ASSIGNMENT 13 – CANON 6

1. Enriquez vs. Caminade 485 SCRA 98 , March 21, 2006

Principle:

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of judicial competence and diligence.
Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain
professional competence at all times. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge.

Facts:

Imelda S. Enriquez charged Judge AnacletoCaminade with Gross Misconduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment and Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure relative to Criminal Case No. CBU-066703 for Murder. As mother of the victim in the criminal case,
Enriquez alleges that respondent judge denies the motion for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused-movants; sets
aside the assailed Resolution of the City Prosecutor on the basis of which the latest amended information was filed; quashes the latest
amended information; and remands this case to the City Prosecutor for completion of the preliminary investigation.

Respondent ruled because there was no preliminary investigation completed on accused Alvin Taggart Pimentel Alvez and Alvin John
Apura as they were denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration or a Petition for Review before the information was filed in
court.

Complainant claims that respondent was grossly mistaken when he ruled, in effect, that the investigating prosecutor cannot file a
criminal information before the expiration of the 15-day period within which the accused are allowed by the Revised Rules of Court to
move for reconsideration or Petition for Review of an adverse 'Resolution.' While, respondent cited Sales v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. [No.]
143802, 16 November 2001) that 'the filing of motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper' and
that an information filed without first affording x xx accused his right to file motion for reconsideration is tantamount to a denial of the
right itself to a preliminary investigation.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the issue raised by complainant pertains to an error of judgment and should have resorted to judicial recourse
such as an appeal of the order in question via a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals instead of a administrative case.

2. Whether or not the respondent judge acted with gravemisconduct and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court finds respondent judge held that lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and elementary
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be
proficient in the interpretation of our laws. Diligence in keeping up-to-date withthe decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of
judges and, of course, members of the bar.

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary investigation upon the filing of an information in court is a well-
established procedural rule under the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent judge fell short of these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence.

Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors "men forgive and time forgets." For when they display an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily,
failure to follow basic legal commands and rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge.

Respondent judge contends that instead of filing the instant Administrative Complaint, complainant should have resorted to judicial
recourse, like an appeal of the Order in question. It should be reiterated that the court's power of appellate review is distinct from an
administrative matter, which involves the exercise of the court's power to discipline judges. An administrative matter is undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare; that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government.

Decision:

Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, for which he is fined in the amount of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000). He is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

2. Juan de la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) vs. Carretas 532 SCRA 218 , September 05, 2007

Principle:

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides: SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Facts:

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This administrative case stems from an anonymous complaint by "Juan de la Cruz," a concerned citizen of Legazpi City, against
respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 9. The letter-complaint
reads: “Kami po ay sumulatsainyodahilposareklamosamasamangugali at asalni Judge Ruben Car[r]etas ng RTC, Branch 9, Legazpi
City. Siyapo ay isangmayabangna Judge at mahiligmanginsultosapamamagitanng side comments samgatestigo, abogado at fiscal,
parangsiyanalangang may alamsabatas. Bilang Judge siyanapoangnagdirect, at cross-examine samgatestigo.
Dahilsakanyangginagawanapapahiyaangmgatestigo, abogado at fiscal saharapngpubliko. Nawawala din poangrespetongpublikosa
justice system. Kami po ay umaasa at nanalanginsamadaliangaksyonnginyongopisinaparamalutasangproblemangito.”

In his comment, respondent judge surmised that the complaint was initiated by a lawyer whose petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage was not granted. He denied the accusation and claimed that he had not insulted anyone.

Respondent judge also stated that, while he may have used harsh word sometimes, they were made out of exasperation and with the
intention merely to right the wrong committed in his presence, not to insult anyone. Nonetheless, he apologized to those who may have
been offended by his remarks.

In connection with the complaint, Judge Romeo S. Das, executive judge of the RTC of Legazpi City, conducted a discreet investigation.
He interviewed lawyers who appeared in the sala of respondent judge. He requested them to submit their respective written comments
on the decorum of respondent judge when holding trial. Among these comments were the following:

1. Respondent judge should avoid making embarrassing, insulting and abrasive remarks;

2. In open court he is arrogant and boastful; and

3. In the course of presentation of evidence for his client, he was insulted and subjected to sarcastic remarks by respondent
judge, not once but for several occasions.

On October 6, 2005, the members of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Albay held a meeting to discuss the matter of assigning a
public prosecutor to the sala of respondent judge. During the meeting, the prosecutors raised their concern about the behavior of
respondent judge. Provincial prosecutor Benigno L. Tolosa furnished Judge Das with a copy of the minutes of the meeting. Considering
that the matter to be discussed involves the problem with the Presiding Judge, the Provincial Prosecutor requested those prosecutors
to share their experiences in the court with the Presiding Judge. They alleged as follows:

1. The judge has a sudden burst of temper and wild moods, insulting and humiliating lawyers in front of their clients even in the
presence of other people.

