Commentary On the Book of Causes Thomas

title:
Aquinas in Translation
Thomas.; Guagliardo, Vincent A.; Hess, Charles
author:
R.; Taylor, Richard C.
publisher: Catholic University of America Press
isbn10 | asin: 0813208440
print isbn13: 9780813208442
ebook isbn13: 9780813210483
language: English
Liber de causis, God--Early works to 1800,
Causation--Early works to 1800, Creation--Early
subject works to 1800, Ontology--Early works to 1800,
Intellect--Early works to 1800, Soul--Early works
to 1800, Neoplatonism--Early works to 1800.
publication date: 1996
lcc: B765.T53S8213 1996eb
ddc: 122
Liber de causis, God--Early works to 1800,
Causation--Early works to 1800, Creation--Early
subject: works to 1800, Ontology--Early works to 1800,
Intellect--Early works to 1800, Soul--Early works
to 1800, Neoplatonism--Early works to 1800.
 Page i

Commentary on the Book of Causes

 Page ii
THOMAS AQUINAS IN TRANSLATION
EDITORIAL BOARD
Jude P. Dougherty, The Catholic University of America
Thérèse-Anne Druart, The Catholic University of America
David M. Gallagher, The Catholic University of America
Jorge J. E. Gracia, The State University of New York at Buffalo
David J. McGonagle, The Catholic University of America
Timothy Noone, The Catholic University of America
Kevin White, The Catholic University of America
John F. Wippel, The Catholic University of America
 Page iii

Commentary on the Book of Causes

[Super Librum De Causis Expositio]
St. Thomas Aquinas
Translated and annotated by
Vincent A. Guagliardo, O.P.
Charles R. Hess, O.P.
Richard C. Taylor
Introduction by
Vincent A. Guagliardo, O.P.
 Page iv
Copyright © 1996
The Catholic University of America Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National Standards for Information SciencePermanence of Paper for
Printed Library materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?1274.
[Super librum de causis expositio. English]
Commentary on the Book of causes / St. Thomas Aquinas ;
translated and annotated by Vincent A. Guagliardo, Charles R.
Hess, Richard C. Taylor ; introduction by Vincent A. Guagliardo.
p. cm. (Thomas Aquinas in translation)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Liber de causis. 2. CausationEarly works to 1800.
I. Guagliardo, Vincent A., 19441995. II. Hess, Charles R.,
1922 . III. Taylor, Richard C., 1950 . IV. Title. V. Series.
BD530.L533T47 1996
122dc20
95-22559
ISBN 0-8132-0843-2 (cl). ISBN 0-8132-0844-0 (pa)
 Page v

CONTENTS
Introduction ix
A Note on the Translation xxxiii
Outline of the Book of Causes xxxvi
Commentary on the Book of Causes
Preface 3
Proposition 1
5
[The Principle of the Entire Work]
Proposition 2
12
[The Three Grades of Universal Causes]
Proposition 3
[The Unity of Universal Causes through the Ultimate 19
Cause]
Proposition 4
28
[Intelligences]
Proposition 5
37
[Souls]
Proposition 6
45
[The First Cause]
Proposition 7
53
[The Substance of an Intelligence]
Proposition 8
[An Intelligence's Knowledge of Higher and Lower 60
Things]
Proposition 9
64
[An Intelligence's Knowledge of What Is above It]
Proposition 10
74
 74
[How an Intelligence Knows]
Proposition 11
81
[An Intelligence Knows Eternal Things]
Proposition 12
87
[Intelligences Know One Another]
Proposition 13
91
[How an Intelligence Knows Itself]
 Page vi

Proposition 14
94
[The Soul in Relation to Other Things]
Proposition 15
98
[The Soul in Itself]
Proposition 16
[The Dependency of Unlimited Powers on the First 103
Infinite Power]
Proposition 17
[The Assimilation of Unlimited Powers to the First 109
Infinite Power]
Proposition 18
111
[Universal Dependence on the First Cause]
Proposition 19
116
[Degrees of Participation in the First Cause]
Proposition 20
120
[Divine Rule]
Proposition 21
125
[Divine Abundance]
Proposition 22
128
[Divine Excellence]
Proposition 23
131
[Rule of an Intelligence]
Proposition 24
134
[Perfections Diversely Received]
Proposition 25
139
[Ingenerable Substances]
Proposition 26
143
[Incorruptible Substances]
Proposition 27
146
[Corruptible Substances]
[Corruptible Substances]
Proposition 28
148
[The Simplicity of Steadfastly Abiding Substances]
Proposition 29
151
[The Steadfast Abidingness of Simple Substances]
Proposition 30
153
[Temporal Things]
Proposition 31
158
[Eternal Things]
Proposition 32
161
[The Condition of the Soul]
 Page vii

Appendices
1. Another Proposition 29 167
2. St. Thomas's Citations of the Book of Causes 169
Bibliography 179
 Page ix

INTRODUCTION
The Commentary on the Book of Causes, composed during the first half of
1272,1 is among the last works of St. Thomas (122074). Why he undertook to
write such a commentary while he was in the midst of composing his chief
theological work, the Summa Theologiae, as well as a series of philosophical
commentaries on Aristotle's major works could be explained by his new and
important realization upon reading William of Moerbeke's recent translation of
Proclus's Elements of Theology:2 that the Book of Causes, which had become
rather problematically attributed to Aristotle, was in great part derived from the
former work.
The Book of Causes entered medieval Europe presumably via Spain through a
translation by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187),3 under the title: Liber de
Expositione Bonitatis Purae, the "Book on the Exposition of Pure Goodness."4
The work also circulated under a second title, Liber de Causis, presumably due
to the frequent citing of it by the opening proposition, which speaks about
primary and secondary causes.5 But under whichever title, the work was
commonly understood to be the completion of Aristotle's metaphysics.
Although its association with Aristotle made it sus-
1. See James Weisheipl, O.P., in Friar Thomas D 'Aquino: His Life, Thought and
Works (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1983), p. 284.
Also, see H.-D. Saffrey, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio
(Fribourg: Société Philosophique, 1954), Introduction, pp. xxxiiixxxvi. According to
Weisheipl, the commentaries on Aristotle's major works stem from 126973.
2. The translation was completed May 18, 1268. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino,
p. 235. For a more extensive introduction to the Book of Causes and St. Thomas's
commentary, beginning with the thought of Proclus, see Cristina D'Ancona Costa,
Tommaso D'Aquino: Commento al "Libro delle cause" (Milan: Rusconi, 1986), pp.
7120. For those interested in correlating the Latin to the Arabic terms, see her index of
terms, pp. 43763.
3. See Dennis Brand, trans., The Book of Causes (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1984), p. 4. According to Pattin, there is some evidence that Dominicus
Gundissalinus was also involved in this translation. See Adriaan Pattin, "Over de
schrijver en de vertaler van het Liber de causis," Tijdschrift voor filosofie 23 (1961),
pp. 50326.
4. See Brand, trans., Book of Causes, p. 4.
5. See Saffrey's introduction, p. xviii.
 Page x
pect from the viewpoint of its compatibility with Christian faith, it nevertheless
was widely read and studied during the "ban" on the works of Aristotle.6
Because this work, which deals monotheistically with a First Creating Cause,
was amenable to a biblical view of the universe, its contents spoke tellingly to
the Christian mind.
Almost immediately after the introduction of the Book of Causes into the
University of Paris, the question of its authenticity as a work of Aristotle was
raised. Albert the Great, for example, suspected the author to be a certain Ibn
Daoud, a Jewish author living in Spain and a contemporary of Gerard of
Cremona.7 St. Thomas referred to the author as the "philosopher" in his earlier
works, such as the Commentary on Boethius' On the Trinity (125859),8 but
with perhaps a bit of uncertainty, if not intentional vagueness. Aquinas's
suspicion that this was not a work of Aristotle might have preceded his
awareness of Proclus's Elements of Theology as the primary source for this
work, for in the De Veritate (125659), Q. 21, A. 5, he first vaguely refers to the
"author" of the Book of Causes, then a few lines later uses the term
"philosopher" to refer to the same author. Noting this, Vansteenkiste questions
the commonly made assumption by asking whether " . . . in the writings of St.
Thomas the term 'philosopher' indicates exclusively Aristotle. No one has
proven that as a fact, and I believe it could be a pure fantasy."9
Soon after its entry into the medieval university, the Book of Causes became
standard fare in the curriculum as the Masters expounded upon it. A number of
commentaries began to spring up, notably those of Roger
6. The ban of Paris in 1210 states: "Neither Aristotle's books, nor the commentaries
thereon, are to be read." Although renewed by Innocent IV in 1263, the situation
became completely reversed when in 1366 Urban V required the study of all the
works of Aristotle as part of the university curriculum. See M-D. Chenu, O.P., Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964), pp. 3739.
7. See Brand, trans., Book of Causes, p. 6. Also see Léon Elders, "S. Thomas et la
métaphysique du 'Liber de causis,'" Revue thomiste 89 (1989), p. 428.
8. See In Boeth. de Trin., Q. 6, A. 1, 3.2a.
9. See, Vansteenkiste, "Il Liber de Causis negli scritti di San Tommaso," Angelicum
(1958), p. 365. Weisheipl, however, understands St. Thomas's applying the term
"philosopher" to the author of the Book of Causes to mean Aristotle. (See Weisheipl,
Friar Thomas d'Aquino, p. 383.) On Vansteenkiste's side, it must be said that none of
St. Thomas's references to the Book of Causes explicitly mentions "Aristotle" as the
author.
 Page xi
Bacon (c. 121292), Giles of Rome (12471316), Henry of Ghent (?-293) and
the Latin Averroist, Siger of Brabant (123592).10
St. Albert the Great (120680), St. Thomas's teacher, also composed a
commentary. While the precise dating of his commentary remains conjectural
(between 1265 and 1272), it seems clear that St. Albert wrote his commentary
without knowledge of either Moerbeke's translation of Proclus or Aquinas's
commentary, since he evidences no awareness of the connection of the Book of
Causes with Proclus.11 Albert's viewpoint assumes the continuity of Aristotelian
thought with the development of Arabic philosophy. He remarks that this work
. . . was assembled by a certain David the Jew from sayings of Aristotle, Avicenna,
Algazel and Alfarabi. He put them in order according to the style of theorems, to
which he himself attached comments in the manner in which Euclid proceeded in
geometry. In the same way, in effect, that Euclid in his comments demonstrates
theorems one after the other, David has added comments which are nothing other
than the demonstrations of the proposed theorems.12
As a result, Albert views the text through a hermeneutic quite opposite that of
Aquinas, in which the approach of the author to the text is decidedly one more
of harmonizing than critiquing.13 Although Albert's attitude to this work differs
considerably from that of Aquinas, the end result coincides with the intent of
Aquinas as well: a more thoroughly Aristotelianized understanding of the
philosophical issues involved than the Book of Causes suggests by itself.14
10. See bibliography, primary sources, section 5.
11. See Leo J. Sweeney, S.J., ''Esse Primum Creatum in Albert the Great's Librum de
Causis et Processu Universitatis," The Thomist (1980), p. 603 and note 13.
12.Liber de Causis et de Processu Universitatis, ed. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 189099), v.
10, Lib. II, Tract. 1, Cap. 1.
13. Alain de Libera remarks, "Thomas lit le Liber de causis à la lumière de Proclus,
pour rejoindre la terre ferme de la théologie dionysienne; Albert l'interprète dans le
cadre d'un péripatétisme total qui, ici ou là, intègre certaines thèses de Denys.
Thomas voit dans le Liber de causis une adaptation critique de la thèologie
platonicienne; Albert y voit une somme du 'péripatétisime antique.' On ne peut faire
coincider deux herméneutiques aussi radicalement distinctes" ("Albert le Grand et
Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du Liber de Causis," Revue des sciences philosophiques et
théologiques 3 [1990], pp. 37576).
14. "Si l'on regarde bien, l'interprétation albertinienne n'est pas dans son résultat
opposée à celle de Thomas . . . " De Libera, "Albert le Grand," p. 375.
 Page xii
While Albert the Great attributes the work to a Jewish author, St. Thomas, as
we have seen, in the preface to his commentary surmises it to be the work of
an unknown Arabic author who had excerpted it from the Stoicheiosis
theologike, the "Elements of Theology" written by Proclus (41085), a
Neoplatonist. But regardless who the author might be, St. Thomas had
discovered the primary source, by means of which he could shed a needed
light upon this mysterious work. Accordingly, he employs Proclus's Elements of
Theology as a constant companion volume in his dissection and elucidation the
Book of Causes.15
Since neither Proclus nor the author of the Book of Causes is a Christian
author, Aquinas also employs the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius (also influenced
by Proclus) to evaluate both.16 Further elements for comparison throughout
the commentary are provided by the views of Aristotle, to which St. Thomas in
the main adheres, in contrast to the rather straightforward Neoplatonism
espoused by the author of the Book of Causes. Fi-
15. Unbeknown to St. Thomas, the author of the Book of Causes also draws upon
the Enneads of Plotinus for Props. 45(4), 9(8), and 22(21). See the introductory
notes to these propositions on S{26}, S{57}, and S{114}.
16. Pseudo-Dionysius himself employs an overall Neoplatonic framework in his use of
the triadic scheme: the one, which remains within itself as the principle; the
emanation of beings from the one; the return of beings to the one as their source. St.
Thomas adapts this in the exitus/reditus schema of his systematic works: God in
Himself, the procession of creatures from God, the return of creatures to God as their
end. See the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (I Sent., D. II, Divisio
Textus & III Sent., Prologue), the Summa contra Gentiles (Book I, Ch. 9, n. 4 & Book
IV, Ch. 1, nn. 12) and the Summa Theologiae (I, Q. 2).
St. Thomas's commentary on the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius is presumed to
have been written before he had read Moerbeke's translation of Proclus's Elements
(see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, p. 174). Because Aquinas understood the
works of Pseudo-Dionysius to be of almost apostolic antiquity (Weisheipl, p. 175), they
served as an important gauge for evaluating the thought of Proclus. But, as Chenu
notes, the works of Pseudo-Dionysius were also not without controversy: " . . . on the
very eve of Saint Thomas's entrance into academic affairs at Paris, there occurred the
great incident of 1241. At that time, the Parisian masters condemned several
propositions inspired by a neo-Platonism of Dionysian vintage, and undoubtedly many
Dominican professors at Saint Jacques were implicated." (Chenu, Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas, p. 51.)
For a study of the relationship between the thought of Pseudo-Dionysius and that of
St. Thomas, see Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).
 Page xiii
nally, there are issues from the side of Catholic faith that need to be
addressed.
St. Thomas's commentary, as we can see, is an involved study of several
juxtaposed currents of thought being counterbalanced, evaluated and
reappraised, making it somewhat more than the usual exposition.17 As a result,
the commentary emerges as a distinct philosophical work in its own right. But
before proceeding further into Aquinas's commentary, we need first to look
briefly at the Book of Causes itself, especially with a view to its doctrinal
contents.

The Book of Causes

The identity of the author of the Book of Causes, or Book on Pure Goodness,
remains an issue still debated by scholars. Pattin, for example, has argued for
Jewish authorship in twelfth-century Spain. Others, like Saffrey and Anawati,
have argued for Arabic authorship at an earlier date.18 If we follow the Arabist
view, the work belongs together with a number of other writings circulating in
the Arabic world that were of pseudonymous origin, in which greater authority,
if not survivability, could be assured for a work by attaching some well-known
and accepted name to it.19 The writings of the so-called "Dionysius the
Areopagite" fall into this cate-
17. Saffrey remarks: "Saint Thomas, lorsqu'il commentait le Liber de causis, avait
trois livres ouverts devant lui: la texte du Liber, un manuscript de l'Elementatio et
un corpus dionysien. Les textes de ces trois livres sont cité ad litteram, les autres
auteurs utilisés, et principalement Aristote, sont cités ad mentem. . . . Mais la
véritable intentio de Saint Thomas dans ce commentaire est de comparer les trois
textes. C'est là tout l'argument de l'ouvrage et c'est peut-être un cas unique dans
l'oeuvre du saint" (Sancti Thomae, pp. xxxvi & xxxvii).
18. See Brand, Book of Causes, pp. 56. Citing the work of A. Badawi, Richard C. Taylor,
and F. W. Zimmermann, de Libera considers the hypothesis of twelfth-century Spain to
have been refuted (see de Libera, "Albert le Grand," p. 350). In a recent article,
however, Pattin, examining the issue again, continues to argue his position: "Notre
conviction est que cet auteur se nomme Ibn Daud" (Pattin, ''Auteur du Liber de causis:
Quelques réflexions sur le récente littérature," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie
und Theologie 41, 3 [1994], p. 388).
19. Saffrey remarks, " . . . l'attribution à Aristote elle-même serait alors une pieuse
supercherie, s'il est vrai que, à partir du VIe siècle, toute oeuvre platonicienne pour
survivre dût se couvrir d'un pseudonyme quelconque: nous avons l'exemple de ces
fragments d'Ennéades, et aussi celui de la fiction dionysienne" (Sancti Thomae, p.
xxiv).
 Page xiv
gory; the Christian writer of these works presents himself as the Athenian
convert of St. Paul mentioned in Acts 17:34. While the writings of Pseudo-
Dionysius are thought to have come from late fifth-century Syria, the Book of
Causes, following the Arabist view, is suspected of having come from the
vicinity of Baghdad around 850.20
Evidence for the Procline inspiration of the Book of Causes is undeniable. As St.
Thomas progresses through his commentary, he documents no fewer than 37
of the 211 propositions found in Proclus's Elements that are relatable to this
work. In this light, the Book of Causes appears at first sight to be no more than
a compendium of Proclus's work, with the essentials abstracted and
highlighted. But that, as St. Thomas clearly recognizes, is only half the story of
this rather puzzling work. The author of the Book of Causes has formulated
much of the Procline, and thus Neoplatonic, view of reality in conformity with a
creationist, and thus more biblical, view.21 Any interpretation of this work,
then, requires careful attunement to a reworked and sometimes inconsistent
hermeneutical grid upon which the author has superimposed the thought of
Proclus.22
20. The works of Pseudo-Dionysius are first quoted at the Council of Constantinople
in 533. For the place and dating of the Book of Causes, following the Arabist view,
see Elders, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin," p. 428, and de Libera, "Albert le grand," p. 350.
21. In his "Doctrine of Creation in Liber De Causis," in An Etienne Gilson Tribute
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959), p. 289, Sweeney concludes: "If this
interpretation is accurate, then, the impact of the divine revelation upon our author
has been strong enough to break through an otherwise rather rigid neoplatonism and
his Supreme Cause becomes the 'First Creative Being.' Whereas Proclus' One causes all
things to be unified, the Esse Creans of the Liber de Causis makes every thing simply
to be by an act of genuine creation." In footnote 77 Sweeney further remarks, "This
interpretation is confirmed by Father Anawati's brief survey of creation in the Arabic
text . . . " He then quotes Anawati: "L'intention de l'auteur est nettement d'affirmer
une 'création' au sens monothéiste de mot. L'expression employée est abda'a (64,2)
que les Latins ont traduit par creans, avec ses dérivés . . . " (In G. C. Anawati,
''Prolégomès à une nouvelle édition du De Causis arabe," Mélanges L. Massignon
[Paris: A. Maissoneuve, 1957], p. 93).
22. This is not to say that the recognition and explanation of this hermeneutical grid is
without difficulties. As Sweeney notes in "Research Difficulties in the Liber de Causis,"
The Modern Schoolman 36 (1959): "Almost every proposition in the Liber exemplifies
that disconcerting use the author makes of the pagan Greek philosopher . . . so near
and yet so far from Proclus" (p. 111), so that we find " . . . puzzling statements
concerning items on every level of his Neoplatonic universe . . . enough to make one's
journey through the Liber slow and painstaking" (p. 115).
 Page xv
Outwardly the author proceeds in the highly formulaic style of Proclus's
Elements, introducing a proposition and then following it with appropriate
comments and corollaries. The procedure is "mathematized" in the style of
Euclid's geometry, a priori in fashion, proceeding deductively, downward from
the higher to the lower, from cause to effect, from the general to the
particular. The order of these propositionsthirty-one in all23gives the impression
of a "logically" flowing cosmos descending necessarily from an ideal pattern.
The airtightness of such a procedure might seem questionable to a
contemporary mind, and indeed, for reasons not always clear, the method itself
seems to break down in the hands of the author as the work unfolds. But the
author, while externally conforming to this ''Euclidean style," seems in truth not
wholly concerned about adhering strictly to this method, violating it at times,
as St. Thomas observes,24 without apology for any inconsistency. One might
be inclined to take this as an "internal weakness" of the work, but that would
be to judge it by criteria to which it seems interested in conforming only
loosely. It would be, furthermore, to miss the real novelty, if not intent, of the
work: to be something more than an abstract of Proclus.
The author states the first principle of the entire work: "Every primary cause
infuses its effect more powerfully than does a universal second cause."
Causality operates hierarchically in the universe: the first and ultimate cause,
who is God, gives being to all. Some of these beings are temporal, i.e.,
generable and corruptible. Others, i.e., higher souls, are on the horizon
between the temporal and the eternal, eternal in their being but temporal in
their activities. Still others are intelligences, i.e., minds alone, immobile and
"abiding steadfastly" as eternal. While the first cause is the cause of the being
(esse) of all beings (entia), other transcendent beings, such as intelligences
and higher souls, are also universal causes, not with respect to being (which
the first creating cause alone infuses), but with respect to the forms and
activities of other things. In this regard, souls know due to higher intelligences,
which are knowers, infusing them with knowledge, while things in the temporal
world move due to higher souls animating them. The threefold Procline scheme
of
23. The Latin translation used by St. Thomas incorrectly divides Prop. 4 in two (a
fact that St. Thomas notes), giving the work thirty-two propositions. See the
introductory notes at Props. 4 and 5.
24. E.g., S{27}.
 Page xvi
being, living, and knowing (esse, vivere, intelligere) is accordingly expressed by
these three descending orders of universal causes.
In view of this chain of causality, the fourth order, the temporal world of
bodies, is passive, informed entirely by what transcends it, having the relation
of image to exemplar. Thus nothing in this passing world is explainable simply
in terms of itself, but everything must be explained in terms of its higher
causes, which temporal things participate with respect to their being, nature,
and activities. All goodnesses, or perfections, that the things of this world
possess are infusions from the realm of higher causes, which, because they are
eternal, are more truly in being than the temporal things, which receive and
share these perfections from them. All the various orders of being, by reason of
cause-effect relations, touch, one upon the other, leaving no gaps between
them.
The first cause itself is understood in the style of apophatic theology: above
description and knowledge by any lower being, including higher intelligences
and souls. It is signified and named only by its first effect, an intelligence. It is
"infinite power," upon which all other powers depend, and it rules all things
without being "mixed" with them. The author is rather silent on the question
whether the first cause, although seemingly the creating God of Scripture, is
personal and free.25
While the first cause alone gives being to all, the author's conception of being
is not expressed altogether unproblematically.26 It is not put forward in terms
of the Aristotelian notion of act in contrast to potency, more familiar and
acceptable to St. Thomas. It definitely includes matter as what minimally
belongs to the existing things of this temporal world, but it cannot be just
matter, since being is given to intelligences and souls as well. The notion of
being, which the first cause alone creates and gives to all, does, however,
seem relatable to the Platonic notion that what is more common than and
therefore ontologically prior to everything else is being. This can be said of
anything existing, whether as inanimate thing, as soul or as intelligence. More
problematic is his stating that being and life in
25. See Sweeney, "Doctrine of Creation," p. 288.
26. Saffrey remarks: "Car il y a bien une création au sens fort de la cause première à la
prima rerum creatura, qui est l'esse, mais cet esse est l'esse superius, c'est-à-dire une
espèce de primum esse, qui sera cause de cette perfection dans les autres êtres.
Cependant, il est difficile d'apprécier exactement la position de l'auteur du Liber . . . "
(Sancti Thamae, p. xxxi). Also, see Sweeney, "Doctrine of Creation in Liber De Causis,"
pp. 28589.
 Page xvii
an intelligence are "two intelligences" being and intelligence in life "two lives"
and intelligence and life in being "two beings"27
Another point of difficulty has to do with "higher being" (esse superius) and
intelligences as eternal, in contrast to which the first cause, who is God, is
before and above eternity, just as he is above time. While such expressions as
"before and above eternity" serve to distinguish the first cause from other
eternal beings, the author leaves insufficiently addressed the question of
whether or not these latter beings always were. The extent to which the author
remains wedded to the ancient view of the "philosophers" on the eternity of
higher beings on this point remains, then, unclear.28
Intelligences are "full of forms," i.e., they know a priori. They are described as
pure knowers, who, in knowing, "turn to themselves." By this the author means
the total immanence of such knowing. This kind of knowing is possible only for
immaterial beings, which are simple in their being, without division and thus
parts.
If the being of an intelligence is self-knowing, reverting only to itself to know in
circular fashion, then the "motion" of the soul is self-motion, not having to be
moved by what is outside it, but itself moving other things. Heavenly bodies,
then, have souls, and "noble souls" move earthly bodies. They turn to what is
higher, intelligences, in order to know, but turn to what is lower in their
activities. In this, however, the author modifies the view of Proclus: human
souls are also higher souls, on the ho-
27. See S{77} and St. Thomas's comments on S{79}.
28. See S{12ff} and S{74ff}. While St. Thomas acknowledges that the term "eternity"
is sometimes used to mean "unfailingness and immobility of being," this still does not
remove the difficulty. See S{12}. St. Thomas clearly distinguishes elsewhere in his
writings the question of creation as ontological dependence in being from the question
of the duration of the world. Accordingly, " . . . although Plato and Aristotle did posit
that immaterial substances or even heavenly bodies always existed, we must not
suppose on that account that they denied to them a cause of their being. For they did
not depart from the position of the Catholic faith by holding such substances to be
uncreated, but because they held them to have always existedof which the Catholic
faith holds the contrary" (De Subst. sep., IX, 52; Lescoe trans., p. 63.) (See ST 1, Q.
4445 & 46.) Also, see Mark F. Johnson, "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of
Creation to Aristotle?" The New Scholasticism 63 (Spring 1989), pp. 12955.
Sweeney, as we have seen, argues for the compatibility of the Book of Causes with the
Christian view, "Although our author would have to be much more generous with
relevant data to enable us to answer affirmatively with complete certainty,
nevertheless our reply is yes" ("Doctrine of Creation," p. 289).
 Page xviii
rizon of eternity and time. Animals and plants have lower souls, and are not the
mere "icons" of some higher soul, as Proclus has it.29
There are other points on which it is quite clear that the author thinks
differently than Proclus and than Neoplatonism as a whole. The first, and
perhaps most crucial, is, as we have already mentioned, the question of the
first cause as the one God who creates. The author removes the polytheistic
overtones of Proclus, whose depersonalized gods, the henads, serve as the
ideas with which intelligences themselves become informed by what are higher
than they. Proclus, in Platonic fashion, preserves the world of subsisting ideas
through such henads or gods, impersonally conceived but nonetheless needed
as exemplars for all beings, knowing and otherwise. Consequently, between
the one and the multiplicity of beings Proclus inserts a world of forms, or ideas,
in the scheme of (1) the unparticipated as such (the one and good); (2) the
participated (ideas, henads or gods); and (3) what participates
(knowinglyintelligences and higher soulsor unknowinglyanimate and inanimate
things of the temporal world). The author of the Book of Causes simply
eliminates this intermediary category (as St. Thomas notes), and does so
without comment,30 presumably because it is unnecessary from a creationist
viewpoint, where the first cause itself, and not self-subsisting ideas, is the
direct and sufficient explanation of both knowing and being. In removing such
ideal subsisting forms between the One and the many, the author also removes
Proclus's ideal intellect, by the participation of which all intelligences are
supposed to know.31
This point of divergence profoundly restructures the entire key notion of
participation. For Proclus everything is participable except one, "the one and
good," which is above all. This means, as we have seen, that it can be
participated by other beings only indirectly through the interven-
29. See S{35}. Also, see S{36}, note 148. For a discussion of the meaning of the
corrupted term "yliatim" applied to intelligences and the common misunderstanding
of it as "matter" in Prop. 9, along with St. Thomas's insightful treatment of this
textual difficulty, see Richard C. Taylor, "St. Thomas and the Liber de Causis on the
Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances," Medieval Studies 41 (1979), pp.
50613. Also, see Cristina D'Ancona Costa, "Causa prima non est yliatim. Liber de
Causis, Prop. 8 (9): le fonte e la dottrina." Documenti e studi sulle tradizione
filosofice medievale (Spoleto) 11 (1990), pp. 32751.
30. See Prop. 3 and S{20}; Prop. 4 and S{29}.
31. See Prop. 13 and S{83}.
 Page xix
ing abstract and universal forms or ideas below it. In the world of the Book of
Causes this triadic view is replaced by a dyadic one which distinguishes
between the first creating cause and created being, but in which the first
creating cause is not "mixed" with created being. So, too, Proclus's triad of
being, life, and intelligence, while not supplanted, is somewhat curtailed and
interrupted by the same dyadic view. If the one is now the God who as pure
goodness creates all, without which there is neither being, life, nor intelligence,
then "all is in all" in a descending order of goodnesses, or perfections, where
each kind of being receives finitely from the "richnesses" of the infinite one
according to its capacity to receive, and multiplicity is explained by the diverse
recipients. The only actual infinite is the pure one, or pure goodness itself,
which participates nothing. All other beings are, to use St. Thomas's
categories, a mixture of esse as what is received and limited by form (and
matter) and form as what receives and limits esse. In the case of such beings,
the "infinitude" of form is not a hyper-real, self-subsisting abstraction vis-à-vis
concretely existing being (ens), but only a potency which receives being (esse)
from the unlimitedness which is God.

St. Thomas's Commentary

In his opening remarks in the preface to his commentary St. Thomas notes
how what is first in the order of being is last in the order of human knowing.
With this casual remark, St. Thomas is signaling an approach different from
that of the Book of Causes. From an Aristotelian perspective St. Thomas does
not consider what the Book of Causes talks about to be something immediately
and self-evidently knowable. On the contrary, the topics discussed in this work
are reserved for the end of philosophical inquiry rather than the beginning.
They presuppose a knowledge of logic and method, then a knowledge of the
natural things of our experience, which Aristotle deals with in his physical
treatises, and finally a knowledge of the human, both in terms of what is
proper to human cognition (the nature of material things) and in terms of the
end of human nature in that which transcends it. For this reason, the subject
matter of this treatise is reserved for the "mature" part of a person's life.
Furthermore, even this "final" knowledge remains imperfect in this life, limited
in its content to what is naturally knowable by the unaided use of human
reason, rather than based upon anything like revelation.
 Page xx
While this treatise does deal with "divine" things, it is for St. Thomas
metaphysics rather than theology proper. Thus St. Thomas interprets the first
proposition of this work in terms of Aristotle's four causes, in which the
meaning of the proposition reduces to a statement about efficient causes that
are universal and per se (eliminating the need for separated forms as causes,
as Platonism would have it). St. Thomas, following the author, remarks how
this principle is verifiable by experience, for when the "use of reason" is lost in
a human person, "life" may still remain, as does "breathing" in a comatose
person. And when "life'' is withdrawn, so, too, "being" in some sense remains,
as in the case of a lifeless body. While being is granted to all that is, in any
way, life is found only in some being(s). So, too, with respect to intelligence.
While St. Thomas does not raise the issue here of what is precisely meant by
"being," it is clear as the commentary proceeds that he would have us
understand "being" (esse) in terms of a more technical notion derived from
Aristotle, namely "act" (actus), specifically the act that all beings (entia)
participate from the self-subsisting "to be" (ipsum esse subsistens) which is
God.32 So, too, what God creates is not just being (esse), but the total being
(ens) of the creature as the subject of creation, where "to be" is the object, or
end, of creation.33 Consequently, the view that the Book of Causes
espousesthat higher intelligences and noble souls give other things their form
and activityis qualified by Aquinas to involve only some of the predisposing
conditions for their nature and activity, and that only in a per accidens way.34
Proposition by proposition, St. Thomas's commentary brings to surface and
explains the various propositions from Proclus's Elements that relate to the
Book of Causes. Several times St. Thomas remarks that Proclus
32. See especially the commentary to Props. 4, 6 and 18. From the other side, it
could also be said that St. Thomas somewhat "Platonizes" this notion: "Hence Plato
said that unity must come before multitude," so that the act of "to be" is " . . .
multiplied by its recipients," and " . . . because from the fact that a thing has being
by participation, it follows that it is caused. . . " (ST I, Q. 44, A. 1; Benzinger trans.).
See De Subst. sep., 3, where Aquinas asserts that both Plato and Aristotle agree in
the basic idea of participation. Fran O'Rourke remarks that once he has "[f]reed [it]
from its separatist nature, Aquinas fully embraces the Platonist principle of causality
and participation; in particular he makes his own much of the vision of the Liber de
Causis, which he continuously relates to the Corpus Areopagiticum" (Pseudo-
Dionysius, p. 127.)
33.
34. See
See ST I, Q. 45,
S{910). Also,A.see
4. S{2324, 3739, 62}.
 Page xxi
more clearly and coherently states the view that the author of the Book of
Causes is advancing. Sometimes this is due to the faulty or unclear translation
which St. Thomas has before him.35 At other times Proclus simply evidences
himself as the more proficient philosopher.36 Still, at other times St. Thomas
notes how the view of the author of the Book of Causes is actually closer to the
view of Christian faith, as a text from Pseudo-Dionysius or another Church
Father shows,37 or how the author departs from Proclus.38 At other times,
Aquinas uses such "Christian texts" to correct the author or Proclus in the
direction of a view more consonant with Christian faith.39 Finally, St. Thomas
also uses Aristotle in places as a philosophical "correction" of some Platonic
view.40
From all of this one might get the impression that St. Thomas is using
questionable measuring sticks to interpret and evaluate this work, but his
thinking here needs to be understood in its historical context. First of all,
concerning any issue touching upon faith, Aquinas as a Christian theologian will
uphold only that view which is compatible with faith. If a certain philosophical
view is opposed to faith, then according to Aquinas's hermeneutic, the choice
must be made in favor of faith e conflict is seen as due ultimately to some
error of human reason.41 On this score, Pseudo-Dionysius functions in the
commentary as the primary theological authority (and so theological correction)
for certain philosophical positions, especially "Platonic positions."42
35. E.g., S{51, 52, 73, 93}.
36. E.g., S{7, 47, 79}.
37. E.g., S{16, 20, 28, 33, 41}. Vansteenkiste notes 23 citations in St. Thomas's other
works where he couples Pseudo-Dionysius and the author of the Book of Causes as
authorities holding a particular view in common. See "Il Libro de causis negli scritti di
San Tommaso," p. 369.
38. S{1314, 29, 33, 41, 44, 58}. In S{21} and S{80} St. Thomas acknowledges the
monotheism of the author, in clear contrast to the thought of Proclus.
39. E.g., S{16, 24}.
40. E.g., S{24, 38}.
41. See In Boeth. de Trin., Q. 3, A. 1, ad 3.
42. The commentary " . . . is not merely a reading of the text; there is, in addition, a
determination of truth and here Dionysius is the principal auctoritas for correction as
well as confirmation. It is most significant that Dionysius is invoked precisely in the
central points of Platonic doctrine . . . in which . . . the De Divinis Nominibus becomes
 an anti-Platonic work. This commentary, therefore, continues the work of that on the
De Divinis Nominibus and with it constitutes an interrelated body of criticism
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page xxii
But when it is a matter of philosophy, then reason itself must decide the issue;
thus Aquinas repeatedly refers to "Platonic positions" (positiones Platonicae).
One might, again, think that this phrase serves as a "red flag," isolating
Platonism from Aquinas's Aristotelianism only to reject it.43 But, if one
examines the texts more closely, one discovers operative here a subtle and at
times involved method developed by St. Thomas for approaching "Plato'' and
"the Platonists."44 That Aquinas needed to work out such a method seems
inescapable, given the fact that Christian theology in the West, as it had been
received by Aquinas, had long been developed along Augustinian, and
therefore basically Platonic, lines. That framework was thought to be more
acceptable to express certain Christian themes than the more recent and
suspect Aristotelian approach employed by the Averroists.45 On this score, it
would oversimplify our understanding
(footnote continued from previous page)
directed precisely at the main theses dependent upon the via Platonica" R. J. Henle,
S.J., Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of "Plato" and "Platonici" Texts in the
Writings of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 384.
Also, de Libera: "La critique du platonisme au nora d'Aristote et de Denys est un
leitmotiv de l'interpretation thomiste du Liber de causis. . . . Thomas réaffirme qu'il
faut suivre la thèse d'Aristote et non celle de Proclus, car la position aristotélicienne
est davantage conformé aux exigences de la foimagis consona fidel christianae . . . "
("Albert le Grand," p. 370). And, "Le sens de la stratégie interprétative de Thomas
apparait ici clairement: si la thèse du Liber de causis a un sens, et elle en a un, c'est à
condition d'effacer en elle toute trace des positiones platonicas, qu'elles soient
inauthentiques ou authentiques . . . " (p. 372).
43. As A. E. Taylor, in Philosophical Studies (London: Macmillan, 1934), pp. 23132,
points out, the issues were no clearer with respect to Aristotle: "Here again there was
a definite tradition confronting him [Aquinas] . . . decidedly in favour of a pantheistic
and naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle . . . "
44. St. Thomas knew little Plato firsthand (see Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, p.
xxi). Due to sparse historical information, he frequently placed under the collective
term "the Platonists" a lengthy and varied development beyond Plato (see the
criticisms of C. J. De Vogel in "Some Reflections on the Liber de causis," Vivarium 4
[1966], pp. 6970). Acknowledgement of this difficulty is certainly not the same as the
removal of it. Nevertheless, what we have to deal with in the commentary is St.
Thomas's understanding of Platonismitself an historical matter. But see Henle, p. 447,
note 4, for a list of texts in which St. Thomas acknowledges differing views among the
Platonists.
 45. See Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, pp. 5058, on this Augustinian
tradition. As Chenu remarks: "St. Thomas himself, in those very passages where he
admits that Augustine was influenced by the opinions of the Platonists, was most
careful not to take exception to his texts, and he respectfully applied to them the
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page xxiii
of Aquinas to see him as a wholesale rejector of Platonism in favor of
Aristotelianism.46 The task facing Aquinas was more complex, and the tools
demanded to accomplish it, more subtle.
The formulaic statement "Platonic positions," with all its variants expressed in
the verb forms of ponere (usually ponebant),47 involves the structure of a ratio
(or radix, fundamentum, or principium) in which the positio (or opinio or
suppositio) is a conclusion flowing from such a reason, principle, or
foundation.48 In this light several possible approaches open up. St. Thomas
might critique and reject: (1) the ratio, or (2) the positio, or (3) both in the via
that the ratio-positio itself expresses. A ratio, then, might be maintained, such
as the principle of reducing a many to a one, but with a position drawn from it
that differs from the usual "Platonic position." Or the position might be
maintained, freed from its Platonic basis,
(footnote continued from previous page)
procedure of reverential exposition" (p. 52). We find a triadic scheme operative in
Augustine's thought similar to the one in the Book of Causes :" . . . a God who was
at once, for his creatures, the causa essendi [cause of their being], the ratio
intelligendi [principle of their understanding], and the ordo vivendi [norm of their
living]" (p. 56). So, too, " . . . Augustine was led to see created beings less in their
own proper consistency than in their representative value. The dichotomy of res et
signa [things and signs], in which all objects of knowledge were ranged, lay at the
base of his whole methodology'' (pp. 5556).
46. A. E. Taylor remarks: "It is not true that he [Thomas] changed the existing
philosophical tradition by dethroning one uncritically accepted and enthroning another.
It would be much truer to say that he retained and built upon the thought which had
been accessible to his own age by the recovery of Aristotle. . . . For the first time in the
life of the modern world he attempted something like a critical and thoroughly
historical appreciation of past philosophy in its entirety" (Philosophical Studies, pp.
23031). Henle (Saint Thomas and Platonism, pp. 30912) speaks of the more historical
approach to philosophy developed by St. Thomas, especially in the late work, De
Substantiis separatis ( 127173), in which he refers to Proclus by name. This work also
serves as another companion piece to the commentary on the Book of Causes, where
both Plato and Aristotle can be cited together by St. Thomas against the positions of
other philosophers.
47. In the present translation ponebant usually appears as "maintained" or "asserted"
to avoid the awkward and otherwise frequent use of "posited." Any appearance of the
phrase "positio Platonica" ought not be understood to insinuate automatically St.
Thomas's use of this ratio-positio method.
48. See R. J. Henle, S.J., "St. Thomas's Methodology in the Treatment of 'Positiones'
with Particular Reference to 'Positiones Platonicae,'" Gregorianum 36 (1955), pp.
391409, and the expanded treatment of this in his Saint Thomas and Platonism,
already cited.
 Page xxiv
where it is rooted in some other principle. In approaching these texts, then, it
is important to realize how St. Thomas deals with the "root" as well as the
"position," accepting, rejecting, or modifying the one, the other, or both. Since
a via exhibits a ratio and a positio, in which the ratio is the premise and the
positio the conclusion of a self-contained reasoning process, a via in Aquinas
indicates a purely philosophical method, distinguishable from and ancillary to
the quite different method of auctoritas, which he employs in theological
matters.49
The need for some such strategical method on Aquinas's part appears more
clearly when we realize that
[m]edieval discussion was carried on under the double rubric of a profound
reverence for tradition and a profound respect for reason. The medieval philosopher
or theologian was, therefore, forced to substantiate his teaching by placing it under
great namesthe Sancti et philosophiof the past, while, at the same time, supporting
it on a solid rational structure. His weapons of debate were twofold: auctoritates
and rationes. Saint Thomas employed both. . . . By using every variation of the
auctoritas-technique he was able to maintain his solidarity with Saint Augustine and
so enjoy protection of the same great name his adversaries invoked. At the same
time, by using the via-positio technique in his handling of Platonism he was able to
attack directly the fundamental principles which were Plato's source of error and
were still at work within Augustinianism. Thus it was that he could borrow the
auctoritates of his Augustinian adversaries while, without offending the Christian
veneration for Saint Augustine, he could, through Plato, destroy their rationes.
In addition, however, the application of the auctoritas-technique to the free positio
[i.e., a position freed from its Platonic ratio] enabled him, on due occasion, to
invoke the great name of Plato in witness of his own positions. His varying handling
of the subsistence of Ideas furnishes pertinent examples.50
That St. Thomas sees himself as a corrector of a number of "Platonic positions"
in his doing of theology, especially with reference to the chief
49. See Henle, "St. Thomas' Methodology," p. 401; Saint Thomas and Platonism, pp.
301 and 3078, 400 and 405. The idea of a via is also operative in St. Thomas's "five
ways" of arguing for the existence of God in ST I, Q. 2, A. 3. Henle isolates 24 such
uses of this ratio-positio method in St. Thomas's Commentary on the Book of
Causes: Props. 1, 2 (2 uses), 3 (4 uses), 4 (3 uses), 5 (2 uses), 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16 (2 uses), 18, 19, 32 (see Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, pp. 18395).
For a discussion of the auctoritas approach and St. Thomas's use of it as a method, see
Chenu, Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, pp. 12655.
50. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, p. 304.
 Page xxv
theological authority, St. Augustine, can be seen from a rather "unguarded"
text in the Summa Theologiae: "For this manner of speaking [that is to say,
that charity, love, and the like, are not something really in the creature but
only a participation in God] is common among the Platonists, with whose
doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to
some an occasion of error"51
The Platonic view found in Augustine is that of some kind of extrinsicism. St.
Thomas would have us see the above as involving not just an extrinsic formal
relation to God Who essentially is charity (love), but also an intrinsically formal
relation, so that charity, grace, and the like, when present, are really in the
creature as the term of divine activity: "God is effectively the life both of the
soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of
the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body."52
St. Thomas's treatment of the same basic Platonic approach in the De Veritate
is somewhat instructive on this score. He asks, in Question 21, Article 4, "Is
everything good by the first goodness?" He responds:
There have been various positions concerning this question. . . . The Platonists . . .
said that all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a conjoint
form, but as by a separated form. For an understanding of this point it should be
noted that Plato held that all things that can be separated in thought are separated
in reality. . . . Hence he asserted that good is separate from all particular goods, and
he called it "good-in-itself" or "the idea of the good" By participation in it, all things
are called good. . . .
This Platonic position was in a sense followed by the Porretans. . . . A creature is
called good simply, they said, not by any inherent goodness but by the first
goodnessas if good taken absolutely and in general were the divine goodness . . .53
51.ST IIII, Q. 23, A. 2, ad 1.
52. Ibid., ad 2 (Benzinger trans.). Also see De Veritate, Q. 21, A. 4, 3a & ad 3. Cornelio
Fabro puts the matter this way: While the truth of Neoplatonism lies in maintaining
that " . . .the real that we experience exists by means of that higher formality that
maintains and penetrates everything with its power . . . the difficult point for all of this
speculation lies in the divergence that remains between the formal unification of the
real in itself and the concrete unity of the real of our experience. While Platonism
opted for formal unity and lost real unity, Aristotelianism, on the other hand, opted for
real unity but lost formal unity . . . " ("The Overcoming of the Neoplatonic Triad of
Being, Life, and Intellect," in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought [Albany: University
of New York Press, 1982], p. 105).
53.De Veritate, Q. 21, A. 4 c. (Schmidt trans.)
 Page xxvi
St. Thomas's position, in contrast, incorporates Aristotle on the one hand with
respect to intrinsic form, and a "corrected" Plato on the other hand with
respect to God as the first efficient and exemplary cause:
If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its
likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be good by reason of an
inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and also
because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all
created goodness. In this respect the opinion of Plato can be held.54
Some of the "Platonic positions" found in Proclusand the author of the Book of
Causes insofar as he follows them as wellthat St. Thomas "corrects" in the
commentary are the following:
1. The "similitude" principle of knowledge, which presupposes that being must
be isomorphic with human knowing, so that what is abstract and universal in
our knowledge is also abstract and universal in reality, constituting a separate
world of ideas, or forms. In contrast, St. Thomas's position is that how a thing
is in reality (particularly and concretely) and in the one knowing (abstractly and
universally) are not the same. Following Aristotle, abstracting and universalizing
for Aquinas pertain to our way of knowing due to the activity of the agent
intellect in us. Knowing and being (except in God) are not the same. On this
score, St. Thomas is able to use the author of the Book of Causes as a
correction of the Platonic "root" for this position by asserting another principle:
that "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the
recipient."55
2. Another Platonic position is that abstract universals as prior self-subsisting
forms are the cause not only of our knowledge of things but also of the very
things that participate them. St. Thomas accepts the Platonic principle that,
wherever there exists a many having some form in
54. Ibid. But see the following article, where St. Thomas asks, "Is a created good
good by its essence?" to which he answers in the negative. The author of the Book
of Causes is cited twice in the solution, where the question is no longer one of a
received and limited form inhering in a created thing but one of what is something
essentially (God) rather than participatively (the creature).
55. See S{77} & S{108}. Although Boethius is frequently cited as the source for this
principle, the author of the Book of Causes more clearly and decisively articulates it.
See Vansteenkiste, "Il Libro de causis negli scritti di San Tommaso," pp. 36970. Also,
see Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, p. 331. See In Met. I, Lect. 10, n. 158, for a
succinct critique of this "similitude" principle in Plato.
 Page xxvii
common, there must be a one that is their source and explanation.56 But he
consistently rejects the "position" that the Platonists drew from it: that there is
a first, self-subsisting idea or form for every class of being in which others
exhibiting that form participate. Instead, St. Thomas places all such ideas in
God as the first efficient, exemplary, and final cause of things. The author of
the Book of Causes also has already made this correction (for the most part),
placing all such forms in the unlimitedness of the first cause and, to a lesser
extent, in the limitedness of intelligences and higher souls.57 Common being
for St. Thomas, then, is no longer "rooted" in a Platonic idea but in God: what
God is essentially (and thus does not participate), creatures have
participatively. But this must be understood analogously. Common being,
which is shared and so finite, is not God. Creatures constitute common being,
composed of act (existence, which is received) and potency (essence, which
receives). Common being, then, is always an effect, viz., the creature that
actually exists, really related to God as its cause, while God, in turn, is related
to the creature only by a relation of reason. Things are in one another "only in
the way that they can be in one another."58 In this context, the role of
intermediary Platonic ideas hierarchically arranged according to greater
universality or commonality between the One and the many as what the many
variously participate, is ''corrected" by being eliminated.59
3. The doctrine of the triad of being, life, and intelligence, explicitly a doctrine
of Proclus, is "corrected" by St. Thomas through his use of Pseudo-Dionysius
and Aristotle. He places this triad formally in God alone as the very "nature" of
God as the one who alone is being, life, and in-
56. See ST I, Q. 45, A 4. Also see Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, pp. 404407.
57. See S{44} and S{20}.
58. See S{66 and 77}. For the ideas in God, see ST I, Q. 15, A. 13; for God as
exemplary cause, see ST I, Q. 44, A. 3.
59. See S{6465, 6768}. St. Thomas accepts three basic kinds of participation: (1)
participation in predication, which is only logical and therefore univocal, involving the
ideas of species, genus, etc.; (2) participation of form in matter or of accidents in a
subject, which is real and univocal, where such forms, whether substantial or
accidental, exist only in the individuals with such forms, rather than as self-subsisting,
as the Platonist view has it; (3) participation of effects in a universal cause, which is
real but analogous, involving the relation of creature to Creator with respect to
perfections that pertain to the creature participatively, but to God essentially. See In
Boeth. de Heb., Lect. 2. Also, see In Met. I, Lect. 10, n. 154; ScG, II, Cap. 52 & 54.
 Page xxviii
telligence "essentially."60 So, too, the "Platonic position" of "the one and good"
as transcending being (esse) is also corrected through the use of Pseudo-
Dionysius: God's essence is simple, self-subsisting ''to be," which is goodness
itself.61
4. As a result of (3), the positing of an ideal intellect, which all intellects are
supposed to participate in order to know, is no longer necessary, as the author
of the Book of Causes also recognizes.62 So, too, the first infinite power is God,
not an abstract Platonic idea after the one and good,63 and God alone is
absolutely self-sufficient.64
5. The doctrine that intelligences (angels) create the nature of intellectual
souls and inform them with knowledge, which the author of the Book of Causes
espouses, is "corrected" by St. Thomas: creation of the intellectual or human
soul is due to the direct activity of God alone. Any informing of the human soul
with knowledge through the mediation of intelligences is only accidental, not
essential.65 So, too, any causal influence of intelligences and the heavenly
bodies on the formation of the human being is restricted to the human body,
insofar as matter is susceptible of being affected by such higher beings.66
6. The position of the author of the Book of Causes that higher souls
60. See S{20, 23, 80, 103}.
61. See S{47}. This view, however, is more strictly speaking that of St. Thomas. For
Pseudo-Dionysius, "to be" is the primary perfection of finite reality, caused by God and
from which God is named as from his first proper effect. But God as the Good for
Pseudo-Dionysius is above "to be" (see Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo Dionysius, pp. 123 and
275). In this regard, Aquinas could be said to be offering a "correction" of Pseudo-
Dionysius, insofar as for Aquinas "to be" is not simply the primary effect caused by God
as Creator but God's essence, and so God's most proper name.
62. See S{83}.
63. See S{92 and 9495}.
64. See S{112}.
65. See S{2324, 38, 62}. It is this doctrine which St. Thomas seems to have found the
most objectionable of all held by the author of the Book of Causes: " . . .we find that
certain people strayed from the truth by taking away from spiritual substances an
origin in a first and highest Author." Applied specifically to the author of the Book of
Causes: "Still others admit that all these substances have the origin of their being
immediately from the First Principle; but in the case of their other attributes, for
example, in that they are living, intelligible and the like, the higher substances are as
causes for the lower ones" (De Subst. sep., IX, 46; Lescoe trans., p. 56.) Also, see III
Sent., D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, ad 1 & ad 5.
66. See S{3739}.
 Page xxix
know in the way that intelligences do is "corrected" by a modification based on
Aristotle: while intelligences are "full of forms," receiving intelligible species
directly from God, the human intellect, Aquinas says, following Aristotle, is a
''blank tablet," which in its dependence upon the senses needs to turn to
phantasms in order to form concepts and thereby know its proper object, the
quiddity of material things.67
Other positions, ones common to the "philosophers," also surface in the
commentary, such as that the world is eternal, a view about which the author
of the Book of Causes remains unclear. Aquinas examines the position of
Averroes, who argues for the eternity of the world on the basis of the
impossibility of a new effect coming about from an unchangeable and eternal
will. Aquinas counters that in God, whose being is outside time and whose
understanding is sempiternal, sempiternal understanding and producing a new
effect are not opposed, just as similarly in us someone " . . .can, with his will
remaining unchanged, defer his work to the future, so that he does it at a
predetermined time."68
Another view common to the "philosophers," such as Plato and Aristotle, one
which the author of the Book of Causes shares, is that the heavenly bodies are
animated. Faith does not speak about it, and St. Thomas leaves the matter
undecided. Elsewhere he argues that the motion of such bodies can be
sufficiently explained by their heavenly bodies being guided by God as the first
unmoved Mover, a Mover which, as a single superior immaterial substance,
understanding many things at once, can also produce many simultaneous
effects among material things.69 But since the view that the heavenly bodies
are animated is an opinion and has the status of probability, the sense in which
that view can be maintained is, not that these bodies are themselves ensouled,
but that intelligences direct their motion.70
67. See S{69 and 92}.
68. See S{7477}.
69. See S{25 41}. See In Met. XII, Lect. 9, n. 2560.
70. See Quaest. Disp. de spir. Creat., A. 6. Aquinas, recognizing the differing views on
the subject of the heavenly bodies, the number of celestial motions, and the way in
which all this motion is to be explained, remarks, " . . .if some view should appear
later on in addition to those which are now stated . . . we must follow the opinion of
those who have attained the truth with greater certitude" (In Met. XII, n. 2566). Also,
see ST I, Q. 32, A. 1, ad 2.
 Page xxx
Although St. Thomas rejects, qualifies, or recasts a number of views expressed,
implied, or left undetermined by the author of the Book of Causes, he also
acknowledges a number of other views which do not need rejection or
"correction." In these instances St. Thomas offers an approving rather than
critical interpretation of the text.
This brings us to our final point of consideration: the views expressed in the
Book of Causes that St. Thomas takes over as themes expressive of his thought
as well, citing them frequently in his other writings. One finds echoes of the
author of the Book of Causes in some of the most common themes we have
come to associate with the metaphysics of Aquinas:71 (1) that the first being,
God, is the "cause of causes." giving being (esse) to all others by way of
creation; (2) that being (esse) as the "first of created things" is the most
proper effect of God, and, in St. Thomas's metaphysics, is the perfection by
which all other perfections are in the creature's real participation in what God
essentially is; (3) that God as the first cause is "innermostly" present in all
things by His abiding power as cause, preserving each thing in being; (4) that
the higher a cause is, the more extensive and intensive its effects, so that the
highest cause, God, is truly the first cause of all; (5) that the more united a
power is, the more powerful and unlimited in its power it is, God alone having
infinite power; (6) that second causes, while real causes, do not act without
the first cause, and whatever power they have is due to the power of the first
cause; (7) that God as being (esse) alone is infinite in that being, individuated
by His own being as "pure goodness;" (8) that God is above every name and
description; (9) that God rules all things without being mixed with them; (10)
that intelligences or angels, which are ''form and being" (essence and
existence), are simple substances, undivided in being, diversified by their
forms; (11) that such intelligences are "full of forms," i.e., they know a priori;
(12) that higher angels possess a greater number of universal forms of
knowledge, by which they know more things than do lower angels; (13) that
every intellectual knower reverts to its essence in order to know (although
Aquinas qualifies this when it comes to the human, who knows not by essence
but by an intellect that turns to phantasms in order to form concepts of
material things; (14) that the human
71. For a similar listing, see Elders, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin," pp. 43839. For a listing
of St. Thomas's citations of the Book of Causes in his other writings (including those
passages cited unfavorably), see Appendix 2.
 Page xxxi
soul is free from the conditions of matter both in its being able to subsist as
incorporeal and in its material activity of knowing; (15) that the human soul is
on the "horizon" of the eternal and above the temporal, sharing in both worlds;
(16) that what is received is received according to the mode of the recipient,
and not as it exists in itselfa principle that applies to the various modes of both
being and knowing; (17) that "all is in all" in the sense in which one thing may
be in another, a cause in its effect in the mode proper to it and an effect in its
cause in the mode proper to the latter.
Since many of these ideas found in the Book of Causes emerged out of a
"communally" worked out and so continually developing philosophical heritage,
the "originality" of the author of the Book of Causes cannot be claimed for each
and every one of them. Still, their formulation and development in the Book of
Causes bears the author's unique and undeniable stamp. When they are taken
up by Aquinas into his thought, though often expressed in the very words of
the author of the Book of Causes, they, too, bear Aquinas's unique and
undeniable stamp as well.72
The influence of the Book of Causes has extended beyond St. Thomas to other
medieval thinkers and, beyond and through them, to modern philosophy.
There, this "Platonic heritage" finds applications quite different from and often
contrary to those made by St. Thomas. One finds echoes of it in Descartes's
Meditations, in particular in his "ontological proof" for the existence of God,
according to which the idea of the perfect that exists innately in my
understanding contains more objective reality than does my thought of it.
Other echoes are present in the notion of the true idea found in Spinoza's
Ethics and "On the Improvement of Human Understanding," as well as in
Leibniz's conception of the monad, which corresponds in so many ways to the
intelligences in the Book of Causes and to St. Thomas's angelology. So, too, in
Kant, the notions of the architectonic function of pure reason, of the idea of
the Ideal as the indeterminate source
72. As Fran O'Rourke remarks, "It is a hazardous endeavor to chart the history of
intellectual influence; and in attempting to clarify the role of a chosen author, there
is an unconscious temptation to extol his importance beyond due measure"
(Pseudo-Dionysius, p. 276.) Determining the extent to which the author of the Book
of Causes directly influenced St. Thomas is, of course, a matter beyond the scope of
an introduction. The intent here is merely to point to a commonality of themes open
to further historical study.
 Page xxxii
of all determinate predications, and of the faculty of understanding a priori
constructing knowledgeall bear traces of such an influence. Finally, Hegel's
triadic system as the life of Spirit unfolding itself in creation and returning back
to itself in reconciliation seems undeniably indebted to the continued
undercurrents of such a tradition, stretching back at least to Plotinus and
Proclus.73
In an interesting "repetition" of history, Hegel sought to encircle religion, and
especially the Christian religion, within the compass of his philosophy as the
Idea of the Absolute, just as Plotinus and Proclus centuries before had sought
in their philosophy to encircle Greek religion within the compass of the One as
they understood it. Perhaps the absence of any such "grand" philosophy today
shows itself in the difficulty of finding in the "many" any ''One" by which they
are and are united, as Plato and the Neoplatonists did in their own way, St.
Thomas and the medievals in theirs, the moderns yet again in theirs. Even if
we are post-moderns at the "end of philosophy," to use Heidegger's phrase, we
at the same time still find ourselves asking the question of being, of life, and of
intelligenceon none of which, from the viewpoint of science today, can we
pronounce any too securely. So, too, the question of religion in relation to
these three questions arises.
In an age preoccupied so often with the hermeneutics of suspicion, the critique
of ideology, and deconstruction, the Book of Causes and St. Thomas's
commentary on it turn our attention to the indication of something else as a
motivating force in the history of human endeavors: the quest for Pure
Goodness in the unity of Being, Knowing, and Life Itself.
73. As A. E. Taylor remarks: "It was from these sources [the Neoplatonic writings of
Pseudo-Dionysius and the Book of Causes] that the schoolmen of the golden
thirteenth century derived the peculiar theory of causality upon which their
conception of the Universe rests, and it is most instructive, as an illustration of the
impossibility of drawing any real dividing line between ancient and modern thought,
to find Descartes, in the very act of professing to construct a new way in philosophy,
assuming as his fundamental principle and treating as evident 'by the natural light'
of the understanding just this same theory" ("The Philosophy of Proclus," in Taylor,
Philosophical Studies, p. 152). And: "The manner and method of Proclus are, in fact,
much those of the great rationalists of the seventeenth century from Descartes to
Leibniz and Locke. In method, in particular, he recalls at once at least two famous
names in modern philosophy, Spinoza and Hegel. Of Spinoza, he reminds us by the
care with which his method is based on Euclid and the geometers, of Hegel by his
insistence upon the grouping of notions in triads" (ibid., pp. 15758).
 Page xxxiii

A NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION

A translation of St. Thomas's Super Librum de Causis Expositio (Commentary
on the Book of Causes) presents an unusual set of difficulties: St. Thomas
commenting through the lens of a sometimes opaque Latin translation of an
Arabic work, itself drawn in great part, but departing in significant ways, from
an earlier Greek work, that of Proclus. The text chosen for our translation is the
one provided by Fr. H.-D. Saffrey, O.P., who attempted a critical edition of the
text by comparing the then-known available manuscripts. Since Saffrey's
edition (1954), further work on both the Arabic and Latin manuscripts of the
Book of Causes, as well as on St. Thomas's commentary, has been done.
Therefore, in translating, we have followed Saffrey's text except in those
places, always noted, where another reading of the text is now indicated.
Numbers appearing in the text bold and in brackets {} refer to the pagination
of Saffrey's edition and are designated S{} in the footnotes.
In translating, we have sought to remain close to the literal meaning of the
text, occasionally at the expense of some awkwardness in the English. This
involves retaining the inaccuracies and occasional omissions in the Latin
translation that St. Thomas presumably had before him, in order to show the
difficulties he himself experienced in trying to comment on this work, as his
remarks in the exposition from time to time indicate. In these cases we have
provided the necessary footnotes to help the reader understand the correct
text or the omissions.
As is the case with any translation, certain key terms have a nuance in one
language that is lost in another, or a technical meaning in one language that
they do not have in another. The latter is especially the case with the term
esse (the verb "to be" in Latin), which translates a nontechnical term from the
Book of Causes, but which in the thought of St. Thomas often has a more
technical meaning. For the sake of simplicity, however, we have translated this
term as "being," both in the Book of Causes and in St. Thomas's exposition,
and footnoted passages that are possibly ambiguous; we have changed the
translation to the inelegant "to be'' only in a few instances in the exposition,
when St. Thomas clearly
 Page xxxiv
intends it in his more technical meaning (e.g., see Proposition 6). The word
ens, indicating being in the substantive rather than the verbal sense, we also
translate as "being." Used less frequently than esse, it is usually accompanied
by an article or other qualifying adjective. The word "being" with the possessive
"its'' or without any qualifier, except where noted, indicates esse in the Latin
text.
The Latin expression influere, in its various forms, is translated as "to infuse,"
etc.; influentia usually as "infusion," but occasionally as "influence" Causatum is
rendered "effect" Superior is usually rendered "higher," but occasionally as
"transcending." We follow the conventional way of translating the expression
converti ad seipsum, in its various forms, which in the Latin has the sense of a
middle voice, with the active voice and the reflexive pronoun as "to turn to
itself," etc. We render reditio and its various forms as "reversion," etc. The
reader who wants to compare the translation of further terms with the Latin, as
well as Arabic and Greek terms, should consult the footnotes throughout.
In St. Thomas's exposition, quotations taken from the Book of Causes are given
in italics to distinguish them from other quotations, e.g., those from Proclus
and Dionysius, which are placed in quotation marks. Each proposition from the
Book of Causes is given a brief explanatory footnote, which relates it to
comparable propositions in Proclus, and in some cases to Plotinus's works, and
then lists St. Thomas's citations of this proposition elsewhere in his writings.
Since footnotes as a rule refer to primary sources, the reader is advised to
consult the bibliography for secondary sources.
For the convenience of the reader we provide the outline of the Book of Causes
that St. Thomas indicates as he interprets this work in the progress of his
exposition. This outline also provides a rationale for our assigning a "title" in
brackets to each proposition in the table of contents. The reader, however,
should be cautioned that the Book of Causes itself contains no such titles to
designate the subject matter of each proposition and that St. Thomas's division
of the text is not the only one possible. Consequently, such titles indicate St.
Thomas's understanding of this work rather than the expressed thought of the
author of the Book of Causes.
Two appendices are provided at the end of the work: (1) another version of
Proposition 29 (30) of the Book of Causes, unknown to St. Thomas;
 Page xxxv
and (2) a listing of texts from St. Thomas's other works that cite the Book of
Causes and various propositions from it.
Special thanks must be given to The Dominican School of Philosophy and
Theology at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, and to Marquette
University for their support in this project. Special thanks also to Fr. Hilary
Martin, O.P., and Fr. Owen Carroll for their involvement in the earlier stages of
this work, to Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P., for some suggestions about the
translation, and to Fr. Saffrey, O.P., for his encouragement of the undertaking
of this collaborative translation. Finally, special thanks to the Director of The
Catholic University of America Press, Dr. David McGonagle, for his patience in
understanding the delays that invariably seem to accompany translations.
As a final point of clarification, I note that Appendix 2 and the documentation
in the footnotes with respect to both the Arabic and Latin manuscripts of the
Book of Causes and the influence of Plotinus's Enneads are the work of
Professor Richard Taylor, who has devoted much of his academic career and
talents to sorting out the many difficulties contained in this sometimes baffling,
but nevertheless fascinating and influential work.
 Page xxxvi

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK OF CAUSES:

ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS'S DIVISION OF THE TEXT
The principle of the entire work respects the order found in causes, expressed
in a threefold way:
1. The first cause infuses the effect more powerfully than does a second cause.
2. The impression of the first cause recedes from the effect last.
3. The impression of the first cause reaches the effect first. (Prop. 1)
I. How universal causes are distinguished (Props. 215)
1. He distinguishes universal causes (Props. 25)
a. into three grades:
1) the first cause, which is God
2) intelligences
3) souls (Prop. 2)
b. How they are united through a certain participation in the ultimate cause
(Prop. 3)
c. He distinguishes intelligences (Prop. 4)
d. He distinguishes souls (Prop. 5)
2. He investigates these one at a time (Props. 615)
a. the first cause, God, is inexpressible whether
1) through a cause
2) through itself or
3) through an effect (Prop. 6)
b. an intelligence (Props. 713)
1) as regards its substance (Prop. 7)
2) as regards its knowledge (Props. 813)
a) how it knows things other than itself (Props. 812)
[1] it knows both higher and lower things (Prop. 8)
[2] it knows what is above it (Prop. 9)
[3] in general, how it knows things other than itself (Prop. 10)
[4] in particular, what it knows
[a] it knows eternal things (Prop. 11)
[b] intelligences mutually understand one another (Prop. 12)
b) how it knows itself (Prop. 13)
 Page xxxvii
c. the soul (Props. 14 & 15)
1) its relation to other things (Prop. 14)
2) in itself (Prop. 15)
II. How lower things depend upon higher causes and how higher causes relate
to one another (Props. 1632)
1. How lower things depend upon higher things (Props. 1619)
a. according to power (Props. 16 & 17)
1) all unlimited powers depend upon the first infinite power (Prop. 16)
2) how they are assimilated to it in greater or lesser degrees (Prop. 17)
b. according to substance and nature (Props. 18 & 19)
1) the universal dependence of things upon the first cause (Prop. 18)
2) the different degrees of closeness to the first cause according to the
participation of some natural perfection (Prop. 19)
2. How higher things infuse lower things with perfections (Props. 2023)
a. on the universal rule of the first cause (Props. 2022)
1) the manner of divine rule (Prop. 20)
2) the sufficiency of divine abundance (Prop. 21)
3) the excellence of divine goodness (Prop. 22)
b. on the rule of an intelligence, whose power is due to the power of the first
cause (Prop. 23)
3. How lower things diversely receive perfections from the first cause infusing
them (Props. 2432)
a. in general (Prop. 24)
b. in particular (Props. 2532)
1) on the difference between corruptible and incorruptible things (Props.
2527)
a) ingenerable substances (Prop. 25)
 b) incorruptible substances (Prop. 26)
c) corruptible substances (Prop. 27)
2) on the difference between simple and composed things (Props. 28 &
29)
a) a steadfastly abiding substance is simple (Prop. 28)
b) conversely, a simple substance is steadfastly abiding (Prop. 29)
3) on the difference between eternity and time (Props. 3032)
a) the order of temporal things to one another (Prop. 30)
b) the order of eternal things to one another (Prop. 31)
c) the condition of the soul as one between eternity and time (Prop. 32)
 Page 1

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS:

COMMENTARY ON THE BOOK OF CAUSES
 Page 3

Preface
As the Philosopher says in Book 10 of the Ethics,1 ultimate human happiness
lies in the noblest human activity, that of our highest faculty, the intellect, in
relation to the noblest intelligible reality. Since an effect is known through its
cause, it is clear that a cause is by its nature more intelligible than an effect,
although effects are sometimes better known than causes from our
perspective,2 because we acquire knowledge of universal and intelligible
causes from sensible particulars. Speaking unqualifiedly, then, the first causes
of things must be those intelligible realities which are in themselves3 the
greatest and noblest in that they are beings and true to the greatest degree,
{2} since they are the cause of the essence and truth of other things, as the
Philosopher makes clear in Book 2 of the Metaphysics,4 even though first
causes of this sort are known less well and later from our perspective. Our
intellect relates to them as an owl's eye does to sunlight, which it cannot
perceive well because of the sun's intense brightness.5 Therefore, the ultimate
human happiness possible in this life must lie in the consideration of first
causes, because what little we can know about them is worthier of devotion
and nobler than all that we can know about lower things, as the Philosopher
makes clear in Book 1 of On the Parts of Animals.6 However, as this knowledge
[of first causes] becomes complete after this life, we shall then be made
perfectly blessed, according to the words of the Gospel, "This is eternal life,
that they know You, the one true God."7
Thus, the aim of the philosophers was principally that, through everything that
they considered in [their study of] things, they might arrive at a knowledge of
first causes. Accordingly, they placed the science of first causes last, reserving
it for the mature part of their life. First they began
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X 7, 1177a1214.
2.quoad nos.
3.secundum se. On the distinction of things more knowable to us from those more
knowable in themselves, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I 2, 71b3372a5; and
Metaphysics, VII 3, 1029a34b11.
4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II 1, 99362631.
5. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II 1, 9936911.
6. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I 5, 64463234.
7. John 17:3.
 Page 4
with logic, which deals with the method of the sciences. Next they proceeded
to mathematics, which even children can have the capacity for. Third to natural
philosophy, which requires time for experience. Fourth to moral philosophy,
which young people are not ready for.8 And last they turned to the study of
divine science,9 which treats the first causes of beings.
{3} Thus we find a collection of writings on first principles that are divided into
different propositions, in a way similar to the procedure of those examining
certain truths one at a time.10 And in Greek we find handed down a book of
this type by the Platonist Proclus, which contains 211 propositions and is
entitled The Elements of Theology. And in Arabic we find the present book
which is called On Causes among Latin readers, [a work] known to have been
translated from Arabic and not [known] to be extant at all in Greek. Thus, it
seems that one of the Arab philosophers excerpted it from this book by Proclus,
especially since everything in it is contained much more fully and more diffusely
in that of Proclus.
The aim, then, of this book called On Causes is to delineate the first causes of
things. And since the word "cause" implies an order of some kind, and in
causes we find an ordering of one to another, [the author] introduces as the
principle of the entire work that follows a certain proposition concerning the
order found in causes. The proposition is:
8. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I 3, 1095a2. This reference is supplied by Fr.
Saffrey in a corrected copy of his edition.
9. I.e., metaphysics, first philosophy or philosophical theology. See Aristotle,
Metaphysics, I 2, 983a610; VI 1, 1026a1033. See St. Thomas, In Eth., VI, Lect. 7. St.
Thomas makes a distinction between two kinds of divine science, or theology:
metaphysics, which considers divine being as the principle and cause of all things, in
which divine being is not the subject of metaphysics but a cause that transcends the
subject, known only through its effects; and Christian theology (sacra doctrina), which
is based on Scripture as revealed knowledge of God as He is in Himself. See In Boeth.
de Trin., Q. 5, A. 4, c.
10. That is, the geometrical method of Euclid, which is imitated by Proclus in the
Elements of Theology. See Dodds, p. xi.
 Page 5

{4} Proposition 11
Every primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully2 than does a universal second
cause.

Now when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the
universal first cause does not withdraw its power from it. This is because the
universal first cause acts on the effect of the second cause before the universal
second cause, which follows the effect,3 acts on it. So when the second cause
which follows the effect acts, its act is not independent of the first cause,
which is above it. And when the second cause is separated from the effect that
follows it, the first cause, which is above it, is not separated from the effect,
because it is its cause.4
1. This proposition is derived from Props. 56 and 70 of Proclus's Elements. Cf.
Dodds, p. 54.45; p. 66.1416, 66.1830. St. Thomas relates it specifically to Props. 56
and 57. He refers to this proposition in a number of his writings, e.g. ST III, Q. 2, A.
6, 2a; III, Q. 6, A. 4, 3a; De Veritate, Q. 5, A. 8, s.c. 9; Q. 5, A. 9, 10a; Q. 6, A. 6c;
Q. 24, A. 1, 4a; Q. 24, A. 14c; De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 4c & 7c; Q. 5, A. 8c. In
Aristotelian fashion, St. Thomas analyzes the application of this proposition in terms
of the four causes, where the efficient cause expresses the primary sense of this
principle. Elsewhere St. Thomas relates infusion (influentia) to creation (" . . . the
infusion of the first agent, which is creation . . . " [ . . . influentia primi agentis, quae
est creatio . . .] [II Sent., D. 1, Q. 1, A. 3, ad 4]) and to God's both causing and
conserving the existence of things (esse rei) (II Sent., D. 15, Q. 3, A. 1, ad 5).
2.plus est influens super causatum suum. Literally, "pours forth more abundantly on its
effect." This key notion is here translated by forms of "infuse," a word derived from the
past participle of infundere, "to pour in." The modern English ''to influence" or "to
exercise influence" fails to capture the notion that the power of the first causeas
source for the second causeboth constitutes and thoroughly permeates the second
cause and all that proceeds from the second cause.
3.quae sequitur ipsum; literally, which follows it (causatum: the effect). As A. Pattin
has noted (Pattin, "De hierarchie," pp. 13031), this reading of the Latin entails the
more than awkward consequence that the second cause is said to follow the effect
that it causes. It is for this reason that Pattin adopted the reading, quae sequitur
ipsam: which follows it (causa prima: the first cause). Nevertheless, the correct
reading is quae sequitur ipsum, in which the Latin verb sequi is used incorrectly to
render the Arabic verb waliya, here found in the form of talihi. Waliya here means "to
be [immediately] adjacent to" or "to be near," not "to follow." For detailed discussion
 of this, see Richard C. Taylor, "A Note on Chapter 1 of the Liber de Causis,"
Manuscripta 22 (1978), pp. 16972. Note also that St. Thomas omits this clause when
he quotes
4. The this
Latin andpassage
two of in
thehisArabic
commentary.
manuscripts here omit a version that is pre-

(footnote continued on next page)

 Page 6
We find an example of this in being,5 living, and man, for it is necessary that
something be first of all a being, next a living thing, and afterward a man.
Therefore, living is man's proximate cause and being is his remote cause. Being
then is more powerfully the cause of man than is living, because it is the cause
of living, which is the cause of man. Likewise, when you assert rationality to be
the cause of man, being is more powerfully the cause of man than is
rationality, because it is the cause of his cause. The indication of this6 is that,
when you remove the rational power from a man, a man does not remain, but
living, breathing, and sensible remain. And when you remove living from him,
living does not remain, but being remains, because being is not removed from
him, but living is removed, since the cause is not removed through the removal
of its effect. As a consequence, the man remains a being. So when the
individual is not a man, it is an animal and, if it is not an animal it is only a
being.
It is, therefore, now clear and plain that the first remote cause is more
comprehensively and more powerfully the cause of a thing than the proximate
cause. For this reason, its activity comes to adhere more powerfully to the
thing than the activity of the proximate cause. It happens in this way only
because a thing first of all is affected by the remote power alone and then is
secondly affected by the power that is below the first.
The first cause aids the second cause in its activity, because the first cause also
effects every activity that the second cause effects, although it effects it in
another way [which is] higher and more sublime. When the second cause is
removed from its effect, the first cause is not removed from it, because the first
cause adheres more greatly and more powerfully to the thing than does the
proximate cause. The effect of the second cause is only through the power of
the first cause. This is because, when the second cause makes a thing, the first
cause, which is above it, infuses that thing with its power, so that it adheres
powerfully to that thing7 and conserves it.
(footnote continued from previous page)
served in the oldest of the three Arabic manuscripts: "because it [the first cause] is
cause of its cause. The first cause, then, is more the cause of the thing than its
proximate cause, which is [immediately] adjacent to it." See Taylor (1981), pp.
43738.
5.Esse is the translation of the Arabic anniya, which for the author of the De Causis
 does not have the technical meaning of the act of "to be" that it does for St. Thomas.
Rather, for him it is the formal substrate upon which life and intelligence are received.
See Taylor (1979), p. 506.
6. Saffrey, reprinting Bardenhewer's edition of the Latin text, has Et illius quod dicimus
significatio. Instead, read Et illius quidera significatio with six important manuscripts
(Aosta and Pattin's LOSTV) and the Arabic text.
7.quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia vehementi. The corresponding Arabic has: "so

(footnote continued on next page)

 Page 7
It is, therefore, now clear and plain that the remote cause is more powerfully
the cause of a thing than the proximate cause that follows it,8 and that the
remote cause infuses the thing with its power, conserves it, and is not
separated from it by the separation of its proximate cause. Rather, it remains in
it and adheres to it powerfully, as we have shown and explained.
Commentary
{5} Every primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully than does a
universal second cause.
To make this clear [the author] introduces a corollary through which he clarifies
the first point as through a certain sign. So he adds: Now when a universal
second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not
withdraw its power from it.To prove this he introduces a third point,
saying:This is because the universal first cause acts on the effect of the second
cause before the universal second cause acts on it. From this he infers what he
asserted in the corollary, and rightly so, because what arrives first must depart
last, for we see that those things that are prior in composition are last in
resolution. The meaning of this proposition, therefore, consists in these three
points: (1) that the first cause infuses the effect more powerfully than does the
second cause; (2) that the impression of the first cause recedes later from the
effect; (3) that it reaches the effect first. Proclus makes these three points in
two propositions. The first is in Proposition 56 of his book, which is as follows:
"Everything that is produced by what is secondary is produced more eminently
by what is prior and more causally efficacious, by which what is secondary is
also produced."9 He makes the other two points in the next proposition, which
is as follows: "Every cause both acts prior to its effect and is the basis of more
things after it."10
(footnote continued from previous page)
that it [the first cause] strongly adheres to that thing." This grammatically
problematic passage of the Latin is based on a literal rendering of a corruption in
the Arabic manuscript used for the twelfth-century Latin translation. The reading of
the Latin suggested by Pattin (I 17.6162) must be rejected in favor of this lectio
difficilior.
8.quae sequitur eam. While in Latin the referent of the pronoun eam may be either
cause (causa) or thing (res), in Arabic the text is unambiguous: "which is
[immediately] adjacent to the thing."
 9. Proclus, Prop. 56, Dodds, p. 54.46; Vansteenkiste, p. 286.
10. Proclus, Prop. 57, Dodds, p. 54.2324; Vansteenkiste, p. 286. Substitutiva,

(footnote continued from previous page)

 Page 8
After making these three points, the author proceeds to clarify them, first
through an example, second through an argument, at: The first cause aids.
Now the example seems to pertain to formal causes in which the more
universal a form is the greater priority it seems to have. {6} So, if we take a
man, [for example,] his specific form is observed in the fact that he is rational.
But the generic form is observed in the fact that he is living or animal. Finally
there is that which is common to all, being. Now it is clear that in the
generation of one particular man, the first thing found in the material subject is
being, then living, and after that man, for he is animal before he is man, as is
said in Book 2 of On the Generation of Animals.11 Again, in the process of
corruption he first loses the use of reason, while living and breathing remain.
Second he loses life, while being itself remains, because he does not corrupt
into nothing. And in this way the example can be understood with reference to
the generation and corruption of some individual. That this is his intent is clear
from what he says: So when the individual is not a man, that is, according to
the act proper to man, it is an animal, because animal activity, which consists
in movement and sense, still remains in it, and when it is not an animal, it is
only a being, because a completely inanimate body remains. This example is
verified in the very order of things, for existing things are prior to living things
and living things are prior to men, because when man is removed what animal
entails is not removed. Instead, the opposite12 is the case, because, if there is
no animal, there is no man. The same argument applies to animal and being.13
Then, when he says, The first cause etc., he proves the three points mentioned
above by an argument. Now he proves the first point, that the first cause
infuses more powerfully than does the second, in this way. Any characteristic
belongs more eminently to the cause {7} than to the effect. But the activity by
which the second cause causes an effect is caused by the first cause, for the
first cause aids the second cause, making it act. Therefore, the first cause is
more a cause than the second cause of that activity in
(footnote continued from previous page)
which Moerbeke uses to render the Greek hypostatikon, seems to mean "standing
as a basis for" or "constitutive of" as a difficult literal rendering of the Greek into
Latin.
11. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals, II 3, 736a24.
12. We read e contrario with Saffrey's corrected copy instead of the printed e converso.
13. For use of this analysis by St Thomas, see, e.g. ST, III, Q. 67, A. 5, ad 1.
 Page 9
virtue of which an effect is produced by the second cause. Proclus, however,
proves this more explicitly as follows.14 The second cause, since it is the effect
of the first cause, has its "substance" from the first cause. But from that from
which something has substance, it also has the "potency," or power, to act.
Therefore, the second cause has its potency, or power, to act from the first
cause. But the second cause is the cause of the effect through its potency, or
power. Therefore, that the second cause is the cause of its effect is due to the
first cause. To be the cause of the effect, therefore, lies primarily in the first
cause and only secondarily in the second cause. Now what is prior in all things
is greater, since more perfect things are prior by nature. The first cause,
therefore, is more the cause of the effect than the second cause.
He proves the second point, that the impression of the first cause recedes later
from the effect, at: When the second cause is removed etc. He puts forward
this argument: What is more powerfully in a thing inheres more [profoundly].
But the first cause impresses more powerfully upon the effect than does the
second cause, as was proved. Therefore, its impression inheres more
[profoundly]. Consequently, it recedes later.
He proves the third point, that the first cause arrives first, at: The effect of the
second cause is only etc., with this argument. The second cause acts {8} on its
effect only by the power of the first cause. The effect, then, proceeds from the
second cause only through the power of the first cause. The power of the first
cause thus enables the effect to be affected by the power of the second cause.
Therefore, it is affected first by the power of the first cause. But Proclus proves
this15 with one middle term in the following way. The first cause is more a
cause than the second. Therefore, it has more perfect power. But the more
perfect the power of any cause is, the more things to which it extends itself.
Therefore, the power of the first cause extends itself to more things than does
the power of the second cause. But what is in more things is first in arriving
and last in receding. Therefore, the impression of the first cause arrives first
and recedes last.
We should now consider the [kinds of] causes for which this proposition is true.
If the question refers to the kinds of causes, it is clear that it is true in its own
way in every kind of cause. An example has already been presented in the case
of formal causes. But a similar argument is
14. Proclus, Prop. 56, Dodds, p. 54.7ff; Vansteenkiste, p. 286.
15. Proclus, Prop. 57, Dodds, p. 54.25ff; Vansteenkiste, p. 286.
 Page 10
found in the case of material causes, for what first underlies as matter is the
cause of more proximate matter by materially underlying it, as prime matter
underlies the elements, which are in a certain way the matter of mixed bodies.
Both of these, in addition, show that the same is the case with efficient causes.
For it is clear that the extent to which some efficient cause is prior, to that
extent does its power extend itself to more things. Hence its proper effect must
be more common. But the proper effect of the second cause is found in fewer
things. So it is more particular. For the first cause itself produces or moves the
cause acting secondarily and so becomes the cause of its acting.
Therefore, the three previously mentioned points we have touched upon are
found originally in efficient causes. From this it is clear that this principle
applies to formal causes by derivation. For this reason [the author] uses the
word "infusing"16 here, while Proclus employs the word "production,"17 {9}
which expresses the causality of an efficient cause. But that this principle
applies by derivation from efficient causes to material causes is not so clear,
because the efficient causes of our experience produce not matter but form.
Yet, if we consider the universal causes from which the material principles of
things proceed, this order must also apply to material causes by derivation from
efficient causes. For, because the efficacy, or causality, of the first and
supreme cause extends itself to more things, it is necessary that what first
underlies all things18 be from the first cause of all things. Then second causes
add the dispositions in virtue of which matters are made suitable to singular
things.19 This appears in one way or another in the things of our experience,
for nature provides prime matter for all artificial things. Then certain prior arts
dispose natural matter to make it suited to the more particular arts. The first
cause of all things, however, is compared to the whole of nature as nature is to
art. Hence that which first underlies the whole of nature is from the first cause
of all things, and the function of second causes is to make it suitable for
singular things.
16.influendi.
17.productionis. Proclus, Prop. 56, Dodds, p. 54; Vansteenkiste, p. 286. In Moerbeke's
translation of this proposition, forms of producere are used to render forms of the
Greek paragein.
18.subsistit in omnibus.
19. That is, unformed matters created by the first cause have their being specified by
secondary causes, and from this process singular things are originated.
 Page 11
It is clear that everything we have said above is also verified in final causes, for
because of the ultimate end, which is universal, other ends are sought. The
desire for these other ends comes after the desire for the ultimate end and
ceases before it. But the explanation of this order leads back to the genus of
efficient cause, for the end is a cause inasmuch as the end moves the efficient
cause to act; thus, insofar as [the end] has the character of a mover, it
belongs in a certain sense to the genus of efficient cause.
If, however, someone asks whether for every genus of causes the above prove
true in all causes regardless of how they happen to be ordered, it is clear that
this is not the case. For we find causes to be ordered in two ways: in one way
per se and in another per accidens. The order is per se when the intention of
the first cause respects the ultimate effect {10} through all the mediating
causes, as when a craftsman's art moves the hand, and the hand a hammer
that pounds out the iron, to which the intention of the art reaches. The order is
per accidens, however, when the intention of the cause proceeds only to the
proximate effect. But that something else is in turn brought about by that
effect lies outside the intention of the first agent, as, when someone lights a
candle, it is outside his intention that the lighted candle in turn light another,
and that one another. What lies outside an intention, however, we say to be
"per accidens." Therefore, this proposition is true for causes that are ordered
per se in which the first cause moves all the mediating causes to the effect.
But in causes ordered per accidens it is the opposite, for the effect produced
per se by the proximate cause is produced per accidens by the first cause,
being outside its intention. Now what is per se is more powerful than what is
per accidens. For this reason he expressly says "universal cause," which is a per
se cause.
 Page 12

Proposition 21
Every higher being is higher than eternity and before it2 or is with eternity or is after
eternity and above time.

The being that is before eternity is the first cause, since it is the cause of
eternity. The being that is with eternity is an intelligence,3 since it is second
being. Existing in a single state,4 it neither undergoes change nor is subject to
destruction. The being that is after eternity and above time is the soul, since it
is lower on the horizon of eternity and above time.
The indication that the first cause is before eternity itself is that being in
eternity is acquired. And I say that all eternity is being but not all being is
eternity.5 So being is more common than eternity. The first cause is above
eternity because eternity is its effect. An intelligence is placed at or made equal
to eternity because it is
1. This proposition is derived from Props. 88 and 87 respectively in the Elements. Cf.
Dodds, p. 80.2527, 80.2223, 80.15, 80.22. St. Thomas relates it to these, as well as
to Props. 169 and 191. He cites it regarding God in ST, I, Q. 10, A. 2, 2a; regarding
intelligences in De Veritate, Q. 8, A. 14, 12a; ST, I, Q. 57, A. 3, 2a; Q. 61, A. 2, 2a;
and regarding the intellectual soul in SCG, II, 68; III, 61; De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 9,
27a and A. 10, 8a.
2.Omne esse superius aut est superius aeternitate et ante ipsam. Less literally, "Every
transcendent being transcends eternity and is before it. . . . " Esse superius, "higher
being" or "superior being," might be translated as "transcendent being,'' since this
more readily conveys in English the notion expressed by the Latin: those beings that
are not restricted to the temporal realm but transcend time in one or more of the ways
mentioned. Here and in most of this work, however, we retain the more literal
translation.
3. For St. Thomas these intelligences or separate substances are understood as
angels: " . . . in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances that
we call angels are called intelligences, and perhaps for this reason, that such
substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek,
they are called intellects or minds" (ST, I, Q. 79, A. 10c; Benzinger trans.).
4.esse secundum; secundum habitudinem unam, non patitur neque destruitur. This
Latin text is based on a minor but significant corruption (missing or misplaced
diacritical marks) in the Arabic manuscript tradition. The Latin translator read al-
anniyah al-thaniyah ("second being," esse secundum) while the correct reading is al-
anniyah al-thabitah ("being standing stable"). Thus the Arabic has a commonplace,
formulaic description of the nature of an intelligence: "It is being standing stable in a
single state, neither being acted upon nor undergoing transformation." See Taylor
(1981),
5.omnis pp. 145; 35556;
aeternitas 44243.
est esse sed non omne esse est aeternitas.
 Page 13
coextensive with eternity and neither changes nor is subject to destruction.
The soul is joined to eternity in a lower way, since it is more susceptible to
impression than is an intelligence, and it is above time, since it is the cause of
time.
Commentary
{11} After setting down the first proposition, which serves as a certain principle
for the entire treatise that follows, [the author] begins here to treat of the first
causes of things. He divides [the treatment] into two parts. In the first part he
treats of the distinction of first causes. In the second part he treats of their
coordination or dependence upon one another, in Proposition 16, at: All the
powers that have no limit etc. He further divides the first part into two parts. In
the first part he distinguishes first causes. In the second part he delineates
them individually, in Proposition 6, at: The first cause transcends6 etc.
Now the universal causes of things are of three kinds: (1) the first cause, which
is God, (2) intelligences, and (3) souls. Regarding the first division he does
three things: (1) he distinguishes these three kinds, in which the first is
undivided because there is only one first cause; (2) he distinguishes
intelligences, in Proposition 4, at: The first of created things etc.; (3) he
distinguishes souls, in Proposition 5, at: The higher intelligences etc.
Regarding the very first division he makes, he does two things. First, he
distinguishes the three kinds just mentioned. Second, he shows how they are
united through a certain participation in the ultimate, in Proposition 3, at:
Every noble soul etc.
With regard to the first division he asserts the following proposition: Every
higher being is higher than eternity and is before it, or is with eternity, or is
after eternity and above time. To understand this proposition it is necessary
first to see what eternity is, then in what way the above proposition is true.
Now the word "eternity" implies a certain unfailingness or unendingness,7 for
to be eternal means to exist, as it were, without {12} limits.
6.superior est.
7.interminabilitatem, which contrasts in Latin with extra terminos, "without limits," in
the same sentence.
 Page 14
But because, as the Philosopher says in Book 8 of the Physics,8 in every motion
there is some corruption and generation, inasmuch as something begins to be
and something ceases to be, there must be some deficiency9 in any motion
whatsoever. Thus all motion is repugnant to eternity. True eternity, along with
unfailingness of being, then, implies immobility as well. Now because the
before and after in the duration of time result from motion, as is clear in Book 4
of the Physics,10 it is therefore necessary, third, that eternity be existing all at
the same time, without a before and after, as Boethius defines it at the end of
On the Consolation of Philosophy, saying: "Eternity is the simultaneously total
and perfect possession of unending life." 11
Therefore, any thing with unfailingness of being that has immobility and is
without temporal succession can be called eternal. The Platonists and the
Peripatetics called immaterial separate substances eternal in this sense, adding
to the notion of eternity that it always had being.12 But this is not in accord
with Christian faith,13 for eternity in this sense belongs to God alone.14 We call
them eternal, however, as things that begin to obtain from God perpetual and
unfailing being without motion and temporal succession. So Dionysius also
says, in Chapter 10 of On the Divine Names,15 that the things that are called
eternal in Scripture are not ab-
8. Aristotle, Physics, VIII 3, 254a1112.
9.deficientia, which contrasts with indeficientia, "unfailinghess" below.
10. Aristotle, Physics, IV 11, 219a1719.
11. Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, V, Prosa 6; CSEL LXVII, p. 122.1213;
PL 63, 858 A. Testor (1973), p. 423: "Eternity, then, is the whole, simultaneous and
perfect possession of boundless life . . . " Also, see I Sent., D. 8, Q. 2, A. 1 for St.
Thomas's discussion of Boethius's definition.
12. Cf. St. Augustine, City of God, X, Chap. 31; PL 41, 311. See II Sent., D. 1, Q. 1, A. 5
and SCG, II, 3237 for St. Thomas's discussion of such arguments.
13. Cf. Concilium Lateranense IV, cap. 1: Firmiter; Denzinger, Enchir. Symb., n. 428;
and S. Th., In Decret. Iam Exp., p. 333 (Mandonnet).
14. Regarding the eternity of God, see ST, I, Q. 10, A. 13 and I Sent., D. 19, Q. 2, A.
12.
15. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, Chap. 10, 3; Dionysiaca I, 492; PG 3, 940
A. "It is therefore necessary that we do not conceive those which are called eternal to
be co-eternal with the God which is before eternity. But, following the most august
writings, we should understand 'eternal' and 'temporal' according to the characteristics
that agree with them. Further, we should interpret those beings that in some way
[partake in] eternity and in some way [partake in] time to be intermediate between
those which are and those which come to be." Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, The
Divine Names and Mystical Theology, tr. John D. Jones (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1980), p. 194.
 Page 15
solutely coeternal with God. For this reason some call eternity taken in this
sense {13} aevum, which they distinguish from eternity taken in the first
sense. But, if one considers the matter correctly, aevum and "eternity" differ no
more than do anthrapos and "man." For in Greek eternity is called evon,16 just
as man is called anthropos.
So, in light of these distinctions, we should realize that this proposition is found
in Proclus's book as Proposition 88 in these words: "Every beingly," or
existential, "being is before eternity or in eternity, or participating eternity."17
Now "beingly being" is said [here] in contrast to mobile being, just as to be
abiding steadfastly18 is said in contrast to to be changing.19 Accordingly, we
can understand by this what every higher being means in this book, namely,
that it is above motion and time. For, according to the authors of both books,
being of this kind is divided into three grades, although it is not for altogether
the same reason for each [author].
For Proclus presents this proposition according to the theories of the Platonists,
who, in maintaining the abstraction of universals, held that the more abstract
and universal something is, the greater priority it has. For it is clear that this
mode of expression, "eternity," is more abstract than "eternal," since the word
"eternity" designates the very essence of eternity, but the word "eternal''
designates what participates eternity. Furthermore, being itself is more
common than eternity, for "every eternal thing is being, but not every being is
eternal."20 So, in accord with what was previously said, separate being itself is
{14} before eternity, while sempiternal being is with eternity, and everything
that participates eternal being participates eternity and is, as it were, after
eternity.
Now, first of all, the author of this book agrees to some extent with
16. Thus in the manuscript for the Greek word aion. See Saffrey, p. 13, note. For a
fuller discussion of the distinction between eternity and aevum, see ST I, Q. 10, A.
5; I Sent., D. 8, Q. 2, A. 1 and 2; II Sent, D. 2, Q. 1. A. 13; Quodlibet. V, Q. 4, A. 7;
In de div. Nom. V, Lect. 1 and X, Lect. 3.
17. Proclus, Prop. 88, Dodds, p. 80.2526; Vansteenkiste, p. 298: Omne enter ens aut
ante aeternitatem est, aut in aeternitate, aut participans aeternitate. Enter ens
renders the Greek to ontos on. Enter and existenter are translated by "beingly" and
"existential" respectively to reflect equally in English the awkwardness of these words
in thirteenth-century Latin.
18.esse stans.
19.moveri.
20. Proclus, Prop. 87, Dodds, p. 80.15; Vansteenkiste, p. 298.
 Page 16
the positions just mentioned. So he explains that The being that is before
eternity is the first cause because it is the cause of eternity. To prove this he
introduces the idea that in it, i.e., in eternity, being is acquired, i.e.,
participated. He proves this by arguing that things that are less common
participate things that are more common. But eternity is less common than
being. So he continues: And I say that every eternity is being but not every
being is eternity. Therefore, being is more common than eternity. In this way
he proves that eternity participates being. But abstract being itself is the first
cause whose substance is its own being. So it remains that the first cause is
the cause from which anything always existing acquires sempiternal being.
But in [explaining] the other two members21 of the division the author of this
book departs from the intention of Proclus and approaches more the common
opinions of the Platonists and Peripatetics. For he explains the second grade
[of higher being] by saying that the being with eternity is an intelligence. For,
because eternity, as was said,22 implies unfailingness with immobility,
whatever is unfailing and immobile in every way wholly attains eternity. But the
above-mentioned philosophers hold that an intelligence, or separate intellect,
has unfailingness and immobility in being, in power, and in activity. So
Proposition 169 of Proclus is: "Every intellect {15} has substance, potency and
activity in eternity."23 And in accord with this the author proves here that an
intelligence is with eternity because it is altogether in a single state so that it
neither undergoes any change of power or activity nor is it as well subject to
destruction in substance. For this reason he later also says that it is made
equal to eternity because it is co-extensive with it and does not change
because eternity extends itself to everything that has the character of an
intelligence.
Finally he explains the third grade as soul, which has higher being, i,e., as
[being that is] above motion and time. For such a soul more closely approaches
motion than does an intelligence, because an intelligence is clearly not touched
by motion in either [its] substance or [its] activity. But the soul in [its]
substance surpasses time and motion and touches eternity, while in its activity
it touches motion because, as the philoso-
21. I.e., intelligences and the soul.
22. Cf. above, S{12}.
23. Proclus, Prop. 169, Dodds, p. 146.2425; Vansteenkiste, p. 515. Also, see St.
Thomas, De Subst. sep., Cap. 20 (vol. 40 D Leon.), p. 79b, 30710.
 Page 17
phers prove,24 whatever is moved by another must be reduced to something
first, which moves itself. Now for Plato it is the soul that moves itself,25 but for
Aristotle it is the animated body, whose principle of motion is the soul.26 Thus
on either account the first principle of motion must be the soul. So motion is an
activity of the soul itself.
Because motion is in time, time touches the activity of the soul itself. Hence
Proclus also says in Proposition 191: "Every participable27 soul has an eternal
substance, but its activity is in time."28 So the author says here that it is
conjoined29 with eternity in a lower way, conjoined to eternity in substance,
but in a lower way because it participates eternity in a lower way {16} than an
intelligence does. He proves this by saying that it is more susceptible to
impression than is an intelligence. For the soul not only receives the impression
of the first cause, as does an intelligence, but it also bears the impression of an
intelligence. But the more removed something is from the first, which is the
cause of eternity, the more weakly it participates eternity. And, although the
soul attains the lowest level of eternity, still it is above time, as a cause is above
[its] effect, for it is the cause of time inasmuch as it is the cause of the motion
upon which time follows.
[The author] also speaks here of the soul that philosophers attribute to
heavenly bodies. For this reason he says that it is on the horizon of eternity in a
lower way and above time. For a horizon is a circle marking off the boundaries
of what is seen. It is the lowest boundary of the upper hemisphere, the
starting point, however, of the lower. Similarly, the soul is the last boundary of
eternity and the starting point of time. Dionysius also agrees with this opinion
in Chapter 10 of On the Divine Names,30 but with this exception: he does not
assert that the heavens have soul, because Catholic faith does not assert this.
So he says that "God is before the
24. Aristotle, Physics, VIII 4ff.; Proclus, Props. 1420.
25. As Saffrey (p. 15, note) indicates, this Platonic teaching is found in the Phaedrus,
245 CE. But Aristotle, De Anima, II 4, 404a21 and 406a1 ff, was probably the source
for St. Thomas here.
26. Aristotle, De Anima, II 4, 415b828.
27. Or "able to be participated." Participabilis here renders the Greek to methekte.
28. Proclus, Prop. 191, Dodds, p. 166.2627; Vansteenkiste, p. 524.
29.connexa. Here in his commentary St. Thomas has connexa while the Latin text of
the De Causis has annexa.
30. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, X 3; Dionysiaca I 492493; PG 3,
937C940A.
 Page 18
eternal" and that, according to the Scriptures, some things are called "eternal
and temporal." But this must be understood "according to the ways" that
Sacred Scripture assumes. "Between things that exist and things that are
made," i.e., generable things, are "whatever things participate in one way in
the eternal but in another way in time."
 Page 19

{17} Proposition 31
Every noble soul has three activities, for its activities consist of animate activity,
intellectual activity, and divine activity.

