BRAZIL

AND THE

U N I T E D S TAT E S

DURING

WORLD WAR II

A N D I T S A F T E R M AT H

Negotiating Alliance and

Balancing Giants

FRANK D. McCANN
Brazil and the United States during World War II
and Its Aftermath
 Frank D. McCann

Brazil and the United

States during World
War II and Its
Aftermath
Negotiating Alliance and Balancing Giants
Frank D. McCann
University of New Hampshire
Durham, NH, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-92909-5    ISBN 978-3-319-92910-1 (eBook)

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This book is dedicated to Diane Marie who made it possible.
 Preface

This book grew from conference papers and lectures that I gave over a
number of years. My interest in the subject began in Professor Robert
H. Ferrell’s diplomatic history seminar at Indiana University. In this proj-
ect, originally I wanted to do a brief study of the negotiations that led to
the alliance between Brazil and the United States. But the deeper I went,
the more it became clear that it was the very nature of those relations to
be continually negotiating their contents, goals, and mutual responsibili-
ties. As in my other studies, I have tried to keep a certain distance from the
two sides and to tell the story from both Brazilian and American perspec-
tives. To do so was, of course, dependent on having documentation from
both that shed light on the same events. That was not always possible, but
it was my goal. This project studying negotiations and the gradual build-
ing of trust was inspired by my continuing studies of the history of the
Brazilian army.
As the notes on sources show, government records for military and
diplomatic interactions were impressively rich and detailed. The difficulty
was that the two countries did not release all the documentation at the
same time; it came available in dribs and drabs over many years. Some
American documents from the war era were declassified in the 1970s,
while Brazilian materials were often opened much later. One of the most
important documents, President Getúlio Vargas’s diaries, were kept secret
by the family until their publication in 1995. Their existence changed the
level of analysis.

vii
viii   PREFACE

Throughout my emphasis is on military relations because they were cen-

tral to the bond between the countries. In the 1930s the Brazilian army was
the principal national institution. From 1939 the danger that the Axis
would strike across the South Atlantic was very real to American military
planners. They wanted to get American forces into Brazil to fend off such
a threat. For the Brazilians allowing foreign troops on their soil was unac-
ceptable. They wanted arms so that they could defend their country them-
selves. The story here is how the Americans eventually negotiated acceptance
of air and naval bases in Brazil. Ultimately the largest American air base
outside of the United States was at Natal in Northeast Brazil. Before long
there would be 16 US bases, including the headquarters of the Navy’s
Fourth Fleet at Recife. The 16,000 American military personnel stationed
in Brazil during the war had noticeable effects on Brazilian culture. German
torpedoes sank Brazilian ships in their coastal waters until Brazil recognized
that a state of war existed. With an eye to getting weaponry, increased
international status, and revenge, Brazil sent an infantry division and a
fighter squadron to fight in Italy under American command. This is the
only case in the war of a foreign infantry division of an independent sover-
eign nation submitting itself entirely to American command and control.
Today in the United States World War II is ancient history, in Brazil it
is almost yesterday. It is a focal point much more so than in the United
States. But that does not mean to say that younger Brazilians know more
than their American counterparts. I carry the story through the post-war
years, the deep disappointment with unfulfilled American commitments
and the turmoil of the 1950s and 1960s which saw Brazil refusing to get
involved in the Korean conflict and the war in Vietnam. The post-war
Cold War with the communist powers contributed to the Brazilian mili-
tary taking control of the government from 1964 to 1985. The World War
impacted greatly Brazil’s process of industrialization, gradually turning it
into the eighth-ranked economy in the world in 2018. Today the military
aspects of the relationship are less salient, but still important. It should
mean something that today there are more Brazilians in South America
than the total population of the entire continent’s other republics and that
Portuguese is now the language of the majority of South Americans.
Brazil has consumed my academic career since 1962 when my fellow
graduate students—George Fodor, Teresinha Souto Ward, and Iêda Dias
da Silva—convinced me to specialize on their country. I continue to be
grateful for their timely intervention.
The American Philosophical Society and the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars made research in the National Archives
  PREFACE 
   ix

possible. The extensive Xerox copies of military intelligence and State

Department files that I collected were organized and made accessible by
student research assistants Candace Kattar and Gus Lawlor at the University
of New Hampshire, who also collected very useful biographical data on
254 Brazilian general officers. They have my lasting gratitude. And I am
thankful to the University for numerous research grants that frequently
allowed me travel to Brazil.
Special thanks to David Mares for including me in the Minerva Grant
Research Group at the University of California—San Diego (2011–2014)
which studied “Brazil as an Emerging Power.” The Minerva Grant under-
wrote a month’s research in Brazil in 2013 that included a return to Natal
and an intensive tour of the Parnamirim air base arranged by my colleague
Rostand Medeiros. And my gratitude to Jose Henrique de Almeida Braga
for sending me his new book: Salto Sobre o Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceara
which provided insights into the effects that the presence of so many
Americans had on local culture.
I must acknowledge that the seminar I had the privilege of giving at the
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos of the Universidade Federal Fluminense in
October 2014 gave me the chance to try out ideas on a remarkable group
of graduate students. I am grateful to Professor Vagner Camilo Alves for
his invitation and making sometimes complicated arrangements. And my
thanks to Nicolette Amstutz of Lexington Books for mining the conference
proceedings of the Brazilian Studies Association.
The help I received from librarians and archivists allowed acquiring
documents and books beyond number. The staffs of the Diplomatic and
Modern Military Branches of the National Archives stand out in my mem-
ory. My daughter Katherine’s invitation to be a contributing editor to the
Handbook of Latin American Studies (Hispanic Division, Library of
Congress) has kept me abreast of the latest historical research in Brazil.
The Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty, the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, the
Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil,
and the Arquivo Nacional contributed to my research more than I can
possibly detail. My dear deceased friend Colonel Luiz Paulo Macedo de
Carvalho and his wife Lucia Maria were my teachers, translators, guides,
and frequently congenial hosts. Over the years Macedo said that we should
write a book together about the full range of the military relations of our
two countries. I hope that this one is a step in fulfilling his idea. Colonel
Durval Lourenço Pereira arranged a visit to the preparatory school of the
Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras and graciously shared his research
on the 1942 German submarine attacks. His research changes how those
attacks should be interpreted.
x   PREFACE

André Gustavo Stumpf has been my sure guide in understanding

Brazilian politics and much more about his country. David Fleischer’s
incomparable weekly reports on Brazil keep it real and immediate. Colonel
Sérgio Paulo Muniz Costa has long been helpful in shaping my under-
standing of the Brazilian army. Also I was aided and encouraged by my
editor at Palgrave Macmillan Christine Pardue, whose gentle prods kept
me going. And thanks to Danna Messer for the fine index.
Selecting photos proved complicated due to copyrights, proper resolu-
tion, and bureaucracy. Three individuals and their organizations were
especially gracious in their assistance: Alexis Quinn of the George
C. Marshall Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia; Matthew
Hanson of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; and
Major Alcemar Ferreira Jr. of the Brazilian Army’s Arquivo Histórico, Rio
de Janeiro. Mr. Hanson not only provided photos, he identified individu-
als whose names I did not know, and sent along a very helpful document
related to FDR’s Natal meeting with Vargas.
Some of the text, expanded and in different form, was drawn from pre-
vious publications. Chapter 6 draws on “Brazil and World War II: The
Forgotten Ally, What did you do in the war, Ze Carioca?” Estudios
Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y El Caribe (University of Tel Aviv),
Vol. 6, No.2 (1995), pp. 35–70. And Chap. 8 utilized “The Rise and Fall
of the Brazilian-American Military Alliance, 1942–1977,” Revista Esboços
(Florianópolis), Vol. 22, No. 34 (July 2016), pp. 13–60.
Among the most valuable things an author can have are friends, col-
leagues, and relatives who read and critique with pencil in hand. My compa-
dre Michael Conniff started with the proposal and gave me insightful
commentary throughout the writing of the book. Sonny Davis, and my
brother Bernard McCann, attacked my punctuation with impressive zeal
and made wise comments on the text. Darlene Sadlier saved me from mak-
ing some factual errors. Francisco Ferraz and Sidney Munhoz bought a
Brazilian perspective with their useful critiques. But above all, I thank my
dear wife Diane Marie, who read and re-read draft after draft making the
text more understandable. And she read the entire text aloud as we checked
the proofs. She gave up our usual canoe excursions on the Lamprey through-
out many fair weather days, as well as ski trips in New Hampshire’s White
Mountains, so I could disappear into my study. Her constant encourage-
ment, good nature, tolerance, patience, and love made this book a reality.
A thousand thanks to all.

Durham, NH, USA Frank D. McCann

Tiradentes Day, April 21, 2018
Fig. 1  Map of Brazil, circa 1940s. From The Brazilian-American Alliance,
1937–1945 by Frank D.  McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by
Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)
 Contents

1 A Relationship of Unbalanced Giants    1

2 Pre-war Fears and Explorations   19

3 Search for Mutual Benefits   59

4 Brazil’s Options Narrow   99

5 Decision to Fight  143

6 The Brazilian Expeditionary Force: The Smoking Cobras  183

7 Post-World War Disappointment  225

8 Cold Wind from the East 249

Index 293

xiii
 Abbreviations

ADP Airport Development Program

AG Adjutant General
AGV Archive of Getúlio Vargas CPDOC, FGV (Rio)
AHE Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio)
AHMRE Arquivo Histórico de MRE (Itamaraty Palace, Rio)
AMAN Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras
AOA Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC, FGV (Rio)
BEF Brazilian Expeditionary Force
CIEX Centro de Informação do Exército (Army Intelligence)
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CPDOC Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea
do Brasil
DA Department of the Army
DAR Division of American Republics (State Department)
ECEME Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior (Command and General Staff
School)
ESAO Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (Officers Advanced Training
School)
EW European War
EXP Expedido (outgoing MRE dispatch)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDRL Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (Hyde Park, New York)
FEB Força Expedicionária Brasileira
FGV Fundação Getúlio Vargas (Rio)
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (State
Department)
G2 Army Intelligence

xv
xvi   ABBREVIATIONS

GS General Staff
JBUSDC Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission
MATS Military Air Transport System
MID Military Intelligence Division (General Staff, War Department)
MMB Modern Military Branch (NARA)
MRE Ministério das Relações Exteriores
NARA National Archives and Records Administration (Washington DC)
NPR National Public Radio
OCIAA Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History
OF Official File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
OPD Operations Plans Division (General Staff, War Department)
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PAA Pan American Airways
PPF President’s Personal File (FDRL, Hyde Park)
PSD Partido Social Democrático
PTB Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
RG Record Group (NARA)
SADATC South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command
SLC Standing Liaison Committee (State, War, Navy Departments)
SNI Serviço Nacional de Informações (National Intelligence Service)
USN United States Navy
WD War Department
WPD War Plans Division (General Staff, War Department)
WWII World War II
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Roosevelt and Vargas on FDR’s arrival in Rio de Janeiro, 1936.
The president’s oldest son James is the naval officer in the front
looking at his father. (Courtesy of the FDR Library, Hyde Park,
NY. NARA)23
Fig. 2.2 Marshall’s arrival in Brazil. (Courtesy of the George C. Marshall
Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia) 28
Fig. 4.1 Guanabara Palace: President’s residence. (Photo courtesy of
author)103
Fig. 4.2 Itamaraty Palace: Brazil’s foreign ministry. (Photo courtesy of
author)108
Fig. 4.3 Catete Palace President’s Offices, where the cabinet met. In the
second Vargas government in the 1950s, the president lived
here. (Photo courtesy of the author) 111
Fig. 4.4 The Springboard to Victory: Miami to Natal to Africa and
points east. (Source: Charles Hendricks, “Building the Atlantic
Bases” in Barry W. Fowle, ed. Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army
Engineers in World War II (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Office of History,
US Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), p. 36) 121
Fig. 5.1 General Gustavo Cordeiro de Faria explaining Natal’s harbor
defenses to Roosevelt, Vargas, and Admiral Ingram. (Courtesy
of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY, NARA) 146

xvii
xviii   List of Figures

Fig. 5.2 This grid map was the type the German navy used to track the
location of its vessels. The dark box shows the area assigned to
U-507 and the light gray to U-130. The dark lines show
U-507’s route to and along the Brazilian coast. (Map was
prepared by Col. Durval Lourenço Pereira for his Operação
Brasil: O ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra
Mundial (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), p. 198.
Reproduced by permission of Col. Durval.) 152
Fig. 5.3 Vargas and his American allies aboard the USS Humboldt.
(Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
NY. NARA. Bottom from left: Harry Hopkins, Vargas, FDR,
Jefferson Caffery. Standing from left: Rear Admiral Ross
McIntire, Major General Robert L. Walsh, Admiral Jonas
Ingram, Rear Admiral Augustin T. Beauregard) 165
Fig. 5.4 Vargas, Roosevelt, and Caffery Natal conversations on the USS
Humboldt. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library,
Hyde Park, NY. NARA) 166
Fig. 6.1 Lt. General Mark Clark, commander of US Fifth Army, in front
seat. In the rear, Captain Vernon Walters, interpreter with FEB
commander João Batista Mascarenhas de Morais. (Courtesy of
the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 199
Fig. 6.2 Map of Italy showing area north of Firenze where FEB fought.
From The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 by Frank
D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by
Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission) 200
Fig. 6.3 Generals Willis Crittenberger, C.O. of Fourth Corps, and
Zenobio da Costa, C.O. of FEB Artillery. (Courtesy of the
Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 201
Fig. 6.4 Map of FEB’s principal area of engagement. From The
Brazilian-­American Alliance, 1937–1945 by Frank D. McCann,
Jr. (Copyright © 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University
Press. Reprinted by permission) 202
Fig. 6.5 Italians cheering victorious FEB troops. (Courtesy of Arquivo
Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 205
Fig. 6.6 FEB patch with combined colors of Brazil and the United
States207
Fig. 6.7 German prisoners captured by the FEB. (Photo courtesy of the
Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro) 209
 CHAPTER 1

A Relationship of Unbalanced Giants

Brazil and the United States are the two giants of the Western Hemisphere
in territory, population, natural resources, and industrial plant. They have
never engaged each other in war, their governments have had relatively
few disputes of the sort that fill the pages of diplomatic and military histo-
ries, and they have adjusted their relations to new regional and world
conditions many times since José Silvestre Rebello presented his creden-
tials to President James Monroe in May 1824 as the first representative of
the independent Empire of Brazil. Though their relations have been
peaceful for 194 years, and give every sign of remaining so, there has been
a thread of tension running throughout the fabric of their relations.1
The sources of this tension have been political, economic, and cultural,
and they are also related to the differences between the identities and sys-
tems of the two countries. Though Brazil and the United States have
many similarities, they are profoundly different from one another.

Similarities and Differences
First let us look at the similarities. They are both huge political entities,
with their land borders measured in thousands of kilometers (miles), their
long seacoasts supporting old seafaring traditions, and they both experi-
enced a long struggle to occupy, control, and develop vast interior spaces.
They both have deep traces of their colonial experiences in their national

© The Author(s) 2018 1

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_1
2   F. D. MCCANN

characters. Both reflect predominately European traditions that overran

native cultures and land claims, but both display cultural traits influenced
by native values and practices. Both used extensive slave labor and had
their cultures significantly marked by African influences from their large
African-descended populations. Both absorbed European and Asian immi-
grants. And their respective military institutions have played major roles in
their own systems, though in very different ways. The Brazilian military
stance is constitutionally defensive, although its military has intervened in
politics to the extreme of taking control of the national government. The
Americans have used their military to intervene in neighboring countries
and international wars while avoiding direct interference in US national
politics. Both countries share the common feature of having superficial
knowledge and understanding of the other’s society. Brazil is seen from
the United States through a Caribbean and Spanish-American haze, while
for Brazilians the United States has a mythical Hollywood and TV image.
Both see themselves as unique expressions of humanity. To make matters
more complicated for American understanding, Brazilian governments
and intellectuals, aside from some on the left, have not thought of their
country as part of Latin America (which was a French cultural construct)
until recently, but rather as a continental-size chunk of South America.2
Their differences are perhaps more salient. Brazil was born at the end
of the medieval era and the beginning of the Renaissance in the Catholic
heritage, while the United States grew from a colonial experience on the
East Coast of North America related to the Protestant Reformation. The
Portuguese monarchy kept Brazil closed to foreigners and foreign trade
from 1580 to 1808, while the Americans had a lively international mari-
time trade from early on. Their intellectual ancestry produced different
attitudes toward law; in the United States, whatever is not outlawed is
legal, while in Brazil to be legal, a thing must be specified in law. This in
turn has produced different attitudes toward government, Americans
assume that they are free to act and so tend to ignore government and to
resent its interference in their daily lives, while Brazilians seek permission,
recognition, and support from the government. Or perhaps better put
from the ever-present bureaucracy. Americans created impersonal, impar-
tial mechanisms, such as the graduated court system, before which they
seek to resolve their differences; Brazil has a similar appearing system of
courts, but on a more personal level, Brazilians seek to settle problems via
the intercession of friends, relatives, and patrons. The panelinha, an infor-
mal grouping of individuals who share common interests and personal
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    3

ties, has “a significantly pervasive role in the brokering, clientelistic nature

of the Brazilian political-governmental system.” Such groups are difficult
to identify and study, but they are one of the unseen linkages “between
various interests, organizations, and agencies” that maintain networks of
influence throughout Brazil. Access to such networks is obtained by what
the Brazilians call pistolão or the exercise of influence. The networks can
be positive or negative, but their functioning can undermine the rule of
law. Regulations and laws may or may not catch hold and endure (pegam
ou não pegam), but they will likely be struggled against via what is known
as the jeito or jeitinho, the overcoming or getting around annoying or
inconvenient obstacles. Panelinha and jeito “serve as means for reconcil-
ing the modern and the traditional – certainly a continuing need for citi-
zens of changing but not yet transformed Brazil.”3 Via the jeitinho, as
Roberto DaMatta observed, “we do what we want and avoid open conflict
with the law.”4
An extreme example of a jeito could be Brazilian Chief of Staff Pedro
Aurélio Góes Monteiro’s reaction to US Navy Secretary Frank Knox’s
request in 1943 to discuss cooperation and to be briefed on Brazil’s war
plans. In fact there were no war plans on which to brief the Americans, so
Góes did a jeito by quickly gathering his staff officers for an all-night ses-
sion in which they created ostensible war plans. The next day the general
was able to expound on Brazilian plans as if they had existed for months
or years.
The landholding patterns and their attendant social-economic and
labor systems that grew out of these respective histories were also dissimi-
lar. The Brazilian Land Law of 1850 reinforced the tendency toward large
landholdings with slave or peon labor, while the American Homestead Act
of 1862 increased the number of small family farms. Witness too the
importance that the American Congress gave to education with the pas-
sage in 1862 of the Morrill Act that set aside public lands in each state for
the support of public universities. That Act gave rise to the great state
universities that have contributed so much to the development of the
American economy and society. In Brazil the public universities were not
established until the 1930s; the lack of public education for the masses
acted as a drag on development. In 1940 Brazil’s white people were 47%
illiterate, Negros were 79%, and Pardos (mixed) were 71%,5 while the
American white population was 4% illiterate and the black 20%. The
United States, in the decades after the Civil War, adopted racial segrega-
tion as a lamentable response to the abolition of slavery, while Brazil hid
4   F. D. MCCANN

its racial prejudice behind a seemingly more tolerant miscegenation. After

slavery was outlawed in 1888, the Brazilian elite gradually embraced the
convenient idea that the country enjoyed a racial democracy, which made
good press copy but was far from the truth. The two countries had been
intimately joined by the African slave trade. Though it was illegal for US
citizens and vessels to participate in the slave trade, they and American
capital engaged enthusiastically in the dastardly traffic between Africa and
Brazil.6
The two countries are continental in size, in 1940 Brazil had a popula-
tion of about 41,114,000, while the United States had 132,164,569, but
then much of Brazil’s territory was beyond the reach of the central gov-
ernment. In 1940, Brazil was still the land of coffee, it dominated world
production. The American economy was heavily industrialized and moved
by extensive coast-to-coast and regional railway networks which also
linked population centers all across the land. With the exception of Minas
Gerais, Brazil’s population was concentrated along its long coast just as it
had been in the colonial era. And with the exception of the rail line from
Rio and São Paulo to Rio Grande do Sul, the republic’s railroads ran from
ports a relatively few miles into the hinterland to carry out regional prod-
ucts for export. The interior areas were tied together by mule train trails,
rather than roads, which were few and far between. Even the “highway”
from Rio de Janeiro to São Paulo was gravel in 1940. As historian Joel
Wolfe observed, “It was not until Brazilians began to manufacture auto-
mobiles in the 1950s that they built the first major roads into the
interior.”7
Another major difference between Brazil and the United States as the
world skidded toward war was that the former was a dictatorship, while
the latter was an elected representative democracy. Getúlio Vargas had
come to power via a revolution in 1930 that toppled an oligarchy led by
the elite of the state of São Paulo. He was the governor of the state of Rio
Grande do Sul bordering Uruguay and Argentina. His military allies were
reformist officers committed to making the army a force for change and
bringing Brazil into the modern world.8 Franklin D. Roosevelt came to
the presidency in early 1933 in a type of electoral revolution that brought
Democrats to power after a decade of Republican rule had plunged the
country into the greatest Depression in history. In attempting to recon-
struct their economies, the two chief executives felt a unity of purpose and
a spirit of comradery. In 1934 Vargas had been elected president by the
constituent assembly turned national congress after writing a new
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    5

c­onstitution. Economic difficulties and political disagreements stymied

plans for rearmament and industrialization. By 1937 it was clear that Brazil
could not pay on its national debt or on bonds sold abroad and also arm
itself. The army was alarmed by its evident weakness in being unable to
defend against persistent corrosive regionalism and rising international
tensions. Brazilian politics entered into crisis as the 1938 presidential elec-
tions neared. Minister of War General Eurico Dutra was convinced that an
explosion was about to occur. Laws were not working, he declared, and
that only the armed forces were “capable of saving Brazil from the catas-
trophe ready to erupt.” It was necessary to act, “even outside the law,” he
asserted, “in defense of the corrupted law and institutions.” The Chamber
of Deputies would be purged of its reactionary, weak, and incapable mem-
bers; in fact it would be closed. Dutra insisted that “the constituted
authorities should be maintained. The movement will carry with it the
President of the Republic, whose authority will be reinforced.”9 To end
the stalemate, Vargas with General Dutra and Army Chief of Staff Pedro
de Góes Monteiro toppled the constitutional government in the name of
the higher good of the security of the Pátria. Vargas made a pledge, or
compromisso, that he would equip and arm the armed forces so that they
could carry out their assigned duty, in return they would provide the mus-
cle for a regime of force and national development. The regime was styled
the Estado Novo (New State) to mark its break with the past. This would
be the government that the United States would have to work with in
creating a framework for hemisphere defense.10 Roosevelt viewed the
Brazilian situation with a certain tolerant benevolence. He had long had a
fascination with Brazil. As a youth, during a trip to Paris, he had seen the
exiled Emperor Pedro II in a park. And, of course, he was stirred by the
adventure of his cousin, Theodore, journeying the River of Doubt with
Brazilian Colonel Cândido Rondon in 1914. That venture had embla-
zoned the Roosevelt name on the river in the Western Amazon. He would
have known that his cousin considered the “last frontier” to be in Brazil.11
He visited Rio de Janeiro briefly in 1936.
The dissimilar national psychologies of the two countries affected what
they expected from their relationship. The Brazilians frequently envisaged
more from the United States than its political system allowed the govern-
ment to give. In the twentieth century, Brazilian leaders thought that the
bonds of “friendship” between the two governments gave them claims on
the United States. They did not appreciate that friendships between lead-
ers, while extremely useful in furthering relations, did not transfer to
6   F. D. MCCANN

friendship at the societal level; that personal friendship did not convert
into national favors. As a result, at times Brazilian leaders were disap-
pointed when their expectations were not fulfilled by their American
counterparts. For their part the Americans, caught up in their fears of the
Axis, minimized Brazilian national pride and worries about foreign
encroachment on their territory. They expected Brazilians to trust them,
ignoring that US history in Latin America recommended that the Brazilians
should be wary.
It is not surprising that tension arises between two huge dynamic coun-
tries linked by many different kinds of interactions. Some of the sources of
tension are cultural, while others are related to the imbalance between the
two economies. The form of Brazil’s government—which has ranged
from monarchy to oligarchic presidency to dictatorship to elected con-
gress and presidency—has been less important than other factors as a
source of tension. Certainly in the post-World War II period, there has
been tension regardless of the type of national leadership. Developmentalist,
left-leaning administrations, right-wing military regimes, and civilian-­
centrist governments have all had their share of problems with the United
States and vice versa.
Some problems could have been avoided if Brazilian and American
leaders had better understanding of the other’s society, language, cul-
ture, and political system. But, given the lack of such understanding, it is
not surprising that Brazilians would feel uneasy facing the highly orga-
nized, economically and militarily strong United States. American impa-
tience, ethnocentrism, and self-righteousness make Washington take
positions on such matters as basing troops, atomic energy, and Amazonian
development that strike Brazilians as potential threats to their national
sovereignty.
Brazilian and American expectations of each other came into play at
such moments. In the post-war era, Brazilians quite rightly recalled their
role in World War II, which at certain points in that conflict was very
important. Indeed, Brazil was a factor in the pre-war tension between the
United States and Nazi Germany, because one of the elements of conten-
tion in the 1930s was over the Brazilian market and access to Brazil’s raw
materials. During the war the American air and naval bases in the Northeast
of Brazil played major roles in destroying Axis submarines in the South
Atlantic and in the Allied victories in Egypt and North Africa. The supply
of natural resources and foodstuffs was of basic importance, as was the
denial of those things to the Axis. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    7

[Força Expedicionária Brasileira, commonly referred to as FEB] in the

Italian campaign was important to both countries, but for different rea-
sons; to the Americans it embodied a guarantee of Brazilian commitment
to the Allied cause; to the Brazilians it was a blood sacrifice that would
bind them to their American allies in a special, deep friendship that would
bring future benefits.
Brazilians and Americans viewed American wartime assistance differ-
ently as well. The building of the steel mill at Volta Redonda in the state
of Rio de Janeiro was for the Americans a short-term, immediate measure,
a bargaining chip that helped keep Brazil out of the German camp, but
Brazilians viewed it and the later economic advisory mission led by Morris
Cooke, that recommended long-term support of Brazilian development,
as the beginning of continued American assistance. Such aid would not be
given to Brazil’s rival, Argentina. Oswaldo Aranha, who as foreign minis-
ter kept Brazil on a steady pro-American course, expressed the relationship
as one in which Brazil would support the United States on the world scene
in return for United States’ support of Brazilian hegemony in South
America. Stated so neatly, it seemed, from the perspective of Rio de
Janeiro, to be a fait accompli, but in the Department of State, such think-
ing was met with caution and the desire to avoid becoming “entangled in
the subtle web of Mr. Aranha’s balance of power politics.”12
Brazilian leaders were understandably drawn to the point of view of
Americans such as Morris Cooke, who believed that the colonial-era econ-
omy was coming to an end and that Brazil would attain industrial maturity
through hydro-electric energy, air transport, and light metals. Cooke was
committed to the idea that great things could be “accomplished for Brazil
and ultimately for the United States in the free passage of our technology
as an essential element in the industrialization of Brazil.”13 At the time
Brazilian leaders were not aware that Cooke’s report was received with
skepticism in the State Department, where one official commented that it
contained “captivating excursions into fantasy,” and that Cooke seemed to
be infected with the enthusiasm about Brazil’s natural resources and future
that prompted “so many otherwise normal American visitors to Imaginative
thinking.”14 Those Americans with direct experience, who had actually
been in Brazil, especially those who spoke Portuguese, often saw things
differently than those who lacked such experience.
Brazilians and Americans came out of the war with different expecta-
tions of each other. 1945–1946 was a time of great historical change for
the world and for the two republics. The American leadership was no
8   F. D. MCCANN

longer the same one that took the United States into the war; it had a
vague or no memory of a special Brazilian role. The events of the war had
eliminated recollection of the difficult days of 1939–1942. In contrast, the
Brazilian post-war leadership was composed of many of the same men who
had led Brazil during the conflict, with the notable exceptions of Getúlio
Vargas and Oswaldo Aranha. The replacement of elites in the United
States was more rapid and continuous in the two decades after the war
than it was in Brazil.
When you look at what was available to read about the war, you notice
that the Brazilian role fades from view. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s
and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles’s memoirs and historians
William Langer and Everett Gleason’s 1952 and 1953 books on the start
of the war gave Brazil its due, but there was no comprehensive study of the
Brazilian involvement until Princeton University Press published The
Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 in 1973. And that book did not
appear in Portuguese until 1995. Even major studies of the war make no
reference to Brazil. The vast majority of Americans today know nothing of
Brazil’s contributions to Allied victory. Indeed, Americans still confuse
Brazil and Argentina and think that Brazil tended to support the Axis and
after the war offered sanctuary to fleeing Nazis. Witness the book and film
The Boys from Brazil, which dealt with a plot to recreate the German
Reich, which was actually set in Paraguay!15 Americans are still surprised to
learn that Brazil fought alongside the Allies. As a result the constant post-­
war Brazilian references to the wartime alliance had no popular reverbera-
tions in the United States.
Brazil and the United States were military allies from 1942 to 1977.
The alliance was an important element in Brazil’s modernization and the
development of its armed forces. As an historical note, when Brazil gained
independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazilian Emperor Pedro I sent an
envoy to Washington with instructions to negotiate an alliance with the
northern republic. The Americans believed that “a Treaty of alliance
offensive and defensive to repel any invasion of the Brazilian Territories by
the forces of Portugal” was not likely to be necessary and so declined, but
concurred in the “expediency of permanently uniting our two Nations in
the ties of Friendship, Peace and Commerce” and that the United States
was disposed to conclude a treaty to that effect.16 So business was to be the
basis of the relationship. However, there were crucial exceptions to the
tendency of the American government to hold the Brazilians at arm’s
length. For example, in 1893, President Grover Cleveland violated
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    9

­ eutrality laws by allowing a private businessman, with Brazilian interests,

n
to raise a 12-ship flotilla, armed with the era’s most feared naval gun and
electrical torpedoes, crewed and commanded by Americans, and steamed
for Rio to suppress rebels against the then new Brazilian republic.17 The
Brazilian government was so pleased that it commemorated July 4 as a
holiday. The relationship over the next decades has been labeled “an
unwritten alliance.”18 In 1917 the Brazilian army sent a group of officers
to train at the US coast artillery school, as well as a mission to study the
organization of American war plants and arsenals, Brazilian officers served
on American warships in World War I, and Brazil welcomed a large
American Naval Mission in 1922.19 During the Great War, Brazil was
largely distracted by its own problems. The army was concluding its sup-
pression of a serious peasant rebellion in the Contestado region of Santa
Catarina and Paraná and attempting to modernize itself and its relation-
ship to society. The war in Europe seemed far away, even though Brazil
became a rather inactive belligerent. Some of the army’s younger officers
were frustrated with missing a chance to fight, which provoked a few of
them to volunteer for service in the French army.20 The gap between the
United States and Brazil perhaps was symbolized by the flag that the orga-
nizers of the victory parade in New York gave to the Brazilian delegation.
It was the flag of the Brazilian Empire that had been overthrown in 1889.

Between the World Wars

After World War I, seeking to modernize their army, the Brazilians turned
to France for an advisory mission. They considered inviting the Americans
to learn from the United States’ massive mobilization, but thought that
they were culturally closer to the French and political and banking inter-
ests in São Paulo backed the choice of France.21 By the 1930s the Brazilian
General Staff was somewhat disenchanted with the French and piecemeal
began seeking American assistance for specialized training in coastal artil-
lery, medical care, and aviation. American aircraft and weapons producers
were more interested in accommodating Brazilians at their plants than
were American military officials in training them in their schools and
bases.22 The idea of a military alliance was not on the official agenda of
either country. Indeed in 1933–1938, Brazil, which could not afford to
buy arms in the United States (also made difficult by neutrality laws),
turned to Germany, where it could use “compensation trade” to acquire
weapons. This was not an ideologically based decision, but a practical
10   F. D. MCCANN

e­ conomic one. The Brazilian army chief of staff warned “…we are dis-
armed, even our rifles are in a sad state.”23 This interlude of doing business
with the Nazi regime caused undue suspicion in the United States and
resulted in the labeling of some Brazilian leaders involved as Germanophiles.
At the very time these purchases were being negotiated, Brazilian army
intelligence officers were saying that the “ambitions and demands of
Germany, Italy, and Japan” were a “latent danger for Brazil.” They also
recommended “greater closeness with the United States of America, our
principal support in case of war.” These officers saw the United States as
Brazil’s best customer, but noted that “we buy relatively little from them.”
They understood that unless Brazil developed its military power, it could
not liberate itself from “North American dependence,” which they
thought it could do “without prejudicing an even greater closeness with
the great confederation of the north.”24
As the world slid toward another great war, Brazilian army leaders
believed that they had to depend on their own wits and resources and that
they should use the crises that lay ahead to obtain the greatest advantage
for Brazil. When considering the looming war clouds, Brazilian military
and presidential papers continually pointed to the United States as the
logical partner.

