RELIGION, PEACE AND THE FUTURE OF ETHIOPIA

By Medhane Tadesse

Religion In Ethiopia: A Separate Tradition

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church emerged from the earliest adoption of Christianity
in the African continent south of Egypt in the 4th century AD (Taddasse, 1996:17),
while the first Muslims sought, and received, refuge in the country and Ethiopia
was the first case in Islamic history of foreign relations i.e. the first hegira
(Haggai,2002:23) .Christianity entered Ethiopia via the ruling class, leading to a
close relationship between the state and the church, to the extent that the state was
synonymous with the expansion of Christian religion. Church and state needed
each other, as in European Christianity, enjoying a mutually self-perpetuating
relationship in what could be described as the unity of the cross and the crown. The
Ethiopian emperor was defacto head of the church ( T.Tibebu , 1995:81) though
the formal spiritual head was the abuna.

It is against this context and historical background that the eventual introduction of
Islam and, more recently, the new Christian churches should be seen. As
Trimingham (1952: XIV) put it, in the whole North-East Africa Ethiopia was the
only region where the early spread of Islam met an already established rival in the
presentation of a new religious conception of life. Both the cultural-religious
setting and the physical environment made the encroachment of Islam difficult and
it tended to enter the country not through the Jihad but rather by way of trade and
individual traders, though it did expand considerably in the Abyssinian periphery
under the short lived invasion of Ahmed Gran in the 16th century. So Islam
generally made headway in the periphery and amongst non-Christians. This was
also the case with later Christian denominations. These historical facts help us to
understand why religion, especially in new forms, remains relevant to the politics
of center-periphery relations in Ethiopia. Most writing about centralism and
regionalism, ethnic politics and the so-called national question, relegates religion to
a sideshow, despite the fact that religion has been historically at the centre of
developments, often key to political dynamics and growing tensions between the
centre and the periphery

The Missionary Factor

In considering the introduction and growth of western Christian denominations in
Ethiopia in recent times two of the most significant churches which have taken root
are those of Mekane Yesus and Qala Heywat. The origins of the Mekane Yesus
church lie in the evangelical revival among Orthodox priests and deacons in Eritrea
in the early 1880’s. It grew from local witness, leadership and initiative aided by
Lutheran missionaries from Germany, Sweden and Norway (EIDE,2001: 53; Aren,
1978:13). It expanded to Wellega at the end of the 19th century where it enjoyed
considerable support, and later among the Sidama and Kambatta. This latter phase
coincided with the southern expansion of Menelik, and many local people joined
en masse partly as a reaction against integration into imperial Ethiopia, in the way
that the people of Arsi turned to Islam. Religion was thus not only a matter of faith
but also a source of identity and political weapon in the periphery. It is not
surprising therefore that the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus /
EECMY (as it became known in 1959) was also considered as a mouthpiece of the
periphery. The second church of major significance is Qala Heywat an indigenous
protestant church which emerged in the south during the years of Italian occupation
(Fargher 1996) when the Sudan Interior Mission had withdrawn. This now has a
membership of over 3m.

Protestant and catholic missionaries played an important role in the shaping of

modern Ethiopia, introducing modern notions of education and medicine and even
influenced the course of diplomatic and political events. Regular mission and
literacy schools increased awareness of the life situation of the individual (Eide:64)
and an ability to comprehend more of the exploitative political context of their
lives. In the long run the EECMY’s effort in higher education led to the
development of an elite cadre of students from the periphery, who began to
articulate the national question. The centers of the evangelical church in Eritrea,
Wellega and Adwa, Tigray became the breeding ground for the three major
liberation movements in contemporary Ethiopia. Although such generalization
must be carefully qualified, the evangelical churches have contributed strongly to
the development of the political dynamics and growing tensions between the centre
and the periphery.

Yet at the same time catholic and protestant missions were also part of the
modernization project in conformity with the centre, with a clear socio-economic
impact in education and health services, and were used by Haile Sellasie as part of
nation building while being allowed to operate freely in these areas. Furthermore,
until the emergence of the charismatic movement in the 1960’s evangelical
churches had maintained an indigenous character in terms of culture, orientation
and leadership. Their leaders were Ethiopian and although they saw politics from
the perspectives of the national centre they had a great deal of sympathy with the
periphery. They fought for ethnic equality, social justice, land reform and freedom,

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in most cases favoring the poor. In this sense they belong to the Ethiopian left and
were more progressive than the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. However they were
not centrifugal forces. After an initial period of optimism they were labeled as anti-
unity forces by the Derg and were harshly dealt with. But paradoxically they also
suffered from a confrontation with opposition political forces like Meison and
ECHAAT in the struggle for supremacy over western Ethiopia. Thus, in spite of
their programme of political neutrality, evangelical churches were part and parcel
of the political discourse in centre-periphery relations, hence became part of the
most decisive political process of the nation.