The activity is divine because soul provides for2 nature with the power present
in it from the first cause. Its activity is intellectual because [soul] knows things
through the power of the intelligence present in it. And, the activity is animate
because soul moves the first body3 and all natural bodies, since it is the cause
of the motion of bodies and the cause of nature's activity
Soul carries out these activities only because it is an image4 of a higher power
This is because the first cause created the being of soul with the mediation of
an intelligence. As a result, soul came to carry out a divine activity Thus, after
the first cause created the being of soul, it placed it as something subject5 to
an intelligence on which it carries out its activities. Because of this, then, an
intellectual soul carries out an intellectual activity.
Since the soul receives the impression of an intelligence, it came to have an
activity inferior to [that of] an intelligence in its impression upon what is under
it.
1. This proposition is derived from Prop. 201 in Proclus, as St. Thomas indicates in
the opening paragraph of his commentary. Cf. Dodds, p. 176.15, 176.1013, 176.11,
176.1316. St. Thomas refers favorably to this proposition in ST, I, Q. 45, A. 5c; SCG,
III, 66; De Veritate, Q. 5, A. 9, 7a and ad 7; De Patentia, Q. 3, A. 1c. But, since
some had interpreted this proposition to mean that intelligences created souls, he
identifies the proposition with this position in De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 4c and ad 10 and
in De Subst. sep., X. What the proposition says in this regard Aquinas accepts only
in a very restricted way.
2.praeparat is the reading that St. Thomas had in his text, though other manuscripts
have parat. The sense is that soul, that is, every noble soul, provides nature with order
of direction.
3. For the meaning of "first body," see Aristotle, On the Heavens, I 23, 268b12270b31.
Aristotle remarks: "And so, implying that the primary body is something else beyond
earth, fire, air, and water, they gave the highest place the name of aether, derived
from the fact that it 'runs always' [aei thein] for an eternity of time"
(270b2124;McKeon trans).
4.exemplum.
5.stramentum. This Latin word is used to denote straw or something suitable for
spreading under foot, a sense quite in accord with the Arabic bisat. See Taylor (1981),
pp. 48; 366. Many of the manuscripts of the Latin tradition contain the corruption,
instrumentum. See Pattin (1966) p. 140, III 33.17.
 Page 20
This is because [soul] impresses things only through motion, since what is
under it receives its activity only if soul moves it. For this reason, then, it
happens that soul moves bodies. For it is characteristic of soul to vivify bodies,
since it infuses them with its power and brings them directly to right activity.6
It is therefore clear now that soul has three activities because it has three
powers: a divine power, an intellectual power, and the power of its essence,7
as we have described and shown.
Commentary
What belong to higher things are present in lower things according to some
kind of participation. For this reason, after [the author] divided the three
grades of higher beings, one above eternity, God, another with eternity,
intelligence, and the third after eternity, soul, he intends now to show how the
third participates both what belongs to the first and what belongs to the
second, saying: Every noble soul has three activities, for its activities consist of
animate activity, {18} intellectual activity and divine activity. We can
understand what he means by a noble soul from what Proclus says in
Proposition 201: "All divine souls have activities that are threefold: some as
souls, others as receptive of divine intellect, and still others as joined
extrinsically to gods."8 From this it is evident that what [the author] calls noble
soul is what Proclus calls "divine soul."
To make this clear we ought to realize that Plato maintained that the universal
forms of things were separate and per se subsistent. Because, according to
him, such universal forms have a certain universal causality over particular
beings that participate them, he consequently calls all such forms subsisting in
this way "gods." For the word "god" implies a certain universal providence and
causality. Furthermore, among these forms he articulates this order: the more
universal any form is, the more simple and prior a cause it is, for it is
participated by later forms, as when we
6. The corresponding Arabic reads somewhat differently: "For it is characteristic of
soul that it give life to bodies, since it infuses them with its power, and also [that] it
guide them to the right activity." See Taylor (1981), p. 149.
7. A minor corruption in the Latin translator's Arabic manuscript no doubt led to this
understanding. The Arabic manuscripts have "and an essential power," as might be
expected. See Taylor (1981), p. 150.
8. Proclus, Prop. 201, Dodds, p. 176.13. Extraiunctae is Moerbeke's Latin rendition of
Proclus's term, exertemenai ("derived from").
 Page 21
assert that animal is participated by man and life by animal and so on. But the
last, which is participated by all and itself participates nothing else, is the
separate one and good itself, which he calls "the highest god" and "the first
cause of all things."9 So Proclus also introduces Proposition 116 of his book as
follows: "Every god is able to be participated." that is, participates,10 "except
one."11 Forms of this kind, which they call "gods,'' are intelligibe12 in
themselves, but an intellect becomes intelligent in act through an intelligible
species. Thus they placed below the order of gods, i.e., of the forms mentioned
above, an order of intellects that participate {19} these forms in order to be
intelligent, and the ideal intellect is among these forms.13 But the intellects
mentioned above participate these forms in an immobile way insofar as they
understand them. Thus they placed under the order of intellects a third order,
that of souls, which, with the mediation of intellects, participate these forms
through motion insofar as they are the principles of corporeal motions through
which corporeal matter participates the higher forms. And so the fourth order
of things is that of bodies.
The higher intellects they call divine intellects. But they call the lower ones
intellects, though not divine, because the ideal intellect, which according to
them is a god per se, is participated by the higher intellects in both ways:
insofar as it is intellect and insofar as it is god. The lower intellects participate it
only insofar as it is intellect, and so they are not divine intellects. For the higher
intellects gain not only their intellectual
9. But see ST, I, Q. 65, A. 4, where St. Thomas argues with regard to Plato and
those of a like opinion, "Yet these opinions seem to have a common root. They are
seeking the cause of forms as if forms as such came into being. As Aristotle proves,
however, what properly comes into being is not the form but the composite. . . .
since like produces like, an immaterial form should not be sought as the cause of
corporeal forms; rather a composite of matter and form should be sought, as in the
case where one fire is started by another" (Blackfriars trans., vol. 10, p. 21).
10.participat: The sense seems to require participat to be understood as "allows
participation of itself."
11. Proclus, Prop. 116, Dodds, p. 102.13. Vansteenkiste, p. 496.
12.intelligibiles. This term requires flexibility for proper translation in context, since it
can mean "intellectual" or "intelligible." Here it is rendered "intelligible," since these
higher intellects are intellectual as per se intelligible and intellectually selfsufficient,
while lower intellects are intellectual or intelligent in act only through participation in
the higher intellects through intelligible species.
13. Cf. St. Thomas, In de Caelo II, Lect. 4 and De Subst. sep., I.
 Page 22
character but also their divine character. Similarly, when souls are joined14 to
gods by mediating intellects, [which are] as it were, nearer the divine, the
higher souls themselves are also divine, because of the divine intellects to
which they are joined or which they participate. Lower souls, however, as
joined to nondivine intellects are not divine. Because bodies receive motion
through the soul, it also follows, according to them, that higher bodies are
divine, while lower bodies are not divine. So Proclus says in Proposition 129:
"Every divine body is divine through a deified soul; but every soul is divine
owing to a divine intellect, while every intellect is divine through a participation
of divine unity."15 Because they call the first separate forms "gods" insofar as
they are in themselves universal, {20} they consequently also call intellects,
souls, and bodies "divine" insofar as they have a certain universal influence16
and causality over the things of their own genus and of lower genera that
follow after them.
Dionysius, however, corrects this position when they assert that the different
separate forms, which they call "gods," exist in succession, so that one would
be per se goodness, another per se being, another per se life, and so on with
regard to the others. For it must be said that all these are essentially the first
cause of all things itself, from which things participate all such perfections. In
this way we will not assert that there are many gods, but one. And this is what
he says in Chapter 5 of On the Divine Names: "Now it," namely, Sacred
Scripture, "does not say that good is one thing, existent17 another, and life or
wisdom another, nor that there are many causes and that there are other
transcending18 and yet subject deities that produce other things, but that all
good processions are of the one [God]."19 How this can be he shows
subsequently from the fact that, since God is being itself and the very essence
of goodness, whatever belongs to the perfection of goodness and being
belongs essentially to him as a whole, so that he is the essence of life, wisdom,
power, and the rest. So further on he adds: ''For God is not somehow existent,
but he pre-
14.applicentur.
15. Proclus, Prop. 129, Dodds, p. 114.1214. Vansteenkiste,p. 501.
16.influentia.
17.existens.
18.excedentes.
19. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, V, 2; Dionysiaca I, 326327; PG 3, 816 CD.
 Page 23
possesses20 the whole of being in himself in an absolute and uncircumscribed
way."21 The author of this book adheres to this as well. For we do not find him
introducing any multitude of deity.22 Rather, he establishes unity in God and
distinction in the order of intellects, souls, and bodies. Accordingly, then, he
speaks of the noble soul, i.e., the divine soul {21} of a heavenly body, in
accord with the opinion of those Philosophers who held that the heavens are
animated. For, according to them, this soul has a certain universal influence
over things through motion. Due to this they called it divine in the same way
that others call "divine" those in society who have charge of the universal care
of the common welfare.23
Consequently, he says that this most nobly divine soul has a divine activity.
Explaining this further, he says that its activity is divine because it provides for
nature, inasmuch as it is the principle of the first motion to which all nature is
subject. It has this through the power that it participates from the first cause,
which is the universal cause of all things, from which it gains a certain universal
causality over natural things. And so, assigning the reason for this activity that
belongs to the divine soul, he says that it is an image,24 i.e., a likeness25 of
higher, i.e., divine, power. For the universality of the divine power is
exemplified in that soul because, just as God is the universal cause of all
beings, so that soul is the universal cause of natural things that are in motion.
He asserts that the second activity of a noble or divine soul is intellectual,
which, as he explains, consists in the fact that it knows things insofar as it
participates the power of an intelligence. And why it participates the power of
an intelligence he shows through the fact that the soul is created by the first
cause, with the mediation of an intelligence. Hence the soul is from God as the
first cause, but from an intelligence as the second cause. Now, every effect
participates something of the power of its cause. So it remains that the soul,
just as it performs {22} a divine activity insofar as it is from the first
20.praeaccipit.
21. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, V, 4; Dionysiaca I, 33334; PG 3, 817 C.
22. That is, deity plural in number.
23. Cf. Plato, Meno, 99 D 8 and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII 1, 1145a29. Also,
see St. Thomas, In Polit. I, Lect. 4, p. 380 b (ed. Parm.): " . . . the error of the gentiles
who called rulers 'gods.'"
24.exemplum.
25.imago.
 Page 24
cause, so too it performs the activity of an intelligence insofar as it is from [an
intelligence] and participating its power.
Some, however, wrongly understanding what he says here, that the first cause
created the being of the soul, with the mediation of an intelligence, thought
that the author of this book had held the opinion26 that intelligences are
creative of the substance of souls.27 But this is contrary to the positions of the
Platonists. For they maintain that such causalities belonging to simple beings
are according to participation. But what is participated is not the participating
thing but what is first such through its essence. For example, if whiteness were
separate, simple whiteness itself, and not something participating whiteness,
would be the cause of all white things insofar as they are white. Accordingly,
then, the Platonists maintained that being itself is the cause of existing for all
things, while life itself is the cause of living for everything [that lives], and
intelligence itself is the cause of understanding for everything [that
understands]. So Proclus says in Proposition 18 of his book: "Everything that
dispenses being to others is itself originally that which it gives to the recipients
of the dispensation."28 Aristotle agrees with this opinion when he says in Book
2 of the Metaphysics29 that what is first and a being to the greatest degree is
the cause of subsequent beings. So, according to what was previously said, we
should understand that the soul's very essence was created by the first cause,
which is its very own being.30 But [the soul] has subsequent participations
{23} from some later principles, such that it has living from the first life and
understanding from the first intelligence. Hence in Proposition 18 of this book
[the author] also says: All things have essence through the first being, living
things are through the first life, and intellectual things have
26. In his corrections to the printed text, Saffrey deletes secundum and adds
<sensuisse>. It is this corrected version that is translated here.
27. Cf. below, S{62} and S{104}. Also, see St. Thomas, ST, I, Q. 47, A. 1 and Q. 90, A.
3; De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 7; De Subst. sep., X. St. Thomas identifies Avicenna as the
chief proponent of this view. But for others as well, see Saffrey's note, p. 22.
28. Proclus, Prop. 18, Dodds, 20.34. Derivans, which is translated as "dispensing," is
Moerbeke's Latin rendition of Proclus's term, choregoun. Note also that the Latin
reflects the reading to einai which is found in all but one of the Greek manuscripts. The
reading adopted by Dodds, to to * einai, is not found in any of the Greek manuscripts.
29. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II 1, 993b2425.
30.Esse here and throughout the paragraph.
 Page 25
knowledge because of the first intelligence.31 This is how he understands that
the first cause created the being of the soul with the mediation of an
intelligence, since the first cause alone created the essence of the soul. But
that the soul is intellectual is due to the activity of an intelligence. That this is
what he means he shows clearly by the words that follow: Therefore, he says,
after the first cause created the being of the soul, it placed it as something
subject to an intelligence, i.e., it made it subject to the activity of an
intelligence, for the intelligence to perform its activity in it, giving it its
intellectual character. Hence he concludes that because of this an intellectual
soul carries out intellectual activity. This also agrees with what he said in
Proposition 1: the effect of the first cause pre-exists the effect of the second
cause and is more universally diffused.32 For being, which is most common, is
diffused into all things by the first cause. But understanding is not
communicated by an intelligence to all things but only to some, presupposing
the being that they have from the first.
But even this position, if it is not soundly understood, is repugnant to the truth
as well as to the opinion of Aristotle, who argues in Book 3 of the
Metaphysics33 against the Platonists, who hold for such an order of separate
causes in terms of what we predicate of individuals. For [otherwise] it follows
that Socrates will be many animals: Socrates himself, separate man and also
separate animal. For separate man participates animal and so is an animal. And
Socrates participates both, so he is a man and he is an animal. Therefore,
Socrates would not be truly one, if from one thing he were an animal and from
another {24} he were a man. Hence, since intellectual being belongs to the
very nature of the soul as its essential difference, if [the soul] had being from
one thing and an intellectual nature from something else, it would follow that it
would not be absolutely one. Therefore, one has to say that the soul not only
has essence but also [has] intellectuality from the first cause. This accords with
the opinion of Dionysius, which we quoted above:34 that good itself, being
itself, life itself, and wisdom itself are not different but one and the same thing,
which is God, from whom things derive that they are, that they live, and that
they understand, as he shows in the same place. So, too, in Book 12
31. Cf. below, S{100}.
32.diffunditur. Cf. above, S{7}.
33. Aristotle, Metaphysics, III 6, 1003a 11 ff. Also, cf. below, S{79}.
34. Cf. above, S{20}.
 Page 26
of the Metaphysics35 Aristotle expressly attributes to God both understanding
and living, saying that he is life and intelligence, so that he excludes the
previously mentioned Platonic positions. Nevertheless [what is said here] can
be true in a sense, if it refers, not to an intellectual nature, but to the
intelligible forms that intellectual souls receive through the activity of
intelligences. So Dionysius says in Chapter 4 of On the Divine Names that
"through angels" souls "become participants of illuminations emanating" from
God.36
Continuing, he states that the third activity of the noble or divine soul is an
animate one. He explains that the activity is animate in that it moves the first
body and, as a consequence, all natural bodies. For it is the cause of the
motion in things. He afterwards gives the reason for this. For because the soul,
as what receives the impression of an intelligence, is inferior to an intelligence,
it consequently acts upon those things that are under it in a way that is inferior
to the way in which an intelligence impresses things subject to itself, since the
primary cause infuses more powerfully than the second cause, as is clear from
Proposition 1.37 Furthermore, an intelligence impresses souls without motion,
inasmuch as it makes the soul know, which is without motion. But the soul
impresses bodies {25} through motion. What is under it, a body, receives the
impression of the soul only insofar as it is moved by it. Consequently, he
indicates the reason why we must say that the motion of natural bodies is due
to the soul. For we see that all natural bodies directly arrive at their fitting ends
through their activities and motions, which could not happen unless they were
directed by something intelligent. From this it seems that the motion of bodies
is due to the soul, which infuses bodies with its power by moving them.
This position, i.e., that the motion of the heavens is due to a soul, has also not
been confirmed in faith, and Augustine leaves this in doubt in Book 2 of On the
Literal Interpretation of Genesis.38 But Augustine in Book 3
35. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII 7, 1072b24ff. Also, cf. below, S{79} and S{103}.
36. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, IV 2; Dionysiaca I, 15455; PG 3, 696 C.
37. Cf. above, S{6}.
38. We take this title from the translation by Roland J. Teske, S.J., Fathers of the
Church series, vol. 84 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
1991). St. Augustine, Super Genesim ad Litteram, II 18; CSEL, XXVIII, p. 62.4; PL 34,
279f.
 Page 27
of On the Trinity39 and Gregory in Book 4 of the Dialogues40 assert that [this
motion] is from God directing the whole of nature and that God moves
corporeal creation, with the mediation of intelligences, or angels.
Finally the author concludes with what he had proposed, i.e., that the noble
soul has the three previously mentioned activities. Now the opinion of Dionysius
agrees with what [the author] said about the divine intellect and the divine
soul when in Chapter 4 of On the Divine Names he calls the higher angels
divine "minds" i.e., intellects, through which "souls" also "participate the
godlike gift in accordance with'' their "power."41 But he understands42 divinity
only in virtue of the connection to God, not in virtue of the universal influence
upon created things.43 For the former is more properly divine, because in God
himself what he himself is is greater than what he causes in other things.
39. St. Augustine, On the Trinity, III 4; PL 42, 873.
40. St. Gregory, Dialogues, IV 6; PL 77, 328 C.
41. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, IV 2; Dionysiaca I, 15355; PG 3, 696 C.
42.accipit.
43. That is, he accepts the use of the notion of divinity regarding those higher angels
or minds only because of their relationship to God, not because they have universal
influence on things below.
 Page 28

{26} Proposition 41
The first of created things is being, and there is nothing else created before it.

This is because being is above sense, above soul, and above intelligence, and
after the first cause there is no effect more extensive or prior2 to it. As a result,
then, it came to be higher3 than all [other] created things and to be more
powerfully united. It came to be so only because of its nearness to the pure
being and the true one, in which there is no multiplicity of any sort.4
Although created being is one, nevertheless it comes to be multiple because it
receives multiplicity. And, it became many only because, although it is simple
and
1. This proposition and the one that follows are a single proposition in the Arabic
manuscript tradition. In the Latin manuscript tradition, as St. Thomas notes (cf.
S{31}), some manuscripts have 31 propositions while others have 32, where Prop. 4
has been divided into two. These "two" propositions are related to Prop. 138 and
perhaps Prop. 177 in Proclus, both of which St. Thomas refers to in his commentary.
Cf. Dodds, p. 122.712, 122.1617, 122.1214; p. 156.79, 156.14. Like Propositions
9(8) and 22(21), these "two" propositions are also inspired by the thought of
Plotinus, though his Enneades is not quoted. Cf. (a) Enneades IV 8, 3.64.10 = PA
Dicta MS Marsh 539, ff. 22vl25v13; Lewis, pp. 23537, nos. 4768. (Lewis omits most
of folio 25v1011 from his translation.) (b) Enn. IV 9, 4.23 and 4.1920; 9, 1.1618; 9,
2.38; and 9, 3.14 = PA Dicta MS Marsh 539, ff. 38v239v8; Lewis, p. 255, nos. 5056.
(c) Enn. VI 7, 14 = PA Theologia pp. 97.799.8, Lewis pp. 471473, nos. 3851. The
author of the De Causis departs from Proclus in two fundamental ways: the first
cause, which is God, is explicitly said to create being; and the intelligible forms are
in intelligences and not prior to them as gods. (In contrast, cf. Proclus, Props. 125,
129, 137, and 161163.) St. Thomas frequently cites this proposition. See, e.g., ST, I,
Q. 5, A. 2 s.c.; Q. 45, A. 1, la; De Veritate, Q. 1, A. 4 s.c. and Q. 21, A. 2, 5a; De
Potentia, Q. 3, Q. 5, 2a and A. 8, 19a; Q. 6, A. 1, 5a; Q. 7, A. 2c; Quaest. Disp. de
Anima, Q. 9c. Certain portions of the explanation are cited in De Potentia Q. 7, A. 2,
ad 5; Q. 3, A. 4, 10a.
2. As his commentary on this proposition indicates, the Latin text of St. Thomas had
prius, "prior." The original Latin translation almost certainly had plus, reflecting the
Arabic manuscript tradition's akthar. The singular causatum, "effect," was probably in
the original Latin translation, though it differs in number from the Arabic ma'lulat. The
corresponding Arabic can be rendered, "there is nothing more extensive and having
more effects than it." See Taylor (1981), pp. 151; 368; 447.
3.superius.
4. For aliquorum modorum read aliquo modorum with the Arabic and several key Latin
manuscripts.
 Page 29
there is nothing among created things more simple than it, it is nevertheless
composed of the finite and the infinite. All the part of it that follows the first
cause is achili,5 that is, an intelligence, complete and ultimate in power6 and
all the other goodnesses. And the intelligible forms in it are more extensive and
more powerfully universal. The part of it that is lower is also an intelligence,
though it is below the former intelligence in completeness, power, and
goodnesses. The intelligible forms in it are not as extended in their breadth as
they are in the former intelligence. First created being is wholly intelligence, yet
intelligence in it is diverse in the way we have said. And because intelligence is
diversified, the intelligible form there becomes diverse. And, just as from one
form, because it is diversified in the lower world, there proceed individuals
infinite in multitude, so too from the first created being, because it is
diversified, there appear infinite intelligible forms. Yet, although they are
diversified, they are not distinct from one another as are individuals. This is
because they are united without corruption and are separated without
distinction, for they are a one possessing multiplicity and a multiplicity in unity.
And the first intelligences infuse the second intelligences with the goodnesses
they receive from the first cause, and they spread7 goodness in them until they
reach the last of them.8
Commentary
After the author of this book has distinguished the threefold grade of higher
being and has shown how the whole is found in the lowest of them by
participation, he intends now to show the distinction of the second
5.achili or alachili, as it appears in some of the Latin manuscripts of the De Causis,
is a transliteration of the Arabic 'aql or al-'aql, "intelligence," "the intelligence." It is
not clear precisely why the translator chose to transliterate this term, though the
simplest explanation, the term's importance, may be the answer. The only other
term transliterated is the problematic Arabic term hilyah, apparently transliterated
as helyatun in Proposition 8(9). The important Aosta manuscript containing the De
Causis has forms of alachl or alachli preceding or following intelligentia throughout
the entire text.
6.potentia.
7.intendunt.
8. As indicated in the Introduction, the Arabic text has 31 propositions, but in some
manuscripts of the Latin tradition the text of the De Causis is found to have 31
propositions, while in others it is found to have 32. It is here that the difference
between the two versions begins. St. Thomas follows the tradition of 31 propositions in
his commentary. As he notes, it is clear that this is not a distinct proposition, since the
conclusion of Prop. 5 deals with what is treated in both Props. 4 and 5. Cf. below,
S{35}.
 Page 30
grade, namely, that being that is with eternity. For the first grade, that of the
first cause existing before eternity, he passes over {27} as undivided, as was
said.9 Now in this proposition he proceeds in a different way than in the other
propositions. For in all the other propositions he presents the proposition and
then proves the proposition offered with the explanation he gives. But here, in
the fashion of those making divisions, he (1) presents what is common; (2)
divides it, at: Although created being is one etc.; and (3) indicates the
difference between the parts of the division, at: All the part of it that follows
etc.
Now what is common to all the distinct10 intelligences is first created being.
Regarding this he presents the following proposition: The first of created things
is being, and there is nothing else created before it. Proclus also asserts this in
Proposition 138 of his book, in these words: "Being is the first and supreme of
all that participate what is properly divine11 and of the deified."12 According to
the positions of the Platonists the reason for this is that, as was said above,13
[the Platonists] maintained that the more common something is the more it is
separate and, as it were, in a prior way participated by what is posterior, and,
thus, that it is cause of posterior things. Furthermore, in the order of
predication, they maintain that the most common is the one and good, and
even more common than being. According to them, good or one are found
predicated of something of which being is not predicated, namely, prime
matter, which Plato associates with nonbeing, not distinguishing {28} between
matter and privation, as is noted in Book 1 of the Physics.14 Still, he attributes
unity and goodness to matter inasmuch as matter is ordered to form. For we
call "good" not only the end but also what is ordered to the end. In this way,
then, the Platonists place the separate one itself and good itself as the highest
and first principle of things. But after the one and the good nothing is found as
common as being. For this reason they maintain that sep-
9. Cf. above, S{11}.
10.distinctis, i.e., individual and separate.
11. divina proprietate.
12. Proclus, Prop. 138, Dodds, p. 122.78; Vansteenkiste, p. 505. Ens is used here by
Moerbeke (rather than esse as in the De Causis) to translate Proclus's on.
13. Cf. above, S{13}.
14. Aristotle, Physics, I 9, 191b35192a16.
 Page 31
arate being itself is created, since it participates goodness and unity, but they
maintain that it is first among all created things.
Dionysius did away with the order of separate things, as was said above,15
maintaining the same order as the Platonists in the perfections that other
things participate from one principle, which is God. Hence in Chapter 4 of On
the Divine Names he ranks the name of good in God as the first of all the divine
names and shows that its participation extends even to nonbeing,16
understanding by nonbeing prime matter. For he says: "And, if it is permitted
to say it, even the nonexisting itself17 desires the good that is above all existing
things."18 But among the other perfections from God that things participate,
he puts being first. For he says this in Chapter 5 of On the Divine Names:
"Being is placed before the other participations" of God "and being in itself is
more ancient than the being of per se life, than the being of per se wisdom,
and than the being of per se divine similitude."19
The author of this book also seems to understand this in the same way. For he
says that this is so because being is above sense, above soul and above
intelligence. How it is above these he shows, adding: There is nothing after the
first cause {29} more extensive, i.e., anything more common, and in
consequence no effect prior to it. But the first cause is more extensive,
because it even extends itself to nonbeings, according to what was previously
said. From this he concludes that, as a result of what was said, being itself
came to be higher than all [other] created things, because it is more common
than the other effects of God, and is also more powerfully united, i.e., more
simple. For those things that are less common seem to be related to the more
common by way of some addition.20 Nevertheless, it seems that it is not
15. Cf. above, S{20}.
16.non ens.
17.ipsum non existens.
18. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, IV 3; Dionysiaca I, 15859; PG 3, 697 A.9.
19. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, V 5; Dionysiaca I, 337; PG 3, 820 A. For
further discussion on this, see ST, I, Q. 5, A. 2, where St. Thomas remarks, " . . . in
idea being is prior to goodness" but " . . . goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is
the end to the form. Therefore, among the names signifying the divine causality,
goodness precedes being" (Benzinger trans., vol. I, p. 24).
20. On the notion of addition, such as that of form, which specifies being (esse), see
 De Ente et Essentia, 4. The resulting being (ens) which participates being (esse) is
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page 32
his intention to speak about some separate being, as the Platonists did, nor
about the being that all existing things participate commonly, as Dionysius did,
but [rather] about being participated in the first grade of created being, which
is higher being. And, although higher being is both in intelligence and in soul,
nevertheless in intelligence itself being itself is considered to be prior to the
specific nature21 of intelligence, and likewise for the soul. For this reason he
asserted that it is above soul and above intelligence. So he gives the reason
why the being that intelligences participate is the most united.22 He says that
this happens because of its nearness to the first cause, which is pure
subsistent being and is truly one, unparticipated, in which there cannot be
found any multiplicity of things differing in essence. But what is nearer to what
is per se one is more united, as participating unity to a greater degree. Hence
the intelligence that is nearest to the first cause has the most united being.
Then, when he says: It became many only etc., he shows the reason for the
distinction that there can be in intelligences according to essence. Here we
ought to note that, if there is some form or nature altogether separate and
simple, no multiplicity can occur in it, as, if there were some separate
whiteness, there would be only one. Now many diverse whitenesses are found
that participate whiteness. In this way, therefore, if first created being were
{30} abstract being, as the Platonists maintained, such being could not be
multiplied, but would be one only. But, because first
(footnote continued from previous page)
"contracted," i.e., both composed of the two principles, essence (essentia) and
being or existence (esse), and yet finite, by reason of its essence specifying it to be
this or that kind of a being, this or that individual in the case of intelligences, or
angels (while signed, or quantified, matter individuates those beings whose essence
is composed of matter and form). On the notion of contraction, see I Sent., D. 43, Q.
1, A. 1. Participated being (esse participatum) for St. Thomas, then, does not
involve an addition of some form over, and thus contraction of, God's existence, but
is, as in the De Causis, created. A creature, or a being which participates existence,
can approach God as absolutely one, or simple, only to the degree it is itself more in
act than in potency and thus more united in its being and in that way more like God.
In contrast to the author of the De Causis, St. Thomas does not conceive being
(esse) as a substrate upon which a form can be added but as a co-principle, along
with essence (simple or composed), in which being stands to essence as act to
potency, in which it is the individual which is the subject of creation, while being is
the object of creation. See ST, I, Q. 45, A. 4c and ad 1.
21.ratio.
22.maxime unitum.
 Page 33
created being is being participated in the nature of an intelligence, it can be
multiplied according to the diversity of those that participate it. And this is
what he says: It, namely, first created being, became many, i.e., divided into
many intelligences, only because, although it is simple and there is nothing
among created things more simple than it, it is itself, nevertheless, composed
of the finite and the infinite. Proclus also asserts such a composition in
Proposition 89, saying: "All beingly being is of the finite and the infinite."23 He
explains this in the following fashion: all immobile being is infinite in its power
of being. For, if what can endure longer in being is of greater power, then what
can endure into infinity is, to this extent, of infinite power. Hence he stated in
Proposition 86: "All beingly being is infinite, not according to multitude24 or
magnitude, but according to power alone," namely, [the power] of existing, as
he himself explains.25 But, if something were to have infinite power of being
such that it does not participate in being from another, then it alone would be
infinite. Such is God, as is said below in Proposition 16.26 But, if there be
something that has infinite power for being according to being that is
participated27 from another, insofar as it participates being it is finite, because
what is participated is not received in the one participating according to its
entire infinity but in the manner of a particular. Therefore, an intelligence is
composed of the finite and the infinite in its being to the extent that the nature
of an intelligence is said to be infinite in its power of being, but the very being
that it receives is finite. From this it follows that the being of an intelligence can
be multiplied insofar as it is participated being, for the composition of the finite
and the infinite signifies this.
{31} Next, when he says: All the part of it that follows etc., he shows the
difference between the members of the division, i.e., between the multiplied
intelligences. He does this in a threefold way: (1) as regards their diverse
perfection; (2) as regards the infusion of some upon others, at: The first
intelligences etc.; (3) as regards the effect of the intelligences in
23. Proclus, Prop. 89, Dodds, p. 82.1. Vansteenkiste p. 298. Regarding enter ens
("beingly being") as the translation of to ontos on, see note 46. For an explanation
of the meaning of the finite (peras) and the infinite (apeiron) and their union
(mikton) in Proclus, see Dodds, pp. 24648.
24. That is, according to number.
25. Proclus, Prop. 86, Dodds, p. 78.1920. Vansteenkiste, p. 297.
26. Cf. below, S{95}.
27.ad essendure secundum esse participaturm.
 Page 34
souls, and this in the following proposition, which is found in some books
conjoined with his commentary here, and begins: Higher intelligences etc. With
regard to the first point he does two things: (1) he shows the difference; (2)
he removes a certain doubt, at: Because it is diversified etc.
Regarding the first point, then, we ought to note that he indicates a twofold
difference of intelligences: one regarding their nature and the other regarding
the intelligible species through which they understand. Regarding their
natures, it is necessary for their natures to be diversified according to a certain
order. For the difference in them is not material but formal, for they are
composed, not of matter and form, but of a nature, which is form, and
participated being, as was said.28 In those things, however, that differ
materially, nothing prevents many being found equal to one other, for in
substances the individuals of one species equally participate the nature of the
species. Likewise in accidents it is possible for diverse subjects to participate
whiteness equally. But in those things that formally differ, a certain order is
always found. For, if one considers it carefully, in all the species of one genus
one will always find one more perfect than another, such as whiteness among
colors and man among animals. This is so because the things that differ
formally differ according to some contrariety, for {32} contrariety is a difference
according to form, as the Philosopher says in Book 10 of the Metaphysics.29
Now in contraries one is always more noble and another more base, as he says
in Book 1 of the Physics.30 This is so because the first contrariety is "privation
and habit" as Book 10 of the Metaphysics says.31 Because of this the
Philosopher says in Book 8 of the Metaphysics32 that the species of things are
like numbers, which are diversified by species according to the addition of one
over the other. It is clear that to the extent that something is more perfect, to
that extent is it nearer to the one that is the most perfect. Hence [the author]
asserts this difference as regards the nature of intelligences, that the
intellectual being that immediately follows upon the first cause is a complete
intelligence ultimate in completion as regards created being in the power of
being and in all the other subsequent goodnesses, while that intellectual
28. cf. S{30).
29. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X 9, 1058b 1 ff.
30. Aristotle, Physics, I 5, 189a34.
31. Aristotle, Metaphysics, X 4, 1955a3 3ff.
32. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII 3, 1043b361044a2.
 Page 35
being that is lower in the order of intelligences retains the nature and specific
character33 of intelligence, but yet it is below the higher intelligence in the
completeness of nature and in the power of being and acting and in all
goodnesses, or perfections.
However, regarding the second difference, which is from the intelligible
species, he supposes that intelligences understand through certain intelligible
species and that intelligible species of this kind [i.e., in the higher intelligences]
have a greater breadth and universality than they do in the lower intelligences.
But he dismisses this now undiscussed, for he will clarify this below in
Proposition 10, which deals exclusively with this.34
Next, when he says: Because intelligence is diversified etc., he removes a
certain doubt. For because he had said that the intelligible species in higher
and lower intelligences are different, {33} this could seem false to someone,
due to the fact that the thing understood is one. So he shows how intelligible
species of this kind are diversified. First he presents a certain example of this.
Second he shows the difference, at: Yet, although they are diversified etc.
Concerning the first point we ought to note that, as was said above,35 the
Platonists held that there were separate forms of things through whose
participation intellects become intelligent in act, just as, through participation
of them, corporeal matter is constituted in this or that species. But the result is
the same if we do not hold for many separate forms, but in place of them all
assert one first form from which all else is derived, as was said above36 in
regard to the opinion of Dionysius, which the author of this book seems to
follow when he does not place any distinction in divine being. So, since the
intelligences are diverse in essence, as was said above,37 intelligible
participated forms must be diverse and different in the diverse intelligences,
just as the diverse participated forms in this sensible world are also found
according to the diversity of individuals that participate them.
Next, when he says: Yet, although they are diversified etc., he shows the
diversity found in the previously mentioned example. For the sensible forms
that diverse individuals participate are individuated forms and are distinct from
each other by that distinction by which one individual is
33.rationem.
34. Cf. below, S{67}.
35. Cf. above, S{18}.
36. Cf. above, S{20} and S{28}.
37. Cf. S{29}.
 Page 36
distinguished from another, so that both forms belong to the existence, not of
one thing, but of diverse things. But intelligible forms are not similarly
multiplied by the fact that they are present in diverse intelligences or intellects,
since they are not made individual forms through this. Rather, they retain the
force of their universality inasmuch as each of them causes universal
knowledge of the same understood thing in the intellect in which it is. The
reason for this is apparent from what was said above. For, since the forms of
things, whether they be separately38 abiding steadfastly per se or united in
{34} the one first, have being that is the most universal and divine, it is clear
that the more the forms approach this most universal being of forms the more
universal they are. In accord with this, he said39 that the forms participated in
higher intellects are more universal. But what is lowest in things is corporeal
matter. Hence it receives such forms as particular without any universality. And
this is what he says: although the intelligible forms are diversified in diverse
intelligences, nevertheless they are not in this way divided from one another
like diverse individuals are divided in sensible things. For they have one
together with multiplicity, one on the part of universality, multiplicity according
to the diverse mode of participation in diverse intellects. Through this he
removes totally the argument of Averroes, who wanted to prove the unity of
the intellect through the unity of the intelligible form. For [Averroes] thought
that, if intelligible forms are diverse in diverse intellects, then they are
individuated and intelligible in potency, not in act. But this is evidently
frivolous, from what has been said.40
Next, when he says: The first intelligences etc., he states the second
difference, which follows from the first. For we find in any order of things
whatsoever that what is in act acts on what is in potency. But what is more
perfect is always compared to the less perfect as act to potency. Therefore, it is
of the nature of the more perfect things in any genus whatsoever to act upon
the more imperfect. So, since higher intelligences are more complete in power
and all the other goodnesses than are lower intelligences, it follows that, just
as the first cause infuses higher intelligences, so higher intelligences infuse the
lower, and so down to the last.
38.divisim.
39. Cf. above, S{32).
40. See Averroes, In III de Anima, Comm. 5, pp. 41113. Also, see St. Thomas, De
Unitate Intellectus, Cap. 5.
 Page 37

{35} Proposition 51
The first higher intelligences, which follow the first cause, impress second,2 steadfastly
abiding forms which are not destroyed, so that they might need to be repeated again.
The second intelligences impress declining, separable forms, such as the soul.
For the soul results from the impression of a second intelligence, which follows
created being more lowly. Souls are multiplied only in the way in which
intelligences are multiplied, because the being of the soul likewise has limit, but
the part that is lower is infinite.
Souls, therefore, that follow an intelligence are complete, perfect, of slight
declination and separation. But souls that follow being more lowly are below
the higher souls in completeness and declination. Higher souls infuse lower
souls with the goodnesses they receive from an intelligence. Every soul that
receives more power from an intelligence is stronger in its impression. What is
impressed by it is fixed, abiding steadfastly, and its motion is regular,
continuous motion. But that [soul] in which the power of an intelligence is less
is below the first souls in impression,3 and what is impressed by it is weak,
evanescent and destructible. Nevertheless, although it is so, its impression still
persists through generation.
It has now, therefore, been shown why the intelligible forms came to be many,
1. While this proposition is related to concerns discussed in Props. 182 and 183 in
Proclus, both of which St. Thomas quotes in his commentary, it seems not to be
explicitly dependent on particular texts in Proclus. The ultimate source is the
thought of Plotinus. For references see the note at the beginning of Prop. 4. As St
Thomas indicates, this should be read as the continuation of Prop. 4. The
transcendent souls spoken of here are the souls attributed to heavenly bodies, i.e.,
the supposed souls of planets and stars. (For a discussion of such souls in
Neoplatonic thinking, see Dodds, pp. 29496.) St. Thomas does not accept the
existence of such souls and for this reason, it seems, does not cite this proposition
in his other works. St. Thomas also diminishes the role given the intelligences by
the author of the De Causis in the generation of the human, allowing for the
influence of heavenly bodies and angels only in the disposition of the human body
as receptive of the soul, not in the creation of the soul itself. But St. Thomas follows
the author in his dismissal of the Neoplatonic notion of an astral body for souls.
2. The Latin secundas is a translation of the Arabic, al-thaniyah. This Arabic, however,
is a corruption of al-thabitah, ''stable." See Taylor (1981), p. 156.
3. More literally, "And that part of it in which the power . . . "
 Page 38
while there is only one simple being [belonging to them all], and why souls
came to be many, some of which are stronger than others, while there belongs
to them one simple being in which there is no diversity.
Commentary
After showing the distinction between intelligences in the preceding
proposition, the author here treats of the distinction between souls, which he
allots according to the difference between intelligences as in some sense
causing these souls, according to his view. So what he treats here in terms of
the distinction of souls can be traced back to the distinction between
intelligences inasmuch as a distinction in effects manifests a distinction of
causes. For this reason in some texts this proposition is not placed on its own
but is joined to the commentary of the preceding proposition. This is also
apparent from the epilogue, which the author places here as common to both
propositions.
{36} The proposition is as follows: The first higher intelligences [which follow
the first cause]4 impress second forms steadfastly abiding, which are not
destroyed so that they might need to be repeated again. The second
intelligences impress declining, separable forms, such as the soul. Proclus gives
two propositions that correspond to this proposition: 182, which reads as
follows: "Every divine intellect is participated by divine souls,"5 and 183, which
reads as follows: "Every participated intellect that is solely intellectual is
participated by souls that are neither divine nor made to alternate between
intelligence and unintelligence."6 To make this proposition evident we should
consider three things: (1) the impression of the soul; (2) the distinction
between souls; (3) the difference between distinct souls. With
4. St. Thomas omits the bracketted words.
5. Proclus, Prop. 82, Dodds, p. 160.56; Vansteenkiste, p. 521.
6. Proclus, Prop. 83, Dodds, p. 160.1315; Vansteenkiske, p. 521. Moerbeke's
translation for the Greek metabole is transmutatio, which we have rendered "to
alternate"; ignorantia is his translation for the Greek anoias, which we have rendered
"unintelligence." The souls spoken of here are the higher souls of heavenly bodies
midway between higher intelligences, which always know, and the "lower" or human
soul, which knows only intermittently. For Proclus, unlike Aristotle, plants and animals
have no soul but are only ''images" or "reflections of souls" (eidola ton psychon) (see
Prop. 64, Dodds, p. 62.1112; also, see p. 296). Neither the author of the De Causis nor
St. Thomas, however, follows Proclus in this. For them lower souls are the souls of
plants and animals impressed and perpetuated through generation.
 Page 39
regard to impression of the soul we should consider: (1) how it belongs to the
soul to be impressed; (2) what impresses it.
That it belongs to the soul to be impressed appears clear if one considers the
nature of impression, for which two things are required: (1) that what is
impressed exist in something; (2) that it not be in it superficially according to
extrinsic contact alone, but that it be intimate to it, penetrating, as it were,
into its depths. And these two things do belong to the soul according to its
proper nature. For it was said above in Proposition 37 that the proper activity of
the soul is to move the body, in that the activity of the soul itself is below the
activity proper to an intelligence, to which it belongs to know things without
motion. But a principle of motion must be applied to a mobile thing because, as
{37} Book 7 of the Physics proves, mover and moved are [present to one
another] simultaneously.8 Hence, according to its proper nature, it belongs to
the soul to be in a mobile body. But the motion by which the soul moves the
body is a living body's motion, which is not from an extrinsic mover, as in the
case of violent motion or the motion of light and heavy things from what
generates them, but from an intrinsic mover. Hence living things are said to
move themselves. Therefore, the soul that moves the body must be in the
body, intrinsically united to it. For this reason is it said to be impressed.
But if we ask what impresses it, according to the opinion of the author of this
book, it is an intelligence that impresses it. For he says, For the soul, namely, a
lower soul, results from the impression of a second intelligence, i.e., of the
second order of intelligences, which, namely, a second intelligence, follows
created being more lowly, i.e., in the lower part of the first created being itself,
which is the being of intelligences. Or when he says: which follows [created]
being etc., this can be taken to refer to the soul, which is below the eternity of
an intelligence, as was said in Proposition 2.9 But this opinion is not valid on all
counts. For we can speak of the impression of the soul in two ways: in one
way, from the viewpoint of the impressed soul itself; in another way, from the
viewpoint of the matter upon which it is impressed. This distinction applies to
any soul abiding steadfastly in it-
7. Cf. above, S{24}.
8. Aristotle, Physics, VII 2, 243a4. Cf. St. Thomas, In Phys. VII, Lect. 3. Also, see In
Phys. VIII, Lect. 8, and In Met. VII, lect. 8 and XII, Lect. 7.
9. Cf. above, S{15}.
 Page 40
self,10 as is any intelligent soul, as will be evident below.11 For the being of its
substance does not consist entirely in its union with corporeal matter, as is the
case with the being of a nonsubsisting soul, such as the souls of nonrational
animals and plants. So in these latter the above distinction is unnecessary,
because the being of such souls is considered simultaneously from the
viewpoint of the receiving matter and from the viewpoint of the soul itself.
{38} If we speak, therefore, of a soul abiding steadfastly in itself, namely, any
intellectual soulbe it heavenly, if one maintains that the heavenly bodies are
animated, as the author of this book supposes, or be it the human soul from
the viewpoint of the soul itselfthen, according to the basic positions12 of the
Platonists, which the author of this book follows on many points, such a soul
results from the impression of an intelligence: for, as was said above in
Proposition 3,13 the Platonists asserted that what is common in anything is
caused by one principle, while what is more proper is caused by another
principle that is lower. So, according to this, a soul abiding steadfastly in itself
has its being from the first cause. But that it is intellectual and that it is a soul
result from second causes, which are intelligences. Hence, since it pertains to
the nature of the soul to be impressed upon the body, it will follow that it is by
an intelligence that this soul is impressed upon the body. But because, as we
showed above,14 the aforementioned position is not true and is contrary to the
opinion of Aristotle, we must say that it is from the first cause, from which such
a soul has its being, that it is also intellectual and that it is a soul and
consequently that it is impressed upon the body. Accordingly,
10.per se.
11. Cf. below, S{38}. For St. Thomas the human, or rational, soul is abiding steadfastly
per se or self-subsistent because, while it is the form of the body, " . . . the human soul
exists by its own act of existing, in which matter in some way shares [though] not
wholly comprising it, since the dignity of this form is greater than the capacity of
matter . . . " and in which the human soul possesses in the intellect a power that
transcends the body (De Unitate Intellectus, III, n. 84, Zedler trans., p. 58; also see I,
nn. 2728) and is capable of a continued existence apart from the body after death (see
Quaest. Disp. de Anima, Q. 14).
12.radices positionum.
13. Cf. above, S{22}.
14. Cf. above, S{23}.
 Page 41
then, the soul does not result from the impression of an intelligence but from
the impression of the first cause.
But if we are speaking about such a soul15 from the side of the susceptible
thing upon which it is impressed, as in the case of a heavenly soul, if the
heavens have soul, then the reason would be similar. For the nature of the
heavenly bodies is not caused in some way by intelligences but by the first
cause, from which they have being. But if we are speaking about the human
soul from the side of the susceptible thing [upon which it is impressed], then
the human soul does result in a way from the impression of an intelligence,
insofar as the human body itself is disposed to being susceptive of such a soul
through the power of a heavenly body acting on the seed.16 For this reason it
is said that both a man and the sun generate a man.17 Furthermore, even
doctors of the Christian faith, namely, Augustine and Gregory,18 {39} asserted
that spiritual creatures called angels, or intelligences, or separated
intelligences, move heavenly bodies. From this it follows that intelligences do
something in the impressing of the human soul upon the body from the side of
[the body as something] susceptible [to impression]. In this way it can be said
that other souls, which are not abiding steadfastly per se, result from the
impression of intelligences and heavenly bodies.
The second point, the distinction between souls, remains to be considered
next. The author gives the same rationale for the distinction, or multiplication,
of souls that he had given for intelligences. For, just as the being of an
intelligence is composed of the infinite and the finite insofar as its being is not
subsistent but participated by some nature, which is why it can be
distinguished into many, so also is it with regard to the being of the soul. And
this is what he says: Souls are multiplied only in the way in which intelligences
are multiplied, because the being of the soul likewise has limit, but the part
that is lower is infinite. Now he says that the very nature participating being is
lower, [and this nature] he calls infinite because of its power to persist infinitely
in being. But the participated being he calls finite, because it is not
participated according to the total infinity of
15. Reading de anima huiusmodi at p. 38.21 with Saffrey's corrected text.
16.in semine.
17. Cf. Aristotle, Physics, II 2, 194b 13.
18. Cf. above, S{25}.
 Page 42
[being's] universality but rather according to the mode of the participating
nature. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, because the nature of an
intelligence is completely independent19 of body, the distinction between
intelligences is considered according to the gradation20 of their proper nature
without relation to any body. But it is of the nature of the soul to be impressed
upon the body. So the distinction between souls is considered in relation to
animated bodies. Hence, if animated bodies are of different species, then the
souls impressed upon them will differ according to species, which it would
likewise be necessary to say if heavenly bodies were animated. But if animated
bodies are of one species, then the impressed souls are also of one species,
multiplied only numerically, as is clear with regard to human souls.
{40} Next to be considered is the third point, the difference between distinct
souls. He asserts three differences, the first of which is taken from the diverse
perfection of souls. For he says that souls, namely, higher ones, such as those
of heavenly bodies, which follow an intelligence as immediately ordered after it,
are complete in the perfection of animated nature. He shows the sign of their
perfection when he adds of slight declination and separation. For it was said
above in Proposition 221 that the soul approaches motion to the extent that it
is lacking in the completeness of an intelligence. For this reason, the higher
and closer to an intelligence souls are, the less motion they have. For lower
souls have motion not only inasmuch as they move the body but also inasmuch
as they are not always conjoined to their bodies and do not always understand.
But higher souls are always conjoined to their bodies and are always
understanding, though they do possess motion insofar as they move heavenly
bodies. Therefore, he says that they are of slight declination because they
decline little from the immobility of an intelligence, and of slight separation
because they are little separated into different things, as when they are found
sometimes in this, sometimes in that, with respect only to the local motion of
the heavenly bodies. But lower souls are lacking in completeness and slightness
of declination, or separation, in relation to higher souls.
The second difference is taken up with regard to the infusion of souls upon one
another. For, just as he said above that the first intelligences infuse
19.penitus absoluta.
20.gradum.
21. Cf. above, S{15}.
 Page 43
the second intelligences with the goodnesses they receive from the first
cause,22 so he now says that higher souls infuse lower souls with the
goodnesses they receive from an intelligence. And in both places the reason is
the same: it is of the nature of the more imperfect to be perfected by what is
more complete, as potency by act.
{41} The third difference is taken up from the viewpoint of the effect. For, just
as he said with regard to intelligences that higher [intelligences] impress nobler
souls, so he now says with regard to souls that a higher soul, receiving power
immediately from an intelligence, has a stronger impression because a higher
cause always acts more powerfully, as was said in Proposition 1.23 Therefore,
what is impressed by a higher soul is fixed upon its body, abiding steadfastly,
i.e., firm and immobile, and its motion is regular, i.e., uniform, and continuous,
as is evident in a heavenly body. But a lower soul, to which the power of an
intelligence belongs, with the mediation of a higher soul, has, as a lower cause,
a weaker impression upon its body. For this reason what it impresses upon the
body, such as life and the like, is weak, due to the passibility of the body before
an external agent, evanescent, changed by an interior principle, destructible,
because what the soul produces in the body eventually ceases to be in its
entirety. And nevertheless the body in a sense participates in sempiternity
according to species, and this is through generation. Here, however, the
author of this book, in attributing the corruptibility of human bodies to the
weakness of the impression of the soul itself, understood the matter more
keenly24 than did the Platonists, who maintained25 that even the human soul
has a certain incorruptible body always united to it.26 It is also evident,
according to the opinion of this author, that when the human soul shall have
been perfected through being conjoined with the first cause, it will be able to
impress perpetual life upon its body. In like accord the Catholic faith professes
future eternal life not only for souls but also for bodies after the resurrection.
22. Cf. above, S{34}.
23. Cf. above, S{7}.
24.sensit.
25.posuerunt.
26. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 196 (cited by St. Thomas in De Subst. sep., Cap. 18, n. 111) and
Props. 205210. On the Neoplatonic notion of the astral body as the "first body" (proton
* soma*) and "vehicle" (och'amema) of the soul, see Dodds, pp. 300, 3049 and 31321.
 Page 44
Finally, he concludes with what he said in this and the previous proposition.
What we have said about the souls of the heavens we have said, not as though
asserting them, but as merely reporting the opinions of others.27
27. Cf. st. Thomas, Quaest. Disp. de spir. Creat., A. 6.
 Page 45

