now
made the targets and were looted and bombed during day time. Prominent tourist
hotels like the Broadway Hotel were asked to wind up their bars, while Amar
Singh Club, Srinagar Club and Golf Course, which had Farooq Abdullah himself
as their patron or president, had to close down their bars. Liquor traders were
attacked, their premises looted and ransacked, forcing them to close their
business. The fact is that much before December 1989, various terrorist outfits
had established effective control in the valley.

The local press too played into the hands of the terrorists by giving
prominence to their activities. This helped the militants to gain wide publicity.
These newspapers also included the Quami Awaz, the official organ of the state
Congress. The papers were threatened by the terrorists to refrain from writing
anything that went against them or their activities. Even a prominent English
language newspaper published from Jammu, the Kashmir Times, carried stories
of terrorist activities in the valley most prominently.

Farooq Abdullah gave clear indications of his lack of interest in mending the
grave situation that gripped his state by spending bulk of his time outside the
country. It became apparent that he had nearly abdicated his responsibilities as
the chief minister of the state. Even when he had remained effective head of the
government, his high flying life style and profligate ways had played havoc with
the state’s finances. Plan funds were diverted to non-productive use. The lack of
accountability was such that one of his own cabinet ministers owed a whopping
34 crore rupees of sales tax to the government. The sales tax was levied on the
income that this particular minister had earned through the sale of cars from the
agency which he and his family owned. Crores of rupees meant for cleaning up
the fast-shrinking Dal Lake (due to encroachment by unscrupulous elements,
with active connivance of those in authority) were diverted to projects that
hardly existed, with the sole aim of lining the pockets of politicians and
bureaucrats. Farooq Abdullah’s election promises of generating employment,
improving law and order and spending money on development, were soon
forgotten by him. Nepotism, corruption, lack of accountability and drift were the
hallmarks of Farooq Abdullah’s second term as the chief minister. This further
alienated the people and caused a great deal of disenchantment with the
unresponsive, and as some would say, irresponsible governance.

Pakistan sponsored militant organisations exploited these genuine public

grievances to the hilt by fishing in the troubled waters of Kashmir. With the
government machinery virtually grinding to a halt, a peculiar phenomenon of
high handedness of terrorist tactics became the order of the day in 1988–89. This
was the imposition of civil curfew. To showcase the reach and acceptability of
their appeal, they would bring the administration and routine life to a standstill
by imposing curfew themselves. They named it civil curfew. It was an extreme
form of what is known as bandh or strike outside the valley. During such
curfews, imposed by the terrorists, shops and business establishments owned by
the Congress or NC supporters were the first to close. Sometimes, these curfews
would last for days on end. The fear psychosis that gripped those in authority
resulted in their actively collaborating with the militants. Even the personal
weapons issued to the party workers found their way to the terrorists. Those who
collaborated with the terrorists thus, had a ready explanation for such action;
these weapons were snatched away by the terrorists!

It was during this period of heightened tension, uncertainty and widely

perceived ineffectiveness of the state government, that an incident of far-
reaching consequence took place in the Valley. On December 8, 1989, JKLF
militants kidnapped Rubiya Syed, the daughter of an important Kashmiri leader
and at that time, Home Minister of India, Mufti Mohammad Syed. They held her
hostage and demanded the release of five of their cadres in exchange for her
release. The Government of India capitulated and accepted the militant demands
to secure the release of Rubiya Syed. Her release in exchange of these hardcore
militants on December 13, 1989, sent the spirits of militants and their supporters
soaring. The irony of the situation was highlighted by the allegation that the
kidnapped woman was seen moving around in the car of the son of a very senior
Congress leader of the state, Ghulam Rasool Kar. Thousands of people came out
on the streets of Srinagar, dancing and singing to celebrate their ‘victory’. Anti-
India slogans rent the air in every corner of Srinagar and other major towns. The
Farooq Abdullah government literally fiddled while the Valley burnt. Its
paralysis, or its deliberate willingness to toe the militant line, further
emboldened the terrorists.

N OTES

1. Kashmir: Crises in Perspective, Indian Research Institute for Kashmir Affairs.

2. Jarnail Singh Bindranwale, head of Damdami Taksal, a Sikh seminary, had turned from a veritable foe
of Congress party into a virulently anti-Indian militant Sikh leader, who gradually assumed the
leadership of armed Sikh militants that demanded a separate country for Sikhs, called Khalistan. He
was later killed during ‘Operation Blue Star’ launched by Mrs Indira Gandhi on June 6, 1984, to
cleanse the revered Sikh shrine, the Golden Temple at Amritsar, of militants, who had turned it into a
fortress. The attack on Golden Temple created a great resentment among a large section of Sikhs,
leading eventually to Mrs Gandhi’s assassination by one of her own Sikh bodyguards.
3. Op.cit., n. 1.
4. Ibid.
5. White Paper on Kashmir, Joint Human Rights Committee, (Gupta Print Services, Delhi).
12
 PAKISTAN’S OBSESSION WITH AND
INTERVENTION IN KASHMIR
“Kashmir runs in our blood.”
—General Parvez Musharraf (A former military dictator of Pakistan)

Pakistan’s Obsession with Kashmir

Projecting itself as the saviour of Kashmiris, Pakistan has left no stone
unturned to propagate its concern for Kashmiris. While many gullible Kashmiris
fall for this propaganda, many others genuinely believe that Kashmiri Muslims
are religiously obliged to demand Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. This, despite
the fact that they are fully aware of the state of affairs in PoK. Economically,
PoK lags behind the Indian administered part of Kashmir; politically it enjoys
little freedom. Between 1949 and 1974, it was directly governed by the central
government from Rawalpindi. Most of the top government functionaries, who
belonged to the federal government service, were either Punjabis or Pushtuns. In
1974, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto gave it an autonomous governing set-up through an
‘Interim Constitution’. It was termed ‘interim’ because the final constitution was
meant to be given after the ‘plebiscite’ was held to decide the final fate of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, whose part it was. To this day, PoK continues to
be governed by this constitution. The salient features of the constitution are:
President to act as head of state, a prime minister as head of the government and
48 legislators, (40 directly elected and 8 indirectly) to form the local assembly.
The province was allowed to use its own national flag and issue its own
passports. However, no country recognised these passports. Therefore, people
had to travel on Pakistani passports. Besides these entitlements, PoK was also
given its own national anthem, an election commission, an auditor general, a
supreme court, high court and subordinate courts.

That all this is a façade behind which Pakistan continued to perpetuate an iron
grip on the state, is evident from numerous restrictions placed on its functioning;
a candidate is eligible to fight elections only if he signs a declaration to the effect
that PoK is part of Pakistan. Article 32 of the Interim Constitution of PoK
stipulates that the legislative assembly cannot make any laws related to currency,
trade, external affairs, defence and security of the state. Almost all important
decisions of the PoK government are subject to approval by ‘Azad Jammu and
Kashmir Council’ which is based in Islamabad and functions under a federal
minister, designated as the ‘Federal Minister of State for Kashmir and Northern
Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs.’ The council consists of five federal ministers
nominated by the prime minister of Pakistan, who also presides over its sittings.
Besides them, PoK is represented on the council by the federal minister of state
for Kashmir and Northern Areas (of Pakistan) Affairs, who is an ex-officio
member, president of PoK and its prime minister, or a minister in his absence.
Thus various stiff measures were put in place to strengthen the federal
stranglehold over PoK. With all these restrictions on its political freedom, it is
ironic to call it Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir). It could take decades for PoK to
enjoy the degree of political freedom that Indian administered Kashmir enjoys.
Nevertheless, having mastered the tools of disinformation, Pakistan continues to
fool the rest of the world by projecting Kashmiris as ‘suffering under the yoke of
Indian occupation forces.’

The people of Northern Areas (NA) suffered a worse fate. Leaders of various
political parties of this area who have been fighting for the rights of the people
here call themselves the ‘no where’ people as they have been totally abandoned
by the people of Pakistan. It was separated from PoK and brought directly under
Pakistan control, much like FATA, (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) near
the Afghan border. It was governed under the Frontier Crime Regulation framed
by the British to control criminal tribes near the Afghan border. The people of
this region were denied the facility of passports and were barred from travelling
abroad. The draconian regulation required every citizen to report to the police
station once every month. Similarly, they were also required to report their
movement from one village to another. Imposition of collective fines on an
entire village for individual inhabitant’s violation of law was common. Till as
late as 1994, the people of NA did not enjoy the right to vote. They neither had
an elected legislative assembly nor a municipal council. They did not have any
representation even in the national assembly. As a matter of fact, political parties
were banned there. It was only in 1994, that Benazir Bhutto allowed political
parties of Pakistan (not of PoK) to open branches there. Most Pakistani political
parties, including Tehrik-e-Jaffaria Pakistan (TJP), a Shia Muslim party,
extended their activities to the NA. One of the adverse fall outs of this opening
up was the setting up of Sipah-e-Sahaba, Pakistan, a militant Sunni Muslim
organisation, with the help and encouragement of the ISI in the area, mainly to
oppose TJP. The fact is that this extremist Sunni party has for long been
campaigning for declaring Shias as non-Muslims. Incidentally, in the complete
Constitution of Pakistan comprising 12 chapters, the name of Gilgit-Baltistan
does not figure even once.

To create a façade of the provincial legislative assembly, Pakistan in October

1994, held party-based elections to elect 26 members of the NA executive
council, much like, and having the same powers, as the NWFP legislative
assembly. However, it emerged later that the council was given only
recommendatory powers and not the legislative powers. Five of its members
were later designated as advisors to the federal minister of Kashmir and NA (of
Pakistan) affairs. Though it was announced at that time that these ‘Advisors’
would be given the same status as ministers of PoK, in actual fact, even those
limited powers were not given to them. Consequently, NA continue to be ruled
from Islamabad with the help of six officers, all outsiders. These are the chief
executive officer, the commissioner, the inspector general of police, the judicial
commissioner and the chief engineer. On most occasions, the first two posts
were held by retired army officers and others by non-natives. The level of
democracy existing can be gauged from the fact that the right of appeal against
the judgements of the judicial commissioner did not exist, as supreme court of
Pakistan had no jurisdiction over him. That much for the way Pakistan treats its
own people belonging to the pre-1947 Jammu and Kashmir State. Engineer Ali
Rinchen writes, “For Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan is like a summer camping
ground. They can be compared with the Mongols of the ninth century who
conquered China but failed to see its variety of resources and the worth of its
people. For them China was only good for grazing pastures for their horses.
Pakistan rulers share the same approach towards Gilgit-Baltistan.” 1

Right from the beginning, Pakistan left no stone unturned to undermine the
Indian voice in Jammu and Kashmir. It created a nucleus around which it built
its strategy to implement its anti-India tirade. For this, it relied heavily on the
MC cadres (who had supported the invading Pakistan army in 1947–48 war), the
Muslim middle class and some sections of Kashmir bureaucracy. This nucleus
was further reinforced by the volunteers of the ‘Muslim Guard’, which had been
formed immediately after the partition. Muslim intellectuals and some
disgruntled elements of the NC provided the much-needed ideological
justification for Pakistan’s interference. This nucleus turned into a well-knit
organisation, which communalised the Kashmiri society by its persistent
disinformation campaign, though it rarely attracted much attention or publicity.
It exploited the religious sentiments of the people by projecting Kashmiris as
part of the larger Ummah, which was under subjugation of the infidel. Its
propaganda machinery worked overtime to condemn the Indian secularism as
un-Islamic. It targeted the Kashmiri Pandits specifically by projecting them as
the enemies of Islam and as the community had consistently worked to
consolidate Kashmir’s links with India.

For Pakistan, Kashmir has significance far beyond being a merely territorial
dispute with India. ‘It runs in our blood,’ as Pervez Musharraf, a former dictator
of Pakistan, once described it. Elaborating further on this argument, he described
it the ‘core’ issue between Pakistan and India. For Pakistan, the issue is
territorial, religious, political, moral and existential — all rolled into one.
Generations of Pakistanis have been brought up on half-truths about Kashmir.
On many occasions, the hurly burly of chaotic but authentic Indian democratic
process, witnessed in the valley too, is projected as evidence of Kashmir being
on fire as a result of suppression of its desire to secede from the Indian state. The
so called ill-treatment of and discrimination against Kashmiri Muslims is
projected as the final argument to motivate the people of Pakistan to come to the
rescue of their co-religiousnists in Kashmir. Pakistan’s proxies in the state,
together with some vested interests, who have fattened themselves on the bounty
coming from both sides, have played no small role in contributing to the success
of Pakistan’s propaganda.

At international level, Pakistan never loses an opportunity to remind the world

that South Asia would continue to simmer as long as ‘Kashmir’ issue is not
resolved. What it leaves unsaid is that it wants ‘it’ resolved to its own
satisfaction. Pakistan has used many arguments to justify the importance of
gaining Kashmir at all costs. A former president of Pakistan justified it in
following words: “Kashmir is vital for Pakistan not only politically, but
militarily as well. Kashmir is a matter of life and death (December 1959).” Later,
on July 19, 1961, he further said, “…Kashmir is important to us for physical as
well as economic security…” Continuing in the same vein, he added, “…You
might say ‘why can’t you give up Kashmir.’ Well, we can’t give up that dispute
because we are bloody minded… for example, for the reason that Kashmir is
connected with our physical security. Thirty-two million of acres in Pakistan are
irrigated from rivers that start in Kashmir.” 2

According to another argument, Pakistan was created as a state exclusively for

the Muslims of South Asia. All Pakistani governments have, since
independence, worked on this basic presumption. When cross-exodus between
India and Pakistan ended with the completion of partition process, 40 million
Muslims were left in India and 12 million Hindus in Pakistan. The existing
figures of these two communities in the respective countries, i.e., 145 million
Muslims in India and less than half a million Hindus in Pakistan today, itself
speaks about the Islamisation drive carried out by successive Pakistani
governments. But more importantly, today more Muslims are living in India than
in Pakistan. Overlooking this reality, Pakistan does not tire of its constant refrain
that Jammu and Kashmir, being a Muslim majority state, should have
automatically become part of Pakistan. Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid state
in the November-December, 2008, issue of Foreign Affairs, “The Pakistan
military command… shares a commitment to a vision of Pakistan as a homeland
for South Asian Muslims and, therefore, to the incorporation of Kashmir into
Pakistan.” Consequently, for the Pakistan, Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of
Partition. However, Pakistan conveniently forgets that out of 145 million
Muslims living in India, only 3–4 million live in Jammu and Kashmir. It also
forgets to mention that 150 million Muslims themselves chose to separate from
Pakistan to form Bangladesh in 1971. Besides, it is well worth recalling, that
Jinnah seemed to have no objection in soliciting the accession of Junagarh,
Hyderabad, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur to Pakistan — all Hindu majority States.
Even the port city of Karachi, soon to become the capital of Pakistan
immediately after its creation, was at the time of partition, a Hindu majority city,
as were some other cities of Sindh. In fact Sindh’s separation from India
appeared to be an absurdity as River Sindhu, which passes through this province,
not only gives India its name, “but the very name and identity of Indus Valley
Civilisation, the cradle of subcontinent’s civilisational heritage, is derived from
River Sindhu.” In fact, the word ‘Hindu’ is itself derived from Sindhu.
3

That, Kashmir, being a Muslim majority state, should have become part of
Pakistan, overlooks the fact that according to Government of India
(Independence) Act, people of the princely states had no power to decide their
own fate, as this decision had been left to the rulers; a condition that Jinnah
whole-heartedly supported. Besides, Pakistan ruined its own case by trying to
grab Kashmir by force, compelling the Maharaja to seek assistance from India
— an assistance, which India gave only after it accepted the accession and was,
thus, legally, well within its rights to provide.

Even otherwise also, taking into consideration the animosity between Jinnah
and Abdullah, it is certain that the latter and his NC, the overwhelmingly popular
party of the State at the time of independence, would have decided in favour of
India. Sheikh Abdullah’s utterances on the issue during that period, make that
abundantly clear. Indian leaders were so sure of Kashmiri sentiment prevailing at
that time that they repeatedly pleaded with the Maharaja to hand over power to
Sheikh Abdullah, who would then decide on the issue. This can be gauged from
the statement of Sheikh Abdullah himself, who declared in the Jammu and
Kashmir Constituent Assembly, “We the people of Jammu and Kashmir have
thrown our lot with Indian people not in the heat of passion or a moment of
despair, but by a deliberate choice. The union of our people has been fused by
the community of ideals and common sufferings in the cause of freedom.”
Similar was the strain of the resolution passed at a special convention of NC held
in October, 1948, to consider the matter of accession of the state with the Indian
Union. It stated, “The convention has given its serious thought to the question of
accession and has examined it in all its aspects and detail. After mature
consideration of the issue, it is definitely of the opinion that Kashmir, with its
unflinching faith in New Kashmir and with the very advanced outlook of its
people on the fundamental issues, cannot find its proper place in Pakistan which
today has become a main citadel of reaction and decaying feudalism… Pakistan,
with its basis in two-nation theory and its persistence in the perpetuation of
religious distinctions, does not and cannot accommodate a programme and an
outlook which is the very negative of its basis and conceptions of social justice.” 4

Sheikh Abdullah’s own choice of India for accession was not an impulsive
decision but based on a well thought out reasoning; Kashmiris would be better
off with a democratic and secular India and they would receive a fair treatment
from a progressive nation rather than from a theocratic state like Pakistan.
Addressing the Constituent Assembly of the state, Sheikh Abdullah said on
November 5, 1951, “…We are proud to have our bonds with India, the goodwill
of whose people and government are available to us in unstinted and abundant
measure… The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of secular
democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction.
This is the bedrock of modern democracy.” It is worth reminding Pakistan that
5

when it “purchased the port city of Gwadar from the Sultanate of Muscat, no
opportunity was given to the people of Gwadar to have any say or voice any
objection to being purchased as chattel.” 6

Some Pakistani writers also complain that the British should have handed over
the undivided India to Muslims when they left the country, as they had taken it
from Mughals, rather than hand it over to Hindus (for them Indian National
Congress represented only Hindus of the subcontinent). Says Tarik Jan, a scholar
at Islamabad’s Institute of Policy Studies, “We (Muslims) were the legal rulers
of India, and in 1857 the British took that away from us. In 1947, they should
have given that back to the Muslims.” Jan’s desire to see India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh re-united under Islamic rule touches a sympathetic chord among the
people of Pakistan, as most of them yearn for the bygone days of the golden era
of Mughal rule in India and the Muslim caliphate internationally. It is a different
matter that Mughals, the greatest of the Muslim Dynasties to rule India, had
entirely Indianised themselves. Nadeem Paracha writes, “Mughals, though
Central Asian by decent, where deeply entrenched in the political and social
traditions of the subcontinent, as was their Muslim polity…” 7

Besides, Tariq Jan’s argument misses another crucial point. When the East
India Company traders came to India, huge swathes of its territory were no
longer under effective Mughal rule, as its long decline and fall had already given
rise to the emergence of many regional chieftains. For three quarters of the 18 th

century, it was these regional powers which determined its fate rather than any
central Muslim authority. The Maratthas, Rajputs, Sikhs, Jats and many other
communities had created their own areas of dominance, independent of the weak
Mughal ruler. The absence of a powerful central authority was one of the main
reasons why East India Company, found it easy to establish its hold on the
country. The British, over a period of 100 years, got all these regional powers
under its suzerainty, creating a politically unified India in the process, perhaps
for the first time in its history. Nearly 200 years of British rule and the exposure
to modern education had, in the meanwhile, given rise to scientific temperament
and democratic aspirations among vast sections of Indian society. Jinnah himself
was a product of this process. Therefore, for the British to have handed over the
power back to Muslims is a specious and meaningless argument, to say the least.

Nevertheless Pakistani hardliners, including its press, continue to harp on this

theme. One of Pakistan’s hardline English newspapers, Daily Jasarat,
articulating Jan’s sentiment in the editorial of its Friday supplement of August
19, 2007, wrote, “The slogan of Jehad should reverberate in every nook and
corner of Pakistan. If Pakistan allows Jehad to infiltrate into India, then Kashmir
could be liberated in six months. Within a couple of years, the rest of the
territories of India could be conquered as well, and we can regain our lost glory.
We can bring back the era of Mughal rule. We can once again subjugate the
Hindus like our forefathers did.” That, during the past over a decade Pakistan’s
ISI has tried to achieve exactly that is borne out by the report put out by India’s
premier investigative agency, the National Investigating Agency (NIA), which
noted in 2011, that “the conspiracy for recruiting young men into LeT terror
network for training in Kashmir, which had come to light with the killing of four
Malayalee militants in the valley in 2008, was hatched in Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Dubai and Oman: Also, LeT bosses from Pakistan had a direct involvement in
camps held for such recruitments.” 8

Jinnah was himself terribly dissatisfied by what he got at the end of his
viciously communal campaign to create a separate state for the Muslims of the
subcontinent. In the end, what he got is best described in his own words; “a
moth-eaten Pakistan.” Ajeet Jawed, a well-known author, who has written a
widely acclaimed book on Jinnah, writes “He was a sad and a sick man. He cried
in agony, ‘I have committed the biggest blunder in creating Pakistan and would
like to go to Delhi and tell Nehru to forget the follies of the past and become
friends again.’” Alas! It was too late. He was too sick and more importantly, by
9

now Pakistan’s destiny was no longer in his hands. It was controlled by those
who had used him, with his immense popularity and charisma, to create a state
for feudal lords and religious fanatics. It is further confirmed by what is recorded
in the TIME magazine of December 23, 1986, “The final judgement rendered by
the wealthy lawyer from Mumbai who carved out Pakistan for the Muslims of
South Asia, as Jinnah put it: Pakistan, he said, ‘has been the biggest mistake of
my life.’” 10

After Jinnah’s death, Pakistan has more or less been ruled by its army, in
collaboration with Islamists of all hues and supported by America. It is for this
reason that Pakistan is considered to be a state run by three ‘As’; Army, America
and Allah. Over the years, for their own geo-strategic interests, the US and its
closest ally, Britain, have been its biggest supporters. As a result, Pakistan got
inexorably sucked into the US-led military blocks, first, as a member of the
Baghdad Pact, then its new avatar the CENTO, and SEATO. Even though it was
an anti-Communist alliance, Pakistan used its membership only to foment
trouble in Kashmir, equipped as it was with modern military wherewithal and
recipient of huge economic assistance. Pakistan therefore, succeeded to a large
extent, in keeping Kashmir issue in international focus. It fancied its biggest
chance in 1965, as it felt that India had sufficiently been weakened by its defeat
at the hands of China in the 1962 war, and further, after Nehru’s demise in 1964,
it did not have a strong enough leader to steer it in difficult times. Therefore, it
resorted to its time-tested method of sending the irregulars under the command
of serving army officers to foment an uprising in the valley. To make it doubly
sure that the plan succeeded in cutting off Kashmir from India, it followed it up
with a thrust of its armoured division in the Chhamb-Jourian sector, in order to
cut off Poonch, Rajouri, Nowshera, Sunderbani and Akhnoor from the State.

Convinced that Indian reaction would be tepid and Kashmiris will rise in
revolt against India at the first sight of Pakistani Mujahideen, Pakistan was in for
a shock on both counts. Kashmiris were not enamoured of the infiltrators and,
assisted the security forces in eliminating them. At the national level, India
11

reacted fiercely with its own armoured formations, sending them towards Sialkot
and Lahore. The unnerved Pakistanis withdrew from Akhnoor–Jourian sector to
areas behind Munnawar Tawi. India made significant gains in Jammu and
Kashmir, by capturing the strategic Hajipir Pass. Pakistan immediately offered
ceasefire, as it was running out of ammunition. India accepted the offer as the
war was thrust on it and there was no point prolonging the war without a clear-
cut objective.

Pakistan suffered a decisive defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pak war. But India could
hardly extract any concession from Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, despite
holding nearly 95,000 Pakistani troops as Prisoners of War. At Simla, India let
Pakistan off the hook by trusting the verbal assurance given by Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto to Indira Gandhi. Bhutto had assured Indira Gandhi that he would mould
public opinion in Pakistan in a manner that the LoC gets wide acceptance as the
international border between the two countries. PN Dhar, who was present at
Simla, wrote, “It was thought that with the gradual use of the LoC as a de facto
frontier, public opinion on both sides would get reconciled to its permanence…
when Mrs Gandhi, after recounting their points of agreement finally asked
Bhutto; Is this the understanding on which we will proceed? He replied,
‘Absolutely’.” The other two significant points on which both agreed were that
12

India and Pakistan would treat Kashmir as a bilateral issue and both countries
will desist from resorting to use of force to resolve the issue. Over the years,
Pakistan has reneged on both the issues forming part of the Simla Agreement.
Pakistan continues to harp on the implementation of UN Resolutions on Kashmir
and as far as non-use of force to resolve the issue is concerned; Pakistan’s
misadventure in Kargil in 1999 violated that provision too.

Zia-ul-Haque’s Islamisation Drive

Zia-ul-Haque’s seizing power in Pakistan in late 70’s resulted in far-reaching
changes in Pakistan’s domestic politics and its policy of dealing with India. It is
a well-known fact that Islamic fundamentalist parties of Pakistan have always
sided with the army during its long spells in power in Pakistan, providing it the
fig leaf of popular legitimacy. However, during Zia-ul-Haque’s rule the leaders
of these parties became important decision-makers and their ideology, the yard
stick against which every decision was measured. As a first step, he Islamized all
institutions of Pakistan, particularly its all-important army, which till then had,
by and large, retained its secular legacy, inherited from the British Indian army.
To create a young breed of radical Jehadis, Zia now targeted the schools, where
impressionable minds would be easy to mould.

School text books were revised to distort facts in such a manner that India and
particularly Hindus, were always presented in a very negative light. Sample
these untruths contained in Class V text books: “The British had the objective to
take over India and to achieve this, they made Hindus join them and Hindus
were very glad to side with the British. After capturing the subcontinent, British
began, on the one hand, loot of all things produced in this area, and on the other,
in conjunction with Hindus, to greatly suppress the Muslims.” Even the facts
13

surrounding the break-up of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh have been

crudely twisted in order to present the whole episode as a consequence of
conspiracy involving US, Soviet Union and India. Rather than making public the
findings of Mehmood-ur-Rehman Commission, the government teaches students
of Class IX to XII that, “A large number of Hindu teachers were teaching in the
educational institutions in East Pakistan. They produced such literature which
created negative thinking in the minds of Bengalis against the people of West
Pakistan. About 10 million Hindus were living in East Pakistan. India stood at
the back of these Hindus to protect their interests. India wanted to separate East
Pakistan to strengthen the economic position of these Hindus….” Even more
14

lies, “In the 1971, India-Pakistan war, the Pakistani Armed Forces created new
records of bravery and the Indian forces were defeated everywhere.” Surrender 15

of over 95,000 Pakistani troops to Indian Army or for that matter, the uprising in
and secession of East Pakistan, finds no mention.

Arif Mohamad Khan writes in the Pioneer of February 28, 2009, “What
radicalised the Pakistani society most was the new education policy and
curriculum introduced at the school level, underlining jehad and martyrdom as
lofty ideals.” Objective of Pakistan’s education policy is contained in the preface
to Class VI syllabus, which says, “Social studies have been given special
importance in the educational policy, so that Pakistan’s basic ideology assumes
the shape of a way of life and its practical enforcement is assured. The concept
of social uniformity adopts a practical form and the whole personality of the
individual is developed.” Arif Mohamad Khan further states that this statement
16
should leave no one in doubt that social uniformity and not national unity, is part
of Pakistan’s basic ideology.” That is why students of Class III are taught that,
“Mohammad Ali (Jinnah) felt that the Hindus wanted to make the Muslims their
slaves and since he hated slavery, he left the Congress.”

Tariq Rehman, a leading Pakistani educationist, commenting on such hateful

literature, wrote, “It is a fact that the text books cannot mention Hindus without
calling them ‘cunning’, ‘scheming’, deceptive’ or something equally insulting:
students are taught and made to believe that Pakistan needs strong and
aggressive policies against India or else Pakistan would be annihilated by it.”
17

The US Commission on International Religious Freedom acknowledged in its

report released on November 9, 2011 that “Pakistani text books foster hatred and
intolerance of minorities, the Hindus in particular…” The report goes on to say,
18

“Pakistan and social studies texts are rife with negative comments regarding
India and Great Britain, but Hindus are often singled out for particular criticism
in texts and interview responses.” The Commission Chairman, Leonard Leo
19

warned, “The teaching discrimination increases the likelihood that violent

religious extremism in Pakistan will continue to grow, weakening religious
freedom, national and regional stability and global security.” The report further
20

cites the National Commission for Justice and Peace as saying, “government-
issued textbooks teach students that Hindus are backward and superstitious, and
given a chance they would assert their power over the weak, especially,
Muslims, depriving them of education by pouring molten lead in their ears…” 21

Arif Mohamad Khan further adds, “This education policy contributed in great
measure in radicalising whole generation of people in Pakistan.”

To create radicalised youth, willing to embrace Jehad, thousands of madrassas

were opened throughout Pakistan under the government patronage. Amir Mir,
writing in Talibanisation of Pakistan from 9/11 to 26/11, puts the figure of
registered madrassas at 11,000; having swelled from 250 in 1947. He, however,
cautions that the figure of unregistered ones would be at a conservative figure of
45,000. Respected Pakistani academician and distinguished columnist, Pervez
Hoodbhoy, writes, “According to the national education census, which the
ministry of education released in 2006, Punjab has 5,459 madrassas followed by
the NWFP with 2,843; Sindh has 1,935; the FANA, 1,193; Balochistan, 769;
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), 586; the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
(FATA), 135; and the Islamabad Capital Territory, 77. The ministry estimates
that 1.5 million students are acquiring religious education in the 13,000
madrassas. These figures appear to be way off the mark. Commonly quoted
figures range between 18,000 and 22,000 madrassas.” He further states,
22

“Extremism is breeding at a ferocious rate in public and private schools within

Pakistan’s cities and towns.” 23

In radicalising Pakistan’s education policy with narrow interpretation of its

religious philosophy, Zia-ul-Haque was only following on the footsteps of
Jinnah, who, while speaking to the All India Students Federation in Jallandhar in
1943, said, “In my opinion, our system of government was determined by the
Quran some 1,350 years ago.” Similarly, the resolution passed by Jamiat-e-
Ulema-e-Hind in 1939, while opposing the Wardha Scheme of Education had
stated, “The Wardha scheme emphasises the philosophy of non-violence and
presents it as a creed. We have accepted non–violence only as a policy. This
cannot be accepted as a creed. This is against the teaching of Qu’ran which
encourages Muslims to Jehad.” It further stated, “The danger of Wardha
24

scheme is that children will be indoctrinated in such a way that not only would
they be friendly to other religious groups, but they would also consider every
religion of the world a true religion. This belief is un-Islamic.” 25

To formalise his drive to Islamise Pakistan, and project it as a religious duty,

Zia added Article 2A to the 1973 Constitution, making the principles of the
Objective Resolution (“Muslims in Pakistan shall be enabled to order their lives
in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qu’ran and the Sunnah”) as
effective part of the Constitution.” 26

The consequences of the total segregation of the sexes, a central goal of the
Islamists, have been catastrophic. This was visible during the 2005 earthquake
that had caused widespread destruction in PoK and adjoining areas. MJ Akbar
writes, “During the 2005 earthquake male students of Frontier Medical College
were stopped by religious fanatics from saving girls from the rubble of the
school building. The girls were allowed to die rather than be ‘polluted’ by the
male touch.” Something similar happened on April 9, 2006, when 21 women
27

and eight children were crushed to death and scores injured in a stampede inside
a three-storey madrassa in Karachi, where a large number of women were
attending a weekly congregation. Male rescuers, who arrived in ambulances,
were prevented from moving the injured women to hospitals,” writes Hoodbhoy.
He further adds, “Pakistan’s self-inflicted suffering comes from an education
system that, like Saudi Arabia’s system, provides an ideological foundation for
violence and future Jehadists.” 28
Afghanistan; Pakistan’s Testing Ground
In 1978, King Zahir Shah’s overthrow in Afghanistan was followed by a
string of pro-Soviet regimes, leading to direct Soviet intervention and eventual
occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in December, 1979. This
development brought Pakistan face to face with the Soviet forces, turning the
former into a frontline state in the on-going Cold War. Due to its geographical
location, Pakistan turned itself into an asset for the US to take on the Soviet
forces in land-locked Afghanistan. Worried as it is about lacking strategic depth
against any thrust by India from the east, Pakistan could ill-afford to have India’s
all-weather friend, the Soviet Union occupying Afghanistan. Having made the
US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s visit to China possible in 1971,
Pakistan had endeared itself to the Americans as never before. This visit had
brought about a tectonic shift in the international power balance and opened a
new vista in the Sino-US relations.

Pakistan played up the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan to warn

Americans that Soviet expansion into South Asia was imminent. Hussein
Haqqani writes in his much acclaimed book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and
Military, “The Pakistanis developed an interest in painting a menacing picture of
Soviet influence in Afghanistan to bolster their own position as the first line of
defence against Soviet expansion into South Asia. The Pakistani Army needed
weapons to maintain its ascendency at home and to face India, and the military
officers realised that the United States would be willing to modernise Pakistani
forces to face the menace of communism. Because a threat from India did not
qualify as a communist threat, Pakistani officials thought they could make a case
for securing US aid by invoking geopolitics and the history of southward
invasion from across the Hindu Kush.” 29

In January 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran had swept away the Shah of
Iran, a staunch supporter of US, into exile. The Shah was replaced by the
Islamists who were virulently anti-American. Soviet presence in Afghanistan
now added to their woes. Zia-ul-Haque saw in these developments a twin
opportunity; first, to create a friendly regime in Afghanistan that would do its
bidding and solve Pakistan’s problem of being beset with the lack of strategic
depth, and second, enable Pakistan to secure huge financial and military aid that
it could utilise to annex Jammu and Kashmir. He exploited the situation to the
hilt. As expected, military and financial aid began flowing into Pakistan not only
from US and its allies, but also from the petro-dollar rich Muslim countries led
by Saudi Arabia. Diplomatically, Pakistan attained a high profile; it suddenly
found itself being courted by all and sundry. Pakistan now became a frontline
state, ready to implement the agenda of US and its allies. “Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan provided the excuse for adopting ‘Jehad’ as state policy as well as a
medley of irregular forces, liberally funded by American and Saudi money,”
writes MJ Akbar. “During the war against the Soviet occupation of
30

Afghanistan, madrassas provided the US-Saudi-Pakistani alliance the cannon

fodder they needed to fight a holy war. The Americans and Saudis, helped by a
more-than-willing General Zia, funded new madrassas across the length and
breadth of Pakistan,” writes Pervez Hoodbhoy. More importantly, the situation
31

in Afghanistan provided Zia with a golden opportunity to wrest Kashmir from

India; using the same means which Americans were applying in Afghanistan to
evict Soviet Union from there.

Having been convinced after the 1971 war that wresting Kashmir from India
through a conventional war was no longer an option, Zia decided to adopt the
route of Jehad. By now Zia-ul-Haque had succeeded in radically Islamising
Pakistani institutions, education system and the critical segments of Pakistani
society, which exercised considerable influence in shaping public opinion,
during his decade-long rule. Therefore, finding recruits and a reliable
organisation for the forthcoming Jehad in Kashmir would not present
insurmountable odds. For providing the foot soldiers for this Jehad, he chose his
trusted ally, the JeI. In early eighties, Zia held meeting with Maulana Abdul
Bari, in which the former made clear to the latter that, “He had decided to
contribute to the American sponsored war in Afghanistan in order to prepare the
ground for a larger conflict in Kashmir and he wanted to involve the JeI of Azad
Jammu and Kashmir…. The war in Afghanistan would be a smoke screen
behind which Pakistan could carefully prepare a more significant battle in
Kashmir.” 32

Zia had intelligently calculated that US involvement in Afghanistan would be

a distraction enough for it to turn a blind eye to whatever Pakistan did in the
region. To overcome Bari’s skepticism of the whole operation, Zia persuasively
argued, “How could Americans stop us from waging Jehad in Kashmir, when
they are themselves waging a Jehad in Afghanistan.” To get the JeI leaders
33

from Kashmir on board, Bari had a secret meeting with Maulana Said-ud-
Taribilli, the first Amir of JeI, at village Ajis, where it was made clear to the
latter that Kashmiris would have to rise in revolt and the rest would be taken
care of by the ISI. To seal the whole deal, in September 1982, JeI leaders from
Kashmir were secretly taken from Saudi Arabia, their official destination, to
Pakistan, where their leader, Taribilli, had a meeting with Zia, who convinced
him of the viability of the project. To plan, execute and oversee the whole
operation, Zia chose its trusted and powerful intelligence agency, the ISI, as it is
known all over the world.

Brief Description of ISI

The Directorate of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan was established
in 1948 under the supervision of Major General William Cawthorn, a British
army officer in Pakistan army at the time of partition. He held the post of deputy
chief of the army staff of Pakistan army. The raising of the ISI was necessitated
by the need to plug the gaps that were noticed in the coordination of ‘intelligence
gathering’ amongst the three services (army, navy and air force) in the 1947–48
war. Army’s Military Intelligence Directorate had been found wanting in many
respects during the just concluded war. During the initial years, the ISI remained
an ordinary intelligence organisation, till General Ayub Khan, seized power in a
military coup in 1958. General Ayub Khan used the ISI to consolidate his hold
on power, rather than use it for the original purpose for which it was raised. In
order to enable the ISI to carry out this political task, its role was officially
expanded to include, “Coordinating the intelligence gathering and other related
functions of all three services, safeguarding Pakistan’s vital interests, monitoring
activities of politicians and sustaining military rule in Pakistan.” Before long, the
ISI got sucked into the vortex of Pakistan’s turbulent politics, characterised by
intrigue, violence, politicking and constant battle of wits between the political
parties and the army.

Over the years, its involvement in domestic politics has become even more
extensive and deeper. ISI’s tasks now include collection of foreign and domestic
intelligence carrying out surveillance over its own cadre, foreigners, the
diplomats of various countries, accredited to Pakistan, politically sensitive
segments of Pakistani society, Pakistani diplomatic corps posted outside the
country; monitoring and interception of communications, and conduct of covert
operations. Today, it has become one of the most powerful intelligence agencies
in the world. Its strength lies in hatching conspiracies, indulging in intrigue,
exporting/fomenting terrorism, peddling misinformation and patronising all
known and unknown anti-Indian elements.

Prior to 1958, the ISI would report directly to the commander in-chief of
Pakistan army. However, after the imposition of martial law, all intelligence
agencies were brought directly under the control of the president and the chief
martial law administrator. Consequently, intelligence agencies competed with
each other to project their own organisations as more loyal than the other. Ayub
Khan used this inter-organisational rivalry to strengthen his own position in
power. In the 1964 presidential elections, extensive use was made of the ISI to
monitor the activities of Awami League and other political parties of East
Pakistan. The ISI’s primary focus increasingly shifted from intelligence
gathering/coordination to meddling in domestic politics. Gradually, the ISI’s
involvement with Pakistan’s politics itself became deeper with every passing
year; a development that has only grown stronger over the years. This was the
basic reason for the dismal performance ‘Pakistan’s military intelligence’ in the
1965 Indo-Pak war. In 1970 general elections in Pakistan, under General Yahaya
Khan, ISI spent huge amount of money to ensure that Awami League did not 34

get majority on its own. But it failed miserably. But Yahaya Khan refused to
invite Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to form the government, despite his party, the
Awami League, emerging victorious. Dishonouring the election verdict resulted
in the breakout of an uprising in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan used Pakistan army
to crush this uprising. The ISI even made attempts to infiltrate into the inner
circles of the Awami League, which eventually proved disastrous, as the Eastern
Wing broke free from Pakistan’s yoke and became an independent country,
Bangladesh.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who now took over the reins of what remained of
Pakistan, as its first democratically elected leader, tried to clip the wings of the
ISI. As a first step in this direction, he appointed Lieutenant General Ghulam
Geelani Khan as its Director General. But so deeply was the ISI entrenched in
Pakistan’s domestic politics that even Bhutto became dependant on it to
strengthen his hold on political power. Additionally, he used the ISI to put down
the rebellion in Baluchistan with a heavy hand. All these happenings, instead of
helping curb the ISI’s role in domestic politics, contributed in further
strengthening the same. During the seven years that Ghulam Geelani Khan
remained at the helm of ISI, it became an inseparable part of Pakistan’s turbulent
politics. In fact, Bhutto ended up expanding ISI’s role in domestic politics rather
than curbing it; something that he had intended to do.

It was on the strong recommendations of Ghulam Geelani Khan that Bhutto

promoted Zia-ul-Haque, an acknowledged Islamist, to the post of chief of the
army staff, in the process superseding a number of officers senior to him. To
return the favour, Zia retained Khan as the director general of ISI, despite the
latter having reached the age of superannuation. When Bhutto realised that ISI
had become too powerful and was not under his control, he created a new
intelligence set up, the Federal Security Force (FSF), to counter the former’s
influence and reach. However, after Bhutto was toppled and Zia seized power,
FSF was abolished and Bhutto was subsequently hanged. During Zia’s rule, ISI
truly graduated to becoming a state within a state. In ISI, he found an efficient,
willing, convenient and obedient tool to carry out his aggressive Islamisation of
the Pakistani society and the elimination of internal opposition to his policies.
Exporting and fomenting terrorism became an acceptable means of statecraft
during Zia-ul Haque’s rule.

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provided Zia with an ideal opportunity to

enlarge the role of the ISI internationally, with the help of Saudi Arabia and US.
The former provided money and Islamic ideological sanction and the latter with
arms, ammunition, money, technical know-how and intelligence backup. Recent
secret documents made public by WikiLeaks carry a secret memo of US
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, which states, “Donors in Saudi Arabia
contribute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups
worldwide… Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for Al
Qaeda, Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups.” All these organisations have
35

umbilical connections to ISI.

Zia cleverly manipulated the implications of Islamic revolution in Iran in such

a manner that Pakistan’s own objectives in the region became coterminous with
the foreign policy objectives of US. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan turned
Pakistan into a frontline state against the communist takeover. This provided a
fresh opportunity to ISI to renew and reinforce its already institutionalised
relationship with CIA. Right from the ‘cold war’ days, when Pakistan’s
Peshawar airbase served as a convenient, innocuous and strategically suitable
forward base to fly its U2 aircraft over Soviet Union, the ISI and CIA have
worked closely with each other for many years. Working for US war in
Afghanistan, provided an opportunity to ISI to renew its cold war links with the
CIA. This relationship between ISI, CIA and the Saudi Intelligence Agency
[Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP)] got strengthened, as the war in
Afghanistan wore on for over a decade (1978–1989). All three worked in tandem
to recruit, organise, train, arm, finance and launch Jehadists from all over the
world into Afghanistan, to fight the Soviet troops that supported the government
of Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, headed by Najibullah.
 The ISI remained the hub around which the whole implementation of the
strategy revolved. The ISI armed the Mujahideen fighting the Soviet forces in
Afghanistan, conducted their training, provided them logistical support and
oversaw their deployment in Afghanistan. To provide teeth and tactical
assistance, troops of Pakistan’s Special Services Group helped guide operations
inside Afghanistan. Between 1983 and 1997, the ISI trained nearly 83,000
Afghan Mujahideen. It also trained about 25,000 fighters from 30 countries to
fight this war. Nearly three billion dollars worth of arms were channeled to the
Mujahideen through ISI. Pakistan misappropriated huge funds by putting a
substantial part of it to its own use and even siphoned off large quantity of arms
to US’s staunch enemy, Iran. Due to this reason, the ISI allowed CIA only
limited freedom to get involved with the war in Afghanistan, as it had its own
agenda to implement. As Yoseph Bodansky, the former Director of the US
Congressional Task Force on ‘Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare’, wrote in
Bin Laden; The Man Who Declared War on America, “The ISI, which
supervised and controlled the Jehad being waged against Soviet Union in
Afghanistan, kept the CIA out of the training camps for Mujahideen. This was
because it was diverting 70 per cent of the arms and money Washington
provided, to fundamentalist Islamist Mujahideen groups loyal to itself and
hostile to the US and to train Jehadis for cross-border terrorist strikes in India.”

It was during this decade that the ISI, first under Lieutenant General Akhtar
Abdur Rehman (1980–87) and later under a virulent Islamist, Lieutenant General
Hamid Gul (1987–89), became truly Islamist in its composition and ethos. In the
eighties, ISI succeeded in checking the power and reach of four civilian
governments that were formed between 1988–1999. It is an open secret that it
was involved in the toppling of Benazir Bhutto’s first government and creating
difficult situations for all other civilian governments that came after her. It was
Hamid Gul who got the nine Islamist right wing parties organised into a
coalition, called Islami Jamhoori Ittehad to fight the 1990 elections against
Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). It is widely believed that these
elections were rigged by the ISI under the instructions and supervision of Hamid
Gul, to ensure Benazir Bhutto’s defeat.

While the war against the Soviet Union was on, the Arab fighters, who had
come to fight there as part of the Jehadi force organised by the ISI, CIA and GIP,
began laying the foundation for the creation of Al Qaeda, under Osama Bin
Laden. Pakistan, however, was focussed on Hizb-e-Islami chief, Gullubdin
Hikmatyar, to ensure it retained control over Afghanistan, after the Americans
had left. It calculated that a friendly regime in Afghanistan, which would be
subservient to Pakistan, would provide it the much sought after strategic depth
vis a vis India, its traditional enemy in the east.

Soviet troops suffered unacceptable combat losses due to the coordinated and
relentless operations conducted by the Mujahideen. Such losses, coupled with
other developments at the international level, eventually resulted in the
evacuation of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This defeat of Soviet troops by
CIA funded and Pakistan trained Mujahideen in Afghanistan, signalled the
victory of Islamist ideology over Pashtun nationalism, which was largely secular
and existed on both sides of the Durand Line. This victory of Islamism soon
36

made deep inroads into the conservative Pashtun tribal hinterland. The
internecine conflict that broke out between various militant groups after the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan government had been toppled and
Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, defeated Pakistan’s plans of installing
its own puppet in Afghanistan. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan might
have removed the communist menace from its neighbourhood, but it did not
necessarily bring in a pro-Pakistan regime there. Therefore, with Afghanistan
embroiled in a self-destroying internecine war, Pakistan’s hold over Afghanistan
appeared tenuous. Pakistan felt that something had to be done.

This fresh thinking resulted in the creation of the Taliban, which literally
means ‘students’. Pakistan trained thousands of Taliban, a creation of ISI, CIA
and the Quetta/Asia Transport Mafia, in various camps established for the
37

Afghan refugees in NWFP across Durand Line, and gradually inducted them into
Afghanistan. Being better trained, more cohesive (they were mostly of Pashtun
ethnicity) and well-supported by Pakistan, they soon brought the whole of
Afghanistan under their control and defeated the fractious parties that ruled
Afghanistan under Burhanudin Rabbani, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces
from there.

Pakistan made the best use of the American dependence on it to fight the
latter’s war in Afghanistan. Pakistan ensured that America turned a blind eye to
its frenzied, though clandestine, attempts at manufacturing nuclear weapons, and
succeeded in hiding the serious preparations Pakistan had put under way for
fanning and sustaining insurgency in Kashmir. With its western flank secure
under their firm ally, the Taliban, the ISI turned its undivided attention towards
its north-east, sending hordes of Jehadis, now free from Afghanistan, into
Kashmir. Equipping and arming these Jehadis with most modern and latest
weapons did not pose any problems, as almost 70 per cent of the aid coming into
Pakistan from US and its allies was diverted towards this new enterprise to grab
Kashmir, code named ‘Operation Topac’. Drawing encouragement from its
grand success in Afghanistan, the stage was set for applying the same tactics in
India, first in Punjab and then in Jammu and Kashmir. It was only in the fitness
of things that the responsibility for the conduct of these covert operations in
Kashmir, should devolve on the ISI, which began sending hordes of Islamist
Jehadis from across the LoC into Kashmir.

In 1992, the US State Department threatened to place Pakistan on the watch-

list of countries which were involved with exporting terror to other countries.
Apparently, this forced Pakistan to appoint a new director general of ISI,
Lieutenant General Javed Ashraf Qazi (1993–95), with the mandate to
restructure the ISI. Qazi tried to put into effect the new mandate by changing a
number of top-rung officers of the organisation. However, at the middle and
lower levels, everything remained unchanged. In the end, nothing really
changed. The reason primarily was that under no circumstances would Pakistan
like to weaken its hold on Kabul, and therefore, it could not break free of those
elements that it cultivated for that purpose.

Pakistan’s involvement and tactics employed in fanning terrorism in Kashmir

Valley have been aptly summed up by Ashely Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Writing in Pioneer of July 10, 2010, he
says, “Many Pakistanis today; academics, policy analysts, and even officials,
concede that fomenting insurgencies within India has been a main component of
Pakistan’s national strategy. But that late admission comes long after Pakistan’s
military establishment moved to replace its failed strategy of encouraging
insurgencies with the more lethal device of unleashing terrorism.” He continues,
“Flushed with confidence flowing from the success of the anti-Soviet Jehad in
Afghanistan during 1980s, Pakistan sought to replicate in the east what it had
managed in the west, namely, the defeat of great power larger than itself, using
the same instruments as before — radical Islamist groups that had sprung up
throughout Pakistan. Pakistan’s ISI pushed into Jammu and Kashmir, for the
first time in 1993, combat hardened aliens, tasked to inflict large-scale murder
and mayhem.”

General Pervez Musharraf’s role as Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan army,
in Kargil war in 1999, was a direct result of his Kashmir-centric obsession,
coupled with his risk-prone propensity, as an officer belonging to the elite
Special Services Group (SSG). It must have been quite humbling for Musharraf
to retreat from Kargil under the intense counter-offensive of Indian army and the
pressure put on Pakistan by the international community, particularly by the US.
Ironically, even though Kargil war was exclusively planned and executed by the
army under General Musharraf, it was the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharief, whom the Pakistanis held responsible for having bungled the enterprise.
Once again it was the ISI that helped divert criticism from the army to the
elected civilian government. It was, therefore, easy for General Pervez
Musharraf to remove Nawaz Sharief and seize power in Pakistan. With
Musharraf’s coming to power in a bloodless coup, the ISI grew even bigger and
continued with its policy (of exporting terror) as far as India in general and
Kashmir in particular was concerned. He himself acknowledged this and his own
role while speaking to the German magazine, Der Spiegal, on October 5, 2010, a
couple of days after launching his own political party, All Pakistan Muslim
League, in London, where he is presently living in exile. He said, “They
(underground militant groups to fight against India in Kashmir) were indeed
formed. The (the Nawaz Sharief) government turned a blind eye because they
wanted India to discuss Kashmir.” The whole aim of this disclosure, as would be
apparent, was to embarrass his bête noire, Nawaz Sharief, but in the process, he
provided enough evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir, if any
evidence was required.

Even more than two decades after the Pakistan-sponsored insurgency broke
out in the valley, Pakistan’s sustained involvement in fanning violence in the
state continues to be intimate and persistent. Figures given in the following chart
will make it clear:

Militants Killed in Jammu and Kashmir: 2008–09

Source: Joginder Singh, a former Director of CBI quoted in Pioneer,October 18, 2010.

After the Twin-Towers of World Trade Centre in New York were attacked by
Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, Musharraf was left with no alternative but to
(reluctantly) give up on Taliban under pressure from US, whose envoy even
threatened him with bombing Pakistan into Stone Age, if Musharaff did not obey
America. This resulted in Pakistan loosening its control over the militants that it
had cultivated for a generation, giving rise to the conflict of interests. On the one
hand Pakistan was helping the US tackle Al Qaeda; on the other, it was
supporting Taliban, involved in deadly combat with US troops in Afghanistan.
In actual combat on the ground in Afghanistan, it was impossible to draw firm
lines that separated different militant groups fighting the US forces. In order to
demonstrate their autonomy of operations, some Pakistani militants carried out a
bold but uncoordinated attack on Indian Parliament in December, 2001. This
brought the two nuclear armed neighbours nearly to war. Under pressure,
Musharraf withdrew assistance to Kashmir-centric militant groups. However,
they were allowed to function under different names after sometime.

STRATSFOR assessment of 2008 puts it in perspective, “While there are

38

those within the ISI who see the militants as valuable tools of the state’s foreign
policy objectives, there are many others who “went native” and developed
sympathies for these Islamist militants, even adopting the Islamist ideology of
the people who were supposed to be their tools. The Pakistani military-
intelligence complex was caught between the need to support the US war against
the Jehadists and the need to cope with the rise of a hostile government in
Afghanistan. On one hand, the ISI was helping Washington capture and kill Al
Qaeda members; on the other, it was trying to maintain as much control as
possible over the Taliban and other Islamist groups, which were enraged with
Islamabad’s decision to assist Washington. The ISI hoped its Kashmir operations
would not be affected by the war against Islamist militants, but attacks on the
Indian Parliament in December 2001, brought pressure from New Delhi.
Musharraf was forced to ban many Kashmiri groups, which were subsequently
allowed to re-invent themselves under different names.” 39

Pakistan ended up playing a double game that neither earned it the friendship
of the Taliban nor the gratitude of the Americans. This double game did not go
down well with those militant groups that were very close to Al Qaeda. Such
militant groups broke free from Pakistan’s stranglehold and openly aligned
themselves with Al Qaeda. For a while, some of these groups even functioned
autonomously. However, many of them found it difficult to break free from the
vice-like grip of the ISI. Eventually many of them were forced to return to the
organisation. After two unsuccessful assassination attempts against Musharraf,
he did make attempts to weed out some forces within the ISI that had grown
autonomous, by removing certain high ranking officers. But for middle-level
officers, who by now subscribed entirely to the Jehadist philosophy of the
militants, it was business as usual.

Many militant groups, particularly the Taliban, turned hostile towards

Pakistan, after Musharraf joined America in its war on terror. Under US
pressure, Pakistan sent its troops into Waziristan area of FATA; an area that
these militant groups considered as their exclusive preserve. This area had for
decades enjoyed autonomy, with tribal ‘elders’ exercising control over various
militant groups. When Pakistan army went after these groups, the tribal ‘elders’
lost control over them and in turn, their autonomy to function independently.
One militant group, namely ‘Pakistan Taliban’ that emerged as a result of this
policy was the direct result of this new policy of Pakistan. With US drones
attacking the area in order to kill Al Qaeda cadres, the alienation grew even
further. The collateral damage that such US attacks inflicted on civilian areas,
killing a number of people, not directly connected with militancy, further fuelled
the resentment among tribal people. This helped Pakistani Taliban increase their
strength, enlarge their area of operation and consolidate their hold on the
alienated people. Under Baitullah Mehsud’s leadership, Pakistan Taliban grew
bold and strong enough to hit at Pakistan army and ISI itself, in bigger and
important cities of Pakistan. Pakistan Taliban’s suicide missions, launched
against selected targets underscored their reach and the level of subversion they
were capable of causing to the Pakistani institutions. Even though it started as a
reluctant ally of US in its war on terror, Pakistan today has got embroiled in an
existential war against the same Jehadists, whom it created in the first place. The
ISI, therefore, is in catch-22 situation; running as it is with the hare and
compelled by circumstances to hunt with the hound.

ISI Declares War on India

It is strange that Pakistan, which has never been well-disposed towards the
Sikhs, should suddenly become the community’s benefactor and patronise their
cause of creating an independent state, the so called ‘Khalistan’. Pakistanis have
always projected Sikhs as nothing less than barbarians and have let go of no
opportunity to heap ridicule on the whole community. It has not stopped at that.
It has passed blasphemous and disparaging remarks about the universally and
deeply venerated Sikh Gurus. In the early eighties, taking advantage of the
political problems in Punjab, Pakistan changed its tactics of dealing with Sikhs,
though its attitude did not undergo much change. It seized the opportunity
provided by Operation Blue Star to exploit the alienation of Sikh community
40

from the government. ISI’s craftily formulated plan included supply of

sophisticated weapons and ammunition to the alienated Sikh youth and
providing refuge to them after they had indulged in violent activity in India.

As situation in Punjab seemed to get out of hand and Government of India

seemed unable to stem the rot, ISI enlarged the scope of the operation under
code name ‘Operation K-2’. The enlarged blueprint included training the
alienated and misguided youth in the handling of sophisticated weapons and
explosives, directing their operations inside and outside India, coordinating their
activities with other terrorist groups and providing them with financial, moral
and diplomatic support. ISI calculated the strategic benefits that would accrue to
it, if Indian forces were kept occupied in Punjab, while their long-term objective
of fomenting insurgency in Kashmir was being given final touches. As US Task
Force report dated February 1, 1993, titled The New Islamic International
submitted to the House of Representatives states, “Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir
tempted ISI to sponsor and encourage creation of Khalistan. In its calculation it
would make the Indian defence of Kashmir difficult. Islamabad was determined
to exploit growing tension in Kashmir to destabilise India and, therefore,
embarked on an ambitious plan of providing training and military assistance to
Punjab militants.”

Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984 gave further impetus to this

terrorism and helped the ISI to establish the strategic value of subversion. By the
middle of eighties, Pakistan had developed a vast and well-equipped training
infrastructure for Afghan Mujahideen which the ISI now used for training first
the Sikh youth and later Kashmiri militants. Dal Khalsa was among the first Sikh
militant groups trained in the camps meant for training of Afghan Mujahideen.
At times, this assistance was funnelled through Gulbudin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-
Islami to enable Pakistan to deny its direct involvement. In a raid on one of these
camps by Soviet forces, a few Dal Khalsa recruits were killed and more
importantly, highly incriminating documents were recovered from them. The
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation TV documentary, named Fifth Estate
contains a chilling account of ISI’s involvement with Punjab militants and
bombing of Kanishka. Another documentary produced around the same time by
the CNN also contains details about ISI’s involvement with terrorism in
Kashmir.

Not much is known of the organisational structure of ISI. With its

headquarters located in Islamabad, ISI has on its rolls over 10,000 employees,
including a large number of military officers and civilians. This figure does not
include the informants and informal assets. Though on the face of it, the ISI is
supposed to function under the joint chiefs of staff committee, it has over the
years, become nearly autonomous. With its mostly covert functioning beyond
the purview of anyone, including the press, it has become the most powerful
institution in the country, which is not answerable to anyone. Drug trafficking,
hawala rackets and narcotic trade keep its coffers full. Financial resources built
as a result, are used to execute the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan and
Jammu and Kashmir, besides running a huge network of various terrorist
organisations. Till some years ago, its banking operations were entirely handled
by Bank of Credit and Commerce International, before it was declared bankrupt.
It is axiomatic that the organisation and functioning of intelligence agencies, the
world over, is shrouded in secrecy. In that respect, ISI is no different. However,
what is different about it is the fact that besides funding and training known
terrorist organisations, it also exercises operational control over these. And to
hide its own involvement; it covers their violent actions by calling them non-
state actors, as in the case of Mumbai attacks (26 November 2008). According to
information available, the ISI is organised into nine divisions as under:

1. Joint Intelligence X (JIX): It serves as a coordinating headquarter,

providing administrative support to its various wings and organisations in
the field. Its most important task is to prepare intelligence planning
estimates and assess threat perceptions. It, along with the Joint Intelligence
Bureau (JIB), is the biggest segment of the ISI, accounting for 60 per cent
of its entire manpower.

2. Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB): It is solely responsible for gathering

political intelligence. One of the three sub-sections in which it is organised,
is exclusively responsible for operations against India.

3. Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB): Besides carrying out field

surveillance of Pakistani diplomats posted abroad, it is responsible for
carrying out intelligence operations in West Asia, China, Afghanistan,
South Asia and the southern Muslim republics of the erstwhile Soviet
Union.

4. Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM): Conducts espionage activity

in foreign countries.
 5. Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB): It has under it the signal
organisation with wireless monitoring stations placed all along the border
with India. This wing provides the signal communication support to
militants operating in Jammu and Kashmir.

6. Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT): As the name suggests, its

responsibility is to gather intelligence of technical nature.

7. Explosive and Chemical Warfare (XCW) Section: This section is

exclusively devoted to evaluating and exploring the use of explosives and
prepare for chemical warfare.