2. The Presiding Judge has a volatile temper and is fond of insulting and humiliating witnesses and also lawyers. She also said
that during arraignment or trial of cases, he would even call her attention and would insult the prosecutor who made the Information and
Resolution of the case and even the Chief who approved the same.

3. The Presiding Judge [scolded] the two private lawyers who were much older than him. She said that being assigned in Branch
9 will not be good for the health of any prosecutor.

The Prosecutors resolved that no prosecutor will be assigned at RTC Branch 9 considering that all prosecutors have their own court
assignment.

Judge Das also received a letter from city prosecutor Palmarin E. Rubio of Legazpi City stated that the prosecutor assigned to the sala
of respondent judge did not want to comment on the conduct of respondent judge. He suggested that members of an audit team
fromthis Court be made to observe the proceedings in Branch 9 to "see and feel the tension, charged atmosphere in the sala once the
trial started."

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge violates the New Code of Judicial Ethics.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court disagreed. Respondent judge deserves more than mere "advice." Respondent judge should be reminded a
judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. He should be learned in the law, dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in
character. Besides having the requisite learning in the law, he must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and
self-restraint. In this connection, he should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court. A judge who is
inconsiderate, discourteous or uncivil to lawyers, litigants or witnesses who appear in his sala commits an impropriety and fails in his
duty to reaffirm the people’s faith in the judiciary.

Decision:

Respondent Judge Ruben B. Carretas is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 2,
Canon 2, Section 1, Canon 4 and Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Rule 3.06 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is fined in the amount of P7,500.

3. Sabatin vs. Mallare 426 SCRA 253 , March 25, 2004

Principle:

Judges are duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times.

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Facts:

The instant administrative case relative to Criminal Case No. 2751-N entitled People of the Philippines v. ArtemioSabatin for illegal
possession of firearms.

The complainant, the accused in the said criminal case, alleged that pursuant to Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000 issued by the
respondent judge, elements of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of General Natividad, Nueva Ecija under the command of P/Sr.
Insp. Franklin Versoza Simon, entered his home and conducted a search thereon without his consent. The complainant averred that
the search warrant in question was actually issued against his brother PedritoSabatin. When the complainant pointed this out to the
police, P/Sr. Insp. Simon merely instructed his men to erase the name "Pedrito" andreplace it with "Artemio," making it appear that the
warrant was, indeed, issued in the complainant’s name.

Sabatin alleged that he was arrested and brought by the policemen to their station for investigation but was later released. He then
received a subpoena after a few days, and it was only then that he learned that a criminal complaint had been filed against him for
illegal possession of firearms. The complainant, in turn, filed a complaint for illegal search, unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and
falsification of public document against P/Sr. Insp. Simon and his men before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).

It was later discovered by the complain that Search Warrant No. 017-N-2000" was issued by Branch 30, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanautan City, but it was signed by Judge EFREN B. MALLARE, the respondent, as an Acting Presiding Judge. They then file the
Motion to Quash Search Warrant before Branch 130, RTC, Cabanatuan City presided by Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr.

Judge Fajardo, Jr. in its ruling ruled that Judge Mallare has no personality to issue the questioned search warrant but did not rule on the
motion to quash since the questioned search warrant is not at all connected with any case pending with the Court, and therefore, this
Court is not the proper forum for the quashing of the said search warrant.

On December 4, 2000, Judge Mallare, the respondent judge issued an Order, to wit: “After a careful perusal of the grounds relied upon
by the accused in seeking for the quashal/dismissal of this case, the Court noticed that the same appeared to be well taken as the
records would readily show that the Chief of Police, PNP, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija has applied for a search warrant against one
PedritoSabatin alias Boyet and this has been admitted by the then Chief of Police Franklin Versoza Simon as per his comment
datedSeptember 2000 (p. 27, rec.), although he misspelled the name Pedrito to Pablito by advancing reason that an error was
committed when said first name was typewrote (sic) and in order to obviate any leakage thereof, a correction has been made from
Pedrito/Pablito to ArtemioSabatin alias Boyet which led to the filing of the instant case.

In short, the search warrant issued by this court against one PedritoSabatin alias Boyet, after it has complied with the requisite for
issuing search warrant (Sec. 3, Rule 126 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure), has not been fully implemented.

Furthermore, the case filed before this Court against one ArtemioSabatin y Miguel alias Boyet cannot be entertained by this court for
this court has never issued any search warrant against said accused; and, therefore, any evidence taken from him maybe considered
inadmissible for the search undertaken by the PNP of Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija, is considered unlawful.

The administrative case was referred to Executive Judge Tomas B. Talavera, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City and dismiss the
case for lack of evidence, as well as the complainants lack of interest to prosecute the case considering the continuous absence
despite notice.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the investigating judge was correct is dismissing the administrative case for failure to prosecute.

