THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM Hobbes to Locke CB, MACPHERSON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSvt Uy PW Sr, Oni 3 07 Peal Sao Sngpore Hong Kon Tok eee Fn oe odes FOR nfrt sera mah of Oxford Unies Pes SUSAN avons STEPHEN SHEILA (© Ord erty Pr 12 i pubes by he Croton Pro 142 ns Sa ir ary ees oe Al np re. Nop of pabenin may be npr, “Tonk, mechan phowsopng rotor orn, wo ‘Reps pease of Oxford Urry at i ot sl hi eS that 2 al mh, my fate mae bo esa hed ano ae ee thst at nw pedo Ata st caon incdng nd omg opoed oe aan pce Pre Ho KongPREFACE Soar time ago I suggested that English political thought from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries had) an ‘underlying unity which deserved notice. [called the unifying assumption “possessive individualism’ and suggested that central dificuties of liberl-democratc thought from John ‘Stuart Milla the present might be better understood ifthey were seen to have been set by the persistence and deep-r00t- ‘edness of that assumption! The notion of possessive indivi- ‘lualiem promised leo to yield a fresh understanding of the tain seventeenth-century political theories in some cates resolving unsettled problems of their meaning. ‘The present work, which pursues that promise, has grown lover several years. The study of Locke establishes, I hope, a reading of his theory of property right which alters the gene- ral view of his political theory. Parts ofthat study, which was the frst to be done, were published in two articles in 1950 and 1954. 1 have not found it necessary to alter or add Substantially to what T then said, though T have added references to some subsequent work on Locke, The study of Hobbes suggests that prevalent treatments of his politcal theory leave a good deal to be understood, and offers an alternative interpretation. The study of Leveller theory un= Sertakes to correcta substantive crror inthe standard treat ‘ments, and explores the implications of the possessive aspect of their notion of freedom. The study of Harrington seeks to Sitengage his theory from the controversy over the gentry land to show that it is better understood as having bourgeois roots. Internal contradictions, especialy in Locke's and Har~ Tington's theories, which had hitherto. gone wnnaticed oF been too easly dismissed, have been examined and used as clues to the thinker's implicit assumptions; so teated, the "Cami Farm i 8 Gone 40)contradictions pointed toa fuller understanding ofthe whole theory, Each study thus contributes I hope, soa more adequate, andsomeo! them toamoreaccurate, understanding of seven” fcenth-century English politcal thoughs, Together they may ‘be thought to establish the usefulness of the notion of posses- sive individualism as a central asumption of liberal politial theory “Acknowledgement is made to the editors of the Wet Police! Quarterly for permission to use material fst pob= lished in its pages as two articles, “Locke on Capitalist Ap- propriation, December 191, and “The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory’, March 1954 and tothe editors of Pert © Preset for permission to use the material on Hate ington, which appeared in ite April 1960 issue Friends and colleagues with whom [ have discussed most ‘of the ideas here presented have saved me rom someenthusi fms, They will not wish to be thanked specially: some ‘of them have been more helpful than they know. So have my Students, ho have made me aware of some difficulties in the subject-matter and encouraged meta think they could be "The paths of scholarship aresmoothed in different fashions in itferene centuries: may be peemittedtorecordmy thanks to the Nufield Foundation, the Canada Council, and my town university, who have been pleased to thinle my studies something, anc otherwise to oblige me with real testimonies of their good opinion. . B MACPHERSON University of Toronte Fine 3 196 CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION ' 1. The Rot of Liter Denne Theory : 1 Problem of ntepreton 4 IL HOBBES: THE POLITICAL OBLIGATION OF THE MARKET ° 2 Phyo Poa he ° (@) Ateraon fom Scity 7 (0) The Sut of Nance » (i) From Pyle to Sul Minn 23 4 Motes of Saxe: “ () Tre Une of Moser “ (2) Canomay oS Sciey ° (Gi) Simple Mae Soi s (ix) Ponenive Maker Soy ss (6) Hote nt the Pir Modet a (0) The Inadegucy fhe Sut of Nature a 4: Pit Obigtion 7° (0) From Mesiraton to Obiatinn » (@) Mon or Prudential OBlgion? a (Gi) The Pore of Equi % () Monti Since, nd te Marker ” (G) The Prenton of Obligtoe fom act. is (0) Historia reese of the Dein & (i) Tae Sa perpetoing Soverin » (G2) Conrsence of Soverigty and Market Scey % (6) Some Objeties Remit 100 UL THE LEVELLERS-PRANCHISE AND FREEDOM 107 2. Type of Frise :(@ The Chole 1 (i) Pets and Ate al (i) etre Paey 9 Go) Samninewe 6 4 Thea nglatiot 1 (The Property it Ones Perce 7 (i) The Dado of Rips and he Ground fr Busine 142 (i) Levee and Inepeneae’ Isao: a (i) Limits aed Dien ofthe Leelle’ Invigaom 154 IV, HARRINGTON: THE OPPORTUNITY STATE 160 1. Useamied Ambir 60 {The Equal Commons andthe Equal Apatian te 5: The SlCancling Bunce Pree we ¥, LOCKE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF APPROPRIATION 196 Tepes i 2 The Thesy of Progeny Right 19 (9 Laskes Parpve 97 (i) To Kia Lied Right 199 (i) The Limitations Transended 2s () The ping Fn tor (Gy The sien Tintain a (0) Tee apps labour tation a4 (ip Laskes Aaievenent eo 5. Cau Direc ie Natal Right and Rasnaty at (lakes Astin of the Dir in Sete oar Eo a (Gy Darn Rigsad Renaliy Genelied 09 (Dien rks a0 (6) Dire ratio 2 4. The Ambra Sate of Nett ae 5 The Ambigon Cin Soy 6, Und Problem Rewer (9 Toe Jota Theory (Maer Rae «Prep Right (The Equation of nda and Majority Consent (Teddi Cece (9) Heke’ Connie VL. POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 1. The Sevenenth-Cenry Fowsatins APPENDIX, ‘Sool Clue and Prachi Chan in Eagln, cic 148 WORKS AND EDITIONS CITED INDEX a1 a5 ws yor sesI INTRODUCTION 1 The Rost of Liberal-Democratie Thesry ‘A ontar deal has been written in recent years about the dificuly of finding a frm theoretical bass for the liberal democratic state. As the dificuey persist, it seems worth inguiring whether it may not le mich in the oots of the liberal tradition asin any subsequent growth, For such an Jnguity, the roots may properly be taken o bein the political theory and practice of the English seventeenth century. It vess then, in the course of a protracted struggle in pais: rent, + civil war, a serice of republicen experiments, 5 restoration of the monarchy, anda Anal constitutional reve- tion, that the principles which were to become basic to liberal democracy were all developed, though not with equal succes at che time, And it clear tha an essential ingredi- cent, both of the practical struggle and of the theoretical justifications, was & new bliin the value and the rights of the individual, ‘Whether the individualism of the seventeenth century is eplored a5 having undermined the Christian nacural law tradition, or applauded as having opened new vists of freedom and progres, it importance is not disputed. Nor ig it doubted that individualism has been an outstanding characteristic of the whole subsequent liberal tradition, In- dividuals, as a basic cheortial positon, starsat least as far back at Hobbes. Although his conclusion cam scarcely be called liberal, his postulates were highly individualistic Discarding trastional concepts of society, justice, and natural ltr he deduced political rights and obligation from the interest and will of dissociated individuals, Individualism‘of another sort, emphasizing the equal moral worth of every human being, was clearly fundamental in Puritan political thinking. nd individualism hae large, if ambiguous, place in Locke's politcal theory. All these thearies were closely ‘elated tothe struggle for a more liberal state. The Puritan theories and Locke's, between them, provided its. main justification, Even the utilitarian doctrine which seemed to supersede them in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is at bottom onlya restatement ofthe individualist principles ‘which were worked out in the seventeenth century: Bentham built on Hobhes. (One would not expect fundamental politcal principles of theseventeenth century tobe entirely auficient for achanged and more complex twenlieth-century world, But one might, txpect that they could still be builf upon, if they were as folid as they seemed, chat is if chey corresponded as well a they seemed to do tothe needs, aspirations, and capacities ‘of modern man, This expectation has not been fafled, ‘The foundations have cracked and tilted. If they are not to beabandoned, they need to be repaired. What kind of fundamental repair should be attempted rust depend on the diagnosis of the weakness. There has ‘been no Tack of diagnoses. Ever since John Stuart Mill's attack on Bentham’s uiitaranism, which had by then be- ome the embodiment of polities! individualism, the weak- ress of liberal indvidusliam has been more or less identified with Benthan’s narrowly selfish, narrowly rationalist, ver~ fon oft, The Benthamite assumption that man in his poiti= ‘al relations was and should be trated a8 calculator of his ‘own interests, and that this exhausted his nature as political ‘man, has been seen as a perversion of the fundamental iberal insights ofan earlier tation. ‘On this sore of diagnosis, the repair that was needed was cone that would bring back a sense of the moral worth ofthe individual, and combine ie again with a sense of the moral ‘value of community, which had been present im some mes sure in the Puritan and Lockean theory. In this way it might bbe hoped to get back to what scemed the desirable values of individualism sehile discarding its excesses. The many "tsempts todo this, ranging, since Mil from T. H. Green's idealism through many kinds of modern pluralism, have all run into serious difficulty, so much so that ie is worth reconsidering the diagnosis, The present study is an attempt to do this. It suggests thatthe dificulies of modern lberal-democrati theory le deeper than had been thought, thatthe original seventeenth- Century individualism contains the centr! dificuty, which lay in its possessive quality. Its possessive quality 5 found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of is own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as 4 moral whole nor a8 part ofa larger social whole, but as an owner of him elf. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining ‘heir actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual, The individ, it was thought, free inaemch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human teasence ie freedom from dependence an the wil of others Sand freedom isa function af possession. Socety becomes 4 lot of free equal individuals related to exch other a8 pro- prictors of their own capacities and of what they have Acquired by their exercise, Society consists of relations of fexchange between propritors, Political society becomes a Caleulated device fr the protection of thi property and for the maintenance ofan orderly relation of exchange. Te cannot be said that the seventeenth-century concepts of freedom, rights, obligation, and justice are all entirely derived From this concept of postesson, but ican be shown that chey were powerfully shaped by it. We shall see that postessive assumptions are present not only in the two main Systematic theories of political obligation (Hobbes's and Locke’) but also, where they might be least expected in the theories of she radical Levellers and the gentry-mindedHarrington. I shall argue that these assumptions, which do correspond substantially to the actual relations of a market society, were what gave liberal theory ite strength in che seventeenth century, but that they Became the source of its weakness in the nineteenth, when the development of the market society destroyed certain prerequisites for deriving ‘liberal cheory from possessive assumptions, while yet the ociety conformed! so clorely to those assumptions that they ‘ould not be abandoned. They have not been abandoned ye, ror can they be while market relations prevail. When we Sce how deeply they are embedded in the original theory we shall understand their persistence; when ther persistence recognized we can consider how far iti responsible for the ificulties of Hberal-democratie theory in our oven time 2 Problems of Interpretation “The socal assumptions whose importance in seventeenth= century politcal theory T have sought to establish have not igenerilly been clearly identified and, therefore, I beliewe, have not generally been given sufficient weight. Since most fof them appeir in the theories as uncertain mixtures of tssumptions about fact and assumptions about right, they tend to be beneath or beyond the notice of both philo- sophical and historial erties. And these social assumptions ‘an easily be overlooked, or undervalued, because they are fometimes not explicit, or not fully formulated, in the theories themselves. This raises a general problem of ‘To sty that « theorist has failed to state some of hie assumptions clearly is of course to presume that he was Using some assumptions beyond those he has explicitly formulated. This presumption cannot be certainly” estab- lished. Tt cannot be established merely by showing that some unstated assumptions are logically required (38 ‘commonly ae) to praduce the theory's conclusions would have also to suppose that the theorist was a strictly logical thinker. This supposition is unwise, While political theorists do try to perside their readers by some sort of reasoned argument, the requirements of politcal persuasion and of logie are not always identical. Besides, a thinker of previous century may not have had the sume notion of logic that we have. ‘But while the presumption that theorist was using assumptions beyond those he explicitly formulated cannot be Certainly establiched, it is still a fairy strong one. Ie would be surprising if political theorists did always state all their assumptions cletrly. Two probable reasons for their not ong £0 are fairly obvious First, where a writer can take it for granted that his readets will shate some of his assumptions, he will see no heed toset these out atthe point in his argument where we, who do not share those atsumptions automatically, think ‘hey should have heen sated to make the argument complete. For example, it was a common seeumptin inthe seventeenth century thatthe labouring clas sa clas apart, scarcely if at allto be counted a5 part of civil society. We should not be Justifed in immputing that assumption to a seventeenth= Century theorist simply on the ground that his conclasion {foes not follow withost i and dos fllow with it. For i possible that some other assumption could be found which fwould produce his conclusion, and that that other assump~ tion ought rather to be imputed. But when an assumption rot only meets the two conditions (a) that it was common fnough that a writer could take i for granted in his readers, tnd (6) that it fills a gap in his argument, but moreover ie ‘mentioned of ured by the writer in some context other than the one in which we think itis equited, the probability that he was taking the assumption throughout his argument becomes too strong to be overlooked. It may well be more misleading for us to exclude i than to admits We shall be noticing several instances of assumptions which are quite ‘ssental fo @ theory being mentioned easualy, a if hardly‘worth stating, of revealed incidentally im the course of an srgument sbout something else "A second reaton for a theorist’ failure to state an assump- tion cleaty is that he may not be clearly awateof it. Fr wuld be strange indeed if a thinker did not sometimes carry over into his premisses some general assumptions about the nature of man of of secety, shaped by hs living in his own society, without being fully aware that he was doing so. No rman formulates all that is in his minds few formolate all thst may later be seen tobe relevant to thet problems. What ‘hey leave unformulated may nevertheless pervade their thinking. The possibilty that such impliie assumptions are preseat shoud not be overlooked. They should not be in puted merely on the ground that they scem to be logically Fequited by the author's argument, ut when such assump- tions do make sense of the argument (or more sense than can otherwise be made of i, and are ones that we ean now see might eeadily have arisen ftom that chnker’s experience of his own society, and when, moreover, they are repeatedly implied in various of his incidental arguments, the prob- ability that he was using such assumptions is saficient to “entitle ws to admit them, “There is of course some risk in reading into an author's work any assumptions he did not clesly state. However strong the presumption that he was taking some assumptions for granted, or that he held some without being aware of them, we cannot be certain that we have got them right. But itis less risky to make the attempt than eo avoid it on principle, IF we admitonly assumptions which mect the teste {hist mentioned, we may a€ least hope to avoid the all-tao- Frequent course of imputing unconsciously assumptions Aeanibe sows pp- us) Lace omgeon te bbs of myer 5 Mi ea eh este ai ce ioe posh oe ae ecief inten fe rhintod Lak we candy cation oe Tee op al ‘which we take for granted but which a writer of an earlier century srould not have done, ‘There may be other reasons, besides che two aleesdy: noticed, why a thinker has not clearly stated all the assump tions he is using. He may have deliberately concealed or isguised some of them, either from fear of offending the reacts hom he wanted to convert to his canchisions, oF from fear of persccution, Political theory was a dangerous trade in the seventeenth century. And even apart from personal danger, a cautious theorist who had reached an Intellectual position which was a decisive break with the received tralition might well think that some subterfuge ‘was needed! to carry hi readers sith him. Explanations of this rort have been increasingly offered by recent scholars, especially to account forthe confusions in Locke's theory." ‘The possibilty, and in Locke's cate the probability, of some measure of concealment of assumption, cannot be neglected, But it has seemed to me that the concealment hypothesis cannot, even in Locke's case explain all that has to be ex- pltined, and that it is an unsatisfactory alternative to the hypothesis that some social assumptions have been lft im= perfectly stated, or implicit, for one of the reasons 1 have Suggested, ‘A general remark may be matte finally about the question of logical consistency in political theories, My point of ‘Separture in each of the following studies is some real oF fupposed inconsisteney in a theoretical structure, I have found i «fruitful hypothesis that each of the thinks in- tended to be consistent, ar (which comes tothe same thing) ‘was consistent within the limit of his vision, Butt should be noticed that this is far from being 2 hypothesis that exch of| the theories is, when properly understood, consistent. Some~ times, indeed, the result has been to show that what appents to be an incansistency ie not so when we recognize the by Ls a Nw ih nd ig 9 hsexistencoofanimplictorimperfectlystatedassumption which bad hitherto been overlooked or not given enough weight, But more often the result has been to show that she theory is in some respects strictly inconsistent, even (or especially) when its implicit assumptions have been given full weight ‘What the analysis achieves then not a resolution of logical inconsistencies bat an explanation of how the theorist could Ihave heen unconscious of them. "The question of consistency isin any case a secondary on. ‘The hypothesis of intended consistency is no more than @ usefel approach. When we find inconsistent postions being taken in + single sentence (eg, in a Leveller statement that since al! pozonr have an equitable right to a voice in elec- tions, therefore the franchise should be given to all men ‘except servants and beggars") we are entitled to ask whether any assumptions the writer may chen have had in mind can account for such statements, and se should be unitite not to Took about for evidence of thee being such assumptions. ‘The presence of apparently clear inconsistency is tobe treated as a clue to inadequately stated assumptions. The hypothesis that a thinker was consistent within the limits ‘of his vision is wseful lee asx way of resolving inconssten- cies chan a pointer to the direction an limits of his vision, ‘which may then be established by other evidence. 