{42} Proposition 61
The first cause transcends2 description.3 Languages fail in describing it only because of
the description of its being. For [the first cause] is above every cause and is described
only through the second causes which are illumined by the light of the first cause.
This is so because the first cause does not cease to illumine its effect, while it is
not illumined by any other light, since it is itself the pure light above which
there is no light. As a result, the first cause alone became that for which
description fails. This is so only because there is no cause above it, through
which it could be known, and4 every thing is known and described only from its
cause. Therefore, when a thing is only a cause and not an effect, it is not
known through a first cause and neither is it described, since it transcends
description,5 nor does speech reach6 it. For description comes about only
through speech, and speech through intelligence, and intelligence through
thought,7 and thought through meditation,8 and meditation through sense.
But the first cause is above all things because it is cause of them. Due to this,
it happens that it does not fall under sense, meditation, thought, intelligence or
speech. Therefore it is not describable.
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 123 in Proclus but in such a way that "all that is
divine" (pan to theion) relates only to God as the first cause and not to the henads,
or gods, of Neoplatonism (as in Proclus, Prop. 162). Cf. Dodds, p. 108.2534, 110.15,
110.89. St. Thomas relates this proposition to the negative theology of
PseudoDionysius, who was also influenced by Proclus. St. Thomas refers to this
proposition in De Veritate, Q. 2, A. 1, 11a and De Potentia, Q. 8, A. 5, 5a, in which it
is stated that God is known by the first effect that He produces, intelligence, but in
such a way that "intelligence," since it is an effect, is not the proper definition, or
name, of God.
2.superior est.
3.narratione: al-sifah, "characterization," "description." St. Thomas relates this term to
"affirmation." The unknowability of the first cause is ultimately due to the
incommunicability of its being, in the tradition of negative theology. See Taylor (1981),
pp. 37173.
4. For quia read et with the Arabic and Pattin's Latin manuscripts OLPSUV and Aosta.
5.est superior narratione.
6.consequitur.
7. I.e., discursive thought.
8.al-wahm. In this context the translation should have been "imagination" (imaginatio)
as St. Thomas clearly saw. See S{46}. See Taylor (1981), pp. 37273.
 Page 46
I say further that a thing either is sensible and falls under sense; or can be
meditated upon and falls under meditation; or is fixed and abiding steadfastly
in one disposition,9 and so is intelligible; or is10 alterable and destructible,
falling under generation and corruption and so falling under thought. But the
first cause is above intelligible sempiternal things and above destructible
things. For this reason, neither sense nor meditation nor thought nor
intelligence fall upon it.
The first cause is signified only from a second cause, which is an intelligence
and is referred to by the name of its first effect, but only in a higher and better
way because the effect has, further, what belongs to the cause, but in a more
sublime, better, and nobler way, as we have shown.
Commentary
After dividing higher being in general into three grades, in which the first is
above eternity, which belongs to the first cause, the second with eternity,
which belongs to an intelligence, and the third below eternity and above time,
which belongs to the soul, the author of this book begins here to investigate
these three grades, one at a time: (1) the first cause [here]; (2) intelligence in
Proposition 7, {43} at: An intelligence is a substance etc.; (3) soul in
Proposition 14, at: In every soul etc.
The most important thing we can know about the first cause is that it
surpasses all our knowledge and power of expression. For that one knows God
most perfectly who holds that whatever one can think or say about Him is less
than what God is. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 1 of Mystical Theology11
that man "according to the best" of his knowledge is "united" to God as
"altogether unknown, because he knows nothing" about Him, "knowing'' Him
to be "above" every "mind." To show this the author presents this proposition:
The first cause transcends description.
Now by description we should understand "affirmation," because whatever we
affirm of God does not belong to Him according to the way in which we signify
it. For the names we give [to things] signify according
9. The Latin translation omits la yatasarrafu, "not varying." See Taylor (1981), pp.
164.
10. Read with the addition of est with the Arabic and Pattin's Latin manuscripts LOPUV
and Aosta.
11. Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, I 3; Dionysiaca, I, 578; PG 3, 1001 A.
 Page 47
to the way in which we understand, which way divine being transcends.12
Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 2 of the Celestial Hierarchy13 that "negations
in divine things" are "true," while "affirmations are incongruous" or
"unsuitable.''14 Proclus also asserts this [in] proposition 123 of his book, in
these words: "Every essential being15 itself, because of its supersubstantial
unity, is inexpressible and unknowable by all second [beings]. It can, however,
be grasped and known from what participates it, because only the first is
entirely unknown as {44} 'amethectum' being."16 Now by "essential being"
[Proclus] understands, in accord with the Platonists' positions, any ideal form,
such as per se man, per se life and the rest of this
12.transcendit.
13. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, II 3; Dionysiaca, II, 75859; PG 3, 141 A.
14. The expression "incongruous" (incompactae) is taken from the version of John
Scotus Erigena and the expression "unsuitable" (inconvenientes) from the version of
John the Saracen (see note at S{43}).
15.Quod ens, literally, "what being," i.e. a "whatness," quiddity, or essence. In Dodds
the phrase "All that is divine" (Pan to theion) is found. Accordingly, Pera, p. 45, n. 162,
has omne divinum instead of omne quod ens, as in Saffrey, p. 43. The meaning,
however, is not different, since, as the commentary tells us, the Platonists called any
self-subsisting essential being, i.e., ideal form, a "god." Also, see Vansteenkiste, p.
499, where the expression vel enter ens as the Latin translation for ontos on appears
as a gloss for omne quod ens. Prop. 161 of the Elements explicitly identifies ontos on
with theion and the theoi.
16. Proclus, Prop. 123, Dodds, p. 108.2528. Amethectum, Moerbeke's translation of the
Greek, amethekton, means "unparticipated." In Prop. 24 of the Elements Proclus
distinguishes between what participates, or the participant (to metechon), what is
participated (to metechomenon), and the first cause, the source (Prop. 23), as the
unparticipated (to amethekton). What is participated serves as an intermediary,
allowing for a distinction between the unparticipated and the participants, the true one
and the many: " . . . the first is a unity prior to the many; the participated is within the
many, and is one yet not-one; while all that participates is not-one yet one" (Dodds, p.
29). The first, then, is an absolute one and as such unparticipable (see Prop. 116). All
else is either a one participated (to metechomenon) by a many or a many participating
(to metechon) a one. The former is higher than the latter as " . . . more nearly akin to
the cause of all things . . . " (Dodds, p. 29) because it is the principle that completes
and unifies its participants. Nevertheless, what is participated is always a
diminishment of the first cause because " . . . it is not the Good, but a good . . . "
(Prop. 8; Dodds, p. 11). Cf. Leo Sweeney, S.J., "The Origin of Participant and
Participated Perfections in Proclus's Elements of Theology," in Wisdom in Depth:
Essays in Honor of Henri Renard, S.J., ed. Vincent F. Daves, S.J., et alii (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1966), pp. 23555.
 Page 48
sort, which they call "gods" as was said above.17 Furthermore, according to
them, things of this sort have supersubstantial unity because they surpass all
participating subjects. Thus he says that none of them can be either expressed
or known by things below them, but they can be known by things above them.
For example, the idea of life can be known by the idea of being. But, although
they cannot be perfectly known or expressed by lower things, still they can be
grasped and known in some way "from what participates them," i.e., through
the things that participate them, just as through those things that participate
life something is known about life itself. But what is absolutely first, which,
according to the Platonists, is the very essence of goodness, is "entirely
unknown'' because there is nothing above it that could know it. Such is what
Proclus means by "amethectum," i.e., "not existing after" anything.18
Since the author of this book does not agree with the Platonists in asserting
other separated ideal natures but asserts only one, the first, as was said
above,19 he therefore dismisses those other things, and says about the first
cause that it transcends description. The reason he, like Proclus,
17. Cf. above, S{18}. These "gods" are the henads or unities in Prop. 6 of the
Elements and as ta metechomena are participable and in this way differ from the
true one (see Props. 24 and 116). But they are like the true one in that they
transcend those beings which participate them so that they are above being
(hyperousios), above life (hyperzoos), and above intelligence (hypernous) (Prop.
115). While Proclus identifies these henads with the gods of Greek mythology, he
conceives of them impersonally. See Dodds, pp. 25760.
18. In Prop. 99 of his translation of Proclus's Elements William of Moerbeke adds a
gloss for the word amethectum: "i.e., not having after" (id est non posthabens) (see
Saffrey's note, p. 44). In this gloss Moerbeke seems to be striving to translate the
underlying meaning of the Greek verb metechein ("to partake," "to have a share of") in
terms of its component parts: meta ("after") + echein ("to have"). St. Thomas himself
explains the term amethectum with the expression "not existing after" (non post
existens). Elsewhere, however, St. Thomas relates the idea of participation to having,
as in the distinction between "being" (ens) and "to be" (esse), where "being is spoken
of as having 'to be'" (ens dicitur quasi esse habens) (In Met. XII, Lect. 1).
19. Cf. above, S{20}. Pseudo-Dionysius also rejects these views. See On the Divine
Names, XI 6. St. Thomas, of course, does not accept the real existence of separated
ideal natures either, because " . . . the intellect can perceive a form apart from its
individuating principles, though not apart from the matter required by the nature of the
form in question. . . . And it was just because the Platonists failed to draw this
distinction that they thought that mathematical objects and the essences of things
were as separate from matter in reality as they are in the mind" (In de Anima III, lect.
8; Foster and Humphries trans., pp. 41819).
 Page 49
gives for this is its supersubstantiality. So he adds in the proposition: languages
fail in describing it only because of the description of its being.20 For it is above
every cause. He indicates further how it is described as well, adding: and it is
described only through the second causes that are illumined by the light of the
first cause. This is identical to what Proclus said: that "it can be grasped and
known from what participates it."21
{45} Now he proves what he says in the proposition in this way. Something is
known in one of three ways: in one way as an effect through a cause, in
another way through itself, and in a third way through an effect.
First, then, he shows that the first cause is not known in the first way, namely,
through a cause, when he says that the first cause does not cease to illumine
its effect, while it is not illumined by any other light because it is itself the pure
light above which there is no light. To understand this we should realize that it
is through corporeal light that we have sense knowledge of visible things. So
we can speak metaphorically of that through which we know something, as if it
were a light. Now the Philosopher proves in Book 9 of the Metaphysics22 that
every single thing is known through that which is in act. Therefore, the very
actuality of a thing is, in a certain way, its light. Since an effect is such that it is
in act through its cause, it follows that it is illumined and known through its
cause. The first cause, however, is pure act, having no admixture of
potentiality. Therefore, it is itself pure light, by which all other things are
illumined and rendered knowable. From this the author further concludes that
the first cause alone is first in such a way that it cannot be described because
it does not have a higher cause through which it could be described, for things
are customarily described through their causes.
Because he has proceeded from the process of knowing to description, he
subsequently shows that the first cause, since it is above knowledge, must be
above description for this reason: because description, i.e., affirmation, comes
about through speech, i.e., through some meaningful utterance.23 But speech
is through intelligence, because meaningful sounds24 are signs of things
intellected.25 Intelligence, in turn, comes about through
20. Saffrey's text omits this word.
21. Proclus, Prop. 123, Dodds, 108.2627. Also, see above, S{43}.
22. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX 9, 1051a2932.
23.sermonem significativum.
24.voces significativae.
25.signa intellectuum.
 Page 50
thought, i.e., through reasoningand {46} this is true of human beings who
come to the understanding of truth by reasoning26 and knowledge through
meditation, i.e., through imagination and the remaining internal sense powers
that serve human reason. And meditation comes about through sense, because
imagination is a movement brought about by a sense in act, as is said in the
book On the Soul.27 Thus, since the first cause is above all things, it surpasses
all of the above. Dionysius asserts this as well in Chapter 1 of On the Divine
Names,28 saying: "And there is neither sense of it nor imagination," which our
author calls meditation, "nor opinion," which he calls reason,29 "nor name,''
which he calls speech, "nor discourse," which he calls description, "nor
science," which he calls intelligence.30
Second, he shows that the first cause is not known in the second way, namely,
through itself. He proves this through the different ways of knowing. Among
things that are known through themselves, some are known by sense, such as
sensible things; others by meditation, or imagination, such as imaginable
things not present31 to the senses; others by intellect, such as necessary and
immobile things; still others by reasoning, or thought, such as generable and
corruptible things. With regard to the latter, the Philosopher says in Book 6 of
the Ethics32 that we reason over contingent things, which can be otherwise.
Hence, since the first cause is above all such things, it cannot be known in any
of these ways. Proclus gives this proof as well, except that he uses the word
"meditation" in place of thought and "opinion" in place of meditation.33
While it is clear from this argument {47} that the first cause is above sensible,
imaginable, and corruptible things, it is not clear that it is
26. See st. Thomas, ST I, Q. 79, A. 8, c.
27. Aristotle, On the Soul, III 3, 429a12.
28. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, I 5; Dionysiaca, I, 35; PG 3, 593 A.
29. Here St. Thomas ought to have written the word "thought"; see above, S{42} (see
Saffrey's note, p. 46).
30. See Pera, pp. 4849, for tables comparing the terminology of Iamblichus, Proclus,
Pseudo-Dionysius, the Book of Causes and St. Thomas here.
31.subjacent.
32. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI 1, 1139a1214.
33. I. e., dianoia and doxa. See Proclus's exposition of Prop. 123, Dodds, pp. 10810.
The text here requires some explanation by St. Thomas, because meditatio is the Latin
translation for two different terms, wahm in the original Arabic of the De Causis and
dianoia in the Greek of Proclus's Elements.
 Page 51
above intelligible sempiternal things. While the author omits any proof of this
here, Proclus proves it by saying that "all thought," whether intellectual or
rational, is "of beings."34 For what the intellect first grasps is being.35 The
intellect cannot apprehend that in which the character of being is not found.
So, since the first cause is above being, it follows that the first cause is above
intelligible sempiternal things. According to the Platonists, however, the first
cause is above being inasmuch as the essence of goodness and unity, which is
the first cause, also surpasses separated being itself, as was said above.36 But,
according to the truth of the matter, the first cause is above being inasmuch as
it is itself infinite "to be."37 "Being,"38 however, is called that which finitely
participates ''to be," and it is this which is proportioned to our intellect, whose
object is some "that which is,"39 as it is said in Book 3 of On the
34. Proclus, Prop. 123, Dodds, pp. 10810.
35. This notion of being (ens) is being as first known and as transcendental. St.
Thomas refers to being in this sense frequently throughout his works. E.g. De Veritate,
I, Q. 1, A. 1, c.; ST, III, Q. 94, A. 2, c. Its early formulation in I Sent., Dist. 8, Q. 1, A.
3, c and Dist. 19, Q. 5, A. 1, ad 7 reveals an Arabic influence, especially that of
Avicenna. See M.-D. Chenu, "Un vestige du stoicisme," Revue des sciences
philosophiques et théologiques 27 (1938), pp. 6368. This notion of ens has a wider
application than the substantive use of ens about which St. Thomas speaks in the next
few lines.
36. See above, S{27}
37.Esse. Here and thoughout the remainder of this paragraph we have St. Thomas's
technical use of the act of "to be," as disitnguised from ens as "being."
38.ens. The distinction between ens and esse is a technical one in St. Thomas's
metaphysics, one notoriously difficult to render in English without awkwardness. By
this substantive use of ens St. Thomas means a being composed of essence, which is
itself only potential, and existence (esse), the act whereby something is or exists. Esse
is thus the act of existing (actus essendi), distinguishable from the essence in all
beings except God, whose essence is "to be." For a fuller discussion, see De Ente et
Essentia, IV, 67; De spirit. Creat., I, c; SCG, I, 21 and 22; ST, I, Q. 3, A. 3 and 4. This
distinction is not present in the Book of Causes, where anniyah (translated esse) and
huwiyah (translated ens) seem fully synonymous. On this see, Taylor (1979), p. 506.
39. The Latin expression here, quod quid est, is used somewhat interchangeably by St.
Thomas with quod quid and quod quid est esse as equivalent translations of Aristotle's
expression ti estin. These are also used somewhat interchangeably by St. Thomas with
quod quid erat esse, the Latin translation of Aristotle's to ti en einai (e.g., see In Met.
VII, Lect. 35 and In post. Anal. II, Lect. 25). For St. Thomas these terms mean "the
 quiddity, or essence of a thing, which a definition signifies" (In de. Anima III, Lect. 8;
also, see De Ente et Essentia, I, 4). Owens, in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian
Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978),
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page 52
Soul.40 Hence our intellect can grasp only that which has a quiddity
participating "to be." But the quiddity of God is "to be" itself. Thus it is above
intellect. In this way Dionysius presents this argument in Chapter 1 of On the
Divine Names,41 saying: "If all thoughts are of existing things, and if existing
things are limited," namely, inasmuch as they finitely participate "to be,'' who
is42 above all substance is set apart from all knowledge."
Third, he shows how the first cause is known through the effect. He says that
the first cause is signified in those things that are said about it only from a
second cause that is an intelligence.43 For we speak of God in this way, namely
as though [speaking of]44 a certain intelligent substance, because an
intelligence is its45 first effect. Hence [an intelligence] is most similar to God
and through it God can be known in the highest way possible. Nevertheless,
God is not sufficiently known through an intelligence, because what an
intelligence is {48} is found in the first cause in a higher way. So a cause that
surpasses its effect cannot be sufficiently known through its effect.
Thus it is evident that the first cause transcends description, because it cannot
be sufficiently known or expressed either through a cause, through itself, or
through an effect.
(footnote continued from previous page)
p. 180, argues for a slight difference in the meaning between ti estin and to ti en
einai. But St. Thomas, commenting on this passage from Aristotle, does distinguish
between (1) a quiddity that is simply form, in which the form is the entire essence
not participated by other beings so that the essence and the individual are identical,
as in immaterial substances, such as angels; and (2) a quiddity in which the form
exists individuated in matter and participated by many individuals so that the
essence and the individual are not identical, as in material substances (see In de
Anima III, Lect. 8). It is only the latter, the quiddity of material things, that is the
proper object of human knowledge (see ST, I, Q. 84, A. 7 and Q. 88, A. 1 and 2).
40. Aristotle, On the Soul, III 4, 429b 1 Off.
41. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names I 4; Dionysiaca, I, 34; PG 3, 593 A.
42.qui est. This term would have reverberations to the Latin reader of God's name
revealed in Exodus 3:14 as Qui est, "He Who is" (see ST, I, Q. 13, A. 11).
43. Here, like Pseudo-Dionysius, the author of the Book of Causes departs from
Proclus: it is not the highest henads, or gods, but an intelligence which immediately
follows upon the first cause as closest to it.
44.quasi.
45. I.e, God's.
 Page 53

Proposition 71
An intelligence is an undivided substance.

For, if it has no magnitude, is not a body, and is not in motion, then

undoubtedly it is undivided. Furthermore, everything that is divisible is divided
only into multiplicity2 or magnitude or its motion. Therefore, when a thing is in
this state it is under time, because it receives division only in time. An
intelligence is not in time but rather is with eternity. For this reason it has come
to be loftier and more transcendent3 than every body and every multiplicity.
But if multiplicity is found in it, [that multiplicity] is found only as one existing
thing.4 Since, therefore, an intelligence is this way, it is not at all receptive of
division.
The indication of this is its reversion upon its essence,5 because it is not
extended along with an extended thing so that one of its extremities is next to6
another. For, when it wants knowledge of a corporeal thing, it is not7 extended
along with it but
1. This proposition relates directly to Prop. 171, which presupposes Prop. 15 in
Proclus, as St. Thomas recognizes in his commentary. Cf. Dodds, p. 150.114. The
author of the De Causis, who has already departed from Proclus by removing the
henads as what are closest to the One, consequently places the first multiplicity
(multitudo) or the beginning of plurality in the intelligences, rather than in the
henads as Proclus does (see Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.1014). Although an
intelligence has multiplicity, it is still one because it is a pure form. The multiplicity
in it is from within, in the unity of the knower with the known, and not from without,
as in a body, which consists of part outside part. St. Thomas refers to this
proposition in De Potentia, Q. 6, A. 2 s.c. and De spir. Creat., Q. 1, A. 7 s.c.
2.multitudo.
3.altior et superior.
4. quasi res existens una. The correct reading of the Arabic, muwahhada, "unified"
(corresponding to henotai in Proclus at Prop. 171, p. 150.6), is preserved in the Ankara
Arabic manuscript. The Leiden Arabic, however, has maujuda, "existing,"
corresponding to the Latin translator's existens. The correct Arabic text would be
rendered, "[this multiplicity] is found unified, as if a single thing."
5.reditio sui super essentiam suam.
6.secunda. The Latin translator here renders thaniyan. The correct version of the
Arabic is na'iyan, "at a distance," from the Ankara Arabic manuscript. The Arabic then
 has: "I mean that it is not extended along with the extended thing such that one of
two extremities belonging to it is at a distance from the other." Note, however, that St.
Thomas understands the text to convey the sense that is more clearly found in the
Arabic. See S{52}.
7. The negative, here non in the Latin, is not found in the Arabic, nor is it found
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page 54
remains fixed according to its own state, since it is a form from which nothing
passes.8 But bodies are not that way.
A further indication that an intelligence is not a body but that its substance
and its activity are undivided is that both are one thing.
An intelligence is indeed many, due to the goodnesses coming to it from the
first cause. Although [an intelligence] is a multiplicity in this way, nevertheless,
because it is near to the one, it comes to be one and undivided. An intelligence
is not receptive of division, because it is the first created [thing] that was
created by the first cause, and [so] unity is more worthy of it than division.
Therefore, it has now been verified that an intelligence is a substance that has
no magnitude, is not a body, and is not in motion in any of the ways that
belong to corporeal motion. For this reason it has come to be above time and
with eternity, as we have shown.
Commentary
After having said that the first grade of higher being,9 namely, the first cause,
is indescribable, [the author] now moves on to the second grade, intelligences.
First he determines what an intelligence is {49} with regard to its substance;
second with regard to its knowledge, in Proposition 8, at: Every intelligence
knows etc.
Regarding the first point, we should realize that the things that belong to a
higher order cannot be sufficiently known through those things that belong to
a lower order, because higher things surpass the way lower
(footnote continued from previous page)
in the Aosta Latin or any of the ten Latin manuscripts entirely collated by Pattin for
his edition. However, here it must be retained since non was contained in the Latin
used by St. Thomas, as his quotation of this text indicates. The Arabic has, "For,
when it wants knowledge of the corporeal extended thing, it is extended with it
while [still] being subsistent and abiding steadfastly in its state, because it is a form
from which nothing escapes. Bodies are not like that."
8.quoniam est forma a qua non pertransit aliquid. See the previous note regarding the
corresponding Arabic. The sense seems to be that the intelligence knows corporeal
things without having to be extended with those things and that it is a subsistent,
steadfastly abiding substance unaffected in its immaterial act of knowing material
things. Neither the Latin nor the Arabic renders this notion clearly. The author's
comments here may be reflections on matters raised in Proclus's Prop. 15 and Prop.
167. St. Thomas was well aware of the problem here as his comments indicate. See
S{51} and S{52}.
9.esse.
 Page 55
things exist, and the power that they have. Now, because human knowledge
takes its rise from sense, we can know sufficiently those things that present
themselves to our senses. But we can arrive at a knowledge of higher things
from them only by way of those things that they have in common with the
sensible things we know. Moreover, those things that present themselves
entirely to our senses are lower bodies, which higher bodies do not agree with
either in the species of [their] essence or in the condition of [their] nature.10
They do, however, agree in the matter11 of quantity, light, and the things that
follow upon these. So, about higher bodies we can attain knowledge of their
brightness, by which they are visible to us, the quantity of their magnitude and
motion, their shape, and even their genus insofar as they agree in genus with
lower bodies. But we are able to know their proper nature with respect to12
species only through negation, inasmuch as their proper nature transcends13
that of lower bodies. So Aristotle proves in Book 1 of On the Heavens14 that a
heavenly body is neither heavy nor light, nor is it generable or corruptible.
Similarly an intelligence also transcends the entire order of corporeal things.
But because its quiddity, or essence, is not its very "to be,"15 but is a thing
that subsists in its "to be" as participated, in a certain way it thus agrees in
genus with bodies, which also subsist in their own "to be." So both are placed
in the genus of substance according to logical intention.16 For this reason an
intelligence can be made known in a describable or affirmative way with regard
to its genus, so that we can call it a substance. But we cannot describe it with
regard to its specific difference. Rather, we have to know it through negation
{50} inasmuch as it transcends the entire order of corporeal things to which
divisibility pertains. And so, making known the essence of an intelligence
insofar as we can know it, he proposes this proposition: An intelligence is an
undivided substance. Now the first cause is not a nature subsisting in its own
"to be" as participated. Rather, it is subsisting ''to be" itself and so it is super-
10. That is, though they too are bodies, they are not the same kind of bodies as are
those of the sublunar realm, nor are their natures found in the same conditions.
11.in ratione.
12.secundum rationem.
13.transcendit.
14. Aristotle, On the Heavens, I 3, 269b18270a23.
15.Esse here and throughout this paragraph.
16. I.e., an analogy of inequality, where the intention is univocal, but the realities
anologous. See I Sent., D. 19, Q. 5, A. 2, ad 1.
 Page 56
substantial and absolutely indescribable. So, Proclus, too, states Proposition
171 in his book in these words: "Every intellect is an impartible substance."17
Now the author proves what has been said by division, and, as it appears from
the words set down here, he presents a twofold division. The first [kind of
division] is on the part of a thing to be divided: a thing that has stable
magnitude but changing quantity, as [is the case with something] in time and
motion. And this is what he says: For, if it has no magnitude, is not a body,
and is not in motion, then undoubtedly it is undivided. For when he says, if it
has no magnitude, is not a body, he excludes stable magnitude, i.e., what has
place. And he says, neither magnitude nor a body, because a body is a
complete magnitude divisible in every dimension, while a surface and a line are
incomplete magnitudes, having one or two parts. Or when he says, if it has no
magnitude, he asserts this in order to exclude those things that are quantified
per accidens, such as whiteness and the like.
He asserts the other division on the part of division itself18 and says that
everything that is divided is divided either according to multiplicity, i.e.,
according to discrete quantity, or according to magnitude, which is division
according to continuous quantity that has place, or according to motion, which
is the division of a continuous quantity that does not have place. For the
division of time and motion is the same, as is proved in Book 6 of the Physics.19
But in the first division he omitted [the consideration] of multiplicity, because
the division according to number follows upon the division of a continuum, as is
clear in {51} Book 3 of the Physics.20 Therefore, in the things in which there is
no division according to magnitude, there is no division according to
multiplicity.
Now with these divisions given, he shows that an intelligence is divided in none
of these ways. The proof seems to be as follows. Everything that is divided is
divided in time, for division is a certain motion from unity to multiplicity. But an
intelligence is not in time but is entirely in eternity, as
17. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.1. Impartibilis is Moerbeke's translation of
Proclus's ameristos. We have rendered impartibilis literally as "impartible" to
distinguish it from indivisibilis, which appears throughout the commentary on this
proposition.
18. I.e., the possible kinds of division that apply to what is divisible, i.e., a body.
19. Aristotle, Physics, VI 12, 232a18233a17.
20. Aristotle, Physics, III 1,200b1520.
 Page 57
he maintained above in Proposition 2.21 Therefore, it surpasses all the
previously mentioned ways of division. Such is the explanation of this
proposition as it appears from the words set down here.
But we should realize that the words set down here are corrupted by a faulty
translation, as is apparent from the text of Proclus, which is as follows: "For if"
[an intellect] is "without magnitude and is incorporeal and immobile, it is
impartible."22 But Proclus presents what follows, not in terms of another
division, but in terms of a proof, for he adds the following: "For everything that
is somehow partible is partible either according to multiplicity or magnitude or
activities.''23 He immediately proves that it is not partible according to [its]
activities, for he adds: "carried out in time,"24 as if to say: all partible activities
are in time. And he adds: "But an intellect is eternal and beyond bodies in all
respects, and what is a multiplicity in it is united. Therefore, it is impartible."25
He shows each of the things asserted above one by one. First he examines
incorporeity, saying the following: "An intellect is indeed truly incorporeal,
which [its] reversion upon itself makes clear."26 Now the reversion of the
intellect upon itself consists in the fact that it understands itself, "for none of
the bodies turns to itself."27 Proclus had proved this before, when he stated
Proposition 15: "Everything able to revert upon itself is incorporeal."28 He
proves this as follows: "For it is not of the nature of any body to revert upon
itself. For if something reverts upon anything it is joined {52} to that upon
which it reverts. This is clearly the case because all the parts of a body that is
turned toward itself will be joined to all [the
21. Cf. above, S{14}.
22. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.2; Vansteenkiste, p. 516. In Proclus these terms
are all expressed negatively: amegethes (sine magnitudine), asomatos (incorporeus),
akinetos (immobilis).
23. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.34; Vansteenkiste, p. 516.
24. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.4; Vansteenkiste, p. 516.
25. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.56; Vansteenkiste, p. 516.
26. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.7. Moerbeke translates Proclus's pros heauton
epistrophe, "reversion upon itself," (Dodds p. 151) as ad seipsum conversio (literally
"turning around toward itself"). The Latin translation of the De Causis gives us reditio
sui super essentiam suam for the Arabic ruju' u-hu 'ala dhati-hi. The terms are
technical philosophical jargon in all three languages so we have chosen to render the
Latin as "reversion upon itself."
27. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.8; Vansteenkiste, p. 516.
28. Proclus, Prop. 15, Dodds, p. 16.30; Vansteenkiste, p. 271.
 Page 58
other parts]."29 This is "impossible in all things that are partible due to the
separation of the parts, some" of them "lying in other places [than others]."30
Now we find this proof added here, but confusedly enough, when the author
says: The indication of this, i.e., that an intelligence is not a body, is the
reversion upon its essence, i.e., that in understanding itself it reverts upon31
itself, which is proper to it because it is neither a body nor a magnitude, which
have one part distant from another. And this is what he adds: because it is not
extended, i.e., by the extension of magnitude, along with an extended thing,
namely, something that has magnitude, so that one of its extremities is next to
another, i.e., distinct from another in the order of place. And, because
someone might conceivably think that an intelligence is extended by
understanding bodies, touching them, as it were, he excludes this, adding: For,
when it wants knowledge of a corporeal thing, it is not extended along with it,
so that it would be understanding magnitude by its magnitude, as Empedocles
would have it,32 but remains fixed according to its own state, i.e., it is not
separated into different parts. He proves this when he adds: since it is a form
from which nothing passes. For magnitude is only in matter, but an intelligence
is an immaterial form from which nothing passes either because one part is not
distant from another or because, although it is indivisible, nothing of a thing
that has magnitude eludes its knowledge. So he adds: But bodies are not that
way, from which we can conclude that an intelligence is not a body.
Then, according to what appears from the words set down here, the author
introduces another proof to show that an intelligence is not a body, because its
substance as well as its activity is indivisible, and each has the unity of
indivisibility, which cannot be in bodies. {53} For a body is divided in its
substance by the division of magnitude and is divided in its activity by the
division of time, neither of which is proper to an intelligence. But Proclus
presents this in his book to prove another point, i.e., to show that an
intelligence is not divided according to motion, for he says the following:
"Furthermore, the identity of its activity with its substance
29. Proclus, Prop. 15, Dodds, p. 16.3134; Vansteenkiste, p. 271.
30. Proclus, Prop. 15. Dodds, p. 18.12, 34; Vansteenkiste, p. 271.
31.supra. In the Latin of the De Causis we find super.
32. Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul I 2, 404b1115; St. Thomas, In de Anima I, Lect. 4, n. 45
and ST, I, Q. 50, A. 2.
 Page 59
shows that an intellect is eternal."33 There is force to this proof because that
thing whose activity comes to it accidentally receives variation according to
that activity, so that sometimes it acts and sometimes it does not act, or
sometimes it acts more and sometimes it acts less. But that thing whose
activity belongs to it according to its essence acts without variation. Such is an
intelligence, to which an intellectual activity belongs according to the nature of
its essence.
Then he shows the third point, that an intelligence is not divided according to
multiplicity. To make this clear, he argues that we must assert that there is
some multiplicity in an intelligence, for many goodnesses accrue from the first
cause. The reason for this multiplication is that an intelligence cannot attain
the simplicity of the unity of the first cause. Therefore, the perfection of
goodness, which is united and simple in the first cause, is multiplied into
several goodnesses in an intelligence. Nevertheless, although there is a
multiplicity of goodnesses in an intelligence, those many cohere to one another
indivisibly. For it cannot be that it retain being34 and lose life or that it retain
life and lose knowledge, as happens in these lower things. This is so because,
since an intelligence is the first created thing, it is nearest to the first cause.
Therefore, those things that are in an intelligence belong to it in the noblest
way after the first cause. Furthermore, unity and indivisibility are nobler than
division. Hence an intelligence {54} possesses indivisibly a multiplicity of
goodnesses, which it participates from the first cause. The proof that Proclus
offers also reduces to the same thing.35
Finally, he concludes with what he had proposed as now proved when he says:
Therefore, it has now been verified etc.
33. Proclus, Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.89; Vansteenkiste, p. 516.
34.esse.
35. In this proof, however, Proclus places the henads as multiple before the
intelligences as multiple for the reason that what is "implicit" (syneptugmenon) is
before what is "discrete" (dieremenon). See Prop. 171, Dodds, p. 150.1014.
 Page 60

Proposition 81
Every intelligence knows both what is above it and what is below it. It knows what is
below it because it is its cause. It knows what is above it because it acquires
goodnesses from it.
An intelligence is an intellectual substance. Therefore, it knows according to
the mode of its substance both the things it acquires from above and the
things of which it is the cause. Therefore, it discerns what is above it and what
is below it and knows that what is above it is its cause and that what is below
it is caused by it. And it knows its cause and its effect according to the mode
that is its cause,2 namely, according to the mode of its substance.
Likewise, every knower knows a better thing and a lower and meaner thing
only according to the mode of its substance and its being, not according to the
mode of the things themselves. If this is so, then without doubt the
goodnesses that descend upon an intelligence from the first cause are
intelligible in it. Likewise, sensible corporeal things are intelligible in an
intelligence. This is because the things that are in an intelligence are not the
impressions themselves. Rather, they are the causes of the impressions. The
indication of this is that an intelligence is itself the cause of the things that are
below it [simply] in virtue of its being an intelligence. Therefore, if an
intelligence is the cause of things due to the fact that it is an intelligence, then
undoubtedly the causes of things in an intelligence are intelligible as well.
Therefore, it is now clear that the things that are either above an intelligence
or below it exist through intellectual power. Likewise, corporeal things are
intelligible with an intelligence, while intelligible things are intelligible in an
intelligence because it is the cause of their cause.3 Because it apprehends only
according to the
1. This proposition derives from Prop. 173 in the Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
150.22152.7. St. Thomas seeks to clarify the way this proposition should be
understood, in accord with what Proclus explicitly says in Prop. 173. That an
intelligence occupies a "middle rank" in the order of things as both a cause and an
effect is frequently referred to in St. Thomas's writings: ST, I, Q. 56, A. 2, 2a; Q. 89,
A. 2c; III, Q. 5, A. 5c; Q. 50, A. 6c; SCG, II, 98; De Veritate, Q. 2, A. 3c; Q. 8, A. 3c;
A. 7c; A. 14, ad 6; Q. 13, A. 2c; De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 4, 11a; Quaest. Disp. de
Anima, Q. 7, A. 8a.
 2. The Latin translation causa eius reflects the Arabic 'illatu-hu, instead of the correct
reading of the Arabic, 'ilai-hi, "according to the mode that is proper to it."
3. Saffrey provides Bardenhewer's Latin here, which is quoniam ipsa est causa esse
earum. Since St. Thomas does not quote the text in his commentary, it is unclear just
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page 61
mode of its substance and because it is an intelligence, it apprehends things by
intellectual apprehension, whether the things be intelligible or corporeal.
Commentary
After having explained4 an intelligence with respect to its substance, [the
author] begins here to clarify its knowledge. First he makes clear how it knows
things other than itself; second, how it knows {55} itself in Proposition 13, at:
Every intelligence understands its essence etc. Regarding the first he does
three things: (1) he explains how an intelligence knows both higher and lower
things; (2) he shows what is higher than it, in Proposition 9, at: The stability of
every intelligence etc.; (3) he shows what its nature is5 in its knowledge of
lower things, at: Every intelligence is full of forms, in Proposition 10.
So, to make clear the way in which an intelligence knows both higher and
lower things, he asserts the following proposition: Every intelligence knows
both what is above it and what is below it. It knows what is below it because it
is its cause. It knows what is above it because it acquires goodnesses from it.
On the surface, the meaning6 of this proposition seems to be that causality is
the reason for an intelligence's understanding.7 But this, if it is considered
correctly, is not true, either with regard to that by which an intelligence is
caused or with regard to those things that it causes. For [an intelligence] is not
caused by its cause through its [own] knowledge, but rather through the
knowledge belonging to the cause that causes it. Furthermore, although an
intelligence, through its knowledge, causes those
(footnote continued from previous page)
what text he had. For his edition Pattin reads quoniam ipsa est causa causae esse
earum. For our translation we depart from the text printed by Saffrey and read
quoniam ipsa est causa causae earum, following Pattin, but omitting esse with Latin
manuscripts ALOPST and Aosta. This latter version corresponds precisely with the
Arabic of the Leiden manuscript.
4.Posita notificatione.
5.quomodo se habeat.
6. <intellectus> is added here by Saffrey.
7.intelligendi. For St. Thomas, although an intelligence, or angel, understands through
its essence, which is a simple form, an intelligence cannot be understood by that either
to be essentially intelligence or to be a creative intelligence, both of which belong to
God alone (see ST, I, Q. 54, A. 2 and 3). An angel knows itself through its essence but
receives the species of the other things which it knows from God (see ST, I, Q. 55, A. 1
and 2; Q. 56, A. 1 and 2; SCG, II, 98).
 Page 62
things that are below it, nevertheless it does not then know them because it
causes them. Rather, it causes them because it knows them.
The true meaning of this proposition must be taken as follows. It is clear that in
the order of things a cause holds a higher rank8 than an effect. Therefore, if
something is both a cause and an effect, it holds a middle rank between the
two. And such is an intelligence, for it is caused by the first cause and is
beneath it. But it does in a certain way cause those things that are below it, as
was explained in Proposition 3,9 and so it is above them. Therefore, [the
author] wants to say that, according to its rank, by which it is both a cause
and an effect, an intelligence occupies a middle mode in understanding. For it
understands what is above it in a way lower than that thing is in itself, while it
understands the things that are below it in a higher way than they are in
themselves. And in this sense, too, Proclus presents {56} the following in
Proposition 173 of his book: "Every intellect is intellectually both what is before
it and what is after it,"10 because both higher things and lower things are in an
intellect according to its mode, i.e., intellectually.
It is in this sense also that the author introduces this proof. For he says that an
intelligence is an intellectual substance because to be intellectual belongs to it
by reason of its essence. Therefore, it knows according to the mode of its
substance both the things that it acquires from above and the things of which
it is the cause. The reason for this is that each thing acts according to the
mode of its form, which is the principle of [its] activity; for instance, what is hot
heats according to the mode of its heat. Hence every knower must know
according to a form, which is the principle of knowledge, namely, according to
a likeness of the thing known, which is in the knower according to the mode of
the knower's substance. Hence every knower must know whatever it knows
according to the mode of its substance. Therefore, since an intelligence
according to the mode of its substance is both a cause and an effect, it will be,
as it were, a kind of boundary, or limit, determining or distinguishing higher
things from lower things, so that it knows higher things through the mode of
its substance in a lower mode than the higher thing is in itself, while it knows
lower things in a higher mode than they are in themselves. We should
understand that the mode of
8.gradum.
9. Cf. above, S{21}.
10. Proclus, Prop. 173, Dodds, p. 150.2223; Vansteenkiste, p. 517.
 Page 63
knowledge is taken from the side of the one knowing, because, although the
first cause is superintellectual, an intelligence does not know it
superintellectually but intellectually. Likewise, although bodies are in
themselves material and sensible, nevertheless, an intelligence does not know
them sensibly and materially but intellectually. But if the mode of knowledge is
taken from the side of the thing known, then it knows each one as it is in itself.
For an intelligence knows that the first cause is in itself superintellectually and
that corporeal things have in themselves material and sensible being.
From these remarks the meaning of all the things that he says here is evident.
 Page 64

{57} Proposition 91
The stability and essence of every intelligence is through the pure goodness that is the
first cause.

