CHAPTER V

HOW TO READ A JUDGMENT1

1. Knowing How to Read

IN the legal field, knowing how to read is a version of MICHELANGELO’s

Sapere vedere. When we read, there are certain classic, widely acknowl-
edged circumstances in which we must take particular care and others in
which we need not to the same degree.
Before discussing how to read a judgment - a task that is more complex
than it seems - we will start by taking a look at other common situations in
which, when reading, we need to pay particular attention.

1.1. Knowing How to Read the Beginning

We all think we are capable of reading a legal text well, but, all too of-
ten, this is not the case. Therefore, before dealing with the reading of a
legal judgment, it is useful to point out some simple reading rules, which,
because of their very simplicity, are commonly forgotten. Essentially, we
must discern what the crux of what we are reading is, and, in light of those
focal points, understand what mistakes we frequently make so as to pre-
vent making them again in the future.
Where to find those focal points is not at all predetermined, and varies
from one text to another: They can be at the end of a text, at the beginning,

1 NIETO, ALEJANDRO, El arbitrio judicial, Barcelona, Ariel, 2000, is a fundamen-

tal work that also refers to a large bibliography. For our part, we have reflected on
the method of creation oriented towards legal writing, in El método en derecho.
Aprender, enseñar, escribir, crear, hacer, Madrid, Civitas, 1988 and 4th reprint
2001. He has kindly allowed me to add some notes to his recent Los límites del
conocimiento jurídico, Madrid, Trotta, 2003 (in preparation), which I also suggest
for further reading on this Chapter.
64 A. Gordillo

or in the middle; they can be emphasized or downplayed; they can be ad-

dressed along with themes that are important or of little interest.
Of course, if the goal is to be didactic, the author of a legal text should
aim to highlight such points. Towards this end, the drafting committee of
the decree-law 19.549/72 put the most important part of the decree at its
beginning, at the behest of the then Attorney of the Treasury of the Argen-
tine Republic, Dr. ADALBERTO COZZI2. It is usually forgotten - unfairly, at
that - that the major contribution to the final text of the decree was from
legal practitioners, like Dr. COZZI, and not from legal theorists. Although
this makes for a less elegant redaction, it undoubtedly helps with the com-
prehension of the decree-law: Its first sections are a summary of the undis-
puted and generally accepted principles of Argentine public law3.

1.2. Knowing How to Read the End

One of the most frequent mistakes I make when reading is that, without
realizing it, I stop reading one or two lines before the end of a text,
whether it be a contract, a legal act, a law, or my country’s Constitution.
As a self-control mechanism, I now start by reading at the end in order to
be sure that I will not miss anything.

1.3. The Illegible Small Print

Another common error is not reading the “small print” very carefully.
The term “small print” likely comes from the fact that provisions of pre-
printed contracts that are adverse to the purchaser are so small that they
cannot be read. Similarly, when manufacturers are legally obliged to pro-
vide descriptions of their products, those descriptions are usually written
in the smallest size possible. (For example, the paper inserts enclosed with
medicines that describe their indications and side-effects are often, if not
always, illegible.) As the years go by and our eyesight fades, it becomes
increasingly difficult to read all this small print without the help of a mag-
nifying glass. Yet young people, who can read it without difficulty, are not
interested in doing so; they will eventually realize - perhaps after continu-
ally being mistaken - that they have to read the small print, and that they
will have to do so with even more care than with the normal size.

2 A similar solution was adopted in 2001 by Perú, Law 27.444, Article IV.
3 And not, as some contend, of public law that has come out of nowhere.
 How to Read a Judgment 65

In fact, because of all this, consumer protection rules usually demand a

minimum print size, and warnings on harmful products, such as tobacco,
are usually written in a size determined by laws or regulations.

1.4. The Hidden Print

“Small print” can also be considered as such not because of its physical
size, but rather because of the difficulty in finding it. An old lawyerly trick
is to write boring, useless, repetitive things that have no immediate or ap-
parent practical sense, and which almost invite being skipped over, and to
incorporate in between provisions adverse to the interests of the opposing
party.

1.5. Knowing How to Read What is Evident

A sophisticated way of hiding something is to put it in an obvious place.

That might work or not, but it is necessary to be aware of it. Indeed, things
can sometimes be so evident that we cannot see them4.

1.6. Knowing How to Read What has Not Been Written

This is the real nightmare: to “read between the lines,” to imagine what it
is that has not been said, and not to make too many mistakes.
When we speak, for example, many misunderstandings stem from say-
ing something one way and being understood another way. The usual sin-
cere, but weak, explanation for such errors is “but I thought you meant...”
and they result in psychologists earning their living by attempting to inter-
pret what a person “really” wanted to say and not what he in fact said.
In our legal and administrative procedures, while everything is carried
out in writing, it is nonetheless usual to speak to public officers over the
course of the process. However, there is not usually a written record of all
such discussions. Any person not involved in the proceedings who, at a
later date, reads the verdict, the act or the judgment, may therefore be at a
disadvantage in the interpretation of the documents, for not knowing what
has been said between the previous officials and the other part. For this

4 The technique, BORGES said, was thought up by EDGAR ALLAN POE in The Sto-
len Letter. POE’s readers wonder at BORGE’s reading of that novel. If you do not
find it in POE, just trust BORGES’ idea.
66 A. Gordillo

reason, it has been said that our proceedings are neither spoken nor writ-
ten, but rather “talked about.”5 CARRIÓ says that they are, to a certain ex-
tent, proceedings carried out during conversations. That is a criticism, but
also a statement of fact.

2. Putting Knowing How to Read into Practice…

2.1. … Upon Reading a Law

When reading a law, we must pay attention to the political, social and
economic context in which the law developed, as well as the period during
which it evolved. We need to search for the real reasons behind the law,
and not content ourselves with the apparent reasons of the day. Similarly,
once we have started to read a law, we must look for the points of the text
that resolve concrete questions, instead of getting hung up in those sec-
tions that are merely conceptual or definitional. In fact, it is out of the
question to pay excessive attention to such sections, because if most of the
Articles of a law specifically articulate a legal regime, those Articles will,
in turn, displace any broad concepts and definitions. As an example, see
Confidentiality Law 24.766: The breadth of its first Article is entirely lim-
ited by later Articles that refer to extremely specific situations within the
national pharmaceutical industry.

