Subtelny, M. E. (1988) - Socioeconomic Bases of Cultural Patronage Under The Later Timurids
Subtelny, M. E. (1988) - Socioeconomic Bases of Cultural Patronage Under The Later Timurids
centers suffered as a result of the loss of contested territories and the serious
drain that continued warfare exerted on their limited resources, it would be
difficult to explain the kind of cultural florescence that took place in the 15th
century simply in terms of competition between dynastic courts. Nor could the
much-vaunted aesthetic tastes and high level of personal culture of the Timurid
princes themselves have accounted on their own for an increase in cultural
activity, for patronage was, as a rule, a costly undertaking.
What, then, were the reasons for the so-called Timurid renaissance? The
present study proposes to delve more deeply into the apparent connection
between political decline and cultural upsurge by examining the socioeconomic
conditions prevailing in Iran and Central Asia in the 9th/15th century which at
once emanated from and reinforced the trend toward political decentralization.
Specifically, it will concentrate on the characteristic forms of landholding and
the unique system of tax immunities prevailing at the time in an effort to explain
how they created the preconditions and context for extensive patronage activity.
In so doing, it will seek to demonstrate that the cultural florescence of the
Timurid period was not simply the result of competition between courts or the
creation of a particular dynastic court, but rather, that it grew out of a broaden-
ing of the bases of patronage as a consequence of the development of certain
socioeconomic institutions—the soyurghal in particular—which were peculiar to
post-Mongol Iran and Central Asia. Because these institutions attained their
fullest development and expansion in the second half of the 15th century, the
study will focus on the reign of the last significant Timurid ruler, Husain
Bayqara (873-911/1469-1506), which spanned the entire last quarter of the
century and which has been most closely identified with the phenomenon of the
"Timurid renaissance."
The political climate of 15th century Iran and Central Asia was a fiercely
competitive one.8 Characterized by internecine struggles between the numerous
Timurid family members and by the constant shifting of loyalties on the part of
the nomadic Turkic (Chaghatay) military elite, it was the result of the fragmenta-
tion of TTmur's vast steppe empire and of the attendant reemergence of the
Turko-Mongol principle that all male members of the ruling clan shared the
right to claim political sovereignty.9 Not only did they claim it, but they struggled
for it in the time-honored steppe tradition of guerilla warfare (qazaqlTq). In these
circumstances, the main political instrument in the hands of the Timurid princes,
who desperately needed to maintain the support of their military elites in order
to secure their hard-won territorial gains, but who were no longer in a position
to hold out to them the promise of booty as TTmur had done, was regular
monetary incentives. These took the form of grants of revenue-producing land,
called soyurghals, as well as various other forms of immunity from taxation.
Originally used in the sense of any kind of benefice or grant,10 the soyurghal
denoted a land grant that was characterized by full immunity from taxation as
well as by complete freedom from judicial and administrative interference on the
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 481
part of the central government whose agents were explicitly prohibited from even
setting foot on the territory of a soyurghal." The soyurghal holder (sdhib-i
soyurghal) thus had the right to administer his granted land and collect the taxes
from it himself. The soyurghal was hereditary in character, although it was
usually renewed on the death of the original beneficiary or reconfirmed on the
accession of a new ruler. Soyurghal holdings could be very large, encompassing
whole provinces or administrative districts, or quite small, comprising only one
or two villages, and could be either arable land or steppe region. The peasantry
or nomadic population living on land that had been granted as a soyurghal was
bound to it and did not have the right to move from it, as had been the case in
Iran at least since the time of the Ilkhanid, Ghazan Khan's, famous decree of
703/1313.12
The soyurghal represented a further development of the earlier iqtac system of
benefices, which, largely under Turko-Mongol tutelage, had been transformed,
starting from the 11th-12th centuries, into military fiefs with rights of inheri-
tance. 13 But, the benefits which accrued to the holder of a soyurghal were far
greater than those connected with the iqta c , for besides not necessarily being
linked any longer to the obligation of providing equipped military contingents,14
the soyurghal also absorbed the tax immunity that had characterized such earlier
institutions as the idrar and the muqdssa.15 It was this complete fiscal and
administrative immunity that became the hallmark of the soyurghal. The soyur-
ghal was not exclusive to the Timurid period, as some scholars have maintained,16
but existed well before TTmur and his successors;17 however, it is precisely during
the period of the rule of the Timurid and Turkmen dynasties in the 15th century
that it attained its greatest expansion and became the predominant form of
landholding in Central Asia and Iran.18 This fact is attested by the great number
of diplomas of investiture or confirmation of soyurghals that date from this
time.19 In particular, the second half of the century may be regarded as the
heyday of the soyurghal, for at no other time were its special privileges of fiscal
and administrative immunity enjoyed by so many.
The expansion of the soyurghal system corresponded directly to the trend
toward the decentralization and fragmentation of political authority that was
increasing toward the end of the 15th century. Thus, at the very start of the
century, the total area that had been alienated in the form of land grants had
been insignificant, as TTmur's strongly centralist policies militated against large-
scale distribution of privileged lands.20 Moreover, on those grants that were
made (often designated liyul and not soyurghal),21 the authority exercised by
their beneficiaries (who were usually his sons, grandsons, or important military
commanders) was greatly circumscribed.22 However, under TTmur's successor,
Shahrukh (811-850/1409-1447), whose power soon became confined to Khorasan
and who needed not only to maintain the loyalty of members of the nomadic
Turkic military elite, but also to attract the support of representatives of the
sedentary Iranian (Tajik) elements of Timurid society—particularly the religious
classes—soyurghals began to be distributed freely.23 The same was true of
Shahrukh's contemporary, the Qara Qoyunlu emir, Qara Yusuf.24
In the second half of the century, the Timurid, Abu '1-Qasim Babur (d. 861/
1457), granted numerous soyurghals to the military commanders who had helped
482 Maria Eva Subtelny
him come to power.25 His cousin, Abu Sacld, also used the liberal granting of
soyurghals to his sons, leading tribal figures, as well as to secular and religious
figures as a means to consolidate his political power.26 Like Abu SacTd, the Aq
Qoyunlu ruler, Yacqub Beg (883-896/1478-1490), granted soyurghals to mem-
bers of the nonmilitary classes, particularly to members of the clergy and civil
administration.27 But no one, it seems, surpassed the generosity of Rustam Beg
Aq Qoyunlu (d. 902/1497) who, according to Hasan Rumlu, distributed more
soyurghals and pensions for the religious intelligentsia (vazTfas) than any prince
of the Qara Qoyunlu or Aq Qoyunlu before him.28 As for Yacqub and Rustam's
Timurid contemporary, Husain Bayqara, Khvandamlr noted: "He always ordered
that the requests (of sayyids, religious scholars, literati [fuzala] and poets) be
granted and that this noble group be awarded soyurghals and favors {soyurghalat
va incamat)."29
Although soyurghals continued to be granted and confirmed under the Safavids
in the 16th century, albeit less frequently, on a much smaller scale and usually
only to members of the religious classes,30 they eventually became supplanted by
the far less generous tiyul, which was more closely linked to government service
and which did not possess the complete administrative and fiscal immunity or
hereditary privileges that characterized the soyurghal.31
The period of Husain Bayqara's rule in Khorasan witnessed the unbridled
growth of other immunities and tax privileges connected with landholding be-
sides the soyurghal. The number of pious endowments (sg. vaqf) in Khorasan
during his time had become so great that, according to KhvandamTr, Husain
Bayqara had to appoint two or three persons simultaneously to the post of sadr,
because it had become impossible for a single individual to oversee them all.32
Under the Timurids, the granting of vaqfs became a way of rewarding members
of the religious establishment and at the same time, by giving them a stake in the
economy, of ensuring their continued support for a government that safeguarded
the stability of that economy.33 Furthermore, Timurid vaqfs tended to be very
generous, their incomes often far surpassing the needs of the pious institutions
they were designed to support, thus resulting in the creation of a kind of "slush
fund," the use of which was for all practical purposes at the discretion of its
administrators.34
In the Hanafite school of Islamic law, which predominated in Khorasan and
Transoxiana, the conditions under which a vaqf could be established and main-
tained were extremely favorable.35 A vaqf could be constituted not only of
immovable, but of movable property as well. Because the latter often embraced
impermanent and even abstract income-producing sources, there is every reason
to believe that soyurghals and other tax immunities could also be converted into
vaqf, or at least donated to a vaqf already in existence.36 The endower of a vaqf
had the right to stipulate all the terms and conditions of its use, including
naming himself and his male descendants as trustees (sg. mutavalli)?1 Although
the revenues from the vaqf property theoretically went to support the pious
institution for the benefit of which it had been set up, in practice, only a portion
of these was actually disbursed for that purpose, the lion's share going to the
trustees.
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 483
An individual who converted all of his private property into a family vaqf
(called vaqf-i ahlT), of which he named himself and his descendants as trustees,
continued to enjoy the benefits of his property tax free even after its dedication;
moreover, he ensured that his descendants would too.38 Because of the inalienable
nature of vaqf, he thereby also safeguarded it against confiscation by the ruler—
not an infrequent occurrence at this time.39 The existence of such a large fund of
vaqfs in Husain Bayqara's time, as noted above, could be accounted for by the
fact that many were actually family vaqfs, which may very well have also been
constituted wholly or partially of soyurghals and other tax immunities. Among
the most famous and best documented examples of the conversion of private
property into vaqf in the second half of the 15th century were the extensive
holdings of the NaqshbandT sheikh of Samarqand, Khvaja c Ubaidullah Ahrar
(d. 1490).40 Likewise, the conversion of their own estates into vaqf by rulers and
their wives in times of political instability, such as the second half of the 15th
century, not only protected their extensive holdings from falling into the hands
of undesirable successors or from seizure by political usurpers, but also won for
them the general approbation of their Muslim subjects.41 Husain Bayqara himself
is on record as having bought with his own private funds (az khalis-i amvdl-i
khvTsh) "flourishing villages and fine grain-producing estates (mustaghalldt),"42
which he then converted into vaqf, undoubtedly designating himself as trustee
and thus continuing to benefit from their revenues with peace of mind.43
Besides tax immunities connected with landholding and pious endowments,
there also existed the privilege of personal exemption from taxes and obligations,
called mucafl or musallamT, which could be conferred on just about anyone who
paid taxes. It simply exempted the grantee from the payment of specified taxes
to the central treasury and from the performance of certain duties and obliga-
tions. Although it did not involve the granting of land, the exemption could
apply to a tract of land already in the possession of the grantee, who could even
be a village community.44 Tracing its origins back to the 1 lth century, the simple
tax immunity was widespread under the Turkmen, Timurids, and Safavids in the
15th and 16th centuries, and continued even down to the 19th century.45
A form of the simple tax immunity, whose origins went back to Old Turkic
times and still survived in the 15th century, was the institution of tarkharii.