8. Joint Intelligence North (JIN): It is believed to have been responsible

for carrying out operations in Jammu and Kashmir in the early years of
insurgency there. This included intelligence gathering (military as well as
political), infiltration, conduct and monitoring covert operations,
propaganda and exfiltration. It is reported that this task has now been taken
over by ‘S’ Wing (see below).

9. ‘S’ Wing: Created sometime in late eighties, it has become the most
secretive, sinister and powerful organ of ISI. Having grown in size and
strength over the years, it has spread its tentacles far and wide. It is believed
that the task of conducting operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir is
handled by this wing, which is staffed in part, by retired Pakistani army
veterans, most of them fanatical Islamists, handpicked by Zia-ul-Haque
himself. The insurgency in Kashmir during the past two decades, is
believed to have been handled entirely by this wing, which has on its rolls
many terrorist commanders/leaders. Its biggest success was the grooming of
Taliban, whom it unleashed with stunning success to capture power in
Kabul in 1996. In addition to controlling its own home-grown terror outfits
like LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammad and HUJI, etc., it also handles Al Qaeda and
Taliban, thus in essence, serving as a single-point coordinating agency to
run the entire terror machinery. It is responsible for creating and nurturing
Jehadists for international operations.

Most of ISI’s resources (financial, material and manpower) are directed

towards running clandestine operations in Jammu and Kashmir, Afghanistan,
and north-east India and, earlier in Punjab. The remaining parts of India and
lately its own NWFP (now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and FATA also consume a
substantial portion of its budget. Its responsibilities include provision of
weapons, training, logistics, intelligence, planning and execution of all militant
operations wherever these are launched by them.

ISI’s initial aim was to coordinate the inter-services intelligence. Then Ayub
used it to retain army’s control on Pakistan. Slowly, while not losing sight of the
original objective, it turned its attention towards achieving strategic objectives
against India. Later, post-Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, when the US lost
interest in that country, ISI sent in own well-trained Taliban to fill the vacuum.
Now, it is using terrorism as a state policy with much greater reach and efficacy.
With ISI controlled at various levels by people whose ideological affinity to
Islamist ideology is stronger than their loyalty to the hierarchal chain of
command, it is difficult to foresee the end result. Pakistan army remains the most
powerful institution and it has used the ISI to maintain its grip on the power
structure in the country. In the process, it has become a law unto itself. The
organisation did not even spare the iconic father of the Islamic bomb, Dr AQ
Khan. In a scathing attack on Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, Dr Khan
wrote in a column in The News, “Unfortunately in our country, the performance
of the intelligence agencies is anything but commendable and is nothing to be
proud of. They have been an extended arm of dictators and have been widely
branded as rogue organisations. These agencies operate outside the law, are least
bothered about the judiciary and totally ignore court orders.” Describing the
ordeal he suffered at the hands of the ISI during Pervez Musharraf’s regime, Dr
Khan writes, “A General, an ISI Colonel and eight subordinates forcibly sent us
to Bannigala and kept us there for 10 hours. During that time our house was
totally ransacked. Bedrooms, clothes, books, files, etc., were searched and many
things taken away; all this without any official warrant or court order to do so. In
any civilised society such despicable acts are totally unacceptable and are dealt
with severely by the courts.” Under the circumstances, if army overhauls it, it
stands to lose that control. No Pakistani army chief is likely to take that risk.

ISI’s Involvement in Jammu and Kashmir

ISI’s involvement in clandestine operations in Jammu and Kashmir goes back
to many decades. In 1969, Jammu and Kashmir police unearthed a conspiracy to
ignite religious and separatist passions in the valley when they arrested a number
of students belonging to Al Fatah (named after the well-known Palestinian
guerrilla group) from a house on in Barsoo, located on the banks of River
Jhelum at Letpora. Further investigations revealed that the group was the
creation of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies (ISI had not attained the kind of
profile that it was to acquire subsequently, and hence, was not a well-known
entity then), directed to unify students for a struggle for secession. Essentially,
the Al Fatah had been directed to target schools, colleges and university students
to turn them into the mainstay of a proxy for future struggle. One of the serious
protests attributed to Al Fatah was the violent agitation that broke out in the
Valley in 1970. The protestors were demanding removal of a book named Book
of Knowledge, from the library of a college in Anantnag. The book was alleged
to contain a picture of Prophet Mohammad (considered to be a blasphemous act
in Islam). The protests came to an end when the book was proscribed by the
Union Government; but by then, it had already accounted for four unfortunate
deaths.

During the decade of ‘Seventies’, the political situation in the Valley remained
largely peaceful. However, many political developments at the national and
international level, impacted Kashmir’s internal politics adversely. This helped
Pakistan to foment trouble in the valley. Pakistan’s ability to use the sway of
radical Islam, which surfaced with deadly effect at many points on the globe
during this decade, as a strategy to further its geo-political interests in South
Asia, transformed the environment in the Valley, drastically. These
developments infused fresh life into the anti-national and pro-Pakistan elements
in Kashmir, who had been lying low for some time, as the breakup of Pakistan
had dealt a serious blow to their morale. Militant revival of Islam helped raise
the morale of Pakistan’s proxies in Kashmir, who had always drawn ideological
motivation from radical Islam. They now started organising themselves again to
launch a movement, whose content and character, perhaps unknown to them,
would be different.

As usual the Indian leadership and its intelligence agencies goofed up again
and failed to notice the gathering storm, particularly when events in Punjab had
made it amply clear that the storm in Kashmir was likely to burst any day, with
an unheard of ferocity and violence. The insurgency in Punjab had created
political turmoil in the whole of northern India. This adverse situation for India
had greatly been created and further exploited by Pakistan to arm and train
Kashmiri youth to unleash violence in the Valley. Political turbulence and
uncertainty inside the Valley helped Pakistan in its effective intervention,
besides projecting the outbreak of insurgency as an indigenous movement
launched by Kashmiris themselves. The Muslim leadership in the valley went
along with the tide as the Indian State appeared politically adrift and its
leadership, after the death of Indira Gandhi, indecisive.

In the meantime, a host of radical Islamic scholars in the garb of Maulvis and
teachers of Madrassas were employed to indoctrinate Kashmiri youth. Islamic
ideology served as the driving force of the militant violence that broke out in the
valley in December, 1989; communal nature and fundamentalist world view
being its chief characteristics. As a natural corollary, separation of Jammu and
Kashmir from India became its immediate objective and turning the valley into a
Muslim theocratic state in all its aspects, its long-term goal. This entailed
fanning Islamic communalism by creating religious fervor against the Kafir, who
was well identified and readily available, next door. Thus Kashmiri Pandits, pro-
India Muslims and other non-Muslims became a natural target; totally
unprotected, in hopeless minority, highly vulnerable, and abandoned by the
secular Indian State.

Pakistan launched a virulent campaign against India, making use of electronic

media, international press, its diplomatic corps and its strong proxies within the
valley. The fundamentalist Muslim organisations like the Tabhligi Jammat, the
JeI, Ahle Hadis and Salafists indulged in door to door campaigning to recruit
new converts to their extremist ideology and consequently to Jehad. The Mullahs
used the mosque and its pulpit to preach hatred against India and its supporters
in Kashmir, the Kashmiri Pandits. According to their thinking, Kashmiri Pandit
provided the support base for India in Kashmir and also served as its
communication link. Wiping him out will serve a double purpose; on the one
hand it will rid the valley of Kafir, turning it into a purely Islamic state, where
Nizam-e-Mustaffa could then be enforced, and on the other, it would dry up
Indian communication channels that would assist in the long run in severing the
State’s links with India. For radical Islamists, there could not be a more noble
cause!

In the initial phase of insurgency, Pakistan’s electronic and print media went
overboard in proclaiming the imaginary victories that the Mujahideen had scored
over the Indian security forces. They went to town with repeated stories of heavy
casualties inflicted on the security forces in so-called pitched battles. The local
press, which depended for its survival on the patronage of the Valley’s middle
class, joined the tirade against India. It was a natural stand taken by the local
press since for decades it had supported secessionism, Muslim fundamentalism
and had advocated for Pakistan’s involvement in finding a solution to Kashmir
dispute.
Operation Topac
The operation to annex Jammu and Kashmir, code-named Operation Topac, 41

was formulated by ISI in 1988. Its main features were; fomenting insurgency in
the state by activating its proxies, while simultaneously infiltrating well-trained
and armed Jehadis. The name of the operation was derived from Prince Tupac
Umru, who had led the war of liberation in Uruguay against the Spanish
occupation in the 18 century. The responsibility for providing the highly
th

motivated Jehadis for this operation was handed over to JeI and other like-
minded religious parties, by Zia-ul-Haque. ISI rightly calculated the Western
nations’ preoccupation with Afghanistan, would provide adequate cover behind
which Pakistan would embark on this ambitious mission without attracting
international attention. Success of Operation Topac would certainly strengthen
the military dictator politically, but the operation had another ulterior motive.
This became apparent when Zia handed over the struggle to non-state actors. MJ
Akbar writes, “It was not merely a shift from quasi-state actors to non-state
actors, it also introduced a new element in the struggle, for the purpose was no
longer limited to ‘liberation’ of Kashmir from ‘Hindu India’ but included the
conversion of Kashmir into ‘Islamic space’. Jammait and Jammait-influenced
fighters wanted a Kashmir cleansed of ‘Hindu perfidy’ and presence. In 1992,
they were instrumental in driving Kashmiri Hindus out of the Valley.” 42

Initially, Pakistan made use of JKLF and its student wing, the Jammu and
Kashmir Students Liberation Front, to foment trouble in the valley. It was a well
thought out and deliberate move as the Front’s slogan of ‘Azadi’ (Independence)
touched a sympathetic chord among the general population and therefore,
elicited greater acceptability and participation. Taking advantage of the
simmering discontent among the people, the JKLF soon infiltrated every
segment of Kashmiri society and the government apparatus, to subvert it from
within. The ISI pumped in huge amounts of money and most modern and
sophisticated weapons into the Valley. The first batch of JeI volunteer Jehadis,
which included the son of Amir of the organisation, crossed over to PoK soon
after the secret meeting between Zia and Said-ud-Taribilli, in 1982. They were
trained in ‘Khalid-bin-Walid’, ‘Abu Jindal’ and ‘Al Farooq’ camps. A large
number of Kashmiri youth that crossed the poorly guarded LoC subsequently,
returned to become the first foot-soldiers of new war unleashed by Pakistan in
the Valley.

From December 1989, an organised phase of assassinations, kidnappings,

murders and looting started in Jammu and Kashmir. This was started by
Amanullah Khan, Chairman of the JKLF, who announced an eighteen-month
campaign of terror against India. With the Valley literally going up in flames,
the insurgency to ‘Liberate’ Kashmir had truly begun. That it will prove most
harmful to the Muslims of Kashmir itself was lost sight of by the Kashmiris,
who saw it as a panacea for all their imagined ills. To the microscopic minority
of Kashmiri Pandits, it brought death and destruction. It ended up in their being
uprooted from Kashmir, their home for as long as history goes, only to be
abandoned and forsaken as refugees.

Internationally too, the environment was favourable for Pakistan to succeed in

its sinister designs. The decade between 1979 and 1989, saw the Soviet troops
getting bogged down in the quagmire of Afghanistan and finally facing the
ignominy of defeat, resulting in their withdrawal 1989. This setback hastened the
Soviet Union’s break-up, which eventually occurred in 1991. As a result, a large
number of countries (many of them Islamic) became independent. Militant
Islamic revolution swept away the Shah of Iran. Germany got re-united.
Romania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and many other countries broke free
from the influence/control of the Soviet Union. As far as the ISI and other
Islamic parties were concerned, it was the Islamist victories in Afghanistan and
Iran that had far-reaching effect on their world view. Pakistan, having been
chosen as a frontline state by the US was wallowing in thenew-found status as
America’s closest ally in this part of the world. Such political ‘high’ in Pakistan
coincided with the ‘low’ in India. India faced a difficult situation both internally
and externally. The Soviet Union, India’s external prop, was on the brink of
break-up; political instability in India had resulted due to Indira Gandhi’s
assassination; with Central government perceived as weak, fissiparous
tendencies in different regions was quite visible; Lastly, two of the strongest
leaders dealing with Jammu and Kashmir, i.e., Indira Gandhi and Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, were no longer available to address any emergency
situation in Kashmir, as and when it arose. Pakistan rightly calculated that the
time was opportune to annex Kashmir. The deteriorating political situation in the
Valley made their dream look quite realistic.

Islamist victories in Iran and Afghanistan had radically Islamised the political
discourse and its direction in Kashmir. Slogans emphasising the Islamic nature
of the movement and advocating the establishment of an Islamic state in Jammu
and Kashmir had become routine in view of their popular appeal. JeI and those
who drew inspiration from Khomeini’s revolution, were in the forefront of
carrying out Islamic indoctrination of the people, particularly in the rural areas.
The former, along with the Al-Jehad, had attained wide acceptability among the
common people. By 1984, the society had been considerably radicalised to allow
Kashmir Liberation Front (KLF), Mahaz-e-Azadi, etc., to grow rapidly. In a
short span of time, these parties were able to convince the people that their
salvation lay in Islamic revolution and that alone was the way to achieve
liberation of Jammu and Kashmir. This resulted in marked erosion of the secular
ethos in Kashmir, and its giving way to a fundamentalist Muslim identity.
Having done their home work properly, it was easy for ISI to give a pan-Islamic
identity and extra-territorial dimension to the developments in Kashmir. The
extent of Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmir was deep and extensive. According
to intelligence agencies and former militants, around 25,000 Kashmiri youth
were trained in the camps established by Pakistan in PoK, and other places in the
first couple of years between 1989 and 1991.

The insurgency in Kashmir was initiated and executed in a classical Maoist

style that only a professional organisation could undertake. In 1987–89, which
marked the first phase of this insurgency, the ISI created a nucleus of Islamic
militancy by seeding and exploiting discontent among the people. This phase
was characterised by sporadic bomb blasts and stray cases of targeting soft
targets, particularly Kashmiri Pandits. Only those cadres were deployed, who
had been provided rudimentary training and were, therefore, expendable.
Adopting uncoordinated hit and run tactics that avoided direct confrontation with
the security forces, was the essential operational feature of this phase. It is now a
well-established fact that a few officers from the SSG of Pakistan’s elite force
had been inducted during this important phase to coordinate and control the
operations in Kashmir. As it happened in 1947 and 1965, the Government of
India either chose to ignore the warnings or was totally incapable of dealing with
the situation. Differences within its own ranks on the methodology to be adopted
to deal with the situation were aired publicly. This further aggravated the
situation and emboldened the militants and their masters from across the border.
Had the government shown the necessary resolve to deal with the situation, it
would have succeeded in nipping the dangerous situation in the bud. Such a
stand by India would have compelled the ISI to re-think. But the government’s
abdicating its responsibilities, led the ISI to embark upon initiating the second
phase in the middle of 1991.

Assassination of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq provided the required environment

for garnering active public support for the second phase, which was
characterised by coordinated armed actions. A special force, whose ranks were
drawn from those who had fought in Afghanistan and officered by mainly
Punjabis from Pakistan, was inducted in the valley around July 1991, to form the
mainstay of this phase. This force was highly motivated and undertook daring
operations. In keeping with the laid down principles in the insurgency manual,
many agent provocateurs freely mixed with the government functionaries to
arouse least suspicion. These agent provocateurs formed the backbone of later
day OGW (Over Ground Workers) . They did not hesitate to operate in police
43

and military uniforms to carry out their operation as and when the tactical
situation so demanded. One of the most effective modus operandi adopted by
them was to create resentment among the general population against the security
forces by committing terror acts in the garb of security forces and ensure that
public anger, which resulted as a consequence, was directed against the latter.
Till 1992, Pakistan ensured that JKLF, led by the Pakistan-based Amanullah
Khan, remained its favourite tool to foment and spread militancy in the Valley.
While at the same time Pakistan ensured that it did not become too strong, as its
slogan of ‘Azadi’ did not suit its long-term interests. Once JKLF had served its
purpose, Pakistan dumped it.

Thereafter, in keeping with its objective, it switched its support to other, more
radical militant groups like Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Allah Tigers, Al Omar,
Al Barq, Muslim Brotherhood, etc. Whereas JKLF talked too loudly of
Kashmir’s independence, the HM cadres sought Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan
and imposing Sharia on the Kashmiri people. During this period the ISI created a
plethora of militant organisations after JKLF had been successfully used by it to
create the initial wave of unrest, which now became self-sustaining. Amanullah
Khan acknowledged as much in his interview to Urdu daily Jang in 1991, when
he said that he had set off the Azadi movement in Kashmir in 1988, by blasting
three bombs in Srinagar. He further mentioned that later, Pakistan army chose
pro-Pakistan Islamic extremists to take over the movement. It was a well-known
fact that between 1990–1993, there were almost 100 militant organisations with
unheard of names, which let loose a reign of terror in the Valley to create panic
and chaos in order to project the government as ineffective. In fact, says Capt SK
Tikoo (Retd), “To be precise, there were 176 militant organisations, some of
these comprising of just two or three militants. In 1993, two militants got killed
in Gurguri Mohalla, Srinagar, when the bag of explosives they were carrying on
their bicycle exploded. That was the end of that militant organisation, because it
comprised just the two of them.” By this time the radicalisation of Kashmiri
society had reached such a level that the infamous Mast Gul who torched the
revered shrine of Nund Rishi at Tsarar-e-Sharif was eulogised as a hero in the
following verse, sung in his praise:

Tsarar bani hari hari

Mast Gul kati bani

(The Shrine at Tsrar can be built brick by brick (bit by bit); where shall we get
Mast Gul from?)

It is true that a large number of Muslims resented this sacrilege, but as usual,
they remained silent.

By 1992, the ISI established a common command over all the militant
organisations, many of whom it had itself created and some, which had
mushroomed during the first phase, as a natural consequence. For example, in
the fall of 1991, it brought together HM, Allah Tigers and Ikhwan-ul-
Muslimeen, in order to launch joint and coordinated operations. Such
coordination helped the ISI to smoothen its operations of funnelling arms,
ammunition and funds to the militants. It also helped it to conduct more
advanced training programmes and produce more hardened and better motivated
cadres for induction into the valley, well-versed in the handling of far more
sophisticated arms, ammunition, explosives and communication equipment. This
period also saw the taking over of the complete command and control of HM by
Syed Sallah-ud-Din who now became its Amir and was designated as the
Supreme Commander. He quickly widened the base of his outfit in the entire
valley by eliminating his competitors like JKLF, Al Barq and Al Jehad. He was
also responsible for extending the insurgency into Doda and Udhampur districts
of Jammu Division. In Febuary, 1995, he shifted his base to Muzafarabad, from
where he has been operating as the Supreme Commander of the ‘United Jehad
Council,’ ever since.

Geelani and Sallah-ud-Din; Pakistan’s most Loyal Foot-soldiers in Kashmir

Mohammad Yusuf Shah was born at Soibug in Budgam district in December
1946. His father, Ghulam Rasool Shah, was an illiterate farmer, though his
maternal grand-father, Gulla Sahib, was a respected religious figure. Gulla Sahib
took keen interest in the upbringing of Mohammad Yusuf Shah and in moulding
his personality. Mohammad Yusuf Shah did his schooling from Government
Middle School, Soibug (now Government High School).Though he did well in
academics, his main interest centered around playing ‘Kabadi’ and hunting
water-fowl at the nearby world famous Hokersar bird-sanctuary. Later, he
shifted to Government Higher Secondary School, Budgam, from where he
passed his secondary school examination in ‘First Division’. However, he failed
to get admission into the Government Medical College at Srinagar. It was during
his stay at Budgam that he came increasingly under the influence of an
influential teacher, Ghulam Nabi Nissar, who introduced him to radical Islam.
Meanwhile, while he was only 14, he had been married to Taja, daughter of a
retired school teacher. He had seven children from her; five sons and two
daughters.

After clearing his higher secondary examination, Yusuf went to Sri Pratap
College in Srinagar, from where he did his graduation. In 1971, he did his
masters from Kashmir University in political science. In the same year, he
became chief election agent of Mirza Afzal Beg’s brother, Mirza Ghulam
Hassan Beg, during the latter’s election from Budgam constituency. Around the
same period, Yusuf took up a job of a science teacher in JeI-run school at Nawab
Bazar, in Srinagar. In 1972, he was appointed as Amir-e-Tehsil of JeI in Budgam
and later as Naazm-e-Aala, chief of the party’s student wing, Islami Jamiat-e-
Tulba. In 1972, he was arrested for the first time during Panchayat elections.
After working in JeI at various levels, Yusuf Shah was appointed as the Amir of
Srinagar district. In 1987 assembly elections, Mohammad Yusuf Shah got the
mandate for fighting the election as the candidate of JeI, which was one of the
main components of MUF (p. 351), from Amira Kadal constituency. Pioneers of
militancy in Kashmir and the founders of JKLF were all his campaign managers.
They were Yaseen Malik, Javed Mir, Ashfaq Majeed, Abdul Hameed Sheikh
and Aijaz Dar. His opponent in the election was Ghulam Mohiudin Shah of NC
and a relative of Farooq Abdullah. It was widely believed that Mohammad
Yusuf Shah had won the election but his opponent was declared the winner. The
complete account is given at page 350. Mohammad Yusuf Shah was
subsequently imprisoned for nine months, during which he transformed into a
hardcore radical, willing to take up arms.

By the end of 1989, and early 1990 (period coinciding with the outbreak of
violence against Pandits), Geelani found in Mohammad Yousuf Shah (an
important JeI leader by then), a young and fire-spewing hardliner, who would be
willing to do the former’s bidding. Geelani, therefore, set himself on course to
mentor Shah.
 Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a known hardliner has, for decades, been the face of
anti-Indian politics in Jammu and Kashmir. A votary of the merger of the state
with Pakistan, Geelani has shown tremendous resilience in remaining politically
relevant in Kashmir. He has managed to call shots when many a stalwart fell by
the way side during the last two decades of unprecedented violence in Kashmir.
As the unquestioned supremo of JeI, he had a readymade platform and a virulent
anti-India organisation. JeI, with its communal outlook was used by Geelani to
fan hatred against Pandits. He turned its dedicated cadres into armed Jehadis at
the behest of his benefactors living across the LoC. His objective was to create
an armed wing totally under his own control that would be in the vanguard of
Islamising Kashmir.

A meeting to strategize this was held in the house of Dr Sultan Mohammad, a

JeI activist, who too had been a candidate in the 1987 assembly elections. This
meeting held on August 3, 1989, in Soibug village of Badgam district, under the
chairmanship of Syed Ali Shah Geelani, was attended by top JeI leaders and
militant commanders of the upcoming armed uprising. These included Ghulam
Mohammad Mir, alias Shams-ul-Haque, Mohammad Ismail, Ashraf Dar and
Maqbool Illahi. In the early part of armed uprising in 1989, Ashraf Dar had
already attained some prominence among the armed cadres of militants as the
baani (founder) militant. Similarly, Maqbool Illahi was known as the asli (real)
militant because of his actual participation in small armed actions. In his opening
remarks during the meeting, Geelani told the audience that time was ripe for
launching a full-fledged armed struggle. He, therefore, announced that JeI would
give complete support to such an armed struggle. At this, Ashraf Dar proposed
that militant organisation, ‘Zia Tigers’ be given the responsibility of carrying out
the armed uprising. This was agreed to by Geelani, who in due course, persuaded
the Majlis-e-Shoora to release funds required to start and sustain militancy in the
valley. As a result, Ashraf Dar, as the chief of ‘Zia Tigers,’ started sending its
cadres across the LoC for receiving arms and arms training.

While all this was going on, many other militant outfits like JKLF, ‘Allah
Tigers, etc, had already emerged as the pioneers of the armed uprising. However,
Geelani was disturbed by the fact that some of these militant outfits were
advocating Azadi (independence) for the state. This advocacy went against
Geelani’s avowed aim of seeking the merger of the state with Pakistan.
However, what came as a shock to Geelani was the advocacy of Azadi even by
‘Zia Tigers’, led by Ashraf Dar. Not the one to brook any disobedience of his
diktat, Geelani struck immediately by creating a new outfit by the name of
Hizbul Mujahideen. Master Ahsan Dar, who presented its constitution,
subsequently rose to be its supreme commander. JeI of Jammu and Kashmir and
in PoK now recognised only HM as the real armed wing of the party and
provided it with all the necessary support.

In the meanwhile, many other militant organisations, which did not subscribe
to the philosophy of Geelani’s JeI, too were getting stronger by the day. Geelani
saw it as a threat to his own standing. To nip the dissidence that was raising its
head, he called a meeting of important functionaries of his party, as also of his
militant wing, the HM, under the chairmanship of Master Ahsan Dar. The
meeting was held in the house of a well-known JeI leader, Abdul Gani Sofi, alias
Shaheen, at Sepdan village in Badgam district. The meeting, among others, was
attended by Mohammad Yusuf Shah, Mohammad Abdullah, alias, Commander
and Ghulam Mohammad Ganai. During the meeting, Geelani ordered the HM
commanders to disarm all cadres of rival militant groups. He, in fact, went so far
as to order their physical elimination, if they did not agree to work under HM.
These orders were, however, strongly opposed by Ghulam Mohammad Ganai
and Mohammad Abdullah. But Geelani would have none of it. He immediately
stripped Master Ahsan Dar of the title of supreme commander and nominated
Mohammad Yusuf Shah in his place, with a pseudonym, Syed Sallah-ud-Din. To
placate Ahsan Dar, he was nominated as the military advisor; a purely decorative
title.

Having felt slighted, it did not take Ahsan Dar long to hit back. He announced
publically that HM was a militant outfit of JeI. It was the first time that such an
important public disclosure had been made by any prominent insider. At the
same time, Mohammad Abdullah, alias, Commander also walked out of HM.
Feeling threatened, Syed Sallah-ud-Din, under Geelani’s orders and with vast
resources at his disposal, started poaching on other smaller militant groups and
succeeded in merging them into HM. This method was greatly resented by a
senior and respected member of JeI, Ghulam Mohammad Ganai. However, on
Geelani’s orders, he was shot dead by HM cadres while coming out of the
mosque after offering evening prayers in his native village, Seeri, in Pattan
district of Kashmir, sometime in 1992.

Sometime later, Geelani announced the formation of Hurriyat Conference, an

oufit that co-opted, besides JeI, 22 other smaller groups/political parties; all
opposed to India (some of these are listed at Appendix ‘B’). It is widely believed
that the formation of Hurriyat Conference was greatly facilitated by US Under
Secretary of State, Robin Raphael, to further her own anti-India agenda in
Kashmir. Geelani, as the president of this outfit, ensured that many hardline
members of his party occupied key posts in it. These included Mohammad
Akbar Bhatt, Zaffar-ul-Islam (divisional commander of HM) and Geelani’s chief
confidant, Sadiq Ali.

Geelani soon started facing opposition from those who were roughing it out in
the field and resented being ordered around by those sitting in the safe havens of
carpeted bungalows. Eventually, it resulted in the virtual split in HM; with one
faction headed by Ahsan Dar and the other by Syed Sallah-ud-din. One time
comrades in arms were now locked in an internecine war to gain an upper hand
in the ongoing militancy in Kashmir. Orders issued by Geelani to Sallah-ud-Din
were quite categorical, “Eliminate all those who oppose us.” In this ongoing war,
Ahsan Dar suffered grievous losses when a well-concealed hide out of his came
under grenade attack from Sallah-ud-Din’s men. The hideout was located in the
house of Rashid Zain-i-Gami, a wealthy and influential supporter of Ahsan Dar.
In this well-planned attack, Rashid Zain-i-Gami and two of Ahsan Dar’s baani
militants were killed. It was a great setback to Ahsan Dar’s faction of HM in its
open war against Syed Sallah-ud-Din. This and other killings of Ahsan Dar’s
cadres over a period of time, with the active support of Pakistan, enabled
Geelani to become the unchallenged godfather of HM, with Syed Sallah-ud-Din
as its operational commander. Besides, being totally driven by the Islamic
concept of Jehad and openly fighting for Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, HM
soon became the preferred militant organisation of Pakistan in the valley. It now
received enormous assistance in terms of modern arms, ammunition, training,
funds and other support from Pakistan. In Geelani and Sallah-ud-Din Pakistan
found willing tools to help them achieve their objectives in the Valley.

Later, in 1994, Students Liberation Front emerged as a popular organisation in

the valley. Geelani saw in it a challenge to his own supremacy and hence
ordered the elimination of its leader, Kukka Parrey. However, despite numerous
attempts, Sallah-ud-Din failed to deliver. This resulted in open war between HM
and Kukka Parrey’s cadres, who stood their ground despite the former’s greater
strength. But the increasing attacks on Kukka Parrey’s men drove them towards
seeking support of the army, who too were getting increasingly targeted by the
HM. However, HM continued to target Kukka Parrey, as he was proving to be a
charismatic leader, gaining strength with every passing day. In one such attempt,
a deep conspiracy was hatched during a meeting in the house of Ghulam Hassan
Khan, a senior JeI leader in Vachi village, in South Kashmir. During the
meeting, attended by 40–50 armed commanders of HM, Ghulam Qadir Ganai, a
senior JeI leader, sent an emissary to summon senior NC leader-turned-militant,
Abdul Qayoom Shah, to the meeting. Shah, on reaching the venue, was taken
aback on seeing the who’s who of the HM in the meeting. The reason for his
being summoned became clear soon enough. He was offered 50,00,000 to
surrender to army, earn their confidence and at an opportune moment, kill Kukka
Parrey. However, the plan fizzled out even before its first phase could be
completed.

By now, Kukka Parrey had become a formidable rival of HM, with the
proverbial nine lives of a cat. He achieved the status of a folk hero who was
trying to preserve Kashmir’s ethos based on moderate Islam, which the HM, on
orders of Pakistan and under the guidance of Geelani, were out to destroy. Under
the cicumstances Pakistan became desperate to get Kukka Parrey eliminated. It
ordered the HM to kill Kukka Parrey under all circumstances. A new plan which
was formulated as a result, envisaged a small but dedicated team of HM
militants surrendering their arms to police/army and commence work as over-
ground workers (OGW) of HM. The group included Abdul Majid Hajam,
Mohammad Ashraf Hajam, company commander Tuffail and his brother, Zafar-
ul-Islam. However, even this attempt failed, as they turned renegades and in fact,
started working for Kukka Parrey and against Sallah-ud-Din and Geelani. When
Geelani learnt about it, he got infuriated to such an extent that he got Hajam
burnt alive in a brick kiln, to send a frightening message to any more prospective
‘renegades’.

By now, with Pakistan’s blessings, Geelani had achieved complete financial,

administrative and operational control over the HM. He was also made
responsible for overseeing its operational performance. He would even appoint
platoon commanders, not to speak of appointing ‘regional’ and ‘divisional’
commanders; appointments which were filled by his chosen protégés.

As Kukka Parrey’s popularity and power grew, Sallah-ud-Din himself came

under increasing threat of Kukka Parrey’s cadres. To escape Kukka Parrey’s
wrath, Sallah-ud-Din was deputed to Doda region across Pir Panjal, to ostensibly
lay the foundations of militancy there. With the help of Pakistan-based militant
outfit, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Sallah-ud-Din was able to create a nucleus of
militants in that region. But Kashmir continued to be unsafe for him, as Kukka
Parrey’s men were increasingly targeting HM cadres. Therefore, Pakistan
considered it prudent to get him across into PoK. Once there; he was made the
chairman of the newly created United Jehad Council that was meant to oversee
and coordinate the functioning of all the militant organisations in Kashmir, under
the overall supervision of ISI. Ever since, Sallah-ud-Din has continued to stay
there.

Post-9/11, Geelani slowly lost support within Hurriyat and was shown the
door. But being used to unquestioned obedience of his orders and with Pakistan
firmly behind him (post-Musharaff), Geelani floated his own outfit, Tehreek-i-
Hurriyat in 2004, with himself as its chairman. What this party stands for is
clearly spelt out by him, and I quote Capt SK Tikoo (Retd), “The Dastoor
(Constitution) of Tehrik-i-Hurriyat, right in its preamble, incites, instigates and
provokes its members to eliminate all non-believers in the name of Islam, and
thus complete the unfinished task of the Prophet. Just read what is written in the
very first chapter (there are three chapters in all) of the Dastoor (pages 4 and 5)
‘…Those who are not accepting the fact that all creation flows from the
dispensation of the one God, those that insist that they will bow to the God of
their choosing and base their culture and civilisation on the philosophies and
points of view of their liking, are hereby told unequivocally that the Messenger
of God has not been sent to accommodate them, but has been sent to impose the
instructions of (the one) God that he brings on every aspect of creation. This (the
will of God) has to be carried out by him in whatever manner required. You
should leave no stone un-turned to condemn/admonish/lash out at the
apostate/polytheist and the dis-believer to accept this; he may try howsoever
hard (towards the controversy), this mission of the Messenger will stand
accomplished.” 44

In a booklet issued by Tehrik-i-Hurriyat, ‘Teen Hadaf’ (Three aims), Geelani

preaches openly for the creation of Ummah sans any geographical boundaries
and different governments, but just one Khilafat. No other Kashmiri has so
openly and brazenly preached hatred against non-Muslims and called for their
physical elimination as Geelani has done.

By the time the second phase of militancy was launched, fear and terror had
gripped the entire valley. The political leadership was so demoralised by targeted
killings that they either went underground or publically renounced their political
affiliations. Similar was the case with police and bureaucracy. Liquor shops,
bars, clubs, video and beauty parlors, cinema halls, etc., were looted, destroyed
or bombed, as being un-Islamic. Efforts were made to enforce a strict Islamic
code of conduct. A large number of government and privately run schools were
burnt to make way for opening up of JeI run schools. Elimination of large
number of intelligence agency personnel, particularly Kashmiri Pandits, was
another effective tactics used to achieve the initial aim. This phase also saw the
takeover of all mosques by radical mullahs.

Irrespective of the type of political dispensation that rules Pakistan, it will

always be its army that will continue to call the shots. Pakistan army has not
reconciled itself with the status quo on Kashmir and its comprehensive defeat at
the hands of Indian army in 1971 war, led it to start a proxy war against India in
Kashmir; a war that was low cost, but effective. Zia’s Islamisation drive created
a generation of Jehadis willing to fight this proxy war and provide a regular
supply of Jehadi reinforcements. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the
defeat of Soviet forces there, convinced Pakistan’s powerful army and the
radical Islamist leaders that their well-motivated Jehadis would be able to repeat
their victory against the Soviet Union, against India too. International events in
the eighties too played a significant role in helping Pakistani leadership to
embark on this dangerous mission, called ‘Operation Topac.’ Unfortunately for
Pandits, they became its first victims.

N OTES

1. Pioneer, July 26, 2010.

2. Jammu and Kashmir Always an Integral Part of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
Government of India Publication (Tara Art Printers, New Delhi, 1996).
3. LK Advani, My Country My Life, (New Delhi: Roopa and Company, 2008).
4. Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Oxford University Press, 1952).
5. Op.cit., n. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Nadeem F Pracha: Dawn. Reproduced in Pioneer January 27, 2010.
8. Pioneer: February 12, 2011.
9. MSM Sharma, Peeps into Pakistan, (Pustak Bhandar, 1954). p 135.
10. This is recorded in the Time Magazine of December, 23, 1996. The Magazine attributes this statement
to Jinnah’s doctor who was attending on him at his death bed.
11. Din Mohammad was among the first to inform Indian Army about the presence of infiltrators in general
area surrounding Gulmarg and acted as a guide to their hideouts. Government of India later conferred
one of its highest civilian awards, Padma Shri, on him. He achieved some kind of a celebrity status.
However, when insurgency broke out in Kashmir in 1990, he was among the first to be shot dead by
the militants.
12. Contained in PN Dhar’s article in a leading daily of April 4, 1995. Here it is quoted by Jagmohan in a
newspaper article.
13. Arif Mohammad Khan, The Times of India, December 27, 2008.
14. Article on the website of prestigious Pakistani paper, Dawn; quoted in Pioneer, December 17, 2010.
15. Arif Mohammad Khan, n. 13.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. The Times of India: November 10, 2011.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Pioneer: November 10, 2011.
22. Newsline, Wednesday, November 4, 2009.
23. Ibid.
24. Arif Mohammad Khan, The Times of India, November 10, 2008.
25. Ibid.
26. Samuel Baid, Pioneer, March 8, 2009.
27. Sunday Times of India, March 8, 2009.
28. Newsline, n. 22.
29. Hussein Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2005).
30. n. 27.
31. n. 22.
32. MJ Akbar quotes Arif Jamal in his book, Tinder Box - The Past and Future Pakistan, excerpted in The
Times of India, January, 9, 2011.
33. Ibid.
34. Awami League, led by the charismatic Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, had its entire support
base in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
35. The Times of India, December 6, 2010 and Pioneer, December 7, 2010.
36. The boundary line, delineating the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is known as ‘Durand
Line’. While Pakistan recognises it as such, Afghanistan does not. This has been a constant source of
friction between the two Islamic neighbours.
37. A Pathan-dominated mafia that thrives on the smuggling and narcotic trade between Pakistan and many
countries of Central Asia.
38. It is a US based private global intelligence organisation, staffed by former intelligence officials, whose
highly informed analysis of world events enjoys a high degree of credibility among various
governments and experts, dealing with strategic affairs.
39. STRATSFOR assessment, dated August 11, 2008: downloaded from Kashmir-
[email protected], on November 20, 2010.
40. ‘Operation Blue Star’ was launched on June 6, 1984, by the Indian Army against Sikh terrorists who
had turned the most revered shrine of the Sikhs, the Golden Temple at Amritsar, into a fortress.
Though the operation destroyed most of the terrorist leaders, it also inflamed Sikh passions due to the
extensive damage caused to the Golden Temple. The operation finally cost Indira Gandhi her life,
when she was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, a few months later.
41. Though Operation Topac was dismissed as fictitious by various intelligence agencies, the build-up to
and outbreak of armed uprising in Kashmir in 1989 bore an uncanny resemblance to what was
outlined in the said operation.
42. MJ Akbar: The Times of India: January 9, 2011.
43. ‘Over Ground Workers’ did not openly carry arms, nor did they indulge in violence. They would rarely
be targeted by security forces. This permitted them to propagate the militant ideology openly and act
as the latter’s conduits and carry out liaison on their behalf, etc.
44. Capt SK Tikoo (retd) in Sahara Times, July 24, 2010.
13
 PANDITS TARGETED
It has happened and it goes on happening; and will happen again if nothing happens to stop it. The
innocent know nothing because they are too innocent. The poor do not notice because they are too
poor. And the rich do not notice because they are too rich. The stupid shrug their shoulders because
they are too stupid. And the clever shrug their shoulders because they are too clever. The young do
not care because they are too young. And the old do not care because they are too old. That is why
nothing happens to stop it. And that is why it has happened and goes on happening and will happen
again.
—Erich Fried1

Exodus of Pandits: Historical Perspective

A cursory study of the history of Kashmir in general and history of Kashmiri
Pandits in particular, reveals that forced exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from
Kashmir in 1989–90, was their seventh mass exodus from the valley to escape
persecution at the hands of rabid Islamists. Ever since the arrival of Islam in
Kashmir in the fourteenth century, persecution and forced conversions of
Kashmiri Hindus has been a regular phenomenon. To escape this fate, they
would seek the safety of the plains of India, where they felt physically secure. It
resulted in a progressive drop in their population in the valley. All these forced
exodus were invariably characterised by a number of similarities in the methods
adopted by the majority Muslim community of Kashmir in enforcing this
exodus. These included systematic oppression, desecration of places of worship,
threat and use of violence, forced conversions and selective killings of Kashmiri
Pandits. On few occasions, the Pandits did offer some limited resistance, but this
was broken with a heavy hand and was followed by violent reprisals and even
greater repression. This left the Pandits with no option but to move out en masse,
leaving behind all their possessions, including movable as well as immovable
assets. In the face of such onslaughts, their only concern was ensuring their
physical survival and their resolve of not converting to Islam, a choice they were
offered, but which most of them refused.

History bears witness to the fact that only once did the reverse exodus occur.
That was during the reign of Zain-ul-Abadin (1420–1470; chapter 2), who asked
the Kashmiri Hindus to return to their native place. Large number of them
heeded his advice and returned to the valley. Zain-ul-Abadin ruled for nearly 50
years and Kashmiri Hindus got respite during this period. Other than this
exception, the exodus have been irreversible, resulting in the exodus of the
aborigines of the Valley for good. Prior to their latest exodus in 1989–1990,
Kashmiri Pandits had been forced out during the Afghan rule in the valley
(1753–1819). However, thereafter, till 1947, first during Sikh rule (1819–1846),
and then during major portion of the Dogra rule (1846–1947), they did not face
any persecution. In the twentieth century, the old story repeated itself in July
1931, during Sheikh Abdullah’s movement against the Dogra Maharaja of the
State. In the large-scale violence directed against Kashmiri Pandits on July 13,
1931, many of their properties were destroyed and some were even killed.
Kashmiri Pandits became the victims of this violence despite the fact that
Kashmiri Muslims were protesting against the Dogra Maharaja and not Kashmiri
Pandits. It was ironic, because Dogra rulers had not particularly favoured the
Pandits for recruitment into government service. Feeling threatened, neglected
and vulnerable after the riots, they moved out to other cities of India. “Some
30,000 to 40,000 families are said to have moved out of Kashmir in the decade
between 1931–41,” writes a distinguished diplomat and India’s former Foreign
Secretary, MK Rasgotra, in the Indian Express of August, 26, 1995.

Official census figures for 1941 say that Kashmiri Pandits formed 15 per cent
of the population of Kashmir, as against 83 per cent Muslims. However, these
figures were wide off the mark. It was a well-known fact that those who
conducted the censuses during the Dogra rule, were invariably junior Muslim
officials, notorious for describing Kashmiri Pandit families as Muslim
households. Actual population of Kashmiri Pandits in 1941 must have been close
to 25–30 per cent of the total population. Indeed, the census of 1941 was the first
statistical assault on the Kashmiri Pandits in the valley; an ingenious ploy among
other methods, used to reduce Kashmiri Pandits to non-entities.

With India gaining independence in 1947, and Jammu and Kashmir opting to
be part of India, Kashmiri Pandits felt that their travails were finally over. They
felt that being now a part of the great Indian state that was democratic and
secular, their future would be safeguarded. They felt that Indian independence
will usher in a new era for Kashmiri Pandits. Alas! It proved to be a vain hope,
as they remained as vulnerable as ever to the whims and fancies of Muslim
majoritarianism. The State’s accession to India did little to improve the fortunes
of about a million Kashmiri Pandits living in Kashmir at that time. Along with
backward and marginalised communities like Gujjars, Bakerwals and others,
they rarely enjoyed the fruits of billions of rupees of development funds that
India poured into Kashmir after independence.
 In the meantime, the old method of employing statistical assault on Kashmiri
Pandit population in Kashmir continued; the figures quoted by the state
administration about the number of Kashmiri Pandits left in the valley after the
1947 Pakistani invasion of Kashmir, was between 80,000 and 120,000. This was
way below the actual number quoted above. At the time of this invasion, some
families had left the valley, but most had returned after the Pakistanis were
pushed out and normalcy was restored.

The whole aim of under-representing the Kashmiri Pandit population was to

deny them their due share in the state legislature and in the government jobs.
This denial extended to their being marginalised politically too, by altering the
electoral boundaries of some Pandit dominated areas in Srinagar, Anantnag and
other places. This was done to ensure that they would not be able to elect a
candidate of their choice from those constituencies, where they lived in
substantial numbers. This way the administration ensured that one (never more
than one) Kashmiri Pandit got elected to the state legislature, that too only with
the support of Muslim votes. The census figures of 1981 put the Muslim
population in the valley at 95 per cent, up from 83 per cent in 1941; whereas the
corresponding Kashmiri Pandits population, placed at 124,000, was down to 5
per cent from 15 per cent, during the same period. The false figures quoted by
the so-called secular government stood exposed in 1989–90, when the number of
Kashmiri Pandits who fled the valley was placed at over 450,000. Nearly
300,000 of them were housed in refugee camps in Jammu, Delhi and elsewhere;
100,000 found place with relatives in various places in India; around 50,000
were still left in the valley before the end of 1990. Thereafter, the 1991 census
put the Pandits at 0.1 per cent of the population, which would translate to barely
3,000 people.

During all this time the Kashmiri Pandits were getting marginalised
economically too. One of the first acts of Sheikh Abdullah after coming to power
was to enact the ‘Jammu and Kashmir Land Estates Abolition Act’. Though its
ostensible purpose was to improve the lot of landless tillers, the exercise was
primarily undertaken to take away the lands belonging to Kashmiri Pandits and
hand these over to Muslims. Hindus, especially in rural areas, whose only source
of sustenance was their land, were turned into beggars overnight, once their
lands were taken away from them without being paid any compensation, as
promised (Chapter 10). To complete their marginalisation, the next set of
legislation brought in by Syed Mir Qasim in the form of ‘Reformatory Law of
the Agrarian Reforms Act, 1971,’ further sealed their economic fate. The Act
was so designed that a Pandit could own nothing other than a house in his
village.

The discrimination was extended to many other areas, chief among these
being the discrimination meted out to Kashmiri Pandits in providing them with
government jobs. At that time, private sector was virtually non-existent, making
government the sole job-provider. Prof KL Bhan mentions in his book, Paradise
lost-The Seven Exoduses of Kashmiri Pandits, an instance when Sheikh
Abdullah himself selected teachers for the post of headmasters for various
schools by simply pointing a finger at a particular individual; in the process
overlooking some well-deserving Kashmiri Pandit teachers. Sometimes, the
degree of discrimination reached absurd levels when Kashmiri Pandit teachers
became subordinates of their own Muslim students, in the same institution where
the former were teaching. This injustice continued from August 15, 1947 to
1971, when the teachers took the matter to the court, finally resulting in the
undoing of this unjust provision after 24 years (T.N. versus State of Jammu and
Kashmir). During Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s rule, his education minister,
Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, issued an order that classified all Kashmiri Pandits,
irrespective of their economic status, as ‘forward category’, and all Muslims as
‘backward category.’ The backward category got preference in admission into
various colleges. This ensured that son of a well-placed Muslim got admission
into a college, whereas a Hindu peon’s son had no such hope. Mir Qasim, on
assuming power after Sadiq’s death in 1971, passed an order that a Mufti or a Pir
would have the first right of appointment to a government post, irrespective of
his merit or qualifications. It was openly propagated that Pandits would get two
per cent of the government job — proportionate to their population. With their
rate of literacy as high as 90 per cent at that time, denial of jobs to Kashmiri
Pandit youth led to their seeking jobs outside the state. “In 1989, the State
Government employed over 200,000 people. Out of these, Kashmiri Pandits
numbered barely 11,342. Besides these, 1,059 worked in Central Government
offices; 620 in Central Government and 204 in State-owned Public Sector
Undertakings respectively.” 2

In 1967, a minor Kashmiri Pandit girl, Parmeshwari Handoo, working in a

government-run ‘Super Bazar’ failed to return home in the evening. The parents
of the girl tried to lodge a missing person’s report at the police station, which the
police refused to do. Some good Samaritans from among the community visited
the police station in a group to try to convince the Station House Officer of the
local police station to lodge the report, but he was unyielding. In the meantime,
other relatives and community members joined to lodge a protest. This had no
effect on either the employer, who refused to carry out an investigation, or the
government which used strong arm methods to suppress the protest. Finally, it
was revealed that Parmeshwari Handoo had been abducted, converted to Islam,
given a new name, Parveen Akhtar, and married off to a Muslim. Kashmiri
Pandits got incensed and launched an agitation that lasted nearly a fortnight and
cost the community five lives. But nothing came of it. Though not much was
expected of the State Government, the Central Government too refused to
intervene, choosing to succumb to Kashmiri Muslim blackmail, which became a
norm, henceforth. After the agitation hundreds of Kashmiri Pandit officials were
posted to places outside the valley.

Pandits’ Attempt to Join Kashmir’s Mainstream

In a sense, ‘the Parmeshwari Handoo’ incident confirmed Nehru’s warning to
the Pandits about the consequences that awaited them if they did not join the
Kashmiri mainstream. Speaking at the annual session of the NC at Sopore in
August, 1945, he said, “If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should
join the National Conference, or bid good bye to the Country… If Pandits could
not join it, no safeguards will protect them.” It is quite astounding that Nehru,
the torch-bearer of democracy, should have advised Kashmiri Pandits to join NC
or leave the valley. It showed Nehru’s utter disregard for the basic principles of
democracy when it came to dealing with Kashmir. Besides exposing the strength
of his own conviction and faith in a pluralistic society, it also established
Nehru’s willingness to compromise to any extent in soliciting Sheikh Abdullah’s
support. It was evidence enough that in order to appease Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru
would go to any extent. In due course of time, this appeasement was turned into
blackmail by Sheikh Abdullah, which Nehru and others who followed him,
succumbed to repeatedly.

Nevertheless, following Nehru’s advice, Pandits, including many of their

leading lights, joined the NC in large numbers. They had hoped that the party
would become a symbol of secularism and nationalism in newly independent
India. But that was not to be. Many decisions taken by the state’s interim
government were patently directed at marginalising the Pandits economically
and politically. Later, Sheikh Abdullah’s talk of independence for the State set-
in even greater disillusionment among the Pandits. “No wonder that during the
four decades between 1948 and 1988 about 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus migrated
to other parts of the country.” 3
The Reality Check which Pandits Ignored
(see Appendix ‘H’, p. 659)

An indication of the coming events was available from what happened in

1986, when the state chief minister, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, aka, Gul Shah,
decided to construct a mosque named Shah Masjid, inside the new civil
secretariat, within premises of an ancient temple in Jammu. People of Jammu
resented this communally driven move and came out on the streets in protest.
Gul Shah retaliated; but only after reaching the Valley. In February 1986, he
instigated the Muslims by raising the slogan of Islam Khatre Mein Hey (Islam is
in danger). This provocative slogan, coming from the chief minister himself, was
enough to instigate the Muslims, who turned their anger against the hapless
Kashmiri Pandits. This resulted in the killing of many Kashmiri Pandits and
destruction of their property and desecration of their temples. The worst hit areas
were mainly in South Kashmir and also Sopore, where Kashmiri Pandits
suffered extensive damage. In Vanpoh, Lukbhavan, Anantnag, Salar and
Fatehpur, the rampaging Muslim mobs plundered and destroyed the Pandit
houses and shops, burnt down temples and set their business establishments on
fire. The Muslim fundamentalists, joined by NC and Congress workers, targeted
the Kashmiri Pandit families in a spree of loot and arson, in the process
terrorising the hapless minority. Hardly anyone from among the majority
community had the courage to come to their rescue. The government proposed
stern action against the rioters, but the Muslim fundamentalists opposed it. The
situation seemed to be getting out of control, when Congress withdrew support
from the GM Shah Government and the centre imposed Governor’s rule.

Describing his firsthand account of the events, Jagmohan, who took over as
the Governor of the State, wrote in a letter addressed to the country’s Home
Minister, SB Chavan:

“I toured almost all the affected areas of all the four districts — Anantnag,
Srinagar, Baramulla and Doda. I have visited practically every damaged
building, religious or private in villages/towns of Wanpoh, Lukbhavan,
Fatehpur, Gautamnag, Salair, Akoora, Sopore and Doda. The damage done to
the individual property — houses and shops — and temples of Kashmiri Pandits
— is substantial. But much greater damage has been done to the psyche of the
Kashmiri Pandits. They are now living like frightened pigeons. In some villages
like Wanpoh or Bonigund, Akoora and Slair, their terror stricken faces reminded
me of the picture of the war time German Jews slated for the gas chambers. On
seeing me they started weeping and bewailing loudly, and demanded immediate
evacuation from the Kashmir valley. They did not want monetary or any other
kind of relief. They argued that since their property, honor and lives were not
safe, relief was meaningless to them. To the best of my ability I assuaged their
injured feelings. But it would take a long time for their wounds to heal, if they
heal at all.”

“It is unfortunate that inaccurate reports were sent by the State Government
and District and Divisional administration to me and Central Government. What
I saw at the site was vastly different from what was reported to me. For instance,
the damage done in village Bonigund, which suffered the most grievous attack
on February 20, 1986, has not been indicated in the report of the State
Government sent to Central Government as late as March 4, 1986. Here, seven
houses were totally burnt, eight partially damaged and looted, three temples and
one shop demolished and burnt. This village is not even ¾ kilometre away from
the district headquarters. This fact alone demonstrates the many-sided infirmities
of the present set-up in regard to which in-depth analysis has been done in my
monthly reports from time to time. The State Government had managed that the
news were blocked and not allowed to be made known outside.” 4

Kedarnath Sahni, a senior leader of the Bhartiya Janta Party, who visited the
valley alongwith two other leaders of the party, soon after these riots, describes
his experience, thus, “We visited every affected village of Anantnag district and
found to our surprise and horror that the people at all the places were so terrified
that they wanted to leave their places immediately. They had packed their
baggage and pleaded with us to take them away from the Valley alongwith us.
The situation was horribly shocking. The villages of Wanpoh, Lukbhavan and
Bijbehara were badly affected. All temples in the villages had either been razed
to the ground or idols placed there were desecrated. The houses of the minority
community were heavily damaged. Fear for life and loss of property loomed
large on their faces. Next day, we went to Baramulla and Sopore. Here too
temples had been stoned and desecrated.” 5

Here is an eye-witness account of Pandit Shadi Lal Tikoo of Anantnag, “I had

an opportunity to accompany the then Governor Shri Jagmohan, the then
Director General of Police, MM Khajooria, Dr Karan Singh and many other
personalities who visited the traumatised Kashmiri Pandits during the communal
disturbances. At a meeting at the Government Guest House, Srinagar, I vividly
remember when Shri HL Jad, a prominent Kashmiri Pandit, touched the shoe
laces of the then Home Minister of India, Shri SB Chavan and with our moist
eyes we prayed to him to save Kashmiri Pandits’ life, honour, person and
property and take steps to checkmate the evil designs of the anti-national
elements. The Home Minister directed the Director General Police to camp at
Anantnag to supervise the Security arrangements.” Hinting at the complicity of
the present day political heavyweight of South Kashmir and former state
Congress president, chief minister of the state and home minister of India, Mufti
Mohammad Syed, in these riots, he writes, ‘I am reminded of an incident. After
having met the Union Home Minister as described above, we met the then
Congress Chief, Shri Mufti Mohammad Syed, at the guest house, the same
day… Having left the place after narrating our experiences during the communal
disturbances, we met Shri Jia Lal Chaudhary, a leading lawyer of Srinagar, just
outside the gate. After exchanging pleasantries, he inquired of us the purpose of
our visit to the Congress chief. Having heard Prem Nath Bhatt and Harji Lal Jad
(both his lawyer friends), Chaudhary Sahib said, “Whom did you approach to
narrate your plight? To whom did you narrate the sequence of events that led to
the devastation and destruction of our temples and the trouble and turbulence
caused to our community? You had gone to the wrong person, friends!’ …
Before anyone could stop him, the man roared, ‘You had gone to him with a
complaint to seek justice? An accused cannot sit in judgment on his own
abetment to the crime’…” 6

Mufti Syed’s politics was not so well-known at that time. With the passage of
time, he came to be closely associated with actions that can simply be termed as
anti-national, though he did succeed, to some extent, in camouflaging these in
the garb of protecting Kashmiri identity, whatever that meant. People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) that Mufti Syed formed subsequently, has established a
firm foot-hold in the Valley and is posing a serious challenge to the hegemony
enjoyed by the NC there. This has been made possible by the issues that his PDP
has espoused to endear itself to the separatists and radical elements in Kashmir.
Some of these are; insistence on opening the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road;
suggesting Kashmir have its own currency; keeping the State under dual control
of India and Pakistan; allotting land to Amarnath Shrine Board and then making
it an issue to rouse anti-Indian sentiment to garner separatist vote for his party in
the 2008 state assembly elections; his formula of self rule as a solution for
Kashmir dispute; declaring his intention to introduce a bill in the state assembly
to rename Ananantnag as Islamabad; introducing a separate currency for the
state, etc. His daughter, Mehbooba Mufti, has taken on from where her father
left. During a seminar in Kashmir recently, she displayed a map of the state
which depicted parts of state’s territory under Pakistan and China. As if all this
was not proof enough of Mufti’s separatist-centric political outlook, one of his
MLAs “Nizam-ud-din-Bhat moved a private member’s bill in the Jammu and
Kashmir State Assembly seeking deletion of sub-clause (b) of Section 147 of the
State Constitution which bars legislation challenging Jammu and Kashmir’s
status as an integral part of India.” No wonder, almost the entire Kashmiri
7

Pandit community considers Mufti to be behind the 1986 violence against them,
particularly in his stronghold of South Kashmir.

The former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police, MM Khajooria

said, “The 1986 communal riots were intended to be focused on the city of
Jammu and the entire Kashmir valley. However, because of the anticipation and
the stern measures taken by the administration, the mischief could not succeed in
Jammu city, Srinagar and Baramulla districts. In Anantnag, the mischief
mongers specially targeted the minority dwellings and places of worship. They
let loose an unprecedented wave of terror. The administration failed to rise to the
occasion despite unambiguous directions to deal with the situation with
firmness. The victims’ allegations of connivance on the part of administration,
were not without substance… The Deputy Commissioner and the Senior
Superintendent of Police were suspended and replaced… However, Governor
Jagmohan reinstated them, dispensing with the departmental enquiries…
Anantnag violence bore unmistakable signs of fundamentalist creed and
practices. Brand new television sets were broken to pieces in full public view,
with zealots shouting, ‘Allah-o-Akbar’. The desecration of symbols of worship
before razing the temples to ground, spoke of the same tale. The involvement of
Jammat-e-Islami in these riots was understandable. The surprise, however, lay in
good number of activists of mainstream political parties, including the parties in
power, taking active part in these shameful acts.” 8

The Indian media either made no effort to report the story, or if it did, it just
buried the truth for reasons best known to it. The security forces stationed in the
valley did no better; they looked the other way.

Imposition of Governor’s rule in 1986, helped to heal the bruised wounds of

Kashmiri Pandits. Besides, they had not, till then, lost complete faith in the
Indian state to provide them with the necessary protection. With the
improvement in the overall situation, Kashmiri Pandits began to forget the
traumatising events of 1986, gradually and regained some confidence.
 Alas! This was not to last long. The Islamists had tasted blood; more
importantly, they had tested the supine reaction of the Indian State. Actually, the
incidents of February, 1986, led to further appeasement of the forces which were
involved in letting loose this reign of terror on Pandits. Daily incidents, which
carried unmistakable signs of increasing intolerance of the Islamists towards the
Kashmiri Pandits, continued to grow. By the end of 1989, the Islamists had
become so bold that Kashmiri Pandits would be stopped in the middle of the
road and instructed to adjust the timing of their wrist watches to bring it in
conformity with the Pakistan Standard Time. Similarly, their women would be
stopped and instructed to put on the tilak on their forehead, so as to make them
stand out in a crowd. Though Kashmiri Pandits had been facing harassment and
discrimination for years, it became brazenly open now.