2.2. … Upon Reading a Contract: See the Facts

A contract must be analyzed looking not only at its text, but also at its
facts. By facts, we mean the attendant circumstances surrounding a con-
tract before it entered into force and during its execution. The relationship
between the text and the facts requires that we study the behavior of the
parties in regard to their contract - to the full extent the law permits - to
understand the true content of a contract.

5 Refer to CARRIÓ, ALEJANDRO et al., En defensa de los derechos civiles, Buenos

Aires, Abeledo-Perrot, 2000, p. 79, note 5. In respect to what was said at the be-
ginning of the preceding paragraph of our text, see, as a specific case, KILLMEATE,
ATILIO, Los discapacitados motrices y el transporte público, in: CARRIÓ et al., op.
cit., pp. 78, 79, 80 (sixth paragraph, second phrase).
 How to Read a Judgment 67

2.3. … Upon Reading Books

The products of legal academia, such as books and law review articles,
are helpful in understanding and interpreting the law, but cannot serve as
binding authority in a specific case. The real weight of these works is, of
course, not because of who authored them, but because of the quality of
their arguments.
We, as lawyers, know this. However, for the purposes of a rhetorical
style, we often leverage such works to function as a primary authority,
even though it is a fallacy of legal reasoning to do so. Reasoning improp-
erly in this way is not so bad in and of itself; what is bad, however, is be-
lieving that reasoning in such a way is actually correct.

3. The Legal Decision

There is no difference between the decision-making process of a magis-

trate in a trial, the lawyer in a case, or a civil servant in a given proceed-
ing. All bureaucratic organizations, big or small, function similarly all
over the world.
There is no difference, either, between the worst mistake a lawyer could
make with his client, or a physician with his patient: that is, to underesti-
mate the capacity of the client or patient to cut to the heart of his own case
and understand the case’s “reality.” In this way, everything is always re-
duced to the same issue: properly perceiving that reality in order to deter-
mine how to categorize it theoretically.
The system of law or the world of medicine serve no purpose if he who
applies those schemas does not succeed in initially identifying that funda-
mental reality. That is the first, and perhaps the only, diagnosis6 to make.
As our capacity to perceive reality is limited and we are always confronted
with unlimited data (LEIBNIZ), such a diagnosis is not bestowed with the
absolute character of Truth. We, human beings, do not have that gift, only
God does. God knows the Truth of the facts, we diagnose (conjecture)
based on what the “truth” seems to be for us within what we can limitedly
see that happened in a case. We do not know now, and will never know
such a perfect Truth, although we must decide regardless and, necessarily,
we do so.

6They do not state the truth: They decide upon hypothesis or supposition, al-
ways temporary, always exposed to refutation.
68 A. Gordillo

3.1. The Formation of the Initial Hypothesis

In the first decision-making stage, factors come to bear that sometimes

are not later mentioned in the judgment or supported by forensic evidence,
and, as such, are known or surmised only by those closely involved at this
point of the proceedings. For those not involved, or only very indirectly
involved, this stage is the most troublesome, because they must adduce or
even guess what those factors were by asking the parties, listening to the
court, or by reading the newspapers’ coverage of initial debates. However,
external parties may also adduce those factors via their own direct reading
of reality, trying to piece together what, at a certain moment, could have
been the very process used internally by the court.
Of course, there are a few generous magistrates who let factors impor-
tant to them be known, which lawyers might miss for their lack of legal
grounding. For example, LORD DENNING, in the first chapter of his book,
The Discipline of Law7, specified the best way to stand and speak in front
of a court. In a similar vein, Judge JACKSON, who ordered the division of
Microsoft, asserted publicly that the way BILL GATES testified in a video
influenced his decision8. More generally, in discrimination cases, “percep-
tions” may be represented by the percentages by which judges pronounce a
sentence in favor of or against a certain minority9, or by which lawyers
accept certain cases.

3.2. The Grounding Process

The common perception is that judges make decisions and then ask as-
sistants to write them, whether the assistants prepare first drafts that the

7 London, Butterworths, 1979. Absolutely no lawyer should ignore the deep

wisdom contained in LORD DENNING’s original words, to which I would further
suggest going. Reading it and really practising it is a must for any attorney worth
his salt. However, do not expect to find there any abstruse reasoning: they are
nothing more and nothing less than very simple and very practical advice, given by
a most experienced judge. Do pay attention to it.
8 That resulted in a useful and colorful argument, but perhaps not a decisive one,
for the annulment of his decision.
9 We refer to our Tratado de derecho administrativo, vol. 1, Parte general,
Buenos Aires, FDA, reprint 2000, 5th ed., chapter VIII, § 15, “Procesamiento esta-
dístico.”
 How to Read a Judgment 69

judges later correct, or prepare alternative drafts between which the magis-
trates choose the best one.
While it is probable that more than once this has been the case, those al-
ternatives do not necessarily constitute a rule. It is true, however, that there
have been extreme cases where tribunals, overloaded with work, have had
to resort to heroic measures. For example, a provincial criminal judge of
first instance told us twenty-five years ago that his court was receiving
eight thousand cases yearly. With such a docket, his alternatives were to
resign, to work until he got sick and died, or to delegate his workload. His
decision: to choose for himself those cases dealing with drug trafficking,
the worst homicides, etc., and for the rest, to let the employees of his
chambers carry out the best justice they possibly could. (Similar stories
come out of some law firms and are also normal in any administration,
public or private.)
In the end, when this judge was promoted to a higher court, the situation
he had left behind remained the same after he left. No one has been able to
change that state of affairs. That judge in his new capabilities continued
and still continues to be a serious, honest, responsible, and capable magis-
trate answering rationally the problem facing him - and facing any other
person in his position - that was not otherwise possible to solve using clas-
sical means. He had the explicit power to send people to prison, and the
implied or secret power to decide that someone else could do that same
job. However, he did not have the power to change the relationship be-
tween the number of man-hours he had available as a judge and the
amount of cases to be decided in his court.
Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina, there are almost
two hundred legal clerks and assistant clerks, whose hierarchical and pro-
fessional levels are equivalent to a judge of first instance or an appellate
judge. Called the “young Court,”10 its number and professional excellence
clearly show that the clerks’ real functions go beyond research11. Here we
suggest that the reader “fill in the blanks” as to what those functions are12.