1 Jin Hany Th Grand Ds qe os ps. 1 HOBBES: THE POLITICAL OBLIGATION OF THE MARKET 1 Philosophy ond Pabcal Theory Hosnssis widely, and rightly, regarded asthe mos formic able of English political theorists; formidable not because the is dtfcle to understand but because his doctrine is at once ao clear, 0 sweeping, and so disliked, His postulates about the nature of man are unflattering, his politcal conelue Sions are ilibera, and his logic appears co deny us any way ‘out. But clear as his theory isin comparison with most others, its unusual breadth and depth has left it open to criticism of many kinds. It has been attacked repeatedly on theological philosophical, and pragmatic politeal grounds. Yet it has Survived, and with added lustre. Direceatack having lefe it vigorous and perennially fascinating, it has been inter- preted, resinterprete, and even nowadays completely recon= Te might seem that nothing more could usefully be sid ‘Yer the interpretations now most widely accepted and most intluential leave something to be desired. Most of them have proceeded by breaking up what Hobbes had presented a5 4 fnonolthic structure. Sometimes this his been done to dis ret the whole theory, but more often to rescue a substan- tial part of it fom what were thought tobe fatal weaknesses in other parts. There can be no objection to probing an apparent monolith, and ifthe probe reveals chat the structure isnot genuine this act should be recordedand demonstrated. But a4 often as this has heen done to. Hobbes, the results have been inconclusive, and it may be doubted whether the process has furthered the understanding of Hobbes's theory,The fist wedge was driven in between Hobbes philo- sophie materialiam and his political theory. Some of the best-known students of Hobbes have taken the view that his politcal theory ws not derived from his materialism oF decisively affected by his concept of science; this view reached its culmination in the influential study published by Strauss in. 1936-1 This line of interpretation, however, lid ot require any very extensive revision of Hobbes's politcal theory. For while Hobbes had spoken ofthe possi biliy of deducing his prychological principles (and hence his polial theory) from the geometrical and physical frst principles of matter and motion,* he did not in fact wy #0 fake any such deduction, He pointed out thatthe peycho- logical principles from which politcal science could be deduced need not themselves he deduced from the laws of ‘motion of material but could be reached directly by sel ‘bscrvation, and thie wae the method he weed,’ Hence to set aside Hobhes’s materialism is not necessarily to under- mine his political theory, although 1 shall argc that the political theory requires the materialism for another reason, ‘Mote recently 4 new wedge has been driven, this time between Hobbes's psychological principles and his political theory, and this has had the more far-reaching consequence of requiring 4 virtual reconstruction ofthe political theory. ‘The new view wae put forward by A. E. Taylor in 19382 Hobier's theory of politcal obligation, & was argued, had no logically necessary connexion with his propositions about the psychological nature of man. This view has been widely accepted, Since its publication, outstanding. students of Hobbes have tried to construct out of Hobbes's weritngs 3 theory they could regard as logically coherent and a8 being, what Hobbes really meant, To do so they have had to set aside Hobbes’ own statements that he was deducing his ‘Pid loopy of Hb Ba aod Grr One 9h Ee Phy gh Wore et 1 R'E Rg art Borer ties iy 2 political theory from his premises about human nature, find © find some other basis in Hobbes forthe theory of tical obligation Ths Oakeshott, after disemingly remarking that we should not expect 2 coherence in Hobbes's moral thinking ‘hich 36 foreign to the ideas of any seventeenth-century titer, and that we should not attempt to create such a Coherence by extracting some consistent doctrine from his writings relects, as just such an erroneous extraction, the theory of political obligation in terms of selEinteest, and [goes on to offer an interpretation which will give ‘ss com herent a view as is consistent with ll of what Hobbes actually ‘wrote! This view is thar Hobbos's politcal obligation is 2 Inixture of physical obligation (submission to the superior farce of the sovereign), rational obligation, which prevents man from willing an action the probable consequences of| ‘which he rationally perceives to be likely to be harmful ta Himself (which is Based on self-interest), and moral oblign- tion, which is crested by the voluntary act of authorizing the sovereign, and consists of obedience to the commands of the authorized sovereign (which is not based on see “This degre of coherence has ot said other scholar Warrender, sharing the view that Hobbes theory of political obligation ts uot suficiently based on selE-inteest, fejects Onkeshott's cautionary admonitions and. constructs from Hobhes a highly coherent theory of obligation, in ‘hich politcal obligation is moral obligation and x deduced rot from the postulates about man's nature but from the will or command of God, or from a body of natural law hich bears ite own authority This construction has in then been found unsatisfactory by other erties; its very "tat pt ny ef ey {dee tne mek and cities web Note A paghe PEAS ce AEST onie na 1S SE aay ray te rh i aeexcellence and thoroughness in developing the implications of the Taylor thesis has led ta the whole thesis being called into question." But if we reject the Taylor thesis and return to the traditional view that Hobbes was deducing his theory of political obligation from postulates about human nature ‘hich he held to be self-evident ro any thoughtful observer, tne are faced again with the old ificulties which the Taylor thesishad the merit of voiding or resolving, Two dificukes particularly may be noticed. Fiest; Hobies's theory of human mature has seemed so vwnacceptable, at leastas the universal theory Hobbes claimed it to be, that unless the political theory could be logically detache from it, the politial theory did not seem to be worth serious consideration; yet the politcal theory con- ‘Snues to haunt Hobbes’ cites as worth serious considera- tion, Hobbers theory of human nature is indeed dificult to accept entire. Apart from the fact that itis apt to arouse Strong emotional resentment, and «0 to be rejected out oF hnand, it may he rejected on various reasoned grounds, [ts mechanical materialism may be held to be untenable. Or ic ray be rejected empirically ifthe theory of human nature were valid, then (granting, a8 such critice generally do freely igant, that Hobbes’ deduction wae good) the political con- hosions he drew should have been acceptable tothe men for land sbout whom he was writing, whereas in fact they never hhave been accepted. Is probably because Habbes's theory of human nature is considered to be untenable (For one of fanother of such reasons), while yet his prowess asa thinker is admired and his conclusions are uneasily felt to have con- siderable force, that searches are mae for some other bass for his conclusions about political obligation, But admiration for Hobbes asa thinker eed not drive us to such lengths, This diffculty, [shall sugges, can be disposed of without spoing to the extreme of jettsoning Hobbes's theory of 1 Nob by Sac Howe Je Hath The Tele Tha, Papa en ih -naman nature or denying its essential place in his deductive system, When we see his theory of human nature a8 4 reflection of his insight into the behaviour of men towards ‘ach other in a specific kind of society, we can see why ‘Hobiies thought his propositions abou human nature would be self-evident ro all honest contemporary abservers once he had set them out ‘orderly and perspicuously”. We can sce also that, while his propositions are not universally valid, they are more nearly valid for his and our time than is allowed by those who must have all or nothing and who therefore reject whatever cannot be shown to be universally valid, Nor is there any difieulty in showing why his propos tions, in spite oftheir high degree of accuracy and adequacy, ‘were not acceptable to his contemporaries In short, when Hobbes's univers claims are reduced to an historical measure, there is no need to divorce his theory of human fate from his political theory inorder to rescue the laters both theories are seen to have a specific historical validity, and to be consistent ith each other. "A second difieulty with the traditional view is that it presents Hobbes ae having committed what is now said to the a grave logical error, namely, as having tried to deduce ‘oral obligation fom empirical postulates of fact, The core Of his theory of human natute i undoubtedly a series of postulates of supposed fact, And the political theory is cer- tainly presented in terms of moral obligation, Ifthe politcal theory was intended to be strict deduction from the theory fof human nature, Hobbes is convicted of having deduced ‘what ought to be from shat iy convicted, because iti now held that itis logically improper ta deduce ought from is ‘Torescue Hobbes fom this postion it has seemed necessary to detach his theory of obligation from his theory of human nature and to find some other basi for the former, of else to deny that his theory of obligation is (as Hobbes thought it ‘was) a moral rather than merely 2 pradential theory of obligationut here, a with the frst diffeulty, an historical view of. Hoties’s thought may show us that i is not necessary to go to such extremes. Why should we impose on Hobbes logical canons which are post-Hobbesian? Te may be said that we must stll do so if we are to satisfy ourselves to what extent his political theory is logically sound and can properly bbe built upon today. But the rule that obligation cannot be Seduced from fact ie itself historically questionable. T shall ‘suggest! that when Hobbes's historically conditioned a- sumptions are given adequate recognition there is some feason to think that Hobbes had struck through several layers of philosophical confusion and hit on a relation be- tween fact and obligation which has as good or better a logical standing than the modern rue. T shall argue that his penetrating vision into his own society enabled him to make 4 philosophic leap which, because of the demands society then made on political philosophy, was not taken up, and was soon lost sight of. Here, without anticipating the stg- iment it need only be said that in view ofthe dificulties we have Seen to be invlved in imponing post- Hobvesian logical requirements on Hobbes, there is 5 prima frie case for turing to social and historical considerations when we con front problems of Hobbes’ logical consistency ot adequacy. ‘We shall pethape be told tha logical and historical ene Aquiries are each autonomous and that no historia! inter- pretation, however acceptable, can afect the question of = heory'sconsisteney and logical adequacy. Tt true enough that no amownt of historia! evidence or conjecture about an suthor’s motives or idioeynerasies can be expected to con- tribute toa judgement of the logical adequacy of his systems though even that sort of historical inquiry, by deawing attention tothe parpore for which and the audience to which he was writing, may save ur from atributing to him philo- sophical questions he was not atking, and from searching his work for answers he was not seeking. The sort of historical interpretation [have in mind, however, is not cot- cemed with motives. It considers historialy the probable content of unstated or unclear assumptions that are con ‘ined or necessarily implied in the theory itself. 1 see no reason to fence this of fom philosophical inquiry, There has indeed been an increasingly sharp division of labour beeween {philosophers and poiical theorists in cent years, especially Eince philosophers have turned to linguistic analysis, This hha reached the point where it can seriously be proposed by the most able recent philosophic writer about Hobbes, that historical considerations are srrlevant to the establishment of Hobbes's meaning: the problem of how Habbee's theory originated or hove it to be explained is pot in a separate compartment from ‘the prior question of what his cheery 151! But to call chis the prior question isto beg the question Tr may equally well be that one cannot establish what the theory is without making historieal as well s logical conjec- tures about Hoblber's unclear or unstated assumptions, In any cate, it seems worth trying whether an inquiry a once logical and historical can thtow different light on HTobbes'= theory, and can bring out essentials ofthat have been left in the shadows by the prevailing sors of logical analysis, In the inquiry which follows T start by assuming that Hobbes was trying to do whit he said he wat doing, ie. {deducing politiealabligaion from the suppored or abserved facts of man’s nature. Instead of puting his theory imme= diately to post-Hobbesian tests of logical consistency in the ratte of duh ad iad then tying to construct from bis Uweitings a theory which wil pass the tests or excusing him fm the ground that no seventeenthecentury thinker should te put fo such tests, and then making out the best cate one can for him as a thinker handicapped by the philosophic shortcomings of his cme, I set aside temporarily che question ofthese tests and move directly tothe social content of some of his assumptions, Tn Section 2 1 show thatthe argument From the physio- logical ature of man to men’s necessary behaviour towardscach other, from which behaviour the need for a sovereign follows, i not the simple deduction from physiological postu- lates that it soften taken to be, but that t & consistent only with a certain model of society. 1 believe that Hobbes’s srgument from the physiological fo the social motion of man fs often seen lees clearly than it might be Because it is wsually taken 36 culminating in the hypotheticd state of nature, ‘which isl? is often not clearly understood. 1 therefore pro- ceed by trying to put the sate of nature in focus, fest by Showing that itis about socal, not natural men, and then by showing that isin any eave not the culminating point ‘of the argument from physiology tothe behaviour of men towards exch other, but that before Hobbes uses the state fof mature hypothesis at all he has developed a theory ofthe hecesary relations of men dn every (which is Inter repto- ‘duced with vasiations in the state of nature hypothesis) 1 then show that bis theory ofthe necessary relations of men in society requires the assumption of a certain kind of society “The question, hove fr bck in his argument fram the pipsio- logieal to the social mation of man he put the necessary socal assumptions sless important than the other question, with whit kind of society isthe social motion at which he srrives consistent? Both questions, however, are worth ‘consideration. The frst admits of more than one answer, de pending on one's reading of rome possibly inconsistent state iments by Hobbes about what is innate and what is acquired in man’s nature. This dificuly is noticed, and the reasons for preferring one reading are given. The second question is then shown to admit of only one answer om either reading fof the passages relevant tothe frst question. Having thus shown thst Hobbes theory of the social motion of man requites the assumption of «certain kind of society, I examine (im Section 3) same models of society, in trder to demonstrate more precisely what Kind of society is required. | argue that Hobibes did more or less consciously Construct such a model, and that the model did correspond in Tange measure to seventeenth-century English society. “The cognition of Hobbes's social assumptions, and of the consequent completeness of his deduction of men's need for sovereign, does not in itself dispose of the philosophic (question whether the political obligation whose necessity Hobbes has thus demonstrated is properly moral obligation for merely expedient and prudential abligation, but it docs pu that question in a diferent perspective then argue, in Section 4, that, the light of Hobbes’s assumptions, his deduction of obligation from fact must be Slowed a logical validity as well a= striking novelty. Iti frgued that because of the assumption he made about the nature of society, which he saw as a series of competitive relations between naturally dissociated and independently elfsmoving individuals, with no natural order of sborlina- tion, he was able to deduce moral obligation from the supposed facts, without importing hierarchical moral values tor teleological principles; that his materialism was an in- tegral part of that deduction; and that the deduction of obligation directly from the suppored facts about the mature fof man and the necessary relations between men is not logical in principle but requires conditions which were not cleitly sitished before Hobbes time Tn Section g 1 conclude, from reconsideration of Hobbes's originality, and of the reatons for his doctrine boeing so generally unacceptable, that he was much less in error and that his theory fas a much grester relevance t0| modern society, than is uevally allowed 2. Haman Nature and the State of Natare i, Aaeraton from eens Ie is commonly said or assumed, by those who tke the traitional view of Hobbes, that hie psychological proposi= tions ae about man as such, man completely abstracted from ciety, and that those propositions cantin all that is needed for his decuction of the ncessity ofthe sovercgn state, Butthere isa serous oversimlicaton in this view. If by his paychologial propositions we mean those properons about felts, imaginadon, memory, reason, appetite and aversion, in which Hobbes describes the human being sa ayster of sclfmoving, self-guided matter in motion (ve the propos tions with which Hobbes opens the argument of Leviathen, andvwhich ght besaid tobe about man a auch, completely Shetracted from sclty, then "Hlobbe'spoychologia propositions donot contain ll that i newded forthe doc tion ofthe necessity ofthe sovereign state Ion the other hand we use the term peychologial proposons to include Hiobbers statement of the necesary Sehaviour of men towards each other n any society (ie tha all men sek ever, snore power over others) or he sia satement of thir Cehaviour inthe bypothetel absence of any society (hein the state of nature then the paycolopical propositions do contain all hats needed forthe deduction of the necesity of sovereign, but they ae not about the human animal 38 fuck; some serumptions about the beheviur of men in Crilzed society had to be added. You can move from the “iver struggle for power in society, or from the sate of ature, to the necenty ofthe soversign without further ‘Seumtions, but you canoet move from man asa mechanical System tothe univeralsrugale for pomer, ort the re of mitre, without futher assumpdions. And the further Sssumptions ar, shall ange, tenable only about the rela tione prevailing between en ns certain kind of society, though Hobbes assumed they were universally valid Thi je an unfamiliar view of Hobbes and roquires further ex: pansion Pe call develop it in two ways I shall how fest (in Section an i) that Hobe’ state of ature o natural condition of mankind not about ‘natura man as opposed to cilived Iman but about men whose desires are specially vilied that the state of nature the bypothetieal condition in which ten at they now are with tatarer formed by living in civilized soctey, would necesarly Bd themselves if there were no common power able to overawe them all. The tridence for this is contained in Hobhes's description of the Sate of nature Seconily, I shall examine (in Section 2, ii) the chain of deduction from the beginning, and show that the psycho- logical analysis, which begins (ar appears co begin) 25 a" analysis of the nature of men in complete abstraction from Society, soon becomes an analysis of men in established social telationships; that certain social aceumptions have to be made in order to establish that ll men in society sck over more power