2. Whether or not Judge Mallare can be held administratively liable.

Ruling:

Yes. The records in the instant case clearly show that the respondent is administratively liable. A perusal of the questioned search
warrant shows that although it was issued by Branch 30 of the RTC of Cabanatuan City, the signatory therein was the respondent.
Judge Federico F. Fajardo, Jr. then presiding judge of Branch 30, Cabanatuan City denied that the questioned warrant was issued by
him. The respondent then made a volte-face and denied that he ever issued any search warrant against the complainant in his Order
dated December 4, 2000, where he also granted the complainants motion to quash.

Judges are always duty-bound to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence . The pursuit of excellence must be
their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the
institution they represent. Judges are also human, although they are expected to rise above human frailties. At the very least, there
must be an earnest and sincere effort on his part to do so. Considering that they are the visible representation of the law and of justice,
the citizenry expects their official conduct as well as their personal behavior to always be beyond reproach.

For gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the respondent Judge Efren B.

Decision:

For gross inefficiency and dishonesty, the respondent Judge Efren B. Mallare is meted a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000).

4. Impao vs. Makilala 178 SCRA 541, October 13, 1989

Facts:

Complainants alleged that from September 1985 up to the last week of April 1988, Judge Makilala held office every Monday at his
residence in Maganoy and the rest of the week stayed at his residence in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Whenever hearings are held in his
residence, respondent judge would always appear in sleeveless shirt and slippers while the party-litigants and their counsels were in

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business attire.He allegedly had no qualms in filling up his daily time record as if he rendered full service when in fact he was always
absent because of his illness and when he was not absent, he only stayed in court for a short period.
The complainants also charged respondent judge with unduly favoring two court personnel. They were given high performance ratings
by respondent while all the other employees were given failing marks. While Judge Makilala found pleasure in scolding them in front of
other people, uttering insulting words like "mgababoykayongmgaKristiyano,".

Complainants also alleged that Judge Makilala punched Daniel Esperat, Court Aide of the MTC of Maganoy, because the latter failedto
deliver the entire volume of nipa ordered by respondent for the roof of his house. After punching Esperat, respondent judge allegedly
went inside his house to get his gun and threatened to kill Esperat. Respondent judge is also charged with having accepted a bribe
from an accused in a criminal case.

On August 22, 1988, the court employees under respondent Judge Makilala went on mass leave to show their protest against
respondent judge’s behavior towards them.

In his consolidated comment, respondent judge denied the charges against him and claimed that the allegations were fabricated by the
complainants to get back at him for his strict enforcement of the Civil Service Law.

On the use of his residence as the MTC of Maganoy from 1974-1984, respondent explained that it was with the approval of the
municipal government because at that time there was no municipal building and the municipal government had to rent private buildings
and houses for its use as its offices. He claimed that in 1984 he refused to transfer to the new municipal building because the municipal
government had not fixed the space allotted for the municipal court. However, from 1985 up to the present, the municipal court and
office have always been in its permanent space in the Maganoy Municipal Building.

As to his alleged absences and short stay in court, respondent insisted that this was due to the lightness of his caseload, and that the
records will show that he has no pending or unfinished work .

Lastly, respondent asked the Court to reconsider his suspension pending the investigation of the charges against him considering
hisold age and his long service without any previous record of serious official misconduct. A counter-complaint against the court
personnel was also filed by respondent judge for alleged violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and dishonesty and immorality.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge can be held administratively liable.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court agrees with the investigating judge that the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the complainants
convincingly established the charges against the Respondent. The Court finds nothing in the records which would warrant the reversal
of the investigating judge’s findings and conclusion.

It is readily apparent from the records of the case that the above contention is manifestly devoid of merit. Despite due notice both
respondent and his counsel did not appear in the scheduled hearings nor did they explain the reason therefore. By their unexplained
absence, respondent and his counsel effectively waived respondent’s right to cross-examine the other witnesses.

As a lawyer and a municipal judge for a number of years, respondent should know that it is not incumbent upon the investigating judge
to call up respondent’s counsel to inquire into the reason for their non-appearance in the scheduled hearings. Nor is it for the
investigating judge to prove that he gave respondent "an opportunity to be present." It is the duty of the respondent’s counsel to be
present during the hearings and to inform the court of the reason for their absence.

The Court is not unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge Makilala is suffering from a lingering illness. However, the seriousnessof
respondent’s illness cannot justify his failure to perform his duties nor does it excuse him from the consequences of his misconduct and
abuse of authority. If indeed respondent found it difficult to discharge the functions of a municipal judge, then he should have retired
voluntarily instead of clinging to his office at the expense of the litigants, his staff and the general public. Considering the number and
the serious nature of offenses committed by respondent judge, the Court believes that the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of
retirement benefits should be imposed upon him.

The behavior of respondent judge complained of and proven in this case, i.e., his acceptance of a bribe, his holding office and
conducting hearings at his residence, his falsification of his daily time record, his failure to observe proper decorum in conducting court
proceedings, his intemperate language and threats against the personnel of his courts, and his use of physical violence against Daniel
Esperat, among others, shows beyond doubt his unfitness to occupy the position of a municipal judge. Respondent judge violated the
established norms for judicial behavior, and the best interest of the judiciary demands that respondent be dismissed from the service.