On many occasions this author’s house was stoned at night, because during
the day my family members had lustily cheered Kapil Dev’s fireworks with the
bat, in an ongoing test match. I recall an instance when one of my relatives was
beaten black and blue on the suspicion that he was carrying some fireworks
home to celebrate victory of Indian cricket team over Pakistan. Needless to say,
those celebratory occasions were quite rare, as Indian cricket team mostly lost to
Pakistan during that period. In fact, such repeated losses to Pakistan created their
own problems, as Kashmiri Pandits would be harassed with all kinds of barbs
and filthy jokes on the incompetence of Indian cricketers. ‘Kashmir Cause’
certainly provided a motivation to Pakistani cricketers to give out their best,
while playing against India. This has been accepted by no less than the legendary
Pakistani captain, Imran Khan, himself. Writing about the 1982 tour of Pakistan
by Indian cricket team, during which Imran Khan tore into the Indian batting, G
Parthasarthy writes, “I asked a Pakistani commentator what he thought of
Imran’s bowling. The commentator replied that Imran had told him that when he
played against India, he thought of Kashmir and treated the encounter not as a
cricket match, but as Jehad.” In the same write-up the author quotes the first
editor of the Jung Group of Newspapers, Mr Khalilur Rahman, as having told
him, “Our problem is that we treat the cricket field as battlefield and think that a
battlefield is a cricket field.”9

Pakistan’s consistent victories against Indian cricket team, which coincided

with the seizing of power by Zia-ul-Haque in Pakistan in the seventies,
contributed in some measure to the moulding of Kashmiri Muslim psyche. They
started believing that Pakistan could now take on India, even in the battlefield.
Such mindset resulted in the increased harassment of Kashmiri Pandits. Shadi
Lal Tikoo writes “…The complexion and content of secularism, brotherhood,
peaceful co-existence and pluralism started to change. This gave rise to the
polarisation of communal and anti-national forces in Kashmir in general and
Anantnag in particular. Qazi Nissar Ahmed masterminded this polarisation by
spreading venom against India and created a wedge between Hindus and
Muslims. Trifling issues that hurt the sentiments of Kashmiri Pandits, were
overplayed, resulting in their frustration and helplessness. I remember three
incidents that took place in Anantnag town. One day, during ‘civil curfew’, a
young Kashmiri Pandit woman was hurled with the choicest abuses in front of
her husband, who had come to district hospital for a checkup (the lady was in the
family way). She was kicked, pinched and subjected to gross indignities. The
incident took place at Mehandikadal in Anantnag town.” He then narrates the
second incident, “A close relative of mine was mercilessly thrashed by Muslim
youths in the presence of hundreds of elders at Nai Basti, Anantnag. The aged
Pandit kept weeping for hours, unable to get any help and sympathy from on-
lookers.” Describing the third incident, Shadi Lal writes, “A huge procession, in
hundreds of trucks, buses, cars and other modes of transport, was returning from
Srinagar at about 9 P.M. The defiant crowd was raising slogans against India and
showering unprintable abuses on Kashmiri Pandits. I ran out of my house and
joined my brother’s family next door. We switched off all lights, bolted all doors
and windows. All the inmates, including young children, our daughters and
womenfolk huddled in a corner, terrified to death. Alas! This was being done by
those who claimed to be devout Muslims and the champions of Islam.” 10

Civil curfew, the calls for which were issued by the Jehadis or their over-
ground political outfit, the Hurriyat Conference, disrupted education, hit hard at
daily-wagers, prevented treatment of sick and the wounded, particularly those
who needed emergency treatment, and generally made life difficult for the
people at large. According to official figures, “In 1990, 198 hartals were
organised. This figure went up to 207 in 1991. Between January 1990 and
October 2009, a total of 1,536 ‘shut-downs’ were organised by these
organisations.” 11

In September 1988, some armed people opened fire on a temple in Srinagar.

This was followed by an assassination attempt on the deputy inspector general of
police. Use of lethal firearms openly, for the first time in the valley, added a new
and frightening dimension to the ever-increasing militarisation of the radical
Kashmiri youth, sending a chill down the Kashmiri Pandit spine. A sudden
hartal declared in February, 1889, to protest again Salman Rushdie’s Satanic
Verses, turned violent. Kashmiri Pandits and the Indian State were subjected to a
venomous tirade. For the first time, the independence day of Pakistan on August
14, 1989, was celebrated in a big way. The celebrations included conducting of a
parade by gun-wielding militants in many parts of Srinagar. In the evening, the
valley reverberated with the sounds of fire crackers and Pakistan Zindabad
(Long Live Pakistan) slogans. The next day, August 15, 1989, the Indian
Independence Day, presented a total contrast; sullen and morose faces, black
flags, anti-Indian slogans and burning of the national flag marked the protests.
On September 8, 1989, the death anniversary of Sheikh Abdullah, special
arrangements had to be made to protect his grave, lest it be dug up by the radical
youth, who had announced prior plans to do so. This was ironical, as millions of
his followers had named him ‘bab’ (father) at the fag end of his eventful life, less
than a decade ago. Frenzied talk of secession and independence of Kashmir
marked every social and political discourse.

With the continued deterioration of conditions in the valley, the Pandits

increasingly became objects of ridicule and hatred. With the situation turning
ominous for them, the Pandits felt that neither the Indian democratic system nor
the Janus-faced secularism of Kashmir had any use for them. From then
onwards, the terrorist started targeting the innocent Pandits. The brutal tactics
employed was the classical modus operandi of the terrorist — ‘Kill one and
scare one thousand’ to instill fear in them. Initially, the aim, perhaps, was to test
the reaction of the administration. If this reaction turned out to be ineffective,
then the militants would enlarge the scope of the violence, forcing the Pandits to
flee the valley. Accordingly, the physical liquidation of Kashmiri Pandits, on
selective basis, began. JKLF, being the preferred terrorist outfit of the ISI at that
point in time, led this assault on the community. The killing in most cases was
not sharp and immediate, but was preceded by inhuman cruelty, torture and rape.
For instance, stitching the lips of the victim before killing him and nailing the
chest and feet of the victim till he bled to death, were just two of the methods
adopted to instill immense fear in the Pandits. Muslim intelligentsia, political
and social activists, professors, lawyers, teachers, engineers, poets, writers,
officers in the State and Central government services, etc., became their
preferred targets. The victims’ only fault being that they were Pandits. The
militants, though, would assign a reason for eliminating their victims by labeling
them as the opponents of the Azadi, being employees of Intelligence Bureau,
being a Mukhbir (informant), etc.

The terrorists had their own interrogation centres and in most cases, the
victims were killed even before the interrogation was over. No Kashmiri Pandit
was given any opportunity to explain his position or to prove his innocence. JeI
diktat — Bahas mubahasa se perhez karen (shun argumentation), was strictly
followed. So the carefully selected victims were killed summarily, mostly at
point-blank range, in narrow lanes and by lanes, in big streets and thoroughfares,
in offices, and at their homes; anywhere and everywhere; the choice was entirely
left to the killer. The latter would make a show of his ‘bravery’ by gunning down
an unarmed, defenseless Kashmiri Pandit, caught unawares, in full public view,
so as to earn the applause of the public for being a true Mujahid! Basharat Peer,
the celebrated author of Curfewed Night, describes the open show of force by
one of his friends, who had turned a militant, “Surrounded by brown barren
mountains, his village had become a militant stronghold. Militants would parade
in the open, slinging assault rifles from their shoulders, hanging hand grenades
from their belts. Indian troops stayed away most of the time.” 12

Pandits Face the Moment of Truth

(see Appendix ‘C’ and ‘D’, p. 637/639)

It was an open secret that arms and ammunition were being stocked in the
valley well before the insurgency actually broke out. The sterile reaction of the
Government of India to the communal events of 1986, had further emboldened
the radical anti-Indian forces. These forces now redoubled their efforts at
recruiting, training and stockpiling arms and ammunition. They began carrying
out low-level sabotage activities and made successful attempts at subverting the
state from within. Even when the common man in the valley was aware of the
storm brewing up in Kashmir, the State and the Central Government agencies
turned a blind eye. The deteriorating law and order situation in the valley was
dealt with in a ham-handed manner by the State Government.

All this while, people in both rural and urban areas were increasingly coming
under the influence of conservative Islamists, whose world view was totally
alien to most Kashmiris. The latter revered the numerous Dargahs and Ziarats
that dot the valley and attract lakhs of people all through the year. People talked
openly that ‘the time for open Jehad against India had finally arrived’. Numerous
Islamic Study Centres were opened by JeI. What was intriguing and inexplicable
was the fact that these centres were headed by non-Kashmiri Muslims, mainly
from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. These study centres carried out sustained and
virulent campaign against Hindus, their customs, religion, traditions and rituals,
undermining whatever secular beliefs the Kashmiris still possessed. This
radicalisation of Kashmiri society manifested itself in the encroachment of
temple lands and ancient shrines of Kashmiri Pandits, sudden spurt in cow
slaughter and open sale of beef from large number of newly opened shops. More
importantly, the separation of Kashmir from India, became the heart and soul of
this radicalization.

JeI, which had become an object of hate after Zia-ul-Haque had hanged
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, after a rigged trial, staged a remarkable comeback. Its
cadres had been decimated by the common people of Kashmir, only a decade
back. Bhutto was quite popular in Kashmir and his hanging by Zia, who was
considered to be a ‘Jammat’ man, resulted in enormous hostility towards JeI
cadres, whom they held indirectly responsible for Bhutto’s hanging. Such was
the outpouring of grief and resultant rage among the people of Kashmir that JeI
supporters were ruthlessly attacked and their orchards destroyed with vengeance.
Even the copies of the holy Q’uran used by them were not spared. Basharat Peer
observes in Curfewed Night, “Grandfather saw angry villagers throwing copies
of the Q’uran into a bonfire in the road near our house. I tried to stop them, but
they would’nt listen and said that it was a JeI Q’uran.” 13

Now, in the changed context, the party was in the forefront of an armed
uprising, infused with and infusing others with the spirit of Jehad. Its fortunes in
the valley had taken an about-turn in the past decade. Every political party,
irrespective of its ideology, had used the appeal of Islam to garner support. But
JeI placed Islam at the centre of Kashmir’s political discourse. Therefore, it was
JeI which called the shots now. Basharat Peer writes about the campaign
launched by JeI, “In early nineties, they had regular meetings called Ijtemas,
where their workers would try to convince the young men to join their armed
wing, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen.” Many poems, glorifying the militants, were
14

composed and sung during marriages and festive occasions, to raise their morale
and project the whole Kashmiri society as one with them. Some of the
songs/verses composed were:

“Yim hei aeysee pandah wuhree, yim kati aayi

Yiman laji pofi panani, gofov manza haei aye”

(The Mujahideen were only fifteen years old, where did they come from? They
came from the difficult routes through caves; may their aunts sacrifice
themselves for them)
 Yim hei aeysee truwah wuhree, yim kati aayi
Yiman laji maasae panani, gassae manza haei aye”

(The Mujahideen were only thirteen years old, where did they come from? They
came hiding themselves in the thick grass; may their aunts sacrifice themselves
for them)

“Mujahideen bayo lag hav paeri; Asya chhiv tohi saetyi saeriyey”

(O! Mujahideen brothers, we will sacrifice ourselves for you. We are all with
you)

Kashmiri Pandits saw all these happenings with great trepidation, though their
faith in the Indian State to protect them and their interests remained unshaken.
The rising fundamentalism, open talk of impending Jehad and the increasing
sway that radical Islamic philosophy exercised on the Kashmiri psyche, created
distress among the Pandits. But they could do nothing, placed as they were, at
the mercy of the majority community.

An Ingenious Cover-up
It did not take much effort on the part of the cunning Kashmiri to hide the
increasingly communal and rabid face of its society from the ill-informed public
opinion in India. The rising Muslim communalism of Kashmiris was termed as
the expression of their sub-national aspirations and their desire to protect their
regional identity. As far as the gullible Indian politician was concerned, the
Kashmiris had to merely label Kashmiri Pandits as Rashtriya Swyam Sevak
Sangh (RSS) members or its sympathisers to deflect attention from the real
issue. Through subterfuge, these Kashmiri vested interests projected the
radicalisation of Kashmiri society as a perceptional aberration, which did not call
for any undue concern. Their hold on the Indian public opinion makers and the
political class that mattered, was complete. In early nineties, when Kashmir was
in flames and the newly appointed Governor, Jagmohan, was fighting the armed
militants with his back to the wall, these forces continued to work on the Indian
establishment. Rather than giving Jagmohan all the support he required in this
grim battle, these forces succeeded with little effort to throw him out of the state.
The Congress party joined the chorus to get Jagmohan replaced, as his effective
handling of the situation was giving the separatist militants sleepless nights,
posing a direct threat to the vested interests in the state.
 Most of the Indian political class preferred not to hear the shrill cries of Jehad
against India in general and Kashmiri Pandits in particular. The disinformation
campaign launched by Pakistan and its proxies in the valley, actually succeeded
in projecting the Muslims of Kashmir as the victims of violence perpetrated by
Indian security forces. These Pakistani proxies propagated that Kashmiri
Muslims were governed by a corrupt political establishment that was thrust upon
them by India! This, according to them, was the root cause of the Kashmiri
youth getting totally disillusioned and alienated from the mainstream and
picking up guns. These vested interests succeeded to a large extent, in obscuring
the rising secessionist movement and its utterly communal character.

The persistent whining of the separatists and the anti-Indian forces about the
victimisation of Kashmiris and their assertion that Kashmiris were denied any
stake in the state power, had many takers in India. All Kashmir-centric political
parties blamed everyone for this state of affairs, except those who were
responsible for creating this mess. They blamed India, the Hindus, Nehru,
Sheikh Abdullah and the imperialist forces, but not Pakistan, or the
fundamentalist, or the secessionists or the armed militants. Astonishingly, those
who joined such chorus had themselves held the levers of political power in the
state at some stage during the last few decades. Many left leaders in India, while
trying to justify the separatist violence, used their typical Marxist jargon to
project the Pakistan-inspired, Pakistan-perpetrated insurgency in Kashmir as a
‘class war of the down-trodden and the exploited masses.’ The MUF, a
conglomeration of many parties, ideologically committed to the Islamisation of
the state, and JeI, blamed the Indian Government and Hindus of having rigged
the 1987 elections, and thus depriving them of political power. The NC, which
benefited from this alleged rigging, too blamed the Government of India for
interfering with their government in the state.

N OTES

1. English translation of German poem by above author; reproduced by Jagmohan in My Frozen

Turbulence in Kashmir.
2. Prof Hari Om, Kashmir Sentinel, December 2006.
3. White Paper on Kashmir, Dr MK Teng and CL Guddu for Joint Human Rights Committee, (Gupta
Print Services, Delhi).
4. The letter is reproduced in Jagmohan’s Book, My Frozen Turbulence.
5. Contained in a pamphlet published by Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch titled, Holocaust.
6. EXODUS, A report prepared by Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch, p. E2.
7. Sandhya Jain, Pioneer, September 27, 2011.
8. Sakhshatkar, Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch, p. 21.
9. Pioneer, September 30, 2010.
10. Sakshatkar, Op.cit., n. 8.
11. Pioneer, December 7, 2009.
12. Basharat Peer, Curfewed Night, (Random House Publications Pvt Ltd, 2008).
13. Ibid., p. 184.
14. Ibid.
14
 MILITANTS SHED KASHMIRI PANDIT
BLOOD
“They who spill the most blood get the highest Headlines”
— Gresham’s Law

(See Appendix ‘E’ and ‘F’; p. 641 and 654)

Taking inspiration from the writings of Abd Al Salam Faraj, the author of Al
Farida Al Ghaiba (the neglected duty), the radicalised Muslim youth of Kashmir
embarked on the path of Jehad against non-Muslims by the end of 1989. Faraj in
his writings was particularly harsh on the concept of secularism. For him, co-
existence in Islam is ruled out, except if the non-Muslim pays jaziya (protection
money in the form of tax). The terrorists and their mentors within and outside
the state knew very well that politically, the Kashmiri Pandits reposed complete
faith in secularism and never supported any movement that aimed at snapping
the historical, cultural and political ties of the state with India. Whenever
occasion arose, the Kashmiri Pandits had vigorously fought the secessionist
forces, whose sole objective has always been consistent; push the State of
Jammu and Kashmir outside the political and constitutional organisation of
India. According to the radicalised Muslims, Kashmiri Pandit community was
clearly inimical to their goals and hence needed to be liquidated. Therefore, the
Islamists launched a vicious campaign to spread visceral hatred against Kashmiri
Pandits. They used terror and violence as the main tools to suppress dissent and
to obliterate the opposition to the Islamist’s world-view. They hoped to achieve
the objective of dismemberment of Kashmir from India; India that stood for
liberal, secular and democratic values. In due course, the Islamists planned to
replace the existing order in Kashmir by a new political dispensation, based on
religious theocracy. Having succeeded in creating a conducive environment for
giving shape to their nefarious designs, they felt that the time was now ripe to
implement these plans.
 Abandoned Kashmiri Pandit locality as seen in April 1990

In complete violation of Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other

international covenants, the terrorists debased, dehumanised and brutalised the
peaceful community of Kashmiri Pandits, by all foul means in their armoury.
The Muslim terrorists groups adopting different evocative names to motivate
their cadres, launched a brutal campaign of rape and murder against the Pandits.
In order to induce enormous fear in the entire community, the Pandits were
subjected to gruesome torture before being killed. Once the desired degree of
fear in the whole community was induced, the Islamists felt that the Pandits
would choose to flee in panic from Kashmir. The indoctrinated breed of
terrorists churned out by the Muslim seminaries of hate, fanaticism and religious
bigotry, launched an all-out religious crusade against the non-Muslim ethnic
groups. They hoped to cleanse the valley of Kafirs and clear the path for
establishing an Islamic state, governed by Shariat (Islamic Law). In such a state,
the non-Muslims, who preferred to stay back in Kashmir, would be
automatically reduced to nothing more than Zimmies and the land would become
Dar-ul-Islam.

With the State Government completely subverted, the Muslim terrorists now
targeted a weak, unarmed and panic-stricken community with impunity. JKLF
drew first blood with the pre-planned murder of Shri Tika Lal Taploo, an
advocate and prominent and vocal member of the provincial wing of BJP. He
was a political activist and had always selflessly served everyone, including the
Muslims of his Mohalla, which made him equally popular among them. He fell
to terrorists’ bullets very close to his house on September, 14, 1989, in broad day
light, while he was on his way to the court. The Muslims of his locality mourned
his death and joined a mammoth funeral procession. This cold blooded
assassination, in front of numerous eye-witnesses, sent a shiver down the spine
of the Kashmiri Pandit community. From then onwards, fear gripped them as
never before. Despite the murder having been committed in front of many eye-
witnesses in broad day light, the killers were never caught. Such failure on the
part of the administration emboldened the terrorists to further increase their
murderous activity. Not a day passed without Kashmiri Pandits being killed in
the valley. As describing each and every killing would be beyond the scope of
this book, only representative cases have been included here.

The next prominent victim of the terrorist violence was Pandit Nila Kant
Ganjoo, a retired sessions judge, who had sentenced Maqbool Bhatt; a founder
member of JKLF, to death. Bhatt had been convicted of murder and finally
executed. The former judge was gunned down on October 4, 1989, on Hari
Singh High Street, a busy thoroughfare of Srinagar. The dead body lay in a pool
of blood where it fell, for quite some time, with no police anywhere in sight and
no Hindu daring to even cover it with a piece of cloth. The Muslim passersby
and shopkeepers watched the scene with jubilation writ large on their faces. It
was only much later that policemen removed the dead body, dragging it like the
carcass of a stray dog. The scene was captured on video and telecast a number of
times. Fear psychosis began to grip the Kashmiri Pandits, which only intensified
with more killings.

Forty-seven years old Sheela Koul (Tikoo), wife of Pran Nath Tikoo,
belonging to Dalhasanyar, Srinagar, had gone to see her brother at Shivapora, a
few kilometers away, on October 31, 1989. While returning home in the
evening, as she reached Habbakadal, close to her residence, she was shot in the
chest and head by JKLF terrorists. She was brought home on a handcart as three-
wheeler auto-rickshaws had suddenly and inexplicably stopped plying on the
route. The taxi operators refused to carry her to the hospital. Despite repeated
phone calls to the SMHS Hospital, Srinagar, the ambulance failed to arrive. She
was somehow carried to the hospital on a folding bed, where she was left
unattended and eventually died.
 Two prominent Kashmiri Pandits killed in the initial phase of Militancy

Fifty years old Ajay Kapoor, son of Shiva Nath Kapoor, was a resident of
Maharaj Gunj, Srinagar, where generations of his family had lived before him. A
genial and a God-fearing businessman, Ajay Kapoor was sprayed with bullets by
militants, who now openly flaunted their Pakistan-supplied Kalashnikov rifles.
Though his assassination took place in full public view on December 1, 1989, no
one dared to touch his body for hours together. That was the kind of fear,
indifference and apathy induced by the gun-wielding militants.

On December 27, 1989, 57 years old Prem Nath Bhatt, a leading advocate of
Anantnag, whose popularity among Muslims was well-known, was killed with a
volley of bullets aimed at his head. Though the killing took place in the main
market, no Muslim uttered a word of sympathy for him. A young boy, Sanjay,
who dared to clean the blood at the site of the murder, was threatened so
brazenly that he had to flee from the valley during the night. Poignantly
describing this event, Shadi Lal Tikoo writes, “…On Khichri Amavasya, called
Khetchimavas in Kashmiri, an important religious festival of Kashmiri Pandits,
an esteemed social worker and an undisputed leader of Kashmiri Pandits of
Anantnag, Shri Prem Nath Bhatt, was brutally killed. On December 28, 1989,
the mortal remains of Shri Bhatt were cremated at Nagbal Shrine, in front of
Durga Mandir. Thousands of Kashmiri Pandits bid a tearful farewell to this great
soul of Anantnag. During the cremation ceremony, I was told that since I was the
next prospective victim, I must leave the Valley at the earliest. During the next
two days, I could not escape as restrictions imposed under Section 144, were
rather strict. On January 1, 1990, accompanied by my brother’s son and my
brother-in-law, I left my motherland, changing three modes of transport to
camouflage my identity, and reached Jammu the same day. Here I joined a close
friend at Talab Tillo. Thus began my Vanvas (exile)…”

On January 4, 1990, a local Urdu newspaper, Aftab, published a press release

issued by HM, asking all Pandits to leave the Valley immediately. Al Safa,
another local daily repeated the warning. These warnings were followed by
Kalashnikov-wielding masked Jehadis carrying out military-type marches
openly. Reports of killing of Kashmiri Pandits continued to pour in. Bomb
explosions and sporadic firing by militants became a daily occurrence. Explosive
and inflammatory speeches being broadcast from the public address systems of
the mosques became frequent. Thousands of audio cassettes, carrying similar
propaganda, were played at numerous places in the Valley, in order to instill fear
into the already terrified Kashmiri Pandit community. Recalling these events, the
former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police, Shri MM Khajooria
says, “The mischief of the summer of 1989 started with serving notice to the
prominent members of the minority community to quit Kashmir. The letter said,
‘We order you to leave Kashmir immediately, otherwise your children will be
harmed — we are not scaring you but this land is only for Muslims, and is the
land of Allah. Sikhs and Hindus cannot stay here.’ The threatening note ended
with a warning, ‘If you do not obey, we will start with your children. Kashmir
Liberation, Zindabad.’” 1

They signaled the implementation of their intentions quite blatantly. ML Bhan

of Khonmoh, Srinagar, a government employee, was killed on January 15, 1990.
Baldev Raj Dutta, an operator in Lal Chowk, Srinagar, was kidnapped on the
same day. His dead body was found four days later, on January 19, 1990, at Nai
Sarak, Srinagar. The body bore tell-tale marks of brutal torture.

Night of January 19, 1990

The night witnessed macabre happenings, the like of which had not been
witnessed by Kashmiri Pandits after the Afghan rule. Those that experienced the
fear of that night are unlikely to forget it in their life time. For future
generations, it will be a constant reminder of the brutality of Islamic radicals,
who had chosen the timing very carefully. “Farooq Abdullah, whose government
had all but ceased to exist, resigned. Jagmohan arrived during the day to take
charge as the Governor of the State.” He took over the charge of the Governor
2

just the previous night at Jammu. He had made efforts to reach Srinagar during
the previous day, but the plane had to return to Jammu from Pir Panjal Pass, due
to extremely bad weather. Though curfew was imposed to restore some
semblance of order, it had little effect. The mosque pulpits continued to be used
to exhort people to defy curfew and join Jehad against the Pandits, while armed
cadres of JKLF marched through the streets of the valley, terrorising them no
end.

As the night fell, the microscopic community became panic-stricken when the
Valley began reverberating with the war-cries of Islamists, who had stage-
managed the whole event with great care; choosing its timing and the slogans to
be used. A host of highly provocative, communal and threatening slogans,
interspersed with martial songs, incited the Muslims to come out on the streets
and break the chains of ‘slavery’. These exhortations urged the faithful to give a
final push to the Kafir in order to ring in the true Islamic order. These slogans
were mixed with precise and unambiguous threats to Pandits. They were
presented with three choices — Ralive, Tsaliv ya Galive (convert to Islam, leave
the place or perish). Tens of thousands of Kashmiri Muslims poured into the
streets of the valley, shouting ‘death to India’ and death to Kafirs. These slogans,
broadcast from the loudspeakers of every mosque, numbering roughly 1,100,
exhorted the hysterical mobs to embark on Jehad. All male Muslims, including
their children and the aged, wanted to be seen to be participating in this Jehad.
Those who had organised such a show of force in the middle of a cold winter
night, had only one objective; to put the fear of death into the hearts of the
already frightened Pandits. In this moment of collective hysteria, gone was the
facade of secular, tolerant, cultured, peaceful and educated outlook of Kashmiri
Muslims, which the Indian intelligentsia and the liberal media had made them to
wear for their own reasons. Most of the Kashmiri Muslims behaved as if they
did not know who the Pandits were. This frenzied mass hysteria went on till
Kashmiri Pandits’ despondency turned into desperation, as the night wore itself
out.

For the first time after independence of India from the British rule, Kashmiri
Pandits found themselves abandoned to their fate, stranded in their own homes,
encircled by rampaging mobs. Through the frenzied shouts and blood-curdling
sloganeering of the assembled mobs, Pandits saw the true face of intolerant and
radical Islam. It represented the complete antithesis of the over-rated ethos of
Kashmiriyat that was supposed to define Kashmiri ethos.
 The pusillanimous Central Government was caught napping and its agencies
in the state, particularly the army and other para-military forces, did not consider
it necessary to intervene, in the absence of any orders. The State Government
had been so extensively subverted that the skeleton staff of the administration at
Srinagar (the winter capital of the state had shifted to Jammu in November 1989)
decided not to confront the huge mobs. Delhi was too far away, anyway.
Hundreds of Kashmiri Pandits phoned everyone in authority at Jammu, Srinagar
and Delhi, to save them from the sure catastrophe that awaited them. The
pleadings for help were incessant. But not a soldier came to their rescue.
Therefore, Kashmiri Pandits found best protection in huddling together indoors,
frozen with fear, praying for the night to pass. The foreboding of the impending
doom was too over-powering to let them have even a wink of sleep.

The Pandits could see the writing on the wall. If they were lucky enough to
see the night through, they would have to vacate the place before they met the
same fate as Tikka Lal Taploo and many others. The Seventh Exodus was surely
staring them in the face. By morning, it became apparent to Pandits that
Kashmiri Muslims had decided to throw them out from the Valley. Broadcasting
vicious Jehadi sermons and revolutionary songs, interspersed with blood
curdling shouts and shrieks, threatening Kashmiri Pandits with dire
consequences, became a routine ‘Mantra’ of the Muslims of the valley, to force
them to flee from Kashmir. Some of the slogans used were:

“Zalimo, O Kafiro, Kashmir harmara chod do”.

(O! Merciless, O! Kafirs leave our Kashmir)

“Kashmir mein agar rehna hai, Allah-ho-Akbar kahna hoga”

(Anyone wanting to live in Kashmir will have to convert to Islam)

La Sharqia la gharbia, Islamia! Islamia!

From East to West, there will be only Islam

“Musalmano jago, Kafiro bhago”,

(O! Muslims, Arise, O! Kafirs, scoot)

“Islam hamara maqsad hai, Quran hamara dastur hai,

Jehad hamara Rasta hai”
(Islam is our objective, Q’uran is our constitution,
Jehad is our way of our life)
 “Kashmir banega Pakistan”
(Kashmir will become Pakistan)

“Kashir banawon Pakistan, Bataw varaie, Batneiw saan”

(We will turn Kashmir into Pakistan alongwith Kashmiri Pandit women, but
without their menfolk)

“Pakistan se kya Rishta? La Ilah-e-Illalah”

(Islam defines our relationship with Pakistan)

Dil mein rakho Allah ka khauf; Hath mein rakho Kalashnikov.

(With fear of Allah ruling your hearts, wield a Kalashnikov)

“Yahan kya chalega, Nizam-e-Mustafa”

(We want to be ruled under Shari’ah)

“People’s League ka kya paigam, Fateh, Azadi aur Islam”

(“What is the message of People’s League? Victory,
Freedom and Islam.”)

Wall posters in fairly large letters, proclaiming Kashmir as ‘Islamic Republic

of Kashmir’, became a common sight in the entire Valley. So were the big and
prominent advertisements in local dailies, proclaiming their intent:

‘Aim of the present struggle is the supremacy of Islam in Kashmir, in all

walks of life and nothing else. Anyone who puts a hurdle in our way will be
annihilated’.

Press release of HM published in the morning edition of Urdu Daily ‘Aftab’ of

April 1, 1990.

‘Kashmiri Pandits responsible for duress against Muslims should leave the
Valley within two days.’

Headlines of Urdu Daily, Al Safa, of April 14, 1990.

‘With Kalashnikov in one hand and Q’uran in the other the Mujahids would
openly roam the streets singing the Tarana-e-Kashmir.’

Here is an eyewitness account of that night by Capt SK Tikoo (Retd), who

alongwith his family experienced the orchestrated happenings, first hand. 3

The Longest Night

“January 19, 1990. Twenty-one years have already passed since that dreadful
day which turned into a never-ending night, when dawn that ends the darkness of
the previous night so very naturally, seemed to be a distant dream. When you
think of those agonising and tormenting hours of that night even today, your
heart misses a beat and if you do not come out of that nightmarish experience
immediately, there is every possibility of going into convulsions that could lead
to a catastrophe. Such is the impact and the imprint of that day on our lives that
you have to carry those scary and torturous memories with you till you are alive.
Chilai-Kalan (the most severe period of winter) was at its worst. It had not
snowed for quite sometime and the sub-zero temperature was sending a chill
down our spine. On top of it, there was mounting tension in the air. Selective
killings of Kashmiri Pandits had already started and we were still awaiting some
miracle to take place that could restore some semblance of normalcy. I, unlike
other days, came home early at around 6 P.M. As usual, I parked my car on the
main road near the then Kani Kadal Fire Station, just across the shop of the
milkmaid, famous for her paneer (cheese) and then walked through the nine
serpentine kochas (narrow lanes) leading to my home, situated on the eastern
bank of Kuta Kohl, once a roaring tributary of Vitasta. All the houses on our side
belonged to Pandits with the sole exception of the house belonging to Munnawar
Sheikh, a well-respected trader of Kashmir Arts. The same was true on the
western bank of Kuta Kohl, though in reverse; everyone on this bank was a
Muslim with the sole exception of a house belonging to Moti Lal Bhan, who as a
teacher had achieved a celebrity status in his profession.

It will be interesting to recall my personal experiences of the horrible day

preceding the deadly night of the January 19, 1990. Mohan Chiragi, against
heavy odds, had taken it on himself to bring out the Srinagar edition of the
leading Urdu national newspaper Quami Awaz, which was already being
published from New Delhi, Lucknow and Patna. The paper was an instant
success, and its office in the Khidmat House on the bund at Abi Guzar, Srinagar,
was a meeting point for all those who still had the courage to talk differently;
against the militancy. The security of the staff of nearly 30 persons, all Kashmiri
Muslims, consisting of reporters, correspondents, copyists, katibs, photographers
and those on administrative duties, had to be taken care of. Working till late at
night, these employees were keen to have me with them, and it suited both
Chiragi and me. Though they were all carrying out their duties as dedicated
newsmen, yet you could not rule out the possibility of someone leading them
astray, if left alone. And why were the staffers keen that I stay with them till they
closed down for the day; usually 10.30 or 11 P.M. — a deathly time those days?
I was, in fact, their insurance. Tahir Mohi-ud-Din (now editor of very popular
Urdu weekly Chataan published from Srinagar) was the news editor and he had
to be left at his residence in Natipora. He was scared of crossing the Ram Bagh
Bridge, where the security forces would subject anyone at that late hour, to a
thorough search, which meant that the person had to stay out in the cold for quite
sometime, no matter what profession one belonged to. Morfat Qadiri, son of that
legendry journalist, Qadiri Saheb, had to be dropped at Narsingh Garh. There
were others who had to be dropped en-route at Tanki Pora, Dalhasanyar and
Bana Mohalla.

The real ‘fun’ would begin at Tankipora-Zaindar Mohalla, I thought.

Incidentally, I discovered that the jeep we were travelling in was displaying Haz
min fazal-i-rabi in bold letters on its front bonnet. This legend was not there a
4

few days back. Besides, Quami Awaz written on its windscreen had been very
discreetly obliterated. Coming back to Zaindar Mohalla. It was pitch-dark by the
time we reached there; no street lights, no lights even in the residential houses on
either side of the road. Atmosphere was very eerie; as if the entire city had been
taken over by ghosts. As we moved on, the headlights suddenly lighted-up some
creepy movement far ahead of us. The passengers in the jeep said in one voice,
Bisam-i-Allah and Allah-o-Akbar. The driver immediately use the dipper thrice
to signal to the now visible crowd, maybe 50 yards ahead of us, that we were a
friendly lot. We slowed down as the hostile crowd of some 20 to 30 young boys
surrounded us immediately. Two or three of them were displaying AK-47 rifles
and a few were having pistols in their hands. Soura-i-Yaseen was continuously
recited by the staffers. Strangely, none seemed to be worried about me, despite
the fact that they wanted me to take care of them, even when confronted by
armed militants. We identified ourselves as journalists representing Kashmir
Times (considered their own newspaper by the militants). However, they singled
me out and wanted me to step out of the jeep. I was absolutely unperturbed,
though the rest of my fellow passengers almost collapsed expecting to see the
last of me. There was further shock in store for my fellow passengers when they
saw and heard me shouting at the leader of this blood-thirsty crowd, “Haya
Ashqa (O! Ashiq)…” Before I could complete the sentence, he came running
towards me trying to hide his AK-47 rifle, and responded, “Papa, Tse kya
chhukh yeti karan (Papa, how come you are here)? I knew Ashq; a young,
twenty-year-old six-footer, with an athletic build, since 1984, when he was a
member of the youth wing of the Awami National Conference led by GM Shah.
He immediately ordered his crowd to get lost and allowed us to go. However, he
soon changed his mind. Within a fraction of a second, the crowd re-assembled
and we were told that we could restart our journey only when we could not hear
them anymore. With the engine of the jeep resting, the silence of the graveyard
was broken all of a sudden by the bone-chilling chorus-singing by the militants,
led by Ashiq himself, moving in four abreast column towards Haba Kadal (for
obvious reasons, being a Kashmiri Pandit locality). They were singing:

Jago! Jago! Subah huyee;

Roos ne baazi hari hai, Hind pe larza taari hai,
Ab Kashmir ki baari hai,
Jago jago subah huyee.

(Wake up! It is already dawn:

Russia has already been defeated. Now India is under attack
And it is the turn of Kashmir.
Wake up! Wake up!)

Those who were unlettered and illiterate in the crowd, (they formed the
majority) would reply:

Jago jago subahan vouthi houye

(Wake up! wake up! it will be utter chaos in the morning).

Imagine the plight of those of us (Kashmiri Pandits) going through this torture
night after night. Nowhere did we ever see a policeman or any other security
personnel en-route.

On January 19, 1990, Bahadur, our helper, was home too and so was my
brother, Ashok. Bahadur lighted the coal Bukhari (stove) and we settled down to
a hot cup of tea, exchanging blank glances. My mother, who had lost her vision
almost completely in both eyes, was the only one asking questions on current
situation. Clock on the wall showed it was already 7 P.M., and it was time to
switch on the television for news. My sister from Narsing Garh, not far away
from our house, was on the phone, “Papa, can you hear something…?” She
sounded nervous and scared. I could hear some sloganeering in the distance,
through my receiver, but could not make out what it was all about. It was scary
though. I tried to reassure my sister and wanted her to give more details. All that
she could say was that huge crowds seem to be coming from Chhatabal area
towards Karan Nagar and they were raising anti-India, pro-Pakistan slogans. The
cause of concern was that they were raising anti-Kashmiri Pandit slogans too.
She wanted to confirm if such slogans were being raised elsewhere too. She was
sure that her time was up and she bid me a tearful good-bye. I was at my wits
end; not knowing what to do. I again rang her up and she let me hear the loud
and clear slogans raised apparently by huge crowds which were coming closer. I
asked her to keep calm and not to lose hope. I once again assured her that all
would be well within a few hours. But who could guarantee a few hours’ of
safety? Our area was still without commotion; but then a call came from Bana
Mohalla. They too repeated the same but added that they had seen people
coming out on roads, huddled up in groups and sort of conspiring in hushed
tones.

Gradually, it was the same situation all over the city. It seemed that the city
had been taken over by JKLF, the only terrorist outfit operating then. It was 9
P.M. and we saw hordes of Muslims coming out on Guru Bazar bund, right
opposite us, on the other side of Kutta Kohl. They were not raising any slogans,
but their loud whispers were reaching us loud and clear. There was complete
blackout on our side as all Kashmiri Pandit households had put off their lights
and all the family members were virtually huddled up in complete darkness in a
single room. On the other side of Kutta Kohl, which was now reduced to a drain,
and which could be crossed on foot in less than five minutes, we saw some
people pointing towards our house. We could distinctly hear them say, “Look,
they are enjoying the warmth of the Bukhari (stove)… but for how long?” I, my
brother and Bahadur too, failed to make out who they were. At this stage, we
appeared to be out of the harm’s way. But suddenly the situation took a turn for
the worse. One of my two telephones (3223) got disconnected. The other one
(5273), whose cable came from the Muslim side was, thankfully, in working
order.

Now hundreds of Muslims came out of their homes, braving the freezing cold.
They started raising threatening slogans at a hand shaking distance. Time now
was 11P.M. Now onwards the time literally froze. I started receiving desperate
calls; first from Bansi Parimoo; a little later from Rageshwari, both from Sanat
Nagar; later from Wanabal and then Rawalpora. End seemed a few minutes
away as help was not coming from anywhere. I called up ‘who’s who’ of Jammu
and Kashmir Police. Some did not pick up the phone and others sheepishly
expressed their inability and helplessness to provide any assistance. I called
Mohan Chiragi in Delhi and got all the phone numbers of those who mattered.
One of them was the then Home Secretary, one Shiromani Sharma. He was sort
of disturbed by my call and was shockingly surprised to hear that the situation in
Kashmir was so bad. He confessed that nobody had informed him about this
looming tragedy. He promised help.

I did not stop there. I traced Mufti Mohammad Syed in Mumbai, where he
was addressing a public meeting, and got in touch with him. It took me a lifetime
to reach him. It was just past midnight when he came on the phone. He advised
me not to panic as help was on the way. I repeatedly called some of my Muslim
friends and soon discovered that it was a futile exercise. There was one Muslim
lady of Rawalpora, who sounded as worried and tense as we were; that was a big
consolation. In the meantime, our immediate neighbours with whom we shared a
common wall stealthily walked into our ground floor room to feel little more
secure in a larger group. My calls to army did not mature and the blood thirsty,
hostile crowd seemed to be knocking at our doors. Death was imminent.
Something had to be done and done very quickly. My brother and I chalked out a
plan; plan to die heroically. There was one satisfaction: My brother’s children,
Anu and Chandan, were safe in Delhi. We had seen them off alongwith photo-
journalist Mushtaq at Srinagar airport only a few days earlier.

Surprisingly, everybody in our neighbourhood was convinced that we had lots

of weapons in our home, though the fact was that my brother Ashok had just one
double-barrel licensed gun at home. We had a box-full of cartridges too. We
appreciated that the frontal attack would come from across the Kutta Kohl. If
that happened; we decided to fire as many rounds as possible, killing or injuring
anyone coming in our line of fire. In the meantime, we prepared the women folk
to lay down their lives by self-immolation. A can full of kerosene oil was kept
handy. It goes to the credit of my mother and her age old friend Rupavati, to
volunteer for this kind of death. Even Bahadur’s wife and her two young kids
prepared themselves for the ultimate sacrifice. As a last attempt; I called an army
phone number in Udhampur. I was assured by an officer of the rank of a major
that a column of soldiers was ready and it would move out from Badami Bagh
Cantonment soon. We waited, but no help came.

The night seemed never-ending. It was at 3 A.M. that I called the Muslim lady
in Rawalpora once again. She sounded a little relaxed. I connected the
movement of the army column that I was just assured of, with her near positive
response. I calculated that the army would have reached Rawalpora first through
the by-pass and hence the lady appeared less panicky. But my calculations
proved ill-founded when she clarified that her neighbour, a senior politician and
a former minister had joined the militant processionists, and on his advice her
husband too had joined the anti-Indian processionists, some of whom were
armed to the teeth. She further said that they were convinced that Azadi was only
a few days away and they could ill-afford not to be seen as part of this victorious
procession. Incidentally, both these gentlemen are living today; while one of
them retired as Chief Justice of a State High Court, the other rose to be a cabinet
minister once again.

The last to call me around this time was Inder Krishen Raina from Ishbar. He
informed me that the hostile crowds had come out on the roads even at that late
hour, to ensure that they were not denied their share of Azadi, now at hand. By
now one thing was quite certain; Kashmiri Pandits, all across the city of Srinagar
were waiting with bated breath for the certain eventuality — death at the hands
of their one time neighborus, who were prowling the streets, raising venomous
anti-Pandit slogans. There was no news from rest of the Valley. The time shown
by the grandfather clock on the wall was just past 4 A.M. But that hardly made
any difference, as the menacing crowd just a few metres away from our doors,
was more restive than an hour earlier, even when the temperature outdoors had
dipped to around seven degrees Celsius below zero. The battle cry of Ya Ali! Ya
Ali! grew louder and closer.

As the womenfolk, huddled together, started chanting Shiv Shiv Shambu, we

loaded the gun. End seemed seconds away. But nothing happened. Ashok looked
at me and we concluded that the marauding crowds were probably waiting for a
signal to attack the Pandits simultaneously, all over the city. Why else should
they have not attacked us after raising that battle cry. After all, it would not take
more than a million strong agitating blood thirsty mobs parading the city streets
for almost nine hours, to decimate the already almost-frozen-to-death Pandits in
a jiffy. I made another call to that major in Udhampur. This time he gave me a
telephone number of some other officer in Badami Bagh cantonment in Srinagar.
I called him and to my surprise, he responded immediately, assuring me that the
column was ready and they were awaiting the orders from the civil authority.
“Where is the civil authority?” I retorted. But alas! He had disconnected the line.
Waiting for the inevitable, the deathly silence was broken by the howling of
stray dogs.
 My mother was the first to hear the Azan from a distant mosque. She said
excitedly, “tala, gash ha aao” (look, it is dawn!). We removed a part of the
curtain hesitatingly and could see the silhouette of huge crowds, now
unbelievably silent, disappearing into narrow lanes. Within a few minutes, with
better visibility, we could hardly see anybody on the bund across the Kutta Kohl.
Was it a jumbo repreive?

We learnt later that our house was the target. It was not attacked for the fear of
heavy reprisals. After all, the Islamists were convinced that our house was
actually an arms and ammunition dump. They apprehended that we had the
capacity to take on the ill-armed hordes, even if they came in large numbers. But
why did they not annihilate the rest of us? Who and what saved us that night?
The answers are still not clear. And look at our naivete; most of us continued to
live there after surviving this nightmare.”

The fear generated by the happenings of the night was so potent that some
sick and old people could not withstand the horror and died of shock. One of the
unfortunate victims was the wife of Triloki Nath Raina who worked as a driver
in All India Radio, Srinagar. Writing about his experience of this night and the
events preceding it, Bushan Lal Bhatt, a resident of Nandimarg in South
Kashmir, writes in Vichar (page H 40):

“During the month of January 1990, fear and threats to Pandits gained
momentum, with Muslims joining the rallies and protests in thousands. On
January 19, 1990, during the whole night, loudspeakers from mosques raised
Jehadi ‘war cries’. Thousands of people participated in these Jehadi gatherings.
About 20 government offices were set on fire at tehsil headquarter, Kulgam, by
thousands of protestors on January 22, 1990. Administration was paralysed;
police did not fire even a single shot. It remained a mute spectator as directed by
the Mujahideen. With these developments, mass exodus started from these areas.
Eighty per cent of the people left from our village leaving behind their houses
and properties. About 10 families were left in Nandimarg after April 1990. In
1992, many of the houses left behind by Pandits were looted and burnt down. An
ancient Shivalingam located in the main Shiva temple was stolen, but the police
did not even lodge an FIR (First Information Report- a formal complaint first
recorded by the police when a citizen brings an untoward happening to its
notice), despite the idol being registered with the Archeological Survey of India
and with the Police.”
 Kashmiri Pandits, pro-India Muslims and other minorities, that represented
the opposition to the crusade launched by the rabid Islamists in Kashmir, on
behalf of Pakistan, continued to live in the valley after January 19, 1990, despite
facing grave threat to their lives. But this could not last for too long. With
physical elimination and threat to their honour and dignity staring them in the
face, tens of thousands of them across the valley took a painful decision to flee
their homeland. Thus began the Kashmiri Pandits’ long journey into the
unknown.

Pandits fleeing from the cities were lucky as they managed to get hold of
some transport till they reached across the Jawahar Tunnel, beyond the reach of
the marauding Mujahids. But those in the rural areas suffered enormous
privations; some of them, particularly in South Kashmir, had to trudge the whole
distance from their villages to the Jawahar Tunnel covering a distance of 50 to
60 kilometres, on foot in the bitter cold of winter. The route was mostly snow-
bound and passed through difficult mountainous terrain. Men, women, children,
sick and the infirm; all walked the distance to avoid meeting the same fate as
some of their relatives and neighbours had. Some women had to sell off the very
symbol of their married status, the Dejihor, to pay for a lift in fruit-laden
vehicles or some other load carriers. Interview of a scholar of sociology and
history, a resident of Srinagar city is reproduced below. The interview was taken
a couple of months after the event.

A partially destroyed abandoned Kashmiri Pandit’s house at Magam.

 Ransacked house of the author in Srinagar, as seen after exodus in April, 1990

“I was informed that a Naka (a loose cordon around a place to prevent ingress
and egress into and out of the area) had been thrown around the locality where I
lived, with the intention to kill me, as and when I stepped out of the house. As
the day passed, fear gripped me as I considered the possibility of the militants
forcing their entry into my house after dark. When the night set in; I quietly
sneaked out of the house, wrapped in a blanket. I was able to give a slip to the
killers because it had started drizzling and the bitter cold, made worse by the
winter rains, had perhaps, dampened their spirits and they seemed to have
abandoned their guard. The information that I would be waylaid was secretly
given to me by a young boy of my own community. After leaving my house; I
took refuge at a fairly distant place, in the house of a relative. The next day, the
militants sent a delegation of the local mosque committee to my house. Most of
the members of the delegation were known to my people. The delegation told
my family members that the reports of my anti-struggle activity had reached the
Mujahids and it would be prudent for me to appear before their tribunal, where
my explanation would be considered sympathetically. The delegation assured
my family that they would themselves ensure that no harm would come to me.
My family members assured them that I would appear before the tribunal as
advised by them. During the night, my people quietly left the house, carrying
bare minimum essentials in a small vehicle, hired at an exorbitant fare. In the
early hours of the morning, the vehicle reached the outskirts of Srinagar. At a
pre-designated place, where I had been instructed to wait, I boarded the vehicle.
No one spoke a word. We continued with our journey into the unknown. By the
afternoon, we were slowly moving up the slopes of Banihal.”

The former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police, MM Khajooria

says, “The trauma of tiny minority forced to encounter unprecedented brutality,
exposure to terror, torture, gruesome murders and extreme hatred that too in the
name of religion, is common knowledge. Lakhs of terrorised men, women and
children were forced to flee for life and honour… The narration enables a peep
into the enormity of the trauma and the intensity of pain that a miniscule
minority was subjected to in its own country, with the State and Central
governments literally watching as mute spectators. Kashmiri Pandits, who took
pride in being a part of the great Indian Nation, were horrified and bewildered
when the succor and support from Delhi, that they expected as a matter of right,
failed to materialise. The rulers in Delhi and their agent, the Governor of Jammu
and Kashmir, who straddled the state apparatus like a potentate with unlimited
powers, disgraced themselves and the nation by miserably failing to discharge
their constitutional duty and moral obligation to protect and reassure the
miniscule minority during the worst crises in their history. Generations of
Indians will bear the stigma of this National let-down.” 5

No one in the administration made any attempt to prevent exodus of Pandits

or help build confidence among the scared community, by providing them with
adequate security, after the events of January 19, 1990. On the one hand, the
members of this scared and shell-shocked community had to fend off the
murderous attacks of the militants armed to the teeth, and on the other, they had
to arrange whatever transport they could organise, to ensure their safe escape
from the valley. While doing all this, they had to pray and hope that militants did
not target them as they were highly vulnerable in such a disorganised state at this
point in time.

The uprising may have appeared to be sudden as Kashmiri Pandits were

literally caught off guard. But those in the know have a different opinion. GM
Sofi, a leading and highly respected journalist from the valley, known for his
courage and objectivity, said during an interview, “It was a volcano smoldering
since the formation of Bangladesh in December, 1971. The rulers of Pakistan
held India responsible for its dismemberment and nursed a sense of vengeance.
Having failed in their efforts to annex Kashmir in two wars with India, they
conceived the idea of arming and brainwashing young Kashmiris, in which they
met a grand success. Thousands of Kashmiri youth crossed the LoC and returned
with heavy arms, equipment and ammunition.” On being asked as to how so
many young men could return with heavy arms and ammunition, Sofi said, “I
believe that either Indian security forces on the LoC were complacent or they
turned a Nelson’s eye to the goings on. The weapons were hidden in mosques,
abandoned temples, river banks, basements and even deserted houses. 40,000
pieces of weapons and a large quantity of ammunition has been recovered. An
estimated three times (of) this quantity, still remains hidden in Valley.” 6

In the meanwhile, there was no let up in the killing of Pandits after this
horrible night, as the subverted police and conniving local administration turned
a blind eye to the depredations indulged in by the armed militants. With the local
media completely functioning under the diktat of militants, the national media
hiding these killings and central government adopting an ostrich-like attitude,
the militants had a field day. In fact, with no one holding the armed gangs
accountable, targeted killings of Pandits only increased in their frequency,
barbarity and scope. Many young men, women and prominent Kashmiri Pandits
fell victims to the armed gangs of Kashmiri Muslim terrorists, for no reason
other than they were Hindus. Here are some victims, randomly selected.

Krishen Gopal Berwa, a central government employee of Budgam and

Romesh Kumar Thussu, a state government employee of Trehgam, Kupwara,
were gunned down on February 1, 1990. Satish Kumar Tikoo, son of a famous
shopkeeper of Habba Kadal, Shri Prithvi Nath Tikoo, well-known by his popular
name Pratha Galdar (one who runs a grocery store) was shot dead on February
2, 1990, near his residence at Karfali Mohalla. Rattan Lal of Rawalpora, working
in military engineering service (MES), a purely civilian organisation, was killed
on February 13, 1990.

The next victim of this ruthless and pre-planned murder was a young
prominent Kashmiri Pandit, Shri Lassa Koul, Director, Doordarshan Kendra at
Srinagar. He was gunned down outside his house at Bemina on February 13,
1990, when he had just returned home from his office.

The poignant death of another young man, Anil Bhan, who belonged to the
same Mohalla as the author, left deep scar on the whole community. He was
killed by Farook Ahmed Dar, aka Bitta Karate, nemesis of Kashmiri Pandits in
the first flush of Militancy in 1989–90. This exponent of Karate is believed to
have killed 35 persons in all, before he was arrested. Thirty-four of these were
Kashmiri Pandits. In a television interview given later, he himself acknowledged
to have killed 29 Kashmiri Pandits. Incidentally, his only non-Pandit victim was
a teenage Muslim girl, named Dolly Mohi-ud-din, who is believed to have
spurned his advances.
 In their well-planned conspiracy of killing Pandits, the rabid militants had
drawn up lists of prominent people of the community, whose killing would send
the right message that they wanted to deliver to the whole community. But the
actual killers at ground level did not always recognise their victims correctly,
leading to some Kashmiri Pandits getting killed unintentionally, due to mistaken
identity. Anil Bhan was one such unfortunate being. He was a probationary
officer working in the UCO Bank at Srinagar. My brother, Ashok Tikoo, who
lived a few yards away from Anil Bhan, too worked in the bank, though a
different one, State Bank of India. Both used to leave their homes at roughly the
same time. On the fateful day of February 16, 1990, Ashok Tikoo, dressed in a
leather jacket, left home for the bank at the usual hour of around 9.30 A.M. A
message was immediately conveyed to Bitta Karate, who lived close by in
Chhota Bazar. After traversing the long narrow lanes from his house to the main
road, Ashok remembered that it happened to be the birthday (as per Hindu
calendar) of his elder brother, Captain SK Tikoo. He decided to return home to
take part in the traditional Pooja. On the way back home, he met Anil Bhan,
almost similarly dressed in leather jacket, heading towards his office. By the
time Bitta Karate reached the bifurcation leading to Haba Kadal, Anil too had
reached that very spot. Anil’s spotter, having seen Ashok Tikoo earlier heading
toward the same direction, but failing to see him return, told Bitta Karate that the
man working in the bank was dressed in leather jacket and was headed towards
Habba Kadal. Bitta Karate just followed the lead. He approached Anil from
behind and fired at him at point blank range, only a few meters from his house.
Anil, who was barely 26 and betrothed to be married shortly, died on the spot, a
victim of mistaken identity. This was acknowledged by Bitta Karate himself to
his friends who also happened to be known to both Ashok as well as Anil Bhan.
The murdered boy’s mother literally went delirious on seeing his young son
lying in a pool of blood. Incidentally, all three lived in the vicinity of each other.
Another young life lost to wanton mindset.

Continued spate of killings took a heavy toll in the coming few days and
months. Ashok Qazi of Tanki Pora, Srinagar, met his brutal end on February 25,
1990; Naveen Sapru, working in the telecommunication department was
assassinated on February 27, 1990; PN Handoo of information department met
his gruesome end on March 1, 1990, and so did Tej Kishen of Badgam, who was
hanged to death on the same day.

RN Handoo, Personal Assistant to Governor, was killed outside the gate of his
house at Narsinghgarh, Srinagar, on March 18,1990, just as he was about to
board the official vehicle to take him to his office. The very next day in the early
hours of March 19, 1990, Shri BK Ganjoo, an extraordinarily efficient and
conscientious telecommunication engineer, was brutally killed in his home at
Chotta Bazar, Srinagar. The manner of his killing finally sealed the fate of
Kashmiri Pandits, as his close Muslim neighbours of many decades, played an
ignominiously crucial role in getting him killed. On seeing the killers coming,
Ganjoo hid himself in a charcoal drum. Unfortunately for him, his neighbours
saw him hiding there. The killers failed to find him in the house and were about
to leave, when his neighbours, whom he had trusted all along, redirected them to
the charcoal drum. A dozen bullets were pumped into the confined space of the
drum, killing the trapped engineer within those dark confines. His young widow
pleaded with the jubliant killers to shoot her and her two baby daughters too.
However, they marched out chuckling “who would then mourn over his dead
body?” From then onwards, the only remaining safety valve of Kashmiri
Pandits, the trust in their Muslim neighbours to protect them, too was gone.

The following day, March 20, 1990, saw the murder of Shri AK Raina,
Deputy Director, Food and Supplies, in his office at Srinagar. While he died in
harness, his subordinates stood silently watching the macabre proceedings.

Forty-five-year old Bansi Lal Sapru, son of Keshav Nath Sapru, a resident of
Gulab Bagh, Srinagar was assassinated on April 24, 1990. His neighbours
accosted him at the gate of his house and he was asked to accompany them into
his own orchard for a chat, where three bullets were pumped into him at close
range. One bullet struck him on his head and he instantly fell to the ground,
dead. His family members screamed and cried in anguish, but nobody came even
to console them.

Prof. Kundan Lal Ganjoo, an agriculture scientist at Sher-i-Kashmir

University of Agriculture Science and Technology (SKUAST) at Wodhura,
Sopore, his home town, was kidnapped along with his wife and his cousin, Pista,
at 9 P.M. on May 2, 1990, by his own Muslim students and their friends
belonging to the terrorist group, ‘Lashkr-e-Ayub’. He was then taken to a
mosque located on River Jhelum. Here, six bullets were pumped into him. When
the first bullet was fired, he involuntarily moved his hand, diverting the aim of
the shooter. The bullet hit Pista on the heel; injuring him slightly. He jumped
into Jhelum and swam across to the other bank. After playing hide and seek with
the militants, he reached Jammu after two days. Ganjoo’s body was kept in the
mosque for the night and then thrown into Jhelum the next morning. His wife,
Prana Ganjoo, was gang-raped and then dismembered. A stone was tied to her
body and thrown into Jhelum, never to be traced.

Ms Sarla Bhat was a nurse in Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences

(SKIMS), Srinagar. This institute, located in downtown Srinagar, the hotbed of
militant activity, had turned into a safe haven for terrorists, who included some
members of the faculty, as well. Sarla was suspected of being an informer of the
police. At the behest of Dr AA Guru, a prominent JKLF ideologue, she was first
gang-raped by a number of Muslim bad characters of the area, before she was
stripped naked and murdered in a shameless manner on April 19, 1990. Her dead
body was thrown on the roadside in full view of the public.

Ravinder Kumar Pandita, son of Nanak Chand Pandita, born on October 4,

1958, resided at Mattan, Anantnag. He was a poor man and worked as a daily-
wager in telecommunication department. While returning home from work on
April 24, 1990, the Muslim terrorists, lying in wait for him, shot at him from
close range. As he fell dead, the killers danced over his dead body in glee.
Though the scene was witnessed by many passers-by, they just moved on.

The horrific death of Shri Sarwanand Koul ‘Premi’ and his son, Virinder
Koul, aged 64 and 28 respectively, was unbelievable. The former was a much
loved and respected poet and a scholar who had contributed immensely to the
enriching of Kashmiri literature. One of his much acclaimed contributions was a
translation of Bhagvad Geeta into Kashmiri verse. He was a true secularist,
whose poems were a reflection of genuine Kashmiriyat. Collection of books in
his library too reflected his true beliefs; liberal, non-sectarian outlook on life.
Despite rise in the level of violence directed against the Pandits, he continued to
live in his village, hoping that having been a teacher, who had taught nearly all
the literate Muslims in the area, he had nothing to fear. But his hopes were
belied and trust broken when Muslim terrorists entered his house on April 28,
1990, and ordered all the members of his family to get assembled in one room
alongwith all their ornaments, money, shawls and precious clothes. The family,
sensing trouble, offered every precious item they had in their home to the killers.
The militants first collected everything, including all the ornaments that the
women of the house were putting on, by cruelly snatching these from them. The
terrorists then destroyed his library; but that did not satisfy their thirst for blood.
Stuffing their loot in one suitcase, Premi was ordered to carry it and follow them
a small distance away from his house. The members of his family wailed and
begged the terrorist to take everything but let go of the family patriarch. The
killers assured them that he would return safe and unharmed. When the militants
did not let go of Premi, his son, Virinder, insisted upon accompanying his old
father. “If you wish you may also accompany him,” said the killers. That was the
last the family members saw their beloved son and father.

For two days, the father-son duo was put to extreme torture. The spot where
Premi would put his tilak mark was nailed. He was tortured by burning butts of
cigarettes. The limbs of his body were broken. His eyes were gouged out. Finally
on April 30, 1990, he was hanged from a tree and bullets were fired on him. His
son, Virinder, was butchered in the same manner. Even by their own standards,
the treatment meted out to Shri Premi and his son must put even the worst
Muslim tyrant to shame.

Surinder Kumar Raina, son of Jia Lal Raina, was only 23 years old when he
was murdered. A resident of Tullamulla, Ganderbal, he had become an orphan at
a very young age. In order to supplement the family income in the absence of his
father, he had taken up a job of a liftman in the SKIMS, Soura. It was from here
that he was kidnapped while he was on duty, on May 2, 1990. While he was
being kidnapped, the other spectators burst into cheer and dance. He was taken
some distance away on Ali Jan Road where a burst from a Kalashnikov caused
his instantaneous death.

