10TH SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

10TH SCHOOL OF LAW, CHRIST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF VIKAS

SPECTOR DONNA ORGANISATION…………………………………………………. APPELLANT I

MR. CHIDDU………………………………………………………………….………………… APPELLANT II

MR. NESAMANI……………………………………………………………………….……… APPELLANT III

V.

HEARD ALONG WITH PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (P.I.L) NO. …./2019

GOVT. OF VIKAS ………………………………………………………………………….………RESPONDENT I

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TABLE OF CONTENT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................................. 3

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED........................................................................................................................ 13
1) WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED AGAINST THE GOVT. OF

VIKAS IS MAINTAINABLE. ............................................................................................................ 13

2) WHETHER THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION)

ACT, 1967, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION AMENDMENT ACT, 2019

VIOLATES ARICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS. ..................................... 14

2.1 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 14? ........... 14
2.2 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 21. ............. 18
3. WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE POWERS GRANTED TO NATIONAL INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) AMENDMENT ACT,

2019 VIOLATES THE QUASI-FEDERAL NATURE OF VIKAS ENSHRINED UNDER THE

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS. ........................................................ 22

4. WHETHER THE SECTION 69 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (PROCEDURE AND SAFEGUARD FOR INTERCEPTION,

MONITORING AND DECRYPTION OF INFORMATION) RULES, 2009 AND THE

IMPUNGED NOTIFIACTION ISSUED BY THR CENTRAL GOVT. UNDER THE

AFORESAID LAW VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION. ..................... 25

4.1. Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 violates Article 14. .............................................................................................................. 25
4.2. Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 violates Article 21. ..................................................................................................................... 28

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONER HAS FILED THIS PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 32 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS FOR THE VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENUMERATED IN
PART III OF CONSTITUTION. THE RESPONDENT MAINTAINS THAT NO VIOLATION OF RIGHTS
HAS TAKEN PLACE. THEREFORE, THE HON’BLE COURT NEED NOT ENERTAIN ITS
JURISDICTION IN THIS PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION.

1 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part:

(a) The right to move the supreme court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is
guaranteed
(b) The supreme court shall have power to issue directions or order or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate for the enforcements of any of the
rights conferred by this part.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ORGANISATION ORG.
GOVERNMENT GOVT.
HONOURABLE HON’BLE
SECTION SEC
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT ITACT
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION PIL
CHIEF MINISTER CM
INFORMATION INFO.
DEPARTMENT DEPT.
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT UAPA
VIKANIAN PENAL CODE VPC
ATTORNEY GENERAL AG

ORS. OTHERS
AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
SC SUPREME COURT
SCJ SUPREME COURT JOURNAL
MANU MANUPATRA

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SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The republic of Vikas also referred as VIKAS, has achieved all round socio-economic progress during the last
72 years of its independence from the Kingdom of Mahishmati. Vikas has become self-sufficient and
prosperous in all fields. Constitution of Vikas is sovereign because it is created by the constituent assembly
and adopted by its people and Preamble.
2. Vikas has been the the consistent militant targets, seven bombs were planted by terrorist in hotels and railway
stations of Chumban which killed more than 200 people that got global attention. However, November 2008
attacks brought into clear focus on the inability of Vikanian security to anticipate terrorist attacks. Govt.
responses to the Chumban attacks were comprehensive failure of Vikas security establishment as per the
analyst. Politician of Vikas focuses on Imaginistan which gave a home to militants and terrorist org. And it
clearly shows that Vikas needs proper domestic counter terrorism infrastructure. In 2014 Sher Singh came into
power and became prime minister. Govts. Anti-terror policies saw a steep reduction in terror activities, in
2018 two attacks on military jawans of Vikas by militants resulted in retaliation and wiped out camp bases by
by surgical insurgency.
3. Current scheme of law proved to be inefficient since, only org. could be designated as terrorist. As a result of
which home minister, Govt. of Vikas on 3rd June 2019 amended the anti terror law ( Unlawful Activities
Prevention Act,1967) ;
(a) to empower central govt. to designate individual as terrorist .
(b) Providing national investigation agency (herein after referred as NIA for the sake of brevity) to
investigate and seize property with mere permission of DG NIA

4. Manju kumar Home Minister of Vikas advocated to pass the bill which was to facilitate speedy investigation
and prosecution of terror offences and designating any individual as terrorist after following the due process
of law. However this new law was opposed by CM’s of seven states as they refused to attend NATIONAL
POLICY COMMISSION (herein after referred as NPC for the sake of brevity) that was scheduled on 5th
june’19.
5. Media reports stated that there was server intrusion in primary database of Reserve Bank Of Vikas,
intelligence report said that there could be involvement of terrorist groups in conspiracy with the individual.
Govt sensed that cyber terrorism could be used as a tool to conduct attacks against computers and information
networks, this attacks could also result in violence against person or cause public unrest. It is also noted fact
that terrorist tend to use internet to prepare plans, recruit terrorist, raise funds and cyber terrorism.
6. Thus to counter cyber terrorism govt. amended section 66f of information technology act (herein after
referred as IT Act 2000 for the sake of brevity) and issued notification under sec 69 of IT Act 2000

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empowering investigating agency to intercept, monitor and decrypt any info shared in computers under sec 69
of IT Act 2000.
7. Taking this issue as a matter of concern an NGO named Spector Donna Org. filed a PIL challenging the
notification. Org also attached RTI reply from Govt.
8. In this chain of event on 7th july’19 custom dept. of vikas received info. about smuggling of counterfeit
currency worth 10 lakh by a passenger named Mr. Nesamani from El dorado, then officials initiated action by
tapping his mobile phone and taking it under surveillance. During investigation Mr. Nesamani admitted to be
indulged in some serious offences against Vikas

9. Based on the given info. Custom dept. lodged a F.I.R. Then after central govt. referred this case to NIA for
investigation and to expose racket of counterfeit currency market and allied activities in Vikas on 10th july’19.
The NIA registered a case against him as RC/07/2019/ONG/MR under sec. 489B, 489C on Vikanian penal
code 1860, and sec 16 &18 of UAPA 1967. Then the NIA produced accused before the special judge.

