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India’s Cooperative Indian Journal of Public

Administration
Federalism during 1–12
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DOI: 10.1177/00195561211072568
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Prakash Chandra Jha1

Abstract
The role of cooperative federalism in India in dealing with the challenges of
the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects such as economic crisis and large-scale
human migration, among others, is put to test. The initial stages of the pan-
demic response highlighted the unitary tilt in the Indian federal structure. At
the later stages of this crisis, cooperative federalism also appears to be visible.
Nevertheless, the lack of cooperation between the States, and the Centre’s fail-
ure to facilitate horizontal federalism without invoking any intergovernmental
agency for the purpose has made the lives of migrant workers miserable. An
intergovernmental institution such as Inter-Sate Council (ISC) could have been
used as a common forum for the Centre and the States for the purpose of both
vertical and horizontal cooperative federalism. The pandemic has also brought
to the fore the importance of India’s grassroots level of government, though,
unfortunately, their potential remains underutilised.

Keywords
Covid-19, cooperative federalism, local government

Introduction
Ideally, the relations between the Centre and the States should be guided by the
spirit of cooperative federalism, on the one hand, among different States, and on
the other, between the States and the Panchayati Raj Institutions and the Urban
Local Bodies. It is ironic that States in India are very possessive of their constitu-
tional rights protected under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and are
often heard invoking the principle of federalism in case of central intrusion in

1
School of Law, SVKM’s NMIMS (Deemed to be) University, Hyderabad Campus, Telangana, India.

Corresponding author:
Prakash Chandra Jha, School of Law, SVKM’s NMIMS (deemed to be) University, Hyderabad Campus,
Plot No. B4, Green Industrial Park, Polepally SEZ, TSIIC, Jadcherla, Mahbubnagar, Telangana 509301,
India.
E-mail: [email protected]
2 Indian Journal of Public Administration

their domain. But when it comes to sharing power with local governments, States
forget all principles of federalism. In fact, State–local governments’ relations in
India are devolutionary and are not based on the principle of federalism. There is
hence the need for research pertaining to interstate relations and State–local rela-
tions. Oommen (2020) notes:

The Constitution also provides for functional decentralisation of public services like
drinking water, primary healthcare, primary education, and link roads, amongst many
others. Partly due to the neglect by the union and mainly because of the deliberate
refusal of several states to carry forward the mandated functional, financial, and admin-
istrative decentralisation during the last quarter century, the much-needed democratic
process for deepening local democracy has suffered a grievous setback. Except in a
few states like Kerala, the progress of local demo­cracy has been halting and haphazard.

Harmonious and cooperative relations between different States are as important

as that between the Centre and the States for the healthy functioning of our federa-
tion. Various problems have been cropping up in inter-State relations from time-
to-time—the coronavirus outbreak being the latest one. Lack of cooperation
between the States, and the Centre’s failure to facilitate horizontal federalism in
the absence of a strong interstate agency has made the lives of migrant workers
miserable. These challenges appear to have magnified due to the absence of inter-
governmental institutions. Informal interstate interaction has no doubt increased
during the pandemic. Some scholars suggest that an intergovernmental institution
such as the Inter-State Council (ISC) could have been used as a common forum
for the Centre and the States for the purpose of both vertical and horizontal coop-
erative federalism. But it has never been used in a meaningful way. K.K. Kailash
(2019) has observed: ‘Though the BJP promised to revive the Inter-State Council
(ISC), it has not kept its word. The ISC met once during the term of this govern-
ment and only eleven times over the last three decades of its existence’.
The Constitution has clearly demarcated the jurisdictions, powers and functions
of the Centre and the State governments, and has spelt out in detail the legislative,
administrative and financial relations between the Centre, States and local bodies.
This will be dealt with in brief in the next section.