Twenty-seven-year old Ashok Kumar, son of Bhasker Nath, lived with his
parents and two sisters at Pulwama. He met with a gruesome death at the hands
of HM militants on May 13, 1990. After being kidnapped, his hands and feet
were broken and he was dragged to the main road crossing of the town. His
tormentors first plucked out his eye-balls with iron rods in the presence of
hundreds of Muslims who relished every moment of this macabre scene. Finally,
after enjoying all the sadistic fun, he was killed by a burst of bullets. Among the
spectators there was a bard who sang “Islam is glorious and great.”

On the same day, in another part of the valley, Veer Ji Bhat, son of D.N.Bhat,
met with a similar fate. He was born on January 31, 1959 at Nagam, Badgam. A
young man with bubbling spirits and a promising career, he was employed as a
junior engineer in the state irrigation department and was presently posted at
Shopian. He was a social activist who went out of his way to help everyone in
distress and difficulty. On the fateful day of May 13, 1990, he was out in the
local market, close to where he lived. While he was talking to his friends in his
usual jovial manner, suddenly a bunch of militants arrived in a car and sprayed
him with bullets. Despite bleeding profusely he caught hold of one of the
militants. But other militants, armed to the teeth, sprayed more bullets on him,
before making good their escape. The incident took place in full public view, but
no one intervened. Veer Ji was carried to SMHS Hospital where a doctor
operated upon him and declared him out of danger. But after half an hour a man
came out from the operation theatre and declared him dead. When his relatives
removed the white cloth covering his face, they found him having turned
completely white. It reinforced their suspicion that the accomplices of the killers,
who had turned all hospitals in the valley into their hiding places, had drained
Veer Ji of his blood.

The incident had the desired effect. While the Pandits were totally scared and
hid themselves behind bolted doors, the members of the Muslim majority
flaunted V-signs all around.

In the continued saga of killings that took a heavy toll of Kashmiri Pandits,
Bushan Lal Koul, son of Shridhar Koul, became its next victim. Born on June
14, 1948, and now a government employee, he resided at Amnoo village, not far
from Kulgam, Anantnag. On May 16, 1990, he was kidnapped by HM militants
and strangulated to death with a steel wire.

Manmohan Bachloo, aged 27, son of Janki Nath Bachloo, belonged to

Qazihama, Baramulla. He was posted at Karnah as an postal assistant in the
postal department. On May 18, 1990, he came to his native town, Baramulla, on
a holiday. Information about his impending arrival at Baramulla was conveyed
to the militants through their accomplices. In fact, one of the killers trailed him
right from Karnah itself. When he reached home, he was called out by one of his
killers, who asked him to join him for a cup of tea at a tea shop, located in the
heart of Baramulla town. Unsuspecting Manmohan accompanied this Muslim
killer with whom he had been friends in his younger days. As soon as he entered
the tea shop, other killers, already waiting for him there, shot him at point-blank
range. He died instantaneously.

Born on July 8, 1962, Dilip Kumar, son of Mohan Lal belonged to

Mujamarag, Shopian. He was unemployed and unmarried too. After his father’s
death a long time ago, the responsibility of looking after the family rested on his
young shoulders. A small plot of ancestral land helped him eke out a living. But
being a Kafir, he had already become a target of Muslim militants. On May 19,
1990, some armed Muslim militants knocked at his door. Knowing what that
knock meant, his mother, gripped with fear and panic, came out to tell the killers
that Dilip was not home. But that did not convince them. They waited outside
the house for a while and finally broke open the door. They got hold of Dilip,
dragged him out and carried him off as a prize catch. His mother, beating her
breast and screaming pleaded with the killers to spare her son’s life, followed the
killers to some distance. His brother in the meantime, rushed to the nearby police
station for help, but no help came. Dilip was now subjected to extreme torture.
His teeth were hammered out. When he had nearly become unconscious with
pain, twelve bullets were pumped into him. Then his dead body was hung from a
tree with a letter pinned on his chest. The letter stated that any person who dared
lift the body would be paid rupees one lakh. No one dared. His body was
subsequently cremated by police.

Ms Girja Tikoo, a school teacher in Bandipora had gone to school to collect

her salary on June 4, 1990. On the way back, she called on a friendly Muslim
colleague. The terrorists kidnapped her from there, with the Muslim lady not
even making an attempt at restraining them or even interceding on her behalf,
leave alone thwarting their evil designs. They gang-raped her, ripped open her
abdomen, placed her on saw machine while she was still alive and sawed her
into two halves. Sometime later, almost a similar fate befell Kumari Babli and
her mother Smt. Roopwati of Pulwama. Shri Balkrishen Tutoo of Habba Kadal,
Srinagar, an officer in agriculture department, became a victim of callous and
collaborative actions of doctors. He was critically wounded on June 22, 1990,
while trying to plead with the merciless terrorists who had barged into his house
to abduct and kill his brother. Tutoo resisted their attempt and was fired upon,
wounding him critically. He was rushed to the hospital, where the callous
doctors on duty allegedly completed the rest of the work!

Fifty-two-year old Makhan Lal Raina, son of Gopi Nath Raina, a resident of
Kharyar, Srinagar, was a medical assistant posted at a dispensary at Khan Sahib
in Badgam district. He was quite popular among the people of the area, mostly
Muslims, to whom he had rendered a yeoman’s service during many medical
emergencies. On June 22, 1990, he was picked up from the dispensary in
presence of nine other Muslims. However, nobody intervened. He was
subsequently tortured in a most brutal manner and finally shot dead. His dead
body was said to have been chopped into pieces. The mutilated body was
eventually recovered from Dardpora in Badgam.

Fifty-nine-year old Raj Nath Dhar, son of Dina Nath Dhar, belonging to
Qutub-ub-din Pora, Alikadal, Srinagar, was assassinated on June 30, 1990. He
lived a simple life as a retired person, taking care of his ailing mother. When the
assassins arrived to kill him, his old and infirm mother raised a hue and cry
seeking assistance from everyone to save his son. But as usual, no one came to
their rescue. After being shot, he was carried by some people to SMHS Hospital,
Srinagar, where he died for want of medical aid and proper care.

Gopi Nath Raina, son of Govind Ram Raina, born on January 1, 1941,
belonged to Manigam, Ganderbal. He ran a medical shop at Kangan. He was
labeled as an informer, a very handy alibi to include him in the ‘hit list’.He was
shot dead in his own shop by HM cadres on July 7,1990. Later, the organisation
owned up the murder through the pages of Kashmir Times and Aftab; the two
dailies published from Jammu and Srinagar respectively.

Dina Nath Mujoo, a 70-year old theosophist and an unassuming scholar had
recently moved from Fateh Kadal to Rawalpora in Srinagar. Having been a
teacher all his life, he had contributed immensely towards educating the Muslim
youth of Fateh Kadal, where he had spent bulk of his life. Besides being an
educationist, he experimented with J Krishnamurti’s thoughts on education. Now
at 70, tall and healthy Mujoo passed his time in philosophical contemplation. He
had no interest in politics and was a harmless person by any standards. Yet the
terrorists did not spare him. They intruded into his house at the dead of night on
July 7, 1990, seized him and stabbed him ruthlessly, before decapitating him.
His wife too was assaulted and badly wounded. She survived because the
terrorists thought that she was ‘dead’.

Born on May13, 1953, Shiban Kishen Koul, son of Radha Krishen Koul of
Ashmuji, Kulgam, Anantnag, was a primary school teacher. His students mostly
belonged to Muslim community, whom he taught with all dedication. However,
that did not prevent the militants from slaughtering him on the uneven and pot-
holed track of his native village on July 15, 1990. His father too was slaughtered
the next day, i.e., July 16, 1990, in the same manner. The assassinations were
carried out by his close neighbours.

Sixty-one-year old Autar Singh, son of Fateh Singh, a Sikh by faith, belonged
to Saimnoo in Kulagam district of Kashmir. An ex-serviceman; he was presently
employed by Hindustan Petroleum at their branch office in Pulwama. He was
suspected of being Mukhbir. After his duty hours on July 26, 1990, when he was
returning home, the armed Muslim terrorists shot him dead.
 Ms Babli Raina of Sopore, a teacher by profession, was gang-raped in her
house in presence of her family members on August 13, 1990.

Chand Ji Kher, son of Dina Nath Kher, and a resident of Vessu, Anantnag was
killed on August 17, 1990. A young boy in his teens, he belonged to a very poor
family. He was called out by his Muslim friends. The moment he was outside his
house, he was shot at and the killers vanished from the scene.

Prof DP Khazanchi, son of Damodar Khazanchi, was born on October 6,

1939, at Srinagar and lived at Kani Kadal, a few yards away from where the
author lived. He was a professor of physics, known for his calm temper and soft
spoken demeanour. But as ill-luck would have it, he had lost his sanity in later
part of his life. Sometimes he would just loiter around aimlessly, talking to
himself. But his condition was no guarantee for his safety against the marauding
gangs. On October 6, 1990, his birthday, when he completed 51 years of his age,
three bullets were pumped into him, killing him on the spot.

Zinda Lal Pandita, son of Prakash Ram Pandita, born on April 4, 1931,
resided at Bagatpora, Handwara. After being kidnapped from his residence on
October 6, 1990; he was brutally strangulated with steel wire in an orchard
nearby, by JKLF murderers.

Jagan Nath Pandita, son of Ganesh Nath Pandita was born on November 17,
1943. He belonged to Bagatpora, Handwara. A widower, he was kidnapped from
his house and taken to his own orchard, where he too was strangulated with steel
wire. His killing took place during the intervening night of October 7 and 8,
1990.

Pushker Nath Razdan, aged 47, son of Tika Lal Razdan, a resident of
Khonmuha, in Pulwama district, was assassinated on October 12, 1990. Some
masked terrorists barged into his house at 9 P.M. when it was pitch dark outside,
and without a warning knocked him down on the floor. They picked him up and
dragged him outside his house, before shooting him at close range. The bullet hit
the left side of his chest. His wife and others in the family cried in panic but not
a single neighbour came to their rescue. Finally, he was carried to the Army
Hospital at Badami Bagh in Srinagar, where he was operated upon. However, he
failed to survive the wounds even after surgery. The policemen from the
Pantachauk police-station completed their formalities by arriving at the scene of
the incident after he was cremated. It was later revealed that he was allegedly
killed by the HM Jehadis.

Maheshwar Nath Bhat, son of Zana Bhat, born on June 20, 1921, resided at
Hazuri Bagh, Srinagar. At 8 A.M. on October 15, 1990, three armed Muslim
militants barged into his house and started making enquiries about his son-in-
law, an officer in the department of forests. They were told that the son-in-law,
had migrated to Jammu long back, but had recently returned to join his office in
Srinagar on promotion, after he had received many assurances from his Muslim
colleagues, with whom he had remained in close touch. While such enquiries
were going on, the son-in-law had hid himself in a bathroom, bolted from within.
Frustrated at not getting the prize catch, the killers opened indiscriminate fire,
killing Maheshwar Nath on the spot and injuring his old and ailing wife. She was
taken to the hospital at Badami Bagh in a state of unconsciousness, where after
initial treatment, she was shifted to Jammu under security cover. Maheswar
Nath’s other relation, who too was injured in the firing, was also admitted to the
same hospital, but succumbed to his wounds.

Omkar Nath Wali, son of Parmanand Wali, born on May 4, 1935, was a
resident of Chak-i-Rajwati, Vessu in Anantnag district. He was an assistant sub
inspector of Police, posted at District Police Lines, Anantnag. His family stayed
in Jammu. He was kidnapped on January 2, 1991 and shot dead in cold blood.
Neither his last rites were performed, nor was an FIR lodged with the police. It
was later revealed that his own colleagues in the police department had hatched
a conspiracy for his murder in connivance with the terrorists of JKLF.

Ms Asha Koul was abducted from Achabal, Anantnag, and taken to an

abandoned house of a Kashmiri Pandit refugee in Srinagar. There, she was gang-
raped for many days and then tortured to death. Her body was found later in a
decomposed state in that very house on August 8, 1991.

Som Nath Koul’s son Surinder Kumar Koul, born on May 4, 1971, at
Batagund, Handwara, was killed by sheer treachery. His whole family had
shifted to Jammu in the wake of Muslim terrorism that had engulfed the valley.
The young boy at the age of twenty had received a call letter for an interview for
the post of a teacher for which he had applied before his family had moved out
to Jammu. He had remained in contact with his Muslim friends in the valley,
who had encouraged him to return at least for the interview. They had assured
him of full safety. His parents, however, were dead set against letting him travel
there. Nevertheless, acting against the advice of his parents, he left for Srinagar.
When he reached Srinagar, the same treacherous friends who had assured him of
safety, kidnapped him. After torturing him no end, he was finally shot to death at
Langet on August 26, 1991.

Kanya Lal Peshin, son of Kanth Ram Peshin of Pazalpora, Bandipora, was
born on October 4, 1937. A poor farmer who barely managed to survive on his
measely income; he was kidnapped from his house at 9 P.M. on October 18,
1991. He was taken three kilometers away from his village and was subjected to
brutal torture. Pins were driven into his nails and finally, a metre length piece of
cloth was stuffed into his mouth to stifle him to death. His dead body was later
found at Ajar, Bandipora. He was said to have been killed by the assassins of
HM.

Similarly, Bimla Braroo of Nai Sarak, Srinagar, and her daughter, Archana
were raped in the presence of her husband, Sohan Lal, before all three were
killed on March 31, 1992.

Here is an eyewitness account of Sudesh Kumar, a law student of Kashmir

University carried by The Illustrated Weekly of India, last quarter, March, 1990.
“TK Razdan and I were travelling in the same matador when some militants
stopped the vehicle. They then pulled out their guns and fired at him close range.
Then they dragged the body out of the matador and took it to a nearby mosque.
There they searched his pockets and took out his identity card and nailed it to his
body and threw the body on the road. It was only later that the police took away
his body…”

These brutal killings continued with more members of the Kashmiri Pandit
community falling prey to the Jehadi hordes, who used their newly acquired
Kalashnikov rifles to deadly effect on these soft targets.

Shambu Nath Garyali’s son Ashwani Kumar Garyali, a 25-year-old, bright

and promising young man, belonging to Chhatabal, Srinagar, was doing
chartered accountancy course. On June 24, 1990, five masked men entered his
room where he was studying and accused him of being an informer. They
brought him down to the first floor of his own residence and pumped five bullets
into his head and abdomen. He was immediately rushed to SMHS, Srinagar for
surgery. The doctors refused to admit him. He was then carried to SKIMS,
Soura, where doctors did not bother to attend to him and was allowed to die. He
was sent to the Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Hospital, Rainawari, for post-
mortem, where his relatives had to wait for hours, before the formality was
completed after paying gratification. His parents strongly believe that had he
been operated upon in SMHS Hospital in time, he would have survived.

Similar was the fate of Radha Krishen Kaw, son of Balbhadher Kaw, a
resident of Kralkhud, Srinagar. Born on May 18, 1931, He was a veteran teacher
and had retired as an education officer. All through his career he had taught
thousands of Muslim students. Even after his retirement, he continued to be
devoted to his profession. The Muslim assassins entered the school where he
was taking a class and forcibly took him out from the back door of the school
and sprayed him with bullets. This incident took place on August 24, 1990.

Similar was the manner in which a social activist, Prof Nila Kanth Raina met
his end.

Ashok Kumar Koul, son of Bhaskar Nath Koul of village Kharbrari, Tehsil
Kulgam, District Anantnag, was kidnapped by four militants from his house on
May 13, 1990, at 9.30 A.M. They took him first to Shallipora village, from
where he was taken to Boulsoo village, where police found his dead body the
next day.

Mushtaq Latram, who was later arrested but subsequently released in

exchange for the hostages of highjacked Flight IC-819, in Kabul, was allegedly
involved in the gruesome murder of four members of a family at Mallapora,
Habbakadal, Srinagar. The infamous terrorist gunned down Jawahar Lal Ganjoo,
Mrs Ganjoo, Badri Nath Koul and his wife Lalla, all living under one roof,
leaving behind two unmarried daughters, two teenage boys and 85-year old
paralytic mother.

Kashmiri Pandits killed between 1989 and October, 1990

 Source: Survey carried out by Centre for Minority Studies, Jammu and Kashmir State. Individual
killings described in foregoing pages are included in this table.

Raman Bhalla, the Minister of Rehabilitation in the State Government said on

March 23, 2010 that, “219 Kashmiri Pandits were killed in 1990.” This was a
shocking under-statement as the number of Pandits killed was many more than
these figures.

Most victims were innocent, ordinary people living in poverty. Those killed
included teachers, lawyers, media men, political activists, intellectuals, errand
boys, shopkeepers, traders, social activists, writers, poets; anyone, as long as he
or she was a Kashmiri Pandit. In most cases, merely killing their victim was not
the sole purpose of their brutal action: inflicting intense pain on the victim
before killing him or her was equally important. Therefore, death did not come
with least pain, say, with a bullet to the head fired suddenly and unexpectedly.
Quite often it was preceded by sustained torture, sometimes lasting for many
days. The methodology adopted for killings included, strangulation by steel
wires, hanging, impaling, branding with hot iron, burning alive, lynching,
gouging of eyes while still alive, drowning, slicing, dismemberment of limbs,
dragging to death, draining of blood and in many cases, slaughtering the victim.
Other methods employed for inflicting pain and torture included; burning
cigarette being applied to the naked bodies of the victims; boiling wax poured on
highly sensitive parts of their bodies; nails driven into the foreheads; tongues
being chopped off; genitals cut off; private parts and breasts of women hewn
open; women ripped into two parts on a wood-slicing machine, etc,.

Given below is a sample of the manner in which some victims were put to
death:

• After being kidnapped on April 27, 1990, from his home in Sadhu
Ganga, Kupwara, Brij Nath Shah’s body was found hanging from a tree two
days later, with his lips stitched.

• Shyam Lal of Chiragam, Anantnag, met with an even worse fate. He was
kidnapped in May 1990. First his hands and feet were chopped off and then
his skull was battered. His remains were stuffed into a sack and deposited
on the thresh-hold of his house, where it was recovered by his brother.

• On May 27, 1990, Prem Nath of Uttarsu in Anantag district was

kidnapped and subsequently impaled by being nailed on the chest and feet.

• Three officials of Life Insurance Corporation of India were kidnapped

from Srinagar. After being tortured, they were confined to an abandoned
Kashmiri Pandit house which was then set ablaze. Two of the tortured men
were burnt alive, while the third one escaped with 50 per cent burns.

• Brij Nath Kaul of Hermain, Shopian, an employee of agricultural

department and his wife were tied to a running vehicle near their home.
Their mangled bodies were recovered 10 kilometers away, later.

Scores of Kashmiri Pandit bodies were found floating in River Jhelum daily;
all had been drowned. Besides these, many dead bodies were recovered from
different places of the valley, with their hands and feet tied. The violence against
them attained grotesque proportions when it was found that they had been
branded with hot iron while still alive, while others had their eyes gouged out.
However, the most dastardly and inhuman method of killing was adopted by the
institutions which are meant to save life, not take it away, i.e., the hospitals.
Injured Kashmiri Pandits, when brought to the hospitals for treatment, were
either allowed to die without treatment or were deliberately killed by doctors in
collusion with the militants. Several cases of injured Kashmiri Pandits bleeding
to death unattended were reported throughout the valley. To add insult to injury,
the killers prevented the relatives to carry the dead body to Jammu for cremation
according to Hindu rites. These dead bodies were disposed off by police, causing
great hurt and injury to the sentiments of the unfortunate relatives and their
families.

In those cities and towns where Kashmiri Pandit population was relatively
thicker, the militants would strike suddenly and unexpectedly. Having identified
their victim, they would approach him openly, with the weapon concealed inside
the common Kashmiri winter garment, the Pheran, and then, without any fear of
intervention by the police, suddenly open fire on the unsuspecting Pandit, at
close range, giving no chance to the victim to escape. The state government,
reeling under the massive onslaught launched by the heavily armed militants,
and weakened by the internal subversion, was unable or unwilling to save the
Pandits. In remote regions, where Kashmiri Pandits were scattered in penny
packets, they were totally left to the mercy of the militants and their neighbours,
who worked in cahoots, either because they were too scared to stand up to the
militants diktat or had willingly joined them. In these places, the violence against
the Pandits was characterised by abductions, kidnappings, assault on womenfolk,
torture and other gruesome forms of assassination. The aim was to induce so
much fear in the hearts of the miniscule population that they would decide to flee
their homes.

It may be mentioned that all these killings were perpetrated by Kashmiri

Muslims and not the militants sent by Pakistan. These killings took place in the
first phase of militancy, dominated by JKLF, which was made up entirely of
local youth. What was even more distressing was the fact that in most cases
those who killed knew their victims well enough and were even friends with
them. Some Muslims too fell prey to the brutal assault let loose by the militants
on any one who represented nationalistic leanings even remotely. Some of the
prominent Muslims who were assassinated in the first phase of militancy
included Mohammad Yousuf Halwai, a loyal worker of the NC; Mohammad
Shahban, a leading journalist, whose paper Al Safa later turned into the militants’
mouth-piece, after his assassination.

The burning passion of Islamists to enforce their own version of puritanical

form of Islam manifested itself in many ways; eliminating cultural icons, even
though from their own community, was one of them. In 1993, Shamima Parveen,
the first woman to perform the traditional Kashmiri satirist dance, Band Pathaer
was brutally killed. Similarly, a very popular and secular minded Member of
Legislative Assembly, Mustafa Mir, too was killed after being kidnapped,
tortured and finally strangled.In the absence of any authoritative figures
published by the state government about the total number of non-Muslims killed
in Kashmir during the past two decades, voluntary/non-government
organisations and private agencies have put such number at 2,500.Out of this
figure, the number of Kashmiri Pandits killed stands at 1,800.

As per the report submitted to the National Human Rights Commission

(NHRC) by Panun Kashmir Movement, the number of Kashmiri Pandits killed
till October, 1990, was 319.

Editor of the Kashyap Vani, BN Nissar, has compiled a list containing names
of 765 Kashmiri Pandits who were massacred. 7

Kashmiri Pandits could easily have been provided with some semblance of
security by the state government in places where their population was larger. But
the protection of this miniscule minority appeared to be an alien constitutional
obligation of those who manned the government machinery in Kashmir. All its
responsible organs watched with complete indifference the mass exodus and the
resulting sufferings of the Pandits, who were left to fend for themselves. During
all this while, Kashmiri Pandits continued to receive threatening letters, death
warrants and highly disturbing and inflammatory telephone calls. They literally
became sitting ducks, as the terrorists enjoyed unfettered liberty and power to
kill. The new symbol of power, the Kalashnikov, hung loosely from their
shoulders, turned the terrorists into a law unto themselves, particularly so, as
elements within the government had abdicated their responsibilities or worked in
collusion with them.

The nexus between the law-enforcing agencies and the terrorists was apparent
to those who were at the receiving end of this violence. In fact, with huge
recruitment of known JeI cadres into Kashmir Police during the two decades
preceding the onset of militancy in Kashmir, such collaboration with the
terrorists, was very much expected. A memorandum, submitted by Kashmiri
Pandit Sabha, Jammu, to the Governor of the State, General KV Krishna Rao,
clearly brought out the above facts. It stated, “The ineffectiveness of the State
Government has not been able to check loot, arson and killing of innocent
people. Instead of the Government, it is the militants who are the de-facto rulers
of the Valley today. The ruling political forces are solely concerned with their
own survival, avoiding the wrath of the secessionists. Happenings in Anantnag,
Sopore, Baramulla, Tral, Murran, Pulwama, Ishber, Vicharnag, Shopian and
other places in the Valley are indicative of the fundamentalists’ designs
regarding their planned attacks on the minorities. On December 15, 1989, in
Shopian, men, children and old women of the minority community were
mercilessly attacked and womenfolk molested. The murder of Mahant Keshav
Nath, Tikka Lal Taploo, NK Ganjoo, Prem Nath Bhat, Ajay Kapoor and others,
was to create scare and awe among the minority community to force them to
leave the Valley. The pace of exodus has further accelerated now.”

After bemoaning the inability of the State Police to either identify or

apprehend even a single Muslim assailant, it emphasised, “The Pakistan-trained
underground elements, who are armed with modern weapons, openly engage in
battles with the security forces, which unmistakably speaks of the inefficiency of
the State Government itself.” 8

There appeared no saner elements left among the enlightened and literate
segments of Kashmiri Muslim population, who could counsel restraint. Even
those who genuinely believed in the teachings of Rishis and Sufis were
frightened into silence and inaction by the terrorists and their camp followers,
who took on the mantle of true preachers of the purest form of Wahabi Islam.
These Islamists were largely seen to be fighting the Kafirs and thus were called
Mujahids. With the entire Kashmiri Muslim population up in arms, screaming at
the top of their voices, ‘death to the Kafirs’, and backing it up by actually killing
them in large numbers, Kashmiri Pandits saw darkness enveloping them on all
sides.

Violence directed at Kashmiri Pandits: 1986-April 1997

Particulars Numbers
Militancy-related killings 765
Killing by militants 430
 Killing by bomb blasts 5
Unidentified dead bodies recovered 88
Deaths due to critical injuries 60
Rape victims killed 22
Kidnapped victims killed 124
Brutal killings 10
Deaths due to strangulation 8
Deaths due to hanging 18
Rape victims 18
Critically wounded cases 108
Wounded victims 30
Kidnappings 66
Kidnapped victims escaped 10
Missing persons 56
Source: BN Nisar, Kashyap Vani, Jammu. Quoted in the Report on the Impact of Migration on the
Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced people; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority
Studies.

N OTES

1. MM Khajooria, former Director General of Jammu and Kashmir Police.

2. Kanchan Gupta, Pioneer, August 10, 2008.
3. Capt SK Tikoo (Retd), The Longest Night, Downloaded from KashmirInterchange@ yahoogroups.com
January 20, 2011.
4. It means a task ‘brought to completion with the grace of God’. In the Islamic tradition, every task is
commenced and finished in the name of God. While commencing a task, the Muslims say
‘ba+ismi+allah (Bismillah), meaning with the Name of God and on completion they say, ‘haz (this is
completed), min (with) fazl grace of, rabbi (God)’, meaning this is done with the grace of God.
5. Holocaust: Kashmiri Pandits in Exile — When will the Trauma End?, A report prepared by Jammu
Kashmir Vichar Manch. p. H21.
6. GM Sofi’s interview reproduced in The Migrant News Letter, Vol 3, Issue 3, March 1998.
7. Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced People,
Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.
8. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, (Allied Publishers, Third Edition, 1993) pp. 495–496.
15
 EXODUS
“It is not the road ahead that wears you out - it is the grain of sand in your shoe.”
—Arabian Proverb

The grain of sand in the shoe of Pandits was the tortuous memory of an
environment wherein acquaintances, neighbours, friends, colleagues, co-
workers, business partners, teammates and class-fellows turned into their
(Pandits’) actual killers or their collaborators. The grain of sand in the shoe of
Pandits was also a bleak future that stared them in the face.

Destroyed and abandoned Pandit houses on the eastern bank of kuta kohl near Kani Kadal, Srinagar,
as seen in April, 2000.

In this atmosphere of irrationality, obscurantism and religious fanaticism,

Pandit men were killed and their womenfolk lost their dignity, only because they
belonged to a different faith; a complete antithesis of Kashmiri Muslims’
avowed faith in the teachings of Noor-ud-Din Noorani (Nund Rishi). The
Pandits well understood that the only iron-clad guarantee of their security and
dignity lay in the voluntary and collective commitment of Kashmiri Muslims to
their safety, security and welfare. After the Afghan rule, Kashmiri Muslims,
despite aberrations, did exactly that. But once they decided to renege on their
voluntary commitment, there was no one around to save the Pandits. Therefore,
what option did the Pandits have in such a situation in order to secure their
safety and the dignity of their womenfolk? How could this essentially peace-
loving, non-violent, liberal, and secular community, completely unarmed,
forming roughly 9.6 per cent of the entire population of the Valley, and spread
out in its numerous villages and towns, take on 90.4 per cent of the population,
whose young men were armed to the teeth, and who enjoyed all kinds of moral
and material support from Pakistan?

In the absence of any organised decision-making mechanism within the

community, and no visible measures being taken by the government, both at the
State and Central level, to save them from being completely annihilated, every
individual took his own decision. The most important and common feature of
that decision was to escape to a safer place. The die was cast. The history was
about to witness the seventh exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir valley,
ever since the arrival of Islam there. The most regrettable thing about it was that
it happened in independent, secular and democratic India that claims Jammu and
Kashmir to be its integral and inalienable part.

What started as a trickle after the events of the night of January 19, 1990, now
became a deluge. The gruesome treatment meted out to Kashmiri Pandits
induced such an intense degree of fear and insecurity into the members of the
beleaguered community, that 94 per cent of them fled spontaneously, without
any prior planning, in the first five months of 1990 (between January to May). A
significant chunk of this was formed of people from rural areas who depended
on agriculture for their livelihood. The truck drivers and the taxi owners sensed
an opportunity to make a killing out of the adversity of Pandits. With fear in
their bruised hearts and tears streaming from their eyes, Kashmiri Pandits bade
adieu to their homes, to the rows of the poplar trees in their lawns, to the river
banks dotted with shikaras and bhatctz, to the magnificent chinars, to their
livestock; to their almond trees in full bloom; to the snow covered Harmukh; to
whatever was still left of Kashmiriyat, and above all, to all that their homeland
represented, the land in which the ashes of their forefathers lay mingled. In some
places the neighbours cried, but they mostly hid themselves, lest they be seen by
the radical elements to be sympathising with the Pandits. Caravans of buses,
trucks and taxies with puzzled and anguished men, women and children huddled
together, looked like sheep being taken to the slaughter house; searching
questions writ large on their faces.

Govt truck/vehicle 2 %
Private truck/vehicle 73.06 %
Private car 7 %
Bus 17.9 %
 Type of transport used by Pandits to flee from the Valley

Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

The unrestrained killing of the Kashmiri Pandits was awell-planned and

calculated move to ethnically cleanse the valley of the Hindus, with the aim of
establishing Nizam-e-Mustafa, a step that would make its merger with Pakistan
easier. By forcing the Pandits to flee, those who orchestrated these events,
seemed to be succeeding in their mission.

As a first step, thousands of people sought shelter at ‘Geeta Bhavan’ in

Jammu, while others headed straight for Delhi, to find shelter in similar camps.
A large number of them were housed in hastily prepared refugee camps in
Jammu and Delhi. Thousands of families had to live in these camps; in tattered
tents under unlivable conditions. Little did they realise that over two decades
later they would continue to live in those refugee camps. Most of them had left
the Valley in panic and confusion, hoping that the situation would normalise,
enabling them to return to their homes soon. Days, months and years rolled by,
but their hopes remained unfulfilled. Most Kashmiri Pandits left behind
everything they had in the Valley. A large number of them lost their near and
dear ones in the violence, specifically directed at them.

Among Kashmiri Pandits there were many (mostly retired and old people)
who had, as a routine, left the Valley to be with their children or other relatives
living outside the Kashmir, to avoid the harsh winter. When they left in late
December, they carried with them only the necessary clothing, etc., which would
suffice them for the next few months, after which they would return to the
Valley. It was during this period of their temporary absence from Kashmir that
Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley were forced to flee. These people lost practically
everything.

In the meantime, militancy had witnessed an upsurge with Pakistan gradually

sidelining the JKLF and increasingly handing over the responsibility of carrying
out militant operations to more radical militant group, the HM. Their attacks on
the security forces increased both in frequency and spread. Kashmiri Pandits,
nevertheless, continued to be their targets, both individually and collectively.
One of their victims was HN Wanchoo, a Kashmiri Pandit trade union activist,
who had filed a number of petitions in Jammu and Kashmir High Court on
behalf of the militant organisations against the security forces. He was also
reportedly acting as an intermediary between the government and certain
militant groups; negotiating to secure the release of their cadres. Wanchoo,
perhaps felt that by taking up the ‘cause’ of militants, he would endear himself
to the militant organisations. He thought that by taking on the new identity of a
Human Rights activist, his identity as a Pandit would be subsumed and he would
cease to be a target of Islamists. His thinking proved completely misplaced; he
was silenced forever on December 5, 1992, by the militants of Jamiat-ul-
Mujahideen.

By and large, the exodus was completed in three waves. Describing these
waves, Dr KL Chowdhury, a renowned doctor, working in the biggest
government hospital of Srinagar at the time of exodus, writes on March 3, 1990,
“This is the third wave of exodus. The first major wave passed soon after
January 19, 1990, the blackest day for Pandits in modern times. Many who fled
that terror, left almost barefooted in buses, trucks, taxis and private cars. Their
properties back home have mostly been looted, some torched as well… There
was a second wave of exodus on January 26/27, 1990, the Republic Day of
India, when a renewed, more determined and savage attempt was made by the
people in the Valley to repeat January 19, 1990. Now, I feel we are witnessing
the last major wave during and soon after the present curfew, before the
terrorists unleash another spate of killings of innocent Pandits.” 1

Some of the abandoned Pandit houses in Srinagar, as seen in April 2000.

Most Kashmiri Pandits fled the valley in the first rush of exodus that took
place immediately after the events of January 19, 1990, and continued
throughout the year. By the end of 1990, most Pandits had already fled. As the
killings continued unabated and government machinery continued to remain
grounded to a halt, even those who had thought of sticking on in the Valley,
irrespective of the situation, moved out. Meanwhile, the militancy continued to
grow, attaining even more sinister and violent dimension. By the middle of the
nineties, the Valley had almost completely been cleansed of the Pandits. Those
who continued to live in Kashmir were spread out in penny packets, living under
the constant threat of the gun.

MONTH WISE MIGRATION — 1990

Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

Bulk of the Pandits left the Valley in roughly three waves between January
1990, to April, 1991. Most settled in Jammu, with Delhi emerging as the next
preferred destination. Whatever numbers of families were still left in the Valley,
chose to leave in small driblets thereafter, as violence against them continued
unabated. By the middle of 2002, nearly 60,000 families had registered
themselves at different places.
 Dead bodies of Pandits killed in Wandhama

In the mean while, by the middle of the nineties, the responsibility of militant
operations completely rested in the hands of highly trained and motivated cadres
of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT – meaning Army of the Pure – entirely comprising of
Pakistani Jehadis) and HM (almost entirely formed of Kashmiri indigenous
recruits). Both these organisations were driven and motivated by a religious zeal
inculcated in them by Wahabi philosophy of Islam. Many of the LeT cadres
were veterans of Afghan war, having fought against the Soviet forces there.
Driven as they were by the sole desire of turning Kashmir into an Islamic entity,
these two militant groups could not even tolerate the presence of even a few
thousand Kashmiri Pandits still left in the valley. Consequently, seven Kashmiri
Pandits living in Sangrama village were killed in March 1997. This was
followed by the incident of January 25, 1998, when 23 Kashmiri Pandits,
including 4 children, 9 women and 10 men were killed in village Wandhama, in
Ganderbal district. These incidents forced the remaining Pandits to flee and find
a place in the already overcrowded refugee camps across the Pir Panjal range. As
per government’s version, even at this time, 1,000 Kashmiri Pandit families were
still living in the Valley. In the next 10 years the “number of families in Kashmir
would reduce to 611.” 2
 Exodus Period

Year of Migrtion from Kashmir Valley Percentage

1989 3.2%
1990 86.72%
1991 1.27%
After 1991 8.81%
Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

Why Kashmiri Pandits became the Targets of Islamists

Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley had completely and without any reservations,
identified themselves with the aspirations of Indian masses during their long
struggle for independence from the British yoke. They had done the same thing
against the feudal set-up of the Maharaja. Pandits had fought shoulder to
shoulder with the people of the Indian princely states against the foreign rule.
“The first ever conference of the Indian States` People, convened in 1927, was
presided over by a firebrand Kashmiri Pandit, Shankar Lal Kaul, who had left
Kashmir after having been removed from the State service on the advice of the
British Resident.” During the conference, Kaul had demanded that the people of
3

the princely states should oppose the princely order and appealed for their unity
for a sustained struggle against the British rule. Subsequently, after a decade,
this demand became an official part of the ‘Charter of Demands’ of this
conference held at Ludhiana, when the conference appealed for repudiation of
the paramountcy and the end of the princely rule in the states. During the
formative years of the conference, another Kashmiri Pandit, Pandit Dina Nath
Kachroo, a close friend of Jawahar Lal Nehru, became the Secretary General of
the Conference. It was the same Pandit Kachroo who was arrested along with
Pandit Nehru during the Quit Kashmir Movement. He attended the Working
Committee meeting of the NC in October 1947, as All India States People’s
Conference representative, when the NC decided to support the State’s accession
with India. Some Kashmiri Pandits, like Pandit Kashyap Bandhu, actually joined
the revolutionary underground, to achieve these objectives.

The State Subject certification, to which the Kashmiri Muslims are so deeply
wedded today, was actually opposed by them when Kashmiri Pandits had
launched a movement for its enactment, to forestall the British attempt at
acquiring land in the state. On the one hand, Muslims opposed the Maharaja, and
on the other, they supported the British. In the memorandum submitted to the
Maharaja in the aftermath of 1931 agitation, they reaffirmed their loyalty to the
British Crown. Islamists all along ensured that their struggle against the
Maharaja retained its Islamic character. Vested interests, even within the
mainstream parties, too allowed pan-Islamism to over-shadow the struggle
against the Dogra rule.

Kashmiri Pandits had embraced the secular education in its totality and had,
therefore, developed a progressive and liberal outlook, which was visible in their
tolerance and forbearance in word and deed. It was they who tried to turn the
struggle against the Dogra rule into a non-sectarian mass movement. In 1938,
Pandits and Muslims jointly issued a Declaration of National Demand, which
later became the basis for the movement of self-government in the state. In its
changed ‘avatar’ it became the manifesto of Naya Kashmir of the NC. Many
prominent Kashmiri Pandits were in the forefront of the NC. These included,
among other prominent community leaders, the renowned poet and scholar, Dina
Nath Nadim. Kashmiri Pandits accepted everything; the snatching away of their
landed estates, the confiscation of their properties, their exclusion from the state
administration, their being rendered politically irrelevant, primacy of Muslims in
politics, their economic marginalisation, Islamisation of all institutions, etc. All
these sacrifices were willingly made in the hope that it will usher in genuine
secularism in the state.

After independence, no community in India has suffered as much for its

commitment to India and its unity, as Kashmiri Pandits have, till their exodus in
1990. They were accused by the anti-Indian segment of Kashmir population as
being the principle conspirators of the accession of the State to India in 1947. In
addition, Muslim intelligentsia held the Pandits responsible for the split in the
MC in 1939, when the party’s majority opted to form NC. This split, they felt,
was engineered by the Pandits to rob the struggle against the Maharaja of its
essentially Muslim character. But the truth is that, Pandits joined the NC after
the party vowed to be guided by secular values and its membership was thrown
open to all communities. Pandits felt that the NC programmes and policies were
based on progressive political thinking. Being the most popular party in
Kashmir, joining NC also fulfilled Pandits’ desire to be part of the Valley’s
mainstream. They had hoped all along that the new political dispensation would
maintain and strengthen its secular character with the passage of time.
 When Plebiscite Front became a force to reckon with in the Valley, Kashmiri
Pandits fought its pernicious separatist and communal ideology. As the
propagators of secularism, which Islam held as abhorrent to its ideology, Pandits
became the obvious targets of its cadres. They also fought the Islamic
fundamentalists who opposed the 1975 Sheikh-Indira Accord. Such stance
adopted by Pandits over a period of time, marked them as enemies of the radical
Muslims. To the Islamists, Kashmiri Pandits were also a constant reminder that
despite resorting to the latter’s ethnic cleansing on umpteen number of occasions
in the past, they continued to come in their way of Islamising the Valley
completely. Therefore, the push delivered to the community in 1990, when
insurgency broke out, was meant to uproot the persistent resistance that Muslim
communalism in Kashmir met at the hands of Kashmiri Pandits.

Uprooting Pandits; Gains for Islamists

By every reckoning, the Islamists stood to gain by evicting Kashmiri Pandits
from the Valley. In their eviction, every segment of Kashmiri Muslim society
and its mentor across the LoC, Pakistan, saw only gains accruing to it. At the
macro level these were:-

• Eviction of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley would end the much feared
secularisation of the Kashmiri Muslim society. With Kashmiri Pandits out
of the Valley, the Muslims would now be more open and amenable to
fundamentalist Islamic preaching. This, the radical elements felt, would be
the first step in Islamising Kashmir; the avowed aim of the Islamists.

• The eviction of Kashmiri Pandits would destroy India’s credibility

among Kashmiri Muslims. This would embolden them to become even
more belligerent and aggressive in demanding secession of Kashmir from
India. This aggressive posture will eventually result in the separation of
Kashmir from India. For Pakistan, it will make its task of gobbling up
Kashmir easier and would be compensation enough for losing its Eastern
Wing in 1971.

• Kashmir, devoid of Pandits, would result in snapping the psychological

connect between the Indian State and the Valley. This objective could
easily be achieved, as Article 370 had already paved the way for such
disconnect. In due course of time, Indian feedback channels would
completely dry up.
 That the Islamists have succeeded in Islamising the entire Valley by cleansing
it of non-Muslims is best illustrated by the census figures given below:

Source: Pioneer dated July 12, 2010.

The dwindling population of Kashmiri Pandits, Kashmir’s biggest minority, is

even more glaring. According to census figures in 1981, the population of
Kashmiri Pandits in the Valley was 15 per cent, which fell to 5 per cent in 1991
and to 0.01 per cent further down the years. According to a statement made by
Raman Bhalla, a Minister in the State Government, in the State Assembly on
March 23, 2010, “Only 808 families of Kashmiri Pandits were living in the
Valley and the total number of men, women and children was 3,445… Killing of
community members led to fear psychosis in the community.” Such a massive
demographic change could not have taken place in Kashmir without detailed
planning at the highest level in Pakistan, backed and executed by its proxies in
Kashmir.” 4

At the micro level, the Islamists hoped to achieve the following:-

• In the long run, the Kashmiri Muslims would get to own all the movable
and immovable property left behind by Kashmiri Pandits.

• The Muslims would corner all the jobs vacated by the Pandits.

• The Kashmiri Muslims would become the sole beneficiaries of huge

doles given by the central government to Kashmir.

• The Kashmiris would get to own and control all the businesses and
commercial activity in the Valley.
 In the past two decades after exodus, nearly all the goals already stand
achieved by the Islamists.

Between 1989–1992, the militant violence tore the Kashmiri society apart.
The spurt in militant violence can be gauged from the fact that whereas the
number of terrorist acts reported in 1988 was 390, it went up to 4,971 in 1992.
The attacks on security forces also registered a substantial increase in the said
period; from just six in 1988 to 3,413 in 1992. Similarly, in 1988, only 36 AK-
47 Rifles (or its later versions) were recovered, whereas in 1992, the recoveries
were a whopping 3,775. With the Jehadi operations getting more extensive and
widespread, as also because of far greater number of Jehadis getting inducted
into the Valley, their masters sitting across the LoC, found it increasingly
difficult to effectively exercise operational control over the militant cadres, over
huge distances. To streamline the complex operational communication for
effective control over various militant groups, the ISI set up a number of
communication and broadcasting stations in PoK. Besides addressing the
problem of effectively communication with various militant commanders in the
Valley, these broadcasting stations were also used for psychological operations.
These communication stations dished out communal propaganda in order to
create hatred between the civil population and the security forces. One such
broadcasting station, Sada-e-Hurriyat (Voice of Hurriyat), churned out
mischievous communal propaganda in local language that influenced the gullible
and the devout, who would come out on the streets with increased frequency and
greater virulence. The ISI’s propaganda machinery and its handling of the media
contributed immensely to the worsening situation in the Valley. Almost the
entire press, both Indian and foreign, carried one-sided stories and even
suppressed those which were not sympathetic to the militants and their cause.
The most important of these was the suppression of the news of violence against
Kashmiri Pandits, leading to their ethnic cleansing from the Valley.

What About Sikhs in Kashmir?

During July-August 2010, many Sikh families living in Kashmir received
threats from the radical Islamists in the valley; they were told to either convert to
Islam or leave the Valley. This created a furore in the Parliament, which at that
time, was in session. Members cutting across party lines condemned these
threats received by the miniscule Sikh community living in Kashmir. To
Kashmiri Pandits, such assertions by the members of the Parliament were quite
in contrast to the fact that not a voice was raised in the august house when
Kashmiri Pandits received far more serious threats which were, subsequently,
acted upon by the Islamists in 1998–90. Kashmiri Pandits were abandoned by
both the Parliament and the political leaders.

Kashmiri Pandits are often asked to explain as to why Sikhs did not leave the
Valley in 1989, when the former had to flee. Pandits have rarely expressed their
opinion on the subject publically for two reasons; those in public life wanted to
remain politically correct and others did not say anything which might have hurt
this proud community or jeopardise their lives in the Valley. However, the
narrative of this book will remain incomplete if this important issue is not
addressed.

It was Zia-ul-Haque who fathered the initiation of insurgency in Kashmir in

late eighties. In Phase-I of ‘Operation Topac’ the military dictator succeeded in
creating huge turmoil in Punjab. By the time Kashmir reached a boiling-point
(November-December 1989), large number of Sikhs, not only in Jammu and
Kashmir but also in the rest of the country, were alienated due to the perceived
success of the violence unleashed by Sikh militants to create the so-called
Khalistan. In Jammu and Kashmir, this alienation was even more pronounced as
the ever-present anti-Indian sentiment in Kashmir provided a conducive
environment for such a feeling to grow. Also, Farooq Abdullah’s anti-Mrs
Gandhi stance had endeared him to ‘Khalistani’ lobby. To spite Mrs Gandhi, he
had allowed the state to become a hub of Sikh militant activity. Despite the fact
that his government was subsequently dismissed, it did not, however, make
much difference to the seed that he had sown. By the time he left office,
radicalised Sikh youth had found safe havens for their activities in the state. As a
matter of fact, among the mainstream politicians of India, Farooq Abdullah was
the most sought after leader by Bindranwale and vice versa.

Consequently, in the early eighties, the divide between Pandits and Sikhs
became quite visible despite having enjoyed close friendly relations for scores of
decades. The divide became even more pronounced after Mrs Gandhi’s
assassination, when Kashmiri Pandits took out a procession in Srinagar to mourn
her death. The anti-Sikh riots that followed, sealed this hostility, even though
Kashmiri Pandits neither played any role in it nor approved of it. By 1989, Sikhs
in the Valley did not identify themselves with the aspirations of Pandits, but
were more inclined towards Muslims, as the latter supported the idea of the
creation of ‘Khalistan’. The fact that some of the middle rung Sikh militant
leaders belonged to Jammu region, further generated sympathy for the Sikhs
among the anti-Indian, radicalised Kashmiri Muslims. Neeta, who today happens
to be an important Sikh militant living in Pakistan, is also from Jammu.

The JKLF, which spearheaded the insurgency in Kashmir in 1989, felt no

need to target Sikhs as that would have unnecessarily alienated them. As far as
Pakistan, which controlled the levers of militancy in Kashmir, was concerned,
directing its cadres in Kashmir not to target Sikh community was a strategic
decision. Targeting of Sikhs by the militants would have hit at the very core of
Pakistan’s tactics, i.e., projecting itself as the benefactor of Sikhs and the
community’s supporter in its aim of carving out ‘Khalistan’. Pakistan also
realised that the presence of Sikh community in Kashmir would earn it great
dividends in India itself, as such a posture could be exploited to project Kashmiri
upsurge as secular in nature. It felt that any claim or even insinuation to the
effect that the movement in Kashmir is communal in character, would be
effectively countered by pointing out the continued safe presence of Sikhs in
Kashmir. Projecting the Kashmiri movement as secular and by manipulating
Indian media, Pakistan ensured that the leftists, liberals, secularists and human-
rights groups within India would help Pakistan divert attention from the
brutalities indulged in by its cadres against the Pandits in Kashmir. Pakistan also
calculated that this argument would polarise Indian public opinion on
secular/communal lines, thus shifting the focus away from ethnic cleansing of
Pandits, to the existing political fault-lines within Indian polity itself.

Despite all the bonhomie existing between the Sikhs and the Muslims of the
valley in 1989–90, the events of the night of January 19–20, 1990, scared the
daylights out of the valley’s Sikh community. As Ashok Tikoo of Kani Kadal,
an eyewitness to the events states, “On the night of January 19–20, 1990, all
Muslims of Kashmir were on the roads while anti-Indian/anti-‘Batta’ (Kashmiri
Pandit) propaganda tapes were being played from the loudspeakers of numerous
mosques of Kashmir. This scared the non-Muslims of the valley to death. Next
day morning, I had to go to Lal Chowk; I do not remember why. I was shocked
to see Sikhs with their families boarding trucks and buses in great hurry. Some
were carrying their turbans in their hands and running to catch the buses/trucks
leaving for Jammu. Kashmiri Pandits were clearly outnumbered in getting out of
the valley. However, the situation changed dramatically after Simranjit Singh
Mann visited Kashmir and had a meeting with Kashmiri separatist leaders. Most
of those who had fled, returned to Kashmir. Some Sikhs did not return and
preferred to stay at Nanak Nagar in Jammu. Even today, they travel back and
forth between Jammu and Srinagar; their families, however, continue to reside at
Jammu even today.”

This, in short, is why Sikhs were not targeted in Kashmir then and continued
to live there despite Pandits leaving en masse. You might ask, “Why did they
receive threats two decades after the break out of insurgency in Kashmir? The
answer is pretty simple. The movement has come to be entirely hijacked by the
Syed Ali Shah Geelani, whose stance from day one has been to amalgamate
Kashmir with Pakistan. Being a radical Islamist to the core and the
patron/creator of HM, he has no use for ‘Non-Believers’. According to him
Amarnath agitation in 2008 was launched by him Bara-e-Islam and he sees the
‘yatra’ as a “cultural invasion of Islamic Kashmir by Hindus of India.”According
to his cadres, they have only one relationship with Pakistan, which is defined by
the oft-repeated slogan — Pakistan se kya Rishta — La Illah-e-Illalah. (Our
relationship with Pakistan is because Pakistan is Islamic State and we too are
Muslims). Besides, Khalistan movement is dead and Sikhs, as usual, are in the
forefront of India’s march ahead, incidentally, under a Sikh Prime Minister.
Despite the alienation of eighties, they have been and continue to be firmly with
India as its most patriotic citizens.

Pakistan has miserably failed to drive a permanent wedge between the Sikhs
and the rest of Indians. So, neither Pakistan nor the likes of Geelani would want
them in Kashmir any more. Besides, imagine the numerous benefits that will
accrue to Kashmiri Muslims if Sikhs were to be thrown out. Fleeing Sikhs will
have to abandon their immovable property, which will be grabbed by Muslims.
If they do not abandon it, they will, at best, have to sell it at throw away prices
(distress sale). Both ways, Kashmiri Muslims stand to gain. The Muslims will
fill up all the posts in both government and private offices in Kashmir, which are
presently held by Sikhs, and which will fall vacant as a result of their fleeing
away. Kashmir will become entirely Islamic, perhaps the most cherished goal of
Islamists like Geelani. Sikhs living in the valley realise all this, as one of them
once told me during my stay in Pattan in 2008, “We are aware of the threats to
our existence here. Therefore, every Sikh family presently in Kashmir has a
functional residence in Jammu or other places. We only have to light the gas
stove to cook our meals. We are prepared for any eventuality.”

Reactions to Exodus
Pakistan, its accomplices in the Valley and the radical Islamic parties had
correctly assessed the reaction of the Indian State; its administrative machinery,
the civil society, political parties and the media. The muted reaction of the
Indian State to the happenings of 1986, in Anantnag district, had convinced the
Islamists that the reaction of India could be managed. As far as the press was
concerned, the Islamists were confident that their own well-crafted and finely
orchestrated disinformation campaign, would neutralise any negative fallout in
the media. Their disinformation campaign had succeeded in obfuscating the
reality by projecting the orchestrated tradition of Kashmiri Muslim’s tolerance
and faith in secularism. The civil society, dominated as it was by the left-liberal
intellectuals, would not pose any serious challenge. In the opinion of the
perpetrators of violence, the political parties in India, egged on by the media,
were likely to get involved in the ‘communal’/‘secular’ debate; in the process,
masking the news about the violence let loose on Pandits in the Valley. Later
events would prove that the assessment of Islamists was almost entirely correct.
The apathy with which all sections of the Indian society reacted, encouraged the
radical elements and their armed militants to increase the tempo of violence. At
the same time, indifferent attitude of the government, the civil society and the
media towards the plight of Kashmiri Pandits, made the latter aware of the
illusion of Indian secularism.

During the crucial period between the middle of 1989 and June 1991, India
saw four prime ministers. Rajiv Gandhi, who was the Prime Minister till the end
of 1989, contributed immensely to the deteriorating situation in the Valley. The
political opportunism displayed by him created a tailor-made environment for
Pakistan to exploit the situation to its advantage. Then followed VP Singh
(December 1989 - November 1990), heading the Janata Dal Government. It was
during his government at the Centre, when the actual exodus began. The
government lacked the will and the competence to deal with the situation. Its
Home Minister, Mufti Mohammad Syed, a Kashmiri Muslim, was too wedded to
the concept of Muslim majoritariansim to intervene on behalf of the hapless
Pandits. Besides, the ludicrous drama of the kidnapping of his daughter by the
militants and his ministry’s shameless surrender to them to secure her release,
had robbed the government of whatever moral authority it still possessed.

After that followed Chandra Shekhar (November 1990-June 1991), who was
dependant on the Congress party and other ‘secularists’ to stay in power. The
weak government that he headed was determined to overlook the Islamic
character of the violence unleashed against Kashmiri Pandits, in order to
preserve its vote-banks. Consequently, the government took no action to issue
orders to its security forces to prevent the killings of Kashmiri Pandits. And
when the exodus of Pandits began, the fact was neither acknowledged, nor was a
word of sympathy uttered to assuage their hurt feelings.

The attitude of these two governments encouraged the Islamists to further

increase the tempo of their violence, destroying whatever was left of the
pluralistic fabric of Kashmiri society. It may be mentioned that even though the
Kashmiri Pandits exercised no influence on the politics and economy of the
state, their immense contribution to Kashmiri thought and its culture had created
pockets of composite culture in the valley. It was these pockets which became
the first targets of the militant propaganda.

Initial reaction at every level of the government, most of civil society and the
major portion of media was that of total indifference to the plight of Kashmiri
Pandits. To them, Kashmir only represented Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits were
just an irritant, whose removal from the Valley would pave the way for complete
integration of the state with India! To the fleeing Kashmiri Pandits, the bigger
shock than their forced displacement, was the manner in which this displacement
and their killings, were brushed under the carpet. The media played an
ignominious role in ensuring that bulk of the Indians remained oblivious to the
ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir. In fact, in the first decade
after the exodus, the only thing bulk of Indians related to with Kashmir was the
so-called excesses of the security forces. Many Kashmiri Hindus were aghast at
the ignorance of their friends, neighbours and colleagues, when the former had
to explain to them the reasons why they could not go back to their native place.
It was only much later, when Kargil incursion by Pakistan took place in 1999,
and terrorism spread to various parts of the country, that the magnitude of the
overwhelming tragedy that had befallen the Kashmiri Pandits, slowly dawned on
the countrymen.

In its bid to neutralise the public opinion in India, all organs of the state and
the media were exploited by the Islamists and their sympathisers to launch a
vigorous campaign of disinformation. On many occasions; it was the Pandits
who came to be portrayed as villains and not the gun-wielding Jehadis in
Kashmir. In fact, the latter were portrayed as the victims of high handedness of
the Indian security forces. In order to exonerate the Jehadis of the crime of
evicting Pandits from Kashmir, the propaganda machinery of the terrorists,
working in cahoots with the so-called ‘Human Rights’ groups in India and
abroad, spread the most nefarious falsehood that it was Jagmohan (the Governor
of Jammu and Kashmir till July 1989 and then again from January to May 1990),
who had asked the Pandits to leave the valley, so that he could then unleash his
security forces on the local Muslims without having to care for any collateral
damage. These elements even reminded the public about the demolitions that
Jagmohan had carried out during the ‘Emergency Regime’ in the Turkman Gate
area of Delhi, where mostly the Muslims reside.

The Congress party was in the forefront of this campaign of falsehood,

conveniently forgetting that it was Congress’ own iconic leader, Indira Gandhi,
who headed the ‘Emergency Regime.’ Benazir Bhutto, the Prime Minister of
5

Pakistan at that time, publically lampooned Jagmohan and bayed for his blood
from across the border. “Her hysterical ranting on Kashmir and crude gestures to
dismember Jagmohan” turned the latter into the single biggest hate-figure for
6

the ‘secularists’ and their camp followers. Giving vent to his anguish, Jagmohan
writes in his book, My Forzen Turbulence in Kashmir, “From the very first day
of my second term, I had to wage not only the most grim and critical battle
against terrorism, but also an equally extensive and dangerous battle against
disinformation. I could hold my own, and even win the first battle, but not the
second, such were the dimensions, frequency and the fury of the avalanche of
insinuation.”

The gullible public in India, fed by the biased media and the furious and
sustained propaganda launched by the left-liberal intelligentsia, actually started
believing in this myth; repeated umpteen times in true Goebellesion manner.
However, even among such segments, courageous people did not buy this
theory. As Khushwant Singh, the doyen of Indian liberal journalistic fraternity,
said, “Even mice don’t leave their holes even when the forest over ground
catches fire, and you want people to believe that Kashmiri Pandits left their
homes, where they lived for thousands of years, just because Jagmohan asked
them to do so.”

Even two decades after their exodus from Kashmir, the Government of India
continues to be in denial about Pandit exodus and its causes. Writing about the
indifference shown by the Government of India to the plight of Kashmiri
Pandits, Vir Sanghvi, a well-known journalist states, “The fate of the Pandits is
an international scandal by any standards. Between 1989 and 1992, the majority
of Kashmiri Pandits were forced out of their homes by militants. Men were
murdered, women were raped, property was destroyed and threats were issued. It
was made clear to the Pandits that they were no longer welcome in Kashmir, a
state that constituted the only home they knew because they were Hindu.”
 An abandoned Pandit house at Magam

Sanghvi further writes, “Forget about the international community, even our
own government has remained curiously indifferent to the Pandits. There has
been no serious attempt to resettle them. Lakhs of people have lost everything
and have been reduced to poverty, swallowing their pride and living on hand-
outs in refugee camps. But few politicians across parties seem to feel that this is
a national shame and that India owes it to the Pandits to give them their pride
back.” Writing about the nation’s failure in recognising the tragedy of Kashmiri
Pandits, the writer mentions, “Sadly, both India and democracy itself have failed
them. Nobody pays any attention to their cause. And politicians do not regard
them as electorally significant enough to merit any concern.” 7

G.M. Sofi, a well-known journalist from the Valley, when asked for his views
on the issue said, “They (Kashmiri Pandits) were compelled to leave their
homes, their jobs and their lands overnight. In fact, Pandits were the first victims
of the scheme (the aim of Pakistan to Islamise the Kashmir problem) which
forced them to leave the State.” 8

Basharat Peer, the author of much acclaimed book dealing with the turmoil in
Kashmir, Curfewed Night, writes “Alongwith killing hundreds of pro-India
Muslims ranging from political activists to suspected informers for Indian
intelligence, the militants killed hundreds of Pandits on similar grounds, or
without reason. The deaths had scared the Pandits and thousands, including my
classmates and their families, had left the Valley by March 1990, for Jammu,
Delhi, and various other Indian cities and towns.” If any more clarification was
9

required, it was provided by no less than the former Deputy Chief Minister of
the State, Muzafar Hussein Beigh, who on November 15, 2010, stated in Jammu,
“I will not give names. But it is true that many people who killed Kashmiri
Pandits and Muslims in Kashmir are roaming freely. I do not know whether it is
the judicial system which has failed or the police system which has failed or
there is some hidden hand, or they want to use them for some purpose. I do not
know.” 10

Surprisingly the same elements, who did not tire of leveling false allegations
against the security forces, found nothing wrong with the eviction of nearly
11

400,000 Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley, or their brutal massacre in cold
blood. Or for that matter the heavy casualties that security forces have suffered
during the past two decades, while fighting the Pakistani Jehadis in Kashmir.
Between July 1988 and July 2010, 5,962 security personnel were killed by
terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir. In the first half of 2010 alone, 45 were killed
while fighting militants.

