WARRIOR SERIES IAN DRURY GERRY EMBLETONFirst published in Great Britain in 1995 by Osprey, an imprint of Reed Consumer Books Ltd. Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road, London SW3 6RB and Auckland, Melbourne, Singapore and Toronto © Copyright 1995 Reed International Books Ltd. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, clectronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. ISBN 1 3729 Filmset in Great Britain by Keyspools Ltd. Printed through Bookbuilders Ltd., Hong Kong. If you would like to receive more information about Osprey Military books, The Osprey Messenger isa regular newsletter which contains articles, new title information and special offers. To join free of charge please write to: Osprey Military Messenger, PO Box 5, Rushden, Northants NNIO 6YX Author's dedication For Sue, James and Sophie. Acknowledgements This book could not have been completed without the assistance of David Isby, who tracked down so many useful sources; Herbert Woodend and Paul Ellis at the MoD Pattern Room; Richard Brooks; and the members of Wargames Developments, who have helped clarify my thoughts about the Western Front. Publisher's Note Readers may wish to study this title in conjunetion with the following Osprey publications: Elite 24 The Old Contemptables Elite 56 Scottish Units in the World Wars MAA 80 The German Army 1914-18 MAA 81 The British Army 1914-18 MAA 245 British Territorial Units 1914-18 Campaign 11 Kaisersclacht 1918 Artist’s note Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour plates in this book were pre- pared are available for private sale. All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained by the publisher. All enquiries should be addressed to: Gerry Embleton ‘Time Machine CH ~ 1425 Onnens Switzerland ‘The publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.GERMAN STORMTROOPERS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND At 6.20 a.m, on 20 November 1917 a thousand guns opened fire on the German trenches defending the town of Cambrai. Under cover of this ferocious bombardment, 376 tanks lumbered across No-Man’s Land, spearheading a surprise attack that smashed through the After trench warfare, the British Army had at last devel oped the means to crack open the Western Front ‘The ‘green fields beyond” were finally in si For the first time in the war, church bells were German lines. three years of rung in England to celebrate a major victory. How ever, ten days later the Germans counter-attacked, They swiftly recaptured part of the newly created salient, and in some places penetrated beyond the original British frontline tanks. Their attack was led by units of elite infantry Stosstruppen or ‘stormtroops Yet the Germans had no in small groups, amply equipped with lig mortars, grenade-launchers and hand The earliest shock troops employed by the Germans in 1913, They still wear the distinctive Picklehauber and are laden with grenades, wirecutters and bridging equipment. (G. Embleton) advanced at an equally astonishing rate. By midday on 30 November the leading stormtroops had gained five miles. Units of Stosstruppen had fou fore, but never in such numbers. Many more would have available for the counter-stroke at Cambrai, but most stormtroop formations were still in Italy, where they had played a key role in the battle of Caporetto, nearly knocking Italy out of the war, ‘ht in France be- been and compelling Britain and France to send sorely needed divisions to shore-up the Italian front. How- ever, the victory at C German military leadership. It proved th; man army had the capability to rupture the Western Front, to penetrate the defences not only of the weakened Italians, but also of the British mbrai counted for more to the the Ge Army itself, And unless Germany could achieve victory in the west by the following summer, it was doomed to certain defeat, since the United States’ entry into the war had given the Allies overwhelming, industrial and numerical superiority On 3 December 1917 the Bolshevik leaders were compelled to accept an armistice, taking Russia out of the war, German infantry divisions were alreadypiling into trains to begin the long journey home, and by the spring of 1918 the German forces on the Western Front had gained 400,000 fresh troops ~ the last reinforcements they would ever receive. The German soldiers rom the cast had fought a very different war from their comrades in the west, and they had a great deal to learn before they could participate in the great offensive of 1918, ‘The German infantry on the Western Front had been transformed: gone were the uniformly armed and equipped rifle companies of 1914. ‘The 19th- century style skirmish lines employed that fateful autumn had become a distant memory. Infantry companies no longer fought as monolithic blocs, but divided into platoons that were themselves split into sub-units, each with a discrete tactical role, By late 1916 the organisation of German infantry battalions on the Western Front had begun to foreshadow that of World War IL In their search for tactical progress on the West- ern Front, the Stossiruppen effectively invented mod- em infantry tactics. Those employed at Cambrai and throughout 1918 involved individual squads of sol diers using a combination of weapons, The ma zine-loading rifle — the sole weapon of the infantry in 1914 — had become just one element in an array of mutually complimentary weapons. While British and French tactics had advanced too, they had not tray elled as far or as fast: by 1918 the German stormtroop battalions were using the same sort of ‘gun group’ and ‘rifle group’ minor tactics that 2nd Para used at Goose Green in 1982: Indeed, the infantry battle on the desolate ridgeline above Darwin would probably have seemed remarkably familiar to a World War I stormtrooper (although the lack of artillery would have astonished him). Trenches were suppressed by machine gun fire, then assaulted with grenades (in 1918 the stormtroops used cut-down Russian field guns and rifle grenades); particularly difficult bun- hers were tackled with heavy weapons. Like the Parachute Regiment, the stormtroopers had a strong esprit de corps, Fit and aggressive shock turning Kaiser Wilhelm Hand General von Moltke at the annual manoeuvres Despite their almost caricature appearance, the German military leadership gave their subordinates great freedom of action that encouraged the development of new tactical methods. (US National Archives) policy 4 troops, they earned their distinctions — and extra rations ~ by proven bravery on the battlefield. Their training emphasised individual initiative. Non-com- missioned officers were no longer there just to cn force the officers’ authority, but to provide tactical leadership throughout the platoon. How the Germans came to develop their battle winning infantry tactics was a mystery to the Allies. The British learned through bitter experience how successful the Germans’ defensive tacties had be- come, and in 1918 they began to reorganise along the same lines. But stormtroops and the never fully understood. The effects of their actions were painfully clear, but even when it came to writ- ing the official history, the best explanation the British could offer was that the Germans had copied the idea from a French pamphlet.' This book is a concise guide to German storm- troopers in the World War I. In the forefront of tactical development throughout the conflict, they were still associated with victory even after Germany methods were plunged to defeat, In the chaos that followed that defeat, many paramilitary groups modelled them- selves in the stormtroops’ image. One even hijackedthe name. When the then-obscure German Workers’ Party organised a gang of toughs to deal with its the street, it called them the 1) (assault detachment’) in con- scious The SA was to become the strong arm of the Nazi party until Adolf Hitler ac ne power CREATING AN ELITE The first official German stormtroop unit was au- thorised on 2 March 1913, OHI? ordered the VIII Corps to form a detachment for the testing of experi- mental weapons and the development of appropriate tactics that could break the deadlock on the Western Front, It was considered a natural job for the Pio- neers ~ the only element of the pre-war army experi- enced with hand grenades and trained for sicge opponents on Sturmabteillung ( nitation. ed supré warfare For several decades the German Army had been preparing to invade its neighbours. Not entirely In 1914 most German regiments fought in successive lines of ‘employed looser skirmishers with no more formations than others. than a metre between each (Private collection) man, Because training was decentralised, some units ignorant of German intentions, the French, Belgian and Russian governments had fortified their fron- tiers, guarding vital road and rail junctions with modern castles of concrete and steel. While the German Army had acquired the heavy artillery and specialist engincer units to storm such strongpoints, it had not anticipated the stalemate that was to follow its failure to defeat the French Army in 1914. Machine guns were at the heart of the problem, Even more effective than pre-war studies had sug- gested, they showed a remarkable ability to survive artillery bombardment in sufficient numbers to mow down attacking infantry. All armies had experienced this, but the armaments company Krupp, in Gi many, was first to offer a technical solution. If hi artillery could not succeed, why not try the opposite Krupp designed the ‘ a37om fht cannon that could be easily manoeuvred in the and to test it the first Sturmabteillung was Major urmkannone frontline eated. Commanded by a Pioncer offi 5Kaslow of the 18th Pioneer battalion, the detachment, became known as Sturmabteillung Kaslow. Other equipment they evaluated included stec! helmets and body armour. After three months’ training the unit ‘was sent into action, parcelled out in detachments to various frontline battalions. The Krupp guns proved cumbersome and vulnerable, and the unit suffered over 30 per cent losses in a series of minor attacks Kaslow was replaced in August 1915 by Captain Willy Ernst Rohr, a 37-year-old career soldier from the prestigious Garde-Schiitzen (Guard Rifles) bat- talion. Under his dynamic leadership, the assault detachment evolved new tactics to break into an enemy trench system. The Sturmkannone were re- placed by cut-down field guns captured from the Russians, and the soldiers adapted their uniforms and personal equipment to suit their new methods ‘Combat operations in the Vosges that autumn sug- gested Rohr’s ideas were sound and, in early Febru- ary 1916 Sturmabteillung Rohr was transferred to Verdun. It was expanded to battalion strength on 1 April, and in May OHL ordered all armies on the Western Front to send two officers and four NCOs to Rohr’s command to learn the new techniques Sturmbataillon Rohr was to be an instructional unit with a high turnover in personnel, not an elite forma- tion that simply creamed off the most capable sol- diers from line regiments, Formation of Stosstruppen On 23 October 1916 Gene German armies ii al Ludendorff ordered all 6 the west to form a battalion of The German Army was one of the last major uns to line iments. Before 3, machine guns were restricted to cavalry and Biger battalions. Here, ‘ager machine gun team prepares for action during a pre-war exercise (Private collection) stormtroops. Impressed by an honour guard from Sturmbataillon Rohr be had inspected at the Crown Prince’sheadqu: Ludendorff aware that the German armies in France and Bel- gium had chang became ters, soon d considerably in the two years he had been away in Russia. By