over athers (and even to establish the behaviour ‘of men in the hypothetical state of nature and hence to cxtablish the necessity of the sovereign and (in Section 3) that the necessary social assumptions are valid only for a specific kind of society. ii, The wate of nature In all three of Hobbes's constructions of his political theory! the step immediately preceding the demonstration ‘of the need for «sovereign able to overawe every individual isthe state of nature, or natural condition of mankind. The state of natute depicts the way in which men, being what they are, would necessarily behave f there were no authority to enforce ln or contact, Given the appettive and delivers: | tive nature of man (which in the Elemens and in Leviathan is set out in the earlier chapters, and which inthe Raiment is disclosed by 2 swift analysis of men's behaviour in con- temporary society) this i the way they would necessarily behave if law-enforcement and contract-enforcement were entirely removed. Thie behaviour would necessarily be an incessant struggle of every man with every man, a struggle of cach for power over others. Hobbes's point, of course, i to show that chs condition mould necessarily thwart every man’s desire for ‘commaions living’ and for avoidance of iolent death, that therefore cvery reasonable man should do ‘whatever must be done to guard against this condition, and‘that nothing short of every man acknowledging an absolute sovereign power is sufficient to guard against Hobbes's sate of nature, as is generally recopeized, is a logical not an historical hypothesis Ie an “Inference, made from the Passions’; it describes what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to fare Hobbes dit not argue thatthe existing imperfectly sovereiga state had originated by agreement between men who had previously been in an actual sate of nature. On the conteary, ' fe believed that a stae of nature never di generally prevail ver al the worl (though he thought a Clse approxima thon to existed among "the sage people i many places (of mericsys and he was clea that mort existing Sovereign States had fad thee origin notin compact but in conquest Chere is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose be- innings ean in conscience be justified!) Nor did he argue that a perfec or completly sovereign sate could be extab- lished only by agreement between men who were om an actual sae of nature. He could not very well argue that, For his whole purpote in weiting was to persuade men who nov lived in imperfectly sovereign states (i.e. by definition, hot in a state of nature) that they could and should acknom= ledge a complete obligation to 4 sovereign, and so should move themselves into a perfecdy sovereign state. What he | could, and id, argue waa that to havea completely sovereign State men must act af they had moved out of a state-of J nature by azreement. The requisite sovercign power might come into existence in either of two ways: by some man or body of men conquer- ing and subduing the inhabitants (overeigary by acquisic tion) of by men agresing by contract with cach other to transfer all their natural powers to some man oF body of ren (covercignty by inwitution).* It made no diference ‘which way the sovereignty was established, as long a8 the ‘eatin 0 3 Eh Svat hc sovercignty was acknowledged by’ all the citizens. It was ‘cnough if they acknowledged ade faci euler or ruling asem- {ly and gave toi the fll measure of obedience they would logically be obliged o give if they had voluntarily transferred to it the natural rights which they would have had in the hypothetical state of nature, In other words all that js netessary is that they should act as if they had transferred their natural rights to a sovercign which they could have tetablished by covenant with each other if they had ever lived in a state of nature ‘When Hobbes comes to deduce the necessary rights of the sovercign and obligation of the subjects, he nds it con- venient to speak of the covenant as an agreement actually rade, oF tobe made, ata given poine in time. By doing so, he avoids having to put his argument continually in condi. tional terms, Instead ofthe awkwardness ofsaying repeatedly “if mon had made rach » covenant it wosld follow that.” he able to my, throughout chapter (8 of Leviashon, "be- cause they have covenaited, it follows that... Yet before he does this he is careful to say that no such covenant need actully be made in order to establish the requisite sovereign power, The sovereign by acquisition has the same rights (and his subjects the same obligations), asthe sovereign by “Hobbes state of nature is, then, a logical hypothesis. The fact that the state of nature isa logical and not an historical hypothesis is generally understood, and ie would scarcely ‘have required attention here had ie not apparently led some: times to's fake inference. It seems often tbe assumed that, since the state of nature was not an historical hypothesis it ‘ust have been a logical hypothesis reaches by seting aside completely the historically acquired chaructristics of men, If inwas not about primitive men it must have been about ratural as contrasted with civilized men. But this does not fellow. The state of nature was for Hobbes + condition logically price ta che establishment of a perfect (ie. com- pletely sovereign) civil society; what he deduced from thestate of nature was the need for men to acknowledge the perfectly sovereign state instead ofthe imperfectly sovereign fates they now had. Hle was therefore able to deaw on his “understanding ofthe historically acquired nature of men in existing civil societies in order to get his deductions about the state of nature. His “inference made from the passions” could be made from the passions of existing men, passions Shaped by civilized living, His inferences were So made His state of nature is a statement ofthe behaviout to which men as they now are men who live in civilized societies and have the desires of eivilized men, would be led ill law and contract enforcement (je. even the present imperfect en- forcement) were removed, To get the state of nature Hobbes has set aside law, but not the socially acquired be: haviour and desires of men ‘The reason why this # 50 generally overlooked is I think, that Hobbes's model of saci, mhick he developed before he introduced the hypothetical state of nature, was itself almost ts fragmented af his state of nature, His model of society contained 4 similar incessant competitive struggle of each for power over others, though within a framework of law and’ order. The behaviour of men in Hobbes's model of Society! is, so to speak, to anti-coia, that when he carries this behaviour into hie hypothetical state of nature, itis there essly mistaken for a statement of the behaviour of rnon-social men. But itis statement of the behaviour of socal civilized men. That this sso cam be seen in a number of mays ‘The most evident indication, though not i itself deci- sive one, is that Hobbes offers, a5 3 confirmation of the ‘natural’ tendency of men to invade and destroy cach other, the observable behaviour of men in present civil society Temayssem strange to some maa, tht hes at well weighed these ‘hinge hat Nature thould hos [ie ar inehe wate nature disc, tnd ender men apt t invade, and toy ove anothers and he may hereto, ne tating tthe Tnferencey made from the Passos, dire perhaps to have the same confimed by Expense. Let him ‘ertore consider with hima, when taking > Journey, he armas Dimele and sesks to go well accompanies shen going 0 ley Be Tock is ores when even in is howe he locks his chests and hie thes he kore there bee Lawes ard pubike Ofer, armed, 10 ewe all injures shall toe done hin hat opinion he ha of it {low bjt when he rises armed of hi ellow Chizens, when he Jocks is does ad of his chen and Sera when be Locks his hes! And again, immediately after saying that a state of nature never generally existed Howsover it may beperdved what manne fe dere woul be, where there were no commen Powe o far; by the manner of lie thick men thee have formerly ied under» peacfll government taeo degenerate int in cell Ware? ‘The ‘natura’ behaviour of men, the behaviour to which they are necessarily led by thei passions, can be seen, approx ‘mated at leas, inthe behaviour of civilized men who live Under civil government, and of civilized men who, having lived under civil government, find themselves in evil war And the reason that this observable behaviour of civilized ren confirms the “inference mate fram the pasions' is that the inference was From the passions of civilized men "A more decisive evidence that the state of nature ie a statement of the behaviour to which specifically civilized sen would be led if even the present imperfect sovereign, were removed, is that the full state of mature is in face reached by soceessive degrees of abstraction from civilized society. This is often lost sight of. Hobbes’ picture of the {ull sate of natute i clearly the negation of civilized soci to industry, no culeure of the earth, no navigation, no come odious building, no arts, no letters, no society, ‘and the ite of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. The pic- ture isso imprestve that we are apt to forget haw Hoboes ‘demonstrates ite necessity, He deduces t from the appetites Levin ch 1, ER AP ;of men who are civilized in that they desire not merely ¢a live butt live well or commadiousy. OF the three principal ‘eases of quarrel” that Hobbes ings ‘in the nature of many which together would put men into this brutish state of hature, if there were no power able to overawe them, the first two (Competition and Difidence) arise out of men’s esi olive well Tes the man who would ‘plant, sow, build, possesse a convenient Seat” who must expect to be invaded and die possessed by others seeking to enjoy the fruits of his labour (Gehich invasion isthe substance of the ‘competition’ Hobbies sees in the state of nature), And it is the holder of such caltivated land and convenient buildings who becomes fare ful or difident and must seek to secure himself by subduing a6 many of his potential invaders st posible, that is, "by force, of wiles, to master the persons of all men he