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591 views81 pages(Ebooks) Historical - Squadron Signal 6000 - Vietnam Studies Group 6037 - Air War Over Southeast Asia (3) - 1971-1975 by Osprey 1984
History of vietnam air war
Uploaded by
Carlos EscaurizaCopyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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/ 81
6037
$8.95
— a
~ Southeast Asia
A Pictorial Record
Vol. 3 1971-1975
Lou Drendel
" squadronisignal publications BUR WEAR
over
southeast Asia
S™* A Pictorial Record
wont ‘sx, Vol. 3 1971-1975
_MIETNAM
‘ae : 7 2 By Lou Drendel
squadron/signal publications (Front Cover) A-7D SLUF (nee Corsair Il) of the 354 TFW. The A-7, with
its superior navigational and weapons delivery computers, took over
and starred in the "Sandy" role during Linebacker I.
(Back Cover) Steve Ritchie got his third and fourth MIG 21s on 8 July,
1972, He flew over the top of the fireball created whan his Sparrow
rissile blasted the first.
COPYRIGHT © 1984 SQUADRONISIGNAL
PUBLICATIONS, INC.
1115 CROWLEY DRIVE, CARROLLTON, TEXAS 75011-5010
All rights reserved. No'part of this publication may be reproduced,
‘stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any means
flectrical, mechanical or otherwise, without written permission of
the publisher.
ISBN 0-89747-148-2
11 you have any photographs of the aircraft, armor, soldiers or ships
‘of any nation, particularly wartime snapshots, why not share them
with us and help make SquadroniSignal's books all the more in.
{teresting and complete in th future. Any photograph sent to us will
‘be copied and the original returned. The donor will be fully credited
{or any photos used. Please indicate if you wish us not to return the
photos. Please send them to: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.,
1915 Crowley Dr., Carroliton, TX 75011-5010.
Photo Credits
USAF
US Navy
US Army
US Marine Corps
Norman . Taylor
F.C Brown
Andy Mutzig
Wayne Mutza
Fon Verner
Fon Botz
Fon Lauer
Bob Baldo
Mike Lecroy
Ralph Hood
Neal Thompson AIR WAR OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA 1971
AAs the American troop commitment in Vieinam wound down, North Viet
ramese reliance on conventional warfare to conquer South Vietnam increas-
td. The Viet Cong had ceased to be an effective political or military force
‘vith the stunning communist defeat suffered during the Tet Offensive of
1968. There was no longer any possibility of an indigenous guerilla force
‘overthrowing the government of South Vietnam, simply because that force
had ceased to exist in the carnage of the Tet Offensive. Any communist vc
tory inthe south would have tobe achieved by the North Vietnamese regular
Army, and the North proved exceptionally singleminded inthis regard
‘Contrary 10 what might have reasonably been expected, the avowed and
demonstrated pull-out of American forces, coupled with undisguised North
Vietnamese aggression, did not result in any dimunition of the antiwar move
sent inthe United States, The radical chic of the late sixties and early seven
ties demanded that any liberal who admitted to being liberal also must voice
his unequivocal opposition to the American Government's policy in Viet
ham, ‘The antiwar movement had become unreasoning, intransigent, and
blind to what was actually happening in Vietnam. Fortunately, Richard Nix
‘on was not the sort of President who would allow his decisions to be swayed
by this radical che
“The North Vietnamese were marshalling their forces for an all-out sp
offensive in 1971, after operations in Cambodia during the spring of 1970
had destroyed communist supply lines through that country into South Vie
‘nam, aborting any communist offensive in 1970, Prior to the joimt US-ARVN,
invasion of Cambodia, it was estimated that up to eighty-five percent of all
‘communist was materiel funneled through Cambodia, particularly through
the por of Sihanoukville. When that supply line was closed, the communists
were forced to rely upon the Ho Chi Minh Tral through Laos. By January of
971, the Trail was nearly as busy as the LA Freeway at rush hout, and the
North was obviously poised for @ major invasion ofthe South, In order to
secure their remaining invasion route, the North Vietnamese moved three
divisions of troops into the Laotian panhandle, and emplaced dozens of
SAMs and hundreds of AAA gunsites slong the Tra
‘Though nominally neural, Laos was in facta clandestine battleground.
