Penal Statue
Means Act or Statues which impose fine or punishment or both and also defines the
offence but not exhaustive to these above.
Punishment can be meted out to a person only if the plain words of the penal provision are able to
bring that person under its purview. No extension of meaning of the Word is permissible. A penalty
cannot be imposed on the basis that the object of a statute so desired.
According to Maxwell the strict construction of penal statutes seems to manifest itself in the
following four ways –
1. Requirement of express language for the creation of an offence;
2. Interpreting strictly words setting out the elements of an offence;
3. Requiring the fulfilment to the letter of statutory conditions precedent to the infliction of punishment;
4. Insisting on the strict observance of technical provisions concerning criminal procedure and
jurisdiction.
Example: Black Magic is an offence in Maharashtra but not to any other state.
It must, however, be noted that unless the words of a statute clearly make an act criminal, it
shall not be construed as criminal. If there is any ambiguity in the words which set out the elements
of an act or omission declared to be an offence so that it is doubtful whether the act or omission in
question in the case falls within the statutory words, the ambiguity will be resolved in favour of the
person charged.
The Court will award punishment only when the circumstances of a case unambiguously fall
under the letter of the law. Legislations which deal with the jurisdiction and procedure relating to
imposition of penalties will be strictly construed.
Where certain procedural requirements have been laid down by a statute to be completed in a statute
dealing with punishments the court is duty bound to see that all these requirements have been
complied with before sentencing the accused even up to the extent of acquitting him on some
technical ground. Penal provisions cannot be extended by implication to a particular case or
circumstance. There can be no presumption that a crime has been constructively committed. Penal
statutes generally have a prospective operation.
For Examples:
In Kedar Nath Vs. State of West Bengal. A.I.R.1953 SC 404,
an offence under an Act punishable with imprisonment or fine or both was committed by the
appellant in 1947. The Act was amended and the punishment in the form of fine was enhanced to the
tune of an amount equivalent to the amount procured by the offender through his offence. The
Supreme Court held that this enhanced punishment could not be meted out to the offender in view of
clear provisions of Art. 20 (1) of the Constitution. Expost facto Law: only current prevailing laws
will apply.
In Sarjoo Prasad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1961 SC 631,
the appellant who was an employee in a shop was convicted under the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 for having sold adulterated food. He argued that since he did not know that
the food sold by him was adulterated, he could not be convicted U/S. 16 of the Act because the
enactment being a penal statute had to be strictly interpreted. S. 16 which penalises selling of
adulterated food and S. 19 which says that absence of a guilty knowledge is not a defence were
interpreted by the court. The Supreme Court maintained the conviction and held that a penal
statute has to be interpreted in favour of the subject only if there are two reasonable
constructions possible. In the present case both the provisions are unambiguous and the guilty
conduct falls under the letter of the law. There being no two interpretations possible, the conviction
was good. The two provisions clearly state that knowledge on the part of the seller, whether the
employer or the employee is absolutely immaterial for the purpose of conviction, and therefore, the
appellant's appeal must fail.
In Ratan Lal Vs. State of Punjab A.I.R.1965 SC 444
The accused a sixteen year old boy was convicted for outraging the modesty of a girl aged seven
years after having committed house trespass. The Magistrate awarded him imprisonment for six
months and fine. After this sentence was passed the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 came into
existence. The accused appealed to the Additional Sessions Judge and then to the High Court in
revision without claiming benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act. After the High Court rejected
his revision he pleaded before the Supreme Court benefit of probation as he was below twenty one
years in age. The Supreme Court by a majority held that the benefit of probation could be given
to him.
In Ranjit Vs. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1965 SC 881
The appellant was convicted U/S. 292, Indian Penal Code by the High Court for selling an obscene
book titled Lady Chatterley's Lover' the sale of which was banned by the Government of India. The
accused contended before the Supreme Court that mens rea of the accused has always to be proved to
maintain conviction under criminal law. Since the prosecution failed to discharge the onus his
conviction should be set aside. He further argued that these days there were such a large number of
books in the stalls that it was virtually impossible to know whether any of these contained obscene
matter because the law could not expect that all books kept for sale were to be read by the shopkeeper
first.The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and held that on a plain reading of S. 292 it is clear
that proof of mens rea is not required for conviction under this section. Mere selling or keeping for
sale an obscene literature had been made punishable. Therefore, when there are no two reasonable
interpretations possible there is no question of giving effect to the principle of strict construction. The
appellant is guilty on the basis of a plain reading of the enactment, and therefore, his appeal must not
succeed.
