differen situations: “I'm gonna get you” games, “walking finger ‘riche the tummy.” and a host of other suspense games that ate stands fare at chis age. The infantis alo likely to have experienced 4 doten ot more varstions ofthe peek-a-boo game 10 begin with: diaper over baby's face, diaper over mother’s face, mother's face ges covered by baby’s feet as they are broughe togeter, Ber fae res abore and scts below the horizon of the bed, and so on. No matter how mother does it, che infant experiences her antes ax belonging to her at a core other: this is only one of the many ways of capericncing her organization, coltesion, and agency. “Moreover, the same general feeling states» engendered in the infant, regardes of which way the mother plays the game” And it is likely that ehis family of games has been paved withthe infant by others—fcher, bbysicer, and 30 00. The purticula afer, then, remains, despite variations in the interaction and changes in the fneractant. I sony the feeling state chat belongs to the self, cae is what permis the infan to triangulated identify what invariant belong to whom. And normal purent/infant interactions are, of coune, necesarilyextensely variable. To highlight che excl tole of variety of experience in dsinguishing eelFinvariansy fom other-invarants, imagine che flowing Seppose that an infant experienced jyfal cytes of anticipation and resolution only with mother, and chat mother always regulated these eycles in the exact same way (vicilly imposible. That infant would be im a ricky spot. In this particular, unchanging activi mother would be semed a core ether brcate her behavior would bey most of the laws (agency, coherence, continuity) that specify ches as agsinat selves. However, the infant could not be site 10 ‘what extent his or her feeling sate was an invariant property of self or of mather's behavior since both would ineurably seempsny tht feeling. (Ths is close to the pictare of sel/other wndifferentiaion assumed by many, except that we have derived ie from the mother's ‘Weittions racer than from the infa's) Under the normal conditions of inevitable variety, then, che infant should have no trouble én sensing who is who and what belongs to ‘whom in thes kinds of encounters Theve are, however, may games and routines in which s great degree of similarity of behavior Therween parent and init is the role, May not thee prstat a more 106 THE SEN E OF A GORE SELF: I dificult task for the infant in distinguishing self from other and from “ex”? These inclode eat ‘makes her hands and the infant's hands do the same ch ‘imitation routines, afect leading and following. as in the mutual cacalation of smiles, and many more. One could imagine that at such fines the cues that specify selEimrarsns and othernvarints coold parially break down, because in imitative interactions, the behavior ofthe other may he comorphic (similarly contoured 38 far 36 intenity and vitality affects are conceraed) and often simula synchronous with the behavior of the infant. One enight expect that these experiences are the ones that come closest eo the nations of merging or of dissolution of sclt/ot peteepaual grounds (Sern 1980), Even under these conditions, however, itis quite cnough of the differentiating eves ean be obliterated. [pier Tey cn des pi-cond de Simultaneity. For istance, if mother's face is shown of three months on television screen but her voce i delayed by several hundred milliseconds the snfant picks up the discrepancy it synchrony and ix disturbed by it, as by a badly dubbe forms of pae-avcake, where mother 8, various boundaties, at least on likely that a infat (Trevarthan 1977; Dodd 1979) Similarly, it isthe ability to estimate time in the split-second range that permits the infane to distinguish the sounds /ba/ and /pa/, which differ only én timing of voice onset (Eimas etal. 1971, 1978), Even if the parent could ac like a perfect ricror, che memorial continuity of a core sense of self could not be abliterated” ‘What happens to the sense of self in thote mutual interactions11/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF involving the regulation of the infant's seeuity or state transforma tions? While these interactions are 10 more devoted to affective alterations than the interactions already discussed, they are historically considered mote conducive to experiences of merger. During, these texpericnces, the parent's behaviors are complementary to the infant (holding the infant, who is being held). In this sense, each partner fs generally doing something quite diferent from the other. The intacness of self and other is therefore readily maintained, since the perceptual cues reveal the other to be following a different temporal, spatial, intensity, and/or movement organization from the slf. In other words, all the eves that specify selGinvariants o* other invariants (discussed in chapter 4) are undisturbed, 0 chat no confusion in che sete of self versos sense of other need occu atthe Jeyel of core-elatednes. I is thus resonable that the sense of a core self and 4 core other need not be breached by the presence of self regulating others, even when the experience concems the infant's affect ate. ‘A second question now arises. What isthe relationship berween the altered sel-experience and the regulating role of the other who helped alter the infun’s se-experience? Or, more tothe point. how is that relationship