the beginning of De cember 1916 the Ist, 2nd and 5th German armies each had an assault battalion, and the other 1+ Ger- man armies established one during the course of the month. However, many of these new Sturmbataillon were created by amalgamating existing stormtroop units that had sprung up among the divisions. While Rohr’s battalion was created by the high command (and soon won powerful friends, including the Crown von Falkenhayn and ultimately Ludendorff), it had no monopoly of new tactical ideas. Since mid-1915 some German regiments had been creating small units of shock troops from within their own ranks. These select troops operated. in sections, platoons and even whole companies, and enjoyed a variety of titles. Many favoured Sturmirupp (assault troop), but others included Jagdkommando (hunting commando) and Patrouillentrupp (raid troop). When the first flamethrower units were as sembled in carly 1915, under Captain Reddemann, he called his men Srosstruppen (stormtroops). caught the soldiers’ imagination and, regardless of their unit’s actual title, the men of these first assault detachments began to themselves as Suosstruppen. OHL did not intend the stormtroops to be a permanent feature of the German order of battle bu Prince, This refer tobombardment. As the war progressed, the Germans granted greater freedom to Tocal commanders, relying on their individual initiative in the absence of reliable communications, (US Army Signal Corps) Communications were the greatest problem on the battlefields of World War I: this recently entrenched German command post could expect to have most ofits telephone lines cut by the first enemy a model for the rest of the army. Once this had been achieved, the stormtroop formations were to disap- pear. Consequently, the stormtroop battalions were never incorporated into the peacetime army struc ture and were never assigned home barracks or re- cruiting areas in Germany. They were not associated nents from the 18th century in iments embraced their military with historical re the way regular re heritage; nor did they receive colours. By November 1916 more than 30 German divi- sions included some sort of assault detachment. Sev- eral independent corps, Landwehr divisions and even the Naval division had also established a storm: trooper unit on their own initiative. This remarkable process of parallel development stemmed from the training methods and doctrine of the pre-war Ger~ man Army, In all other major armies training meth- command, but the ods were determined by the h 22 corps districts of the Imperial German Army were fiercely independent. While the renowned General Staff planned German strategy, peacetime troop movements were left entirely to the corps command- ers, who reported directly to the Kaiser. This tradi- tion of tactical independence paid handsome divi- dends after 1914. The general staffs of other armies worked equally hard to solve the tactical problems of the Western Front, but many handicapped them- anage the frontline battle German regimental officers, accustomed to less in- selves by trying to micro terference in their tactics, had more freedom to experiment. As a result, by the summer of 1915 stormtroop units were springing up throughout the German armies in the west. Sturmbataillon Rohr would be the most famous, and was instrumental in 7winning official approval for stormtroops, but the simultaneous appearance of assault detachments in so many divisions demonstrates just how successfully the German military system encouraged individual initiative UNIFORMS German infantry the more practical uniforms wi Although the style of the German field service dress. harked back to the glory days of 1870, the 1910- pattern feldgraw w nen began World War I in one of by the rival armies form was eminently suitable for the opening campaigns of 1914. However, once the German Army went on the defensive in the west, the soldiers’ appearance began to change. One of the first casualties was the Pickelhaube itself. Its spike served no practical purpose but was the first part of a German soldier to become visible if he peered over the parapet, and frontline soldiers soon dispensed with it. The M1915 Pickelhaube featured a detach- able spike, and the drab cloth cover worn over it lost the red regimental number on the front, The con- struction of the M1913-pattern Picklehaube reveals a second influence on the German soldiers’ appear- ance, and one that would prove almost as significant as the demands of trench warfare: the effect of the Allied blockade. The Picklehaube was supposed to be made from boiled leather, but felt, thin metal and even compressed cardboard were tried as substitutes. The stormtroop detachments in 1913 wore standard service uniforms. During that year, the appearance of the frontline troops differed only in minor detail from that of 1914. In a change agreed before the war, Steingrau (stone grey) trousers were introduced to replace the Feldgrau ones because the latter seem to have faded too quickly. The M1907—10 arian version the plain turnbacks, and the false skirt pocket flaps disap- peared. Soldiers were leather equipment, including their boots, belts a cartridge pouches, but this was not always possible in tunic was superseded by a more utili distinctive cuffs were replaced by supposed to blacken the the frontline, as captured equipment shows. Wartime Equipment From 1915 soldiers were issued with a new piece of defensive equipment — one that was to prove indis- pensable when the German scientists introduced their so-called *higher form of killing’. The M1915 respirator had a rubberised fabric face piece and a detachable filter (soldiers carried a spare). The in- crease in the use of poison gas by both sides com pelled soldiers to carry respirators and to rig up gas alarms in their frontline positions. It also added a unique element of horror to the battlefield. However, for all the suffering it caused, this ghastly application of industrial technology failed to break the deadlock. On 21 September 19) duced a completely new infantry uniform. The Bluse (blouse) was supposed to replace both earlier tunics, although the 1907/10 and 1914 p use until the end of the war. Cut slightly looser, it has two large slanted pockets at the front, and looks rather more like a modern combat jacket than the 19th-century style of the carlier tunies. ‘The front he German army intro- tterns remained in buttons ~ metal, painted grey ~ are concealed behind Sturmbataillon Rohr {0 fightin. This elaborate tested several types of breastplate was body armour in 19) rejecting all but the steel helmet as too cumbersome subsequently issued 10 some snipers and sentries, aw)a flap, and the shoulder straps are detachable, Manu factured in a dark field grey, it has a fall-down collar faced with As before, the jackets of Jiger and Schiitzen regiments were dyed a much greener shade of Feldgrau ‘The M1895 knapsack, with its distinctive cow hide back, was too cumbersome for trench warfare While it remained on issue until 1918 and was worn in action on the Russian Front, by late 1913 C infantry in France and Belgium had began to use an ‘assault pack’. They wrapped their greatcoat in a tent cloth and rolled it around a mess tin, creating a smaller, handier pack, more suited to their needs. Their old knapsacks would be used when marching rman behind the lines into battalion stores while the infantry were in the frontline ‘The first article of uniform that disting stormtrooper from a regular infantryman appeared in carly 1916. In time, it would become the trademark of the German soldier in both World Wars. Its very shape has such an emotional charge that the US Army agonised throughout the 1970s before intro- milarly shaped kevlar helmet but were often pu ‘uished a ducing its soon dubbed th a range of body armour tested by the German Army from 1915. Dubbed by the British the ‘coal scuttle” helmet, it was made from silicon-nickel steel and ‘Fritz’. The M1916 Stahthelm was part of Stormtroopers are inspected outside their rest billets before going into the line. Note the sandbags bulging with stick grenades, and the puttees nd boots that have -placed the pre-war jackboots. (WWM) weighed 1.2 kg is over the ears and back of the neck, it offered better protection than either the French M1915 mild-steel ‘Adrian’ helmet or the revived medieval design favoured by the British. It was padded inside and adjusted by leather straps to fit each individual. ‘Thick lugs projected from either side to support an additional steel plate across the front of the helmet. The Stafthelm was issued to sentries and snipers, but was rarely seen by ordinary riflemen. From its inception, Sturmabteillung Rohr was used to test body armour that might be effective in No-Man’s Land. ‘The early stormtroops. experi mented with shields rather like those used today for riot control; but in those pre-Kevlar days, the Ger- man shields were made from solid steel and proved too heavy to use during an attack. The protection they offered could not compensate for the loss of mobility. Steel breastplates were similarly restrictive, and tended to be worn by look-outs or other exposed personnel in static positions. The German Army’s pre-war interest in siege warfare paid an unexpected bonus in the autumn of °1914: the arsenals of its border fortresses were packed with hand grenades, originally intended for use by the garrisons. These were shipped to the frontline, where they gave the Germans a uscful advantage during the first months of trench warfare Since only the Pioneers had been trained in their use, al Pioncers were posted to infantry battal- supervisors, During 19 individ ions 3 two new types of grenade entered production and soon became stand ard weapons: the Eierhandgranate (egg grenade) and the Stielhandgranate (stick grenade) By February 1916, when the German Army launched its great offensive at Verdun, stormtroop detachments had begun to assume a rather different appearance from soldiers in regular infantry battal- ions. Stormtroops were among the first to receive the new steel helmet; most of the 5th German Army’s wearing the Picklehaube with the The stormtroops spearheading the ch cross. infantry were spike removed. attack were well equipped with stick grenades, ca carrying a dozen or more in a sandbag slung their chest. Captain Rohr’s men had also substituted ankle boots and puttees for their 1866-pattern leather jackboots — another practice that was to spread throughout the assault units over the following two years. The stormtroopers had also started sewing leather patches on their elbows and knees ~ shielding their most vulnerable joints from the wear and tear of The Crown Prince inspects Picklehaube, and the anewly formed battalion ammunition pouches of stormtroops before the being worn by the soliders Great Offensive of 1918. on the right Note some officers still aw) wearing the out-dated crawling. ‘The first wave over the top at Verdun was primarily armed with hand grenades, so the men carried their rifles slung and did not wear the issue belt and shoulder harness that supported the ammu- nition pouches. Extra clips of 7.92 mm c: were carried in cloth bandoliers, each holding 70 rounds, By the end of 1916 official stormtroop battalions were established throughout the western armies. Soldiers were selected from regular battalions, posted to a stormtroop formation for a period and then returned to their original unit. A typical infan- try battalion of mid-1917 would have included a number of officers and junior NCOs who had served ina stormtroop formation, Exact figures are impossi- ble to obtain, since a high proportion of the Imperial Army’s records was destroyed by