10 For example CARRIÓ, ALEJANDRO, La Corte Suprema y su independencia,

Buenos Aires, Abeledo-Perrot, 1996, p. 12.
11 The situation is repeated wherever we look, with different forms of resolving
the same kind of problem. We have seen senior governors signing dossiers without
reading them, sometimes without even looking at them. Whatever their assistant
told them was enough for them. In one case, we were present at the signing of an
executive order, carried out under the same conditions: Neither the minister nor the
president read it. We were also told about certain presidents who had somebody
70 A. Gordillo

3.3. The Explanation of the Decision

Usually, what is written in a judgment does not necessarily reflect all

that the deciding court took into consideration. For one thing, the more
experience the magistrate has, the more basic the grounds13 he uses to de-
cide cases, as he has learned the value of silence and the perils of verbos-
ity14. Of course, this is an empirical criterion for which no written rule
exists, but which is no less real and no less old15.
Lawyers, to the contrary, may err on the side of verbosity, since their
aim is to convince the court. For that, they may feel that they need to argue
successfully a case for their client in many different concurring ways.

sign their signatures on their behalf, and about some law firms where assistants or
clerks sign as lawyers. There are also cases of computer-digitized signatures. Fur-
ther details in Tratado de derecho administrativo, vol. 2, La defensa del usuario y
del administrado, Buenos Aires, FDA, 2000, 4th ed., chapter XIV. Sometimes, but
not always, signing on behalf of another person is equivalent to deciding on behalf
of that other person. This phenomenon is known as délégation de signature.
12 Even academic élites acknowledge this fact within the mysteries and secrets
of the Supreme Court: “There was a lot of delegating from the judges to the clerks.
Let us not fool ourselves, there is still a lot of delegating. I offend no one by spea-
king the truth.” VANOSSI, JORGE REINALDO, La extensión jurisprudencial del con-
trol de constitucionalidad por obra de la Corte de la Argentina (Balance de una
década de ‘certiorari’ criollo), separata-preview of Anales de la Academia Nacional
de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos Aires (year XLV, 2nd period, n° 38),
Buenos Aires, La Ley, 2000, p. 31.
13 At the same time, it is clear that, at the beginning, the judge must not decide,
just discern what is necessary. See SUNSTEIN, CASS, One Case at a Time. Judicial
Minimalism on the Supreme Court, Cambridge and London, Harvard University
Press, 1999.
14 Which is not so if it is clear that a wide range of arguments leads to the same
conclusion. It remains, as is the case in law, the sound uncertainty of which was
the convincing argument instead of the false certainty of the formal ground chosen
by the court. That is the reason why the writings of CICERO survive and not the
grounds of the tribunal. The same happens in legal decisions written on the back of
a judicial brief (endorsed on the bill). MARTINEZ-TORRÓN, JAVIER, Derecho anglo-
norteamericano y derecho canónico. Las raíces canónicas de la “common law”,
Madrid, Civitas, 1991, p. 78.
15 See NIETO, op. cit., pp. 142-153. In medicine, there are things spoken by doc-
tors that are not told to patients, known as the “secrets of the operating room”.
 How to Read a Judgment 71

Lawyers try to argue and prove their theses from the different angles that
the judge could potentially use upon rendering a decision16.
However, the court, when engaged in written proceedings, sometimes
finds a solution by reading only the facts and the petitum of the parties’
submissions17 (which is, in fact, the way we should read decisions the first
time through.) In this sense, the trait d’union - the legal link of arguments -
can be provided as much by the judge as by the parties. While providing
the legal link is easy, it is difficult to decide what the reality of the case is
to which that law must be applied.
In terms of determining that reality, the magistrate, in his judgment, only
has to think about the arguments he must18 show so that he satisfies the
parties and that a court of appeals does not overturn his decision for want
of sufficient argumentation. For this reason, the “best courts,” speaking of
those whose judgments are not normally appealed with success, frequently
elaborate less on their argumentation. The fundamental point, then, be-
comes the facts or elements of the case that the magistrate considers deci-
sive or determinative: These, he should always describe in his judgment19,
although that does not always happen.
Because of this, it frequently happens that the arguments that really mili-
tate in favor of the decision adopted are not made explicit in the judgment.
Indeed, in order to streamline the judgment, these arguments wind up be-
ing deleted by the court, even though they had initially been included or
were part of the real arguments within the court. This goes to show, it
seems, that the paper draft is still one of the best aides for organizing our
thoughts and imagining those of others in a similar predicament20.
Other arguments that obviously cannot be written do not need to be de-
leted, but judges will keep them in mind when rendering their decision, as

16 In oral hearings at American courts, judges ask lawyers argumentative ques-

tions.
17 For this reason, we should make courtesy visits and ‘chat’, if allowed to, with
extreme care and circumspection. This is really an art form in some countries such
as mine. In others it is forbidden, yet exceptionally management does try to draw a
line now and then.
18 Judge CHARLES BREITEL put forth the fewest arguments and, with those,
worked very carefully. Yet his brief judgments were not for a “quick read.” The
same went for LORD DENNING, The Discipline of Law, op. cit., p. 7.
19 But all are not always there. See the preceding pages.
20 As we have explained in El método en derecho. Aprender, enseñar, escribir,
crear, hacer, op. cit.
72 A. Gordillo

in the examples of LORD DENNING and JACKSON, mentioned above. These

are both very respectable and respected magistrates, who took into consid-
eration the attitude and composure of the parties and lawyers before them.
Applying LORD DENNING and JACKSON in a different context, one can
uncover the real explanation behind Marbury v. Madison21.