experienced by the infant? We can answer for an adule or older chil. Sometimes it screams out and seems to fill the entire attentional fied as in the powerful felings af being with someone when you ate imecure or seared, being enfolded in chat person's arms and engulfed in something like security, of almost falling into the other's personhood (what 4 normal “meager” expe- rience is purportedly like) [Atother times, the relationship between the altered slf-experience and the regulatory role of the other is silent and goes unnoticed. This situation is analogous co the silent or invisible presence of the “self-ccher* as well expresied inthe terminology of Self Psychology by Wolf (1980) and Stechler and Kaplan (1980). Setting mii, Sorte moment, my: pricalar wge-eppropriate form of the selfbject aced, one may compas the need for the continaoys ‘mesence of 4 perchologiclly mourshing selfohject milieu with the continuing physiological ned for an environment containing oxygen. Rt {eaelatively silent need of which one becomes aware sharply only when its nox being met, when a hash wll compels one co daw the breath Jinn. And foi goes ako with the efobyect needs. As ony a3 person 08 THE SENSE OF 4 CORE LP: ‘i securely embeded in a cal matrix that proves him with a fell in Teh ad at dan os Lee tll wing ceo etd eearyra Pec ey of ate wn be ‘wll cofeehy fine phn ttl a paral ral teen seltaticien, a ironomovs. a, by some avery of tea ete celta escarole aes eal eed a eed a eka or ere ee friendly it mighe be disposed tomard him, Even strong selves tend 0 fngment under such circumstances. One can fel lonelet i» crow sialppennersbelencnleabeniau cheaeesbe mie (af 1905 Piz “Whether the relationship between altered selfexperienee and the regulating role of the other is abvious or unobtrusive, the alteration in selfexperience always belongs entirely to the self. Even in the obvious situation ofa security need being met, the other may appeat to provide—may actully even seem to porsest—the “security before enfolding you, But the feeling of becoming secure belongs only to the self In those situations when the regulatory role of the ‘other goes unnoticed, ehe experience of selfalteration belongs only t the self by defval- “The previous dseusion addressed the question of who subjectively ‘owns, 10 0 speak, the alteration in selfexperience—the self, che other, ot some “we or fused amalgam. The answer seems to be that it falls completely within the domain of the sense of self. This issue of subjective ownership, however, leaves unanswered the ques: tion of how the relationship is sensed. Somme relationship nots comme to exist between the change i scf experience and the regulating role, obvious or unobtrusive, of the other, simply because they tend t0 occur together. They become related as do any attributes of a repeated lived experience. They are not elements that are fused or confused; they are simply relate. ‘They are two of the more salient elements (that i, attributes) of any pparicular lived experience with a self-regulating other. Merger ‘experiences at this age are simply a way of being with someone, but someone who acts as self-regulating other. Any such lived experience includes: (1) significant alterations in the infant's feeling state that seem to belong vo the self even though they were mutwally created by self with an other, 2) che other person, as seen, heard, and felt at the moment ofthe alteration, (3) a intact sense of score self snd,11/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELE cove ther ils which allthis cacy, and (6) vay of pote fl ean pe Wr eh form « mlipcive wae cat peers fon nore wes a ad Seley saan Goad ae ceed ee Yoling covert ln Che frm oft toma euode fe lved. The Fraley fl memory tthe tl nt Bock he leat scuets of te capercae one ratiomhips one with the od he elas oe ea a ool a th irl apa Viewers ae) ales hacerlo faba ha cer bo eeepc a ad ap Jisy ct ceased i ee Gecko ADE the plans tured toe bea ony wi eke be a ose ke ee fe Seria Ind the perception of the other donot have wo cllape ino one pret ve ery cian berpesrer wry ennee ara poeta ateune poate yoy en ari lee yarnere pos Lived episodes immediatly become the speci eps for mem cay ud wih epeson they Keer eased spans ot dered in chapter 4 They are gerald pode of ineractive experience cieeirciaraclly sepreeseci Rat CRM ‘fetive experience as « dyadic evest, and this comceptoalizstion fs Iecessary to a generic view of antersubjectivity, It also possible that the deminssce of separition/individastion theory t explain the ie period under discussion acted as an sbstacle toa fle apreciation ‘of the role of snersubectvity. “To be more specific on this pot, ego prychoanalyticcheory has ‘viewed the perad after seven to nine months athe time of emerging snore ally (hitching i the metaphor) Fim che undiferentiated and fased state that preceded it. This phase was predominantly devoted to establishing «separate and individuated self to dinolving merger experiences, and t© forming a more autonomous self that could inteuct with « tote separated other. Given tht view of the tnajor life task of chie period, ts bs not nmprining thet the theory filed to notice thut the appearance of intersubjective relitedness permitted, for the fis time, the crestion of mutually held ental states and allowed for the realry-ased joining (even merging) of «experince. Paradoxcily, ts only with the advent of inter- subjectivity that anything like the joining of subjective psychic experince can actualy occur. And cis i indeed what the leap 9 an imcrubjective sense of self and other makes possible, jst a che developmental moment when traditional theory had the ede begin~ ning te flow the other way. In the present slew, both separation individuation and new font of experiencing unin (or being-with) merge eqully ov of the same experience af imerabjectvty." 