The attitude of intellectuals and media to the plight of Kashmiri Pandits has
been aptly summed up by the former Foreign Secretary MK Rasgotra:

“Our own Human Rights enthusiasts, ever ready to smear the image of our
armed forces engaged in fighting Pakistan’s dirty proxy war in Kashmir, have
done little to highlight Pandit’s plight. Worse still, our media’s casual, almost
cynical treatment of this slow motion tragedy, thoughtless and repeated
description of these victims of denial, deprivation and terror as ‘refugees’ has
inured the country to this grevious wrong. It dulled the Nation’s sense of
responsibility towards an abused and aggrieved minority and lulled the
authorities into complacency and inaction.” 12

The angst and anguish of Kashmiri Pandits was most poignantly put across in
the appeal issued by ‘Save Kashmiri Pandit Campaign Committee,’ “…Must we
tell these partisans that nothing is more distasteful to a Kashmiri Pandit than
even the remotest thought of leaving the land which he loves only as a son
would love his mother?” It further said, “The choice was forced on us by
Pakistan-led terrorists who have imposed their writ on Kashmir, taking an
unending toll of innocent human lives and wrought death and destructions….” 13
 Wilson John wrote in the Pioneer of July 19, 2007, “….The fact that Muslim
terrorists and their sympathisers systematically kept driving out more than
300,000 (some say 500,000) Hindus from their homes for over five years, even
as India, the largest democracy in the world and one of the most powerful
military powers in Asia, looked the other way…” In 2004, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, while addressing a conference on Kashmiri Pandits in New
Delhi acknowledged their plight when he said, “ What has happened to the
Pandit community in the Valley is a great national tragedy. I would say a great
human tragedy. Therefore, whatever can be done to relieve their pain and
suffering is in the wider national interests… The long-term objective has to be to
enable the Pandit community, and all those who want to go back to the Valley,
to return and lead a life of dignity and self respect.” However, despite such a
statement from the highest in the government, nothing substantial has been done
to give concrete shape to the Prime Minister’s declaration.

Nearly two decades after the exodus of Pandits when the passions for Jehad
had cool down and Kashmiri youth were looking for better career opportunities,
various political parties including some mainstream and extremist organisations,
issued statements inviting Kashmiri Pandits to return to the Valley. Reacting to
these statements, Omar Abdullah, the scion of Abdullah family and the State’s
Chief Minister said, “It is very easy to say that we will lay down our lives to
bring KPs (Kashmiri Pandits) back to the Valley, and I appreciate the sentiment,
as I am sure the KPs reading it, will. Pity, that sentiment was missing when our
mosques were being used to drive these people out. None of us was willing to
stand up and be counted when it mattered. None of us grabbed the mikes and
said this is wrong and KPs had every right to continue living in the Valley. Our
educated well-to-do relatives and neighbours were spewing venom 24 hours a
day. We were mute spectators, either mute in agreement or mute in abject fear;
because the guns turned against the Pandits, found their target elsewhere, as my
party workers found, but mute nonetheless.” This statement appeared in the
National Conference website and was reproduced by Kashmir Times on May 30,
2008.

US Reaction
It is worthwhile to take a look at the attitude of the US towards the activities
of ISI in Kashmir, where it was involved in letting loose a reign of terror and
spilling of the innocent blood. The US turned a blind eye to the ISI-perpetrated
violence in Kashmir. Due to its own compulsions of being dependent on the ISI
to prosecute its war in Afghanistan, the US closed its eyes to the large-scale
diversion of its funds and other aid by the former to fund its anti-India activities.
After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US lost interest in
South Asia. Nevertheless, it was fully aware of ISI’s role in fomenting trouble in
the Punjab and later in Kashmir. But it chose not to needle its long time ally.

Canadian intelligence sources confirmed that neither FBI nor CIA provided
any useful assistance to the Canadian investigating agencies during the
investigations of the Kanishka bombing. As a matter of fact, the US seemed to
be happy with the turn of events in South Asia, as would be apparent from
perusal of Barbara Crossett’s report in the New York Times, at the
commencement of Pakistani sponsored Islamist insurgency in Kashmir, in 1990.
Premen Addy writes, “The report reveals the prognostication of an unnamed
Islamabad-based western diplomat, that the world was about to witness a
permanent shift in the sub-continental balance of power. The prediction,
mercifully, was as still-born as the Nixon administration’s hope of similar
geopolitical change in the wake of its support for the Pakistani military
dictatorship, in its war with India in December 1971.” As we move away
14

further from those times, as also due to the proven and continued complicity of
ISI in spreading terror globally, many ‘think-tanks’, independent organisations,
and even the UN have accepted the fact that Pakistan’s state-within-a-state, the
notorious ISI, has continued to train, fund and patronise the LeT, that is used by
it to target India (as a matter of state policy) and places around the world (as a
matter of duty towards the Ummah).Talking about LeT, Frank J Cilluffo,
Director of Homeland Security Institute at the George Washington University,
said in his testimony to the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign
Affairs, “Its formation was supposedly aided by instruction and funding from
Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence,
which gave this support in exchange for the LeT promising to target Hindus in
Jammu and Kashmir, and train Muslim extremists on Indian soil.” 15

Report dated April 16, 2010, prepared by the independent panel appointed by
the UN to probe Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, concluded that a nexus between
ISI and various terrorist organisations continues to flourish. The report said,
“The Pakistan military organised and supported the Taliban to take control of
Afghanistan in 1996. Similar tactics were used in Kashmir against India in
1989.” Referring to other Jehadi Sunni groups based largely in the Punjab, the
report further said, “The Pakistan military and ISI also used some of these
groups in the Kashmir insurgency after 1998. The bulk of the anti-Indian activity
was and still remains the work of groups such as LeT, which has close ties with
ISI.” 16

N OTES

1. Sakshatkar, Published by Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch, (Chapter titled Holocaust).

2. Sanjay Tikoo, Convenor, Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS) in a statement in Rising Kashmir,
April 1, 2009.
3. White Paper on Kashmir, Dr MK Teng and CL Guddu for Joint Human Rights Committee, (Gupta
Print Services, Delhi), p. 67.
4. India News, IANS, (Indo-Asian News Service), downloaded from Kashmir Interchange
@Yahoogroups.com, March 25, 2010.
5. After wide-spread protests against Mrs Indira Gandhi’s refusal to resign, consequent to an adverse
verdict given against her by Allahabad High Court, on a petition filed by her electoral opponent, Raj
Narain, Mrs Gandhi declared a state of emergency in the country.
6. Sandhya Jain, Pioneer, November 22, 2011.
7. Both India and Democracy itself have Failed the Kashmiri Pandits, Vir Sanghvi,
[email protected] posted on January 20, 2012.
8. From interview by Omkar Razdan, Times of India, November 9, 1997.
9. Basharat Peer, Curfewed Night, (Random House, 2008).
10. Pioneer, November 16, 2010.
11. The magnitude of such accusations and their falsehood can be gauged from the fact that since 1990,
security forces have faced 1,511 cases of human rights abuses. After investigation by various
agencies, including the National Human Rights Commission, 1,473 were found to be false. As a
result of these findings, 104 persons were punished for offences, wherever, culpability was
established.
12. MK Rasgotra, Indian Express, August 26, 1995.
13. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence: (Allied Publishers, 1993) pp. 495–496.
14. Premen Addy, Pioneer, August 9, 2008.
15. Quoted here from the excerpts of his testimony carried by Pioneer, September 28, 2011.
16. Pioneer, April 17, 2010.
16
 MYTHS PERPETUATED TO JUSTIFY
VIOLENCE
“The bigger the lie, the more people will believe it. Think of the press as a great keyboard on which
the government can play.”
—Joseph Goebbels

After the Pandit exodus from Kashmir, several myths were perpetuated by
vested interests to justify the violence let loose by Kashmiri Muslims on Pandits,
that forced the latter to flee from the Valley. This book examines these:-

Remnants of the author’s gutted house in the foreground, as seen in April 2000.It was burnt in 1992.

• Kashmiri Pandits were big landlords.

• Kashmiris are victims of wide economic disparity that exists between the
Valley and the rest of the country.

• Kashmiris feel that their distinct Kashmiri Muslim identity is under

threat from Hindu India, and that

• It was the former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Jagmohan, who

asked the Pandits to leave the Valley.
Kashmiri Pandits were Big Landlords
By no stretch of imagination were Kashmiri Pandits big landlords. As
mentioned in Chapter 10, thousands of Kashmiri Pandits were rendered destitute
as the Big Landed Estate Abolition Act took away their only means of
sustenance, without getting any compensation in lieu. The truth is that when this
Act was passed in September 1950, about 24 families and three religious
institutions owned a total of 518,811 kanals of land, with each owning more than
3,000 kanals. Ownership of this land in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh was
330,301, 152,924 and 65,586 kanals, respectively. In Kashmir, 152,924 kanals
were owned by the following individuals/institutions:-

Sr. No Name Land owned (in Kanals)

1. Shrimati Vidyawati 70,468
2. Wazir Ramdas 19,368
3. Wazir Tej Ram 4,665
4. Sardar Kishan Singh 5,976
5. Dewan Dhanpat Rai 7,754
6. Thakhtir Kartar Singh 2,626
7. Ahmad Mir 4,202
8. Musmati Ashraf Begum 3,915
9. Pandit Shyam Sunder Lal Dhar 10,412
10. Pandit Balkak Dhar 5,144
11. Raja Upender Krishen Kaul 8,162
12. Khanqah Baba Siam-ud-din 5,856
13. Ziarat Pir Dastgir 4,483
Source: DN Dhar; Where Kashmiri Pandits Big Landlords? Page 34, Naad, April 2012, Volume
XXII, No. 04.

Six of the above land-owners in Kashmir (serial 1 to 6) belonged to Jammu

and five (serial 7 to 11) belonged to Kashmir. Two religious institutions
mentioned at serial 12 and 13 were located in Kashmir. Among the Kashmiri
owners, two each were Muslims and Kashmiri Pandits and one a non-resident
Kashmiri Hindu.

There also existed a practice of bestowing the ownership of huge chunks of

land called Jagirs on favourite individuals by the rulers. This practice in Kashmir
owed its origin to the time when Kashmir was ruled by Sultans. Among the
Kashmiri Pandits, Miro Pandit had been granted Kamraj (Baramulla) as a Jagir
by Emperor Jehangir, whom the former had freed from the captivity of Afghan
ruler, Mahabat Khan. Miro Pandit, whose ancestors had fled to Dhar in Madya
Pradesh, during the persecution of Pandits in Kashmir by Sultan Sikander,
commanded the Golconda fort before finally being appointed as the chief of
Noor Jehan’s Army. However, by the time Sheikh Abdullah introduced the land
reforms, this jagir had all but ceased to exist.

Dogra rulers continued with the tradition of bestowing Jagirs in Kashmir. But
these were granted to non-Kashmiris; not a single Kashmiri Pandit was granted
any such favour. Some Kashmiri Pandits were Chakdars. During Maharaja
Ranbir Singh’s rule, as the land revenue dwindled, he granted some fallow land
to some Hindus, who were required to pay revenue as per a fixed schedule. By
1950, the share of the produce of Chakdars had been reduced to a pittance due to
various stringent conditions governing the inheritance of such lands.

Myth of Economic Disparity

The argument that it was economic deprivation of Kashmiri Muslims which
forced the poverty-laden youth to take up arms, has been repeated ad nauseam
by the vested interests. Pakistan and its sympathisers propagated this argument
to camouflage the real intentions of the Islamists. The Indian political parties
that supported this view did so to protect their vote banks. Population figures of
various communities in the state, based on 1981 census, are given below. As the
militancy broke out in Kashmir some years later, these population figures will
serve as a benchmark to assess the ‘truth’ of the economic reality of the state.

Source: White Paper on Kashmir, Dr MK Teng and C.L. Guddu for Joint Human Rights Committee.

The Hindu population shown above did not include 2,50,000 Hindu and Sikh
refugees, which formed nearly 4.2 per cent of the population.

The total population of Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists (including 4.2 per cent of
the refugees) was 40.18 per cent. Per capita growth from 1970–71 to 1985–86
went up from 548 crores to 2204 crores at current price and from 548 crores
to 683 crores at constant price of 1970–71. Within the state, Kashmir with its
overwhelming Muslim population, was allotted between 65–69 per cent of the
financial resources, compared to 31–35 per cent to Jammu and Ladakh together.

The Kashmiri Muslims owned 97.4 per cent of the agricultural land. The
Hindus and other minorities had to be content with 2.6 per cent of the remaining
land, though they comprised 11 per cent of the population in Kashmir. The
former owned 96 per cent of the fruit orchard acreage in Kashmir, against 2.8
per cent by Hindus. Similarly, the Kashmiri Muslims owned 98.7 per cent of
karewas (highlands), growing saffron, compared to 0.03 per cent owned by
Hindus. Besides this, the export of dry fruit (almonds and walnut) and precious
walnut and willow wood, was completely monopolised by the Muslims. The
Hindus had almost no share in it. There were nearly 48,100 orchard holdings,
employing an estimated 800,000 people, out of which Kashmiri Pandits formed
a minuscule number estimated to be less than 0.5 per cent. Due to its complete
monopoly of Kashmir’s agricultural sector, the Kashmiri Muslims appropriated
94 per cent of the subsidy paid by the state on horticulture, agriculture,
agricultural implements, fertilisers, pesticides, etc. Hindus received less than 2.4
per cent of this subsidy.

98.9 per cent of the industries using electric power were owned by Muslims,
with Hindus owning just 0.02 per cent. Same situation existed in handloom and
handicraft industry in Kashmir, which was almost entirely owned by Muslims.
This industry provided employment to 91,941 persons, nearly all of them
Muslims. Hindus formed 0.4 per cent of the total employees. In 1985–86, when
Muslims in the valley were getting radicalised, the membership of the
handlooms and handicraft cooperative societies stood at 17,776. Out of this, only
0.3 per cent was owned by Kashmiri Hindus. In the same year, out of the 46, 293
industrial units registered with the directorate of industries in Kashmir province,
98.7 per cent were registered in the name of Muslims and 0.01 per cent in the
name of Hindus. 98.8 per cent of the total of 28,110 employees of the industries
registered under Khadi and Village Industries Board, were Muslims.

In the absence of railway network in the state, road transport played a vital
role as the primary source of travel and communication within and outside the
Valley. Even in this sector, the ownership of the transport and transport
companies was monopolised by Muslims, with Sikh ownership standing at 4.2
per cent. The Hindus of Kashmir were negligible stakeholders in the transport
sector. In 1985–86, even in the state-owned Jammu and Kashmir State Road
Transport Corporation (JKSRTC), Kashmiri Hindus accounted for only 0.8 per
cent of its total number of 6,434 employees. The state government had floated
some schemes for providing loans (and subsidies on such loans) for establishing
industries, self-employment enterprises, exports unit, handicraft and small scale
units (and purchase of land for such enterprises, etc.). The beneficiaries of these
schemes were almost entirely Kashmiri Muslims, with Hindus receiving barely
0.1 per cent of the entire amount.

Boats of various types and sizes played an important role in transportation

through inland waterways and in tourism industry of the state. The entire fleet of
these boats, including the luxury houseboats, was owned by Muslims. Number
of various types of boats existing and the employment provided by these in
1985–86, are given in the chart below. Today (July 2011) the number of luxury
houseboats is little over 1,200. 1

The tourist industry in Kashmir also depended heavily on the network of

hotels. 96 per cent of these hotels were owned by Kashmiri Muslims, compared
to 2.2 per cent owned by Hindus.

Even in the awarding of contracts for various developmental projects,

including public works, Kashmiri Hindus, at an average, received about 4 per
cent of these. Similarly, till 1979, when the contracts for the exploitation of
forest products were given to private individuals, the Hindu share of receiving
these contracts was only 6.2 per cent. After 1979 these were nationalised. Other
income generating sources, like issue of licenses for quarrying, mining of
marble, establishing brick kilns and manufacture and export of carpets and
shawls, were completely in the hands of Kashmiri Muslims. 2

For years the vested interests carried out a sustained propaganda that the State
of Jammu and Kashmir lagged behind other states of India economically, as it
faced step-motherly treatment from the Central government. However, the facts
indicated otherwise. In the crucial years preceding the outbreak of violence in
Kashmir, the state was (and continues to be) way ahead of other states, on every
parameter that determines the economic well-being of a state. In fact, Kashmiris
themselves find the ‘theory of their economic deprivation’ as the cause of their
uprising, as laughable. After all, economically deprived people are not voracious
meat eaters, as Kashmiris are. “On an average, 3.5 million goats are slaughtered
annually for consumption in Kashmir.” 3

During militancy, Kashmir has prospered economically and is far better

placed than most other states of India. Besides Punjab, Kashmir is the only other
place, where most agricultural operations are undertaken by hired labourers from
Bihar and Orissa since long. Among other things, it is the only place where
education is free from elementary to professional and university level; where per
capita saving and per capita consumption of animal proteins is the highest in
India; it also ranks highest in the expenditure incurred on clothing. It is also,
perhaps, the only place where everybody owns a house. Some other parameters
too are revealing. According to the study carried out by National Sample Survey
Organisation in 2009, the average household has assets worth almost 11,00,000
the highest in the country. Kerala follows with the average household assets
being worth a little over 7,51,000. Experts say that even though there are no
major industries in the state, income is more evenly distributed in Jammu and
Kashmir than in any other part of the country. Says Haseeb Drabu, former
Chairman of Jammu and Kashmir Bank, “It’s the only place in the world where
the most radical land reforms were initiated in a non-communist regime. It even
pre-dates the land reforms carried out in Kerala. Therefore, you find that average
Kashmiri’s asset base is much better than the average person in the rest of the
country. Agrarian sector, especially horticulture, is doing well. Land has
provided a resilient economy.”

It was believed that economically Kashmir is so heavily dependent on tourist

industry that the disturbed conditions during the past two decades would destroy
its economy. But these beliefs have been proved unfounded. The disturbed
conditions in the valley have, if anything, improved the economic well-being of
the people in the state. Even though the tourist industry crumbled due to rising
militancy in nineties, the economy did not collapse and land prices continued to
rise. “There was an impression that Jammu and Kashmir survives only on
tourism, and once tourism goes down, the economy will crumble. It’s not so.
There is very large agrarian sector, which has done very well,” said Haseeb
Drabu. “Since the beginning of militancy in 1990, the state has managed to get
the lion’s share of Central resources; 35,571.3 crores in grants and assistance.” 4

“Between 2000–2003, it got 13,188 crores which is more than three times what
India’s poorest state, Bihar, got; 4,047 crores. When you consider that of the
14,085 crores net resource transfer by the centre, 13,188 crores was grant, you
will get an idea of the magnitude of dole that Jammu and Kashmir gets. A
similar economic revival plan for Bihar would amount to 47,458 crores!” (See 5

Table 1 and 2 below):-

Table 1: Economic Profile

Source: Planning Commission, Government of India, Reserve Bank of India, State Finances 2002–03
and Statistical Outline of India 2002–03.

Table 2: Prime Minister’s Economic Package applied to two Most

Backward States

Population Description
(Crore)
 10,143,700 (Jammu and Total Funding to Jammu and Kashmir (4 Years) 5,800
Kashmir)
Per Capita Share of Total Funding 5718 ( )
36,804,660 (Orissa) Justifiable Funding to Orissa on the basis of J&K (4 21,045
Years)
82,998,509 (Bihar) Justifiable Funding to Bihar (4 Years) 47,458
Per Year Funding to J&K 1450
Per Year Funding to Orissa 5,261.25
Per Year Funding to Bihar 11,864.5
Source: Census of India 2001 and Calculation on the basis of available figures.

A Kashmiri understands quite well the massive economic benefits that accrue
to him as a result of his being part of India. “A Kashmiri gets eight times more
money from the centre than citizens from other states. While per capita central
assistance to other states moved from 576.24 in 1992–93 to 1,137 in 2000–
2001, that of a Kashmiri spiralled from 3,197 to 8,092.” 6

“To put this in perspective; if the aid given by the Central government to the
State were to be distributed to each family (of 5 persons); they would get
40,460 every year. Per capita consumption has also shot up from 134/month in
the eighties to 746/month in 2000.” It is interesting to note that Jammu and
7

Kashmir has the lowest poverty level in India: in 1990, the percentage of people
‘below poverty line’ (BPL) was 25.17 per cent, which dropped to 3.48 per cent
in 2000. Compare this with 26.10 per cent in whole of India. This, despite the
fact that the State’s contribution was less than 1 per cent of the GDP in 2000–
2001. “In 2001–2002, the state spent 7516.6 crores, of which 4,577, (or 60
paise of every rupee spent came from centre). The state’s non-developmental
expenditure was 2,829 crores, including its salary bill of 1,193 crores, while
its own revenues were barely 1,095 crores. The state could not have paid even
the wages of its employees without the centre’s help.” In other states, central
8

assistance comprises 70 per cent debt and 30 per cent aid; in Jammu and
Kashmir it is 90 per cent aid and 10 per cent debt. Later, even this 10 per cent
debt was converted in to aid. In fact, the centre is funding the complete Five-
Year-Plan of 11,400 crores.

Table 3: Population Below Poverty Line (1973–2000)

 Source: Census of India.

The state is also quite well off in other socio-economic fields as indicated by
the following facts:-

• Its literacy level at 64.8 per cent and sex ratio of 923/1000 is almost at
par with the national level of 65.4 per cent and 933/1000 respectively.

• Its birth rate of 19.9/1000 is lower than the national average of

25.8/1000. So is its death rate; 5.4/1000 for the state compared to 8.5/1000
of the national average.

• Jammu and Kashmir’s infant mortality rate (45/1000) is also superior to

the national average (68/1000). See Table:-

Table 4: Demographic Profile

Source: Census of India 2001 and UNDP

 The official per capita income of Jammu and Kashmir in 2002–2003 was
12,399. This was lower than the national per capita income of 16,707. But it is
much higher than many other states; Bihar — 5108, Orissa — 8547. “For the
10 Five Year Plan, the state got a per capita allocation of 14,399 whereas
th

Bihar and Orissa got 2,536 and 5177 respectively, while the national average
was only 5668.” 9

The Jammu and Kashmir Government employs 350,000 people, which

translates to 34.5 government employees for every thousand persons. Rajasthan
Government on the other hand, employs less than double the number of people,
despite being about five and half times bigger than Jammu and Kashmir in terms
of population.

Table 5: Government Employee Status

States J&K Rajasthan

Population 10,143,700 56,507,188
Per Capita Income ( ) 12,399 11,978
Number of Govt. Employees (Lakhs) 3.5* 6.0**
Govt. Employees per 1000 Population 34.5 10.6
Source: Census of India and Statistical Outline of India, 2003–04
*www.jammukashmir.nic.in. (Website of Govt. of J&K).

**Rajasthan Plans Computer Training for Employees, 8.11.2004;

Indo-Asian News Service, Jaipur.

“In 2002–2003, it raised a mere 936 crores by way of taxes and had total
non-tax revenue of 4,745 crores. Bihar collected 2,814 crores by way of taxes
and had total non-tax revenue of 2,062 crores. Quite clearly, therefore, the
nation’s munificence is lavished upon Jammu and Kashmir.” This appears quite 10

unfair considering the fact that “the State government’s accounts have not been
audited for over a decade. No one knows what was spent where and who got
what.” 11

Table 6: Tax Mobilisation in States in 2002–03 ( Crores)

 Source: State Finances, Reserve Bank of India, 2002–03

Note: Tables 1 to 6 have been reproduced from a report authored by Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPAS);
a privately funded think-tank focussed on the study and review of Public Policy in India

All security-related expenditure of the State is also reimbursed to the State by

the centre. 5,50,000 security forces personnel deployed in the State have also
contributed to the flourishing economy of the State. To add to their (Kashmiris)
income, “Income Tax and Sales Tax are hardly ever paid and rarely demanded.
The phenomenon pre-dates terrorism,” says Anand K Sahay. 12

According to National Sample Survey Organisation, urban parts of Jammu

and Kashmir have prospered during the period of militancy. Jammu and Kashmir
also has many other advantages compared to other states of India. It enjoys a far
greater degree of autonomy than any other state in India through its own
constitution and privileges guaranteed by Article 370 of the Constitution of
India. Jammu and Kashmir did not bank with Reserve Bank of India, but with its
own Jammu and Kashmir Bank, wherein it owned majority stake and from
which it could obtain overdrafts. Recently this arrangement has undergone a
change. Through an agreement that the State reached with the Reserve Bank of
India on January 21, 2011, the latter “will undertake all its general banking
business and act as its sole agent for investment.” This agreement came into
13

effect from April 1, 2011.

As would be evident, terrorism itself has created a huge economy and

powerful lobby of vested interests. For them, keeping the pot boiling makes
great economic sense.

Valley’s Dominance of State’s Economy and Politics

Ever since its accession to India, the political dispensation governing Jammu
and Kashmir, has been completely dominated by the of State’s Muslim majority
legislators who belong to the Valley. Irrespective of their party affiliations
Kashmiri Muslim legislators zealously guard the interests of the Valley’s
Muslims. The Central government has all along been a willing and enthusiastic
accomplice in this communal agenda of theirs. To quote an example, on March
25, 2011, a government order entitled Dogras of the State (basically from
Jammu) to obtain a Dogra Certificate which envisaged some relaxation in rules
governing their recruitment into Central Para Military Forces, in terms of some
physical measurements. However, the separatists created a hue and cry, terming
it as a prelude to creating a Duggar Desh (Dogra State).Taking a cue from the
separatists, the Muslim legislators then ganged up, with the active connivance of
the Central government, to have the order revoked a month later; on April 28,
2011. That the State government had bowed in front of the separatist’s
communal agenda, supported by the Indian Government, was not the first such
instance. It is because of this ganging up by Kashmiri Muslim legislators that the
decks in every sector within the State are tilted heavily in favour of Kashmir.

Jammu comprises an area which is 70 per cent larger than Kashmir and has 45
per cent of the State’s population. But Jammu has only 37 seats in the State
Legislative Assembly, whereas Kashmir has 46. Jammu returns one member to
the state legislature for 90,000 people, whereas in Kashmir, it is 73,000 people
who return one such member. This, despite the fact that Jammu region has more
registered voters (30,59,986) than the Valley (28,85,555). Average size of
Parliament and Assembly seat (in terms of voters) in Jammu is 12,31,000 and
66,600 respectively; in the Valley these figures are 8,03,000 lakh and 52,400
respectively. Kashmir gets to elect three members for the Parliament and Jammu
only two.

In late eighties, two million people visited Vaishno Devi Shrine every year
compared to half a million tourists visiting Kashmir. Yet 90 per cent of the
tourism budget was allotted to Kashmir.

Out of a total of 450,000 government/semi-government employees in the

State, 330,000, come from the Valley. Jammu and Ladakh are grossly under
represented; the former having only 15 per cent representation in the civil
secretariat. At the secretary level, Jammu’s share is 8 per cent. Ladakh’s
representation in civil secretariat is only 0.68 per cent. The unemployment
figures in Jammu and Ladakh are 69 per cent, which is far higher than that in the
Valley, where it is 30 per cent (2006 figures). Between 1990 and 2006, state
government employed 265,000 persons; only 345 of these were Kashmiri
Pandits.

Jammu contributes 70 per cent of the State’s revenue, whereas only 30 per
cent of its total expenditure is incurred on it. Since 1996, the state created
155,000 job opportunities; Jammu got only 15,000 of these, remaining went to
the valley. “At an average, 6000,000 tourists visit Jammu every year and only
200,000 visit Kashmir, yet 90 per cent of tourism expenditure goes to the
Valley,” says Dina Nath Mishra.

The discrimination against Jammu and Ladakh is further compounded when

even developmental works are carried out with a heavy bias towards the Valley.
As Dr Hari Om, writing in the Indian Express of July 17, 2002 states, “Chenani
is the only power project in Jammu, producing a paltry 22 MW of power. The
rest of the projects, Upper Jhelum, Lower Jhelum, Upper Sindh, Mohra and
Ganderbal, etc. are all in the Valley, with a production capacity of 328 MW.
While only 10 crores has been spent on Chenani project, 500 crores has been
spent on the Kashmir plants.” Major factories like the cement factory, Hindustan
Machine Tools and telephone factory, are all located in Kashmir itself. Writing
about the state of other infrastructural projects, Hari Om states, “Jammu has a
total area of 26,293 sq kms and Kashmir 15,853 sq kms. In 1987, Jammu had
3,500 kms of roads, covering 18 per cent of this area, whereas Kashmir had
4,900 kms, covering more than 40 per cent of the area.”

The tilt towards the Valley extends to even the number of professional
colleges and technical institutes opened in the State. Whereas Kashmir boasts of
Post-graduate Sher-e-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, dental college,
veterinary college, Agriculture University, Regional Engineering College, the
Artificial Limb Centre, Institute of Hotel Management and Physical Training
Institute: Jammu has one ill-equipped medical college and a small under-staffed
engineering college which does not even have a full range of equipment. The
agriculture and Ayurvedic colleges in Jammu have been closed down. In the
admissions to Regional Engineering College and Agricultural University, the
share of Jammu province is only 30 per cent.

Mata Vaishno Devi University was established in Jammu after the proposal
was rejected by the government on many occasions, on one pretext or the other.
Even when the proposal was finally accepted, the university was set up by the
Vaishno Devi Trust, using funds collected from pilgrims. The Trust had to shell
out 13 crores to purchase the land at commercial rates. On the other hand, Baba
Ghulam Shah Badshah University, set up as a counter move in Rajouri, was
funded by the State Wakf Council headed by Mufti Mohammad Syed, the then
Chief Minister, who also gave it a huge chunk of forest land, free of cost.

In 1986, the Prime Minister announced an aid package of approximately 180

crores for the state. Out of this, Jammu got 15.5 crores, and Kashmir, 70.06
crores. The remaining amount of 92.76 crores was meant to be spent on the
common development projects of the entire state, but actually it turned out that
more than 50 crores was allocated to Kashmir.

To add to all these economic advantages enjoyed by the Valley Muslims,

Kashmiri Pandits exodus from the valley in 1990 has further improved their
economic status. Huge chunks of agricultural and non-agricultural land left
behind by Pandits (some estimates put it at 14,000 hectares of agricultural land
alone) has been illegally appropriated by them. Besides, continued life in exile
compelled a large number of Pandits to resort to distress sale of their properties.
“99 per cent of the sale of houses by Pandits was termed as distress sale.” Such 14

distress sale, particularly in the initial years of militancy, further contributed to

enriching the Kashmiri Muslims. A clear indication of improved economic status
of Kashmiri Muslims is the fact that in every home, whenever there is some
function, jewellery is presented as gifts to the guests. “Now, even diamonds are
becoming popular. It was not so earlier,” says Nisar Ahmed, a shop-owner.

Additionally, what contributed substantially to the economic betterment of

Kashmiri Muslims was that they got to fill-in thousands of government posts
which were created as a result of Pandit’s exodus from Kashmir. Besides, the
posts vacated by Pandits in the State government services while retiring every
month, too got filled by Kashmiri Muslims as none was recruited from amongst
the former. By 2007, approximately 72 per cent of state government Pandit
employees had retired and these posts were filled up by Kashmiri Muslims.
After more than two decades of their exodus, the State government, on
instructions from the centre, has recently recruited 3,000 Pandits, though their
service conditions stipulate that they need to serve in Kashmir. How many will
take up these jobs is, therefore, a moot point.

It is because of all these reasons that one does not get to see the same stark
poverty in Kashmir Valley, as one gets to see in the rural areas of rest of India.
 Compare this with PoK, if only to bring out the fact that Kashmiris are better
off than those living across the LoC. World Bank report of July 2002, stated that
88 per cent people in PoK live in rural areas, depending on forestry and
agriculture. Unemployment ranges between 35 to 50 per cent. Literacy, till
recently, was only 10 per cent, though it has now risen to 48 per cent. Sixty per
cent of the population has no access to drinking water. Whereas, per capita
income of Pakistan was 420 $ ( 21000) in 2006, in PoK it was 185–200 $ (
9,500).

Present Economic Realities of the State

Government of India has poured in thousands of crores of rupees into the
State in the past two decades of insurgency, to help some specific sectors, like
tourism, which were hard hit by insurgency. Before militancy set in, tourism
contributed 500 crores per annum to the State’s economy. The tourist inflow,
which had reached a peak of 730,000 in 1978–79, was reduced to a few thousand
after violence broke out in Kashmir. Public infrastructure also suffered great
damage due to neglect and violence. Between 1989 and 1996, about 725
educational institutions and 303 bridges and culverts had been destroyed. The
negligible recovery of taxes and revenues during the nineties further increased
the non-plan deficit. Consequently, the State’s economic dependence on the
centre further increased in the recent past.

Reserve Bank of India’s figures (2009–2010) clearly point out the deep
financial mess the State is in. In 2009–2010, it received 60 per cent of its total
expenditure, amounting to 13,252 corers, as grants. Between 1989–90 and
2009–2010 (militancy period), the state received a total of 94,409 crores, as
grants. During the decade between 1994–95 and 2005–2006, the state got 10–12
per cent of the total amount disbursed as grants to all the states of the country.
Though, in 2009–2010, it had marginally dipped to eight per cent. Such high
level of grants, compared to its ratio of the entire population of the country
(nearly one per cent) proves that the Central government has been more than
kind to the State. The inflow of goods into the Valley also increased from
1,157.33 crores in 1989–90 to 2,536.53 crores in 1994–1995 (the worst period
of militancy). During the same period, the outflow of goods from the Valley also
increased by nearly 50 per cent.

Compare this with the centre’s attitude towards the perennially insurgency-hit
north-east. The combined grant received by the eight north-eastern states during
the same period was 29,084 cores; 44 per cent of their entire expenditure. This
is significantly lower than that of Jammu and Kashmir.

Mis-utilisation of these funds by Jammu and Kashmir has often raised many
eye brows. Only 30 per cent of the aggregate expenditure of the State is incurred
on social sectors, i.e. schools, health and rural development — fourth lowest
among all states. This is against the national average of the 40 per cent.

Despite militancy being at peak during 1990–1995, 6,428 villages were

brought under new water supply scheme, besides executing two master plans for
Jammu and Srinagar, respectively. Similarly, handicraft production in Kashmir
Valley, which in 1974–75 was 200 million, rose to 2,400 million in 1993–94.
Export of handicrafts also registered a jump from 75 million to 2,130 million
during the same period. In 1993–94 alone, 3,617 health centres were set up. The
enrollment of primary school students also went up from 745,000 in 1989–90 to
940,000 in 1994–95. The State employs 350,000 people, whereas Rajasthan,
which is five times the size of Jammu and Kashmir employs only 600,000
people. For the Tenth Five-Year Plan, it got a per capita allocation of 14,399,
compared to 2,536 for Bihar and 5,177 for Orrisa.

Administrative expenditure of Jammu and Kashmir is nearly 12 per cent of its

overall expenditure. Some might argue that such high level of expenditure is
attributable to the State’s mountainous terrain and its disturbed conditions. But
Himachal and Sikkim, both mountainous regions, spend only six per cent on
administrative expenditure. Another pointer to the woeful state of financial
affairs of the state is its per-capita spending. In Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal
Pradesh (all mountainous states and also affected by militancy in varying
degrees), the per capita spending is 59 lakhs, 35 lakhs and 38 lakhs,
respectively (figures for 2009–2010). In Jammu and Kashmir, it is only 20
lakhs. This clearly shows that not enough money is being spent by the State on
projects that would have benefited the people directly. One of the reasons is that
the State is not generating enough revenue of its own. Besides, there are
legitimate doubts whether even the money being shown as spent, was in fact
spent at all. Incidentally, not long ago the State was rated as the second most
corrupt state among all Indian States by the Berlin-based International
Corruption Watchdog, ‘The Transparency International.’ As Mohan Guruswamy
and Jeevan Prakash Mohanty have stated, “Talk to even the most ardent pro-
India Kashmiri, and he will tell you that politicians and bureaucrats have stolen
most of the money. Lending credence to this is the amazing explosion of new
construction in evidence all over Kashmir Valley. It is believed that every
second house belongs to a government employee or one connected with it.
Relate this to the low poverty level in the State and it would seem that trickle-
down economics works.” 15

That the so-called economic backwardness was the cause of breaking out of
insurgency in Kashmir has been refuted by no less than its youthful Chief
Minister, Omar Abdullah. Speaking on the occasion of inauguration of
Qazigund-Anantnag railway line on October 28, 2009, he said, “Kashmir issue
cannot be resolved through the flow of money. It was the politics, not the urge
for money that drove the Kashmiri youth to take up arms twenty years back.”

Grants from Central Govt. ( Cr.): Share of Total State Expenditure (%)

Source: Times of India, July 19, 2010

Another Myth: Identity Crisis

Raising the bogey of Kashmiri identity being under threat by ‘Hindu’ India’
by Kashmiri separatists, local politicians and their supporters outside the State
has been a common feature of Kashmiri politics. For separatists, it becomes an
emotion-laden slogan to galvanise its cadres against India, projected as a
coloniser, out to overwhelm and destroy Kashmir’s predominant Islamic culture.
For mainstream politicians of the Valley, it helps to pit their support base in the
Valley against Jammu. This helps them polarise voters regionally, and reap rich
electoral dividends; the Valley has larger number of assembly seats than Jammu
region. For their supporters outside the State, it is another stick to beat the
‘communal forces’ with.

The facts are to the contrary. Hindus of Kashmir, who formed about nine per
cent of its population in 1947, have almost entirely been cleansed out of Kashmir
valley. With Article 370 in place; no outsider can settle in the State or own
businesses there and thereby endanger Kashmir’s Muslim identity. If at all, its
Muslim identity has been strengthened after 1947. In this respect, Kashmir can
favourably be compared to Pakistan and Bangladesh, where minority Hindus
have met with the same fate. The only difference being that both these countries
are declared Islamic republics, whereas India is a secular nation. Is not Kashmiri
identity threatened by the fact that Kashmir is the only place where people prefer
Urdu or English, as the medium of instruction for their children, instead of their
mother tongue, Kashmiri? Ironically, those who are beating their breasts about
the loss of Kashmiri identity have actually been responsible for the decline in the
fortunes of Kashmiri language. This decline, which began after the annexation of
Kashmir by Mughals in sixteenth century, was dealt a deathly blow when Urdu
was declared the State’s official language in 1947. The language also suffered
due to the disagreement over the suitable script for writing Kashmiri. Kashmiri
Pandits have been in favour of Sharda script for writing Kashmiri, whereas
Muslims have preferred Persian. Historically and scientifically speaking,
Kashmiri Pandits have a stronger argument. Dr KN Pandita writes, “Kalhana’s
Rajtarangini, which Stein made the archetype for his translation into English,
was also written in the Sharda script.” Needless to say, Sharda script was a
16

scientific and time tested script. Dr Pandita further says, “Its replacement by
Arabic script, to which some diacritical marks have been appended, remains the
most unscientific and unjustifiable script for Kashmiri language.” The fact is
17

that rather than examining the issue purely as a scientific exercise, Kashmiri
Muslims have turned it into a political issue. The contention of later-day Hindu
writers and poets to use diacritically modified Devnagri script for Kashmiri
language has some scientific justification.

The present crises in the valley have nothing to do with economy or identity.
The outbreak of insurgency in Kashmir is an Islamist upsurge against India,
whose secularism is alien to the very core of radical Islamic religious concept.
Such view has been repeatedly confirmed by Kashmir’s most prominent
separatist leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani. While addressing a huge congregation
of people in Srinagar during the ‘Amarnath land row agitation’ in July 2008,
Geelani said, “We have one point programme; Azadi, bara-e-Islam (Freedom for
Islam) and not for secularism or anything else.” As a result, the grand strategy
18
of the radical Islamic elements and their armed cadres in Kashmir has been to
annihilate the Kashmiri Hindus in order to present an Islamised Kashmir as a fait
accompli. This was the actual cause why Pandits were killed and forced to flee.

Turning Jagmohan in to Fall-guy

One of the important features of the disinformation campaign launched by the
radical Islamists was to nurture and cultivate support for their perceived
grievances against India. Venomous propaganda of their grievances relating to
political, religious, economic and other aspects, over decades, had enabled the
Islamists to prepare the ground for effectively spreading lies against India and
Pandits, which people readily believed. Jagmohan, was the Governor of the State
during the most crucial period when insurgency broke out and rapidly spread
throughout the Valley (January to May 1990). It was during his governorship
that Pandit exodus began. His firm handling of the sudden upsurge in violence
had turned him into a target of the radical elements as they found in him a
determined administrator who could pose a serious challenge to their nefarious
designs. Vicious and insidious campaign of calumny, lies and his so-called
communal bias was launched against him. Turning him into a fall guy became
the most important political objective of the separatists. Benazir Bhutto,
Pakistan’s Prime Minister at that time, lent her own voice to this tirade against
Jagmohan, demanding his removal, repeatedly and publically. During his brief
spell as Governor of the State, Jagmohan tried his best to stem the rot against
heavy odds, but VP Singh’s Government at the Centre extended no support to
Jagmohan in this grim fight against the militants. In fact, in order to appease the
separatists and their mentors across the LoC, he was immediately replaced.

With the government machinery, the media, the left-liberal class and the
‘human rights’ activists baying for Jagmohan’s blood, the militants, their OGWs,
collaborators and sympathisers decided to put the blame for the exodus of
Kashmiri Pandits on him. They and their above-mentioned collaborators outside
Kashmir, worked overtime to spread the myth that it was Jagmohan who had
advised/ordered the Kashmiri Hindus to leave the valley, so that he could then
unleash the security forces on the hapless population without any worry of
collateral damage! As if India was a banana republic or we were living in a
mediaeval period. The political parties, with their vote banks in their mind, and
the pliant media went out of its way to support the separatist propaganda. The
media, with very few exceptions, chose to hide the tragic story of Pandit exodus.
No matter what Jagmohan said, his word never reached the people. The gullible
public believed what was fed to them by the biased media and the wily
politicians.

Kashmiri Pandits have had a long history of their habitation in Kashmir,

dating back to pre-historic era. Their cultural traditions and rituals were
fashioned by their deep attachment to their land. From birth to death, through
many festivals held at Kashmir’s numerous religious shrines, endowments and
ancient temples, their entire life was bound with their land. Many of their
pilgrimage centres and temples trace back their origin to the Neelmat era and
beyond. Some of these centres have witnessed unbroken pilgrimages being
undertaken from times immemorial to the present day. This religious tradition
kept the Pandits intertwined with the Valley’s land. Generation after generation,
Kashmiri Pandits lived and died in the Valley despite the Muslim onslaught after
the arrival of Islam in Kashmir. It is, therefore, naive to think that Kashmiri
Pandits should have snapped their moorings and abandoned their homes of
thousands of years, at Jagmohan’s bidding. It is inconceivable that a literate
community like Kashmiri Pandits would jump into the unknown and throw itself
at the mercy and charity of strangers, because Jagmohan asked them to do so. It
is preposterous to think that a well-established community will leave behind all
assets amounting to thousands of crores of rupees and put their own future and
that of their coming generations at risk in an alien environment, because
Governor Jagmohan asked them to do so. According to the Islamists, this
perilous course was adopted by the Pandits to enable Jagmohan to do with the
Valley and its people, as he pleased, like a modern-day Sikander Butshikan.

No one ever asked the Islamists and their camp followers one simple question;
“In the utter chaos into which the Valley was thrown due to the sudden outbreak
of militant violence in 1989-90, how was Jagmohan able to send this message of
evacuation to every nook and corner of Kashmir, into which Kashmiri Pandits
were scattered.” And the miracle is that all this happened while Jagmohan was
flying into the Valley, a day after being sworn-in at Jammu, while the caravan of
Kashmiri Pandit exodus was winding its painful way up the slopes of Pir Panjal,
in precisely the opposite direction.

It was not only their physical elimination that scared the day lights out of
Kashmir Pandits, but the indignities heaped on their womenfolk and the highly
credible threats conveyed by the Islamists, which forced the Pandits to leave.

A survey carried out while compiling the White Paper on Kashmir, to

ascertain the reasons for the exodus, revealed the truth. This is appended below:

Percentage of Pandits Expressed following as the cause of their fleeing from Kashmir
who fled from
Towns Village Remote
Areas
56 38 12 They were marked to be killed and had just about a day and a half to make
good their escape.
38 13 12 They had credible information that their names appeared in the “hit list”
prepared by the militants.
43 28 22 They heard rumours that their name figured in the “Hit List”
68 42 8 They received threats from various militant organisations.
6 2 - They received instructions to appear before Muslim tribunals established in
local mosques, after Friday prayers, who would then decide their fate. Less
than one per cent stated that they actually appeared before any such tribunal.
Others fled before the appointed day of their appearance before these
tribunals.
38 46 71 Threats were communicated through Muslim neighbours and acquaintances.
42 69 68 They received confidential information that they were being accused of
espionage for India. They further said that they believed that such accusations
meant sure execution at the hands of militants.
32 41 76 They were confidentially counselled by their Muslim neighbours to shift to
Jammu as their continued stay in Kashmir involved great risk to their lives.
82 - 57 They received threats through public address system of mosques, which
involved long discourses on the sacred mission of the Islamists to rid the
Valley of Kafirs (As Pandits were referred to).
62 21 8 They read notices in locally published Urdu newspapers warning Hindus to
leave Kashmir within 24 hours or face death.
67 47 - They were forced out of their homes to join the rampaging mobs that held the
Pandits to ransom on the night of January 19, 1990.
87 67 68 They did not dare lodge a complaint with the local police station for the
following reasons:-
(a) Feared retaliation by militants.
(b) Apprehensive about police revealing their identity to the militants.
(c) Militants kept strict watch on police stations.
79 38 - They felt insecure as police posts in their localities did not function.
78 83 - They apprehended attack on their womenfolk. 86 per cent decided to leave
after the traumatic events of the night of January 19.
93 - 63 Describing their experience of the night of January 19, they said they did not
join the night long protest. 81 per cent respondents said that they hid their
women and children lest they were harmed. 12 per cent said that unruly mobs
had entered their houses and their behaviour inside the houses was dangerous.
81 per cent of the respondents stated that during this night and many other
nights that followed, they hid their women folk and children from strangers
who broke into their houses.
 43 - 14 They had evacuated under the protection provided by the central security
forces. They expressed the view that they would certainly have been
eliminated if these forces had not helped them to evacuate.
46 61 83 They would have run the risk of being converted to Islam had they not fled
from the Valley.

When specifically asked to spell out their apprehensions, 85 per cent of the
respondents said that they would have fallen victim to large-scale assassinations
had they not fled from the valley. 92.5 per cent said that their womenfolk would
have been assaulted had they not fled.

The following is the opinion expressed exclusively by women interviewees:

Percentage of women who Expressed following as the cause of their fleeing from Kashmir
fled from
Towns Village Remote
locations
52 86 - They were marked to be killed and had just about a day and a half to make
good their escape.
68 74 - Apprehended attack on their houses.
63 - - They had evacuated due to large-scale assassinations of Hindus.
88 96 - Feared assault on their families.
76 72 - Expected mass conversion of Hindus to Islam.
88 - - Expected no guarantee of their life in the localities in which they lived and
decided that their evacuation was necessary.
97 - - They would have been liquidated in large numbers had they not evacuated
in time.
6 - 8 Were advised by the central security forces to evacuate to safer places.

Source: White Paper on Kashmir: Dr MK Teng and CL Guddu for Joint Human Rights Committee.

It may be noted that none of the respondents stated having received any overt
or covert instruction from the State/Central Government or from the Governor or
from his office to the effect that even remotely suggested that they should leave
the Valley. While speaking at a seminar in New Delhi on December 26, 2010,
Jagmohan described it as “one of history’s greatest lies.” 19

When specifically asked to comment on the widely circulated canard in the

valley that it was Jagmohan who encouraged Pandits to leave the valley, Sofi
replied, “It is a total lie. It is part of systematic propaganda. The Pandits flight
from the Valley was the sequel to a plan hatched well in advance from outside
the state. It had nothing to do with Jagmohan… Nearly 32,000 Kashmiri Pandit
houses have been burnt in since 1991. Is Jagmohan’s hand in this too?”

Ashish Nandy of the Centre for Developing Studies said appropriately, “When
Hindus began to be exterminated systematically in Kashmir and to leave in large
numbers; our secular friends said then that Governor Jagmohan had deliberately
organised the forced exodus. I would like to see people leaving their ancestral
homes with a sack in hand just because the governor of the state asks them to do
so! When questioned later as to how the killing of Hindus were not condemned
strongly enough, some of them said newspapers had refused to carry their
statements.” 20

Speaking at an international Conference in Kolkatta, on January 25, 2005,

eminent French journalist and human rights activist Francois Gautier said, “The
Kashmiri Pandits are victims of unparalleled ethnic cleansing. I have covered
Kashmir since 1990s and saw how the Kashmiri Pandits had to flee because of
terror, and live in camps in a sorry state. It is a very sad story.”

The secular façade which Kashmir has worn after Independence was provided
mainly by Kashmiri Pandits. They never reacted to Muslim communalism;
instead, they faced it with the fervent hope that universalisation of education and
gradual development of scientific temper by the majority community in
Kashmir, would lead to religious tolerance, equity, justice and the recognition of
the genuine aspirations of Kashmir’s minority Pandits. However, this hope was
shattered, as neither the Muslims in Kashmir nor the Indian Government, which
swears by secularism, came to their rescue in their hour of need. All the
constitutional guarantees for the protection of their life, dignity and property
were trampled with impunity. Indian political parties, its official organs, media
in general and the secularists, remained mute spectators to the communal killings
of Pandits, other non-Muslims and pro-India Muslims and their forced exile
from their homes and hearths.

N OTES

1. House boats are synonymous with tourist industry in Kashmir. Tourists live in these magnificent boats,
anchored in the serene and placid waters of Dal and Nagin lakes of Kashmir. Incidentally, it was a
Kashmiri Pandit, Narain Das, who constructed the first house boat in Kashmir. “Narain Das was one
of the first five Kashmiris to learn English from Rev. Doxy, the founder of famous Kashmir Mission
School in 1982,” says the book Keys to Kashmir. He was the father of the renowned Shaivite
 philosopher of recent times, Swami Laxman Joo. Narain Das had opened a small store to cater to the
needs of European visitors, who had started flocking to Kashmir in large numbers at the turn of
nineteenth century.
Once his store was destroyed in fire, and not finding a suitable place to run the strore from, he shifted
to a doonga. This shifting turned out to be a blessing in disguise as the doonga could be moved to a
convenient location for visitors and moored there. When rain and snow destroyed the matting walls
and hay roof of his new store, he replaced these with wooden planks and shingles. A British officer
once took fancy to his doonga and purchased it from Narain Das, who found the deal quite profitable.
Thereafter, Narain Das started constructing doonga and gave up the business of running stores.
Narain Das had also developed trade relations with some companies belonging to Western countries.
One of these was Koch Burns Agency, which too ran a departmental store from a doonga, parked on
the Jhelum, near Shivpora in Srinagar. “In 1885, the Koch Burns Agency shifted to Chinar Bagh near
Dalgate. Once a customer of the Agency, Dr Knight, suggested to Narain Das that he should make
some modifications to the doonga to make it more attractive and convenient for the tourists to live
in,” says Inder Krishen Raina, a grand nephew of Narain Das. The latter found the idea interesting
and carried out the required modifications. By July 4, 1890, after much trial and error, the first house
boat was ready for commercial use of tourists. However, constant improvement in design and
aesthetics continued till many years thereafter. With vital inputs from Colonel R Sartorius, V.C., and
some other Englishmen, the first double storey house boat, named ‘Victory’, was constructed in
1918. This had led to Narain Das being known by the nick name Nav Narain (Nav, meaning boat).
The boats are made of quality cedar wood available in deep forests of northwest Kashmir.
2. Dr MK Teng and CL Gadoo, White Paper on Kashmir for Joint Human Rights Committee for
Minorities in Kashmir (Gupta Print Services).
3. Binish Gulzar and Syed Rakshanda Suman; Pioneer, August 25, 2009.
4. Shankar Aiyer, India Today, October 14, 2002, p. 36.
5. Mohan Guruswamy and Jeevan Prakash Mohanty, Jammu and Kashmir: Is there really a fresh vision
and a new blueprint? Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPAS), New Delhi.
6. Shankar Aiyer, n. 4.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Mohan Guruswamy and Jeevan Prakash Mohanty, n. 5.
10. Ibid.
11. Joginder Singh, Pioneer, February 11, 2008.
12. Inside Kashmir-3, Times of India, August 2, 2010.
13. Times of India, January 22, 2011.
14. Prof Hari Om, Kashmir Sentinel, December, 2006.
15. Mohan Guruswamy and Jeevan Prakash Mohanty, n. 5.
16. Dr KN Pandita, Koshur Samachar, July 2011, p. 32.
17. Ibid.
18. Subodh Gildayal, Times of India, August 20, 2008.
19. From interview by Omkar Razdan, Time of India, November 9, 1997.
20. A Dangerous Symbiosis, Outlook, April 1, 2002
17
 AFTERMATH OF EXODUS
Green fields are gone now, parched by the sun.
Gone from the valleys, where rivers used to run.
Gone with the cold wind that swept into my heart.
Gone with the lovers, who left their dreams depart.
—Greenfields lyrics (The Brothers Four)

Ganpathyar locality of Srinagar, predominantly inhabited by Kashmiri Pandits, looking completely

deserted, even a decade after the exodus (April 2000)

Jammu: Pandit Refugees’ First Halt

At the government level, there existed no procedures or mechanisms that
would immediately be put into practice to provide succor to the thousands of
hapless refugees. On reaching Jammu, many people took shelter in temples,
schools, serais (inns), community/religious places, government buildings, open
patches, street corners, etc., mostly under open skies. The government did not
rise to the occasion and failed to provide shelter to the traumatised community,
most of whom had landed with practically nothing, besides the clothes they were
wearing. It was left to the members of the voluntary Hindu organisations to
provide the refugees with the bare essential requirements. Gita Bhavan, forming
part of the Shiva temple complex in the heart of Jammu city, became the focal
point of the Pandit refugees on arrival. Most of the refugees disembarked here
after they fled from Srinagar. They arrived in a disheveled state, hungry and
thirsty, but safe anyhow. Several prominent Hindu leaders of the state formed a
Sahayta Committee (Assistance Committee), under Amarnath Vaishnavi, a
prominent Kashmiri Pandit social activist.

Jammu city witnessed utter chaos as it lacked adequate infrastructure to

handle such a huge influx of new settlers. Initially, the government turned a
blind eye to the problem, but the ever-increasing number of refugees pouring in
from the valley, compelled the government to establish tented camps to house
them. In due course of time, nearly 215,000 Pandit refugees were accommodated
in 36 camps established at different locations in Jammu province, including
those at Nagrota, Reasi, Udhampur and Kathua. These camps did not have even
the rudimentary civic facilities, like sanitation and water supply. Medical
facilities were non-existent. For example, for a township of 500 tents in Nagrota,
located six kms from Jammu, there were only three taps for the entire
population, with water supply restricted to half hour each in the morning and
evening. Similarly, the camp had only three toilets and no schools, compelling
children to while away their time in idle gossip and aimless pursuits. Due to the
appalling conditions prevailing in the camps, 60 per cent of the refugees shifted
to one-room rented accommodation shortly after arriving in these camps. This,
despite the fact, that heavy inflow of refugees into Jammu had pushed up the
rents exorbitantly. Approximately 15 per cent of the refugees were also
accommodated by their relatives.

Arrival of such a huge number of refugees in Jammu suddenly put additional

burden on the limited resources of the city. This led to the increased cost of
essential commodities of daily-use and higher rentals for scarce accommodation,
which Pandits sought. Rise in the cost of living across the board, created
difficulties for the locals who found themselves dealing with thousands of
uninvited people. Kashmiri Pandits became a focus as well as a cause of the
resentment felt by the people of Jammu. Virender Kumar’s dispatch in the
Indian Express of July 10, 1990, states, “In Jammu, the influx of more than one
lakh refugees… has given rise to apprehensions that they would soon be
competing with the local people for the limited jobs and avenues of higher
education. The government’s action in giving regular postings to some refugees
in Jammu has made these apprehensions look real.”

In order to avoid an adverse political fall-out in Jammu, the State Government

appointed the Relief Commissioner as the officer responsible to supervise the
provision of relief to the refugees. Many sub-offices were also created at various
places in Jammu, under the charge of assistant commissioners. Each refugee
family’s arrival was recorded in a ‘Ration Book’ as ‘Refugee Family’, after the
head of the family furnished all details about the family members, including
names, addresses, etc. This book was certified by the relief commissioner. The
rations drawn by each family, along with financial assistance received, was duly
entered into this book. The distribution of ration was carried out through
government-run ration shops and financial relief was disbursed through a
number of counters established at various places in the city.

Since most refugees had lost all means of their livelihood, they were provided
with a monthly financial assistance of 1000 for a family of five members,
besides nine kilograms of rice and two kilograms of wheat flour per head per
month by the government. Paying such a paltry sum as relief fell far short of
what was paid to people in similar situations even in war-torn Ethiopia and
Somalia. India, that prided itself in providing shelter to the persecuted people
like the Zoroastrians, the Tibetans and refugees from erstwhile Soviet Union,
East Pakistan and Afghanistan, could have certainly shown more compassion
while dealing with their own persecuted people. This ‘relief’ was not applicable
to the employees of the state government who were permitted to draw their
regular salaries from offices in Jammu.
 A view of a typical Refugee Camp at Jammu

Delhi became the other major destination for the refugees, where a number of
refugee camps were hurriedly organised by some voluntary Hindu organisations.
‘Kashmiri Samiti’, Delhi, under its President Chaman Lal Gadoo, worked
tirelessly to provide relief with their limited resources. Fifteen years after their
displacement, 14 per cent of Kashmiri Pandit refugees were still occupying 16
camps and 70 non-camp habitations, with nearly 60 per cent of these being from
rural areas; 60 per cent from Anantnag and 28 per cent from old Baramulla
districts, with the remaining from urban areas, mostly from Srinagar district.

An unstarred question in Rajya Sabha on August 7, 2002, received the

following reply:

“As per information available, 56,246 families have migrated from the Valley.
Of these 34,305 are staying in Jammu, 19,338 families are in Delhi and 2,603
families in other states. 238 Kashmiri refugee families are living in 14 camps in
Delhi and 4778 families in 12 camps in Jammu…”
 Nearly the same figures were quoted by Sh Jitender Singh, the Minister of
State for Home Affairs in the Union Government. Speaking in the Rajya Sabha
on August 22, 2012, he said that close to 60,000 families of Kashmiri Pandits
had moved out of the Valley. (Times of India, Delhi Edition, August 23, 2012).

Post Exodus: Immediate Fallout

The Indian people are by and large, emotionally attached to their birth places.
This is visible during involuntary displacement when villages and towns have to
be permanently evacuated to facilitate the execution of development projects.
When the Tehri dam was to be built, one of the reasons given by the local
residents for being reluctant to shift out from there to new rehabilitation sites
was that they were deeply attached to their birth place. Displacement, resulting
due to conflicts and political turmoil, leads to impoverishment and deterioration
in the living standards of the displaced. This is evident in the following:-

1. Landlessness.

2. Homelessness.

3. Unemployment.

4. Marginalisation on all accounts.

5. Food insecurity.

6. Morbidity and mortality.

7. Social dis-articulation.

Being, by and large, composed of and dominated by elements that had long
ceased to be neutral and secular, Kashmiri Pandits suffered due to the attitude of
this biased bureaucracy, whose prejudice against the former was well-
established. Traditionally, the state bureaucracy was divided into two factions;
those belonging to the State and those, mostly Muslims, who belonged to the
Indian Administrative Service. The former had risen to high positions from
ordinary appointments, due to being ‘conferred’ with the IAS designation,
without having had to pass the actual examination. This segment formed a very
powerful block of the State Administration. The other faction was rootless in the
state, but survived by ingratiating itself with the political bosses at the centre and
at the state level. Nevertheless, having realised the minimal impact that the
Kashmiri Pandits exodus was likely to have on the State or on the national
politics, this segment of bureaucracy chose to remain indifferent to their plight.