Decision:

The Court finds respondent Judge Jacosalem D. Makilala guilty of serious misconduct and abuse of authority and is hereby dismissed
from the service. Any retirement benefits due him are hereby ordered forfeited to the government.

5. Angeles vs. Diy 631 SCRA 456 , September 29, 2010

Facts:

Complainant Judge Angeles alleges that she is the private complainant in the Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 which,
by order of respondent Judge Sempio-Diy dated 20 June 2008, were submitted for decision, and the promulgation of judgment was set
for 11 September 2008. In a subsequent Order dated 8 September 2008, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy moved the promulgation of
judgment to 17 September 2008, for the reason that she had a previously scheduled medical consultation concerning a neck ailment.
Thereafter, the promulgation of judgment on 17 September 2008 was cancelled and reset to 17 October 2008, with respondent Judge

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Sempio-Diy citing voluminous case records and health problems as grounds to support her request before the Court of a thirty (30)-day
extension.

On 17 October 2008, the promulgation of judgment was once again cancelled and reset to 14 November 2008 on account of a second
request for extension of time based on the ground that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy had just recently arrived from a trip to the United
States where she attended a symposium on religiousfreedom. Following a third request for extension of time, the promulgation of
judgment was reset for the last time to 12 December 2008.

Finally, the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was promulgated on 12 December 2008, wherein all the accused, except for
accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino, were acquitted. To complainant Judge Angeles, the said Decision was belatedly rendered because
there was a lapse of six (6) months from the time it was submitted for resolution to the time it was promulgated. She further avers that
her personal examination of the case records revealed that no requests for extension of time to decide the subject cases were made by
respondent Judge Sempio-Diy. Likewise, she notes that the case records do not show that requests for extension of time, if any had
indeed been made by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy, were granted by the Supreme Court.

Judge Angeles is adamant in her contention that the Joint Decision in the subject criminal cases was rendered way beyond the 90-day
period prescribed by the Constitution. In addition, complainant Judge Angeles raises another instance where respondent Judge
Sempio-Diy is supposed to have incurred unjustifiable delay.

As it happened, convicted accused SPO1 Roberto C. Carino assailed the Joint Decision by filing an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
on 5 January 2009, which the prosecution countered in its Opposition filed on 14 January 2009. However, it was not until 30 July 2009,
or more than six (6) months later, that respondent Judge Sempio-Diy issued an Order submitting the incident for resolution, "it
appearing that the accused through counsel has failed to file the necessary pleading despite the period given by the Court." Less than a
month later, or on 24 August 2009, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy resolved the pending matter by denying the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Despite the denial of the said Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, things did not sit well for complainant Judge Angeles. For her, the
Resolution dated 24 August 2009 was belatedly issued by respondent Judge Sempio-Diy.

By failing to decide/resolve the subject cases and the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration within the period mandated by law and
jurisprudence, as well as in falsifying official documents, complainant Judge Angeles now stresses, respondent Judge Sempio-Diy
violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, New Code of Judicial Conduct, Code of Judicial Ethics, Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials.

Respondent Judge Sempio-Diy , in her comment counters that she decided the subject cases in due time and within the extended
period granted by the Supreme Court. She maintains that the orders resetting the promulgation of judgment were issued in good faith
and in the interest of full transparency, pursuant to her request to decide the subject cases expeditiously.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge can be held administratively liable.

Ruling:

Yes. In its evaluation, the OCA found that Judge SempioDiy cannot be held guilty of unreasonable delay in rendering the Joint Decision
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690 given her seasonably filed requests for extension of time. The requests were all
granted by this Court in the November 24, 2008 Resolution, giving respondent a total extension period of ninety (90) days from
September 18, 2008. The OCA, however, opined that respondent should be administratively sanctioned for incurring delay in the
resolution of accused Carino's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court finds no evidence to sustain the charges of delay against Judge SempioDiy in rendering the Joint Decision in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294 and Q-95-62690. The Court hold, however, that there was indeed delay in resolving
accused Carino's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 5, 2009.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered a disciplinary proceeding
against her as a member of the bar.20 Violation of the basic tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 121 and 1222 as well as Rules 1.0323 and
12.0424 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Decision:

Respondent Judge Maria Elisa SempioDiy is found to have been in delay in the rendition of an order in Criminal Case Nos. Q-95-61294
and Q-95-62690 and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in observing the reglementary period for disposing of motions.

6. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Mantua 665 SCRA 253 , February 08, 2012

Principle:

Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that “Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”

Facts:

The judicial audit team submitted a memorandum five days after Judge Mantua’s retirement, to Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C.
Vilches (DCA Vilches). As of audit date, the Court has a total caseload of 356 cases consisting of 230 criminal cases and 126 civil
cases. The report of the judicial audit team showed that no appropriate action was done in 68 cases, 23 cases remained unresolved
after a sufficient amount of time, and 10 cases were not decided within the reglementary period. In contrast, there is no showing that
Judge Mantua ever requested this Court for a reasonable period of extension to dispose of these cases.