Under the Mongols and their successor states, it had included, in addition to full
immunity from taxation, such privileges as free entry into the presence of the
ruler, the right to keep all booty won in battle, and to break the law up to nine
times without prosecution. Originally conferred on individuals in reward for
distinguished military service, the honorary title of tarkhan and its special
privileges were hereditary down to the ninth generation.46 In TTmur's time,
tarkhan diplomas (nishdn-i tarkharii) were issued freely to warriors who had
distinguished themselves in battle.47 According to Nizam al-DTn ShamT, a tarkhan
had the right to enter freely into TTmur's presence; to commit up to nine
transgressions of the law (i.e., the ydsd) without penalty—a right extended to his
descendants; to be freed from the obligation of providing transport animals for
couriers and government officials (uldgh);** and to be exempted from all taxes
due the state treasury (takdlif).*9
484 Maria Eva Subtelny
By the second half of the 15th century, however, with the dilution ofV the
Chingizid ideal and the concomitant disappearance of some Turko-Mongol
traditions, particularly in such areas as Khorasan, the title does not appear to
have been conferred any longer on members of the military elite, and there are
no tarkhan diplomas dating from Husain Bayqara's time that have come down
to us. Even in Transoxiana, it may be assumed that those prominent members of
the Chaghatay aristocracy whose names are frequently attested in the Babur-
nama with the title must have inherited it.50 But, by the end of the 15th century
under the Timurids and the beginning of the 16th under the Safavids and
Uzbeks, the tarkhan privilege of tax immunity had increasingly become asso-
ciated with members of the higher clergy and spiritual dignitaries, such as
sayyids, members of the ulama, and prominent Sufis—a practice that had in fact
already been widespread under the Ilkhanids and in the territories of the Golden
Horde in particular.51 There are even documented cases of important merchants
being made tarkhans under the Safavids and Uzbeks.52 As a result, the term
tarkhan became synonymous with the terms for the simple tax immunity—
mu c afl and musallamT—with which it was often coupled in documents in the
standard formula for personal tax exemption, "mucafva musallam va tarkhan,""
or in the fuller formula, "mifaf va musallam va tarkhan va hurr va marfuc al-
qalam va maqtuc al-qadam," which also denoted fiscal and administrative immu-
nity for a specified tract of land.54
To sum up the differences between the soyurghal, the mucafT or musallamT,
and tarkhanT in the second half of the 15th century: the soyurghal was a
privileged type of land grant that was hereditary and that entailed not only fiscal
immunity and exemption from the performance of obligations, but also complete
administrative and judicial freedom for the recipient, who thus also had the right
to collect the taxes from the land for himself. The mucafT or musallamT rep-
resented a personal exemption from taxes and obligations, which could also
apply to land, but which was usually not hereditary. In the case of exemption
from taxes on land, however, the holder of the immunity had no right to collect
the taxes for himself. TarkhanT, like the mucafT or musallamT, also represented a
simple tax immunity, but it was hereditary (theoretically down to the ninth
generation) and, in addition, carried with it special personal privileges vis-a-vis
the ruler and the law.
In Husain Bayqara's time, a single individual could simultaneously be in
possession of several types of immunities. For example, the famous Persian poet
and NaqshbandT mystic, cAbd al-Rahman JamT (d. 898/1492), enjoyed the
privileges of tarkhanT (personal tax exemption plus the prestige he derived from
the title he undoubtedly received as a prominent member of the Naqshbandiyya
Sufi order), was the holder of soyurghals (on which not only did he not pay any
taxes to the state treasury, but from which he also had the right to collect the
revenues for himself), and in addition to being freed from paying the cushr
(tithe)55 and the mal (synonymous with the kharaj, or basic land tax), 56 he was
granted immunity from all personal taxes (mucdfva musallam) for the rest of his
life.57 This last privilege was granted him by Husain Bayqara after he asked to be
freed from the payment of taxes for a period of two years in order to enable him
to make an extended pilgrimage to Mecca in the years 877-878/1472-1474. 58
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 485
The distribution and confirmation of tax immunities, both personal and those
connected with landholding, which proceeded virtually unchecked in Timurid
Khorasan and Transoxiana as well as in Aq Qoyunlu Azerbaijan and Iran in the
second half of the 15th century, resulted in a significant loss of tax revenues to
the central treasuries of both states. At the same time, the administrative and
judicial immunity associated with the soyurghal meant that such lands were
for all practical purposes withdrawn from government control.59 In the case of
large soyurghal holders—primarily princely family members or important mem-
bers of the Turkic military elite who bore the obligation of supplying military
contingents—this frequently translated into de facto political independence,
which, in turn, undermined the political authority of the central government.
The later Timurid and Aq Qoyunlu rulers who continued to expand the
system of fiscal immunities thus trod a fine line between their use of them as a
means to win and maintain political support in the difficult political conditions
of the second half of the 15th century, and the steady erosion of revenues and
authority that their distribution necessary entailed. But whereas in the first part
of the century, strong centralizing rulers like Tlmur or Shahrukh could even
suspend soyurghal ownership in the event of insubordination on the part of
family members or military commanders, 60 by the second half of the century, it
would have taken a very strong ruler indeed to neutralize the considerable power
not only of the class of soyurghal-holding Turkic emirs, who represented the
military backbone of the state, but also of the Tajik religious establishment, itself
a beneficiary of this system especially in the form of pious endowments, on
whom rulers relied to keep their Iranian subject population under control as well
as to act as a counterweight to the military elite.
Attempts to stem the disintegration of central authority by suspending or
abolishing soyurghals and other immunities were not lacking in the final decades
of the 15th century. But rulers who tried, usually under the guise of a "return to
Islamic legality," to impose the Irano-Islamic model of the centralized state on
their kingdoms were uniformly unsuccessful. Neither the centralizing reforms of
the Aq Qoyunlu ruler, Ya c qub Beg, under the determined leadership of his
famous qadi, cIsa SavajT (in the period from about 894/1489 until his death in
896/1491),61 nor those of his contemporary, Husain Bayqara's powerful par-
vanachT,62 Majd al-Dln Muhammad (especially from 892/1487 until his dismissal
about three years later),63 could prevail over the coalition of powerful Turkic
emirs and those privileged elements of the sedentary population (especially
members of the religious intelligentsia) whose interests as holders of soyurghals
and other immunities would have suffered. It was precisely this failure to reverse
the decentralizing trend that was one of the most important factors contributing
to the weakening and ultimate collapse of both the Timurid and Aq Qoyunlu
kingdoms at the turn of the century.
The consequences of the erosion of tax revenues to the central Timurid
treasury that resulted from the growth of fiscal immunities in the period of
Husain Bayqara's rule were underscored by the irregular and often extraordinary
486 Maria Eva Subtelny
measures his government was frequently forced to resort to in order to raise the
requisite funds for its continued operation. One of these was the levying from
time to time of the noncanonical general capitation tax {sar-shumar).M Thus, for
example, according to KhvandamTr, on account of the refusal by Husain Bay-
qara's sons, who were sitting on their soyurghals around Herat, to pay anything
into the central Timurid treasury, it suffered a drastic drop in revenues. In order
to pay the army and to cover other "necessary administrative expenses" (ikhrajat-i
zarunya), Husain Bayqara ordered his chief finance minister (vizier) at the time,
Nizam al-Mulk Khvaff, to raise large sums of money in the form of a general
capitation and dwelling tax65 on the inhabitants of Herat and its districts several
times over a period of one to two years, a measure that caused tremendous
popular discontent.66 On an earlier occasion, when Bayqara's vizier, cAbdullah
Akhtab, levied the capitation tax on the inhabitants of Herat and ordered them,
under oath, to itemize everything they owned in both cash and kind and bring it
to the treasury so that it could be assessed for tax purposes, the measure
occasioned a popular revolt.67
Other methods employed by Husain Bayqara's government to raise much
needed cash included the regular confiscation of high government officials,
especially those connected with the finance department, who were invariably
charged with embezzling state funds. Not only did the charges brought against
them (usually by a political rival) not have to be proven, but they also were often
dismissed after the payment of a large sum of money to the treasury by the
accused, who could then even count on being reinstated in his former post.68
Gifts to the court (pTshkash), especially by way of thanks for being pardoned for
some political mistake,69 were another way of bringing in money.70 A graphic
illustration of the financial straits in which the central government continually
found itself, was Husain Bayqara's appointment of the vizier, Nizam al-DTn
Bakhtiyar SimnanI, for the express purpose of recovering "latent sources of
taxation" (Jihdt-i ghdyibT) for the state treasury.71 Not being able to raise enough
money and pressured by the many holders of tax checks (bardtddr-i bisydr)11
who feared that his inability to come up with the targeted sum might jeopardize
their own incomes, Nizam al-DTn foolhardily suggested that the royal residences,
such as the Bagh-i safld, Bagh-i zaghan, and others, be taxed—a suggestion that
earned him immediate dismissal from his post and landed him in prison, where
he died.73
But while on the one hand the system of fiscal immunities withdrew revenues
from the realm of government taxation, it served on the other to maximize the
personal incomes of individual holders of these privileges. This was particularly
true of the sahib-i soyurghal, who had the stated right to collect taxes and
demand fulfillment of obligations from his dependent population.74 The soyur-
ghal holder thus became the chief beneficiary of the burden of taxation and
obligations, which was borne, as always, by the mass of the peasantry, who were
little more than sharecroppers or tenant farmers bound to his land. Moreover,
there are indications that the weight of taxation and obligations, crushing as it
was, was actually increasing toward the end of the 15th century as a consequence
of the expansion of the soyurghal system. Besides canonical taxes (i.e., those
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 487
sanctioned by the Shari c a), such as the basic land tax (mal=kharaj), which
under the Timurids varied from ^IO to A/w of the harvest;75 taxes dating from
pre-Islamic times, such as the bdgh-shumdr on fruit trees and vineyards;76 taxes
derived from Turko-Mongol practices and identified with the yasa, such as the
general capitation tax (sar-shumar) and the tamghd tax on town manufacturing,
sales and trade; 77 taxes that had survived from the period of Kartid rule;78
various "administrative dues" (ikhrdjdt) to support a host of officials, especially
those entrusted with tax collection;79 there were also those taxes that the soyur-
ghal holder exacted himself. For, despite the fact that he was usually cautioned
in his diploma of investiture against imposing any new or additional taxes and
obligations over and above those he was expressly entitled to, it was inevitable
that he should eventually do so, given the complete administrative and judicial
freedom that he enjoyed on his soyurghal. 80 The fact that the great majority of
soyurghal holders were members of the Turkic military elite whose attitude
toward the sedentary Iranian population as a whole, and toward cultivators in
particular, was traditionally one of contempt and general disregard for its
welfare, guaranteed that they would exploit the subject population living on their
lands to the fullest. Bert Fragner has succinctly summed up the benefits of the
soyurghal system to the soyurghal holder when he states that, "[It] gave its
beneficiaries the greatest power over cultivated land and its people that a land-
lord could achieve in the following centuries [i.e., mid-14th century onwards] of
Iranian history."81
Specifically, the soyurghal holder could take advantage of special categories of
"extraordinary" taxes (e.g., cavdrizdt) that could be used to cover such personal
expenses as banquets, family feasts, court entertainments, and the like.82 Once
such new taxes were "on the books" so to speak, they tended to become
regularized, thus contributing to the accumulation of taxes over time.83 Thus, for
example, landlords collected such "regular" taxes/obligations as the cJdT and
nauruzi (presents offered on the occasion of religious festivals and the festival of
the Persian New Year), the salamdna (presents offered by way of congratulations,
also called mushtuluq, i.e., "good news"), as well as the generic plshkash (any
kind of informal present).84 There could also be other "unofficial" {ghair hukrrii)
taxes and obligations, which represented a gray area in the field of taxation,
affording the landlord considerable leeway in the imposition of new taxes and
obligations according to his personal needs.85 Needless to say, such practices
contributed to a growing arbitrariness in the realm of taxation. Of the numerous
obligations that the subject population was liable for,86 of greatest benefit to the
landlord was the corvee (blgdr), which allowed him to call up peasants as well as
townspeople for any length of time necessary to work not only on public works,
such as the cleaning and repair of irrigation canals, but also on his private
projects—the restoration and erection of palaces, the laying out of gardens—all
at no cost to him.87 In Abu SacTd's time, the vizier, Qutb al-DTn Tavus SimnanT,
called up two hundred peasants for a period of two years to construct the Juy-i
Sultan! irrigation canal north of Herat.88
The great number of taxes that were in existence in the late 15th century and
that are often listed in diplomas of immunity (our chief source of information
488 Maria Eva Subtelny
89
about the taxation of the period) has frequently elicited comment by researchers.