Fundamentalist Drift of Islam and ChristianityIn Ethiopia : Character And Implication

When the Derg came to power in 1974, relations between religious institutions and
the state deteriorated. The initial stage of the revolution was seen as a time of great
reform and a search for social justice. The declaration by the Derg about the
separation of the church and the state as well as the equality of religions was
welcomed by Ethiopian Muslims and western Christian denominations. But before
a year was out, the Derg opted to bring the EOC under its control after purging its
top leadership and a large-scale persecution ensued against the other religious
institutions. However Mengistu’s nationalist project gave him the support of the
EOC since it was closely intertwined with legitimacy and Amhara cultural
supremacy; the idea of unification and national integration also being important to
the EOC.

The socialist rhetoric of the Derg was at loggerheads with the teaching of the
churches, and religious teaching was discouraged. However, the repression of the
evangelical churches could also be interpreted within the traditional contradictions
between the centre and periphery, more specifically in terms of the struggle for
control of the local base in the periphery. In line with Ethiopian leaders throughout
history, the repression applied by the Derg was political rather than religious in
nature, yet paradoxically it contributed to religious revivalism in all denominations,
including, albeit to a lesser extent, the Ethiopian Orthodox church. Repression, war
and famine, poverty, Christian and Islamic humanitarianism, migration to the
Middle East, external foreign influence - all contributed to revivalism and
militancy in the evangelical churches and among Ethiopian Muslims. Religious
militancy also owes much to the particular circumstances of foreign influence.

Most of these factors continued after 1991 when the EPRDF led government came
to power. The EPRDF granted unregulated freedom of religious activism and this
coupled with heavy involvement of external actors and the continuing widespread

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poverty in the country has dramatically impacted on the religious equilibrium that
had existed for many hundred years. The new Christian Churches and Muslims
were quick to take advantage of the new situation. Thus although the charismatic
movement within the EECMY goes back to the 1963 annual Awassa conference of
the Swedish Pentecostal Church or the Swedish Philadelphia Mission (Yosef;
1976:16), the charismatic or Pentecostal movement of today is a global
phenomenon which, aided by continent wide organization, finance and strategy, is
making considerable headway across the continent.

The same may be said of the recent Muslim revivalism in Ethiopia, where, for
example, the non-African revivalist movement that has recently had major impact
on Islam in Ethiopia is the puritanical reformist movement Wahhabi, originating
in 18th century Arabia, and dominant in Saudi Arabia today, and led by militants
seeking to return to original Islamic sources for inspiration. The arrival of Austaz
M.Uusman from Pakistan via Saudi Arabia and Hassan from Saudi Arabia in 1991
heralded the beginning of well-organized Wahhabi movement in Wollo
( Kelkilacew: 1997 ,93 ). Reportedly two militant Islamic groups, Wahhabi and
Jam’at Takfir (in competition with each other) have recently been active in the
country with a focus to control Mosques and structures of the Islamic Supreme
council, and particularly to target youth. They don’t recognize the Ethiopian
government and call for shari’a law to be implemented. Some reports, though
difficult to verify, claim that extremists already control more than half the mosques
in Wollo and Jimma. Others such as Al-ittihad and a new radical Islamic group
known as Nusrallah (an offshoot of the defunct IFLO) are engaged in violent
armed struggle against the Ethiopian state. In these ways, poverty at home and
financial and organizational support from abroad is dramatically influencing the
nature of political Islam in Ethiopia.

Also influencing the entire Horn is the Islamic militancy of the Sunni Islamism of
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its variants in Sudan. Common to both is a
propensity for violence, which has led its proponents and their opponents into an
intractable logic of conflict. Both variants have succeeded in creating followers in
Ethiopia initially mainly through Islamic humanitarianism, philanthropic
organization, Islamic scholarships and Ethiopian migrant labor to the Middle East.
The Saudi embassy in Addis Ababa and the International Islamic Relief
Organization have played a key role, although the use of humanitarian aid,
especially in medical treatment, as a vehicle for religious conversion is as old, of
course, as the earliest Christian missions to Africa, and most recently in US
evangelical involvement in food aid. The Islamist government in Khartoum and
extremist organizations in Somalia has also tried to export political Islam through
the western and eastern parts of Ethiopia respectively.