World War II Alliance with the United States

In January 1937, such thinking naturally led President Getúlio Vargas to
offer discussion of all forms of military and naval cooperation, including
an American naval base in a Brazilian port to be used in case of aggression
against the United States. At the time Washington was not prepared to
act. Less than two years later, it would be the Roosevelt administration
that would be desperate to obtain bases in Brazil.
The popular perception of World War II in Brazil has a curious poison-
ous undercurrent suggesting that the United States had somehow drawn
Brazil into the conflict against the better judgment of Brazilian leaders. At
its extreme this undercurrent alleges unbelievably that US Navy subma-
rines sank Brazilian ships to provoke the country to enter the war.25 This
tale had its origins in the efforts of Nazi agents to undermine the credibil-
ity of Brazil’s war effort. It was believed by some at the time and has been
passed on down to the present. Some of the literature on the Brazilian
Expeditionary Force carries a warily suspicious tone that Brazilians, espe-
cially the FEB troops, had been exploited by the United States. Some
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    11

c­ ommentary suggests that the United States pressured Brazil to enter the
war. The documentary evidence leaves little doubt as to what actually hap-
pened. However, some of these false undercurrents are fixed in a portion
of the popular Brazilian imagination.26
Even some noted Brazilian historians have carelessly misread events.
For example, Boris Fausto, historian at the Universidade de São Paulo,
asserted: “By the end of 1941, without waiting for authorization from the
Brazilian government, American troops had set up bases in the Northeast”27
[emphasis added]. This book shows the absolute falsehood of that state-
ment. Alternate facts and unresolved doubts must not be allowed to infect
history. Keeping analyses firmly based on archival records lessens the space
available for fake stories.
The FEB in the Italian campaign was the culmination of a long and
complex process of negotiations and confidence building from 1938 to
1944 that created the alliance between Brazil and the United States. My
intent is to study the nature of Brazilian-American military relations, the
negotiations that created the alliance, and the often divergent objectives of
the two nations. From 1938 onward, American leaders had been worried
about Brazil’s vulnerability to German attack, especially against its north-
eastern bulge. They feared that if the Axis could secure part of the north-
east its forces could launch an air attack on the crucial Panama Canal.
Moreover, the United States needed air and naval bases to confront the
Axis submarines that were threatening the passage of Allied shipping
through the South Atlantic and to fly aircraft, equipment, and supplies
across to Africa and then onto the Middle East, Russia, South Asia, and
the Far East. Their solution was to obtain permission to build air and naval
bases in Brazil’s northeast, eliminate Axis-owned airlines from Brazilian
skies, build up Brazilian military capabilities, and station American troops
in the region to assure its safety. In 1940, to prepare the critical airfields
before an actual emergency occurred, the US Army made an agreement
with Pan American Airways to make arrangements with Brazilian authori-
ties and to do the construction via its subsidiary Panair do Brasil. As a
result when the need arose in 1942, the necessary airfields were available
to handle the increasingly heavier military traffic from Miami through
Brazil to Africa and beyond. In retrospect the army was pleased with its
wisdom because without “the foresighted planning that preceded the
1940 contract with Pan American, the entire course of the war might have
been changed.”28
12   F. D. MCCANN

The history of World War II has tended to focus on the battlefields, but
victories could not be won without munitions, equipment, food, and all
manner of other supplies. And without transport by air and sea, such cru-
cial things could not reach their destinations. In the vast logistical network
created by the United States, the Northeast of Brazil was the “indispens-
able link.”29 When the North Atlantic air route closed down in the winter
months, “the Brazilian route handled virtually all air traffic to Europe and
Africa, a large part of the planes and emergency supplies for India and
China, and some of the lend-lease materials for the Soviet Union.” This
traffic included thousands of supply planes and some 2500 combat planes
flying to overseas stations. In 1943, the vitally significant Brazilian airway
would be “the air funnel to the battlefields of the world.”30
Until the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Brazilians did not share American
strategic worries about the Axis. For them the struggles in Europe and
Asia were far away and they believed that the more likely immediate threat
to Brazil was from Argentina in the south. Some Brazilian leaders thought
that as in World War I they could avoid large-scale involvement. But above
all they wanted to control defense of their own national territory.
Moreover, they were uncertain that the United States could or would
come to their aid if Brazil were attacked. In reality their armed forces were
weak, and they had insufficient industrial capability to produce their own
weapons. Where the two national perspectives and objectives deviated,
there were tensions, suspicions, and misunderstandings ruling the day.
American military and naval intelligence reports and analyses richly docu-
mented the issues involved, but, as would be expected, they were colored
by an American perspective that was impatient with Brazilian worries
about sovereignty. The documents were classified secret and unavailable to
historians for decades after the war. They and the Brazilian archives for the
period have been gradually opened to researchers, and some documents
have even found their way into print. Thus, it is now possible to have a
more balanced account of what took place.

Notes
1. For relations in the decades prior to the 1930s, see Frank D.  McCann,
“Brazil and the United States: Two Centuries of Relations,” in Sidnei
J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations
in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual
de Maringá, 2013), pp. 23–51.
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    13

2. Leslie Bethell, “Brazil and Latin America” Journal of Latin American

Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (August 2010), pp. 457–485. Darcy Ribeiro in his
study of the meaning of Brazil projects its destiny as joining “with all Latin
Americans in our common opposition to … Anglo-Saxon America ….” See
his Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2000), pp. 321–322.
3. Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp.  20–21; Belmiro Valverde Jobim
Castor, O Brasil Não É Para Amadores: Estado, Governo e Burocracia na
Terra do Jeitinho (Curitiba: IBOP-Pr, 2000), pp.  46–50; and not to be
missed is Roberto Da Matta, O que faz o brasil, Brasil? (Rio de Janeiro:
Rocco, 1989), pp. 29, 41, 66–69.
4. Lívia Barbosa, O Jeitinho Brasileiro: A Arte de ser mais iqual que os outros
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Campos, 1992), Roberto DaMatta, Prefácio, no
page number, pp. 125–137.
5. T.  Lynn Smith, Brazil: People and Institutions (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1963), p. 490.
6. Gerald Horne, The Deep South: the United States, Brazil, and the African
Slave Trade (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 3–4. For
race in the two countries see Thomas E. Skidmore, O Brasil Visto de Fora
(São Paulo: Editora Paz e Terra, 2001), pp.  101–125. For a study that
analysed participation by US-built ships, the financing and organizing of
their voyages see Leonardo Marques, “The Contraband Slave Trade to
Brasil and the Dynamics of US Participation, 1831–1856”, Journal of
Latin American Studies, Vol. 47: part 4 (November 2015), pp. 659–684.
7. Joel Wolfe, Autos and Progress, The Brazilian Search for Modernity (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 5.
8. I have described and analyzed the 1930 movement in Soldiers of the Pátria:
A History of the Brazilian Army (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2004), pp. 259–300.
9. Dutra told Hélio Silva this version in 1959; Silva, 1937: Todos os golpes se
parecem, pp. 390–391; Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Junior and Mauro Renault
Leite eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova
Fronteiro, 1983), pp. 228–229.
10. I have detailed the alliance among Vargas, Dutra, and Góes Monteiro in
“The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra” in Jens
R. Hentschke, ed. Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141 and “Compromisso Among Vargas, Góis
Monteiro, Dutra and the Establishment of the Estado Novo,” ACERVO,
Revista do Arquivo Nacional, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Jul.–Dez. 2017), pp. 19–35.
http://revista.arquivonacional.gov.br/index.php/revistaacervo/article/
view/814/867.
14   F. D. MCCANN

11. Theodore Roosevelt, Through the Brazilian Wilderness (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1914), p. 333.
12. Eric. C. Wendelin, Memo, Division of American Republics, June 10, 1944,
832.00/5-3144, RG 59, NARA.  For discussion see McCann, The
Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 (Princeton University Press,
1973), pp. 327–328.
13. Morris Cooke to Miguel Alvaro Ozorio de Almeida and Samuel Wainer,
June 30, 1943, Cooke Papers, 0283, FDRL; for more on Cooke Mission
see Cooke, Brazil on the March  – A Study in International Cooperation
(New York; McGraw-Hill, 1944).
14. Walter N.  Walmsley, DAR, December 8, 1942, 832.20/480, RG 59,
NARA.
15. The book came out in 1976 and the film followed in 1978.
16. José Silvestre Rebello presented his credentials on May 26, 1824, and
stayed in the United States until September 1, 1829. In response to
Rebello’s notes of January 28 and April 6, 1825, there was Henry Clay,
Secretary of State, to José Silvestre Rebello (Brazilian Charge d’ Affaires in
the United States), Washington, April 13, 1825, Document 136, Willian
R.  Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning
the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1925), pp. 233–234. Emperor Pedro I’s instruction to
Rebello to seek an alliance was in Luis José Carvalho e Mello to Rebello,
Rio de Janeiro, 15 de Setembro 1824, Despachos Ostensivos, 1823–1827
(444/2/28), Arquivo Histórico Itamaraty (Rio). The best study of those
early years is Stanley E.  Hilton, “The United States and Brazilian
Independence,” in A.J. R. Russell-Wood, ed. From Colony to Nation: Essays
on the Independence of Brazil (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975), pp. 109–129.
17. Steven C. Topik, Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the
Age of Empire (Stanford University Press, 1996), pp.  135–177. The
Empire of Brazil was overthrown by a military coup on November 15,
1889.
18. E.  Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-­
American Relations (NY: Columbia University Press, 1966).
19. R.  D. Layman, “The Brazilian Navy in the Great War,” Relevance: The
Quarterly Journal of the Great War Society (Spring 1996), Vol. 5, No. 2,
pp. 31–33.
20. For the Contestado affair and Brazil during the war, see McCann, Soldiers
of the Patria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937, pp. 121–190.
For Brazil in the war, see Francisco Luiz Teixeira Vinhosa, O Brasil e a
Primeira Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico
Brasileiro, 1990), pp. 99–183.
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    15

21. The commander of the French army, Marshal Joffre, recommended his
former chief of staff, BG Maurice Gustave Gamelin, as chief of mission. He
would be best known as commander of the French army in the disastrous
defeat by the German invaders in 1940.
22. McCann, Soldiers of the Patria: pp. 250–251, on private and official mili-
tary interests in Brazilian ties pp. 360–361.
23. Estado-Maior do Exército, Relatório … 1936 … G[eneral] D[ivisão]
Arnaldo de Souza Paes de Andrade (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-­
Maior do Exército, 1937), Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio), pp. 4–5.
24. General de Divisão Francisco Ramos de Andrade Neves (Chief of Staff),
Rio de Janeiro, Aug. 3, 1934: Estado-Maior do Exército, Exame da
Situação Militar doBrasil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do
Exército, 1934), Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). Quotes are from
pp. 5–9.
25. Hélio Silva said that this tale was spread by Axis agents to cast doubt on
Brazil’s reasons for joining the conflict. The rumor’s longevity and spread
is remarkable, I have been asked about it by students in various parts of
Brazil. See Hélio Silva, 1942, Guerra no Continente (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Civilização Brasileira, 1972), p. 394. It is discussed on the internet, usually
trying to discredit its validity; see Túlio Vilela, http://­educacao.uol.com.
br/historia-brasil/brasil-na-segunda-guerra-terror-no-atlantico.jhtm.
A popular magazine, Super, published a piece on Brazil and World War
II “Pearl Harbor no Brasil”; some readers’ comments asserted that the
United States sank the ships [“na verdade foi os EUA que atacaram o
Brasil, e botaram a culpa nos nazistas” (in truth it was the United States
that attacked Brazil and put the blame on the Nazis)]; see: http://super.
abril.com.br/forum/Revista/Edicao-setembro2010-A-genetica-
fracassou/Pearl-Harbor-no-Brasil.
However, the sinking of Brazilian ships was closely documented by the
recorded testimony of survivors that the submarines were German. See
detailed reports on 14 vessels in Ministério das Relações Exteriores, O Brasil
e a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944),
Vol. II, pp. 61–148. Moreover, captured German naval records regarding
the attacks on the Brazilian ships are very clear: US Navy, Office of Naval
Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy,
1939–1945 (Washington, 1947), pp.  86, 89–90. See the “Report on a
Conference between the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer at the
Berghof the afternoon of 15 June 1942” in which Hitler approved executing
the submarine attacks on Brazilian shipping and ports. German sub attacks
had started in February and on June 15, 1942; Hitler approved the continu-
ation and increase of submarine attacks on Brazil to begin at the start of
August. Considerable correct information is readily available in Brazil; for
16   F. D. MCCANN

those who care to search the internet, see, for example, http://www.naufra-
giosdobrasil.com.br/2guerrasubmarinos.htm. There is an excellent analysis
in the well-researched book: Vágner Camilo Alves, O Brasil e a Segunda
Guerra Mundial: História de um Envolvimento Forçado (Rio de Janeiro:
Editora PUC-Rio, 2002), 164–184. For the rumor, which he called “absurd
historical doubt,” see pp. 180–181. The definitive study of the German sub-
marine attacks is Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil: O ataque alemão
que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora
Contexto, 2015).
26. Sometimes this undercurrent bubbles up in publications, for example, a
book published by the state of Paraná press: Alfredo Bertoldo Klas, Verdade
sobre Abetaio: drama de sangue e dor no 4o ataque da F.E.B. ao Monte
Castello (Curitiba: Imprensa Oficial, 2005). The author was a lieutenant in
the Brazilian Expeditionary Force’s 11th Infantry Regiment that fought in
Italy. He believed that the Brazilian government provoked the German
submarine attacks on Brazilian ships by allowing American air and naval
bases in Northeast Brazil. He equated the Vargas dictatorial regime with
“Nazism.” Throughout there is an undertone that the United States
dragged Brazil into the war. In sending the FEB without sufficient train-
ing, including with little explanation of what the war was about, against
“an alert and brave enemy… they [the Brazilian government] committed a
crime in the name of Brazil.” [p. 237]. The importance of books such as
Klas’s is that they feed rumor and myth-making in the streets. Such rumors
were nourished by reputable writers such as Nelson Werneck Sodré, who
in his Memórias de um Soldado (Rio: Editora Civilização Brasileiro, 1967),
p.  207, incorrectly asserted that there was no proof in German archives
regarding the sinkings. It is unlikely that he bothered to check those
archives, which were then held in the National Archives in Washington and
the Public Records Office in London. I first heard the mythical tale that
the American navy had sunk the Brazilian ships from students at the
Universidade Federal de Roraima in August 1998. A study of how the
story was maintained for so many years would be useful.
27. Partly because of the paucity of extensive research on Brazil in World War
II, inaccuracies have crept into the historical literature. See Boris Fausto, A
Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1999), p. 228.
28. I added the emphasis. Julius H. Amberg (Special Asst. to the Secretary of
War) to Hugh Fulton (Chief Counsel, Truman Committee, US Senate),
August 13, 1943, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG165, NARA. There
was a congressional investigation into the army’s dealings with Pan
American Airways. On the air line’s “Airport Development Program,” see
   A RELATIONSHIP OF UNBALANCED GIANTS    17

Therese L. Kraus, “The Establishment of United States Army Air Corps

Bases in Brazil, 1938–1945” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland,
1986) and my “Aviation Diplomacy: The United States and Brazil, 1939–
1941,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1968),
pp. 35–50.
29. William L.  Langer and S.  Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–
1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 600.
30. Stetson Conn and Bryon Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, 1960), pp. 325–326.
 CHAPTER 2

Pre-war Fears and Explorations

Brazilian Military Prior to Outbreak of War

The 1920s had seen the Brazilian army torn by the rebellion of hundreds
of junior officers that fed political unrest. Then the disputed 1930 presi-
dential election ended in a well-organized uprising that has been called a
“revolution.”1 The army generals lost control of key commands and all of
the states save the capital of Rio de Janeiro. The new government styled
itself revolutionary and launched an extensive political reform. This pro-
voked a three-month civil war between the state of São Paulo (1932) and
the federal government, which the state lost. As a result the national mili-
tary was split in a variety of ways and was badly in need of restructuring
and reform.2 By 1934–1935 the Brazilian army was in the midst of reor-
ganizing itself. Admittedly much of the reorganization never got beyond
the planning stage. However, the army did create an intelligence service
and made a careful study of Brazil’s military situation, including possible
threats to national security. That threat analysis indicated that Brazilian
authorities were measuring the dangers that were accumulating on the
world scene and were carefully considering how best to protect their
country. Brazilian leaders believed that they could only depend on their
own wits and resources and that they should try to obtain the greatest
advantage for Brazil from whatever crises that might appear. But, when
considering a possible world war and the problem of equipping and pre-
paring its armed forces, the Brazilian military and presidential papers

© The Author(s) 2018 19

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_2
20   F. D. MCCANN

repeatedly pointed to the United States as the logical source of military

supply.3 However, in the 1930s the political realities of international
finance and trade, and restrictive American laws on arms sales, made it
impossible to buy weapons from the United States and facilitated Brazilian
purchases from Germany.4
While historians have been aware of the problem of military supplies
through the focus of the American-German competition over Brazil, a less
known aspect was related to the Chaco War between Paraguay and
Bolivia’s (1932–1935) and Peru and Colombia’s struggle for control of
Leticia in the Western Amazon (1932–1933). Indeed those wars on
Brazil’s borders contributed to the decision to reorganize the army in
1934. President Getúlio Vargas was particularly troubled about Paraguay
and how the Chaco conflict could affect relations with Argentina. Likewise
the army general staff was “very alarmed.” The war appeared to be grow-
ing more complicated. Vargas wrote to his new ambassador in Washington,
his old friend, Oswaldo Aranha, that Paraguay would not know what to do
with its 70,000 strong, victorious army after the war. It would not have
jobs for the returning soldiers and so Vargas foresaw that the general com-
manding “a discontented army” would likely overthrow the civilian gov-
ernment. He was afraid that Paraguay could “create problems on our
frontier in Mato Grosso, provoking an incident that would bring Argentina
into the conflict.” Argentina had been “openly supporting Paraguay, pro-
viding all manner of supplies, concentrating troops on the border of
Bolivia” even seizing some Bolivian border posts and “advocating the
reabsorption of Bolivia, [which had been] part of the [colonial] viceroyalty
of the Prata.” The Argentine minister of war, General Manuel A. Rodríguez,
was notably loud in calling for such action. Argentina had made loans to
keep Paraguay fighting. Brazilian military attachés were not allowed to
visit the war zone and were treated with “visible suspicion.” “Our policy,”
Vargas wrote, “has been cordial friendship with Argentina and abstention
of interference in the Chaco question.” Maintaining that policy, “we must
take military precautions,” in order to avoid future problems.
However, he lamented, “We lack almost everything.” He wanted to
know what the Americans thought about all this “and to what point will
they accompany us?” Brazil did not have funds and “two things we need at
the moment: some units for coastal defense; one or two cruisers, subma-
rines and one or two gunboats on the Paraguay River.” Ambassador Aranha
replied that President Franklin Roosevelt asked that they do nothing about
the Brazilian fleet without consulting him because he had “decided to do
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    21

everything he could so that everything could be built [in the United States]
on the best and cheapest terms.” Aranha cautioned that they had to keep
this secret between them, that the slightest leak could compromise their
efforts to secure American arms. “The truth … Getúlio, is that these people
are convinced that in case of war we will be with them.” However, they were
“alarmed with our lack of interest in this post since the time of Domicio da
Gama (1911–18), and the Americans did not understand how Brazil could
twice renew the French military mission’s contract and not keep the
American naval mission ( which was then in doubt).” He feared they would
turn to Argentina. “I tell you,” Aranha affirmed, “that everything is possible
to obtain, but it will all have to be done with discretion, with secrecy.”5
Aranha warned that Argentina was trying to undermine Brazil’s friendly
relations with the United States and that “we must preserve our position so
that in any eventuality we can count on this country.”6
At that time Brazil lacked gold reserves and hard currencies to finance
its international trade, so in June 1935, the government signed an infor-
mal compensation trade agreement with Germany that using complicated
exchange mechanisms allowed Brazil to swap its natural or agricultural
products for German manufactures. Washington protested vigorously to
this closed arrangement that detached Brazilian-German trade from the
wider international system based upon gold and convertible currencies.
Because of the close linkage between obtaining arms and Brazil’s foreign
trade, the army’s general staff paid close attention to trade policies.
Vargas committed himself to arming and equipping the military and
building a national steel factory in return for military backing for extend-
ing his presidency with dictatorial powers that would eliminate politics.
The execution of this arrangement proceeded in the hesitant, indirect way
in which Getúlio usually maneuvered. He flashed mixed, even contradic-
tory signals. But rather than being devious, his lack of clarity likely reflected
his indecision and caution. He had made an agreement, or compromisso,
with Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro to establish a dictatorship that
would arm Brazil.7 In his diary Vargas commented on June 15, 1936, that
the only way to make the necessary arms purchases would be “a great
reduction in payment of the foreign debt” which could not be done under
“the political regime that we are following.” So defense policy produced
the dictatorship called the Estado Novo.8
The debates within the army regarding trade and arms policies gave the
officer corps the appearance of grouping into pro-American (later Allied)
and pro-German (later Axis) camps. The European crisis produced deeply
22   F. D. MCCANN

conflicted and complicated responses in the Brazilian officer corps.

Certainly, there was admiration for Germany’s post-World War I recon-
struction of its armed forces and its military industries. Furthermore there
was growing acceptance of the idea that in facing the uncertainties ahead,
Brazilian national security demanded a strong, efficient, centralized
­government committed to defense. It was easy for contemporary American
observers to see nefarious Axis influences in the statements and attitudes
of Generals Eurico Dutra (minister of war) and Pedro A. de Góes Monteiro
(army chief of staff), but historians should look more deeply and not
merely accept what seems obvious.9 It has been common for historians to
present the government of Getúlio Vargas as wavering between Nazi
Germany and the United States. It often looked that way to newspaper
reporters and hence later historians who saw Dutra and Góes Monteiro
having “sympathy for Germany.”10 However when Dutra was asked
directly by a New York Times reporter “Can it be said that the sentiment
of the Army is pro-German and anti-American?”, he replied: “Not at all.
The Army is intent on perfecting its professional efficiency, and is solely
pro-Brazilian. [And] for help along this line it has looked to the United
States rather than to Germany.”11 The idea of being pro-Brazilian was
often difficult for Americans to understand.
In 1938, listening to the advice of its generals, the government of
Getúlio Vargas contracted with Germany’s Krupp and Zeiss companies for
a massive purchase of artillery pieces and appropriate sights and other
optics.12 That $ (US) 55,000,000 package raised suspicions in Washington,
but should have been balanced against President Vargas’s friendly relation-
ship with Franklin Roosevelt and the Brazilian leader’s unsolicited offer
after their cordial meeting in Rio de Janeiro in late 1936 to discuss full
military and naval cooperation, including building a naval base in Brazil
for American use in the event of a war of aggression against the United
States. Vargas observed that such an attack on the United States “would
necessarily” involve “the vital interests of Brazil.”13 The American army’s
intelligence files oozed doubts and distrust; staff officers knew nothing of
Vargas’s offer of a naval base and tended to view many Brazilian officers as
Nazi sympathizers. Some were, but most merely had a professional admi-
ration for the discipline and efficiency of the German army.14 Unfortunately,
Roosevelt’s government did not take up the offer, and the Brazilian lead-
ership turned to their own problems and solutions. Less than two years
after Getúlio’s remarkable offer, the Americans would be urgently pursu-
ing that very cooperation (Fig. 2.1).
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    23

Fig. 2.1  Roosevelt and Vargas on FDR’s arrival in Rio de Janeiro, 1936. The
president’s oldest son James is the naval officer in the front looking at his father.
(Courtesy of the FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY. NARA)

American Fears and Brazilian Neutrality

It is important to recall that the war began suddenly in September 1939
with the German invasion of Poland and that the conquest of the
Netherlands and Belgium and shocking retreat of the British across the
Channel from Dunkirk in early June and the defeat of France in mid-June
1940 caused panic in Washington. It was not at all evident that Britain
could hold off the Germans, who launched massive air attacks on the
island kingdom. Eventually, the Germans gave up their invasion plans, but
that was not immediately clear. Meanwhile, Italy attacked British colonies
in East Africa and Japan took over French Indo-China. On September 27,
the three aggressors signed a ten-year military and economic pact, form-
ing the Axis alliance. Their forces swept into Romania and the Balkans and
plunged into Greece. Uncertainty was the order of the day. On December
29, 1940, President Roosevelt held a radio “fireside chat” with his coun-
trymen stressing the Axis threat and calling for an immense production
24   F. D. MCCANN

effort that would make the United States “the great arsenal of democ-
racy.” Brave inspiring words, but everything remained to be done. What if
the French surrendered their fleet to the Germans and they mounted an
attack from Dakar, in West Africa, on Northeast Brazil? The distance was
a mere 1400 miles and only 8 hours by air. American planners worried that
if the Germans could get control of Northeast Brazil, they would separate
the United States from South America’s natural resources.15 An even
worse fear was that if they got a toehold on the “hump” of Brazil they
could step by step move on the Panama Canal cutting that lifeline.
Today, understanding German weaknesses, that scenario of a German
attack on the Panama Canal appears like a fantasy, but at the time it looked
all too possible. Military planners in Washington were unsure of Axis capa-
bilities and so had to think in worst case scenarios. In fact at the White
House conference of American and British staff officers with President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on December 23, 1941,
the two leaders “thought it was important to keep a flying route open
across Africa, referring to the Brazilian situation and the threat from
Dakar.” FDR emphasized “the dangers of Brazil”; while Churchill wor-
ried about a German move into North Africa and a seizure of Dakar, he
imagined the possibility of “an expedition against Dakar” to head off such
an event.16
The nightmare of a German seizure of either Dakar or Natal disturbed
the sleep of American military leaders for several years. From the early
1930s, Germany and the United States had competed for Brazilian trade
and the American military had courted the Brazilian army energetically.
Military planners hoped that the United States would trade arms to Brazil
for permission to station a defense force in the northeast. From 1939
through 1942, American military planning emphasized the exposed nature
of the Brazilian bulge and the War Department’s desire to garrison it with
American troops. In January 1939, according to War Department ana-
lysts, Brazil’s coastal cities were

“almost completely defenseless …against even small naval raiding expedi-

tions. Brazil is helpless in the face of any kind of powerful enemy. … If we
are ever embroiled over the Monroe Doctrine the chance is about 95 per
cent it will be on account of undefended Brazil. … Twenty-five hundred
miles of undefended coast line … which means all a hostile force would have
to do would be to enter, drop anchor and take charge.”
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    25

There was no anti-aircraft defense in Brazil, even for Rio and São Paulo.
Clearly amazed, the analyst lamented “No equipment whatever. With
planes on a regular schedule to Europe, need I say more?”17
That comment might be a bit overdramatic, but Brazil was militarily
weak. In February 1939, officers at the Army War College, responded to
an unusual secret request for a “Special Strategic Study of Brazil” setting
out necessary American actions to assist “in the maintenance of its inde-
pendence and integrity in the face of internal or external operations,
undertaken, fostered or assisted by non-American countries.” The officers
involved were sensitive to Brazilian sovereignty concerns, insisting on “the
immediate evacuation of Brazilian territory as soon as the desired results
have been obtained.”18 Immediately upon the outbreak of war, the
Brazilian government proclaimed its neutrality. Minister of War Dutra
warned Brazilian officers to avoid any sign of partiality in their public
actions and statements.19
The American army and navy had different interpretations of the situa-
tion in the South Atlantic. The army saw the situation as perilous, while
the US Navy was content with its relationship with the Brazilians and was
not anxious to help the army establish itself in Brazil. Clearly, any transat-
lantic invasion would be by sea and air. When the army’s War Plans
Division proposed broadening the quest of bases for joint army and navy
use, the navy objected. It already had secured Brazilian permission to use
the northeastern harbors and did not see the urgency that the army did.
During World War I, some Brazilian officers had served aboard American
warships, and American officers were teaching at Brazilian naval institu-
tions by the end of that war. And beginning in 1922, the American navy
had a sizeable and well-regarded mission in Brazil. Its officers had good
rapport with Brazilian naval leaders, and overall the navy had better rela-
tions with the Brazilians than did the American army.20
Brazil worried American officialdom because the threat of German and
Italian commercial, political, and military penetration was very real. Brazil
had a German and Italian immigrant and descendant population estimated at
1,519,000 located mostly in the southern states of São Paulo, Paraná, Santa
Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The long history of friendly Brazilian-
American relations and trade dating from the late eighteenth century was
positive and reassuring, but the German and Italian emphasis on preserving
contact with and the loyalty of the immigrant communities was troubling.
Army planners feared that German and Italian communities might rebel
against the government. The Americans naturally wanted to counter German
26   F. D. MCCANN

and Italian propaganda and influence.21 And, of course, the Vargas govern-
ment was very worried about the many unassimilated German communities
in the southern states. In 1940 there were 581,807 German speakers in Rio
Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná according to the census.22 The
Nazi Party in Brazil was the largest in the world outside Germany with 2900
members in 17 states. The government was less concerned with the Italians
who were more Brazilianized. The government moved army units to key
locations in the south, closed German language newspapers and schools and
made clear to the German ambassador that the Nazi Party was not allowed
to establish itself in German-speaking communities. Vargas had outlawed all
political parties, and when the German ambassador aggressively argued that
the Nazi Party should be allowed, he was declared persona non grata.23
Minister of War Dutra commented that the foreign immigrants had made it
possible to fill vast uncultivated and undeveloped spaces with viable commu-
nities, but government neglect had allowed them to become “true enclaves
focused internally, socially organized with habits, customs, and traditions of
their distant motherlands.” The army saw such communities as “worse than
a foreign military occupation.” It would not be possible, Dutra said, to rap-
idly nationalize them, but with patience and persistence this “problema seris-
simo” would be eliminated.24
The government was also convinced that the Germans had a large num-
ber of secret agents operating “a well-organized espionage system” in the
country.25 German propaganda aimed at keeping Germans resident in
Brazil “as an alien bloc owing allegiance to the mother country.” Moreover
the government feared that Germany, and maybe Japan, had “long-range
designs on Brazil” and such fears had been “considerably accentuated since
the Munich Conference” (Sept. 29, 1938). The American army War Plans
Division’s (WPD) intelligence chief reported that officials of the German
embassy in Rio and consuls in various cities “have become extremely arro-
gant since the recent events in Czechoslovakia.” The Germans were con-
ducting “an active program of inviting prominent Brazilian professional
men to visit Germany, accompanied by their wives, all expenses paid. These
invitations are being more frequently accepted.” German short-wave
broadcasting stations were “extremely active in transmitting to Brazil in
Portuguese. The musical programs are exceptionally fine and the reception
superior to that of any other broadcasting country.” The news programs
gave “pro-Fascist and anti-American interpretations to all possible news.”
The intelligence chief worried that the result of these activities would even-
tually be “an effective nucleus of pro-fascist Brazilians.”26
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    27

Instead of seeing the failed May 1938 coup attempt by the fascistic
Integralista party as a positive sign of government strength, American
analysts aware of German and Italian backing of the Integralistas worried
that it could happen again.27 The Vargas regime was after all a dictatorship
held in place by the military. Pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi forces might stir up
enough internal dissent to topple the government, or if they could secure
control of part of the country, Germany and Italy could send reinforce-
ments as they had been doing in Spain since 1936. In fact as early as June
1938, the Integralistas had a plan for another revolt in the southern states
according to a report by German ambassador Ritter.28 If a Fascist regime
could be established in Brazil, the vital interests of the United States would
be shaken “and the Panama Canal menaced.” Such events would affect the
stability of neighboring Uruguay and Argentina that also had large
German and Italian populations and endanger the security of the
hemisphere.29

