LADECO vs.

ANGALA
G.R. No. 153076 - June 21, 2007
FACTS:
Datsun crewcab driven by Deocampo bumped into a pick-up owned by Angala
and driven by Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation
(LADECO) owned the crewcab. The left door, front left fender, and part of the
front bumper of the pick-up were damaged.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten
kilometers per hour (kph) and was making a left turn preparatory to turning
south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at
around 60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact.
Respondent alleged that he heard a screeching sound before the impact.
Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer
when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal
because he noticed a blinking light while looking at the speedometer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.
RULING:
Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance
applies
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who
has the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable
with the loss.
In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since
he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the
responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done
at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running
straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving
very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he
also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up.
He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 138569,
September 11, 2003

Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they
return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The
tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any
person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. 

Facts:    Diaz filled up a savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks deposit
slip through a middleman.  The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by
returning the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips.  Since the transaction took
time and the middleman had to make another deposit, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. Somebody got the passbook. Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any
transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account
followed by a formal written request later that day. It was also on the same day
that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before of P300,000
from its savings account.  The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of the
authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail.

Issue:    Whether or not Solidbank must be held liable for the fraudulent
withdrawal on private respondent’s account.

Held:    Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring

that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings
account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively
its owner.  If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be
clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating
unauthorized withdrawals by that person.  For failing to return the passbook to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6
presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding
the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the
same. However, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor.  Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced. Hence, the liability
of Solidbank for actual damages was reduced to only 60%, the remaining 40%
was borne by private respondent.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code on simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between
the bank and its depositor.  The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary
nature of banking.  RA 8791 declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary
nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance.”
This new provision in the general banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory
affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding that “the bank is under
obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with  meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.”

79050-51    November 14, 1989

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance (Torts and Damage

FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other
people boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in
Isabela, to celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20
kph, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route  to Manila,
encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with
it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa,
as well as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa,
through her guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-
delict against PANTRANCO. 
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the
accident and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the
chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence 

HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making
a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware
of the existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its
own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction
 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds
before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required
to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered

G.R. No. 140698  June 20, 2003

Lessons Applicable: Last Clear Chance, emergency rule (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136

FACTS:

 November 29, 1989 1:30 pm: Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney with the owner Sheila Seyan as passnger.
 The speeding Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Rogelio Engada came from the
opposing direction and swerved to its left encroaching upon the lane of the
Tamaraw.  In attempt to avoid the pick-up, Seyan shouted at Iran to swerve
to the left but the Engada also swerved to its right hitting the Tamaraw at its
right front passenger side causing its head and chassis to separate from its
body.
 Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan and
Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital.  Seyan suffered a
fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple
contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-
lower pole of the right kidney.  Upon discharge, she Seyan incurred P130,000
 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap
totalling a loss of P80,000 
 MTC: Engada guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
with serious physical injuries
 CA: Affirmed MTC
 Engada appealed alleging that CA failed to consider that he already relayed
his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right signal light.
He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more
reason to swerve to his left 
ISSUE: W/N under the doctrine of last clear chance Iran should be liable.

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

 Engada's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision
 in abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite lane was free
of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage
 after seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, he did not slow down
 emergency rule
 An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is
required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails
to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a
better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence -
Iran cannot be faulted
 at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed
as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder
the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of.

FACTS:
 Wendell Libi shot his lover Julie Ann Giotong, both minors, before he
turned the firearm on himself. As a result, the parents of Julie Ann filed
against Wendell's parents to recover damages. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. CA
reversed the decision.

 ISSUE:
 Whether or not the parents of Wendell Libi liable for vicarious liability.

 RULING:
 Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their minor
children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The
 parents' liability as being primary and not subsidiary and liability shall
ceased if the parents can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good
father to prevent damage.

 In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in supervising the
activities of their son. It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they
allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of CANU and that the
gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box.
Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access
to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for the natural consequence of
the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. 

PALISOC v. BRILLANTES

G.R. No. L-29025  [October 4, 1971]

FACTS:

Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were

automotive mechanics students, an altercation transpired between the deceased
and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years old
while Virgilio was already of age. The parents of Dominador filed an action for
damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3)
Quibule who was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4)
Brillantes who is a member of the board of directors and former sole proprietor
of MTI.

ISSUE:
 Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together
with the defendant?

HELD:

The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule

respectively) were held liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages.
No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI board
of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly
impleaded as party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their
custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortuous act must live and board in the school.

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty
of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule
failed to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The
judgment of the appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory
damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim
for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of
the said defendants.

Salvosa v. IAC

G.R. No. 70458 [October 5, 1988]

Facts of the Case:

Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit. The Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer.  As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the
AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the
AFP,  as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos. Jimmy B. Abon was also
a commerce student of the BCF.

Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with
an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit
of the BCF.  As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.

Issue:

WON BCF is subsidiarily liable.

Ruling of the Case:

Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for “damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180 — ‘so long as (the
students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.” Jimmy
B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at attendance in the school,” or in
the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos Case Digest

Facts:

St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive through

visitation of other schools where prospective high school enrollees were
studying. Among the students of the school who took part in the campaign was
Sherwin Carpitanos and James Daniel. Sherwin and other high school students
were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva and driven by
by James, then 15 years old. On their way to Dapitan City, the jeep turned turtle
resulting in the death of Sherwin. 

The parents of Sherwin thus sued James and his parents, Villanueva and SMA.
At the trial, the traffic investigator testified and submitted his report showing
that the jeep turned turtle because the steering wheel guide of the jeep was
detached. This report and the testimony of the traffic investigator was not
disputed by any of the parties. 

After trial, the lower court held that the school is primary liable for damages as it
had special parental authority at the time of the accident. The parents of James
were found to be only subsidiarily liable and were ordered to pay only in the
event of insolvency of the school. James was absolved for being only a minor
under the special parental authority of the school. Villanueva, the vehicle owner
was not held liable at all. 

Issue:

Was the lower court correct? 

Held:

No. 
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care. 

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized

activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.

Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor,
those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while
under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for the school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the death or injury
sustained. Injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained
of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 

In this case, the parents of Sherwin failed to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities. They admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of SMA or the reckless
driving of James, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence reliance on Art. 219, of the Family Code is unfounded. 

Further, it was Ched the grandson of the vehicle owner Vivencio who allowed
the minor James to drive the jeep at the time of the accident. The school did not
allow James to drive the jeep. So whether the accident was caused by the reckless
driving of James or the mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, the school could not be held liable since these are events which it had no
control. If the school may be considered negligent, it was only the remote cause
of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. 

At any rate, since it is clear that the accident occurred because of

the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school but the
registered owner of the vehicle who should be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin. Registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets. (St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002).