ean, so Tong tll he sce no other power great enough to endang him’, Even the man that otherwise would be glad to be at fase within modest hounds! must increae his power by n= trading others if he is to have a chance of resisting the invasion of others. In short, the matter about which competi- tion and difidence would lead to war ofeach with ally is the civilized matter of cultivated land and ‘convenient seats Even the third cause of quarrel (which Hobbes calls Slory) is more typical of men whose sale of values has been scquired by living in civilized society than of “natural” men is that very man ooketh hat companion shoud value hiny the same Intehesets pon mele: Ar yponal sige of contempt under “hing arly endeavour as ara dre (which amongst chem ‘hat hve no common power to Keep them in git if nouEh 10 take them desroy ath oer) to exrt 3 peter vale fem his Comer, by mages and rom oer bythe example? All cree of the causes of quarrel are presented as factors operating in any kind af society, but becoming destructive cea aed coply then cher is no common power to hold them in check Competition, difidence, and glory, far from being charac teristic only of the brutish state of nature, are the factors in present civil society which would cura civil society into that frutish condition i there were no common poster. Compet- tion, difence, and glory are ‘natural dispositions of men Jn iil society. ‘Natural’ for Hobbes is not the opposite of| social or civil "The naturall condition of mankind’ covers the whole chapter in Leviathen in which Hobbes moves fram the present dispositions of men to the brutish condi- tion, The natural condition of mankind is within men now, hot set apart in some distant time or place, the term state of nature’ were not 20 firmly entrenched in the Iterature about Hobbes ie would be helpful to discard it entirely and keep to such another term a5 "the natural Condition of mankind’, which is more readily seen to be something within men. Hobbes himself rarely used “state of mature’. In the Elemente his chapter is entitled “OF the Condition of men in mere nature’. It opens with the state- iment that, having previously described the whole of man’s ratural powers of hody and mind, he will now ‘consider in that estate of security this our nature hath placed us’, and he proceeds to describe the natural” conditidn of men in all sircumstances ie. their natural equality, vanity, and appe- fites, without using any particular phrase For this condition, ether shows chat this would necessarily les tothe brutish condition if common power were absent, and uses “state fof war’ to describe that concition. Similarly, in Levéarhon hhe uses ‘the natural condition of mankind? for his chapter tiles opens with = diseuesion of the natural condition of men in all circumstances (their natural equality, competition, dlifidence, and vanity), by which he Binds ‘in the nature of Iman” the chee causes of quarrel, without sing any particu lar phrase fr cis condition; then shows tha if men have no common power over them they must be isthe brutish conde tion, which he eas the ‘time or condition of wirIn both these treatments, where he avoids state of nature’, and especially in Leviarha, i's posible to distinguish be- tween the natural condition of tan (ue. the condition in which men are or tend to be in all circumstances, in or outof Cul society, because of their natores and the state of War (je. the condition that would follow if there were no com- mon power, or which does follow ifthe common power js removed by hypothesis) In the Radimen, however, where he does use "state of nature’? he uses it indiferetly 10 dleseribe both conditions, and the distinction between ther is lore. And because this cistinction is lost, the hypothetical character of the state of war (whichis maintained, though precitiouly, in the Elemente and Levtarhen) is lost in the Ruciments, where the state of nature, identified with the state of wa, is sid to have been “the natural state of men, before they entered into society’* ‘Yer there can be litle doubt thae in the Ration, ain the other two works, the state of nature i «logial astrac- tion drawn from the behaviour of men in civilized society Indeed itis even clearer in the Radiment than in the other too treatments that Hobbes has got atthe ‘natura proclvi= ties of men by looking just below the surface of contem- porary society, and that the sate of mature is 2 twostage logieal abstraction in which man’s natural proclivities are first disengaged from their civil setting and then cartied to their logical conclusion im the state of war. For the Radi mmont, omitting the whole physio-psychological analysis of fan isa system of matter in motion, opens with a brilliant dissection of men’s behaviour in contemporary society, which reveals their ‘natural’ procivties, and moves directly to the deduction of the necessary outcome in a state of war if there were no sovereign Hos by wht adic, men do meet willbe bast owes by serving ‘hore ting eich they do when they ace mee For f they meet for ‘rai, pin every man regs oe hs llow, bt his Busnes to dstargesome ofce a cetn marke-ienisip is bepotten which Tesh more of jelusy i than tru lovey and whence factors some ‘Spex ay ares bar good wll reves if for plesste, and rection of ‘ind eve mais wont please self mest wh thn ings which Sep laughter, whence hemay (acoring tothe ate of th hich ie idulous) by comprion of another mas defers ad india, us the sore current in is own oiton; al although thi Be sme ties innocent and without otece, yeh anit ty a nt 50 ck Siphted with he soc, a hei own vain por. But for he tow par thse Kinds of meeings we wound the aber thei Intl if tying, ations are amine, judged comme nay i Every rat bse pent esis ing Before they par so ashi ‘eas wasotily who wa wont always at pring gout st. And these relinieed the true delghs of sce, unto which we are cated Synth by dose pasion which re incden toa reatues So clear isi by experience to all men wh aide move nately Sesider human afsi tat all fee cones aheth ether fom ttl poverty oom vain lay, whence the paris met endesour teary with them eter se Beefy orto lve Bebind thern that tine eifoycv sneer and honor wit thse, wth whom hey five teen conversant. The same tal colected by reas at of he ‘fnion themselves, of wil god, honour potable? “The nature of man is thus got primarily from observation of contemporary society, and ineidentally Confirmed by examin- ing definitions. ‘tis from this analysis of the nature of man in society that Hobbes deduces the necessary tendency towards a state of war. He deduces it by temporarily setting aside fear ie. fear both of a sovereign and of other individuals. Take men as they tow ate, remove the fest of unpleasant of fatal con- sequences of their actions to themselves, and their present ratural proclvities would lead directly to the state of war ‘The dissection of men's behaviour in present society shows that all society ‘is ether for gain, or fer glory; that i, not so uch for love of eur fellows, as for the love of ourselves Since gain and glory ‘may be better attained to by dominion,than by the society of thes: I hope nobody will doubt but that men would much more geetiy be eatied by matre if al fee were removel, to obtain dominion, than to gain “Thus iby hypothe one removes all fa (far both ofa sovereign and of ater indvitas) the ful sate of ature {the stat of war) flows, But the fll state of nature ts Condition n which fen of other individuals must be omic presen, Bring back into consideration, therefore the fn thr indviuals (whichis in fae never sent) an this fear shown to bebeightened bythe absence ofa wovereign, I fllows thatthe fll sate of ature ar wate of war cone dicts man's lesirove and fel wate ‘And wt happen that through fear of eachother we think it tori ourelves of this comiiton and to get some Flows by sting up or SSknowicdgings sovereign able to protect uss “Thus inthe Redimeus the sate of wa is hypothetical condition, gt by purely logical aeration. Yt calling this hypehetiel condition the state of nature” Hobbes Inake fay to mitead either ae 4 condition hstoscaly frie to cv society or asa hypotnetalcondion deduced Flom men's‘ntualcharacteriic considered ently apart, from ther socalyacquzed characters “The rouble with Hobbes concet af stat of nature i that it tends to telescope two diferent coniton: the condi- tion of anpathy and Competition in eich men are suo find themselves lthe cme beenaeo thir natures andthe Etish condition of war The likelihood of tis telesoping appears tobe greater when the tem sate of mare used {Grin the Racin) than when is avided, but the tee Scoping neve entely abot However, by boing steadily tothe act thatthe men ho woul fll into the state of ar iPehere were no common power are ciiaed men, with Gh lined oars for convenient ving and eivived tastes fer fecling supeio, we an avid the ero of treating Hobbes Sete of mitre sean analyser of primitive man or of san considered apart from all his socially acquire charsc- (SA third demonstration that Hobbes's state of mature does not at aside contemporary man’s soil sired charse- {istics but simply law. and contracr-enforezment, or fear cfs sovercign (and, temporarily, au we have just sn in the ‘Radimons, fear of eter ndvideals),s provided by noticing trhat its that Hobbed's man woold lal, and would com felingly fea the Tack of, in the Ful rich state of nature Wat he would lack is prcily all the goods of cvlized living: propery, industry, commerce the sciences at, and lester, st well s secur for his ife. To be without theve goods contrary to man's nature. Its because of the lack thee goods that Hobbes's natural man is driven to seck fy out ofthe state of nature, "The Passions that enclne [natural] men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of sich things state necesary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obexin them." The passion for com= radios living rs pasion of Hobbes: naira man. Natural tani civilized man with only the restruint of law removed, Si, From phuilogical wo etal motion ‘We have seen that Hobbes's state of nature is a descrip- tion neither of the necessary behaviour of primitive men (hough primitive men approximate to it more