RAF Bomber Command in 1945, Men who had served with the stormtroops 1 well have returned with different uniforms as well as different tactical ideas. In his autobiographical novel Krieg, Ludwig Renn has a newly arrived officer say to an NCO: *You are mearing puttees and leather knepieces. Is that allowed in the regime , Learning that the man has just returned from a storm, battalion, the captain is delighted, and plans a whole sergeant-major platoon of assault troops. But Renn implies that some line officers were not best pleased with NCOs return, ing to the battalion with personalised uniforms a new sense of their own importance. Renn’s real name was Arnold von Golssenau, and he was a career officer who may have encountered such an attitude among his colle and WEAPONS Rifles and Carbines In 1914 German infantry regiments were uniformly armed with the 1898-pattern Mauser rifle, Cham: bered for the 8x37 mm rimless cartridge, it held five rounds in an internal box magazine that was loaded through the action by brass stripper clips. The side of the stock was cut away on the right, allowing the soldier to slide the cartridges in with the flat of his thumb, rather than push them down with the tip. This has a practical advantage over the British Lee. Enfield (SMLE) in which you had to press home the rounds with the end of your thumb, sometimes splinterin the nail in your haste to get the rifle back into action. On the other hand, because it is cocked on opening, the Mauser bolt is less tolerant of poor quality ammunition and dirt around the breach. You cannot retain your sight picture while working the Mauser’s action, and the magazine only holds half as many rounds as an SMLE. The Germans attempted to increase the Mauser’s firepower by issuing a 2: round magazine, but it only appeared in limited numbers and was rather awkward to handle, With its backsight down, the M1898 was sighted to 200 me- nd it could be elevated by 50-metre increments to a maximum of 2,000 metres. Weighing + kg and 1,250 mm long, the M1898 was a robust and accurate weapon, ideally suited to the open warfare of 1914, but not for the trench fighti that followed. The German Army issued carbines to all other tres, unloaded, arms: cavalry, artillery, pioneers, independent ma- sun companies and motor transport units. The only infantry units to use them at the beginning of the war were the Jiiger and Schiitzen bat The standard carbine was the MI898AZ (Karuhiner 98 lions. | stormtroop company poses for a group photograph during 1918. It isat less than half its established strength in riflemen, but it includes two MG "08s and one MG W815. (WM)mit Aufplans~ und Zusammensetsvorrichtung), which was 1,090 mm long and had a 590 mm barrel instead of the 600 mm of the M1898. Two much shorter carbines had been tested before the war, but we rejected because the muzzle-flash and recoil from a 435 mm barrel proved unacceptable Sturmbatuillon Rohr adopted the K.98 carbine during 1913, and it slowly became the standard armament of stormtroop formations throughout the German armies in the west. It nificantly shorter, and thus handier in the confines of the trenches; but at prevailing combat ranges, it was no less accurate or hard-hitting. When it came to re-arm in the 1930s, the German Army adopted a new Mauser with similar dimensions to the K.98 for all was si infantry units, Automatic Weapons The stormtroop battalions also received the world’s first effective sub-machine gun, the MP18. Designed by Hugo Schmiesser, the MP18 introduced most of the features that were to make the sub-machine gun the key close-quarter weapon of World War IL Chambered for 9 mm Parabellum, the MPIS fired from the open bolt: pulling the trigger, sent the bolt forward, where it stripped the uppermost round from the magazine, chambered it and fired it. If the r was held back, the bolt continued to cycle, ais and flung driven directly back by the propellant g forward again by the return sprin; cally simple, and highly effective. Over 30,000 were supplied to the German Army during 1918 of them arrived after the great March offensive. General Ludendorff looked to the MP1S to increase the defensive power of the German infantry as the Tt was mechan . but most Allies began their assault on the Hindenburg Line ‘oop battalions had Is, if not auto~ Some soldiers in the storm had experience with rapid-fire weapc matics. NCOs in charge of machine gun or mortar teams were often equipped with pistols capable of doubling as a carbine. Both the P.’08 Luger and the “Broomhandle’ Mauser were capable of receiving a shoulder stock which gave them an effective range of over 100 yards, More practically, it gave the NCOs a angi handy self-defence weapon that was much better than a rifle when enemy bombing parties were clos- ing in. For close-quarter fighting in the enemy trenches, an Artillery Model Luger with a 32-round ‘snail’ magazine made much more sense than a bolt action rifle with a five-round magazine, As Erwin Rommel observed: ‘Ji a man-to-man fi pinner is he who has one more round in his maga ‘The Pioneers’ hand grenades of 1914 were soon replaced by far more effective weapons. The M1915 Stielhandgranate is the most famous, and it became almost the primary weapon of the assault battalions. When stormtroop detachments led the attack at Verdun in February 1916, many of th action with their rifles slung, leaving their hands free to lob stick grenades into surviving French positions. nd Grenades m went into The stick grenade consisted of a hollow cylinder about 100 mm long and 73 mm in diameter contain- ing an explosive mixture of potassium perchlorate, barium nitrate, black powder and powdered alu minium, The cylinder had a metal clip on the side, Early models had to be lit manually, which proved dangerous; later versions incorporated an automatic ignition system. (WM) The light flamethrower was operated by two men: one carried the tank of fuel and compressed nitrogen, the other aimed the hose.‘The standard German infamy rifle was the Gewehr 98 (top), but other troops were issued with the Karabiner 98a (middle). likely to snag on a This was soon adopted by stormtrooper’s kit. the stormtroopers, and (Pattern Room Collection) some G.98s were converted to carbines durin (bottom). Note d K.98 is fully stocked and haya turn-down bolt, less enabling it to be attached to a belt. It also had a handle 225 mm long. A hollow wooden throwing cord projected from the bulbous end; pulling it ignited a friction tube that detonated the main charge 2 seconds later. Some were issued with 7-second fuses, others with 3-second fuses; the type of fuse was stamped on the handle. Thei was also a percus- sion-fused version, detonated by a spring-powered ker when it hit the ground. In 1916 German infantry began to receive a new the Fierhandgranate or Weighing 310 grammes (11 07) it was made of cast ‘on, painted black and was the size and shape of a hen’s egg. A friction lighter ignited a 3-second fuse, although an 8-second fuse was available if it was fired x grenade’. from a grenade launcher. thrown as far as 50 met Phis tiny grenade could be by an experienced grena- dier, but its explosive effect was fairly limited, The enade was first encountered by the British on the Somme: stormtroops counter-attacked north of Thiepval in July 1916, hurling the new grenades into captured trenches and re-taking most of the original German frontline. Both main types of German grenade relied pri- marily on blast rather than fragmentation, and they ¢ effective in the confines of a trench were far ma than in the open ficld. Stormtroopers assaulting particularly well-defended positions tended to tape ther and then post pet or into batches of stick grenades tog these deadly packages over the enemy para the slits of concrete bunk Machine Guns ‘The German Army did not take to machine with the same readiness as the British and Fr a in 1913 were they issued to line infantry nies: only regiments. However, wartime experience soon vindi- cated the machine gun lobby of the pre-war army, and the number of machine gun companies rose rapidly. In 1914 each infantry re six-gun machine gun company. During 1915 regi- ments received supplementary machine gun sections of 30-40 men and three or four machine guns, and by the end of the year many regiments had two full- iment included a strength machine gun companies. In the winter of 1915/16 specialist mach machine gu schiitzen Trupps) were created. Trained specifically for offensive use of machine guns, their personnel underwent a four- or five-week instruction course and were formed into independent companies of six guns. They were first scen at the frontline at Verdun. By mid-1916 the ad hoe development of machine ne gun units, known as marksmen (Maschinengemehr Scharf gun units had left some regiments with as many as 25 machine guns, and others with their regulation six. In August a new standard organisation was adopted: all machine gun companies were to consist of six weapons and all infantry regiments were to have three such companies, one attached to each infantry 3MPI8 was one of the irst sub-machine guns to be used in action. Note the 32-round ‘snail’ magazine, developed for the Artillery Model Luger, and its loading tool. The magazine affects the balance of the MPIS, inting the weapon sharply to the left even when empty. (Pattern Room Collection) battalion. ‘The machine gun marksmen companies were grouped into machine gun detachments (Maschinen-Gewehr — Scharfichiitzen-Abteillungen) cach of three companies, One such detachment was normally attached to each division engaged in active operations at the front. When the divisional Sturmbataillone were formed in December 1916, each battalion had either one or two machine gun compa nies. The number of German machine gun units con- tinued to increase during 1917, although the number of machine gun companies per regiment remained the same. Machine gun companies were expanded to ight, ten and finally 12 weapons per company, and th too, A stormtroop battalion could have anyth from 12 to 24 machine guns, while independent Sturmkompagnien had their own machine gun pla- toon of two weapons. Machine gun companies were equipped with the Maschinen-Gewehr “08, a modified Maxim gun de sign, The gun itself weighed 25 kg (35 Ib); on its stout metal sledge and with its water-jacket filled, it weighed 63.6 kg (140 Ib) and was not the most mobile of infantry weapons. Although the MG "08 was to exact a fearful toll of Allied infantrymen, it was primarily a defensive weapon. It did not break down to manageable loads and it was a struggle to move it across the heavily cratered battlefields of the Wester Front. Nevertheless, when the German 5th army made its supreme effort at Verdun, in June 1916, attacking regiments put their machine gun compa- nies in the front line, The Bavarian Life Guard, number of independent companies was increased “4 supported by Sturmbataillon Rohr seized the village of Fleury and brought up 24 MG “08s to fight its way through the ruins. Light Machine Guns ‘The German Army recognised the need for a lighter machine gun in 1915, and work began on a modifica- tion of the MG "08 design. In the meantime, since most of Germany’s enemies were already using light machine guns, the German army formed. special battalions to use captured enemy weapons. The first Musketen-Bataillone were created in August 1915 and committed to the Champagne batt ptem- ber. These units were armed with Madsen light machine guns, captured from the Russians. The Danish-designed Madsen was a true light machine gun: air-cooled, bipod-mounted and weighing just under 10 kg, it was fed by a 20-round box magazine. ‘The Russian Army had bought