‘The North Vietnamese maintained an army of occupation of up to 100,000
troops, which asisted and controlled the Pathet Lao (the Laotion com:
‘muniss). They also maintained the Ho Chi Minh Tral through Laos. The
‘Trail was a series of roads and pathways, able to accommodate anyihing
from biycle porters to tanks. twas the principal North Vietnamese invasion
route othe south, and as such, received a considerable amount of attention
from Allied air forces. The United States provided advisors and weaponry to
the Laotion Government, and the American Central Intelligence Agency
helped to maintain an army of 30,000 Meo tribesmen under Major General
Vang Pao. This clandestine army, along with the CIA's own airline, Air
America, maintained what was in effect an almost illisory American
presence in Laos, which had ltl or no effect on North Vietnamese oper:
Intelligence reports that the North Vietnamese were on the verge of launch
ing a major invasion of the south from their Laotion sanctuaries prompted
President Nixon to authorize the same sort of operation that had been so sue
‘tefl the previous yar in Cambodia, The American name forthe operation
was DEWEY CANYON II, But American participation was limited to aerial
interdiction, close support, and tactical arift. All of the grunts on the mis
sion were ARVN, and for that reason the name which became public
Knowledge was LAM SON 719,
“The attack into Laos was named after a Vietnamese viciory over the
Chinese in 1427, and got under way on February 8, 1971, The South Viet
rnamese general in charge was the commander of ARVN I Corps, Lieutenant
General Hoang Xuan Lam. He chose some of South Vietnam's best troops,
inchuding the Airborne Division, Marine Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and
the Ist Armored Brigade o carry out the atacks on the Ho Chi Minl Trail.
‘At 1000 hours on 8 February, 1971, over §,000 ARVN troops crossed the
frontier on highway 9, west of Khe Sanh, the former Marine combat base
that served as the staging area forthe attack. The plan was for the ground
forces to link up with the airlifted troops around Tehepone, consolidate their
positions, then seek out and destroy North Vietnamese supply dumps
Withdrawal from Laos was scheduled for March 10. As the invasion force
advanced, ARVN Rangers and Airborne troops established fite bases on the
peaks along route 9,
Total American forces involved in the operation were 10,000 men, 2,000
fixed-wing and 600 rotary-wing aircraft. US ground troops were restricted to
operations within South Vietnam, which meant that their combat role was
confined to the initial phase of the operation, consisting of the clearing of
Highway 9, from Quang Tri to Khe Sanh, In spite of a news blackout, word
of the impending atack leaked, and the North Vietnamese were denouncing
‘expansion of the war into Laos by the United States even before the attack
20% under way. President Nixon, in his memoir, stated that LAM SON 719
‘was a "military success, bt a public relations divaster.” The foundations for
that disaster were laid immediately, as the American antiwar lobby joined
Peking and Moscow in calling the forthcoming operation—"imperialst a8
sression””
The North Vietnamese counterattacked and many vicious battles were
fought, with the ARVN troopers giving better than they got, though the ad
vance towards Tchepone was bogged down by the heavy fighting. In an at
{empt to break the North Vietnamese defense, General Lam used 120 US Ar
my Hueys to aieit two ARVN infantry battalions into the Tehepone area. In
spite of the fact that the attack was preceded by 1-82 strikes, and clear
‘weather allowed maximum use of close ai support, the helicopters en
countered the heaviest anti-aircraft fire of the war. It isto their credit, and
the discredit of the North Vietnamese gunners, that only one helicopter was
lost. This final assault resulted in the achievement of most of the objectives
‘of LAM SON 719. Ina joint communique issued on § March, USand ARVN
‘commands pronounced the operation an unqualified success. Large caches of
‘weapons, ammunition, and foodstuffs had been captured or destroyed. Over
13,000 enemy had been Killed, forthe loss of 2,000 Allied solders, Enemy
losses also included 76 arilery pices, 106 tanks, 05 trucks, and 1,934 crew
served weapons
The communist propaganda network was nothing, if not inventive. Their
scoreboard for LAM SON 719 read as follows:
{In more than 60 days and nights of fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with
the Southern Lao population and liberation forces against the enemy's
“LAM SON 719" operation, the population and armed forces atthe
Khe Sanh Front have recorded great victories. We have frustrated ail
US strategic schemes forts military adventure. We have destroved an
Important part of the enemy forces and war means, including: nearly
7,000 troops, with 4,084 Gis wiped out, 863 military vehicles, tn
‘cluding 236 tanks and armored personnel caries uted, 234 aircraft
shot down or destroyed on the ground, 72 cannon and big mortars
wrecked, 42 war vesses captured or burned, 41 big lopstc bases and
Supply dumps containing millions of liters of fuel and thousands of
tons of weapons, ammunition, food and miliary supplies, ett
destroyed.