Compared with the relatively small number of taxes and obligations enumerated
in documents dating from TTmur's time,90 those from the last two decades of
the 15th century often contain upwards of twenty-five to thirty different taxes
and obligations, some of which actually represent whole categories of taxes."
Naturally, the greater the number of taxes and obligations a soyurghal diploma
contained, the more attractive it would be to a potential beneficiary, and hence,
the greater its value as a political instrument in the hands of a granting ruler. But
because there is no exact congruence between the taxes and obligations listed
from one diploma of immunity to another and because diplomas usually list only
those taxes and obligations that a grantee was expressly being exempted from, it
may be assumed that there were many more taxes and obligations in existence
than are contained in any single document, no matter how long its list.92 In fact,
the taxation system of late Timurid-Turkmen times represents a plethora of
terms for taxes and obligations, the exact nature of some of which is not always
clear.93 The close connection between the system of taxation and the soyurghal
system of landholding is demonstrated by the fact that any reform of the former
had ultimately to be tied to a reform of the soyurghal system itself.94
Some scholars have painted a rosy picture of agricultural activity in late
Timurid Khorasan, specifically in the districts (bulukat) surrounding Herat.95 If
there was an increase in agricultural productivity at this time (and much more
research is needed to determine if in fact there was), any increases in taxation
may have been warranted.96 But the numerous complaints from the tax-paying
population of Timurid Khorasan about its inability to meet its tax obligations,
such as those registered in the personal correspondence of Jam!, for example, who
often interceded with the Timurid government on its behalf, are a telling, al-
though indirect, indication that the burden of taxation had become ruinous.97
More graphic testimony is borne by the flight of the peasants from the land98 and
by the popular revolts that flared up from time to time—in 1457 and 1470, for
example—in response to the imposition of heavy extraordinary taxes on the
residents of Herat and its surrounding regions.99 In the wake of the disturbances
of 1470, Husain Bayqara even found himself forced to exempt the peasants and
artisans of Herat and its dependencies from the payment of all extraordinary
taxes (vujuh-i khdriji) and monetary contributions in support of the army (zar-i
lashgar) for a period of two years.100
Chaghatay clans but who had been elevated to the rank of emir and had gained
admittance to the supreme military council (dlvan-i ac la) of the Timurid admini-
stration; Tajik members of the administration, especially viziers, who had also
been recipients of soyurghals dating back to the mid-15th century;110 those who
did not always have clearly defined administrative duties but enjoyed favored
status as "intimates" {muqarrab) of the sultan; and members of the religious
intelligentsia. The blurring of the traditional distinction between the Turkic and
Iranian (Tajik) estates in Timurid society that had become institutionalized in
the organization of the Timurid state itself also contributed to a broadening of
the social bases of patronage."1 Although the numerous members of the Timurid
princely family continued to be actively involved in cultural patronage, in the
second half of the 15th century it was no longer the prerogative of Timurid
princes,"2 and these at times even found themselves in competition with their
own courtiers and elites.
Who, then, were some of the individuals who were prominent patrons during
the time of Husain Bayqara? The following does not pretend to represent a
complete list of all patrons active during this period; rather, it is intended to
provide a sampling of the range of nonprincely elements who were instrumental
in shaping the cultural life of Khorasan in the second half of the 15th century.
An exhaustive study of the backgrounds, sources of income, and activities
sponsored by all patrons of the period would provide valuable insights into such
questions as the relative extent of involvement by the Turkic and Tajik estates in
cultural patronage; the degree of assimilation of Perso-lslamic culture by the
Turkic element and, conversely, the extent of integration of Tajik elements into
the ruling elite; preferences for activities sponsored; as well as differences between
them in taste and aesthetic criteria. Unfortunately, information relating to specific
activities patronized and even the identification of patrons themselves is notori-
ously fragmentary and often purely anecdotal in nature. But the sources for the
late Timurid period are rich and frequently yield valuable data in the most
unlikely places.
The most prominent and influential patron of the late Timurid period was,
without a doubt, Mir CA1T ShTr, the famous Chaghatay poet Nava°T (844-
906/1441-1501), who was very much a product of the system described above
within which he worked to advantage. The scion of a cultivated family of Uighur
bakhshTs (chancellery scribes who specialized in the Uighur script), he did not
belong to the hereditary military aristocracy. However, his family had been in
Timurid service from the time of TTmur himself and had been connected in
particular with the family of Tfmur's son, cUmar Shaikh, the great-grandfather
of Husain Bayqara."3 The two families appear to have been formally linked
through the institution of foster brotherhood (kukaltashT). CA1T ShTr was later
elevated to the rank of emir of the dTvan-i acla by Husain Bayqara and he
occupied a unique position at the court of the Timurid sultan as his intimate
courtier (muqarrab)."4 In view of the length of his family's service to the
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 491
Timurid house, CA1T Shir must certainly have inherited lands and privileges from
family members.
Although no actual soyurghal diplomas in his name have as yet come to light,
there are numerous references in the sources to the fact that CA1T ShTr received
grants of land from Husain Bayqara and that he possessed independent means of
such magnitude that they could only have been derived from soyurghal land-
holding. For example, in the endowment diploma {Vaqfiyya, dated 886/1481-
1482) for the Ikhlasiyya complex, which he built in the northern part of Herat,
C
A1T ShTr states that Husain Bayqara had granted him a large tract of land on the
Juy-i InjTl in 881/1476-1477 and that it was on a portion of this that he built his
famous complex, which included a madrasa, mosque, college for QurDan reciters
(dar al-huffaz), a khanaqah (hostel), hospital, bath, and a private residence,
called Unsiyya, all of which he converted into a pious endowment of which he
presumably remained the trustee." 5 In this document, he enumerates a long list
of revenue-producing properties, which he was constituting as pious endowments
for the support of the complex and its activities. These included fields under
cultivation, orchards and irrigation canals located in various districts surrounding
Herat and in other regions of Khorasan, shops, warehouses, and even storied
buildings in the bazaars of the city." 6 CA1T ShTr explicitly states that all of these
were his own private property—an important precondition for the establishment
of a legal vaqf."7
Muhammad Haidar (d. 958/1551), the author of the TarTkh-i rashidi, estimated
that CA1T ShTr's daily income from his estates (amldk) was 18,000 shahrukhTs, in
addition to which he had under his control retainers, the mint, stables, and all
the royal workshops (buyutat).u* Daulatshah, CA1T ShTr's contemporary, states
that in order to prevent inheritors from squandering his wealth, CA1T ShTr spent it
on the construction of numerous buildings and public works throughout Khora-
san and he adds that the value of all the pious endowments he established for
these was approximately 500 kapakl tumans (=5,000,000 kapaki dinars).119 In
order to put these sums into proper perspective, the cost of a home in the
exclusive Khiyaban district of Herat at the time was about 3,000 kapakT dmars. 120
An indirect indication of the fact that CA1T ShTr possessed independent sources of
income is the statement by Babur that not only did he not receive anything from
Husain Bayqara (i.e., by way of a salary or stipend), but that he actually gave
him large sums of money every year in the form of presents to the court
(pTshkash).121 Other indications of CA1T ShTr's great wealth are the many accounts
about his extraordinary generosity, which in subsequent periods became pro-
verbial. For instance, he often paid the extraordinary taxes that were levied on
the population of Herat by officials of Husain Bayqara's finance office (dTvan) or
by Bayqara himself out of his own pocket (az khassa-Di khvTsh),ni and he
regularly discharged the debts of friends and associates.123
Although he did not bear the title, CA1T ShTr must also have enjoyed the
privileges of tarkhanT, which included not only personal tax immunity, but also
special consideration from the ruler. KhvandamTr alludes to these in an account
about CA1T ShTr's intercession on behalf of 3,000 peasant families from Khorasan
whom Bayqara wanted to resettle in Khorazm. In it he makes the point that CA1T
492 Maria Eva Subtelny
Shir had the right to approach the sultan up to nine times about any matter,
however inopportune, without fear of censure.124
C
A1T Shir's extensive patronage of all aspects of the cultural life of Herat was
summed up by a near contemporary: "So many matchless and excellent calligra-
phers, singers, musicians, painters, gilders, artists, writers, composers of enigmas
(a favorite verse-form of the time), and poets thrived under his patronage that it
is not known whether as many have ever been in evidence at any other time." 125
Many of these were paid directly by him, such as the painter, MTrak Naqqash,
whom he paid 5,000 dinars to write an inscription on the newly reconstructed
cathedral mosque (masjid-i jamic) of Herat, and even had to resort to a ruse to
force the indolent artist to complete the work.126 The 370 mosques, madrasas,
and public works (buqac-i khair) that he is credited with constructing or restoring
throughout Khorasan 127 were also financed out of his private resources,128 and
although the main labor costs were probably avoided thanks to the obligation of
blgar, CA1I Shir was generous in his remuneration of artisans and master crafts-
men. For example, during the restoration of the cathedral mosque of Herat
(which was begun in 903/1498), he periodically provided the workmen engaged
in reconstructing the main cupola with fine clothes, entertainments and "other
favors," a factor that, according to KhvandamTr, facilitated the speedy comple-
tion of the project.129
Another notable Timurid patron of Husain Bayqara's time was the emir,
Nizam al-Dln Shaikh Ahmad SuhailT, also known as Shaikhum SuhailT (d. 918/
1512-1513130), who hailed from the hereditary Turkic military elite. The descen-
dant of an illustrious Chaghatay family whose members had been emirs in the
service of TTmur and his son, Shahrukh, 131 Shaikhum Beg, as Babur calls him,
had been in the service of Abu SacTd before he joined Husain Bayqara and
became one of his emirs.132 A close friend of CA1I Shir's133 and an intimate
(muqarrab) of the sultan's, he was made keeper of the great seal at CA1I Shir's
request.134 He was a poet in his own right in both Persian and Turkish, writing
under the pen name, Suhaill, and he is mentioned by all of the contemporary
literary biographies (tazkiras).iiS Among others, he was the patron of Husain
Vaciz Kashifl, who wrote his popular Anvar-i SuhailT for him.136
Another high-ranking member of the Timurid military aristocracy who was an
active patron was Shujac al-Dln Muhammad Burunduq, one of Husain Bayqara's
chief Barlas emirs.137 His great-great-grandfather, Chaku Barlas, had been one
of TTmur's men and he himself had been an emir in the service of Abu '1-Qasim
Babur and of Abu Sa c ld, who had given Kabul to him and Jahanglr Barlas.138
Muhammad Burunduq was known as the builder of the caravanserai (ribat)
called Qush Ribat northwest of Herat on the Herat-Marv caravan route. 139 The
bequests (mauqufat) he made to this caravanserai as well as to the shrine of
c
Abdullah Ansarl at Gazurgah and to a madrasa in ChlchTktu, which are recorded
in a vaqf inscription (dated 905/1500) at the Gazurgah shrine, indicated that he
possessed much landed property throughout Khorasan, including fields under
cultivation (mazraca), garden parks (chahar-bagh), irrigation works, mills, shops,
and so forth.140 Bernard O'Kane is of the opinion that the Qush Ribat was
located at the center of an agricultural settlement.141 This was most probably
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 493
CONCLUSION
arts and architecture, poetry, and belles-lettres would not have been possible in
the first place without the creation of socioeconomic conditions that favored the
development and expanded the practice of patronage to the point where it could
give rise to one of the most productive periods in the cultural history of medieval
Islam.