Chiefs of Staff George Marshall and Góes Monteiro

Exchange Visits
In 1939, the Roosevelt government was so preoccupied with Brazil that it
sent its newly designated army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall,
to Rio de Janeiro on the USS Nashville to assess the Brazilian army first-
hand and to begin negotiations. It was the first time in history that an
American chief of staff or designate had made a foreign journey in that
capacity. To be exact Marshall had been selected but did not succeed
General Malin Craig as chief until September 1, 1939.30 The idea of an
exchange of visits between the chiefs of staff of the armies of Brazil and the
United States came from Oswaldo Aranha, who after serving as ambassa-
dor in Washington from 1934 to 1938 had become foreign minister. In
February 1939 during a visit to Washington, he met with army generals.
He was the constant driving force behind close relations with the United
States. Germany had invited Brazil’s chief of staff to visit and to participate
in Wehrmacht maneuvers, and he had made worrisomely favorable
comments about the German army. Aranha correctly thought that the
exchange of visits would forestall a Góes Monteiro trip to Europe. Years
later Marshall recalled that “in order to suppress these intimacies, I was
sent to Brazil on a goodwill tour.”31 Marshall would have been well pre-
pared by his attendance from mid-1938 at meetings of the Standing
28   F. D. MCCANN

Liaison Committee, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State

Sumner Welles, which dealt mainly with Latin American military matters,
specifically the defense of Brazil.32 Beyond assuming that he had learned
something about Brazil, it is not clear how meticulous his preparation had
been. The American military attaché had sent a detailed explanation about
the relative balance of power within the Brazilian army. One would sup-
pose that the minister of war was more powerful than the chief of staff, but
the reality was, according to the attaché, that “the Chief of Staff controls
more important elements of the Army leaving to the Minister of War
control of administrative matters…. As matters now stand, the Minister of
War is decidedly overshadowed by the Chief of Staff in actual power and
political influence”33 (Fig. 2.2).
Considering that it took at least 14 days each way by ship, such a trip
was a major commitment of time and effort. Marshall’s reception on the

Fig. 2.2  Marshall’s arrival in Brazil. (Courtesy of the George C.  Marshall
Foundation Research Library, Lexington, Virginia)
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    29

streets of Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, and Belo Horizonte was startlingly
effusive. The popular reception at the dock in Rio and along Avenida Rio
Branco was “extremely warm and the spontaneous applause from the
crowds surprised even the Brazilian officers” assigned to meet the general
and his party. In Belo Horizonte some 12,000 school children and thou-
sands of adults lined Avenida Afonso Pena, clapping and cheering as
Marshall thrilled them by getting out of the car and walking a mile or so
waving to the crowds. Even Brazilian officials were surprised at the emo-
tionally demonstrative reception. General Francisco Pinto, Vargas’s aide,
remarked “Our people are generally… somewhat indifferent to foreign
State visits, and I was surprised and delighted with the size of the crowds
and their applause as the procession drove down the Avenida Rio
Branco.”34 And Marshall observed that it was carrying hospitality too far
to have a Brazilian colonel and a major assigned to him as “aides.” He
thought that the calls on officials and receptions were “pretentiously
arranged,” perhaps especially Chief of Staff General Góes Monteiro’s serv-
ing champagne to those welcoming Marshall at the war ministry. Even so
he carefully noted Brazilian procedures so that his army could reciprocate
similarly when General Góes arrived in the United States. He wrote to
General Malin Craig that “they are doing this in great style.”35
On June 7 Marshall conferred with Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro
giving a “long and clear exposition of the matters that brought him to
Brazil and asking for their cooperation in case of war.” He assured them
that if Brazil were attacked, the United States Navy and Army Air Force
would come to its assistance. To prepare a joint defense, Washington
wanted to have access to a port, where it could concentrate its ships, and
bases in the northeast where it would set up deposits of munitions, arms,
oil, and gas to facilitate operations. General Góes countered that in the
event of war Brazil’s principal worry would be to defend the south against
invasion from Argentina and against subversion among the numerous
German, Italian, and Japanese immigrant communities in the southern
states.36
One of the difficulties that American officers had in discussing defense
matters with their Brazilian counterparts was knowing the exact size of the
Brazilian army. It was not necessarily that the numbers were secret, but
because for years the authorized strength had been set for one year at a
time and the authorized strength was usually higher than the actual
strength. In 1936, for the first time the authorized numbers were set for
three years (1936, 1937, and 1938) at 4800 regular officers, 1100 tempo-
30   F. D. MCCANN

rary officers, and 74,000 soldiers. The problem was that while the actual
officer number was correct, the enlisted strength was estimated to be at
20% lower than that authorized. The actual number of soldiers was about
60,000.37 The question of army strength was made more difficult because
funds to carry out the army Reorganization Plan of 1934 were nearly non-­
existent. The army command dealt with the lack of funds by reducing the
numbers recruited. Officers protested and held mysterious secret meet-
ings, while the minister of war responded with public statements that the
reductions were merely rumors and that the “efficiency of our land forces”
was being maintained.38 The resulting discontent in the officer corps was
one of the causes of the rise of Integralista and Communist agitation
among officers and sergeants and a factor in the Moscow-sponsored upris-
ing in November 1935.39
Another difficulty that foreign observers had was evaluating the quality
of the troops. However, the reality for Brazilian officers was all too clear
and was reason for embarrassment, because most recruits were painfully
uneducated. They were, a Brazilian officer admitted, “ignorant of our
past, unaware of our present … indifferent to the future” lacking elemen-
tary “civil and moral education,” and with only a vague understanding of
good and bad.40 General Dutra complained that 60% of potential recruits
were illiterate and nearly 50% were physically unqualified.41 Because illit-
eracy was so common, basic training necessarily included instruction in
reading, writing, and arithmetic, and troops who were deficient at the end
of their service period were kept another six months. The “cancer of illit-
eracy,” as officers called it, was a serious limitation on military capability.
Marshall’s tour of southeastern and southern Brazil was a public rela-
tions success and gave him the opportunity to visit army units. Aside from
“a devilish number of speeches a day,” he thought the reception “remark-
able, with a steadily increasing enthusiasm.” The elaborateness of the
receptions made a deep impression on him. In Porto Alegre, Rio Grande
do Sul, en route from the airport, there was a “Guard of Honor, Cavalry
escort surrounding my car, motorcycle police. Main street bordered by
thousands of school children in uniform, 50 or 75,000 people crowded in
the rear of children, confetti and paper, like Broadway, for a half mile of
blocks, four or five bands.” Dinners with state officials, balls, “guards in
plume, jackboots … guests grouped to receive me, Governor as escort,
national anthems, a dais at which to sit. It sounds like a joke or a bit of
stage business, but it was all in deadly earnest in their desire to do the gra-
cious thing.” His own warmth appealed to Brazilians; in Porto Alegre he
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    31

delighted them by sending a considerable amount of candy to an orphan-

age and in Belo Horizonte, as mentioned, walking the line of march to
better greet the crowds charmed the mineiros. Thinking ahead to Góes’s
return visit, he was worried because “what they have done personally we
cannot duplicate.”42 It is notable that Marshall was not favorably impressed
by the officers of the small US Army Military Mission that had been advis-
ing on Brazil’s coastal defenses, they did not present a sufficiently alert and
smart appearance to suit him. The general asserted that he wanted “to
have only the highest type of officer in Brazil.”43 Marshall himself had
selected Major Matthew B.  Ridgway for this assignment because of his
previous experience in Latin America; he was then assigned to the Fourth
Army staff in San Francisco. The Head of the Army Air Corps General
Henry H. Arnold had recommended his former Assistant Chief of Staff
Colonel James E. Chaney. Marshall sent Ridgway and Chaney north on a
Pan American plane to have a look at the area from Belém to Recife. Góes
returned with Marshall to the United States on the USS Nashville to con-
tinue their talks.44 While en route, Ridgway wrote a memo for Marshall
declaring that the objective of US policy “should be the maintenance in
Brazil of a government determined and able to both preserve its territorial
integrity and to cooperate fully with the United States in Hemisphere
Defense.” He commented further that “The supply of arms and muni-
tions is the critical first step. If, withheld, Brazil will inevitably turn to
Europe. If furnished, the remaining steps will be relatively easy of
accomplishment.”45
Góes wrote to President Vargas that he feared that Marshall suffered “a
real deception” on seeing Brazil’s military weakness, because he had
thought the Brazilian forces were stronger, and so now had a low opinion
of “our military potential.” Góes Monteiro showed a lack of understand-
ing of American military thinking when he told Vargas that he feared that
if Brazil did not agree to an alliance, the Americans would turn to
Argentina, where it had a military aviation mission. Of course, Argentina
could not defend Northeast Brazil. But, even so, Góes Monteiro was
hopeful that they could find solutions beneficial to Brazil and that “approx-
imation” with the United States would solve “our capital problems.”46
Marshall did not leave any comment indicating the low opinion that
Góes feared. At the time the American army itself was not in prime condi-
tion. By the mid-1930s, the army “had reached a low point in both num-
bers and readiness for combat … [because of] congressional thrift and
anti-war sentiment.” Back in 1932 it had somewhat less than 120,000
32   F. D. MCCANN

active-duty enlisted men and was 17th in size in the world. By the time
Marshall went to Brazil, the US Army had about 175,000 soldiers, still
considerably under the 280,000 authorized in the National Defense Act
of 1920. Army appropriations were “grossly inadequate even to halt the
normal deterioration of attrition and obsolescence, much less to develop
and buy modern weapons to match those being acquired by America’s
potential enemies.” The needs of the “absurdly small and ill-equipped” air
force were especially cause for deep worry.47
Góes and Dutra likewise knew that their army was not in proper condi-
tion. They had committed themselves to overthrow the government based
on the Constitution of 1934 in November 1937, because it did not satisfy
defense needs.48 In his general staff report for 1937, Góes Monteiro had
charged that the 1934 law specifying that army reorganization was to be
completed within three years had not been fulfilled. Simply put, the army
was “useless for the field of battle.” The images that he sketched were
extremely discouraging. The army was, he said, “fragile, more fictitious
than real,” its big units were “dismantled … incapable of being mobilized
in reasonable time and employed in any situation.” The general staff’s
worries about Brazil’s military weaknesses, he wrote, had intensified with
the news that Chile was renewing its army’s equipment and that Argentina
was improving its armament, expanding its weapons industry, and gener-
ally developing its military capabilities. In the United States, President
Roosevelt was calling for the “prompt and intensive equipping of its armed
forces.” The nations of the globe were preparing for war. “The violence in
Abyssinia, China, and Spain were,” the general declared, “true practice
wars to test the means of destruction and protection” in rehearsal for a
great and decisive struggle. Neither pacifist illusions nor Brazil’s turn-of-­
the-century Krupp artillery would be able to protect the country. On
Brazil’s very borders, the “ex-belligerents of the Chaco, despite the inter-
minable peace conference in Buenos Aires, had returned to the path of
complete rearmament, in expectation of another appeal to arms.” Góes
warned that “the moment, in which we are living, imposes a radical trans-
formation of [our] military organism … [because] we remain paralyzed,
about a decade behind.” They had the responsibility to restore Brazil’s
armed forces in order to “redeem us from the previous inertia and to free
us from the depressing situation in which we are entombed.” These cir-
cumstances motivated Góes and Dutra “to solicit insistently from the
President of the Republic all the measures required for the reform of our
[army’s] structure.” And most basically the army needed arms to carry
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    33

out its defense mission.49 So knowing how weak they were; they were
ready to listen to Marshall’s proposals.
The army units that Marshall saw looked respectable. In the 1920s, in
a massive construction program, the army had established 61 new posts or
barracks (quartéis), many in the southern states. They were attractive and
so well built that many are still in use. They made a good impression as did
the parading troops that were likely carefully selected.
Arriving in the United States, Góes was fascinated by the country’s
power and organization. Marshall pulled out all the stops to insure that
the Brazilian general really saw the United States. Marshall commented
that “no officer in our Army has ever had the same opportunity to see our
country as did [Góes] Monteiro….” And Marshall made sure that Góes
understood that even though the American army was small, it was disci-
plined, skilled, and preparing itself for war. The Brazilian general was
impressed with the physique, intelligence, technical skill, and high state of
discipline of the American army and was so taken with the country’s
potential power that he remarked to Marshall that the United States
“could lick the world.” At San Francisco, Góes could not avoid being
excited when he had an aerial view of “the Fleet with its 100 or more ves-
sels steaming into the Golden Gate.”50 And at West Point watching the
Corps of Cadets on parade, Góes was “reduced to tears.” And he enjoyed
playing history buff touring the battlefield of Gettysburg and observing an
air show at Langley Field with Marshall. Of course, he had the opportu-
nity to see the Brazilian Pavilion at the World’s Fair in New York. Perhaps
the highpoint was having Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of the
Army George Woodring, and Marshall take him to the White House to
meet President Roosevelt. Throughout the tour he was hosted by the
leading generals of the US Army.51
Marshall evaluated the tour saying “General Monteiro carried himself
very well, considering the limitations on language and the lack of a dash-
ing appearance. He really made a splendid impression, however, better
than I anticipated … he was given a really remarkable reception.” He cor-
rectly thought that the general had been impressed with the American
army. Marshall mused that “I think he had in mind that we were rather
careless people in a military way, and he found in these concentrated gar-
risons that quite the opposite was the case.”52
During their voyage on the USS Nashville, Marshall “grew worried
about his [Góes’s] condition, with relation to a strenuous trip, travel and
altitude.” He “inveigled Monteiro into a physical exam, by first having the
34   F. D. MCCANN

doctor come up and examine me.” It turned out that that his heart was “a
little flabby, and a cardiogram had indicated a bad valve.” Góes had assured
him that he was up to the journey, but Marshall had his doubts and
arranged things so he could have adequate rest and added a doctor to the
party. Marshall appeared to have developed a fondness for Góes beyond
what was necessary for military protocol.53
In their conversations Góes Monteiro stressed that Brazil needed help
from the United States in protecting its maritime communications along
its exposed 4650-mile coastline, especially in keeping the sea lanes open to
the northeastern region. In exchange Brazil would offer use of air bases at
Natal and on Fernando de Noronha Island.54 As early as 1936, Góes
Monteiro had stated that, in the event of a world conflict, Brazil would
not be able to stay neutral and that its only source of arms would be the
United States.55 On his return to Brazil, Góes was exuberant about the
“liberty, order and discipline” in the northern republic.56 Even so American
military intelligence maintained a highly guarded attitude toward General
Góes. Late in life, he declared that “I was never a Nazista or a Fascista, as
many people thought. I was only an admirer, as a soldier, of the German
army…. I never admired Hitler; I admired, yes, the German Generals.”57
Marshall did not speak Portuguese so all of his conversations and
speeches had to be interpreted. There were few American officers who
spoke Portuguese, but one, Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, had served in the
US Military Mission to Brazil and had developed considerable fluency. He
was at Marshall’s side throughout the time in Brazil and later was with
Góes Monteiro in the States. Marshall thought that Miller’s role had been
of “the highest importance to the success of the mission” and his advice
and guidance during Góes Monteiro’s “tour of the United States was
directly responsible for a large measure of the success of the visit.” He was
the exception to Marshall’s low opinion of the military mission in Brazil.
Marshall was not one to give out unmerited praise, and he emphasized his
regard in a letter to Ambassador Caffery observing that Miller, “while self-­
effacing and modest to a remarkable degree, played a leading role in this
affair. He made a profound impression everywhere he went… I mention
this because he is a man of great value to us in connection with Brazil. …
He seems to have Monteiro’s confidence to a remarkable degree.” He was
so impressed that he rearranged Miller’s posting and sent him to the War
College in September 1939 with the idea that his next assignment would
be Brazil.58
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    35

Góes promised Marshall that his army would create new coast artillery
and anti-aircraft units and would station an army division in the northeast,
but he repeated again and again that everything would depend on arms
from the United States. He provided a list of military equipment that his
army considered urgent and indispensable. He stressed that the prices and
terms of payment had to match those offered by Germany and other
countries. The Vargas government wanted to exchange raw materials,
such as manganese, for the desired items. The Brazilian government
wanted to know, “with absolute certainty,” that the American Congress
would revoke the neutrality law and that there would be no “future obsta-
cles to our possible acquisitions in the United States.”59 Fearful of war and
increasingly isolationist, the Congress had passed Neutrality Acts in 1935,
1936, and 1937. These laws were intended to deal with the unsettled
world scene produced by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil
War, and the Japanese invasion of China, but they made difficult any
agreements to arm Brazil.
Marshall wrote to him on October 5 explaining the supply constraints
and legal limitations that they were working within. The army could sell
“to a friendly government any materiel which is surplus and no longer
needed for military purposes.” Such sale to Brazil would be at nominal
prices. However such materiel was “limited in quantity and quality, because
of our deficiencies in war materiel.” He referred to a list of available sur-
plus that Colonel Miller had sent to Góes, which included 6-inch mobile
guns that could be used in coastal defense. They would require some
modernization with new carriages that could be made in commercial fac-
tories. The “principal deficiency” Marshall lamented was ammunition, “of
which we have a shortage.” If munitions could not be made in Brazil, he
suggested that Brazil procure them from “private manufacturers in the
United States.”
At that time the law did not allow the sale of “new equipment manu-
factured in our government arsenals.” He was hopeful that a bill to autho-
rize such sales would pass when the Congress re-convened in January, but
realistically that might not solve the problem “because our government
arsenals have insufficient capacity to meet our requirements in the present
emergency.” As a result the American government was giving priority to
purchasing equipment and arms from commercial firms. He suggested
that they do the same in Brazil. This must have pained Góes because Brazil
did not have sufficient industrial capability. Marshall reinforced Colonel
Miller’s suggestion that Góes send a qualified officer to the States to select
36   F. D. MCCANN

surplus equipment when it came available and to “place orders with com-
mercial firms after obtaining plans from our War Department.” Marshall
was pleased “that your government has tentatively approved certain mea-
sures for the increased effectiveness of our military cooperation” and that
the Brazilian army was considering “establishment of air bases in north-
eastern Brazil” and offered to provide information on technical require-
ments. To improve cooperation, the US Military Mission was to be
strengthened, some Brazilian officers were to be sent for training, and
Washington was to send technicians to orient Brazilian war industries.
Regarding Góes’s worry about the neutrality laws, Marshall was reassuring
that whatever the Congress did, “it should not create obstacles to your
procurements in the United States, as the neutrality legislation is directed
toward belligerent nations.” He promised Góes that he would return to
the idea of exchanging manganese for arms as soon as “our requirements
and funds” have been determined.
He concluded saying that his army was going to send a flight of seven
“Flying Fortress” B-17s, under the command of Major General Delos C.
Emmons, to participate in the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the
Republic (November 15). He assured his “good friend, of my desire to
cooperate to the full extent of my authority in all measures which will
­better prepare your country for its own defense, and that of the American
continent.”60
Góes had returned to Brazil with the basis of an agreement for military
cooperation, but nearly three years passed before it was signed, mostly
because the Americans were unable to provide arms. The exchange of
chief of staff visits showed American concern for Brazilian security and
helped focus the American public on hemispheric defense.61 One point of
divergence was that the Americans wanted to include the defense of Brazil
within a broader framework of hemispheric defense, which the Brazilians
thought would diminish their role by mixing it with their neighbors, espe-
cially Argentina. The Brazilian military would “go all the way” with the
United States, Minister Aranha told Ambassador Caffery, “but does not
want to get tied up with any other country or countries.” The army
“would not approve a scheme for continental defense.”62 Brazil did not
want the bilateral relationship situated within the continental and
multilateral context. Brazilian military leaders judged that their country’s
size and location gave it a “privileged position that ought to rate it special
help by Washington.”63 Yet it seemed that the United States authorities
were conditioning the furnishing of military equipment on the possibility
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    37

of Brazil participating in the collective defense of the hemisphere. The

clash of viewpoints contributed an unnecessary roadblock to the defense
of Northeast Brazil.
An odd result of Góes’s journey is that a serious misunderstanding
crept into Brazilian historiography. Various authors claim that he went to
Germany before the war. It had been publicized that he had been invited
to visit Italy, Germany, England, France, and Portugal. In later years many
scholars assumed that he had gone.64 The reality was that he had decided
against the European trip before going to the United States. The very day
Marshall arrived in Brazil on May 25; Ambassador Caffery reported that
there were renewed efforts being made to have Góes travel to Europe after
the visit to the United States. However, on June 6, Caffery reported that
Góes told him that afternoon that he had decided not to visit Germany
and the others and that he would return to Brazil in the Flying Fortress as
Washington had offered.65 The documents concerning his plans have been
available since the early 1960s, so there is no reason to perpetuate the
myth. Moreover it should have been obvious to all that he stayed so long
in the United States that the outbreak of war made such a trip impossible.
But even more oddly, Foreign Minister Aranha did not seem to know of
Góes’s decision not to go to Europe. On August 18 he wrote to Vargas
that turning down the invitations was difficult and could provoke “resent-
ments, doubts or reserves.” The government had to accept them, but they
required the “maximum prudence … [so as not to give] the smallest signal
of [Brazil’s] sympathies….” Within the “restricted liberty that we have
and must preserve,” decisions must be made according to Brazilian inter-
ests and sovereignty.66 No matter, within two weeks Germany invaded
Poland.

Neutrality and Cooperation

Prior to the exchange of visits, the Brazilian General Staff had discussed
how to facilitate negotiations so that they supported national interests.
They had already ordered and paid for extensive armaments from Germany,
which had yet to be shipped, and they wanted to insure that arrangements
with the United States would not interfere with receiving those weapons
and would not violate Brazil’s declared neutrality.67 Minister of War Dutra
advised Vargas that they should seek economic advantage from “a mutual
and intensified commercial cooperation with the United States, but with-
out military commitments.” They should follow a policy of solidarity and
38   F. D. MCCANN

peace with their South American neighbors while preserving “the most
formal neutrality” regarding the European war. However, if Vargas decided
to approve military cooperation with the United States as suggested by
Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro, Dutra recommended that discussions with
the Americans be based on three “essential conditions”:

(1) “Complete maintenance of our territorial and military sovereignty

in any armed forces actions or cooperation;”
(2) “Complete freedom of action in our diplomatic relations and com-
mercial and cultural exchange with all the world’s powers, permit-
ting us, without subterfuges or allegations, the most cordial
relations with the European countries;” [i.e., Germany and Italy]
(3) “Maximum discretion in the negotiations, so as not to provoke
distrust and animosity among the other South American nations.”
[i.e., Argentina]68

Vargas responded that Brazil should keep out of any conflict in Europe
or Asia that did not affect national interests. But that they should examine
the cooperation that the United States was offering as it pertained to
­military preparation and defense against Brazil being attacked or threat-
ened. As this cooperation was defensive, it was necessary, Vargas thought,
to carry it so as not to affect relations with other countries.69
Dutra passed Vargas’s decision on to Góes Monteiro emphasizing that
“Brazil should remain permanently out of any extra-continental conflict….”
And he thought that they should not share their defense studies and opera-
tions plans with the Americans, as the US military attaché had requested.
Considering that Brazil’s traditional policy was non-aggression and that
their plans were “exclusively” defensive, Dutra did not think that their plan-
ning had anything to do with cooperation with the United States.70
Military relations got off to a shaky start because American neutrality
laws prevented the United States from selling weapons prior to the out-
break of the war and because its own forces were so badly armed that
Washington had little extra to give Brazil.71 The Brazilians did not yet feel
threatened, and they were unwilling to allow American forces into their
country. The two sides did agree to set up a binational military commis-
sion to continue negotiations.
Marshall was able to offer training and had invited Dutra to send some
officers to US army schools. However, it took a year before 14 officers
departed for the United States. It was clear to the chief of the small US
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    39

Military Mission that experience in the United States would be an effective

way to combat the antipathy toward Americans exhibited by some officers
who had trained in Europe. He went so far as to urge that selected Brazilian
officers serve a year or more in the American army.72 Instruction for such
Brazilians at Forts Benning, Sill, and Monroe was offered in Portuguese.73
May 1940 was a crucial month. On May 13, during a visit to Belo
Horizonte, Vargas gave a speech strongly reaffirming Brazilian neutrality,
while warning that extremist elements of any sort would not be allowed to
flourish, and asserting that “if we should have to take any initiative, we
shall not do so alone but in accord with the rest of the American nations.
‘Like cautious Ulysses’ they should avoid the ‘lure of the Sirens which
roam our seas so that our thoughts may be free to concentrate not only on
Brazilian interests, but on the destinies of Brazil….’”74 That same day
Góes Monteiro had a conversation with US Chargé d’Affaires William
C. Burdett, in which he reported that 8 of the 28 anti-aircraft batteries
that they had ordered from Germany had arrived. Góes described the
deliveries as a challenge to the Allies that showed the Germans were con-
fident in their ability to supply arms. He affirmed that when the time came
Brazil would cooperate fully with the United States and the other American
Republics, but that Brazil was unarmed and had no weapons industries, it
only had plenty of manpower. He was worried about the advances in avia-
tion and uneasy about the course of the war seemingly believing that the
Germans had a good chance of defeating the Allies. He believed that there
was a real need for the closest cooperation between Brazil and the United
States because both were confronted by a real and imminent danger.75
In that bleak month of May with German forces storming toward Paris
and defeated British troops desperately fleeing across the Channel to home,
the nightmare of Germany gaining control of, or destroying the French
and British fleets, sent Washington into a planning frenzy.76 Army planners
were studying situations that would be addressed in the various Rainbow
Plans. In April and early May, one of the student officer groups of the Army
War College class of 1939–1940 was laboring over “War Plan Purple” that
addressed a supposed combined rebellion and Axis invasion of Brazil. The
Army War College in Washington, D.C., was a rung on the ladder to higher
command in World War II. The student officers at the War College learned
how to conduct war operations by planning theoretical maneuvers and
carefully studying historical campaigns. The War College stressed groom-
ing officers for general war staff service and higher command. There were
no class rankings, and work was done in committees.77
40   F. D. MCCANN

The Brazilian study assumed a civil war in which Brazilian federal and
rebel forces were fighting along an east-west line through São Paulo. It
posited that Germany and Italy had created bases in the Cape Verde and
Canary Islands off Africa and were reinforcing the rebels with men and
munitions. Argentina had aligned itself with the rebels. The planning
aimed at keeping the friendly government of “Loyalist Brazil” functioning
and defeating the combined German, rebel, and Argentine forces. The
dual focus was to secure Rio de Janeiro and Natal. They gave a lot of
attention to estimating how rapidly the United States and the Axis could
move troops into Brazil and the respective efficiency of the opposing
fleets. Of four committees studying the Brazilian problem, only one had
decided to send an American expeditionary force. Perhaps this reflected a
tendency to avoid a direct South American involvement? Quite reasonably
the officers were troubled by the difficulties caused by Brazil’s rough ter-
rain, lack of roads and railroads, and the organization of the crucial
American fleet. One critic wondered what would be the American public’s
reaction to displacing so much army and naval power to the South
Atlantic.78 Worse, on May 24, the British Admiralty passed on reports that
Germany had loaded 6,000 troops on merchant ships that might be en
route to attack Brazil. As a precaution President Roosevelt ordered the
army and navy to work up a plan over the weekend of May 25–27 to send
100,000 troops to defend Brazil. Labeled “Pot of Gold,” the operation
could not be carried out because the army had no units ready, the Army
Air Corps did not have sufficient air transports, the airfields in Brazil were
inadequate, and the necessary naval support would have to be detached
from the Pacific fleet, which the navy opposed. And, of course, the
Brazilians would not welcome thousands of American troops. What hap-
pened to the German troop ships, that the British warned about, is
unknown.79
On June 4, 1940, Vargas met with his ministers of foreign affairs, jus-
tice, army, and navy and the two services’ chiefs of staff to discuss the
international situation and what Brazil should do in the likelihood that the
United States entered the war on the Allied side. They decided that Brazil
should continue to arm itself and to maintain its neutrality, although in
favor of the United States. They would keep their commitment to enter
the war only in case of aggression against an American country.80 Dutra’s
notes on that meeting indicated that they would cooperate with the
United States militarily, but they did not decide what to do if the Americans
entered the war without first being attacked.81 Dutra assured the new
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    41

American military attaché, Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, who had just com-
pleted the War College course mentioned above, that Brazil would col-
laborate with the United States, but emphasized that Brazil needed arms,
and thereafter he sent Ambassador Jefferson Caffery a listing of their
needs. In reality there was continuing doubt and perhaps fear, among
Brazil’s military, that the United States could not actually deliver the nec-
essary arms. A deeply troubled Foreign Minister Aranha commented to
Caffery that “You hold conversations with us and the Germans give us
arms.”82 Well, not exactly. The Germans were, according to the Brazilian
ambassador in Berlin, anxious “to end the war quickly,” and they were
encouraging Brazilian neutrality by offering to increase their purchases of
commodities in Brazil when the war ended. German companies were
accepting orders at discount prices for goods to be delivered in September.
At that point the Germans were optimistic that they would win.83
On June 11, Vargas, perhaps unintentionally, raised worries in
Washington by giving a speech that contained language that was inter-
preted ambiguously. Newspapers in the United States regarded his remarks
as Fascist, while those in Germany praised them as courageous.84 The
speech, which he entitled “On the Threshold of a New Era,” was given on
Navy Day on the fleet’s flagship Minas Gerais at a luncheon for admirals
and generals. On board ship Vargas had shown General Góes Monteiro a
copy of the speech, and Góes had cautioned that some of the terms and
phrases might be interpreted as approving the German invasion of France,
which was then underway. But Getúlio read the text without changes.85
He did not yet know that FDR had the night before condemned
Mussolini’s declaration of war on crumbling France and retreating Great
Britain as a dagger plunged into the back of a neighbor.86 Vargas’s focus
was Brazil, but it certainly referred generally to the world situation; the
speech caused considerable consternation. Recalling that the day com-
memorated the 1865 naval victory of Riachuelo in the Paraguayan war, he
was certain that all Brazilians would do their duty in this historic moment
when all of humanity was confronting “grave repercussions” resulting
from the “rapid and violent change of values.”