The power of the intelligence is of a more powerful unity than the second
things, which are after it because they do not receive its knowledge.2 The
intelligence has come to be so only because it is the cause of what is under it.
The indication of it is this which we recall: through the divine power that is in
it, the intelligence is the ruler of all the things that are under it and through
[that divine power] it retains these things because through [that divine power]
it is the cause of the things. And it retains all the things that are under it and
encompasses them.
This is because everything that is first for things and is the cause of them
retains those things and rules them. None of them escapes it because of its
exalted3 power. Therefore, the intelligence is the ruler of all the things that are
under it, and it retains them and rules them, just as nature rules the things
that are under it through the power of the intelligence. Likewise, the
intelligence rules nature through divine power.
The intelligence has come to retain things that are after it and to rule them
and to suspend4 its power over them only because they are not substantial
power for it. Rather, it is the power of substantial powers because it is the
cause of them. The intelligence encompasses generated things, nature and the
horizon of nature,5
1. This proposition, like Proposition 22(21) and a substantial portion of Props. 4 and
5(4), does not have the Elements of Theology of Proclus as its source. Rather, it
derives ultimately from the Enneades of Plotinus. Cf. Enneades V, 5, 9 = PA Epistola
nos. 194202, Lewis p. 353; Enn. V, 1, 7.1820, 7.2526 = PA Dicta pp. 185.49, Lewis,
p. 281, nos. 1016; Enn. VI, 7, 17.4043 = PA Dicta pp. 188.2198.12, Lewis pp. 4756,
nos. 3246; and Enn. V 1 title. Also see V 1, 1516 = PA Theologia p. 109.10, Lewis,
p. 267, no. 107. Here St. Thomas relates this proposition to Prop. 12 in Proclus. He
cites it in De Ente et Essentia, IV and V; SCG, I, 26; De Potentia, Q. 5, A. 1, 4 s.c.;
De Veritate, Q. 21, A. 5c; Quodlibet. II, Q. 2, A. 3 s.c.
2. That is, they do not attain its level of cognition.
3. For Saffrey's alteram we read altam with Bardenhewer, Pattin, and the Arabic (al-
'aliya).
4.suspendens.
5. The Latin translator's Arabic manuscript had the corrupt reading, ufuqa altabi'a,
horizontem naturae, instead of ma fauqa al-tabi'a, "what is above nature," which is
found in all the extant Arabic manuscripts.
 Page 65
namely, the soul, for it is above nature. This is because nature contains
generation, while soul contains nature, and intelligence contains soul.
Therefore, the intelligence contains all things. And the intelligence came to be
so only because of the first cause, which is supereminent to all things because
it is the cause for intelligence, soul, nature, and the rest of things.
The first cause is not intelligence, soul, or nature. Rather, it is above
intelligence, soul, and nature because it creates all things. But it creates
intelligence without a medium, while it creates soul, nature, and the rest of
things with the mediation of an intelligence.
Divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor is it like the soul's
knowledge. Rather, it is above an intelligence's knowledge and the soul's
knowledge because it creates the various kinds of knowledge.6 The divine
power is above all intellectual, animated, and natural power because it is the
cause for every power. The intelligence has yliatim7 because it is being and
form. Likewise, soul has yliatim, and nature has yliatim. But the first cause does
not have yliatim, because it is being alone.8
But if someone should say: the first cause must have9 yliatim, we will say: its
yliatim is infinite being and its individuality10 is the pure goodness that infuses
the intelligence with all goodnesses and, with the mediation of the intelligence,
[also infuses] the rest of things.
Commentary
After stating how an intelligence knows what is above it and what is under it,
[the author] shows here what is above {58} it, introducing this proposition to
show that an intelligence depends on the first cause: The
6.scientias.
7.yliatim reflects the Latin manuscript tradition's corruption of helyatin, a
transliteration of the indefinite singular genitive of the Arabic hilya, "form" or "shape."
For further discussion of this and St. Thomas's interpretation of the transliterated term
in his commentary on this proposition, see Taylor, "St. Thomas and the Liber de causis
on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances," Mediaeval Studies 41
(1979), pp. 50613.
8.esse tantum.
9. Bardenhewer's text is modified by Saffrey to read necesse est ut sit <habens>
yliatim. Pattin reads the text as Bardenhewer without <habens>. We read necesse est
ut sit ei yliathim. The word ei found in Latin manuscripts OPS and Aosta is a literal
translation of la-ha found in the Arabic manuscripts.
10.individuum suum.
 Page 66
stability and essence of every intelligence is through the pure goodness that is
through11 the first cause. Proclus also states this proposition, but more
universally, saying in Proposition 12 of his book: "The principle of all beings and
their first cause is the good."12 The author means the same thing by "pure
goodness" in his proposition that Proclus means by "the good" in his
proposition. For pure goodness is said to be, not a participated goodness, but
the very subsisting essence of goodness, which the Platonists called the "good
itself.'' What is essentially, purely, and primarily good must be the first cause of
all things because, as Proclus proves, a cause is always "better"13 than its
effect. So what is the first cause must be the best. But this is what the very
essence of goodness is. Hence it must be that what is essentially "good is the
first cause of all things."14
And this is what Dionysius says in Chapter 1 of On the Divine Names: "But
because" God is the very "essence of goodness through" his "very being, he is
the cause of all existing things."15 So, too, must intelligences, which have
participated being and participated goodness, depend on pure goodness as an
effect does on its cause. And this is what [the author] says: The stability and
essence of an intelligence exists through pure goodness because an
intelligence has from the first goodness stable being, i.e., it endures without
motion.16
He proves this in two ways. First through the effect of an intelligence itself. The
force of his proof consists in this: if the proper activity of any thing is found in
another thing, then that thing must of necessity possess this {59} activity from
a participation of the other thing as an effect possesses something from [its]
cause. For example, if fired iron performs the proper activity of fire by burning,
it is necessary to say that iron possesses this from fire as an effect from [its]
cause. But the proper activity of God himself is that he is the universal ruling
cause of all things, as was held in Proposition 3.17 Hence something can
achieve this activity only insofar as it participates it from the first cause as its
effect. But, because the first
11.per. This quotation of the beginning of the proposition differs from the
proposition by the addition of this word. Whether the word was found in the text of
the De Causis used by St. Thomas is uncertain.
12. Proclus, Prop. 12, Dodds, p. 14.12; Vansteenkiste, p. 269.
13.melior.
14.
15. Proclus, Prop. 12, Dodds,
Pseudo-Dionysius, On the p. 14.23;
Divine Vansteenkiste,
Names pp. 270
I 5; Dionysiaca andPG
I, 41; 271.
3, 593 C.
16.est immobiliter permanens.
17. Cf. above, S{18} and S{21}.
 Page 67
cause is one to the highest degree,18 the more simple and one anything is, the
closer it is to the first cause and the more it participates its proper activity.
Furthermore, intelligences are of greater unity and simplicity than lower things.
A sign of this is that whatever is below an intelligence and has the power to
know cannot arrive at the knowledge of the substance of an intelligence,
because an intelligence's simplicity surpasses it. For the same reason, corporeal
sense also lacks the knowledge of any intelligible thing. That an intelligence is
simpler is shown by the fact that it is a cause of lower things in the way spoken
of before in Proposition 3.19 [The author] shows this through what immediately
follows: an intelligence rules all the things that are under it through the divine
power that is in it. We are to understand by "rule" the ordering and movement
of lower things toward an end, and through such divine power existing in it it
retains, i.e., conserves, things from the impediments to its rulefor these two,
namely, to rule and to retain, are proper to a cause in relation to its effect.
Therefore, an intelligence rules things and retains them through divine power
because, through it, it is the cause of things. He shows how it retains lower
things when he adds that it retains all causes that are under it and contains
them, namely, by impressing its power upon them. For it is not the cause of all
lower things immediately, but with the mediation of lower causes. {60}
He subsequently proves what he had said through this: everything that is first
in things and is a cause of them retains those things and rules them, as was
said.20 And none of the things that are under any cause can be exempt from
the rule and retention of its cause through any extraneous power. So, since an
intelligence is first with respect to lower things and consequently is their cause
in the way stated, it follows that with respect to lower things an intelligence
has, as it were, the office of ruler in retaining and ruling [them]. For thus we
see that even those things that are below an intelligence have ruling power
through the power of an intelligence, just as through nature, which is the
principle of motion in natural things, those things that are under nature are
ruled and retained. So likewise, an intelligence rules nature and the other
things that are under it through divine power. In this way he has therefore
proved from higher things that as a ruler an intelligence rules and retains lower
things through the power of a higher
18.maxime.
19. Cf. above, S{21}.
20. Cf. above, S{59}.
 Page 68
cause and that this is so because it is their cause. That it is a cause proceeds
from the fact that it is of a more powerful unity.
But he has not yet proved how it follows from the fact that an intelligence is a
cause that it retains and rules the effects. So he adds the proof of it: The
intelligence has come to retain the things that are after it and to rule them and
to suspend its power over them only because they are not substantial power
for it. Rather, it is the power of substantial powers because it is a cause of
them. The force of this proof is that everything is ruled and conserved by some
power belonging to it, through which it performs some activity for an end and
resists impediments. But the power of an effect depends on the power of the
cause, and not the converse. For, since power is the principle of acting in each
thing, the source of a thing's having the principle of acting must be the power
of its power. It was said in Proposition 121 that a lower cause acts through the
power of a higher cause. Hence the power of the higher cause is the power of
the power of the lower cause. It is in this sense that {61} he says that the
power of an intelligence is the power of substantial powers, i.e., of the powers
proper to the substances of lower things. Thus, it is evident that an intelligence
rules and retains lower things, extending its power over them, from the fact
that it is their cause.
He shows what the lower things that it rules are, adding that an intelligence
encompasses generated things, i.e., it contains generable and corruptible
things under it as effects that it rules and retains, and nature, which is the
principle of motion in them and is found first in the first of bodies. It also
encompasses the horizon of nature, namely, the soulfor it was said in
Proposition 222 that the soul is on the horizon of eternity and time, existing
below eternity and above timebecause it is above nature, which is the principle
of motion, which is measured by time. He proves that an intelligence
encompasses all the above through the fact that nature contains generation,
i.e., generated things, existing as the principle of generation: the particular
nature for a particular generation, while the universal nature that is in a
heavenly body universally encompasses all generation as its effect.
Furthermore, soul contains nature because, according to the opinion of those
who hold that heavenly bodies are animated, which the author of this book
supposes, soul is the principle of the motion of the first body and consequently
of all natural motions, as was held in Prop-
 21. cf. above,
22. Cf. above, S{16}. S{7}.
 Page 69
osition 3.23 And again intelligence contains soul because the soul participates
intellectual activity from an intelligence, as was said in the same proposition.24
Hence he concludes that an intelligence contains all things because whatever
is contained by something contained is contained by the thing containing it. He
reiterates the reason why this belongs to an intelligence: because of the power
of the first cause, to which it is proper to be supereminent to all things, not
through the power of another thing, but through [its] proper power. For
through its divine power it is the cause of intelligence, {62} soul, nature, and
the rest of things, namely, generable and corruptible things. In this way he has
therefore shown that an intelligence depends on the first cause, because from
it an intelligence possesses the universal power of containing lower things.
Then, when he says, The first cause etc., he shows the same thing from the
position of the first cause by a demonstration, as it were, showing the "reason
why," for the previous proof was more through a sign.25 First he lays down the
proof; second he excludes an objection, at: But if someone should say etc. So
he says first, proposing, as it were, what he intends to prove, that the first
cause is not intelligence, soul, or nature but is above all these as their creator
[acting] with a certain order, for it creates intelligence immediately, but soul,
nature, and the rest of things with the mediation of an intelligence. We should
understand this to mean, as we said before in Proposition 3, not that their
being26 has been created by an intelligence, but that these things have been
created in their essence by the first cause alone,
23. cf. above, S(24).
24. Cf. above, S{21}.
25. The contrast here is between a propter quid demonstration, in which the effect is
known through a knowledge of the cause, giving the "reason why," and a quia
demonstration, which knows something about the cause from the effect as a "sign" of
the cause. The argument through a sign (syllogismos dia semeiou) is referred to by
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 75a34. St. Thomas remarks on this passage: "He
[Aristotle] further shows that even if the premises were always both necessary and
true but not per se, one would not know the cause why [propter quid] of the
conclusion. This is clear in syllogisms which prove through signs, for although the
conclusion be per se, one does not know it per se nor propter quid. For example, if
someone were to prove that every element is corruptible on the ground that it is seen
to grow old. This would be a proof through a sign but neither per se nor propter quid,
because to know propter quid one must know through the cause" (In post. Anal. I,
Lect. 14; Larcher trans., p. 49).
26.Esse here and throughout the rest of the commentary on this proposition, except
where otherwise indicated.
 Page 70
while they receive certain superadded perfections through an intelligence.27
Now he begins to prove that the first cause creates all the abovementioned
things at: Divine knowledge etc. To understand this proof, we should realize
that, of the perfections coming to things from the first cause, there is
something that reaches all things, even down to generable and corruptible
things, namely, being. But there is something that does not reach effects
insofar as they are effects but only causes insofar as they are causes, namely,
power. Hence the participation of power reaches as far as nature, which has
{63} the character of a principle. But there is something that reaches as far as
the intellectual soul, namely, knowledge, which, however, is in a soul in a way
lower than it is in an intelligence. For it belongs to an intelligence [to know]
without motion, inasmuch as it apprehends truth immediately, while it belongs
to the soul [to know] with a certain motion, as the soul proceeds from one
thing to another [in knowing].28 Thus, both an intelligence and the soul attain
being, power, and knowledge; nature [attains] being and power; generated
things [attain] only being. So, if the first cause is the cause of all knowledge,
power, and the totality of being, then it follows that all things are created by it.
Furthermore, he proves that it is the cause of all these things through the fact
that what is first and most excellent in each order is the cause of all the things
that follow in that order. But the first cause has knowledge more excellent than
all knowledge, and power more excellent than all power, and being more
excellent than all being.29 Therefore, it is the cause of all knowledge, power,
and being. From this it follows that it is the creator30 of intelligence, soul,
nature, and the rest [of things].
So [the author] first shows this concerning knowledge and says that divine
knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, because the knowledge of an
intelligence is through a participation of the thing understood.31 Much less is it
like the soul's knowledge, which is not only through a participation of the thing
understood but also through a participation of the intellectual
27. Cf. above, S{22}.
28. That is, the soul knows discursively. See ST I, Q. 5458 on angelic knowledge and
QQ. 79 and 8489 on human knowledge.
29.Ens here, contrasted with esse, which latter term is used throughout this
paragraph.
30.creatrix.
31. See ST I, Q. 55, AA. 1 and 2.
 Page 71
light from an intelligence, possessing knowledge only by means of motion.32
Rather divine knowledge is above an intelligence's knowledge and above the
soul's knowledge because it has essential knowledge without motion and
without any participation of intellectual light or of the thing understood,
knowing things through its essence.33 This is so because it is the creator34 of
all knowledge. Hence it must be higher than all knowledge.
Now he proceeds in the same way with power and says that divine power is
above all intellectual, {64} animated, and natural power because intelligence,
soul, and nature have power participated from another, as the power of a
second cause is participated from the power of the first cause, which is not
participated from another, but is itself the cause of all power.35
He also proceeds in similar fashion with being, showing that the first cause has
being in a higher way than all other things. For intelligence has yliatim, i.e.,
something material or in a condition like matter,36 for yliatim is derived from
yle, which means "matter." How this is so he explains, adding: because it is
being and form. For the quiddity and substance of an intelligence itself is a
certain subsisting immaterial form. However, because it is not its own being
but subsists in participated being, the subsisting form itself is compared to
participated being as potency to act or matter to form. Likewise the soul has
yliatim as well, [having] not only a subsisting form but also a body, whose form
it is. Likewise nature has yliatim as well because a natural body is truly
composed of matter and form. But the first cause in no way has yliatim,
because it does not have participated being but is itself pure being and
consequently pure goodness because everything, inasmuch as it is a being,37
is good. But everything that is participated must be derived from what subsists
purely through its
32.mobiliter se habens circa scientiam. For St. Thomas, the human intellect knows
through a "motion," or change, of some kind inasmuch as (1) it moves from potency
to act in the acquisition of knowledge through the formation of concepts; (2) its
knows things only through one concept at a time and thus reasons, moving in its
consideration from one thing to another as the expression of thinking (cogitatio) and
inquiry (inquisitio). These two features characterize rational intellect in distinction to
angelic and divine intellect. (3) To know and to be are not the same for the human
intellect, or angelic intellect. See In loan. I, Lect. 1.
33. See ST I, Q. 14, on God's knowledge.
34.creatrix.
35. See ST I, Q. 25, on the power of God.
36.aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae.
37.ens.
 Page 72
essence. Hence, the essence of an intelligence and of all beings is from the
pure goodness of the first cause. So the reason is evident why he said above38
that the first cause is not intelligence, soul, or nature, since its knowledge
surpasses the knowledge of an intelligence and the soul, while its power
surpasses all power, and its being all being.
Then, when he says: But if anyone should say etc., he removes a certain
objection. For someone could say that, if the first cause is only being, then it
seems that it is common being, which is predicated of all things, {65} and that
it is not something that is an individual being, distinct from others.39 For what
is common is individuated only by being received in something. But the first
cause is something individual, distinct from all others. Otherwise, it would not
have any activity. For it does not belong to universals either to act or to be
acted upon. Therefore, it seems that it is necessary to say that the first cause
has yliatim, i.e., something that receives being. But to this he responds that
the infinity of divine being, inasmuch as it is not limited through some
recipient, takes in the first cause the place of the yliatim that is in other things.
This is so because, just as in other things the individuation of a commonly
received thing comes about through what the recipient is, so divine goodness,
as well as being, is individuated by its very own purity through the fact that it
is not received in anything.40 Due to the fact that it is thus individuated by its
own purity, it has the ability to infuse the intelligence and other things with
goodnesses.
In evidence of this we should consider that something is said to be an
"individual" because it is not of its nature41 to be in many things, for it is of the
nature of a universal to be in many things. Now that it is not of the nature of
something to be in many things can happen in two ways. In one way through
the fact that it is determined to some one thing in
38. Cf. above, S{62}.
39.aliquid individualiter ens ab aliis distinctum.
40. In ST I, Q. 29, A. 3, ad 4, St. Thomas replies to the objection that the term
"individual" cannot be predicated of God because the term implies matter as the
principle of individuation by saying, "But God cannot be called an individual in the
sense that His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies
incommunicability. Substance can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-
subsistence. . . . Person in God is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature"
(Benzinger trans., vol. I, p. 158).
41.natum est.
 Page 73
which it is, such as, it is of the nature of whiteness by reason of its species to
be in many things. But the whiteness received in this subject can only be in
this subject. But this cannot proceed into infinity, because there is no
proceeding into infinity in formal and material causes, as is proved in Book 2 of
the Metaphysics.42 Hence we must arrive at something whose nature is not to
be received in anything else, and from this it has individuation, as, for instance,
does as prime matter in corporeal things, which is the principle of singularity.
Hence everything whose {66} nature is not to be in something else must by
this very fact be an individual. This is the second way in which it is not of the
nature of something to be in many things because it is not of its nature to be in
something else, as, for instance, if whiteness were separate, existing without a
subject, then it would in this way be an individual. It is in this way that
individuation exists in separate substances, which are forms having being, and
in the first cause itself, which is subsistent being itself.43
42. Aristotle, Metaphysics, II 2,994a20ff and 994b17ff.
43. See ST I, Q. 3, A. 3 and 4.
 Page 74

Proposition 101
Every intelligence is full of forms. Among intelligences, however, there are some that
contain more universal forms and others that contain less universal forms.

This is because the forms that are in the second, lower universal intelligences
in the mode of particulars are in the first intelligences in the mode of
universals. And the forms that are in the first intelligences in the mode of
universals are in the second intelligences in the mode of particulars.
The first intelligences have2 great power because [these intelligences] possess
a more powerful unity than the second, lower intelligences. The second, lower
intelligences have3 powers that are weak because [these intelligences] possess
less unity and more multiplicity. This is because the intelligences near the true
pure one possess less quantity4 and greater power, while the intelligences that
are more distant from the pure one possess greater quantity and weaker
power. Because the intelligences near the true pure one possess less quantity,5
it so happens that the forms that proceed from the first intelligences proceed
by a universal procession that is united. We abbreviate and say that the forms
that come from the first to the second intelligences are of a weaker procession
and are more powerfully separated6 from one
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 177 in Proclus. Cf. Dodds, p. 156.19, 156.1620. It
presupposes the principle articulated in Prop. 173: what is received by something is
received according to the mode of the recipient. St. Thomas frequently quotes this
proposition's assertion that an intelligence is "full of forms" (ST I, Q. 83, A. 3, ad 1;
SCG, II, 98; De Veritate, Q. 8, A. 5, 3 s.c.; A. 8, 1 s.c.; A. 14, 9a; A. 15c; Quaest.
Disp. de Anima, Q. 7, ad 1 and Q. 18c); that the higher intelligences possess forms
which are more universal (ST I, Q. 55, A. 3 s.c.; SCG, II, 98; De Veritate, Q. 8, A. 10,
2 s.c.; Quodlibet VII, Q. 7, A. 3c; Quaest. Disp. de Anima, Q. 7, ad 5); and that the
higher or more transcendent something is, the more it extends itself to other things
(ST II-II, Q. 45, A. 3, ad 1; SCG, III, 74; Quodlibet. III, Q. 3, A. 1c.
2. Pattin reads in primis intelligentiis following Bardenhewer, whose text Saffrey
reprints here. We read primus intelligentiis, in the dative, found in Latin manuscripts
LOSTUV and Aosta, which corresponds precisely to the Arabic text.
3. Again we read primis intelligentiis instead of in primis intelligentiis. See the previous
note.
4.quantitatis. St. Thomas interprets this to mean "composition." Cf. below, S{71}.
5. With Latin manuscripts LOPSUV[s] and Aosta as well as the Arabic, we omit et
maioris virtutis found in Bardenhewer and Pattin.
6. That is, distinguished.
 Page 75
another.7 For that reason it comes about that the second intelligences cast
their gaze upon the universal form that is in the universal intelligences, dividing
and separating it, because they can receive those forms in their unity and
truth8 only through the mode according to which they can receive them,
namely, through separation and division. Likewise, any thing receives what is
above it only through the mode according to which it can receive it, not
through the mode according to which the received thing [itself] is.
Commentary
{67} After the author of this book has shown how [an intelligence] knows what
is above it and below it and [has shown] what is above it, he begins now to
show how it understands things other than itself besides the first cause. First,
he shows how in general it knows all things other than itself; second, how in
particular it knows eternal things, in Proposition 11, at: Every intelligence etc.
So, first he presents the following proposition: Every intelligence is full of forms.
Among intelligences, however, there are some that contain more universal
forms and others that contain less universal forms. This we also find in
Proposition 177 in the book of Proclus in these words: "Every intellect is a
plenitude of species. But one contains more universal species, while another
contains more particular species."9 Now we must consider two things about
this proposition: first, what is common to all intelligences, or separate intellects,
namely, the plenitude of forms, or intelligible species; second, the difference
between the universality and the particularity in them.
So, with regard to the first point, we should consider, as we already said
before,10 that the Platonists, because they hold that the forms of things are
separate, maintained that the order of intellects depends upon the order of
these forms. For, since all knowledge comes about through
7. Literally, "and are of a more powerful separation."
8.certitudinem.
9. Proclus, Prop. 177, Dodds, p. 156.12. Species is the translation given by Moerbeke
for Proclus's eidos. While eidos means "form" according to the Platonic usage of the
term, a sense easily carried by species, there seems to be an advantage in
transliterating it here as "species" to help convey the notion that what is being talked
about in this context is a form as known. Plenitudo ("plenitude") is Moerbeke's
rendition of pleroma.
10. Cf. above, S{18}.
 Page 76
the assimilation of the intellect to the thing understood, it was necessary that
the separate intellects participate abstract forms in order to understand. The
kind of participations of forms [meant] are the very forms, or intelligible
species, spoken of here. But following the view of Aristotle, which on this score
is more consonant with the Christian faith, we assert that there are no separate
forms above the order of intellects other than the separate good itself, to which
the whole universe is ordered as to an extrinsic good, as is said in {68} Book
12 of the Metaphysics.11 We must say then that, just as the Platonists said
that the separate intellects obtain diverse intelligible species from participation
in diverse separate forms, so we should say that they obtain such intelligible
species from participation in the first separate form, which is pure goodness,
namely, God. For God himself is goodness itself and ''to be"12 itself,
encompassing virtually in himself the perfections of all beings. For he himself
alone knows all things through his essence without the participation of any
other form. But lower intellects, since their substances are finite, cannot know
all things through their essence. In order to have a knowledge of things, they
must understand things by means of the intelligible species that they receive
from a participation in the first cause. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter 7 of On
the Divine Names, that "from" the Divine Wisdom "itself the intelligent and
intellectual powers of the angelic <minds> have simple and blessed
intellects."13
We should also consider, as Augustine says in Book 2 of On Genesis Literally
Interpreted14 that, just as forms proceed from the word of God into corporeal
matter in the constitution of things, so, too, from the same thing, namely, the
word, a knowledge of things comes about in angels through the reception of
such intelligible species.15 The Platonists also held that it is due to the
participation of ideas both that separate intellects
11. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 1075a1315.
12.esse.
13. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, VII 2; Dionysiaca I, 388; PG 3,868 B.
14. St. Augustine, Super Genesim ad Litteram, II 8; PL 34, 269; CSEL XXVII 44, 523.
15. I.e., the word (verbum) is an intelligible emanation from God, expressive both of
the diverse forms of created things and the intelligible species of these same things as
that by which an angelic intellect knows them a priori, i.e., by God providing them with
the corresponding species. See ST I, Q. 15 on the ideas in God, Q. 55 on angelic
knowledge and QQ. 56 and 57 on the angel's knowledge of immaterial and material
things. Also, see SCG, II, 96100.
 Page 77
know things and that corporeal matter becomes varied according to diverse
species. But we should realize that the same diversity of participation is found
both in intellects and in corporeal matter. For the matter of lower bodies
participates some form for its specific being. {69} Yet, the potency of matter,
which still extends itself to other forms, is not exhausted16 by that form. But
the matter of heavenly bodies is exhausted by the form that it participates,
because no potency remains in it for another form. Likewise, human intellects,
which are lower, are not filled17 by intelligible species. Rather, from the
beginning the human possible intellect is like a tablet upon which nothing is
written, as is said in Book 3 of On the Soul.18 Later, however, it receives
species in a certain order. Nevertheless, it is not filled in this life. But separate
intellects from the very beginning are immediately filled with intelligible species
for knowing all the things to which their natural faculty extends itself. Hence
Dionysius says in Chapter 4 of On The Divine Names that "intellects understand
supermundanely and are illuminated" according to "the ideas of existing
things."19 And this is what [our author] says, that an intelligence is full of
forms, or, as Proclus says more expressly,20 is a ''plenitude" of forms because
intellectuality itself belongs to the proper nature of an intelligence, or separate
intellect.
Regarding the difference between the universality and the particularity of
intelligible species, we should first note what both the author says here and
Proclus says in his book: that the higher [intelligences] have more universal
forms, while the lower ones less universal.21 Dionysius says this as well in
Chapter 12 of The Celestial Hierarchy, where he remarks that "the order of
cherubim participates higher wisdom and cognition,"22 while the lower
substances "participate more particular wisdom and knowledge."23 This
universality {70} and particularity ought not to be re-
16.repletur.
17.repletur.
18. Aristotle, On the Soul, III 4, 430al.
19. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, IV 1; Dionysiaca I, 14849; PG 3, 693 C.
We translate rationes here as "ideas." Supermundane ("supermundanely") is the Latin
for hyperkosmios in Pseudo-Dionysius.
20. Proclus, Prop. 177, Dodds, p. 156.1; Vansteenkiste, p. 519.
21. See St. Thomas, ST I, Q. 55, A. 3; SCG, II, 98; De Veritate, Q. 8, A. 10.
22.cognitione.
23.scientia. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, XII 2; Dionysiaca II, 936; PG 3,
292 D.
 Page 78
ferred to the things known, as some have poorly understood, surmising that
God knows only the universal nature of a being.24 The consequence of that
would be that, among the lower intellects, to the extent that each was higher,
its knowledge would rest to a greater extent in the universal. For instance, that
one intellect would know only the nature of substance, while a lower one the
nature of body, and so on down to the individual species. But this way of
thinking clearly contains a falsity. For the knowledge by which something is
known only in the universal is imperfect knowledge, while the knowledge by
which something is known in its proper species is perfect knowledge. For a
knowledge of the species includes a knowledge of the genus, but not the
converse. It would thus follow that the higher an intellect was, the more
imperfect its knowledge would be. Therefore, the difference between
universality and particularity concerns only that by which an intellect
understands. For the higher an intellect is, the more universal is that by which
it understands, so that its knowledge is extended by that universal to knowing
even proper things much more so than the knowledge of a lower intellect,
which knows through something more particular. We also observe this among
ourselves by experience. For we see that those who possess a more excellent
intellect comprehend the whole truth of some question or state of affairs from
fewer things heard or known, which others of coarser intelligence cannot
apprehend unless the matter be shown to them point by point, for which
reason it is necessary to give examples frequently.25 Therefore, God, whose
intellect is most excellent, comprehends all things by one reality alone, namely,
his essence. But among the other separate intellects, the
24.ens. See st. Thomas, ST I, Q. 14, A. 6. In I Sent., D. 35, Q. 1, A. 3, St. Thomas
attributes this view to Averroes. In De Veritate, Q. 2, A. 5, he discusses it with
reference to Averroes and Avicenna. In speaking of this position in De Subst. sep.,
14, St. Thomas presumably has in mind contemporary Latin Averroists at the
University of Paris, who referred to Aristotle's remarks about God in Book 12 of the
Metaphysics (XII 7, 1072b2223 and XII 9, 1074b151075a10) to argue that God does
not know singulars. St. Thomas concludes his interpretation of these passages in
Aristotle by saying, "It is therefore apparent to anyone who considers carefully the
above words of the Philosopher, that it is not his intention to exclude absolutely
from God a knowledge of other things, but rather, that God does not understand
other things through themselves as participating in them in order that He then may
become understanding through them; as happens in the case of any intellect whose
substance is not its understanding" (Lescoe trans., pp. 8586).
25.frequentes inducere.
 Page 79
more one has knowledge of things by fewer species that extend themselves to
more things, the higher it is. Thus the human intellect, which is the lowest,
cannot have knowledge of things unless it knows the natures of various things
by means of various species,26 while corporeal matter {71} and corporeal
sense are found to lack universal participation in species altogether.
Now both the author and Proclus27 give the same proof of this difference
between the universality and the particularity of species, which they take from
the effect.28 For, just as intelligences know through intelligible forms, so, too,
do they produce their effects through intelligible forms, because every intellect
acts by understanding, as will be said later.29 But the greater powers belong to
the higher intelligences. This is so because they are more simple and of less
quantity, i.e., composition, as being nearer the first one.30 Therefore, their
active powers must extend themselves to more things. Yet, the powers
themselves are more simple. From this it appears that the forms of the higher
intelligences are more universal.
Now he shows subsequently how forms that are united in the higher
intelligences are multiplied in second intelligences, ascribing the reason for this,
like Proclus, to the lower intelligences. For lower intelligences obtain their
intelligible species from the higher intelligences by looking toward them in a
sense, because just as an intelligence does everything that it does by
understanding, so it receives everything that it receives in an intellectual way,
namely according to the mode of its proper nature. And because the nature of
a lower intelligence is not of such a simplicity and unity as the nature of a
higher intelligence, so neither are the intelligible forms received in a lower
intelligence in that unity in which they
26. I.e., the human intellect knows the universally intelligible aspects of a nature,
which the individuals sharing that nature concretely possess, only through a species,
or concept, abstracted from the sense experience of an individual of that nature.
See ST, I, QQ. 84 and 85 for St. Thomas's explanation of how and what the human
intellect knows.
27. Proclus, Prop. 177, Dodds, p. 156.515; Vansteenkiste, p. 519.
28. I.e., a posteriori.
29. Cf. the following paragraph.
30. I.e., composed of fewer species by which more, and not less, is understood: "Thus
the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the
whole mass of intelligibile objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each
one of them, as it were, extending to more things" (ST I, Q. 55, A. 3c; Benzinger
trans., vol. 1, p. 279).
 Page 80
exist in higher intelligences. For this reason, intelligible forms are more
multiplied in lower intelligences than in the higher [intelligences], so that those
things that are understood by a higher intelligence through one intelligible
species, a lower intelligence understands through many. But because, as was
[just] said, whatever an intelligence does, it does by understanding, {72} just
as it receives what it receives by understanding; therefore, the reason for this
multiplication of species can be due, not only to the receiving intelligence, but
also to the impressing intelligence, by whose provision species are multiplied in
a lower intelligence according to its capacity. Hence Dionysius says in Chapter
15 of The Celestial Hierarchy: "By provident power each intellectual essence
divides the uniform intelligence given to it by a more divine [intelligence] and
multiplies [it] according to a proportion31 that leads to a lower
[intelligence],"32 i.e., according to the proportion of a lower substance.
31.analogiam.
32. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, XV 3; Dionysiaca, 10061007; PG 3, 332
B.
 Page 81

Proposition 111
Every intelligence understands sempiternal things, which are not destroyed and do not
fall under time.

This is because, if an intelligence is always that which is immobile, then it is

itself the cause of sempiternal things, which are not destroyed and do not fall
under generation and corruption. An intelligence is so only, because it
understands2 a thing through its being, and its being is a sempiternal one that
is not corrupted.
Therefore, since this is so, we say that3 things are destructible due to
corporeity, i.e., due to a temporal corporeal cause, not due to an eternal
intellectual cause.
Commentary
After showing how an intelligence understands things other than itself because
[it understands] through intelligible forms with which it is full, [the author]
treats here in particular of the knowledge by which an intelligence knows
eternal things. First, he shows that it knows eternal, or incorruptible, things;
second, he shows how it knows them, at: All of the
1. This proposition is primarily derived from Prop. 172 in Proclus's Elements. Cf.
Dodds, p. 150.1521. However, in his assertion that it is a conflation of Prop. 172 and
Prop. 174, St. Thomas was not without substantial reason, especially in the Latin
text. The Arabic is very close to Prop. 172 except in the opening line, where the
author has ya'qilu, intelligit, "understands," for Proclus's hypostates, "is directly
constitutive of" (Dodds pp. 150.16 and 151). While it is possible that the extant
Arabic here is itself a corruption, there is no clear manuscript evidence for this. Thus
it would seem, as St. Thomas points out, that the author had Prop. 174 in mind
while basing his text primarily on Prop. 172. St. Thomas cites this proposition in ST
I, Q. 56, A. 2, sc and in the De Veritate, Q. 8, A. 7, 1, sc.
2. The Latin intelligit reflects a corrupt reading in the translator's Arabic manuscript,
ya'qilu, which is also found in the Leiden Arabic manuscript. The correct reading of the
Arabic is yaf'alu, "it effects," found in the other Arabic manuscripts. This latter is a
translation of paragei (Prop. 172, Dodds p. 150.19), which Dodds renders "gives rise
to" (p. 151).
3. Omissions here in the Latin translator's Arabic caused the translator to render the
Latin quite differently from what we find in the Arabic: "If this is then so, we say: the
cause of things subject to change and falling under generation and corruption is from
corporeity, i.e., from a corporeal, temporal cause, not from an intellectual, perpetual
cause."
 Page 82
first things are etc.4 With regard to the first point, he proposes the following
proposition: Every intelligence {73} understands sempiternal things, which are
not destroyed and do not fall under time. He understands by sempiternal
things those things that are above time and motion, as he explained in
Proposition 2.5 Now, he expressly says which are not destroyed and do not fall
under time, for certain things fall under time that are nevertheless not
destroyed, such as the motion of the heavens, which, while measured by time,
will neither be destroyed nor cease, according to the position of the
philosophers.
On the surface it seems that the meaning of this proposition is that an
intelligence does not know things that are corruptible and fall under time, but
[knows] only incorruptible things that exist above time. But that this is not the
meaning of the proposition is evident from the proof that is added, in which he
proves, not that an intelligence knows sempiternal and incorruptible things, but
that it immediately causes only sempiternal things. Hence we need to explain
what is meant by: every intelligence understands, i.e., how by understanding it
causes sempiternal things. This is clear from Proclus's book, where he presents
two propositions on this point. One of these is 172: "Every intellect is
proximately constitutive6 of things perpetual and unchangeable in substance."7
The other is 174: "Every intellect by understanding establishes the things that
are after it."8 The author of this book has conflated these two propositions into
one, and, while he sought brevity, he introduced obscurity.9 Nonetheless, in
this sense,10 he proves the proposition in the same way as Proclus. In this
proof he does two things. First, he shows that an intelligence does not
immediately produce things that are corruptible or fall under time, but only
sempiternal things; second, [he shows] the source of corruptibility in things.
4. cf. Prop. 12., S{77}.
5. cf. above, S{12}.
6.substitutor. Literally, "the underlying cause" as Moerbeke renders Proclus's
hypostates according to the literal sense of the parts of the word.
7. Proclus, Prop. 172, Dodds, p. 150.1516; Vansteenkiste, p. 517.
8. Proclus, Prop. 174, Dodds, p. 152.8; Vansteenkiste, p. 517.
9. Cf. Horace, Poet. 25. Also, see St. Thomas, In Boeth. de Trin., Prooemium.
10. I.e., with the understanding that "he does not prove that an intelligence knows
sempiternal and incorruptible things, but that it causes only sempiternal things
immediately."
 Page 83
{74} He shows the first in this way. An intelligence produces its effect
according to its being.11 This is so because its understanding is connatural and
essential to it, for it produces something only by understanding, as we have
shown above.12 Hence whatever it produces, it produces through its own
being. But the being of an intelligence is incorruptible and above time, equal to
eternity, as was said in Proposition 2.13 Therefore, the immediate effect of an
intelligence is sempiternal, not falling under corruption or time. He makes the
second point clear, saying that, since an intelligence does not immediately
cause corruptible things, it does follow that corruptible things are not
immediately from an intelligence but are from some temporal corporeal cause.
For corruption and generation in these lower things are caused through the
motion of the heavens, while the motion itself of the heavens is not
immediately from an intelligence but from a soul, as he said above in
Proposition 3.14
Now, if someone wanted to reduce this process to the meaning that appears
superficially from the proposition, one could further say that an intelligence
knows corruptible things as sempiternal, for, although they are in themselves
material, they are not in an intelligence materially, and thus not temporally, but
sempiternally. This is made evident through the effect, since the immediate
effect of an intelligence is sempiternal. For that by which an intelligence knows
is the productive principle15 in it, just as an artist acts through the form of an
art. But the proof given here, even though it is granted by some philosophers,
does not have necessity. For, if this proof were granted, many of the
foundations of the Catholic faith would be removed, for it would then follow
that angels would be able to do nothing new in lower things immediately, and
much less God, who is not only {75} eternal but before eternity, as was said
above.16 Furthermore, it would follow that the world always was.
For this seems to be the most effective reason for those who maintain that the
world is eternal, taking as their reason the unchangeableness of the maker. For
they do not see how it could be possible for some agent, if it existed altogether
unchangeably, to begin now to act when originally it had not acted, unless
perhaps some exterior change is presupposed. For,
11.Esse here and throughout this paragraph.
12. Cf. above, S{71}.
13. Cf. above, S{15}.
14. Cf. above, S{24}.
15.principium factivum.
16. Cf. above, S{14}.
 Page 84
as Averroes argues in his commentary on Book 8 of the Physics,17 if some
voluntary agent wants to make something after and not before, he must
imagine at least time, which is the number of motion. So he concludes that it is
impossible for a new effect to come about from an unchangeable and eternal
will, unless some motion is presupposed. Because this seems to be the more
effective argument used to prove the eternity of the world, we must pay
careful attention to an analysis of its argumentation.18
Now we should note that there is one way of speaking about an agent that
produces something in time, and another way about an agent that produces
time together with the thing that is produced in time. For when something is
produced in time, it is necessary to accept some proportion to time, either with
regard only to what is produced, or also with regard to the producer itself. For
sometimes the action is in time, not only on the part of what is acted upon, but
also on the part of the agent, for something is in time insofar as it is in motion,
whose number is time. So when some change is found on the part of what is
acted upon and on the part of the agent, then the action with regard to both is
in time. For instance, when somebody becomes cold, it occurs anew19 to him
to light a fire to ward off the cold. But this is not {76} always what happens,
for something exists whose substance is not in time, but whose activity is in
time, as he will say below.20 An agent of this kind, without any change in itself,
produces an effect in time that did not exist before. In this way God, too, can
produce something in time that is new21 and did not exist previously,
according to a defined22 proportion of this effect to this time, as happens in all
miraculous effects produced immediately by God. Nor is this opposed
17. Averroes, In Phys, VIII 1,252 a 10b 6, text. 15. Also, cf. St. Thomas, In Phys.
VIII, Lect. 2 and In Met. XII, Lect. 5.
18. For further discussion on the question of whether the world is eternal or temporal,
see ST I, Q. 46; SCG, II, Cap. 32 and 35; Quodlibet., III, Q. 14, A. 2 and XII, Q. 6, A. 1;
De Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantes. Briefly, for St. Thomas that the world is
eternal can be neither proved nor disproved. He takes the argument given by Aristotle
for the eternity of the world as only probable. In the De Aeternitate Mundi contra
Murmurantes, St. Thomas argues against John Pecham, a contemporary at the
University of Paris, who claimed that it could be proved that the world is not eternal;
see Ignatius Brady, "John Pecham and the Background to the De aeternitate mundi of
St. Thomas Aquinas," St. Thomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies (Toronto: PIMS,
1974). The creation of the world as temporal is thus a matter of faith, according to
Aquinas.
19.de novo.
20. Cf. Prop. 31, S{140}.
21.de novo.
22.certam.
 Page 85
to saying that God produces through his being,23 because his being is his
understanding. Just as his being is one, yet he understands many things and
because of this can produce many things, even though his understanding
remains one and simple, so too, though his being is eternal and unchangeable,
he can nevertheless understand any temporal and changeable being. And so,
although his understanding is sempiternal, he can nevertheless through it
produce a new effect in time. An indication of this appears in some measure24
in us, for a man can, with his will remaining unchanged, defer his work to the
future, so that he does it at a predetermined time.25
But if someone should say that as often as this happens one must
presuppose26 another prior motion, at least that very course of time that
cannot be understood without motion, from which it could happen that
something that was not appropriate to be made earlier, is indicated afterwards
as appropriate to be made, we will say this is quite true in God's particular
effects, which he brings about in time. For that he raised up Lazarus on the
fourth day but not before, he did with respect to some preceding change of
circumstances.27 But this is irrelevant to the production of the universe
because time and the whole totality of motion come to be at once with the
world. Thus there is no other preceding time or motion to which it would be
necessary that the newness of this effect be proportioned. {77} [Rather, the
newness of this effect need be proportioned] only to the reason of the maker
inasmuch as he understood and willed that this effect will not have been from
eternity but that it begin to be after not being. For thus time is the measure of
activity or motion, just as dimension is the measure of corporeal magnitude.
So, if we should ask about some particular body, for example, earth, "Why is it
forced within these limits of magnitude and not extended further?" the reason
for this can be [taken] from its proportion to the world as a whole. But if we
should ask further why the whole universe of bodies does not surpass the
boundaries of such a determined magnitude, the reason for this cannot be
from its proportion to some other magnitude. Either we must say that corporeal
magnitude is infinite, as the ancient natural philosophers
23.Esse here and throughout the remainder of the paragraph.
24.aliqualiter.
25.determinato tempore.
26.praeintelligere.
27.rerum.
 Page 86
held, or we must say that the reason for such a determined magnitude is due
solely to the intelligence and will of the maker. Therefore, just as the infinite
God could produce a finite universe according to the plan28 of his wisdom, so
the eternal God could produce a new world according to the same plan of
wisdom.
28.Rationem here and in the next line.
 Page 87

Proposition 121
All of the first things2 are in one another in the mode appropriate for one of them to be
in another.

This is because life and intelligence are in being,3 and being and intelligence
are in life, and being and life are in intelligence. Nevertheless, being and life in
intelligence are two intelligences, and being and intelligence in life are two
lives, and intelligence and life in being are two beings.
This is so only because each one of the first things is either a cause or an
effect. An effect is in a cause in the mode belonging to the cause, and a cause
is in the effect in the mode belonging to the effect. We abbreviate and say that
a thing acting in a thing4 in the mode belonging to a cause is in it only in the
mode that is its cause,5 as sense is in soul in an animate mode, soul is in
intelligence in an intellectual mode, intelligence is in being in an essential
mode, the first being is in an intelligence in an intellectual mode, intelligence is
in soul in an animate mode, and soul is in sense in a sensible mode. Let us
return6 and say that sense is in the soul and intelligence in the first cause in
their own modes, as we have shown.
Commentary
{78} After showing that an intelligence understands sempiternal things, [the
author] here introduces a proposition in order to show how intelligences, which
are sempiternal things, mutually understand one another.
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 103 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 92.1318.
There Proclus speaks of the first triad of hypotheses, being (on), life (zoe) and
intelligence (nous) and the three basic relations to which they give rise: causal (kat'
aitian), essential (kath' huparchin) and participative (kata methexin). St. Thomas
refers to Prop. 12 in ST IIII, Q. 23, A. 6, ad 1; SCG II, Cap. 73; De Veritate, Q. 24, A.
8, 6a; De Potentia, Q. 3, A. 3, 1a; Quodlibet. IX, Q. 4, A. 1c.
2. I.e., primary principles.
3.esse here and throughout the proposition and St. Thomas's commentary on it.
4. In place of in rem read by Bardenhewer and Pattin, we read in re with nine
(BCLOPSTUV) of the ten manuscripts entirely collated by Pattin and with the Aosta
Latin. Our reading is consistent with the corresponding Arabic as well.
5. The Latin translator read huwa 'ilatu-hu here. The correct reading of the Arabic is
huwa 'alai-hi, ''which is appropriate to it."
6.redeamus.
 Page 88
Something is understood because it is in the being that understands, and so he
shows in this proposition how one higher being7 is in another. The proposition
is as follows: All of the first things are in one another in the mode appropriate
for one of them to be in another. Proclus also sets forth this proposition [as]
103 in his book in these words: "All things are in all things, but properly in
each."8 Moreover, what Proclus says, "but properly in each," and what is said
here, in the mode appropriate for one of them to be in another, are the same
thing. For in both places what is meant is that one is in the other according to
the mode appropriate to that in which it is.
But Proclus introduces this proposition according to the positions of the
Platonists by which they assert separate subsistent forms among which, as was
said above,9 each one is higher to the degree that it is more universal and
extends its participation to more things. Accordingly, being itself is higher than
life itself and the latter higher than intellect itself. And so, establishing this,
Proclus adds in his proposition, "For life and intellect are in being, and being
and understanding are in life, and being and living are in intellect."10 The
author of this book also seems to speak in the same way, calling such separate
things "first things." For he adds, explaining as it were, This is so because life
and intelligence are in being, and being and intelligence are in life, and being
and life are in intelligence, which is identical with the words of Proclus.
In his proposition Proclus adds an explanation of the way in which one of these
is in the other, saying, "But all beings are in one place intellectually, and in
another vitally, and in another beingly11 (i.e. after the mode of being)." It is as
if he said that {79} all three of the above are in intellect intellectually, in life
vitally, and in being essentially. But in this book what is asserted in place of this
seems to be corrupted and badly understood. For it goes on to say,
Nevertheless, being and life in intelligence are two intelligences. But we should
understand that these two, namely, being and life, are in an intelligence
intellectually; and being and intelligence in life are two lives, that is, both are in
life vitally; and intelligence and life <in being> are two beings, that is, both are
in being itself essentially. But,
7.unum de entibus superioribus.
8. Proclus, Prop. 103, Dodds, p. 92.13; Vansteenkiste, p. 492.
9. Cf. above, S{18}.
10. Proclus, Prop. 103, Dodds, p. 92.1315; Vansteenkiste, p. 492.
11.enter.
 Page 89
if we understand his words literally, this is false. For to live for a living being is
its very being,12 as is said in Book II of On the Soul,13 and to understand for
the first intelligence14 is itself its life and its being, as Book XII of the
Metaphysics says.15 So too, Proclus, excluding this misunderstanding, says that
"the being of an intellect is knowing and" its "life" is "knowledge."16 Otherwise,
the incongruity that Aristotle describes in Book III of the Metaphysics17 against
the Platonists would follow, namely, that Socrates would be three animals,
because he himself is an animal, and the idea of animal in general in which he
participates is also predicated of him, and likewise the idea of man, which is
also an animal. So it would follow that each one of these three would not be
one but many.
But Proclus gives a clear proof of what we have been discussing when he
distinguishes how one thing is said of another in three ways: in one way,
causally, as heat is said of the sun; in another way essentially, or naturally, as
heat is said of fire; and in a third way "according to" a certain "having after,"18
i.e., consecutiveness19 or participation, namely, when something is had not
fully but in a posterior way and particularly, as heat is not found in bodies
composed of elements {80} in the fullness with which it is in fire. Thus, what is
essentially in the first is in the second and in the third by participation; while
what is essentially in the second is causally in the first and in the last by
participation; and what is essentially in the third is causally in the first and the
second.20 In this way all things are in all things.
But because the author of this book does not seem to posit separate forms,
when he says here that being, life, and intelligence are in one another, we
should understand him to mean this only insofar as they are found in things
having being, living, and understanding. For living and
12.vivere enim viventis est ipsum esse eius.
13. Aristotle, De Anima, II 4, 415b13.
14. intelligentis.
15. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII 7, 1072b24ff.
16. Proclus, Prop. 103, Dodds, p. 92.2829; Vansteenkiste, p. 492.
17. Aristotle, Metaphysics, III 6, 1003a11ff. and above, S{23}.
18.Posthabitio is Moerbeke's translation here for methexis, apparently emphasizing the
component parts "to have" (echein) and "after" (meta) of the Greek word, since
otherwise Moerbeke translates this term as participatio.
19.consecutionem.
20. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 103, Dodds, p. 92.1720, and Prop. 65, Dodds, p. 62.1314;
Vansteenkiste, pp. 492 and 28990.
 Page 90
understanding are found causally in being itself according to its proper
character,21 in the way in which it was said22 in Proposition 1 that being is the
first cause, while living and understanding are posterior causes. But we should
not understand literally that intelligence and life are in being itself two beings,
but that these two, insofar as they are in being itself, are not other than being.
Similarly, being, insofar as it is in life, is life itself, since life adds nothing to
being except a determined mode of existing,23 or the determined nature of a
being.24 The same should be understood in the other comparisons according
to which one of these is said to be in the other.
But because, according to the understanding of this author, these three are
not certain subsisting things, as was said,25 he subsequently applies this
proposition to things that subsist per se, which are: first being, which is God,
intelligence, the intellectual soul and the sensitive soul. He states that in this
way the cause is in the effect and conversely, insofar as the cause acts on the
effect and the effect receives the action of the cause. Moreover, the cause acts
on the effect in the mode belonging to the cause itself, but the effect receives
the action of the cause in its own mode. So it is necessary that the cause be in
the effect in the mode belonging to the effect {81} and that the effect be in
the cause in the mode belonging to the cause. Thus, those things that are in
the senses sensibly are in an intellectual soul in the mode appropriate to it, and
those things that are in the soul in an animate mode are in the intellect in its
proper mode, and the things that are in an intelligence intelligibly are in the
first cause essentially according to its mode. Conversely, prior things are in
posterior things according to the mode of posterior things. From this we can
grasp how intelligences understand one another and the first cause. For each
one understands the other insofar as the other is in it in the mode of that in
which it is, because lower things are also in higher things according to certain
more excellent likenesses, or species, while higher26 things are in lower things
according to certain more deficient likenesses and species.
21.rationem.
22. Cf. preceding paragraph.
23.essendi.
24.entis.
25. Cf. above, S{5}.
26.superiores.
 Page 91

Proposition 131
Every intelligence understands its essence.

This is because it is simultaneously what understands and what is understood.2

Therefore, since an intelligence is both what understands and what is
understood, then it undoubtedly sees its essence. And when it sees its
essence, it knows that it understands its essence through intelligence.3 And
when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of the things that are under it,
because they are from it. But they are in it in an intelligibile mode. Therefore,
an intelligence and the things understood are one. This is because, if the
things understood and an intelligence are one, and an intelligence knows its
own being, then undoubtedly, when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of
the things. And when it knows the rest of the things, it knows its essence,
and4 when it knows things, it knows them only because they are what is
understood. Therefore, an intelligence simultaneously knows its essence and
the things understood, as we have shown.
Commentary
After showing how an intelligence understands other things, [the author] now
introduces this proposition to show how it understands itself. This proposition is
also found as 167 in Proclus's book in these words: "Every intellect understands
itself."5 But we must take the mean-
1. This proposition is based on Prop. 167 as well as 168 and 169 in Proclus's
Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 144.22; p. 146.2627; p. 146.1921, 146.23. The author
departs from Proclus on the question of the existence of an ideal intellect, as St.
Thomas notes. St. Thomas refers to this proposition in ST I, Q. 94, A. 2, 3a and III,
Q. 50, A. 6c.
2. I.e., it is both knower and known.
3.et, quando videt essentiara suam, scit quod intelligit per intelligentiam essentiam
suam. Like the Leiden Arabic manuscript, the Latin translator's Arabic text here
suffered from homeoteleuton and misplaced or missing diacritical marks. The proper
Arabic text has, "When it sees its essence, it knows that it is an intelligence in act.
When it knows that it is an intelligence in act, it knows that it is an intelligence that
understands its essence."
4. We read et for quia with Pattin's Latin manuscripts LOSUV and Aosta and in accord
with the corresponding Arabic.
5. Proclus, Prop. 167, Dodds, p. 144.22; Vansteenkiste, p. 514.
 Page 92
ing of this proposition and {82} its proof from the things that Proclus says.
For, as was said above, according to the opinions of the Platonists, the order of
intellects is placed under the order of separate forms, from whose participation
they come to be actually understanding. Hence separate forms are compared
to them as the intelligible to the intellect. Furthermore, just as the Platonists
asserted certain ideas for other things, so too [they asserted an idea] for
intellects themselves, which they called the "first intellect."6 This ideal intellect
understands inasmuch as it is intellect and is a form understood inasmuch as it
is an ideal form. Thus intellect and thing understood are entirely united in it.
Through this [union] [the first intellect] understands itself completely, because
its essence as a whole is [something] intelligible, [and] not just [something]
that understands. Furthermore, according to the Platonists, every intellect has
a participated intellect. But the higher intellects participate intellect itself more
perfectly. Hence they participate it not only in order to be intellect but also in
order to be intelligible and, in a certain sense, formal intellects. Thus a being
that understands and a thing that is understood are in a certain sense
conjoined in [higher intellects] according to their substance. Therefore, they
also understand their essence, but differently from the way that the first
intellect does. For the first ideal intellect does not participate some prior form of
intellectuality but is itself the first form of intellectuality. Hence its intelligible
[object] is not other than itself. Posterior intellects do have something of the
form of intellectuality in their substance, but in such a way that it is derived
from the higher ideal intellect. Thus in this way they understand their own
essence because they also {83} understand the higher intellect that they
participate. And this is what Proclus adds in his proposition: "But the first
[intellect understands] only itself, and in it intellect and the intelligible thing
are numerically one. But each subsequent intellect [understands] itself and
those things that are prior to it simultaneously in such a way that the
intelligible thing for it is both what it is and that by which it is.7
But because, according to the opinion of Aristotle (which in this agrees more
with Catholic doctrine), we do not maintain that there are many forms above
intellects but only one, which is the first cause, we must say
6. cf. Proclus, Prop. 21, Dodds, p. 24.2729.
7. Proclus, Prop. 167, Dodds, p. 144.2125; Vansteenkiste, pp. 51415.
 Page 93
that, just as the first cause is being itself, so is it life itself and first intellect
itself. Hence, Aristotle also proves in Book 10 of the Metaphysics8 that the first
cause understands only itself, not because it lacks knowledge of other things,
but because in understanding its intellect is not informed by any intelligible
species other than itself. Thus in this way the higher separate intellects,
inasmuch as they are close to the first cause, understand themselves both
through their essence and through participation in a higher nature.
So, to prove this proposition, the author first states here that in separate
intellects what understands and what is understood are simultaneously [one
thing] inasmuch as they are not only intellects according to their substance but
also intelligible as what most closely participate first intellect. So he concludes
that an intelligence understands its essence. Because its essence is the
essence of something that understands, it follows that, by understanding its
essence, it understands that it understands its essence. Furthermore, he shows
subsequently how it understands other things as well, through the fact that it
understands its essence. For it results from the proposition given that all other
things are in an intelligence {84} in an intelligible mode, and so an intelligence
and the things understood are one insofar as they are in an intelligence.
Therefore, when it understands its essence, it understands other things. For
the same reason, whenever an intelligence understands other things, it
understands itself. But we shall consider below whether these things are
applicable to the intellectual soul.9
8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII 9, 1074b30ff.
9. Cf. Prop. 15., S{88}.
 Page 94

Proposition 141
Sensible things are in every soul because it is their example,2 and intelligible things are
in it because it knows them.3

The soul came to be so only because it extends between intellectual things,

which are not in motion, and sensible things, which are in motion. Because the
soul is such, it comes to impress corporeal things. For this reason it came to be
the cause of bodies and the effect of the intelligence that is before it.
Therefore, things that are impressed by the soul are in the soul in the sense4 of
an example, because sensible things are exemplified according to the example
of the soul while things that are located above the soul are in the soul in an
acquired manner.
Therefore, since this is so, let us return and say that all sensible things are in
the soul in the manner of a cause, except that5 the soul is an exemplary cause.
And I understand by "soul" the power acting upon sensible things.6 But the
efficient power in the soul is not material and the corporeal power in the soul is
spiritual, and the power that impresses things that have dimensions is without
dimension. Furthermore, intelligible things are in the soul in an accidental
manner because undivided intelligible things are in the soul in a divisible
manner, while united intelligible things are in the soul in a multiplied manner,
and immobile intelligible things are in the soul in the manner of motion.
Therefore, we have already shown that intelligible and sensible things are in
the soul. But sensible, corporeal mobile things are in the soul in an animated,
spiritual, united manner, while intelligible, united, quiescent things are in the
soul in a manner that is multiplied, mobile.
1. This proposition is derived from Prop. 195 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
179.415. St. Thomas quotes it in Quaest. Disp. de Anima, Q. 19, 10a.
2.exemplum. I.e., an exemplar, as St. Thomas explains below.
3. The Latin differs from the Arabic because of a misreading by the translator or
because of a faulty manuscript. The Arabic has "because it is a sign of them."
4.intentionem.
5.praeter quod corresponds precisely to the Arabic min ghaira an.
6.virtutem agentera res sensibles. The Latin verb ago does not quite carry the sense
found in the Arabic, which has "the power effecting sensible things."
 Page 95

Commentary
{85} After determining what the first cause is and what an intelligence is, he
determines here what the soul is. First, he determines what it is in its
relationship to other things. Second, he determines what it is in itself, at: Every
knower etc.7 With regard to the first he asserts the following proposition:
Sensible things are in every soul because it is their example, and intelligible
things are in it because it knows them. But to understand this proposition, let
us see what Proclus writes in his book concerning this. There Proposition 195
states the following: "Every soul is all things, sensible things exemplarily, but
intelligible things yconice."8 He says, "yconice," i.e., in the manner of an
image, for an image is something made in the likeness of another, as an
exemplar is that in whose likeness something else is made.
Now, this proposition is proved both here and in Proclus's book in this way. The
soul, as was held in Proposition 2,9 is midway between intellectual things,
which are altogether separate from motion, and in this are made equal to10
eternity, and sensible things, which are in motion and fall under time. And
because prior things are the cause of posterior things, it follows that the soul is
the cause of bodies and an intelligence is the cause of the soul in the manner
previously explained.11 Furthermore, it is clear that it is necessary for effects to
preexist in causes by way of exemplarity, because causes produce effects
according to their likeness. Conversely, effects have the image of their causes,
as Dionysius also says in Chapter II of On the Divine Names.12 Thus sensible
things, which are caused by the soul, are in it in the manner of an example, so
that {86} those things that are below the soul are caused according to the
example and likeness of the soul. But things that are above the soul are in the
soul in an acquired manner, i.e., through a certain participation, so that they
are related to the soul as exemplars, while the soul is related to them as in a
certain sense an image. Thus it is evident that sensible things preexist in the
soul as in a cause, which is in a certain sense the exemplar of its effects.
7. Cf. below, Prop. 15, p.
8. Proclus, Prop. 195, Dodds, p. 170.45; Vansteenkiste, p. 525. Moerbeke renders
Proclus's paradeigmatikos by exemplariter ("exemplarily") and eikonikos by yconice.
9. Cf. above, S{15}.
10.parificantur.
11. Cf. above, S{22}.
12. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names II, 8; Dionysiaca I, 99; PG 3,645 C.
 Page 96
Further, he subsequently explains what the soul understands, saying: I
understand by "soul" the power acting upon sensible things. For, according to
those who maintain that the heavenly bodies are animated, the soul of the
heavens is the cause of all sensible bodies, just as each of the lower souls is
the cause of its own body. Therefore, no lower soul has universal causality over
sensible things. And so, sensible things are not in it in the manner of a cause
but only in the soul of the heavens, which has universal causality over sensible
things. Here he calls this, the power acting upon sensible things. Each of the
souls that exists here has causality over its own body. But it does not cause
that body either through sense or through intellect. Hence it does not pre-
possess the intelligible and exemplary characteristics13 of its body. Rather, it
causes that body through natural power. So, too, in Book II of On the Soul14 it
is said that the soul is the efficient cause of the body. But such an agent does
not act through some exemplary character properly understood, unless we call
the very nature through which it acts the exemplar of the effect that is
produced in some way in its likeness. {87} In this manner all the sensible parts
of its body preexist virtually in the nature of the soul, for they are adapted to
the potencies of the soul, which proceed from its nature.
Even though sensible things are in the soul, which is their cause, they are not,
however, in it in the manner in which they are in themselves. For the power of
the soul is immaterial even though it is the cause of material things, and is
spiritual, even though it is the cause of bodies, and is without corporeal
dimension, even though it is the cause of things that have dimension. Because
effects are in a cause according to the power of the cause, it is necessary that
sensible bodies exist indivisibly, immaterially and incorporeally in the soul. Just
as things lower than the soul are in it in a manner higher than in themselves,
so higher things, namely, intelligences, are in the soul in a mode lower than in
themselves, namely, yconice, or in the manner of an image, as Proclus says. In
place of this [term] the author says here, in an accidental manner, i.e.,
through a certain lower mode of participation, so that intelligible things, which
are in themselves undivided, united, and immobile, are in the soul in a divisible,
multiple, and mobile way in relation to the intelligencefor they are proportioned
to be the causes of the multiplicity, division, and motion of sensible things.
13.rationes.
14. Aristotle, On the Soul, II 4, 415b8.
 Page 97
Or he says that immobile things <are in the soul> in the manner of motion
because, according to the Platonists, it is proper to the soul that it move itself,
but, according to Aristotle, the soul is the principle of the motion of a thing that
moves itself.15
Finally, in the epilogue he concludes to what he had proposed, which is clear
from his premises. From what he has said, it can be made clear how the higher
souls of the heavens, if the heavens are animated, can know sensible and
intelligible things, for they know them insofar as these things are in them.
15. Cf. above, S{15}.
 Page 98

{88} Proposition 151

Every knower knows its essence. Therefore, it reverts to its essence with a complete
reversion.