3.4. The Legal Policy behind the Decision and its Explanation

Courts adopt various legal policies to address similar problems22. As an

example, when a court decides to annul an act of the administration (due to
some reason that caused it to find the act illegitimate in the first place) it
has two different, seemingly opposing ways to go about doing so. One
way is for the court to base its decision on some “vice,” if you will, of the
administration that, when acted upon, does not draw the attention of the
general public23. Another way is for the court to leverage the multiplicity
of the breaches of the legal order by the administration24. The first method
seems to suggest a court that is more secure, in that it can annul an act for
a seemingly small reason without causing political friction. The second
method seems to suggest a court that feels it must fully demonstrate to
society that there was no other alternative than to annul the administra-
tion’s decision, that it was imperfect to the point of no salvation.
There are also those cases in which the court does not consider that it
has to put an end to an act, but neither does it want to appear as agreeing
politically with a decision of the Executive or any other branch. Under
such circumstances, the court can act in several ways. It can consider the

21 As MILLER, JONATHAN et al., explain in Constitución y poder político. Juris-

prudencia de la Corte Suprema y técnicas para su interpretación, Buenos Aires,
Astrea, 1987.
22 There is also a temporary policy regarding when to decide certain things, as
shown by, among others, the French Conseil d’Etat. See Problema del control de
la administración pública en América Latina, Madrid, Civitas, 1982, p. 57; LONG,
M. / WEIL, P. / BRAIBANT, G., Les grands arrêts de la jurisprudence administrative,
Paris, 1978, 7th ed., pp. 221-222.
23 Also, the Greek Conseil d’Etat: PETROULIAS, DEMOSTHENE, Note sur la moti-
vation des actes administratif en droit hellénique, in: DUPUIS, GEORGES (dir.), Sur
la forme et la procédure de l’acte administratif, Paris, Economica, 1979, pp. 31 et
seq., p. 40, note 1.
24 This is the Argentine court system, as explained in the Tratado de derecho
administrativo, vol. 3, El acto administrativo, Buenos Aires, FDA, 2000, 5th ed.,
chapter IX, § 4.7, “Efecto sinérgico de los vicios”, p. 15.
 How to Read a Judgment 73

issue non-justiciable25 and not even start considering the action; it can de-
clare itself incompetent; it can determine that administrative remedies
were not yet exhausted; or it may use any other procedural excuses or ar-
guments that would disallow it from entering into the substance of a ques-
tion. In this way, the court can communicate that it may not find a particu-
lar action invalid, but that it does not want to pay the political cost of
saying so expressly. It prefers therefore to keep out of the debate by using
the many procedural subterfuges that exist to that end from time immemo-
rial.

3.5. Reading a Judgment

The first thing to do when reading a judgment is to surmise what the

arguments might have been that did not find their way into its text; in other
words, what the “first stage” arguments were. Towards this end, it is im-
portant to be attentive to what is going on in the real world, to follow the
news, to pay attention to the journalists’ coverage of the internal delibera-
tions of the court, etc. It is equally important not to get caught up in deep-
thought reading the grounds of a judgment, to the extent that the “musings”
of the litigants should not surpass the court’s key “decision-making
words”26 in importance.
In order to recreate in our minds what the scenario could have been at
that first stage, we must proceed in reverse. We need to isolate not all of
the judgment, but rather only what the problem before the court was, and
how the judgment decided it, and from there try to surmise what could
have been the pattern of reasoning that might have led the court through
the arguments of the first stage. We are not looking at what is written in
the judgment, which could be incomplete or not entirely reliable. (Or
could even be inexact, in the sense that often the grounds that are given are
not the real ones that the decision was based on.)27 Instead, we try to recre-
ate in our minds, as closely as possible, the reality in which the judgment
was handed down. As we pointed out before, sometimes the arguments

25 The “false political matters” recalled by MAIRAL, HÉCTOR A., Control judicial
de la administración pública, vol. I, Buenos Aires, Depalma, 1984, § 305, pp. 511-
513.
26 According to the wise words of the Royal Judicial Notice of 1768, infra, §
6.1.
27 They are the ex post motivations explained by NIETO.
74 A. Gordillo

contained in the submissions of the successful party28 remain, but not the
judicial decision that supported them. One can work all the same, from
hypothesis to hypothesis, with a certain degree of proximity to the real
thing, not the written one.
So, the arguments delineated in a judgment should encourage us to think
about the other reasonings not present there. We should not take the
grounds of the judgment as “authority” frozen in time. It is the decision
that counts, not its wording or argument. Much less its words, no matter
how much we may use them for eloquence, emphasis, grace or wisdom.

4. The Difficulty in Finding the Object of the Judgment (What the Judge
Decides, What he Does)

Some judgments are so lengthy that we get really lost in them. Others
are so bare-boned that we might skip over them or ignore them for being
so concise, as if they were less important for being shorter. However, we
must take precautions against both of these possible attitudes before judg-
ments that are too long or too short. We can find two-line judgments that
are fundamental, and hundred-page judgments of little interest.
The importance of a judgment does not depend on its breadth or its theo-
retical attraction, but rather on what it decides. Long legal musings, an
abundance of quotations, or arduous discussions offered by individual
magistrates or judicial panels do not make a judgment important. What the
judgment decides does.

5. What to Look For: What the Judgment Is or Decides

In order to read cases so that they are useful for building our knowledge
and experience, it is important to keep clear that, above all, a judgment is a
judicial decision made in the face of a certain factual situation. Towards
this end, we must try first to determine what the factual situation is that
the judgment refers to, what the problem presented is, and just generally
what the case is about. Further, we must turn our attention to what deci-
sion the court adopted, whether it admitted or denied the claim, or whether
it rendered a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant.
Yet as we are looking for this information, we must keep in mind that
how the court said what it did, which legal arguments it gave, or what doc-

28 The most distinguished, CICERO.

 How to Read a Judgment 75

trine it elaborated upon are not so important, but rather what was decided
in the face of a certain problem.
If a judgment is clear and tidy, at the beginning of the judgment there
will be a description of the conflict and, at the end, just before the signa-
tures, of how it was decided.
If the judgment is not clear and tidy - and there are many that are not - it
will be necessary to skim the judgment in order to determine what its facts
are, and, starting from the end and working backwards, to read the case to
understand what was decided.
It is fundamental not to get sidetracked by the way the decision was ar-
gued. If a case is important to us, an understanding of these points will
come later, once we have understood the court’s approach vis-à-vis the
case’s reality.
It can be that the facts of a case are multifaceted, or it can be that the de-
cision itself is complex and contains many variables. The latter usually
occurs if a decision is favorable, i.e. the court chooses to enter into the
substance of a case29. An unfavorable decision, on the other hand, may be
summed up as follows: at the trial court level, “the claim is dismissed”;
later, at the appellate level, “the judgment is affirmed” or “the appeal is
denied.” Indeed, judgments adverse to the plaintiff are easily identified:
We understand the word “no” from the very beginning and, in light of
whatever the claim is, we have a clear idea of what was decided.