Actual Allied losses were 115 aircraft, of which 107 were helicopters, 75
tanks, and 198 crew-served weapons. During 30 days of heavy fighting in
USS Enterprise crewmen prepare to launch a sunset mission. August
‘of 1971 in the South China Sea, (US Navy) In one of the last checks before launch, a catapult crewman checks
the launch bridle cable on an A-3 Skywarrior. (US Navy)
EKA.38 launching from USS Coral Sea, 15 January, 1972, in the Gulf
of Tonkin. The Skywarrior began life as a nuclear attack bomber, but
by the time it received its baptism of fire over Vietnam, it was used
exclusively in support roles such as reconnaissance, electronic
countermeasures, and aerial refuelling. (US Navy)
Laos South Vietnamese forces had acquitted themselves well, standing up to
numerically superior forces, even when weather prevented effective air sup
por.
In anticipation of worsening weather, and fecing that most of the objec
tives ofthe operation iad been met, General Lam ordered the withdrawl of
his forces from Laos. The Assistant Division Commander ofthe 10Ist Air:
borne Division, Brigadier General Sidney B. Berry, Jt, ordered his pilots to
load their helicopters tothe absolute maximum in a effort to cut down on
the number of sorties required to accomplish the withdrawal; an order that
‘made good tactical sense in minimizing the exposure tothe ant-aicra fire
of the North Vietnamese. Unfortunately this precipitated a disastrous image
of the whole operation. Loading helicopters tothe absolute limit often meant
having ARVN troopers hanging on the skids. When photos of this were
released by the wire services they painted a picture of withdrawal turned 10
rout, It was an undeserved epilogue to an operation in which the South Viet
hnamese had fought bravely’ and well. The major American media, never
known for their dissemination of good news, quickly seized on these images
and turned the withdrawal into a bug-out, ignoring the official versions of
LAM SON 719. Headlines such ast SCRAMBLE FOR SAFETY” and
“The invasion of Laos comes to an end in bitter debate and run for cover”,
heralded American reportage ofthe operation. As far as the American public
(and to a large extent, the South Vietnamese public) was concerned, LAM
SON 719 had been a complete disaster, reinforcing the opinion thatthe war
was unseinnable
‘The experts knew better. Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on gust
rilla warfare, wrote to Henry Kissinger from Vietnam after the operation,
Praising its military suceess. He also offered the opinion that the outcome of
the war would now depend upon South Vietnamese psychology and con
fidence. His words were prophetically accurate. By any rational estimate
LAM SON 719 had been & tactical victory. Inthe strategie short run, it Was
also successful, forcing the North Vietnamese to again postpone thir plans
for a spring invasion for a full year, and reducing casualties within South
Vietnam while the withdrawal of US forces continued. But lke so much of
the Vietnam War, the propaganda victory belonged to the communists,
whose alles in the major western media turned a tactical victory into
widespread doubt about the fighting abilities of ARVN.