1," ut rhage sen Br len deciogeets te Te1/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF In. spite of a general disregard of intersubjective experience as a dyadic phenomenon, theorist: have regularly appeared, often just ‘outside of the mainstream, who have held positions receptive to the concept of intessubjectivity or subjective relatedness. Vygotsky's notion of the “intermental” (1962), Fairbaim’s of the infan's innate interpersonal relatedness (1949), and MacMurray’ af the field of ehe ‘Perional (1961) ay-well os Sullivan's of the interpervonal fell (1953), fare influential examples. It was against this background that the recent findings of the developmentaltes acted to bring the develop imental leap of eruibjectivity into its present sharp focus. Its not surprising that these developmentalies were Largely interested cithee in the role of intentionality in the mother-infant interaction or in how infants acquire language. Both routes would ultimately lead to the issue of ineersubjectvity and its underlying assumptions, which the philosophers had long been dealing with ‘The Evidence for Intersubjectve Relatabnes ‘What, then, is the evidence for the appearance of interiubjective relatedness at seven to nine months? Trevarthan and Hubley (1978) have provided a definition of intersubjetivity chat can be operation alized: “a deliberately sought sharing of experiences about events nd things.” What subjective experiences docs the infant give evidence of sharing or, atleast, expecting the mother to share? Recall that infants at this poioe in development are sill paevesbal The subjective experiences that they can share must be of a kind that do mor require tanslation into language. Three mental sates that are of great relevance to the interpersonal world and yet do aot require Language come to mind. These are sharing joint attention, sharing intentions, and sharing affective states. What behaviors do infants show 0o suggest that they can conduct or appreciate these deg? 128 THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: 1 SHARING THEE FOCUS OF ATTINTION “The geiure of pointing and the act of following another's line of vision are among the first overt act that permit inferences about the sharing of atention, oF the establishing of joint atention. Mothess pint and infants point. Let us start with the mother's pointing, For her pointing to work, the infant must know to stop looking at the pointing hand itself and look in the direction i indicates, to the target. For a Tong time it was believed that infunts could nat do this tunel well into their second year because they could not escape their egocentric position. But Murphy and Messer (1977) showed that rine-month-oldsdo- indeed detach their gaze from the pointing hand and follow the imaginary line to the target. “What has been mastered 2 this stage isa procedure For homing in on the attentional Focus of another. Ir isa disclosure and discovery routine... highly generative within the limited world inhabited by the infant im the sence that it is nos limited to speciic kinds of object. Ie has, morsover, equipped the child with a technique for transcending egocentriem, For inset as he can appreciate another's line of regard and decipher their marking intentions, he has plainly achieved a hasis for what Piaget has called decentration, using 2 coordinate system for the world other than the one of which he is the center” (Bruner 1977, 276). Parlier than nine months, infants show a preliminary form of this, discovery procedure: they follow the mother’s line of vision when she turns her head (Scaife and Bruner 1975), jast as the mocher follows the infant's line of vision (Collis and Schaffer 1975) So far, we have sten only a routine of procedure for discovering another's attentional focus. Infants of nine months, however, do moge than that. They not only visually follow the diection of the point but, after resching the target, look back at the mother and appear to wie the feedback from her face to confim that they have arrived at the intended target. This is now more than a dicovery procedure. It is 4 deliberate attempe to validate whether the joiet attention has been achieved, chat is, whether the focus of atteaion is heing shared, although the infant is not self-aware of these ‘operations ‘Similarly, infants begin to point at aboot nine months of age, though they do so less frequently than mothers do, When they do, their gaze alternates between the target and the mother's face, asM1/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF when she is pointing to see if she has joined in to shate the stventional focus be seems reasonable to assume that, ezen prior £0 pointing, the infants beginning capacity to move about, to craw! of ‘ruiz, is crucial in discovering altemative perspectives a i necessary for joint attention. In moving about, the infant continually alees the perspective held on some known stationary sight. Perhaps this initial