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The judicial audit team also found that Branch 17’s case records were not in order. The case records are stitched togetherwith
pagination. However, the criminal records are not chronologically arranged. Also, the records attached to criminal cases jointly tried are
incomplete (Crim. Cases 1129, 1131, 1189, 1190, 1185, 1186, 1033, 1205, among a few). The court’s docket books are not updated.
There are no logbooks on arrest and search warrants, exhibits, disposed/decided/archived cases and incoming documents. There is no
order on payment of postponement fee in proper cases.

It was also noticed that alias warrants of arrest were issued without archiving cases

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge Celso L. Mantua failed to decide cases on time that violates Canon 6 of New Code of Judicial Ethics.

Ruling:

Yes. This Court has always impressed upon judges the necessity of deciding cases with dispatch. Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics provides that a judge should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that “justice delayed is often
justice denied.” Section 15(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires that judges of lower courts decide cases within three months
from the date of submission. This Court has repeatedly reminded judges that they must resolve matters pending before them promptly
and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they should ask for an
extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be
observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time. Judges must dispose of the court’s business promptly. Delay in
thedisposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute.
Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions .

Decision:

The complaint against Judge Celso L. Mantua is dismissed. The Financial Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator is
directed to release the retirement pay and other benefits due Judge Mantua unless he is charged in some other administrative
complaint or the same is otherwise withheld for some other lawful cause.

7. Mariano vs. Nacional 578 SCRA 181 , February 10, 2009

Principle:

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requiring judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly
and with reasonable promptness.

Facts:

In the course of the ejectment proceedings, respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional issued a pre-trial order requiring the parties to file their
respective position papers and affidavits of witnesses on September 30, 2004. The parties complied with the September 3, 2004 order.
Subsequently, respondent issued an order dated December 28, 2004 requiring the parties to submit their respective “memoranda in the
form of a court decision. The parties likewise complied with this order. The case was eventually decided by respondent on February 14,
2005.

Complainant avers that the issuance of the December 28, 2004 order violated the prohibition on memoranda by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (RRSP). Complainant likewise posits that respondent violated the Rules when he decided thecase only on
February 14, 2005 or 136 days from the date required by law.

In his comment, respondent admitted that he had exceeded the maximum period allowed under the RRSP. He offered the following
excuses: (1) the quality of his decision had priority over compliance with the reglementary period; (2) his caseload was heavy and (3)
the documents of the case were voluminous. He also justified his December 28, 2004 order by stating that the case was “not an
ordinary one.”

Respondent added that this administrative complaint was filed only because the judgment was against complainant.

In its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that respondent violated basic procedure and the code of judicial
conduct.6 It also found that respondent had been previously admonished for gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, partiality,
oppression and incompetence in Prado v. Judge Nacional.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge violates New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Ruling:

Yes. The findings of the OCA are well-taken but we do not agree with the recommended penalty. Without doubt, Civil Case No. 12334
was a case of unlawful detainer covered by the RRSP. Section 5 of the RRSP explicitly provides that only complaints, compulsory
counter-claims and cross-claims pleaded in the answer, as well as the answers to these pleadings, are allowed. The RRSP also
expressly prohibits the filing of a memorandum.
The urgency of restoring social order is the paramount consideration in settling unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases. The
necessity of promptly resolving unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases is made more imperative by the express legal provisions on
periods of rendition of judgments. Specifically, Section 11, Rule 70 of the ROC provides that the court shall render judgment within 30

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days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or expiration of the period for filing the same. The RRSP provides for the same
period.

Further, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requiring judges to perform all judicial duties
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

We cannot accept the justifications advanced by respondent. Doing so will undermine the wisdom behind procedural rules and diminish
respect for the law

Decision:

Respondent Judge Jose P. Nacional is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure for which he is fined P40,000. He is
also found guilty of violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary for which he is fined P20,000. Respondent is furthermore found guilty of violation of Canons 1 and
12 as well as Rules 1.03, 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is fined P10,000. He is hereby
ordered to remit payment of the fines within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution. Respondent is sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar offense shall warrant an even more severe penalty.

8. Dagudag vs. Paderanga 555 SCRA 217 , June 19, 2008

Principle:

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a prerequisite to the due
performance of judicial office.

Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties.

Section 6 of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and
courteous in relation to lawyers.

Facts:

Sometime in 2005, forest products were confiscated by the representatives of PNPRMG, DENR and the Philippine Coast Guard for
non-compliance of pertinent documents, and since no one claimed ownership of the said items for a reasonable time, it was confiscated
in favor of the government. Respondent-judge, in a case for issuance of writ of replevin, instituted by plaintiff Edma, issued and decided
infavor of the plaintiff, for the return of the undocumented forest products. DENR, CENRO and herein petitioner filed a motion to quash
the writ of replevin but was thereafter denied by herein respondent. The DENR counsel was also lambasted in the courtroom by herein
respondent.