‘Antiwar forces kept the brutality of the wat in the forefront of the news
with the convition of Liewtenant Wiliam Calley in the My Lai Massacre,
Though no one could condone Calley’ ations inthe premeditated murder of
22 South Vietnamese civilians, the general public was for clemency for
Calley. His court martial senteiced him to life imprisonment at hard labor,
but President Nixon, with the support of @ majority of Congressional
leaders, intervened, reducing the sentence to ten years. Calley was eventually
paroled in 1974. There was litle doubt in the minds of most Americans that
Caley’s actions were not representative of our efforts in the war, and even
his actions were felt to be the result ofthe covert nature ofthe Viet Cong at-
tacks suffered by his unit. However, the lurid reportage of the massacre, highlighted by the gore of color photography, accentuated the horrors of the
war, Ifthe atrocities of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had received a
Fraction ofthe coverage My Lai got, there would have been to slackening of
the will ofthe American public to support the objectives of the war. AS it
vas, the media chose to ignore much of the brutality of the enemy. If one
Feled upon the television networks or the major print media for information
fn the conduct ofthe war, you would have believed that the communists were
pure-ot-heat revolutionaries, while the United States was only interested in
brutally defending a way of life that was manifestly corrupt. Fortunately
much of the major media was looked upon with some distrust by a majority
ff Americans, and the media's increasingly antiwar bias only served (0
alienate generations that had grown up trusting their news media
The Laotion invasion and the Calley tral were not the only Vietnam prob-
lems faced by the Nixon Administration in 1971. In. June the Pentagon
Papers story broke. The Pentagon Papers were a 7,000-page study. of
American involvement in Vietnam from World War Il through 1968, com
missioned by Robert McNamara, Officially tiled, “The History of US
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam”, the study had been compiled from
information contributed by the Department of Defense, the State Depar
‘ment, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Many verbatim documents were
included in the study, and much of i was classified as SECRET or TOP
SECRET. Though the Pentagon Papers primarily discredited the manner in
Which the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations conducted Vietnam Policy
their release would compromise intelligence sources stil in place. They would
also cause & good deal of political embarrassment among foreign leaders if
their communications with the American Government were publicized, This
would result in less-than-candid exchanges im the future. Under the ci.
Cumstances, the Nixon Adminstration concluded thatthe prudent sourse to
follow wouid be to attempt to block publication through court injunction,
The New York Times had gained access to the study when it was passed t0
them illegally by a former Pentagon employee, Daniel Ellsberg. Elsberg's ac
tion was at best that of a common thief, and at worst that ofa traitor. He was
lionized by the media. The New York Times and Washington Post in par
ticular betrayed their First Amendment trust by demonstrating double stand
ards when it same to the Vietnam War. Though the Pentagon Papers would
abviously damage the US, and in spite of the fact that they were obtained i
legally, both of these newspapers allowed their antiwar bias to guide their
policies. And the US Supreme Court showed somewhat les-than-supreme
ood judgment by allowing ther publication. It was one more indication that
many Americans did not have the patience or fortitude to support a war that
‘would probably continue with or without US participation, America was get~
ling out of Vietnam.
[A Intruder of VA-165 enroute to targets in North Vietnam on § May,
1972. (US Navy)
&
=
\VA-165 Intruder has just been hauled to a stop bythe arresting cable
aboard USS Constellation after an April, 1972, mission over Vietnam,
(Us Navy)
ATE of VA192 “Golden Dragons” off the USS Kitly Hawk on a 1971
mmission over Vietnam. With its state-of-the-art weapons delivery com:
puters, the Corsair II made its pilots the best bombers in the fleet.
um \VEP-63 RF-8G operated from the USS Midway in 1971. (Shinichi
Ohtaki)
(Let The RF-8 Crusader we
‘att throughout the Vietnar
‘cat aboard USS Coral Sea.
kaso refuelling VF-92 “Silver Kings” Phantoms prior to in.