It is interesting, in the light of the foregoing discussion, to reexamine Marshall
Hodgson's popular concept of the "military patronage state," by which he
referred to the pattern of patronage activity established by the Mongol and post-
Mongol states, and especially the Timurids whom he considered as illustrative of
the patronage state at its best.170 Conceding that states organized according to
Turko-Mongol steppe principles had an effect on land tenure that was "not
negligible," Hodgson surmised that they provided a "somewhat different frame-
work" in which patronage of high culture took place.171 He was right. But had he
examined that framework more closely, he would no doubt have modified the
emphasis his term placed on the central role played by the state in the direction
of cultural life, and recognized that the revival of the late Timurid period was the
product precisely of the weakening of central government control and of the
concomitant creation of a variety of stimuli and a multiplicity of approaches.
NOTES
Author's note: 1 would like to acknowledge the generous assistance provided by the Social Science
Research Council (New York) during the period of research on this article. I would also like to thank
my colleagues, Beatrice Manz (Tufts University) and Robert McChesney (New York University), as
well as the Editor, Peter von Sivers, for their valued comments and suggestions.
'Lucien Bouvat, who appears to have coined the phrase, used it loosely to refer to the general
resurgence of intellectual life at the courts of the Timurids [L'Empire mongol (2eme phase) (=Vol.
VIII, pt. 3, of Hisioire du monde, ed. E. Cavaignac) (Paris, 1927), p. 201]. Rene Grousset, the great
popularizer of Central Asian history, explained it as "the artistic and literary movement of the
fifteenth century," particularly in Samarqand and Herat [Les civilisations de I'Orient, Vol. I: L'Orient
(Paris, 1929), p. 282; Eng. tr.: The Civilizations of the East, Vol. I: The Near and Middle East, tr.
C. A. Phillips (New York, 1931), p. 314] and he called Herat under the rule of Husain Bayqara "the
Florence of what has justly been called the Timurid renaissance" [L'Empire des steppes (Paris, 1939),
p. 546; Eng. tr.: The Empire of the Steppes, tr. N. Walford (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970), p. 465].
Most recently, Hans Robert Roemer has explained that it was the "great flourishing of Islamic
architecture at this time" that accounted for the term coming into vogue in Europe ["The Successors
of TTmur," in The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. VI: The Timurid and Safavid Periods, ed.
P. Jackson & L. Lockhart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) (hereafter CHI), p. 142].
2
See Adam Mez, Die Renaissance des Islams (Heidelberg, 1922); Eng. tr. The Renaissance of
Islam, tr. Salahuddin Khuda Bakhsh and D. S. Margoliouth (Patna, 1937).
3
Jean Aubin first drew attention to the problematic use of the term, "Timurid renaissance," in his
article, "Le mecenat timouride a Chiraz" [Studia Islamica, 8 (1957), 72], in which he asked pointedly,
"Mais, au fait, renaissance de quoi? Et en quoi timouride?" Similarly, Roy Mottahedeh [Loyalty and
Leadership in an Early Islamic Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 311, referring
to the Buyid "renaissance," asked, "What is being reborn?"
"Thus, for example, Daulatshah, Tazkirat al-shucara [The Tadhkiratu :>sh-Shucara'\, ed. Edward
G. Browne (London, 1901) (hereafter Daulatshah), p. 481; Babur, The Babur-nama, fac. ed. Annette
496 Maria Eva Subtelny
S. Beveridge (Leiden, 1905; rep. ed., London, 1971) (hereafter BN), fol. 177b; Eng. tr.: Babur-nama:
Memoirs of Babur, tr. Annette S. Beveridge (London, 1922; rep. ed., New Delhi, 1970) (hereafter BN
tr.), p. 283; Fakhri Haraff, "Lata^if-nama," in CA1T Shir Nava 3 !, Majalis al-nafa^is [The Majalis-un-
Nafa'is, "Galaxy of Poets, "of Mir cAli Shir Nava'i. Two 16th Century Persian Translations], ed. Ali
Asghar Hekmat (Teheran, 1323 H.S./1945), p. 135.
'Soviet historians frequently refer to the entire period from the 1340s to the end of the 15th
century as the period of "feudal fragmentation"—see, for example, N. V. Pigulevskaia et al., Istoriia
Irana s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVIII veka (Leningrad, 1958), p. 211.
'Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. II: The Expansion of Islam in the Middle
Periods (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 492.
'For cultural activity under the Aq Qoyunlu rulers, for example, see Walther Hinz, Irons Aufstieg
zum Nationalstaat imfiinfzehnten Jahrhundert (Berlin & Leipzig, 1936), pp. 108-19.
"For an overview of the events after Timor's death, see R. M. Savory, "The Struggle for
Supremacy in Persia after the Death of TTmur," Der Islam, 40, 1 (1965), 35-65.
'See Lawrence Krader, Social Organization of the Mongol-Turkic Pastoral Nomads (The Hague,
1963), p. 367; Martin B. Dickson, "Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Sixteenth Century," in Trudy
dvadtsiat'piatogo mezhdunarodnogo kongressa vostokovedov, Moskva I960, Vol. Ill: Zasedaniia
sektsii X, XI, XIII (Moscow, 1963), p. 210; M. E. Subtelny, "Babur's Rival Relations: A Study of
Kinship and Conflict in 15th-16th Century Central Asia," Der Islam (in press).
l0
For the etymology of the word, see Gerhard Doerfer, Tiirkische und mongolische Elemente im
Neupersischen, 4 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1963-1975), I, 351-53.
"The standard formula used in the diplomas of investiture to refer to fiscal and administrative
immunity was "marfuc al-qalam va maqtuc al-qadam" \\\l., "with the pen (of the tax collector) lifted
and the feet (of government agents) amputated"] and government officials were ordered to "keep
their pens and feet withdrawn" ("qalam va qadam kutah va kashtda darand"). See I. P. Petrushevskii,
"K istorii instituta soiurgala," Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, 6 (1949), 244-45; Hans Robert Roemer,
Staalsschreiben der Timuridenzeit. Das Saraf-nama des cAbdallah Marwarld in kritischer Auswertung
(Wiesbaden, 1952), p. 168; also Bert Fragner, "Social and Internal Economic Affairs," in CHI, VI,
512.
I2
1. P. Petrushevskii, Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Irane XIII-XIV vekov (Moscow-
Leningrad, 1960), p. 264 and pp. 272-73.
"Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 256-62.
l4
Fragner, CHI, VI, 506.
I5
I. P. Petrushevskii, "Feodal'nye instituty idrar i mukasse v Irane v XIII-XIV vv.," in Pamiati
akademika Ignatiia lulianovicha Krachkovskogo. Sbornik statei (Leningrad, 1958), pp. 202-5; 1. P.
Petrushevskii, Ocherki po istorii foedal'nykh otnoshenii v Azerbaidzhane i Armenii v XVI-nachale
XIX vv. (Leningrad, 1949), p. 156; Fragner, CHI, VI, 502-4. A discussion of the origins of the
soyurghal is necessarily outside the scope of the present study. For this, see Petrushevskii, "K istorii,"
pp. 227-46; and Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 256 ff., esp. pp. 258-60 where he summarizes the
views of Iakubovskii, Gordlevskii, Cahen, etc., on iqta c , and also pp. 272-74 where he discusses the
soyurghal itself. See also A. Belenitskii, "K istorii foedal'nogo zemlevladeniia v Srednei Azii i Irane v
timuridskuiu epokhu," Istorik marksist, 4 (1941), 43-58; Ann K. S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant
in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration (Oxford, 1953; rep. ed., 1969),
pp. 101-2; Fragner, CHI, VI, 504-10.