Constitutional Context
The Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India lists legislative and executive
powers between the Union and the States. The Central government has exclusive
power over the subjects in the Union List, and the State over subjects in the
State List. Both the Centre and the States have jurisdiction over subjects in
the Concurrent List. Public health and sanitation are in the State List. The Union
List includes railways, shipping and navigation, and airways—all of which affect
economic activities including the movement of people across State boundaries. In
areas such as education/training, both the Centre and the States/UTs have the
authority to make laws. However, in case of conflicts, the law made by the Centre
would prevail over the States. The Centre for Disease Control and the Indian
  Jha 3

Council of Medical Research are central institutions that also play important
roles. Some of the legislations such as the colonial-era Epidemic Disease Act
(1897) and the National Disaster Management Act (2005) strengthen the hands of
the Central government in times of crisis (James, 2020).
As far as epidemics are concerned, several subjects across the three lists are
potentially relevant. These include the Union List subjects on port quarantine and
on interstate migration and quarantine, the State List subject on public health and
the Concurrent List subject on the spread of infectious diseases from one State to
another/other State/s.
Following the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments in 1992, States are also
expected to strengthen the third-tier governments on a range of matters including
health (although this is not a mandatory requirement). This is reflected, for instance,
in specific State municipal laws that empower the Municipal Commissioner to
address the spread of epidemic diseases. It can be argued that our Constitution
envisages a role for all the three tiers of government to address Covid-19. With
public health being a State List subject, and the aforesaid Union List and Concurrent
List subjects referring only to ports and interstate matters, a law that gives a primary
role to States and a coordinating role to the Centre would likely reflect the
constitutional scheme most accurately. States manage public health and sanitation
matters, including developing and implementing public health strategies such as
containment (surveillance and contact tracing, and quarantining) and mitigation
efforts. In most States, as part of the administration, a Central government employee,
the health secretary, is responsible for coordinating anti-Covid-19 activities.
Healthcare services are delivered through State hospitals and clinics (James, 2020).
Moreover, under Article 242 of the Constitution of India, local governments
are authorised to conduct several functions in urban areas—one of these is public
health, but the specific functions of local governments are determined by State-
level legislation. Thus, local governments are an integral part of the effort to
combat Covid-19, although the degree of autonomy they possess varies from
State to State (James, 2020).
Thus, the Indian Constitution provides for a cooperative federal model. At the
time of the first lockdown, the situation of migrant workers and fiscal issues
associated with the pandemic has called into question the meaning of cooperative
federalism. However, since the second phase of the lockdown, the Centre, to some
extent, understood the sensitivity of States, and the autonomy of States in terms of
taking measures against the epidemic was restored. Before discussing the
challenges of cooperative federalism, the next section throws some light on
cooperative federalism during the Covid 19 pandemic.

Cooperative Federalism and the Covid-19 Pandemic

India exercised a strong Central leadership in dealing with the challenges of the
Covid-19 pandemic successfully. Strong Central leadership, however, did not
mean weak States and local governments. The role of federalism in India as a tool
to deal with the growing complexity of a multilevel constitutional space and the
new challenges posed by the economic crisis, globalisation, Covid-19 pandemic,
4 Indian Journal of Public Administration

and large-scale and human migration is put to test. The initial stages of the
Covid-19 response highlighted the unitary tilt in the Indian federal structure. At
later stages, cooperative federalism was also visible at the vertical level. At the
horizontal level, the lack of cooperation and coordination among the States made
the lives of migrant workers miserable. The Centre’s role as a facilitator of hori-
zontal federalism was also questionable.
Without the cooperation of the Centre, States and local governments, it would
not have been possible to take on the outbreak in the world’s second-highest
populated country—with high density, where social, religious and political
gatherings is a norm of life and where there is large-scale interstate migration.
India defied the fears of the world’s topmost experts in this regard. When the
Covid-19 outbreak started spreading by the middle of March, Centre and State
governments took several measures to contain the outbreak. Many State
governments moved with imposing partial lockdowns and closing their borders.
On 24 March 2020, the Centre announced a three-week nationwide lockdown,
thereby restricting the movement of the entire 1.35 billion people in India.
Surprisingly, the national lockdown was imposed with only four hours’ notice,
leaving most States unprepared. This led to a chaotic situation for migrant workers
who were forced to return to their home States. However, the unprecedented
action by the Central government, which would have created a major political
flashpoint in normal times, was not opposed by State governments. Throughout
May, June and July, subsequent lockdowns with varying degrees of restriction
were imposed by the Centre and State governments (Sahoo, 2020).
Rekha Saxena argues:

A key feature of India’s response to the Covid-19 outbreak has been the close col-
laboration and cooperation between the Union (Central) and State governments. The
pandemic has underlined the necessity for strengthening cooperative federalism since
no single jurisdiction or level of government has the capability to deal with the crisis
on its own. (Saxena, 2020)

Though the Covid-19 outbreak was an apt opportunity for a true display of this
cooperative nature of federalism, unfortunately, this was not the case during the
initial phases of the lockdown. Rather, a top-down approach seemed to have been
followed. The Central government, in fact, faced considerable criticism for this
move. Later on, however, things changed a bit. The PM began holding consulta-
tions with the chief ministers of various States, before issuing orders for extension
of lockdown. States got more and more say in decision-making. It was finally up
to the State governments to decide which area would be declared a containment
zone and which would not be.
The pandemic brought two arch-rivals on the political field: Home Minister Amit
Shah and Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal who had meetings more than once
to discuss and check the spread of Covid-19. After meeting with Shah, Kejriwal
tweeted: ‘Extremely productive meeting between Delhi government and Central
government. Many key decisions were taken. We will fight against corona together’
(The Hindustan Times, 2020a). Even a Congress-ruled State like Rajasthan
  Jha 5

appreciated the effort made by the Centre. This is evident from the letter written by
Rajasthan chief minister Ashok Gehlot to Prime Minister Modi:

In such a difficult and challenging time you had meaningful dialogue with the Chief
Ministers of the states through video conferencing in the last few months, which is
commendable. Along with the ideals of collaborative federalism, such dialogues help in
exchange of knowledge, knowledge of better strategies being adopted in various states
and establishing mutual coordination. (The Hindustan Times, 2020b)

Jharkhand CM Hemant Soren lauded the ‘strength of federalism’ displayed by the

cooperation among different States, especially in dealing with the migrant crisis,
engendered by the announcement of a twenty-one-day national lockdown (ibid).
Prime Minister Modi also sought the cooperation of States, beginning with his
video conference with chief ministers before the second lockdown. States
reciprocated the call for cooperation, leading to an improvement in the healthcare
facilities. Earlier, India used to import most of its Personal Protection Equipment
(PPE) kits, N-95 masks and ventilators, but now has become almost self-reliant
and in a position to export them. All States with their full strength and resources
tried to stop the spread of Covid-19. At the same time, financial support was
provided to needy people who had lost their means of livelihood during this
epidemic. It appears that rather than resorting to confrontational politics, the
Centre remained committed to cooperative federalism. The PM held numerous
meetings with chief ministers over the nine months of its incidence to ensure their
productive engagement. The Centre also claimed to have provided all necessary
guidance and support to the State governments.
It can be argued that governments at all three levels were involved in responding
to the pandemic, with varying degrees of effort and organisation. First, the
capacity of States/UTs, especially their public health infrastructure, was critical.
States with relatively smaller populations, such as Kerala, Karnataka and Orissa,
were able to manage their resources effectively. Their previous experience with
virus outbreaks or natural disasters, such as the Nipah virus outbreak of 2018–
2019 (in Kerala and Karnataka) or natural disaster preparedness (in Orissa,
Kerala), came in handy.
Some local governments also played a notable role. For example, Brihan
Mumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) in Mumbai is an outlier in the Indian
context because it had complete control of public health functions in the
metropolitan area, which likely accounted for its success. BMC’s successful
intervention in Dharavi (slum)—a densely populated locality in Mumbai—in
containing the outbreak was well appreciated both nationally and internationally
by WHO and the US daily Washington Post as the ‘Dharavi model’. This was a
display of good State–local relations. It should be noted, going forward, that more
research on pandemic-related responses across different States and local
governmental entities needed to be conducted (Parab, 2020).
On account of cooperation between Centre and States, India had a number of
milestone achievements: Conducting over twelve crore tests, second only to the
United States in the world. An analysis of the Covid-19 diagnostic labs across the
6 Indian Journal of Public Administration