Issues:

1. Whether or not relevin is a proper remedy where the confiscated items were undocumented forest products under the custody
of the DENR.

2. Whether or not the acts of herein respondent constitutes gross ignorance of the law and unbecoming of a judge.

Ruling:

1) No. The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. That since the case is for violation of Section 68
of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 is under the jurisdiction of DENR. That respondent should have dismissed the replevin suit outright
for three reasons, to wit:

That courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies, under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion;

That also, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction courts cannot take cognizance of the cases pending before administrative agencies
of special competence. That since the undocumented forest products are in the custody of the DENR, an administrative proceeding
may have already been commenced; and,

That the forest products are already in custody of law and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.

2) Yes. Respondent in taking cognizance of the replevin suit and thereafter issuing the said writ constitute gross ignorance of the
law. Respondent also is liable for using inappropriate language in court, and repeated interruption of the lawyers and refusal to consider
the motionto quash are undignified and very unbecoming of a judge. Considering also that this is his third offense.

Decision:

The Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and unbecoming conduct. Accordingly, the court dismisses him from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

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9. Maturan vs. Gutierrez-Torres 681 SCRA 311 , September 19, 2012

Principle:

CANON 6- COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.

SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require

similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Facts:

On August 12, 2004, complainant Atty. Arturo Juanita T. Maturan (Maturan), the counsel for the private complainant in Criminal Case
No. 67659 entitled People v. Anicia C. Ventanilla, filed a sworn complaint against Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, the former Presiding
Judge of Branch 60 of the Metropolitan Trial Court inMandaluyong City, charging her with unjustifiably delaying the rendition of the
decision in his client’s criminal case. Atty. Maturan averred that the criminal case had remained pending and unresolved despite its
having been submitted for decision since June 2002. Atty. Maturan stated that Judge Gutierrez-Torres’ failure to render the judgment
within the 90-day period from submission of the case for decision violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Constitution, and constituted gross inefficiency. On August 27, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge
Gutierrez-Torres through its first indorsement of the complaint to submit her comment, and also to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for her violation of her professional responsibility as a lawyer pursuant to the Resolution dated
September 17, 2002 issued in A.M. No. 02-902-SC to which an extension was asked of by the respondent Judge. Despite the
extension given, she still failed to file her comment and further asked for more extension.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s judge dismissal from service isvalid.

Ruling:

Yes. A judge like Judge Gutierrez-Torres should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of the
obligation to promptly administer justice. She must cultivate a capacity for promptly rendering her decisions. Should she anticipate that
she would need a period longer than what the Constitution and the issuances of the Court prescribe within which to render her decision
or resolution, she should request a proper extension of the period from the Court.

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the Constitution must
bedecided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates all
justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in their courts.

Reiterating the mandate, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to “devote their professional
activity to judicial duties, which include the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions
and to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

These judicial canons directly demand efficiency from the judges in obvious recognition of the right of the public to the speedy
disposition of their cases. In such context, the saying justice delayed is justice denied becomes a true encapsulation of the felt need for
efficiency and promptness among judges.

Decision:

The Court finds former Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres guilty of gross inefficiency, and imposes on her a fine
of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, if any. The Court orders Judge Gutierrez-Torres to show cause in writing
within ten days from notice why she should not be suspended from membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for her act of
insubordination towards the Court. The Court directs the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA to compute
the balance of Judge Gutierrez-Torres’ earned leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-
OCA which shall compute its monetary value.

10. Jamsani-Rodriguez vs. Ong 628 SCRA 626 , August 24, 2010

Principle:

Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary clearly enjoins that: “Judges shall maintain order
and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Facts:

Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez, an Assistant Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of theOmbudsman
initiated this administrative matter against the Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (Fourth
Division), with Justice Ong as Chairman.

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Details of the Charges are:

A. Grave Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service, and Falsification of Public Documents

In conducting provincial hearing, the Fourth Division has adopted a different procedure. They do not sit as collegial body, instead they
divide the division into two. In such a manner, the Chairman will hear some of the cases alone and the other members will hear other
cases, conducting hearing separately and simultaneously.

The complainant contended that by not acting as a collegial body, respondent Justices not only contravened Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1606, but also committed acts of falsification by signing their orders, thereby making it appear that they had all been present during
the hearing when in truth and in fact they were not.

B. Improprieties During Hearings Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and Grave MisconductAllegedly, Justice Ong
and Justice Hernandez made the following intemperate and discriminatory utterances during hearings.

C. Justices Ong, Hernandez, and Ponferrada’s Gross

Ignorance of the Law Amounting to Manifest Partiality for Dismissing Criminal Case No. 25801

The complainant cited the Fourth Division’s resolution granting accused Ronaldo V. Puno’s demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
case upon a finding that the assailed contracts had never beenperfected, which finding was contrary to the evidence of the Prosecution.