We march toward a future unlike that which we knew in economic, social,

or political organization, and we sense that the old systems and outdated
formulas are entering into decline. …. It is not the end of civilization, but
the tumultuous and fruitful beginning of a new era. The vigorous peoples …
need to follow the course of their aspirations, instead of contemplating that
42   F. D. MCCANN

which collapses and falls into ruin. We must therefore understand our time
and remove the debris of dead ideas and ideals. … The State ought to
assume the obligation of organizing the productive forces to give to the
people all that is necessary for their aggrandizement as a collective. …
We are creating industries, enabling the exploitation of raw materials, in
order to export them transformed into industrial products. To accelerate the
pace of these achievements, some sacrifice of commodities is necessary, [as
is] the manly disposition to save in order to build a strong nation. In the
period we are going through, only peoples hardened in the struggle and
strengthened by sacrifice will be able to face storms and overcome them.
Political order now cannot be made in the shadow of vague humanitarian
rhetoric intended to annul borders and create a fraternal and united interna-
tional society without peculiarities or friction, enjoying peace as a natural
good and not as a conquest of every day. Instead of a panorama of balanced
and fair distribution of the goods of the Earth, we witnessed the exacerba-
tion of nationalism, the strong Nations imposing themselves by organizing
based on sentiments of the Fatherland and sustaining themselves convinced
of their own superiority. The epoch of improvident liberalisms, of sterile
demagogies, useless individualism and sowers of disorder is past. Political
democracy replaces economic democracy, in which power, emanates directly
from the people and instituted to defend their interest, [and it] organizes
work, source of national aggrandizement and not means and roadway to
private fortunes. There is no more room for regimes founded on privileges
and distinctions; there are, only, those incorporating the entire nation
[based] on duty and offering, equally, social justice and opportunities in the
struggle for life.
Happily in Brazil we have established a regime which is adequate for our
necessities without imitating or affiliating ourselves with any of the current
doctrines and existing ideologies. It is a regime of Brazilian order and peace,
in accord with the nature and tradition of our people, capable of rapidly
boosting the general progress and guaranteeing the security of all.87

Reading the speech today, one wonders what the fuss was all about.
Likely it was the timing of it. The British had just retreated across the
Channel, the Netherlands and Belgium were conquered, and France was
on the edge of falling under the Nazi boot. It was a very nervous time.
Phrases like “vigorous peoples,” “dead ideas and sterile ideals,” “old sys-
tems” caught attention and maybe paralyzed thought.
Vargas noted in his diary that “the Germans praised it, the English
attacked, the Americans were alarmed. Internally they accuse me of being
a Germanophile.” He ended his diary entry for June 12 saying that the
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    43

conversations “between the chief of the American Military Mission and

our military and the foreign minister about our war materiel [have]
started.”88 The next day the Brazilian newspapers carried a note that
Vargas had written to clarify his meaning. He emphasized the maintenance
of a foreign policy of solidarity in the defense of the American continent
and neutrality in regard to European conflicts while declaring that his
speech of June 11 was intended to alert the nation that the changes in the
world required strengthening the Brazilian state economically and militar-
ily.89 It is possible, as historian Gerson Moura argued, that Vargas intended
his remarks to put more pressure on Washington to support Brazilian
industrialization and to speed up arms delivery, but the president’s scant
comments left room for doubt.90

Vargas Sought Not to Alienate Germany

Behind the scenes a perplexing drama unfolded. On June 20 Vargas met
with German Ambassador Kurt M.  Prüfer, who brought cables from
Berlin proposing that Germany immediately order a “great quantity of
cotton and coffee for delivery after the war,” which he hoped would end
soon. Prüfer reported that Vargas suggested that they should arrange a
trade agreement before the war ended. Likely he thought that his bargain-
ing position would be weaker once the fighting ended. Moreover, the
ambassador said that Vargas had “emphasized of his own accord his full
intention to maintain neutrality and his personal sympathy for the authori-
tarian states, referring at the same time to the speech he made on June 11.
He openly expressed his aversion to England and the democratic system.”
It is strange that Prüfer’s comments were at odds with what Vargas wrote
in his diary about their meeting. Prüfer said Vargas had requested the
meeting, while Vargas twice wrote that Prüfer had asked for it. The refer-
ence to the June 11 speech matched German interpretations of it but
disagreed with Vargas’s diary comments. And their dating of the meeting
differed by a day. Was Prüfer accurate in his account or was he telling
Berlin what he knew would be pleasing?91
Vargas’s conversations with the German ambassador have been inter-
preted frequently to show that he was playing both sides, and, as a noted
Brazilian historian expressed it, “the expectation, at the time, was that
Brazil would be on the side of the Axis countries.”92 The official German
view in June 1940 was that Vargas, “despite protestations of friendship,”
was rejecting “North American policy… in anticipation of England’s
44   F. D. MCCANN

defeat and the resulting weakening of Roosevelt, and the orientation of

Brazilian policy toward trade with Germany and Europe.”93 Germany held
out a promise to buy large amounts of Brazilian products “immediately
after the war ends” and to deliver on the steel works, as long as there was
“no substantial change … in the present state of Brazil’s neutrality.”94
Certainly, Vargas’s public position was that, for Brazil and the Americas,
the European war was “something very distant and beyond the interests of
the continent.”95
However, Getúlio’s long time “homem de confiança,” [confidant] Paulo
Germano Hasslocher, wrote from his diplomatic post in Washington that
the speech had the advantage of focusing world attention on Brazil in this
moment of great crisis. He thought that the two men who would decide
the outcome of the war were FDR and Hitler; all others would play sec-
ondary roles. He recalled a saying of Talleyrand that in “international poli-
tics, when you are not the strongest, you ought to be with the strongest.”
The United States, he asserted, was stronger than Germany. “This country
can do all that Germany has done and is doing, and much more.” Modern
war would be decided in favor of the country with the greater industrial
capacity to give its armies the greatest and most efficient armament. “I am
absolutely certain that it [the United States] is the most powerful in the
world and invincible on the day that it steps into the arena of battle. … I
think that from the wisdom and knowledge of things we ought to place
ourselves at the side of the United States. Not as humble vassals, but as
cooperators and collaborators in a task of common interest … that is more
in line with our character and development.”96
The day after Hasslocher wrote that advice, FDR signed a joint resolu-
tion of Congress authorizing the Secretaries of War and Navy to assist the
governments of the American Republics to enlarge and enhance their mili-
tary and naval establishments.97
Curiously, on June 22, Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro gave a decidedly
“Pan-Americanista” speech that seemingly was intended “to correct the
unfortunate impression caused by Vargas’s speech of June 11.” The occa-
sion was the farewell luncheon at Rio’s Jockey Club in honor of General
Allen Kimberley, chief of the American Military Mission, returning home
after two years in Brazil. Commentators and most historians seemed to
have ignored that Góes asked that Kimberley carry the message to the
American government and people of “our sentiments of brotherly conti-
nental confidence … which are permanent factors in the foreign policy of
Brazil.” He pleaded that the United States immediately implement a secu-
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    45

rity program, assisting the Latin American peoples to cooperate in collec-

tive defense. He observed that it was “the duty, now, of the members of
this [Pan American] brotherhood … to contribute … [to] making it effec-
tive and efficient.”98 Hardly the sentiments one would expect from an
officer American intelligence continued to regard as dubious. However,
Góes was extremely worried, somber, pacing back and forth in his office.
He commented to General Leitão de Carvalho that he feared that it would
be all over by September “with a complete victory by the Axis forces.”99
Góes talked too much and revealed his thoughts too openly, making him
hard to evaluate. Appearances and realities mixed in curious fashion in
Brazil in the first half of 1940. In his annual report to Vargas, Minister
Dutra commented that after the exchange of visits of the chiefs of staff, “a
tacit alliance is on the way of being established objectively for the armed
cooperation of the two countries, in case of war with a European power or
in the south of the continent.”100 Whatever motivation Vargas may have
had in giving the puzzling June 11 speech, it contributed to the Roosevelt’s
decision to act.

Notes
1. The uprising wiped away the political arrangements of what is called in
Brazil the Old Republic and brought to power a group of political leaders
with a different set of ideas about what was needed in the country. There
has been a continuous debate among historians over the nature of the
political-military events of October 1930. A useful starting point for the
debate is Lúcia Lippi Oliveira (Coordenadora) et al., Elite intellectual e
debate político nos anos 30: uma bibliografia comentada da Revolução de
1930 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1980), pp. 35–51.
2. See McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army,
1889–1937 (Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 191–371.
3. General de Divisão Francisco Ramos de Andrade Neves (Chief of Staff),
Rio de Janeiro, 3 de Agosto de 1934: Estado-Maior do Exército, Exame da
Situação Militar do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Estado-Maior do
Exército, 1934), 6–8. For a very explicit statement, see Estado-Maior do
Exército, 2a Grande Região Militar, Rio de Janeiro, Dec. 1936, Memo #1
(Situação do Paiz), Correspondéncia Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Pedro
de Góes Monteiro, Caixa 1, Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio). It
noted (in section “Neutrality and Cooperation”) that Brazil would not
be able to maintain neutrality in the event of a world conflict, that it
would have to associate itself with one of the sides, and that, because it
46   F. D. MCCANN

lacked war materiels, its mobilization would provide soldiers that would
have to be equipped by another power, “which could not be other than
the United States of America.”
4. For an analysis of the trade situation and Brazilian purchase of German
arms, see Stanley E.  Hilton’s close study of Brazil’s arms negotiations
with Germany in his Brazil and the Great Powers, 1930–1939: The Politics
of Trade Rivalry (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), 118–129,
186–190; and my The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945
(Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 149–175.
5. G. Vargas to Oswaldo Aranha, n.p., Dec. 24, 1934, GV 1934.12.14/1,
AGV, CPDOC; and O. Aranha to G. Vargas, Washington, D.C., Jan. 18,
1935, GV 1935.01.18/2, AGV, CPDOC.
6. Oswaldo Aranha to G.  Vargas, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 1935, GV
1935.03.06/1, AGV, CPDOC.
7. A compromisso can be thought of as a pact. For fuller treatment, see
McCann, “The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio, Góes, and Dutra,”
in Jens R.  Hentschke, Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141.
8. Vargas, Diário, Vol. 1, pp. 523–524.
9. On Brazil’s strategic situation and the military’s concerns about arms,
foreign trade, and international relations: McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria:
A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Stanford University Press,
2004), pp. 349–363.
10. Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999), p. 227; typical of books that argue that Vargas
was vacillating is Roberto Gambini, O Duplo Jogo de Getúlio Vargas (São
Paulo: Edições Símbolo, 1977).
11. Maj. Lawrence C.  Mitchell (Military Attaché), Rio, March 13, 1939:
“Interview with Minister of War, Army’s attitude toward Germany and
the United States,” No. 2202, 2257 K-33, RG165, National Archives
[NARA].
12. The Friedrich Krupp Company and the Carl Zeiss Company were key
elements of Germany’s war industries. The contract called for the delivery
of 1,180 artillery pieces of various calibers. For a listing by type, see
Ministério da Guerra, Relatório apresentado ao Presidente da República
dos Estados Unidos do Brasil pelo General de Divisão Eurico Dutra, Ministro
de Estado da Guerra em Maio de 1940 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional,
1941), pp.  5–7 [hereafter MG, Relatório…Dutra…1940]; Mauro
Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar
Dutra: O dever da verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira,
1983), p.  335. The negotiations took place over two years starting in
1936. The Krupp contract was signed on March 9, 1938.
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    47

13. Sumner Welles to F. D. Roosevelt, Washington, DC, January 26, 1937,
President’s Personal File 4473 (Vargas), FDR Library, Hyde Park,
NY. Roosevelt and Vargas met in Rio de Janeiro in November 1936. In
addition to saying that Brazil’s “vital interests” would be involved if the
United States were attacked, he suggested the possibility of the United
States “utilizing some other portion of Brazilian territory as a means of
safeguarding the eastern approach to the Panama Canal.” For Welles
biography, see Michael J. Devine, “Welles, Sumner”; http://www.anb.
org/articles/06/06-00696.html; American National Biography Online
Feb. 2000.
14. Prior to World War I, Brazil had planned to contract a German mission to
instruct the army and had sent 34 officers in three contingents to train
with the Imperial German Army (1905–1912) for two-year periods.
Members of this group founded the army journal A Defesa Nacional in
1913 and shaped the modern Brazilian army. A number of them were
senior generals in the late 1930s. For a listing of names, see McCann,
Soldiers of the Patria, p. 486. Some of the admiration of the reconstructed
army of the Third Reich was actually nostalgia related to the pre-World
War I experience.
15. Sixty-five percent of US bauxite supply for the aluminum industry came
from neighboring Dutch Guiana (Surinam); as in William L. Langer and
S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–1941 (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1953), p. 603.
16. Memorandum, Washington, December 23, 1941: Notes of meeting at the
White House with the President and the British Prime Minister presiding.
http://marshallfoundation.org/librar y/digital-archive/
memorandum-10/.
17. “Notes on Coast Artillery Defenses of the coast of Brazil,” January 16,
1939, 2006-164, War Department, Military Intelligence Division,
RG165, NARA.
18. “Special Study, Brazil,” March 29, 1939, Army War College, War Plans
Division (WPD) 4115-7, WWII RS, NARA. In asking the War College to
do this study, General Marshall was breaking a long-standing policy of
not using the college for such studies. See Brig. Gen. G.  C. Marshall
(Deputy Chief of Staff) to Maj. Gen. John L.  DeWitt (Commandant
Army War College), February 6, 1939, 14281-22, WPD, RG165,
NARA.  The officers involved worked in secret under the leadership of
Major Francis G. Bonham between February 17 and March 29, 1939 to
produce the study on Brazil and another on Venezuela. The War College
was then at Fort Humphreys in Washington D. C. Larry I. Brand, ed. The
Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981), pp. 194–195.
48   F. D. MCCANN

19. Maj. Lawrence C.  Mitchell (attaché), Rio, Sept 22, 1939, Report 2300:
“Comments on Current Events, No. 4,” 2050-120, War Dept., General
Staff, Military Intelligence Div., RG165, NARA. Dutra urged Brazilian offi-
cers to follow combatant operations to glean lessons and enlightenment.
20. The US Navy mission had 16 officers, headed by a rear admiral; see
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F50716F8355B
11728DDDAE0894DA415B828EF1D3. The mission endured until
1977. From its origins into the 1930s, see Eugénio Vargas Garcia,
“Anglo-American Rivalry in Brazil: the Case of the 1920s,” Working
Paper CBS-14-00 (P), July 15, 2000, Center for Brazilian Studies,
University of Oxford, pp. 19–24.
21. Col. E.R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Memo for Asst. Chief of
Staff WPD, January 25, 1939, WPD 4115, RG 165, NARA.
22. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), Recenseamento,
1940 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1940), as in Ricardo A. Silva Seitenfus, “O
Brasil e o III Reich (1933–1939),” pp. 275–276. https://www.degruyter.
com/downloadpdf/j/jbla.1988.25.issue-/jbla.1988.25.1.273/
jbla.1988.25.1.273.pdf. There were then about 900,000 Germans in
Brazil.
23. McCann, “Vargas and the Destruction of the Brazilian Integralista and
Nazi Parties,” The Americas, Vol. XXVI (July 1969), No. 1, pp. 15–34.
German language even disappeared from head stones in cemeteries in
southern towns, such as Canela, Rio Grande do Sul. I saw that firsthand
during a visit to Canela.
24. Eurico Dutra, Ministro de Guerra, Relatório dos Principais Actividades do
Ministerio de Guerra durante o ano de 1939 (Rio de Janeiro; Imprensa
Militar, 1940) dated July 1940, pp. 45–46. For a study of Nazi activities,
see Ana Maria Dietrich, “Nazismo Tropical? O Partido Nazista no Brasil”
(Tese de doutorado em História, Universidade de São Paulo, 2007). http://
docshare01.docshare.tips/files/20852/208520682.pdf.
25. For German spies, see Stanley E.  Hilton, Hitler’s Secret War in South
America, 1939–1945: German Military Espionage and Allied
Counterespionage in Brazil (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1981).
26. Col. E.R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Washington, January 27,
1939: “Attitude of Brazil toward the United States and Intrusion of the
Axis States in Brazil.” 2006-164, RG165, NARA.
27. McCabe Memo January 25, 1939. On Integralismo, see Stanley E. Hilton,
“Ação Integralista Brasileira, Fascism in Brazil, 1932–1938,” Luso-
Brazilian Review 9, No.2 (Dec. 1972), pp. 3–29; McCann, Soldiers of the
Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, pp. 372–375; Marcus Klein, Our
Brazil Will Awake! The Acção Integralista Brasileira and the Failed Quest
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    49

for Fascist Order in the 1930s, (Amsterdam: Cuadernos del CEDLA,

2004), pp. 71–74.
28. Karl Ritter, Rio, June 29, 1938, # 993, mentioned the Integralista plan
that had fallen into police hands, see O III Reich e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro:
Editora Laudes, 1968), pp. 97–101.
29. Col. E. R. W. McCabe (Asst. Chief of Staff G2), Memo for Asst. Chief of
Staff War Plans Division, January 25, 1939: “Defense Policy of Brazil,”
G-2/2006-164, RG 165, NARA.
30. Marshall arrived at Rio on May 25 and departed on June 6, reaching
Annapolis, Md., on June 20. General Góes Monteiro returned with him
for an extensive visit to the United States. They were entertained at the
US Naval Academy, whose commander had been a member of the naval
mission in Brazil. In May 1939, Marshall was deputy chief of staff, but
President Roosevelt already had named him to succeed General Malin
Craig (Oct. 2, 1935–Aug. 31, 1939), and he was to take over the chief’s
post on September 1. There is a chronology of his career in Larry I. Bland,
Editor, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. xxix–xxx.
31. Larry I. Bland, Editor, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1, p. 716.
Quote from interview Bland had with Marshall on December 7, 1956.
32. The Standing Liaison Committee, formed in early 1938, had representa-
tives from State, War, and Navy Departments. As deputy chief of staff
from mid-1938, Marshall was an active participant. The SLC was the
forerunner of the post-war National Security Council (1947).
33. Major Lawrence C. Mitchell, Rio, March 2, 1938, Report 2057 “Law of
1938 for Organization of the Brazilian Ministry of War” 2006-86, War
Department, General Staff, RG 165, NARA.
34. On Marshall’s reception there is Caffery, Rio, May 26, 1939, 832.20111/29,
#1317, RG 59, NARA. This lengthy dispatch included the full program of
the tour, including arrival times and methods of travel. Attached to it are
clippings, editorials, and front-page photos. There is a detailed 11 page
program of Marshall’s visit in “Programa das homenagens do Brasil a
missão militar chefiada por S.Exa. o General George C. Marshall, Chefe do
Estado Maior do Exército Americano e sua ilustre comitiva” (Rio de
Janeiro, 1939) HB203f, Arquivo Horta Barbosa, CPDOC. Góes Monteiro
was the general’s family name. Many Americans referred to him incorrectly
as “Monteiro.” Familiarly friends and even the press called him Góes for
short. For his biography, see “Góes Monteiro,” Israel Beloch and Alzira
Alves de Abreu, eds. Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983.
Vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2246–2259; for
Dutra, see “Eurico Gaspar Dutra,” ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 1126–1154. Because
of a spelling reform, some publications now spell his name Góis. I am using
the spelling he used himself.
50   F. D. MCCANN

35. General George C. Marshall to General Malin Craig, Rio de Janeiro, May
26, 1939, http://marshallfoundation.org/library/to-general-malin-
craig-6/ and Marshall to Craig, Belo Horizonte, June 1, 1939. http://
marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/1-577-to-general-
malin-craig-june-1-1939/. The originals are in Records of the Adjutant
General’s Office, 1917–, 210.482 Brazil [4-29-39], RG 407, NARA.
36. Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe… (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 357–360. Góes provided background on the
invitation, noting that Dutra was not favorable to the idea. Marshall’s
presentation and Góes’s response are from Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, A
Serviço do Brasil na Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Editora A
Noite, 1952), pp.  58–59. Leitão was the commanding general in Rio
Grande do Sul during Marshall’s visit. There is a detailed summary of the
trip in General Paulo Q.  Duarte, O Nordeste na II Guerra Mundial:
Antecedentes e Ocupação (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1971), pp. 45–62.
37. Major William Sackville (Military Attaché), Rio, March 4, 1936: “Brazil’s
Authorized Army, 1936-7-8” 2006-105, RG 165, NARA.
38. Major William Sackville, “Agitation within Army to prevent reduction of
effectives,” Rio, Nov. 1, 1935, 1552, 2006-102, G-2 Regional, Brazil
6300-c, MID, G2, WD, RG 165, NARA. Sackville could not have been
more wrong when he concluded his report saying, “There is not much
probability of further agitation by officers.”
39. McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army,
pp. 375–388.
40. Major Emmanuel Kant Torres Homem to Lt. Col. José Agostinho dos
Santos, n.d. Forte de São João (Niterói, RJ) included in Relatório,
Segundo Periodo de Instrucção, 2 GAC, 1936, III–IV, Arquivo Histórico
do Exército (Rio).
41. MG, Relatório … Dutra … 1940, p. 132.
42. George C.  Marshall to General Malin Craig, Rio, May 26, 1939, and
Belo Horizonte, June 1, 1939, in Larry I. Bland, Editor, The Papers of
George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 1, pp.  716–717, 717–720. He outlined
ideas for Góes’s tour of the United States.
43. Comment in memo of Orme Wilson to Sumner Welles, Rio, Nov. 15,
1940, 832.20/261, RG59, NA.  The military mission had been there
since 1934, its four officers provided training and advice in coastal defense
and other technical matters.
44. Throughout Marshall was careful with costs noting that Pan American
had offered a free flight to the north. General George  C.  Marshall to
General Malin Craig, Rio de Janeiro, May 26, 1939, http://­
marshallfoundation.org/library/to-general-malin-craig-6/. Ridgway
and Chaney had distinguished careers. Marshall assigned Ridgway to the
War Plans Division in September 1939; in 1942 he took command of the
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    51

82nd Airborne Division, had distinguished roles in the Sicily and

Normandy invasions, commanded the Eighth Army in Korea, and in
1952 succeeded Eisenhower as NATO commander. In 1942 Chaney was
the first commander of US Army forces in Britain, being succeeded in
that post by Eisenhower. One wonders how long the impressions they
formed of Brazil in 1938 continued to influence their thinking.
45. Matthew B. Ridgway to G. C. Marshall, USS Nashville, June 17, 1939,
Memo: “Brazil in Hemisphere Defense,” WPD 4224-11, World War II
Records Section, RG 165, NARA.
46. Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, July 7, 1939 and July 10,
1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas,  CPDOC.  Curiously in the mid-1930s,
Argentine war plans assumed that Brazil and the United States were allied
against that republic; see Capt. Vernon A. Walters, Rio, Jan. 27, 1944,
“The Plano Maximo,” G-2 Regional Files 5995, RG 165, NARA. This
document was the Argentine plan for war with Brazil. Góes’s planned trip
to Europe was not just to Germany, first he was to go to England, France,
and Italy. In fact the American invitation had been received after the other
four, but Vargas had decided it should be acted on first. In the end Góes
never made the trip to Europe. On trip plans and Vargas’s interest, see
Jefferson Caffery (Ambassador to Brazil), Rio, May 8, 1939,
832.20111/8, RG59, NARA.
47. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York:
MacGibbon & Kee, 1964), pp. 332–333.
48. For Góes Monteiro and Dutra’s role in establishing the Estado Novo
dictatorship see McCann, “The Military and the Dictatorship: Getúlio,
Góes, and Dutra,” in Jens R.  Hentschke, Ed. Vargas and Brazil: New
Perspectives (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 109–141.
49. Estado-Maior do Exército, Relatório dos Trabalhos do Estado-Maior …
1937 … pelo GD Pedro Aurélio de Góes Monteiro (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa
do Estado-Maior do Exército, 1938), 4–5, 8–9. “We inherited … a quasi-
Army only nominal, devoid of what is essential and, therefore, worthless
on the battlefield” p. 5.
50. G. C. Marshall to Jefferson Caffery, Washington, July 24, 1939, #2-018,
Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, General Materials, George
C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
51. Góes at West Point was from G. C. Marshall to Lt. Col. Harold R. Bull,
Washington DC, July 15, 1939 #2012, Larry I. Brand, Sharon Ritenour
Stevens, and Clarence E.  Wunderlin, Jr. Eds., George Catlett Marshall
Papers. Vol. 2, “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),
52   F. D. MCCANN

p. 13. Col. Bull had just ended his tour as secretary of the general staff.
See Getty Images for photo at White House. Brazilian Ambassador Carlos
Martins also was with Góes at the White House. There is a one minute
video of Marshall and Góes at the air force display at Langley Field on
June 22, 1939 http://marshallfoundation.org/library/video/langley-
field-virginia-air-show/.
52. G.C.  Marshall to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Washington DC, July
24, 1939, #2-018 http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-
archive/to-jefferson-caffery/.
53. Marshall to Gen. Malin Craig, on USS Nashville “Off Recife,” June 10,
1939 [Handwritten Aerogramma via Panair] 2257 K32, RG165, NARA.
54. Under Secretary Sumner Welles to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery,
Washington, May 8, 1940, 810.20 Defense/58 ½, United States Foreign
Relations 1940, Vol. 5, pp. 40–42; Hélio Silva, 1939: Véspera de Guerra
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), pp. 194–195. The
Brazilian coastline would be equal to the distance from San Diego in
California to the Arctic Circle in Alaska.
55. Estado-Maior do Exército, 2a Grande Região Militar, Rio de Janeiro,
Dec. 1936, Memo no. 1 (Situação do Paiz), (Sec. 4) Correspondência
Pessoal, Acervo Pessoal Gen. Pedro de Góes Monteiro, Caixa 1, Arquivo
Histórico do Exército (Rio).
56. Jefferson Caffery to Marshall, Rio, August 10, 1939, Marshall Papers,
Pentagon Office, General (Brazil-American Military Mission), George
C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
57. Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe… (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria
Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), p. 40. This book was based on a series of
interviews with the general.
58. G.C.  Marshall to Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Washington DC, July
24, 1939, #2-018 http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-
archive/to-jefferson-caffery/. Miller was from New Hampshire and
graduated from West Point in the fabled class of 1915 ranking ninth.
59. Góes Monteiro to Marshall, Rio, August 8, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio
Vargas, CPDOC.  For the Góes-Marshall letters and lists of the arms
requested, see WPD 4224-7 to 13, WWII Records Section, NARA.
60. G.C.  Marshall to P. de Góes Monteiro, Washington DC, October 5,
1939, #2-061 http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/
to-general-pedro-góes-monteiro/ Marshall was replying to a letter from
Góes dated September 8, 1939, WPD4224, RG165, NARA. He thought
that the orders for materiel from Germany were “virtually cancelled and
arrested” by the outbreak of war. He wanted to know if the United States
could “supply us with identical materiel with extreme urgency.”
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    53

61. Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe… (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria

Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), 365; Forrest C.  Pogue, George
C. Marshall: Education of a General (New York: Viking, 1963), p. 342.
62. Jefferson Caffery to Sumner Welles, Rio de Janeiro, May 24, 1940,
810.20 Defense/58 ½, telegram, United States Foreign Relations 1940,
Vol. 5, pp. 42–43. Caffery reported that Aranha told him that morning
that Brazil was ready to “cooperate 100% with the United States in plans
for military and naval defense or to repel aggression, and even to cooper-
ate with the United States in war.”
63. Ricardo Antônio Silva Seitenfus, O Brasil de Getúlio Vargas e a Formação
dos Blocos, 1930–1942: O processo do envolvimento brasileiro na II Guerra
Mundial (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1985), p. 348 ff.
64. While having been invited to German maneuvers has been emphasized in
a number of books, he was also to observe British maneuvers. The
Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, laid out the order of visits as Italy,
England, Germany, and France. See Oswaldo Aranha to Getúlio Vargas,
Rio, August 18, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.  Frank
D.  McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 (Princeton
University Press, 1973), 146, note 46. For the persistent myth circulating
in Brazil that Góes Monteiro went to Germany, see, for example, Luis
Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1973), p. 263. The myth has so
penetrated Brazilian historiography that it is even found in cultural stud-
ies such as Ruy Castro’s biography of Carmen Miranda; see Carmen:
Uma Biografia (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2005), p. 243. On the
cancelled trip to Europe, see Hélio Silva, 1939, Véspera de Guerra (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1972), pp. 158–160.
65. Caffery, Rio, May 25, 1939, Telegram 174 (4 pm), 832.20111/18, RG
59, NARA and Caffery, Rio, June 6, 1939, Telegram 184, RG 59, NARA.
66. Oswaldo Aranha to G. Vargas, Rio, August 18, 1939, Arquivo Oswaldo
Aranha, CPDOC. Having access to documents on both sides does not
always clarify matters.
67. Eurico Dutra to G. Vargas, Rio, May 5, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas,
CPDOC. Surprisingly Dutra thought that a war in Europe would attract
Russia into an anti-German alliance, and he feared that would cause the
spread of communism in Brazil. He said that any alliance or commercial
arrangement with Russia could have “the most serious consequences for
Brazil.” In 1935 Brazil had suffered a communist revolt in its army that
had been supported by agents and money from Moscow. Though quickly
suppressed, it deeply disturbed the Brazilian officer corps for years there-
after. McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army,
1889–1937, pp. 375–388.
54   F. D. MCCANN

68. Eurico Dutra to G. Vargas, Rio, May 5, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas,
CPDOC.
69. Vargas to Dutra, Rio, May 9, 1939, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
70. Eurico Dutra to Góes Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, May 11, 1939, Aviso
Secreto No. 9, Arquivo Marechal Dutra as in Mauro Renault Leite and
Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever
da verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983),
pp. 400–401.
71. The Neutrality Act of 1939 repealed the arms embargo and permitted
“cash and carry” exports of arms and munitions to belligerents. The final
vote in the House of Representatives was on Nov 2.
72. Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller, Memo for American Ambassador, Rio, Sept.
24, 1940 “Sending of Brazilian Army Officers to the US for Instructional
Purposes” 2257-K-18/181; see also Eurico Dutra to Maj. Edwin
L.  Sibert (Military Attaché), Rio, January 8, 1941, 2257-K-18/247,
WD, GS, MID, RG 165, NARA.
73. BG Sherman Miles (Chief G2) to Military Attaché (Brazil), Washington,
Jan 16, 1940, Telegram 217, 2257-K-18; and Maj. Edwin L. Sibert to
Asst. Chief of Staff, G2, Rio, Jan. 3, 1941, No. 2565: “Brazilian Officers
to US Service Schools,” 2257-k-18/232, WD, GS, MID, RG 165, NARA.
74. Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil, Vol. VII (Rio de Janeiro: José
Olympio Editora, 1940), pp.  317–320. Speech was on May 13, 1940.
The speech was reported to Washington in Randolph Harrison, Rio, May
16, 1940, Dispatch 3014, 832.00/1289, RG 59, NA. Getúlio’s imagery
of “Ulysses” avoiding the lure of sirens may have been a reference to the
29 foreign naval vessels that had visited Brazil in the previous 17 months.
See Duarte, O Nordeste na II Guerra Mundial, p. 67.
75. Robert C. Burdett to George C. Marshall, Salvador da Bahia, May 17,
1940, 832.00/1289 ½, RG59, NARA. He met with Góes in Rio on May
13. The chargé d’affaires was in charge of an embassy when the ambas-
sador was absent.
76. On May 23, 1940, Roosevelt told a group of businessmen that the defeat
of Britain and France would remove the protective buffer of the British
fleet and the French army. “And so … we have to think in terms of [pro-
tecting] the Americas more and more and infinitely faster.” The Belgian
army surrendered on May 28, and the British evacuation from Dunkirk
began. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere
Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960),
p. 34.
77. Harry P. Ball, Of Responsible Command: A History of the U.S. Army War
College (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Alumni Association of the United States
Army War College, 1983), pp. 212–219.
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    55

78. Of course, such “planning” is based on assumptions about enemy capa-

bilities that are only as good as the intelligence available and the quality
of the familiarity of the planners with the terrain they will be operating in.
The documents do not show adequate familiarity with the terrain or
awareness of the difficulty of movement in a country without roads.
“Course at the Army War College, 1939–1940. War Plans. Formulation
of War Plans Period.” Report of Staff Group No. 3. Subject: War Plan
Purple. Date of Conference – 20 May 1940, AWC WPDC4081. Copy in
US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. Lt. Colonel L. W. Miller
participated in this exercise.
79. For “Pot of Gold,” see Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere
Defense, pp. 273–274. Conn and Fairchild took pains to show American
and British concerns about German interest in establishing a base at
Dakar in French West Africa and what this could mean for Brazilian secu-
rity. See p.  120. The origin of the British report of a possible German
expeditionary force is not clear. The 6,000 German troops came from
“Foreign Policy and Armed Forces,” http://www.history.army.mil/
books/wwii/csppp/ch04.htm, p. 95.
80. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II (São Paulo: Siciliano & Rio de
Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1995), p. 317 (4 June 1940). Others
have said this meeting was on June 5. I am following the date of the
Vargas diary entry. The existence of the Vargas diary was a closely guarded
family secret until its publication in 1995.
81. Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico
Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, p.  401. The editors said that the
meeting was on June 5, but they did not cite a particular document.
82. Hélio Silva, 1939, Véspera de Guerra, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização
Brasileira, 1972), p. 201. Lehman Miller, an engineer officer, West Point
class of 1915, had been in Brazil with the small US Military Mission
(1934–38), went to Rio as military attaché, then was made chief of mili-
tary mission and promoted to brigadier general.
83. Cyro Freitas Valle, Berlin, June 17, 1940, #193, Arquivo Histórico de
Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), Palácio de Itamaraty, Rio de
Janeiro (hereafter AHMRE). The foreign ministry encouraged the
Americans to be more active in strengthening trade; see MRE to
Embaixada/ Washington, Rio, August 5, 1940, #155, Expidido 3801,
AHMRE.
84. The New York Times, June 12, 1940; Cyro de Freitas Valle, Berlin, June
12, 1940, #183; June 15, 1940, #189; July 2, 1940, #233, Arquivo
Histórico de Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Itamaraty Palace, Rio de
Janeiro). AHMRE.
56   F. D. MCCANN

85. Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe… (Rio de Janeiro: Editora