10. Then after NIA cyber cell team sought permission from the competent authority to proceed upon approval.
NIA began to intercept and decrypt relevant info. From the target computer source and many info. That helped
the investigating agency was retrieved on 11th july’19.
11. On obtaining incriminatory evidence NIA initiated action against Mr. Chiddu in Dhanjan. Upon arrest NIA
official drew MoA of arrest in accordance with the procedure making a seizure of some objectional devices
and documents in various languages.
12. NIA officials added Mr. Chiddu to the same registered F.I.R and tried him under several sections of VPC,
1860. And UAPA 1967. Thus the govt. of Vikas issued a notification adding the names of accused in the 4th
schedule of UAPA,1967 as amended in 2019 as “terrorist”.
13. Then after NIA officials filed charge sheet against both the accused and presented them before the special
NIA Court on 25th july’19.
14. Then after the accused challenged the constitutionality of UAPA,2019 in high court of Dhanjan.
15. Upon an application made by the A.G of Vikas in PIL filed by org. in re the same substantial question of law
before the hon’ble high court of Dhanjan. The hon’ble supreme court transferred the case from High court and
clubbed the same with the PIL.
16. The hon’ble Chief Justice constituted an 11 judge bench to adjudicate the matter and to reconsider the
reasonable restriction available to Right to Privacy and the aforementioned issues, and thereby served notice
to central Govt. informing accordingly.
17. Further the Central Govt. filed statement of objection to the combined petition on 1st September 2019
18. The registrar of Supreme court has listed the matter before the constitutional bench of supreme court at 11:30
AM on 15th September for final argument

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED AGAINST THE GOVT. OF

VIKAS IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION)

ACT, 1967, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION AMENDMENT ACT,

2019 VIOLATES ARICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS?

2.1 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 14?
2.2 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 21.?

3. WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE POWERS GRANTED TO NATIONAL INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) AMENDMENT ACT,

2019 VIOLATES THE QUASI-FEDERAL NATURE OF VIKAS ENSHRINED UNDER THE

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS?

4. WHETHER THE SECTION 69 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (PROCEDURE AND SAFEGUARD FOR INTERCEPTION,

MONITORING AND DECRYPTION OF INFORMATION) RULES, 2009 AND THE

IMPUNGED NOTIFIACTION ISSUED BY THR CENTRAL GOVT. UNDER THE

AFORESAID LAW VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.?

4.1 Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 violates Article 14.?
4.2 Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act,
2000 violates Article 21.?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED AGAINST THE GOVT. OF

VIKAS IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the PIL filed by the petitioners under Art. 32 of
the Constitution is not maintainable and it should be dismissed. The respondents contend that there has
been no violation of fundamental rights and no gross injustice in the present case. A petition can be
filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution only when the fundamental right is violated. Thus, the PIL is not
maintainable.

2. WHETHER THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES

(PREVENTION) ACT, 1967, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION
AMENDMENT ACT, 2019 VIOLATES ARICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
VIKAS.

In the present case, the impugned provisions are not of wanton abuse and power conferred cannot be
held to be bad since there are ample safeguards. The principle of possible abuse of power is not
applicable since the power as conferred is not vague. Exercise of power by the authorised persons is
permissible if it is necessary to maintain public order, and not merely law and order and when the
incidence of crime and prohibited acts goes beyond the limits. The primary objective of the amendment
is to protect the integrity of our democratic institution and promote a peaceful global environment as
defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal
government. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the amendments to the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 vide the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act,
2019 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Vikas.

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3. WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE POWERS GRANTED TO NATIONAL INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) AMENDMENT ACT,

2019 VIOLATES THE QUASI-FEDERAL NATURE OF VIKAS ENSHRINED UNDER THE

BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS?

India as a wounded tiger should evolve equally improved strategies to combat and counter

frontier terrorism in particular adopting global counter terrorism strategies, and the ways and

means to adopt and execute these strategies to eradicate its prolonged problem of frontier-

terrorism in all its forms. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the

amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 vide the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 does not violate the quasi federal nature of Vikas enshrined

under the basic structure of the Constitution of Vikas.

4. WHETHER THE SECTION 69 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (PROCEDURE AND SAFEGUARD FOR INTERCEPTION,

MONITORING AND DECRYPTION OF INFORMATION) RULES, 2009 AND THE

IMPUNGED NOTIFIACTION ISSUED BY THR CENTRAL GOVT. UNDER THE

AFORESAID LAW VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.?

In the present case, the notification made under Section 69 of the IT Act, 2000 (Procedure and

Safeguard for Interception, Monitoring ad Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 is not arbitrary

and lays down proper guidelines, norms and principles for the exercise of power. Also, it is in the

interest of the public safety, and it is considered necessary to do so, in addition to interest of the

Sovereignty and integrity of the country; the security of the State; and for the prevention of

incitement to the commission of an offence. Also, Section 69(2) of the Act lays down procedural

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safeguards subject to which the power is to be exercised. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before

