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186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 93475. June 5, 1991.

ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy;

Requisites before double jeopardy could attach.––In People vs.
Bocar, We ruled: “Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d)
a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Among the condition for double
jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have been arraigned in
the previous case.––When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No.
2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before
the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the judgment of
conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his
arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among
the conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the accused
must have been arraigned in the previous case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.––
More-

______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

187

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

over, he is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised

Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, We held: “It is a cardinal rule
that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only
for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend
against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other. Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the informations were
for separate offenses, one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other
under the rule on double jeopardy, case at bar.––Since the
informations were for separate offenses––the first against a
person and the second against public peace and order––one
cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy.

PETITION for review from a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Esmeraldo U. Guloy for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

At around 8:30 o’clock in the evening of 14 March 1985,

along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an owner-type
jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly “hit and bumped”
a tricycle then driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in
damage to the tricycle
1
and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and
Paulino Gonzal.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed
against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple
physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code reading as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the

Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
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jurisdiction of

_____________

1 Rollo, 5.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

this Honorable Court the above-named accused, being then the

driver and person in charge of an Owner Jeep Toyota bearing
Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pilipinas ’85, and without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the
necessary care and precautions to avoid damage to property and
injuries to persond (sic), did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive, manage and opefate (sic) said Owner Jeep
in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, as a
result of which said motor vehicle being then driven and operated
by him, hit and bumped a tricycle SUZUki (sic) bearing Plate No.
NA-6575 MC Pilipinas ’85, driven by Ernesto Reyes y Esguerra
and owned by Ernesto Antonel, thereby causing damage to the
Suzuki tricycle in the amount of P7,845.00; and due to the impact
the driver and the passengers of a (sic) tricycle Suzuki, sustained
physical injuries which required medical attendance as stated
opposite their respective names to wit:

1. Ernesto Reyes –– More than thirty (30) days

2. Paulino Gonzal –– More than thirty (30) days
3. Patricio Quitalig –– Less than nine (9) days

and incapacitated them from performing their customary labor

for the same period of time.”

which was filed on 10 September 1985 with the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila and docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 64294 and assigned to Branch 68
thereof; and (b) an Information for violation of paragraph 2
of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment
of one’s victim reading as follows:

“That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the

Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused,
being the driver of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313
UV Pil. ’85 which hit and bumped a motorized tricycle with Plate
No. NA-6575-MC ’85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a
consequence of which Paulino Gonzal and Ernesto Reyes
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sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then and

there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic) them
and failed (sic) to help or render assistance to them, without
justifiable reason.”

which was filed on 14 November 1985 with the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 71) and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2793.

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VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 189

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig

rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding the
petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one’s
victim as defined and penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and to pay the costs.
Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila which docketed the
appeal as Criminal Case No. 70648.
In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68 of
the Regional
2
Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea of not
guilty. Petitioner’s appeal, Criminal Case No. 70648, was
decided on 31 July 1989. The court affirmed with
modification the decision appealed from. The modification
consisted merely in the reduction of the 3
penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) to two (2) months.
Still unsatisfied with the new verdict, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals on 31 August 1989 a petition for
its review, docketed as C.A.-G.R. CR No. 07351, assigning
therein the following alleged errors:

“I

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT ‘THE TRICYCLE
DRIVEN BY ERNESTO REYES WAS BUMPED BY THE JEEP
DRIVEN BY THE PETITIONER.’

II

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE FINDING OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF

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PASIG, METRO MANILA, THAT THE PETITIONER, ‘LOSING

PRESENCE OF MIND AS THE BLOODY SCENARIO WOULD
INDUCE IN THE AVERAGE MOTORIST, HE (SIC) OPTED,
PERHAPS INSTINC-

_____________

2 Rollo, 6.
3 Id., 6-9.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

TIVELY TO HIDE IDENTITY, APPREHENSIVE MAY BE OVER

THE ENORMITY OF HIS MISDEMEANOR AND THUS
DECIDED (SIC) TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE TO HIS
FALLEN VICTIMS.’

III

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN DECLARING

THAT, ‘AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE
DEMEANOR OF THE WITNESSES, IT IS DIFFICULT TO
DISMISS THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF SAID COURT GIVING
CREDENCE TO PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES’ FOR NOT
BEING (SIC) SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AND CLEARLY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

IV

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGED (SIC) ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, FINDING THE
PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ABANDONMENT
UNDER ART. 275, PAR. 2, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF TWO
(2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF ARRESTO MAYOR AND
TO PAY THE COSTS.

THE RESPONDENT HON. JUDGE ERRED IN NOT

DECLARING NULL AND VOID ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
4
OF PASIG AND ALL
THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT.”

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The Court of Appeals found no merit in the petition and

dismissed
5
it in its Decision promulgated on 9 November
1989. Pertinently, it ruled:

“We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner that par. 2 of

Art. 275 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to him since the
evidence allegedly shows that it was Ernesto Reyes, the tricycle

______________

4 Rollo, 18-19.
5 Rollo, 14-21.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

driver, who negligently caused the accident. Petitioner misses the

import of the provision. The provision punishes the failure to help
or render assistance to another whom the offender accidentally
wounded or injured. Accidental means that which happens by
chance or fortuitously, without intention and design and which is
unexpected, unusual and unforeseen (Moreno, Phil. Law
Dictionary, 1972 ed., p. 7 citing De La Cruz v. Capital Insurance
& Surety Co., 17 SCRA 559). Consequently, it is enough to show
that petitioner accidentally injured the passengers of the tricycle
and failed to help or render them assistance. There is no need to
prove that petitioner was negligent and that it was his negligence
that caused the injury. If the factor of criminal negligence is
involved, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code will come into
play. The last paragraph of Art. 365 provides that ‘the penalty
next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the
injured party such help as may be in his hands to give.’ Petitioner
was charged under par. 2 of Art. 275 not under Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.”