The complainant insisted that the conclusion that the assailed contracts had never been perfected was based on National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) resolution, which the Fourth Division appreciated in the guise of taking judicial notice. She contended that
taking judicial notice of the NAPOLCOM resolution upon a demurrer to evidence was highly erroneous and constituted gross ignorance
of the law.

Respondent’s Comment:

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez averred that their arrangement had been adopted in the best interest of the service, because they
had thereby expedited the disposition of their cases, resulting in considerable savings in time, effort, and financial resources of the
litigants, lawyers, witnesses, and the court itself; but that they had meanwhile discontinued the arrangement after it had piled up so
much work at a much faster pace than the Fourth Division could cope with. They argued that even assuming, arguendo, that the
arrangement had been irregular, it could only be the subject of a petition for certiorari on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not an administrative complaint, due to its amounting only to a mere procedural lapse.

Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez refuted the complainant’s allegation on their use of intemperate and discriminatory language while ,
admitted having asked the lawyers appearing before them about the law schools they had graduated from, but explained that they had
done so casually and conversationally, with the scenario playing out between two Justices teasing each other from time to time. They
claimed that their queries were usually made in jest and were intended to break the monotony and seriousness of the courtroom
setting. Justice Hernandez denied having shouted at Prosecutor Tujan-Militante but conceded the possibility of having observed that
her presence in Cebu City was a waste of government funds, because she was not one of the Prosecutors assigned to prosecute any
of the scheduled cases.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law amounting to manifest partiality (relating to the grant of the demurrer to evidence in
Criminal Case No. 25801), tice Hernandez pointed out that the Supreme Court had already sustained their action by dismissing the
petition for review of the Special Prosecutor through the resolution issued in G.R. No. 171116 on June 5, 2006.

Justice Ponferrada’s separate comment echoed his co-respondents’ assertions in their joint comment.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent justices is guilty of the filed charges.

Ruling:

A. Respondents’ Violation of the provisions of PD 1606 and Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan. Section 3 of PD
1606,21 the law establishing the Sandiganbayan, provides: Quorum.—The Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices
each. The three divisions may sit at the same time.

B. Although there is no evidence to support the complainant’s charge that Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the
improper and intemperate statements attributed to them. Mere admission of the Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez of randomly asking
the counsels appearing before them from which law schools they had graduated, and their engaging during the hearings in casual
conversation abouttheir respective law schools. They thereby publicized their professional qualifications and manifested a lack of the
requisite humility demanded of public magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their
lack of judicial temperament and decorum, which no judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid especially during their performance
of judicial functions. They should not exchange banter or engage in playful teasing of each other during trial proceedings (no matter
how good-natured or even if meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe). Judicial decorum demands that they behave with
dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear before their court.

C. The charge of manifest partiality for issuing the resolution granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 25801 is dismissed. As already mentioned, this Court upheld the assailed resolution on June 5, 2006 in G. R. No. 171116 by
declaring the petition of the Office of the Special Prosecutor assailing such dismissal to have

“failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

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Decision:

The court resolves as follows:

• Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offenses shall be dealt with more severely;

• Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez is admonished with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be
dealt with more severely; and

• Associate Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada is warned to be more cautious about the proper procedure to be taken in proceedings
before his court.

11. Lucero vs. Bangalan 437 SCRA 542 , September 07, 2004

Principle:

A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. As an administrative officer of the court, a judge should
organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity

Facts:

The present complaint originated from three (3) separate cases of Forcible Entry filed against herein complainant by Wilfredo Garo in
Civil Case 250-L; by Federico Aguinaldo in Civil Case 248-L and by Rogelio Antonio in Civil Case 249-L. All these cases were heard
before the sala of the respondent judge.

In relation to the aforementioned civil cases, the office of the respondent judge through his Clerk of Court II, Fredelito R. Baltazar,
issued three separate summonses all addressed to complainant, Emelie Lucero.

Contrary to the express provisions of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure that all cases of forcible entry, irrespective of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, will be governed by the said Rule, the above summonses failed to state
that summary procedure shall apply to the three civil cases of forcible entry. Each of the said summons also required Emelie Lucero to
file her answer to the complaint within 15 days upon her receipt of the summons. Under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
defendants are required to file their answers within 10 days from receipt of the summons.

In her complaint, Emelie Lucero stated that the deficiencies in the summons issued by the office of the respondent judge confused and
misled her.

Thereafter, respondent judge set the three civil cases for preliminary conference. However, the preliminary conference was reset. On
the other hand, the preliminary conference for Civil Case No. 248-L was reset Sunday.

On February 12, 2003, before the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 248-L was conducted, respondent judge rendered three
separate decisions ordering complainant to surrender the possession of the contested property. Respondent judge grounded his
decision upon the failure of the complainant or her counsel to appear during the preliminary conference set on February 6, 2003.