the Hon’ble Court that the Section 69 does not violates Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
1)Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 : (1981) 4 SCC 335 .......................................................................25
2)AK ROY v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710 : (1982) 1 SCC 271 ............................................................................................19
3)Andhra Industrial works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539 .............................................................12
4)Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34 .............................................................................................14
5)B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 4 MLJ 181 (SC) : 2010 (5) SCALE 134 : (2010) 6 SCC 331 ..................................21
6)Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336..................................................................................................23
7)Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 1124 .........................................................................................13
8)Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, 460 : (1983) 2 SCC 442 .................................................23
9)Chinta Lingam v. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 474 : (1970) 3 SCC 768; State (Delhi Adm) v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382
: 1980 (3) SCR 500 ......................................................................................................................................................25
10)Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., AIR 1971 SC 870 ................................................................................................................13
11)Coimbatore Stock Exchange Ltd v. TN electricity Regulatory Commission, (2014) 13 SCC 358 : 2013 (6) SCALE
408 ...............................................................................................................................................................................16
12)Consumer Education and Research Centre and ors. v. Union of India and ors., AIR 1995 SC 922 ..........................26
13)D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 : (1983) 1 SCC 305 ...........................................................................15
14)Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101; Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager
15) U.P. Financial Corpn, AIR 1993 SC 597 ..................................................................................................................26
16)District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496 : AIR 2005 SC 186 .........................................19
17)District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 7 SCC 496 : AIR 2005 SC 186 .........................................24
18)E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 : (1974) 3 SCC 3..............................................................23
19)Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union Of India, AIR 1986 SC 872; Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC
3313 .............................................................................................................................................................................26
20)Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715 ......................................................13
21)Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1994 SC 1844; Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum v. Union of
India, (1996) 5 SCC 647 ..............................................................................................................................................26
22)Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 55, at 58 : (1994) 6 SCC 349 .........................................................15
23)Gopal Das v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 1 ............................................................................................................13
24)Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378 ..........................................................................................27
25)Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378. .........................................................................................27
26)Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789, 793 : (1976) 2 SCC 128 .......................................27
27)Inderjit Barua v. The State of Assam, AIR 1983 Del 513 .............................................................................................20
28)Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, AIR 1968 SC 353 : (1968) 1 SCR 231 .........................................16
29)K Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467 : (2001) 2 SCC 259 ............................14
30)K.S. Puttaswami v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1................................................................................................27
31)Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332 .....................................................26
32)Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1...........................................................................................................21
33)Kuttishankaran Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1965 ker 161 ........................................................................................26
34)Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, 891: (1981) 2 SCC 600. Test for valid classification
restated .........................................................................................................................................................................14
35)M Jagdish Vyas v. Union of India, AIR 2010 SC 1596 (1603) : 2010 AIR SCW 2321 : (2010) 4 SCC 150 ...........16
36)M S Bhut Educational Trust v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 Guj 160; LIC v. Consumer Education and Research
centre, AIR 1955 SC 1811 ...........................................................................................................................................26
37)Magan Bhai v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 400 ........................................................................................................13
38)Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 ...............................................................................................26

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39)MC Mehta v. Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 376 : AIR 2003 SC 3469; Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, 2013 (1)
AII LJ 222 (226) (SC) (Individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high
pedestal which would bring in anarchy or disorder in the society...............................................................................18
40)Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1232 : (1974) 4 SCC 788; Guidelines or principles or norms
for exercise of discretionary power is essential ...........................................................................................................24
41)Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 : (1960) 2 SCR 375 ..................................................................17
42)Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 (456) : AIR 2009 SC 984............................................19
43)Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 ...........................................................................26
44)Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689 .....................................................................................................26
45)PB Desai v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 15 SCC 481 : 2014 (1) SCJ 208 ..............................................................20
46)People’s Union for Civil Liberties(PUCL) v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301 ......................................................28
47)Rajesh Gulati v. Government NCT of Delhi, (2002) 6 SCALE 142 ..........................................................................19
48)Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 .........................................................................15
49)Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : 1950 SCR 594 .................................................................18
50)Sheo Nandan Paswan v State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877, 895 : (1987) 1 SCC 288 ................................................24
51)Shrinivasa Rao v. Veeraiah, AIR 1993 SC 929; RL Bansal v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 978............................................24
52)State of Haryana v. State of Punjab, (2002) 2 SCC 507 : AIR 2002 SC 685 .............................................................21
53)State of Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 68 : (1977) 4 SCC 608 ..................................................................21
54)Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel Corporation Limited, AIR 1987 SC 1064, 1071 : (1984) 3 SCC 369 ..........25
55)Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 : (1982) 1 SCC 31; Gram Saba........................25
56)T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 .............................................................................26
57)UOI v. MV Valliappan, (1999) 6 SCC 259, 269 : AIR 1999 SC 2526 ......................................................................16
58)UP Power Corporation Limited v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139 : AIR 2009 SC 296 ......................16
59)Vikram Cement v. State of MP, (2015) 11 SCC 708 : 2015(4) SCALE 533.............................................................15
60)Western M.P. Electric Power and Supply Company Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others, 1970 AIR 21, 1969 SCR (3)
865 ...............................................................................................................................................................................16
Statutes
1)Article 32(1) when r/w 32(2) itself states that, Article 32 can only be invoked for enforcement of rights as
guaranteed by Part III and for issuing writs to enforce Rights as guaranteed under part III ...................................12
Rules
1)Constitution of Vikas is Pari Materia to the Constitution of India [hereinafter referred as Constitution for the sake of
brevity] .........................................................................................................................................................................12
2)Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part: ........................................................................................... 3
Books
1)M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1170 (8th ed., 2019) .......................................................................................18
2)M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.941 (8th ed., 2019) .........................................................................................23
3)MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1241 (8th ed., 2019) ........................................................................................18
4)MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1252 (8th ed., 2019) ........................................................................................19
5)MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.20 (8th ed., 2019) ............................................................................................20

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED AGAINST THE GOVT. OF
VIKAS IS MAINTAINABLE.

1. A Public Interest Litigation can be filed under Article 32 of the Constitution2 for the
enforcement of Fundamental Rights 3, as guaranteed by part III of the Constitution. 4

2. The petitioner lacks the essential ingredients to maintain the matter before the hon’ble Court.
Though the hon’ble Court has clubbed the matters, yet certain issues regarding maintainability
of the case must be highlighted before this Court to prevent any miscarriage of justice.

3. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 can be invoked only when Fundamental
Right has been infringed 5. No question other than relating to a Fundamental Rights will be
determined in a proceeding under Article 32 6. Thus, where there is no infringement of
Fundamental Rights or scope for enforcement of any Fundamental Right, the writ petition is
not maintainable on the fragile ground 7. In the present case, there has been no violation of the
fundamental rights since, the action taken by the Govt. was in furtherance of National security
and thus cannot be termed as arbitrary or as one which was without the application of the mind.
4. Moreover, infringement of Fundamental Right cannot be founded on remote of speculative
grounds8. There is no such action which infringes or poses a threat to Fundamental Right of the
citizens. Mere apprehension that the petitioner would be deprived of his Fundamental Right is
not enough to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 32 9.

5. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the present case is not
maintainable and it should be dismissed.