acceptance of serially diferent perspectives iv a necesary precursor to the mote generic “realization” that others can be using 2 different coordinace system from the infant's own, ‘These observations lead one to infer that by nine months infants have some sense that they can have 4 particalar attentional focus, that mother can alko have a particular acentional focus, that these two mental states can be similar or not, and tha if they are not they can be brought into alignment and shared. Interatentionality becomes area. SHARING ineTENTIONS Researchers interested in infants’ language acquisition have natuelly been drawn to look at the most immediate origins of language use These origins include the gestures, postures, actions, ane nonverbal vocalizations that infants display jost prior to and presumably as a precunor to language. Such provolinguisic forms have been examined closely by a number of researchers, all of whom agree in one way for another that beginning at about nine months the infant intend to communicate (Bloom 1973, 1983; Brown. 1973; Bruner 197 1977, 1981; Dore 1975, 1979; Halliday 1975; Bates 1976, 1979; Ninio and Bruner 1977; Shield: 1978; Bates etal. 1979; Bretherton and Bates 1979; Harding and Golinkoff 1979; Trevarthan 1980; Harding 1982), The intention to communicate is diferent from the intention simply eo influence another person. Bates (1979) provides 4 working debnition of intentional communication that we cam we: Inventions! commaniciion it signaling behavior in which the seer is aware, a prion, of the effec thatthe signal will have om hs lence, ani he persis in hat behavior anti the effect is obtained oF failure dlealy indicated. The behavioral evidence that permits us 0 infer the 2 Ping soup signe in rahing, which dally gre conned a 4 Fl my ethyl bmg ger agrmareeel ‘ern tec es wx cc wh w maser ue mots aching at 130 THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: 1 presace of communicative ineetions inclades (4) alterations in eye faze contact hetween the goal and the intended Iisteners, () augment tions, ations, apd subseitution of signals until che goal has been ‘bisiaed, and) changes fa the foem of the slp towards sbbveriaed ani/or exaggerated pater that are appropriate only for achieving a ‘communicative gal (p. 34) ‘The mow seightforward and common examples of intentions “communication ae protlinguistic forms af requesting. For example, the mather i holding something the infant wants—iay, a cookie “The infant reaches outa hand, palm wp towards mother, and while making grasping movements and looking back and forth between hand and mother’s face intone, “Eht EI” with an imperative prosody (Dore 1995) Those acts, which are ected ata refeeat person, imply that che infnt aterbutes an intermal etal sate f0 that person—namaly, compecherson of the infants intention and the capacity to intend to sitefy thet ineation. Intcotions have ‘become shareable experiences Ineiniewionslity becomes rea. Once again t need not be self-aware. "Dunn has obierved the interactions ‘older and younger siblings and has richly describes ma subtle events between them that imply that they have shared moments of intersubjecivity, For instance, a three-year-old and a ‘one-year-old suddenly burst into laughter over 2 private joke fi which no one ele can find the eliciting cause. Similar eruptions of ‘easing episodes occur that alto rermin opague to adult comprehension (Dunn 1982; Dunn and Kendrick 1979, 1982). Such events requite the attribution of shareable mental states that involve intentions and ‘expectations. You can't tease other people unless you can correct jruess what is “in their minds" and make them suffer or laugh because ‘of your knowing ‘Can infants alse atcibuce shareble affective ates to their 100 panes? A group of scscarchers (Emile et al. 1978; Klinert 1978/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF ‘Campos and Stenberg, 1980; Emde and Sorce 1983; Klinest et al 1983) have described a pheniomenon they call socal referencing, ‘The yearald infants ate placed in a situation bound to ereate uncertainty, usually ambivalence between appeoach and withdesmrl ‘The infant may be lured with an attractive toy to crave across a vial cli (an apparent drop-off, which is mildly frightening at fone year of age or $0) or may be approached by an unusual but highly stimulating objece such at 4 Meeping, Mashing: robot like RaDz2 fram Siar Wars. When the infanss encounter these siuations and give evidence of uncertainty, they look towards mother to read ther face For its affective content, essentially to see what they should feel, to get 4 second apprsil t9 help resolve their uncertainty. Tf the mother hat been instructed eo show facial pleasure by smiling, the infane crosses the visual cif. If che mother has been instructed to show ficial fear, the infant turns back from the “cli” reeeats, and pethaps becomes upset. Similarly, if che mother smiles at the robot, the infant will too. If che shows fear, the infane will become ‘more wary. The point for our purposes is that infants would not check with the mother in this fashion unless they ateshuced to her the capacity wo have and to signal an affect tha has relevance to their own actual or potential feeling states ‘Recent preliminary findings in our laboratory (MacKain et al 1985) suggest that infants a about nine months notice the congruence berween their own affective