Coelho Branco, 1956), pp. 365–367.
86. http://www.history.com/speeches/franklin-d-roosevelts-stab-in-the-
back-speech  FDR also attacked the isolationists who were endangering
the country’s security. The speech was at the University of Virginia, where
his son was graduating from law school.
87. For the text, see Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil, Vol. VII (Rio
de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1940), pp.  331–335. There is an
English translation of some dubious  sections of the speech in Caffery,
Rio, June 11, 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, V,
pp. 616–617.
88. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p.  319–320 [June 11 and
June 12, 1940]. He labeled the Germanophile charge as irrational or
absurd. For the various interpretations and concerns, see McCann, The
Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945, pp. 185–190.
89. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 320, and note 29 [June
13].
90. Gerson Moura, “Brazilian Foreign Relations, 1939–1950: The Changing
Nature of Brazil-United States Relations during and after the Second
World War” (Unpublished Ph.D.  Dissertation, University College
London, 1982), pp. 55–57. He saw the US commitment to support con-
struction of a steel mill and strengthening the armed forces as the price
for Brazil ending its neutrality (p. 56). Moura based his study on British,
American, and Brazilian archives. His interpretations were often influ-
enced by British perspectives. He summarized his dissertation research in
his Sucessos e Ilusões: Relações Internacionais do Brasil Durante e Após a
Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio
Vargas, 1991). Unhappily it does not include the ample documentation
of the dissertation.
91. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 321 [June 17 and June 20,
1940]; Kurt M. Prüfer, Rio, June 21, 1940, 235/157133, telegram as in
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol.
IX, p. 659. According to Prüfer the meeting was on June 21, but Vargas’s
diary has it on June 20. Some historians have accepted the June 11 speech
as an indication that Vargas was, at worse, playing both sides. Others have
him seeking to unlock the Brazilian-American negotiations on military
and economic cooperation; Ricardo A. Silva Seitenfus, O Brasil de Getúlio
Vargas e a Formaçâo dos Blocos, 1930–1942 (São Paulo, 1985), pp. 324–
330; Amado Luiz Cervo & Clodoaldo Bueno, A Política Externa
Brasileira, 1822–1985 (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1986), pp. 72–73; and
Gerson Moura cited in note 90.
   PRE-WAR FEARS AND EXPLORATIONS    57

92. Edgard Carone, A Terceira República (1937–1945) (São Paulo: Difel/

Difusão, 1976), p. 55. Carone did not clarify exactly to whose expecta-
tion he referred.
93. Kurt M.  Prüfer, Rio, July 2, 1940, 235/157134, telegram as in
Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol.
X, pp. 100–101.
94. Emil Wiehl (Director, Economy Policy) to Prüfer, Berlin, June 19, 1940,
8719/E609576-77, telegram as in Department of State, Documents on
German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. IX, pp. 630–631.
95. Vargas statement in Nación (Buenos Aires) June, 1940, as quoted in
Demócrito Cavalcanti de Arruda, “Nossa Partcipação na Primeira e
Segunda Guerras Mundiais” in Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva sobre a
F.E.B (Porto Alegre: Cobraci Publicações, 1949), p. 36.
96. Paulo Germano Hasslocher to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, June 14,
1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.  Hasslocher was from Rio
Grande do Sul and had been a close associate since Vargas’s governorship
(1927–1930). In Washington he was commercial consul since 1931. For
biography, see “Paulo Germano Hasslocher,” in Israel Beloch & Alzira
Alves de Abreu, Eds, Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–
1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Forense-Universitária, 1984), Vol. 2,
p. 1582.
97. Public Resolution 83, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, Joint Resolution 367.
Signed by FDR on June 15, 1940.
98. Randolph Harrison Jr. (Second Secretary), Rio, June 24, 1940, 3186,
832.20/209, RG 59, NARA. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance,
pp. 189–190.
99. General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, A Serviço do Brasil na Segunda
Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Editora A Noite, 1952), p.  25. The
general was then regional commander in Porto Alegre. Later on he would
be chief of the Brazilian delegation in the Mixed Brazilian-American
Defense Commission in Washington.
100. Eurico Dutra, Ministro de Guerra, Relatório dos Principais Actividades do
Ministerio de Guerra durante o ano de 1939 (Rio de Janeiro; Imprensa
Militar, 1940) dated July 1940, p. 31.
Of course the reference to the south of the continent meant Argentina,
which the Brazilians continued to regard as their likely opponent.
 CHAPTER 3

Search for Mutual Benefits

Armaments Key to Brazilian Cooperation

In 1940, American officers did not have a high regard for the Brazilian
military, indeed, for any Latin American military. They vastly preferred to
send their own forces to defend Brazil, but in truth did not have troops
trained and armed for such a mission, nor did they have the transports to
get them to Brazil. The Brazilians regarded the idea of accepting American
defenders as a threat to national sovereignty, something their self-esteem
would not allow. American intelligence estimates misread the caution of
Brazilian generals as a pro-German attitude. In early June 1940, Góes
Monteiro reminded Military Mission Chief Colonel Miller that they had
been talking for a year about military cooperation and after all that conver-
sation, not a gun, not a round of ammunition had reached Brazil.1 As
crisis-laden 1940 dragged on into August, the two sides stumbled about
looking for a mutually satisfactory solution to their defense dilemma.
The War Department announced that a meeting in Washington of the
chiefs of staff of the armies of the American Republics would be held in
October, and to prepare for that meeting, Dutra wrote a memo for Vargas
outlining his thoughts on the position Brazil should assume. He first sug-
gested that someone other than General Góes be sent so that the decision-­
making process could be slowed down, but, failing that, the government’s
instructions should be carefully defined to maintain Brazil’s neutrality. He
referred to Col. Miller’s promise that Brazil would receive its desired

© The Author(s) 2018 59

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_3
60   F. D. MCCANN

armaments during a projected period of six months to three years. Such

timing was too vague for the Brazilians. And Dutra wanted to be sure that
they would not give up their rights to the arms purchased from the Reich.
He told Vargas that it seemed as if the United States could only provide
old armament unsuitable for their defense plans.2
In July, Ambassador Caffery had stated the case bluntly, Washington
had to provide credits to allow the Brazilians to buy arms or they would
negotiate with the Germans. Brazil simply had to have arms. Moreover,
Caffery told Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Krupp was ready to com-
mit to building a steel mill in Brazil after the war, and to avoid that pos-
sibility, Vargas wanted to obtain financing from the Export-Import Bank
to purchase steel mill equipment and technical assistance in the United
States. So Brazilian defense and industrial development were intimately
linked to the danger of “Brazil’s falling altogether into the German orbit.”
It was time, the ambassador wrote, for Washington to decide.3
General Góes Monteiro commented to an American diplomat that he
was “sorry that the United States did not realize that it had failed to con-
vince Brazil that it had a definite program and contrasted ‘vague’ American
policy with German ‘action’.” Góes was “realistic,” and the diplomat con-
cluded that if Washington offered “something concrete and [could] con-
vince him that we are ready for action, he would be willing to play on our
side. I think we may take it for certain that unless we do so convince him,
he will play on the German team.”4
It was probably not that simple. Góes understood the dangers his coun-
try faced. He also understood that, of necessity, the southern end of the
defense zone of the United States in the Atlantic was anchored on Cape
São Roque (the closest point in Brazil to Africa) and the island of Fernando
de Noronha (223 miles offshore). The United States would need air and
naval bases on the Brazilian coast. And Góes supposed that there would be
three ways that the United States could obtain such bases: (1) by agree-
ment; (2) by fomenting a civil war as it had done in Panama in 1903; or
(3) by open military conquest. Obviously, he preferred the first option.
The Brazilian General Staff believed that making an agreement was “the
only way, in the current circumstances … [for Brazil] without abdicating
its sovereignty, to exploit prudently the contradictions and oscillations
between the opposing blocks to become sufficiently strong without
broader commitments.”5 Besides as early as July 1940, the Brazilian
General Staff thought that it would be “singularly difficult [for Brazil] to
guarantee the inviolability of its territory.”6
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    61

Fortunately, President Roosevelt decided to provide the wherewithal

for the steel mill thereby setting Brazil on the long path to becoming an
industrial giant and rising power by the end of the twentieth century. The
Brazilian ambassador requested permission to sign the agreement on the
steel mill before the presidential elections for fear that they could upset
their plans.7 Meanwhile, in July 1940 the foreign ministers of the American
Republics met in Havana to assess what their countries should do regard-
ing the deepening European crisis. The Vargas government was somewhat
miffed that its request to host the meeting had been overridden, but it
emphasized that “our Pan-Americanism has not changed [just] because
things in Europe have changed.” The conference authorized the tempo-
rary Pan American administration of European colonies in the Caribbean
and northern South America to prevent their falling to the Germans, and
it asserted in a Reciprocal Assistance Declaration that any attempt against
the sovereignty or political independence of any American Republic would
be considered aggression against all. The declaration contained provisions
for the signatory countries to enter into mutual defense agreements, which
became an objective in United States relations with Brazil.8 On June 1 the
importance of preventing European colonies from falling into German
hands was illustrated by the arrival of the French aircraft carrier Bearn
seeking safety at Martinique when France gave up the fight against the
Nazi invasion. It was carrying 106 American-made pursuit planes, while
an accompanying ship had on board a quarter billion of France’s gold
reserve which was being rushed to the United States for safe-keeping. In
this case the American and British navies threw a protective blockade
around Martinique.9
In mid-August 1940, the War Department was revising its color-coded
war plans (known as the Rainbow Plans) and requested “strategic” surveys
of the major cities of Brazil to prepare, among other things, the military
government aspects of LILAC, the plan for Brazil. During the coming
months, the military attaché’s office in Rio de Janeiro and the War Plans
Division in Washington wrote detailed surveys of Natal, Pará (Belém),
Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Southern Brazil, and Mato Grosso/Amazon.10
Such preparations were extremely sensitive because if implemented, the
United States would be occupying key parts of Brazilian territory. And
perhaps out of frustration at the slowness and back and forth of decision-­
making, then Lt. Colonel Lehman W.  Miller, who had recently been
appointed head of the American military mission, confessed to General
62   F. D. MCCANN

Góes Monteiro that until the day of his writing nothing had been resolved
in the United States to insure that attacks against Brazil could be repelled.11
Miller’s openness seemingly enhanced Brazilian confidence in him.
Reportedly army leaders were “delighted” with him and confident that he
would develop a more satisfactory mission. Apparently, they had grown
resentful of his predecessor General Kimberley’s attitudes. They resented
that two years before some members of the mission had been appointed
despite Brazilian opposition and, in fact, in the face of warnings from the
embassy. They had confidence in Colonel Miller and convinced that he
would “restore and increase the prestige of the Mission.” They were also
favorably impressed by Major Thomas D.  White and his men in the air
mission.12 The War Department now realized that it had been a mistake to
send unwanted personnel to Brazil and was “more than anxious to correct
it.”13 On September 23, Ambassador Caffery notified the State Department
that, in the event of aggression, the Rio government had decided to place
all Brazilian resources on the side of the United States. But he regretted
that a collection of American press commentaries attacking Vargas and
military authorities had exasperated them. Vargas commented that he was
not allowing his press to attack FDR or the United States.14
The Brazilian ambassador to Berlin gave Vargas his view of what was tak-
ing place. Calling the then six-week old war between Germany and Britain
one of extermination, he thought it was becoming a stalemate because the
British could bomb Germany only at night and therefore its attacks were
imprecise, and although Germany could strike from the air day and night, it
could not dream of landing on the island. “To prevent the United States
from entering the war, something always feared, Germany had signed with
Italy and Japan the Treaty of Triple Alliance.” That treaty, he said, could
only irritate the “norteamericanos.” It wasn’t so much “a treaty of alliance
as it was a threat.” The German press was “carrying on a daily campaign,”
he reported, “seeking to show (to whom it was not clear) that South
America needed Europe more than the United States and emphasized
besides that the States and Great Britain only wanted to make us vassals,
while Germany only aspired to carry on pacific commerce with us.” The
press was saying that the hoped for entry of Spain into the war would deci-
sively influence the opinion of the Spanish-­speaking countries.15
Behind the scenes in Washington and New York, the army was taking
secret steps that would affect the course of the war and the nature of
Brazil’s involvement in the conflict. In June 1940 the Military Appropriation
Act allowed the president to approve secret projects without providing a
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    63

public accounting of expenditures. Thereupon the War Department nego-

tiated a contract with the Pan American Airports Corporation, a subsidiary
of Pan American Airways (PAA), to carry out the Airport Development
Program (ADP) to develop air bases and routes from the United States,
through Latin America over to Africa and on farther east.16 And, of course,
the Brazilian bases would be central to the whole structure. Chief of Staff
Marshall stressed the importance of this agreement in a memo to Secretary
of War Henry Stimson saying that “the immediate conclusion of the PAA
contract is now more essential to our national defense than any other sin-
gle matter.”17 President Roosevelt approved the allocation of $12,000,000
from the Emergency Fund that the Congress had voted back in June.
Getting permission to have bases was only the beginning. They had to
be built before they could be used. And the Brazilians would not permit
the American military to build bases while Brazil was neutral. But Pan Am
could improve its landing facilities ostensibly for its own use. The airline
was then shifting from flying seaplanes to land-based craft. To minimize
Brazilian objections, PAA decided to have its Brazilian subsidiary Panair do
Brasil carry out the project. The head of Panair, Cauby C. Araújo, who
was to carry on the negotiations with the Brazilian government and orga-
nize the work, was instructed to say that the airfields and associated facili-
ties were solely for the use of Panair do Brasil and PAA. He was given
latitude in how much detail he would reveal to Brazilian leaders. He and
airline officials were cautious lest the project’s close connection with the
United States government be seen as disguised imperialism and harm PAA.
The war would not last forever, and the company had to protect its future.18
On January 18, 1941, Araújo met with Vargas at the president’s sum-
mer residence in Petrópolis and explained the program, including the role
of the United States government. After giving it some thought, he gave
his approval but commented that he would have to wait on issuing a
decree authorizing construction because of some difficulties in the army.
General Francisco José Pinto, the president’s military aide who was pres-
ent throughout the conversation, noted that “nazista” sentiment was then
strong in the army and so they had to proceed slowly. Curiously Getúlio
made no mention of any of this in his diary. At that time he was maneuver-
ing to check the army’s influence somewhat by creating a ministry of aero-
nautics, under a civilian, rather than an aviation officer. The new ministry
would oversee both civilian and military aviation. Work on the airfields
could begin, but Araújo would have to submit a formal application to
obtain a decree.19
64   F. D. MCCANN

The Vargas government was dictatorial, but it used bureaucratic pro-

cedures. Pressure groups inside and outside the government influenced
its decree-laws. If no opposition appeared and if the desired law did not
conflict with the regime’s definition of national interest, the parties
involved literally could write their own decree, but when, as in this
instance, formidable groups such as nationalistic military officers, rival
airlines, and foreign governments were involved, progress was slow and
cautious, with commissions and bureaus submitting studies and position
papers.
The new aviation ministry was a problem for Cauby Araújo because the
men who staffed it were under the influence of Lufthansa, the German
airline. He backdated the Airport Development Project (ADP) application
to January 20, the day Getúlio signed the decree creating the ministry.20
Doing so allowed him to send it to the National Security Council by way
of the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, which supervised
aviation until the new air ministry was running. General Pinto, secretary-­
general of the Security Council, protectively oversaw the process. This
tactic successfully prevented successful opposition. Araújo took on the task
of getting the land for the airfields. The Department of Civil Aviation
(DAC) or the army owned the sites at Belém, Camoçim, Fortaleza, and
Recife; the subsidiary of Air France Cia. Aêropostal Brasileira owned the
airfields at Natal, Maceió, and Salvador. Araújo purchased Aêropostal out-
right and negotiated agreements with the DAC and the army. In a few
cases, he purchased other properties, or the government confiscated them
and gave them over to Panair. This was being done without the formal
authorizing decree, six months slipped by, and then Araújo himself wrote
up the draft document. Even getting the full ministry to approve the
decree was tense and required Foreign Minister Aranha to make a firm
stand in favor of it. The decree was published in the Diário Oficial on July
26, 1941 giving it the force of law.21 Likely the cabinet did not know that
if its decision had been negative, the United States would have had “to
occupy Northeast Brazil by force of arms” to protect the airfields in con-
struction.22 And it may well be that the decision was made easier by the
arrival on July 23 of the first shipment of war materiel from the United
States.23
The decree required that Panair present plans and cost estimates for
the Brazilian government’s approval, and upon completion it was to turn
the fields over to the ownership of the government, which in turn would
lease them to Panair for 20 years. This, of course, hid the role of the
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    65

American army, but it was also practical because the Brazilian government
did not have experience in managing modern airfields. In the first half of
1941, the War Department was pressuring Pan American to speed the
ADP. German forces were hurtling through North Africa, and Natal was
the key link in the supply route from the United States to the endangered
British forces. Because of Brazil’s neutrality, the ADP had to appear to be
a strictly civilian commercial endeavor. Delay, however, was the hallmark
of the project. The lack of qualified field engineers, poor communications
in the northeast, differences in Brazilian and American notions of speed
and scale of construction added to the language problem, slowed the pro-
gram. It took five months from the initial survey simply to clear the ground
for one of the runways at the Natal-Parnamirim (Little River) field. It was
September before the first heavy equipment—bulldozers, graders, trucks—
arrived with their operators from the United States. There was consider-
able local graft and profiteering in the sale of land and supplying services
and building materials. There were some incidents of agitation and sabo-
tage and constant fear of a surprise German commando or air attack. Army
intelligence warned that German “landings are possible throughout prac-
tically the whole coast line of the Natal region.”24 Throughout 1941 the
American authorities worked to convince the Brazilians to allow stationing
Marine guards at Natal and the other base sites. Brazilian military com-
manders in the northeast were steadfastly opposed to any American troops
being allowed in. However, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
December 7, Vargas consented to Roosevelt’s request to allow uniformed
Marines to be located at Belém, Natal, and Recife. The first three Marine
companies arrived with their arms crated and secured in storage. They
were the opening wedge, and in the following months, air corps and navy
personnel increased in number. Even so sabotage was a reality. In February
1942, sugar in the gas tanks of a B-17 caused it to crash on takeoff killing
its crew of nine. Despite such dangers Brazilian cooperation with the ADP
was, according to General Marshall, “of inestimable value for the increase
of our air forces in Europe and the North of Africa.”25
By September 15, 1941, Britain had survived the German air offensive,
in the process shooting down 1,733 German aircraft, thereby insuring
that there would be no invasion of the island kingdom. It was a fitting
moment for Vargas to clarify further the Brazilian government’s position.
On September 21, he met with the armed services ministers, the foreign
minister, and Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro to discuss the situation and to
consider what Góes should say while in the United States. It was clear that
66   F. D. MCCANN

Brazil could not remain on the margin of world events and that its national
security was of “supreme importance.” The war had caught the Brazilians
unprepared, and they had to overcome the “tyranny of [war] materiel” by
freeing themselves from dependence on foreign suppliers and produce “in
our own country the arms that one day we will need to defend our sover-
eignty.” They had to industrialize, because they believed that industrial
states would win out over agrarian ones.26 Truly, Brazil did not have
enough arms to defend itself. In November 1940 it had 114,336 Mauser
rifles (1908 vintage) and 464 artillery pieces of various calibers, 300
81  mm mortars, and 24 light tanks.27 So Brazil’s military collaboration
with the United States assumed the greater objective of industrialization
beyond the immediate defense against the Axis.
But the “collaboration” was moving too slowly for both sides. Military
Mission Chief Colonel Miller wrote to Góes, on September 19, complain-
ing that until that day “nothing concrete had been resolved.” His govern-
ment, he declared, “was favorable” to providing arms to Brazil, but that
Brazil had not taken steps necessary to mount a defense. Góes replied
heatedly that “the blame was neither ours, nor [that of] the Brazilian gov-
ernment,” that they had done all that the Americans had asked. They were
dependent on the United States for arms as Góes had been repeatedly
saying. Vargas regarded Miller’s statements as “rather impertinent” and
discussed with his army and navy ministers and General Góes how to
respond. This Miller-Góes exchange set a tone of recrimination and mis-
understanding that put the efforts toward collaboration and cooperation
at risk.28
Roosevelt apparently cautioned American generals that Vargas needed
to be sure of his ground before agreeing to their plans. And the Brazilian
generals had to be convinced that they were not ceding national territory
to foreign occupation. Without modern arms the Brazilian army was just
too weak to risk cohabitation with American forces. For the Brazilian gen-
erals, the negotiations with the Americans were full of “inferences, possi-
bilities, and digressions” from which they could not measure the
consequences of an agreement with the United States. Dutra warned
Vargas that “Brazil’s fundamental problem” was that it had to arm itself so
that it did not become an “American Mongolia” subject to a bold assault
by a stronger nation.29 They could not accept a “pseudo-solution of vague
promises, put off in time, imprecise in quantity and quality and subordi-
nated to priorities that, for certain, are to our disadvantage.” Dutra
thought that they had to do what they could to secure the arms purchased
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    67

from the Reich, perhaps getting the Americans to help free the arms ship-
ments from the grips of the British blockade. “Either the Americans
should provide the promised arms or they should help us get them from
Germany.”30 If neither of these things could be done, Dutra did not see
how an agreement would be possible, despite recognizing that General
Marshall was “our sincere friend” and that the two countries had enjoyed
“a long existence of uninterrupted harmony.”31
While the negotiations were proceeding with Brazil, Roosevelt’s team
was building its defensive system in the North Atlantic. In September
1940, the Americans negotiated a “destroyers-for-bases” deal with the
United Kingdom that transferred 50 old destroyers to the British navy in
exchange for bases leased for 99 years in Newfoundland, Bermuda,
Trinidad, British Guiana, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, and the Bahamas.
The agreement not only tied the United States and Great Britain in the
crucial alliance against the Axis but also marked the beginning of the end
of the British Empire in the Western Hemisphere.32 In late December
Roosevelt set up the Office of Production Management to coordinate
defense industries and to speed aid “short of war” to Britain and other
endangered nations. In a “fireside” radio chat, he emphasized the Axis
threat to the United States and called for a national effort to make the
country “the great arsenal of democracy.” By mid-March 1941, German
and Italian submarines had sunk more than two million tons of Allied
shipping. The Lend-Lease Act passed that month was emblematic of
American anxiety. It allowed any country whose defense the president
deemed vital to defense of the United States to obtain arms, equipment,
and supplies by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease. It also squarely placed the
United States on the allied side for total victory over the Axis.33 In April,
agreement with Denmark permitted the United States to extend its defen-
sive shield in the North Atlantic to Greenland, followed in July by the
stationing of troops in Iceland to prevent its occupation by Germany. But
those moves did not ease Washington’s fears about Axis threats to South
America. In fact, as two noted scholars of the era observed: “Washington
military authorities rated defense of the Western Hemisphere second in
importance only to defense of the United States itself.”34
The American strategy was to build a defensive system of bases with
three key points in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland in the north, in
Trinidad off Venezuela, and in Northeast Brazil in the South Atlantic. The
objective was to have forces in place to fend off a sudden German thrust,
which planners conceived might come as a coordinated north and south
68   F. D. MCCANN

pincer attack. American military planners believed that it was “within the
capabilities of the Axis powers to establish small forces in Northeast Brazil
before effective armed resistance could be interposed by United States
forces.” The problem was that in early June 1941 the American
“Government had no naval craft, surface, sub-surface or air, within 1,000
miles of the tip of Brazil and the nearest Army force was nearly twice that
distance.” And the line of communications to that area was “almost wholly
sea-borne.” A realistic military analysis showed that “a small force in initial
occupation will compel a major effort to expel it.” To be obliged to redi-
rect American forces to expel an even small force from the northeast was
“highly undesirable,” and such a risk “should not be accepted.” Chief of
Staff Marshall and his navy counterpart, Admiral Harold R. Stack, believed
“That risk exists today. It will continue so long as we fail to provide the
security forces essential for that area.” There was in their view “the distinct
possibility of a lodgment by

small German forces in Northeast Brazil which would require a very strong
effort on our part to dislodge. Once our security forces are there, that pos-
sibility will be eliminated. It will then require a strong German effort to
dislodge us, and the probability of such an effort being made will be rela-
tively small.”

Marshall envisioned a protective army force of all combat arms totaling

about 9,300 troops and 43 aircraft. The army and navy had the forces
available with sufficient shipping to move them from the Atlantic seaboard
on 20 days’ notice. He favored having President Roosevelt directly ask
President Vargas to allow entry of American forces.

The real hazard, however, which probably should not be mentioned to

President Vargas, lies not in the danger of an unsupported attack by German
forces. The greatest peril in this situation lies in the possibility of a sudden
seizure of airfields and ports in Northeast Brazil by forces already in the
country and acting in collusion with small German forces. The latter, arriv-
ing by air and perhaps by sea, would so time their movement as to arrive at
these points immediately after their seizure. They would at once take over
and organize these points for defense.35
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    69

“One More Good-Will Mission and Brazil Will

Declare War on the U.S.A.”36
While the military negotiations went forward, the United States con-
ducted a grand-scale campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Brazilian
people. The war period, as Darlene Sadlier observed, “was one of the few
times in U.S. history when culture’s importance in domestic and world
affairs was recognized and discussed alongside issues of finance and com-
merce.”37 In August 1940 President Roosevelt appointed Nelson
A. Rockefeller as coordinator in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-­
American Affairs (OCIAA). The new agency’s mission was to use modern
public relations techniques and mass communications to polish the image
of the United States throughout Latin America, but particularly in Brazil.
It also worked to expand the Latin image among North Americans via
programs in schools and universities. It emphasized the idea that the peo-
ples of the Western Hemisphere were all Americans. As one OCIAA-­
sponsored high school text expressed it: “A citizen of Brazil is just as much
an American as is a citizen of the United States.”38
The OCIAA used multiple approaches. It had important Brazilian
books, such as Euclides da Cunha’s Os Sertões, Gilberto Freyre’s Casa-­
Grande e Senzala, and Jorge Amado’s Terras do Sem Fim translated into
English and published in the United States.39 It commissioned movies in
Hollywood and elsewhere that depicted friendly relations among the
American Republics. Singer Carmen Miranda, imported by Broadway,
became the “Brazilian bombshell” whose comedic film roles dazzled
Americans but earned her ridicule by Brazilians. Rockefeller used his par-
tial ownership of RKO studios to send Orson Welles to make a film about
Brazil, which turned out to be too genuine for the studio chiefs and for
President Vargas, who “disliked the image of a poor and black Brazil that
Welles was creating in It’s All True.”40 Welles’s graphic scenes of Brazil’s
poor black and mulatto people resulted in his funding being cut.41 Walt
Disney headed down to Rio too and created a symbol for Brazil in the
cartoon parrot, Zé Carioca, who introduced Donald Duck to his home-
land and to samba. Unfortunately the film Saludos Amigos (1942) pre-
sented a whitewashed image, even the highly Africanized city of Salvador
da Bahia appeared to have no dark-skinned inhabitants. He was immedi-
ately captivated by the rhythm of Ari Barroso’s Aquarela do Brasil, which
was fast becoming an unofficial national anthem, and incorporated it into
later film scores.42
70   F. D. MCCANN

Rockefeller cleverly arranged to have American corporations freed from

taxes on the cost of advertising in Latin America as long as they were
cooperating with the OCIAA. During the war tax-exempt American cor-
porate advertising became an effective tool. “By selectively directing this
advertising toward newspapers and radio stations that accepted “guid-
ance” from his office, [Rockefeller] was effectively able to control the
images …projected about America during World War II.” By the war’s
end, more than 75% of world news reaching Latin America passed through
the OCIAA.43 More broadly, the American military “relied far more heav-
ily on Disney for their military training-film program than on any other
Hollywood studio….”44 Brazilian security officials regarded some of the
Hollywood people, such as Douglas Fairbanks Jr., as agents propagating a
message of eventual German defeat, which of course they were.45
In October 1941, FDR removed Latin America from the purview of
William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and entrusted the
tasks related to conquering the hearts of Latin America to Nelson
Rockefeller’s program.46 James Reston observed in The New York Times in
1941 that the purpose of the OCIAA was to convince Latin America to
close ranks against the German threat and that the Good Neighbor Policy
was not a temporary expedient but a sincere and permanent change of
attitude.47
The sudden and breathtaking courtship was not entirely flattering—
Brazilians were aware that the Americans were also pursuing their Spanish-­
speaking neighbors. They believed that they should receive special
attention because of Brazil’s size and importance and the old friendship
with the United States. However, aside from knowledgeable diplomats,
the two peoples hardly knew each other. Until 1940 there was no history
of the United States available in Portuguese. The common conception of
the United States among Brazilians came from the very popular Hollywood
films, while Americans were not sure if the capital of Brazil was Buenos
Aires or Rio de Janeiro. Portuguese was rarely taught in American schools,
and educated Brazilians were more likely to speak French than English.
The results would have been more profound if more Brazilians had been
sent north to experience the land of Uncle Sam. The State Department
was unenthusiastic about proposals to organize a program to promote
Brazil in the United States. The coordinator’s office was more successful
countering Axis propaganda and explaining shortages caused by restricted
shipping. But some Axis propaganda had a persistent life as the rumors
about American responsibility for the submarine attacks in 1942 showed
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    71

[see Chap. 1, Note 25]. The OCIAA propaganda did contribute to pre-
paring the Brazilian public for coming events. Public opinion in Brazil
often raced ahead of Vargas government policy. In August 1942 it would
be the Brazilian people who would demand war against the Axis.48

Inaction and Distrust
The militaries of the two countries were slow to reach a common view of
the war and its dangers. The initial American posture was defensive seek-
ing to protect the hemisphere from feared German attacks. American mili-
tary planners saw the Northeast of Brazil as a likely potential target for a
German thrust from Africa. Because the Brazilian armed forces did not
have the strength to fend off such an attack, the Americans thought that
they should send their own troops to the northeast. It did not help matters
that the American press portrayed Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro as
leading the hypothetical Nazi faction in the Brazilian army. General Amaro
Soares Bittencourt, who had been sent to Washington to negotiate arms
purchases, observed that such press commentary made a “profound
impression” on Washington officials, particularly because Dutra and Góes
publicly did not challenge or deny such rumors. The wide lack of confi-
dence in official circles, he suspected, was contributing to the delay in
shipping arms.49 Once the arms question had been resolved, General
Amaro was to become the head of the Brazilian military commission in the
United States and the main channel for military communications between
the two countries. General Marshall was very clear that the army would
help Brazil get modern arms, but that there was little that could be done
in the immediate future. He did promise General Amaro that Brazil’s
requests would be given preference over those of the other Latin American
Republics. The United States was not yet on a war footing and did not
then have sufficient arms and equipment for its own forces.
Indeed, some of the Brazilian requests were greater than the amounts
available to American forces, and some were larger than the combined total
of American and British requirements. American staff officers reshaped the
Brazilian lists to more realistic quantities. At least now the Americans knew
what the Brazilians thought that they wanted, and the Brazilians knew
what the United States could provide. How it was to be paid for was
another matter of concern. In March 1941 the State Department arranged
with the Export-Import Bank for a $12,000,000 credit for Brazil, even
while it hoped to delay a decision until the Lend-­Lease Act, which would
cover the Brazilian arms, was passed and signed on March 11.50
72   F. D. MCCANN

Dutra privately lamented the American lack of confidence and the

unspoken fear in Washington that the Brazilians might use resources
obtained from the United States “in a direction opposed to American
objectives.” The war minister offered to resign if Vargas thought it would
elevate American confidence. He defended himself by saying that his opin-
ions had nothing to do with “nazistas or fascistas, or any other similar
doctrines,” that his only objective was “to raise the level of the army’s effi-
ciency and give it the means to carry out its mission,” and that he did not
favor either side in the current war, that he was fully absorbed in solving
Brazilian problems. He was concerned, as he knew Vargas was, to prevent
“any foreign country trying, under any circumstances to occupy, even
briefly, points or zones of the National Territory, whose security is always
ours to maintain.”51 Vargas declined to remove Dutra. The more prob-
lems that the Americans faced in providing the necessary arms, the more
Brazilian faith in American intentions diminished.
The Americans were organizing their industries for war production and
arms that were available either went to struggling Britain or to their own
expanding forces. Brazil was, however, a continuing concern as demon-
strated at the Army War College in early 1940 where one of the four staff
groups in the class of 1940 “developed War Plan PURPLE that envisioned
operations in Brazil against a coalition of Germany and Italy.” Col. Lehman
W. Miller was one of that group and was soon assigned as military attaché
in Rio de Janeiro. That select class of 99 officers was the last before the
college closed before the war and two-thirds of the officers made general
by 1946 and 13 of them commanded divisions during the war. They were
the “cream of the crop” of the army’s officer corps.52 The war in Europe,
which started as the war college session began, captivated the officers’
attentions, and as the classes ended in May 1940, President Roosevelt
federalized the National Guard signaling that the crisis had deepened.
Newly named military attaché, Colonel Lehman W. Miller, had been in
Washington during the conversations with General Amaro, working
closely with Colonel Matthew Ridgway. Amaro had given them a good
sense of the Brazilian hesitancy regarding stationing American troops in
Northeast Brazil. Before returning to Rio, Miller wrote a sensible analysis
of the Brazilian situation. The majority of Brazilians were, he said, “pro-­
American, pro-British, and anti-Axis,” but they were also very nationalis-
tic, protective of their sovereignty, and resistant to any infringement of it.
The Brazilians wished to contribute actively to hemisphere defense, not
merely to be bystanders. He advised that the United States should supply
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    73

what arms it could and should assist in the development of a Brazilian

arms industry. The preparation of air and naval bases in the northeast
should go forward “with the understanding that such bases are Brazilian
and will be defended by Brazilian forces….” He warned against attempt-
ing to lease bases or sending American forces to Brazil prior to the
Brazilians realizing that an attack was imminent.53 This was good advice,
but it did not resolve the American army’s paramount worry, namely, that
the Brazilians might not call for help in time to resist an Axis attack.
In May 1941, Miller returned in Rio as chief of the American Military
Mission and had been promoted to brigadier general to facilitate his rela-
tions with senior Brazilian officers and to give more prestige to his work.
An indication of Brazil’s importance to the American army at that time
was that the only other countries that had such military missions were the
Soviet Union and Iran. In 1939, Colonel Miller had traveled with Generals
Marshall and Góes Monteiro and had impressed Marshall with the skillful
way he dealt with the Brazilians. Góes apparently liked him and had
requested that he be made chief. Miller was then a distinguished officer.
He graduated from West Point in the famous 1915 class that the stars fell
upon ranking ninth well ahead of Eisenhower and Bradley. He went to
Brazil in 1934 as a member of the four-man mission on coastal defense.
He returned to the States in 1938, only to be selected to accompany
Marshall back to Brazil, where he acted as interpreter for Marshall’s tour.
In September 1939 he was one of the 99 officers to attend the Army War
College in the last class prior to American entry into the war.54
The successes of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s panzers in North
Africa kept American eyes on the vulnerable South Atlantic and, what they
called, “the Brazilian bulge.” The Brazilians had announced their inten-
tion to hold combined arms training maneuvers in the northeast in August
and September. The thinking in Washington was that even a token
American presence in the northeast would discourage a German attack.
From that line of thought, there developed the idea of participating in the
Brazilian maneuvers. Marshall suggested to General Miller that if the
Brazilians could be persuaded to agree, he could send “three or four
squadrons” of the air force and some ground units that the Brazilian army
lacked—anti-aircraft, signal, combat engineers, and medical troops—to
participate under Brazilian command. “We would have no combatant
ground troops,” he cautioned, “other than antiaircraft.” He noted that
the principal difficulty would be to find shipping to carry troops to and
from Brazil. He directed General Miller to sound out Brazilian army offi-
74   F. D. MCCANN

cials, but cautioned him that the idea might not be practical, that FDR had
not approved it, and that he was being “purely tentative.”55 But Miller was
anything but tentative.
The situation again seemed dire. German officials and Vichy French
Admiral Jean-Francois Darlan negotiated an agreement that appeared to
give the Nazi regime a free hand in North Africa.56 The German occupa-
tion of Dakar seemed to be about to happen. Hurried staff meetings in
Washington resulted in Colonel Ridgway being sent to Rio to arrange
immediate Brazilian-American staff planning and agreement to the dis-
patch of American forces at the soonest possible moment.57 He and
Ambassador Caffery met with Foreign Minister Aranha, who told them
that President Vargas would not likely agree to receive American troops in
Brazil, unless Roosevelt directly requested that he do so. Why FDR did
not make that request is still unknown. Roosevelt was then thinking of
occupying the Azores, even though army planners favored sending troops
to Brazil.
On May 22, Sumner Welles made a remarkable statement about the
relations between the two countries, namely, “that there is no government
anywhere with which this Government

regards itself as being on more intimate terms of trust and confidence than
with the Government of Brazil. As Aranha knows, I have made it a practice
ever since I have occupied this office to communicate to the Government of
Brazil all information which this Government received which I have believed
would be of value to the Brazilian Government. … you should state to
Aranha that in our considered judgment the German Government and its
allies can never achieve victory so long as they do not obtain mastery of the
seas, and particularly of the Atlantic. The United States will never permit the
passage of the control of the seas, and particularly the Atlantic, into the
hands of powers which are clearly bent solely on world conquest and world
domination …. That is a fundamental principle in our present policy.”