His motion to reconsider the above decision wherein he

strongly urged for reconsideration because:

xxx
“x x x We find it hard to visualize that the accused may be
penalized twice for an ‘accident’ and another for ‘recklessness’,
both of which arose from the same act. We submit that there
could not be a valid charge under Article 275, when, as in the case
at bar, there is already a pending charge for reckless imprudence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. It is our view that

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the charge under Article 275 presupposes that there is no other

charge for reckless imprudence.”
6
having been denied in the Resolution 7
of 17 May 1990,
petitioner filed the instant petition.
Before Us he raises this sole issue:

“Could there be a valid charge for alleged abandonment under

Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as
basis for prosecution. ‘2. Anyone who shall fail to help another
whom he has

______________

6 Rollo, 23.
7 Id., 5-12.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

accidentally wounded or injured’ when, he was previously charged

with ‘reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical
8
injuries’ under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised
Penal Code?”

He maintains the negative view and supports it with the

argument that “[f]or the same act, that is, the vehicular
collision, one could not be indicted in two separate
informations at the same time based on ‘accident’ and
‘recklessness’, for there is a world of difference between
‘reckless imprudence’ and ‘accidentally’.” As expanded by
him:

“x x x since petitioner is facing a criminal charge for reckless

imprudence pending before Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila x x x which offense carries heavier
penalties under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, he could no
longer be charged under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment x x
x for having allegedly failed ‘to help or render assistance
9
to
another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured’.”

In Our resolution of 1 August 1990 We required

respondents to comment on the petition.
In its Comment filed on 10 September 1990, respondent
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, putting the issue squarely, thus:

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“x x x whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365

of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to prosecution for
abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code.”

answers it in the negative because said Articles penalize

different and distinct offenses. The rule on double jeopardy,
which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore,
apply pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Hence, the
petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
In Our resolution of 13 March 1991 We gave due course
to the petition and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda. Petitioner
submitted his on 22

_____________

8 Id., 9-10.
9 Id., 11.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

10
April 1991 while the People moved that its Comment be
considered as its memorandum.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner
is actually invoking his right against double jeopardy. He,
however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his
petition or deliberately obscured it behind a suggestion of
possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The
reason seems obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that
issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would
have been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried,
and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in
Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial Court.
As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former
was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in
the latter took place only on 27 April 1989. Among the
conditions for double jeopardy to attach is that the
11
accused
must have been arraigned in the previous case. In People
vs. Bocar, supra., We ruled:

“Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b)

before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.”

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Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses

12
under the
Revised Penal Code. In People vs. Doriquez, We held:

“It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy

may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A
simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of
an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewhere,
where two different

___________

10 Rollo, 58-61.
11 People vs. Ilagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277; Andres vs.
Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216; People vs. Bocar, et al., 132 SCRA 166; Gaspar vs.
Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415.
12 24 SCRA 163, 171.

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Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each
crime involves some13 important act which is not an essential
element of the other.”

In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot

from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among
the people present and physical injuries to one,
informations for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed.
Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and
he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double
jeopardy. We ruled:

“The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same

offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different
provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under one does not bar prosecution under the other.”

Since the informations were for separate offenses––the first

against a person and the second against public peace and

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order––one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under

the rule on double jeopardy.
The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly
for separate offenses. The first, Criminal Case No. 64294,
for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole
chapter (Criminal Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi
Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The
second, Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one’s
victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two (Crimes
Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal
Liberty and Security) of Book Two of the same Code.
Quasi offenses under Article 365 are committed by
means of culpa.14
Crimes against Security are committed by
means of dolo.
Moreover, in Article 365, failure to lend help to one’s
victim is

____________

13 Citing People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People vs. Capurro, 7 Phil.
24; People vs. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472.
14 Article 3, Revised Penal Code.

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VOL. 198, JUNE 5, 1991 195

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals

neither an offense by itself nor an element of the offense

therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the
penalty by one degree. The last paragraph of the Article
specifically provides:

“The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this

article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in hand to give.”

Such being the case, it must be specifically alleged in the

information. The information against petitioner in this case
does not so allege.
Upon the other hand, failure to help or render assistance
to another whom one has accidentally wounded or injured
is an offense under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same
code which reads:

“The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:

xxx

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2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom

he has accidentally wounded or injured.”

The foregoing distinctions15satisfy the guidelines We made

in People vs. Relova, et al., wherein We held:

“It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the

constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with
absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown
need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be
regarded as the ‘same offense’ where the second offense
necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the
constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the
technical elements constituting the first offense need be present
in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here
seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements.”

_____________

15 148 SCRA 292, 310.

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People vs. Sabellano

Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or

procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two
informations against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is
DENIED without pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Note.––The rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment

of acquittal is not reviewable by a higher court for an
appeal by the government from the judgment would put the
accused in second jeopardy from the same offense. (Central
Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 49.)
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–––––o0o–––––

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