This is because knowledge is nothing but an intellectual action. So, when a

knower knows its essence, it then reverts through its intellectual activity to its
essence. And this is so only because the knower and the known are one thing,
since the knower's knowledge is its essence from itself and toward itself.2 It is
from itself because it is a knower, and toward itself because it is the known.
This is because, due to the fact that knowledge is the knowledge of the knower
and the knower knows its essence, its activity is a reversion to its essence.
Therefore, its substance again reverts to its essence.
And by the reversion of a substance to its essence I mean nothing other than
that it is abiding steadfastly,3 fixed per se, not needing in its fixity and its
essence anything else to raise it up,4 since it is a simple, self-sufficient
substance.5
1. This proposition is derived from Proclus's Elements, Proposition 83. Cf. Dodds, pp.
76.2930, 76.3378.1, 76.3178.4. St. Thomas relates it to six propositions in Proclus:
Props. 15, 16, 43, 44, 83, and 186. St. Thomas quotes this proposition in ST I, Q. 14,
A. 2, 1a and ad 1, where he applies it preeminently to God; De Veritate, Q. 1, A. 9c;
Q. 2, A. 2, 2a and ad 2, where he refers to it as metaphorical, since there is no
motion, properly speaking, in intellectual knowing; Q. 8, A. 6, 5 s.c.
2. St. Thomas, as his interpretation of Aristotle in On the Soul, III 4, 430a19, shows,
would understand what is said here to apply only to separate substances, not the
human intellect (see In de Anima III, Lect. 9). What the human intellect as the lowest
of intellects knows is the quiddity of material things, so that the human intellect
becomes one with what it knows intentionally, not physically (see ST I, Q. 84, A. 2).
But we can know what the intellect is indirectly through an act of reflection (see ST I,
Q. 87, A. 1 and 3; De Veritate, Q. 10, A. 8).
3.stans.
4.erigente. The Arabic expresses this notion more clearly: ''not needing in its stability
any other thing to make it subsist."
5. This position is Neoplatonic with important Platonic foundations. The knower, be it
an intellect or higher soul, is a self-sufficient substance existing and knowing through
its own essence. For St. Thomas intellectual beings subsistent in their own essences
can exist without matter, though they depend on God for the actuality of existence
 (esse). As mentioned above, intelligences or angels have knowledge only from their
essences or from divine illumination. In contrast, for St. Thomas, following
(footnote continued on next page)
 Page 99

Commentary
After showing how the soul relates to other things, [the author] shows here
how the soul relates to itself. He proposes the following proposition: Every
knower knows its essence. Therefore, it reverts to its essence with a complete
reversion. To understand this proposition we ought to consider certain
propositions given in Proclus's book.
One of these is Proposition 15 in his book, which is as follows: "Everything that
is able to turn upon itself is incorporeal."6 The author clarified this proposition
before, in Proposition 7 of this book.7
Let us take as the second Proposition 16 in Proclus's book, which is as follows:
"Everything able to turn upon itself has a substance separable from every
body."8 The proof of this is that, since a body cannot turn upon itself, as {89}
is held in the stated proposition, it follows that turning upon itself is an activity
separated from a body. Furthermore, a substance whose activity is separable
from a body must also be separable. Hence everything that can turn upon itself
is separable from a body.
Let us take as the third Proposition 43 of Proclus's book, which is as follows:
"Everything that is able to turn to itself is authypostaton,"9 i.e., is per se
subsistent.10 This is proved by the fact that every thing turns [back] upon that
through which it is made a substance. Hence, if anything turns upon itself
according to its being, it must subsist in itself.
Let us take as the fourth Proposition 44 of Proclus's book: "Everything that is
able to turn upon itself according to its activity is also able to turn
(footnote continued from previous page)
Aristotle, the senses, both external and internal, are required as an objective
instrumental cause for any human knowledge, since the human is not a simple
substance but a substance composed of body and soul (see ST I, Q. 84, A. 6.).
6. Proclus, Prop. 15, Dodds, p. 16.30; Vansteenkiste, p. 271. Proclus's term
epistreptikon is rendered by Moerbeke as conversivum ad, which we translate literally
as "able to turn upon." Corresponding to this are the reditio ("reversion") of which the
author of the De Causis speaks and the conversio ("conversion," "turning") and reditus
("return'') of which St. Thomas speaks.
7. Cf. above, S{51}.
8. Proclus, Prop. 16, Dodds, p. 18.67; Vansteenkiste, p. 271.
9. Proclus, Prop. 43, Dodds, p. 44.25; Vansteenkiste, p. 282.
10. This is a gloss added to Prop. 40 by William of Moerbeke. The Latin De Causis
expresses Proclus's term authypostaton by stans, fixa per se ("abiding steadfastly,
fixed per se") while the Arabic has qa'imun bi-dhati-hi with the same sense.
 Page 100
upon itself according to its substance."11 This is proved through the fact that,
since to turn upon itself is [a mark] of perfection, if what turns [upon itself]
according to activity were not to turn upon itself according to substance, it
would follow that the activity would be better and more perfect than the
substance.12
Let us take as the fifth Proposition 83 of Proclus's book, which is as follows:
"Everything that knows its very self is in every way able to turn upon itself."13
The proof of this is that what knows itself turns to itself through its activity and
consequently through its substance, as is evident from the stated proposition.
{90}
We shall take as the sixth Proposition 186 of Proclus's book, which is as follows:
"Every soul is an incorporeal substance, separable from a body."14 This is
proved in this way, according to what has [already] been stated: The soul
knows itself. Therefore, it turns upon itself in every way. Therefore, it is
incorporeal and separable from a body.
Now having seen these propositions, we should consider that three things are
asserted in this book [regarding this matter]. The first of them is that the soul
knows its essence, for what is said here ought to be understood with respect to
the soul. The second is what he concludes from this, that it reverts to its
essence with a complete reversion. And this is the same as what Proclus said in
his proposition: "Everything that knows its very self is in every way able to turn
upon itself."15 The complete reversion or conversion is understood both
according to substance and according to activity, as was said.16
Now, he proves that the second point follows from the first in this way. When I
say that a knower knows its essence, "to know" itself signifies an
11. Proclus, Prop. 44, Dodds, p. 46.12; Vansteenkiste, p. 282.
12. St. Thomas's own position with regard to the human intellect is given in ST I, Q.
87, A. 1: "But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper
natural object, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 7), it understands itself according as it is
made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the
active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by
their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore, the intellect knows
itself not by its essence, but by its act" (Benzinger trans.). Hence for St. Thomas what
Proclus says here applies only to separate substances (see ibid., ad 2 and 3).
13. Proclus, Prop. 83, Dodds, p. 76.2930; Vansteenkiste, p. 296.
14. Proclus, Prop. 186, Dodds, p. 162.1314; Vansteenkiste, p. 521.
15. Proclus, Prop. 83, Dodds, p. 76.2930; Vansteenkiste, p. 296.
16. Cf. above, S{89}.
 Page 101
intellectual activity. Therefore, it is evident that, due to the fact that the
knower knows its essence, it returns, i.e., it turns, to its essence through its
intellectual activity by understanding it. That this ought to be called "reversion"
or "conversion" he shows through the fact that the knower and the known are
one thing, since the soul knows its essence. Thus the knowledge by which it
knows its essence, i.e., the intellectual activity itself, is from itself because it is
a knower and is toward itself because it is the known. Thus there is a certain
circular motion which is conveyed by the word "reversion" or "conversion."
Furthermore, from the fact that it reverts to its essence according to its
activity, he concludes further that even according to its substance it reverts to
its essence. {91} Thus the return is made complete according to activity and
substance.
He explains subsequently what it means to revert according to substance to its
essence. For those things are said to turn upon themselves according to
substance that subsist through themselves, having fixity such that they do not
turn upon anything else that sustains them, as is the [case with] the
conversion of accidents to subjects.17 Now this pertains to the soul and to
everything else that knows itself, because every such thing is a simple
substance, self-sufficient through itself, not needing, as it were, material
support. And this can [serve as] the third point, namely, that "the soul is
separable from a body," as Proclus proposes in his proposition.18
Now the first of these [three points], namely, that the soul knows its essence,
is not proved here. But Proclus proves it in his book in this way: "But that it
knows itself" is "clear," "for, if it knows what is above it, then all the more is its
nature to know itself, as knowing itself from causes that" are "before it."19
Here we ought to consider carefully that before, when [the author] treated of
the knowledge of intellects, he said that the first intellect knows itself alone, as
he said in Proposition 13,20 because
17. I.e., accidents inhere in their subjects and so have their being through them and
not through themselves. See Quodlibet. IX. Q. 3, A. 5, 2m.
18. I.e., Prop. 16. Cf. S{88}.
19. Proclus, Prop. 186, Dodds, p. 162.2123; Vansteenkiste, p. 522. But such knowing
for the intellectual soul would not involve a complete identification between the
knower and the known, as the De Causis seems to suggest, but Proclus does not. By
returning to Prop. 13 of the De Causis, St. Thomas will suggest an interpretation that
allows for the distinction found in Proclus to be also made for the author of the De
Causis.
20. Cf. above, S{82}.
 Page 102
it is itself the ideal intelligible form. But other intellects as close to it participate
both the form of intelligibility and the power of intellectuality from the first
intellect, just as Dionysius says in Chapter IV {92} of On the Divine Names,
that the supreme intellectual "substances" are both "intelligible and
intellectual."21 Hence each of them knows both itself and what is above it,
which it participates. But because an intellectual soul participates the first
intellect in a lower way, it has in its substance only the power22 of
intellectuality. Hence it knows its substance, not through its essence, but,
according to the Platonists, through the higher things that it participates;23
and according to Aristotle in Book III of On the Soul,24 through the intelligible
species, which are made to be in a certain sense forms, inasmuch as through
them it comes to be in act.25
21. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, IV 1; Dionysiaca I, 147; PG 3, 683 B.
22.vim.
23. But see ST I, Q. 84, especially A. 1, 3, 4 and 6, where St. Thomas rejects this view.
24. Aristotle, On the Soul, III 4, 430a 12.
25. This is, of course, St. Thomas's position. Following Aristotle, for St. Thomas the
human intellect does not already contain forms but is like a blank tablet, a pure
potentiality (ST I, Q. 84, A. 3). Since the object of the human intellect is the quiddity of
material things (see ST I, Q. 84, A. 7), the human intellect must first turn to the
phantasms to have any knowledge (see ibid.). The return of the human intellect to
itself first requires an act of judgment by which the intellect judges that a thing
corresponds to the form which the intellect has produced and apprehends so that the
intellect knows that it knows (see ST I, Q. 16, A. 2). But this does not mean that the
human intellect comes to know itself directly by such a judgment. What is further
required, in a path of indirection, is that the intellect move in its reflection from the
objects which it knows (the quiddity of material things) to the acts whereby such
objects are constituted and thereby to the knowledge of the kind of power required to
produce such objects and acts, which power must be immaterial (see ST I, Q. 87, A. 1
and 3). The object of the human intellect's knowledge and the indirect way the human
intellect returns to itself must be sharply distinguished, then, from that of separate
intellects, which know their essence directly through themselves without having to turn
to other things because what they are and that by which they know are the same (see
ibid.).
 Page 103

Proposition 161
All the unlimited powers2 are dependent upon the first infinite, which is the power of
powers, not because they are acquired,3 but rather [because] they are a power
belonging to things having stability.4
But if someone should say that the first created being, namely, an intelligence,
is unlimited power, we say that created being is not power [itself] but rather a
certain power. And its power came to be infinite only with respect to the lower,
not with respect to the higher, because this5 is not the pure power, which is
power only because it is power6 and which is the thing that is limited neither
with respect to the lower
1. This proposition relates to Props. 92 and 93 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
82.2328; p. 84.56; p. 82.2835. The author, in his monotheism, departs from Proclus
by identifying the first infinite power with God instead of understanding it to be a
Platonic idea that occupies an intermediary position between the one and good,
which transcends it, and being, which is below it. St. Thomas refers to this
proposition in ST I Q. 50, A. 2, ad 4; De Potentia, Q. 6, A. 3, 9a; De Ente et
Essentia, 5; De Natura Materiae, 3.
2. Literally, "All the powers for which there is no limit."
3.non quia ipsae sunt acquisitae, stantes in rebus entibus. The words in roman type
are present in Bardenhewer's Latin but not reproduced by Saffrey. These omissions
seem to be typographical errors, since St. Thomas quotes this text using just these
words in his commentary. The corresponding Arabic as well as Latin manuscripts O and
Aosta support this text. The reading proposed by Pattin (Pattin, 129.7273) is not found
complete in any of the manuscripts he collated.
4.immo sunt virtus rebus habentibus fixionem. Here Saffrey refrains from reproducing
entibus ( . . . rebus entibus, habentibus . . .) found in Bardenhewer's text, since St.
Thomas omits this in his quotation. The Latin text of this entire opening sentence
seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the Arabic text on the part of the
translator. The Arabic has "All the infinite powers are dependent upon the first infinity,
which is the power of powers, not in that it is acquired or stable and subsistent in
things having being but in that it is a power belonging to things having being and
possessing stability." The Arabic more clearly evidences its dependence upon the
opening text of Proclus's Proposition 92: "The whole multitude of infinite potencies is
dependent upon one principle, the First Infinity, which is not potency in the sense that
it is participated or exists in things that are potent, but is Potency-in-itself, not the
potency of an individual but the cause of all that is." St. Thomas is well aware of the
textual problems here and even rightly suggests that the text should read the singular
where
5.ipsa. the Latin has the plural. Cf. below, S{9394}.
6. I.e., it is not power qua power or power per se.
 Page 104
nor with respect to the higher. But the first created being, namely, an
intelligence, has limit and its power has limit, according to which its cause
remains.7
The first creating being is the first pure infinite. This is because, if for powerful8
beings there is no limit, due to their acquisition [of infinity] from the first pure
infinite, due to which they are beings, and if the first being itself is that which
determines9 things for which there is no limit, then without doubt it is above
the infinite. But the first created being, namely, an intelligence, is not the
infinite, but rather it is called what is infinite and is not called what is itself that
which is not finite.10
Therefore, the first being is the measure of first intellectual beings and of
second sensible beings because it is that which has created beings and
measured them with a measure appropriate to every being.
Let us, therefore, return and say that {93} the first creating being is above the
infinite, while second created being is infinite, and what is between the first
creating being and second being is not finite. And the remaining simple
goodnesses, such as life, light and their like, are the causes of all things that
have goodnesses, because the infinite is from the first cause. And the first
created [being] is the cause of all life and similarly of the remaining
goodnesses, which descend from the first cause upon the first created [being],
and [this] is an intelligence. Then,11 they descend upon the remaining
intelligible and corporeal effects with the mediation of an intelligence.
Commentary
After distinguishing higher causes and after elaborating the individual parts of
his division, he begins here to show how [higher causes] relate to one another.
In regard to this he does three things. First, he shows how
7.et virtuti eius est finis secundum quem remanet causa eius. This passage was
clearly problematic to its Latin readers, as St. Thomas's understanding of it
indicates. The problem lies with the particular Arabic manuscript used by the
translator or with the translation itself. The Arabic text is much more clear here:
"and its power is also finite so long as its cause continues to be."
8.fortibus.
9.ponit.
10. Again the Arabic is considerably clearer: "And the first originated being
(alhuwiyah), i.e., the intelligence, is not infinite, but rather one says that it is without
limit and one does not say that it is what is infinity itself."
11. I.e., the first created intelligence.
 Page 105
lower things depend upon higher things. Second, he shows how higher things
infuse lower things, in Proposition 20, at: The first cause rules etc. Third, he
shows how in different ways lower things receive the infusion of the first
infusing [cause], in Proposition 24, at: The first cause exists etc. In regard to
the first he does two things. First, he shows how lower things depend upon
higher things according to power. Second, how they are dependent [upon
them] according to their substance and nature, in Proposition 18, at: All things
have an essence. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that
all infinite powers depend upon the first infinite power. Second, he shows that
they are assimilated to it to greater or lesser degrees, in Proposition 17, at:
Every united power etc.
In regard to the first he asserts this proposition: All the unlimited powers are
dependent upon the first infinite, which is the power of powers, not because
they are12 acquired, fixed, abiding steadfastly in things having being, but
rather [because] they are a power belonging to things having stability. But the
second part of this proposition seems to be corrupted in all the books. For it
ought to be said in the singular: "not because it is acquired, fixed, abiding
steadfastly {94} in things having being, but rather because it is the power"
etc., so that it refers to the power of powers. This is clear from Proclus's book,
which says in Proposition 92: "Every multitude of infinite potencies has
originated from one first infinity, which neither exists as a participated potency
nor subsists in those things with potencies but [subsists] according to itself,
being not a potency belonging to some [particular] participant but [a potency]
belonging to all caused beings."13
In the first place we should consider here that "infinite potency" is said of
whatever always exists, as was said above in Proposition 4,14 inasmuch as we
see that those things that can last longer have greater power of being. Hence
those things that can last infinitely have infinite potency in this respect. Now,
according to the positions of the Platonists, anything that is found in many
things must be reduced to something first, which is such through its essence,
from which the others are said to be such
12. Here St. Thomas has sint in place of sunt found in Bardenhewer.
13. Proclus, Prop. 92, Dodds, p. 82.2326. The actual conclusion of Proclus's text reads,
"but the cause of all beings" (alla panton aitia ton onton), instead of what Moerbeke
gives, "but for all caused beings" (sed omnium causatorum entium). As Vansteenkiste
points out (p. 299, Prop. 92, n. 1), Moerbeke apparently read aitia ton as the single
word aitiaton.
14. Cf. above, S{30}.
 Page 106
through participation. So, according to them, infinite powers are reduced to
something first that is essentially the infinity of power, not because it is a
power participated in some subsisting thing but because it subsists through
itself. But this, according to the Platonists, is not the very idea of being,
because such separate being has infinite potency. But with this it also has
finitude, as maintained before in Proposition 4.15 Hence it remains that it is not
the first potency that is essentially infinity itself. Nor did the Platonists maintain
that this idea of infinity is the first simply, because infinity itself participates
unity and goodness. Hence the one and good is the first simply. But this ideal
infinite, upon which all infinite powers depend, is a "medium between" the one
and good, which is the "first" simply, "and being." This is how Proclus explains
his proposition.16
{95} But the author of this book does not maintain that there is a real diversity
between such abstract ideal forms, which are said to be through their essence,
but attributes all things to the one first, which is God, as was also clear above
from the words of Dionysius.17 Consequently, according to the intention of this
author, this first infinite, upon which all infinite powers depend, is the first
simply, which is God. Now, by the being that is below the infinite, which
Proclus also mentions, he does not mean the idea of being18 but rather the
first created being, which is an intelligence. What Proclus proves about the
idea of being he proves here about the first created being, which is an
intelligence. So he says: If anyone would wish to say that the first created
being, which is an intelligence, is infinite power, it will not therefore be
necessary to say that it is essentially power; rather it is what has power. Hence
it is not that first infinite upon which all infinite powers depend. That it is not
the first infinite power is made clear through the fact that it is not infinite in
every way and in every respect, but is infinite only with respect to the lower,
not with respect to the higher. He says that the power of an intelligence is
infinite with respect to the lower because it is not comprehended by those
things that are below it. However, it is not infinite with respect to the higher
because it is surpassed by what is higher than it, by whose comprehension it is
limited. So Proclus also says in
15. Cf. above, S{30}.
16. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 92, Dodds, p. 82.3435; Vansteenkiste, p. 299.
17. Cf. above, S{20} and S{30}.
18.ens.
 Page 107
Proposition 93: "Every infinite in beings is infinite neither with respect to the
things situated above it nor with respect to itself"19 because, as he himself
proves in the same place, each thing is circumscribed and limited both by itself
and by higher things. Nor can it be circumscribed or limited by lower things.
Therefore, the power of an intelligence is not infinite with respect to all things,
because it does not have pure power, {96} i.e., it is not essentially power so as
to be subsisting power. For such a thing that is essentially power is limited
neither with respect to the lower nor with respect to the higher, for it does not
have anything prior by which it could be circumscribed. But an intelligence that
is the first created being has limit, and its limit is that according to which it
remains, i.e., [its limit is] according to [the degree to which] it falls short of
what is above it, remaining after it, as it were, without the force to equal it.
Next he shows what that first infinite is, upon which all infinite powers depend.
He understands here that the first creating being, namely, God, is the first pure
infinite, as the essentially existing infinite power. He proves this because
intelligences, which he calls here knowing20 and powerful due to the greatness
of power that they have, are infinite due to their acquisition [of infinity] from,
i.e., participation in, the first, which is the pure infinite, i.e., essentially, from
which they have not only infinity but also being. And if the first creating being
is what by its participation makes things to be infinite, then it is necessary that
it be above the infinite. According to what he says here, we should understand
[him to mean] that the first being is above the participated and created
infinite. But in Proclus this is said of the idea of the one and good, which is
above the idea of the infinite, according to the Platonists. So, explaining what
he had said, that the first being is above the infinite, he adds that the
intelligence is infinite, namely, participatively, but not essentially, so that it is
itself that which is infinite.
Therefore, he concludes from the premisses that, since the first being gives
{97} being and infinity to intelligences, it is the measure of first beings,
namely, of intelligible things, and consequently of second beings, namely, of
sensible things, inasmuch as the first in each genus is the measure of that
genus insofar as, by approaching it or receding from it, something is known to
be more perfect or less perfect in that genus. But he explains
19. Proclus, Prop. 93, Dodds, p. 84.12; Vansteenkiste, p. 299.
20. The term, "knowing" (scientes), does not appear in the Latin text of the De Causis
here. St. Thomas imports this idea into this proposition's explanation.
 Page 108
that the first being is the measure of all beings because it has created all
beings with the due measure appropriate to each thing according to the mode
of its nature. For the fact that some things approach it more or less is due to
the arrangement of the first being.21
Finally, then, in summing up, as it were, he gathers from his premisses what he
principally intended and says that the first creating being is above the infinite,
namely, what is infinite by participation. But the second being, which is
created, namely, an intelligence, is infinite participatively. Furthermore, that
which is mediate between the first created being, which is an intelligence, and
second created being, which is a corruptible body, is infinite, namely, a
celestial body. But Proclus asserts this as if the idea of the infinite were
mediate between the idea of the good and the idea of being. Now, having
established the order of things with regard to the infinite, [the author]
continues in a similar vein with respect to the other things and says that all the
other simple goodnesses, namely, life, light, and the like, are the causes of
things that have such goodnesses. For just as the first cause is the infinite
itself, and all other things have infinity from it, so also is the first cause life itself
and light itself, and from it the first created [being], namely, an intelligence,
has life and intellectual light. And likewise {98} also other goodnesses descend
from the first cause, first upon the first created [being], which is an
intelligence, and then upon the others with the mediation of an intelligence,
whether these others are understood to be intellectual souls or spiritual things.
21.ex eius dispositione.
 Page 109

Proposition 171
Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power.

This is because the first infinite, which is an intelligence, is close to the pure
true one. So, for this reason it has happened that infinity is more in every
power close to the true one than in a power distant from it. This is because
when a power begins to be multiplied, its unity is then destroyed. And when its
unity is destroyed, its infinity is then destroyed. And its infinity is destroyed only
because it is divided.
The indication of this is divided power and the fact that the more [that power]2
is concentrated and united, [the more] it is magnified and becomes more
powerful and effects wondrous activities. And the more it is partitioned and
divided, [the more] it is lessened and weakened and effects base activities.
Therefore, it is now clear and plain that the more a power approximates the
pure true one, the more powerful its unity becomes. And the more powerful its
unity becomes, the more apparent and more manifest is the infinity in it, and
its activities are great, wondrous, and noble activities.
Commentary
After showing in the preceding proposition that all infinite powers depend upon
the first infinite power, [the author] subsequently shows in this proposition how
one power more approaches the first infinity than another. And he says that:
Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. Proclus asserts this
same proposition [as Proposition] 95 in his book, in these words: ''Every
potency that exists more unitedly is more infinite than a [potency] made
plural."3 Now, this is proved in two ways in both places.
{99} First, through an argument, [which proceeds] in this way. As is
1. This proposition, which follows from the preceding proposition, relates to Prop. 95
in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 84.2832, 84.3435. St. Thomas quotes this
proposition and its explanation frequently. Some examples are: ST I, Q. 77, A. 2,
2a; II-II, Q. 37, A. 2, ad 3 and Q. 52, A. 2, 2a; SCG, II, Cap. 20; De Veritate, Q. 3, A.
2, 3a and Q. 5, A. 2, 3a; De Potentia, Q. 5, A. 10, 6a; Q. 6, A. 3, 10a; Q. 7, A 8c;
Quaest. Disp. de Anima, Q. 13, 9a.
2.ipsa.
3. Proclus, Prop. 95, Dodds, p. 84.1617; Vansteenkiste, p. 300.
 Page 110
known from the previous proposition, all infinite powers depend upon the first
infinite, which is the power of powers. So, to the degree a power has been
closer to that first power, to that degree it necessarily participates its infinity.
Now, that first power is essentially one. So, to the degree that something is
more one, to that degree it necessarily has more infinite power. And so it is
that the power of an intelligence, which is first among the infinite created
powers, is infinite to the greatest degree as closer to the first one. But powers
that are multiplied, by this very fact, fall away from unity and so their potency4
is lessened. An example of this appears in knowing powers, for the intellect,
which is not divided into many potencies, is more efficacious in knowing than
sense, which is diversified into many potencies. For the same reason the
knowing power of an intelligence, which is not divided by the sensitive and the
intellectual, is stronger than the human knowing power both with regard to
knowing singular sensible things and with regard to knowing intelligible things.
Second, this is proved through a sign.5 For we see in corporeal things, which
are divisble into parts,6 that, when many are brought together and united,
their power becomes stronger.7 From this, wondrous activities follow, as is
evident in many men simultaneously dragging a ship, who individually8 would
be unable to drag either it or its proportional parts. And the more the power of
a corporeal thing is divided, the weaker it becomes and it performs baser
activities, just as an entire house burns by a great fire that has gathered
together, which could not happen if the fire were separated9 throughout
different parts of the house.
From these two propositions [the author] concludes to what he had proposed,
as is evident in the text.
4.posse.
5. I.e., through experience.
6.partibilibus.
7.vehementior.
8.divisim.
9.dividatur.
 Page 111

{100} Proposition 181

All things have essence2 through the first being, while all living things move
themselves3 through their essence due to the first life, and all intellectual things have
knowledge due to the first intelligence.
This is because, if every cause gives something to what it causes, then
undoubtedly, the first being gives being to everything it causes. Likewise, life
gives motion to its effect, because4 life is [both] a procession from the first
being, [which is] at rest and sempiternal, and the first motion. Likewise, an
intelligence gives knowledge to its effect, which is because all true knowledge
is intelligence5 alone, and an intelligence is the first knower that there is, and it
infuses knowledge upon the rest of knowers.6
Now, let us repeat and say that the first being is at rest and the cause of
causes. If it gives being to all things, then it gives [it] to them by way of
creation. And the first life gives life to those which are under it, not by way of
creation, but by way of form. Likewise, an intelligence gives knowledge and the
remaining things to those which are under it only by way of form.
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 102 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 92.58,
92.1012. The author of the De Causis introduces a distinction here with regard to
being, life, and intelligence foreign to Proclus, for whom the above three are
impersonal hypostases. The first is "by way of creation," the other two "by way of
form." St. Thomas, following Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius, understands all three
to be one and the same as God. St. Thomas quotes this proposition in De Potentia,
Q. 3, A. 1c and presupposes it in Quodlibet. III, Q. 3, A. 1c. Throughout this
proposition and St. Thomas's commentary on it esse and ens appear regularly. They
can usually be distinguished by the context, where esse appears as "being without
qualification and ens as "being'' qualified by an article or in the plural.
2.habent essentiam. Though this reading was in the manuscript used by St. Thomas
and is common in the Latin tradition, it is a corruption of the original translation,
habent entia. The latter is found in Latin manuscripts T and Aosta and corresponds
precisely with the Arabic dhawatu huwiyat.
3.sunt motae.
4. We read quoniam for quia as corrected by Saffrey.
5.intelligentia. While this reading is found quoted by St Thomas, the original
translation had in intelligentia, "in the intelligence," which is found in Latin manuscripts
L, S, and Aosta and in two of the Arabic manuscripts.
6.scientia.
 Page 112

Commentary
Now to understand this proposition we should first note that all the grades of
things seem to reduce to three: being, living, and knowing.11 This is so
because every thing can be considered in a threefold way. First, in itself, and
thus being is proper to it. Second, insofar as it tends to something else, and
thus to move itself12 is proper to it. Third, insofar as it has other things in itself,
and thus to know is proper to it, since knowledge is accomplished because the
known is in the knower, not materially, but formally. Furthermore, just as to
have something formally and not materially in oneself, in which the nature of
knowledge consists, is the noblest way of having or containing something, so to
be self-moved is the noblest kind of mobility. In this consists the nature of life,
for we call those
7.secundum.
8.Prime ens renders to protos on, which Dodds translates, "the primal Being." Dodds,
p. 93.
9. Proclus, Prop. 102, Dodds, p. 92.14; Vansteenkiste, p. 491.
10. Cf. above, S{30}.
11.intelligere.
12.moveri.
 Page 113
things living which in some way move themselves. Therefore, being, which is
first, is common to all things, but not all things attain the perfection of moving
themselves. Hence not all things are living, but [only] certain things that are
more perfect among beings. Again, among those things that are able to
move13 themselves or others, not all are able to move by way of knowledge,
but [some move] through some material principle, as happens with plants.
Further, not all living things attain {102} the level14 of knowledge, but only
those things in which the principle of motion is something formal without
matter, for sense itself is able to receive15 the species of sensible things
without matter, as is said in Book II of On the Soul.16
Second, we should note that in every genus the cause is what is first in that
genus, by which all the things that belong to that genus are constituted in that
genus, such as among the elementary bodies, fire is the first hot thing, from
which all things obtain heat. Now, one does not proceed into infinity in any
order of things. So in the order of beings something must be first, which gives
being to all. And this is what he says, that all things have essence through the
first being. Likewise, in the genus of living things something must be first, and
from this all living things have life. And because it is proper to a living thing
that it be able to move itself, he therefore says that all living things are in
motion through their essence, i.e., move themselves, due to the first life. So,
too, Proclus says in his book, "All living things that are able to move themselves
are due to the first life."17 And [the author] proves that to move oneself
proceeds from the first life, adding: because life is a procession proceeding
from the first being, [which is] at rest and sempiternal. To understand this we
should realize that [a thing] is first something in itself before being moved
toward another. Hence, to be moved presupposes being. But, if being itself is,
as it were, what underlies motion, it will be necessary again for some principle
of motion to be pre-supposed, and so on, until some immobile being is arrived
at which is the principle of self-motion for all things. And this is the first life.
Hence it is clear that life in all living things is a certain procession proceeding
from a certain first being, [which is] at rest and sempiternal, i.e., subject to no
mo-
13.motiva.
14.gradum.
15.susceptivus.
16. Aristotle, On the Soul, II 12, 424a1819.
17. Proclus, Prop. 102, Dodds, p. 92.23.
 Page 114
tion. Likewise, in the order of knowers as well, {103} something must be first.
It is clear that in the order of perfection and nature intellectual knowledge is
prior to sensible [knowledge] because it is more immaterial. Hence we judge
about sensible knowledge through the intellect as of the lower through the
higher.18 Moreover, in intellectual knowledge itself it is clear that rational
inquiry proceeds from principles known per se, of which we have intuitive
understanding.19 Hence reasoning follows intuitive understanding. Therefore,
the first in the order of knowers is an intellect, and so all intellectual things,
i.e., knowing things, must have knowledge,20 that is, knowledge21 due to the
first intellect. Hence Proclus says in his book that "all knowing beings
participate knowledge due to the first intellect."22 And [the author] assigns the
reason for this: because all knowledge at root is intelligence alone, for
intelligence is a certain "summit" as Proclus says,23 of all knowledge. Hence an
intelligence is the first knower and it infuses knowledge upon all things that
know.
But, as we said before,24 according to the Platonists, the first being, which is
the idea of being,25 is something above the first life, i.e., above the idea of life,
and the first life is something above the first ideal intellect. But, according to
Dionysius, the first being, the first life, and the first intellect are one and the
same, which is God. So, too, in Book XII of the Metaphysics26 Aristotle says
of27 the first principle that it is intellect and that its understanding is life, and
due to this all things have being, life, and understanding28 from it.
{104} Third, we should note that these three are caused in different ways in
things, whether by different principles, according to the Platonists, or by the
same principle, according to the teaching of faith and of Aristotle. For there is a
twofold way of causing [something]. One is the way by which something is
made with something else being presupposed. By this way something is said to
be made through imparting form;29 because what arrives later is related to
what was presupposed by way of
18.superius.
19.intellectus.
20.scientiam.
21.cognitionem.
22. Proclus, Prop. 102, Dodds, p. 92.34; Vansteenkiste, p. 491.
23. Proclus, Prop. 102, Dodds, p. 92.11; Vansteenkiste, p. 492.
24. Cf. above, S{78}.
25. ens.
26. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII 7, 1072b24ff. Also, cf. above, S{24}.
27.attribuit.
28.intelligere.
29.informationis.
 Page 115
form. By another way something is caused without anything presupposed. By
this way something is said to be made through creation. So, while
understanding presupposes living and living presupposes being, being does not
presuppose anything else prior [to it]. So it is that the first being gives being to
all things by way of creation. But the first life, whatever that might be, does
not give life by way of creation but by way of form, i.e., by imparting form. The
same must be said of an intelligence. From this it is evident that, when [the
author] said before30 that an intelligence is the cause of a soul, he did not
understand [an intelligence] to be [the soul's] cause by way of creation but
only by way of imparting form, as we explained above.
30. Cf. above, S{22}.
 Page 116

Proposition 191
Among intelligences there is that which is a divine intelligence because it receives from
the first goodnesses, which proceed from the first cause through a multiple reception;
and among them there is that which is merely an intelligence, because it receives from
the first goodnesses only with an intelligence mediating. Among souls there is what is
an intellectual soul because it depends upon an intelligence; also among them there is
what is only soul. Among natural bodies there is what has soul ruling and directing it;
and among them there are what are only natural bodies that do not have a soul.
This comes about only because it2 is not totally intellectual,3 or totally
animated, or totally corporeal, nor does it depend upon a cause that is above it
unless what from it is complete [and] entire and what depends upon a cause
that is above it. For not every intelligence depends upon {105} the goodnesses
of the first cause, but only that intelligence among them which is especially
complete [and] entire. For it is able to receive the goodnesses that descend
from the first cause and to depend upon them, so that its unity is made
powerful.4 Likewise, again, not every soul depends upon an intelligence, but
only that [soul] among them which is complete, entire, and more powerfully at
one with intelligence because it depends upon an intelli-
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 111 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 98.1832.
It expresses a theme common to Neoplatonism and medieval thought: the
interconnectedness of all things in reality through a downward participation devoid
of gaps.
2. Because of an omission in this sentence (see next note), it appears that the referent
of ipsa would be quite unclear to Latin readers. St. Thomas does not cite this passage
or discuss it in literal detail.
3.Et hoc non fit ita nisi quoniam est ipsa < . . . > neque intelligibilis tota. While
Bardenhewer's Latin text (without the ellipsis) seems to reflect what St. Thomas had
before him, the original Latin translation had the word expositio. This rendering of the
Arabic al-sharh, "series," is rare in the Latin tradition but preserved in S and Aosta.
Corresponding to this text and the next few lines, the Arabic has "This came to be so
only because neither the whole intellectual series, nor the whole [series] of souls, nor
the whole corporeal [series] is linked with the cause that is above it; rather, only that
part of [each] which is complete and perfect, so that it is what is linked to the cause
that is above it."
4.vehemens.
 Page 117
gence, and [this] is a complete intelligence. Likewise, again, not every natural
body has a soul, but only that among them which is complete [and] entire, as
if it were rational. And the remaining intelligible orders follow this arrangement.
Commentary
After showing in the preceding proposition that all things depend upon the first
[being] for their nature, [the author] shows here how certain things diversely
approach it according to [their] participation of natural perfection. He asserts
the following proposition: Among intelligences there is that which is a divine
intelligence because it receives from the first goodnesses, which proceed from
the first cause through a multiple reception; and among them there is also that
which is merely intelligence, because it receives from the first goodnesses only
with an intelligence mediating. Among souls there is what is an intellectual soul
because it depends upon an intelligence; and among them there is also what is
only soul. Among natural bodies there is what has soul ruling and directing it;
and among these there are what are only natural bodies, which do not have a
soul. This proposition is found in Proclus's book [as Proposition] 111 in these
words: "In every intellectual series (i.e., order)5 there are divine intellects
receiving the after-possessions6 (i.e., participations) of the gods, and there are
intellects only; and in every [series] of souls7 there are intellectual souls
dependent upon their proper intellects, and there are {106} souls only; and in
every corporeal nature some have souls present8 from above, and some are
natures only, lacking the presence of souls."9
In evidence of this we should realize that, according to the Platonists, a
fourfold order is found in things. The first is the order of the gods, i.e., of the
ideal forms, which have among themselves an order corresponding to the order
of the universality of forms, as was said before.10 Beneath this order is the
order of separate intellects. Beneath that is the order of souls. Again, beneath
that is the order of bodies. These three lower orders are understood to
correspond to the three things that were touched upon in
5.ordinationis.
6.posthabitiones. See Prop. 12, note 383.
7.animalis. Literally, "animated [series]."
8.astantes.
9. Proclus, Prop. 111. Dodds, p. 98.1823; Vansteenkiste, p. 495.
10. Cf. above, S{18}.
 Page 118
the previous proposition. For bodies participate being only, while souls
according to their proper nature participate further being and living, and
intellects participate being, living, and understanding. But the causality of
these things belongs to the divine order, whether we assert that there are
many gods ordered under the one, according to the Platonists, or only one
[God], possessing all things, according to us, for the universality of causality is
proper to God.
Such orders, since they proceed from the first one, have a certain continuity
with one another, so that the order of bodies touches the order of souls and
the order of souls touches the order of intellects, which touches the divine
order. Moreover, wherever diverse orders are joined together one under the
other, what is the highest of a lower order must participate something of the
perfection of the higher order due to [its] closeness to the higher order. We
see this clearly in natural things, for certain animals participate some likeness
of reason and certain plants participate something of the distinction of sex,
which is proper {107} to the genus of animals. So, too, Dionysius says in
Chapter VII of On the Divine Names that through divine wisdom "the ends of
the first are conjoined to the beginnings of the second."11 Thus, those which
are the highest in the order of intellects or intelligences depend more closely
upon God through a certain more perfect participation, and they participate
more his goodnesses and his universal causality. Thus, they are called divine
intellects or divine intelligences, just as Dionysius, too, says that the highest
angels are, as it were, placed together "in the vestibule" of the deity.12 Lower
intellects that do not reach such a degree of excellence in participation of the
divine likeness are intellects only, not having that divine dignity. The same
reasoning applies to souls with respect to intellects, for the highest13 souls are
intellectual insofar as they are close to the order of intellects. But the other
lower souls are not intellectual, having only what belongs to the soul, namely,
to be life-giving, as is most evident in the case of the souls of animals and
plants. The same reasoning applies to the order of bodies with respect to souls,
for more noble bodies, which
11. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, VII 3; Dionysiaca I, 407; PG 3, 872 B.
12. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, VII 2; Dionysiaca II, 844; PG 3, 208 A.
13. Or, most transcendent.
 Page 119
are constituted of a more perfect nature, are animated but the other bodies
are inanimate. And the same reasoning applies to all the other orders into
which the previously mentioned general orders are distinguished, because
there are diverse orders among bodies, and likewise among souls and
intellects.
 Page 120

{108} Proposition 201

The first cause rules all created things without being mixed with them.