6. Discovering the Judgment

Within the legal decision there are, then, two distinct moments. One is
when the judge is shaping a provisional hypothesis as to how to decide the
case, and the other is when the judge is shaping the basis of the final deci-
sion. Over the course of that two-step process, the judge is adjusting, re-
vising, and eventually correcting the initial hypothesis.

29 In Ángel Estrada, out of three votes, the first opinion is dissenting and the
second and third are concurring. They formed part of the majority by indicating
that the Ente Nacional Regulador de la Electricidad [The National Electricity
Regulation Authority] must decide again, but now “bearing in mind what is set
forth in this resolution”: CNFed. CA, Chamber I, LL, SAdm., 6-X-00, p. 34.
76 A. Gordillo

6.1. Knowing How to Read

Let us reiterate that there are two classic ways to analyze a given judg-
ment: the first, is to pay attention to what the judgment decided vis-à-vis a
certain problem; the second, is to pay special attention to the arguments
the judgment employed, without taking into account first and foremost
what is decided or what the problem actually is.
The latter is the method used exclusively in preparing case summaries,
and it is also the way in which many law students, lawyers and law profes-
sors read judgments.
These methods are so basic yet disparate that, more than two centuries
ago, a king considered it necessary to prohibit the spread of the second
method. The Spanish Royal Judicial Notice of June 25, 1768, stated: “In
order to avoid the prejudice arising from the practice observed in the Ap-
pellate Court of Majorca of motivating its judgments, giving place to the
musings of the litigants [...] I order the cessation of said practice and to
pay attention to decision-making words.”30
It is important not to focus on what a judgment says, but rather on hav-
ing an adequate understanding of the case or the problem of fact the judge
was facing and what he decided.
Likewise, the judge, when reading the parties’ written submissions, must
focus on what facts they allege (even though they may conflict with his
own perception of the evidence) and, on the basis of those facts, the judge
must target what the parties are asking. Indeed, it is always necessary to
understand first and foremost what is being dealt with: in a written sub-
mission, to know what the object and petition are (which must coincide
with each other)31; and in a judgment, what was decided in each approach.

6.2. Description and Factual and Legal Reasoning

When we have an interesting selection of judgments whose holdings

seem useful, we can read them more closely. But do we have to take into
account mainly the case’s legal arguments or its description of the facts?
It is a given that the facts are of utmost importance in the law, and if we
make a mistake of fact, everything else comes apart. Indeed, the facts de-

30 NIETO, op. cit., pp. 137 and 143-145.

31 GENARO R. CARRIÓ pointed out that these are the fundamental parts of a legal
writing, to which the lawyer must pay the highest attention and care. Mutatis mu-
tandis, it is the same method used by BREITEL in his judgments.
 How to Read a Judgment 77

termine whether a solution is fair or unfair, whether a certain behavior is

abusive of the law or not, whether someone acted in good or bad faith,
whether malpractice was committed or not, etc. In this sense, good legal
work can be differentiated from bad legal work not so much by normative
or conceptual arguments, but by the depth in which it scrutinizes facts to
properly identify the issues in play.
While facts are the most important thing in a case, the most interesting
thing in a judgment is how those facts are perceived, reasoned, and argued.
However, we must not assume that a case’s description of the facts is nec-
essarily complete and appropriate: this, because reality never truly enters
into a judgment32.
One thing that can occur, though, is that certain questions of fact influ-
ence a decision, but are not explained in the judgment. As a consequence,
the reader does not realize that such questions came to bear on a particular
decision. However, those questions do not play any less of a role in solv-
ing the problem presented.

7. What the Judgment Says “More” or “Less”

If readers delve into the “aimless ruminations” mentioned by the Spanish

Royal Judicial Notice of 1768, it would seem that it is worse the judgment
that says too much, as opposed to too little. This is because what is lacking
at least makes the reader think about what could be the real grounds of the
judgment. The presence of too many arguments - particularly when they
are not central - creates an obstacle for discovering a judgment’s grounds,
because superfluous arguments wind up leading the reader to dead ends.
At other times, both things happen at once: the judgment omits its funda-
mental grounds and instead gives reasons that did not lead to the decision,
but these latter reasons can nonetheless be grounded “objectively,” albeit in
the abstract.
The final writing of a judgment is not done with the same care as mak-
ing the decision on which it is based. It is possible that in that final ver-
sion, many arguments slip through the cracks, both when the court is say-
ing too much and too little. When the court is saying too much, arguments
“slip by” because it is almost a sport in our profession to come up with and
look for different angles. If we can add a good argument to the judgment,
we add it, even if it is an argument that did not play an important role in
rendering the decision. In this way, instrumental arguments multiply

32 Because judges have the same human problem which LEIBNIZ remarked.
78 A. Gordillo

within a judgment, even though they played absolutely no role in the deci-
sion-making process. Academic writings that comment on judgments will
add even more arguments, maybe as irrelevant - but less dangerous - as the
ones the judgment itself adds.
There are also arguments that, as a matter of good taste, are better left
unwritten. For example, while damages have to be taken into account, no-
body wants to condemn the State to an amount that it cannot pay, because,
as it was harshly said, “When there is no money, there is no law.”33 State
responsibility thus diminishes in times of crisis and increases in times of
well-being. Similarly, in a civil sentence, the magistrate will take into ac-
count the situation of the victim or the tortfeasor, or of both - for instance
when setting a sum for redress, whether it be equal or superior to the profit
the responsible obtained by committing the injury. Sometimes the judge
makes this explicit34, sometimes he does not35.
If it is a question of convicting the State to pay damages, no judgment
would include a consideration of how much there is in the public coffers.
Yet, it would be wrong to think that this argument has not been carefully
weighed.
We will consider two famous and two lesser known cases to illustrate
how judges saying too much or too little can set back our analysis. It
would not be the case’s fault, but rather ours, if we were to misunderstand
the judges. As will be seen, though, this has already happened in the past.