country throws up surprising results. Even Jharkhand, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh,
which are considered lower income States, have managed to improve their
infrastructure and established Covid-19 labs in every district. Now India is
undertaking about twelve lakhs tests a day. As against the death rate of 749
individuals per million in the United States and over 750 per million in European
nations such as the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, the rate of fatalities in India
is 93. (Worldometer, 2020) Lauding India’s efforts in fighting the pandemic, the
World Health Organization (WHO) noted:

Over a period of five months, the number of laboratories in the country rose from 14 in
February to more than 1596 in August. The testing rate has been ramped up significantly
over the last few months with the introduction of the rapid antigen detection test in addi-
tion to the molecular tests, which remain the mainstay of diagnosis. (WHO, 2020)

By and large, there was cooperation at all levels of government. But there were
exceptions: a notable one was the announcement of the nationwide lockdown on
24 March 2020 with little advance consultation or notice. State/UT and local
governments were trying to contain the virus while simultaneously dealing with
the economic consequences of the lockdown. The Central government eventually
stepped in after several weeks. The lockdowns, the situation of migrant workers
and the fiscal issues associated with the pandemic also called into question the
very meaning of ‘cooperative federalism’. The next section will delineate these
issues in some detail.

Challenges to the Cooperative Federalism in India

Major challenges of cooperative federalism during the Covid-19 pandemic
include the following: the imposition of pan-India policies on subjects strictly
within the States’ domain, prohibiting the sale of alcohol, withholding of GST
compensation, the irregular supply of essential medical equipment during the
initial phase of lockdown, denial of State disaster funds from the benefit of
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) contributions, terms of reference (ToRs)
for the 15th Finance Commission (FC) and failure to coordinate with States with
regards to migrants return to their States initially. Several States couldn’t ramp up
testing earlier due to the unavailability of testing kits from the Centre. Many of
them reportedly had to procure these from the market/abroad. The classifications
of a zone into ‘red’ and ‘orange’ evoked vehement criticisms from several States.
The States had asked for more autonomy in making such classifications. However,
subsequent attempts of forging coordination between the Centre and the States
mitigated the chances of political acrimony and policy ambiguity.
To many critics, the nationwide lockdown, preceded by a day-long curfew, was
hastily initiated by the Central government on 24 March 2020, at a time when there
were only a relatively small number of confirmed Covid-19 cases daily (J. Ghosh,
2020). This lockdown, with relatively minor adjustments, lasted ten weeks; it
affected most economic activities and restricted the mobility of persons, resulting in
extreme hardship. With the closure of transportation systems initially, migrant
workers in large metropolitan areas had no travel options back to their home States.
  Jha 7

As was well-publicised, many travelled thousands of kilometres literally on foot to