"Thus Belenitskii, "K istorii," p. 46, who bases his conclusions on the first mention of the term in
the Zafar-nama of Nizam al-DTn ShamT in 779/1377-1378 [see Histoire des conquetes de Tamerlan
intitulee Zafarnama par Nizamuddm SamT avec des additions empruntees au Zubdalu-t-lawarTh-i
BaysungurT de Hafiz-i Abru, ed. Felix Tauer, 2 vols. (Prague, 1937-1956), I, 77]. Thus also
A. Iakubovskii, "Timur (Opyt kratkoi kharakteristiki)," Voprosy istorii, 1946, nos. 8-9, pp. 66-67.
"For references, see Petrushevskii, Ocherki, p. 153 and p. 171; Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 273;
Petrushevskii, "K istorii," pp. 232-49.
18
See A. Iu. Iakubovskii, "Voprosy periodizatsii istorii Srednei Azii v srednie veka (VI-XV vv.),"
Kralkie soobshcheniia Instituta istorii material'noi kul'tury im. N. la. Marra, 1949, no. 28, p. 43, who
says that the Timurid kingdoms were organized entirely on the soyurghal system.
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 497
"For an overview of published documents, see Bert G. Fragner, Reperlorium persischer Herr-
scherurkunden. Publiziene Originalurkunden (bis 1848) (Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1980),
pp. 30-51.
20
Beatrice F. Manz, "Administration and the Delegation of Authority in Temiir's Dominions,"
Central Asiatic Journal, 20, 3 (1976), 197 and 203-4. Manz's conclusions contradict the theses of
Belenitskii, "K istorii," p. 49, that soyurghal land grants were made extensively by TTmur toward the
end of his life, as well as of Iakubovskii, "Timur," p. 66.
21
For an example of the use of the term tiyul in a diploma of investiture from TTmur's time, see
L. Fekete, Einfiihrung in die persische Palaographie, ed. G. Hazai (Budapest, 1977), p. 72. For tiyul,
see below.
"Manz, "Administration," pp. 206-7. See also Beatrice F. Manz, "Politics and Control under
Tamerlane," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1983, pp. 336-39.
23
For examples of soyurghals distributed under Shahrukh, see Manz, "Politics and Control,"
pp. 357-58. See also Petrushevskii, Ocherki, pp. 149-50; Petrushevskii, "K istorii," p. 230; Belenitskii,
"K istorii," p. 50; Jean Deny, "Un soyurgal du timouride Sahruh en ecriture ouigoure," Journal
asiaiique, 245, 3 (1957), 253-66.
" F o r examples of soyurghals distributed under the Qara Qoyunlu, see Belenitskii, "K istorii,"
p. 51; O. A. Efendiev, "Institut 'suiurgal' i tsentralistskaia politika pravitelei Ak-Koiunlu i pervykh
Sefevidov," in Formy feodal'noi zemel'noi sobstvennosli i vladeniia na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke.
Bartol'dovskie chteniia 1975 g. (Moscow, 1979), pp. 168-69; I. P. Petrushevskii, "Vnutrenniaia
politika Akhmeda Ak-koiunlu," in Sbornik slatei po istorii Azerbaidzhana, 2 pts. (Baku, 1949), 1,
145-46; Jean Aubin, "Un soyurghal Qara-Qoyunlu concernant le buluk de Bawanat-Harat-Marwast,"
in S. M. Stern, ed., Documents from Islamic Chanceries (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1965), pp. 159-70.
25
For examples, see Belenitskii, "K istorii," p. 55.
"Roemer, CHI, VI, 117.
27
Khvandamir, TarTkh-i Habib al-siyar, ed. Jalal al-DTn Huma°T, 4 vols. (Teheran, 1333 H.S./
1954-55) (hereafter HS), IV, 431. See Efendiev, "Institut 'suiurgal'," p. 172.
28
Hasan Rumlu, Ahsan al-tavarlkh, Vol. XII: A Chronicle of the Early Safawis, Vol. 1 (Persian
text), ed. C. N. Seddon (Baroda, 1931), p. 15; V. Minorsky, "The Aq-Qoyunlu and Land Reforms,"
BSOAS, 17, 3 (1955), 461; Hans Robert Roemer, "Le dernier firman de Rustam Bahadur Aq
Qoyunlu?" Bulletin de I'lnstitut francais d'archeologie orientate, 59 (1960), 282. Roemer translates the
phrase as "religious and temporal benefices"—for his definition of vaztfa, see p. 282, n. 3. See also
I. P. Petrushevskii, "Gosudarstva Azerbaidzhana v XV veke," in Sbornik stalei po istorii Azerbaid-
zhana, pt. I, pp. 189-90.
"KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 111. It may be argued, however, that the "soyurghalat" in the phrase,
"in c amat va soyurghalat," is to be interpreted not in its technical sense, but rather in its primary
meaning of "gifts," "favors," and therefore simply as a synonym for "in c amat." See n. 54 below.
Belenitskii, "K istorii," p. 56, maintains that Husain Bayqara was the first to distribute soyurghals to
the civil administration and clergy, but, as noted earlier, the practice already existed under Husain
Bayqara's predecessor, Abu SacTd, and probably even earlier. Daulatshah, for example, writes that
the Persian poet, Salman SavajT, received a soyurghal in recognition for his services from the
Jalayirid, Sultan Uvais—see Daulatshah, pp. 260-61. For what appears to be a diploma of immunity
granted by Husain Bayqara to the court singer, Nizam al-DTn Qul Muhammad, see Roemer,
Staatsschreiben, pp. 91-92, doc. 37(44a).
30
See, for example, B. G. Martin, "Seven Safawid Documents from Azarbayjan," in Stern,
Documents, pp. 171-206, esp. docs. 2 and 4-7; also Ann K. S. Lambton, "Two Safavid Soyurghals,"
BSOAS, 14(1952), 44-54; Efendiev, "Institut'suiurgal'," p. 173.
''Petrushevskii, Ocherki, pp, 184 ff. Petrushevskii connects the tiyul with the centralizing policies
of the Safavids, especially from the time of Shah c Abbas I. See also V. Minorsky, ed. and tr.,
Tadhkirat al-Muluk: A Manual of Safavid Administration (circa 1137/1725) (London, 1943; rep. ed.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 28-29; Petrushevskii, "K istorii," pp. 235-42;
Fragner, CHI, VI, 509 and 513-16. The statements made by James J. Reid in his Tribalism and
Society in Islamic Iran 1500-1629 (Malibu, Calif.: Undena Publications, 1983), pp. 16-17, that the
tiyul originated in "the search for pastureland in unexplored areas, wasteland, or conquered terri-
498 Maria Eva Subtelny
tory," which he bases on the definition of the word in Kashgharl's DTvan and in Radlov's Opyt
slovariia [the latter from Minorsky's article, "Tiyul" in El 1 (not "Tuyul" in El 2 as on p. 33, n. 21)],
and that it "eventually" (he does not say when) came to designate "the division or allotment of booty,
conquered land, and/ or pasture land," are highly interpretive, as are some of his assertions about the
soyurghal, such as the fact that it was "generally immune from the exactions and extraordinary levies
listed in various documents." What is striking about many of his statements about the iqta c ,
soyurghal and tiyul is that they show little or no evidence of acquaintance with the relevant primary
or secondary literature on the topic (see, for example, his categorical dismissal of the works of
Petrushevskii, p. 40). See John Woods' review of this book in IJMES, 18, 4 (1986), 529-32, and the
rejoinders by Reid and Woods in IJMES, 20, 3 (1988), 408-10.
"KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 321. For the duties of the sadr, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 249;
N. Makhmudov, "Iz istorii zemel'nykh otnoshenii i nalogovoi politiki timuridov," Izvesliia Otdeleniia
obshchesivennykh nauk AN Tadzhikskoi SSR, 1, 32 (1963), 25.
"See Robert D. McChesney, "Waqf at Balkh: A Study of the Endowments at the Shrine of CA1T
Ibn AbT Talib," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1973, p. 117.
34
See McChesney, "Waqf at Balkh," p. 118 for examples of this, such as the vaqf for the madrasa
and khanaqah of Ulugh Beg in Samarqand, and the vaqf granted by Husain Bayqara in 885/1480—
1481 to support the "newly discovered" cAlid tomb at Balkh.
35
For the adoption of the Hanafite mazhab among the nomadic Turks of Central Asia, see W.
Heffening (-J. Schacht), "Hanafiyya," El 2 , vol. 3, p. 162; 1. P. Petrushevsky, Islam in Iran, tr.
H. Evans (London: Athlone Press, 1985; first publ. in Russian, 1966), p. 113. It ought to be noted
that although the Shaficite school was represented to some extent in the towns of eastern Iran, it was
dominant only in areas to the west of Khorasan, such as Azerbaijan, Fars, etc.—see Petrushevsky,
Islam in Iran, p. 303.
"See McChesney, "Waqf at Balkh," p. 330; also J. Krcsmarik, "Das Wakfrecht vom Standpunkte
des Sari c atrechtes nach der hanefitischen Schule," ZDMG, 45 (1891), 529-30. For an example of a
soyurghal donated to a vaqf, see Roemer, Staatsschreiben, p. 72a (Persian text), p. 75 (tr.), and
p. 163 (commentary). For an example where personal tax immunities (musallamiyal—see below)
constituted part of the endowment for a shrine, see FikrT SaljuqT, ed., Risala-^i mazarat-i Hirat, 3 pts.
in 1 vol. (Kabul, 1967), pt. 3 (TaclTqat), p. 134. For an instance where a manuscript of a Sufi treatise
was made vaqf, see A. A. Molchanov, "K kharakteristike nalogovoi sistemy v Gerate epokhi Alishera
Navoi," in Rodonachal'nik uzbekskoi literalury. Sbornik siatei ob Alishere Navoi (Tashkent, 1940),
p. 164, n. 22.
"On the admissibility of this practice, see W. Heffening, "Wakf," El 1 , vol. 4, p. 1097; Krcsmarik,
"Das Wakfrecht," pp. 558-60; also Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 247-48. It is for this reason,
namely, the right of the endower to set the conditions of its use, as well as the inalienability of
the endowed property, that Petrushevskii regarded vaqf as a separate conditional form of
feudal landholding—see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 248). See also McChesney, "Waqf at Balkh,"
pp. 116-17.
38
This does not mean, however, that all vaqfs enjoyed complete tax immunity under the later
Timurids. In addition to the cushr (tithe), certain vaqfs also had to pay a tax for the maintenance of
the sadr and his officials (called rasm al-sadara)—see Makhmudov, "Iz istorii," p. 25. In cases where
vaqfs had been granted complete tax immunity, the relevant documents also normally contain a
clause prohibiting sadrs or other officials from interfering in the given endowment—see Roemer,
Staatsschreiben, p. 70.