He then gave substance to this declaration of “trust and confidence” by

sharing a piece of extremely sensitive secret information. Roosevelt had
“personally authorized” him to inform President Vargas that “a very con-
siderable portion of the United States fleet is now travelling under secret
orders from the Pacific to the Atlantic and that this portion of the fleet will
be in the Atlantic by June 8.” The developments of the past weeks affect-
ing the Atlantic had provoked this movement, and those vessels would be
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    75

used to “safeguard the interests of the United States and its American
neighbors.” Ambassador Caffery met with Vargas on May 28 and told him
to tell Roosevelt that “Brazil will honor its obligations contracted at
Panama and Habana. In other words you can count on us.”58
In Rio de Janeiro another exchange moved the military relationship in
a less intimate direction. General Miller met with Chief of Staff Góes
Monteiro on May 30, 1941. At first, the meeting seemed to go well, but
then Miller undiplomatically said things that upset Góes, who afterward
wrote a detailed memo for Dutra about their discussion. Maybe once it
was on paper it seemed worse? Certainly by the time Vargas read it, bad
feelings were bubbling. Brazilian army historians have described it as a
“grave incident” caused by Miller’s “unfriendliness.”59 Góes noted that
Miller was clearly “uncomfortable” reminding the chief of staff that he
was “a personal friend and very particularly a sincere friend of Brazil….”
He said he was disturbed by unspecified “grave worries” and mentioned
that General Marshall and the American government had doubts about
Brazil’s willingness to cooperate effectively with the United States and
were especially troubled by recent “indications and rumors.” Góes pressed
him to explain, and Miller said that “certain statements by Brazilian
General Staff officers regarding the need for immediate delivery of war
materiel were interpreted in Washington as a sign that cooperation
between the two in case the war reached their shores was no longer work-
able.” Góes affirmed that their cooperation necessarily would be propor-
tional to the arms that they had for their troops. Miller pointed to the
“reserve  – and even a certain coldness and indifference  – noted in the
Brazilian military toward a greater tightening of the links needed for even-
tual cooperation” which he attributed to the Brazilian army not wanting
to upset the German army. Góes replied that his government and the
armed forces were oriented by the “real interests” and “preponderant sen-
timents of the country” and that they were never concerned about the
feelings of any other army. Brazil would not flee its duties of solidarity and
giving aid to its Sister Nations, but that “it had no reason to offend other
peoples aggressively.” Miller continued by referring to persistent intelli-
gence reports that “a great part of the officers of the Brazilian army sym-
pathized with the German army and with Nazism,” and he alluded to the
influence of German agents and seeming tolerance for Nazi organizations
active in the country.60 Góes, at least in this memo, seemed to keep cool,
rejoining that Brazilians were much more against the Reich than for it.
Convictions of members of the armed forces, he insisted, “were solely
76   F. D. MCCANN

those of deep-rooted patriotism, with a clear national consciousness

against the imperialist intentions of any foreign elements that come to
threaten us.” He regarded such negative propaganda as “ridiculous and
vile” attempts to cause confusion and to cast the regime set up in 1937 in
a bad light abroad and to make the Brazilian army appear different than it
actually was. He denied that there were adherents of Nazism or any other
ideology in the army. He admitted that his fellow officers “greatly admired
the strategy, tactics, operations, organization and efficiency of the German
army,” but he was certain that American military leaders shared such pro-
fessional admiration. Brazil lamented “the catastrophe that was bloodying
Europe, [and] did not have a special predilection for any of the belliger-
ents”; it intended to remain “impeccably neutral” but at the same time
committed to guaranteeing the common security of the Americas. The
Brazilian army would fulfill its duty, and “the dominant and stubborn
sentiment among us is to react against any type of domination or slavery.”
Changing the subject, Miller, who Góes described as “visibly embar-
rassed,” turned to less exasperating topics. Why Miller had risked alienat-
ing an officer who he had cultivated for a number of years is not clear. The
immediate consequence was that Góes imposed some distance on their
relationship by telling Miller that, henceforth, he should transmit in writ-
ing any future requests or suggestions from the American General Staff.61
Finally, turning to American participation in the projected maneuvers
in the northeast, Miller again pushed his luck by asserting that some of the
officers slated to lead the maneuvers were notoriously against cooperation
and approximation with the United States and were sympathetic toward
Nazism. Góes responded that the mere fact that Miller, a foreign officer,
could say something so “unacceptable” to the Brazilian army’s chief of
staff proved that “the members of the North American army were treated
as if they belonged to our own ranks, with all consideration, esteem and
confidence.”62 Góes likely thought that it would be helpful to have other
American officers involved in the discussions because he suggested that
the American General Staff secretly send some staff officers to Brazil to
work on implementing their agreement. He expressed surprise that
Washington had not done so yet.
Miller was uneasy about the overall situation and expressed his worry
about the apparent calm with which Brazilian officials were appraising the
frightening world scene. He believed that the entrance of the United
States into the conflict was inevitable and that there would be a lengthy
war. Góes assured him that for a long time the Brazilian General Staff had
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    77

considered the situation as extremely dangerous (perigosíssima) with

increasing and enduring complications. He assured Miller that he would
discuss American participation in the maneuvers with Dutra and the new
minister of aeronautics and that they would respond. He observed that the
idea behind the northeastern maneuvers in part had been to ease American
worries about the “density of our forces in that region.”63
At that point the Brazilian Armed Forces numerically appeared respect-
able if compared to other non-Axis forces around the world. The army
had 92,000 organized in five divisions commanded by 6500 officers. US
Army intelligence rated the training to be “fair,” and it regarded the train-
ing of the 192,000 unorganized reserves to be “poor.” The latter was
composed of those who had completed their obligatory year of military
service and on paper appeared as a reserve. But there was no system of
active reserve units and so the military value of such reservists was doubt-
ful. The Navy had 17,000 personnel on its vessels which were put to sea
infrequently. The small air force had been created in 1941 by a forced
marriage between Army and Navy pilots and crews and had 4722 mem-
bers in 8 squadrons. All together they lacked modern arms and equip-
ment, a secure supply of gasoline, and ammunition.64
Góes regarded his exchange with Miller as a troubling and “important
conversation” and reminded Dutra that both the British and German mili-
tary attachés had visited him recently asking pointed questions about the
projected maneuvers. The German Attaché General Gunther Niedenfuhr
had told him that Berlin had informed him that the United States was
planning to send 40,000 soldiers and 1,200 aircraft to participate. Góes
told both officers that such reports were exaggerated and that the maneu-
vers were simply routine annual affairs.65
Minister Dutra sent Góes Monteiro’s extensive memo to President
Vargas. In his cover letter, Dutra wrote that before the president took
any action, he wanted to give his views on the “complex and intercon-
nected problems” related to this grave and important conversation.
Dutra wanted Vargas to know that he fully agreed with Góes’s firmness
in rebutting General Miller’s “objections, doubts, suspicions… about
the attitude of Brazil and our effective cooperation with the USA in
defense of the Hemisphere.” Miller’s alluding to high-ranking Americans
expressing doubts because of imprecise rumors of unknown origin struck
Dutra as “imprudent, discourteous and capable of causing us to have
misgivings about the sincerity of the proposals of those who distrust us
without reason.” It was not reasonable, he said, to have to take time
78   F. D. MCCANN

from important tasks to address repeated suspicions and fantasies. Dutra

believed that confidence could not be forced; it had to be earned by
mutual understanding.
He made a series of observations on the topics that Miller had raised.
The first comment was on a joint aerial survey of the northeast. There
were neither detailed maps nor aerial photos of the region because the
Brazilian army’s geographic service had been concentrating on mapping
the south, which it saw as the likely battlefield in the event of an Argentine
attack.66 The Brazilians had appropriate technicians but needed aircraft
and up-to-date cameras; however, the Americans wanted to do the work
themselves, which was unacceptable.67 The second topic was American
participation in the projected maneuvers, an idea that Dutra saw as break-
ing Brazil’s careful neutrality. He did not see sufficient reason for such a
demonstration of force, “which he thought would have negative effects at
home and abroad.” However, thirdly, he thought it is fully acceptable and
useful to have US staff officers come secretly to Brazil. Being there they
would see the Brazilian army’s problems and necessities and could result
in the “true and desired climate of mutual confidence.” As for the fourth
topic of the supposed Brazilian “calm and indifference” to the powers’ war
preparations, he said that such an interpretation of the attitude of their
armed forces was “positively mistaken.” Rather the Brazilian military was
closely following the “shocking events” and analyzing what they meant for
Brazil. But officers avoided discussion outside their professional military
circle so as not to stir up useless agitation in the press. “There is no lack of
interest, no indifference. On the contrary there is a very sensible collective
anxiety to obtain the arms and equipment of every type that we lack.”
Then expressing his deep frustration with the Americans, he told Vargas
that they seemed merely “to want to secure positions and bases leaving us
standing by watching foreigners defend our land. … They want, under the
appearance of alliance, domination. We ask for arms for our troops and
they offer [their] troops to substitute ours. …They propose to defend our
land [instead of providing arms to us].” Then he said what he really felt:
“Such alliances and accords are more appropriate for the African colonies
or Asiatic possessions, intolerant and intolerable for agreements negoti-
ated between free countries, which mutually join in a common struggle.”
He was feeling that it would only be by their own efforts, with their own
people and their own materiels, that they would resolve the “fundamental
problems of our sovereignty and hold off any threats to our national integ-
rity.” They could not count on foreign help. They had a professionally
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    79

prepared officer corps and large numbers of reserves. Unfortunately, their

arms were minimal. “We are united: we have discipline and much love for
our country…. On these bases we can, we should and we want to realize
our defense and cooperate with our brothers of all of America in the col-
lective security of the Hemisphere.”
He asked that Vargas raise the army’s troop levels, approve acquisition
of 100 million bullets for the infantry and have all artillery rounds be fab-
ricated in Brazil, and authorize the call-up of reserve officers and the pur-
chase of Brazilian-made steel helmets, equipment, and uniforms. Dutra
closed by saying that to reach their objective they had “to convince the
men of the government and the American people that Brazil wants and
can cooperate in the defense of the Hemisphere,” but that “great and
strong Republic” should facilitate acquisition of armament. “With equal
sincerity we have to convince them that Brazil cannot and does not want
to be relegated in hemispheric questions to the level of a mere geographic
expression where only foreign, though friendly, flags come to secure pos-
session of the land and the defense and sovereignty of our country and of
our people.” Their watchwords, Dutra concluded, should be “compre-
hension and confidence.” The next day Vargas replied that he agreed.
“The Brazilian government,” he wrote, “intends to cooperate with the
Government of the United States in case the circumstances require it in
conformity with the agreements already discussed and accepted.” It must
be clear, he said, that adopting such a position, “the Brazilian Government
does not ever abdicate its free determination and autonomy, principally
regarding the problems and activities, directly or indirectly related to our
sovereignty, the guarding of our territory and the defense of national
interests.”68
The same day that he discussed the memo with Dutra, Vargas met with
German Ambassador Kurt Prüfer and asked if he were to accept Roosevelt’s
oft repeated invitation to visit Washington would the Reich consider it
opportune for him to offer to act as a mediator between the two govern-
ments. He emphasized that this was only a vague idea that he wanted to
explore before taking any action. Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
replied asking Vargas not to take such a step, because “Germany did not
have the slightest reason to request any initiative whatever with respect to
proposals for mediation.” Ribbentrop was content to leave such moves
“to the other side, which would doubtless become convinced quite inde-
pendently, sooner or later, of the hopelessness of continuing the war
against Germany which it had provoked.”69 Because Vargas left no com-
80   F. D. MCCANN

ments about any of this, it is not known if the mediation idea was related
to his exchange with Dutra. It is interesting that the day before he had
noted in his diary that the first delivery of arms under the US Lend-Lease
program had arrived. “Our expenditures will go up. It is becoming neces-
sary to speed up [obtaining] war materiel and increasing military effec-
tives.” And before that, on May 29, he had explained to the Japanese
ambassador that if any American country were attacked, Brazil would
stand with it.70
But obviously, General Marshall’s inquiry about possible American par-
ticipation in the projected Brazilian maneuvers had stirred deep anxieties.
Brazilian officers knew that their army was weak and practically disarmed,
and they did not know whether or not they could trust the Americans. It
is possible that they were concerned that putting Brazilian and American
troops side by side would result in embarrassing comparisons. It was good
that they were unaware of how extreme were some of the ideas floating
about in the American General Staff. When a chief of staff is mulling over
ideas, his staff can let their imaginations take flight. In mid-June 1941, in
a memo for General Marshall, one of his intelligence officers warned that
“Brazil is utterly incapable of defending this area and may even shift its
support to Germany should England fall. It is already wavering…. It is
therefore imperative that U.S.  Forces become firmly established in the
vital area before we are too deeply involved in war.” He laid out three pos-
sible lines of action for gaining access: (1) by diplomacy, including “con-
sideration … [of] outright purchase of vital concessions”; (2) by subsidizing
the existing regime including paying the Brazilian armed forces for con-
cessions; and finally (3) by “Political pressure accompanied by force.” If
the second course succeeded, “we should quietly proceed to organize
Brazil in such a way that it would serve our military and economic inter-
ests for years to come.” And more bluntly, he recommended that “If the
existing regime will not agree to these arrangements a coup might be
arranged which could be synchronized with direct political pressure and
the intervention of armed forces.” If the situation reached such an
­extremity, he advised arranging “matters so that a part of the Brazilian
people will welcome our arrival.” Carefully prepared and convincing pro-
paganda should present such action as being “in the interest of the self-
preservation of the United States and the other American Republics.”71
In June 1941 anxiety in the War Plans Division over getting troops into
Brazil continued to boil up. On the 19th Secretary of War Stimson drafted
a letter to Roosevelt saying that “recent news from North Africa makes it
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    81

very clear that we must act immediately to save the situation in Brazil.”
Instead of sending it, he talked it over with General Marshall, and they
decided to go immediately to the White House to see the president. The
conversation was at the president’s bedside. Given the urgency, Roosevelt
said he would direct the State Department to find a way to get troops into
Brazil as soon as possible. He thought that the best way would be to per-
suade Brazil to agree to a limited lease of an air base near Natal. Marshall
was not optimistic because he knew that State was deeply opposed to the
idea of leasing bases in Latin America. Moreover at that moment the
American army did not have the equipment or ammunition to supply an
expeditionary force and at the same time leave anything to defend the
United States proper.72 American military planners must have been very
gloomy indeed.
Sumner Welles telegraphed Ambassador Caffery that the situation was
changing rapidly and a German attack on the Western Hemisphere was
becoming “more imminent.” The president and the service chiefs judged
“the most vulnerable points … are Iceland and Natal.” If Vichy gave over
control of Dakar to Germany, it was “probable that Germany would then
undertake its classic pincer strategy by attempting to occupy Iceland and
Natal, the objective being, of course through the use of air forces based
upon those regions to cut off Great Britain from the supplies now reach-
ing her across the North Atlantic and from the South Atlantic.” He wanted
Caffery’s advice on how best to approach President Vargas about using
the “pretext of maneuvers” to get troops into the northeast.73
Caffery replied the next afternoon saying that he had talked with
Foreign Minister Aranha, who said it “would be a mistake to ask President
Vargas to permit the sending of United States troops to northern Brazil,
especially in view of the failure of the United States to supply arms for the
Brazilian army.” The ambassador agreed with Aranha and observed that
“Vargas has been leaning more and more in our direction during the past
few months. He is definitely on our side but certainly the moment has not
yet arrived when he could agree to this proposal and get away with it.”
Caffery asked Aranha if it would help if Washington invited Brazilian
forces to join in the defense of some American possessions, but that sug-
gestion seemed to go nowhere.74
While these discussions were going on, the unforeseen had happened;
the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22. Even so the Americans
continued focusing on securing the North and South Atlantic. Gradually
army planners estimated that for the next one to three months, the
82   F. D. MCCANN

Germans would be so involved in the Soviet Union that they could not
invade Great Britain, prevent American troops from landing in Iceland, or
maintain their “pressure on West Africa, Dakar and South America.” This
seemingly providential occurrence provided time to substitute the British
forces in Iceland, strengthen the navy in the Atlantic, and get American
forces into Brazil.75 The German campaign in Russia provided breathing
space that gradually eliminated the danger of Axis aggression across the
South Atlantic. Even so the army still wanted to dispatch a security force
to Northeast Brazil as quickly as possible.76 Sending troops to secure
Iceland was then in the works. War Plans Division head General Leonard
Gerow was sufficiently concerned about Brazil that he hoped to get the
army’s units preparing for transport to Iceland redirected as expeditionary
forces to Brazil instead.77

Joint Planning Amidst Uncertainty

While the foregoing had been happening, a joint planning group of
Brazilian and American officers had spent a month in the northeast devel-
oping a defense plan that included locating major air bases and supply
centers at Natal, Recife, and Belém. In the plan, the Brazilians were to
provide ground troops to garrison those cities, and it recommended cre-
ation of a permanent joint board to study and implement the construction
of the bases and other aspects of the plan.78 This exercise in joint planning
convinced the American officers that their Brazilian colleagues did not
have a realistic notion of how much time it would take to build, staff, and
organize such bases. They assumed that Brazil would encounter difficul-
ties similar to those the United States faced in mobilizing and expanding
its forces. They believed that “the period from now until the end of 1942
may well be the critical stage” and that though the proposed plan was
excellent, it did “not provide adequate protection during this critical
period.” And although Góes Monteiro implied that instead of creating
new units, as the plan recommended, it would be more efficient to transfer
existing units to the northeast, in which case “the shortages of materiel”
would have to be filled by purchases in the armament market or by loans
of equipment from the United States Army.79
The seemingly satisfactory trend toward greater cooperation was bal-
anced by a dose of reality from Ambassador Caffery who reminded
Washington “that the Brazilians had very little interest in hemisphere
defense as such: for the most part, they are doing what we ask them to do
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    83

because we ask them to do it. I would like to make that clear. At the same
time, they are very apprehensive over what looks to them like penetration;
they are apprehensive of our sending troops to Natal before they are actu-
ally needed there.”
He was hearing that some Brazilian officers were calling the American
emphasis on the air defense of the Natal region an “aviation scam.” He
repeated that “they are sorely disappointed that after so many years of so
much talk and so many promises we have done nothing for them in the
way of air materiels and only what our War Department calls a ‘token ship-
ment’ for the Brazilian military. Their lack of confidence in us is growing
daily.”80
In August 1941 the two armies were still discussing joint training
maneuvers in the northeast that the planners in the War Department
hoped could be used as a pretext to establish the presence of American
troops. As the documents discussed above indicate forcefully, General
Góes Monteiro and Minister of War Dutra saw the proposal as a ruse, and
they told Vargas that if he agreed to it they would resign, but the president
would have none of it. Keep negotiating, he told the generals, “we need
to have the Americans furnish the promised materiel, so we can defend
ourselves, but we cannot agree to foreign occupation.”81 From the meet-
ings of the mixed military commission and his conversations in the United
States, it was clear to Góes Monteiro that the Americans wanted to build
navy and air bases and garrison them with their own troops. Vargas com-
mented in his diary that “In summary: the Americans want to drag us into
war in Europe under the pretext of defense of America.”82
The Brazilians would not go to war until it was clear that their national
interests were at stake. They understood that the Americans wanted to
station troops in north and Northeast Brazil, but they were not willing to
let foreign troops, even friendly ones, into national territory. On the eve
of Pearl Harbor, the American army headquarters was in the final stages of
completing an operations plan for a Northeast Brazil theater and had des-
ignated two divisions to prepare for a Brazilian expedition. Some officers
had visited Brazil in the summer of 1941 to see the region firsthand.83
Likely it startles Brazilians today to learn that long before Pearl Harbor
their country was the object of American war planning. Rainbow war plan
LILAC (Purple), which had Northeast Brazil as its focus, proposed an
initial ground force of 19,000 to be concentrated at the Belém, Natal, and
Recife air bases. However, given the shortage of shipping and the more
urgent needs in other theaters, it is unlikely that troops could have been
84   F. D. MCCANN

sent until late in 1942. But the foregoing pages should make clear that
Brazil had been cooperating with the United States since January of 1941.
It is not surprising that officers on both sides had some difficulty under-
standing the thinking of the other. Vargas kept the two sides talking while
trying to explain Góes’s and Dutra’s attitudes to General Lehman Miller.84
General Miller’s “negotiating” became so insistent that Góes had him
declared persona non grata in November. What exactly happened to force
Miller’s recall is not clear, but it certainly sidelined an upwardly mobile
officer, he would eventually be assigned to training combat engineers. The
Brazilian situation was mostly static until the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor and the Philippines on December 7. The next day, after conferring
with his ministry, Vargas telegraphed FDR assuring him of Brazil’s solidar-
ity, but still he wanted to keep Brazil out of the war. Germany and Italy’s
declarations of war on the United States on December 11 did not change
his mind. General Dutra sought to resign because of the persistent nega-
tive rumors that he was pro-German, but Vargas refused, reaffirming his
confidence in him.85 A few days later, on December 21, Foreign Minister
Aranha told Vargas that the American government would not provide
military equipment because it did not have confidence in various people in
the government. The president replied that he had no reason to distrust
his aides and that the “facilities that we have given the Americans do not
allow such lack of confidence”; moreover he would not replace his gener-
als because of “foreign demands.” Aranha said that he agreed with his
attitude, “but the truth is that they don’t trust them.”86

The Northeast Became Even More

Strategically Important
The Americans were soon fighting a war on a world scale, and the Brazilians
were focused on keeping foreign troops from entering their country.
However Japanese victories in the Pacific cut the air routes from North
America to the South Pacific, and as winter weather effectively ended air
travel in the North Atlantic, the only air route from the United States to
Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia was via the South Atlantic. The
importance of Northeast Brazil grew by the day. The situation in the Far
East was deteriorating rapidly, and in the week before Christmas 1941, the
Army Air Corps was ordered to move 80 heavy bombers to the Philippines
in an operation called “Project X.”87 From October to early December
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    85

1941, the army’s War Plans Division had revised its operational plans for
Brazil based on the assumption that the Germans would soon make a
thrust in the South Atlantic. This planning under Rainbow 5 called for the
deployment of more than 64,000 air and ground troops who would be
concentrated around Belém, Natal, and Recife.88 WPD planners con-
cluded that the “occupation of Natal by American forces in considerable
strength affords the only reasonable assurance that we can maintain com-
munications in the South Atlantic and a base from which long-range air-
planes can fly to Africa and thence to the Middle East and the Far East.”89
General Marshall thought that the three main air bases in Brazil should
each be protected by a 1,200-man infantry battalion, supported by seven
or eight combat aircraft.90 The general staff feared that “Germany’s failure
to achieve full success in Russia may strongly influence her to invade Spain,
Portugal and French North and West Africa for the purpose of restoring
the balance.”91
With this perspective in mind, it is understandable why the US Army
was so worried about the security of Northeast Brazil. Even so Marshall
and the general staff did not want to make any move into the Brazilian
bulge without the Vargas government’s consent and cooperation. Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles over optimistically assured Marshall that
he thought that within the next ten days the Brazilians would agree. The
War Plans Division conceded that they could afford to wait the ten days,
“…but no longer. Every week adds to the

peril and difficulty of sea-borne troop movements in that area. Axis subma-
rines in numbers are now reported between Natal and the African coast.
Known Axis capabilities, possible Brazilian internal reactions, and unpre-
dictable surprise moves, combine to create a growing peril. We now fight
facing westward. The southeast lies open.”92

It is interesting that all this planning and discussion was running far
ahead of American capabilities. By the end of June 1941, the army had
1,455,565 personnel, but as of October 1, the general staff rated only one
division, five anti-aircraft regiments, and two artillery brigades as combat
ready. The Army Air Corps then had only two bomber squadrons and
three pursuit groups ready. Moreover, congressional restrictions on the
use of draftees and reserve personnel and the shortage of shipping pre-
vented large-scale overseas deployments. Interest in Brazil likely had been
intensified by the Selective Service Act’s ban on sending draftees outside
86   F. D. MCCANN

the Western Hemisphere. And it should be remembered that before the

Pearl Harbor attack the American public was full of doubts about the war.
When the Selective Service Act was extended for 18 months on August
12, 1941, it passed the House of Representatives by the extremely slim
majority of one vote (203 to 202)!93 The army’s strategic October esti-
mate admitted that “our present forces are barely sufficient to defend our
military bases and outlying possessions. If the Axis Powers were in a posi-
tion to attempt a major military operation against the Western Hemisphere,
our current military forces would be wholly inadequate.”94 Until its armed
forces were ready for a transatlantic offensive, the United States could only
conduct “preliminary operations” that would strengthen the defense of
the Western Hemisphere, and important among such operations was safe-
guarding the bases in Northeastern Brazil.95
One of the positive effects of the Japanese attack was the seemingly
increased willingness of the Brazilians to cooperate. The two governments
agreed to form a Joint Military Board for the Northeast on December 17,
1941.96 The US Army selected Colonel Lucius D. Clay of the engineers
and Colonel Robert C. Candee of the Air Corps to be its representatives.
Clay had a lot of recent experience upgrading hundreds of civilian airports
in the United States. The two were to be the General Headquarters’
“advance agents in Brazil” with the idea that they would eventually serve
there. After meeting with their Brazilian counterparts, Clay and Candee
recommended spending $2,700,000 to improve the airway that the Air
Corps Ferrying Command was to use. Urgently, they called for small
groups of US Army mechanics and communications specialists to be sta-
tioned at each airfield and that emergency shipments of machine guns and
ammunition be sent to allow transient air crews and Brazilian troops to
defend the fields and planes from any locally organized fifth-column
attacks.97 The army’s foresight in enlisting PAA/Panair to construct and
improve the airfields in Brazil was indeed wise.
On December 31, 1941, Vargas gave an address to the leaders of the
armed forces in which he recalled a century of esteem and collaboration
with the “noble American nation” and declared that when it was attacked
there was no doubt as to Brazil’s attitude of solidarity with the United
States. Until that moment, he said, “we could have discordant opinions
about the reasons for the conflict, [and] make personal forecasts as to its
consequences.” Brazil was not in the war, even indirectly, and the nation
would maintain exemplar neutrality, but Vargas observed that “nations
like individuals must face [their] Destiny…. We made the decision that
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    87

corresponds to our historical determinism.” He assured the officers that

he was convinced that the “materiel elements which we still lack will be
delivered in opportune time” for Brazil to fulfill its responsibilities guard-
ing the hemisphere.98

Notes
1. Ambassador Caffery to Sumner Welles, Rio, June 10, 1940, 832.20/203-­
1/3, RG 59, NARA. Caffery reported that afternoon Góes and Miller had
talked.
2. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, August 29, 1940, Mensagem No.
40-12, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds.,
Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 402–404.
The Brazilian generals were putting constant pressure on the British
military attaché, Col. Parry-Jones, and his American counterpart Col.
Edwin L. Sibert to get the arms on order or stopped by the British allowed
through the blockade. Col. Sibert reported that the generals may have had
financial as well as patriotic reasons behind their insistence. Supposedly
10% of the total purchase price, or about $4 million dollars, was to go to a
select group of officers. Naturally, that made “these officers interested in
the continuance of the contract even above any patriotic consideration.”
Whether this was true or merely rumor is unknown, but it is an interesting
sidelight. Col. Edwin L. Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Military Attaché, Report:
comments on Current Events, Jan. 31, 1941, MID, War Dept. General
Staff, 2052-120, RG165, NARA.  I am using the rank that Sibert held
when he wrote the dispatch.
3. Caffery, Rio, July 8, 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940,
p. 608; Caffery, Rio, July 16, 1940, ibid., pp. 49–50.
4. Division of American Republics, Department of State, July 1, 1940:
“Attitude of Brazilian Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro and Federal Interventor
Cordeiro de Farias towards Nazis,” G-2 Regional File Brazil, 5900–5935,
RG 165, NARA. American government officials made statements like this
without offering proof that such interpretations had validity.
5. Góes Monteiro to Dutra, Bases de Convenção com os EUA (Basis of
Agreement w/ USA), Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 11, 1941, Ofício Secreto 284
e Anexo, p.  1, 2, & 4. Góes Monteiro Archive (or Acervo), Arquivo
Historico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in Giovanni Latfalla, “O Estado-
Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre
os Anos de 1938 e 1942.” Caminhos da História (Vassouras), (Jul.–Dez.
2010), Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 65–66. This document was written in prepara-
tion for Góes’s trip to Washington in October 1941.
88   F. D. MCCANN