reach home. Visuals of men, women and children undertaking days-long walks to
reach home have raised questions about the Centre’s preparedness before the
announcement. Scenes of the countless migrants sleeping on tracks, and the
sufferings of pregnant ladies and children were quite disturbing. The poor had been
left behind, at their own peril. It had been extremely unfortunate to have seen and
read about many cases of deaths and sufferings of migrant workers. The Centre was
not able to come up with any policy to help the thousands of people on the roads.
This was a major failure of India’s cooperative federalism.
At short notice, in most instances, State/UT and local (both municipal and
PRs) governments had to step in, aided by civil society, to provide temporary
relief measures such as housing, food and other assistance to both local residents
and migrant workers. The Rajasthan government alleged that some States delayed
their consent for buses to enter (Beg, 2020). The Centre subsequently organised
Shramik special trains. These trains operated with limited stops from May through
July to transport migrants back to their home States.
Though there was cooperation between the Centre and the NDA-ruled States,
the same was not true in the case of opposition ruled States. For example, the Shiv
Sena-led coalition government in Maharashtra blamed the BJP for politicising the
outbreak. NCP’s Jayant Patil said if the BJP blamed the Maharashtra government
for the spread of the virus in the States, should the Centre be blamed for the failure
to check the spread of Covid-19 in the country (The Hindustan Times, 2020a).
Some States took arbitrary decisions in sending back migrants to their home
States by bus. Thus, the return of migrants became a major concern for fragile
health systems, especially in rural areas facing the possibility of new infections.
Bihar CM Nitish Kumar disapproved of some States sending back migrant
workers to Bihar in buses. He argued: ‘Very purpose of the lockdown will be
defeated if thousands of migrants are sent to Bihar by busses’ (Kumar, 2020).
Maharashtra CM Uddhav Thackeray demanded that the Central government
allow special trains to send migrant workers to their homes. Some States demanded
that since migrant workers had been working in different States, it was the
responsibility of those States where they worked to look after them. That did not
happen, however. Some States such as Haryana, Kerala and Telangana treated
them well by organising camps for them. Some States like Rajasthan felt that the
lockdown Phase 1 should have been enforced with a four–five-day advance
warning so that maximum migrants would have reached their homes. Another
important issue highlighted by some States was why special trains were started so
late and were so few in number. Some States deployed cost-free special Shramik
buses to mitigate the problems of movement of migrants. It was widely reported
in the media that workers were not transported keeping the social distancing
norms in mind, thereby increasing the risk of their infections.
Initially, it appeared that neither the Centre nor the States were sensitive to the
problems of vulnerable migrants. It was only after migrants gathered in large
numbers at the railway and bus stations and in absence of transportations when
they started walking thousands of kilometres towards their home that Shramik
Special trains were started. But those trains too fell victim to the lack of coordinated
national planning.
8 Indian Journal of Public Administration

Even with regard to interstate travel, accusations kept flying about restrictions
over entry at the States’ borders. For instance, in May, the Uttar Pradesh
Government did not allow buses from Rajasthan and Haryana to enter its borders.
Karnataka prevented the entry of people from Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil
Nadu. Thus, interstate restriction in the wake of lockdowns resulted in agony to
the passengers. The need for a robust and responsive system of co-ordination
amongst the States and the role of the Centre in facilitating such coordination at
the grassroots level cannot be emphasised enough (Agarwal, 2020).
As Assam’s Covid-19 cases rose, the  State government pointed a finger  at
Rajasthan. The spat started after 6 May, when a bus packed with forty-three
passengers returned from Rajasthan’s Ajmer Sharif, which was a red zone,
bringing five more cases to Assam (Kalita, 2020).
While West Bengal Chief Minister Mamta Banerjee declared on 23 April that it
would do everything to bring back the lakhs of migrant workers stuck across the
country, the State reportedly did little to make good on this promise. Despite the
Centre’s notification, Bengal, which has shown a high fatality rate for the virus, was
slow to open up its borders (Ghosh et al., 2020). Both Maharashtra and Karnataka,
host to a large number of workers from Bengal, complained that the State was
refusing to give consent for trains ferrying them home. The Gujarat government
fumed about a communication breakdown, alleging that Bengal officials did not
even respond to its requests to accept migrant trains. Buses from Jharkhand were
turned back at the Bengal border, with the latter claiming it had no standard operating
procedure to receive migrants (Mukesh, 2020). Kerala sought urgent help from the
Centre when Karnataka closed its border, cutting off essential supplies of food and
medicine for the people of North Kerala (Smitha, 2020).
The matter of who was to foot the transport bill of migrant workers also caused
tension among States. Delhi and Bihar got into a heated exchange after the former
demanded reimbursement for sending migrants on a special Shramik train to
Muzaffarpur. Delhi claimed that the Bihar government must reimburse it for
buying tickets in bulk for returning migrants. The Bihar government shot back
that migrants would be compensated for train fare at the quarantine centres once
they returned (Chakravarty, 2020).
The political war of words over the movement of migrant workers on Shramik
special trains continued as the Union Railways Minister Piyush Goyal (BJP)
accused the governments of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and
Rajasthan—all Opposition-ruled States—of not giving permission to receive the
trains, drawing strong rebuttals from the States (Dastidar, 2020).
Most of the States, including major Opposition-led States such as Maharashtra,
Punjab, Rajasthan, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Telangana and West Bengal,
found it difficult to fund basic relief measures in this crisis and requested the Centre
to release the money urgently. Many States faced a financial crunch because they
were not able to get their due share from the GST revenue collected by the Centre.
Some observers question centralising the motives of the Centre culminating into
the ToRs of the FC where, among other things, the FC was asked to examine whether
revenue deficit grants should be provided at all for the State governments (ToR 5),
and to recommend measures for controlling ‘populist measures by the States’
(ToR 7 (viii)). Such mandates not only compel the FC to go beyond its constitutional
  Jha 9