7.1. Chocobar36

The Supreme Court was backlogged with more than seventy thousand
cases regarding retirement pensions, and at the same time was considering
a case that would either extend or curtail social security rights. This must
have been very difficult, indeed, as courts have always been sensitive to
this issue due to the fact that such payments can literally feed the popula-

33 Of course, we have talked about countries going through insolvency periods.

34 The CSJN [The Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic], in Ek-
mekdjian, aroused an interest in this and other aspects; GONZÁLEZ PÉREZ, JESÚS, La
degradación del derecho al honor (honor y libertad de información), Madrid,
Civitas, 1993, p. 45.
35 Sometimes rules impose it. In Finland, fines for traffic violations depend on
the financial situation of the offender. In this way, a member of the nouveau riche
might have to pay almost $100,000 just for changing lanes illegally.
36 1996, LL, 1997-B, 247.
 How to Read a Judgment 79

tion receiving them, and because of the stage of life in which the claimants
are. Social security laws find applicability at times when pensioners face
death rather closely for comfort, and who claim for payments they think
the law determines for them. That said, if the Court let its docket backlog
by seventy thousand cases, it is because the Court considered these cases
as one, taking into account the economic weight on the public coffers of
such a global decision37.
When the delay became unsustainable due to the appearance of the Ar-
gentine Ombudsman before the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights38, it became public in the newspapers of the day (as well as via
members of the tribunal) that, out of nine votes, there were two groups of
four votes. Newspapers39 reported that the ninth vote would decide be-
tween signing the vote establishing the highest percentage increase of gov-
ernment payments, or trying to force the other group to increase the per-
centage that it recognized. The newspapers proceeded to point out the total
amount that the decisions would represent for the national treasury40. It
was said that when, as of the first vote, members of the second group were
challenged to be in majority, they stated that if they were to be a majority
then their judgment would be different. While we do not have proof of
this, we do know what the newspapers reported: that is, that the pivotal

37 Which was certainly not mentioned in the judgment.

38 Which was public and notorious, but not recorded in the judgment.
39 The judgment did not say as much, although much happened “behind the
scenes.” Horse trading, as it is known in the United States, is a common practice
worldwide in three-judge tribunals. It is the search for an in-between agreement
among all the magistrates, in which each of them resigns a bit of his position in
order to reach a common decision. Although horse trading is a natural part of con-
sensus building within a group of magistrates, it cannot be reflected in the judg-
ment lest it lack style. Nonetheless, we cannot forget to analyze how an agreement
was reached. Even in the individual courts we can find an exchange of ideas be-
tween the judge and his clerks or other officers or employees of the court, because,
logically, they influence each other. Even though ideas that led to a decision are
not explained by a judgment, that does not mean that a person who ignores that
process will be reading a judgment well.
40 The same kind of strategy was presented in 1986 in In re Zappa. The head-
lines in newspapers were “Impossible to Pay 82 Percent”; “It Is a Blind Alley.” See
OTEIZA, EDUARDO, La Corte Suprema. Entre la justicia sin política y la política sin
justicia, La Plata, LEP, 1994, p. 158 and its references of p. 157. There, the deci-
sion was “legal” but unreal: It was impossible to comply with the judgment and it
was not complied with, as OTEIZA explains, op. loc. cit.
80 A. Gordillo

ninth vote obtained a small increase from the first group, and in the end
joined it to become a majority.
On what can we base this case? With the bitter saying “When there is no
money, there is no law”? Whatever we choose, we can do so very briefly.
Yet the final judgment contained hundreds of legal considerations, and
while this is not, in and of itself, reprehensible, if somebody refers to them
for legal precedent or persuasive authority, he is victim to a serious mis-
perception. For this reason, we should not pay special attention to the text,
but should pay a lot of attention to the court’s actual decision-making
process in the case.

7.2. Peralta41

One Monday, a decree of necessity and urgency was issued that turned
all fixed-term deposits in the financial system into long-term bonds. While
much has been written on this case, there is a piece of information regard-
ing the reality of the bonds that solves the subject.
The Friday of the long weekend previous to the decree, there was a
sharp and extreme financial overheating in the market. Because of this
overheating, at closing time, the overnight or “call” bank deposits of that
day for the weekend were contracted with more than 900% annual42, al-
most four digits of interest. That single piece of information shows without
argument that it was necessary and urgent to cool down immediately such
an absurd overheating in the economy. No one has ever found it necessary
to read the ensuing legal proclamation, because the solution is so self-
evident. Anything more said would simply be extraneous.

7.3. Allevato

Sometimes I read a case very carefully, which is when I probably make

a mistake. As proof of this, I always bear in mind one comment I wrote, in
which I found everything wrong with the judgment’s reasoning43. True

41 CSJN [The Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic], in re

Peralta, Fallos [Judgments], 313: 153.
42 Fifty times more than a highly worrying banking rate, in call, of 15 or 16% at
present.
43 See our book Después de la reforma del Estado, Buenos Aires, FDA, 1996,
st
1 ed., annex of chapter X, pp. 56-60. It is appropriate to highlight that it is an
 How to Read a Judgment 81

enough, the way in which the judgment was written was far from perfect
and it was replete with mistakes of fact and faulty legal reasoning. This
wrongly encouraged me. I commented on the case’s arguments and stated
my firm discrepancy. I pointed out all of the factual errors, and “logically”
proceeded to propose the opposite legal solution.
Big mistake. I had not noticed a factual peculiarity that was not in the
judgment, but was in the background of the problem; a peculiarity that, by
application of a different line of reasoning - whether it had been mine or
the court’s -, would have allowed me to reach the same conclusion as the
court. Although I was thinking (and think) that the pronouncement did not
possess the appropriate grounds of fact and law, its perception of reality
and its decision were correct. My perception of reality was wrong, al-
though my arguments were “good.” Obviously, good arguments are worth-
less when they are applied incorrectly.
Let me reiterate, the judgment contained the suitable solution, even
though for other reasons and using another description of the facts in the
same case.
It is clearly preferable to give a good solution and explain it badly, than
give a bad solution and explain it “well.” The latter is a fallacy, because if
the solution is wrong, we cannot say that, legally speaking, it is good. In
such a scenario, the concepts that present themselves would be like those
of SAVIGNY, which are potentially good in vitro, but do not pertain to the
problem to be solved. These concepts are, inasmuch, bad in concrete
cases, where a faulty application of the law results from attempting to do
so with a premise that does not fit within the framework of normative rea-
soning.
Law is not an abstract exercise, it is the solution to specific problems. If
the law decides problems wrongly, it is not good law.