Kashmiri Pandits soon realised that they had landed from frying pan into the
fire. Their travails started right from the process of disbursement of relief itself,
which soon got entangled in the web of bureaucratic corruption. It did not take
much time for the biased bureaucracy to frame rules that made it difficult for the
refugees to prove their displaced status. The concerned Relief Department often
changed the terms and conditions of eligibility for the Pandits to receive relief.
Driven from pillar to post, the refugees greased the palms of Babus (an
unflattering term used to describe a government servant, who constitutes the
heart and soul of bureaucratic red tape), in order to receive the paltry sum. A
survey conducted to assess the impact of this undesirable situation established
that 62 per cent had paid regular bribes to ensure disbursement of relief to them.
About 26 per cent of those queried refused to answer the question out of fear of
incurring the wrath of the concerned officials. A news item published in a
leading national daily, the Indian Express sometime during this period states:

“The trauma of terrorism that compelled Hindus in Kashmir to flee to safety

has followed them into their forbidding refugee camps around Jammu.” Quoting
Mumbai-based film maker, Ashok Pandit, who spoke to the Express News
Service after visiting all the 36 camps around Jammu, housing 215,000 refugees,
it says, “After suffering persecution by separatists, the distraught runaways felt
they were being victimised by the administration, who did not care about their
plight.” Writing about the state of civic amenities existing in the camps, the
newspaper further writes, “The water supply and sanitation in almost all these
tent settlements, were inadequate, if not non-existent. Medical facilities were
pathetic.”

The paper further writes, “For food, the residents of the camp at Nagrota were
expected to travel to Jammu by a Matador (a small vehicle that can carry about
10–12 passengers) and were apportioned not more than one kilogram sugar and
nine kilogram rice per family per month on their ration cards. The rice was
weighed with a generous mixture of gravel, the refugees alleged.”

Describing the plight of the refugees in the camps, the newspaper adds,
“While two young girls died of snakebite, a young woman and a two-year-old
child succumbed to exposure on account of the oppressive heat. There were
some 3,000 government quarters lying vacant in Jammu, but for some reason are
not being used for accommodating the streams of refugees. The refugees
complained that instead of attending to these issues, the government was giving
compensation as relief to the business houses and Shikarawalas (boatmen).”
Both of these categories were owned by Kashmiri Muslims.

Ironically, compared to what the Pandits had to undergo, the Muslim refugees
(those who had shifted out of the Valley to avoid becoming unintended victims
of the violence in Kashmir) were not put up in tented camps, but were lodged in
separate government quarters. They were not required to fill-up any forms, nor
were they rquired to prove their displaced status. They were not even required to
collect their cash relief from the counters established for the refugees, but the
same was disbursed to them separately.

The government employees among the refugees, and those serving with other
corporate houses, had been permitted to draw their salaries in exile, as long as
they could not join their duties in the Valley due to the ongoing militancy. An
order issued by the Governor in 1990, had categorised them as ‘refugee
employees’. However, in its implementation, the order was curiously twisted and
distorted to harass them. The Head of the Finance Department, a Muslim IAS
officer, devised a term ‘Leave Salary’ and instructed that the refugee employees
will be paid their salaries under this proviso. It was an ingenious means of
further harassing approximately 12,000 refugee employees who formed less than
five per cent of the total employees in the State Service.

The leave salary rule had a devastating effect on a large number of employees
who were working on temporary/ad hoc/non-permanent/work-charge basis.
Their services were abruptly terminated as they could not claim ‘leave salary.’ 1

Many of the discharged employees had worked for years on their respective
posts, and for them, the chances of finding a fresh job at this stage in life were
negligible. Hundreds of employees had no chance of having their jobs confirmed
in due course, as per the existing government orders. They were suddenly faced
with bleak future, with no way of earning their livelihood. The ‘leave salary’
rule had other ramifications; the employees could only be paid their substantive
pay; the disbursement of other admissible allowances was withheld. They could
not claim periodic increments, promotions, grade increments and pensionary
benefits. After protests and demonstrations by the employees, some allowances
were restored, but the admissibility of the fresh ones was left to be decided by
the State Government. Subsequently, however, the government issued
supplementary orders to various departments to allow the refugee employees to
draw periodic increments. As far as other benefits were concerned, despite
demonstrations and other forms of non-violent protests, no other benefit was
granted. To add insult to injury, promotions of some Pandit employees were
ordered, but they were posted to the remotest corners of the Valley, from where
they had fled due to intense militant activity. The orders particularly specified
that promotions would take effect only on the concerned employee physically
reporting to the place of posting. No employee, thus promoted, ever reported to
the next place of posting.

Another class of Pandit refugees, who lost their livelihood, was those who had
served their entire lives in private institutions and organisations which received
grants-in-aid from the government. Most of them had reached a stage in their
service that would have entitled them to pensions and other benefits. These
institutions included schools, colleges, hospitals, nursing homes, clinical
laboratories, Hindu religious endowments and temple trusts, including the
Dharmarth Trust (p. 562). These affected employees ran from pillar to post to
have their salaries restored to them, but in vain. As Kashmir Sentinel mentions,
“It took almost a hundred orders for the government to restore the basic rights of
the refugee employees. For each order to materialise, the displaced Hindu
employees had to wage a relentless struggle of protests, dharnas and rallies in
scorching heat.” For restoration of house rent allowance/city compensatory
2

allowance, which had been denied to them, they had to go to High Court, which
upheld their plea. The State Government approached the Supreme Court to have
the verdict reversed, but the latter too upheld the High Court order. However, till
as late as May 2010, they had not been paid their dues.

The Indian society largely remained oblivious to the plight of the Pandit
refugees as the media had clearly succeeded in hiding their tragedy from the
public. While blood continued to flow in the Valley, the Kashmiri Pandits’ plight
in the camps and outside was soon forgotten. The tents in the camps became
uninhabitable due to normal wear and tear, but were not replaced. With no
regular maintenance, the makeshift sanitary arrangements and drinking water
facilities soon gave way, without being replaced or repaired. No one in the
Government, both in the State and at the Centre, had any time to visit the camps
and get to know the plight of the refugees, first hand. In 1993, Farooq Abdullah
and Ghulam Nabi Azad visited the camps, but instead of assessing their needs
and issuing necessary instructions for improving the living conditions in the
camps, they asked the refugees to return to the Valley. Incidentally, this was the
period when the HM and LeT had come to establish their complete sway on the
militancy in Kashmir. Many foreign delegations, including those from European
Union and Commonwealth, that visited the camps, were horrified to see the
pitiable conditions in which the refugees were living. However, the detailed
reports submitted by these delegations to the government too had little impact.
The conditions in the camps continued to deteriorate. The dire straits into which
this religious minority found itself after the exodus was pitiable, to say the least.

The conditions in the refugee camps deteriorated with the passage of time. No
one paid heed to the plight of the refugees living in these camps. On April 17,
1992, Dr KN Pandita, a widely respected former Director of the Centre for
Central Asian Studies said, “The members of National Integration Council could
visit the debris of a religious shrine, but no one visited the refugee camps in
Jammu where Hindu refugees are leading a life worse than animals.” 3

Initially, the refugees thought that they would be able to return to the Valley
once the violence subsided there. Therefore, immediate succor was what they
looked forward to. However, gradually, it became apparent to them that their
return to Kashmir had become another of the many issues that comprised
‘Kashmir dispute’, which for six decades has defied a solution. Their long-term
stay outside their familiar surroundings became a reality. Consequently, the
adverse effects of permanent displacement on the entire community, particularly
its identity as a distinct ethnic group, became acutely visible. Complete loss of
status, property and prestige, dealt a deathly blow to the proud community. The
ill-effects of the exodus have been severe and varied and must be examined in
detail.

Loss of Movable and Immovable Property

(see Appendix ‘J’, p. 668)

The spontaneous decision to leave the Valley without any planning or

preparation was forced on the Pandits by the ruthless violence that was
unleashed on them in Kashmir. This decision of theirs resulted in the huge loss
of their movable and immovable properties. The movable assets included
furniture, fittings, fixtures, kitchenware, equipment, clothing, bedding, vehicles,
electronic equipment and other household items. The study carried out by the
Centre for Minority Studies (Jammu and Kashmir) found that only 35–45 per
cent families could bring with them their movable property when they
abandoned their homes. This was either because these were looted or destroyed
in fire or there was neither any space to carry these nor any time available to
pack them for convenient carriage. Many people also thought that they would
return soon and therefore, there was no need to carry these items with them.
Though majority of people did not know where they were headed to, yet they did
not carry with them even the bare minimum kitchen ware.

A majority (93 per cent) of refugees owned house, in which they lived and
another six per cent owned these houses partially. Only one per cent lived in
rented accommodation. These figures represented both rural and urban refugees.
About 8–10 per cent families owned two houses. In rural areas, they additionally
owned granaries, cowsheds and shops. In urban areas about five per cent of them
owned shops. In fact, 25 per cent owned more than one shop/establishment. 40–
45 per cent of houses/establishments abandoned by Pandits were destroyed by
being set on fire by the militants or their over ground supporters. About five per
cent houses were occupied unauthorised by those whose links with militants
were well-known, and one per cent houses/establishments were occupied by
security forces. About 1–4 per cent houses were given to tenants by their legal
owners without seeking any rent. Majority of the houses were not insured.
However, government did pay some compensation for burnt houses, but the
amount was too meager to make any significant difference.

Later, in a rush for distress sale, properties worth crores of rupees were sold at
throw-away prices by Pandits, due to numerous compulsions imposed on them
by circumstances of exile. A large number of houses of the refugees occupied by
the militants and their over ground sympathisers, continued to remain under their
occupation, particularly in rural areas. A law was enacted in 1997 to prevent
distress sale and illegal occupation of abandoned Pandit houses. But its
implementation left much to be desired. Even today, numerous houses and shops
remain occupied illegally and the law has not been able to catch up with the
illegal occupants. As far as the commercial establishments were concerned, these
were completely lost, as these were either looted or taken over by the militants
or by their proxies.

The immovable property consisting of land (irrigated and un-irrigated),

orchards, vegetable gardens and non-fruit-bearing trees, was a source of income
for rural communities. Almost 30 per cent refugees did not have any information
about the status of their immovable assets in 2005, while 35 per cent said that the
land was lying idle, with no cultivation being undertaken. Many said that their
orchards and trees had been destroyed. About 4–5 per cent of the property was
occupied unauthorised. The irrigated land had been put to use by neighbours
without paying any rent. To quote one example; four kanals of land belonging to
Pandit refugees was grabbed by the local residents of village Tulwari in
Handwara tehsil. Despite repeated complaints to the concerned authorities, the
land has not been restored to the owner. Similarly, land belonging to Kashmiri
Pandit refugees has been acquired by the State Government in some villages,
namely, Kherman, Hanood, Nandram, Khannabal, Handwara, and in some
villages in Kupwara district. It has been done without obtaining the consent of or
even informing the land owners about it. The aim, obviously, is to foreclose the
chances of their return to the Valley. What is ironic is the fact that this has been
done in contravention of the express orders of the State Government itself
(Jammu and Kashmir Refugee Immovable Property-Preservation, Protection and
Restraint on Distress Sale and circular issued by State Revenue Department —
No rev/Mr/56/2009 dated 14 July 2009). The circular clearly states that
acquiring the refugee Pandits’ land will be against the government’s
commitment to their eventual return.

Distress sale of orchards, trees and irrigated land became the order of the day
in the first decade after exodus, as the refugees could not return to the Valley. A
large number of refugees sold these at throw away prices.

Status of Immovable Property (Response calculated in Percentage)

Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.
 As far as the livestock was concerned, a majority of families living in rural
areas raised these to augment their income. These included cows, bullocks,
horses, ducks, sheep and chickens. 22 per cent had livestock worth 20,000. 42
per cent families lost their livestock valued at 10,000 each. On an average,
every family lost nearly 15,000 worth of livestock. The percentage of such
affected families belonging to the rural areas was 95 per cent. Consequently,
these families lost one of their major sources of income due to exodus. The
livestock left behind in rural areas by Hindus was simply grabbed and sold for
slaughter.

State of a typical Kashmiri Pandit locality, four months after exodus (April 1990).

Demolition and destruction of Kashmiri Pandit houses, in fact complete

localities, dispossessing them of their land, orchards, business establishments,
trade, shops and other properties, was aimed at destroying them economically. In
the days after their exodus, the Pandit houses were ransacked and looted; even
wooden doors and window frames were prised open and sold publicly. After
nothing was left of the houses, except the concrete structures, these were burnt.
In the first four years after exodus, 18,000 houses abandoned by the Pandits
were torched. “So far militants had burnt nearly 3,441 abandoned houses
belonging to Kashmiri refugees in the Valley.” 4

Those houses which were not burnt were occupied by the cadres of the
militant organisations and their influential over-ground supporters. A similar fate
awaited the premises of trade, shops and business and commercial
establishments, which too were taken over by the militant activists and their
collaborators. Agricultural land, orchards and land attached to burnt-out houses
was initially nibbled at, but subsequently appropriated completely, with the
active connivance of the administration. “In two cases, government bus-stops
have been set up on the land owned by Kashmiri Pandits.” 5

Status of Movable Assets

Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

Economy and Employment

Even before the exodus of Pandits in 1990, they had to suffer discrimination
ever since the first Interim Government was formed after the accession of the
State to India. Pandits found themselves dependent on the whims and fancies of
the biased bureaucracy of the state and its Islamised administrative set-up.
Though they escaped the militants’ bullets, but for relief and rehabilitation, they
were entirely dependent on the same administrative machinery. Their fresh
travails began as soon as they landed at Jammu and met with bureaucratic apathy
and on most occasions, deliberate attempts at harassment.

By the time the exodus took place in January 1990, the Pandit representation
in the state government service had been reduced to a paltry figure. Taking
advantage of the special powers conferred on it by Article 370, the state
government had drawn up a complicated system of selection for recruitment into
state government service. This was done to ensure that the recruitment remained
Kashmir-centric. The system of recruitment was based on separate quotas for
recruitment from Jammu and Kashmir provinces (including Ladakh).The service
cadres in both provinces were further divided into Kashmir Administrative
Service (KAS) and those belonging to subordinate services. State Public Service
Commission carried out recruitment to the former, and the Staff Selection
Committee, appointed by the state government, carried out selection to the latter.
The recruitment to the subordinate services was further carried out based on
quotas allocated to each district, in both provinces. Being a microscopic minority
in every district of the Valley, except in Srinagar, the Kashmiri Pandits
automatically stood eliminated. Even in Srinagar, they met with the same fate,
though for different reasons. They had to compete with Muslims, who enjoyed
reservations as ‘backward classes’.

As a result of all these manipulated rules and regulations, the Pandit

representation in government service never exceed four per cent, though their
population remained between seven and eight per cent. The same rules were
applied to exclude Hindus from the Muslim-majority districts of Poonch, Rajouri
and Doda, while filling up the quotas from these districts. The same yardstick for
recruitment was not applied while carrying out recruitment from the Hindu-
majority districts of Udhampur, Kathua and Jammu. Here, the Muslims
appropriated big quotas of employment on the pretext of belonging to ‘backward
classes’. The rule of provincial-quota was not applied to the recruitment to KAS
and Specialised Staff Agencies. The State Public Service Commission, staffed as
it was, with those who believed in Muslim precedence, ensured almost complete
exclusion of Pandits from the service. The quotas, which ensured jobs in the
higher echelons and subordinate services to Muslims in Kashmir and Jammu
provinces, became a rule.

After exodus, the situation for the Pandits became even more hopeless.
Whatever little scope there still existed for Pandits to get employment in the
state services also vanished. They were told that they had ceased to be the
residents of Kashmir Province and they did not belong to Jammu either. Hence,
they could not lay claim to the quota from any of the two Provinces! The
ridiculous extent to which this argument was taken can be gauged from the fact
that young talented cricketers were not included in various state level teams
because of the same reason. Thus an undeclared moratorium was placed on the
recruitment of Kashmiri Hindus in the state services. Strangely, the same rules
did not apply to Kashmiri Muslims, whose applications received expeditious and
special consideration. As a result, irrespective of the qualifications required to
fill vacant posts after 1990, these were filled by Muslims. Rules continued to be
modified in order to help Muslim recruitment into numerous government posts.
This situation is starkly reflected by the figures available for 2006. Out of
400,000 state government employees, only 4,000 were Kashmiri Pandits. Rate of
unemployment in Kashmir was 30 per cent (93 per cent of these were Kashmir
Pandits), whereas in Jammu it was 69 per cent. Between 1990 and 2005,
approximately 4,500 displaced Kashmiri Pandits retired from government
service, but no recruitment was carried out from amongst them to fill the
vacancies thus created.This was in sharp contrast to the recruitment of Kashmiri
Muslims to fill in the vacant slots left by the fleeing Pandits.

Around 2004, the Government of India sanctioned establishment of additional

‘Anganwadi’ centres. This was in addition to the 10,317 such centres that
already existed. Out of these centres, only four were allotted to refugees.
According to government’s own yardstick, every 700 people in a given
population were entitled to one such centre. Accordingly, Kashmiri Pandit share
should have been much more than merely four centres. Sometime around the
middle of 1990’s, Education Guarantee Scheme or EGS under Sarva Shikhsha
Abhiyan, named Rehbar-e-Taleem, was launched by the State Government. This
scheme involved upgradation of primary schools to middle Schools and the latter
into high schools. Consequently 10 EGS centres were created in each block,
making it roughly 200 such centers in Kashmir alone. Teachers’ posts in these
schools came to be filled in against clear vacancies. Only two Kashmiri Pandit
girls found a job in these centres. Similarly, they did not find any avenues in
other schemes, like Rehbar-e-Tamiraat for engineers and Rehbar-e-Ziraat
launched for graduates in agricultural sciences. Computerisation of state
administrative machinery and the entire education infrastructure, created
enormous scope for employment of computer literate youth. However, Kashmiri
Pandits were left out of this entire system.

Though some refugees from rural areas found jobs in the State and Central
government offices, the number was quite insignificant. The statistics are
interesting and bring out the hard reality of the situation. In April 1996, this
number reduced to 25,662 from 26,000 in 1989. However, as the employees kept
retiring and no fresh recruitment from the refugee Pandit community took place,
the number further reduced to 6,654 in 2004. During the decade between 1996
and 2006, the state government provided jobs to nearly 265,000 educated youth.
And how many were Pandits? Merely 345! Even when the jobs were available,
many refugees had lost precious time during exodus or had suffered such a
traumatic experience that in the new environment, their awareness levels were so
low that they could not compete on even terms. In 2005, unemployment among
the eligible Pandit youth was as high as 72 per cent. Exodus also forced the
eligible job seekers to find jobs closer to their residences, as the changed
environment dictated that the whole family stays together, for security and
economic considerations.

The Pandit refugees were also denied any share in other centrally sponsored
welfare schemes, like the Maternity Benefit Scheme, Old Age Pension Scheme,
Integrated Scheme for Widows and Destitutes. They were also not eligible for
grant of loans that were liberally doled out as part of the liberalisation of the
Indian economy. The directions issued by the State Government vide its SRO-
43, which spelt out its policy on providing ‘healing touch’ to the population in
Kashmir, left out the unemployed Kashmiri Pandit youth entirely.

The exiled trading and agricultural community among the Pandits, numbering
approximately 3,700, lost their goods and stocks worth 200 crores, with a
recurring annual loss of nearly 25 crores. It may be mentioned that 50 per cent
of the displaced people from villages owned orchards and agricultural land
measuring between a few kanals to 82 kanals. All these people were entirely
dependent on agricultural income from cash crops, paddy, apple, walnuts,
almonds, etc. They became paupers overnight, as they were left with practically
no source of income. Having been robbed of their livelihood, they were among
the worst hit. Others, particularly those owning businesses, were also hit hard as
they could not recover their dues before leaving the Valley, nor restart their
businesses for want of capital. Many others had to leave behind their money in
banks, as these did not function, because the administration had come to a halt.
In 1995, an amount of one crore was sanctioned by the state government to
displaced traders to start their businesses. However, even this assistance was
withdrawn, later.

One of the serious consequences of the exodus was that the traditional
occupations of earning livelihood had to be abandoned by the refugees as these
dried up in the given circumstances. While in Kashmir, 39 per cent of the Pandit
households depended on government jobs, 30 per cent on agriculture, 20 per cent
on self-employment, 10 per cent on jobs in private sector and one per cent on
other jobs. The exodus changed all that. The agricultural sector vanished
completely, being replaced by joblessness or by those receiving relief from the
government. This segment now swelled to a whopping 26 per cent household,
mainly from rural background, dependent on this relief for their survival (figures
for 2002). Similarly, the number of households dependent on trade and minor
businesses also came down drastically. This added a serious dimension to the
problem. On the one hand, such people had to survive on meager amount
provided as relief and on the other, they wasted their precious time in the
absence of any gainful employment. This has adversely affected their physical
and mental well-being as the effective participation rate for population above 18
years has also reduced. This rate has come down from 62 per cent in the pre-
exodus period to 46 per cent in post-exodus period. For refugees from rural
background, the decline was very sharp, i.e., from 82 per cent to 37 per cent.
This drastic shift in effective participation affected the Pandit women in a big
way, as their occupation in agricultural activities came to an abrupt end, without
it being replaced by anything worthwhile. Gradually, some of these ladies were
lucky enough to find jobs in private sector in order to augment the meager
house-hold incomes.

The employed and the unemployed among the Kashmiri Pandit refugees were
treated unfairly and discriminated against by the State’s powerful bureaucracy. It
is ironic that government continued to shower economic largesse on the slain
militants’ families by dishing out cash doles amounting to lakhs of rupees, but
turned a blind eye to the rehabilitation of the victims of militancy. Joginder
Singh, the former Director General of India’s premier investigative agency, the
Central Bureau of Intelligence says, “Parents and families of terrorists killed in
open encounters are given an ex-gratia of 10 lakhs meant for their
rehabilitation, while assistance hardly reaches their victims. More is being done
for terrorists than for the four lakh Kashmiri Pandits and Sikhs who were forced
to leave the Valley as part of ethnic cleansing launched by terrorists and
separatists.” 6

Damage to Religious Places (see Appendix ‘I’; p. 662)

“Sheikh ne masjid banayi, mismar butkhana kiya:
Pehle kuchh soorat to thee, ab khaas veerana kiya.”
—Daya Shankar Nasim

(The Sheikh made a mosque after demolishing a temple; earlier there was an
image to concentrate upon, now there is a ruin to wander on.)
 Vandalising and destroying of Kashmiri Pandit religious places came
naturally to the radical Islamists whose ancestors had done the same ever since
their arrival, first in India and later in Kashmir. Nirad Chaudhary puts it in
perspective when he says, “From 1000 AD, every temple from Kathiawar to
Bihar, from Himalayas to Vindyas has been sacked and ruined. Not one temple
was left standing all over North India. They escaped destruction only where
Muslim power did not gain access to them for reasons such as dense forests.
Otherwise it was a continuous spell of vandalism.” 7

Most of the temple lands and their other religious assets in Kashmir belonged
to some known entities, namely, Dharmarth Trust, Bajrang Dev Baba Dharma
Das Koul Mandir (popularly called Bab Dharam Das) , Ganesh Mandir, Durga
8

Nag Mandir and Hari Parbat. In addition to these institutions, some local
committees formed by Kashmiri Pandits also managed some temple properties,
estimated to be nearly 500 in number. During Dogra rule, when Dharmarth Trust
was set up by Maharaja Ranbir Singh, he had incorporated a provision into its
by-laws which stipulated that selling of any temple land would amount to killing
of 100 cows. This had the desired effect and temple lands and other assets
remained untouched by the unscrupulous elements.

Immediately after exodus, a large number of Pandits’ religious shrines were

targeted. These places were attacked by frenzied mobs bent upon wanton
destruction of centuries old structures of great magnificence and heritage. With
the departure of Pandits from the Valley, a deathly silence fell on a large number
of religious places, where sizeable congregations used to assemble on auspicious
days. Some of these places were closed down; others, like the famous Sharika
Temple at Hari Parbat, were covered by a worn out tarpaulin to appease the
majority community. Places of Hindu social organisations, used mainly for
socio-cultural activities, were burnt down or bombed. Rocket attacks were also
carried out to destroy or damage the Kheer Bhavani temple at Tulamulla and
Ganesh Temple at Ganpathyaar in Srinagar. Both attacks were off the target,
causing little damage. Cremation grounds and some holy springs, alongwith their
adjacent lands, were appropriated by unscrupulous elements. The cremation
ground at Sopore and Sadhu Ganga Temple at Kandi in Kupwara district were
encroached upon. The sprawling cremation grounds at villages Sagam and
Fatehpora have been appropriated by the Wakf board. The famous temple at
Mattan lost 33 kanals of its land to similar illegal occupation.

In many cases, the process of illegally occupying the lands of the Hindu
religious sites started much before the actual exodus. Biased government,
working under the dictates of the Islamists and prodded on by its Islamised
bureaucracy, itself became a usurper of Hindu religious sites on one pretext or
the other. The cremation ground at Sopore was taken over to construct a bridge
over it. The land belonging to Durga Nag Trust in Srinagar too was taken over
by the Wakf board. Subsequently, a shopping complex, named Suleiman
Complex was constructed on it. Vide its order, SRO-702 dated December 31,
1984, the entire temple and its land was transferred by the State Government to
the Wakf board. In the same manner, Public Health Engineering Department of
the State constructed a tank over the holy spring of Guddar (Godawri) in
Kulgam. Near the same place at Manzhgam, a primary school has been
constructed on the temple land. A proposal had also been floated to convert the
holy spring and the temple complex at Manghoma, near Pulwama, into a water
supply scheme.

According to a statement made by the Home Minister of India in Parliament

on March 12, 1993, 38 temples/shrines were demolished, damaged and
desecrated in Kashmir between 1989 through 1991. Year wise data is given
below:

Year Temples Demolished/Damaged

1989 13
1990 09
1991 16
Total 38

The above figures presented a conservative estimate by the government for

obvious reasons. The actual number was much larger and stood at approximately
68, as the state government never collected the data from remote areas and
deliberately played down the issue in the same manner in which it hid the exodus
of Pandits. The factual data was collected from Pandit refugees who were
witness to such destruction. Centuries old idols, like the rare Sahstri-Netra
Shivling in Silgam Temple, on the road to Pahalgam, have been destroyed.
Similarly, the Hanuman Temple near Hari Parbat was also completely destroyed.
Sanctum sanctorums of many temples were defiled by smearing idols with filth.
Consequent to the destruction of Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, 39 more
temples were destroyed in Kashmir. The media, as usual, was reticent to report
these incidents. Kashmiri refugees in Jammu did hold demonstrations; but these
were dismissed as part of the communal politics, till the Sahayita Samiti, All
State Kashmiri Pandit Conference and the local unit of Bharatiya Janata Party,
produced irrefutable evidence about it. The trend of destruction of temples
continued much after the exodus. Two decades after the insurgency broke out in
Kashmir, the number of temples destroyed stood at approximately 60. Lieutenant
General (Retd) SK Sinha, former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir writes,
“What happened a couple of years earlier in Jammu and Kashmir was, if
anything, more reprehensible. Some 60 functional Hindu temples were
destroyed, but the secular brigade and the secular media suffer from collective
amnesia about it and the ethnic cleansing of Kashmir Valley because of which
Pandits are now living as refugees in camps.” 9

Of late there have been reports emanating from the Valley which point to a
new trend as far as the temple properties are concerned. It is believed that some
unscrupulous elements, working in connivance with land mafia have started
selling off temple properties in Kashmir. According to a news report the
situation is serious enough to attract the State Government’s notice, which
subsequently decided to have the matter investigated. State Revenue Minister
Aijaz Ahmad Khan was quoted to have said, “We have taken note of the concern
expressed by the legislators about the sale of property of Hindu shrines by their
management and will probe the disposal of such properties.” Even the
10

management of these temples is illegally constituted. “As such temple trusts

have not had elections for the last 17 years, caretakers and outsiders have been
controlling temple assets worth crores of rupees, and are now selling or leasing
them out,” said Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti President, Mr Sanjay Tickoo.
Property of big temples like the Ramji Temple in Srinagar, which is worth crores
of rupees, is being sold or leased out allegedly on the management’s instructions.
Similar stories concerning other temples have also been reported. Newspapers
also reported that Vaital Bhairva shrine at Motiyar, Rainawari, Srinagar, has
been ransacked and its Dharamshala occupied by relatives of the local MLA. It
is even reported that Jammu and Kashmir Dharmarth Trust has sold the land of
Pratepeshwar Temple, Kohnikon and Barbarshah. The Prayag Temple at
Shadipora, Srinagar, too, witnessed plunder and later encroachment.

There were nearly 46 temples on the left and right banks of River Jhelum,
which held great reverence for Pandits in the Valley. Most of these were
gutted/looted at the time of exodus. As late as March 2010, the State’s Revenue
Minister, Raman Bhalla admitted in the State Assembly that 170 temples had
been ‘damaged’ in ‘militancy related’ violence. The same figures were quoted
by Jitender Singh, Minister of State for Home Affairs in the Union Government
while speaking in the Rajya Sabha on August 22, 2012 (Time of India, Delhi
Edition, August 23, 2012). However, Kashmiri Pandits refute these figures and
put the same at 550. The minister also admitted that 113 kanals of temple land
was grabbed in Shopian alone.

After the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley, a large number of
temples were left without any Pujari/caretaker. As ground situation improved,
many Pujaris came from outside the state and filled-in this vacuum. Over a
period of time, with the assistance of unscrupulous elements in the state
administration, they became Mahants controlling these temples and their
properties. In due course these Mahants, in connivance with the local mafia are
now selling these lands with fictitious records and other papers. “Officially,
there are only 404 temples in Kashmir, owning 2,081 kanals (260.12 acres) of
land. In fact, government figure is much less than actual figure. For instance, as
per official record, land owned by Sheetalnath Mandir in Srinagar is far less than
what it actually has,” writes Tariq Bhatt. He further writes, “Seventy per cent of
11

its properties have been compromised, encroached upon, leased or sold after
1990 by non-Kashmiri mahants in connivance with land sharks.” 12

Education
Disruption caused in the education of their children due to exodus was,
perhaps, the most serious fallout of Kashmiri Pandits’ exodus. For a community
that boasted of a high literacy rate, not being able to send its children to schools
and colleges was a great tragedy. Educating their children, no matter how poor
the parents, has remained central to their existence for as long as one can
remember. After the exodus, they were not able to provide proper coaching to
students preparing for various examinations. This resulted in loss of precious
years for the affected children. Besides, different sessions of education for
Kashmir and Jammu regions also added to the problem of maintaining
continuity. For those aspiring to seek admission to professional colleges or seek
jobs based on their educational qualifications, it was near impossible to do so in
the absence of relevant documents/degrees, as these had been left behind in the
Valley.

An important feature of education of Kashmiri Pandit children is the gender

equality which is so visible. Though, in later years closer to exodus, admissions
to technical and professional institutes and higher education, recorded larger
percentage of males compared to females. In 2001, the total number of literate
population in Jammu and Kashmir was 54 per cent (66 per cent for males and 42
per cent for females). Among the refugee population in 1989–90, it was 61.40
per cent for males and 40.33 per cent for females, which increased to 69.50 per
cent for males and 54.65 per cent for females in 2002. It was later revealed that
refugees living in camps were worse off educationally than those living outside.
As large percentage of refugees living in camps were those who had migrated
from rural areas, educationally they suffered the most.

After getting uprooted from the Valley, the school and college going children
had nowhere to go. Jammu, Udhampur and many other places, which boasted of
heavy concentration of Pandit refugees, neither had the physical infrastructure in
terms of schools/colleges nor did they have adequate teaching staff. The
disruption thus caused to their education had a devastating effect on the
continuity of their education. Some children got themselves admitted in public
schools run by private organisations or individuals. But few could afford their
fees. The situation was even worse in higher secondary and above classes, as the
staff and other facilities available were inadequate. As large number of the
displaced children were on the rolls of the schools run by Hindu educational
societies, like DAV (Dayanand Anglo Vedic) and Vishwa Bharti Trust, and
those run by Christian Church Mission societies, it would have been better if
these societies were permitted to open branches of their schools in areas having
heavy refugee concentration, to ensure that students already part of their
institutions in the Valley did not suffer. Despite making repeated pleas to the
government to allow them to start the schools on temporary basis, the permission
did not come till end of 1993.

Establishment of four Kendriya Vidyalaya Schools purely for Kashmiri Pandit

refugees, announced by the Central Government, never materialised. However,
Jagmohan, during his tenure as the Governor, issued orders to start camp
schools/colleges in Jammu and Udhampur to enable the children to continue
their education without break. This was a well thought-out move as it involved
least effort and expenditure due to the fact that a large number of refugee
teachers were readily available to take on the task of teaching. Consequently, the
camp schools started functioning in canvas covered sheds and teachers among
the refugees were drafted to start teaching. The camp colleges were organised in
existing colleges by starting evening shifts after the local students had finished
their classes. This caused the least disruption. Similar departments were created
for postgraduate students.
 The indifference and the apathy of the state government towards these camp
schools became evident soon enough: lack of accommodation, poor sanitation,
inadequate teaching aids and other allied problems became the order of the day.
Numerous delegations were sent to all concerned to plead with them to carry out
some improvement in the situation, but in vain. In due course, these schools
came to be run under tattered bits of canvas, which did not provide a speck of
shade during the scorching summer or shelter from rain during monsoon. It
would not have cost the state government much if children in the camps had
been provided with books, uniforms, writing material, etc., free of cost. Mid-day
meal scheme, which is applicable in large number of schools in various states,
could have easily been implemented in the camp schools, too. But this was not
done. No effort was made to provide professional counsellors in selected camp
schools, to guide the children in choosing right careers in keeping with their
aptitude.

The admission of refugee children to various professional colleges became

almost impossible; in Jammu, the seats were exclusively reserved for students
from Jammu region, and they could not go back to Kashmir from where they had
been thrown out at gun point. Even though their share in professional/technical
colleges/postgraduate departments located in Kashmir was barely 8 to 10 per
cent, even this was now denied to them due to their inability to go there. In any
case, the schools and colleges run by Hindu educational societies, like the DAV
or Vishwa Bharti Trust were either burnt down or taken over by the militant-
sponsored Muslim organisations.

The post-exodus period registered a significant increase in the discontinuation

of the education of Pandit children; eight per cent for boys and 11 per cent for
girls at the school level; 24 per cent for boys and 30 per cent for girls at the
college level; and one per cent each for boys and girls at the postgraduation and
professional college level. Most of the figures mentioned above, comprised of
boys and girls from the camp locations, mostly belonging to agricultural
background. This discontinuation in education was due to various factors, chief
among them being the changed living environment, which was harsh and
provided inadequate living space, economic distress, loss of interest in education
due to non-availability of jobs, non-existence of suitable educational institution
in the close vicinity of camps, confusion about the change of university, negative
and discriminatory attitude of Kashmir University and finally, the deliberate,
unsympathetic and rigid attitude of the state government, which did not allow
flexibility of jurisdiction that would have helped a large number of students to
continue their education without break. In the immediate aftermath of the
exodus, many students faced serious problems of admission.

These problems, however, were overcome in due course of time by the

refugees’ own efforts and determination to pursue education. Gradually, in the
post-exodus period, proportion of the educated and trained personnel showed
marginal increase, though not among those living in camps and having rural
background. This period also witnessed increase in the enrollment of children,
both males and females, into colleges and professional training establishments.
However, there was an increase in the rate of dropouts of camp students from
schools and colleges, particularly among girls. Later, some state governments
offered reservations to the children of refugees in various professional colleges,
though the children from camps could not take as much advantage of these
reservations as the non-camp refugee children, due to their inability to fulfill
eligibility criteria.

According to the pilot study conducted by Community Education

Development Fund in June 2004, about 68 per cent families financed the cost of
education of their children’s higher education by either taking bank loans or by
distress sale of their properties. The survey also found that proportion of
educated and trained males had marginally increased for postgraduation,
professional and vocational training. In the case of females, there had been an
increase in the percentage of vocational training and at graduation level, though
this percentage was lower for those living in camps as compared to non-camp
inhabitants. Another fact that came to light was that families preferred to extend
the education of their children because the avenues of employment for refugee
youth in state services, after the exodus had almost entirely dried up. Gradually,
the male and female population of refugees in the age group 6–24, attending
educational institutions registered a significant increase. In the pre-exodus
period, an overwhelming majority of students enrolled only in the schools.
However, the later-post-exodus period saw significant enrollments in the
colleges and professional training institutes. In the pre-exodus period, it was 82
per cent for males and 67 per cent for females, which increased to 99 per cent for
males and 97 per cent for females. This increase in the percentage of refugee
students enrolling in various schools and colleges, despite their displacement and
none-too-happy living environment, were in keeping with the perception held by
Pandits, who have traditionally considered knowledge to be a source of
livelihood. This perception only got reinforced in the changed circumstances,
because now they had nothing to fall back upon, except their education.
 This trend also owed a lot to the easing of admission criteria and special
reservation quotas for refugee students by the Central government and some
state governments. During the period between 1990–2002, 19 boys and 8 girls
per 100 refugee Pandit families were admitted to various professional training
courses throughout the country. Bulk of these reservations (87 per cent) were
provided by states other than Jammu and Kashmir; Maharashtra and Gujarat
being the leading states in this regard. Jammu and Kashmir, however, provided
seats to girls among the refugees for training in Industrial Training Institutes and
Polytechnic Training colleges located in Jammu, which awarded diplomas. As is
evident, whereas other states took the lead in coming to the rescue of refugee
students by reserving seats for them in various degree colleges, their own state
felt no such need. Even the reservations given in diploma courses were limited to
institutions in Jammu division, which were not funded by either the state or the
Central government. These reservations, offered by various state governments to
refugee students went a long way in equipping them with the desired technical
skills that ensured their better job prospects and greatly alleviated the sufferings
of thousands of such students.

Cultural and Ethnic Identity

The greatest challenge that Kashmiri Pandit community has faced in the two
decades of its exodus is the difficulty in preserving its culture. Their forced
displacement from Kashmir resulted in the snapping of their cultural links with
the Valley that sustained it. Culture is a complete pattern of social behaviour of
an ethnic group, its practices and collective thinking, manifested through group
behaviour. An ethnic group’s culture and worldview areinter-related. Religion,
philosophy and value systems of the group have great bearing on it. Culture is
not static as its dynamic nature enables it to adopt, reject and evolve constantly.

India is formed of varied regions, communities, languages, ethnicities, etc. Its

diversity represents the sum total of every community’s own peculiar culture.
This cultural diversity is developed over centuries and is influenced by history,
religion, climate and geography. Culture, including rituals, music, dance,
folklore, marriages, celebrations of various festivals, etc., are products of, and
closely related to the place of habitation. It is through various stages of cultural
development that an ethnic group assumes a particular form, which eventually
becomes its identity. Social and cultural aspects, which form the two inseparable
parts of a group’s identity, are inter-dependent. In addition, historical
vicissitudes, through which an ethnic group passes, leave their own visible
imprint on its identity and racial (ethical) values form the core of its collective
thinking or its distinct identity. “When a particular group come through quirks of
history into social interaction with any other alien group, the former tries to
absorb some traits from latter,” writes GL Jalali.
13

CHANGES IN DRESS/FOOD/CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

Source: Figures quoted from the study conducted by the Centre for Minority Studies, Jammu and
Kashmir.

Leaving its usual place of habitation temporarily/permanently can result in

serious set-back to the very cultural identity of a community. This also results in
the submerging of cultural identity of the displaced in the larger cultural milieu
of the place where they have moved to. Such cultural transformation can
adversely jeopardise the very existence of a community that has a distinct
culture. “Loss of identity of a well-defined ethnic group can result in the speedy
disintegration of the group character.” Uprooting of a large segment of people
14

from their original place of habitation, inevitably results in huge disruption of its
social customs and cultural identity. Such social disruptions can seriously
hamper a community’s growth and its self-confidence, ultimately leading to its
extinction.

Kashmiri Pandit culture, which has evolved over centuries, is vibrant and
multi-hued, with its unique features reflecting its richness. Being a persecuted
community for centuries, its culture has evolved by constant reappraisal and its
need to survive and sustain itself against heavy odds. Many myths and legends,
dating back to pre-historic times, when the Valley was still Satisar (see chapter-
1), form part of its socio-cultural landscape. Kashmir Shaivism or Trika
philosophy, characterised by its depth of thought and originality, was the product
of the vibrant environment of the Valley. A deep love of nature and its diverse
elements has, therefore, got ingrained into their religious rituals and social
customs. Pilgrimage to mountain peaks (Harmukh, etc) and performance of a
large number of religious and social rituals on the banks of Vitasta (river
Jhelum) represent some of these sacred traditional practices. In short, nature’s
bounty in the form of gushing rivulets and icy springs that Kashmir is endowed
with, inculcated in the community an immense love for nature, which got
interwoven with their social and religious customs.

Kashmiri Pandits belong to a distinct socio-cultural group with its roots

deeply imbedded into the history, culture and environment of Kashmir. Such
identity can be preserved only if the whole or part of the group continues to
inhabit that specific area. Once the whole ethnic group vacates that place, it gets
unhinged from its moorings. Under the circumstances, for Kashmiri Pandits, to
preserve their distinct ethnic identity has become very difficult. This difficulty
has got further complicated because Kashmiri Pandits are a small community
and after exodus, are compelled to live in penny packets throughout the world.
Due to these reasons, Kashmiri Pandits are in clear danger of losing their identity
as a distinct ethnic group. This, despite the fact that even after suffering
persecution and being evicted from the Valley many times in the past, Kashmiri
Pandits have retained their core beliefs. Sir Walter Lawrence writes in his book,
Vale of Kashmir, “Bhata, Bhata, Kaw Bata” — (Kashmiri Pandits are knit
together like a pack of crows).

Language plays a significant role in preserving distinct identity of any ethnic

group. It is not merely a medium of communication but a repository of the
critical nuances of cultural moorings of a community. One of the biggest
casualties of the exodus has been the Kashmiri language. Use of Kashmiri
language by the children as a means of communication within their homes after
exodus, is on the decline. At the same time, children of the refugees cannot learn
this language because no commonly acceptable script exists. A demand had been
made that Kashmiri language in another alternative script, Devnagri, be taught,
so as to enable the young generation to learn the language of their forefathers.
This demand was accepted by the Human Resource Development (HRD)
Ministry, but was subsequently annulled by it when the new government came
into power at the centre in 2004. This was done to appease the majority
community of Kashmir, that had demanded the recognition of Urdu script for
teaching the language. This has dealt a serious blow to the aspirations of the
young generation and pushed them further away from their roots. Bulk of the
children of refugees living in Jammu, particularly in camps, who used Urdu
language for reading and writing while in Kashmir, continued to prefer Urdu.
However, the same cannot be said of refugees living outside the State. They now
prefer to communicate in Hindi, which is the official language of a number of
states, where refugees live and where it is the most commonly used medium of
written and spoken communication. In the years immediately after exodus, use
of Kashmiri language for communication was confined to children and
grandchildren living in refugee camps. However, even here, the language has
undergone significant changes.

Other damage to cultural identity was caused by the loss of the rare and
invaluable manuscripts, paintings, objects of art and antiques left behind by the
fleeing community. These were subsequently looted by the anti-social elements.
This loss of treasure trove is a huge blow to the community’s cultural heritage.

Another phenomenon that is becoming increasingly visible in the community

is the breakup of the joint family system, something alien to its culture. Over a
period of time, splits in the families of Pandit refugees have become quite
evident. It has been noticed that traditional joint families split faster into nuclear
families, as space crunch hastened this process. Roughly 37 per cent families
split. 1,979 families split into 3,076 households, mainly due to lack of
accommodation; a combined split rate of 55 per cent. The splits were noticed
more among population that had migrated from rural areas, as most of these
people lived in large joint families in their villages in Kashmir. Such breakups
went against the socio-cultural ethos of the rural community and put the social
security of older people at grave risk. This situation, besides creating social,
cultural and economic insecurity, also prevented joint effort when any member
of the family was faced with a serious challenge. The trend was also reflected in
the reduced size of an average family, which showed a decline from six persons
per household in 1989–90, to four persons in 2002. Among the urban refugees,
the decline in the size was sharper, i.e., from five to three, compared to rural
refugee households, whose size reduced from five to four persons. Spatial
disintegration due to forced displacement further accentuated this problem.

Late female marriages due to disintegration of society and lower incomes, has
also been noticed. Another trend adding to this problem is the desire of parents
to secure higher income grooms for their daughters away from immediate
surroundings and outside the community. This has resulted in the creation of
imbalance in sex ratio. Marital status too has shown significant changes, as a
consequence of the influence of other cultures, breakdown of joint family system
and marriages outside the community. Increased rates of divorce are a reflection
of the combined effect of these changes.

Changes are also visible in dress code. These changes, starkly visible among
the refugees, are mostly forced by the climate and prevailing fashion trends.

Similarly, the food habits have also undergone some changes, partly due to
climate and partly due to economic reasons. Kashmiri vegetables had a special
place in the menu of a Kashmiri Pandit household while in the Valley. However,
due to heavy demand for these in Jammu, whatever little came from Kashmir,
became exceedingly costly, resulting in refugees slowly getting used to what was
locally available. Some refugees found the new menu difficult to digest, but
force of circumstances ensured that the change finally took effect. For refugees
living outside the state, this change was forced on them much faster.

Exodus has also brought about changes in the celebration of religious festivals
and observance of socio-cultural rituals. Though there are many similarities in
the observance of religious festivals/practices between the Kashmiri Pandits and
outside Hindus, the regional imperatives have, over centuries, induced many
modifications and innovations of significant nature into the former’s
observances. The impact of local customs, rituals and religious festivals is
evident in the social milieu of the Pandits after exodus. Such phenomenon is
visible more among non-camp refugees than among those living in the camps.
However, by and large, Kashmiri Pandits have stuck to their traditional
practices. One of the main reasons for this is that a large concentration of
refugee Pandits exists in Jammu, which is not too far from the Valley. This has
ensured some degree of continuity.

A significant number of married Kashmiri Pandit women no longer put on the

Dejihor, a traditional symbol of marriage; akin to Mangalsutra among married
women outside the Valley. Many women have discontinued the use of Dejihor
due to the fact that being made of gold, it is prone to snatching by petty
criminals and therefore, carries a security risk in various cities and towns of
India, where refugees now live. Its use by the married women is now restricted
to social gatherings and special get-togethers. Other cultural ingress of outside
influence can be seen by way of Pandit women adopting other non-Kashmiri
Hindu practices, like wearing sindoor, payal, bichhu and nuth or even piercing
the nose. Significant changes have been noticed among the bridal wear too;
wherein the brides wear non-traditional dresses like lenhga and choli, etc.
Women have also started observing non-traditional fast, just to be a part of a
dominant social group in their new environment. A surprising inclusion of the
imbibed culture has been the demand for dowry. Coupled with increase in the
inter-caste/inter-community marriages, the exclusivity of Kashmiri Pandit
culture is certainly under threat. It may be mentioned that these cultural changes
have occurred across the cross-section of refugee population.

Recreational facilities and avenues for refugees have literally dried up. There
are no opportunities for young men to indulge in sports/cultural activity due to
their non-availability. This has resulted in the youngsters staying glued to the
television or listening to family gossip; both do not contribute in any significant
manner to their overall development. In Kashmir, summer time was a season for
picnics and excursions. These used to be organised both at the institutional, as
also at the individual level. Exodus put paid to this activity; in the process,
drying up another source of entertainment, so essential for overall development
of the body and mind.

Despite the fact that Kashmiri Pandits have and are showing a great deal of
resilience as far as maintaining their separate ethno-religious identity is
concerned, the fact is that the community is up against heavy odds as far as
preserving its unique identity is concerned. A ray of hope in this is the proximity
of a large concentration of refugees to the Valley and living in clusters that
permit retention of the essential features of their socio-cultural customs. Besides,
after exodus from the Valley, the community has recreated in many places, the
iconic symbols of its cultural identity that existed in Kashmir. This will enable
the younger generation to identify itself with its own customs, cultural heritage
and the community’s ethno-cultural identity. These icons attract people out of
sheer faith or devotion to their teachings. It is interesting to note that nearly one
hundred such icons have been created in and around Jammu alone, which attract
hundreds of devotees, linking them, in a manner to Kashmir valley. In addition,
nearly 40 anniversaries of sages and saints are also celebrated annually, thus
recreating the flavour of Kashmir to some degree. These attempts nourish and
re-establish connectivity with the roots, back in the Valley.

Irrespective of all these positive pointers, the fact is that Kashmiri Pandit
identity as a distinct ethnic group is under severe threat. Though the community
has made herculean attempts to preserve the uniqueness of its identity, in the
long run, the result of such efforts will remain beyond the control of this
community; particularly so, because vested interests in the Valley are bent upon
foisting on Kashmiris a monolithic, theocratic and exclusivist creed, which is
alien to it.

Health
Health of the members of a community that has got displaced from its original
habitat due to violence and conflict, rarely gets the attention that it deserves.
Both the community elders/leaders, as also the government agencies are so
engaged in the immediate task of providing the much needed succor to the
displaced, that health issues get neglected. In the long run, these issues magnify
to pose a serious challenge. As a renowned doctor says, “…Many of the most
profound issues of health and well being of communities and individuals, as a
result of ethnic and political violence, are barely touched upon. The consequence
is a failure to address many of the most obvious and complex health problems
found in nearly all such societies.” 15

The physical, mental and spiritual health of the Kashmiri Pandit community
suffered great ravages as a result of their sudden and forced displacement from
their ancient and ancestral habitat to an alien environment. This displacement
resulted in the loss of their homes and hearths and all material possessions. The
new environment of tropical heat and unhygienic living conditions created
collective distress which rendered the elderly, infants, pregnant women, the
disabled, the chronically ill, and the vulnerable to serious sickness. Tensions of
making a new beginning outside their familiar surroundings, whose main
features were overcrowding, poor quality of water and sanitation, and contact
with various infections, took a heavy toll of this vulnerable section of refugees.
Having low immunity levels, these people suffered enormously in the absence of
any organised healthcare mechanism and specialised medical care. Life saving
drugs were not available in the hastily organised camps and were too costly
outside. There was no sign of diagnostic laboratories inside the camps. To make
matters worse, the tented accommodation was created in the most inappropriate
surroundings, like flood prone nallahs and gullies which had tall grass and scrub
and thorny plants growing all over. The unfortunate refugees living there were
exposed to the scorching heat of summer, creeping insects and poisonous reptiles
and torrential rains during monsoon.
 Heat-related Deaths

Year No. of deaths

1990 1056
1991 409
1992 397
1993 178
1994 89
1995 62
1996 43
1997 148
Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies.

Pandits were not used to such environment, nor were they provided with any
wherewithal to counter or minimise its ill-effects. The refugees were
subsequently provided with one-room tenements, which did not vastly improve
the situation. The study carried out by the Centre for Minority Studies of the
State (CMS), summarised the situation as follows:

“Muthi camp, having 498 one-room tenements, was housing 2,345 inmates;
the size of the rooms being 10x10 feet. Each room was packed with more than
seven members of a family, belonging to three generations.”

Among the young, heat and tension-related diseases took a heavy toll. This
included diabetes, hypertension, heart problems, kidney failure, heat stroke and
even snakebite. Not used to living in such conditions back home in the Valley,
many refugees became victims of serious disease, like heart ailments, trauma,
anxiety, panic attacks, depression, sleep disorder, nightmares, frozen shoulder,
arthritis, muscle cramps, irritable bowels, refugee belly syndrome and much else.
The old, infirm, women and children became sick due to diseases bred by the
reaction of tropical rains with the filth and squalor of the camps. Post-exodus,
the major causes of death were such diseases that had not contributed to
mortality in a major way in the Valley. These were liver diseases and hepatitis,
snakebites, stroke and paralysis and sunstroke. This resulted in the increased
mortality rate of the members of the community.

High mortality rate, coupled with very low growth rate, created one of the
most serious adverse effects of exodus. According to a paper presented by Dr
KL Choudhary at a seminar organised by Organisation Research Foundation,
New Delhi, on September 3, 2003, 108 Kashmiri Pandits had died in 1993 (three
years after exodus from the Valley), while only 42 were born. In 1995, the
situation was even worse: as against five births there were 200 deaths. In 1997,
there were 134 deaths compared to 85 births. Another study concluded that in
1990, 1,056 people died because of heat-related diseases. This figure was 409,
397 and 178 for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively. Between 1997 and
2003, there were 148 such deaths. Most deaths that occurred were certainly
preventable. Crude death rates in the case of men increased from 5 to 7, and in
respect of females from 4.5 to 4.8. The CMS study came to the same conclusion.

Some other relatively unheard of diseases in Kashmir also made their

presence felt in the refugee community. These were hypertension, mental
depression, psychiatric disorders, diabetes, skin diseases, ulcer/acid dyspepsia,
asthma/allergies, intestinal disorders, kidney disease and malnutrition/anaemia.
The CMS study also found that some other diseases, like the stress syndromes,
including cardio-vascular stress, stress-belly, psycho-trauma, endocrine stress,
musculo-skeletol stress and cranial stress had also become common among the
refugees. It was recorded by the study that after exodus, more than 36 per cent
women became infertile by the time they reach 40 years of age. An amazingly
high percentage of 79 per cent suffered from depression, while 76 per cent
suffered from anxiety disorder, phobias and panic attacks.

“The incidence of tuberculosis, renal stones, renal failure and asthma had also
increased markedly”, says Dr P.K. Hak, Professor at Srinagar Medical College.
He further writes in a study, “While the incidence of ailments the exiled
community suffered traditionally has increased, a host of new diseases and
syndromes, previously unknown or rare, is also afflicting them… Malaria has
caused great morbidity among refugees because the community lacked the
immunity acquired by people living in endemic areas. Overcrowding has caused
a greater number of pneumonia and tuberculosis cases. Skin diseases afflict
almost everyone. Most patients suffer from renal colic, renal stones and renal
infections. Angina pectoris has got precipitated. Hypertension is common even
among youth… stress diabetes is a new syndrome. A large number of displaced
Kashmiri diabetics have no other visible factors except stress.” Renowned
16

neurologist of the State, Dr Sushil Razdan, was quoted by Daily Excelsior of

September 3, 2003, as having said, “Dozens of patients have died because of
heat stroke. The incidence of neuro-cystocircosis has also increased. Older
people, very young, and women are the worst sufferers.” A study carried out by
an eminent diabetologist and a senior faculty member of Government Medical
College, Jammu, too brought out that refugees between the ages of 28–40 had
developed diabetes, only after forced displacement, which created great stress.

Many refugees could not cope with the situation and succumbed to the severe
strain imposed on them by living in exile. Others could not reconcile
psychologically to the changed conditions and became mental wrecks. Late
marriages, late conception, premature menopause, reduced fertility span,
diminished libido, hypo-sexuality of exile, forced celibacy, sexual deprivation,
contraception and elective abortions were the other ill-effects of displacement,
on the health of the refugee community. High divorce rates, accompanied with
low birth rates further compounded the problem. Nearly 36 per cent women
reported developing ovarian failure, an entirely new trend. A study conducted by
Department of Human Development and Family Studies (Kansas State
University, Manhattan) among 42 Kashmiri Pandit families living in large
community halls, revealed that exodus had affected the health of children
seriously, resulting in their falling sick intermittently. Insufficient primary health
centres and heavy rush in government hospitals in Jammu, forced the refugees to
seek medical attention in private clinics, putting additional burden on their
already limited resources. In the pre-exodus period, the refugees spent 3 per cent
of their income on medical expenses; the same went up to 5–10 per cent in the
post-exodus period. Healthcare services in Jammu could not cope with the
sudden increase in the number of patients it had to take care of. Thus, costly
private medical care was the only available alternative.

Like every other issue, the State government made no efforts to provide basic
healthcare to the displaced Pandits, particularly those living in camps. If the
government had the least concern for the health needs of refugees, it could have
established a fully-equipped primary health centre, with adequate investigative
and diagnostic set-up and a gynaecological unit, for each camp. The refugees
could have been covered by health/life insurance, which would have cost the
exchequer not more than 40–50 crores. Then, in 2006, the State government
had made a provision of 0.80 crores per year for providing healthcare facilities
to the refugees. This budgetary provision was barely enough to cover the salaries
of the employees dealing with this issue. Lack of availability of medicines and
high morbidity rate was the direct result of this inadequate budgetary allocation
and rudimentary healthcare system existing to take care of the Pandit refugees.
Drop in Population
Improper living conditions, inadequate living space, lack of privacy, living in
unfamiliar surroundings and lack of medical care, resulted in significant drop in
population of Kashmiri Pandits, compared to the national average; male
population growing at a lower rate than female population. In due course of
time, it is likely to threaten the very survival of this ethnic group. This is one of
the most serious consequences of the exodus. Whereas the annual rate of growth
for the entire country in 2006 was 1.95 per cent (Jammu and Kashmir had 2.77
per cent), for refugees it was recorded at 0.56 per cent. Gender-wise too, the
discrepancy was quite pronounced, i.e., 0.50 per cent for males and 0.61 per cent
for females. Lower growth rate is directly attributable to stressful living
conditions, inimical environment, late marriages, shorter fertility period and
reduced birth rates due to economic difficulties that discouraged bigger families.

It was hoped that with the passage of time and improvement in overall living
conditions of refugees in and outside the camps, there will be some improvement
in the situation which has led to the drop in the population growth of Pandits.
However, these hopes have been belied. According to the recently published
news item, “there is a big gap between birth and death rates among the
minuscule Kashmiri Pandit community for the past 20 years.” 17

According to a random survey of the records of births and death among the
community, “every month 93 Kashmiri Pandits die across the globe. That means
1,116 Pandits die every year. According to this estimate, roughly 22,320 might
have died during the past 20 years of their exodus from the Valley.” Compare 18

these figures with the births in the community during the same period, which
stands at nearly 82 Kashmiri Pandit children born every month. This puts the
number of Pandit children that might have been born in the exile at around
19,780. Based on these figures, 2,540 Kashmiri Pandits die every year without
being replaced by fresh births. Low birth rate is not the only reason for the
dwindling population of Pandits. Adoption of one-child norm, high divorce rate
compared to the period before exodus, and a large number of its youth now
marrying outside the community, has further aggravated the issue. The
community will have to give this issue a serious thought if they wish to see its
survival.

Morbidity Pattern
 Gender ratio has also recorded a significant change; out of tune with the
national scenario. During the pre-exodus period, there were 1,044 females per
1,000 males. This increased to 1,059 by 2002. Compare this with the national
ratio, which was 927 females for 1,000 males in 1991, which increased
marginally to 933 in 2001. It may be pointed out that the increase in the sex ratio
was significantly higher in rural refugee population than among the urban
refugee population. This was due to higher female literacy, better status for
women based on equity, lower mortality rate among females and increased life
expectancy of females at birth. Late marriages of females due to displacement,
lower incomes and search for financially better off grooms from other
communities/locations has further added to this state of affairs. Due to the
significantly lower growth rate for males, the community will not be able to
retain replacement levels in future. This will result in the decrease in population,
with far-reaching effects on the very survival of the community in the long run.
The greater proportion of population in higher age group without commensurate
replacement level, will result in large number of older and senile population
becoming pre-dominant.
Loss of Political Relevance
Kashmiri Pandits have been alienated from the Valley’s mainstream politics
ever since 1956, when the State adopted the Indian Constitution. Whereas at the
national level, Nehru included Article 370 into the Indian Constitution as a
safeguard against the possibility of Indian Hindu majority riding roughshod over
the Muslim minority in Kashmir, no such safeguards were created to protect
minorities, like Kashmiri Pandits, Hindus from Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh,
from an overwhelming Muslim majority, at the sub-regional level. This, despite
the fact that Kashmiri Hindus had been clamouring for such safeguards ever
since 1931. Letters exchanged between Prem Nath Bazaz and Jawahar Lal Nehru
(both were friends) dated June 24, 1936 and July 8, 1936, bring out this fact
clearly. How the lack of safeguards affected the Pandits can be gauged from the
fact that in 1947, with a population of nearly 15 per cent, Kashmiri Pandits had a
considerable presence in at least six constituencies; four in Srinagar and two in
Anantnag district.