wate and the affect exprenion seen on someone's face. IF infants are made sad and upset by several minutes’ separation from mother (this is the age of acute separation reactions). as soon as they are reunited with her they stop being upset but remain solemn and are judged by mother and experimenters sill co be sadder than usual, If then, right after the reunion when they are still sad, the infants are shown. a happy face and a sad face, chey prefer to look at the sad face. This does not hippen if the infants ae either made to Laugh first o hid not been separited in the first place. One conclusion i that the infant somehow makes a match hecween the feeling state as experienced within and as seen “on or "in" anocher, a match that we car call iuraltvey. Interactivity may be the first, most pervasive, and most imme- iseely important form of sharing subjective experiences. Demos (1980, 1982s), Thoman and Acebo (1983), Tronick (1979), and 132 THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: 1 others, as well as peychoanalysts, propose that early in life affects are both the primary medium and the primary subject of communication. ‘This is in accord with our observations. And at nine to rwelve months, when the infane has begun to share actions about objects and to exchange propositions in prelinguistic form, affective exchange is sill the predominant mode and substance of ‘communications with mother, Iti for this reason that the sharing ‘of affective states merits primary emphasis in ou views of infants of i intentions these ages. Mont protolinguistic exchanges involving intentions and ‘objects are atthe same time affective exchanges. (When the baby for the first time says “bi-s” and points to the ball, the people around sexpond with delight and excitement) The rwo go on simultaneously, and findings chat define a given event as primarily linguistic or ‘primarily affective depend on perspective. However, the infant who is just learning the discursive mode appears to be far more expert in the domain of affect exchange. In a similar vein, Trevarthan and Hubley (1978) have commented thatthe sharing of affective moods and states appears before the sharing of mental states that reference ‘objets, that is, things outside of the dyad. It seems clear that the sharing of affective states is of paramour imporeance during the fre part of intersubjective relatednes, 20 much so that che next chapter ill be devoted to a different view of che intersubjective sharing of ecling, states The Nature of the Leap to Intersubjectve Relaedness Why does the infant suddenly adope an organizing subjective pere spective about self and others that opens the door to antersabjectii 1 this quantum leap simply the result of a newly emergent, specific capacity of skill? Or docs it result from the experience of social interactions? Or is it the maturational wafolding of a major human rnced and motive sate? Piaget (1954), Bruner (1975, 1977), Bates (1976, 1979), and others whose primary approach. is cognitive or linguistic view this achievernent mainly in terms of an acquited social skill the infant discovers generative rales and procedures for 988Lf THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF dewcracions that ultimately lead to the discovery of ineerabjctviy Trevachan (1978) has called this a eonstructionise approach Shields (1978), Newson (1977). Vygotsky (1942) and others have understood this achievement more as the result of mother’s entrance into “meaning” exchanges, beginning a& the saints bith. She interprets all the inf’s behaviors in terms of mranings that i she ateributes meanings to them. She provides the semantic element all by herself a fst, and continues o bring the infane’s behavior into her framework of created meanings. Gradually, as the infant is able the framework of meaning becomes mutually creat, This approach, ‘ed on social experience, might be called the approach of incerpe- somal meanings. ‘Many thinkers in France and Switzerland have independently approached the problem along similar lines and pushed the notion cof maternal interpretation into richer clinical seriory. They anert that mothers “meanings” reflect noe only what she observes but also her fantasies about who the infant is and is t become. Intersubje- tivity, for them, ultimately involves interfunasy. They have asked hhow the fantasies of the parent come 10 influence the infane's behavior and ultimately to shape the infan's own fancaies. This, reciprocal fantay intercon ‘+ a form of created interpenonal meaning atthe covert level (Kreis, Fair, and Soulé 1974; Keiser sind Cearer 1981; Cramer 1982, 198%: Lebovici 1983: Pinal Douricz 1983). The creation of such meanings has been called “interactions fntasmatique." Fraierg etl. (1975) and Stem (1971), dn the Unite States have sno paid close attenion tothe relationship between maternal fantasy and overt behavior. “Trevarthan (1974, 1978) has stood relatively alone in maintaining hae intenubjeciviey is an inna, emergent human capacity. He joins out thatthe other explanations forthe appearance of ieerub- Jecsivity, especialy the constructionist explanation, do not allow for ‘ny special awareness of humans or forthe shared sorareness that i se highly developed in humans, Ele sees this developmental leap as, the “eliferentition of + coherent feld of intentionality” (Crevarehan and Hubley 1978, p. 213) and views iaerubjecivicy as