7.4. Pereyra

We have previously commented44 on this judgment exclusively to show

its analytical process. We have not included expressly our hypothesis that

excellent tribunal that has handed down magnificent judgments. One of them
serves as an example of factual analysis: The Scotch Whisky Association Ltd.,
CNFed. Civ. y Com., Chamber II, 2000, LL, 2000-C, 696, whose legal analysis
was good, but whose description of the facts was so clear that there was no other
option than a fair solution.
44 El método en un caso de derecho: hechos, valoración, normas, RAP, 234-91,
Buenos Aires, 1998.
82 A. Gordillo

provides the foundation to our analysis in order to leave it open to the

reader. In any event, we do not have information that would allow us to
support or misrepresent our premise. We think that is a question of sympa-
thy or antipathy towards the categories of people (not even the specific
people involved in the lawsuit) that comprise the two central groups in the
case. One group was made up of Jehovah’s Witnesses, one of whom, be-
cause of his religion, refused to defer to his country’s emblems, e.g. the
flag45. The other group was made up of the military establishment, and
among them, the military courts that convicted him of insubordination.
In this case, there were many values at stake, such as freedom of wor-
ship, personal freedoms, and religious discrimination, as well as the judg-
ment of the values present during the period in which those military sen-
tences were given. On the flip side, the essence of the national being, or-
der, and authority were at stake, as well as the national defense, the flag’s
defense, and our Western and Christian way of life, the latter taking into
consideration the fact that the detention was “benevolent” and there was no
mistreatment46, etc.
We use this case as a barometer of the feelings and value judgments
predominant in our culture. Those who analyze this case in our many
postgraduate courses usually agree with the judgment against the Jeho-
vah’s Witness. Such was, likewise, the legal solution, including on the part
of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic. It seems that
we, as a society, neither give preference to nor favor diversity: We prefer
uniformity, homogeneity47.

45 The sincerity of his beliefs was never in doubt.

46 Third parties led us to believe that those last arguments came to bear on mak-
ing the decision. They were not explained in the text of the jurisdictional pro-
nouncement.
47 We started with the symmetric arrangement of desks in classrooms and with
the democratizing white school coat. Private schools, though, introduced elegant
and nice uniforms, so the white school coat became a discriminatory factor. We
still have the uniform, but do not allow freedom or individuality. The same can be
said of the way students are taught to greet the flag. This practice is unknown in
the United States, where, without needing a martial line-up, nobody would deny
honoring and respecting their flag. In this way, we keep on rewarding what is the
same and pestering what is different.
 How to Read a Judgment 83

8. The Interest in the Subject or in the Judgment

There are subjects that are excitingly new and current, that, when
brought before a court, nonetheless receive an adverse sentence, because
the court did not share the same enthusiasm as the party concerned.
Let us suppose that, upon denying the action, the judgment explains the
interests of the complaint and also the motives by which the judge denies
the claim.
In that instance, the sentence is not of interest as such, but only as re-
gards the instrumental vehicle of the subject at hand that could even, po-
tentially, be contained in an article of a review, in a chapter of a book, etc.
The complaint was original, but the judge understood with good reasons
that it should not be received. Is there any legal news in that?
Strictly speaking, no, because the law has not changed with that judg-
ment. Let us say that it is a piece of information that can be useful to have,
if someone thinks about presenting the same complaint before the same
court, or in order to enrich its legal culture if the situation that had to be
solved with it was not clear. But no more than that.
The principle that should serve as our point of departure for the analysis
of judgments, thus, is that a judgment is not reading material as if it were
an article taken from a law review, a monograph, or a thesis.
The resolution of a problem is what is important in the judgment, and
the resolution is that which is attractive for a particular reason. If it is an
interesting decision, analyzing how the judge explains that decision will be
also of interest. If it is not innovative - maybe because it is obvious - the
interest of its content is not different from any other publication unrelated
to the judgment.
This clarification is important, precisely because many judges are law
professors; as they publish articles and books, they frequently include in
their judgments the theories they have developed in such works. There are
no legal, ethical, or social impediments for using judgments as a vehicle
for developing ideas for class lectures, but it is important to point out that
the fact that these ideas are embodied in case law or other legal writings
does not transform them into a source of law.
Its value depends on its intrinsic persuasive power, or the power of the
authority that inspired the judgment’s author, but it cannot be said that a
judgment was citing strictly a jurisdictional pronouncement.
84 A. Gordillo

8.1. Dictum and Holding

That question is similar to the distinction between what is called dictum

and holding of a judgment. The holding is what specifically resolves the
issues in question and thus provides the reasons given for that approach.
Dictum comprises all that is said about the issues in question, including
collaterally or unrelated to the thema decidendum, and which, therefore, is
not judicial precedent.

8.2. Form vs. Substance

Sometimes how a judgment is framed is interesting, even when it is ad-

verse to substantive law, not for what it says, but for what it decides re-
garding form over substance. As an example, we can procedurally allow a
citizen to contest a certain State activity if he has standing, but we can
dismiss his complaint substantively if he contests a legally permitted activ-
ity. The first point is interesting and the second is not, because, presuming
the activity is lawful, we gain no empirical knowledge of what the court
found determinative.