2 Constitution of Vikas is Pari Materia to the Constitution of India [hereinafter referred as Constitution for the sake of brevity]
3 Article 32(1) when r/w 32(2) itself states that, Article 32 can only be invoked for enforcement of rights as guaranteed by Part III
and for issuing writs to enforce Rights as guaranteed under part III.
4
Andhra Industrial works v. Chief Controller of Imports, AIR 1974 SC 1539.
5 Gopal Das v. Union of India, AIR 1955 SC 1.
6 Coffee Bd. v. Joint C.T.O., AIR 1971 SC 870.
7 Federation of Bar Association in Karnataka v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 715
8 Baldev Singh Gandhi v. State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 1124.
9 Magan Bhai v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCC 400.

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2. WHETHER THE AMENDMENTS TO THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION)

ACT, 1967, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES PREVENTION AMENDMENT ACT,
2019 VIOLATES ARICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS .

6. It is submitted by the respondents that the amendments to the unlawful activities (Prevention)
Act 1967, vide the unlawful activities (Prevention) Act 2019, does not violate article 14 and 21 of
the constitution of Vikas.

2.1 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 14?

7. Article 14 provides that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

8. The amendments have been made on the basis of reasonable classification. Article 14 forbids
class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable classification of persons, objects and transactions by
the legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. Classification to be reasonable should fulfil
the following two tests:

9. It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based on an intelligible differentia,

some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped together in the
class from others left out of it.

10.The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or reasonable nexus
with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.10

11. It is abundantly clear that Fundamental rights enshrined in part III of the Constitution are neither
absolute nor unlimited but are subject to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the state in
public interest under clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19. As to what are reasonable restrictions would naturally
depend on the nature and circumstances of the case, the character of the statute, the object which it
seeks to serve, the existing circumstances, the extent of evil sought to be remedied as also the nature
of restraint or restrictions placed on the rights of the citizens. 11

12. According to Mr. Jain, when legislation is attacked, as being discriminatory, two conditions must
be fulfilled to uphold the legislation namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons that are grouped together from other left out of the group and

10 Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, 891: (1981) 2 SCC 600. Test for valid classification restated.
11 ibid
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(ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation
in question.12

13. Article 14 of the constitution does not insist that the classification should be scientifically perfect
and a court would not interfere unless the alleged classification results in apparent inequality. The
question for determination by court is not whether it has resulted in inequality but whether there is
some difference which bears some just and reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere
difference does not per se amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection
clause.13

14. The SC observed in the case of D.S. Nakara v. Union of India14 that, if the State establishes not
only the rational principle on which classification is founded but correlate if to the objects sought to be
achieved then it satisfies the twin test of reasonable classification. Further in the case of Shri Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.15 the court opined that it is equally well settled
by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law
but also by a law of procedure.

15. In the present case, the primary objective of the amendments is to protect the integrity of our
democratic institutions and promote a peaceful global environment as defending our nation against its
enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal Govt. Without national security, a
nation would easily and quickly be able to be invaded and overcome, leaving the citizens subjugated
to another nation’s rule, which likely would not have their best interests at heart.

16. So, the amendments made is based on intelligible differentia as the persons suspected as terrorist
are the differences made in the society which are capable of being understood and the amendments are
made to protect the integrity of the nation which is the main object sought to be achieved. Hence, both
the test of the reasonable classification has been fulfilled. The legislature is required to deal with diverse
problems arising out of an infinite variety of human relations. It must, therefore, necessarily have the
power of making laws to attain particular objects and, for the purpose, of distinguishing, selecting and
classifying person and things upon which its laws are to operate.

12 Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34.

13 K Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, AIR 2001 SC 467 : (2001) 2 SCC 259.
14 D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 : (1983) 1 SCC 305.
15 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538.

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17. Classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say it must not only be based on
some qualities or characteristics which are found in all persons grouped together and not in others who
are left out, but those qualities and characteristics must have reasonable relation to object of
legislation16.

18. The principle of equality of law thus means not that the same law should apply to everyone but that
a law should deal alike with all in one class; that there should be an equality of treatment under equal
circumstances. It means “that equals should not be treated unlike and unlike should not be treated
alike. Likes should be treated alike”.17

19. In the case of M Jagdish Vyas, the SC observed that, Article 14 thus means that ‘equals should be
treated alike’; it does not mean that ‘unequal ought to be treated equally’.18 Though Article 14
mandates that State shall not discriminate between similarly situated persons, but that does not mean
that all persons should be subjected to similar treatment. 19

20. It is well settled that equals cannot be treated unequally. But it is equally well settled that unequals
cannot be treated equally. Treating of unequals as equals would as well offend the doctrine of equality
enshrined in Articles 14 of the Constitution.20 The SC observed in the case of Western M.P. Electric
Power and Supply Company Ltd that a person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by
law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice
and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
law.21

21. Thus, in the present case, the guarantee of equal protection of law does not mean that identically
the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons in spite of difference in circumstances
or conditions because all are not equal by nature, attainment or circumstances, and, therefore, a
mechanical equality before the law may result in injustice.

16 Vikram Cement v. State of MP, (2015) 11 SCC 708 : 2015(4) SCALE 533.
17 Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 55, at 58 : (1994) 6 SCC 349.
18 M Jagdish Vyas v. Union of India, AIR 2010 SC 1596 (1603) : 2010 AIR SCW 2321 : (2010) 4 SCC 150.
19 Coimbatore Stock Exchange Ltd v. TN electricity Regulatory Commission, (2014) 13 SCC 358 : 2013 (6) SCALE 408.
20 UP Power Corporation Limited v Ayodhya Prasad Mishra, (2008) 10 SCC 139 : AIR 2009 SC 296.
21 Western M.P. Electric Power and Supply Company Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others, 1970 AIR 21, 1969 SCR (3) 865.

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22. The Supreme Court has observed in the case of UOI v. MV Valliappan22 that, it is settled law that
differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational nexus on the basis of which
differentiation has been made with the object sought to be achieved by particular provision, then such
differentiation is not discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the constitution.

23. It is not necessary that for a classification to be valid, its basis must always appear on the face of
the law. To find out the reasons and the justification for the classification, the court may refer to relevant
material, example - objects and reasons appended to a Bill, parliamentary debates, affidavits of the
parties, matters of common knowledge, the background circumstances leading to the passage of the
Act, etc.23

24. In Narendra Kumar and Ors. vs. The Union of India and Ors.24, the Court held that in applying the
test of reasonableness, the Court has to consider the question in the background of the facts and
circumstances under which the order was made, taking into account the nature of the evil that was
sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harm caused to individual citizens by the proposed
remedy, to the beneficial effect reasonably expected to result to the general public.