Complainant appealed the three decisions of the respondent judge to the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33,
which annulled, reversed and set aside the same on the ground of violation of due process in depriving the defendant, herein
complainant, an opportunity to be heard When ordered to comment,respondent judge raised the defense that it was his Clerk of Court
II, Mr. Fredelito R. Baltazar, who erroneously indicated in the summons that the reglementary period to file answers was 15 days
instead of only ten days as provided for under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

In respondent’s comment, judge did not explain why the summonses issued in the three civil cases of forcible entry filed against
complainant failed to state that it shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Neither did he explain why the preliminary
conference for Civil Case No. 248-L was calendared on a Sunday, a non-working day.

All the complaints filed with the lower court against the complainant clearly showed that they were “For: FORCIBLE ENTRY.” These
words appearing on the captions should have alerted the respondent judge that the Rule on Summary Procedure should be applied to
all the three cases. Respondent judge’s apparent laxity in the conduct of his official affairs paved the way for the issuance.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent judge violates the Code of Judicial Conduct

Ruling:

Yes. Courts exist to dispense and promote justice. The realization of this solemn purpose depends to a great extent on the intellectual,
moral and personal qualities of the men and women who are called to serve as judges. A judge owes it to himself and his office to know
by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how correctly and justly. When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with
the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public inthe courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring
of injustice.

Respondent judge’s explanation that his staff was responsible for erroneously stating in the summons that complainant has 15 days to
file her answer instead of the 10-day period prescribed under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure deserves no consideration.
Time and again it has been had ruled that a judge cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should be the master
of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects. A judge should be an effective manager of the court and its

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personnel. He is directly responsible for the proper discharge of the official functions of his staff. The efficient administration of justice
cannot accept as an excuse the shifting of the blame from one court personnel to another. The setting of the preliminary conference in
Civil Case No. 248-L on a Sunday, a non-working day, further underscores the negligence of the respondent judge. His collective
actions fell short of the competence and faithfulness to the law required of judges.

However, we find no basis to hold the respondent judge administratively liable for Rendering an Unjust Judgment and violation of
Republic Act No. 6713. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence. In this case, the complainant failed to substantiate her charges.

Decision:

Judge Felino U. Bangalan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Allacapan, Cagayan, is found guilty of violation of the Revised Rule of
Summary Procedure for which he is fined Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00). Judge Bangalan is further sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

12. Espineli vs. Español 453 SCRA 96 , March 10, 2005

Principle:

A judge is mandated by the Constitution to render judgment and resolve pending incidents not more than 90 days from the time the
case is submitted for resolution.

Facts:

In Espineli complaint letter , he averred that he was the accused in a murder case that was tried before the branch presided by
respondent judge. After the prosecution rested its case, Espineli’s lawyer filed a demurrer to evidence on March 8, 1999, without leave
of court. Respondent judge ordered the assistant provincial prosecutor to file his comment to the demurrer within ten days. The
respondent judge then set the continuation of the trial of the case on April 19, 1999.

On the date of the hearing ,respondent judge ordered that the case be considered submitted for decision in view of the demurrer to
evidence submitted, without leave of court, by the accused’s counsel. However, after accused’s counsel left the courtroom, Espineli
arrived with his NBI escorts so respondent judge set aside her previous order, reopened the case and set it for hearing on May 19,
1999. She decidedthe case on August 31, 1999, convicting the accused Espineli (complainant herein).

On October 8, 1999, Espineli filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but it remained unresolved as of June 19, 2001.2
Respondent judge averred that she did not act on it because she was still waiting for the comment of the prosecution. Espineli surmised
that respondent judge falsified her certificate of service by not indicating that there was, in her branch, a matter that remained
unresolved even beyond the 90-day period set by law, for otherwise she could not have collected her salary.

In the respondent judge’s letter, she explained that the delay in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration was not intentional. She
said that the delay was merely an oversight “which could be attributable to the maze of record that could not be properly kept, managed
and reviewed considering the limited space being occupied by the court and its staff.” She further alleged that she could not act on the
accused’s motion because the prosecution had not yet filed its comment.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Judge Dolores L. Español is liable forinefficiency and neglect of duty

Ruling:

Yes. No amount of explanation can justify respondent’s failure to decide the case beyond the 90-day period prescribed by law and to
resolve the motion for reconsideration for 23 months. The noble office of a judge is to render justice not only impartially, but
expeditiously as well, for “delay in the judiciary lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.

The Constitution provides that all cases or matters filed before lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the
date they are submitted for decision or resolution. Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that “a judge should
administer justice without delay.” Rule 3.05 thereof provides that “a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.” A judge is mandated by the Constitution to render judgment and resolve pending incidents not more
than 90 days from the time the case is submitted for resolution.

Decision:

As to foregoing premises considered and as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Dolores L.
Español is found liable for inefficiency and neglect of duty. She is fined the amount of P11,000 to be deducted from her retirement
benefits, considering that she compulsorily retired from the service on January 9, 2004.

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