39
Lambton, Landlord, p. 113.
40
See the collection of vaqf documents relating to Ahrar and his family published by O. D.
Chekhovich, ed. and tr., Samarkandskie dokumenty XV-XVI vv. (O vladeniiakh Khodzhi Akhrara v
Srednei Azii i Afganistane) (Moscow, 1974), esp. pp. 35-36 for the conditions set down by Ahrar for
his endowments.
41
A graphic example of this practice under the Timurids was the family vaqf of Abu Sa c ld whose
daughter-in-law (wife, in the opinion of some scholars), HabTba Sultan BegTm, converted her
extensive landed property and even costly fabrics and artifacts, into a vaqf of which she and her
descendants were the trustees—see V. L. Viatkin, "Vakufnyi dokument Ishratkhana," in M. E.
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 499
Masson, cd., Mavzolei Ishratkhana (Tashkent, 1958), pp. 109-36 for the text of the endowment
diploma dated 868/1464. For an example of this practice under the early Uzbeks, see R. G.
Mukminova. "K kharakteristike feodal'nogo instituta 'tiiul' v srednei Azii," in Formy feodal'noi
zemel'noisobstvennosti, pp. 123-24.
j;
For the term, mustaghallat, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 248, n. 3.
4
'KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 111. For a similar expression, "az khalis-i amlak-i khwlsh," see R. D.
McChesney, "The Amirs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVII Century," JESHO, 26, 1 (1983), 55,
where it is rendered as "his own private property." I do not think that the technical term, khalisa,
meaning land belonging to the royal domain (see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 246; Minorsky,
Tadhkirat al-Muluk, pp. 147-48), is intended here.
"Compare Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-muluk, p. 27, where he says, "It is difficult to say yet in what
they (i.e., mucafT, musallamT) differed from the soyurghal." Roemer echoes this same uncertainty in
Staalsschreiben, p. 168. For a diploma issued by the Aq Qoyunlu ruler Rustam (dated 902/1497)
granting two sayyids exemption from taxes on their lands, see Roemer, "Le dernier firman,"
pp. 284-87.
•"Petrushevskii, Ocherki, p. 180. For an example of a patent of personal tax exemption (nishan-i
musallamT), see Roemer, Staatsschreiben, pp. 79-82, doc. 12 (17a). See also Fragner, CHI, VI, 505
and 511-12; Heribert Busse, Untersuchungen zum islamischen Kanzleiwesen an Hand tiirkmenischer
und safawidischer Urkunden (Cairo, 1959), p. 102; Petrushevskii, "K istorii," p. 245.
46
For the standard definitions of the term given by Juvain!(l3th c.) and Abu '1-Ghazl(l7th c ) , see
Doerfer, Tiirkische und mongolische Elemenle, II, 4 6 1 - 6 2 .
"See, for example, Nizam al-DIn Shaml, Zafar-nama, I, 122-23.
48
For this obligation, see N. Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta i nalogi pri Timure i timuridakh,"
Voprosy istorii SSSR. Trudy Tadzhikskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im V. I. Lenina (Seriia
istoricheskikh nauk), 2 (1966), 249.
49
Nizam al-DTn ShamT, Zafar-nama, I, 123. For the category of taxes termed takalTf (also taklifat-i
dJvarii), see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 379.
50
Thus, for example, Ibrahim Tarkhan, who was an emir of Husain Bayqara's—see Babur, BN tr.,
p. 58. See also Babur, BN tr., pp. 61-64 on the revolt of the tarkhans of Samarqand. One of these
was the powerful DarvTsh Muhammad Tarkhan, who was the patron of CA1T Shir Nava^T during the
latter's student days in Samarqand.
'When it had been granted especially to members of the higher Christian clergy—see S. M.
Shapshal, "K voprosu o tarkhannykh iarlykakh," in Akademiku Vladimiru Aleksandrovichu Gord-
levskomu k ego semidesialipiatiletiiu. Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1953), p. 304; also M. Minovi and
V. Minorsky, "NasTr al-DTn TusT on Finance," BSOS, 10, 3 (1940-1942), 763, 776 and 785. For a
reference in a document dating from the end of the 16th century to the fact that the Armenian clergy
of Georgia had been tarkhans "since long ago" (az qadtm al-ayyam), see A. D. Papazian, Persidskie
dokumenty Matenadarana, Vol. I, pt. 1: Ukazy (XV-XVIvv.) (Erevan, 1956), p. 295. The institution
was also widespread in the khanates of Kazan, Astrakhan (=Hajji Tarkhan) and especially Crimea
[for examples of tarkhan documents from the sphere of the Golden Horde and the Crimean khanate,
see I. N. Berezin, Tarkhannye iarlyki Tokhtamysha, Timur"-Kutluka i Saadet"-Gireia (Kazan, 1851);
Akdes Nimet Kurat, Topkapi Sarayi Miizesi Arsivindeki Altin Ordu, Kinm ve Tiirkistan Hanlanna
ail Yarlik ve Bulkier (Istanbul, 1940), pp. 62 ff.], and it was practiced as well in the Rus' principalities
and later in the Russian empire as late as the reign of Alexander II (see Shapshal, "K voprosu,"
pp. 304-8). The statement made by Reid (Tribalism and Society, p. I l l ) that the title tarkhan "may
or may not refer to Timurid origins," does not take into account the long history and widespread
nature of the institution, and his assertion that it was "extremely common" under the Timurids but
"extremely rare" under both the Aq Qoyunlu and Safavids is overstated.
For an example of a tarkhan diploma conferred on a merchant by the Safavid, Shah IsmacTl I, in
1516, see Walther Hinz, "Zwei Steuerbefreiungs-Urkunden," in J. Fiick, ed., Documenta islamka
inedita (Berlin, 1952), p. 218. For a reference to the naming of a Samarqand merchant by the name
of Fazil as tarkhan by the Uzbek, Muhammad ShTbanT Khan, see KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 284. In this
connection, Babur's comment that this Fazil was not one of the Samarqandi tarkhans, but rather one
of the merchant tarkhans of Turkestan (Babur, BN, fol. 84; BN tr., p. 133) is very significant, for it
500 Maria Eva Subtelny
indicates that a distinction was made, at least in the Transoxanian sphere, between the hereditary
begs (emirs) who were members of the military aristocracy and who had probably borne the title for
generations, and non-noble tarkhans from the sedentary population.
"See, for example, Busse, Untersuchungen, p. 159 and p. 165.
54
See V. Minorsky, "A Soyurghal of Qasim b. JahangTr Aq-qoyunlu (903/1498)," BSOS, 9, 4
(1939), 930, line 13. Minorsky misread jazv for hurr in this instance. For the term, hurr (lit., "free"),
in the formula, "hurr va tarkhan," see Busse, Untersuchungen, p. 167; for its substitution in the same
formula by its Persian equivalent, azad, see Shapshal, "K voprosu," p. 314. There is a great deal of
confusion in the secondary literature about the institution of tarkham, which many scholars have
equated with the soyurghal. The confusion appears to have originated with Hinz, who maintained
that the possessor of a soyurghal was called tarkhan or "freeman" (Freiherr) (Hinz, "Zwei Steuer-
befreiungs-Urkunden," p. 211). His conclusion stemmed from his interpretation of the word "soyur-
ghal" used in a Turkish document in the technical sense of a land grant with tax immunity, rather
than in its primary sense in Turkish of "gift" or "favor" (in this case, the conferral of the favor
of tarkhan status), and thus equivalent to the Persian "incam" (Hinz, "Zwei Steuerbefreiungs-
Urkunden," p. 214, lines 35-36. For the primary meaning of soyurghal, see Doerfer, Tiirkische und
mongolische Elemente, I, 351; for instances of its use in this sense, see Petrushevskii, "K istorii,"
pp. 227-28). Following him, Busse maintained that, in the case of both a simple immunity (mu c afl,
musallamT) and a soyurghal, the recipient received the title tarkhan (Busse, Untersuchungen, p. 98.
What is curious about Busse's statement is that he appears to have made it on the authority of
Petrushevskii's article, "K istorii," tn which Petrushevskii not only made a clear distinction between
the two meanings of soyurghal, but did not even mention the term tarkhan). Busse's contention,
however, is not borne out by the documents he published in his collection, for the title tarkhan is not
used in the soyurghal documents at all, only in documents confirming certain sayyids in their posts as
trustees of a vaqf and declaring it exempt from taxation (see Busse, Untersuchungen, docs. 3 and 4,
esp. p. 159 and p. 165). Although citing Busse, Fragner maintained the reverse of what Busse
suggested—that the granting of tarkhan status also involved the granting of land and that both were
called tarkhanT (Fragner, CHI, VI, 512). The statement made by Doerfer, on the other hand, that the
holder of a soyurghal was not the equivalent of a tarkhan and that the difference lay in the fact that a
soyurghal owner was not only exempt from taxation, but also had the right to collect taxes for
himself, whereas a simple tarkhan, who was not also in possession of a soyurghal, enjoyed only tax
immunity, is absolutely correct (Doerfer, Tiirkische und mongolische Elemente, II, 465, although it is
difficult to understand why he cites Busse, Untersuchungen, p. 102 as a reference).
" F o r the c ushr, see Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," pp. 162-63; Petrushevskii, Zemledelie,
p. 255.
56
For the term, mal, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 373.
"The diploma issued to Jam! was published by Molchanov in his article, "K kharakteristike,"
pp. 158-59 (text), pp. 160-61 (tr.), based on Kamal al-DTn cAbd al-Vasic al-NizamT's Maqamat-i
MaulavT-yi Jam! (comp. 898/1492). It is noteworthy that the document stipulates that the grant of
immunity does not require a yearly renewal ("sanatan bacda sanatin nishan-i mujaddid natalaband").
Without giving the dates or numbers of the only two manuscripts of this work, which he says were
held in the State Library of Uzbekistan, Molchanov indicates that the document itself was found on
fol. 82b (see p. 154, n. 2). The manuscripts he refers to appear to be identical with the two described
in Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 10 vols. (Tashkent, 1952-1975),
III, 287-88, nos. 2480-2481.
58
In addition to the monies that would be freed up as a result of this blanket tax exemption, Jam!
assured the members of his retinue who were to accompany him that he would have available more
than 10,000 kapakT dinars of his own money for the trip—see Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," p. 157
(based on cAbd al-Vasic, Maqamat).
5
'lt is instructive to compare this state of affairs with the situation in the Safavid state in the
seventeenth century about which the Frenchman, Jean Chardin, complained that the system of
assignments (tiyul), which was already noted were not nearly as generous as the soyurghals of
Timurid times, had withdrawn many lands from the government's control—see Minorsky, Tadhkirat
al-muluk, p. 182.