Sheikh Abdullah’s ambivalence, radical land reforms carried out by the first
Interim Government (see Chapte-10), lack of economic opportunities and
political uncertainty had created such a sense of insecurity among the Pandits
that 20 per cent of them had migrated to places outside the valley by 1950.
Reservation for Muslims in education and employment, events of 1986 in South
Kashmir and political mobilisation on religious platform resorted to by the
mainstream political parties, gave a further impetus to this exodus, with Pandits
continuing to move out of the State in search of security and better economic
prospects. By 1981, their population was reduced to five per cent. Pandits have,
however, consistently questioned these figures as a deliberate attempt at under-
assessing their numbers in order to marginalise them politically. Their claim is
borne out by the fact that 400,000 Pandits migrated outside the Valley in 1989–
90. Out of these, approximately 170,000 are registered in Jammu alone. Some
social organisations of Pandits claim that approximately the same number left
the Valley between 1947 and 1989. According to Prof Saifudin Soz, a minister at
the Centre said “there are roughly 700,000 Kashmiri Pandits, with their largest
concentration of nearly 300,000 in Jammu, 100,000 each in Delhi, other metro
cities, different states, and 10,000 living abroad. Pre-1947 displaced Pandits are
nearly 70,000 and present in the Valley are roughly 20,000.” Some estimates
19

put the number of Pandits in the whole world at 1.5 million. However, a figure
of 700,000, quoted in a seminar at Organisation Research Foundation in 2003,
and in the seminar held in the Political Department of Jammu University on
Kashmiri refugees, is generally accepted to be closer to the actual figure.

After the exodus of 1990, their numbers in the Valley fell sharply, and by
1991, Pandits constituted merely 0.1 per cent of Kashmir’s population. By 2010,
the number of Pandits left in there was less than 5,000.

In the elections of 1952, 1962 and 1967, Kashmiri Pandits had won from three
constituencies, namely two from Srinagar and one from Anantnag district. By
1972, they were left with one constituency of Pahalgam, perhaps because of its
association with the holy cave of Amarnath and the pilgrimage centre of Mattan.
Pandits could not win even this seat on their own strength. Their dwindling
numbers had gradually made them irrelevant to the political process in the state;
after exodus their irrelevance was complete. Out of 154,000 Kashmiri Pandits
registered with the Relief Commission Office, only 22,818 have been included
in the voters’ list; 50 per cent of refugees are no longer registered as voters in the
Valley. Even among the registered voters, only 23 per cent have exercised the
franchise in the last elections. Their irrelevance was confirmed when NC, for the
first time, did not put up any Pandit candidate in 2002 elections. Ironically, in
1996 elections, when the majority community of Kashmir boycotted the polls,
some Muslims got elected on the strength of Pandit refugee votes alone. Even
then the elected candidates rarely visited the refugee camps or spent any funds
out of the constituency development fund on the refugee voters, except as a
symbolic gesture to derive political mileage. The reality is that nearly 350,000
Kashmiri Pandits, whose relevance to the events in the Valley cannot be
questioned, have ceased to have any stake in the Valley’s political process. Their
displacement and lower population growth rate have ensured that their
irrelevance to the political process is total and complete.

Psychological Impact
There is a universal acknowledgement of the fact that even a mere dislocation
is psychologically stressful. Therefore, forced displacement is doubly so. Yet,
there is virtually no debate on the problems of mental health among displaced
communities. Consequently, neither its long-term implications are known nor
the costs that the affected community and the society at large pay in the long run.

With the prevailing infrastructure available in the camps and low priority
being given to the disease even in normal course, psychologically ill patients
were almost entirely neglected. Generally, diseases related to mental health of
people forced to migrate, constitute a substantial and growing burden in societies
of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Middle East. Mental health disorders do not
affect solely the concerned individuals, no matter how much they suffer. They
affect families and communities which, in turn, are inseparable from the local,
national and global process, socially and economically. Besides, one of the
reasons for the long-standing neglect of neuro-psychiatric disorders is the false
belief that such disease can be given a lower priority than the infectious diseases.
This is possibly because of non-manifest nature of the diseases. Besides,
“cultural tradition and local forms of social relations influence the expression of
neuro-psychiatric illness and psychological distress.” The mental disorders
20

manifested themselves in various forms, like epilepsy, major depressive

disorders, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, etc. Those least powerful, like
women, children and old and infirm are definitely more vulnerable to mental
disorders.

Forced exodus of Kashmiri Pandits from Kashmir disrupted their social

insurance mechanisms, which were present in their original habitat. Catastrophic
stresses such as torture, rape and violence that Pandits suffered, created a cluster
of symptoms, now known as ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder,’ or PTSD.
Unemployment and separation from family in the new environment sharply
increased the risk of their mental illness. Living in cramped condition, in tented
accommodation with practically no sanitation, made life miserable for the
refugees. Even for those who lived with relatives or shared accommodation with
others, life was a continuous struggle, which had a devastating effect on the
whole generation of the community. Idleness and lack of work/vocation too had
long-term adverse effects, which unbalanced even the steadiest of people. “The
community had to pay a price in terms of morbidity, emotional and behavioural
changes, and range of other softer psychological difficulties, which compelled
them to lead a life of compromised productivity and well-being.” 21

The displaced Pandits were at a greater risk of developing depression, anxiety

and ‘Somatisation Disorders’, besides certain other unexplained physical
symptoms. They also suffered from cultural and disturbing nightmares, as the
grief for those actually dead sank in. In some instances, the refugees were at
greater risk of alcohol and drug use, delinquency among the youth and tendency
to indulge in family violence; though in the case of Kashmir Pandits, these
tendencies were not too pronounced. Displacement also provoked heightened
inter-generational and gender conflicts, viz., between children and parents,
between husband and wife. These tended to increase and not decrease with time,
as adaptation to new society went forward at different rates within a family.

N OTES

1. ‘Leave salary’ provision was applicable to only those persons who were permanent employees. Those
not holding such jobs got automatically disenfranchised.
2. Kashmir Sentinel, May 2010, p. 9.
3. Times of India, April 18, 1992.
4. Ashok Kumar, the former Chief Secretary of the State, quoted by Asha Khosa in Indian Express,
March 10, 1996.
5. Koshur Samechar, October 2009.
6. Pioneer, July 12, 2010.
7. Kanchan Gupta, Pioneer, September 3, 2010.
8. The origin of this temple at Bishember Nagar in Srinagar, has an interesting background. A Pandit
Judge during Sikh rule, named Dharam Das Koul, was so pained by the judgement that convicted a
Muslim wrongly, that he renounced the world and became a bairagi and established this temple. In
due course, the temple grew rich because of the royal patronage that it enjoyed. Its properties
included many houses, 22 acres of the sprawling Chinar Bagh behind Srinagar Golf Course, shopping
complexes and buildings on Maulana Azad link-road upto Munawarabad Chowk. Today, 70 per cent
of its properties have been compromised; properties on Maulana Azad link-road encroached
upon/leased/sold out.
9. Lt Gen SK Sinha, former Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, Pioneer, October 22, 2009.
10. Statesman News Service, Jammu, January 27, 2009.
11. The Week, June 19, 2011.
12. Ibid.
13. The Migrant, Issue 3, Vol III, March 1998.
14. Ibid.
15. Byron J Good, Ph. D., Prof of Medical Anthropology, Department of Social Medicine, Hammond
Medical School.
16. Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced People;
Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies, p. 107.
17. The Tribune, December 14, 2011.
18. Ibid.
19. Hindustan Times: April 26, 1995.
20. Byron J Good, Ph. D., n. 15.
21. Neha Pande, Disaster and Mental Health: Organisation of Community Based Services, Marathwada
Earthquake as a Case Illustration: Presented at a workshop on Strengthening of Community
Participation in Disaster Reaction and Role of NGOs, New Delhi, January 13–15, 1995.
18
 RETURN AND REHABILITATION
“Each blade of grass has its spot on earth whence it draws its life, Its strength; and so is man rooted
to the land from which he draws, His faith, together with his life.”
— Joseph Conrad

A world riven with dissension, conflict, wars, insurgency and wide economic
disparities, will continue to witness mass exodus of people from one continent to
another, from one region to another, from one country to another and within a
country. All such displaced people will need to be resettled and rehabilitated,
needing enormous state intervention.

Photograph taken by Dr Sanjay Parva of his ancestral house at Magam, Malmoh.

Rehabilitation of a huge mass of people is a complex and difficult process

even at the best of times. The rehabilitation of displaced Kashmiri Pandits is
even more complicated, because their forced displacement is one of the many
intractable issues that constitute ‘Kashmir Problem’ which has defied solution all
these years. Despite insurgency having broken out in the Valley after a
sufficiently long incubation period, all government departments, NGOs, self-
help groups, etc. were found thoroughly ill-prepared when the whole Valley was
engulfed by flames, resulting in forced exodus of almost 400,000 Kashmiri
Pandits. To make matters worse, no policy existed on the rehabilitation or
resettlement of the refugees. Under the circumstances, long-term rehabilitation
measures must be carefully considered, planned and executed. These include;
proper housing, adequate compensation for huge losses suffered by them and
providing the refugees with the means of earning their livelihood. To do all this,
it would be necessary to set up a statutory authority with adequate powers for
resettlement and rehabilitation. Such statutory authority must have the powers to
restore to the displaced people their properties, including houses, shops,
commercial establishments, industries, etc., wherever these are still existing.

Their sense of alienation too will have to be addressed as part of the

rehabilitation plan. This would mean ensuring their participation in their own
affairs, particularly in the matters of their welfare, religious and cultural affairs,
including enabling them to maintain their unique identity, etc. It would be
necessary to provide institutional guarantees that will infuse reasonable degree
of confidence in the community. Their economic state will have to be
ameliorated at the earliest; initially at the place of their resettlement. The
complexity of this process is, indeed, a formidable task. When people get
displaced, the production systems get dismantled, kinship groupings disrupted
and long established residential settlements are abandoned. People’s lives are
affected in the most painful manner. Jobs are lost, assets destroyed, healthcare
tends to deteriorate. For those in business, the links between producers and
customers are often severed. Displaced Kashmiri Pandits accept that it is
impossible for the government to create a habitat outside the Valley which
would be an exact replica of their original habitat. But civic facilities provided to
the refugees must have the basic necessities like latrines, drainage, soakage pits,
roads, schools, grounds, ponds, dispensaries, drinking water source, schools, etc.
Some of the other issues that need specific attention are discussed in the
subsequent paragraphs.

One of the first tasks that the Central Government should have carried out was
to assess correctly the total number of refugee families living in different parts of
the vast country. But like many other issues connected with their forced exodus,
this too fell a victim to political exigencies. Centre relied on the details provided
by the State Government.

The number of families who have registered as refugees at Jammu, Delhi and
other places outside the Jammu and Kashmir State is as under:

Jammu Division Families

 Hindus 27,282
Muslims 2,303
Sikhs 1,830
Others 75
Total 31,490 (1)
Delhi 19,339
Himachal Pradesh 115
Haryana 523
Chandigarh 206
Punjab 100
Uttar Pradesh Committee 500
Madhya Pradesh 40
Karnataka 60
Goa 140
Kerala 5
Maharashtra 124
Rajasthan 47
Total 21,199 (2)
Grand Total: 1+2= 52,689 families comprising of estimated 125,000 people.

The district-wise break-up of families and people who have not migrated and
continue to stay in the Valley is given hereunder:

District Families No of Persons

Srinagar 557 2,228
Budgam 112 425
Baramulla 313 1,404
Kupwara 16 64
Anantnag 419 1,859
Pulwama 318 1,543
Total 1,735 7,523
Source: Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of Kashmiri Displaced
People; Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies. Figures obtained from the State
Government.

Economy and Employment

 The refugees living in the camps and those whose main occupation was
agriculture before their exodus are indigent. In most cases they are dependent on
the meager amount of monthly relief they receive from the government. With 56
per cent households in the camps being jobless or dependent on others, a large
number of adults are without any gainful employment. In the absence of
availability of any capital to start a venture, their condition is hopeless. It is,
therefore, important that the government provide loans to such unemployed
persons on easy terms; in case the government’s financial institutions cannot
provide such loans without accepting collateral, then such provision should be
allowed to be met by the loanees by mortgaging their properties left behind by
them in Kashmir. A special recruitment drive could be carried out by the
government/semi-government agencies to recruit people from the refugee
camps. Even the private sector should be persuaded to launch schemes to
enhance various skill levels of the qualified young people in these camps, who
should subsequently, be absorbed by the same sector in different jobs. State
government had stated that it is committed to providing one job per family of
those Pandits who were still living in the Valley. However, this promise was
never met.

Every effort must be made to address the adverse effects of exodus on the
displaced Pandits. People who need immediate economic assistance are the ones
who live in camps and those who belong to lower economic strata. These people
must be provided with larger relief package to enable them to cope with the high
cost of living. It would be prudent to launch a special fund for economic
reconstruction with an initial corpus of 1,000 crores for the refugees, or
whatever amount an expert committee, constituted for the purpose, suggests.

Social security for the old and infirm among the displaced people is need of
the hour as these people have been rendered most vulnerable to serious health
effects as a result of the forced displacement. Due to the break-up of the joint
family system and significant drop in the population growth, old and infirm will
continue to face the brunt of the consequences of exodus. It would be necessary
for the government to modify the old-age pension scheme which already exists,
for such destitute and helpless people.

For a community as small as Kashmiri Pandits, Parliament should include

them in the ‘reservation schedule’ so that reservations are extended to them in
the same manner as other disadvantaged sections of the society.
Housing and Property
The present arrangements of housing that exist in the camps are grossly
inadequate and unhygienic. The one-room tenements, numbering roughly 4,500
need immediate augmentation. It is important that same number of two-room
tenements be constructed immediately to ease the problem. The government has
undertaken this type of scheme at Jagti, near Jammu. About a year back, the
Prime Minister handed over some of these two-room tenements to some refugees
— the first among those who was allotted this accommodation was the sole
survivor of Wandhama massacre. However, the civic amenities existing in the
township are almost non-existent. There are practically no healthcare facilities
available anywhere close by. “The situation is so bad that nearly 160 refugees
died within two months of their moving into the township,” says Dr Khema
1

Kaul, an activist of Panun Kashmir. Similarly, house-rent allowance must be

made applicable to those living on rent after working out the criteria of
eligibility for receiving the same. In addition, it would be worthwhile to assess
the number of houses belonging to the refugees in both rural and urban areas of
Kashmir, which still exist and have not, as yet, been sold. To prevent their
distress sale, it is necessary that these houses and other similar properties should
be taken over by the government and put to some productive use. Income
generated thereby could be used for the welfare of the displaced people. Again,
for managing this whole process of enumerating, assessing and evaluating the
worth of such properties, a statutory body needs to be created, whose writ will
have a legal sanction. The existing law that is meant to prevent distress sale has
proved woefully inadequate to achieve its intended purpose.

Making the Community Politically Relevant

Today, Kashmiri Pandits stand completely disenfranchised. In a democracy,
no deprivation is worse than this fate. Public purpose, as widely understood,
gives primacy to the interests of the public as opposed to the interest of an
individual. However, in actual fact, more often than not, the public interests are
determined by those groups/communities/vested interests, which are
economically strong and politically dominant. As the amorphousness of the term
is open to subjective interpretation, it is evident that smaller communities like
Kashmiri Pandits, are likely to get increasingly marginalised, politically.
Besides, with numerous alternatives being discussed to grant greater autonomy
to the State and consequently to Jammu and Ladakh, it is quite on the cards, that
Kashmiri Pandits will be left high and dry.
 An overwhelming number of Pandit refugees feel that the only way they can
retain their relevance to political process in Kashmir is to create two
constituencies in exile. This alone can give them a voice. At the same time,
taking into consideration their peculiar circumstances, the Election Commission
of India should, in consultation with the State Government, have one seat
reserved for Pandits in the State Legislative Council. At the same time; all
displaced Kashmiri Pandits must be enrolled as voters in their respective
constituencies, of which they were bonafide voters in the Valley before exodus.
This would go a long way in helping them attain some degree of political
relevance. Presently, there is no consensus on the exact number of displaced
Kashmiri Pandits living outside the valley. The census authorities can assess this
figure on the basis of the State Subject Certificate held by the refugees, or in its
absence, their registration record, as displaced people. This must be done at the
earliest as the next generation of the displaced Pandits has not been able to
obtain this certificate due to the disturbed conditions in Kashmir. Later, in the
absence of this certificate, their claims of being a state subject will be contested,
and they will have no credible proof to prove their Kashmiri descent.

Preserving its Distinct Identity

The most important factor that will contribute towards enabling the Kashmiri
Pandit community to preserve its distinct identity is the promotion of Kashmiri
language. Its original script, ‘Sharda’ has fallen into disuse for centuries.
Majority of the community, particularly the younger generation, are not familiar
with the Persian-Arabic script that Kashmiri Muslims use to write in Kashmiri.
Therefore, it is only Devnagri script which can fill this vacuum. Its applicability
could be restricted to Kashmiri Pandits alone, in case government finds it
politically inexpedient to apply it to whole Valley.

The Kashmiri Pandits’ religious places are mismanaged and under serious
threat of being gobbled up by unscrupulous elements. These need to be protected
by handing over their management to a statutory body, on the lines of ‘Shri Mata
Vaishno Devi Shrine Trust’, at the earliest. Representation of community
members on the board of such Trust must not be less than 50 per cent. Rough
estimates suggest that hundreds of crores of rupees are held by various trusts
which manage these religious places at present. Besides, land and estates, which
form a substantial part of these trusts, too needs to be accounted for. Efficient
and well-regulated management alone can ensure that locked-up capital is
released to be used for the betterment of the community at large.
 With some improvement in ground situation in the Valley over the last few
years, an ever-increasing number of the displaced Pandit community have been
visiting Kashmir regularly, with many of them extending their stay for longer
duration. In the last five years, a large number of Pandit religious places and
those associated with their sages and saints have been repaired and restored to
their original shape by Pandit organisations, with the active help of locals. This
activity is bound to get a fillip if violence in the Valley is kept at bay and peace
is given a chance. Such measures will go a long way in helping Pandits keep
their religious and socio-cultural practices alive. Spending longer periods of time
in Kashmir, keeping their traditions alive in Kashmir and taking care of their
centuries-old temples and places associated with their history, will go a long way
in helping Pandits preserve their unique identity as a distinct ethnic group.

An abandoned Hindu temple lying in disuse on the banks of Kahmil

N OTES

1. Panun Kashmir is a political movement launched by a faction of displaced Kashmiri Pandits,

demanding a separate enclave within Kashmir, having a Union Territory status. This statement was
made by Dr Khema Kaul in a seminar held on November 27, 2011, at Noida, a township in the
National Capital Region.
19
 CRITICAL ISSUES

“The golden rule in a democracy is that it is the duty of the majority to protect the minority, be it
religious, racial or linguistic. It is a self-evident rule… Firmly rooted in the universality of human
rights.”
—PC Chidambaram (November 8, 2009)

(Indian Home Minister in his speech to a convention hosted by Dar-ul-Uloom,

Deoband)

Was Violence Against Kashmir Pandits a Genocide?

By definition, genocide is, ‘the killing of one hundred or more members of an
ethnic, racial, linguistic or a religious group.’ The UNO has declared genocide
as a crime under International Law through a resolution passed by the UN
General Assembly on December 11, 1946. Consequently, a Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide came into effect on January 12, 1951.
The targeted killing of Kashmiri Pandits from September 1989, onwards, till the
entire ethnic community was almost entirely cleansed out of the Valley, clearly
fits into the definition of genocide. If the complete data of the killings were to be
compiled, the list would run into thousands. Among the dead were those
reported missing, or those whose dead bodies were disposed off by the
government agencies as unclaimed.

According to the fact-sheet presented to the National Human Rights

Commission (NHRC) by the State of Jammu and Kashmir, 719 Hindus had been
killed. The report states, “Due to the targeted attacks by the militants against the
innocent civilians in the early years of the ongoing militancy in Jammu and
Kashmir, coupled with calls by Islamist terrorist groups to Kashmiri Pandits to
leave the Valley, the vast majority of them and other minority communities were
forced to migrate.” The report further states that 43,364 Hindu families went to
Jammu until 1991 and 28,713 to Delhi. Informing about the destruction of
religious places, the report states that 97 temples were destroyed by militants till
the end of 1994. For a community numbering less than half a million prior to
their exodus in December 1989, having over 700 of its members killed from the
fall of 1989 up till the summer of 1990, was indeed a heavy toll.

The basic human rights of Pandits, as of every other Indian, are guaranteed by
Indian Constitution and the provisions of International Law. These provisions
were clearly violated and their abuse should have straightway attracted the
invoking of such provisions to defend the basic human rights of Kashmiri
Pandits. For getting justice under such provisions, they did not have to belong to
a minority community. It was only because Indian Government and international
organisations turned a blind eye to their plight, that they (Pandits) had to present
their case in front of the NHRC. Various Kashmiri Pandit organisations
presented a comprehensive case, in which they pleaded with the NHRC to
declare the events preceding the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits, and those that
continued till much after they had evacuated the Valley, as ‘genocide’, as
defined by the International Convention, to which India is a signatory.

In order to preserve its secular façade, the political establishment sacrificed

the Kashmiri Pandits at the altar of political expediency and vote-bank politics.
Truth became a casualty and Pandits once again became the victims of unjust
and unjustified stand taken by the State and Central governments. Nevertheless,
it is apparent from the stand taken by the NHRC that they were hard put to
justify their eventual stand as they appeared to have been convinced of the
Pandits’ argument that genocide did actually take place. The NHRC resorted to
the jugglery of semantics and played with the words to conclude that ‘genocide-
type of situation had got created’. Actually, what they said was this, “Killing and
‘ethnic cleansing’ of Kashmiri Pandits must be seen in the deeper intent to
secure the secession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The crimes committed
against the Kashmiri Pandits are, by any yardstick, deserving of the strongest
condemnations… but against the stern definition of the ‘Genocide Convention’;
the Commission is constrained to observe that while acts akin to genocide have
occurred in respect of Kashmiri Pandits, and that, indeed, in the minds and
utterances of some of the militants, genocide type design may exist… the crimes,
grave as they undoubtedly are, fall short of ultimate crime of genocide.” (NHRC
Case No. 938/94–95 7 1181/94–95, 11 June 1999).

Leave alone calling it a genocide, the Government of India has shied away
from calling it even an ethnic cleansing, which it certainly was. As Vir Sanghvi,
the Editor-in-Chief of a leading national daily, The Hindustan Times, writes,
“Hundreds of thousands of Pandits fled because they feared for their lives. There
is a term for this sort of thing even though we, in India, are reluctant to use it:
ethnic cleansing,” He further adds, “Whenever ethnic cleansing has occurred
over the last few decades in Eastern Europe for instance, the world has sat up
and taken notice. The United Nations has got involved. The world press has
treated it as a global story and Western governments have tried to find solutions.
Except that in the case of the Pandits, nothing has happened. Nobody seems to
care.”1

Internally Displaced People (IDP) Status

People becoming internally displaced is a recent phenomenon. The situation
has been brought about by many internal armed conflicts taking place in many
countries. Whereas the rules governing the treatment of trans-border
displacements are adequately covered by various conventions on refugees, the
IDPs enjoy no such protection. As no legally binding instrument guarantees
protection or assistance to them, they remain the most vulnerable sections among
forced refugees. Though at present there are over 23 million ‘official’ refugees
in world due to various reasons, this does not include the IDPs. What is even
worse, it is the weakest and the poorest who suffer the most among them, when
they are forcibly displaced from their usual habitat and places of residence,
either due to conflicts or natural disasters. Being refugees within their own
country, it is the country’s own specific laws that become applicable to them.
Those displacements, which occur as a result of armed conflicts, attract
provisions of Article 3 and additional Protocol II of Geneva Conventions, which
lays down the Principles of Treatment of civilians fleeing, as a result. It also
includes the Provision and care of the sick and the wounded, the women and the
children. Guiding principles on internal displacement lay down specific rights of
IDPs, so far as their rights of protection and humanitarian assistance and the
obligations of the governments during displacement are concerned. But in
reality, it only serves as a framework, because the provisions are not legally
binding. In India, the problem of IDPs becomes grave as the country does not
recognise IDPs and, therefore, applies no legal provision to ameliorate their lot.

Some Kashmiri Pandit organisations had requested the NHRC to declare the
displaced Pandits as ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ as per the International
Conventions and usage. Central Government contested the claim on the ground
that it does not recognise IDPs, and that the exodus took place essentially
because of terrorist actions, abetted by Pakistan, to secure secession of Jammu
and Kashmir from the Union of India. Besides, the Government of India
declared that ‘Kashmiri Pandits needed only rehabilitation and the laws of the
land were adequate to take care of that and the solution was required to be found
at the political level. Based on these arguments, the NHRC neither intervened
nor gave any relief. The Commission, though, empathised with the Kashmiri
Pandits and felt that the community was not getting the degree of relief that it
deserved. But, beyond that, there was nothing much it could do. Hypocrisy and
the dishonesty of the Government were quite clear from the contents of its letter
dated May 6, 1996 (Case No 802 on NHRC file):

“…The complainants are appropriately styled as refugees as they have

migrated on their own from areas in the Valley to Jammu area of the same State
or other areas of the country. Their claims to designate them as internally
displaced persons are not acceptable to the Government of India on the ground
that displacement was self imposed.”

It could be argued that Kashmir problem has defied a lasting solution for the
last over six decades and is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Does it mean
that in the absence of any political solution, Kashmiri Pandits’ rights should be
trampled just because they are too few in number?

By all accounts, Kashmiri Pandit community is an internally displaced

community and it expected the Central Government to declare them as such. But
the Government of India took shelter behind some vague rules which do not
permit it to declare even forcibly displaced people as IDPs. To add insult to their
injury, the Government took the stand that Kashmiri Pandits had left the valley
of their ‘own accord’, as if they had decided to go for a picnic at the height of
winter in temperatures below freezing point, leaving everything behind! It is a
matter of abiding shame for the government to have sacrificed the whole
community at the altar of political expediency.
 Compared to the hypocritical Indian attitude towards the displaced Kashmiri
Pandit community, the US was more sympathetic to it. Frank Pallone, the US
Congressman introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives on
February 15, 2006, condemning the violation of human rights of Kashmiri
Pandits. He categorically stated that Jehadis were indulging in ethnic cleansing
of the Valley to turn it into an Islamic state and 400,000 Kashmiri Pandits, many
of whom were murdered, were displaced from their homes. The resolution stated
that the House condemned the human rights violations of Kashmiri Pandits in
the strongest terms. The House conveyed its sense by stating that the
Government of India and the State Government of Jammu and Kashmir should
take immediate steps to remedy the situation and act to ensure the physical,
political and economic security of the embattled community.

Even the term, ‘Refugee’ has recently been re-defined by the State
Government with ulterior motives. The Prime Minister had, as part of a package
for the State, announced certain measures for the rehabilitation of the refugees
(displaced Kashmiri Pandits). As per the original notification a ‘refugee’ implied
a person who had moved out of the Valley after November 1, 1989, and had
been registered as such. However, according to the new notification, a ‘refugee’
will now be IDPs also, i.e., people who moved from one place to another within
the Valley. This amendment has been incorporated to deprive genuine Kashmiri
Pandit ‘refugees’ (actually refugees, but labeled as ‘migrants’ due to political
exigencies) from the benefits announced by the Prime Minister, and at the same
time, benefit Kashmiri Muslims. The Pandits left the Valley over twenty years
ago, and it is only the Muslims who have and continue to move from one place
to another, within the Valley. It may be mentioned that all Kashmiri Pandits
applying for jobs under the Prime Minister’s package for refugees, had given an
undertaking as required by the notice issued by the Services Selection Board of
the State that ‘they will serve in Kashmir Valley alone’. This was a ploy to
dissuade the Pandit refugees from applying for such jobs.

Kashmiri Pandits recently saw a ray of hope in the judgement delivered by the
Honourable Justice of Delhi High Court, Justice Gita Mittal, in the case relating
to the petition filed by PK Kaul and others, versus Delhi Estate Officer, who had
issued eviction orders to refugee Kashmiri Pandit employees. While delivering a
significant judgement, Justice Mittal held the ‘Kashmiri refugees as IDPs.’ She
based her verdict on a number of existing guidelines and principles governing
internal displacement, as also various judgements delivered by the Supreme
Court of India.
 Articulating the aspirations of the Kashmiri Pandit refugees, the All India
Kashmiri Samaj, an apex body of all Kashmiri Pandit Organisations, during its
Global Meet held in Jammu on March 4, 2012, passed a resolution on this
important issue. It stated, “Guidelines set-forth by the working group on
internally displaced people at the United Nations Human Rights Council, shall
have to be accepted as fundamental to their restitution in the Valley. At least
four out of the ‘Compendium of Fundamentals’ are of vital interests to us. These
are: non-refoulment, concentrated and comprehensive living, recognition of
specific identity and empowering them politically with viable means of
sustenance.”

Minority Status
Whereas at the all-India level there is a statutory provision that empowers the
Centre to declare certain sections of the society as ‘minorities,’ which entitles
them to crucial benefits, the same does not apply to minorities within a state. In
the Indian context, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis have been
recognised as minorities by the National Commission of Minorities Act, 1992.
This Act does not lay down any well-defined principles to identify a minority.
This was, perhaps, deliberately intended to be so, as there was always a danger
of any distinct ethnic/religious group demanding a minority status. With huge
diversity, there are numerous such groups who have a distinct ethno-cultural
identity of their own, which can safely classify these groups as a minority. As
per the census of 1991, minorities, as defined by this Act constitute 17.5 per cent
of the country’s population. Nevertheless the rigidity of interpretation ensured
that Pandits could not claim any minority status.

Under the Indian Constitution, states enjoy all the requisite powers to re-
categorise minorities to cater for their local needs. For example, in Jammu and
Kashmir, Muslims, obviously, are not a minority. But at the same time Kashmiri
Pandits cannot be declared a minority, as the State government has not enacted
any law to that effect, despite having all the powers to do so. Despite being a
microscopic minority, Kashmiri Pandits enjoy no special consideration as such.
This has been commented upon by no less than the Chairman of National
Commission for Minorities (NCM), Wajahat Habibullah, who said, “The
declaration of Kashmiri Pandits as a minority in Jammu and Kashmir was a
‘crying need of the hour’ and he would actively pursue the matter with the State
Government.” Expressing helplessness in the matter, the Chairman further
2

added, “The writ of the National Commission for Minorities does not run in
Jammu and Kashmir because it enjoys a special status. But we have come across
several cases of suffering involving the families of Kashmiri Pandits, who chose
to stay back in the Valley, despite repeated threats from terrorists. Not much is
being done for these families and their wards. It’s time the State Government
notified Kashmiri Hindus as a minority in Jammu and Kashmir. They must pass
their own Act, set up their own minority commission and re-categorise the
minorities, depending on the actual population in the state.” 3

Though the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, vide its
Article 27, recognises minority rights, it does not define it in definitive terms.
Besides, due to political expediency, the governments may deny the existence of
minorities altogether, in order to avoid its applicability.

Return of Pandits to Kashmir

Return of Kashmiri Pandits to the Valley is the biggest challenge to the very
idea of India as a multi-ethnic, plural and secular democracy. Therefore,
restoration of that position must remain India’s ultimate aim in Kashmir.

Displaced people have a right to return to their native places. According to

UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the provisions of the
Indian Constitution, it is the responsibility of the Government of India to create
conducive conditions for Pandits to return safely and honourably to their
habitual place of residence. UN Guideline 28 is quite categorical on this issue. It
states, “Competent authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to
establish conditions, as well as provide means, which allow internally displaced
persons to return voluntarily to their homes or places of habitual residence.” This
involves the following:

1. Guaranteeing their safety and security.

2. Protecting their ‘Fundamental Rights’ as enshrined in the Constitution

of India and honouring the same as universally accepted.

3. Unhindered freedom of movement.

4. Protecting their inalienable right to livelihood with dignity and honour.

5. Providing adequate opportunity to enable them to participate in the

 affairs of their community.

6. Must have a guaranteed right to be consulted in the matters that

concern the welfare, identity, religious freedom and cultural well-being of
their own community.

7. Adopting such measures which would reinforce their sense of

belonging as a necessary pre-condition for their re-integration into the
Valley’s social milieu.

8. Their economic well-being will have to be ensured through a

mechanism that will ensure their economic rehabilitation at their usual
place of residence, or at a mutually acceptable place. Following must form
part of economic package:
• Loss of property must be completely compensated.
• Availability of generous loans on low interests for rebuilding their
houses and restarting their businesses.
• Provision of relief for loss of agricultural assets.

It is generally accepted that people displaced as a result of wars, conflicts or

other natural calamities, be able to return to their homeland, once the turbulence
has subsided. But this is contingent upon the fact that normalcy has been
restored. In the case of Kashmiri Pandits, the moot point is whether the desired
level of normalcy has been restored or not?

Kashmiri Pandits, particularly those living in camps, yearn to return to the

Valley. They are overwhelmingly nostalgic while expressing their desire to
return to their roots in Kashmir. In a survey conducted among displaced Pandits
in 2005, to assess the pre-conditions of their return to Kashmir; security emerged
as the overriding consideration, followed by their desire to have a secure area in
the Valley, to settle in, preferably enjoying Union Territory status. These
preferences were, in turn, followed by a need to be provided with social security,
complete economic rehabilitation and reservation in jobs; the last being the
choice of those displaced from rural areas of Kashmir. Many linked their return
to the Valley with the necessity of their being politically empowered as a pre-
condition. Therefore, the essentials pre-requisites that must be available to the
displaced Pandits on return are; ability of Kashmiri Pandits to protect, promote
and live according to their cultural traditions; be able to live without fear,
without being discriminated against by the state or the Muslim majority
population of the valley; be able to live in a secure environment that guarantees
right to life and property of each individual; enjoy all democratic rights in
accordance with the provisions of the Indian Constitution.

Having been deprived of any role in political decision-making, Pandits’

alienation from the mainstream has been complete. As a matter of fact, they
played no role even in deciding issues that greatly impacted their own
community. This will have to be rectified if Pandits are to live in Kashmir with
dignity and honour. That will be possible if a statutory body is created to oversee
the rehabilitation of Pandits in the Valley and provide them with constitutional
safeguards so that they are not pushed out again in future. As Dr Ajay Chrungoo,
President ‘Panun Kashmir’, said, “Pandits’ return to the Valley needs a new
constitutional dispensation with ingredients which will retain them in the Valley
on lasting basis.” 4

On a few occasions in the past, the state government has shown some urgency
in dealing with the issue of return of Pandits to Kashmir. In November, 1997, it
stated, “The matter of safe return of refugees to their native places in the Valley
is of top most priority for the State Government… the State Government had
constituted a sub-committee headed by Financial Commissioner (Planning and
Development) to draw up an action plan… which was submitted in July 97.” As
a consequence, a group of refugees visited the Valley to interact with their
neighbours to renew their old contacts. In 1997, an Act called the “J&K
Kashmiri Refugees Immoveable Properties (Preservation, Protection and
Restraint of Distress Sale - 1997) was passed. Later, the same year, another Act,
called the Jammu and Kashmir Refugees (Stay Proceedings) Act, 1997, was also
passed. In 1999, it was envisaged that 2,000 families could be moved into 15
clusters of 166 homes still intact in the Valley, where security was available. An
amount of 44 crores was made available for this purpose. However, families
refused to return for various reasons. In August 2002, a statement made in the
Rajya Sabha said, “…The return to the Valley with honour and dignity is one of
the top most priorities of the State Government.” The last attempt made by the
Mufti’s Government in 2003, envisaging settling the refugees in Mattan and
Tullamulla, in two more clusters, was put paid to due to Nandimarg massacre.

Events in Kashmir since 2000, when conditions in the Valley started

improving, have not induced much confidence among the displaced Pandits.
Whenever serious steps were afoot to rehabilitate the Pandits in the Valley, the
militants struck with great ferocity, killing Hindus and Sikhs to convey their
opposition to the proposal. In the process, many innocent men, women and
children were killed. It has been Pandits’ experience that whenever there is a talk
of their likely to return to the Valley, there is invariably a violent event that
targets the remaining few Kashmiri Pandits, who still continue to live there,
sending a chilling message to those who are contemplating such a return. During
Mufti Mohammad Syed’s rule, when loud-thinking about the return of Pandits
could be heard in the corridors of power (coupled with the construction of
clusters of flats in Budgam, etc.), Nandimarg massacre took place in the dead of
night (2.30 A.M.) on March, 24, 2003, in which 24 Kashmiri Pandits, including
11 men, 11 women and 2 children were brutally murdered. The murders were
committed to deter Pandits from returning to Kashmir and send a message to
those persuading the Pandits to return. This put an end to any talk about Pandit’s
return, at least for the time being.

The diffidence of the Pandits to return to the Valley on account of their

security concerns can be gauged from the fact that despite a reasonably attractive
package announced by the State government in its budget proposal in 2009, only
300 families expressed their willingness. This was in addition to 934 families
that had registered themselves for their return in 2008, after the Prime Minister
had announced a similar package. This forms just two per cent of the total
number of registered displaced families (55,476). It is not a random killing due
to a stray grenade attack on security forces or being an unintended victim of
cross-firing, etc., that scares the Pandits. It is the fear of being the targets of
well-planned massacres, like Wandhama, Chhitisingpora and Nandimarg, that
scares them and justifiably so.

Events of 2008 and 2010 in Kashmir further shattered the Pandits’ confidence
in the ability of the government to provide them with adequate security on their
return to the Valley. Mass agitations launched by separatists on Amarnath land
transfer issue in 2008, and orchestrated stone-pelting that paralysed the entire
Valley during the summer of 2010, was a serious setback to the cherished desire
of those Pandits who wanted to return to Kashmir. These agitations, spearheaded
by separatists, attracted huge participation, indicating the ability of these militant
leaders to whip up mass hysteria, which the vested interests can easily turn
against the Pandits.

Sometime back the State government’s formulation of a ‘Surrender Policy’ for

the militants further eroded the confidence of the Pandits regarding the
intentions of the government. The policy was aimed at allowing those Kashmiri
youth who had crossed over to Pakistan/PoK to return to the Valley and
rehabilitate them. There are nearly 800 of them in the militant camps and many
of them have married the local girls, whose children are now Pakistani citizens.
That such people can pose a serious threat to Pandits was totally overlooked and
did little to instill confidence in the latter. This sinister policy has created great
apprehensions in the minds of Pandits who suffered at their hands.

Rehabilitation of Pandits in the Valley is itself going to be a nightmare for the

State administration. A large number of houses belonging to the community
have been burnt/destroyed, and out of the remaining, about 80 per cent houses
have been sold out as part of distress sale. The remaining 20 per cent have been
occupied by security forces on rental basis. Getting these premises vacated is
proving a herculean task. One wonders whether any thought has been given to
this aspect. Till permanent arrangements for their rehabilitation in the Valley are
made, there would be a need for huge transit accommodation. Besides, it will
need careful planning on many fronts; creating means of earning a livelihood,
housing, adequate compensation for losses suffered; return of houses, factories,
orchards, lands, etc., wherever these are still in functional order. To encourage
the refugee youth to return to the Valley, the private sector should be encouraged
to employ them by opening up its outlets in Kashmir.

One of the biggest obstacles to the return of Pandits is going to be their re-
integration into the social milieu of the Valley. A complete generation has grown
up in the Valley without ever having interacted with Pandits. This has robbed the
Kashmiri society of a chance to live in an environment where there are ‘others’
besides Muslims. For Kashmiri Pandits it will be easier to fit into a purely
Muslim dominated social milieu, but it will be next to impossible for the
younger generation of Valley Muslims to share social space based on interaction
with non-Muslims. This is further made worse by the fact that during this period,
the fundamentalist Muslim preachers, namely Salafists, Wahabis and their ilk,
have brainwashed the entire generation into adopting a more intolerant stance
towards Kashmiri Pandits. The following examples will suffice:

A slogan has recently been coined to describe the return to the Valley of some
women employees who were given jobs as part of the Prime Minister’s relief
package. One of the pre-conditions laid down by the state government before
issuing appointment letters to these women employees was that they would have
to serve in the Valley itself. The slogan goes something like this:
 ‘Bud budani rooze tapas, yazzat soozukh vaapas’

(The old men and women preferred to stay in the scorching sun, but they chose
to send their honour back to the Valley)

While playing marbles, the Kashmiri Muslim children name the targeted
marble as Bhatta, (Kashmiri Pandit).

Kashmiri Pandits have further been discouraged from contemplating return to

the Valley because of the step-motherly treatment meted out by the State
government to those Kashmiri Pandits who are still left behind in the valley.
Their sad plight was very much evident when the NCM visited the Valley
recently. According to NCM, there were 3,700 Kashmir Pandit families in the
Valley in March 2011. During their interaction with the beleaguered Pandits,
they found that they had been left to the wolves, with no one in the government
sparing any thought for them. Seeing their pathetic condition the NCM noted,
“that the State Government was not doing enough for the welfare of Kashmiri
Pandits left behind in the Valley. They were found to be even worse off than the
refugee Kashmiri Pandits, who have better access to employment and
educational opportunities outside the State.” Seeing their condition, Chairman of
the NCM was moved to say “I have met several Kashmiri Hindu families, which
stayed back in the Valley. Today, their wards barely have access to jobs, while
those of the refugee Kashmiri Pandits are much better placed because they had
moved out and managed a better education, besides the benefits of the state
schemes for the Kashmiri refugees. Those who stayed back are now regretting
not having migrated. Their children curse them for having stayed on. The State
Government must provide for them.” 5

The reaction of Muslim separatists in Kashmir to the idea of Pandits’ return

has ranged from ambivalence to outright hostility. Though some of them have
refused to take a clear-cut stand, others have, on occasions, expressed their view
on the issue openly. In an interview given to Murtaza Saibili, a correspondent of
Surya magazine (June 1993 issue), most separatist leaders, ranging from Syed
Ali Shah Geelani on the one extreme to Miyan Abdul Qayoom, President of
Kashmir Bar Association, on the other, accepted the possibility of the return of
Kashmiri Pandits only on the pre-condition that Pandits will have to participate
in the ongoing struggle in favour of Islamic Liberation.

The militant organisations have openly opposed the return of Pandits to the
‘Islamic Kashmir’. Nearly 17 years after the above interviews were conducted;
their stand has shown little softening-up. In a recent television debate on ‘Return
of Kashmiri Pandits’, Sajjad Lone, Chairman of People’s Conference, an
important part of All Party Hurriyat Conference, and a well-known separatist
leader said,“Some Kashmiri Pandits are overqualified to return.” It is clear from
his statement that all Pandit refugees are not welcome back. A few years back,
when PDP was ruling the state, its top leader, Mehbooba Mufti had also stated
that only those Pandits, who lived in refugee camps, were the government’s
responsibility. It is clear from the above statements that since all the property
and lands left behind by Pandits in Kashmir had been usurped by Muslims, bulk
of Pandits, therefore, were not welcome back to the Valley, to claim the same.
Such a hostile attitude of important Kashmiri leaders towards the return of
Pandits, sends a negative message to the frightened community.

The fact is that various stakeholders in the ongoing insurgency have their own
reasons to oppose Pandits’ return to Kashmir. The armed militants oppose it on
ideological grounds; the separatists for political reasons; the general masses
oppose it for purely economic reasons. Muslim masses in Kashmir have
benefited enormously from the Pandit exodus. They have monopolised all the
jobs, appropriated all businesses, occupied abandoned properties, either forcibly
or by purchasing these at throwaway prices in distress sale, etc. Thousands of
government jobs have gone to the local Muslims as no Pandit has been recruited
to fill in the vacancy created by the retirement of their co-religionists. The
Muslim educated class has seen the clear advantage that Pandits’ exodus and
their continued displacement out of the Valley, gave them. They have naturally
developed a stake in preserving the status-quo. Muslim middle class will,
therefore, consider it a threat to their economic interests, if the Pandits were to
return. In the face of such stiff opposition to Pandit’s return, mainstream political
parties have been cold to the proposal. Besides, Kashmiri Pandits’s return has
occupied only the margins of political debate in the country. Except the
Bharatiya Janata Party (when out of power) no one has sincerely taken up the
cause of this beleaguered community. The plight of Kashmiri Pandits has got
masked by the ‘secular versus communal’ debate, often witnessed in the Indian
polity. Being too few in number, Pandits themselves do not represent a
monolithic vote-bank and therefore, are not taken seriously by any political
party.

In the final analysis, a microscopic minority like Kashmiri Pandits can live
safely and with dignity only if respondent Muslim majority so desires, and to
this end, is able to convince its radical fringe. This will largely depend upon the
degree to which majority community is willing to accommodate the political and
economic aspirations of this microscopic community. As of today, it does not
appear to be in any mood to do so. This is evident from the reaction to the last
Assembly elections to the State Legislature held after the Congress-PDP
coalition government had to resign, as a consequence of the Amarnath land row.
When reminded by a senior journalist about the overwhelming response of
Kashmiris to the elections, Syed Ali Shah Geelani said tersely, “Kufr has won
and Islam has lost.”

Similarly, even at the common man’s level, some incidents, like the one that
took place at Chhatabal, do not inspire confidence. While collecting evidence of
the dilapidated state of temples of the Valley, Sanjay Tickoo, President of
Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), and his colleagues just about
managed to escape with their lives, when local youth attacked them for daring to
record the evidence. Describing the incident, Tickoo said, “It was 386th temple
which we wanted to document through pictures for restoring it. But five-six
members from the majority community came and threatened us,” Tickoo told the
Hindustan Times. Tickoo is further reported to have said, “these men used words
like “Jis tarah humne tumhare mandiroon ko jalaya hai vaise hi tum logon ko
jalayenge, aur kisi ko pata bi nahi chalega (The way we have burnt your
temples, in the same way we will burn you and no one will know about you).
Yehan sirf Islam Chalega (Only Islam will prevail here). India ko lagta hai ki
tum logon ko vapas layega, jo bi aayega mara jayega, hum log phir se gun
uthayenge (India thinks they can bring Kashmiri Pandits back to Valley.
Whosoever will come, will die. We will again take up arms against you).”
Tickoo said the locals manhandled the members of the KPSS. “We had to leave
the place. The villagers who had gathered at the spot did not intervene. This
shows that the attitude towards the minority community has not changed.” 6&7

Many Pandits think that their return to Kashmir can only be a part of an
overall and comprehensive settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir problem,
wherein all parties to the dispute will have to guarantee their safety, security and
dignity. Today, the situation is such that return is not even talked about by the
Pandits because of both internal and external factors, which have firmly sucked
the Valley into the vortex of Islamic terrorism. Activities of Pakistan-created and
sponsored terror groups is not just confined to the Valley, but have also spread to
many other parts of the country. Despite West’s consensus on war on terror and
the pooling of resources by many countries to end this scourge, there is no end in
sight to this menace. In fact, Pakistan itself has now fallen prey to this endless
and senseless violence at the hands of radical elements, which it created in first
place. Large parts of Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, Waziristan,
etc., are today completely under the sway of various Islamic terror groups.
Kashmir will, therefore, continue to simmer, despite the fact that India-Pakistan
composite dialogue has been on and off and on again, for some years now.

In the meanwhile, Pakistani society too has got extremely radicalised. This is
evident from people eulogising the assassin of Salman Taseer, the Governor of
Punjab and a top politician of Pakistan People’s Party, who had supported the
amending of the draconian anti-blasphemy law. Sometime later, killing of the
only Christian Minister in the Federal Cabinet, Shahzad Bhatti, for the same
reason, further confirmed this trend. At the popular level in Pakistan, there is
extensive support for waging of Jehad in Kashmir, if not in the whole of India.
According to a poll conducted by a Pakistan News Magazine, Herald, in January
2002, 64 per cent supported it. Besides, most of the people do not consider
Kashmir to be a territorial dispute, but a Hindu-Muslim issue, in which their
sympathies are with Muslims of Kashmir in ‘their struggle for separation from
India and accession to Pakistan’. Kashmiri Pandits’ return is, therefore, also
linked to the end of Islamist violence.

India’s challenge lies in its need to maintain and defend democratic pluralism,
the bedrock of its much acclaimed liberal and secular constitution. Kashmir is
central to this concept. India feels that armed insurgency in Kashmir is
sponsored from Pakistan and it has helped the separatist movement primarily
because of the Muslim-majority character of the state. The present government
at the Centre in India feels Kashmiri Muslims have themselves fallen victims to
this violence and if somehow this sponsorship of violence and terror were to
stop, Kashmir could once again return to the peaceful ways of the old, wherein
the problem could then be resolved with a heavy dose of autonomy/self-rule.
This view, though simplistic, does have some merit. Composite dialogue
between India and Pakistan seems to be revolving around this thinking
(presently suspended due to terror strike on Mumbai by Pakistan based LeT on
November 26, 2008).

According to the Pandits, they fled the Valley because of an overwhelming

sense of insecurity that engulfed the community in 1989–90, as a result of the
Pakistan sponsored insurgency in Kashmir. Therefore, they can return only if in
their opinion, the place becomes safe enough for them to return. This will be
possible only when threat of Pakistan’s intervention disappears completely and
peace returns. There appears to be no possibility of that happening any time
soon. Pakistan is unlikely to back off its chosen path to grab Kashmir by
infiltrating its well-armed and well-trained Jehadis into Kashmir. “Since 1990,
Indian army has recovered over 80,000 AK series rifles; over 1,300 machine
guns; over 2,000 rocket launchers; some 63,000 hand grenades and seven
million rounds of ammunition. The Indian Army has also eliminated over 20,000
terrorists, a large proportion of whom were foreign terrorists.” Despite paying
such huge costs, the entire Pakistani terror infrastructure is intact and thriving.
There are some 2,000 to 2,500 terrorists in training camps. Some 700–850 are on
the launching pads and holding camps near the LoC. Around 230 terrorists made
35 attempts to infiltrate this year (2011). Nearly 50 terrorists have been killed in
2011 so far, 19 in the last two months alone.” Under the circumstances,
8

generally peaceful situation prevailing in Kashmir in 2011 cannot be termed as

return of normalcy on permanent basis. As long as Pakistan uses terrorism in
Kashmir as a state policy and retains the ability to exercise that option; Kashmir
will remain unsafe for Pandits to return.

One of the biggest confidence building measures among the Pandits would be
if the majority community in the Valley assures them of their security and
dignity. This can happen only if there is a change of heart on the part of majority
community in Kashmir, which will enable them to overlook their own economic
costs that Pandits’ return will impose on them. For a microscopic minority to
build enough confidence in the overwhelming Muslim majority of Kashmir, the
willingness of the latter to welcome them back is a necessary prerequisite. At the
moment, this possibility does not seem to exist. Under the circumstances, no
amount of coercion, use of force, offering of incentives, etc., will persuade the
Pandits to return to the Valley, only to be thrown out again. That would be
catastrophic. On the other hand, if the government insists on a partial return
without giving much thought to the underlying problem, it is likely to prove
disastrous and counter-productive. Intricacies of similar situation have been
aptly summed up by Erind D Mooney, special advisor to the United Nations
Secretary General on Internally Displaced, who also has a long experience of
working in the office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights
in Geneva. He states, “Simply providing aid to persons whose physical security
is under threat not only neglects their protection needs but can actually
exacerbate and perpetuate their plight, for instance by providing a false sense of
security, shoring up repressive regimes, fostering long time dependency and
even resulting in well-fed dead.” 9
 Some years back one could safely assume that return of peace to the Valley
depended largely on the improvement in Indo-Pak relations. But now, the
situation in Afghanistan after the contemplated US withdrawal from there is also
likely to impact the events in Kashmir. The whole region is geographically
interlinked and historically interwoven. The seamless movement and operations
carried out by Jehadis in the Af–pak areas are likely to increase, if the
International Security Assistance Forces operating in Afghanistan were to leave
lock stock and barrel. With the epicentre and command structure of these forces
operating from Pakistan under the latter’s overall supervision; the Jehadi
activities are unlikely to leave Kashmir untouched. It is, therefore, unlikely that
peace will return to Kashmir any time soon. Under the circumstances, hoping for
the return of conditions conducive enough for Pandits to return, do not look
bright.

It is also debatable whether the youth of the diaspora will be willing to return
to the Valley on permanent basis for reasons which are varied and complicated.
For one, Kashmir does not provide any employment opportunities in either
industry or service sector, as no industries exist there and there is negligible
growth in the service sector, because of two decades of militancy. The inability
of these two crucial sectors to absorb a substantial number of youth in new jobs
has even forced the local youth to seek jobs outside the State. As government
continues to be the main employer, beyond a point, it cannot provide jobs to
everyone. The traditional employment generating industries like horticulture and
handicraft suffered enormously due to militancy and has, therefore, not kept
pace with the requirements of the liberalised economy or the requirements of the
burgeoning number of job seekers. Similarly, schooling of young children too,
poses serious problems. Having grown up in a free environment outside
Kashmir, where religion has practically no place in their school curriculum, it
will be almost unthinkable for these children to study in Valley schools, where
every child is required to wear religion on his or her sleeve and where their
soaring spirits get easily stifled.

Under the circumstances, the only ones who might think of returning, on
experimental basis, would be small-time shopkeepers and those entirely
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. These displaced Pandits would be
the only ones willing to return to Kashmir with even a lesser degree of security
and political empowerment. Being poor and from rural background, getting back
their land would provide them with their only source of livelihood. Though even
in their case, a relatively small incident of violence against them can trigger
panic and have devastating consequences.

For Kashmir and Kashmiri Pandits, a lot has changed during the last two
decades. On the one hand, with fatigue setting-in among the people of Kashmir
due to the two decade-old turmoil, some people in Kashmir do yearn for the
olden days, when peace prevailed and Kashmiri Pandits’ presence among them
was taken for granted. Recently (end of 2011) 25 Sarpanchs (the elected heads
of the local village councils) met to discuss the return of Kashmiri Pandits to
Kashmir. It was for the first time after the exodus that the elected representatives
of the people in Kashmir discussed the issue. By any reckoning, it represents a
positive change among the local population. However, at the same time, the
exodus has brought about some critical changes among the Kashmiri Pandits,
both at the individual as also at the community level. These changes militate
against their desire to return to Kashmir.

Some years ago, an elderly Kashmiri Pandit refugee’s last wish, made from
his death-bed in Udhampur, was to go back to Kashmir. His family took him to
Kud, not far from Udhampur, which looked like Kashmir. That was the kind of
burning desire of that generation, which strongly connected to Kashmir.
However, this is not true of Kashmiri Pandit youth who grew up outside
Kashmir. They neither connect nor identify themselves with Kashmir in the
same way as their elders did. Besides, Pandits of the older generation were
predominantly state government employees and their world revolved around
Kashmir. The new generation largely works in private enterprises within and
outside India, turning them into global citizens. The Valley’s economy provides
no avenues for gainful employment of such youth, equipped as they are with the
skills that are not in demand in Kashmir. Additionally, Kashmiri Pandit youth
aspires for better career opportunities, which Kashmir cannot provide.

Widespread and rampant inter-community marriages amongst Kashmiri

Pandits, have also ensured that the community is losing its distinct identity
rapidly. High mortality and low birth rate has further accentuated the process of
extinction of the Kashmiri Pandit community. Under such circumstances, even if
ideal conditions were created for the return of Kashmiri Pandits to Kashmir,
there may not be anyone willing or even left to go back there.

Nevertheless, acceptance by India, of the forced displacement of Kashmiri

Pandits from the Valley as a fait accompli, will amount to granting official
recognition to the Islamists’ success in turning Kashmir into an entirely Islamic
state. In its own estimation, and in the eyes of the world, such recognition by
India will make its credentials, as a democratic and secular country, ring
extremely hollow: its much hyped cooperative federalism will lie in tatters.
Despite pushing the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits under the carpet; history will be
unrelenting in judging India’s claim to being a liberal democracy. Can India
accept this kind of situation without paying a heavy price in terms of its standing
in the world, particularly at a time when it is emerging as a big economic power
house and a regional power?

Turning Adversity into Opportunity

Forced displacement thrusts numerous adverse situations on the displaced;
uprooting, loss of assets, social disorder and breakdown of norm. Such
experience can be summed up as trauma. It is a well established fact that
refugees go through a process of adaptation, which includes, a stage of ‘arrival
euphoria’ lasting two to six months, followed by six months to two years of
disillusionment, which creates a heightened risk of mental illness. Both these
stages are finally followed by adaptation. That is the time when displaced people
start picking up the threads and start the process of rebuilding their lives.
Cataclysmic experience like forced displacement, can also provide a new
platform for take-off. In the long run, the displaced community would find itself
substantially better off, experiencing the law of increasing returns, till it reaches
the point of inflection.

There are many instances in history which point to a very significant but the
least talked of the fallouts of mass exodus, viz, turning adversity into an
opportunity. History is replete with examples which prove that
individuals/groups of people who have become refugees have succeeded beyond
the routine, in their new environment. Jews, after exodus from their Biblical
lands in Palestine; millions who were part of history’s greatest mass exodus of
people after the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947; thousands upon
thousands who flocked to America after its accidental discovery in the
seventeenth century, easily come to one’s mind. Some of the greatest names in
history, particularly in the recent past, have been refugees. Jews today are the
most successful/influential ethnic group in the US. Similarly, some of the most
prominent leaders/achievers in various fields, in the recent past, have been
refugees. As Dr KN Pandita mentions, “All these people did not allow the
adversity to crush them, but turned it into a challenge to realise their dreams.
Refugees have created great civilisations in human history — along the Nile, the
Euphrates, the Tigris, the Oxus, the Danube, the Seine, the Indus and the
Ganges, and lately the Potomac. Diasporas have created new parameters of
human culture. This they did by unleashing that hidden and dormant potential in
order to create a new world, a new civilisation, and a new vision.” Those
10

refugees who belonged to remote and semi-closed regions of the Valley, found
newer and unheard of avenues of employment and new occupational fields.
During a survey carried out in 2006, about 50 per cent of the refugees accepted
that exodus had increased their awareness levels, which helped them to land
better jobs. Thus, in their case, the displacement was a step towards attaining
better social and economic status in terms of physical assets and human capital.

It is axiomatic that displaced people tend to behave in conservative, risk-

avoiding ways, clinging to familiar practices and groupings. As they re-establish
themselves economically and socially, they leave this period of stress and
insecurity behind. People now begin to behave in more innovative and risk-
taking ways and their attitudes become increasingly flexible, individualistic and
open-ended. This happens because the simplified cultural repertoire and the
breakdowns of patterns of community organisation and leadership that occur
during resettlement, make for less restraint on diversity and individual initiative,
as the relocated community re-establishes itself. In the process, the community
no longer finds itself outside management and gets integrated into wider regional
setting in such a way that it gains economic and administrative ability. At the
same time, many refugees adapt themselves very well, taking advantage of the
new opportunities that present themselves, to forge better lives for themselves
and their families. Displacement, while difficult and traumatic, does not have a
uniformly negative impact on the victims, both individually and collectively.
Depending on the initiative displayed, resources available, opportunities offered
by the new environment, the refugees might eventually benefit from such
displacement. Even though reluctantly in the beginning and in most cases
grievingly, the refugees will give up old attachments and make new ones,
accepting the new relationships in the process and finding sources of pleasure
there-in.