{gress on a 1971 combat mission. The tanker version of the Intruder
could ‘up to 3,844 gallons of fuel, of which 3,000 were
transferable at rates of up to 350 gallons per minute. (US Navy)
the primary naval reconnaissanc
This RF Is taxling to a forward ATs of VA-27 “Royal Maces” overfly the USS Constellation in the
Gulf of Tonkin. (US Navy)
(Above Right) USS Constellation underway in the South China Sea
uring a 1974 deployment to WestPac. (US Navy)
USS Hancock in the Gulf of Tonkin 25 May, 1972. Hancock was one of
five attack carriers operating in the Gulf during the spring of 1972.
Saratoga, Midway, Constellation, and Kitty Hawk also sent their ar
inst North Vietnam in response to the Easter Invasion of
South Vietnam. (US Navy) ATE of VA-146 ““Blue Diamonds" being positioned on the catapult
aboard USS Constellation prior to a 25 April, 1972, mission against
North Vietnam. (US Navy)
ATs of VA.27 and an A6 of VA-196 aboard Connie being made ready
to depart on a mission over North Vietnam in 1972.
ue Diamonds” A.7 returning to USS America after a 1970 mission
over Vietnam. (US Navy)
1972
Except for LAM SON 718, there were no major military operations during
1971. Negotiations remained deadlocked, with the North Vietnamese con:
vinced thatthe US would leave Vietnam at al costs, and that there was ite
to be gained by negotiating concessions to the existence of a US-backed
government in the south. But while they had unquestionably scored a prop
Beanda victory in LAM SON 719, the communists realized that ARVN was,
taining in competency, and if Vietnamization was allowed to continue un-
challenged, the south might prove capable of defending itself without US
troops. Cleary, it was to the advantage of the North to invade the South as
soon as possible. If they were able to inflict heavy US casualties in the proc
€, so much the better, since that would probably only hasten the American
‘withdrawal
'By February of 1972 the North Vietnamese had moved their thirteen main
force divisions into position for a spring offensive in the south. Five were in
Laos, seven were in South Vietnam, and the one remaining in North Vietnam
‘was poised at the DMZ. New SAM and AAA sites had been builtin Laos and
inthe lower panhandle of North Vietnam. Heavy ariller had been emplaced
just north ofthe DMZ, new roads had been constructed through the DMZ in:
to South Vietnam, two new airfields had been builtin southern North Vie
nam, and tons of supplies had been positioned for the upcoming assault. All
ofthis activity was well documented by Allied intelligence. Contrary to 1970
and 1971, when spoiling attacks had aborted North Vietnamese invasions of
the south, the communist preparations for this all-out attack were allowed to
0 on unmolested,
‘While the North Vietnamese were busily preparing to invade the south,
Richard Nixon was in communist China, telling Chou En Lai that his require
‘ment for complete withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam was
‘negotiated ceasefire and a return of all American POWs, This, he said, had
‘been offered tothe North Vietnamese, who had rejected these terms, insisting
thatthe United States impose a political settlement on the South Vietnamese
Which would give the communists an active role in the government of the
south, Chou urged Nixon to withdraw as quickly as he could, warning him
that the North Vietnamese would never surrender. Nixon replied that the
United States could never abandon is friends in that manner, since such an
action would demonstrate to friend and foe alike that the United States as
lunreliable in its commitments. The result of the Nixon trip to China was the
Shanghai Communique, which pledged in part that neither nation *“should
seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by
any other county or group of countries to establish such hegemony.” It was
[Nixon’s view that this was a thinly disguised warning to the Russians by the
Chinese. Tt could just as well have been meant for the North Vietnamese,
whose appetite for conquest was soon to be demonstrated
arly in 1972 it became evident that the North Vietnamese were not going
to negotiate anything. Therefore, President Nixon decided to go public with
the details of the, until then, secret negotiations taking place in Paris. Hein
‘luded details of an American proposal which the North Vietnamese would
not even listen to. Ik was by far the most conciliatory offer to date, and in
Cluded withdrawal ofall American troops within six months ofa cease-fire,
Which would include all of Indochina, and an internationally supervised
presidental election in the south. South Vietnamese President Thiew and Vice President Ky had even agreed (o resign a month before this election would
take place! Nixon also revealed the details of the North Vietnamese prop
aganda coup in which they had so adoitly maneuvered George McGovern in
to publicly proposing a peace plan which would be “acceptable” 10 them.