mandate but also reveal how non-elected bodies are being misused to constrain the
fiscal space of the States. This not only weakens the foundations of fiscal federalism
but also runs against the tenets of cooperative federalism (K.S. Ghosh, 2020).
Further, even as States were then being granted more powers to shape their
own Covid-19 approach, the impact of the top-down approach adopted during the
early stages of the lockdown has hampered their ability to successfully formulate
their own policies. For instance, during the early stages of the outbreak, the Centre
adopted a policy that allowed the Centre’s disaster management funds to benefit
from corporate social responsibility contributions. However, this same privilege
was denied to the States.
The Centre and the States must understand the huge potential of local self-
government to fight the Covid-19 pandemic and restore India’s economic health.
There are about thirty-two lakh elected representatives in the panchayats and
about two lakh more in the municipalities. About ten–twelve lakh are drawn from
the SCs and STs. They are the ones in touch with the neediest, the most destitute
in every village and town. Then, there are some fourteen lakh women leaders in
villages. They constitute the largest body of democratically elected women in the
world (Aiyar, 2020).

Future of Cooperative Federalism in India

As has been discussed earlier, there was both cooperation and conflict between
Centre and States and among States. The Central government’s attempts of forging
coordination with the States mitigated the chances of political acrimony and
policy ambiguity that occurred in the first phase of lockdown. However, subse-
quently, the Central government took several measures post- lockdown such as
GST compensation, farm laws and ToRs of the FC among others, which goes
against the tenets of cooperative federalism. Opposition-ruled States’ unease with
those measures was evident in their locking horns with the Centre. PM Modi,
himself having been chief minister of a state for a considerable time period, should
have better understood the sensitivity and interests of States.
Many observers have almost written off the workability of federalism under
the six years of Modi government in general and during the post-Covid-19
outbreak in particular. There is a great deal of cooperation between the NDA-
ruled States and the Centre, though not on a level playing field during the lockdown
in confronting the challenges emanating from the coronavirus pandemic.
GST was considered one of the best examples of cooperative federalism, but it
is getting discredited because of the Centre not involving States in decision-
making over GST allocation and denying States their due. This is a worrisome
development for Indian federalism because it has thrown into doubt the ability of
even an organisation like the GST Council to manage Centre–State tensions. The
Council was touted as an ideal model of Indian federal institution-building—one
that ought to be replicated in other policymaking verticals that require coordination
(Chokkakula, 2020).
In times of pandemics like Covid-19, the relationship between the State and the
people needs to be strong, trustworthy and organic. This will not be possible in a
10 Indian Journal of Public Administration

centralised system of governance. The prime role in this is to be discharged by the

local governments with community participation. M.A. Oommen (2020) argues:

Covid-19 has brought home sharply the significance and need of the local government,
the gram sabha, and all the participatory institutions that the 73rd/74th Constitutional
Amendments, 1992, have given to the people of India. These amendments have
endowed the panchayats and municipalities with such authority and power to deliver
economic development and social justice at the local level. (Articles 243G and 243W)

In their recent study, Acharya and Porwal have found that despite the Indian gov-
ernment’s efforts to contain the disease in the affected districts, cases have been
reported in 627 (98%) of 640 districts. They have underlined the need for devising
a tool for district-level planning and prioritisation and for effective allocation of
resources (Acharya & Porwal, 2020).
Dutta and Fischer made the case for the critical role of local governance in
coordinating pandemic response by examining how State authorities have
attempted to bridge the gap between the need for a rapid, vigorous response to the
pandemic and the local realities in three Indian States—Rajasthan, Odisha and
Kerala. Through a combination of interviews with mid-and low-level bureaucrats
and a review of policy documents, they show how the urgency of Covid-19
response galvanised new kinds of cross-sectoral and multi-scalar interactions
between administrative units involved in coordinating responses, as local
governments assumed crucial responsibility in the implementation of disease
control and social security mechanisms.
The Centre increasingly accepted the fact that without States’ cooperation,
Covid-19 problems could not be dealt with. Repeated teleconferences between
the prime minister and the chief ministers were testimony to the fact. Thus, a
notable acknowledgment of the need to evolve solutions through a consultative
process involving the States and offering flexibility to States to adapt guidelines
to their respective circumstances, and the States accepting the need for guidelines
from the Centre to meet the challenges from the pandemic were good signs of
cooperative federalism. Central leadership must understand that the ‘more
powerful the states became, the lesser would be the governance problems for the
nation as a whole’. As Varshney has argued, ‘This binary—that a strong Centre
requires weak States and vice versa—is conceptually flawed’ (Varshney, 2013).
States should be seen by the Centre as drivers of India’s growth. A great deal
of understanding should be developed between the Centre and the States over the
introduction of GST and the creation of a common market. As for the recent
controversy over GST, the Centre needs to respect the commitment made to the
States with regard to the payment of their due GST compensation. New challenges
emanating from Covid-19 infection call for new intergovernmental institutions or
operationalisation of such dormant institutions contemplated in the Constitution.

Concluding Observations
India is fighting a war at several fronts: the Covid-19 pandemic, an economic
downturn made worse by the lockdown, a migrant workers’ crisis and China
  Jha 11

threatening Indian territory in Ladakh. The breakdown in trust and coordination

between Centre and States has the potential to magnify these challenges. Hence,
cooperative federalism is the only panacea. As has been explained, we have wit-
nessed both cooperation and conflict between the Centre and States in recent
times. The Covid-19 outbreak and the prolonged lockdown have led to unprece-
dented policy challenges, necessitating genuine cooperation and coordination
amongst the States. There is a pertinent need to rejuvenate the existing institu-
tional mechanisms like the ISC which has remained largely moribund. The ISC
could have coordinated with States to address several problems that occurred
between two or more States due to the pandemic.
The nationwide lockdown witnessed Centre–State conflicts as well as conflicts
among States over a range of issues. However, subsequent attempts of forging
coordination between the Centre and the States, and amongst the States mitigated
the chances of political acrimony and policy ambiguity. Regular consultation with
the States should be ensured, treating them as equal partners in the federal
structure. There cannot be a better time than now for the Centre to honour its GST-
related commitments to the States. Many observers have noted that the Covid-19
pandemic could have been handled in a better manner if the Centre would have
followed a bottom-up approach and allowed States to make decisions about the
lockdown. It is essential for both the Centre and the States to rise above party
politics and take the pandemic head-on. India’s ability to fight the Covid-19
pandemic largely rests on how well the country manages its intergovernmental
relations—both vertical and horizontal. The future of cooperative federalism in
India requires local government to be treated on an equitable footing as one of
three tiers of the federal structure.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

References
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