nearly than So men under established cil governments) nor of the necessary behaviour of the human animal stripped of all his socially acquired appetites, The state of mature ia deduction from the appetites and other Faculties not of man as such but of civilized men We now turn to examine Hobbes's chain of deduction from the beginning. The physiological and. peychological snalysis of che nature of man with which Hobbes opens the ‘whole deductive argument in the Elomovis and in Leviathan begins as an analysis of the nature or motion of man con-sidered apart from established soil eatonships Ti, of appears tobe, about man at such, nt about civilised man Yersince by the time the argument reaches the hypoetcal stite of nature #8 about civiied many the question i, there di civilization ge into the argument? ‘The question might be thought to be unnecessary, since in a seme civilization was always there, Hobbes tls os himself thet the paychological analysis & of contemporary ‘an: whoroeverooketh into himself, al consireth what he doth, when he does shine, oping reason, hop, fore, By tnd upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know, ‘what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions andthe reader of Leviathon i inte to confirm Hobbes reading of man with no more pains than “onely to conse fhe alo find not the same in himsel. For ths kind of Doctrine, admiterh no other Demonte tion And indeed che presumpion stat twas the natore of cvlzed man that Hobbes was analysing From the Begine ning. For the resolutive-compositve method which he s0 “Minired in Galileo and which he took over? was to resolve sing sciety into simplest elements snd then recom: | pore those clement into. logis! whole. The reslving, { therfore, was of existing society into exiting individu, | and of them i turn into the primacy elements of their motion. Hobbes dos not ake us through the reaaltve part {this thought, but starts us with the result ofthat an taken ts through only the comportve part The order of hi ‘houghtwasfrom man in society back to man a a mechanical system of mater in motion, and only then forward aguin © ‘man’s necessary socal behaviout. Buti is only the second hal of this that he presents to his readers, And Because he begins his presentation (in Leviathow and in the Elements) ‘sith the plsilogeal an! paychologial analysis of man at {sytem af matter in motion the eeaer i pe forge that 1 SOURIS OR al pw. ani ory ad Pai i ise Ppa dary oa rit oes r the whole construction had its source in Hobbes thinking bout civilized men. In spite of thie, ie & stil necessary to inquire where cvi- lization got into Hoobbes's construction. For nthe reslutive- composiive method the resolutive stage proceeds not inerely by breaking the phenomenon down into its simplest slements, but doing this with a considersble amount of tbstrction, In that abstraction, something of the complex whole (inthis ease society and the nature of civilized tas) imay be set aside. And Hobbes has, or at last appears to have, set aside the specifically civilized characteristics of man in hisopening presentation of the nature of man. So we must inquire how and where these go ita his compositive stage. ‘Theinquiry is lese needed in the Rudiments for there Hobbes roves straight from his glimpse into contemporary society to the construction of the state of nature, without going at all inco that higher degree of abstraction which comprises the inital psychological analysis in the Blomente and Levis than. “The man whom Hobbes presents in the opening chapters cof Leviarhon should be more readily intelligible to us than to Hobloes's contemporaries, for that man is very like an automated machine. Tt is not only selfmoving but self ireting, Ie hs, built into it equipment by which alters is mation in response to diferences inthe materi it vses, and to the impact and even the expected impact of other matter ‘on it, The frst five chapters of Leviathan describe the items of this equipment: the senses, which receive the pressures of ‘utsice bodies, transmit them through the nerves tothe brain and heart, which then deliver a counter-pressure; the imagi- nation, oF memory, which ean recall past sense impressions and store up experience of them; the mechanism of rayne fof Thoughts’ or ‘Trayne of Imaginations, which hunts “the causes, of some eect, present or past; or». the effects, of some present or past cause," and which thos enables the mechanism to forecst the probable result of various possibleactions it might take; language, which enables the machine to communicate and receive communications and to onder its own reckonings; and reason, which by adding snd sub tracting mames and the consequences of names can reach {general propositions or rules for its own guidance. Chapter 6 of Leviathar introduces the general direction ‘or goal that is built in to the machine. The machine seeks €0 Continue its own motion, Te does this by moving towards things which it calculates are conducive to its continved motion and away from things not conducive, Motion to- wards is called appetite or desire, motion away from ‘alle aversion, A few of the appetites and aversion a8 for food, are builtin to the machine, but most are acquired by "Experience, and tral of their effects upon themselves, of ‘other men’! The acquired appetites and aversions are not always forthe same things: they difer as between different ‘machines (because they have diferent experiences), and ‘within one machine at different times (because each one “is in continuall mutation’) Whatever is the object of any machine's appetite i registers as good, and the objects of te aversion, el: Each therefore seeks its own good and shuns itsown evi. All the states of mind and general dispositions of men, such as hope, despsin, fear, courage, anger, confidence, Uifidence, covetousness of riches, ambition for office or pre~ cedence,pusllanimity, magnanimty, love, jealousy, revenge- fulness grief pity, emulation, and envy, can be reduced to the action of the appetite for one's own good in various Aliferentcireumnstances ‘Every man's actions are determined by his appetites anc versions or rather by his calculation of the probable effets fn the satisfaction of his appetites, of any action he mighe tke When inthe mind of man, Appetite and Aversion Hopes and eaten concerning one an the sume things ste akenatly aed paneer divers oo and vl comeguenes ofthe ding of omiting the thing rounded, come wieeniel into our thoughts 0 that sometimes swehavean Appete it sometinesan Aversion Frm it Sometimes eget alle to doy sometimes Depie o Fret tet the whole imme of Deiten Aversion Hoper and Pang continued the thing Be eter dey or though impose, that we call Dessenarion! All voluntary actions are determined by thie process of Selberation. "For a Voluntary Acris that Which proceedeth from the Will, and no other.” And Wil ir the lit Appetite in Deliberating’* Finally, because Life elf but Motion, snd can never be without Desire, nor without Reare, no ‘more than without Sense’, cach man must seek continual ‘Success obtaining those things which he from ime ta time Aesies and wil esie.t ‘Now in the whole of Hobbes's analysis so far, the only mention ofthe relation of one ofthese selémoving machines others of them has been in the analysis of states of ming for general dispositions of men. Some ofthese (eg. indigna- tion, charity, covetousness, ambition, fortitude, liberality, jealousy, revengefulness, pity, cruelty, emulation, envy) Hobbes does explain se relations between men of as ofects of relations between them. But the analysis of thse stats of| tind is incidental tothe main line of is deduction Te shows, how a wide range of observable characteristics of men can be explained in terme of Hlobbes's postulate that men ace self-moving and selfireting appetite machines, but this is rather an incidental confirmation of che original postulate than a sage in the main deduction from the nature of the mechanism to the necessary tendency of struggle of every fan with every man ‘The nest propositions that sre significant in the main deduction are in chapter § where in discussing intellectual virtues Hobbes makes two general statements from observae tion, one concerning the relations between men, and one‘concerning the differences between the passions of diferent men, The frst is that men value everything by comparison swith what others have: ‘Vertue generally, in all sorts of subjects, ix somewhat that is valued for eminence; and con= Sisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all ren, nothing would te prized."' The second i that the Giference between different men's wit (ie. their ability 10 ‘deal intelligently with the problems that confront ther) is ‘ue chiety tothe diferent degree oftheir ‘Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour’. Some men have “no great Passion for any of these things’, some men have, and the diference of passions proceeds "nat only from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difer- fenoe of eustomes, and education? Te ie not until ehapter to, however, that Hobbes begins his serious alysis of the relations’ between these sl moving machines, and chapters ro and rt say almost all that Hobbes has to say about those relations. We have to notice that chapters 10 and 11 are about the relations be- tarcen civilized men living in established societies, an that ‘these two chapters contain all or all but on, of the essential propositions from which Hobbes deduces in chapter 1 the ecesity of war of every man sptinst every man fa common power were removed, The only relevant necessary propos fiom not stated until chapter 13 isthe natural equality of men, which is needed to show that the sate of war could never end by any one man’s vitory over the rest Tn shor, it in ehapters 10 and 11 hat we find the main transition from man the machine by itself, to man the ‘machine asa unit ina series of social relationships, And iti in these chapters that we shall expect to find such nev postu lates, stated oF implied, as are needed for the deduction of the state of nature, and that we can sc to what extent those postulates are drawn from the observed relations of men in 2 specific kindof society. 