They didn't reveal that it was & plan which had been proposed by Kissinger
‘months before in the secret negotiations, and which they had turned dovn,
‘When confronted with this, the North Vietnamese negotiator, Xuan Thuy
said, “What Senator McGovern says is his problem,” In his 25 January
speech, Nixon also stated his willingness to consider any reasonable peace
plan. But he warned that he would not allow hostile action to endanger the
lives of the 69,000 Americans remaining in South Vietnam
The South Vietnamese, realizing that they would have o bear the brunt of
he upcoming invasion, secelerated their training programe and canceled all
leaves, They were at ready as they could be when the communists struck,
Ceilings and visibilities were severely restricted by low, scudding monsoon
rain clouds when the communists attacked aeross the DMZ and into Quang
Tri Province on 30 March, 1972. It was the beginning of what came to be
known a the Easter Offensive. For the first time in the war the NVA
employed tanks in massed formations, This was the conventional warfare
that Allied tactician had tried for years to lute the communists into fightin.
The atacks across the DMZ were coordinated with similar attacks from Laos
and Cambodia against Pleiku and An Loc.
The initial attacks were met with stiff resistance by ARVN, but without the
close air support which was denied by weather, they were slowly worn down
by the weight of the NVA onslaught, and forced to fall back and regroup. It
sway evident that airpower would have to play’ a pivotal role ifthe invasion
twas to be blunted,
B-S2 ARC LIGHT strikes were flown against the NVA INVASION
FORCES, using radar bombing techniques, and as the weather slowly ie
proved, more and mote tactical aepower was brought tf bear on the North
Vietnamese. More B-S2s were ordered to Southeast Asia, and by late June the
B32 force numbered 200 bomber, flying up to 3,180 sorties per month. Ina
move designed to demonstrate his determination to prevent a North Viet
ramese victory in the south, President Nixon ordered the B-S2s into the
Hanoi-Haiphong atea forthe fist time in the war. On 21 and 23 April the
BUFS struck Bai Thuong Airfield, Vinh, Thanh Hoa, the Haiphong
Peiroteum Products storage area, and Hamn Rong transshipment point, in
OPERATION FREEDOM PORCH BRAVO. It was hoped that thee at
tacks would give the North Vietnamese something to think about, and
perhaps inspire serious negotiations. (Prot o this, Henty Kissinger had been
asured by Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the North Viet
namese would assume a much more Flexible posture when the “secret” talks
‘esumed in Paris on April 24, Since the Russians were the principal sponsors
of the North Vietnamese, there was every reason to believe there might be
progress. Then, when the North Vietnamese cancelled the 24 April mecting,
the Russians denied that they had any influence on NVA plans, or that they
had supplied much in the way of weaponry!
The summit meeting with the Soviets was on the horizon, and President
VA-147 “Argonauts” operated thelr A-7s off Constellation during the
spring 1872 campaign against North Vietnam. (US Navy)
VA-56 “Champions” A7Bs enroute to targets In March, 1973. (US
Navy)
The time-honored custom of decorating aircraft which land on the
wrong cartier with graffiti wae carried on during the Vietnam War.