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church

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Having been weakened economically by the Derg and being organizationally
sluggish, the EOC has been slow to cope with the challenges. Lack of vision and
leadership is also part of the problem. Orthodox Christians also do their teaching
more in a passive capacity as committed individual believers in contrast to the paid
agents of the other national and international church organizations in the country.
There is thus a marked contrast in the modus operandi between the EOC on the one
hand and the charismatic movement and radical Islam on the other. The latter have
all shown a capacity for mobilization, discipline, patience , flexibility, and social
engagement that has consistently outmaneuvered the EOC. In fact the EOC has
become an easy prey and a soft target for other religious institutions as each is in
competition to secure as many members of the EOC as possible to their churches.

The EOC opposes what it calls the unnecessary project of evangelizing the
evangelized which was a key factor in the tensions between missions and the EOC
for many years. According to Tadesse Tamrat (p.28) the clear basis for the
permission given by the Ethiopian Christian rulers to the missionaries to operate in
their domains was always the understanding that they convert only non-Christian
subjects of the periphery. Also the long history of relative religious tolerance in
Ethiopia was the feeling on the part of the EOC that its dominant position was not
in any way challenged, hence it was usually willing to tolerate other religions. That
equilibrium is under attack and the EOC is now worried about losing members to
missionary churches. Both revivalism and freedom of movement and other
structural, financial and organizational advantages have enabled the other churches
to focus on the centre and to target followers of the EOC. The realization on the
part of the EOC that missionaries had only come to take away its adherents with
financial support, offers of health care, education and many other ‘modern’
attractions has irritated its leadership and its followers. The long held belief that the
missionaries came to Ethiopia principally to destroy their church has an
increasingly large following and there is an argument that if the EOC is to survive
then only it should prevail. Such a view, if correct, implies the strong possibility of
future violent confrontation and conflict. The chronic problem of denying burial
grounds to the pentecoste and violent confrontation during religious holidays
between the EOC and the Pentecoste in recent years should be taken as early
warning of an imminent problem.

Foreign Influence, Regionalism and Class Composition

Revivalism seems to have brought changes in the character, orientation and

leadership of the religious institutions in question. For some it is worrying that
foreign involvement is at its highest level. Externally supported new forces

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increasingly challenge traditional indigenous leadership both in Islam and the
Evangelical churches with a potential detriment to peace and stability that could
stand in the way of national interest. It seems clear that both radical Islam and
Christian right are forces that in their ideological form will generally be
antipathetic to a secular Ethiopian state. Their theorization is also marked by
stereotypes, often derogatory, about Ethiopian cultures and traditions. What are the
implications of these given the need to create national consensus and a unity of
purpose among Ethiopians to face future challenges? This development suggests a
longer-range trend toward increased polarization of differences on Ethiopian unity
and independence.

Moreover, ongoing dynamics of religious organizations could influence the future

course of centre-periphery relations, where religion is intimately linked to socio-
political conditions; the analysis of religious life has to attend to social structures,
identity groups and cleavages and to the ways in which religious systems are
engaged in sustaining hegemony or rebellion. Ethnic federalism has also
decentralized religion at operational level. Unregulated freedom at national level
has provided regional authorities the freedom to support the expansion of those
faiths to which they subscribe. This coupled with the historical dominance of
Islam and new Christian denominations in the periphery could be used for pushing
exclusivist ethno-political agendas with the danger of a Nigerian type of Christian-
Islam polarization emerging.

The change in religious equilibrium will thus affect centre-periphery relations, the
politics of ethnicity and the future location of political power. When coupled with
the changing class nature of different denominations this will impact on the nature
of political power in Ethiopia. Elsewhere, religious institutions have been
prominent in the political movements of a great many countries - notably, Brazil,
Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, South Korea, Poland, Haiti, South
Africa and most recently certain evangelical churches in neighboring Kenya- to
oppose, denounce, frustrate and remove unpopular regimes. It would be naïve to
underestimate the capacity of the protestant movements currently engulfing
Oromiya and the Southern region, to influence the politics of the country at
national level.

Moreover, most expressions of world religions tend to be identified with particular

interest groups and social classes, either in their origins (whether ethnic, regional or
occupational) or as adopted vehicles for promotion of a particular ideology or
world view. Given that some religious denominations are highly active in
recruiting the educated and the middle class it is timely to ask how the change in
religious equilibrium and demography in Ethiopia will affect the balance of
political forces in the country, given also the changing nature of power in the 21st
century, which is increasingly based on knowledge, big business, media, civil

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society and networks of influence. The changing nature of power will also change
the nature of conflict to assume hegemony. As such those churches which appeal
to the elite will be used as networks of contacts and as channels to advance their
own and their class self-interest, giving them the opportunity to play an important
political role in the same way that business people develop contacts with political
elites for mutual benefit. The churches then provide an arena in which political,
business and civil society elites may congregate to their mutual and
interchangeable advantage. In these ways religious institutions are in the process of
developing a hegemonial coalition with secular political leaders aimed at
maintaining order and the continuation of elite control.