25. The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be
applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available
to them irrespective of differences or circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.25

26. Hence, in the instant case the person suspected under the procedures established by law under the
circumstances like, if the person commits or participates in acts of terrorism, cyber terrorism, prepares
for terrorism, promotes terrorism or is otherwise involved in terrorism are designated as terrorist under
due process of law as these people are the extremist and does not belongs to normal class of people and
they are those differences in the society which can become anatomy of terror for the nation and these
differences are capable of being understood and hence this menace must be curbed. Thus, the
amendments made to empower government to designate individuals as terrorist under due process of

22 UOI v. MV Valliappan, (1999) 6 SCC 259, 269 : AIR 1999 SC 2526.

23 Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, Bihar University, AIR 1968 SC 353 : (1968) 1 SCR 231.
24 Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 : (1960) 2 SCR 375.
25 In Re: The Special Courts Bill, 1978, AIR 1979 SC 478 : (1979) 1 SCC 380.

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law for the sake of national safety and integrity is the need of the hour and is not violative of Article
14.

27. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the amendments to the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 vide the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019
does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Vikas.

1.2 Whether or not the amendments made has been a violation of Article 21.

28. Article 21 lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except
according to the ‘procedure established by law’. In Olga Tellis 26, the SC has emphasized that the ambit
and sweep of the ‘right to life’ embodied in Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean only
that life cannot be extinguished as taken away but much more than that. In MC Mehta v. Union of
India27, the expression ‘personal liberty’ used in Article 21 has also been given a liberal
interpretation.28

29. Under the 9th entry of the Union list in the Seventh Schedule, Parliament can make laws of
Preventive Detention for reasons connected with Defence, Foreign Affairs, or the security of India:
persons subjected to such detention. And Article 22 of the Indian Constitution lays down proper
guidelines, norms and principles for the exercise of such power.

30. The 3rd entry of the Concurrent list in the Seventh Schedule lays down – Preventive detention for
reasons connected with the security of a State, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of
supplies and services essential to the community; persons subjected to such detention. In Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras29, the Court opined that this entry is complementary to entry 9, List I
dealing with “security of India”. The term ‘security of a State’ includes serious and aggravated forms
of public disorder.

31. Article 22 – Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases – (1) No person who is arrested
shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest
nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest

26 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar,
(2003) 6 SCC 1; Tunilata Mallick v. State of Orissa, 2011 (106) AIC 922 (925) (Ori-DB) : 713 (2012) Cut LT 120; Pratap Kumar
Nayak v. State of Orissa, AIR 2012 Ori 53 (58) (DB).
27 MC Mehta v. Union of India, (2003) 5 SCC 376 : AIR 2003 SC 3469; Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, 2013 (1) AII LJ 222

(226) (SC) (Individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal which would bring in
anarchy or disorder in the society).
28 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1170 (8th ed., 2019).
29 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 : 1950 SCR 594.

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magistrate within a period of twenty four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the
journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in
custody beyond the said period without the authority of magistrate. (3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2)
shall apply – (a) to any person who for the time being is arrested or detained under any law providing
for preventive detention. (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for
preventive detention.

32. Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 lay down a few safeguards, and provide for minimum procedure, which must
be observed in any case of preventive detention. It may be noted that SC has developed certain norms out of
Articles 22(4) to 22(7) with a view to protect the personal liberty of detenu against bureaucratic lethargy,
insensitivity, red tape and routine approach.30

LAWS AUTHORISING PREVENTIVE DETENTION -:

33. There exists a number of Central and State laws authorising preventive detention on various
grounds. Some of these central laws are – (1) National Security Act (NSA) (2) Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA)31

34.The Constitutional validity of NSA came to be considered by the SC in AK Roy v. UOI32, the Court
rejected the contention that preventive detention was basically impermissible under the Constitution.
Under section 3 of the Act, an order of preventive detention can be made if the Government is satisfied
that it is necessary to do so to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of
the Country, the relations of Country with foreign powers, security of country, security of the State,
maintenance of public order, or maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.

35. Hence, the salient feature of NSA is that an order of preventive detention can be made by the
Central or State Government if it is satisfied with respect to any person that it is necessary to do so to
prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with
foreign powers, security of India security of a State, maintenance of public order. These are all the
grounds mentioned in the two legislative entries in Lists I and III.

36. Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must satisfy a triple test (i) it must prescribe
a procedure (ii) the procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the Fundamental Rights

30 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1241 (8th ed., 2019).

31 MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.1252 (8th ed., 2019).
32 AK ROY v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710 : (1982) 1 SCC 271.

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conferred under Article 19 which may be applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable
to be tested with reference to Article 14. 33

37.In the present case, any person suspected to be involved in any unlawful activity can be detained
without trial and conviction by a court, merely on a suspicion in the mind of an executive authority.
Preventive detention is preventive, not punitive in theory. Preventive detention is not to punish an
individual for any wrong done by him, but at curtailing his liberty, with a view to preventing him from
committing certain injuries activities in future. 34 And if a person can be detained, it would be easier to
detain his property. Even certain safeguards are mentioned in the Article 22 of the Constitution for the
detention of any person under the procedures established by law. Hence, it is not arbitrary and can be
done for the sake of defence and security of the nation.

38. Right to fair trial in a criminal prosecution is enshrined in Article 21. Fair investigation and fair
trial are concomitant to preservation of fundamental rights of accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution.35 So, in the present case, The Minister for Home Affairs, Government of Vikas, Mr.
Manju Kumar, advocating for the Amendment, has himself stated that designating an individual as
terrorist, after following the due process of law, is of prime importance to nip terrorism in the bud.

39. Hence, there is no violation of right to life and personal liberty as in the case of PB Desai v. State
of Maharashtra36, the Court opined that the due process of law requires that everyone who is tried
under any law before the court must have some awareness of, or at least a reasonable opportunity to
become aware of their legally owed duty towards its recipient. And in the instant case the individuals
are suspected if the person commits or participates in acts of terrorism, cyber terrorism, prepares for
terrorism, promotes terrorism or is otherwise involved in terrorism and are designated as terrorists on
the basis of fair trial under the due process of law.