This VA-195 Corsa Il landed aboard Coral Sea instead of its home
3 Kitly Hawk and paid the price, 26 Apri, 1972. (US Navy) A‘6A intruder of VMA-224 aboard Coral Sea prior to 7 May, 1972, mis-
sion. It is loaded with Mk 20 Rockeye ar
tive against hard targets. (US Navy)
Pilot and Bombardier-Navigator prepare to board their VA-165 In-
{ruder prior to a May, 1972, mission against North Vietnam, (US Navy)
Nixon wanted Kissinger, in his preparatory talks with the Soviets, to stress
that anything else the Russians might be interested in negotiating would de
pend upon their using ther influence to end the war in Vietnam. Kissinger
wanted to be more flexible in his dealings with the Russians, and pointed out
to the President that even if the North Vietnamese should win the war he
would sil be hailed on the home front for withdrawing,
Nixon, ina flash of insight which demonstrated his expertise in foreign af=
fairs replied, I don't give a darmn about the domestic reaction if that hap-
ens, because fit does, sitting inthis office wouldn't be worth it. The foreign
Policy ofthe United States will have been destroyed, and the Soviets will have
¢stablished that they can accomplish what they are after by using the force of
arms in thd countries. Defeat is simply not an option!” Inthe end, Nixon
allowed Kissinger to set the agenda for a Nixon-Brezhnev summit without in
sisting upon a Vietnam settlement as a prerequisite. The summit was arrang-
ed during Kissinger’s trip to Moscow that spring, but Nixon demonstrated
that he was not letting the Russians off the hook entirely with a tough speech
two days after Kissinger’ return, In that speech, the President described the
North Vietnamese attack by saying, «There is only one word for it.I NVA.
SION.” He promised that the bombing of North Vietnam would continue
Until ‘their_military offensive had stopped. The North Vietnamese
‘demonstrated that they understood this kind of language by rescheduling the
cancelled 24 April meeting for 2 May
‘The Presidents instructions to Kissinger for this meeting were tough and
forthe point, “they have violated all understandings, they have stepped up
the war, they have refused to negotiate seriously. ‘The President has had
‘enough and now you have only one message to give them, “Settle or ese!”
But the North Vietnamese were insulting and unresponsive duting the
‘meeting with Kissinger, and after three hours, the meeting broke up without
any positive results
‘Ads from Hancock knocked down the Duong Phuong Thuong
in North Vietnam during April of 1972. (US Navy) VAA65 Intruders overtly Constellation as an A-7 crosses the fant
recovering from a mission over the North in May of 1972. (US Navy)
(Above Right) A-4F of CVW-21 pulls out atter scoring a dit
the Son Trieu highway bridge (lower right) in North Vi
April of 1972. (US Navy)
(Right) 8-6 loaded with three and one half tons of bombs enroute to
North Vietnam in May, 1972. (US Navy)
In the meantime, events on the battlefield had taken a turn forthe worse.
The communists had captured Quang Tri and, though it was not considered
militarily vital by US experts, the effect on South Vietnamese morale was
devastating. As the battle for Hue—a city that was considered militarily
vital—began, it was clear that the United States would have to do somethi
to shore up South Vietnamese resolve, and send a message to the North Viet.
namese and their Russian sponsors that their aggression would not succeed.
‘The question was, what could the United States do that would achieve thes
goals, while preserving the upcoming summit and the much-ballyhooed
detente” with the Russians?
F-48 of VF-111 being hooked to the cat aboard Coral Sea prior to 10
April, 1972, mission against North Vietnam. (US Navy) (On 23 April, 1972, A‘7s from VA-146 flying from USS Constellation outnumt
‘caught this NVA convoy north of the city of An Loc. They destroyed (US Navy)
‘most of the Soviet-made URAL-375 trucks. Though surrounded and
ARVN, with around-the-clock air support, held An Loc.