human ‘capacity preset in a primary form fram the eatly months of life* 4 tna hn cing meri Tvl wane" (Tewetan and Hbley 199 che lee dren fs wane Banas ence eel der emt be st emergent ama Spit. Howe ht ‘THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: | All thrce viewpoints seem necessary foram adequate explanation of the emergence of intesubjectivty. Trevarthan is right hat some special form of awareness must conse into play at this point and that the capacity for it must wnfold maturationally, And that special awareness what we ate calling an organizing subjective perspective However, the xpacity mast have some tools to work with and the constructivist approach has provided the tools in the form of rule structures, action formats, and dicovery procedures. Finally, che Capacity plus the tools would be operating in a vacuum without the addition of inerperonal meanings that are mutually created. All ‘three taken together ar required fora fuller account of intersubjective relatedness. ‘Once intersubjectivity has been tasted, 30 f0 speak, dors it just remain 3 a espacty to be used of not, ot a penpetive on elf and ‘ther to be adopted or not? Or does it become a new psychological ‘need, the need to share subjective experience? ‘We cannot caaliily add to the lst of basic psychological needs cvery time we came upon a new potentially autonomous capacity ae need. The usual psychoanalytic solution to this problem, since the pioneering work of Hartmann, Kris, and Lowenscin (194), is t0 call all such aueonomously functioning capacities and need-like states “autonomous eo fonctions," rather than instincts or morivational systems, This label gives them their self-evident primary autonomous satus but also puts them potency 3¢ the service of the “basi” rpvehoanalytic needs, whose higher starus is protected. (Iti mainly fn the area of infancy research thatthe presence and pervasiveness of newly recognized capacities and needs has become apparent and poses the problem) ‘Up to a point, this solution of autonomous exo functions has proven extremely helpful and generative forthe Fld. The question | when does an autonomous exo function become of such magnitude that it is beter conceived asa “has need or motivational system? Curiosity and stimalus seeking are good cases in point. These appeat ‘mesmo yes of yma chr ee ea acto ea Tet ‘hee (1909 Thc er 0 got tht the eae peti eh ed mempeio. Oly "Thee tech mse to hve Ga oer sal say fr example, eb capes aeajr eng wel ne1 / THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF te parake more of the quality of motivtional systems that of mere autonomous ego functions. ‘What, then, ahout intersubjective relatedness? Are we #o consider Or are we dealing with a primary psychobiological need? ‘The answers to these questions are this another autonomous ego fanet actually momentous for clinical theory. The more one conceives of interuubjective relatedness a8 a bisic psychological need, the closer cone refashions clinical theory taward the configurstions suggested by Self psychologists and some existential psychologist. rom the perspective of infancy research, the question remains open. One consideration in this inue ix wo figure ost what it 10 reinforcing about intersubjectivity. There is no question but that its seinforcing power cin be relied. to achieving security needs or attachment goals. For instance, intersubjective successes can result in feelings of enhanced security. Similaely, minor flares in intcrsab Jectivity cam be interpreted, experienced, and acted upon as toca! ‘ruptures in a relationship. This fs often seen in therapy. ‘A parallel view is that an overriding human need develops for Ihamnat-group paychie-metabership group a5 a member with potentially sharcable subjective experiences, in contrast w a nonmember whose subjective experiences are wholly tanigue,idioryncratic, and nonshareable. The issue is Basic. Opposite poles of this one dimension of psychic experience define different prychotic states. At one end is the sense of cosmic prychic isolation, alienation, and aloncness (the last person Left on earth), and at che ‘other end isthe feeling of total prychie transparency, in which no single comer of potentially shareable experience can be kept privat. ‘The infant presumably begins to encounter this dimension of psychic ‘experience somewhere in the middle, between the extreme poles, as hati, ineloion in the huraan, ‘most of us continue to do.® Speaking teleologically, 1 assume chat nature in the course of ‘evolution ‘created several ways to assure survival through group THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: 1 ‘membership in social species. Ethology and attachment theory have spelled out for us the behivioe patterns that serve to asiure thoie vals that enhance physical and psychological itcemeshings of ind survival. I suggest that nature has also provided the ways and means for any subjective intermeshings of individaals that would add survival value. And the survival value of intersuyjeetvity is potentially There is no question that different societies could minimize or ‘maximize this need for inersubjectivity. For instance, if a society were socially structured so that it was assurned that all members had essentially identical, inner subjective experiences, and if homogeneity of this apect of felt life were stressed, there would be litte need, and no societal pressure, 0 