This is because rule does not weaken its unity, exalted over every thing, and
does not destroy it, nor does the essence of its unity, separated from other
things, prevent it from ruling things.2
This is because the first cause is fixed, ever abiding steadfastly with its pure
unity. And it rules all created things and infuses them with the power of life
and [with] goodnesses according to the made of their powers3 to receive4 and
their possibility. For the first goodness infuses all things with goodnesses in one
infusion. But each thing receives that infusion according to the mode of its
power and its being.
The first goodness infuses all things with goodnesses only through one mode
because it is goodness only through its existence, being5 and power, so that it
is goodness, and both goodness and being are one thing. So, as the first being
and goodness are therefore one thing, it happens that it infuses things with
goodnesses with one common infusion. And goodnesses and gifts are
diversified due to the concurrence of the recipient. This is because recipients6
do not receive goodnesses equally, rather some of them receive more than
others. [All] this is due to the greatness of its largesse.
Therefore, let us return and say that every agent that acts through its being
alone is neither a connecting link nor another mediating thing.7 The connecting
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 122 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dadds, p. 108.115,
108.1112, 108.1516. The author of the De Causis reserves providence to the first
cause alone rather than to "every divine thing," as in Proclus. St. Thomas refers to
this proposition in ST I, Q. 3, A. 8s.c.; Q. 5, A. 1, 2a; De Potentia, Q. 7, A. 2; De
Veritate, Q. 21, A. 1, 7c.
2. Bardenhewer gives eas here, while St. Thomas has res in his quotation of this
passage. Res, which corresponds preciesly with the Arabic, is preserved in Latin
manuscripts OST and Aosta.
3. We read virtutum for Bardenhewer's virtutis, with Latin manuscripts LOPSUV and
Aosta and with the Arabic.
4.receptibilium.
5.suum esse et suum ens.
6. The Arabic has "recipients of goodnesses."
7. St. Thomas explains the meaning of these two terms when he comments on
Proclus's Prop. 122. Cf. below, S{111}. Continuator, "connecting link," corresponds to
wuslatun in the Arabic.
 Page 121
link between an agent and its effect is nothing but an addition to being, as
when an agent and its effect are through an instrument and [the agent] does
not act through its being, and they are things that are composed.8 For this
reason what receives receives through a continuous connection9 between itself
and its maker, and then the agent is separated from its effect. But an agent [in
which] there is no connecting link at all between itself and its effect is a true
agent and a true ruler; making things for the sake of beauty, after which it is
not possible for there to be some other beauty, and it rules its effect through
the ultimate of rule.10 This is because it rules things through the mode in
which it acts, and it acts only through its being. Therefore, its being will also be
its rule. For this reason, it happens that it rules and acts through ultimate
beauty and rule in which there are neither diversity nor deviation.11 And
activities and rule due to first causes are diversified only according to the merit
of the recipient.
Commentary
After showing how lower things depend upon higher12 things, [the author]
shows here how higher things infuse lower things through their rule. In this
regard he does two things. First, he treats of the universal rule of the first
cause. Second, of the rule of an intelligence, in {109} Proposition 23, at: Every
divine intelligence etc. With regard to the first he does two things. First, he
shows the manner of the first cause's universal rule. Second, he shows the
appropriateness of the first cause to rule, in Proposition 21, at: The first is rich
etc.
Regarding the first he asserts the following proposition: The first cause rules all
created things without being mixed together with them. In evidence of this we
should note that in human rule we see it happen that the one who has charge
of ruling a number of things must be drawn from his own rule to many things.
But he who is free from the charge of ruling others is
8. The Arabic has ''and its being is composed."
9.continuationem.
10. The Latin text here omits parts of the Arabic and carries different nuances. "As for
the agent that is such that between it and its act there is no connecting link at all, this
agent is a true agent and a true dispenser of providence which effects things with the
utmost and ultimate of thoroughness and which directs its act with the ut-most of
providence."
11.tortuositas.
12.superioribus, i.e., transcendent.
 Page 122
more able to preserve uniformity in himself. Hence the Epicurean philosophers
asserted that in order to conserve divine quiet and uniformity the gods could
have charge of no rule. Instead, they are entirely at leisure, caring about
nothing, so that in this way they are seen to be happy.13 And so, against this
[the author] begins in this proposition by saying that these two things are not
contrary in the first cause and that the universal rule of things and the
supreme unity, by which God is exalted above all things, do not impede one
another. So he immediately asserts at the beginning of his explanation: This is
because rule does not weaken its unity, exalted over every thing, and does not
destroy it because neither in whole nor in part is anything taken away from
divine unity by universal rule. Conversely, he adds: Nor does the essence of its
unity, separated from things, prevent it from ruling things. Proclus asserts all
this in Proposition 122 in these words: "Every divine thing both provides for
secondary things and is separated from those things for which it provides; and
providence does not subvert its unmixed and united excellence, nor does
separated unity destroy providence."14
{110} Now, to make this proposition clear [the author] introduces three things.
For, first, he shows the different manner of receiving the infusions of the first
cause on the part of the recipients. Second, he shows the unity on the part of
the first cause which infuses, at: And the first goodness etc. Third, from these
two he concludes to what he proposed, namely, that the rule of the first cause
stands above15 without being mixed with things, at: Therefore, let us return
and say.
So, he says in the first place that all goodnesses that are found in things flow
from the first cause. Each thing receives such goodnesses according to the
manner and proper character16 of its substance and powerfor there are
different natures and powers for different thingsand so it is that, although the
first cause infuses all things with one infusion, its infusion is nevertheless
received differently in different things. A clear example of this is in light, which
proceeds from a luminous body in one
13. Cf. Augustine, City of God, XVIII, Cap. 41; PL 41, 601. Also, see Dodds's
commentary on Prop. 122 of Proclus's Elements, p. 264.
14. Proclus, Prop. 122, Dodds, p. 108.14; Vansteenkiste, p. 499.
15.exstat, in place of Saffrey's extat.
16.proprietatem.
 Page 123
way, but according to the way that different rays pass through variously
colored glass, the rays produce a different appearance.
Next he shows that the first cause infuses all things with a single infusion, for it
infuses things under the aspect17 of the good. For it has the goodness that
makes things good, i.e., that which is the principle of goodness in all things.
But the goodness of the first cause is its very being and essence because the
first cause is the very essence of goodness. Hence, since its essence is one to
the greatest degree, because the first principle is the one and good in itself, it
follows that the first cause for its part acts on things and infuses them in one
way. But things receive its infusion in different ways, some more and others
less, each according to its proper character.
He then concludes from the premises to the first cause's lack of mixture with
other things. A full understanding of this conclusion can be had if we take the
words of Proclus's explanation,18 who thus says, {111} "Therefore, the ones
who provide (namely, the gods) do not receive a relation to those things for
which provision is made, for through the being that they are they make all
things good. Furthermore, what acts upon all things through being acts
without relation, for relation is an addition to being, due to which it is outside
[its] nature."19 Now, he means by "relation" some disposition through which an
agent is adapted or rendered proportionate to a patient, or a recipient. And
because [an agent] acts thus in different things it must have different
dispositions by which it is adapted to diverse things. In this way a certain
multitude20 occurs in a thing of this sort, that is, one that acts in different
ways upon different things according to its different dispositions, which are
outside its nature, or essence, which is one. Thus, such a thing, that is, one
that acts according to different dispositions, is mixed with the things upon
which it acts according to a certain adaptation to them. But the first cause acts
17.secundum rationem.
18.commento.
19. Proclus, Prop. 122, Dodds, p. 102.1317; Vansteenkiste, p. 499. Proclus's term
schesis is translated by Moerbeke as habitudo ("relation") and St. Thomas relates it to
dispositio ("disposition"). In similar fashion St. Thomas says in ST I, Q. 13, A. 7 and Q.
45, A. 3, that creation places a real relation in the creature only and not in God.
20. That is, a certain plurality.
 Page 124
through its being, as was proved.21 Hence it does not act through any
additional relation or disposition through which it would be adapted to and
mixed with things. And such a "relation" is called here a connecting link or
mediating thing because through such a disposition or relation an agent is
adapted to a recipient, and is in a certain sense a mediating thing between the
essence of the agent and the patient itself. So, because the first cause acts
through its being, it must rule things in one manner, for it rules things
according to the way that it acts. Hence it is clear that its rule is the best and
the most beautiful. For every ruler of a multitude tends to reduce the many
whom he rules into one. And this is found to the greatest degree in divine rule,
which is one in itself and diversified in effects only according to the diversity of
the things subject [to it] according to [their] diverse merits, as it were.
21. Cf. above, S{110}.
 Page 125

{112} Proposition 211

The first is rich owing to itself and it is more rich.2

The indication of this is its unity, not because its unity is dispersed in it.3
Rather, its unity is pure because it is simple in the extreme of simplicity. If
anyone wishes to know that the first cause is rich, let him cast his mind over
composite things and inquire about them with close scrutiny. For he will find
that every composite thing is diminished,4 needing either another or the things
from which it is composed. Furthermore, the one simple thing which is
goodness is one, and its unity is goodness, and its goodness is one thing.5 That
thing is more rich which infuses, while no infusion upon it occurs in any way.6
But the rest of things, whether they are intellectual or corporeal,7 are not rich
in themselves. Rather, they need the true one infusing them with goodnesses
and all graces.
Commentary
After determining the manner of divine rule, [the author] shows here the
sufficiency of God to rule. He attends to this in two ways: first, ac-
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 127 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
112.2532. For the author of the De Causis only God as the first cause is self-
sufficient, in contrast to Proclus, who distinguishes self-sufficiency from the one, or
good (see Elements, Prop. 10).
2. The Arabic has, "The First Cause is sufficient in itself and is the most
(self)sufficient." See Taylor (1981), p. 229.
3. The Arabic has, "[it is] not the case that it is a unity that has been established
(mathbutah) in it," i.e. by something external.
4.diminutum for the Arabic naqisan. The notion of diminished or deficient being is also
found in both Avicenna and Averroes, though with a different sense than what is found
here.
5. The Latin translator's Arabic manuscript apparently omitted a'ni and al-wahid in this
sentence, as do the Ankara and Istanbul Arabic manuscripts. The corresponding Arabic
text has quite a different sense: "But the simple thing, i.e., the One which is good
(khairun), is one and its unity is good, and the good and the one are a single thing."
6. That is, what is only a cause of the infusion of goodnesses and itself does not
receive any infusion from another is more rich in goodnesses than what is below it and
a recipient of its beneficence.
7.Reliquae autem res intellectibiles sint aut corporae. In agreement with the Arabic we
add sint here following Latin manuscripts S and Aosta.
 Page 126
cording to the abundance of God; second, according to his superexcellence,8
and this at: The first cause etc.9 For these two things are necessary for a ruler.
The first is that he have an abundance of good things from which he is able to
provide for those subject [to him]. So, too, Dionysius says in Chapter XII of On
the Divine Names10 that "domination is the entire perfect possession of
beautiful and good things," and "rule is the distribution of every end, law and
order." Now, to show the abundant sufficiency in God he proposes this
proposition: The first is rich owing to itself and is more rich. In evidence of this
let us take Proposition 127 from Proclus, which is the following: "Every divine
thing is simple in the first and greatest degree, and because of this it is self-
sufficient in the greatest degree."11
{113} Now, he proves that God is simple in the first and greatest degree by
reason of unity, for God is in the greatest degree one, since he is the first unity,
just as he is the first goodness. But simplicity pertains to the notion12 of
unityfor something is said to be simple that is one, not gathered together from
many. Hence, to the extent that God is one in the first and greatest degree, to
that extent he is also simple in the first and greatest degree. From this he
proceeds further to show the second part of his proposition, namely, that God
is self-sufficient to the greatest degree because self-sufficiency follows upon
simplicity. For every composite thing requires many things from which its
goodness is constituted. Not only does it need those things from which it is
composed as from parts, but it also needs something else that causes and
conserves the composition, as is obvious in compound bodies, for different
things would not come together into one except through some cause uniting
them. Therefore, since God is simple in the first and greatest degree as having
his whole goodness in a oneness that is most perfect,13 it follows that God is
self-sufficient in the first and greatest degree.
8.superexcellentiam.
9. Cf. Prop. 22, S{123}.
10. Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, XII 2; Dionysiaca I, 529; PG 3, 969 B.
11. Proclus, Prop. 127, Dodds, p. 112.2526. The term "self-sufficient in the greatest
degree" (maxime per se sufficiens) in Proclus is autarkestaton, which he applies to "all
that is divine" but not to the good, which transcends the divine. See Elements, Prop.
10.
12.rationem.
13.in uno perfectissimo.
 Page 127
But the author of this book bypasses the first part of the proposition, which is
about simplicity, presupposing it, as it were, and speaks only of self-sufficiency,
which he signifies by the word "riches." In place of what Proclus says in his
proposition, that God is "self-sufficient," [the author] says that the first is rich
owing to itself. For in every genus the first is that which is owing to itself, for
what is in itself is prior to what is through another. Furthermore, in place of
what [Proclus] says there, that "it is to the greatest degree sufficient," [the
author] says here that it is more rich than all other things. But the proof for
what is proposed is identical in both places. For [the author] first says that the
divine unity, which is not dispersed into many parts but is pure unity, is the
sign that God is in the extreme of simplicity, i.e., is simple in the greatest
degree. From this he proves further that God is self-sufficient in the greatest
degree by the lack of what is found in composite things, as he already said.14
{114} But because by the word ''riches" not only sufficiency but also the
abundance that is able to redound upon others is understood, to show that
God is rich he continues on about the infusion of things with his goodness,
since due to the abundance of his goodness he infuses other things, while
there is nothing which infuses him. But all other things, whether they be
intellectual, such as intelligences and souls, or in a body, are not rich in
themselves, as if they had an abundance of goodness from themselves, but
they need to participate goodness from the first true one, which infuses them
freely with all goodnesses and perfections, without anything being added to
him thereby.
14. Cf. the preceding paragraph.
 Page 128

Proposition 221
The first cause is above every name by which it is named, because2 neither diminution
nor mere completeness belong to it.

[This is] because what is diminished is not complete and cannot effect a
complete activity when3 it is diminished.4 And what is complete among us,
although it is self-sufficient, nevertheless cannot create anything else, nor [can
it] infuse anything from itself at all. Therefore, if this is so among us, then we
say5 that the first is neither diminished nor merely complete. Rather, it is above
the complete6 because it creates things and infuses them with goodnesses
with a complete infusion, because it is goodness without limit or dimensions.
Therefore, the first goodness fills all worlds with goodnesses. But every world
receives that goodness only according to the mode of its potency.
Therefore, we have already shown and made clear that the first cause is above
every name by which it is named, and higher and loftier than it.
1. This proposition, like 9(8) and 4 and 5(4) above, does not have Proclus's
Elements as its source. Though the Enneades of Plotinus are not directly quoted, it
is clear that this work is the ultimate source for the thought of this proposition, as is
the case for 9(8) and 4 and 5(4). Regarding the teaching that the First is above
mere perfection, cf. Enneades V 2, 1.118 = PA Theologia, pp. 134.1137.5, Lewis, pp.
29192, nos. 112. For the doctrine of the First Cause being above every name, cf.
Enneades V 3, 13.414.19 = PA Epistola, nos. 121138, Lewis, p. 323. St. Thomas
finds Proclus's Prop. 115 as a possible source but seems to be aware that the
correspondence between that proposition and the De Causis text here is far from
precise. St. Thomas quotes this proposition in De Veritate, Q. 2, A. 1, 3a.
2.quoniam. The Latin translator's Arabic had li-anna-hu (as do two of the Arabic
manuscripts) rather than the correct reading, wa-dhalika anna-hu, "for."
3.quando. The Latin translator's Arabic had idha instead of the correct reading, idh,
"since."
4. The Latin requires this translation. However, the Arabic has a different sense: "The
First Cause is above every name by which it is named. For neither deficiency nor mere
perfection is appropriate to it, because the deficient is imperfect and unable to effect a
perfect act since it is deficient."
5. Two Arabic manuscripts (Ankara and Istanbul) agree with the Latin and have 'inda-
na, "among us" or "in our view." The correct reading, however, is 'adna, ''we resume,"
found in the Leiden Arabic manuscript. Thus the Arabic text has, "Therefore, if this is
so, we resume and say . . . "
6. We read supra completum with Bardenhewer, in place of Saffrey's revision
supercompletum.
 Page 129

Commentary
After showing the abundance of the divine goodness, [the author] shows here
its excellence, saying: The first cause is above every name by which it is
named. To understand this proposition we should note that what [the author]
gathers together here into one [proof], Proclus distinguishes in his book {115}
into several [proofs]. Proposition 115 of his book is this: "Every god is
supersubstantial, supervital, and superintelligent."7
Proclus proves this in a twofold way. First, by a general proof, which is as
follows. God is a "unity perfect in itself." "But each one" of the other things that
are below God is ''not unity" itself "but" is something that participates unity.
Therefore, it is clear that "God is beyond all" such "things."8 Second, he proves
it by a special proof, namely, it is not the same for a substance to be, to be a
substance, and to be one. But any subsisting substance participates being and
oneness.9 Hence it remains that God, who is oneness itself10 and being in
itself, is above substance, and consequently above life and intellect, which
presuppose substance,11 as is also clear in this book from Proposition 18
presented above.12
But because the author of this book presents the proposition in general, he is
content with a general proof alone. For in all things that are below the first
cause, we find some things existing perfectly, or complete, [while] others
things [are] imperfect or diminished. The perfect seem to be those things that
are self-subsistent in nature, which we signify through concrete terms, such as
"man," "sage," and the like. But the imperfect are those things that are not
self-subsistent, such as the forms "humanity," "wisdom," and the like, which
we signify through abstract terms.13 The difference between these two is that
what is not complete can-
7. Proclus, Prop. 115, Dodds, p. 100.28; Vansteenkiste, p. 496. The respective terms
in Proclus are: huperousios, huperzoos, hupernous.
8. Proclus, Prop. 115, Dodds, p. 100.2933; Vansteenkiste, p.496.
9.esse et uno.
10.ipsum unum.
11. Proclus, Prop. 115, Dodds, p. 100.34102.12; Vansteenkiste, p. 496.
12. Cf. above, S{100}.
13. St. Thomas's explanation here is Aristotelian rather than Platonic. For Aristotle, and
St. Thomas following him, universal forms do not subsist in themselves, as the
Platonists held, but are abstracted by the human intellect from the particular and
concrete existing things that have these forms, whether substantially or accidentally.
 Page 130
not effect a perfect activity, for heat does not make hot, but a hot thing does,
and wisdom does not think wisely, but a sage does. Now, what is complete
among us, although it is self-subsistent, is in some sense sufficient unto itself,
in that it does not need another in which to inhere as in a subject.
Nevertheless, since the form, which is the principle of action, is, in [what is
complete among us], limited and participated, it cannot act by way of creation
or {116} infusion, as does what is totally form, which in itself is totally
productive of other things by a participation in itself. Since, therefore, it is so
among us in those things that are diminished and concrete, it follows that God
is neither diminished nor complete simply, but rather above the complete. For
his action is not lacking as if it were something diminished, and he acts by way
of creating and infusing, which those things that are complete among us
cannot do. And this is what he adds: because it creates things and infuses
them with goodnesses with a complete infusion. And this is so because he is
subsistent goodness without limit, i.e., he is not goodness limited to some
participative incorporeal nature, as is the goodness of an intelligence. And he is
without dimensions to which he would be limited, as is the case for corporeal
goodness. From this he concludes further that, because the first cause is
unlimited goodness itself, it follows that it is the first goodness and that it fills
all worlds, i.e., all distinctions of things and of times, with its goodnesses,
although not all things receive its goodness in the same mode and equally, but
each one according to the mode of its potency, as was stated before in
Proposition 20.14
Therefore, the entire force of this proof goes back to what Proclus briefly
touched upon, namely, that "God is unity" itself, "not" something "united,''
such as the complete things found among us, and yet [this unity] is "perfect in
itself," from which the diminished things, i.e., the nonsubsistent forms that are
among us, fall short. From this he here concludes further that the first cause is
higher than any name we impose, since every name we impose either signifies
after the manner of a complete thing that participates, such as concrete terms,
or signifies after the manner of a diminished thing and of the formal part, such
as abstract terms. Hence no term we impose is worthy of the divine excellence.
14. Cf. above, S{110}.
 Page 131

{117} Proposition 231

Every divine intelligence knows things inasmuch as it is an intelligence and rules them
inasmuch as it is divine.

This is because knowledge is the characteristic proper to an intelligence, and

its completeness and fullness2 are only in its being a knower. Therefore, God,
who is blessed and sublime, rules because he fills things with goodnesses. And
an intelligence is the first created thing and is more similar to God, who is
sublime. Due to that it rules things that are under it. Just as God, who is
blessed and sublime, infuses things with goodness, similarly an intelligence
infuses the things that are under it with knowledge. But, although an
intelligence rules the things that are under it, nevertheless God, who is blessed
and sublime, precedes an intelligence in ruling. And he rules things by rule
more sublime and of a higher order than is the rule of an intelligence, because
[his rule] is what gives rule to an intelligence.
The indication of this is that things that receive3 an intelligence's rule receive
the rule of the creator of the intelligence. This is because nothing whatsoever
escapes his rule, since he wills to make all things receive his goodness at once.
This is because it is not the case that everything desires intelligence or desires
to receive it, but all things do desire goodness from the first4 and desire very
much to receive it. There is no one who doubts that.
Commentary
After relating the manner of divine rule and showing the sufficiency of God to
rule, [the author] treats here of the rule of the second cause, namely, an
intelligence, whose rule comes from the power of the first cause. He asserts
this proposition: Every divine intelligence knows things in-
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 134 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 118.
2032. St. Thomas interprets rule here in light of the Aristotelian notion of the good
as end.
2.integritas.
3. Pattin follows the Arabic and reads <non> recipiunt. However, there is no evidence
for non in the Latin tradition. Consequently, we translate Bardenhewer's Latin as found
in Saffrey without the negation.
4.bonitatem ex primo. The translator's Arabic manuscript apparently had, al-khair rain
al-awwal, instead of the correct reading, al-khair al-awwal, "the First Good."
 Page 132
asmuch as it is an intelligence and rules them inasmuch as it is divine. A similar
proposition, 134, is found in Proclus's book, in these words, "Every divine
intellect understands as an intellect, but it provides as a god."5
In evidence of this we should note what he said before in Proposition 19.
Among intelligences some are divine, others are not.6 He calls the highest
intellects, or intelligences, {118} "divine" because of their abundant
participation of the divine goodness from [their] closeness to God. Now,
whatever abundantly participates a characteristic proper to some thing
becomes like7 it not only in form but also in action. This is clear with the things
the sun illuminates. Some participate the sun's light only to the extent that
they are seen, but some to the extent that they illuminate other things, which
is the proper action of the sun, as is clear of the moon. Because form is the
principle of action, everything that acquires its action from an abundant
participation of the infusion of a higher agent must have two actions: one
according to its proper form, another according to a form participated from the
higher agent, as a heated knife cuts according to its proper form but burns
insofar as it is heated. Thus, each of the highest8 intelligences that is called
"divine" has a double action: one insofar as it abundantly participates the
divine goodness, and another according to its proper nature. Now, it is proper
for an intelligence, inasmuch as it is such a thing, to know things, and so a
divine intelligence, inasmuch as it is an intelligence, is able to know9 things.
But it is proper to God, who is the very essence of goodness, to communicate
himself to other things. We see that everything, insofar as it is perfect and a
being in act, transmits its likeness to other things. Hence what is essentially act
and goodness, namely, God, essentially and originally10 communicates his
goodness to things. This belongs to his rule, for it is proper for a ruler to lead
those that are ruled to their appropriate11 end, which is the good. Thus, to the
extent that it abundantly participates the divine goodness, a divine intelligence
is itself made capable of ruling things.12
Now, it is clear that whatever performs some action according to its proper and
natural form performs that action more powerfully and more
5. Proclus, Prop. 134, Dodds, p. 118.20; Vansteenkiste, p. 503.
6. Cf. above, S{105}.
7.assimilatur.
8.supremorum.
9.cognoscitiva.
10.primordaliter.
11.debitum.
12.fit regitiva rerum.
 Page 133
perfectly than what performs it {119} by participation of the power of a higher
agent, as fire heats more intensely than a heated body, and the sun illuminates
more than does the moon. So, the rule of God, which is his action according to
his essential goodness, must be higher and more efficacious than an
intelligence's rule, which belongs to it according to a participation of the divine
goodness. And so it is that the rule of the first cause, which is according to the
essence of goodness, extends to all things. A sign of this is that all things
desire the good with an appetite that is either intellectual, animate, or natural.
But the rule of an intelligence, which is proper to it, does not extend to all
things, for it does not diffuse intellectual goodness in all things, but only in
those things whose nature is to understand. So, all things seek, not the
intellectual good, but only the good simply.
 Page 134

Proposition 241
The first cause exists2 in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not
exist in the first cause according to one disposition.

This is because, although the first cause exists in all things, each thing,
nevertheless, receives it according to the mode of its potency. This is because
among things there are some that receive the first cause by a united reception
while others receive it by a multiple reception, and among them there are some
that receive it by an eternal reception while others receive it by a temporal
reception, and among them there are some that receive it by a spiritual
reception while others receive it by a corporeal reception.
And the diversity of reception is due not to the first cause but to the recipient.
This is because the recipient3 is also diversified.4 Because of that, what is
received is therefore diversified. But the infusion, existing as an undiversified
one, infuses all things with goodnesses equally, for goodness from the first
cause equally infuses all things. So, the things are the cause of the diversity of
the infusion of the things
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 142 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, pp.
124.27126.7. However, the clarity found in Proclus is far from evident here, due to
the infelicitous rendering of the Greek pareinai with a dative object by the Arabic
maujudathun fi or other forms of the root w-j-d. While the Greek has the sense of
"to be present to," the Arabic can have the sense of "to be found," and "to exist."
Both of these fail at times to translate the corresponding Greek. Moreover, the Latin
translator uses both senses of the Arabic in different passages, sometimes
perferring forms of existo and other times preferring forms of invenio in the passive.
For his interpretation, St. Thomas relies on both the clearer sense found in
Moerbeke's translation of Proclus and his own understanding of what the De Causis
text should mean here. St. Thomas refers to this proposition in De Veritate, Q. 1, A.
4, 6 s.c and Q. 5, A. 2, 9a.
2.existit. Some confusion arises here because of the translation of the forms of the
Arabic root w-j-d in this proposition. Here maujudatun is rendered as existat, while
later tujadu is rendered as inveniuntur, "are . . . found." Both senses of the Arabic are
possible, but in this context the rendering needs to be consistent. Regarding the root
w-j-d, see A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina (Avicenne)
(Paris, 1938), pp. 41823.
3.suscipiens.
4. In place of est diversificatum we read etiam diversificatur, following Latin
manuscripts OS Aosta and the Arabic.
 Page 135
with goodness. Therefore, without doubt all things are not found in the first
cause through one mode.
Therefore, it has already been shown that the first cause is found in all things
through one mode, while all things are not found in it through one mode.
{120}
Thus, the degree5 of closeness to the first cause6 and the way7 in which a
thing is able to receive the first cause [determine] the extent of its reception
and enjoyment of the first cause.8 This is because a thing receives from the
first cause and enjoys it only through the mode of its being. And I understand
by "being" only being and knowledge,9 for a thing receives from it [the first
cause] according to the mode in which a thing knows the first creating cause
and according to that extent it enjoys it [the first cause], as we have shown.
Commentary
After showing the manner of divine rule and its sufficiency to rule, [the author]
begins to show here how the divine rule is participated in diverse ways by
diverse things. First, he clarifies this in general. Second, he proceeds in
particular concerning the diversity of things that are under divine rule, in
Proposition 25, at: United substances etc. Regarding the first, he asserts the
following proposition: The first cause exists in all things according to one
disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one
disposition.
In evidence of this we should note that something is said to be in another in
several ways: in one way really, in another way according to the relation of
action and passion. Now, according to the first way, all things must be said to
be in the first cause in one way, because that by which all things are in the
first cause is one and the same thing, namely, divine
5.modum.
6. The Latin translator's Arabic manuscript apparently had fa-s-sabab al-awwal 'ala
nahwa qurbahu, instead of the correct reading, al-ilah al-ula <yaqdiru ash-shai'u 'ala
qubuli-ha> 'ala nahwa quwati-hi, "<The thing is able to receive> the first cause in
accordance with its potentiality. . . . "
7.modum.
8.delectari per eam.
9. For per esse nisi cognitionem we read per esse nisi esse et cognitionem, following
Latin manuscripts ABCOPSTUV Aosta and the Arabic of the Ankara and Istanbul
manuscripts.
 Page 136
power, for effects are virtually in their cause. But according to this mode the
first cause is in things in diverse ways because the first cause is in the things
caused inasmuch as it imprints its likeness on them, while diverse things
receive the likeness of the first cause in diverse ways. But in the second way
the opposite is the case. For the first cause acts upon all things according to
one mode and so [the author] says it is in all things according to one
disposition. But all things do not receive the action of the first cause in the
same way, and so he says that all things do not exist in the first cause
according to one disposition. To clarify this proposition, three things follow.
First, he clarifies the proposition. Second, he proves it, at: And the diversity
etc. Third, he draws a certain corollary, at: Thus, according to the made etc.
{121} He says first, then, that all things are said not to be in the first cause
according to one disposition because, although the first cause exists in all
things insofar as it touches all things through the effect of its action, each
thing, nevertheless, receives its action according to the mode of its power. He
gives an example of this according to the first three kinds of diversity10 found
in things. The first of them is according to the diversity of unity and multiplicity;
this diversity belongs to substances themselves. For those things whose
substance is simple receive the action of the first cause in a united way, while
those whose substance is composed receive it in a multiple way, namely,
according to the mode of their substance. The second [kind of] diversity is
taken from the duration of things in their being, for some receive the action of
the first cause by an eternal reception, namely, those whose being is not
subject to motion. Hence the duration of these in their being does not vary
according to before and after. But others, namely, those whose being is
subject to motion, receive the action of the first cause by a temporal reception
and consequently their duration is continuous according to the succession of
before and after. He states a third [kind of] diversity due to the very species, or
form, of a thing insofar as certain things are incorporeal according to their
species, and these receive the infusion of the first cause spiritually. But others
are corporeal according to their species, and such receive the infusion of the
first cause by a corporeal reception.
But Proposition 142 in Proclus's book contains everything that has been said
above. It states the following: "The gods are present to all in
10.diversitates.
 Page 137
the same way, but not all things are present to the gods in the same way.
Rather, each assumes their presence according to its order and potency: some
unitarily, others in a multiplied way; some perpetually, {122} others in time;
some incorporeally, others corporeally."11
Then, when he says, And the diversity etc., he proves what he premised in this
way. For diversity of reception can come about for two reasons: sometimes due
to the agent, or the one that infuses; but at other times due to the recipient.
For, because the diversity of the cause produces diversity in the effects, if the
agent is diverse and the recipient is one, the diversity of the reception must be
caused by the agent, and not by the recipientfor instance, water, which is
frozen by cold and melted by heat. Conversely, if the agent should be one and
the recipient diverse, the diversity of reception will be due to the recipient and
not the agent, as is clear with the sun, which hardens mud and melts wax.
Now, it is clear that the first cause is one, without diversity. But those things
that receive the infusion of the first cause are diverse. Therefore, the diversity
of reception is not due to the first cause, which is pure goodness infusing all
things with goodness, but is because of the diversity of the recipients. Thus, it
is clear that the first cause is found in all things through one mode, but not
conversely. We should keep in mind that the action of the first cause is
twofold: one inasmuch as it establishes things, which is called creation;
another inasmuch as it rules things already established. Therefore, what he
says here has no place in the first action because, if all diversity of effects must
reduce to the diversity of the recipients, it will be necessary to say that there
would be some recipients that are not from the first cause, which is contrary to
what he said before12 in Proposition 18: All things have essence through the
first cause. So, it is necessary to say that the first diversity of things, according
to which they have diverse natures and powers, is not due to some diversity of
the recipients but is due to the first cause, not because there is some diversity
in it, but because it knows diversity, for it is an agent according to {123} its
knowledge. Therefore, it produces the diverse grades of things for the
completeness of the universe. But in the action of ruling, which we are treating
now, the diversity of reception is according to the diversity of the recipients.
Finally, when he says, Thus, according to the mode etc., he infers a certain
11. Proclus, Prop. 142, Dodds, p. 124.2631; Vansteenkiste, p. 506.
12. Cf. above, S{100}.
 Page 138
corollary from what he previously said. For, if the diversity of reception of what
the first cause infuses comes about in things according to the diverse power of
the recipients, it follows that, since those closer to the first cause have greater
power, they receive the first cause and its infusion more perfectly. And because
every knowing substance, insofar as it has being more perfectly, knows both
the first cause and the infusion of its goodness more perfectly, and the more it
both receives and knows this the more it takes delight in it, it follows that the
closer something is to the first cause the more it takes delight in it.
 Page 139

Proposition 251
United intellectual substances are not generated from another thing, and every
substance that is abiding steadfastly in its essence is not generated from another thing.

But if someone says, it is possible for it to be generated from another thing, we

shall say, if it is possible for a substance that is abiding steadfastly in its
essence to be generated from another thing, then undoubtedly that substance
is diminished, needing that from which it is generated to complete it. The
indication of this is generation itself. This is because generation is only a
pathway from diminution to completeness. For, if a thing is found needing
nothing other than itself for its generation, i.e., for its form and formation, and
it is itself the cause of its formation and its completeness, then it is forever
complete and entire.
And it comes to be forever the cause of its own formation and its completeness
only because of its relation to its cause. Therefore, that relation2 is its
formation and its completeness simultaneously.
Therefore, it has already been made clear that every substance that is abiding
steadfastly in its essence is not generated from another thing.
Commentary
{124} The author said above3 that creatures receive the rule of the first cause
in diverse ways according to a threefold diversity: that of unity and multiplicity,
which concerns simplicity and composition; that of eternity and time; and that
of the spiritual and the corporealfor corruption happens to what is corporeal
and incorruptibility [characterizes] what is <spiritual>. So, here he begins to
pursue the above-mentioned kinds of diversity in things. First, the difference
between the corruptible <and the
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 45 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 46.12-19.
Following Proclus closely, the author asserts that intellectual substances in which
the essence and the substance are nothing but the form itself are self-caused and
self-complete. As St. Thomas notes, however, the author also holds that this does
not preclude the dependence of these pure forms on a higher cause.
2.comparatio.
3. Cf. above, S{121}.
 Page 140
incorruptible>; second, the difference between the simple and the composed,
in Proposition 28, at: Every substance that is abiding steadfastly in its essence
is simple etc.; third, the difference between eternity and time, in Proposition
30, at: Every substance created in time. Regarding the first he does two
things. First, he shows that certain substances are ingenerable. Second, he
treats of their incorruptibility,4 in Proposition 26, at: Every substance that is
abiding steadfastly in itself does not fall etc.
Regarding the first, he asserts two propositions, the first of which is the
following: United intellectual substances are not generated from another thing.
He calls simple substances united substances because every composed thing
contains some multiplicity within itself. But, he calls those whose nature is to
understand intellectual substances, which, since they are immaterial, are also
intellectual in act. Now, when he says that they are not generated from
another thing, this can be understood to mean either ''from matter," insofar as
the preposition "from" implies a relation to a material cause, or "from an agent
cause," insofar as this preposition implies a relation to an efficient cause. The
latter meaning seems to be more consistent with what he asserts in the proof
of his comment.
The second proposition is the following: Every substance that is abiding
steadfastly in its essence is not generated from another thing. He calls a
substance that is abiding steadfastly in its essence that which subsists in itself.
{125} But, since to subsist in itself is proper to substance, it accordingly follows
that no substance is generated. So, we must say that the substance and
essence of a thing is principally form, which a definition principally signifies.
Therefore, whatever things have a form founded on matter are not the kind of
substances that are abiding steadfastly in their essence. Rather, their
essences, i.e., their forms, rest on the foundation of matter. Thus, those
substances that are abiding steadfastly in their essence are those which are
only forms, not in matter, and it is impossible for such to be generated. We
should note, however, that the first proposition is the conclusion of the second
proposition.5 For he proved before that all intelligent substances are abiding
steadfastly in their essence, which was held in Proposition 15, Every knower
knows etc.6 So, if every substance that is abiding
4.incorruptio.
5.concluditur ex hac secunda.
6. Cf. above, S{91}.
 Page 141
steadfastly in its essence is not generated, it follows that every intellectual
substance is not generated.
The first of these two propositions is not found in Proclus's book, but only the
second, which is [Proposition] 45 there: "Every authypostaton," i.e., what
subsists in itself, "is ingenerable."7 And only this proposition is subsequently
proved here in the same way as in Proclus's book. For it is clear that everything
that is generated is of itself imperfect because it is a being in potency and so it
requires to be completed or perfected through that from which it is generated,
i.e., through the one that generates, which reduces it from potency to act. The
sign of this is that generation is nothing other than a certain pathway from the
incomplete to the opposite complete, namely, to the incomplete thing that pre-
exists, for the terms of generation are privation and form. Now, matter as it
exists under privation has the character of the imperfect. But as it exists under
form it has the character of the perfect. And so it is clear that generation
{126} is the pathway, or process, from the imperfect to the opposite perfect.
So, if there is something that does not require something other for its
formation, but is itself the cause of its own formation because its substance is
form, it follows that such a thing is forever complete, or perfect. And thus there
cannot be a transition in it from the imperfect to the perfect, but it is at once in
itself both a being and one, as is said in Book VIII of the Metaphysics.8 It
remains, therefore, that every substance that is a subsistent form is not
generable.
But lest someone incorrectly understand by this that such substances have no
cause of their being, though he said before9 that all things have essence
through the first being, he subsequently makes clear how one should
understand what he has said. For what he has said, that it is [itself] the cause
of its own formation and completeness, must not be understood as if it did not
depend on some other higher cause. But he said that it is the cause of its own
formation in the sense that it has a sempiternal relation to its first cause.
Hence in relation10 to its first cause it has simultaneously, i.e., at once,
formation and completeness. In evidence of this we should note that each
thing participates being according to the relation it has to the first principle of
being. Now, a thing composed of matter and form has being only
7. Proclus, Prop. 45, Dodds, p. 46.12; Vansteenkiste, p. 283.
8. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII 6, 1045a26ff.
9. Cf. above, S{100).
10.comparationem.
 Page 142
through the acquisition of its form. Hence through its form it has a relation to
the first principle of being. But because matter temporally pre-exists form in a
generated thing, it follows that it does not always and simultaneously have the
above relation to the principle of being, since it was matter, but with form
supervening afterwards. Therefore, if a certain substance {127} is form itself, it
follows that it always has the above relation to the first cause and it does not
come to it after a time but is simultaneously concomitant with its substance,
which is form.
So, therefore, it is has been made clear that every substance that is abiding
steadfastly in its essence is not generated from something.
 Page 143

Proposition 261
Every substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself does not fall under corruption.

But if someone should say, it is possible for a substance that is abiding

steadfastly in itself to fall under corruption, we shall say, if it is possible for a
substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself to fall under corruption, it would
be possible for it to be separated from its essence and [yet] be fixed, abiding
steadfastly in its essence without its essence. But this is absurd and impossible
because, due to the fact that it is one, simple and incomposite, it is itself
simultaneously both cause and effect. Now, the corruption of anything that
falls under corruption happens only because of its separation from its cause. As
long as a thing remains dependent upon its cause, which maintains and
conserves it, it neither perishes nor is destroyed.2 So, if this is so, the cause of
a substance that is abiding steadfastly in its essence is never separated,3
because it is inseparable from its essence, due to the fact that it is itself its
cause in its formation.
And it becomes the cause of itself only because of its relation to its cause, and
that relation is its formation. Furthermore, because it is always related to its
cause and is itself the cause of that relation, it is cause of itself in the way we
have described, because it neither perishes nor is destroyed, since it is
simultaneously cause and effect, as we have just shown.
Therefore, it is already clear that every substance that is abiding steadfastly in
itself is neither destroyed nor corrupted.
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 46 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 46.2028.
Here the author argues that the self-subsistent substance whose essence is identical
with its formal cause is simple and incomposite, and consequently free from the
corruption characterizing material composites. St. Thomas distinguishes two senses
of "the cause of being," namely, the formal cause and the efficient cause. Only God
is self-sufficient or characterized as "abiding steadfastly in itself" in both senses.
2. Though it does not affect the translation, we read neque etiam destruitur instead of
Bardenhewer's and Saffrey's neque destruitur. In doing so we follow Latin manuscripts
BS and Aosta in accord with the Arabic, which has aidan.
3. The Latin here is a mistranslation of the Arabic, which has, "If this is so, the
substance subsistent through its essence never separates itself from its cause . . . "
 Page 144

Commentary
[The author] treated things that are not generated before.4 Here he treats
corruptible and incorruptible things; first, incorruptible things [here]; second,
corruptible things, in Proposition 27: Every destructible substance etc.
Regarding the first, he asserts the following proposition: Every substance that
is abiding steadfastly in itself does not fall under corruption. Proclus also
asserts this in his book [as Proposition] 46, in these words, "Every
authypostaton is incorruptible."5
{128} In evidence of this proposition we should note that, since the
preposition "in"6 denotes cause, that is said to be abiding steadfastly, or to
subsist, in itself which has no cause of being other than itself. The cause of
being is twofold: the form by which something is in act, and the agent that
makes [it] to be in act. So, if "to be abiding steadfastly in itself" means that it
does not depend upon a higher agent, then to be abiding steadfastly in itself
applies only to God, who is the first efficient cause7 on whom all second causes
depend, as is clear from the [discussions] above. But if "to be abiding
steadfastly in itself" means what is not formed through any other thing, but is
itself form, then to be abiding steadfastly in itself applies to all immaterial
substances. For a substance composed of matter and form is abiding
steadfastly in itself only by reason of parts, because matter is in act through
form and form is sustained in matter, just as something is said to move itself by
reason of parts because one part of it moves while another part of it is moved.
Thus, it is evident that to be abiding steadfastly in itself can apply only to a
substance that is a form without matter. Such a substance is of necessity
incorruptible. For it is clear that in corruptible things corruption occurs because
something is separated from its formal cause, through which it8 has being in
act. For just as generation, which is the pathway to being, is through the
acquisition of a form, so corruption, which is the pathway to nonbeing, is
through the loss of a form. So, if a substance that is abiding steadfastly
4. Cf. above, S{124}.
5.authypostaton, i.e., self-subsistent. Proclus, Prop. 46, Dodds, p. 46.20;
Vansteenkiste, p. 283.
6.per.
7.causa agente.
8.aliquid.
 Page 145
in its essence were to be corrupted, it would be necessary for it to be
separated from its formal cause. But its form is its essence. Therefore, it would
be separated from its essence, which is impossible. Therefore, it is not possible
for a substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself to be corrupted.
But lest someone should think9 that substances of this sort that abide
steadfastly in their essence do not depend upon some higher efficient cause,
{129} he subsequently excludes this, at: And it becomes the cause of itself
etc. He says that this must not be understood in such a way that a substance
of this sort would be the cause of itself, as if it were not dependent upon some
higher efficient cause. Rather, he says this because such a substance in itself
has a relation to the first cause insofar as [the first cause] is the cause of its
formation. For we see that material things are referred to the first cause in
order to receive being from it through their form. And for this reason a
substance whose entire essence is form has in itself always a relation to its
cause, and this relation is not caused in such a substance through some other
form. And so he says that it is cause of itself in the way mentioned above. And
so it is that it cannot be corrupted, as he has shown.10
Therefore, it is clear that every substance that is abiding steadfastly is
incorruptible.
9.credat.
10. Cf. above, S{128}.
 Page 146

Proposition 271
Every destructible, nonsempiternal substance is either composed or supported by2
another thing.

[This is] because a substance either needs3 the things from which it is and it is
composed from them, or it requires [something] supporting [it] in its stability
and essence. Therefore, when it is separated from what supports it, it is
corrupted and destroyed.
But if a substance is neither composed nor supported, it is simple and never
destroyed or diminished4 at all.
Commentary
After showing what the condition of an incorruptible substance is, [the author]
shows here the condition of a corruptible substance, asserting this proposition:
Every destructible, {130} nonsempiternal substance is either composed or
supported by another thing. And Proclus asserts this same proposition [as
Proposition] 48 in his book.5
The proof for this proposition is that if everything that is abiding stead-
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 48 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 48.510.
With this proposition, which is closely dependent on Proclus, the author clarifies his
understanding of simple substances with a brief discussion of composite substance.
Corruptible substances are either composites of parts or dependent on some subject
(matter) for their sustenance. St. Thomas notes that this proposition is relevant to
the understanding of both intelligences and the human intellectual soul. For he
holds that the soul is not completely dependent upon matter, since it is not the case
that all the activities of the soul involve matter.
2.est delata super.
3. The Latin translator apparently read yakunu muntaqisan instead of the correct
reading, yakunu muntaqidan, "is dissoluble."
4. The Arabic is considerably clearer for this proposition: "Every destructible and non-
perpetual substance either is composite or is present in something else, because the
substance is either dissoluble into the things from which it is, such that it is composite,
or it needs a substrate for its stability and subsistence, such that when it separates
itself from its substrate, it corrupts and is destroyed. So if the substance is not
composite and present [in something else, but] is simple and per se, then it is
perpetual and altogether indestructible and indissoluble." See Taylor (1981).
5. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 48, Dodds, p. 48.56; Vansteenkiste, p. 283.
 Page 147
fastly in itself is incorruptible, as was proved,6 then everything that is corrupted
must not be abiding steadfastly in itself but must need something else to
sustain it. This happens in two ways: in one way, when a whole needs parts for
its constitution. So, when the parts separate from one another, corruption
follows. In another way, when the form is not subsistent but needs for its
stability a supporting subject. And so, when the supporting subject is not
disposed to such a form, there must take place a separation of the form from
the subject, and so corruption follows. Hence, it is clear that every corruptible
substance either is composed of diverse parts, through whose dissolution the
corruption of the whole follows (as is evident in compound bodies), or the form
needs matter or a subject to sustain it, and so through the change of the
subject corruption follows (as is evident in simple bodies and in accidents).
And for this reason we can accept the corollary that, if a certain substance is
not composed but is simple and is not supported by a subject that it needs for
it to be, as it were, but is abiding steadfastly in itself, it is entirely incorruptible.
This is evident in both an intelligence and the intellectual soul. Regarding the
latter, it is clear that [the intellectual soul] is not a form supported by the
matter to which it gives being in such a way that [the intellectual soul] is
totally dependent upon it, because it would then follow that none of its
activities7 would be without the involvement8 of corporeal matter, which is
clearly false from what is proved in Book III of On the Soul.9
6. Cf. above, S{127ff}.
7.nulla eius operario.
8.communione.
9. Aristotle, On the Soul, III 7ff. For a more complete treatment of what St. Thomas
says here, see Quaest. Disp. de Anima, Q. 1 and 2.
 Page 148

{131} Proposition 281

Every substance that is abiding steadfastly in its essence is simple and is not divided.

But if anyone should say, it is possible for it to be divided, we will say, if it is

possible for a substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself to be divided and
[yet] it is simple, then it would be possible for the essence of its part again to
be through its essence, just as the essence of a whole [is]. So, if that is
possible, the part would revert upon itself, and every part of it would revert
upon itself, just as the reversion of a whole upon its essence is. But this is
impossible. So, if this is impossible, then a substance that is abiding steadfastly
in itself is indivisible and is simple.
If it is not simple but is composed, one part of it would be better than another
part, while one part of it would be worse than another part. Thus, a better
thing would be from a worse thing, and a worse thing from a better thing,
when every part of it is separated from every other part of it.
Therefore, its totality is not sufficient in itself, since it needs its parts from
which it is composed. And this belongs, not to the nature of a simple thing, but
rather to the nature of composed substances.
Therefore, it is already established that every substance that is abiding
steadfastly in its essence is simple and is not divided. And when it does not
receive division and is simple, it receives neither corruption nor destruction.
Commentary
After attending to the difference in substances according to generation and
corruption, [the author] attends here to the difference in substances that can
be considered according to simplicity and composition. To do this he introduces
two propositions, the second of which seems to be the converse of the first.
The first proposition, then, is the following: Every substance that is abiding
steadfastly in its essence is simple and is not divided. Pro-
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 47 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
46.2948.4. Here the author establishes the indivisible and simple nature of a self-
subsistent substance through consideration of its reversion on itself and the relative
ranking of its parts if it were composite. St. Thomas notes that the arguments
presented here are much more fully and carefully presented in Proclus.
 Page 149
clus also asserts this proposition in his book [as Proposition] 47, in these
words: "Every authypostaton is impartible2 and simple."3
It seems that we should note here that "simple" and "impartible" are the same
in subject, but differ in notion. For something is called "impartible" {132}
through the privation of division because it is not divisible into many. But
something is called ''simple" through the privation of composition because it is
not composed of many. So [the author] proves first that a substance that
abides steadfastly in itself is indivisible, and second that it is simple.
Proclus better proves the first point than the author does here. For this is
Proclus's proof. He says, "For, if it were partible, being authypostaton," i.e.,
subsistent in itself, "it would establish itself as partible, and the whole of it4
would return to itself5 and every [part] would be in every [part] of it. But this is
impossible. Therefore, [anything] authypostaton [is] impartible."6 In evidence
of this we should note here that something is understood to be abiding
steadfastly in itself, not by reason of a part, so that one part of it would abide
through another [part], as happens in material substances, but by reason of
the whole, so that the whole abides steadfastly in itself [as] a whole.
Furthermore, everything is turned to that through which it abides steadfastly
as an effect to a cause, and it must be in [its cause] as in its foundation. So, if
something partible were abiding steadfastly in itself, each part of it would have
to be abiding steadfastly through each [part] and each [part] would have to be
founded in each [part]. But this is impossible because it would then follow that
one and the same part of it would be simultaneously both cause and effect
with respect to the same thing, which is impossible.
Now, in this book the author proves the matter in this way. What belongs to
something in itself would, if it were partible, belong to each part of it. So, if
something partible were to be abiding steadfastly in itself, each part of it would
have to be abiding steadfastly in itself, and so not depend upon another [part]
for the constitution of the whole. But this proof is
2.impartibile.
3. Proclus, Prop. 47, Dodds, p. 46.29; Vansteenkiste, p. 283. lmpartibile ("impartible,"
i.e., without parts) is Moerbeke's translation of Proclus's term ameres. In the
commentary St. Thomas explains this term to mean "not divisible into many."
4.totum ipsum.
5.vertetur ad seipsum.
6. Proclus, Prop. 47.3033, Dodds p.46; Vansteenkiste, p.283.
 Page 150
not very effective, because whatever belongs to some whole in itself need not
belong to each of its parts. For there is a type of whole that consists of similar
parts, such as air or water, and another type of [whole] that consists of
dissimilar [parts], such as an animal or a house.
{133} Now, he proves in a twofold argument that what is abiding steadfastly in
itself is simple, i.e., not composed of many. In everything composed of many
parts it is necessary to maintain that there be a certain order of parts, namely,
that one part of it be better and another worse. For many come to constitute
one thing in a certain order, just as multiplicity proceeds in a certain order from
one. Hence we see that, in the composition of a natural body, form is more
preeminent7 than matter, and in the composition of a compound body, one
element dominates, and in the composition of the parts of an animal, one
member is more principal than another, and in the parts of a continuum, one
part comes closer to a point, which is the principle of magnitude, than another.
Therefore, if something composed of many parts is abiding steadfastly in itself,
each part of it will have to be abiding steadfastly due to each other part, and
so a better part will have to depend upon a worse part, and conversely.
The second argument is that everything that is abiding steadfastly in itself is
sufficient to itself in its being, not needing another for its subsistence. Through
this a dependency upon a formal and material cause that gives it subsistence is
excluded, but not a dependency upon an efficient cause. But anything
composed of parts is not sufficient to itself but needs for its subsistence the
parts of which it is composed, which stand as the material cause in relation to
the whole. Therefore, nothing composed of parts is abiding steadfastly in itself.
Therefore, every substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself is simple. We
should realize, however, that Proclus explicitly asserts this second argument in
his book,8 while the author of this book presents it by way of a conclusion.
7.praestantior.
8. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 47, Dodds, p. 46.3248.4; Vansteenkiste, p. 283.
 Page 151

{134} Proposition 291

Every simple substance is abiding steadfastly in itself, namely, in its essence.