EKA-SB at Danang in St 1972. Danang was one of the
primary divert fields for carrier-based aircraft. (Andy L. Mutzig) LINEBACKER I
‘What the President desided to do was what military experts had been say-
ing should have been being done since the beginning of the war. In his own,
words, “The only way 0 stop the killing i to take the weapons of war out of
the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam.” To that end he
Accded that air operations (and this time, effective ait operations) against
North Viettam would have tobe reinsttued. His advisors were split on the
wisdom of tis. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was against it, while
Secretary of State Rodgers indicated that he would befor iif it worked. Kis
inger noted that, even if we lost in Vietnam Nixon would stil be given credit
for withdrawing. Almost al of them felt thatthe Russians would cancel the
summit f Nixon went ahead with concentrated and effective bombing ofthe
North, But the President noted that **The summit isn't worth a damn ifthe
price fortis losing in Vietnam. My instinct ells me tha the country cam take
losing the summit, but it can’t take losing the war.” John Connally, a
‘member of the National Security Council, put the fear of Russian cancel
tion of the summit into proper perspective when he said; “..if they cance,
tnd {don’t think they wil, we'll ram it right down their throats,
‘On 8 May, 1972, the President went on television to announce that the
communists had not only refused to consider his peace proposals, but had
also failed to pu forth counter-proposals. Under these circumstances, he had
no other choice than to use other means to get thelr attention, He announced
that he was: () mining all entrances to North Vietnamese ports to prevent a=
‘fs 10 these ports as well as all North Vietnamese naval operations from
these ports; 2) US forces will take appropriate measures within the internal
and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam o interdict the delivery of
any Supplies; (3) rail and all other communications would be cut off to the
meximlam extent possible and that air and naval strikes against military
‘argets in North Vieinam would be feinsttuted. Domestic reaction (0 this
speech was swift and predictable. The Democrats howled in outrage, in-
‘woduclng measures in Congress ( limit the Presidents war-making powers
Itvas the unanimous opinion ofthe major media thatthe upcoming summit
with the Russians would be postponed indefinitely. They were wrong. The
Russians understood the language Nixon was speaking, and though they of
ficilly protested the renewed bombing, no mention was made of the summit
‘When Kissinger questioned Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in a circumspect
manner, Dobryain ceplied, “You have handled a difficul situation uncom-
monly wel.”
Rather than giv the President credit for his courage and insight, the media
attacked the bombing campaign, repeating and attempting to lestimize the
USS America-based A‘7s of VA.86 join with VF-161 Phantoms off the
Midway for a Loran bombing mission in March of 1973. (US Navy)
F-4D Phantom from the 13th TFS equipped with Loran navigational
‘equipment provides bomb roloase commands for a pair of VF-151
F-4Bs during @ March, 1973, mission. (US Navy)
propagands coming from Hanci. The chief propaganda claim had to do with
the bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. Over several centuries the North
Vietnamese had developed a system of 2500 miles of earthen dikes to conttol
the annual flooding caused by monsoon rains. The monsoon of 1971 was
specially heavy, and the majority of North Vietnamese were preoecupied
with war-related duties. As a consequence, the dikes were not maintained
and flooding occurred. The 1972 flooding had the potential for even worse
Fesulis, since repair work on the dikes was postponed in favor of preparing
for the invasion of South Vietnam. Though the dikes would have been
legitimate targets under the law of war, their attack was never seriously con
sidered at anytime during the war. Even when the North Vietnamese began
emplacing AAA and SAM sites on or near dikes, they remained off limits to
‘American bombers. Ironically, it was not the media or the North Vietnamese who posed the
greatest threat of failure in the new campaign, which had been dubbed
OPERATION LINEBACKER, The Pentagon, after years of inept, inefec:
tual, and empty military threais and actions instituted by the Johnson Ad
ministration, was apparently not prepared for a President who had the guts
to back up words with actions. The plan they advanced for LINEBACKER
did not begin to match the “go-for-broke” mood of the President. He let
them know, in no uncertain terms, that, having taken the political heat for
the decision to step up pressures on North Vietnam, he was not going to be
satistied with halfway measures. The stupid and dangerous rules of engage
‘ment as propagated by the Johnson Administration went out the window. As
Nixon noted in a memo to Kissinger: “I want the military to get off its
backside...We have the power to destroy the enemy war-makine capacity
‘The only question is whether we have the will (use that power. What