5 kari ‘The ground traversed in chapters 10 and 11 i substan- tialy that beeween the neutral definition of power with thigh chapter ro opens (Te Powsn of « Man, (co take it Universally.) is is present means, to obtain some future apparent Good’), and the conclusion early in chapter 11: "So that in the frst place, I put fora general inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceasethonely in Death’,*powernow being power | ‘ver other men. It is this canchision which leads directly t0 the state of war of chapter 43, when all political authority and law-enforcement are removed by hypothesis, The ques tion is how Hobbes moves from the neutral definition of power tothe desir of every man for ever mote power over bther men In Leviathon, immediately after the neutral definition of. power, he classifies power as either original (or natural) or flee instrumental, and assets: onwa Puss the eminence ofthe Faculties of Body, Ming ssexraowlinary Suengt, Fume, Prasence, At Eoquer, Lierae lity, Nob. natant ae tone Powers wich cid by these, ry fortune, are means an Tosramens to acquire more: a Riches Repeat, Friend andthe secret working of God which men ell Good Luck. Forth atuse of Powis inthis poi, ke 10 Fame, increasing a proven ike the ooion of heavy bode, which the order they 2 make sil dhe more bast ‘Wenotice that a man's natural power i defined not ashi natural abikty (Strength, prudence, &e.) but ab the emi) of his ability. It isthe eminence of his ability over That of others that enables him to acquire instrumental powers Ciehes, reputation, friends, &e,). A man's power is not an Absolute but a comparative quantity. I doesnot, as might be | thought to have been implied in the firs oF neutral definition of power, consist of a man’s personal capacities plus any further command over things that he can acquire by exer ising those capacities it consists of the excess of his per= Sonal capacities over those af other men, plus what can |1 HOBBES: POLITICAL OBLIGATION OF THE MARKET scquire by that excess. A new postulate is implied in this redefinition of power, namely, that the capacity ofevery man {ro get what he wants is opposed by the capacity of every ‘other man, This postulate is made explicitly inthe parallel passage in the Element. There, the power of a man to get Something he wants is frst defined se the fcuk of body and mind (and) euch father power by them re acquired vn riches, lace of authori, iendehip or favour and food fortune: (This slowed by the satement:] And Because the power of tan resiteth and Rinderth the eet of the power of nother; power snp sno mare, ba the ences ofthe power of one Shove tht of another For ual powers opponed destroy one sre, fn such eet opposition called conention Every man’s power is opposed by the power of others, 30 suniverilly that "power simply’ can be fedefined s= 4 com- parative not an absolute quantity, This postulate of the opposition of individuals powers is new itis not contained in the previous propositions about man as a selemoving ‘mechanism seeking to maintain or enhance his motion.* If there were any doubt about the university of the opposition of posers which Hobbes is stating in that post Inte # would be removed by his discussion of varios specif kinds of power in society, and his analyst of valuing and honouring, which follow these definitions of power both in Leviathan and inthe Elem, In Leviathan, the reason why such things a5 wealth and reputation are power is that they tgive defensive and offensive strength ageint others, Thus Riches oped orth ibeaity, is Powers becaue i pocireth Ariens ant servants: Without erly noe sos bose th ce they defend nots but expo mento Enna Prey. Reputtion of power Powers because i draweth withthe adherence of those har neod protection.» ley what quality roever maketh x man Beloved of feaed of many a the reputation of such quality Power, Because tba mest have theasssanc, and sevice of may? [All the kinds of acquired power that Hobbes describes Consist in defensive and offensive strength against others. ‘Anda of thera consis in command over some of fhe powers father men; they areall the product of the tansfer of some men's powers to other men. Hobbes has in effect defined equited power as ability to command the services of other men. A man’s power over nature, his ability to wansform rature by iis own strength, intelligence, and knowledge is apparently put under the’ head of his original, not his sczuired, power. The power of men associated to transform ature is neglected. Hobbes's analysis of valuing and honouring, which fol. lows the description ofthe kins of power, lls out his picture of the relations of men in society. Transfers of power are Ssesumed to be so vsual that there is = market in power. A ‘man's power is treated as a commodity, regular dealings in Which establish market prices ‘The Fata Woxvs of may isa ofall ater things i Prices Ya iso sy 60 much as would he given forthe ue of his Power a therefore 5 nt absolute, but hing depart on the ned nd Jilgement of snochr And asin other things in ey ot he fel, bu the bayer determines the Prise: Fo les man as most men fa tate theoseves atthe highest Value they eany yr thet tee ‘Value sno more thea it iseteemed by thers The value men set on one another, in comparison with the value each sets on himself is measured by the degree to which each is honoured or dishonoured by others, as shown by the postive or negative amount of deference accorded to him in various ways “The manifestation ofthe Vale we se on one anather is tht which + commonly called Honouring, ant Dishorourng. To Vale a ma tea high ats» Honor hin, alow ete to Dishonce hr, But high, slow in this Cet vo be urderstood by compan fo ‘he ate that each man sereth on ims? ‘The degree of honour accorded to 4 man this measures his actual value in comparison with the value he sets onhimself, But the actual value js determined by what others would give forthe use of his power. Hlonour, garded sub jectively bythe recipient, the diference between his on tstimate and the market estimate of his value, But hanowr, regarded objectively, corresponds to the market estimate that both establishes his actual power and is established by bis actual or apparent power, His actual or apparent power is made up chicly of his power to command the services of others, and his power to command the services of others is Based on the others’ estimate of his present power: Honerals is whatwoever poset ation, of quality, ian argue rmeneand signe of Pwer [50] Dominion, and Victory is Honouables Tecate acquired by Power. Riche ste Honourable fa they ae Power» Tiey Retlton of determination of what 2 an a 4s, i Honourable, a being the contempe of sll dius, and tlngers To be Conspicuous, that i ty, tbe known For ‘Wath, Oc, grest Aeon, or ay eminent Good, s Honourable zaign ofthe power for which hem conspicuous, Coretueste fof great Riches, and ambition of great Honour are Honourable? a fignes of powet to ohtain them. «Nor dost it aler the exe of Honour, whether an action (oi be great and dificult and cone quently signe of much power) be jus or unjust for Honour ene ‘ich only the opinion of Pex. ‘We have here the essential characteristics of the competi= sive market. Every man's value, manifested by the honour igiven im by others, is both determined by and determines, the others’ opinion of his power, manifested by what they ‘would give forthe use of hi power, Valuing, or honouring, is not simply a relation between one man who receives and fone man who gives honour or dishonour; ita relation be ‘oreen one man sho receives it and al the others who give to him, ic all other men who have any interest, however con tingene of remote, in the way he uses his power. All these other men make their estimates of his power independent ‘And they make their estimates of his power comparatively to the power of others, for his usefulness to them is not 1 trian oh 2, FF TT fan absolute quantity but a quantity depending on the vailbility of others. And everyone not only i estimated pall the others who ave any interest in the way he uses his power, but alo esac all these others. Yet ou of this immensely large number of independent value judgements, tn objective value ofeach man is establishes. Ir ean only be fo established because every man's power is regarded 28 4 ‘commodity, ie. thing normally offered for exchange, snd ‘fired competitively. Every man i in the matket for power, cither as supplier or emander, for everyone ether has some pwer to offer to others or wants t9 acquire the power of some others ‘The same assumptions are implied in the treatment of honouring snd valuing in the Elomens, To honour a man ‘is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds oF tcest of power above him that contendeth or compareth himeell And woxounaete are those signs for which one rman acknowledgeth power or excess above his concurrent in another’ So strength, victory, adventure, nobility, and the rest, arc honourable; “riches are honourable; a8 signs of the power that acquired them, "., and according to the signe of honcur and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or wont of a man, Bor so much worth is everything, 4a man wil give forthe use of all i ean do." Here, as in “Leviasha, the objective value i established by the estimates of others, which estimates are based on the usefulness of his parent power to them, Every man’s value is established 28 prices are established in the market. A market determines the price only of things which are normally offered for sale and wanted by purchasers. To speak of the value or price lof every man, therefore, sto assume that every man is either ‘seller of his power ors buyer of others’ power (or both). “Hobbes's analysis of valuing and honouring, enlarging as it does on the definitions of power and descriptions of kinds of power, substantially completes his argument that the necestary behaviour ofall men in society isan endlessstruggle for power over others. He has moved from the Sefinition of power ax present means to abtain Future good, through a redefinition of power asthe excess or eminence of fone man's means in comparison with another's, The second

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