60
See Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR, 4 vols. (Tashkent, 1967-1968), 1, 480.
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 501
" F o r studies of these reforms, see Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu," pp. 451-58; Petrushevskii,
"Vnutrenniaia politika," pp. 149-52; Efendiev, "Institut 'suiurgal'," pp. 170-71.
"This was one of the highest administrative posts in the Timurid government—see KhvandamTr,
HS, IV, 326.
63
For a study of these reforms, see M. E. Subtelny, "Centralizing Reform and its Opponents in the
Late Timurid Period," Iranian Studies (in press).
" F o r the sar-shumar, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 381; Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta,"
pp. 246-48; Fragner, CHI, VI, 549-50. The sar-shumar was a direct descendant of the qubchur of
Mongol times.
65
The full phrase used by KhvandamTr is "sar-shumar va sara-shumar va barda-shumar va
nambardar." The sara-shumar (also khana-shumdr) was a dwelling or household tax—see Fragner,
CHI, VI, 550. I have not been able to find a satisfactory explanation for the barda-shumar in the
secondary literature on the topic of taxation, but it appears to be identical with the sar-shumar [see
KhvandamTr, Dastur al-vuzara, ed. S. NafTsT (Teheran, 1317/1939) (hereafter DV), p. 429]. For a
possible explanation for nambardar, see Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," pp. 250-52; also Makh-
mudov, "Iz istorii," pp. 29-30.
"KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 428-29.
"KhvandamTr, DV, p. 392; KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 152. For the revolt, see M. R. Arunova, "K
istorii narodnykh vystuplenii v gosudarstve timuridov v XV v.," Kralkie soobshcheniia Instiluta
vostokovedeniia Akademiinauk SSSR, 37 (1960), 34-36.
"Compare the biographies of Husain Bayqara's viziers in KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 380 ff.
"Regularly referred to in the sources by the phrase, "bi-rasm-i shukrana."
70
See, for example, the gifts presented to Husain Bayqara by MTr CA1T ShTr [KhvandamTr, Makarim
al-akhlaq, fac. ed. T. GandjeV ([Cambridge]: Trustees of the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, 1979)
(hereafter MA), fol. I71r.]; his brother, DarvTsh CA1T (KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 190); Majd al-DTn
Muhammad (KhvandamTr, DV, p. 404); and the vizier, Afzal al-DTn Muhammad (KhvandamTr, DV,
p. 439).
" F o r the term, mal-i ghayibt, used to refer to the property of fleeing merchants or notables that
was confiscated by the state in TTmur's time, see Jean Aubin, "Comment Tamerlan prenait les villes,"
Studio Islamica, 19 (1963), 103.
72
The barat was a tax or revenue check that was issued to officials, etc., in the value of their salary.
It was a fixed sum drawn on the revenues of a particular village or district. See Walther Hinz,
"Das Rechnungswesen orientalischer Reichsfinanzamter im Mittelalter," Der Islam, 29 (1950), 20;
Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-muluk, p. 29.
"KhvandamTr, DV, p. 394.
74
The recipient of a simple tax immunity on his land probably also collected something for himself
from the peasants living and working on his estate, even though he had no legal right to do so—see
Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-muluk, pp. 28-29.
"Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 373-74; Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," p. 945; A. Iu. Iakubovskii,
"Cherty obshchestvennoi i kul'turnoi zhizni epokhi Alishera Navoi," in A. K. Borovkov, ed., Alisher
Navoi. Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1946), p. 13; Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," pp. 238-39; E. A.
Davidovich, "Sviditel'stvo Daulatshakha o razmerakh zemel'noi renty pri Uiugbeke," Pis'mennye
pamialniki Vostoka(\91l), 30.
''Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 387; Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," p. 243.
"Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 386; Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," p. 262; Fragner, CHI, VI,
540-43.
78
For a reference to this, see Daulatshah, p. 269.
"Such as the sadrana or rasm al-sadara (commission for the sadr), the rasm al-vizara (commission
for the vizier), iabitana (tax to support the tax assessor), sahib-jamcana (tax to support the person
who drew up the salary lists), muhassilana (tax to support the tax collector), mushrifdna (tax to
support the overseer of tax collectors), darughana or darughakT (dues for the bailiff), mTrabana (tax
to support the overseer of the irrigation network), etc. See Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 389-90;
Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," p. 946; Fragner, CHI, VI, 550.
80
Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 272; Belenitskii, "K istorii," p. 53; Lambton, Landlord, p. 103.
"'Fragner, CHI, VI, 502.
502 Maria Eva Subtelny
82
Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 382-83; Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," pp. 242-43; Minorsky,
"A Soyurghal," pp. 496-97; Fragner, CHI, VI, 551-52.
"Fragner, CHI, VI, 550.
"Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," p. 951.
"Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," p. 930 and p. 933; Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 360 and p. 401.
86
Such as ulagh—see n. 48 above, and Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," p. 161 where it is
mentioned in JamT's diploma of immunity; qunalgha or nuzul—the obligation to billet and entertain
military and government personnel and even prominent persons for what could at times be extended
periods—see Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," p. 948, and Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 396-98; and
c
ulufa—the obligation to provide fodder for military and government personnel, the agents of the
landlord, or the landlord himself—see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 384, and Minorsky, "A Soyur-
ghal," p. 948.
"Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Muluk, pp. 181-82; Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp. 394-96.
88
KhvandamTr, DV, p. 386.
89
Thus, Roemer, "Le dernier firman," p. 283: "Ce qui saute aux yeux dans ces deux documents et
dans tant d'autres, c'est le grand nombre d'impots et de taxes imposees a la proprifcte fonciere en ce
temps-la."
90
See, for example, the diploma issued by TTmur to his grandson, Muhammad Sultan, in 804/1401,
published in Fekete, Einfiihrung, pp. 71-75.
"See the soyurghal diploma (farman) issued by Qasim b. JahangTr Aq Qoyunlu, dated 903/1498,
which lists about thirty taxes and obligations (published in Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," pp. 928-31);
the document (yar/Tgh) issued by Ya c qub Aq Qoyunlu, dated 1488, which lists about twenty-seven
(published in Minorsky, "A Soyurghal," pp. 952-56); Rustam Aq Qoyunlu's diploma of personal tax
exemption, dated 902/1497, lists about 25 (published in Roemer, "Le dernier firman," pp. 284-87);
the diploma issued by Husain Bayqara granting tax exemption for life to Jam! lists about eleven
(published in Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," pp. 158-59).
92
See the table in Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," pp. 241-42, where he compares the taxes and
obligations listed in several documents of the period.
93
The best treatment of the post-Mongol taxation system is Petrushevskii, Zemledelie [frequently
cited in its Persian translation, KishavarzT va munasibal-i arzT dar Tran-i cahd-i mughul, tr.
K. Kishavarz (Teheran 1344/1966)], esp. pp. 340-402; see also Petrushevskii, Ocherki, pp. 248-95;
and A. K. Ali-zade, Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskaia i politicheskaia isloriia Azerbaidzhana Xlll-XlV
vv. (Baku, 1956), pp. 193-258. For an excellent general overview in English, see Fragner, CHI, VI,
533-56. For taxation under the Timurids in particular, see Makhmudov, "Feodal'naia renta," pp.
231 -70; as well as his "Iz istorii," pp. 21 -33; and his Zemledelie i agrarnye otnosheniia v Srednei Azii
v XIV-XVvv. (Dushanbe, 1966), pp. 69-97; also Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," pp. 153-69. For
taxation under the Turkmen dynasties, see Walther Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens im 15.
und 16. Jahrhundert," ZDMG, 100 (1950), 179-201; and Lambton, Landlord, pp. 102-3. For a
discussion of the system as it existed under the Safavids, but with valuable comments about the later
Timurid period as well, see Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Muluk.
94
Fragner, CHI, VI, 534-35; Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu," p. 359.
95
Thus A. A. Semenov, "Nekotorye dannye po ekonomike imperii Sultana Khusein-Mirzy (1469-
1506)," Izvestiia Otdeleniia obshchestvennykh nauk Akademii nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR, 4 (1953), 69-
82. One would actually expect a general decline in agriculture under the later Timurids, such as
occurred under similar conditions under the Buyids—see Ann K. S. Lambton, "Reflections on the
lqtac," in George Makdisi, ed., Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb
(Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 367; also Roemer, CHI, VI, 141.
96
The question that begs itself, however, is whether this increase (if it did in fact take place) was a
consequence of the soyurghal system producing a more efficient way to organize agricultural activity,
or whether there were other economic factors, such as expansion of trade, growth of handicrafts,
creation of new markets, etc., that contributed to the creation of new wealth in the region. Naturally,
a full study of the economic history of the region cannot be attempted here.
"See the original letters of Jam! published by A. Urunbaev, ed. and tr., Pis'ma-avtografy Abdar-
rakhmana Dzhami iz "Al'boma Navoi" (Tashkent, 1982), for example, nos. 171 (176), 172 (177),
182(187).
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 503
' 8 The flight of peasants from the countryside could partially account for the increase in the size of
the population of Herat at this time—a fact alluded to by MucTn al-DTn IsfizarT [Rauzat al-jannat
ftausif-i madmat-i Harat, ed. Sayyid Muhammad Kazim, 2 vols. (Teheran, 1338-1339/1959-1960),
II, 181]—as well as for the extreme poverty and political unrest of many of its inhabitants—often
referred to by Nava 3 ! in his works.
" F o r these revolts, see Arunova, "K istorii," pp. 34-36.
'°°KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 152.
""For a description of the efforts of the Timurid vizier, Qutb al-DTn Tavus SimnanT, in improving
agricultural production in Khorasan, see KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 383-85.
IO2
A. Iakubovskii, "Feodal'noe obshchestvo Srednei Azii i ego torgovlia s Vostochnoi Evropoi v
X-XV vv.," in Malerialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi SSR, Pt. 1: Torgovlia s
moskovskim gosudarstvom i mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Azii v XVI-XVII vv. (Leningrad,
1933), pp. 54-56; Semenov, "Nekotorye dannye," p. 76; Fragner, CHI, VI, 526-27. For a parallel
development under the Ilkhanids, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, p. 287.
103
See, for example, the diplomas of immunity addressed to sayyid families under Husain Bayqara
in Roemer, Slaalsschreiben, pp. 66-69; for an example from the Aq Qoyunlu realm, see Busse,
Unlersuchungen, pp. 154-61.
4
For a parallel practice under the Ilkhanids, see Petrushevskii, Zemledelie, pp, 285-86. See also
the comments of Bernard O'Kane, Timurid Architecture in Khurasan (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda
Publishers, 1987), p. 86, regarding the building activity of emirs in the capital, Herat.