40. Exercise of power by the authorised persons is permissible if it is necessary to maintain public
order, and not merely law and order and when the incidence of crime and prohibited acts goes beyond
the limits.37

33 District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496 : AIR 2005 SC 186.
34 Rajesh Gulati v. Government NCT of Delhi, (2002) 6 SCALE 142.
35 Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, (2009) 1 SCC 441 (456) : AIR 2009 SC 984; Amarinder Singh v. Prakash Singh Badal,

(2009) 6 SCC 260 : 2009 7 SCALE 382; G Someshwar Rao v. Samineni N Rao, (2009) 14 SCC 677 : (2009) 10 SCC 268;
Jaydnera Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 7 SCC 104 : (2009) 7 SCALE 757; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008)
16 SCC 417 : (2008) 7 JT 409; Vijay Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2013) 121 AIC 440 (P&H).
36 PB Desai v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 15 SCC 481 : 2014 (1) SCJ 208.
37 Inderjit Barua v. The State of Assam, AIR 1983 Del 513.

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41. Hence, in the present case, the impugned provisions are not of wanton abuse and power conferred
cannot be held to be bad since there are ample safeguards. The principle of possible abuse of power is
not applicable since the power as conferred is not vague.

42. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the amendments to the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 vide the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019
does not violate Article 21 of the Constitution of Vikas.

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3. WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE POWERS GRANTED TO NATIONAL INVESTIGATION

AGENCY, VIDE THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) AMENDMENT ACT,
2019 VIOLATES THE QUASI-FEDERAL NATURE OF VIKAS ENSHRINED UNDER THE
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF VIKAS.

43. India’s constitution is of federal type. It establishes a dual polity, a two- tier governmental system,
with the central government at one level and the state government at the other. The Indian federal
scheme while incorporating the advantages of a federal structure yet seeks to mitigate some of its usual
weakness of rigidity and legalism.38

44. In a case hon’ble supreme court opined that “We have accordingly come to the conclusion – a
conclusion which was also reached by the Union Constitution Committee – that the soundest
framework of our constitution is a federation with a strong centre.” Indian constitution has adopted a
semi-federal system of government, all the essential powers, both legislative and executive have been
conferred upon the central government.39

45. Within a federal framework the Indian constitution provides for a good deal of centralisation. The
central government has a large sphere of action and thus plays a more dominant role than the states.
There is a long concurrent list containing subjects of common interests to both the centre and states.
The emergency provision provides a simple way of transforming the normal federal fabric into an
almost unitary system so as meet national emergencies effectively.40

46. In State of Karnataka v. Union of India 41, the Court Observed that leaving the functions of the
judiciary apart, by and large the legislative and the executive functions of the Centre and the States
have been defined and distributed, but, even so, through it all runs and overall thread or rein in the
hands of the Centre in both the fields. 42

47. Part XI of the Constitution pertains to the “Relation between the Union and the States”. Chapter I
of Part XI is in respect of “Legislative Relation”. Article 245 generally states that the Parliament,
subject to the provisions of the Constitution, may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory

38
MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.20 (8th ed., 2019).
39 State of Haryana v. State of Punjab, (2002) 2 SCC 507 : AIR 2002 SC 685.
40
All federal systems including the American are placed in a tight mould of federalism. No matter what the circumstances, it
cannot change its form and shape. It can never be unitary. On the other hand, the (Indian) Constitution can be both unitary as well
as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances. In normal times, it is framed to work as a federal system. But
in times of war it is so designed as to make it work as though it was the unitary system. Ambedkar, VII CAD 34-35.
41State of Karnataka v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 68 : (1977) 4 SCC 608.
42B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 4 MLJ 181 (SC) : 2010 (5) SCALE 134 : (2010) 6 SCC 331.

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of India. Article 246 vests in the Parliament “the exclusive power” to make laws with respect to any of
the matter enumerated in List I the Seventh Schedule (“Union List”, hereafter). 43

48. Hence, Article 249 of the constitution gives power to the Parliament to legislate with respect to a
matter in State List in the national interest. Therefore, the most fundamental purpose of federal
government is to keep the nation safe from physical attack and to defend the Constitutional order. So,
the amendments are not violative of the quasi federal nature of Vikas.

49. As in the present case, the current scheme of law proved to be inefficient since only “organizations”
could be designated as terrorists. Similarly, several authorizations from the respective State police were
mandated by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 so as to attach and seize the properties of
such terrorists for investigation purposes which were considered to be the main cause of delay and
inefficiency of the law. Hence, to exempt the State police from the extra burden so that they can execute
their assigned jobs properly and effectively serve to maintain law and order in local areas by protecting
members of the public and their property, preventing crime, reducing the fear of crime and improving
the quality of life for all citizens, the law amended meets the need of the hour.

50. In the instant case, Vikas has emerged as one of the world’s most consistent targets of radical
militants. Although the attacks of November 2008 were merely the most recent and dramatic in a series
of bloodshed terrorist incidents throughout the urban Vikas. During that phase, the terrorist planted
seven bombs in the Railway Stations and 5-star Hotels of Chumban, causing the death of more than
200 people.

51. The November 2008 attacks, however, brought into clear focus the inability of the Vikanian
security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist related intelligence.
Further one prominent analyst wrote, the government’s responses to the Chumban attacks were
“comprehensive failures from the point of view of Vikas’s security establishment.” It made clear that
Vikas needs to dramatically enhance its domestic counter-terrorism infrastructure. Improvement will
require significant infusions of resources, policy consistency, and political will that are often lacking
in Vikas.

52. Hence, in the light of this, India as a wounded tiger should evolve equally improved strategies to
combat and counter frontier terrorism in particular adopting global counter terrorism strategies, and
the ways and means to adopt and execute these strategies to eradicate its prolonged problem of frontier-
terrorism in all its forms.

43 Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1.

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53. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the amendments to the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 vide the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019
does not violate the quasi federal nature of Vikas enshrined under the basic structure of the Constitution
of Vikas.