the Madsen for its cavalry before the war and it took little effort to re-chamber the weapons, Each Musketen-Batuillon consisted of three companies, each with four officers, 160 of other ranks and 30 machine guns. A four-man squad operated each weapon, and the soldiers also carried K.98s, like the regimental machine gun com- panies. The Mustketen-Bataillone were used during the battle of the Somme as part of the German second When a breakthrough occurred, they were rushed to plug the gap, machine-gunning the leading Allied units and inviting the inevitable attention of British artillery. They suffered heavy casualties, and lost all their Madsens by the end of the campaign. line. lery‘The British Army was already using the Lewis gun: a heavier weapon, weighing closer to 15 kg, but far easier to manocuvre than an MG 08. With a 47- 1 could not deliver the sort of sustained fire of a belt-fed weapon, but it round drum magazine ave an infantry platoon the means to suppress an enemy position without relying on heavy weapons further back. By the end of the Somme battle, enough 1. guns had fallen into German hands for the Musk battalions to re-equip with them. Also re-chambered for German ammunition, the Lewis guns remained in use until the Musketen battal to Maschinen-Gemehr Scharfichii April 1918. By then, all German contained so many light machine guns, there was no purpose in having a handful of battalions armed exclusively with them, However, the stormtroop battalions seem to have liked the Lewi en ns were converted ‘n battalions, in ntry giments nso much that many retained them in preference to the later light machine guns produced by the Germans. Lewis guns remained in frontline service until the end of the war, with captured weapons repaired and con- verted in a factory in Brussels Loading a 24.5 em heavy Minenwerfer (old model) hhad to be done carefully they were prone to burst owing to premature ¢ cold increased the danger by making the barrels brittle. (US Army Corps) In December 1916 the German Army intro- duced its ‘official’ light machine gun, the Model ’08/ 15 ~ basically an MG °08 mounted on a bipod and fitted with a wooden rifle butt and pistol grip. It was still water-cooled, but the casing was narrower Weighing 19.3 kg (43 Ib) it was only ‘light’ in the imagination of its designers. On the other hand, it ably the world’s first general purpose ma- chine gun (GPMG): light enough to be manhandled over the battlefield, but heavy enough to deliver sustained fire. Fed by 100- or 230-round belts, the MG 08/15 could provide a much er volume of fire than the Lewis or Chauchat light machine guns being used by the Allies and, despite its weight, it anticipated the tactical role of the MG34 in World War Il ‘The MG ’08/15 was first encountered on the Western Front in the spring of 1917, when German ved three, ‘This in- try companies each rec Iscreased 10 six over the course of the year, although units on the Eastern Front were a lower priority, and most made do with a pair of \WG ‘08/15s until the Russian campaign was over. The MG "08/13s were nitially organised as discrete units, effectively form- ing « fourth platoon in each rifle company rather as the British infantry platoons added a Lewis section to their three infantry As the numbers of MG °08/15s increased, they were integrated into the platoons, giving platoon commanders the ability ta manoeuvre their rifle sections covered by the sup- of the machine guns. sections. pressive fir Grenade-launchers ‘The German Army began the war with two types of rifle grenade in service. Both weighed just under a kilo and were fired from the Gemrehr 98 rifle, using a special blank cartridge. Re racy minimal, but once the trenchlines were ¢stab- lished, troops rigged up all manner of improvised mountings. By 1916 a purpose-built Granatenmerfer (Grenade-thrower) had been introduced. It weighed 40 kg, but broke down into two loads ~ the thrower (23 kg) and the platform (13 kg), It had a maximum range of 350 m and a minimum range of 30 m. Infantry regiments had 12 each by 1916, and with them special ‘rebounding’ grenades were introduced. he latter carried a separate black powder charge so that when the grenade struck the ground, it was blown back into the air a fraction of a second before it ‘oil was vicious and accu- ial over the six-shot revolvers favoured by the Allies. Note the serial number 'l this is the first Luger The German Army's standard service pistol was the Pistole “08 , better known by the name of its inventor, the Luger. With manufactured by Erfurt in an S-round magazineand 1916. (Pattern Room ‘one in the breech, the Collectio Luger had a clear edge detonated. The Granatenmerfer could also launch signal rockets. This handy two-man weapon could deliver an impressive hail of fire against enemy strongpoints; its ammunition was light, and if enough infantrymen carried forward sandbags full of grenades, the Granatanmerfer could support them with both direct and indirect fire Mortars: After witnessing the success of Japanese improvised mortars at Port Arthur, the German Army ordered « series of purpose-built weapons for the Pioneers. By1914 the Pioncers had three types of Minenmerfer at their disposal: the 7.6 em light mortar that threw a 47 kg bomb out to 1,050 m; the medium 17 cm mortar that fired a 49.5 kg bomb 900 m; and the heavy 21 cm mortar that delivered a 100 kg bomb up to 530 m, The latter was originally intended for the defence of fortresses, and was the deadliest weapon on the Western Front. Its very high trajectory and heavy charges could bring about the collapse of The mortars’ noise, and slow, remorseless passage through the air added to the terror. New versions of all three mortars were introduced in 1916; these had much longer ranges and were capable of delivering gas-filled projectiles The trench mortars were assigned to the siege train in 1914, but although they whole sections of trench. emained nominally in the hands of Pioneers, they were soon reorganised into independent mortar detachments. Their person- nel were largely drawn from the infantry, and they were attached to the infantry on a basis of one Minnenwerfer Abieillung per regiment. Each regi- mental detachment consisted of 12 7.6 cm mortars and 24 grenade-launchers. ‘The heavier mortars w grouped into Minenerfer companies, with one nor- mally attached to each division. Each ompany com- prised three sections: one heavy (four 24 m or 23 em mortars) and two medium (eight 17 cm mortars). There were also at least 13 Minenwerfer battalions as a reserve at the disposal of General Headquarters, that could be sent to support German attacks or to reinforce a hard-pressed sector. A Minenmerfer bat- talion had four companies, each equipped with six heavy and four light mortars. Stormtroop battalions usually included a morta company of their own, Independent Siurm- kompagnien generally had a section of up to four light mortars, Soldiers from the Pioneer units were already incor- porated into the stormtroop detachments, On 18 January 1915 an all-volunteer formation of Pioneers, was created to operate the newly developed flamethrowers. By a curious twist of fate, the com- mander of the Flanmenmerfer Abteillung, Major Herman Reddeman, was a former chief of the L zig fire brigade. He had been conducting experi- ments with flame weapons for several years before the war, and had collaborated with Richard Fiedler, the man credited with perfecting the first operational flamethrower. Two types were tested in combat: a man-pack version (Kdeines Flammenmerfer) operated by two men, static version (Grosses Flammenmerfer) that projected a jet of flame for +0 m. ‘To operate the former, one man carried the fuel tank on his back, while a second man aimed the tube. Compressed ni expelled fuel oil which was ignited as it left the nozzle, It was tested in February 1915 against the French near Verdun, and in June against the British. In both cases the terror inspired jamethrowers = and a ge Left: Stormtroop battalions included a battery of artillery ~ usually these cut-down Russian 76.2 em field guns, with an effective range of 1,000 metres. Used to engage enemy machine gun positions, they were hand pulled since horses were too vulnerable. (WM) Right: German artillery, rifles and pistols for sell defence. The Artillery Model Luger and Mauser C96 were particularly favoured because they doubled as light carb accurate at up to 100 metres when fitted with a shoulder-stock. (Pattern Room Collection)by jets of liquid flame enabled the German assault troops to capture their objectives with relative ease No man was prepared to rem: blazing fuel oil cascading over the parapet, The Fl Abteilung became the 3rd Guard Pioneer battalion. Initially composed of six companies, by 1917 it had expanded to 12 companies, chment and a regimental headq) Each flamethrower company consisted of 20 large and 18 small A platoon (Flammenwerferirupp) of bevween four and eight small flamethrowers was attached to most stormtroop in in a trench with mmenwverf a workshop dei ar ters. flamethrowers. battalions. Artillery The Krupp 3.7 em cannon tested in 1915 had proved 2 disappointment, but the Germans remained con- Vinced that the best counter to an enemy machine gun nest was a small field gun that used direct fire The Sturmkannone was duly replaced by a mountain howitzer that could be manhandled across the battle: field. However, in early 1916 the stormtroopers re: ceived a specially converted field gun, the 7.62 cm Infanterie Geschiitz. This was the standard Russian Front in 1917, serv Note the size profile of the bullet-proof shield. (WM) A German ‘trench gun’ in action. Some 50/‘close range’ batteries were added to the German forces on the Western ficld-piece with its barrel shortened from 2.28 m to 1.25 m, new sights graduated to 1,800 m, and a low recoil carr with wheels only 1.1 m in diameter. It fired a 5.9 kg (13 Ib) shell of German manufacture By 1917 chere were 50 infantry gun batteries on the Western Front; each stormtroop battalion included t forward for the one, and the others were bro close defence of threatened sectors or as support for local offensives. ‘They were also used as anti-tank guns, Batteries consisted of either four or six guns. During 1917 the Germans supplemented the infantry gun batteries with another 50 or so ‘close- nge batteries’ (Nahkamp/-Batterien) each of four 7.7 em field guns on special low-whecled carriages Instead of being fixed directly on the axle, the gun was mounted on trunnions forward of it. These batteries had neither transport nor horses, and were used primarily as anti-tank guns firing semi-armour- piercing ammunition. RECRUITMENT Every German male was liable for military service from his 17th to his 45th birthday, but parliamentary opposition to the spiralling military budget helped ensure that less than half the young men eli actually called to the colours before 1914. Senior eral ible were officers were also conscious that while the\ German machine gun platoon on the march during the second battle of the Somme, 1918. They are ‘equipped with captured British Lewis guns, which were used extensively by German machine gun units afver 1916. IWM) population had increased by 50 per cent since 1870, fhe Prussian nobility had not bred as quickly. Ex- panding the army too rapidly would necessitate com- missioning officers from outside the Junker class — an act so unthinkable that it was never fully imple: mented, even during the war. In the three years before World War I, only 45 per cent of Germany's potential military manpower went into the army. In 1914 the German Empire n army of 4.9 million men from a could mobilise otal population of 67.5 