8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
VOL. 189,AUGUST 30, 1990 201
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
*
G.R. No. 77029. August 30, 1990.
BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE,
ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,
petitioners,vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL
MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Attorneys; Notary Public; Presumption of regularity of a public
document executed before a notary public.—As to petitioners’ claim that the
signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged
without Ricardo’s knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed
that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities
of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both
parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the
legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized document (Dy v. Sacay,
165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989).
In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested
through the intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear,
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity
and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]).
Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889,
October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of
consideration of the deed was not substanti-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
202
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
ated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless
the contrary is proven.
Same; Evidence; Admission of the former owner of the property,to be
binding upon the present owner, must be made while he was still the owner
thereof.—As to petitioners’ contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal
defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968 entitled
“Settlement to Avoid Litigation” (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of evidence
that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another (Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule
is embodied in the maxim ‘res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.’
Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court “where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former.”
It is however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property
must have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v. del
Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]). Hence,
Lanceros’ declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no
binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to
DELCOR in 1964.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence that an issue, neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.—Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners
which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised
before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled
jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor
raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v.
C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987];
Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development
Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282,
July 5, 1989). Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
(mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in
the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos’ proportionate
share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers
and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of
Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that
she was deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
203
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 203
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 2/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Succession; No legal bar to a
successor to dispose his hereditary share after death of the decedent.—The
hereditary share in a decedents’ estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of the ‘causante’ or predecessor in interest
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a
successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is
not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v.
Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Registration; Purchaser in good faith
of a registered land may rely on the certificate of title.—Besides, the
property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers
the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20,
1989). If the property is a registered land, the purchaser in good faith has a
right to rely on the certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to
look for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970;
Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77427,
March 13, 1989).
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. Campos, Jr., J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.
Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a1 petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del Monte
Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming
2
the decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff corporation as the
true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan
Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of
_______________
1 Penned by Justice Jose C. Campos, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Crisolito
Pascual, Serapin Camilon and Desiderio P. Jurado.
2 Penned by Judge Benjamin K. Gorospe.
204
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 3/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square
meters more or less.
As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:
“The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan
Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated at Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from the late Luis
Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn
acquired the same parcel from Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 per
deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry
No. 1128 at the back of Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the
mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha
—1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio
and Ursula, all surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area
containing 48,122 square meters.
“Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived
by her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on
October 17, 1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of the
estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them was lot
2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the
said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive,
under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly approved by the Land
Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among others, was adjudicated to
Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the time of extra-judicial settlement
and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) filed an action
with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the
partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same
prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476.
“Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the
heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which
it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before purchasing
Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis Lancero and
found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan (Exh. “B”), the
corresponding technical description (Exh. “P”) and the Deed of Sale
executed by Ricardo Gevero—all of which were found to be
unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought the
land in good faith and for value, occupying
205
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 205
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
the land since the sale and taking over from Lancero’s possession until May
1969, when the defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property.” (Rollo, p.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 4/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
23)
After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-
D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of SEVEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square
meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby
adjudicated as follows:
“Lot No. 2476—B—to the heirs of Elena Gevero;
“Lot No. 2476—C—to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;
“Lot No. 2476—E—to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and
Francisca Aquino;
“Lot No. 2476—F—to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and
Emilia Merida Rumohr;
“Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476—G—to defendant spouses Enrique
Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
“No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A
considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between the Heirs
of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito and
Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending appeal before
the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.” (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-
22)
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners
herein) appealed to the IAC (now Court of Appeals) which
subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision appealed
from.
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration
(Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April 21, 1986.
Hence, the present petition.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are:
1)whether or not the deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to
Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether or not
206
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the
deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private respondents’ action is
barred by laches.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 5/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing
alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was
forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed
the document in 1968 entitled “Settlement to Avoid the Litigation”;
3) Ricardo’s children remained in the property notwithstanding the
sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the
correct number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the
share of Eustaquio Gevero without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183
of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square meters from the
bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-
owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the
consent of the Geveros’ to bring about the segregation of the 20,119
square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the
issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR’s title T4320, both of
which were illegally issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is
20,649 square meters whereas the segregated area covered by TCT
No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters
(Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78).
As to petitioners’ claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952
deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged without Ricardo’s
knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed that the
deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities
of a public document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by
both parties before the notary public, yet petitioners did not bother to
rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized
document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A.,
G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In fact it has long been settled
that a public document executed and attested through the
intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear,
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the presumption of
regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C.,
155 SCRA 520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven (Siasat
207
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 207
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10, 1985). Likewise, petitioners
allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not
substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is
presumed unless the contrary is proven.
As to petitioners’ contention that Lancero had recognized the
fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he signed the document in 1968
entitled “Settlement to Avoid Litigation” (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 6/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of
Court). This particular rule is embodied in the maxim ‘res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet. ’ Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of
Court “where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in
relation to the property is evidence against the former.” It is however
stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must
have been made while he was the owner thereof in order that such
admission may be binding upon the present owner (City of Manila v.
del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465
[1910]). Hence, Lanceros’ declaration or acts of executing the 1968
document have no binding effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the
land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.
Petitioners’ claim that they remained in the property,
notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p.
71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by
both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:
“Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that Luis
Lancero had taken possession of the land upon proper investigation by
plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis Lancero who was the
owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. x x x” (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v.
Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282
[1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20
SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA
737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A.,
142 SCRA 130 [1986]).
208
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which
allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed of sale have not been raised
before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is settled
jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v.
Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44
[1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC,
147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation
v. C.A., 157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5,
1989).
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 7/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
(mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT No. 7610 was not
included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to
Ricardos’ proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area
pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title and
that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance
from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was
deceased at the time it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
The hereditary share in a decedents’ estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of the ‘causante’
or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777),
and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until
the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja,
46 SCRA 577 [1972]).
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the
rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of her
death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the
date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in
the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when
Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that share which he inherited
from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the
deed of sale.
Petitioners contend that Ricardo’s share from Teodorica was
excluded in the sale considering that a paragraph of the
aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and
209
VOL. 189, AUGUST 30, 1990 209
Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).
It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as
to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof
(Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203
[1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its
entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34
SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon by the
petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would
not only create contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at
naught the entire provisions thereof.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR’s action is barred by laches
considering that the petitioners have remained in the actual, open,
uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present (Rollo,
p. 17).
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 8/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is
a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of
a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art.
1498, lst Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its
execution was considered a sufficient delivery of the property
(Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64
Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960];
Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397
[1975]).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of
registration that transfers the ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v.
C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property is a
registered land, the purchaser in good faith has a right to rely on the
certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it to look for
flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852, March 25, 1970;
Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No.
77427, March 13, 1989).
Under the established principles of land registration law, the
person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs.
CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC,
171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more
than that. It did not only rely on the
210
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gevero vs. Intermediate AppellateCourt
certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first
investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of
Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the
corresponding technical description and the deed of sale executed by
Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in
order. It even went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in
possession of the land to the exclusion of any other person.
DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in
question.
Consequently, DELCOR’s action is not barred by laches. The
main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues
appear unnecessary.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 9/10
8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 189
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Sarmiento,J., On leave.
Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
Note.—The requirement of the law for the allowance of will was
not satisfied by mere publication of notice and hearing. Notice of
hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and devisees is required.
(De Aranz vs. Galing, 161 SCRA 628.)
———o0o———
211
© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b56d34cabd5c64478000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 10/10