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4. WHETHER THE SECTION 69 OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, THE

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (PROCEDURE AND SAFEGUARD FOR
INTERCEPTION, MONITORING AND DECRYPTION OF INFORMATION) RULES, 2009
AND THE IMPUNGED NOTIFIACTION ISSUED BY THR CENTRAL GOVT. UNDER THE
AFORESAID LAW VIOLATES ARTICLE 14 AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

54. It is humbly submitted by the respondents that the section 69 of the Information Technology Act
2000, the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguard for Interception, Monitoring and
decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 and the impugned notification issued by the Central Govt.
under the aforesaid law does not violates article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

4.1 Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
violates Article 14.
55. As has been explained by Bhagwati, J., in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,44 Rule of law that
permeates the entire fabric of the Indian Constitution excludes arbitrariness, “Wherever we find
arbitrariness or unreasonableness there is denial of rule of law.” Article 14 enacts primarily a
guarantee against arbitrariness and inhibits state action, whether legislative or executive, which suffers
from the vice of arbitrariness. “Every state action must be non-arbitrary and reasonable.” Otherwise
the court would strike it down as invalid.

56. Article 14 is primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in state action and the doctrine of
classification is evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing whether a particular state action is arbitrary
or not. If a law is arbitrary or irrational it would fall foul of Article 14. 45 In Bhagat Ram v. State of
Himachal Pradesh,46 it was held that any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct would
be violative of Article 14.

57. The remarks of Bhagwati, J., in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu47 are noteworthy. Equality is
a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined and confined”
within traditional and doctrinaire limits. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one
belong to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and
Constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14.

44 Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1336.

45 M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, p.941 (8th ed., 2019).
46 Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, 460 : (1983) 2 SCC 442.
47 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 : (1974) 3 SCC 3.

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58. In the instant case, the Govt. of Vikas has sensed that cyber terrorism as a tool could be utilized to
conduct unlawful attacks and threat of attacks against computers, networks and information stored and
these attacks could result in violence against persons or property or cause public unrest through
explosions, plane crashes, etc. It is a noted fact that Terrorist tend to use Internet to prepare the schemes,
raise funds and spread cyber terrorism.

59. Thus, to counter cyber terrorism, the Govt. of Vikas issued a notification under section 69 of the
IT act, 2000 which is in the interests of public, National security and integrity and hence cannot be
termed as arbitrary.

60. A common tendency in modern democracies is to confer discretionary power on the Govt. or
Administrative officers. In order to ensure that the discretion is properly exercised, it is important that
the statute in the question lays down some norms or principle according to which the administrator has
to exercise the discretion. Article 14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee against any action
of the Administration which may be arbitrary, discriminatory or unequal.

61. Article 14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee against any action of the Administration
which may be arbitrary, discriminatory and unequal. 48 This principle manifests itself in the form of a
law conferring unguided and unrestricted power on an authority is bad for arbitrary power is
discriminatory.

62. As Bhagwati, J., observed: “The law always frowns on uncanalised and unfettered discretion
conferred on any instrumentality of the state.”49 Where power granted is open to use disproportionate
to purpose to be achieved is invalid in the absence of guidelines or principles or norms which are
‘essential’ for exercise of such power. 50

63. It is contended by the respondents that the powers given to the investigation agencies to intercept,
monitor or decrypt any information which is generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer
source is not uncanalised and unfettered discretion.

64. In the instant case, NIA cyber cell team sought permission from the competent authority to proceed
in furtherance of the information provided in order to intercept, monitor and decrypt relevant
information from the target computer source. This shows that the power conferred to the agencies are
not unguided and unrestricted rather it lays down guidelines, principle and norms for the exercise of
power.

48
Shrinivasa Rao v. Veeraiah, AIR 1993 SC 929; RL Bansal v. UOI, AIR 1993 SC 978.
49 Sheo Nandan Paswan v State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877, 895 : (1987) 1 SCC 288.
50 District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 7 SCC 496 : AIR 2005 SC 186.

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The SC has laid down the following words in Naraindas:51

Article 14 ensures equality before law and strikes at arbitrary and discriminatory state action...

65. If power conferred by any statute on any authority of the State is vagrant and unconfined and no
standards or principle are laid by the statute to guide and control the exercise of such power, the statute
would be violative of the equality clause, because it would permit arbitrary and capricious of power,
which is the antithesis of equality before law.

In Sudhir Chandra,52 the SC has observed:

66. … Our Constitution envisages a society governed by rule of law. Absolute discretion
uncontrolled by guidelines which may permit denial of equality before law is the antithesis of rule of
law. Absolute discretion not judicially reviewable inhere the pernicious tendency to be arbitrary and
is therefore violative of Article 14. Equality before law and absolute discretion to grant or deny benefit
of the law are diametrically opposed to each other and cannot co-exist.

67. The SC in the case Nargesh Meerza53 held that the regulation made by Air India International, a
statutory corporation was bad as it armed the managing director with uncanalised and unguided
discretion to the extend the age of retirement of any air hostess. No guidelines, principles or norms
were laid down subject to which the power were to be exercised. Nor there was any procedural
safeguard available to an air hostess who was denied extension.

68. In the present case, there are procedural safeguards mentioned under the Section 69(2) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 as The procedure and safeguard subject to which such interception
or monitoring or decryption may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.

69. The statutory provision conferring power has sufficient guidelines, principle or policies to regulate
the exercise of power; the power has been conferred on a high official who is not expected to misuse
the same but is expected to exercise the power reasonably and rationally; 54 there are procedural
safeguards subject to which the power is to be exercised, such as natural justice, recording of reasons
for the decision, provision of appeal to the higher authority, etc. 55

51
Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1232 : (1974) 4 SCC 788; Guidelines or principles or norms for exercise
of discretionary power is essential.
52
Sudhir Chandra v. Tata Iron and Steel Corporation Limited, AIR 1987 SC 1064, 1071 : (1984) 3 SCC 369.
53
Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 : (1981) 4 SCC 335.
54
Chinta Lingam v. UOI, AIR 1971 SC 474 : (1970) 3 SCC 768; State (Delhi Adm) v. VC Shukla, AIR 1980 SC 1382 : 1980 (3)
SCR 500.
55
Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 : (1982) 1 SCC 31; Gram Saba, Shahzadpur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1982 P&H 33; Shiv Dutt Rai Fateh Chand v. UOI, AIR 1984 SC 1194, 1212 : (1983) 3 SCC 529.
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70. In the present case, the notification made under Section 69 is not arbitrary and lays down proper
guidelines, norms and principles for the exercise of power and there are procedural safeguards subject
to which the power is to be exercised.

71. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the notification made under Section
69 does not violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

4.2 Whether or not the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000
violates Article 21.

72. Article 21 envisages a right to life and personal liberty of a person, which not merely guarantees
the right to continuance of a person’s existence but a quality of life, 56 and therefore, State is casted
upon a duty to protect the rights of the citizen in discharge of its Constitutional obligation in the large
public interest,57 guaranteed as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.

73. In the present case, there has been no violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. To establish the
violation of Article 21, the act should be subjected to the equality test of Article 14 and the test of
reasonableness under Article 19. 58 Article 14 ensures fairness59 and guarantees against arbitrariness. 60
74. It provides that every action of the Govt. must be informed by reasons and guided by public
interest.61 Public Interest means a subject matter in which the rights of the public is interested 62 to the
means of concern which is advantageous to people as whole. 63 Article 19 provides that a restriction
can be characterized to be reasonable if it strikes a balance between the fundamental right and
restriction thereon.64

75. In the present case, the Union of Vikas was facing continuously a problem of terrorism which
would bring about instability in many ways. The Supreme Court in its earlier order, stated clearly that
it is the duty of the Govt. to provide the people of the country with necessary conditions for leading a

56 Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1994 SC 1844; Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5
SCC 647.
57 Consumer Education and Research Centre and ors. v. Union of India and ors., AIR 1995 SC 922.
58 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
59 Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101; Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager , U.P.

Financial Corpn, AIR 1993 SC 597.

60 Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union Of India, AIR 1986 SC 872; Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2000 SC 3313.
61 M S Bhut Educational Trust v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2000 Guj 160; LIC v. Consumer Education and Research centre, AIR 1955

SC 1811.
62 Kuttishankaran Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1965 ker 161.
63 T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
64 Om Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689.

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peaceful life as promised by the Constitution under Article 21. 65 The respondents has only followed
the said order.

76. In kharak Singh,66 Subba Rao, J., has observed:

The right to personal liberty takes in not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his
movement, but also free from encroachment on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not
expressly declares a Right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential
ingredient of personal liberty…

77. In the case of K.S. Puttaswami, 67 the SC has held that the Right to privacy is a part fundamental
right of a citizen guaranteed under part III of the Constitution. However, it is not an absolute right but
is a subject to certain reasonable restriction, which the State is entitled to impose on the basis of social,
moral and compelling public interest in accordance with law.

78. In the instant case, it is a noted fact that Terrorist tend to use Internet to prepare schemes, recruit
potential terrorist, raise funds and spread cyber terrorism. Thus, to counter cyber terrorism the Govt.
of Vikas issued a notification under 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which was in the
furtherance of compelling public interest.

79. In Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh,68 it was observed that, depending on the character and
antecedents of the person subjected to surveillance as also the objects and the limitation under which
surveillance is made, it cannot be said surveillance by domiciliary visits would always be unreasonable
restriction upon the Right to privacy.

Further, Mathev, J., observed on the same point: 69

80. Assuming that the fundamental Rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have a penumbral zones
and that the right to privacy is itself a Fundamental Right, that Fundamental Right must be subject to
restriction on the basis of compelling public interest.

81. Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1855 empowers the Central Govt. and the State Govt. to
take possession of licensed telegraph and to order the interception of messages in two circumstances:
(1) in the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety, and (2) if it is
considered necessary or expedient to do so, in addition to the following instances: in the interest of the

65 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.

66 Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1964) 1 SCR 332.
67 K.S. Puttaswami v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
68 Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378.
69 Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1378.

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Sovereignty and integrity of the country; the security of the State; friendly relations with foreign states;
public order; and for the prevention of incitement to the commission of an offense.

82. Telephone tapping is permissible in India under Section 5(2) of the telegraph Act, 1855. The court
has held that this section is constitutionally valid. This section lays down the circumstances and the
grounds when an order for tapping of phone may be passed. The constitutionality of this provision has
not been questioned, but no procedure for making the order is laid down therein. 70

83. In the instance case, on an average 7500 to 9000 orders for interception of telephones and 300 to
500 orders for interception of emails are issued by the Central Govt. every month, for the sole purpose
of national security. Also, 40% of the orders for interception of the computer sources give details that
are incriminatory in nature and require further investigation. In furtherance of this, an approximate of
5% of the cases, which orders for interception of computer sources are received, corroborate the
recovery of new evidences that is proof of terrorist activity.

In People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India and ors.,71 the SC observed that;

84. In order to rule out arbitrariness in the exercise of power under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act,
1855 and till the time the Central Govt. lays down just, fair and reasonable procedure under Section
7(2)(b) of the Act, it is necessary to lay down procedural safeguard for the exercise of power under
Section 5(2) of the Act so that the right to privacy of a person is protected.

85. In the present case, the notification under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, is
in the interest of the public safety, and it is considered necessary to do so, in addition to the interest of
the Sovereignty and integrity of the country; the security of the State; public order; and for the
prevention of incitement to the commission of an offense. Also, Section 69(2) of the Act lays down
procedural safeguard subject to which the power is to be exercised.

86. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the notification made under Section
69 does not violates Article 21 of the Constitution.

70 Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 789, 793 : (1976) 2 SCC 128.
71 People’s Union for Civil Liberties(PUCL) v. Union of India (1997) 1 SCC 301.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may this Hon’ble Court be pleased to
adjudge and declare:

1. That the appeal be not maintainable.

2. That the amendment to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1976, vide the Unlawful Activities
Prevention Amendment Act, 2019 be not violating of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of Vikas.

3. That the excessive powers granted to NIA vide the Unlawful Activities Prevention Amendment Act, 2019
be not violating the quasi-federal nature of Vikas enshrined under the Constitution of Vikas.

4. That the notification under Section 69 of the IT Act, 2000 be not violating of Article 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of Vikas.

And pass any order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interest of

Justice, Fairness, Equity and Good Conscience.

For This Act of Kindness, the Respondent shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.

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