million, France, acutely aware of its numerical inferiority, had trained all its young men but the disabled, and fielded 5 million soldiers from a population of just 39.5 million, Between the ages of 17 and 20, German men were theoretically liable for service in the Landsturm, Service with the regular army began at 20 and con- sisted of two years’ duty with the standing army and three for those posted to the cavalry or horse artil- lery. After completing regular service, men were assigned to the reserve for four or five years respec tively, and were liable to be called up for two weeks’ refresher training each September, When a man reached 27, his liability for frontline service was over, and he was transferred to the Landirehr. At the age of 39, men were re-assigned to the Landsturm, essen tially a militia intended only for garrison duties. The high proportion of young men not selected for mili tary service were not forgotten, but were assigned to the Erstaz-reserce (supplementary reserve) for 12 years, and were theoretically liable for a little basic training. In 1914 this pool of untrained manpower provided a reserve of a million men in their twenties, and it was used to bring a succession of new reserve units to full strength, Drain on Manpower ‘The annual recruit contingent or class (Jahrresklasse) consisted of all men who reached the age of 20 in a given year. During the war Germany's enemies closely monitored the arrival of each class in the frontline, since the timing of each call-up revealed just how quickly German manpower was bei pended. Germany went to war in 1914 with the same passionate enthusiasm that gripped so many Euro: pean nations. ‘Thousands of young men volunteered ex 19a The Germans e enough Danish-made Madsen light machine guns from the Russians to equip a number of Musketen battalions These specialist light machine gun units fought on the Western Front during 1916, sustaining heavy losses on the Somme. (Pattern Room Collections} r service ahead of their conscription class, and the German Army expanded beyond its anticipated strength. The class of 1914 was called up at its normal time — the end of September — but there was a delay of several months before all the recruits were taken into the depots. The men of the Ersats-Rese were being organised into new reserve divisions.’ Meanwhile the existing Reserve and Landinehr for mations took their place in the German order of battle. The Landsturm was drawn upon to make up the losses, and was all but exhausted by the end of 1985. ‘The class of 1915 was called up between April and June 1915 (four months early). Yet this was not enough, and the class of 1916 was called up between August and November ~ a full year early. Neverthe tess, each class received four to five months’ training before being posted to the frontline. When the Ger- man Army suffered over 300,000 losses during 1915, steps were taken to comb out more personnel, men previously rejected as unfit were re-examined under more stringent criteria, and many found themselves in uniform after all. ‘The class of 1917 was called up from January 1916 (over 18 months early). Training time was reduced to three months as the holocausts of Verdun and the Somme shattered whole divisions, Writing after the war, several senior officers regarded 1916 as critical: the year the last of the peacet trained German Army perished. 2 The class of 1918 was called up from September 1916, and the first of these 18-year-old recruits were at the front by January 1917. Many of these young men were organised into new infantry formations.” ‘The class of 1919 was in uniform by the summer of 1917, but most of these teenage recruits were dis- patched to the Russian Front to release more exp. enced soldiers for service in the west Most German soldiers ignored regulations and kept diaries, often filled with details about their own, unit and those of their friends. But they were official documents that told the Allies even more; their paybook showed which class they belonged to, and from their company payroll number, the Allies could calculate how many men had been through a particular unit. Each soldier was alloted a number when he joined his unit, and if he was killed, cap- tured or invalided out, his replacement would be given the succeeding number. It was very logical, but very useful for enemy intelligence. Phe British Army had an officer at GHQ whose sole duty was the analysis of captured paybooks. British records show that, for example, a company of the 202nd Reserve ntry regiment included men from the class of 1918 as early as April 1917. By Seprember, the only members of earlier classes remaining in the regiment were returned sick or wounded. Recruitment into the assault battalions was vol- untary from 1915 until late 1917. Standards in thegh that when four ns were converted to stormtroops, more than 500 men had to be transferred out as unsuitable. Although officers could be posted to a stormtroop unit compulsorily, men of other ranks were supposed to be under 25 years old, unmarried and with a good carly Sturmbataillone were so h Tiger bate sports record. With Ludendorfi’s endorsement, the raining role of the stormtroop battalions expanded. Soldiers, and especially NCOs, spent a limited pe- od with an assault battalion before returning to heir original unit Re-organisation for 1918 Campaign he steady depletion of German manpower eventu- lly frustrated Ludendorff’s intention of raising all livisions to stormtrooper standard, In the winter of 917/18, as he planned Germany’s do-or-die offen. sive in the west, Ludendorff realised he faced an )superable demographic problem: too many men in nks were in their thirties, or unable to meet the ohysical demands of the new tactics. His solution was » reorganise the army, concentrating the you! into atta jonately ty divisions.” These received a dispropor ¢ share of ¢ artillery support, ummunitions, rations and training time. Ludendorff ssembled them into an elite striking force that, in 918, would achieve the first major breakthrough on Western Front. However, for every attack divi Skeletal remains of a German soldier Tie in an bandoned position, Constant artillery fire nade it hard enough to evacuate the wounded, let lone the dead, Bodies vuried in the frontline vere frequently Jisinterred by enemy shells. (US National Irchives) sion, there three trench divisions (Ste uninspiri were lungsdivisionen) of marginal fighting value. An mixture of the old and very young, they now were less well equipped and certainly less motivated. Ludendorff’s reorganisation is the origin of the myth that stormtroopers were like the World War II spe- ial forces: elite units recruited at the expense of less glamorous line battalions. In fact the organisation of the original stormtrooper battalions had not sucked the lifeblood of ‘ordinary’ regiments; they had been training units, and their personnel had eventually returned to their orig al regiments to pass on new ideas and _methods and contribute to a constant ‘levelling up’ of tactical skill. TRAINING Ludwig Renn’s novel describes the experiences of a sergeant posted to a stormtroop battalion in the winter of 1917: ‘We had to drag machine guns, fling bombs, advance along trenches and craw! without a I seated on sound. At first it was a severe strain on me occasion and several times everything reeled Then, daily it grew every around me, but only for a short time easier. We mere on duty from morning to night with only to or three hours of an interval at midday. I had no time for reflection and felt in good trim. 24Renn’s hero was not alone: a high proportion of the German Army was retraining that winter. As outlined above, the Army was being reorganised into ‘attack’ and ‘fortress’ divisions; the fittest men were concentrated in the former, and the very best among them were posted to the starmtroop battalions. ‘The First Units Captain Rohr’s stormtroop detachment had effec~ tively been a training unit since its inception. In December 1915 it hosted a cadre from the 12th Landwehr division, instructing several hundred of- ficers and men in the new tactics. The Landehs troops learned how to fight in platoons and sections, rather than lining up each rifle company in a tradi- tional skirmish line, They learned to use 1:5,000 s maps of enemy positions, rehearsing theit atcacks on full-scale mock-ups of the French lines. For the first time, NCOs found themselves given a real job of leadership ~ making their own tactical decisions. In 1916, after is performance at Verdun had proved the value of stormtrooper tactics, Rohr’s battalion established a base at the nearby town of Beauville, It had barely begun a training programme for the four Jiger battalions scheduled to become stormtroop units when the Brusilov offensive and Rumanian declaration of war forced OHI, to dis- n British soldiers pull away aptured heavy nenwerfer. The short range of the pre-war mortars larced the Germans to deploy them in the frontline, where they were vulnerable to capture if the Allies attacked. (Private collection) patch three of the battalions to the Eastern Front. Only the 3rd (Brandenburg) Jager battalion was retrained, becoming the 3rd Jager-Sturmhataillon on + August 1916, and 300 men had to be transferred from the battalion as unfit for the physical demands of the new role. The training programme involved repeated live fire exercises over dummy trenches, with flamethrower, trench mortar and infantry gun detachments all in action. ‘The numerous stormtrooper battalions estab- lished in December 1916 were regarded primarily as training units, Selected officers and NCOs from each infantry division served brief tours of duty with an army-level stormtroop battalion, returning to their formation to pass on what they had learned. The stormtroop battalions did not spend their time in the frontline, but remained at bases in the rear, though occasionally they would be brought forward to un- dertake trench raids or local offensives. Many assault battalions were alloted motor transport ~ rarity in the German Army ~ so their transit to and from the battlefield was as rapid as possible. The offensive at Caporetto was preceded by a period of specialised training in mountain warfare. oops assigned to the operation were sent to the 14th army front in September 1917 to acclimatise them; they undertook progressively longer marchesin the thin Alpine air in preparation. Further weap- ons training was also required, as they were issued with three MG °08/15s per company during that month, (‘The MG °08/15 was nearly as complex as the full-size MG °08, and almost impossible to keep in action without a fully trained crew.) ‘The extra firepower was a blessing, but there was a constant shortage of trained machine gunners for the rest of the w Retraining the Infantry German infantry taining altered during the war. The time allo ruits’ basic trainin reduced, but the content of their instruction became General 1 ated to re was more relevant, dendorff was not the pompous martinet he appeared. He had no time for the niceties of drill: it was irrelevant on the modern battlefield, and he likened it to dog training. (He had rd for the sort of methods used to ‘break in’ recruits in more recent times.) Endless drill, he a similar r remarked, simply deprives young men of their per- sonalities. ‘The infantry belligerents w battalions of most major taken out of the line for retraining at regular intervals, The catastrophic level of casual: ties made this essential: battalions often had to be flooded with new recruits to bring them back up to strength. When British battalions were withdrawn to. the rear, their refresher training often took place at central