9. The Excess of Information

We have said many times that we have not read the arguments or the le-
gal reasoning of a particular judgment. Some people may think that a bit
irresponsible or not serious enough, but there are certain reasons that put
this problem in another perspective.
For one thing, it is better to realize that in the time dedicated to acquir-
ing useless information, we could have learned something useful, or, at a
minimum, we could have been resting. If we are short of time, we must
manage it greedily. When somebody wonders how we read so many
judgments and how we remember them, there is only one answer: that I do
not always read them completely48 but only the description of the problem
and the decision adopted to address it. My colleagues may note that when I
act as a lawyer for a claimant or respondent, I cite too many legal articles

48 It is a “catch 22”: the more carefully we read a judgment, the fewer judgments
we read and the more we loose sight of the whole. That is the reason why the
group analysis is important, as in chapters 4 and 5 of OTEIZA, op. cit.
 How to Read a Judgment 85

and books49, but that I do not cite many cases. When I can, I do so
briefly50.
A second reason that has led me to read cases in the way described
above was the need to read a large volume of them, in order to select those
that would be published in the “Administrative Law Case-Law Supple-
ment” of the newspaper La Ley: the more judgments read, the better the
selection51. However, the need to read many cases does not only stem from
being in charge of a publication, as I have been for many years for that
Supplement: it stems from the contemporary problem that everybody
dedicated to the law has, that is, an excess of available information, spe-
cifically, and excess of case law. Let us stop a moment to examine this
problem.

9.1. The Official Collections of Case Law

Every official collection adds many volumes every year, and that repre-
sents only a part of the actual total of new case law52. If we include the
judgments of provincial or foreign courts, the total obviously exceeds a
person’s normal reading capacity.

49 Not in my arguments before a court, as the court knows its body of case law
better than I do. If I do put an obstacle in the way of the court’s work, stylistic rea-
sons would force it to look for and quote other precedents than the ones I have
mentioned. A different practice occurs at international tribunals, as I explain in
Statutory Limitations of Administrative Tribunals, soon to be published by the
Inter-American Development Bank Administrative Tribunal XX Anniversary,
Washington, 2003.
50 Cien notas de Agustín. Notas asistemáticas de un lustro de jurisprudencia en
derecho administrativo, Buenos Aires, Fundación de Derecho Administrativo,
1999.
51 The method has stayed with me, while the motives have not. In effect, I had
the privilege of later receiving many judgments through friends and acquaintances
as soon as they appeared. Some computing networks of public interest provide a
similar service. For example, the one of the University of Palermo called Red DIP
[DIP Network], or Red de Derecho de Interés Público [Law Network of Public
Interest]: [email protected]. Enrollment is free.
52 Let alone the court itself. According to unofficial information, for example,
the CSJN [The Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic] does not pub-
lish all its judgments, but “selects” the ones of highest interest - that is, of course,
according to he who classifies them.
86 A. Gordillo

Let us suppose I have to research cases for a particular subject. Obvi-

ously, there is a first thematic selection in which we are going to be guided
by the kind of tribunal and case we are looking for. At the same time, we
can find guidance in the glossaries and indices of the casebooks we will be
perusing. Once this main first selection is done, there are still more judg-
ments left than time I have to read them.
If from the very beginning we try to read them all in depth, our invest-
ment of time will be so high that we will not be able to read the range of
cases we must. It may occur that among the ones we did not look at there
could have been some cases of interest. So, in order not to miss potentially
important judgments, we must read quickly and well. We must be able to
maintain a global vision of our research, without affecting our ability to
take notes. Otherwise, we could get lost or confused in the research.

9.2. Selecting by Book: Its Limitations

One way of doing research can be to trust in the research already done
by the author of a particular book. While this is not bad as a starting point,
the problem is that books do not usually address the exact problem we
want to investigate. A book can provide a general orientation, but not spe-
cific sources to the specific issue we are looking for. The same happens
with review articles, monographs, theses and treatises. As every case is
individual, such approximations orient, but do not settle, the problem. In
this first stage, it is important to find out if there are judgments that settled
in any way the thema decidendum in question. This is because you have to
know where you are in order to start.

9.3. The Selection by Means of Review Summaries

Another possibility is to search in summaries of law reviews and CDs

compiling such summaries. Many young lawyers usually read no more
than the summary of the review publishing the judgment, but that poses an
initial problem, which is that the summaries may not necessarily represent
a good reading of the judgments. If the other party realizes that one has
quoted summaries from a CD, they are likely to reply with a real judgment
and scoff at the “academic” summaries.
 How to Read a Judgment 87

9.4. The Personal Selection: Its Problems

If we want to select pronouncements that contribute to a certain point of

view or address a certain matter, we are left with no choice but to flip
through a huge number of judgments and to search rapidly for what inter-
ests us. If we do not have much time, it is of no use to read the cases in
detail, because, in the end, it may be of no interest. Moreover, reading
closely serves no purpose, since only what was decided is important, and
that is found at the end.
In fact, before proceeding, we first must determine if we are even inter-
ested in the decision. If we skim in order to save time, we may skip over
an important judgment or get caught up in one that is not important at all.
However, if we are not able to “speed read” - which is faster even than
skimming - we will be able to read fewer judgments and the quality of our
information will be limited by a reduced reference field. Perhaps other
people who know how to search better will be able to find judgments that
we could not find, so we must achieve a speed in reading specifically in
order to find at least the precedents regarding the matter we must analyze.

9.4.1. Being Informed on a Daily Basis

Another possibility is reading legal newspapers every day, something

that, of course, a lawyer should do. The problem is, though, once again,
that we have a lot of information, and either time does not allow for a deep
reading or the subject might not be of interest to us. Obviously, we need to
resort to an initial thematic selection due to the great number of subjects,
e.g. are we interested in civil or criminal law, commercial or administra-
tive law, etc. Within those subjects, there are other subjects that may at-
tract our attention and others that may not, but once that selection is made,
a priori there are still too many judgments to read in order to be updated.
As when we are searching for something in particular, here, too, we face
the problem of juggling with time and quality of selection.
Daily reading has other difficulties. One is the need to keep a distance
from the object, in that information gathered should not be taken for spe-
cific data of the current law, but rather as a legal hypothesis. This is be-
cause quick daily reading means reading with inadequate reflection, and it
does no good to overwhelm ourselves with information that is destined to
change. What is more, daily reading does not even prepare us sufficiently
for those changes.
88 A. Gordillo

Finally, we have to average out the number of hours we spend on re-

flecting with the time we use in receiving information. The suggested
technique for reading judgments prevents us from relying on the existing
answers and, instead, contributes to creativity and to keeping our minds
alert. Indeed, the technique prepares us for the changes to come, and it
engenders reflection rather than amassing information53.

53 BIELSA said: “Some people study for five hours but think for only one. It is the
other way round: We have to study for one hour and think for five.”