Even though there is always a conflict between adopting the new environment
and the desire to restore the past, the fact remains that compulsion of the
circumstances forces meaningful participation in looking for a way ahead with
optimism and hope. This alone will allow the displaced to pay attention to future
rather than be chained to the past. Over the centuries, Kashmiri Pandits have
shown remarkable ability to adapt to the new environment that they had to face
after every exodus from the Valley. They have made use of every opportunity
available outside to carve out a new and brighter future. Their new generations
had little scope for a worthwhile future in the Valley and therefore, the
displacement forced on them might, eventually, prove to be a blessing in
disguise. However, this optimism is only applicable at the individual level and
not at the community level, because it is unlikely that this microscopic minority
of Kashmiri Pandits will be able to salvage their culture and social customs once
the link with Kashmir is permanently severed.

Some members of the community often quote the example of Jews while
drawing inspiration from their determination to return to the Promised Land after
a long absence of nearly two millennia. Kashmiri Pandits feel that they too can
return to the Valley if only they can somehow keep the hope of such return
burning in the hearts and minds of the future generations. However, this
comparison is only cosmetic. The community has to understand that the most
important factor that helped the Jews to survive was their ability to adhere to
their religious and spiritual traditions and pass these on from generation to
generation, with single-minded resolve. They were also successful in reviving
the language of their spiritual discourse as most of them learn to read and write
Hebrew, as a matter of routine. Same thing cannot be said of Kashmiri Pandits,
who are not familiar with Sanskrit language; they are not able to read and
understand their religious texts or construct a sentence. Same applies to their
mother tongue, Kashmiri. Therefore, quoting the Jewish example may be a good
idea to motivate the community, but the fact is that Kashmiri Pandits do not
come anywhere close to the Jews in their survival technique. In the ocean of
diversity of Hindus in India, Kashmiri Pandits are, therefore, bound to get
submerged in it; in the process, losing their unique and distinct identity as an
ethnic group.

N OTES

1. Vir Singhvi, Both India and Democracy itself have Failed the Kashmiri Pandits, posted on January 20,
2012, downloaded from [email protected].
2. Tribune News Service, New Delhi, March 21, 2011, downloaded from kashmir-
[email protected] on 28 March, 2011.
3. Ibid.
4. Dr Ajay Chrangoo, Koshur Samachar; November 2009, p. 21.
5. Tribune News Service, n. 2.
6. Hindustantimes.com, date-lined November 17, 2009.
7. News carried by local newspaper in Kashmir: Downloaded from KP [email protected]:
April 1, 2009.
8. Maj Gen GD Bakshi, (Retd), The Times of India, November 18, 2011.
9. Dr Ajay Chrangoo, President, Panun Kashmir, Koshur Samachar, January 2010, p. 16.
10. Dr KN Pandita, Voice of Silence, Jammu.
 APPENDICES

Appendix ‘A’

Important dates in the history of the State after its formation

1846– Maharaja Gulab Singh.

1857
1857– Maharaja Ranbir Singh.
1885
1885– Maharaja Partap Singh.
1925
1925– Maharaja Hari Singh.
1947
1915 First horse-driven cart arrived in Srinagar, using the cart road constructed over the Banihal
Pass; later to be developed as National Highway1A (NH 1A).
1932– In 1932, the Muslim Reading Room Party was turned into J&K Muslim Conference by
1934 Sheikh Abdullah, who also became its first President. Initially, its sole aim was to seek justice
for Muslim, but with the passage of time, it became a strong movement against the Dogra
rule. This led to the passing of Constitutional Act, 1934, to create a diarchic form of
Government. It stipulated the formation of a 75-member Legislative Assembly; 35 of which
would be elected. By this time, differences had arisen in the Working Committee of Muslim
Conference (MC) in regard to the constitutional reforms propounded by the Maharaja. These
differences finally resulted in the breakup of MC, with Sheikh Abdullah leading the
breakaway faction, the National Conference (NC), with its membership now thrown open to
all classes, irrespective of religion.
1938–39 With Sheikh Abdullah receiving increasing support for his movement against the Maharaja
from Indian National Congress, and particularly from Pandit Nehru, the NC gained wide
acceptability among people and made deep inroads into Valley’s rural areas.
1942 Jammat-e-Islami (JI) formed at Shopian by Maulvi Ghulam Ahmed Dar in collaboration with
Syed Shahabadudin.
1944 Resolution of ‘Naya Kashmir’ was adopted by the NC. Same year, Mohammad Ali Jinnah
visited Kashmir.
10 May Quit Kashmir Movement launched; Sheikh arrested. Nehru arrives in Kashmir to plead his
1946 case, but is arrested by the Maharaja.
 Oct 1946 MC under the leadership of Maulvi Yousuf Shah launches ‘Direct Action’ campaign.
12 Aug Maharaja offered ‘Stand still’ agreement to both India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted it, but
1947 India sought some clarifications.
22 Oct Tribal invasion of the State launched by Pakistan.
1947
23 Oct Muzafarabad and several towns captured by invading forces.
1947
24 Oct Mohara Power Station captured. Baramulla falls.
1947
25 Oct Maharaja Hari Singh asked for Indian assistance, which was declined.
1947
26 Oct (a) Accession offered, (b) Instrument of Accession signed.
1947
27 Oct (a) Indian troops arrive in J&K and (b) Brig Ghansara Singh was sent as Governor of Gilgit,
1947 once the British paramountcy expired on Oct 30. Muslim officers and men mutinied and took
the Governor prisoner. The Garrison Commander, Maj Brown, hoisted Pakistani flag on Nov
4, 1947.
29 Oct Sheikh Abdullah heads Emergency Government (called Chief Emergency Administrator).
1947
30 Dec India takes the case to UN.
1947
01 Jan UNSC passed the following Resolutions: (a) Jan 48 - Appealed for improvement in situation.
1948 (b) 17 April 48 - Set up 5-member Commission to mediate between India and Pak. (c) 13 Aug
48 - (See below)
04 Mar Sheikh Abdullah appointed PM.
1948
05 Mar Elections to State Legislative Assembly, subsequently designated as Constituent Assembly,
1948 held.
13 Aug Most significant UN Resolution passed. It had three parts: (a) Part I – related to ceasefire
1948 (called for immediate ceasefire). (b) Part II - Made it incumbent upon Pakistan to withdraw all
forces, regular and irregular, while India was required to reduce its forces and (c) Part III
-“The Government of India and Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of J&K shall
be determined in accordance with the will of the people. To that end, upon the acceptance of
the said agreement, both countries agree to enter into consultation with the Commission to
determine fair and equitable conditions, whereby such free expression of the will be assured.”
4th Resolution was supplement of the Third Resolution. One of the important assurances
given by the “UN Commission for India and Pakistan” (UNCIP) was that “The plebiscite
proposal shall not be binding upon India, if Pakistan does not implement Part-I or Part-II of
the resolution of Aug 48.”
01 Jan Ceasefire resolution comes into effect.
1949
12 Mar Admiral Nimitz was designated as Plebiscite Administrator and UNCIP deputed to settle
1949 ceasefire and supervise it.
09 Jun Maharaja abdicates and vests all his powers in his son, Karan Singh.
1949
27 Jul Karachi Agreement signed. Its main features were: (a) CFL (Ceasefire Line) was delineated
1949 based on the general line occupied by respective countries on 01 Jan 1949. (b) Troops on both
sides to remain at least 500 yards on either side of the CFL. (c) Both sides were free to adjust
their defences behind the CFL, subject to no laying of wire/mines (d) No additional military
potential would be introduced into J&K by either side and (e) UNCIP stations observers as
deemed necessary.
14 Mar Sir Owen Dixon appointed representative of the United Nations in place of UNCIP to find a
1950 lasting solution to Kashmir Problem.
Oct 1950 General Council of NC passes a resolution demanding holding of elections to Constituent
Assembly.
01 May Karan Singh issues a proclamation instituting a Constituent Assembly.
1951
Oct 1951 Elections held. NC won all 75 seats, 73 unopposed and 2 contested. Jammu’s Praja Parishad
boycotted the elections.
31 Oct Constituent Assembly meets.
1951
07 Aug Sheikh Abdullah delivers a virulently anti-India speech.
1953
09 Aug Sheikh Abdullah arrested. Deputy Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad sworn-in as
1953 the PM.
06 Feb Constituent Assembly ratifies Accession.
1954
1954 First Constitution (Application to J&K State) Order was issued by the President. Through
this, India applied certain provisions of the Constitution of India to the State.
09 Aug Plebiscite Front formed by Mirza Afzal Beg.
1955
1956 Under Article I of the Constitution of India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir is included as
one of the states of the Republic of India, vide Indian Constitution Act 1956 (Seventh
Amendment). However, Article 370, providing special status to the State, is retained.
19 Nov Assembly elections held. People give formal sanction to the Accession.
1956
26 Jan The State Assembly formally adopts the State’s Constitution.
1957
1958 Through an amendment to Article 312 of the Indian Constitution, All India Services are
extended to the State.
08 Jan Sheikh Abdullah released.
1958
21 Feb Sheikh Abdullah’s’ lecture at Hazratbal leads to large-scale riots.
1958
29 Apr Sheikh Abdullah is re-arrested.
1958
21 May Kashmir Conspiracy Case is initiated.
1958
1959 Permit system of entry into the State is done away with.
Oct/Nov Sino–India war.
1962
 04 Oct Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad resigns under Kamraj Plan. Shamsuddin is sworn is as PM.
1963

27 Dec Mo-e–Muqadas is found missing from Hazratbal Shrine.

1963
04 Jan Relic found and replaced in Hazratbal.
1964
03 Feb Relic identified as real by Mirakh Shah.
1964
29 Feb GM Sadiq becomes PM.
1964
08 Apr Kashmir Conspiracy Case is withdrawn. Sheikh Abdullah is released from prison.
1964
May 1964 Sheikh Abdullah goes to Pakistan to meet Ayub Khan and others on Nehru’s bidding.
27 May Nehru dies. Sheikh Abdullah cuts short visit to Pak and returns.
1964
Feb 1965 Sheikh Abdullah goes to Saudi Arabia for Haj.
28 Mar Sheikh Abdullah meets Chou-En-Lai.
1965
09 May Sheikh Abdullah is re-arrested.
1965
30 May Article 249 of the Indian Constitution is extended to the State. This would enable the Centre
1965 to legislate on any issue, just like in other states.
30 May Designation of PM and Sadr-e-Riyasat changed to Chief Minister and Governor respectively.
1965
05 Aug Pakistani Mujahids enter valley.
1965
01 Sep Pak launches massive attack in Chhamb.
1965
16 Sep China issues ultimatum to India. Pakistan offers cease-fire. India accepts the offer.
1965
22 Sept Cease-fire declared.
1965
10 Jan Tashkent Declaration signed.
1966
08 Dec Sheikh Abdullah released.
1967
08 Jan Sheikh, GM Shah and Beg expelled from the state.
1971
12 Jan Plebiscite Front banned.
1971
03 Dec Bangladesh war.
1971
13 Dec GM Saqid dies and Mir Qasim takes over as CM.
1971
 16 Dec Pak Army surrenders in East Pakistan. Bangladesh born.
1971

03 Jul Simla Agreement signed. CFL becomes Line of Control (LoC).

1972
24 Feb Kashmir Accord between Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi signed.
1975
25 Feb Sheikh Abdullah takes over as CM.
1975
13 Apr Sheikh Abdullah becomes President of NC.
1975
Mar 1977 Parliamentary elections held.
09 Jun State elections held. NC wins.
1977
09 Jul (a) Sheikh sworn as CM. (b) Resettlement Act passed in Assembly.
1977
25 Sep Beg asked to resign as relations between two lifelong colleagues sours.
1978
08 Sep Sheikh dies. Farooq is sworn in as the Chief Minister.
1982
19 Oct India–West Indies Cricket match in Srinagar is disrupted by anti-national elements, providing
1983 first signs of the shape of things to come.
02 Apr Jagmohan takes over as Governor for the first time.
1984
07 Mar G.M. Shah Government dismissed.
1986
Nov 1986 Violence let loose on Hindus in Kashmir by radical Isamists, particularly in Anantnag. A
large number of ancient temples destroyed and cows slaughtered to hurt Hindu sentiment.
Nov 1986 Rajiv–Farooq Accord signed to fight the forthcoming elections jointly.
Mar 1987 Fresh elections, widely believed to be rigged, held.
12 Jul Jagmohan resigns.
1989
19 Sep Tika Lal Taploo assassinated.
1989
18 Jan Farooq Abdullah resigns.
1990
19 Jan Jagmohan appointed Governor again.
1990
Night19/20 Terrifying night long posturing by entire Muslim population of Kashmir by means of mass
Jan 1990 demonstrations, use of mosque pulpits and public address systems, physical intimidation of
the microscopic Kashmiri Pandit minority, compels them to flee en masse from the Valley.
Kashmiri Pandits refer to the night as Holocaust Night. Mass exodus Commences.
21 May Maulvi Farooq killed by armed militants.
1990
26 May Jagmohan resigns.
1990
1995 Mohammad Sultan Bhatt, brother of Abdul Gani Bhatt, Chairman APHC killed.
22 Mar Sangram Pura massacre; seven Kashmiri Pandits killed by heavily armed militants.
1997

Jun 1997 32 Hindus killed in Udhampur district by heavily armed militants.

25 Jan Wandhama massacre; militants kill 23 Kashmiri Pandits in cold blood on the Islamic night of
1998 prayer, Shab-e-Barat.
Apr 1998 Prankot massacre; 27 Hindus, including 11 children, killed by militants.
May-Jul Kargil War
1999
Mar 2000 35 Sikhs killed by militants in Chhittisinghpora village, 68 Kms from Srinagar.
22 May Abdul Gani Lone, a moderate separatist leader, killed by Al Umar Mujahideen.
2002
2002 Assembly polls held.
24 Mar Nandimarg massacre; 24 Kashmiri Pandits, including 2 children and 11 women killed by
2003 militants.
Sep 2003 All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) splits. Syed Ali Shah Geelani heads the breakway
faction, Tehrik e Hurriyat.
Jul-Aug Amarnath land row orchestrated by PDP and led by separatists paralyses life in the State. The
2008 Congress-led government falls.
2008 Assembly polls held. NC and Congress form a coalition government. Umar Abdullah
becomes Chief Minister.
2010 Widespread demonstrations, orchestrated by separatists, and led by stone pelters paralyse life
in the Valley. In the two month long turmoil, 115 young men were killed, mostly in police
firing.
Oct 2010 Three-member team of interlocutors constituted by the Center to suggest ways for facilitating
the normalisation of political situation in the state
May-Jul Panchayat polls held in the State to elect 29,707 Panchs and 4,128 Sarpanchs, recorded a
2011 massive turnout of voters in the Valley. Official estimates put it at nearly 80 per cent.
19 Jul Dr Ghulam Nabi Fai, a Kashmiri settled in US and Executive Director of pro–separatist
2011 Kashmir American Council, who has played a crucial role in lobbying with US Congressmen
and propagating Pakistani viewpoint in the US during the last two decades of turmoil in the
Valley, arrested in the US by FBI.
24 May Government of India after receiving the reports from the interlocutors earlier, made it public
2012 by uploading it on the Union Home Ministry’s web site. Both the Hurrriyat factions rejected
the report, as did the main opposition party in India, the BJP.
Jun 2012 Amarnath yatra reduced to 39 days this year.
25 Jun 350 year old Dastgir Sahib Shrine, located at Khanyar in Srinagar, which housed a relic of
2012 11th century Sufi Saint, Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jeelani, gutted in a fire.
Appendix ‘B’

Main Parties Forming Hurriyat Conference

• Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front.

• People’s Conference.

• Awami Action Committee.

• Jammat-e-Islami (JI).

Besides above, following smaller parties also form part of this separatist
conglomerate:

• Ittihad ul Muslimeen-Shia Party, headed by Maulana Abbas Ansari

• Bazme Tawheed.

• Jammat-e-Ahle Hadis.

• Traders Federation, Srinagar.

• People’s Movement.

• Freedom Movement.

• Kashmir Bar Association.

• Kashmir Study Circle.

• Dukhtaran-e-Millat
Appendix ‘C’

Ultimatum issued by Hizb-Ul-Mujahideen to Kashmiri Pandits (Published

in Al Safa, dated April 14, 1990)

“Pandits, responsible for having perpetrated oppression and atrocity on the

Muslims should quit in two days.”

“A spokesman of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen has stated that in a meeting of its Area

Commanders, held yesterday, a decision was taken to give an ultimatum to the
Kashmiri Pandits to leave Kashmir in two days. The spokesman said that all
Pandits of Jammu and Kashmir should leave from here in two days. According
to the spokesman, behind the oppression and persecution of Muslims, Pandits
have a hand. He said that all the Pandits have become the instruments of Indian
imperialism. He said that Pandits have received training in arms outside the
Valley and have drawn up plans to foment disturbances of a serious nature. He
said that the Area Commanders feel that the Pandits have a hand in the recent
arrest of Mujahideen as well as the raids on their quarters. The spokesman said
that the oppression against the Muslims is unleashed by them.”

(Translated from Urdu)

Extracts of a Sermon Broadcast on the public address system of a Mosque

in Srinagar, on January 27–28, 1990.

“The aim of the Jehad is Azadi and it is enjoined by Almighty on all followers
of ‘Tauheed’ to participate in the Jehad. The crusade is for the establishment of
Kashmir into an Islamic society. The heretics can only live in Islamic society if
they accept the Islamic laws. The non-Muslims have always helped the usurpers
from outside to enslave the Muslim masses in Kashmir. For them, therefore, the
only way is to quit this ‘pak sarzameen’ (sacred land).

We have always protected the non-Muslims and they have always indulged in
espionage. Now they are bewildered because the day of reckoning is on their
head.”

(Source: White Paper on Kashmir, prepared by Joint Human Rights Committee)

Appendix ‘D’

Handout issued by Hizb-Ul-Islam in 1990

“Islam is our aim; Quran is our constitution;

Jehad is our path; war till victory; God is great;
War cry of Hizb is ‘Allah o Akbar; the cry of Hizb-ul-Islam,
Take heed India.”

1. The Muslim brotherhood in Kashmir has risen in arms against the

usurpers of its freedom, which has been snatched in 1947, and ever since.
The Muslims have now taken to arms to free themselves from the slavery;
Muslim youth in the cities and towns and in the villages are to receive
training in the use of arms to engage the Indian security forces.

2. There is no going back after the armed struggle begins. The Jehad is
invincible. We demand our right to freedom, which has been recognised by
the United Nations Organisation in 1947, and the British Government that
ruled India then.

3. An all round attack has to be launched on the state administration

which has run the Indian colonial administrative machine in the state, the
Indian security forces, at whose hands thousands of Mujahids have attained
martyrdom and the enemies of the freedom of the Muslim brotherhood in
Kashmir.

4. Muslim brotherhood is an integral part of the Umat e Islami, the

Muslim nation of the world, which can no more be divided by any
boundaries. There is no boundary between Kashmir and the Muslim
commonwealth of Pakistan, except that imposed by Indian imposters,
which at present divides the Muslims of Kashmir.

5. Traitors to the cause of Islam will alone shirk the responsibility to serve
the cause of Islam and they will receive the punishment that they ought to
be given. All servants are enjoined to do whatever is in their power to
wreck the government from inside and outside; harass, demoralise and
destroy Indian security personnel; eliminate the enemies of revolution,
propagate Muslim law and Muslim code of life, which is supreme law in
Kashmir and participate in mass resistance to Indian oppression.

6. The community of Pandits in Kashmir, which has in it the treacherous

agents of India, has no option but to submit to the law of Islam, as the
supreme law in Kashmir or leave Kashmir.

7. Our youth is prepared to fight the Indian military with the support of
the great Islamic Mujahideen of Palestine and Afghanistan. They will
achieve victory and liberate the Muslims here from the clutches of an
oppressive and crafty usurper. Muslims have always fought for freedom
and won it. Jehad is victorious!
Appendix ‘E’

List of Kashmiri Pandits/others Killed in the Initial Phase of Militancy

Appendix ‘F’

Some of the Unidentified Bodies of Pandits recovered (List not Exhaustive)

Details Area where body Date

found
Two women and three men killed by draining their blood. Women Sopore, Kashmir 27.01.1990
raped before being killed. Cut marks on arm veins, the only
injury.Bodies recovered from Jhelum.
One person with his face burnt and body bullet-riddled. Nizam-e- Khanyar, Srinagar 30.01.1990
Mustafa engraved on his thigh recovered.
Four young men killed by draining their blood. Defaced by torture Chhanpora, Srinagar 05.02.1990
before being killed.
Bullet-riddled bodies of two men and one woman recovered with Budgam Bus Stand, 15.02.1990
JKLF poster hanging from their necks. Srinagar
One girl raped and then hanged. Recovered from 17.02.1990
Jhelum near Bijbehara
Dead bodies of five young men recovered with their eyes gouged out Ashmukam, 14.03.1990
and bones broken. JKLF-Azadi engraved on their faces. Anantnag.
Bullet-riddled bodies of a male and a female recovered. Baramulla (behind 26.03.1990
Degree College)
One male found hanging from a tree with JKLF poster hanging from On the road side near 03.04.1990
his neck. Vicharnag, Srinagar
One bullet-riddled male body. Rotnipura, Pulwama 07.04.1990
Two old men and an old woman strangulated to death. Bodies Karfalimohalla, 08.04.1990
recovered from an abandoned house. Srinagar
One woman gang-raped and killed. Azadi painted on her forehead. Near SKIMS, Soura, 18.04.1990
Srinagar
One boy’s body cut into pieces. ‘Pandits leave or face death – Outside Tyndale 24.04.1990
JKLF’, written on the trunk. Biscoe Memorial
School, Srinagar
Mutilated bodies of three men recovered from an apple orchard. Hyderpora 26.04.1990
Killed by draining their blood.
Unidentified body recovered. Khrew, Pulwama 26-04-90
Two bullet-riddled bodies of young boys recovered. Duru, Anantnag 29.04.1990
Bodies of three men and a woman recovered from Dal Lake. Srinagar 29.04.1990
Bullet-riddled body of a woman recovered. Kupwara 01.05.1990
Body of a male recovered. Kupwara 01-05-
1990
One bullet-riddled body of a male recovered. Tulamula, Srinagar 09.05.1990
Body of a male recovered. Pulwama 10-05-
1990
 Young male body recovered from Jhelum. Not Known 10-05-
1990
One male body recovered. Pulwama 10-05-90
Body of a young boy recovered. Jhelum 10-05-90
An old man’s body, killed by strangulation recovered. “Leave Govt Village Aakur, 12.05.1990
Schools and Join Islamic Schools” written on a chit recovered from Kashmir
the pocket.
One male body recovered. Srinagar 13-05-
1990
Bullet-riddled body of an old male recovered. Old Airport Road, 18.05.1990
Srinagar
One male burnt body recovered. Srinagar 24-05-
1990
Bullet-riddled body of a woman recovered. Kawdara, Srinagar 26.05.1990
Two young girls tortured to death. Safakadal, Srinagar 27.05.1990
Dead body of an old man killed by strangulation. JKLF engraved on Drabiyar, Srinagar 28.05.1990
left arm.
Bodies of a male and female each recovered from road side; both Batmalu, Srinagar 28.05.1990
killed by having been nailed on their forehead.
One young man’s bullet-riddled body, whose eyes had been gouged Rainawari Srinagar 28.05.1990
out, recovered.
One half-burnt body of a man recovered. Nawakadal College, 29.05.1990
Srinagar
A woman kidnapped, raped and cut into pieces. Govt employee at 30.5.1990
Sopore
Bodies of a boy and a girl recovered. They had been killed by Behind J&K Bank, 1.06.1990
draining their blood. Nizam-e-Mustafa was engraved on their Anantnag
forehead.
A police constable kidnapped and killed. Anantnag 03-06-
1990
A man hanged to death. Pulwama 10-06-
1990
Five decomposed male bodies with torture marks and hands tied Srinagar 12.06.1990
behind recovered from Jhelum.
Body of a male with bullet marks recovered. Baramulla 12-06-
1990
Three bodies of young men found hanging from a tree in an orchard Kulgam, Anantnag 15.06.1990
with JKLF poster placed around their neck.
One male body with strangulation marks recover. Shopian 22-06-
1990
One male body recovered from Jhelum. Srinagar 22-06-
1990
One male body recovered from Manasbal Lake. Manasbal, Srinagar 22-06-
1990
 Two men killed by strangulation. Threatening letters pasted on the One each from 24.06.1990
bodies by Hizab-ul-Mujahideen. Badgam and
Kupwara.
A couple killed after being tied to a running vehicle. Chak Hanjan, 26-06-
Anantnag 1990
One male hanged to death. Pulwama 10.07.1990
One male bullet-riddled body recovered. Badgam 11.07.1990
One man stabbed to death and a threatening letter from JKLF Srinagar 11.07.1990
recovered from his pocket.
One young man’s dead body recovered. Khannabal 29.07.1990
One male dead body found. Kupwara 29.07.1990
One male dead body recovered. Sopore 01-08-
1990
Five male bodies recovered from river. Near Baramulla from 15.08.1990
Jhelum
Bodies of a male and a female recovered in decomposed state. Behind SKIMS, 27.06.1990
Srinagar
One girl raped and then stabbed to death. Baramulla 7.09.1990
Three male bodies recovered from a river at Sumbal. Drowned after Sumbal 17.09.1990
their hands and feet had been tied to stones.
Four bullet-riddled bodies of young boys recovered. General bus stand 22.09.1990
Batamallu, Srinagar
A woman’s mutilated body found. Highway near 30.09.1990
Chowgal, Kupwara
Bullet-riddled bodies of a man, woman and a girl child each Alikadal, Srinagar 2.10.1990
recovered. JKLF painted on the walls of their house.
One boy killed by cutting the veins of his arms and ankles and left to Sanat Nagar, Srinagar 10.10.1990
die.

Source: Kashmir News Network, Report on the Impact of Migration on the Socio-economic Conditions of
Kashmiri Displaced People; Prepared by Jammu and Kashmir Centre for Minority Studies and White Paper
on Kashmir prepared by Dr MK Teng and CL Guddu for Joint Human Rights Committee.
Appendix ‘G’

Number of People Killed in the Valley Between January 1990 and April
2011

Number of militants killed 21,323

Civilians killed by militants 13,226
Civilians killed by security forces 3642
Security forces personnel killed by militants 5,369 (includes 1,500 Kashmiri Policemen)
Total people killed 43,560

Source: Jammu and Kashmir Government documents, reproduced in The Times of India, June 20, 2011.
Appendix ‘H’
Temples Vandalised during Disturbances in February 1986

Anantnag District
1 Anantnag Town: Two temples damaged and one looted.
2 Achhabal: One temple desecrated and garbage thrown on idols.
3 Moripura: One temple burnt completely.
4 Sagam: One temple demolished.
5 Naogam: One temple partially burnt.
6 Teelvani: One temple partially burnt.
7 Gautamnag: A two-storey temple burnt and it Dharamshala stoned.
8 Krangsoo: Temple priest assaulted.
9 Akura (Mattan): One temple and its entire property looted, and shed set on fire.
10 Dialgam: One temple heavily damaged by stoning.
11 Salar: One temple set on fire.
12 Aishmuqam: One temple set on fire.
13 Bijbihara Town:
(a) Two temples completely looted; ancient idols, valued at more than Rs. 10 lakhs, broken.
(b) ‘Jai Devi’ Temple desecrated and idols stolen.
14 Wanpoh (Gasipora): Two temples and Samadhi of Swami Dama Kak completely burnt.
15 Dhanav (Bogund): Two temples and one Dharamshala burnt.
16 Chogam: One temple stoned; its doors, windows and pillars broken.
17 One temple on the parikrama of the holy spring at Verinag damaged, doors broken, idols thrown into
the spring.
18 Larkipora: Three temples of Goddess Durga, Siddha Lakshimi and Shiva completely burnt, idols
broken in to pieces.
19 Fatehpura: One temple completely burnt along with its entrance gate. Ancient Shiva idol broken to
pieces.
20 Quill (Pulwama): One temple partially damaged.
21 Trisal: One temple stoned, compound wall of another temple damaged.
22 Pawan Sandhya at Verinag converted into a mosque.
Srinagar District
23 Ganpatyar (Srinagar): Temple heavily stoned and rockets fired at it.
24 Jawahar Nagar: Shiv Mandir desecrated and damaged; its property consigned to flames.
25 Maisuma: Dashnami Akhara, from where Chhari Mubarak (formal commencement of the
pilgrimage) leaves for Holy Amarnath Cave, burnt.
26 Raghunath Mandir: Damaged by stoning.
27 Tullamulla: One temple in the village burnt.
28 Waskura: The famous temple of Mata Rupa Bhawani partially burnt.
 29 Ganderbal: Two temples burnt and two damaged.
Badgam District
30 Yachhgam: One temple partially damaged.
31 Badgam Town: Sharda temple damaged.
32. Chadura: One temple damaged.
Kupwara District
33. Tekpora: One temple burnt.
34. Lalpura: One temple burnt.
35. Handwara: One temple damaged.
Baramulla District
36. Baramulla Town: One temple partially damaged.
37. Vankura: One temple damaged completely.
38. Sopore: One temple partially damaged.
39. Bandipora: One temple partially burnt.
A ‘I’
PPENDIX

Details of the Temples Destroyed/Vandalised in Kashmir in the First Phase

of Militancy

Temples Destroyed
SUMMARY
Anantnag=31, Baramulla=7, Budgam=1, Srinagar=3, Kupwara=1
Besides the above mentioned details, 7 temples were destroyed in Doda and 2 in Rajouri District

Temples Vandalised
Source: Published by Jammu Kashmir Vichar Manch (February-March 1993) on the basis of countless
eyewitness accounts and reports published in:
— The Statesman, March 5, 1986
— The Hindu, March 4, 1986
— The Telegraph, March 4, 1986
— The Hindustan Times, March 3, 1986 (Editorial)
— Kashmir Samiti, New Delhi.
— The Martand, Srinagar.
Note: Besides these, there are numerous other temples located in remote villages, which are not included
here, either because these had already been usurped or it was too dangerous for investigators to go there.
Appendix ‘J’

Land Owned by the Kashmiri Pandits and Left Behind in Kashmir Valley

Legend: Kls — Kanals (one kanal is equal to 506 sq m)

Mls — Marlas (one marla is equal to 25.3 sq m)
Twenty marlas make a kanal.
Source: J&K Centre and for Minority Studies Report on the Impact by Migration on the Socio-economic
Conditions of Kashmiri Displayed People. Annex IV (b), p. 356.
 INDEX

9/11 attacks, 372, 409

26/11 attacks, 372

A
Abadien, Zain-ul, 59, 415
Abbottabad, 121, 125, 215, 221
Abdali, Ahmad Shah, 70, 71
Abdullah, Farooq (Dr), 182, 341, 342, 345, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 355, 356, 357, 403, 442, 496,
550
Abdullah, Omar, 506, 530
Abdullah, Sheikh, 81, 177, 178, 179, 181, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 204, 206, 210, 211, 226,
227, 241, 242, 245, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 270, 275, 277, 278, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 300,
305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 321, 322, 323, 325, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 337,
338, 339, 340, 342, 345, 364, 365, 398, 417, 418, 420, 429, 434, 512
Afghanistan, 36, 37, 42, 89, 103, 107, 110, 143, 175, 206, 214, 251, 252, 313, 374, 375, 376, 379, 380, 381,
382, 383, 386, 390, 391, 392, 396, 398, 400, 411, 507, 508, 545, 622
Africa, 204, 228, 307, 589
AK-47 rifles, 448, 494
Aksai Chin, 95, 99, 103, 113, 272, 274
Al Qaeda, 380, 381, 385, 386, 387, 392
Albania, 50
Algeria, 331
All India Radio, 454
All Party Hurriyat Conference, 617
Amarnath cave, 92, 424, 498, 532, 542, 588, 613, 618
Ambedkar, BR (Dr), 298
Amritsar, 81, 190, 208
Anantnag, 60, 89, 116, 122, 127, 128, 132, 325, 394, 417, 421, 422, 423, 425, 427, 428, 440, 463, 466, 469,
471, 474, 476, 479, 499, 530, 545, 587, 588, 595
Arabian Sea, 108, 252
Article 370, 264, 284-298, 318, 334, 338, 493, 523, 531, 557, 587
legal position, 291-295
impact of, 295-298
Arunachal Pradesh, 529
Aurengzeb, 69
Austrailia, 204
Awami League, 378
Azad, Ghulam Nabi, 550
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 314

B
Baghdad, 257, 368
Bahadur, Guru Teg, 69
Baltistan, 48, 59, 62, 79, 84, 91, 98, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 122, 238, 242, 248, 249, 260, 360, 361
Baluchistan, 208, 379
Bangladesh, 182, 336, 339, 363, 366, 367, 370, 458, 531
Baramulla, 29, 30, 35, 48, 49, 89, 116, 122, 132, 135, 220, 222, 225, 227, 229, 233, 242, 325, 422, 423,
425, 466, 474, 479, 512, 545, 595
Bay of Bengal, 336
Beg, Mirza Afzal, 255, 331, 338
Bhagvad Gita, 39
Bhartiya Jana Sangh, 250
Bhartiya Janata Party, 314, 422, 438
Bhutto, Benazir, 360, 502, 508, 533
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 202, 358, 369, 378, 379, 431, 502, 533
Bose, Subash Chandra, 271
Brahmans, 34, 36, 39, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 100, 135, 136, 137, 138, 144,
163, 269
Buchher, Roy (Sir), 201, 217, 226, 228, 240, 241
Buddhism, 27, 33, 34, 35, 37, 108, 138, 151, 152, 153, 160, 161, 162, 163, 170, 174, 273
Bulgaria, 250
 C
Calcutta, 191, 307
Carriappa, KM (General), 201, 240
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 306, 332, 380, 381, 382, 507
Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), 257, 332, 368
Chenab, 30, 90, 91, 122, 132, 243, 272, 333
China, 32, 35, 95, 97, 98, 99, 103, 107, 108, 111, 113, 123, 152, 160, 161, 162, 246, 252, 253, 258, 272,
273, 274, 274, 332, 336, 361, 368, 374, 391, 424
Churchill, Winston, 176, 254
Clinton, Hillary, 379
Critical Issues, 601-628
internally displaced people (IDP) status, 604-608
minority status, 608-609
return of pandits to kashmir, 609-625
turning adversity into opportunity, 625-628
was violence against kashmir pandits a genocide?, 601-604
Czechoslovakia, 398

D
Dal Lake, 56, 72, 114, 116, 117, 355, 389, 500
Dev, Kapil, 426
Dhar, Birbal, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 141
Dogras, 12, 78, 80, 102, 190, 300, 523

E
East India Company, 83, 180, 366
Emperor Akbar, 66, 67, 68, 117, 128, 153, 219, 234, 242, 373, 375, 396, 407, 425, 444, 448
Emperor Ashoka, 32, 33, 34, 35, 160
En Lai, Chou, 331
England, 118, 191, 193, 263, 345
Europe, 249, 331, 604
Exodus, 482-508, 541-591
aftermath of, 541-591
cultural and ethnic identity, 572-579
 damage to religious places, 562-566
drop in population, 584-585
economy and employment, 556-562
education, 567-572
health, 579-584
jammu: pandit refugees’ first halt, 542-546
loss of movable and immovable property, 551-556
loss of political relevance, 587-589
morbidity pattern, 585-587
post exodus: immediate fallout, 546-551
psychological impact, 589-591
reactions to, 499-507
uprooting pandits; gains for islamists, 492-495
US reaction, 507-508
what about sikhs in kashmir?, 495-499
why kashmiri pandits became targets of islamists, 489-492

F
France, 196, 251

G
Gandhi, Indira, 182, 335, 338, 342, 346, 347, 349, 369, 389, 395, 398, 492, 496, 502
Gandhi, Mahatma, 235, 262, 271
Gandhi, Rajiv, 350, 351, 353, 500
Gathering Storm, 345-357
farooq takes centre stage, 345-349
governor’s rule, 349-357
Geelani, Syed Ali Shah, 404, 498, 532, 616, 618
Germany, 252, 253, 398
Ghazni, Mahmud, 42, 43
Gilgit, 48, 79, 85, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 98, 103, 104, 107, 110, 111, 112, 121, 124, 125, 139, 159, 186, 233,
238, 240, 241, 242, 248, 249, 252, 254, 260, 360, 361
Goa, 199, 595
Gulmarg, 90, 116, 122, 219, 267, 317
Gujarat, 571

H
Haji Pir Pass, 122, 243, 334
Hamadani, Syed Ali, 52, 53, 54
Harappa, 30
Haque, Zia-ul, 111, 175, 340, 373, 375, 376, 379, 391, 396, 427, 431, 496
Hazratbal Shrine, 181, 328
Himachal Pradesh, 42, 90, 124, 594
Himalayan Range, 89, 91, 92, 93, 103, 105, 123, 124
Hindu, 27, 28, 33, 36, 37, 44, 46, 49, 51, 55, 58, 59, 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 85, 100, 101, 102, 119, 136, 139,
146, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 159, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 179, 181, 185, 188, 195, 196, 200, 201, 204,
209, 224, 225, 234, 275, 277, 278, 304, 324, 326, 350, 364, 370, 375, 397, 419, 439, 460, 477, 493, 504,
511, 512, 513, 516, 531, 532, 542, 545, 550, 551, 557, 563, 565, 568, 569, 577, 587, 600, 602, 616, 620
Hinduism, 27, 35, 36, 50, 151, 170, 171, 174, 204, 209, 273
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), 278, 353, 401, 402, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 441, 445, 465, 466, 468, 470, 472,
486, 488, 498, 550
Holy Qu’ran, 373, 432, 445
HUJI, 392
Hungary, 398
Hyderabad, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 203, 213, 290, 364

I
India, 31, 33, 35, 36, 42, 48, 56, 71, 78, 80, 83, 88, 89, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 116,
117, 118, 123, 124, 126, 129, 135, 136, 138, 145, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 60, 163, 166, 171, 174,
178, 180, 184, 186, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207,
208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 224, 225, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236,
237, 238, 239, 240, 243, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261,
263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292,
293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 301, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319,
320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 339, 341, 346, 347,
348, 349, 353, 357, 359, 362, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376,
381, 384, 385, 388, 389, 390, 392, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 404, 406, 411, 414, 416, 417, 420,
423, 424, 425, 427, 428, 430, 431, 433, 434, 435, 437, 442, 443, 449, 454, 455, 458, 460, 472, 476, 483,
487, 490, 491, 492, 486, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503, 504, 506, 507, 508, 511, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520,
521, 522, 523, 527, 530, 531, 532, 533, 636, 539, 545, 556, 558, 562, 564, 572, 577, 598, 603, 604, 605,
606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 618, 619, 620, 624, 625, 628
Indian Air Force, 132, 235
Indian National Congress (Later Congress), 179, 184, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 208,
209, 210, 247, 254, 262, 283, 271, 275, 277, 306, 309, 310, 314, 323, 337, 338, 339, 341, 346, 347, 348,
 349, 350, 351, 352, 355, 356, 357, 366, 371, 421, 423, 424, 433, 500, 502, 618
Indus, 31, 81, 83, 91, 93, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 123, 124, 125, 155, 272, 364, 626
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), 258, 360, 367, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388,
389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 429, 494, 507, 508
Iran, 37, 42, 52, 206, 375, 380, 381, 398
Islam, 28, 42, 44, 48-64, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 102, 136, 138, 139, 148, 151, 159, 163, 165, 170, 171, 172, 173,
174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 209, 210, 214, 219, 256, 276, 294, 362, 373, 394, 403, 407, 408,
409, 414, 415, 419, 421, 428, 432, 437, 438, 442, 443, 444, 445, 465, 478, 480, 483, 488, 492, 495, 498,
532, 534, 537, 618
Islamabad, 110, 261, 359, 361, 372, 389, 424, 507
Jagmohan, 350, 421, 423, 425, 433, 442, 502, 503, 511, 532, 533, 534, 535, 538, 568
Jahangir, 68, 69, 117, 129, 130, 174, 512
Jaish-e-Mohammad, 392
Jamat-e-Islami, 175, 277, 337, 340, 351, 376, 395, 396, 397, 398, 403, 404, 405, 406, 408, 410, 430, 431,
432, 434, 479
Jammu and Kashmir, 63, 79, 81, 86, 88, 94, 95, 97, 99, 103, 107, 110, 184, 187, 188, 189, 195, 196, 197,
207, 211, 212, 213, 215, 218, 219, 221, 223, 225, 231, 236, 240, 244, 245, 247, 248, 252, 254, 255, 256,
257, 258, 260, 261, 265, 267, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 285, 286, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 297, 298,
302, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 326, 334, 358, 359, 361, 363, 364, 369, 372, 375, 376, 383, 384, 385, 391,
392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 404, 405, 416, 418, 425, 437, 441, 451, 457, 458, 475, 483, 484, 486,
487, 489, 493, 496, 502, 505, 508, 511, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 528, 529, 554, 556,
557, 565, 566, 567, 571, 573, 580, 584, 594, 595, 602, 603, 605, 606, 608, 609, 612, 619
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), 278, 345, 349, 353, 356, 397, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405, 429, 438,
439, 442, 450, 463, 470, 471, 478, 485, 497
Janata Dal, 500
Japan, 160, 257
Jehad, 213, 214, 215, 219, 367, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 381, 384, 399, 402, 407, 409, 427, 431, 432, 433,
434, 436, 442, 443, 444, 620
Jhelum, 31, 36, 61, 66, 71, 89, 91, 92, 102, 114, 115, 116, 121, 124, 128, 157, 219, 223, 224, 225, 272, 339,
393, 462, 463, 476, 525, 566, 574
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 189, 190, 193, 195, 196, 200, 202, 203, 206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216,
217, 226, 229, 230, 246, 262, 276, 277, 306, 314, 364, 366, 367, 368, 371, 373
Junagarh, 195, 197, 199, 201, 202, 213, 364

K
Kabul, 39, 40, 42, 72, 74, 75, 82, 139, 141, 383, 392, 474
Kanishka, 35, 157, 160, 273, 389, 507
Karachi, 108, 111, 200, 215, 216, 242, 243, 251, 272, 316, 364, 373
Karachi Agreement, 111, 242, 243, 251
Karakoram Range, 93, 94, 107, 111, 123, 125
Kargil, 62, 63, 93, 99, 101, 106, 108, 110, 123, 125, 238, 369, 384, 501
Kashmir, (passim throughout text)
brief historical sketch, ancient, 27-46
273–232 BCE, buddhism, 33-35
100–631 CE, kushan dynasty, 35-36
631–855 CE, karkotta dynasty, 36-38
855–939 CE, utapala dynasty, 39-40
939–1128 CE, didda and lohara dynasty, 40-41
1003–1101 CE, lohara dynasty-I, 42-44
1101–1286 CE, lohara dynasty II, 44-46
antiquity, 28-32
early history, 32-33
events between 1931 and 1947 CE; problem and how it got complicated, genesis of, 184-279
britain’s reasons for manipulating UN debate, 251-261
british withdrawal turns partition into complex exercise, 191-211
CFL (later, LoC), 242-244
india intervenes militarily, 232-235
influential leaders show little vision, 261
invasion and accession, 218-232
jawahar lal nehru, 271-275
jinnah, 276
maharaja hari singh, 266-271
others, 276-277
pakistan decides to grab kashmir by force, 211-218
proceedings at the un, 235-242
refugees, inevitable by-products of war, 276-279
rise of kashmiri majoritarianism, 185-191
sheikh mohammad abdullah, 261-266
UN resolutions serve british interests, 244-251
Kashmiri Pandits, 31, 66, 69, 75, 86, 87, 99, 135-166, 174, 177, 180, 181, 187, 189, 297, 300, 302, 310,
318, 324, 326, 327, 328, 354, 362, 395, 397, 399, 410, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423,
 426, 427, 428, 429, 431, 433, 434, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 449, 453, 455, 458,
459, 460, 461, 462, 466, 474, 475, 477, 478, 479, 480, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493,
494, 495, 496, 498, 500, 501, 503, 504, 505, 506, 511, 512, 513, 514, 525, 526, 532, 533, 534, 535, 539,
541, 543, 54, 546, 547, 550, 556, 557, 558, 559, 562, 566, 567, 574, 577, 578, 581, 584, 585, 587, 588,
589, 590, 593, 594, 597, 598, 599, 600, 602, 603, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 611, 613, 615, 616, 617, 618,
619, 620, 623, 624, 625, 627, 628
architecture and painting, 159-160
cosmology and science, 158-159
dance, drama and music, 157-158
food habits, 163-
history, 152-153
kashmir’s contribution to buddhism, 160-163
kashmir’s contribution to indian literature and fine arts, 151-152
kashmiri pandit costume, 164-166
lalleshwari (lal ded) (1335–1376 CE), 148-151
literature, 154-157
religion, 144-148
Kashmiriyat, 169-182, 443, 463, 484
general perception, 169-174
re-visiting the concept of, 174-180
some recent views of eminent people, 180-182
Kazakhstan, 254
Khalistan, 388, 389, 496, 497, 498
Khan, Amanullah, 397, 400, 401
Khan, AQ (Dr), 393
Khan, Ayub (General), 258, 333, 334, 377, 378, 392
Khan, Imran, 427
Khan, Liaqat Ali, 203, 211, 215, 217, 224, 234
Khan, Yahaya (General), 378
Kissinger, Henry, 335, 336, 374

L
Ladakh, 37, 48, 59, 79, 84, 89, 91, 93, 94, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 113, 123, 159, 238,
261, 293, 297, 304, 305, 317, 318, 493, 511, 514, 524, 525, 557, 587, 598
Laden, Osama Bin, 381
Lahore, 71, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 130, 142, 143, 185, 200, 217, 224, 227, 229, 234, 262, 333, 369
Land, Its People and Communications, 88-132
AGPL and siachen glacier, 111-113
baltistan-gilgit and ladakh region, 103-104
eastern ladakh, 104-107
ethnic and linguistic composition of state, 99-101
fruits, trees and forests of Kashmir, 119-121
gardens, lakes, springs and meadows, 116
gilgit-baltistan, 107-111
jammu region, 101-103
kashmir valley, 113-116
main mountain ranges, 89-94
mughal gardens, 116-117
mughal road, 128-130
pampore and saffron, 117-118
present state of communications, 125-128
rail link to valley, 130-132
regions comprising state, 94-99
state of communications in 1947, 121-125
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), 367, 380, 392, 409, 488, 508, 550, 620
Lawrence, Walter (Sir), 90, 91, 574
Lhasa, 93, 123, 273
Line of Control, (LoC), 99, 111, 112, 127, 135, 242, 243, 244, 251, 340, 353, 369, 383, 397, 404, 405, 458,
459, 492, 494, 527, 533, 621
Lord Brahma, 28
Lord Krishna, 33, 206, 220, 274, 479
Lord Rama, 158
Lord Shiva, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39, 139, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 160, 454, 542
Lord Vishnu, 28, 29

M
Mahabharata, 32, 33, 144, 156
Maharashtra, 571, 595
Manekshaw, SHFJ (Field Marshal), 226, 228, 243, 336
Mecca, 331, 332
Miltants Shed kashmiri Pandit Blood, 436-480
longest night, 446-481
night of january 19, 1990, 442-446
Mirpur, 89, 90, 102, 123, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 242, 249
Mizoram, 529
Mohammed, Bakshi Ghulam, 262, 314, 317, 318, 322, 323, 328, 418
Mohenjo Daro, 30
Mountbatten, Lord Viscount, 193, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 106, 217, 228, 229, 230, 232, 235, 259, 270,
271, 285
Mount Everest, 94
Mount Kailash, 106
Mughal And Afghan Period, 66-76
1586–1752 CE, mughal period, 66-70
1753–1819 CE, afghan rule, 70-76
Mujahideen, 278, 353, 368, 380, 381, 382, 389, 396, 405, 432, 433, 454, 486
Mukerjee, Shyama Prasad (Dr), 250, 314
Mumbai, 368, 390, 451, 547, 620
Musharraf, Pervez, 362, 384, 385, 386, 387
Muslim, 41, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 61, 63, 69, 72, 74, 78, 80, 100, 102, 103, 136, 151, 164,
169, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196,
197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224,
225, 227, 233, 234, 245, 247, 249, 256, 257, 259, 262, 263, 269, 270, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 284, 294,
296, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 330, 334,
335, 337, 341, 347, 350, 351, 360, 361, 363, 364, 366, 375, 385, 391, 395, 396, 399, 401, 415, 416, 417,
418, 419, 421, 427, 428, 430, 433, 436, 438, 439, 440, 446, 450, 451, 452, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464,
466, 467, 468, 469, 471, 472, 473, 480, 491, 492, 493, 500, 504, 506, 508, 511, 514, 523, 524, 531, 534,
535, 536, 539, 548, 557, 558, 562, 569, 587, 611, 615, 616, 617, 618, 620
invasion of, 41
Muslim Conference (MC), 177, 178, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 220, 249, 277, 361, 491
Muslim League, 184, 189, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198, 208, 213, 262, 270, 276, 277, 306, 307, 309, 385
Muzzafarabad, 91, 100, 219, 221, 240, 242
Myths Perpetuated To Justify Violence, 510-539
another myth: identity crisis, 531-533
kashmiri pandits were big landlords, 511-513
myth of economic disparity, 513-523
 present economic realities of the state, 528-531
turning jagmohan in to fall-guy, 533-539
valley’s dominance of state’s economy and politics, 523-528

N
Najibullah, 380
Nanga Parbat, 90, 91, 104, 105, 106, 124
National Conference (NC), 177, 179, 182, 189, 190, 204, 232, 242, 254, 255, 261, 262, 277, 284, 286, 286,
287, 288, 290, 293, 300, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307, 310, 313, 314, 316, 318, 319, 320, 321, 325, 328,
335, 337, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 348, 351, 352, 356, 361, 364, 365, 403, 408, 420, 421, 424, 435, 478,
490, 491, 588
National Investigating Agency (NIA), 367
Nehru, Jawahar Lal, 113, 189, 190, 192, 193, 194, 201, 204, 209, 210, 213, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230,
232, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 245, 246, 247, 254, 258, 259, 262, 264, 265, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 275, 285, 286, 287, 288, 294, 305, 306, 307, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 317, 322, 328, 329, 330, 332,
367, 420, 434, 473, 490, 587
New Delhi, 31, 221, 264, 315, 337, 386, 447, 506, 538, 581,
New York, 222, 223, 313, 335, 385, 507
Nixon, Richard, 335, 336, 508
Noor Jahan, 129, 130
North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 104, 211, 213, 214, 215, 221, 316, 360, 372, 382, 392

O
Operation Blue Star, 388
Operation Gibralter, 243, 333
Operation Gulmarg, 219
Operation Topac, 340, 383, 396, 411, 496

P
Pakistan, 48, 89, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 125, 126, 128, 135, 154, 155, 175,
178, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237,
238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263,
264, 265, 266, 270, 271, 274, 276, 277, 278, 285, 286, 293, 295, 297, 306, 308, 309, 310, 313, 314, 316,
317, 318, 321, 322, 323, 323, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 340, 341, 345, 348, 353, 356, 358-411,
424, 426, 427, 429, 434, 440, 444, 445, 449, 455, 458, 478, 480, 483, 485, 492, 493, 496, 497, 498, 499,
500, 501, 502, 504, 506, 508, 513, 527, 531, 545, 605, 614, 619, 620, 621, 622
obsession with and intervention in kashmir, 358-411
 afghanistan, pakistan’s testing ground, 374-376
brief description of ISI, 377-388
geelani and sallah-ud-din; pakistan’s most loyal foot-soldiers in kashmir, 402-411
ISI declares war on india, 388-393
ISI’s involvement in jammu and kashmir, 393-396
operation topac, 396-402
pakistan’s obsession with kashmir, 358-369
zia-ul-haque’s islamisation drive, 370-374
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), 100, 111, 113, 128, 135, 240, 245, 249, 261, 277, 278, 340, 345, 358,
359, 360, 361, 373, 397, 399, 405, 409, 494, 527, 614
Pandavas, 32, 33, 129
Pandits Targeted, 414-435
exodus of pandits: historical perspective, 414-420
ingenius cover-up, 433-435
pandits face the moment of truth, 430-433
pandits’ attempt to join kashmir’s mainstream, 420
reality check which pandits ignored, 421-430
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 228, 231, 234, 235, 248, 265, 271, 285
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 424, 617, 618
Peshawar, 35, 83, 143, 380
Pir Panjal Range, 46, 89, 90, 91, 92, 102, 122, 127, 128, 489
Poland, 398
Poonch, 36, 37, 43, 84, 89, 90, 101, 102, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 213, 216, 219, 220, 235, 239, 240, 242,
243, 245, 249, 334, 368, 557
Praja Parishad, 305, 312, 314
Punjab, 30, 42, 43, 73, 78, 85, 86, 99, 101, 107, 121, 123, 126, 127, 142, 143, 154, 187, 207, 208, 212, 213,
216, 224, 225, 227, 231, 278, 339, 346, 372, 383, 388, 389, 392, 394, 496, 507, 508, 517, 595, 619

Q
Qasim, Syed Mir, 318, 320, 337, 338, 418, 419
Quit Kashmir Movement, 190, 261, 490
Qutab Minar, 132

R
Rajasthan, 231, 521, 522, 529, 595
Ramayana, 156, 158
Rashtriya Swyam Sevak Sangh (RSS), 433
Rawalpindi, 121, 122, 212, 218, 221, 316, 358
Rehman, Sheikh Mujibur, 378
Return and Rehabilitation, 592-600
economy and employment, 595-597
housing and property, 597-598
making community politically relevant, 598-599
preserving its distinct identity, 599-600
River Sindhu, 37, 157, 364
Rohtang Pass, 90, 127
Romania, 398
Rushdie, Salman, 428
Russia, 228, 251, 252, 254, 259, 30, 449

S
Sanghvi, Vir, 503, 604
Saraswati River, 30, 31, 135, 155
Saurashtra, 202, 231, 284, 309
Shah, Bulbul, 48, 50, 51, 174
Shah, Hyder, 51, 60
Shahjahan, 68, 69, 117
Sharief, Nawaz, 384, 385
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 329
Shekhar, Chandra, 500
Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Trust, 599
Siachen, 94, 97, 111, 112, 113, 243, 339
Sikandar, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 156
Sikh, 69, 73, 75, 77-87, 139, 181, 208, 222, 227, 228, 232, 233, 278, 325, 346, 388, 389, 415, 469, 493,
495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 513, 515
and dogra rule, 77-87
1819–1846 CE, sikh rule, 77-78
1846–1947 CE: dogra rule, 78-79
formation of jammu and kashmir state, 79-87
Simla, 93, 244, 251, 340, 369
Simla Agreement, 244, 251, 340, 369
Singh, Hari (Maharaja), 86, 186, 202, 204, 233, 242, 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 273, 284, 300, 308, 439
Singh, Gulab (Maharaja), 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 268, 270
Singh, Khushwant, 503
Singh, Manmohan, 506
Singh, Ranjit (Maharaja), 73, 75, 78, 79, 82, 83, 101, 141, 142, 143
Singh, VP, 500, 533
Saudi Arabia, 332, 375, 376, 379, 380
Sikkim, 529
Sofi, GM, 174, 405, 458, 459, 504, 538
South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), 257, 332, 368
Soviet Union, 246, 253, 301, 334, 370, 374, 375, 380, 381, 391, 398, 411, 545
Sri Lanka, 339
Srinagar, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 54, 59, 68, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 104, 114, 115, 117, 121, 122, 123,
124, 125, 126, 130, 132, 148, 157, 177, 185, 189, 202, 211, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227,
228, 229, 232, 234, 235, 264, 265, 267, 268, 277, 286, 287, 314, 319, 340, 345, 346, 347, 348, 352, 354,
355, 357, 401, 403, 417, 422, 423, 424, 425, 428, 429, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 446, 447, 451, 453, 454,
456, 457, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 482, 486, 496, 498,
529, 532, 541, 542, 545, 557, 563, 565, 566, 582, 587, 588, 595
Standstill Agreement, 197, 198, 199, 205, 106, 218
Syed, Mufti Mohammad, 350, 357, 423, 424, 451, 500, 526, 613

T
Taliban, 380, 382, 383, 385, 386, 387, 392, 508
Tashkent Agreement, 243, 334
Thimayya, KS (Major General), 233, 241
Tibet, 35, 37, 48, 51, 79, 88, 95, 97, 103, 104, 108, 109, 123, 160, 161, 272, 274, 278
Transition to Islam, 48-64
1320–1323 CE, rinchen, 49-54
1389–1413 CE, sultan sikandar, 54-58
1420–1470 CE, sultan zain-ul-abidin, 58-63
1519 CE, harmukh tragedy, 63
1540–1551 CE, mirza hyder dhughlat, 63
1553–1586 CE, chak rule, 64
 early rulers, 48-49
Tsunami, 30

U
Udhampur, 101, 102, 103, 122, 127, 128, 130, 325, 402, 452, 453, 542, 557, 567, 568, 624
Uneasy Truce, 300-342
1965 war, 333-335
1971 war, 335-342
constituent assembly of state, 304-310
dismissal of interim government, 310-321
formation of interim government, 300-304
formation of plebiscite front and its impact, 321-328
moye muqadas (sacred relic) agitation, 328-331
two wars and their impact, 332-333
United Kingdom, 191, 259
United Nations (UN), 210, 228, 230, 234, 239, 244, 247, 250, 604, 607, 621, 622
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), 237, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 249
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 247, 248, 250, 251, 255, 256, 257, 274, 289, 304
United States (US), 81, 247, 250, 255, 256, 257, 258, 274, 306, 313, 332, 335, 336, 368, 370, 371, 374, 375,
376, 379, 380, 381, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 392, 398, 406, 507, 508, 606, 622, 626
USSR, 258, 336
Uzbekistan, 254

V
Vaishno Devi Shrine, 524, 599

W
Washington, 335, 381, 386, 508
Wavell, Lord, 193, 207
Waziristan, 387, 619
World War I, 253, 307
World War II, 221, 247, 249, 268, 278

X
Xinjiang, 95, 97, 98, 107, 108, 123, 124, 253, 272, 273, 274, 278, 313
 Y
Yugoslavia, 250

Z
Zain-ul-Abidin, Sultan Ali Shah, 58, 59, 60, 62, 153
 AUTHOR

Col Tej Kumar Tikoo (Retd), Ph.D. was born at Srinagar (Kashmir) on 15 April,
1950. After completing his school and college education at Srinagar, he joined
the Indian Army; being commissioned into 1st Battalion of the newly raised
Naga Regiment on 22 August 1971. Soon thereafter, he found himself fighting
the 1971 Indo-Pak war in the eastern sector, which resulted in the creation of
Bangladesh.

As an infantryman, Col Tikoo spent major portion of his thirty four years of
service in the Army, on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir or fighting
insurgency operations. This includes deployment in present day southern
Siachen Glacier and counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland, Manipur,
Assam, Punjab, Srilanka (as part of IPKF) and later in Jammu and Kashmir.

Col Tikoo is a graduate of the prestigious Defence Services Staff College and
has been an instructor in the Senior Command wing of the Army War College at
Mhow. He also commanded the newly fromed counter-insurgency training
school in Jammu and Kashmir which, over the years, has contributed immensely
to the success of Army, Para Military and Central Armed Police Forces in
fighting insurgency in the State. He retired in 2004.

He is an M.Sc. in Defence Studies from Madras University. He was awarded a

Ph.D. in defence studies in 2012.

He can be contacted at : [email protected]

 Table of Contents
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1. Ancient Kashmir: A Brief Historical Sketch
2. Transition to Islam
3. Mughal and Afghan Period
4. Sikh and Dogra Rule
5. Land, its People and Communications
6. Kashmiri Pandits
7. Kashmiriyat
8. Genesis of Kashmir Problem and how it got Complicated: Events between
1931 and 1947 AD
9. Article 370
10. An Uneasy Truce
11. Gathering Storm
12. Pakistan’s Obsession with and Intervention in Kashmir
13. Pandits Targeted
14. Militants Shed Kashmiri Pandit Blood
15. Exodus
16. Myths Perpetuated to Justify Violence
17. Aftermath of Exodus
18. Return and Rehabilitation
19. Critical Issues
Appendices
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Appendix G
 Appendix H
Appendix I
Appendix J
Index
Author