Nirbhaya Rape Case: Because of this Case, Criminal Law Amendment Act 2013 was enacted.
Taxing Statutes
It is to be noted that like penal statutes taxing statutes are to be strictly construed. The logic
behind this principle is that imposition of taxes is also a kind of imposition of penalty
which can only be imposed if the language of the statute clearly says so. A person cannot
be taxed unless the language of the statute unambiguously imposes the obligation without
straining itself. Intention of the legislature to tax must be gathered from the natural meaning
of the words by which it has expressed itself. Any kind of intendment or presumption as to
tax does not exist. Nothing can be drawn by implication. The language must be explicit. If the
person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however, great
the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the crown, seeking
to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free,
however, apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.
In case the words of a taxing statute are clear, effect must be given to them irrespective of the
consequences. Statutes imposing pecuniary burden is desired to be imposed. Whether a
particular conclusion is desirable or not cannot be the guiding factor in reaching a decision
while construing a taxing statute. Neither can be language of a taxing legislation be so
stretched as to do favour to the State nor can it be so narrowed as to benefit the person sought
to be taxed. For Examples –
In Union of India Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, A.I.R. 1956 SC 202,
certain goods were sold in the Ministry of Industry and Supplies, Government of India. The
question was whether these were exempt from payment of sales tax U/S. 5 (2) of the Bengal
Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 which exempts from payment of sales tax to the Indian Stores
Department, the Supply Department of the Government of India, and Administration of the
Railway or Water Transport. The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the High Court
in holding that the Ministry of Industry and Supplies to whom the goods were sold was not
the same as the Indian Stores Department or Supply Department of Government of India who
were exempted from payment of sales tax. It was observed that S. 5 (2) of the Act named the
two Departments unambiguously sales to whom were not subject to payment of sales tax.
Since the Department to whom the goods were actually sold does not figure in the section, no
benefit on such a transaction could be given. There is no room for extension or analogy. If the
legislature intended to give the same facility to sale of goods to other Department also, it
could have done so by merely naming those Departments in the section.
In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Vegetable Products Limited, AIR. 1973 SC 927,
the respondent company submitted its return of income after a notice for doing so was served
on him under the Income Tax Act, 1922. It paid the amount as per the provisional assessment
made U/S. 23-B. In the meantime the new Income Tax Act, 1961 was enacted and the tax due
along with the penalty to be paid was determined under the new Act. The Tribunal and the
High Court, held that penalty U/S. 271 (1) (a) (i) was to be imposed on the assesse and the
amount already paid under the provisional assessment shall be subtracted. The Supreme
Court while dismissing the appeal held that S. 271(1) (a) (i) of the new Act could be
reasonably construed in two ways. In such a situation it was obligatory on the court to accept
that interpretation under the principle of strict construction for taxing statutes which favours
the assesse. If the result of such a construction was not very conducive to the State, the
remedy is with the legislature and not with the court.
In Sevanti lal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, A.I.R. 1968 SC 697, the
appellant gifted some shares to his wife who sold them He argued that these capital gains
could not be included in his income U/s. 16 (3) (a) (ii) of the income Tax Act, 1922 on
the ground that when this provision was added to the Act in 1937 by an amendment, the
expression income did not include capital gains. The concept of capital gains was
included in the expression income only in 1947 by an amendment in the form of S. 2 (6c)
of the Act in 1947. Once a form is amended, the amended form takes the place of the old
form. Consequently, there is only one natural meaning of the word income and that is that
it includes capital gains. Since there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the word income
used In the statute, the appellant has no option but to pay taxes as per the law.In the
absence of any ambiguity, therefore, there is no question of interpreting the word income
strictly in his favour.