6. Góes Monteiro to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, July 26, 1940, Relatório do Estado-­
Maior do Exército, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
7. Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa (Brazilian ambassador to the US) to Getúlio
Vargas, Washington, September 24, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas,
CPDOC.
8. Frederick B.  Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally
Gentle Chaos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995), pp.  247–250.
Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960),
pp. 48–56 (hereafter cited as Conn & Fairchild, Framework).
9. Conn & Fairchild, Framework, pp. 49–50.
10. These studies give a vivid portrait of life and organization of those cities in
1940–1941. The ones on Rio de Janeiro and Belém, Pará, were typical:
War Department, “Survey of Rio de Janeiro Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 –
Text, Military Intelligence Division (MID), August 6, 1942, S30-772, and
“Survey of the Pará Region of Brazil,” Vol. 1 – Text, MID, June 6, 1941,
S30-770, RG 165, NARA. Lt. Col. Archibald King (WPD, Judge Advocate
General) to Asst. Ch. of Staff –G2, Washington, August 15, 1940, 2052-­
121, MID, General Staff (GS), War Dept. RG165, NARA. Lt. A. R. Harris
(Liaison Branch) to Military Attaché (Rio), Washington, March 25, 1941:
“Priority for Strategic Surveys” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept., RG165,
NARA. For example, Col. Edwin L. Sibert (Military Attaché), Rio, May 3,
1941 Rpt.2704: “Narrative of a Trip by the MA Across Bahia and Piauhy
[sic] during early March, 1941” 2052-121, MID, GS, War Dept. RG 165,
NARA.  That American officers were allowed to make such trips was an
indication of Brazilian cooperation.
11. Lt. Col. Lehman W. Miller to Chief of General Staff, Brazilian Army, Rio,
September 19, 1940, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
12. Thomas D. White went to Brazil in April 1940 as the air attaché and then
became chief of the military air mission. After Brazil he served on the gen-
eral staff as one of its Brazil specialists. He was promoted to four-star gen-
eral in 1953 and chief of Air Force Staff from 1957 to 1961.
13. Caffery, Rio, September 6, 1940 #3538, 832.20/224 ½, RG 59, NARA.
14. Caffery, Rio, September 23, 1940, Telegram 476, 711.32/91, RG59,
NARA.
15. Ciro de Freitas Vale to Getúlio Vargas, Berlin, October 23, 1940, Arquivo
Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC. The ambassador’s choice of words showed the
typical attitude of Brazilians toward Spanish speakers by referring to them
as “Castelhanos,” Castilians, as in people of Castile, Portugal’s ancient
enemy.
16. “War Department – Pan American Aviation Contract for Latin American
Aviation Facilities,” November 2, 1940, WPD 4113-3, World War II RS,
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    89

NARA. For an interesting discussion of the development of Pan American,

see Rosalie Schwartz, Flying Down to Rio: Hollywood, Tourists, and Yankee
Clippers (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004),
pp. 221–257.
17. Memo, Chief of Staff for Secretary of War, Washington, September 7,
1940, as quoted in Conn & Fairchild, Framework, p. 252.
18. F.P.  Powers (Panair business manager) to Evan Young (responsible for
PAA’s foreign relations), Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1940, “ADP,”
Cauby C. Araújo Papers; author’s interview with Cauby C. Araújo, Rio de
Janeiro, October 4, 1965. Presumably a copy should be in the PAA archives
at the University of Miami.
19. The foregoing came from my interview with Cauby C. Araújo, October 4,
1965. Vargas appointed Joaquim Pedro Salgado Filho as the Minister of
Aeronautics in late January 1941. Góes Monteiro regarded this appoint-
ment as Getúlio’s way to weakening the influence of the armed forces.
There is a fascinating collection of news clippings attached to A.W. Childs,
“New Air Ministry,” January 22, 1941, 832.00/1332, RG 59, NARA.
20. Petition to Minister of Transportation and Public Works, January 20,
1941, “Requerimento 30/31” and “Requerimento 28/41 ao Presidente,
Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional,” January 20, 1941, both in
“ADP,” Araújo Papers. Unfortunately this private collection is now appar-
ently missing.
21. Prior to the cabinet meeting, Vargas had asked Aranha to sign the decree
below his own signature, but at the meeting Aranha saw that the presi-
dent’s name had disappeared. Aranha took out a photostat of the original
showing his signature and forcefully told him that he would not stand
alone before the army as the supporter of the United States. Vargas signed
the document again and the cabinet approved it as Decree-Law 3462 (July
25, 1941). It appeared in the Diário Oficial on July 26, 1941. The story
about the signatures was told to me by the foreign minister’s son Euclydes
Aranha in Rio de Janeiro on November 15, 1965. Oddly the only refer-
ence in Vargas diary to a cabinet meeting at that time in July was on July
26. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942 Vol. II, p. 410.
22. “Official History South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command,” Part
I, II, p. 71, US Army Center for Military History.
23. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942 Vol. II, entry July 23, p. 409.
24. War Department, “A Survey of the Natal Region of Brazil,” May 14, 1941,
I, p. 35 as in History SADATC, Part I, II, p. 72.
25. As quoted in General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, A Serviço do Brasil na
Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra A Noite, 1952), p. 63.
The author was chief of the Brazilian delegation on the Brazil-United
States Defense Commission during the war.
90   F. D. MCCANN

26. MG, Relatório…Dutra…1940, pp. 4–6. For a deeper analysis of Brazil’s

arms situation, see my “The Brazilian Army and the Pursuit of Arms
Independence, 1899–1979,” in Benjamin F. Cooling (Ed.), War, Business
and World Military-Industrial Complexes (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat
Press, 1981), pp. 171–193.
27. The army did have 129,085 carbines, 8732 automatic rifles, 5738 Madison
and Hotchkiss machine guns, 20 anti-aircraft machine guns, 13,986
swords, and 7797 lances. Col. Ralph C.  Smith (Executive Officer, G-2,
General Staff), Memo for Army War College: “Brazilian Army: Armament
and Munitions on hand, Status of Training,” Nov. 3, 1941, G2 Regional
Files, Brazil 6000, RG 165, NARA.
28. On September 20, Dutra bought Miller’s documents to Vargas, who found
the questions “um tanto impertiente” (rather impertinent, insolent, or
rude). The next day Vargas discussed the matter further with the ministers
of war, navy, foreign affairs, and Góes; see Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol.
II, p. 339 (entries Sept 20 & 21, 1940). Memorando, Col. L. Miller to
Góes Monteiro, Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 19, 1940 and Report of General
Staff of US Army on Military Cooperation with Brazil, Rio, Sept. 19, 1940
(translation in Portuguese of report done in Washington) in Góes Monteiro
archive (or Acervo), Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro as in
Giovanni Latfalla, “O Estado-Maior do Exército e as Negociações Militares
Brasil-Estados Unidos Entre os Anos de 1938 e 1942.” Caminhos da
História (Vassouras), vol. 6, no. 2 (Jul./Dez. 2010), pp. 61–78.
29. Likely Dutra was confusing Mongolia with Manchuria, which Japan had
invaded in 1932 and had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo.
30. There is a detailed review of the arms contract with Germany and the pro-
cesses of the British blockade that entrapped the arms en route to Brazil in
Major Edwin L.  Sibert, Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 21, 1941 Military Attaché
Report: Comments on Current Events, MID, War Dept. General Staff,
2052-120, RG165, NARA.
31. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, November 20, 1940, No. 58/19, in
Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico
Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 404–407.
32. For a careful study of those bases from South America to Newfoundland,
see Steven High, Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967 (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
33. On the complicated politics leading to the passage of the Lend-Lease leg-
islation, William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War,
1940–1941 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 252–289.
34. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation: The
World Crisis of 1937–1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper
& Row, 1952), Vol. II, p. 614.
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    91

35. General George C.  Marshall, Memoranda by the Chief of Staff of the
United States Army to the Under Secretary of State (Welles): Military
Cooperation of Brazil, Washington, June 17, 1941, as in Foreign Relations
of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 498–
501. This assessment ignored the fact that the sufficient German immi-
grant population that could possibly provide such a fifth-column force lay
thousands of miles south in Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do
Sul. How they could be assembled, trained, and transported to the
Northeast does not seem to have been considered.
36. This was Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha’s weary comment on the num-
ber of goodwill ambassadors he had to receive. “The Wooing of Brazil,”
Fortune, XXIV, No. 4 (October 1941), p. 100.
37. Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in
World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. xii. This is the
best study of the OCIAA.
38. Harriet M. Brown & Helen Bailey, Our Latin American Neighbors (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin, 1944), p. 1. Before saying that citizens of Brazil and the
United States are both Americans, the authors said that the term “America”
should be applied “to both the continents in the Western Hemisphere.” And
so the peoples of all the hemisphere’s nations are Americans. For an excellent
analysis of the Rockefeller office and its archival records, see Gisela Cramer
and Ursula Prutsch, “Nelson A.  Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American
Affairs (1940–1946) and Record Group 229,” Hispanic American Historical
Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 785–806.
39. For a recent study of the translation program, see Eliza Mitiyo Morinaka,
“Ficción y política en tiempos de guerra: el proyecto de traducción stadun-
idense para la literatura brasileña (1943–1947),” Estudos Históricos (Rio de
Janeiro, setembro-dezembro 2017), Vol. 30, No 62, pp. 661–680. For an
excellent study of the Rockefeller Office’s Brazilian programs see Alexandre
Busko Valim, O Triunfo da Persusão: Brasil, Estados Unidos e o Cinema da
Políatica de Boa Vizinhança durante a II Guerra Mundial (São Paulo:
Alameda Casa Editorial, 2017).
40. Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in
World War II (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 75.
41. Darlene J. Sadlier, Brazil Imagined 1500 to the Present (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2008), pp. 215–233. The unfinished Welles film was “It’s
All True”; see Catherine Benamou, It’s All True: Orson Welles Pan-
American Odyssey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). For the
part of the film about the Cearense Jangadeiros, see José Henrique de
Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza:
Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 147–152. For Carmen Miranda’s adventures
and misadventures as a cultural go-between: Bryan McCann, Hello, Hello
Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 129–150; and the excellent biography
92   F. D. MCCANN

by Ruy Castro, Carmen: Uma Biografia (São Paulo: Companhia das

Letras, 2005), especially pp. 258–349. The Brazilian elite criticized her for
becoming too Americanized; see Castro, pp. 244–251.
42. Saludos Amigos premiered in Rio de Janeiro on August 24, 1942. For an
in-depth study of Disney activities, see J. B. Kaufman, South of the Border
with Disney: Walt Disney and the Good Neighbor Program, 1941–1948
(New York: Disney Editions, 2009). “What Walt Disney Learned from
South America” Walt & El Grupo; Documents Disney Diplomacy” NPR,
September 17, 2009. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=112916523. Disney and his artists visited Brazil, Argentina,
and Chile in August–October 1941. The Disney party was swept up in
admiration for Brazil’s infectious samba; see Kaufman’s South of the Border.
Barroso’s 1939 Aquarela was Americanized as simply Brazil and entered
the playlists of the big bands.
43. David J. Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America
(New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), p. 36. The author did not provide
his source, but his statement appears credible.
44. John Baxter, Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio
Contributed to Victory in the War (New York: Disney Editions, 2014),
pp. 173–174.
45. See, for example, Police Chief Filinto Müller to Benjamin Vargas, Caxambú,
April 30, 1941, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, Rio. He warned that
Fairbanks was coming as a propaganda agent for both the United States
and Britain. He met with Getúlio. For more on Fairbanks and other
Hollywood people sent on missions, see Darlene J. Sadlier, Americans All:
Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2012), pp. 34–36.
46. Antonio Pedro Tota, O Imperialismo Sedutor, A Americanização do Brasil
na Época da Segunda Guerra (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000),
p. 90.
47. James Reston, “Our Second Line of Defense,” The New  York Times
Magazine, June 29, 1941, p. 7.
48. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 246–249. OCIAA efforts
were not aimed at getting Brazil into the war, but they increased Brazilian
concerns about Nazi Germany. There has been little effort to see how its
programs affected local attitudes. There is useful local emphasis on
Fortaleza in José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra
chegou ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp.  153–169. For
more documentation and interpretation, see http://cpdoc.fgv.br/­
producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/anos37-45/AGuerraNoBrasil/TioSam.
49. General Amaro Soares Bittencourt to Eurico Dutra, Washington, March 2,
1941, in Mauro Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal
Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp. 407–409. General Amaro
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    93

had been sent to handle the day-to-day details of the arms purchases. He
mentioned a story in the Washington Times-Herald of Feb. 28, 1941.
50. The Lend-Lease Act permitted any country whose defense that the presi-
dent considered vital to that of the United States to receive arms, equip-
ment, and supplies by sale, transfer, exchange, or lease.
51. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas Rio, March 8, 1941  in Mauro Renault
Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra:
O dever da Verdade, pp. 410–411.
52. Col. Trent N.  Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F.  Moler, “A Historical
Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA, April 15, 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 47. Miller’s classmates
included Maxwell Taylor, Lyman Lemnitzer, Anthony C. McAuliffe, and
Charles Bolte. Miller graduated from West Point in 1915, the class the
stars fell upon. He ranked ninth in that class of 164 cadets. His classmates,
Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Joseph T. McNarney, and James Van
Fleet were ranked 61st, 44th, 41st, and 92nd. Order of class ranking clearly
did not determine success in their military careers. https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/The_class_the_stars_fell_on.
53. Colonel L. Miller to Colonel M. B. Ridgway, Washington, February 13,
1941, WPD 4224-122, RG165, NARA.
54. Col. Trent N.  Thomas & Lt. Col. Charles F.  Moler “A Historical
Perspective of the USAWC Class of 1940” (US Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pa, 15 April 1987), ADA183148.pdf. p. 81.
55. George C. Marshall to BG Lehman W. Miller, Washington, May 6, 1941,
2–441, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, General Materials,
George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
56. The German-Vichy agreement was announced on May 15, 1941.
57. Improvement in air travel made the Washington-Rio de Janeiro journey
faster than Marshall’s ten days by boat in 1939. Until 1940 the air trip had
been five days via the coastal route, because night flying was not possible.
In 1940 Pan American opened a land route from Belém to Rio, using the
new DC-3 that cut the time in half.
58. Welles to Caffery, Washington, May 22, 1941, 868.20232/206:Telegram
and Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, May 28, 1941, 862.20232/2061:
Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. VI,
(Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 494–496.
59. Milton Freixinho, Instituições Em Crises: Dutra e Góis Monteiro, Duas
Vidas Paralelas (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1997),
p.  382. Colonel Milton wrote “grave incidente pela visita inamistosa
[unfriendly visit] do chefe da Missão Militar Americana no Brasil….”
60. For a detailed study of German activities in Brazil, see Leslie B. Rout and
John F.  Bratzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States
94   F. D. MCCANN

Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II (Frederick, Md.:

University Press of America, 1986), pp.  106–172; and a contemporary
report Aurélio da Silva Py, A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no
Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: Edição da Livraria do Globo, 1942). The
author was chief of police in Rio Grande do Sul and led the anti-Nazi
efforts.
61. Góis Monteiro to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 2, 1941, Ofício No. 82
“Entendimento com o Chefe da Missão Militar Americano” in Mauro
Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar
Dutra: O dever da Verdade, pp.  425–431. It may be noteworthy that
before Miller had this conversation with the chief of staff, Ambassador
Caffery had asked President Vargas if he would authorize it. Why the presi-
dent would need to authorize a meeting between the head of the military
mission and the chief of staff remains unclear.
62. Ibid. p. 429.
63. Ibid. p. 431.
64. “Sizes of the Brazilian Armed Forces in July 1941,” Intelligence Branch,
MID, Combat Factor, Brazil, July 1, 1941, 6010, G2 Regional, RG 165,
NARA.
65. Leite and Novelli Jr., eds., Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O dever da
Verdade, p.  430. The British attaché was Lt. Colonel Parry-Jones. The
reality was that the Brazilian army had never conducted such large-scale
training maneuvers in the northeast.
66. For military competition between Brazil and Argentina, see Luiz Alberto
Moniz Bandeira, Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração
na América do Sul (Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul 1870–2003) (Rio de
Janeiro: Revan, 2003), pp. 197–217.
67. By the spring of 1942, the Brazilian government agreed to an extensive
photomapping program from French Cayenne to Uruguay of a stretch
100  km inland and along the Amazon up to Iquitos, Peru. War Dept.,
Special Staff, Historical Division, “History of United States Army Forces
South Atlantic,” (1945), p. 30.
68. Eurico Dutra to Getúlio Vargas, Rio, June 5, 1941, No. 35-25 (Pessoal e
Secreta), and Getúlio Vargas to Eurico Dutra, Rio, June 6,1941 in Mauro
Renault Leite and Luiz Gonzaga Novelli Jr., eds, Marechal Eurico Gaspar
Dutra: O dever da Verdade., pp. 418–425.
69. Joachim von Ribbentrop to Prüfer, Berlin, June 11, 1941, 235/157214,
telegram as in Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII,
p. 41. He is replying to Prüfer’s telegram of June 6. Getúlio Vargas, Diário,
1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 398 (5 June 1941). The president gave no hint as
to what he discussed with the German ambassador.
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    95

70. The Lend-Lease comment was in Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II

p. 399 (10 June 1941) and the conversation with the Japanese ambassador
in ibid. pp. 396–397 (29 May 1941).
71. Col. Paul M. Robinett, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Washington,
June 14, 1941, BCD 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff), NARA. This set of records of the joint chiefs was declassified August
20, 1973. Colonel Robinett was closely associated with General Marshall,
was involved in the Arcadia Conference (1941), later fought and was
wounded in North Africa. It is noteworthy that the Brazilian Army awarded
him its Order of Military Merit. See Biographical Sketch, Paul M. Robinett
Papers, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Va.
72. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960),
pp. 286–287.
73. Sumner Welles to Jefferson Caffery, Washington, June 26, 1941, 810.20
Defense/892a:Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp. 501–502.
74. Caffery to Welles, Rio de Janeiro, June 27, 1941 (3 p.m.), 810.20
Defense/892 1//2:Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1941, Vol. VI, (Washington: GPO, 1963), p. 502.
75. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York:
Harper, 1948), pp. 303–304.
76. Stetson Conn & Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1960),
pp. 286–287.
77. Ibid. p. 287.
78. Ibid. p.  291. The American members returned to the United States on
October 5, 1941.
79. Commission of Officers of the North American General Staff to
Commission of Officers of the Brazilian General Staff, Rio de Janeiro,
September 25, 1941, with attached memo by Góes Monteiro, same place
and date, BDC5700, 5740 Reports The Defense of Northeastern Brazil,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG218, NARA.
80. Jefferson Caffery, Rio, September 24, 1941, No. 5437, Brazil 5900, G2
Regional, RG 165, NARA.  The phrase the ambassador reported was
“tapeação de aviação,” which I translated as “aviation scam.”
81. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp.  415–416 (August 19,
1941), pp. 424–425 (August 22–26, 1941).
82. Ibid., 424, entry for August 22, 1941. “Em resumo: os americanos que-
rem nos arrastar à Guerra na Europa sob o pretexto de defesa da América.”
96   F. D. MCCANN

83. Memo, WPD for GHQ, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4516-38; Report of G-3 GHQ,
18 Dec 41, GHQ 337 Staff Conferences Binder 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
84. Ibid. 425, August 25, 1941. Góes had Miller recalled; see Stetson Conn &
Byron Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 301–302.
85. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp.  440–442 (entries
December 7–12, 1941).
86. Ibid. p. 443 (December 21, 1941). American distrust of Dutra and Góes
was persistent.
87. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Vol. I, 332. At the end of
December 1941, the British-American Arcadia Conference that set the
strategy for the war designated the route through Brazil as the most impor-
tant one between the hemispheres; Conn and Fairchild, Framework of
Hemisphere Defense, p. 304.
88. Conn & Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp.  292–293.
The previous Rainbow 4 series was based on the assumption that Great
Britain would collapse. The shift of focus to the South Atlantic necessarily
increased the importance of Brazil’s security in US Army thinking.
89. WPD study, Dec 21, 1941, subject: “Immediate Military Measures,” OPD
Exec 4, Book 2, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
90. Remarks of Gen Marshall at Standing Liaison Committee meeting, January
3, 1942, SLC Minutes, Vol. II, Item 42, MMB, RG165, NARA.
91. Brief Joint Estimate (General Marshall and Admiral Stark), December 20,
1941, WPD 4402-136, MMB, RG 165, NARA. This was presented at the
Arcadia Conference, where Roosevelt met with Churchill. They agreed
that the Iberian Peninsula and Africa were likely targets.
92. Memo from WPD for Chief of Staff, December 21, 1941, WPD 4224-­
208, MMB, RG 165, NARA.
93. The Selective Training and Service Act was approved on Sept. 16, 1940,
providing one year of training for 1,200,000 men between 21 and 35 years
of age. This was the first time in history that the United States enacted a
peacetime draft.
94. Conn & Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 146–148.
95. Ibid. p.  149. The other preliminary operations were completion of the
occupation of Iceland, occupation of Dakar, and protective occupation of
the Portuguese Azores and Cape Verdes, as well as the Spanish Canaries.
Obviously to move anywhere in the South Atlantic, Northeast Brazil had
to be secure as a base of operations.
96. The US embassy delivered the proposal for this to President Vargas on
Nov. 13 and he discussed it with Dutra that day; see Getúlio Vargas,
Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 435 (13 November 1941).
   SEARCH FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS    97

97. On Clay and Candee’s trip to Brazil, see Oral History Interview, Major
General Kenner F.  Hertford by Richard D.  McKinzie, June 17, 1974,
Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Mo. For the building of
American air bases, see McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance,
221–239.
98. Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio,
1943), Vol. 9, pp. 187–190. He presented an optimistic face to his military
and reminded the United States that he was still waiting for arms. Simmons,
Rio, January 2, 1942, #6172, 832.00/1454, RG59, NARA. Dramatically
Vargas told the officers “I shall be with you, ready to fight, to win, to die.”
 CHAPTER 4

Brazil’s Options Narrow

Inter-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro

(January 1942)
A month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American people
were deeply distressed and fearful, and Washington was anxious to expand
the number of its allies against the Axis and to have the American Republics
present a unified front. The previous Inter-American conferences in Lima
(December 1938), Panama (October 1939), and Havana (July 1940) had
set a tone of cooperation in the unfolding world crisis. The deep suspi-
cions with which Latin Americans viewed the United States, because of
American interventions in previous decades, had been ameliorated, but
not fully eliminated, by Roosevelt’s 1933 renunciation of intervention and
the launching of the Good Neighbor Policy. Truly, Latin American leaders
tended to have private reservations and doubts about the reality of
Roosevelt’s pledge, but it was convenient to act publicly as if it were true.1
Moreover Americans, despite Good Neighbor rhetoric, tended “to regard
the portion of the New World that lay to their south as their sphere of
influence, a sphere whose economic potential to the degree that it bene-
fited foreigners must benefit primarily the citizens of the United States.”2
With the Axis threat now looming, the American Republics gathered in
Rio de Janeiro to find a common response to the Japanese attack and
German-Italian declarations of war. Nine republics in Central America and
the Caribbean had declared war on Japan already. It could be argued that

© The Author(s) 2018 99

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_4
100   F. D. MCCANN

the Good Neighbor Policy was paying dividends. However that may be,
President Vargas was probably realistic when he commented in his diary
that such declarations were likely more due to American pressure than to
spontaneous decisions.3 Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela called for a
resolution that would make the breaking of relations with the Axis manda-
tory, but Argentina and Chile were opposed. Chile was understandably
fearful that its long, undefended coastline would be open to Japanese
assault, especially because the American navy had been seriously mutilated
by the Pearl Harbor attack. When Washington promised that its fleet
would protect the Chilean coast, Foreign Minister Gabriel Rossetti insen-
sitively retorted, “What fleet? The one sunk in Pearl Harbor?” Meanwhile,
the Japanese embassy in Santiago was promising that there would be no
attack if Chile stayed neutral.4
Chile’s relationship with Germany was complicated. German offi-
cers had worked to modernize the Chilean army since 1884, for several
years a German officer served as chief of the general staff, and Chilean
units on parade looked very much like the German army. However, the
Prussianization was less substantive than “a matter of style.” But it was so
persistent that honor guard units were still wearing spiked Prussian-style
helmets in 2017! Moreover, strong German influence played an important
role in upgrading and modernizing Chilean education.5
Being contrary the Argentines reinforced the negative image that
Secretary of State Hull had of them. The Brazilians and Americans expended
much effort during the conference to bring the Argentines into the Allied
fold. If Germany won the war, Argentine leaders believed that they would
gain “the Golden Market for Argentina’s traditional exports … [as well as]
capital, manufacturers, and branch-plant technology.” That “if” would not
materialize, but for a time American planners even considered invading
Argentina to remove the supposed “Nazi Menace.”6 Many Argentines
thought of the war as a distant European conflict and did not want to
embrace American-led Western Hemisphere solidarity. Reportedly, their
delegates at Rio showered Peruvian and Paraguayan delegates with atten-
tion and money, trying to convince them to assume an extreme neutralist
stance. Germany, according to the FBI, had spread money around in Buenos
Aires.7 And, like Chile, Argentina’s military connections with Germany had
age and depth.8 It is possible, as some have argued, that Argentina acted as
it did to resist US dominance of the Western Hemisphere; local [Nazi] Party
pressure was insignificant.9 Whatever the reasons, Argentine refusal strained
relations with Washington for many years.
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    101

Throughout the conference, Foreign Minister Aranha and President

Vargas acted as mediators to bring the Argentines around and to restrain
the Americans from alienating them completely. They did not want
Argentina to become so isolated that it might react militarily against Brazil.
The Brazilians were not only in the American camp, they were leading the
other republics toward a complete break with the Axis. Days before, on
New Year’s Eve, Vargas had addressed a dinner of military leaders in which
he said that the decision to stand with the United States had been clear
from the moment of the Japanese attack. Brazil did not need international
congresses to show it where its responsibilities lay. He called for unity
against rumor mongers and against propaganda from suspicious and self-­
interested sources. He added a reminder to the Americans that he trusted
that the arms they needed “will be delivered in opportune time.” He
affirmed that if attacked, a united, cohesive Brazil would fight and the
Pátria would not succumb.10

Rio Conference, January 1942

In the heat and humidity of the Brazilian summer, the Vargas govern-
ment was pleased to be hosting the Third Consultative Conference of
the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to decide on a com-
mon course of action. The conference would set Brazil firmly on the
path against the Axis, although at times Washington was uncertain of
the Brazilian commitment. Sumner Welles and Aranha had become good
friends during the latter’s years as ambassador in Washington, and holding
the conference in Rio meant that Aranha would be chairman.11
The Americans had some difficulty understanding what was happening
in Brazil. It is now possible to see a bit behind the scenes. On Friday,
January 9, Vargas worked on his speech for the conference and showed the
draft to Oswaldo Aranha who wanted to make sure that his own address
reflected that of the president.12 Negotiations to secure Northeast Brazil
and to provide arms for the Brazilian forces were stalled, but beyond the
foreign ministers’ speechmaking, Vargas and Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles held historic conversations. Secretary Hull did not think he
himself should be away from Washington, and Roosevelt probably was
more comfortable with Sumner Welles leading the American delegation.13
Two days before Welles disembarked from his Pan American seaplane at
Rio’s Santos Dumont Airport, Vargas met with the National Security
Council in a very unusual session on Saturday afternoon, to discuss the
102   F. D. MCCANN

international situation, defense needs, and the coming conference. He

could not have been clearer when he told its members that “Brazil must
stand or fall with the United States” and that anyone in the government
who disagreed was “at liberty to resign his position.” They agreed unani-
mously. Generals Dutra and Góes Monteiro, who reportedly had believed
in the early months of the war that Germany would prevail, commented
that Vargas’s stance was “the only correct policy for Brazil to follow.”
However, they lamented that the country had little ability to defend itself.
Unfortunately, the Army’s repeated attempts to obtain weaponry from the
United States had thus far resulted in “nothing but token shipments despite
the promises of the American government.” They mentioned as an exam-
ple that the few small tanks that had been sent had arrived “without arma-
ment” and so were “practically useless.” Both men had recently told Axis
representatives, as well as those of Argentina and Chile, that Brazil would
be standing with the United States. Vargas assured the National Security
Council members that the armed forces would not have to worry about
subversive activities, even of the uprisings of German or Italian sympathiz-
ers, because “the Brazilian people were 100% in agreement with his policy”
and they would take care of any Axis-instigated uprisings (Fig. 4.1).14
Under Secretary Welles arrived in Rio on Monday, January 12, and that
very night, he and Ambassador Caffery met with Vargas in Guanabara
Palace. Welles gave him a letter from FDR repeating his invitation to visit
Washington so he could repay “the warm welcome that you and the
Brazilian people gave me when I visited your beautiful capital in 1936.”
He observed that “no country has done more to bring … [a growing
inter-American solidarity] about than Brazil, and no person has given it
wiser leadership than yourself.”
Praising Getúlio’s “magnificent cooperation … generous attitude and
assistance with regard to … the ferry service to Africa and the naval and air
patrols from your ports and airfields …,” he offered his appreciation “from
the bottom of my heart….” Then he turned to what Getúlio wanted to
know most of all, saying that

I did not fail to catch the import of the reference in your speech of December
31 to the delivery of ‘the material elements which we still lack.’ Despite new
demands for equipment of an urgent character necessitated by the a­ ggression
of the Japanese, I assure you that before long we shall be able to supply you
with the equipment for which you have been waiting. … existing productive
capacity is being doubled in order that this country can fulfill its role as the
‘arsenal of democracy’.
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    103

Fig. 4.1  Guanabara Palace: President’s residence. (Photo courtesy of

author)

The meeting of Foreign Ministers shortly to convene in Rio under your

friendly auspices is the most important inter-American meeting that has ever
convened in the New World. The security of the Western Hemisphere, the
future welfare of all of us, may well depend upon its outcome.15

Vargas, however, remained “apprehensive.” It seemed to him that “the

Americans want to pull us into the war, without this being useful, neither
for us, nor for them.” After Welles and Caffery left, he worked on his
speech for the conference.16
On Tuesday, January 14, Argentine Foreign Minister Enrique Ruiz
Guiñazú appealed to Vargas not to break relations with the Axis. He
replied that as conference host, Brazil’s “attitude had to be conciliatory
and could not put itself in such an extreme position of opposition,” and
urged him to talk with Welles.17 The American undersecretary wrote a
fuller report that had Vargas telling Guiñazú that Brazil completely sup-
104   F. D. MCCANN

ported the United States and “considers it indispensable that a joint dec-
laration by all the American Republics for an immediate severance of
relations with the Axis powers be adopted by the Conference.” Further,
he had sent a courier to Buenos Aires with a message saying the same to
the acting president of Argentina, Ramón Castillo, and that he was using
Brazil’s considerable influence with Chile to obtain its adherence. Welles
likely got those details from Aranha. Clearly Vargas’s diary entry was more
restrained. He could have been affected by his conversations the day
before regarding the once again requests from Dutra and Góes to resign.18
The army leaders were opposed to breaking relations because they lacked
armament and were losing faith in American promises to provide it.
Welles was convinced that if it had not been for the “strong and helpful
position taken by President Vargas and by Aranha four of the other South
American Republics would probably have drifted in the direction of
Argentina.”19 Welles had a very low opinion of Foreign Minister Guiñazú,
who the year before he had heard praise Mussolini and Spanish dictator
Francisco Franco, and so it is not surprising that he regarded him as “one
of the stupidest men ever to hold office in Argentina’s proud history.”20
In the long telegram to Roosevelt, Welles reported that the ambassa-
dors of Germany, Italy, and Japan had sent threatening letters to Vargas
warning that if Brazil broke diplomatic relations, it would mean war with
the Axis. Vargas and Aranha were anxious that this threat be kept quiet for
the present. Vargas told Welles that his responsibility for taking Brazil into
war was very great and that his efforts during the past 18 months to obtain
arms from the United States had not been successful, but that he depended
on FDR to understand his “crucial difficulties.” Brazil, the president said,
unlike a small Central American country, could not be satisfied and feel
protected by the stationing of American soldiers on its territory. Rather it
had “the right to be regarded by the United States as a friend and ally and
as entitled to be furnished under the Lend-Lease Act with planes, tanks,
and coast artillery sufficient to enable the Brazilian Army to defend at least
in part those regions of northeastern Brazil whose defense was as vitally
necessary for the United States as for Brazil ….” Welles and General
Marshall had agreed not to raise the possibility of stationing American
troops in the northeast, which was a dead letter until the Brazilian army
received at least “a minimum of materiel requested by President Vargas.”21
The problem was not so much a question of American will, but of short-
ages and building the manufacturing infrastructure to produce the massive
quantities of arms, equipment, and ammunition. That took time. General
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    105