depots, under instructors based there rather This is one of the thousands of Lewis guns aptured by the Germans and modified to fire German 7.92 mm ummunition. The Mlusketen battalions replaced their Madsens with Lewis guns at the end 1916, and the machine un companies of many stormtroop battalions ‘etatined captured Lewis achine gun became vailable. (Partern Room Collection) The MG ‘08 was too cumbersome to serve iifensive weapon, but sinee the German army had shown such little Interest in light machine uns before the war, the Soldiers had to make do with it. Germans attacking vt Verdun tried to push heir MG ‘08s forward, leading to an intensive nachine gun battle in the ruined village of Fleury Private collection) 2than under their own officers. French infantry were also trained by officers seconded from the General Staff, However, German infantry remained under the control of their own officers all the time, includ ing training periods behind the lines. In both World Wars, the German Army ensured that its private soldiers had the strongest possible bond between them and their regiment. Each regiment was re cruited from a particular town or district, and a small cadre of officers and NCOs stayed there at the outbreak of war, ready to train the new recruits. Throughout the war, officers and NCOs from che regiment would return to the depot to supervise the training of new personnel. Returned wounded would be posted back to their old unit, returning to familiar faces. ‘The pre-war training of the German infanery was second to none. The veterans of the British Expeditionary Force may have been individually superior in many respects, but there were only six divisions of them. In August 1914 the German Army put four million men into the field. This was a tremendous asset that lasted Imperial Germany well into 1917. By then, many senior commanders were lamenting the end of the pre-war army, Ludendorff likening the German infantry of 1917 to a militia However, although the overall quality of the baccat ions may have declined through the horrendous losses on the Somme, the German infantry remained better trained than all its opponents, Even by 1918 between a quarter and a third of the German frontline infantry were pre-war trained.” Few British infantry companies had more than one or two indi viduals with any pre-war experience by then. French infantry battalions no doubt had more, but their pre war training was of little relevance: the elbow-to0 elbow charges persistently attempted in 1915 simply ve German machine guns an unmissable target German infantry officers received new training as well as their men, In the autumn of 1916 the Germans began to develop new defensive tactics, mainly as a response to the terrible power of the British artillery unleashed on the Somme. ‘The tradi- tional policy of packing the frontline with troops and not yielding an inch had cost the Germans dearly From September company commanders were sent on month-long courses at training areas just behind the fines. There they studied the new, elastic de- fences that were to prove so effective in 1917 Comprehensive retraining began a second time in the winter of 1917/18. Infantrymen received extra training in rifle shooting —a skill thar had been last byII armies on the Western Front — and took part in ndless route marches. By February 1918 battalions the attack divisions were marching as far as 60 km day the German infantry in 1914.’ By maintaining uch a relentless pace, the Ge » time to recover after their frontline was broken at Caporetto. However, the burden on the infantrymen ad increased beyond all reason. A critical shortage and an almost complete dearth of motor illery batteries had to make the same sort of breakneck speed demanded mans gave the Italians horses nsport ~ meant that io with only four horses per gun, and at least half the nfantry machine gun companies had to travel on ot. ‘The initial assault in M enefit of thorough rehearsal. Stormtroop battalions actised attacking full-scale models of their real bjectives. Officers and senior NCOs had accurate rial photographs to plan from. Live ammunition nes with unpre- ‘ch 1918 enjoyed the s used wherever possible, somet table results: I made practice attacks with the company on com- cated trench systems, with live grenades, in order to nto account the lessons of the Cambrai battle... we ad some casualties ... A machine gunner of my com- nny shot the commanding officer of another unit off his ‘ewing some troops. Fortunately se, while he was r ie wound was not fatal.’ Left: Shock troops implement the new skills of trench wart ‘live ring” trenches at Sedan, luguse 1917. (MW) lustrian and German soldiers draw hot rations on the Italian front, where Stormtroopers lead demolition of the Italian urmy in October 1917. Stormtroopers enjoyed better rations than line battalions, and spent less time in the frontline trenches, where hot meals were a rarity. (WM) he tactical manual they employed showed that the training role of the stormtroops was now com- plete, ‘The 1918 edition of the German infantry waining manual was effectively a stormtroopers’ handbook. ‘There was no mention of dedicated as: sault units within the all German infan- trymen were supposed to be trained in that way. The infantry squad was now the prime tactical unit, and attalion where earlier editions had included diagrams show~ ing long skirmish lines, there were now symbols representing rifle squads or machine gun or mortar teams, Six of the 18 squads in a company were designated light machine gun squads. ORGANISATION There was no standard organisation among the stormtroop detachments created in 1915/16. Most were simply infantry companies with a few added Only with the establishment of army-level assault battalions throughout the west did a general structure emerge. The stormtroop bat- heavy weapons talions formed in December 1916 consisted of: + Headquarters: 10 officers and 32 men (although some were larger). + 4 assault companies of about 4 officers other ranks. nd 120+ 1 or 2 machine gun companies, each originally of + officers, 85 men and 6 machine guns, but expanded to 135 men and 12 machine guns dur ing 1917. + 1 flamethrower platoon of between 4 and 8 man pack flamethrowers. * Linfantry gun battery of between 4 and 6 7,62 cm guns manned by about 80 men + Tmortar company with 2 officers, about 100 other ranks and eight 7.6 em mortars. ‘This formation included up to 1,400 officers and men, and was the basis of German infantry organisa- tion during World War I. The number of infantry vary from one to five of Their strength varied too: could Swurmbataillon Rohr Rohr’s companies were over 200 stron; the 3rd Jiger-Sturmbataillon had 263. Compared toa standard infantry regiment, a stormtrooper battalion included many more heavy Weapons German line regiments consisted of three battal- ions, each about 800 strong and organised as follows: * Battalion Headquarters. companies and those of + 3 infantry companies + TL machine gun company of between 6 and 12 MG “08s. + L mortar detachment of 4 light (7.6 cm) mortars. + I signalling detachment with 8 battery-operated signal lamps Fach infantry company consisted of three platoons, cach divided into four 18-man sections. The latter were further sub-divided into two squads, each of one corporal and eight privates. This, the Gruppe, was the smallest unit, and was originally only an administrative arrangement that served no tactical The advent of light machine guns and the new tactics changed this for ever. As noted above, during 1917 each company received three MG "08/ 15s and many had at least six of them by the end of purpose the year. The signalling detachments operated under the direction of the divisional signalling regiment; their largest lamps could be seen at up to 3,000 metres in daylight. German battalions tended to be weaker in man- power, but sometimes stronger in heavy weapons. ‘The Sth Grenadier regiment defending the Menin road in September 1917 was typical, occupying an 80-yard front with one battalion in the outpost zone, one in support and one in reserve. Companies aver- aged two officers, ten NCOs and 68 of other ranks. The heavy Mc regiment's comprised 08s, 32 MG °08/13s and 12 light mortars Weapons The An MG ‘08/15 team in action during the battle of Champagne, April 1917. As German infantry companies received more light machine guns, platoons began t0 subdivide into ‘gun groups’ and ‘rifle groups’, capable of independent fire and movement. (IMM)dead Germans found in 1e British wire after a ight raid near Givenchy [The stormtroop battalions ecialised in trench raids, fren breaking up ‘live and x live" arrangements hich sometimes jeveloped on quieter sectors of the front. -rivate collection) 80 men in the foremost battalion were caught by the British bombardment on 20 September and only 20 urvived to surrender Assault battalions were often divided into com- vany-size battlegroups and sent to undertake special issions in support of line infantry divisions. For sample, on 21 March 1918 the 3rd Jiiger Siurmbataillon was split into four: one infantry com- ny, one flamethrower platoon and two infantry ed to the 7 uns were assig 9th Reserve division; one mpany, a flamethrower plato! two infantry guns, \o mortars and a machine gun company went to the 50th Reserve division; a similar-sized force went to he 18th division; and one company and four mortars cre held FIGHTING SPIRIT World War I imposed an unprecedented psychologi- n reserve by the 2nd army cal burden on frontline soldiers. Battles were no longer fought and won in a few days, but lasted for weeks and months. Men no longer fought a visible foe: the infantrymen of both sides buried themselves in the earth to avoid the pitiless hail of projectiles. It was a war of men ag nes; flesh against steel. ‘The battlefield doubled as a burial ground, with human remains frequently disinterred by shellfire as fast as they could be shovelled away. There was no martial glory for infantry, They never stood trium- phant on a battlefield aba loned by the enemy, nor did they march into conquered cities; the frontlines hardly moved. All they could do was to endure he st nary infantrymen, they spent little time on the defen- sive, skulking in filthy trenches. Arriving at the front by lorry, they would filter into position after dusk and make a sudden assault on the enemy lines. By would be on their way back to base, taking ntry mtroopers were different: unlike ordi- dawn, the the in that sector to face the inevitable Allied retaliatory prisoners with them — and leaving the inf bombardment. They were certainly used to shatter the ‘live and let live’ system (the informal truce arrangements sometimes arrived at by German and Allied infantry) and they were conscious of their They wore customised uniforms, carried zs full of grenades, and tucked coshes and belts. Like fighter pilots and U- status, whole b: daggers into thei Boat crew, the stormtroopers became romantic ures to the German popular press — heroes to be 7emulated. The German war bond posters of 1914-16 featured a medieval knight, representing the G soldier; in 1917 the knight was replaced by a Jantern- jawed, steely-eyed hero in a Stullhelm, a gas-mask dangling from his neck and a bag of grenades at the ready. This was the new face of the German warrior Stormtroop battalions also served to bolster the fighting spirit of the rest of the army. To become a stormtrooper was the aspiration of many keen young recruits, and if the stormtroopers’ trench raids some times upset the frontline units in one sector, the reports of their deeds made welcome reading for German soldiers elsewhere. Men who had spent harrowing weeks under