For it is created without time and is higher2 in its substantiality than temporal
substances. The indication of this is that it is not generated from something
else, because it is abiding steadfastly through its essence. And substances
generated from something else are composed substances that fall under
generation.
Therefore, it is already clear that every substance that is abiding steadfastly in
its essence is only atemporal, and that it is loftier and higher3 than time and
temporal things.
Commentary
Here [the author] asserts the following proposition, which is the converse of
the previous one: Every simple substance is abiding steadfastly in itself,
namely, in its essence. But we should realize that he does not prove this
proposition in his comment, but he inserts something else, which he proves,
namely, that a substance abiding steadfastly in itself is created without time
and is in its substantiality higher than temporal substances. And this is
Proposition 51 in Proclus's book, in these words: "Every authypostaton is free
from those things that are measured by time according to their substance."4
We should note here that when Proclus says, "according to their substance"
this can refer either to temporal substances themselves, whose substantial
being is subject to variation, whence they are said "to be measured by time
according to their substance." Or it can refer to substances that are abiding
steadfastly in themselves, which are according to their substance higher than
temporal substances. {135}
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 51 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 50.16.
This discussion of the atemporal nature of self-subsistent substances is little more
than a translation of Proclus.
2. That is, more transcendent.
3.altior et superior.
4. Proclus, Prop. 51, Dodds, p. 50.12.
 Page 152
So, [the author] gives the following proof for this additional proposition. For it
was shown before5 that no substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself falls
under generation. But all substances that are measured by time according to
their substance fall under generation. For they are measured by time according
to their substance because their substantial being changes6 through
generation and corruption. Therefore, it remains that no substance that is
abiding steadfastly in itself falls under time; rather, [such a substance] is
higher than all temporal substances.
From this proposition proved in this way, we can conclude to what [the author]
stated. For, if it is proper to a substance that is abiding steadfastly in itself not
to fall under time according to its substance, then this belongs to every simple
substance, because every generable substance that falls under time is
composed of matter and form. It remains that every simple substance is
abiding steadfastly in itself, which is what he first proposed.
5. Cf. above, S{124ff}.
6.variatur.
 Page 153

Proposition 301
Every substance created in time either is always in time and time does not overreach2
it, because it and time are created equally; or it overreaches time and time
overreaches it, because it was created at a certain moment3 of time.
This is because, if created things follow one another, and only that substance
follows a higher substance which is like it, not a substance unlike it, then there
are substances like the higher substance, and there are created substances
that time does not overreach, which are before substances that are4 made like
sempiternal substances, and there are substances that are not continuous with
time5 [and] are created at a certain moment of time. Therefore, it is not
possible for substances created at a certain moment of time to be continuous
with sempiternal substances, because they are not at all made like them.
Therefore, substances sempiternal in time are {136} those which are
continuous with sempiternal substances, and they are intermediaries between
fixed substances and substances bounded by time.6
And it is possible for sempiternal substances, which are above time, to follow
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 55 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p.
52.1554.3. Here the author considers the hierarchy of substances with respect to
their relation to time. The three sections of the hierarchy discussed here are: (1) the
higher substances, which are above time both in substance and in activity; (2) the
temporal substances, which are sempiternal in time and inseparable from it; and (3)
substances that are not sempiternal and not continuous with time, i.e., separable
from time, having perpetuity only through generation of like individuals.
2.non superfluit. For the Arabic text the Latin translator read ghaira fadil instead of the
correct reading, ghaira fasil, "is inseparable." In Arabic the forms are distinguished only
by the placement of one diacritical mark or point. This problem persists for the roots f-
s-l and f-d-l throughout this proposition, with severe consequences for the Latin
translation. Our translation is of the Latin, as it must be. But a complete translation of
the Arabic text of this proposition is supplied in Appendix 1.
3.in quibusdam boris.
4. Pattin adds <non> to his edition of the De Causis. This addition is clearly required
in the Arabic text. However, there is no evidence at all that non was in the original
Latin translation.
5.abscisae a tempore. Literally, "cut off from time."
6.substantias sectas in tempore. Literally, this is "cut off in time," though the sense is
that these are not coequal and continuous with time but rather bounded by it because
they come into being and pass out of being.
 Page 154
temporal substances created in time only with the mediation of temporal
substances sempiternal in time. And these substances become intermediaries
only because they share7 in permanence with more sublime substances and
through generation they share in time with temporal substances that are not
continuous with time.8 For, although they are sempiternal, nevertheless their
permanence is through generation and motion. And substances sempiternal
with time are like sempiternal substances that are above time in durability, but
they are not made like them in motion and generation. Substances bounded by
time are not in any way9 made like sempiternal substances that are above
time. Therefore, if they are not made like them, then they cannot receive them
or touch them.
Therefore, there are necessary substances that touch sempiternal substances,
which are above time, and they will touch substances bounded by time.
Therefore, through their motion they will assemble10 between substances
bounded by time and sempiternal substances, which are above time. And
through their durability they will assemble between substances that are above
time and substances that are under time, namely [those] which fall under
generation and corruption. And they will assemble between good substances
and base substances, so that the base substances are not deprived of the good
substances nor deprived of all that is good and fit,11 nor be without endurance
and stability.
Therefore, it has already been shown from this that there are two kinds of
durability, one of which is eternal and the other temporal. But one of the two
durabilities is abiding steadfastly and at rest, while the other durability is in
motion. And one of them is united12 and all its activities are simultaneous,
[such that] one of [its activities] is not before another. But the other is
flowing,13 extended, [and] some of its activities are before others. And the
totality of one of them is through its essence, while the totality of the other is
through its parts, in which each [part] is separated from its counterpart in
terms of first and last.14
Therefore, it is already clear that among substances there are some that are
sempiternal above time. And among them there are sempiternal [substances]
equal to time and time does not overreach them. And among them there are
[some] that are bounded by time, and time overreaches them from the higher
of them down to the lower of them, and [these] are substances that fall under
generation and corruption.
7.communicant.
8.substantiis temporalibus abscisis.
9.per aliquem modorum.
10.aggregabunt.
11.omni bonitate et omni conveniente.
12.aggregatur.
13.currens.
14.per modum primum et postremum.
 Page 155

Commentary
After attending to the difference in things according to generation and
corruption, as well as simplicity and composition, [the author] here attends, in
the third place, to the difference between what is temporal and what is
eternal. Regarding this, he does two things. First, he shows how some things
are in a twofold way both sempiternal and temporal. Second, he shows how
the eternal and the temporal exist simultaneously, at: Between a thing whose
substance etc.15 Or, in the first he asserts the order of temporal things to one
another; in the second the order of eternal things to one another, at: Between
a thing whose substance etc. Regarding the first, he asserts the following
proposition: {137} Every substance created in time either is always in time and
time does not overreach it, because it and time are created equally; or it
overreaches time and time overreaches it, because it is created at a certain
moment of time.
In evidence of this we should note that, because time is the number of motion,
every mobile substance is said to be created in time. Now, there are two kinds
of mobile substance. One of them is motion in the whole of time, such as a
heavenly body, whose motion is equivalent with time because time is in the
first place and in itself the measure of the motion of the heavens and by that
motion it provides the measure for16 all other motions. And this [is so] whether
we assert that the motion of the heavens always was and always will be, as
Aristotle and certain other philosophers maintained, or also that the motion of
the heavens was not always nor will always be, as the faith of the Church
teaches, because in this way also the motion of the heavens is equal to time.
For there was no time before the motion of the heavens began nor will there
be time after the motion of the heavens ceases to be. Hence the substance of
a heavenly body is in every way always in time by reason of its motion, and
time does not surpass it, but both are equal to one another. But some
substances are mobile and their being and motion are not in the whole of time
but in some part of time, as is evident with generable and corruptible
substances. And because such a substance does not have a relation to the
whole of time but to a part of time, one part of time is found to be greater than
their duration and another part less. Hence it is that such a substance
15. cf. Prop. 31.
16.mensurat.
 Page 156
surpasses time with respect to that part [of time] which is less than the
duration [of the substance]. In turn, it is surpassed by time with respect to
that part [of time] which is greater than the duration [of the substance]. For in
Proclus's book we find Proposition 55, [which states this] more plainly and
briefly in this way: "Everything that subsists according to time [does so] either
because it is always in time or for a time has [its] hypostasis17 in a part of
time."18
{138} Now, to clarify the stated proposition, [the author] first gives the proof.
Second, he infers a certain corollary, at: Therefore it has already been shown
from this etc. The same proof is given in both books. For the order of things
proceeds in such a way that like things follow one another. But those things
which are entirely dissimilar follow one another in the grades of things only
through some intermediary. So we see that a complete animal and a plant are
entirely dissimilar with respect to two things. For a complete animal has senses
and moves with progressive motion. But a plant has neither of these.
Therefore, nature does not proceed immediately from complete animals to
plants but produces in between incomplete animals, which have senses, like
animals, but do not move, like plants. Now, it is clear that spiritual substances,
which are made equal to eternity, as was said before,19 and generable and
corruptible substances are entirely dissimilar. For spiritual substances both
always are and are immobile, and neither of these [characteristics] belongs to
generable and corruptible substances. Hence it is necessary to maintain that
between these two extremes there is some intermediary, which is like both
extremes, so that the grades of things proceed through like things.
Proclus proceeds by investigating the matter in this way. Between what is
"always" and immovably a being and what is "for a time" and is movably, there
can be found only three kinds of ''intermediary," namely: (1) that "which
always" is in motion, (2) that "which" immovably is "for a time," and (3) that
"which" is "for a time." But this third kind cannot be an intermediary because
that "which" is "for a time" is the same as what is in motion for a time, which
we have called an extreme. So, too, what immovably is for a time cannot be an
intermediary. For it is impossible for some such thing to be, for something
ceases to be only
17.hypostasim. I.e., its being or reality.
18. Proclus, Prop. 55, Dodds, p. 52.810; Vansteenkiste, p. 286.
19. Cf. above, S{15}.
 Page 157
through some change. Hence what is immovably cannot be [something that is]
a being for a time. Rather, it is always a being. So, it remains that an
intermediary between what always is immovably and what for a time is
movably, is that which is always {139} in motion. For this [nature] belongs to
the higher [extreme], for the reason that it is always being, but to the lower
extreme, for the reason that it is in motion.20 Now, [the author] uses the word
"generation" in general for any change whatsoever because in any motion both
generation and corruption are involved, as is said in Book VIII of the Physics.21
Thus, substances that are always in motion, namely, heavenly bodies, touch
both extremes according to a certain likeness. And through them higher
immobile substances are joined in a certain way to lower generable and
corruptible substances, insofar as the power of higher substances is brought
down to generable and corruptible things through the motion of the heavenly
bodies.
Now, he infers subsequently a certain corollary from these things, namely, that
"perpetuity" or perpetual durability is of two kinds: one by way of eternity, and
the other by way of the whole of time. These perpetual durations differ in three
ways. First, eternal perpetuity is fixed, abiding steadfastly, immobile. But
temporal perpetuity is flowing and mobile insofar as time is the measure of
motion, while eternity is understood as the measure of immobile being.
Second, eternal perpetuity is all at the same time, "collected" into one, as it
were. But temporal perpetuity has successive "extension according to before
and after," which belong to the nature of time. Third, eternal perpetuity is
simple, "a whole'' existing "according to itself." But the universality or totality of
temporal perpetuity is according to different parts succeeding one another.
20. I.e., it is becoming. Cf. Proclus, Prop. 55, Dodds, p. 52.2029.
21. Aristotle, Physics, VIII 3, 254a l112.
 Page 158

{140} Proposition 311

Between a thing whose substance and action are in the moment of eternity and a thing
whose substance and action are in the moment of time there exists an intermediary,
and it is that whose substance belongs to the moment of eternity, while [its] activity
[belongs to] the moment of time.
This is because a thing whose substance falls under time because time
contains it, falls under time in all its dispositions. For this reason its action also
falls under time. Because when the substance of a thing falls under time,
undoubtedly its action also falls under time. But a thing which falls under time
in all its dispositions is separate from a thing which falls under eternity in all its
dispositions. There is continuity only among like things. Therefore, there must
be another third intermediary thing between the two, whose substance falls
under eternity, while its action falls under time. For it is impossible that there
be a thing whose substance falls under time but its action under eternity. For
then its action would be better than its substance. But this is impossible.
Therefore, it is clear that between things which fall under time in both their
substances and their actions and things whose substances and actions both fall
under the moment of eternity there are things which fall under eternity in their
substances, while they fall under time in their activities, as we have shown.
Commentary
In the preceding proposition [the author] clarified the order of temporal things
to one another. Here he clarifies the order of eternal things to one another.
First, he asserts that among eternal things there is something which is eternal
in every way and something which is both in a way eternal and in a way
temporal. Second, he clarifies the condition of what is both in a way eternal
and in a way temporal, in Proposition 32, at: Every
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 106 in Proclus's Elements. Cf. Dodds, p. 94.2130.
As St. Thomas notes, the previous proposition clarified the author's understanding of
the order of temporal things, while this propostion does so for the order of eternal
things. St. Thomas refers to it in De Veritate, Q. 28, A. 9, 3 s.c. and Quodlibet. V, Q.
4. A. 7c.
 Page 159
substance etc. Regarding the first, he asserts the following proposition:
Between a thing whose substance and action are in the moment of eternity
and a thing whose substance and action are in the moment of time there exists
an intermediary, and it is that whose substance belongs to the moment of
eternity, while [its] activity [belongs to] the moment of time.
{141} Here it seems that the "moment" of eternity or time is taken [to mean]
"measure," so that what is measured by eternity he says is in the moment of
eternity and what is measured by time he says is in the moment of time.
Proclus also asserts this proposition [as Proposition] 106 in his book in these
words: "Between everything that is in every way eternal according to
substance and activity, and what has substance in time, there is an
intermediary, which is in one way eternal but in another way measured by
time.''2
Now, it could appear to someone that this intermediary is a heavenly body,
which is incorruptible in its substance, while its motion is measured by time.
But this is not sound. For in the preceding proposition3 what is always in
motion is simply placed among temporal things. For as the Philosopher says in
Book IV of the Physics:4 "As time measures motion, so the 'now' of time
measures what is mobile." Hence a heavenly body which is in motion is not in
the moment of eternity but in the moment of time. Furthermore, motion is not
the action of what is moved but rather something that it undergoes.5 It is the
action of the mover, as is said in Book III of the Physics.6
The principle of motion is the soul, as was held in Proposition 2.7 So, because a
noble soul is immobile in itself {142} but its action is motion, it follows that the
soul in its substance is in the moment of eternity, while its action is in time.
Both the substance and the activity of a body that is in motion is in time, while
both the substance and action of an intelligence is in the moment of eternity.
Now, the proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of the preceding
proposition. For it was said before8 that the grades of beings are
2. Proclus, Prop. 106, Dodds, p. 94.2123; Vansteenkiste, p. 493.
3. Cf. above, S{137}.
4. Aristotle, Physics, IV 11, 219b2223.
5.magis passio.
6. Aristotle, Physics, III 3, 202a2627.
7. Cf. above, S{15}.
8. Cf. above, S{138}.
 Page 160
continuous with one another according to a certain likeness. Hence those
things that are totally dissimilar follow one another in the order of things
through some intermediary which has a likeness to both extremes. But a thing
whose substance and action is in time is totally unlike that whose substance
and action is in eternity. Therefore, there must be between them a third
intermediary thing, so that either its substance falls under eternity, while [its]
action under time, or conversely. But it cannot be that the substance of
something be in time but [its] action in eternity, because then [its] action
would be higher and better than [its] substance and the effect than the cause,
which is impossible. Therefore, it remains that intermediary thing is in the
moment of eternity with regard to its substance but in time with regard to [its]
activity. And this is what we intended to prove.
 Page 161

{143} Proposition 321

Every substance that falls under eternity in some of its dispositions, while falling under
time in other of its dispositions, is simultaneously a being and a coming to be.

For every thing that falls under eternity is truly a being and every thing that
falls under time is truly a coming to be. Therefore, if this is so, then, if one
thing falls under both eternity and time, it is a being and a coming to be not in
one way but rather in different ways.2
Therefore, it is already clear from what we have said that everything that
comes to be, falling under time in its substance, has a substance that depends
on the pure being, which is both the cause of durability and the cause of all
things, whether sempiternal or destructible.3
There must be a one causing the acquisition of unities while it is itself
unacquired, though4 all the rest of the unities are acquired. And the indication
of this is what I say: If a one is found that causes acquisition [but is itself]
unacquired, then what is the difference between it and the first thing that
causes acquisition? For it can only be either that it is like it in all its dispositions
or that there is a difference between the two. Therefore, if it is like it in all its
dispositions, then one of them is not first and the other second. But if one of
them is not like the other in all its dispositions, then one of them is first and the
other second. Therefore, that in which there is a fixed unity not found to be
from another is the first true one,
1. This proposition relates to Prop. 107 and Prop. 116 in Proclus's Elements. Cf.
Dodds, pp. 94.3296.7 and p. 102.13, 102.1723, 102.2526. This final proposition
consists of two parts. The first half draws on Proclus's Prop. 107 for the teaching
that a substance that is in both eternity and time is both a being as eternal and
stable and a coming-into-being as temporal and changing. But all that has come
into being and is substantially subject to time is ultimately linked to the Pure Being
which is the cause of all perpetuity and all things, according to the author's
exposition. The second half has little relation to the first and draws on Proclus's
Prop. 116. Here it is argued that all unity ultimately derives from a "First True One"
as the uncaused cause of the unity participated by all other things. This awkwardly
formed concluding proof of the True One is especially interesting for its similarity to
a proof found in al-Kindi's On First Philosophy. Cf. Rasa'il al-Kindi al-falsafiyah, ed.
Muhammad 'Abdalhadi Abu Rida, I (Cairo, 1950), pp. 16062.
2.per
3. Themodum et modum.
Arabic has "a true one."
4. sed.
 Page 162
as we have shown. But that in which unity is found to be from another is in
addition to the first true one. So, if it is from another, it is a unity acquired from
the first one. Therefore, it happens that unity again belongs to the true pure
one and the remaining ones, and that there is unity only because of the true
one, which is the cause of unity.
Therefore, it is already clear and plain that every unity after the true one is
acquired and created. But the first true one creates unities, causing acquisition
[but is] not [itself] acquired, as we have shown.
Commentary
Because in the preceding proposition [the author] proved that there is some
thing whose substance is in eternity but whose action in time, he shows
subsequently the condition of such a substance in this last proposition, saying:
Every substance that falls under eternity in some of its dispositions, while
falling under time in other of its dispositions, is simultaneously a being and a
coming to be. Proclus asserts this same proposition [as Proposition] {144} 107
in his book in these words: "Everything that is in one way eternal but in
another way temporal is simultaneously both a being and a coming to be."5
Now, to clarify this proposition [the author] does three things. First, he states
the proof of the proposition he has introduced, which [proof] depends wholly
upon the meaning6 of the terms. For, because eternity is all at the same time,
lacking succession of past and future, as was held above,7 he calls what is in
eternity "a being" because it is always in act. But time consists in the
succession of past and future. Hence what is in time is in [the state of]
becoming, as it were, which the word "a coming to be" signifies. So, what is
wholly in eternity is wholly a being. And what is wholly in time is wholly a
coming to be. But what is in one way in time but in another way in eternity is
simultaneously a being and a coming to be.
Second, at: Therefore it is already clear etc., he introduces a certain corollary.
For the disposition among beings is such that lower things depend
5. Proclus, Prop. 107, Dodds, p. 94.3233; Vansteenkiste, p. 493. Moerbeke
translates Proclus's genesis as generatio ("coming to be").
6.significatione.
7. Cf. above, S{11 ff}.
 Page 163
upon higher things. Hence what is wholly a coming to be, as having substance
and activity in time, must depend upon what is simultaneously a being and a
coming to be which has substance in eternity but activity in time. This must
depend upon what is wholly in eternity with respect to substance and activity.
And this further depends upon the first being above eternity, which is the
principle of the duration of all things both sempiternal and corruptible.
Third, at: There must be a one causing etc., he shows that all things depend
upon this first one. To understand what he says here, we ought to take
Proposition 116 in Proclus, which is as follows: "Every god is participable,
except one."8 Proclus asserts this proposition to show how the Platonists {145}
maintained that there are many gods. For they did not maintain that all [the
gods] are equal9 but that one is first, which participates nothing but is
essentially the one and good. They maintained that the other lower gods
participate the one and good itself. And he presents the proof of this because it
is clear that the first and supreme God participates nothing, otherwise he
would not be the first cause of all things. For what participates always
presupposes something prior which is essentially. But he proves that all other
gods participate through the fact that, if the first god is one essentially and not
by way of participation, either one of the other gods is likewise one and thus in
no way different from the first, or it must be one by way of participation. For, if
one itself is the essence of the first, then, if something differs from it as a
second that exists after it, it must not be such that its essence is one itself but
that it participates [its] unity.
And this is what [the author] proposes here: that it is necessary to assert that
there is a first one which causes unities to be acquired, i.e., from which
whatever are one participate unity, but it does not acquire, i.e., it does not
participate unity from some other. And what was stated he presents as a proof
of this.
And so ends the entire Book of Causes. Thanks be to almighty God, who is the
first cause of all things.
8. Proclus, Prop. 116, Dodds, p. 102.13; Vansteenkiste, p. 290.; cf. above, S{18}.
9.omnes ex aequo.
 Page 165

APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Page 167

Appendix 1
Another Proposition 29:
[Proposition 30(29) Translated from the Arabic]1
Every substance originated in time is either perpetual in time and time is inseparable
from it because it and time were equally originated; or it is separate from time and
time is separate from it because it was originated in a certain moment of time.
For, if originated things follow one after another and the higher substance
follows only the substance similar to it and not the substance dissimilar to it,
then the substances similar to the higher substances (namely the originated
substances from which time is not separate) are before the substances that are
<not> similar to the perpetual substances (namely the substances not
continuous with time and originated in certain moments of time). For it is
impossible for substances originated in certain moments of time to be in
contact with perpetual substances, because they are not at all similar to them.
The substances perpetual in time are, then, those which are in contact with
perpetual substances and are intermediate between the fixed substances and
the substances that are not continuous with time.
It is impossible for perpetual substances above time to follow temporal
substances that are not continuous with time except through the mediation of
temporal substances perpetual in time. And these substances came to be
intermediate because they share in perpetuity with higher perpetual
substances and they share in time with temporal substances that are not
continuous <with time> through generation. For, although they are perpetual,
their perpetuity is through generation and motion. Substances perpetual with
time are similar to perpetual substances above time in perpetuity and dissimilar
to them in motion and generation. As for substances that are not continuous
with time, these are in no way whatsoever similar to perpetual substances
above time. And if they are not similar to them, then they cannot receive them
or be in contact with them.
It is therefore necessary that there be substances that are in contact with
perpetual substances above time so that they are in contact with substances
that are
1. Revised translation based on Taylor (1981), pp. 33032; Arabic text, pp. 26068.
 Page 168
not continuous with time. So, through their motion they join temporal
substances that are not continuous with time and perpetual substances that
are above time. Through their perpetuity they join substances that are above
time and substances that are under time, i.e., falling under generation and
corruption. [In this way] they join noble substances and ignoble substances,
lest ignoble substances destroy noble substances and so destroy all beauty and
all goodness and not have any persistence and fixity.
It has become plain from these proofs, then, that there are two sorts of
perpetuity, one eternal and another temporal. The perpetuity of one of the two
[sorts of perpetual substance] is subsistent and quiescent, while the perpetuity
of the other is mobile; one of them is concentrated, and all its activities are
together without some being before others, while the other is flowing and
protracted [through time] and some of its activities are before others; and the
completeness of one of them is through its essence, while the completeness of
the other is through its parts, every one of which is distinct from others in
terms of priority and posteriority.
It has become clear and evident, then, that there are some substances
perpetual above time, there are some substances equal with time and time is
inseparable from them, and there are some that are not continuous with time
and time is separate from them both above and below, and these [latter] are
substances falling under generation and corruption.
 Page 169

Appendix 2
The following list of references to the works of St. Thomas in which he explicitly
refers to the Book of Causes and its various propositions is taken from C.
Vansteenkiste, O.P., "Il Liber de Causis negli scritti di San Tommaso,"
Angelicum XXXV (1958), pp. 32574. The appendix is divided into two parts:
I. A numbered list of citations of the Book of Causes found in the works of St.
Thomas.
II. A listing of these citation numbers under those propositions of the Book of
Causes to which they refer. The summaries and divisions of the propositions
are by Vansteenkiste. Citations that can refer to more than one proposition in
the Book of Causes are given by him in parentheses. For example, in
Proposition 2, numbers (96) and (97) also relate to Proposition 9.1
I
Explicit Citations of the Book of Causes in St. Thomas's Writings
A
Commentaries on Scripture
In Psalmos
1. Ps. XVII
B
Theological Commentaries
In Boethium de Trinitate
2. Q. 1, A. 1, 6a
3. Q. 1, A. 3, 2a
4. Q. 4, A. 1, 2a
5. Q. 6, A. 1, 3.2a
1. Vansteenkiste provides a third list, not reproduced here, of 89 implicit citations of
the Book of Causes by St. Thomas, indicating that there are perhaps many, many
more.
 Page 170
C
Theological Syntheses
Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum
6. I, D. 4, Q. 1, A. 2c
7. D. 8, Q. 1, A. 2 s.c.
8. D. 8, Q. 1, A. 3 s.c.
9. D. 12, Q. 1, A. 2, 1a
10. D. 14, Q. 1, A. 1, 3a
11. D. 14, Q. 2, A. 1, 2a
12. D. 17, Q. 1, A. 5, ad 3
13. D. 19, Q. 2, A. 1
14. D. 22, Q. 1, A. 1, 1a
15. D. 22, Q. 1, A. 1, ad 1
16. D. 33, Q. 1, A. 2c
17. D. 34, Q. 3, A. 2, ad 3
18. D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, 1a
19. D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, 2a
20. D. 37, Q. 1, A. 1, 1a
21. D. 38, Q. 1, A. 2c
22. D. 42, Q. 1, A. 2 s.c. 2
23. D. 43, Q. 1, A. 1c
24. D. 43, Q. 1, A. 2, 4a
25. D. 43, Q. 1, A. 2, ad 4
26. II, D. 1, Q. 1, A. 3, 1a
27. D. 1, Q. 1, A. 3c
28. D. 1, Q. 1, A. 4c
29. Ibid.
30. D. 1, Q. 1, A. 6, 5a
31. D. 1, Q. 1, A. 6, ad 5
32. D. 2, Q. 1, A. 1, 1a
33. D. 2, Q. 1, A. 1, ad 1
34. D. 2, Q. 2, A. 3c
35. D. 3, Q. 1, A. 1, 5a
36. D. 3, Q. 1, A. 1c
37. D. 3, Q. 1, A. 1, ad 5
38. D. 3, Q. 1, A. 2c
39. D. 3, Q. 3, A. 1 s.c. 2
40. D. 3, Q. 3, A. 1c
41. D. 3, Q. 3, A. 2 s.c. 2
42. D. 4, Q. 1, A. 1c
43. D. 13, Q. 1, A. 1, 2a
44. D. 17, Q. 1, A. 1 s.c. 1
45. D. 17, Q. 2, A. 1, 3a
46. D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, 1a
47. D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, 5a
48. D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, ad 1
49. D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, ad 2
50. D. 18, Q. 2, A. 2, ad 5
51. D. 19, Q. 1, A. 1c
52. Ibid.
53. D. 23, Q. 2, A. 1c
54. D. 32, Q. 2, A. 2c
55. D. 39, Q. 3, A. 1c
56. D. 41, Q. 1, A. 2c
57. D. 44, expositio, c
58. III, D. 10, Q. 1, A. 1, ql. 2, ad 3
59 D. 11, A. 2c
60. D. 13, Q. 1, A. 2, ql. 2c
61. D. 13, Q. 3, A. 1 s.c. 3
62. D. 14, A. 1, ql. 2, ad 1
63. D. 14, A. 2, ql. 2, 4a
64. D. 14, A. 3, ql. 4 s.c. 1
65. D. 22, Q. 1, A. 1 s.c. 3
66. D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, 3a
67. D. 35, Q. 1, A. 1, ad 3
68. IV, D. 10, A. 4, ql. 5, 1a
69. D. 12, Q. 1, A. 1, ql. 1c
70. D. 17, Q. 1, A. 5, ql. 2, ad 3
71. D. 49, Q. 1, A. 2, ql. 3, 2a
72a. D. 49, Q. 2, A. 6, 5a
72b. D. 50, Q. 1, A. 1 c.
 Page 171
Summa Contra Gentiles
73. I, c. 26
74. II, c. 98
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. III, c. 61
78. III, c. 66
Summa Theologiae
79. I, Q. 3, A. 8 s.c. 2
80. Q. 5, A. 1, 2a
81. Q. 5, A. 1, ad 2
82. Q. 5, A. 2 s.c.
83. Q. 10, A. 2, 2a
84. Q. 10, A. 2, ad 2
85. Q. 14, A. 2, 1a
86. Q. 14, A. 2, ad 1
87. Q. 45, A. 4, 1a
88. Q. 45, A. 4, ad 1
89. Q. 45, A. 5c
90. Q. 50, A. 2, ad 4
91. Q. 55, A. 3 s.c.
92. Q. 56, A. 2, 2a
93. Q. 56, A. 2 s.c.
94. Q. 57, A. 3, 2a
95. Q. 58, A. 1, 3a
96. Q. 61, A. 2, 2a
97. Q. 61, A. 2, ad 2
98. Q. 84, A. 3, 1a
99. Q. 94, A. 2, 3a
100. I-II, Q. 2, A. 6, 2a
101. Q. 5, A. 5c
102. Q. 50, A. 6c
103. Q. 67, A. 5, 1a
104. Q. 67, A. 5, ad 1
105. II-II, Q. 23, A. 6, ad 1
106. Q. 37, A. 2, ad 3
107. Q. 45, A. 3, ad 1
108. Q. 52, A. 2, 2a
109. III, Q. 6, A. 4, 3a
110. Q. 75, A. 5, ad 1
D
Disputations
De Veritate
111. Q. 1, A. 1 s.c. 4
112. Q. 1, A. 4 s.c. 6
113. Q. 1, A. 9c
114. Q. 2, A. 1, 3a
115. Q. 2, A. 1, 11a
116. Q. 2, A. 2, 2a
117. Q. 2, A. 2, ad 2
118. Q. 2, A. 3c
119. Q. 3, A. 2, 3a
120. Q. 5, A. 2, 3a
121. Q. 5, A. 2, 9a
122. Q. 5, A. 8 s.c. 9
123. Q. 5, A. 9, 7a
124. Q. 5, A. 9, 10a
125. Q. 5, A. 9, ad 7
126. Q. 5, A. 9, ad 10
127. Q. 6, A. 6c
128. Q. 8, A. 3c
129. Q. 8, A. 5 s.c.
130. Q. 8, A. 6 s.c. 5
131. Q. 8, A. 7, 1.2a
132. Q. 8, A. 7, 2.1a
133. Q. 8, A. 7 s.c. 1
134. Q. 8, A. 7c
135. Ibid.
136. Q. 8, A. 8 s.c. 1
 Page 172
137. Q. 8, A. 8c
138. Q. 8, A. 10 s.c. 2
139. Q. 8, A. 14, 9a
140. Q. 8, A. 14, 12a
141. Q. 8, A. 14, ad 6
142. Q. 8, A. 15c
143. Q. 13, A. 2c
144. Q. 18, A. 4, 7a
145. Q. 21, A. 1, 7a
146. Q. 21, A. 2, 5a
147. Q. 21, A. 4, ad 9
148. Q. 21, A. 5c
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. Q. 22, A. 11c
152. Q. 24, A. 1, 4a
153. Q. 24, A. 8, 6a
154. Q. 24, A. 14c
155. Q. 28, A. 9 s.c. 3
De Potentia
156. Q. 3, A. 1c
157. Ibid.
158. Q. 3, A. 3, 1a
159. Q. 3, A. 4, 10a
160. Q. 3, A. 4, 11a
161. Q. 3, A. 4c
162. Ibid.
163. Ibid.
164. Q. 3, A. 4, ad 10
165. Q. 3, A. 5, 2a
166. Q. 3, A. 7c
167. Ibid.
168. Q. 3, A. 8, 19a
169. Q. 3, A. 8, ad 19
170. Q. 3, A. 9, 27a
171. Q. 3, A. 10, 8a
172. Q. 5, A. 1 s.c. 4
173. Q. 5, A. 8c
174. Q. 5, A. 10, 6a
175. Q. 6, A. 1, 5a
176. Q. 6, A. 3, 9a
177. Q. 6, A. 3, 10a
178. Q. 6, A. 3, ad 9
179. Q. 6, A. 6 s.c. 2
180. Q. 6, A. 6c
181. Q. 7, A. 2, 6a
182. Q. 7, A. 2 sol.
183. Q. 7, A. 2, ad 5
184. Q. 7, A. 5, 5a
185. Q. 7, A. 8c
De Malo
186a. Q. 2, A. 9, ad 18
186b. Q. 4, A. 6, ad 15
187. Q. 16, A. 1, 4a
188. Q. 16, A. 2, 10a
189. Q. 16, A. 2, ad 10
190. Q. 16, A. 4 s.c. 2
191. Q. 16, A. 4c
192. Q. 16, A. 4, ad 14
193. Q. 16, A. 6 s.c. 4
194. Q. 16, A. 7, 3a
195. Q. 16, A. 9, 8a
196. Q. 16, A. 9, ad 8
De Spiritualibus Creaturis
197. A. 1 s.c. 7
 Page 173
De Anima
198. A. 7, 8a
199. A. 7, ad 1
200. A. 7, ad 5
201. A. 9c
202. A. 13, 9a
203. A. 17, 9a
204. A. 18c
205. A. 19, 10a
206. A. 20, 18a
Quodlibeta
207. II, A. 3 s.c.
208. V, A. 7c
209. VII, A. 3c
210. IX, A. 5c 211. IX, A. 5c
E
Special Treatises
De Ente Et Essentia
212. C. 4
213. C. 5
214. Ibid.
215. C. 8
216. C. 18
Responsio Ad Io. Vercellensem De Art. XLII
217. Art. 15
F
Works of Doubtful Authenticity
Quaestio De Immortalitate Animae
218. Arg. 18
De quatuor Oppositis
219. C. 4
De Natura Materiae
220. C. 1
Partes Deletae Ex Autographo S. C. Gentiles
221. I, C. 68
222. I, C. 73
Supplementum Ad S. Theologiae, III
223. Q. 83, A. 3c
 Page 174
II. Propositions from the Book of Causes Cited by St. Thomas
Proposition 1
a. Every primary cause infuses its effect more powerfully than a second
[universal] cause. The effect of the second cause is only through the power of
the first cause.Nos. 2, 3, 9, 29, 57, 69, 100, 109, 110, 122, 124, 125, 126,
127, 150, 152, 154, 163, 167, 173, 186 (2x), 210, 221, 222, 223
b. It is necessary that something first of all be a being, next a living thing, and
afterward a man. Being is more powerfully the cause. When you remove living,
being remains (see Prop. 4 a).Nos. 19, 28, 54, 56, 65, 69, 103, 104, 110, 186,
201
Proposition 2
a. The first cause is before eternity, since it is the cause of it (see Prop. 9).Nos.
13, 33, 83, 84
b. The soul is [lower] on the horizon of eternity and above time.Nos. 70, 72a,
72b, 77, (96, 97), 170, 171
c. An intelligence is made equal to eternity (see Props. 7 b, 31).Nos. 32, 84, 94
(96, 97), 216
Proposition 3
a. Every noble soul has three activities.No. 123
b. [The soul's] divine activity is . . . from the power . . . of the first cause (see
Props. 9 b, 23).Nos. 89, 123, 125, 157, (169)
c. The first cause created the being of the soul with an intelligence mediating
(see Props. 5 a, 8 d, 9 c, 14 b, 16 c).Nos. 26, (46, 47, 48, 161, 164)
d. The soul [was placed as something] subject to an intelligence [on which it]
carries out [its] intellectual activity.Nos. 47, 50, 125
e. The soul impresses things only through motion (see Prop. 5 b).Nos. 34, 71,
125
Proposition 4
a. The first of created things is being (see Props. 1 b, 18 a).Nos. 4, 8, 27, 30,
31, 82, 87, 88, 111, 125, 146, 165, 169, 175, 182, 219
b. Created being . . . is composed of the finite and the infinite.Nos. 35, 37
c. Intelligible forms are more extended [in higher intelligences] . . . and not as
extended [in lower intelligences] (see Prop. 10 b).
d. Because intelligence is diversified, the intelligible form [there] becomes
diversified . . . just as . . . individuals in the lower world.No. 40
Proposition 5
a. [The first higher] intelligences impress steadfast forms.Nos. 46, 48
 Page 175
b. [The motion] of souls . . . is regular, continuous motion (see Prop. 3 e).Nos.
66, 67, (71)
Proposition 6
a. The first cause transcends description, and language fails in describing it
(see Prop. 22 a).Nos. 1, 5, 6, 14, 15, 68
b. The first cause is signified [only] from a second cause . . . referred to by the
name of its first effect, which is an intelligence.Nos. 17, 18, 115, 184
Proposition 7
a. An intelligence is an undivided substance.Nos. 179, 197
b. An intelligence is with eternity . . . above time; its substance and activity . . .
are one thing (see Props. 2 c, 31).Nos. 140, 155, 194
Proposition 8
a. Every intelligence knows what is above it . . . because it acquires from it as
its cause . . . and what is below it . . . because it is its cause (see Prop. 13
c).Nos. 42, 53, 72, 94, (99), 101, 118, (128), 131, (135), 143, (160, 192),
198, 206
b. An intelligence knows . . . things according to the mode of its substance . . .
and not according to the mode of the things themselves (see Props. 11 b, 13
a).Nos. (42), 74, 95, 101, 102, 128, 134, 135, 141, 160, 189, 203
c. Sensible things are intelligible in an intelligence (see Props. 12, 13 a).Nos.
39, 136
d. An intelligence is the cause of the things [below it] (see Props. 3 a, 5 a, 9 c,
14 b).
Proposition 9
a. The stability and essence of every intelligence is through the pure goodness
that is the first cause.No. 172
b. An intelligence is the ruler of all the things [under it] . . . through the divine
power because through it, it is the cause of the things. (For the soul see Prop.
3 b; see Props. 3 c, 23.)Nos. 78, 89, 137, 166, 169, 182
c. The first cause . . . creates an intelligence without mediation and . . . the
rest of things with the mediation of an intelligence (see Props. 3 c, 8 d).
d. An intelligence . . . is being and form.Nos. 36, 207, 212
e. The first cause . . . is being alone; its being is infinite; its individuality is the
pure goodness [that infuses . . . the rest of things].Nos. 38, 73, 147, 148, 149,
183, 213
Proposition 10
a. Every intelligence is full of forms.Nos. 39, 41, 62, 76, 98, 129, 136, 139,
142, 144, 199, 204
 Page 176
b. Among intelligences there are some that contain more universal forms and
others that contain less universal forms (see Prop. 4 c).Nos. 41, 63, 75, 91,
138, 191, 200, 209
c. The first intelligences have great power because [they possess] a more
powerful unity [than the second, lower intelligences] (see Prop. 17 a, and
elsewhere).
d. [Any] thing receives what is above it only through the mode according to
which it can receive it, not through the mode according to which the received
thing is. (For knowledge, see Props. 8 b, c; in general, see Props. 12, 20 b, 22
c, 24.)Nos. 21, 45, 105, (137, 151), 153, 158, 193, 211
Proposition 11
a. Every intelligence understands sempiternal things, which things are neither
destroyed nor fall under time.Nos. 93, 133
b. An intelligence understands a thing through its being (see Prop. 13 b).
Proposition 12
All of the first things are in one another in the mode appropriate for one of
them to be in another. An effect is in a cause in the mode belonging to the
cause, and a cause is in the effect in the mode belonging to the effect (see
Prop. 13 b).
Proposition 13
a. Things are . . . in an intelligence . . . in an intelligible mode (see Prop. 8 b &
c).
b. When [an intelligence] knows its essence, it knows the rest of the things
[that are under it] (see Props. 8, 11 b).Nos. 99, 132, 188
Proposition 14
a. Sensible things are in every soul because it is their example (see Prop.
3).Nos. (137), 205
b. The soul . . . is an effect of the intelligence [before it] (see Prop. 3 c).
Proposition 15
Every knower knows it essence. Therefore, it returns to its essence with a
complete reversion. . . . abiding steadfastly, fixed per se (see Props. 7,
28).Nos. 12, 52, 85, 86, 113, 116, 117, 130
Proposition 16
a. The power [of an intelligence] came to be infinite only with respect to the
lower, not with respect to the higher. (With regard to the soul, see Prop.
5.)Nos. 25, 49, 60, 90, 176, 178, 195, 196, 214, 217, 220
b. The first infinite . . . is the power of powers . . . pure power.No. 23
c. The remaining . . . effects [are] . . . with an intelligence mediating (see
Prop. 3 c).
 Page 177
Proposition 17
a. Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power (see Prop. 10
c).Nos. 22, (24, 44, 64), 106, 107, 108, 119, 120, 174, 177, 185, 202
b. The more [that power] is united, the [more] wondrous [its] effects.No. 177
Proposition 18
a. The first being . . . the cause of causes, gives . . . being by way of
creation.Nos. 27, 43, 59, 156, 162, 168, 169
b. [The first] life gives [life to those under it], an intelligence [knowledge and]
the remaining things [to those under it but only] by way of form.Nos. 27, 59,
80, 111, 145, 156, 162
Proposition 19
Among intelligences . . . there is divine [intelligence] . . . and only intelligence.
Among souls [there is] an intellectual [soul] and only soul.Nos. 159, 187
Proposition 20
a. The first cause rules all [created] things without being mixed with them.Nos.
7, 20, 79, 181.
b. The first goodness infuses [all things with goodnesses] in one infusion. But
each thing receives that infusion according to the mode of its power and its
being (see Props. 10 d, 12, 22 c, 24).
Proposition 22
a. The first cause is above every name by which it is named (see Prop. 6
a).Nos. 15, 16, 33, 114
b. Neither diminution nor mere completeness belongs to it (see Prop. 9 e).
c. Every world receives [that goodness only] according to the mode of its
potency (see Props. 10 d, 12, 20 b, 24).
Proposition 23
Every divine intelligence knows things inasmuch as it is an intelligence and
rules them inasmuch as it is divine (see Prop. 9 b).
Proposition 24
The first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but not all
things exist in the first cause according to one disposition. . . . Each thing . . .
receives it according to the mode of its potency (see Props. 10 d, 12, 20 b, 22
c).Nos. 11, 61, 112, 121
Proposition 27
Every destructible substance . . . is either composed or supported by another
thing.Nos. 51, 180, 218
 Page 178
Proposition 29
Every simple substance . . . is loftier and higher than time [and temporal
things] (see Props. 2 c, 7 b, 31).
Proposition 30
Created things follow one another, and only [that] substance follows [a higher
substance] which is like [it] (see Prop. 31).No. 55
Proposition 31
Between a thing whose substance and action are in the moment of eternity
and a thing whose substance and action are in the moment of time there exists
an intermediary . . . (see Props. 7 b, 30).Nos. 10, (140, 155), 190, (194), 208
 Page 179

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Expositio (126972). Turin: Marietti, 1950.
In
[English translation: Commentary on the Metaphysics
Met.
of Aristotle. Trans. John P. Rowan. Chicago: Henry
Regnery, 1961.
In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis (126970).
Leonine edition (1884). Vol. 2.
In [English translation: Commentary on Aristotle's
Phys. Metaphysics. Trans. Richard J. Blackwell, Richard J.
Spath, and W. Edmund Thirkel. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1963.]
In Sententia Libri Politicorum (126972). Leonine edition
Pol. (1971).Vol. 48.
In Aristotelis Libros posteriorum Analyticorum
In (126972). Second Leonine Edition (1989). Vol. 1.2.
In (126972). Second Leonine Edition (1989). Vol. 1.2.
post. [English translation: Commentary on the Posterior
Anal. Analytics of Aristotle. Trans. F. R. Larcher, O.P. Albany:
Magi Books, 1970.]

E
Scriptural Commentaries

In Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura (126972). Ed.

Ioan.Raphaelis Cai, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1952.

F
Special Treatises

De
De Aeternitate Mundi contra Murmurantes (1270). In
Aet.
Opuscula Philosophica. Turin: Marietti, 1954.
Mundi
 Page 182

[English translation: On the Eternity of the World.

Trans. Vollert, Kendzierski, and Byrne. Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1964.]
De Ente et Essentia (125256). Turin: Marietti,
De Ente 1948.
et [English translation: Aquinas on Being and
Essentia Essence. Trans. Joseph Bobik. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1965.]
De Natura Materiae. In Opuscula Philosophica.
De Natura
Turin: Marietti, 1954. (This work is of doubtful
Materiae
authenticity.)
De Substantiis separatis (or De Angelis) (127173).
Leonine edition (196768). Vol. 40.
De Subst.
[English translation: Treatise on Separate
sep.
Substances. Trans. Francis J. Lescoe. West
Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College,1959.]
De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas (1270).
In Opuscula Philosophica. Turin: Marietti, 1954.
De
Also in Leonine edition (1976). Vol. 43.
Unitate
[English translation: On the Unity of the Intellect
Intellectus
against the Averroists. Trans. Beatrice H. Zelder.
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1968.]

3
Arabic Editions of the Book of Causes
Bardenhewer, Otto. Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Über das reine Gute
bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis. Freiberg-im-Breisgau: Herder,
1882.
Badawi, 'Abdurrahman. Procli: Liber (Psuedo-Aristotelis) de expositione
bonitatis purae. In Neoplatonici apud Arabes. Islamica 19. Cairo, 1955; pp.
133.
4
Latin Edition of the Book of Causes
Adriaan Pattin, O.M.I. "Le Liber de causis. Édition établie à l'aide de 90
manuscrits avec introduction et notes." In Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 28 (1966),
pp. 90203. Also, as a separate publication: Louvain: Éditions du "Tijdschrift
voor filosofie," n.d. [1966].
[English translation: The Book of Causes. Translated from the Latin with an
Introduction by Dennis J. Brand. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1984.]
5
Other Latin Commentaries on the Book of Causes
Albert the Great. Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis. In B. Alberti Magni
Opera Omnia. Ed. August Borgnet. Paris: Vivès, 189099. Vol. 10, pp. 361619.
 Page 183
. De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa. In Alberti Magni Opera
Omnia. Munster: Aschendorff, 1993. Vol. 17, 2.
Roger Bacon. Quaestiones supra Librum de Causis. In Opera hactenus inedita
Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. 12. Ed. Robert Steele. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935.
Giles of Rome. Fundatissimi Aegidii Romani, Archiepiscopi Bituricensis,
Doctorem praecipue, Ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustine, Opus super
Authorem de Causis, Alpharabium. Venice: J. Zoppin, 1550.
Henry of Ghent. Les Quaestiones in Librum de Causis attribuées à Henri de
Gand. Critical edition by John P. Zwaenepoel, C.I.C.M. Louvain: Publications
universitaires de Louvain, 1974.
Siger of Brabant. Les Quaestiones super Librum de Causis de Siger de Brabant.
Critical edition by Antonio Marlasca. Louvain: Publications universitaires de
Louvain, 1972.
6
Other Primary Works Cited
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Aristotle. Aristoteles Graece ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri. Berlin: Reiner,
1931.
[English trans: The Basic Works of Aristotle. Ed. Richard McKeon. N.Y.:
Random House, 1941.]
St. Augustine. De Genesi ad litteram libri XII. In Corpus Scriptorum
Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vol. XXVIII ex recensione I. Zychia. Prague: PL
Tempsky-Freitag, 1894. In Patrologia Latina. Ed. J. P. Migne. Paris, 184464.
Vol. 34.
[English translation: On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis. Trans. Roland J.
Teske, S.J. Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991.]
. De civitate Dei libri XXII ex recensione E. Hoffmann, pars I. Prague: Tempsky-
Freitag, 1899. In PL, Vol. 41.
[English translation: City of God. Trans. Gerald Walsh, S.J., et al. New York:
Doubleday, 1958.]
. De Trinitate. CSEL, Vol. 50. Turnhout: Brepols, 1968.6. In PL, Vol. 42.
[English translation: On the Holy Trinity. Trans. A. West and W. Shedd. In
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Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1976.]
Averroes. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentarium, Venetiis apud
Iunctas, 15621574. Frankfurt-am-Main: Minerva, 1963.
Boethius. Philosophiae Consolationis Libri quinque recensuit G. Weinberger.
CSEL, Vol. LXVII. Vienna: Hoelder & Pichler, 1934.
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[English translation: The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. W. V. Cooper. New
York: Random House, 1943.]
St. Gregory the Great. Dialogorum Libri quatuor. In Patrologia Latina. Ed. J. P.
Migne. Paris, 1849. Vol. 77.
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theologica translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke." In Tijdschrift voor filosofie 13
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Plato. Platonis Opera. Ed. J. Burnet. 5 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 190513.
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Proclus. Proclus: The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text with Translation,
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l'Aréopage, et synopse marquant la valeur des citations. Ed. P. Chevallier et al.
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Jones. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980. Pseudo-Dionysius. The
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3
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Antoniotti, M. L. "La prémotion divine: Saint Thomas d'Aquin et l'auteur du
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Potentia Dei.'' Dissertation. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
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4
Other Related Literature on St. Thomas
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Scholasticism 26 (1952), pp. 4979.
Berti, E. "Aristotelismo e neoplatonismo nella dottrina tomistica di Dio come
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347352.
Blanchette, Oliva. The Perfection of the Universe according to Aquinas: A
Teleological Cosmology. University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1992.
Booth, Edward. "A Confrontation between the Neo-Platonisms of St. Thomas
and Hegel." Angelicum 63 (1986), pp. 5689.
Brady, Ignatius. "John Pecham and the Background to the De aeternitati
mundi of St. Thomas Aquinas." In St. Thomas Aquinas Commemorative
Studies. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974.
A. Campodonico. "Il carattere immediato della presenza di Dio nel mondo
secondo Tommaso D'Aquino." Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 76 (1984), pp.
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Chenu, M.-D. "Un vestige du stoicisme." Revue des sciences philosophiques et
théologiques 27 (1938), pp. 6368.
. Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Trans. Albert M. Landry, O.P., and
Dominic Hughes, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964.
Clarke, W. Norris, S.J. "The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or
Neoplatonism." New Scholasticism 26 (1952), pp. 16794.
. "St. Thomas and Platonism." Thought 32 (1957), pp. 43744.
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Corrigan, Kevin. "A Philosophical Precursor to the Theory of Essence and
Existence in St. Thomas Aquinas." The Thomist 48 (1984), pp. 21940.
De Couesnongle, C. "La causalité du maximum. Pourquoi saint Thomas a-til mal
cité Aristote?" Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 38 (1954),
pp. 65880.
De Vogel, Cornelia J. "Deus Creator Omnium. Plato and Aristotle in Aquinas'
Doctrine of God." In Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval
Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, C.S.S.R. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1983.
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P. "St. Thomas and the Causality of God's Goodness."
Laval théologique et philosophique 34 (1978), pp. 291304.
Dondaine, H.-F. "Le premier instant de l'ange d'apres Saint Thomas." Revue
des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 39 (1955), pp. 21327.
Ducoin, G. "L'homme comme conscience de soi selon saint Thomas d'Aquin." in
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Libri Catholici, 1955.
Fabro, Cornelio. La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso.
Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1939.
. Partecipazione e causalità secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino. Turin: SEI, 1960.
(Participation et causalité selon saint Thomas d'Aquin. Louvain: Universitaires
de Louvain, 1961.)
. "Platonismo, neoplatonismo e tomismo, convergenze e divergenze." Aquinas
12 (1969), pp. 21742.
. "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of
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Farre, Luis. Tomas de Aquino y el Neoplatonismo. La Plata: Instituto de
Filosofia, Universitad Nacional de La Plata, 1966.
Faucon, P. Aspects néoplatoniciens de la doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin.
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Fauser, Winfried, S.J. "Albert the Great's Commentary on the Liber de causis."
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Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas." Divus Thomas 76 (1973), pp. 5064.
Fetz, R. L. Ontologie der Innerlichkeit. Reditio completa und processio interior
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Geiger, Louis-Bertrand, O.P. La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas
d'Aquin. Paris: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1953.
Gomez-Nogalez. "Santo Tomás y los Arabes. Bibliografía." Miscellanea Comillas
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Aquinas." Dionysius 6 (1982), pp. 8393.
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Hayen, André. La communication de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin. 2
vols. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1957, 1959.
Henle, R. J. "St. Thomas' Methodology in the Treatment of 'Positiones' with
Particular Reference to 'Positiones Platonicae.'" Gregorianum 36 (1955), pp.
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. Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study of "Plato" and "Platonici" Texts in the
Writings of St. Thomas. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956.
Huit, C. "Les éléments platoniciens de la doctrine de saint Thomas." Revue
thomiste 19 (1911), pp. 72466.
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allemande." Revue de théologie et de philosophie 110 (1978), pp. 42748.
Johnson, Mark F. "Did St. Thomas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?"
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Jordan, Mark D. "The Grammar of Esse: Re-reading Thomas on the
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