Conclusion

A full study of religious conflict and its relationship with politics and peace in
Ethiopia is beyond the scope of this briefing paper which aims to reflect on the
mutations in the major faiths in Ethiopia, on how they continue to appeal to the
mass of the people (especially the young and marginalized), and on the change in
religious equilibrium and its impact on peace and a culture of tolerance, together
with its possible translation into political agendas. Apart from a general admonition
to be ever aware of the ambitions of the Christian right and of Islamist objectives,
there may seem to be little of a direct nature that the government can do to arrest
the immediate trend or change the situation, other than vehemently protect the
secularity of the State as defined in the Constitution. For the author of this Briefing
a number of other possibilities suggest themselves:

1. Indigenous Islam and the early activities of the Ethiopian Evangelical

Church were not directed against the Ethiopian state. Indeed although
excluded from national life indigenous Muslims have generally been
unwilling to collaborate with external aggressive forces, and have
been no less loyal or patriotic than Christians. Contemporary
religious militancy should be seen as a wholly new phenomenon and
a threat to peace, stability and independence of the country. It is
externally energized and directed and there is a need to maintain the
Ethiopianization of leadership, resources and religious content. We
should also be consistently reminded that the new trend does not
equate to Islam or western Christianity in their broader, cultural
senses.

2. Religious equilibrium is in danger of collapsing very quickly.

Whether it is ageing and frustrating or being more utopian than
practical, the EOC still commands a sizable and very influential
section of the Ethiopian society which could lead to a fatal collision

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 with the other religions. Ethiopian ‘age old’ conservatism, to which
the EOC has undoubtedly contributed, is not easily reconciled with
sudden religious shocks, hence the high risk uncertainties of the
future. Support for capacity building and internal reform in the EOC,
would help to ameliorate these impacts.

3. Forming an ecumenical forum for churches in Ethiopia would help in

forestalling conflict. A National Council of Religions could serve as a
forum for discussion, conflict resolution and joint action on burning
national issues. There is a precedent in the Joint Relief Partnership of
1984 in which the EOC, EECMY and the Ethiopian Catholic Church
Jointly engaged in humanitarian assistance in drought-stricken areas
of Northern Ethiopia.

4. Debate is required on whether, or how, religious freedom should be

regulated (e.g. code of conduct). A critical feature here is properly
interfacing uncontrolled religious freedom with controlled secular
democracy in the country. The media and schools, through civic
education, can play a pivotal role in disseminating a culture of
tolerance and boldly serve as a forum for inter-religious dialogue.
The most serious challenges to religious toleration and diversity
usually come from exclusivist truth claims. Government should take
such issue in to account when preparing books and materials for
religious education.

5. Efforts should be made to bridge the gap between the promise of ethnic
federalism and the practical benefits so far delivered. Religion does
not create the grievance or the ambition; it helps express it. Genuine
democratization, can help to limit the conditions that produce radical
and hostile action, but in parallel to this Pan-Ethiopian institutions
should also be encouraged as vehicles by which fundamentalism may
be moderated.

Of great consideration is the widespread poverty which lies at the heart of

militancy, the rapid change in religious equilibrium and the growing influence of
religion stimulated by the economic weakness of the state, and the apparent
bankruptcy of secular ideologies. The post-colonial African state (including the
Ethiopian state) is widely seen as having failed to provide the basic social services
in terms of education, health, security and economic freedoms. But the crisis is not
one of economics only or of security only: it is one of hope, one of soul, one of
believing into a model or shape for the future, and for many this means that the
hour of the miracle worker (religion) has finally come. In Ethiopia the failure of the
statist, socialist and rigorously nationalist ideology of the Derg to cope with the

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problems of modernization created an ideological vacuum that religious institutions
have been competing to occupy, at least in part. This, in many ways is a reaction to
the wider political crisis of the Ethiopian state in which the legitimacy of the
government is being challenged from ethnic, human rights, economic and even
secular ideological fronts.