enhance the development of intersubjec= tivity. Ifo the other hand a society highly valued the existence and the sharing of individual differences at this level of experience (as cours docs), then their development would be facilitated by that ‘Let us return to life as lived from moment to moment and examine noce fully how affective experiences cin enter the intersubjective domain, 2 phenomenon that I call afc atumement.Chapter 7 The Sense of a Subjective Self: IL, Affect Attunement ‘The Problem of iSheringiAlfitine States, ‘The sharing of active states is the most pervasive and clinically scriaine feature of intersubjective celatedness. This is expeca when the infant first enters this domain. Interffectivity is mainly what i meant when clinicians speak of parental “mizroring™ and “empathic responsiveness.” Despite the imporance of these events, it is not a all clear how they work. What ae the ats and process that let other people know that you are feling something very like what they ate feeling? How can you get inside of” other people's subjective experience and then let them know that you have arrived there, without suing words? After all, the infants we are talking about are-only | months od Trnitation in co mind 28 a possible way one might show this. The mother mighe imieate the infant's ficial expressions and gestures, and the haby would see her doing this. The problem with this solution is that che infant could only tell from the mother’s THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTH SELF/UL. inmitation that mother got what the infant did; she would have reproduced the same overt behaviors, but she need no have hud any similar inner experience. There is no reason why the infant should make the further assumption that mother also experienced the same feeling state that gave rise to the overt behavior. For there to be an intersubjective exchange about affect, che, strit imitation alone won't do. In fact, seve place JBimphe parent mast be able to read the infant's fecling state from the infiat’s overt behavioe. the parent mus perfoen| tome behavior thae is noe a srit ination but nonctheles corexpon in some way ta che infants avert behavior, JIM, the infant must be able to read this corresponding parental respome as having to do with the infant's own original feeling experience and noe jus inmieting the infan's behavior. It is only in the presence of tse three conditions that feeling states within one person can be knowable to another and that chey can both sense, without sing language, thar the transaction has occurred. ‘To accomplish this tarsscio papeyma cote detail (1981). What is striking in these descriptions is that the one wi procenea must take fn fact, musical—dlomain sm great slight changes in her contribution at each dialogic twM1/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF fe oa her vocalization may be slightly different each time “Whieat che infant is around rine months old. however. one berinsyy ke (fe is not clear how mothers know this change has occurred in the infant; it seems to be are of thelr innaitive parssval sense.) She begins to expand ber Eu yond tra tation ine «new ccpory of bebvor we ‘The phenomenon of affect attunement is best shown. by examples (Stem 1985). Affect attunement is often so embedded in other ‘behaviors that relatively pure examples are hard! to find, but che Best five examples that follow are relatively unencumbered by other soings-on A sinesmonth-old gil becomes very excited about a ay and aches Page ape tar eyepin| ipa eee lenn/ peyer a2 her meet Her mother Moka back, sachs op her shonbion and performs a tric shimmy with her upper boy, like a go-eo dance The shimmy lass only aboot Tong. as her daughters Samah” hit equally excited, onl an intense J cloementhcld boy tgs Lit bod ona sft pat Bt i me anger bot graualy wih psu, exubernes and humor, He se ‘ps steady thythm. Mother falls into his hyn and ay, “Kanne im, Kstasshom," the "hon fling othe sek andthe lass” fing with the pepurtory eponing and he mupersfal holding of bisa alo hefore fale aa 2 ‘hn cightand-ane-hlfamoath-old boy races fora toy ja beyond teach, Slenly he stretches towaed leaning and extending sms {agers out filly Sell shore of the toys be tne hs body 0 iqocere ou the en inch he ned 10 reach i At chat moment is mother says "uaouah . avobah!” witha crescendo of vocal efor. the expintion of sr pusing sist her tensed toms. The mothers seccering roabesprntory Bort matches the ina’ scelering Bhp fore | teemonth-old ge accomplishes an amasing routine with mother dnd then lok athe. The gel opens op her ie (er mouth opens her eyes widen, he eyebrows ic) and the loses tack nee of changes whove contour can he represented by 4 smooth sich (7), Moser responds by ntoning "Yeaby” with pic line that rise and alt asthe volume crescendor and decreed ‘THE SENSE OF A SUBJECTIVE SELF: 1 “YR” The mother's prosodic contour has matched the chil’ ‘eu inetic cortour ‘Arnine-month-old boy is siting facing is mother, He his ‘mis hand and i shaking e up and doven wich daplay of And ik amosement. As mother watches she begins to nod ber hnead up and down, keeping 2 tight heat with her won art motions ‘More often the attunement is 50 embedded in other actions and ‘purposes that i is putially masked, asin che next example: [A tem-month-old itl finally gees a piece in jg saw pura, She tects toward ner tether, hres fet heed op tn the