intensive Allied shellfire, unable to hit back, were heartened to hear of the stormtroops’ exploits. Their raids were not just re- ported in Germany, but featured heavily in trench newspapers, ane of which was even called Der Stosstrupp and carried a regular section entitled Stosstruppgeist (stormtrooper spirit). As the Royal Navy’s blockade of Germany began to take effect, so the German civilian population ran short of food as inflation eroded families’ incomes. After the privations of the dreadful ‘turnip winter’ of 1916, anti-war feeling within Germany led to parlia- mentary demands for peace and to industrial unrest. Soldiers could not be isolated from this: while the army could censor their letters home, it could not edit the replies. Morale suffered as news from Ger- many filtered through the ranks, It had some curious side-effects, such as soldiers hacking off their jack~ boot heels and posting them home to family members short of footwear. (The soldiers then drew new boots from company stores.) The morale of the stormtroopers was clearly higher than that of some units of the regular army This division was formalised in the reo mnisation 28 1 company of stormtroops rushes forward during an exercise: three platoons side by side, eacl officer. Nhe ‘enemy” rrenches have been overrun by the first wave. The men have their rifles slung, bags of grenades at the r many carry lon shovels ro entre handled nch their new positions. IWM) during the winter of 1917/18: the young, fit and keen were gathered into the ‘attack divisions’, and the less motivated were left behind. In the Kaiser's Bartle, this helped the Germans break through, but meant that casualties were concentrated among their best soldiers. The very success of this attack exposed the German High Command as liars: German propa- anda had claimed that the enemy were on their knees, that Britain was being strangled by the U Boats, but the size and content of the vast British supply dumps that were overrun that March told another story altogether: cases of coffee, chocolate, cigarettes ~ and the company rum, This proved all too tempting for hungry infantrymen in 1918, and looting slowed down the German advance. At the same time, even the least reflective stormtrooper became aware that he faced an uphill struggle. One soldier questioned in his diary whether the British were trying to make everything they could out of copper and brass, just to taunt the Germans, who were so short of vital metals. LOGISTICS Supplying troops in the trenches was fraught with difficulty. Supplies from the rear were likely to be unreliable, 80 troops going into the frontline took at least five days’ rations with them. Small cookers fired by solidified alcohol were used to warm food in the trenches, and large vaccum flasks were provided so shat hot coffve or soup could be carried up. Ration parties were dispatched whenever hostile fire permit- ted, delivering food from ration depots established close to the positions. They were frequently delayed by enemy artillery fire or got lost in the pitch dark-German 10 em guns ir sosition near the river Sereth during the invasion Rumania. Three of the our Figer battalions irmarked for conversion » stormtroop units in 1916 were rushed to the Eastern Front instead. Mier ighting in Rumania, they rejoined the Alpine Corps for the Caporetto offensive. (US National Archives) 2ess, so the drinks were often cold by the time the soldiers received them. Since most water in northern France and Bel jum was undrinkable, the German Army was forced organise local drinki water systems. Pipes were id from existing waterworks or mains and new wells ere dug and pumps installed. Breweries, sugar actories and other suitable buildings were c ‘o water treatment plants. Di nverted inking water was piped nto villages as close to the frontline as possible, and sometimes as far forward as the support trenches. This system broke down on the Somme, when the heer weight of Allied artillery fire cut the pipes. The Germans resorted to mineral water, taking over ex sting actories and providing reserves of carbonated er close to the front. When soldiers entered the they took two water bottles and as many bottles carbonated water as they could find The 1916-pattern Granatenwerfer weighed 16 hg, the steel platform mother 24kg, and was an awkward shape t0 6 unless dismantled. It fired its 1.85 kg grenade toa range of 50-300 m. The 1916 German organisation was 12 grenade throwers per infantry regiment. (Pattern Room Collection) Food Supplies In 1914, German field service daily rations consisted of + 750 g bread or 400 g egg biscuit or 300 g field biscuit g fresh meat or 206 preserved meat 1,300 g potatoes or 60 ¢ 250 ¢ vegetables « tables ‘The meat ration was gradually reduced, fallin; at the end of 1915, and to 288 g by mid-1916, when one meatless day a week was introduced. In October 1916 it was cut to 250 g. Portions of preserved meat were cut to 150g. Soldiers not actually in the frontline had only 200 g of meat from June 1916. 10 350g »Company commanders could order a daily ration ofa halfa litre of beer, a quarter litre of wine or 125 ml of brandy, rum or arrack. The daily tobacco ration was two cigars or cigarettes or 30 g of pipe tobacco. In the frontline trenches, soldiers often had to rely on their iron ration, They carried at least one iron ration, and usually more, It consisted of + 250 g biscuit + 206 g preserved meat or bacon + 130 g preserved vegetables g coll 2 2 5 salt German infantry on the Weste compelled to abandon the jor battles of 1916, Their splendid deep trenches provided excellent protection, but chey were con gets. Once British 9.2-in. howitzers ob n Front were r trenches during the ma- spicuous ta tained their range, the bunkers became death traps and the infantry was forced to fight from shell craters instead, Lurking in the surreal fandscape carved out 1 French 120mm gun in took place. This tactic action on the Aisne: after enabled smalll advances to their unsuccessful take place, but no offensive of 1915, the breakthrough could be French Army relied on its accomplished because it heavy artillery to pulverise took so long to move the the German positions ins forward. (Private before any infantry attack collection) by the guns, the infantry were much harder for Allied forward artillery observers to locate. But it brought new hardships: ration parties failed to reach many units or took so Jong 10 find the saldiers that the food was ruined. Wounded men could no longer be evacu~ ated along relatively safe communication trenches; instead they faced a hazardous journey across the wasteland, balanced on the shoulders of their com- rades. More often than not, they had to wait until last ght before any such movement could be attempted. MEDICAL SERVICES Each German infantry battalion had two medical officers, four medical NCOs (one per company) and 16 stretcher bearers. The latter ware che red cross and were officially non-combatants. In the trenches, companies usually established a medical aid post just behind the fire trench, The regimental aid post was in the second support trench and usually in dug-outs or cellars designed to accommodate 30 wounded men cach. They were provided with electric lighting, extra rations and stockpiles of dressings. ‘The regi al aid post was staffed by three battalion medicalsional fficers and cight stretcher bearers from the divi- bearer company (Sunitdtskompagnie). A ounded soldier who required more treatment than ¢ regimental aid post could offer was evacuated toa wagon rendezvous’ (IWagenhalteplats): a group of. jug-outs about 4,000 metres behind the regiment rid post and manned by personnel from the divi onal bearer company. Hot drinks and food could be >rovided here, and this post was connected by tele- hone to the main dressing station further to the Wagons kept here were sent forward under back ver of darkness to help the bearers bring ounded soldi The wounded were then evacuated to the main essing station, usually situated in a shell-proof helter, probably in a village about 10 km behind the rontline trenches. Walking wounded were assem- ied into groups at the wagon rendezvous and sent vack together. Wounded men were given medical ards that showed whether they were able to walk, ere fit to be transported to the rear, or were too adly injured 1 mave, Soldiers found at the main cessing station without a card or other authorisation, ere sent back to their unit ver enough stretcher bearers, wounded men were Because there were fien carried back by their comrades, but every tempt was made to prevent stragglers slipping back ) the aid posts and staying thi Evacuation Problems vacuating a wounded man was fraught with peril en if a stretcher party was not deliberately targeted the enemy, there was more than enough random vachine gun and artillery fire to strike them down, justav Ebelhauser helped carry back his friend ross the battle-scarred landscape of the Somme: ‘Every crater, every crevice, every hole unfolded w and more horrible pictures of death, One man they ssed had his carcass torn to pieces, and was missing his ad... Further on their feet dipped into the belly of mother, causing the bomels to burst from the mutilated ody ‘They reached the aid post, where Ebelhauses’s comrade died on the operating table,” Most casualties — perhaps as many as 80 per cent were caused by artillery. The shells burst into large hunks of razor-sharp iron that inflicted ghastly njuries. Although these soldiers often had the ben- German dead lie ina shellserape, struck by Allied artillery fire. Forced to evacuate their trenches by accurate heavy shellfire, the Germans fought from shell craters, where were still vulnerable to air burst shrapnel. (CS National Archives) efit of anaesthetic, it was difficult to evacuate them from a battlefield so often reduced to a sea of mud- filled craters. The sheer number of wounded fre- quently swamped the available medical facilities, condemning many men to a miserable death because they could not be treated in time, Gas Auacks By introducing poison gas, the Germans added a new dimension of horror to the battlefield, and if the Allies were slower to find such an evil use for their chemical industry, they soon made up for Yost time ‘The French had a working gas shell by 1916; Hi 31badgered the British government for gas shell too, and received a limited guantity for the latter stages of the Somme battle. By 1917 subjected to regular chemical attack, with the British specialising in saturation bombardments. One such attack struck St Quentin on 19 March 1918, just as the town filled up with troops for the German offen sive: 3,000 drums of chlorine British lines at 10 p.m., submer jerman soldiers were as were fired from the we the buildings in a thick greenish-white cloud, Respirators were of little help: the gas was in such concentration that no oxygen came through the filters, Fresh traaps enter- ing the area the next morning found the streets full of men coughing up the bloody remains of their lung One NCO from the 16th Bavarian reserve rei would survive the Kaiser’s Battle the followin but end the war hospitalised after a mascar attack — Adolf Hitler recovered fr refused to authorise the use of chemical weapons in World War II, He believed the Allies would retaliate with even ents than the scien tists of the Third Reich could provide m his injuries but ore deadly nerve a; Disease Until 1914, disease usually killed more soldiers than did the enemy, ‘The first major conflict in which bullets claimed more lives than germs was the Russo- apanese war of 1904/3. During World War I sol- diers of all armies on the Western Front experienced the same phenomenon — partly due to improved medical care, and partly due to the unprecedented carnage on the battlefield. The single most important medical achievement of the German Army was to shield itself and Germany from the typhus epidemic that inflicted such terrible suffering on the Serbs and Russians. Frequent de-lousing of their own men and enemy POWs kept the disease out of central and western Europe, while it literally decimated the Ser bian ni, In October 1918 Germany was strack by the worst influenza epidemic of the 20th century, The “Spanish Flu’ was a virulent infection that struck across the whole world in the late summer of that year; it afflicted America, Europe and Asia simulta. neously, but its effects were maxintised in Europe, where civilian populations were already weakened by years of poor diet. Few German families escaped the soaring fever and hacking coughs that characterised the infection, and by November there were 400 deaths a day in Hamburg alone, When the dise vanished — as suddenly as it had come — it left 400,000 Germans dead. More people died in the latter half of 1918 than in the entire war, Militarily, it was the last straw for the German Army ~ the end to the High Commands hopes of prolonging the strug zle, Even the most die-hard stormtroopers could not fight with a temperature of 40 degrees (104°F). The total number of German casualties during World War I will never be known exactly controversial at the time: the High Command had resorted to delibes falsification and many records were lost during the war. Approximately two million German soldiers died: roughly one in six of those mobilised. While in Britain the casualties sustained under Haig’s command have attracted socal criticism since the 1920s, it is worth noting that Germany's It was most successful offensive in the west, the great breakthrough in March 1918 and the subsequent ning at ‘ote how Stormtroopers 1 curters, ane and the sold left has a stick the ready. (WM)NCO, Sturmbataillion, May 1916Stormtrooper training, Sedan 1917ryCombat equipment (see plate commentary)rd Jager-Sturmbataillion counterattacks at Cambriaassaults between April and June, cost the German Army 125,000 killed in action, 738,000 wounded and 104,000 missing or captured — a total of 963,000 casualtics. COMBAT TACTICS Prior to 1914, German infantry tra exclusively devoted to offensive tactics. Yet there was no consensus on how to attack across a ba ed by quick-firing artillery, bolt-action rifles Imost lefield domi and machine guns. It seemed obvious that infantry needed to spread out to survive, but from the 1880s there was a sharp reaction against open order tactics, generals remembered the chaos that had ensued in many of the battles of 1870. At Gravelotte, for example, skirmishers became pinned down, unable to go forward or back, and whole battalions dissolved into disorderly mobs. Some officers came to believe that while closer formations might suffer more casu- alties in the short term, they were ea and by retaining mobility, they would lose fewer men in the long term. This school of thought was rather discredited by the Boer wars, when British infantry frequently pinned down by long-range Mauser to control, Trenches were clearly visible from the air, and Allied observer sireraft were constantly above the German lines, directing artillery fire against them. German wireless stations monitored their signals, and could give some warning when a position was about to be shelled, (CS National Archives) In the first years of the 20th century, Gern infantry reverted to widely spaced lines of skirmishers “Boer tacties’ — only to return to closer fa as the difficulties of controlling such scattered units An 80-man platoon spread over a became apparent 300 m front was impossible for its commander to m The commanders of the districts had a free hand in the trainin; which explains the patchy performance of Germa infantry in 1914: some divisions operated in thin jerman_ corps of their men, skirmish lines, others came on in dense masses as if machin s had never been invented. This lack of cohesion was punished with bloody finality in 1914 battalions attempting to close with the enemy in columns of platoons were cut to pieces. Even against the questionable marksmanship of the French and Russian armies, dense formations usually failed Against the BEF they were nothing short of suicide witness the bloody repulse of the Prussian Foot Guards at Ypres. Attacks with limited objectives Mier the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the German Army remained on the defensive in the west for the whole of 1913. ‘Throughout that year the French Army expended hundreds of thousands of men try= nan trench lines. Brit to break through the Ge ish attempts in the spring n- were equally 45disastrous. However, the Germans were not entirely passive: divisional commanders frequently ordered with (Angriffe mu limited objectives “attacks, 1n Ziele) to secure important ground or deny n to the enemy. Pre-war German doctrine dictated that the methods by which such attacks were achieved were the responsibility of the local com: manders, unlike their French counterparts, who snowed under with tactical instructions from the General Staff By employing re German all the pre-war tactics of siege nfantry were frequently able to seize French or British positions. The German Army had a far higher proportion of howitzers in its field artillery batteries, a wai id this proved to be a crucial advantage. High-trajectory fire was much more ef- fective against trenches than the flat-shooting field guns that made up the majority of British and French batteries. Howitzers, hand grenades and mortars enabled the German infantry to capture the frontline enemy trenches, and helped hold them against 3 attack. The vital high ground of Pilckem counte Ridge, the scene of their heavy losses in 1914, was taken by the Germans in April 1915 with the aid of 150 tons of chlorine gas, one attack with limited objectives that succeeded beyond expectation. Yet neither the artillery nor the new terror weapon ena- bled the infantry to make a major breakthrough EL Hs RT mee oF “The H Attacking infantry faced two mai 1 of Verdun’ obstacles — barbed wire and machine gun nests ~ and they had little time Defending artillery was likely to in No-Man’s Land the moment signal flares sailed into the air from the to deal with them, bring down a heavy barra enemy trenches, When, in February 1916, the Ger- man Army returned to the offensive and attacked Verdun, the assault was spearheaded by stormtroops and Pioneers. While German artillery batteries sup- pressed the French guns with new gas shell, detach- ments of sturmiruppen charged over the top to open aps in the French wire. ‘The concrete machine posts that dotted the g bank of the Meuse tacked by flamethrowers of Reddemann’s 3rd Guard Pionecr battalion. Other stormtroop units raced to lob gre- hills on the east the cently slopin were nades into the French trenches. In some sectors, mountain guns with large steel shields were manoeu- vred out of the German frontline trenches to er concrete strongpoints in direct fire. The stormtroopers were followed by the line infantry, swarming forward in skirmish lines remi- niscent of 1914. They occupied the French positions, overrunning any surviving bands of defenders. Suc- ceeding waves of infantry brought forward the MG “08s and box after box of ammunition to defeat ‘attacks. the inevitable French counter In October 1917 the Alpine Corps spearheaded the German offensive at Caporetto, the most comprehensive battlefield victory of World War I The breakthrough was complete, 30,000 Italian troops were killed and 300,000 surrendered. (US National Archives) Right: A German 7.7 em field gun at full recoil: the gun is mounted on a low wrriage with small wheels ke ita si et. 50 o0ft Nahkampf-l (close-range formed in 1917 used 7. guns converted in this, manner. (US National Irchives)The initial success at Verdun was not sustained after the first week. The French rushed in fresh infantry divisions and countless batteries of artillery and German casualties mounted. Attacking Ger- man regiments continued to organise detachments of mtroops to lead their assaults, but it proved harder and harder to coordinate the infantry rushes with the artillery support. Once beyond their ori frontline, the Germans were no longer workin accurate maps and aerial photographs. The French did not occupy such obvious positions, and many attacks came unstuck in hidden belts of barbed wire, or were decimated by previously: concealed machine ns, The initial ported by 1,600 heavy howitzers. unprecedented artillery concentration was incred- ble, but in a perverse way it led to a strengthening of he French defences. French infantry learned that digging proper trenches merely offered the German, zunners a clear target. In the moonscape battlefield of Verdun, the defenders began to fight from shell holes, improvised positions within. the tangled std nal erman infantry attacks were sup- uns, two-thirds of which were The devastation wrought by this and fortified basements To counter this more wreckage of the forests, among the ruined villages effective defence in depth, stormtroops tried to press ralless of what was happening to their flanks, trusting to the succeeding waves of infantry to follow their progress, German artillery began to employ a ‘rolling barrag a curtain of shells ahead of the infantry, although in practice the barrage often moved on too fast penetrated the network of French positions, they inevitably bypassed some of them: and this was the of ‘infiltration tactics’ on re dropping As stormtroop detachments Defending on the Somme The Verdun offensive was called off in the summer of 1916 when the British Army launched its long: awaited offensive on the Somme. Britain has never really recovered from this ~ its first experience of continental warfare in the industrial age, but for the Germans it was equally disagreeable. For German infantry, obliged to sit in darkened bunkers reverber- ating under the tons of high explosive, the Somme was a nightmare. British accounts might praise the German fortifications, frequently remarking that thedeep underground shelters were impervious to all but a direct hit, but this was small consolation when the monstrous guns of the Royal Garrison Artillery did score direct hits. Whole platoons were buried alive, Counter-attacks broke down as battalions lost half their men before they reached the start line, The English bombardment kept increasing in inten sity at the turn of each hour, Even when night settled acer the mutilated fields of France, there had been no let up... For three more days and nights it was for Ebethauser and his comrades nothing short of hell on earth, Fire came crashing down fiom all directions turning shell hole afier shell hole into open and silent tombs, How many soldiers lay buried there, soldiers whose bodies would never be found? The earth shook night and day ... The few remaining defenders of this section of the Western Front had become nothing more than crawling animals, seeking refuuge in ever fresh-made holes. They slid from one crater to another in vain search for food as well as protection, But neither could be found. 8 When warm summer weather dried the liquid mud of the Ypres battlefield, it broughe new attracted a plague of flies by day and rats by (Private collection) If the Somme left some officers and men in the British Army rather less confident in the judgement of their senior commanders, German infantry expe- rienced similar doubts in theirs. Infantry r followed the tradition of “Halten, was

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