Prospective Operations of Statutes Introduction
There is a legal maxim; Ex post Facto Law – Article 20(1)‘A new law ought to be
prospective, not retrospective in its operations.’ Ordinarily, a legislature has power to make
retrospective laws, but Art.20 of the Indian Constitution, 1950 provides certain safeguards to
the persons accused of crime and so Art. 20(1) of the Indian constitution imposes a limitation
on the law making power of the constitution. It prohibits the legislature to make retrospective
criminal laws however it does not prohibit a civil liability retrospectively i.e. with effect
from a past date. So a tax can be imposed retrospectively. Clause (1) of the Article 20 of the
Indian Constitution guarantees rights against ex-post facto laws. It provides that “ no person
shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the
commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that
which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offence.”
Prospective Operation of Statutes
The dictionary meaning of the word prospective with reference to statutes shows that it is
concerned with or applying the laws in future or at least from the date of commencement of
the statute. It is to be noted that the Doctrine of Prospective overruling is evolved by the
Supreme Court for the first time in India in I.C. Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1967
SC 1643. In this case Supreme Court held that the Parliament had no power to amend the
fundamental rights. Chief Justice Subba Rao posed the questions as to when Parliament could
not affect fundamental rights by enacting a bill under its ordinary legislative process even
unanimously, how could it then abrogate a fundamental right with only a two third majority
and while amendment of less significant Articles of the Constitution require ratification by a
majority of States of the Union, how could a fundamental right be amended without this
requirement being fulfilled. CJ Subba Rao raises a question of as how ordinary legislative
bill can amend the fundamental right where as for any other constitutional provision to be
amended, we have to pass constitutional amendment bill under article 360A. It was held by
the supreme court, no ordinary legislative bill can amend fundamental right with 2/3
majority and to amend fundamental right, a constitutional amendment should be passed and
all the requirements of majority should be fulfilled, only then amendment can be done
The learned judge was of the view that the word 'law' mentioned in Art 13 (2) means both
ordinary law as well as constitutional law. Consequently, the state was not empowered to
make any constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges fundamental right as 'law'
includes 'amendment' as well. Thus, while holding that the Parliament was not
empowered to amend fundamental rights, the five learned judges jointly declared that
the principle would operate only in future and it had no retrospective effect. Therefore,
the name 'prospective overruling'. The effect of the decision was that all amendments made
with respect to the fundamental rights till the day of the decision in the case would continue
to remain valid and effective, and after that date the Parliament would have no power to
amend any of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution.
Reasons for the Evolution of the doctrine
There appears to be at least following two reasons for the birth of the principle of prospective
overruling, in India:
a) The power of Parliament to amend the fundamental rights, and the First and the
Seventeenth Amendments specifically, had been upheld previously by the Supreme Court in
Shankari Prasad Vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1951 SC 458, and Sajjan Singh Vs. State of
Rajasthan, AIR. 1965 SC 845.
b) During 1950 to 1967, a large body of legislation had been enacted bringing about an
agrarian (agriculture) revolution in India.
INTERPRETATION OF BENEFICIAL STATUTES/WELFARE LEGISLATION
MEANING OF BENEFICIAL STATUTES:
A beneficial statute is a class of statute which seeks to confer benefit on individuals or class
of persons. The established principle in the construction of such statutes is there should not be
any narrow interpretation & hence strict literal interpretation must be avoided. The court
should attempt to be generous towards the persons on whom benefit should be conferred.
When a statute is interpreted liberally to give the widest possible meaning to it, it is called
beneficent construction.
MEANING OF BENEFICENT CONSTRUCTION
Beneficial construction is an interpretation to secure remedy to the victim who is unjustly
denied of relief. The interpretation of a statute should be done in such a way that mischief is
suppressed and remedy is advanced.
Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes. When
there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the meaning which
gives relief and protects the benefits which are purported to be given by the legislation,
should be chosen. This is also known as purposive interpretation.