ssfand wich forcefal arm flap raises hersef partly off the ground in a furry of fnubersnce. The mother says "YES, thats gin” The "YES" i fetoned wth mach stem. Te has an explonine re that choos the fi Hing of penuee and power. (One could easly argue that the “YES, thats girl functions as 4 rourine response in che focm of a postive reinforcer, and it certainly does do so. But why does the mother noc just xy “Yes, carta giel"? Why docs she need to add the intense intonation to “WES” that vocally matches the child's gestures? The “YES.” 1 suggest, isan attunement embedded within 4 routine response ‘The embecling of attunements is $o common and most often s0 subtle that unles one is looking for it, or asking why any behavior i being. performed exactly the way itis, the attunements will pass unnoticed (except, of course, that one will gather from them what ve imagine to be “really” going on clinically), ‘Attunements have the following characteristics, which makes them ideal for sccomplishing the interactive sharing of affect: 1, They give the impresion that a kind of imitation has oscurres ‘There tt no faithful rendering of the infnt's over behusio, but ee nt ‘2 "The matching is Iargely romrmodal. Thai the channel or modalicy ‘of exprenion wied by the mother 19 match the infants Behavior ‘by the infant Inthe feat example, che iaenaey level and duration of the gis voice is fected bp eared ty meepren fa fs focal cater festors of the boy's erm rnovcoents are wetcbed by fae ofthe matber's voice.1L/ THE FOUR SENSES OF SELF 3. WR ic heing matched is nat the other person’ behewor pre hae ‘ate The ultimate reference forthe match appears ‘stam (infered or sirectly apprehended), not the external behavioral trent. Thos the match appear to occur betwcen the expersions of inner ste. These expresons cam difer in mode ot Form. but they ie ta aces alee chee i mtlciataen rantage of soggesting complete temporal synchrony. “Echoin taken litelly, at last avoids the tempor constraint. In spite of these semansc limitations, however, thete concept reptetent attempt to grapple with the ssue of one person releting another's inner state nth important respect, unlike imitation a contagion. they are appropriately concerned with the subjective state rather than the manifest behavior “This meaning of reflecting inner state has been used mostly in clinical cheories (Maier etal. 1975; Kohut 197%; Lacan 1977), which hhave noted that reflecting back an infu’ feling state i importne to the infan’s developing knowledge of his or her own aMfetvity and sense of self When used in this seme, however, “mirroring” implies chat the mother is helping to create something, within the lafaat that was only dimly or purty theee uel hee reflection acted somehow so vlily iy existence, This concept goer far beyond just participating in another's subjective experience. It involves changing the other by providing something the ocher did tc have before of if t was present by consolidating it ‘A second problem with miroring at term i the inconsvtency anu overinclusivenes of its usage. In elnial writings. ic sometimes refers to the behavior itelf—ehat is, to true imitation, a Bveral reflecting back, in the domain of core-e to the sharing or aignenent of internal sete sdness—and sometimes in. ous terms, affect attunement in the domain of intersubjective relatedness. sill cher /BJECTIVE SELF; I times, it refer: to verbal reinforcements or consensual validation at the Ievel of verbal relatedness, “Mirroring” is thus commonly wsed to embrace three different processes. Moreover, itis not clear which subjective states are to be included in mitroring affects—intentions? motives? belief? ego functions? In shor, while mirroring has focused ‘upon the estence ofthe pralem, the indeterminate usage has blurred what appear to be real diferences in mechanism, form, and Function Finally, there is “empathy.” Is attunement suficiently close %0 ‘what is generally meant by empithy? No, The evidence indicates that artune almost automat ically. Empathy. on the wther hand, involves the mediation of . What is generally called empathy consists of at least four distinct and probably sequential processes {1} the resonance (of feeling state; (2) she abstraction of empathic knowledge from the experience of emotional resonance; (3) the integration of abstracted ‘empathic knowledge into an empathic response; and (6) a ernsient role identification, Cognitive processes such as theve involved in the second and third events are crucial ro empathy (Schaffer 1968; Hoffman 1978; Ornstein 1979; Buch 1963; Demos 1984). (Cognitive imaginings of owhae it mut be like to he another perion, however, are nothing more than elaborated acts of roe taking and aot empathy, unless they have been ignited by at least a spurk of emotional resonance) Affect attunement, then, shares with empathy the inital process of emotional resonance (Holfiman 1978); neither can occur without it. The work of many paychoanalytic thinkers concurs on this formulation (Basch 1983). But while affect attunement, like empathy, stares with an emotional resonance, it dos something dliflerent with it, Attunement takes the experience of emotional resonance and automatially recasts that experience into anothes forts of expression, Attunement thus need not proceed towards empathic knowledge ot response. Amanement is a distince form of affective transaction in its own right.