Religious approaches to intractable social and economic ills are being phrased
anew, something which has largely meant inventing new religious paradigm,
approaches and organizational forms. This explains the recent advances made by
the charismatic protestant and the wahhabi movement in Ethiopia. The one
common element of these apparently disparate phenomena is their attempt to
address what was formerly addressed by politics. They are displacing the state by
deploying large amount of resources, manpower and organizational skill. Whether
it is to dream of a better world or to try to live less poorly in this one, many people
in Ethiopia (as elsewhere when the state fails) have switched their allegiances from
politics to religion. If the Ethiopian state cannot prevail because its economic
policies continue to be poorly financed, directed or implemented then it will have
little in the way of positive change to offer the masses, and substantial numbers,
perhaps the majority, of Ethiopians will continue to depend on religion, but are
likely to become ever more ready to experiment and accept different versions of it.
This has the potential to lead to a very fluid and unsettled domestic political
situation.

Given the widespread rise of new religious movements in the rest of Africa, and
their frequent external financing, the challenge for the State in Ethiopia is to to
learn how to live with this new phenomenon, to be sensitive to its dangers, possibly
deal with some of its grievances, seek to reach accommodation with it while
protecting (up to a point) the interests of long established faith groups, such as the
EOC and mosques. In doing so the objective of the government must be to prevent
civil conflict on the back of religious differences, for which in Ethiopia all the
ingredients are present – implying a regulating and mediating role by a
democratically legitimate secular state.

References:

 Ayel T/ haimanot. " The Struggle for the Ethiopianization of the Roman Catholic
Tradition" in the Missionary Factor In Ethiopia. University of Lund, 1996.

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 Aren Gustav. Evangelical Pioneers In Ethiopia.: Origins of the Evangelical Mekane Yesus
Church. Uppsalla University, 1978 Volumes 1 & 2
 Crummey, D. " The Politics of Modernization Protestant and Catholic Missionaries In Modern
Ethiopia", in the Missionary Factor In Ethiopia. University of Lund, 1996.
 Camilla C.T. Gibb. "In the City of Saints : Religion, Politics and Gender in Harrar, Ethiopia."
Ph.D. thesis. University of Oxford, 1997.
 Eide's M. Revolution and Religion In Ethiopia: The growth and persecution of The Mekane
Yesus Church, 1974-85. Oxford: James currey Ltd, 2003.
 Getachew Haile. " The Missionary's Dream: An Ethiopian Perspective On Western Missions In
Ethiopian" In the Missionary Factor In Ethiopia.
 Haggai Erlich. The Cross and The River: Ethiopia, Egupt and the Nile. London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Inc. 2002.
 Hussien Ahmed. Islam in Nintheenth Century Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform and Reaction.
Brill-Ledien, the Netherlands, 2001.
 Kelkilachew Ali. " Religion, Rituals and Mutual Tolerance In Wollo. The case of Kabe. South
west Wollo ". M.A. thesis in Social Anthropology, A.AU June 1997.
 Kurtz, L. God and the Global Village. ( )
 Merid W/Aregay. " The Legacy of Jesuit Missionary Activities From 1555 to 1632". In The
Missionary Factor in Ethiopia.
 Molvaer. R. Socialization & Social Control In Ethiopia. Wiesvaden. Harrassowitz Verlag 1995.
 Rubenson. Samuel. " The Interaction Between The Missionaries and The Orthodox: The case of
Abune Selama". In the Missionary Factor In Ethiopia.
 Rubenson Seven. " The Missionary Factor In Ethiopia Consequences of a Colonial Context. " In
The Missionary Factor In Ethiopia.
 Tadasse Tamirat. " Evangelizing The Evangelized: The Root problem Between Missions and the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church. " In The Missionary Factor In Ethiopia.
 Teshale Tibebu. The Making of Modern Ethiopia 1896- 1974. The Red Sea Press. Inc. 1995.
 Trimingham J. Spencer. Islam In Ethiopia. Oxford. University Press, 1952.

 Yosef Kidanewold. " The History of The Pentecostal Movement in Addis Ababa, 1963-76" B. A.
thesis in history, A.A.U. August 1976.
* Gerard Prunier. The Far Edge of Religion: Religious and Quasi-Religious Answers to the Crisis of the
State in Eastern Africa. A Private memo.

Some Notes about the Author

Medhane Tadesse is Associate Professor of history and is currently senior SSR Senior Advisor to
the African Union and serves in similar capacities in the Security Sector Transformation in South
Sudan. He has written on various political issues of the Horn on the subject of intra and inter-state

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conflicts. A veteran political analyst in the Horn he has been involved in debates on current
political developments in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Sudan. Better known in Ethiopia and
the Horn for his analysis of contemporary historical developments, regional diplomacy and
conflict resolution, Medhane has produced many articles including several books such as The
Eritrean-Ethiopian War! Retrospect and prospects and recently Al-ittihad: Political Islam
and Black Economy In Somalia.
The Article was published in May 2002

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