IO5
See Jean Aubin, "Le patronage culturel en Iran sous les Ilkhans: Une grande famille de Yazd,"
in Le monde iranien el I'Islam, 3 (1975), 107-18.
l06
For an interesting theoretical elaboration of this idea, see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process,
Vol. II: State Formation and Civilization, tr. E. Jephcott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 258 ff.
""For a study of the political motives for cultural patronage, see M. E. Subtelny, "Art and Politics
in Early 16th Century Central Asia," Central Asiatic Journal, 27, 1-2(1983), 121-48.
l08
For an example of a large, state-sponsored project under TTmur, see KhvandamTr, DV, p. 344.
See also Manz, "Politics and Control," pp. 325-26.
l09
See O'Kane, Timurid Architecture, pp. 85-86.
"°For example, the vizier, Qutb al-DTn Tavus SimnanT, was granted his native province (vilayat)
of Simnan as a soyurghal by Abu '1-Qasim Babur—see KhvandamTr, DV, p. 383. Judging from the
accounts of their careers, viziers also relied heavily on the embezzlement of state funds as a source of
income (see KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 380 ff.). The same appears to have held true for sadrs (see
KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 321 ff.).
" ' i n Husain Bayqara's time, Tajiks could be appointed to offices that had previously been the sole
preserve of the Turkic elite and that entailed membership in the ruling body of the state—see
Subtelny, "Centralizing Reform." For a tentative outline of the organization of the Timurid state, see
Roemer, CHI, VI, 131-32.
" 2 As maintained by Aubin, "Le mecenat timouride," p. 73.
"3cAlT ShTr's great-grandfather, Bu SacTd Chang, had been an emir of c Umar Shaikh's son,
Bayqara, and he had been favored by Shahrukh as well—see KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 594-95. His
father, Ghiyas al-DTn KTchkTna, was a respected member of Abu SacTd's court and a member of Abu
'1-Qasim Babur's government—see Sam MTrza SafavT, Tuhfa-'i saml, ed. VahTd DastgirdT (Teheran,
1314 H.S./1935), p. 179; CA1T ShTr Nava3T, Majalis, p. 133; Daulatshah, p. 495.
" 4 For CA1T ShTr's background and the official positions he held, see M. E. Subtelny, "CA1T ShTr
Nava^T: BakhshT and Beg," in I. Sevcenko and F. Sysyn, eds., Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to
Omeljan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday, 2 pts. [Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 3/4 (1979-1980)],
pt. 2, pp. 799-806.
nic
A\\ ShTr Nava^T, "Vaqfiyya" [Vaqfiia], in Alisher Navoii, Asarlar (in Uzbek), 15 vols. (Tashkent,
1963-1968), Xlll, 169; also 178-79 where the duties of the mutavallT, who is not named, are set forth.
See also an abridged Persian translation of the original Chaghatay in CA1T ShTr Nava^T, Majalis, p.
xxi. For the lkhlasiyya complex, see Terry Allen, A Catalogue of the Toponyms and Monuments of
Timurid Herat (Cambridge, Mass.: Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, 1981), pp. 94-97.
" 6 For the complete list, see CA1T ShTr Nava^T, "Vaqfiyya," pp. 176-78.
'"'AIT ShTr Nava'T, "Vaqfiyya," p. 172. See also Krcsmarik, "Das Wakfrecht," p. 523.
504 Maria Eva Subtelny
'"[Muhammad Haidar], "Iqtibas az TarTkh-i rashldl," ed. Muhammad ShafTc, Oriental College
Magazine, 10, 3 (1934), 156. FakhrT HaratT, the author of a near contemporary translation and
amplification of Nava^T's Majalis al-nafaDis, entitled "Lata D if-nama," estimated that his daily income
was 75,000 dinars (although this figure seems improbably high), and that his daily expenditures were
15,000 dinars—see CA1I Shir Nava^T, Majalis, p. 134. For the value of the Timurid dinar and
shahrukhl, see Fragner, CHI, VI, 558-59 and 566-67 (for their values in German Gold Marks).
'"Daulatshah, p. 505. It is not entirely clear from Daulatshah's statement, however, whether the
figure he gives refers to the revenues from the endowment or their total value. But note that, if
calculated on an annual basis, the figure given by Muhammad Haidar comes to 6,570,000 kapakl
dinars, and that given by Fakhri Haraff for CA1I Shir's expenditures comes to roughly 5,500,000
dinars.
l20
KhvandamTr, MA, fol. 170r. For the cost of several luxury items in Herat at this time, see Zain
al-DTn VasifT, Badayic al-vaqayic, ed. A. N. Boldyrev, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1961), I, 541-42, where we
learn that a curly black lambskin cap, for example, cost 20 tangas, a pair of gold embroidered
slippers 10 tangas, a short knife, called yak-avizT, 10 tangas, and that the pay of an ordinary servant
(mulazim) in CA1T ShTr's employ was 500 khanis a year. For the value of the Timurid tanga in Husain
Bayqara's time, see Davidovich, "Sviditel'stvo," pp. 25-26; also Fragner, CHI, VI, 567.
m
Babur, BN, fols. 171-171b; BN tr., p. 272.
'"KhvandamTr, MA, fol. 17lr.
123
As in the case of a debt of 50,000 kapakl dinars (which he called "a paltry sum"), which he
covered for one of the sons of the NaqshbandT sheikh, Khvaja Ahrar—see KhvandamTr, MA, fols.
169v-170r.
'"KhvandamTr, MA, fol. 161r.
'"Fakhri HaratT, "LatiPif-nama," in CA1T Shir Nava 3 !, Majalis, p. 135.
'"KhvandamTr, MA, fols. 176v-177r.
l27
Thus according to Fakhri HaratI, "Lata^if-nama," in CA1I Shir Nava°T, Majalis, p. 134. See also
KhvandamTr, MA, fols. 145v-147r, which lists over 120 structures; and Daulatshah, pp. 405-6.
[28
Daulatshah, p. 505, who uses the phrase, "az khalis-i amvalash."
'"Khvandamlr, MA, fol. 149r. For a discussion of this episode based on KhvandamTr's Khulasat
al-akhbar, see Lisa Golombek, "The Resilience of the Friday Mosque: The Case of Herat," Muqarnas,
1 (1983), 98.
""According to Sam MTrza, Tuhfa, p. 182.
"'Daulatshah, p. 509.
l32c
AlI Shir Nav53T, Majalis, p. 56; Babur, BN, fol. 174a.
'" A1T Shir Nava 3 !, Majalis, p. 57; VasifT, Badayic, I, 565, where he is called one of CA1T ShTr's
C
"deputies" (navvab).
""Khvandamlr, HS, IV, 159.
'"See the notices on him in Daulatshah, pp. 509-13; CA1T Shir Nava3T, Majalis, pp. 56-57; and
Sam MTrza, Tuhfa, pp. 181-82.
l36
Sam MIrza, Tuhfa, p. 182; see also Jan Rypka, History of Iranian Literature (Dordrecht, 1968),
p. 313.
l37
B5bur, BN, fol. 170a, where he is first in Babur's list of Husain Bayqara's emirs. KhvandamTr,
HS, IV, 196, calls him Husain Bayqara's amir al-umara. For the diploma naming him emir of the
qush-khana, see Roemer, Slaatsschreiben, pp. 87-88.
l38
Babur, BN, fol. 170a.
139
O'Kane, Timurid Architecture, p. 360.
l40
For the text of this inscription, see FikrT Saljuql, Gazurgah (Kabul, 1341/1962), pp. 26-28; for a
summary of it, see Lisa Golombek, The Timurid Shrine at Gazur Gah (Toronto: Royal Ontario
Museum, 1969), p. 88.
''"O'Kane, Timurid Architecture, p. 361, n. 6.
l42
KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 160. For his career, see KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 418-32.
'"KhvandamTr, DV, p. 423.
'"Rypka, History, p. 447.
Bases of Timurid Cultural Patronage 505
l45
For the text of the vaqf inscription, see Saljuqi, Risala, pt. 3 (Tacliqat), p. 134. For a description
of the complex, see O'Kane, Timurid Architecture, pp. 271-75.
l46
KhvandamTr, DV, p. 434; pp. 433-41 for his career.
""Daulatshah, p. 513.
l48
He was buried here in 910/1505—see KhvandamTr, DV, p. 440; also Golombek, The Timurid
Shrine, p. 89.
'"KhvandamTr, DV, p. 438. See also Allen, A Catalogue, p. 118 and p. 220.
l50
For the text, see Roemer, Staatsschreiben, pp. 74-75 and p. 163 (commentary).
l5l
See the notice on him in KhvandamTr, DV, pp. 400-417.
'52MucTn al-DTn IsfizarT, Rauzat, I, 218-19.
'"O'Kane, Timurid Architecture, p. 244.
""KhvandamTr, DV, p. 415.
'"KhvandamTr, DV, p. 407.
' " F o r a description, see M. E. Subtelny, "Scenes from the Literary Life of Timurid Herat," in
R. Savory and D. Agius, eds., Logos Islamikos: Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis
Wickens (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), pp. 144-45 (based on the account
in VasifT, Badayic, 1, 523-28).
'"Edited and translated with commentary by Hans Robert Roemer as Staatsschreiben der
Timuridenzeit. For full reference, see n. 11 above.
'"Daulatshah, p. 515; Babur, BN, fol. 175; BN tr., p. 278.
"'KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 328-29.
160
KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 329.
'"For the text of the diploma naming him to this post, see Roemer, Staatsschreiben, pp. 53-54.
'"Babur, BN, fol. 175a; Daulatshah, 516; KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 326.
'"KhvandamTr, HS, IV, 326.
' 64 For the description of one such majlis, see VasifT, Badayic, II, 963-64.
'"Sam MTrza, Tuhfa, p. 130.
" 6 For a reference to these gifts, see E. E. Bertel's Izbrannye trudy, Vol. IV: Navoi i Dzhami
(Moscow, 1965), pp. 121-22.
"'Molchanov, "K kharakteristike," pp. 156-57. Molchanov points out that this was the same
amount of money that had been assigned Husain Bayqara as a generous stipend by his early mentor,
Abu '1-Qasim Babur. It is entirely possible, however, that the figure 100,000 was simply a generic
designation for a large sum of money.
" 8 Urunbaev, Pis'ma-avtografy, pp. 33-34; see, for example, nos. 60 (64), 88 (93), 69 (74) and 222
(227).
l69
He was JamT's nephew—see CA1T ShTr NavaDT, Majalis, pp. 235-36.
""Hodgson, The Venture, II, 400 ff. and 490.
"'Hodgson, The Venture, 11, 408.