INTERPRETATION OF BENEFICIAL STATUTES
• A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the
legislative intent. Although beneficial legislation do receive liberal interpretation, the courts
try to remain within the scheme and not extend the benefit to those not covered by the
scheme. It is also true that once the provision envisages the conferment of benefit limited in
point of time and subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, their non-compliance will
have the effect of nullifying the benefit. There should be due stress and emphasis to Directive
Principles of State Policy and any international convention on the subject.
• It must be remembered that though beneficent/purposive construction aims at enlarging the
scope of the benefits and the classes of the beneficiaries, the rule of interpretation can only be
resorted to without doing any violence to the language of the statute. The liberal construction
can only flow from the language of the act and there cannot be placing of unnatural
interpretation on the words contained in the enactment.
• Also, in some cases, the courts have opined that beneficial construction does not permit
raising of any presumption that protection of widest amplitude must be deemed to have been
conferred on those for whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted.
CASE LAWS
There are different kinds of legislations which receive beneficent construction. Laws which
are enacted with the object of promoting general welfare and facing urgent social demands
receive beneficial legislations. Examples of statutes include The Factories Act, Industrial
Disputes Act, Employees State Insurance Act, Manual Scavengers Rehabilitation Act and
more recently, the Protection of Rights of Transgender Persons Act, 2019. In case of
legislations which may have two different interpretations, the legislation which favours the
class of persons for which it is purported should be preferred.
In the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd v Ashok Vishnu Kate, the court held that during
interpreting social welfare legislation, a construction should be placed on the relevant
provision which furthers the purpose for which such legislation was enacted.
Socio-economic legislation which is aimed at social or economic policy changes, the
interpretation should not be narrow. Justice Krishna Iyer in a case relating to agrarian reforms
observed that “the judiciary is not a mere umpire but also an active catalyst in the
constitutional scheme”. In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal, the Supreme Court said that
a welfare legislation must be interpreted in a third World perspective favouring the weaker
and poor class. It has also been laid down in the case of labour legislation that courts should
not stick to grammatical constructions but also have regard to ‘teleological purpose and
protective intendment’ of the legislation.
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is one of welfare statute which intends to bring about peace and
harmony between management and labour in an industry and improve the service conditions
of industrial workers which in will turn accelerate productive activity of the country resulting
in its prosperity. As a result the prosperity of the country in turn will help to improve the
conditions of the workmen. Therefore this statute should be interpreted in such a way that it
advances the object and the purpose of the legislation and gives it a full meaning and effect
so that the ultimate social objective is achieved. The courts while interpreting labour laws
have always stressed on the doctrine of social justice as enshrined in the Preamble of
Constitution
.
In the landmark case of B Shah v Presiding Officer, Labour Court, court applied beneficent
rule of construction in construing section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, which makes
the employer liable to pay maternity benefit to woman worker at the rate of average daily
wage for the period of her actual absence immediately preceding and including the day of her
delivery and for six weeks immediately following that day. The court held that Sundays must
also be included and held that the Act was intended not only to subsist but also make up for
her dissipated energy and take care of child. The Act was read in the light of Article 42.
One of the leading examples of liberal construction is in the interpretation of Section 123 of
Railways Act 1989 which defined ‘untoward accident’ to include ‘accidental falling of a
passenger from a train carrying passengers’. The question in contention before the court was
whether ‘untoward accident’ will cover the instance of a passenger who fell down and died
while trying to board the train. In deciding the case, the court said that there are couple of
interpretations of ‘accidental falling’; first one being that it only applies when a person is
inside the train while second includes a situation where person is trying to board a train and
falls down. The relevant provision was deemed as a beneficial piece of legislation and hence
received liberal and wide interpretation and hence the definition was expanded to include a
passenger who fell off the train in the process of boarding it.
The effect of a beneficial legislation should not be construed to be defeated by
subsequent legislation except through a clear provision. The rights of minor children to
get maintenance from their father as provided in Section 127 of CrPC was construed
not to have been taken away in respect of Muslims by the Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 section 3(b) which enabled a Muslim woman to claim
maintenance for the minor children upto the age of two years only from her former
husband. It was held by the court that the right of children to claim maintenance under
CrPC was independent of right of divorced mother to claim maintenance for the infant
children and former is not affected by 1986 Act.