Marshall admitted that “shortages make it practically impossible to find any-

thing for immediate or even reasonably prompt delivery.”22 While watching
a horse-jumping exhibition, Welles asked Vargas for a private meeting, which
they set for the next Monday evening during the festive reception for the
conference delegates at Guanabara Palace, the president’s residence.23
There was a cultural difference in the way Americans and Brazilians
viewed the proper style for holding an international conference. The
Americans wanted to keep focused on the tasks at hand, while the Brazilians
wanted to mix in some levity. The Brazilians knew that some quiet busi-
ness could be done in social settings, so they wanted to have some recep-
tions complete with formal dress. Caffery telegraphed the State Department
that “he was doing his best, but that, it was next to impossible to keep the
Brazilians and especially Aranha from entertaining.” When the Chilean
ambassador announced that he wanted to hold a reception in honor of his
foreign minister, Caffery envisioned the possibility of 20 such affairs. He
invited his Latin American colleagues to a meeting at his residence and
persuaded them to agree that they would not give any “conference par-
ties.” Wistfully, he told State that, “it is extremely difficult to prevent the
Brazilians from adding more parties to their list.”24
Meanwhile, the day after the conversation with Welles in Petrópolis,
Vargas returned to Rio for a round of golf at the Itanhangá Club in the
Barra da Tijuca. After the round Argentine Minister Guiñazú came by to
propose a conciliatory formula to support the United States. Aranha, who
was there, argued against the idea, but Vargas thought it worth examining
and pressed the Argentine to speak with Welles.25
The next morning Vargas and Aranha discussed the probable conse-
quences of breaking relations with the Axis. The president also learned that
Góes Monteiro and Dutra were still talking about resigning. On January
15, as the Inter-American Conference was opening in the Tiradentes Palace
in downtown Rio, Vargas and Dutra were in Guanabara Palace discussing
the generals’ wish to resign. A decision to break relations, as the Americans
wanted, would take them to war, which, Dutra insisted, the army opposed
because it was not ready. He emphasized that without the arms that the
Americans had been promising, but not delivering, the armed forces could
not adequately defend Brazilian territory, especially if Argentina main-
tained relations with the Axis. That night General Góes came by the palace,
and after outlining the recent developments, Vargas convinced him that his
and Dutra’s resignations would be most inconvenient. Góes agreed and
said he would persuade Dutra to stay.26
106   F. D. MCCANN

On the early evening of January 19, the crucial “long and frank” con-
versation between Vargas and Welles took place in the president’s favorite
escape on top of the hill (morro) at the far end of the palace grounds,
which was cool and very private. Vargas must have regarded this meeting
as very important because he wrote one of the longest entries in his diaries
about it. He said that circumstances had given Brazil the role of arbitrator
between the United States and Argentina and Chile who did not want to
break relations with the Axis. He did not want to take advantage of that
role, observing that he could not risk his country without some security
guarantees, principally the delivery of war materiel. The day before, Welles
had telegraphed FDR asking permission to promise in his name that if
Vargas gave him a list of the minimum war materiel needed, Roosevelt
would guarantee that it would be made available at “the first possible
moment.” Welles had gently reminded Roosevelt that “like all armies, the
Brazilian High Command is not inclined to be enthusiastic about getting
into war if they have none of the basic elements for defense.”27 He admit-
ted that General Marshall had expressed doubt about Brazil and that the
chief of staff worried it was “not safe to give Brazil arms that they may use
against us.” But Welles rejected that idea and warned that “[an Axis-­
inspired] revolution in Brazil might have fatal repercussions … If we felt it
necessary to move by force into Northeast Brazil, the effort might be far
greater than we care to envisage.”28
Roosevelt wrote his response by hand and sent it to Lawrence Duggan,
a key Department of State adviser on political relations. He could not
reach Welles or any of his staff by telephone, so he called Ambassador
Caffery in Rio, who was to meet with Welles and Vargas shortly. FDR said
“Tell President Vargas I wholly understand and appreciate the needs and
can assure him flow of material will start at once. …there are shortages in
a few items which I do not trust to putting on the wire … I want to get
away as soon as possible from token shipments and increase them to a
minimum of Brazilian requirements very quickly. Tell him I am made very
happy by his splendid policy and give him my very warm regards.” A list
of immediate shipments was to follow in a separate coded message.29
Vargas and Welles talked more about the necessity of attracting
Argentina. Welles expressed his dismay with and distrust of Argentina. He
said that Japan had given money to certain Chilean political figures,
including Foreign Minister Juan Bautista Rossetti. Vargas kept emphasiz-
ing that “he needed the delivery of the armaments that the American
government was delaying.” Welles gave him absolute guarantees and told
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    107

him that he had sent Roosevelt an urgent cable and expected a rapid
response. The under secretary, likely feeling the importance of the
moment, then went a step further by placing a telephone call to the White
House. Roosevelt assured Welles that 65 light tanks and 2000 other mili-
tary vehicles would be sent immediately. Vargas was worried about
Argentina’s attitude and the need to attract it to their side. Welles was
irritated with Buenos Aires and said that if the Argentines did not join in
breaking with the Axis, the United States would cut them off. He con-
fided that he was betting his position as under secretary on achieving the
break in relations. Vargas rejoined that Welles could “count on Brazil, but
that with this decision, I was staking my life, because I would not survive
if it turned out to be a disaster for my pátria.”30
After that conversation they attended a lively reception in the
Guanabara Palace, complete with music. In the midst of the festivity,
Argentine Foreign Minister Guiñazú drew Vargas into a conversation, in
which the president told him that Argentine-Brazilian friendship was an
integral part of his government’s program, and reminded him that he had
grown up on the frontier and believed that it was natural for the two
peoples to understand and respect each other. “When there had been
distrust or touchiness, it was the fault of the governments not the peo-
ple.” The reception was still on when Vargas ducked out to make these
comments in his diary; he wrote that he could hear the lively music drift-
ing up from downstairs.31
Setting aside any distrust he may have had about Chilean Minister Juan
Bautista Rossetti, Welles did his best to win him over. In a four-hour con-
versation, Rossetti swore that he expected to receive instructions from
Santiago at any moment to vote in favor of breaking relations. As an
inducement to his government, Welles recommended that Chile receive
Lend-Lease arms.32 In reality, Rossetti probably was determined not to
break with the Axis. His Radical Party could not afford to antagonize the
German-Chilean community for fear of losing its support in the 1942
presidential election. And he had more personal reasons. He commented
that “if I return to Chile… after having broken relations with the Axis,
they may hang me in the Plaza de Armas”33 (Fig. 4.2).
In his office at the Itamaraty, on January 21, Aranha came up with a
new formula to gain the Argentine and Chilean votes favoring a break in
relations. The motion would be to recommend breaking relations, thus
leaving it to each republic to put the recommendation into effect.
Argentina and Chile could vote for it knowing that they would not actu-
108   F. D. MCCANN

Fig. 4.2  Itamaraty

Palace: Brazil’s foreign
ministry. (Photo
courtesy of author)

ally break relations. Vargas approved the idea as a way to appear to main-
tain unity, and that very day Welles and Guiñazú agreed to the maneuver.
However, the next day a word came that President Ramon Castillo had
forbidden Guiñazú to vote in favor of any formula that involved breaking
with the Axis. The unity that the Americans and Brazilians wanted seemed
to be slipping beyond reach. To create time for more negotiations, the
vote was delayed and the conference focused on bringing peace to the
Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict in Amazonia. The fighting had lasted
from July 5 to 31, 1941, and an armistice had been signed in October;
what was negotiated at Rio was a protocol setting forth the procedure by
which a diplomatic settlement would be reached.34
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    109

The Americans also had their own problem with the formula. Secretary
Hull was livid when he learned of it, which was heightened by late-night
radio news that spoke of an Argentine victory at the Rio Conference.
According to Adolf Berle, who was with the Secretary of State on January
24, Hull called Welles at the Copacabana Palace Hotel and had a half-hour
“violent” conversation. It was midnight in Washington and 2:00 a.m. in
Rio, and Welles was just getting into bed after a very long day. The secretary
furiously accused Welles of getting “us into a fine mess … I never gave you
‘carty blanchy’ (sic) to act for us!” He told Welles to tell the conference the
next day that he had not been authorized to vote for the compromise and
to switch his vote against it. Hull thought that Argentina should be regarded
as an “outlaw.” Furthermore, he thought Welles was being “ingenuous –
not a single government would carry out its commitments.”
Welles reminded him that he had Roosevelt’s specific approval to act as
he did. Hull denied it, so Welles insisted that they get the president on the
line for a three-way exchange. Fortunately, the president was in the White
House. Roosevelt listened to the raging diplomats then said, “I’m sorry
Cordell, but in this case I am going to take the judgment of the man on
the spot. Sumner, I approve what you have done. I authorize you to fol-
low the lines you have recommended.” Hull supposedly never forgave
either of them. Caffery weighed in with a telegram to Hull saying that
“General feeling here is far better… to secure… adhesion of Argentina and
Chile to this formula [i.e. to recommend a break] than to a more ideal
formula [i.e. to insist on a break] without them.” They were so delighted
at having FDR’s backing, that Welles and Caffery “really tied one on that
night,” which left Welles with some difficulty functioning the next morn-
ing. Nevertheless, he was able to cable FDR his thanks assuring him that
“We have achieved … a result which is the safest for the interests of our
own country.”35 Hull felt humiliated and worn down and was, according
to Adolf Berle, “nervously and spiritually torn to pieces”; he took to his
bed for a week.36 The breach between the two diplomats festered like a
wound that refused to heal.
On Sunday, January 25, Dutra sent Vargas comments on the war materiel
that Welles had said was being sent. It was not what they had requested and
would be of little use (pouco adianta). He then went by the palace to give
Vargas a letter and one from General Góes, both saying that the military had
not been sufficiently heard regarding the consequences of breaking relations
and that “Brazil is not prepared for war.” That night Aranha also sent a let-
ter dealing with the American pressure on Brazil to break immediately and
110   F. D. MCCANN

Roosevelt’s appeal to Vargas to do so. The president noted in his diary that
“Oswaldo proposed ending the conference by declaring Brazil’s relations
with the Axis broken. I did not respond. I can’t act precipitously. … There
is still the matter of Argentina’s position, which will probably [cause it to
become] a foco of reaction against the North Americans and a center of
intrigues. I think that I am going to have an unpleasant night.”37
The next day, Aranha and Vargas had a long conversation about the
international situation and the necessity of announcing the break with the
Axis at the closing ceremony. Vargas, in a display of caution, called a cabi-
net meeting for that last day of the conference to make a final decision just
before the closing at 5 p.m. He noted in his diary that “there are doubts
about the attitude of the minister of war. Only there are no doubts that we
are traversing a grave moment concerning the fate of Brazil.” To head off
an inopportune move by Dutra to resign before the cabinet meeting,
Vargas had his son-in-law Amaral Peixoto arrange to have the war minis-
ter, Góes, and Aranha gather at his house. The two generals were feeling
some resentment toward Aranha, and Vargas wanted to smooth things
over before the cabinet met. They then went to the executive offices in the
Catete Palace for the meeting at 3:30 p.m. (Fig. 4.3).
Vargas summarized the situation stressing the appeal that the American
government had made, the advantages of responding and the disadvan-
tages of any delay, and the consequences that could come from a negative
attitude. He had each minister state his views. When it was Dutra’s turn,
he read a very long prepared statement that justified his hesitations by
repeatedly emphasizing “our lack of military preparation for war.” He also
read a brief letter from Góes Monteiro saying that the armed forces were
not adequately equipped “to defend our territory.”38 He blamed the
Americans for not providing arms and feared that they would not do so
but ended by expressing his “solidarity with me.” Vargas praised the min-
ister’s “frankness and loyalty” and authorized Aranha to declare the rup-
ture of relations at the closing session of the conference, asserting that he
took the responsibility on his own shoulders. Concluding the foregoing in
his diary, Vargas admitted feeling “a certain sadness” because “many of
those who applaud this decision … are adversaries of the regime that I
founded, and I begin to doubt that I can consolidate it to pass the govern-
ment tranquilly to my substitute.”39
Aranha’s speech was full of allusions to Pan Americanism and how
Brazil’s solidarity with America was “historic and traditional.” “The deci-
sions of [all of] America always obligate Brazil and, even more, the aggres-
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    111

Fig. 4.3  Catete Palace

President’s Offices,
where the cabinet met.
In the second Vargas
government in the
1950s, the president
lived here. (Photo
courtesy of the author)

sions against America.”40 The passage of time had not just increased the
self-confidence of Brazilians in themselves, but also their awareness of soli-
darity with their American brothers. “Today at 1800 hours, by order of
the president of the republic, Brazil’s ambassadors in Berlin and Tokyo,
and Chargé d’affaires in Rome communicated to those governments that
in virtue of the recommendations [of this conference]… Brazil broke dip-
lomatic and commercial relations….” “For the first time … the structure
of Pan-Americanism has been put to the test, a whole continent declares
itself united for a common action, in defense of a common ideal, that is all
of America. We fulfill our duty as Americans … [and] assume the respon-
sibilities that fulfill our universal destinies.”41
112   F. D. MCCANN

Getúlio listened to the conclusion of the conference on the radio and

thought that the speeches were “well applauded” but in general were full
of “the same wordy, obsolete, and phony liberal rhetoric.”42 At 8 p.m.
Roosevelt cabled Vargas saying that the peoples of the Americas were in
his debt for his clear-sighted leadership. “Continental solidarity … has
been greatly strengthened. [It was] a magnificent triumph over those who
have endeavored to sow disunity among them …. That triumph has been
sealed by the prompt and forthright decision of your Government and of
the other American Governments …. Your personal friendship in these
critical times is a source of constant inspiration to me.”43
The next day Welles and Caffery had lunch with the president, when
they talked frankly about the risks Brazil was running and the need for war
materiels and industrial products for its defense and security. Welles made
the most formal promises that he would take care of that. He was very
upset with Argentina and disposed to not only deny it any aid but to take
economic and financial measures against it. Vargas kept a discrete silence
to Welles’ threats. To add more drama to the day, when the Argentines’
plane took off from Santos Dumont airfield, it crashed into Guanabara
Bay. Vargas observed that “happily everyone was saved.”44
Welles returned to Washington with fresh lists of what the Brazilian
military wanted. All the American Republics, save Argentina and Chile,
followed the Rio conference’s recommendation to break relations with the
Axis. Even so, tension and uncertainty continued between Rio de Janeiro
and Washington.45
While the diplomats had been meeting in Rio, American Colonels
Lucius D. Clay and Robert C. Candee had surveyed the northeast to get
a clearer idea of the region and in the process gained a sounder under-
standing of the complex Brazilian situation:

We left Washington with the impression that the War Department regarded
Northeast Brazil as a highly strategic area where hostile military operations
might develop at any moment and – where it was therefore imperative to
have U.S. troops – air and ground-as soon as possible. We find in Rio much
“solidarity,” Good Neighborliness, and a willingness to concede the impor-
tance of the defense of N.E. Brazil, but practically no inclination to do any-
thing concrete in the matter. The Brazilians agree that the area should be
defended and say that they will seek our air units, or even ground forces,
when attack becomes imminent. In the meantime, they will gladly permit
the conversion of commercial fields into military airports and the installation
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    113

of other facilities and improvements by us while they furnish the ground

protection. The Ambassador agrees that we should have troops in NE Brazil
but believes that these must be limited to air units for the present. Mr.
Sumner Welles regards Brazilians as among our best friends but holds that
the War Department has put a considerable strain on their friendship by
blocking the delivery of certain military equipment which we have promised
to furnish Brazil.46

Returning from their journey, the colonels concluded that they could
do no more until the two governments reached a broader understanding
and returned to Washington with little to show for their efforts. The Joint
Military Board could not do more, because the Brazilian members believed
that the board’s task was limited to “supervising a construction program
that would not involve or imply participation of United States Army
ground forces in the defense of the Brazilian bulge.” Informally, the
Brazilian chairman of the board advised Colonel Clay that joint defense
was a dead issue until the two governments had a formal agreement set-
ting out the responsibilities of each side.47
Military Attaché Miller also recommended that the two governments
reach an agreement “which will satisfactorily solve this question of partici-
pation of the armed forces in the defense of Northeast Brazil.”48 Miller
was increasingly fearful about the Brazilian attitude regarding defense of
the northeast. He had to make an effort not to show that he was losing his
patience in conversations with officials, such as air chief Brigadeiro
Eduardo Gomes. In an exchange on January 28, Gomes insisted that
“Brazilian forces must be allowed to provide the initial defense of Brazilian
territory.” They would call for American help only if they were unable to
hold off an enemy attack. Miller lamented that “if the view of Brigadeiro
Eduardo Gomes prevails, our ground and air forces will arrive in Brazil too
late for effective assistance, if they arrive at all.” He had been forceful with
Gomes, saying that with the break in relations, Brazil would eventually be
in the war and “we will be Allies. … I cannot understand why some of the
Brazilian Military authorities are so opposed to permitting any American
soldiers or aviators to come to Brazil to help defend your territory.”
Gomes replied, “It is because we wish to be the first to defend Brazilian
territory. As long as we live we shall defend it and ask you to give us the
necessary equipment.” Miller: “Does that mean that you insist on defend-
ing alone Northeast Brazil when the attack comes and that only after dis-
covering that you are unable to meet the attack alone you will call upon us
114   F. D. MCCANN

for help?” Gomes: “Yes, we wish to be the first to defend Brazil and if we
find that we need help we will ask you for that assistance.” Miller: “Then
it will be too late. We are as far from Brazil as is Europe. Help cannot be
sent in a few hours of time.” Gomes: “All you need to do is to put in a few
more landing fields between the United States and Brazil and that will
permit help to be sent very quickly.” Miller explained that “help consists
of more than individual airplanes, and that ships cannot be held in waiting
for the dispatch of the other means of assistance that are always necessary.”
Gomes said that he did not believe an attack against Brazil was imminent.
Miller: “How do you know?” Gomes: “We will be glad to have you use
your Navy, including Navy aviation to assist us at any time.” Miller: “How
many ships do we have in the South Atlantic at the present time? Our
Navy does not yet have the means to act effectively both in the Atlantic
and Pacific. The attack may come before you expect it. I lie awake nights
worrying about the danger of an attack against Brazil, and I am not willing
to assume the responsibility of military cooperation in the defense of Brazil
under the conditions which now exist. It seems to me that you people are
motivated either by distrust of the United States’ intentions or by false
pride.” Gomes: “It isn’t distrust of the United States. If it were we would
not be willing to have your Navy operating from Northeast Brazil ports.
Your navy could take Northeast Brazil if it desired.” Miller opined that
“Brazil should welcome the assistance of all possible Allies if she is really
apprehensive of the danger confronting her.” Gomes said that he thought
that Northeast Brazil only needed the protection of three squadrons of
pursuit planes against bombing raids and that “if the airplanes are fur-
nished to the Brazilian Air Force it can provide the necessary personnel.”
A clearly frustrated Miller wrote to Ambassador Caffery that “All attempts
at a favorable solution directly between the representatives of the armed
forces have been of little avail.” He concluded by urgently recommending
that the two governments, by diplomatic channels, reach “some general
agreement … which will satisfactorily solve this question of participation
of the armed forces in the defense of Northeast Brazil which is so vital for
the defense of this hemisphere and the United States.”49
Miller’s agitation to get American troops into Brazil deeply offended
the great Brazilian ally of the United States, Oswaldo Aranha. Reportedly
he was “sore as hell!” He was quoted as saying “That’s always the way
whenever you let the military do it. They have no understanding of the
human factors that enter into any political situation.” He remarked that
“Brazil has graciously agreed to the construction of landing fields and
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    115

other military air preparations at Recife and Natal. However … all this did
not satisfy General Miller. He wants Brazil to agree to a further intensifica-
tion of American military presence on Brazilian territory.” Aranha fumed
that this was something “he will resist even if he has to go and carry a gun
himself.” Dramatically, he threatened, “Much as I love the United States
… I would be the first to shoot an American soldier who dared to land on
Brazilian territory against the wishes of this government.”50
The question of sending American military to Brazil hinged on
Washington fulfilling the promises to supply arms and equipment made to
Góes Monteiro during his visits to the states. The request to send marines
to guard the new base at Natal was the “storm center” of a persistent clash
of nationalisms. Miller’s position, which they had to have the American
army guarding Northeast Brazil, was based on distrust of the leaders of the
Brazilian army. By early January 1942, Brazilian staff officers were think-
ing that they had made a mistake in the initial negotiations by going as far
as they had, which had left them open for further demands. Letting the
Americans send troops into Brazil would wound “national pride” and per-
haps reveal that “even the President’s unique grasp on the country would
not be strong enough to withstand public indignation.” Such a turn of
events “would create an excellent opportunity for the Nazis and the
Integralistas to exploit the situation, using as their motto the already exist-
ing slogan ‘Brazil for the Brazilians.’” The Brazilian General Staff opined
“that the arbitrary occupation of Brazilian soil by the United States land
forces would have serious reaction in the other South American countries
and would endanger the entire ‘Good Neighbor’ policy.” General Góes
Monteiro met with various generals to say that he was ready to step aside,
if anyone of them was “willing to turn Natal over to the United States
Marines.” They all refused. Even General Ary Pires, assistant chief of staff,
who was “an out-and-out anti-Nazi, has been particularly contrary to the
United States Army demand.”51 It was clear that while the Rio Conference
had been successful, there was much to be done to pump life into the
relationship of the two republics.
In early March alarming rumors were adding to the worries and frustra-
tions. Supposedly Berlin had sent orders that the Vargas government
should be overthrown. Who was to do that was unclear. Meanwhile Axis
submarines had sunk four Brazilian ships and a fifth was several days over-
due. Observers thought that the sinkings were meant to serve notice that
if the other Latin American Republics followed Brazil’s lead, they would
receive similar punishment.52 Fifth column activities had grown bolder,
116   F. D. MCCANN

and intensified Axis propaganda was emphasizing the inability of the

United States to provide military equipment or adequate shipping. There
was a fantastic story that Japan had secretly organized a military force
composed of Japanese immigrants in Brazil that was ready to attack São
Paulo. Painting a dire picture of the situation in Brazil, the American
army’s intelligence chief, Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee, warned that
the political stability of the Vargas regime depended to a large extent upon
the support of the United States. “Without our strong support, the pres-
ent government may fall.”53 Clearly fear was unsettling and spreading
though both governments. The acting chief of the Latin American Section
of US Army intelligence warned that there were an “excessive number” of
Americans in Brazil “investigating or reporting or arranging for bases,
factories, railroads, espionage, propaganda or motion pictures. There are
too many Americans on official missions without knowledge of the lan-
guage, custom, and character of the people.”54
Evidently General Miller had decided that there should be one less
American on the scene. After returning from a trip to Washington at the
end of the previous October, he told Góes Monteiro that he had tried to
resign as attaché, but that Marshall had refused. He intended to keep
seeking relief.55 In the midst of the rumor-filled atmosphere after the Rio
Conference, Marshall relented and ordered Miller back to Washington.
Publicly it looked as if he was being relieved against his will. A defender
wrote to General Marshall: “the only individuals … in the Armed Forces
of Brazil who have anything against General Miller are ultra-nationalists
… or well-known pro-totalitarian generals and high police officials as well
as members of the Integralista movement ….” The writer, Paul Vanorden
Shaw, had been born in Brazil to a missionary and academic family, had a
PhD in political science from Columbia University, and taught at the
Universidade de São Paulo (1934–1940). He followed developments in
Brazilian foreign relations closely, and from his correspondence, it appears
that he was quite knowledgeable. He observed that Americans who
bucked “the appeasement policy of the State Department and of the
American Embassy here in Rio” have been “pushed out.” He asserted
that “the policy which Washington has followed and is following with
respect to Brazil is suicidal from the point of view of military cooperation
which is the only thing that counts now.” He noted that “General Miller
speaks almost perfect Portuguese, a fact which is extremely rare among
Americans who have lived here even a longer time than he.… His inter-
pretation of Brazil is the only safe one on which to proceed at the moment
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    117

and that any other is dangerous if not suicidal.” Shaw was convinced that
his departure was “a great loss,” and the circumstances surrounding his
return were “symptomatic of an underlying situation which is fraught
with grave dangers to the defense plans of the Americas….” He con-
cluded affirming that Miller was “a symbol of a great Cause in real dan-
ger.”56 There is no indication in the Army files that Marshall ever saw this
letter. But it is useful as an indication of the great tension surrounding
relations with Brazil at that time.
The difference between Brazilian and American attitudes can be
ascribed to their relative proximity to the war itself. By the end of January
1942, Axis submarines in the North Atlantic had sunk 31 ships totaling
nearly 200,000 tons. The great sea lanes along the coast of the United
States had a constant procession of unarmed tankers carrying oil from
Venezuela and Mexico that underpinned the war economy. If Germany
had concentrated on submarine assaults, it could have potentially crip-
pled the Allied war effort. The American Army Air Corps had no training
in anti-submarine operations, and the Navy did not have the proper air-
craft to carry them out. It looked as if the submarines were destroying
the Allied supply lines. In February another 71 ships went to the bot-
tom, showing, to Winston Churchill’s mind, that the Navy’s protection
was “hopelessly inadequate.” Thankfully Hitler refused to accept the
advice of his admirals that the Atlantic was crucial; instead he was fixated
on defense of the North Atlantic, believing that “Norway is the zone of
destiny in this war.”57
In North Africa Rommel’s troops pushed the British back near Tobruk
in Libya, while through January in the Philippines, MacArthur was iso-
lated on Corregidor. To these discouraging losses was added the surrender
of Singapore to the Japanese by British, Indian, and Australian forces on
Sunday February 15. The Brazilians must have wondered about the wis-
dom of their decisions. Caffery commented that “our friends here are
becoming increasingly critical of our side in the struggle: they criticize us
for too much and too loud talking and for inefficiency in our efforts. I may
add that a lot of them are becoming thoroughly frightened.”58
Within days after the Rio Conference ended, Finance Minister Artur de
Sousa Costa went to Washington to set the relationship on a more benefi-
cial footing. His goal was to broaden the Lend-Lease agreement from
military equipment to include construction costs of the Volta Redonda
steel mill, rails, and rolling stock for the Central do Brasil rail line, financ-
ing for strategic materials production, and agreements for American pur-
118   F. D. MCCANN

chases. The delivery of arms and equipment was “very urgent,” Vargas
emphasized, and would confirm “if it is worthwhile or not to be the friend
of the United States.”59 Getúlio’s concern at this point was shown by his
minute attention to the details of the negotiations in the constant stream
of communications with Sousa Costa. His telegrams listed the numbers of
combat cars, artillery pieces, and munitions which he labeled as “urgent
necessities.” He worried about the prices of coal and oil because Brazil was
totally dependent on imports from the United States. The new Lend-­
Lease accord covered all purchases to the level of $200 million. Of key
importance for the future, the Volta Redonda steel mill was included in
the Lend-Lease agreement. Along with the support for collection of natu-
ral rubber in the Amazon and for various industries, the United States
committed itself to fund and to provide advice to Brazilian industry and to
purchase its products. In effect, it was partnering in the economic devel-
opment of Brazil.60
In the midst of these negotiations, Vargas sent word about disquieting
activities on the Argentine frontier. There were reports of police forces
being substituted by Argentine army units apparently equipped for action,
placement of new radio stations, the appearance on the Uruguay River of
armed speed boats, and the hasty construction of roads and landing fields,
with engineers making maps and building bridges and storage facilities in
Posadas, Misiones. Disquieting too were reports of German agents dis-
guised as Protestant missionaries in German colonies in Southern Brazil.61

Worries About Argentina

Was Argentina preparing to attack? Such reports from the frontier were
certainly disturbing, but it all looked different from Buenos Aires. The
Brazilian Naval Attaché Augusto do Amaral Peixoto clarified the situation.
The same kind of threatening rumor about a Brazilian buildup on the
frontier was then current in Argentina. He attributed the coincidence of
stories of military concentrations on both sides along their common bor-
der to those “most interested in a clash, the Nazis.” He went further say-
ing that this was not a good time for Argentina to go to war. It was
completely isolated, without supplies for a military campaign,

agitated internally by a policy that divided the nation in two big groups
absorbed by economic problems, it was not believable that Argentine leaders
could think of a struggle which in the ultimate analysis would be a war against
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    119

the continent! As extremely Nazi as the government pretends to be, it can

do little more than stay neutral in the hope of a German victory so it can
assume the classic attitude of stabbing us in the back.

He advised Ambassador José de Paula Rodrigues Alves that “our duty

is to try, as much as possible, to unmask the Nazi intrigues, avoiding ‘mis-
understandings’, but at the same time, staying alert as long as the present
Executive Power is dragging the Argentine nation toward the sad situation
of isolation on the South American continent. As for movements of the
Argentine fleet, they are limited to an inefficient patrolling without an
organized plan that seems aimed at satisfying public opinion.” He went on
to say that the great majority of Argentines favored a policy of aiding the
United States and that the Buenos Aires newspapers did not hide their
displeasure with the “frank sympathies of the president for the Axis.” The
government’s declaration of a “state of siege” silencing the press and end-
ing the legislative session allowed it to resist the pressures produced by the
Rio Conference.
President Castillo distorted the facts, Amaral Peixoto asserted, and
made it appear as if he was defending national sovereignty by not “submit-
ting to ‘North American impositions.’” He commented that FDR and
Churchill had been cheered when they appeared in newsreels so that
recently the censors were editing them out. He believed that Argentina’s
neutral status would make Buenos Aires the center of Nazi espionage in
South America. At the moment Argentines regarded Brazil’s attitude with
admiration, but he feared that mood could evolve into “resentment and
envy.” He warned that the “Fifth Column campaign, is not small, and
enjoys, as we know, official support, [and] continues to develop its web of
intrigues.”62 Brazilian alarm about Argentina continued as its military
took control and allowed Colonel Juan Perón to rise to power.

Axis Submarine Attacks Brought the War to Brazil

In the days after the Rio Conference, the Axis threats became very real as
German submarines began sinking Brazilian ships. On February 16, the
first victim was the Buarque out of Belém do Pará with a cargo of
Amazonian products. In February and March 1942, submarine attacks
sent three more Brazilian steamers to the bottom. On March 9, the last of
these, the Cairú, which was camouflaged and without lights, was torpe-
doed at night without warning by a submarine later identified as U-94. In
120   F. D. MCCANN

the first two instances, the crews and passengers were allowed to disem-
bark in lifeboats before their vessels were sunk. But the Cairú was taken
by surprise, which would become the usual German practice.63
Events unfolded rapidly, and on Saturday, February 28, Roosevelt, for
the first time, “with great earnestness” asked Vargas to allow into Brazil
about 1000 unarmed officers and soldiers to supervise the American aircraft
that would be en route to Africa. Vargas had lunch at Dutra’s house with
the minister and Góes and afterward that afternoon back at Catete Palace
signed the decree legalizing the Air Base of Natal.64 Thus, the Americans
finally had the official approval, at least to conduct their ferrying operations
through Brazil. It was also necessary to engage in some direct military
diplomacy. Brigadier General Robert Olds, chief of the ferrying command,
flew to Brazil to cultivate Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, air commander of
the northeast. He invited Gomes to the United States and promised 30
bombers and 30 fighters. Before his return to Brazil, Gomes inspected six
B-25s and six P-40s at Bolling Field in Southeast Washington that were
preparing to fly to Natal. In effect the way was clear to create the South
Atlantic Wing of the Air Transport Command later in May (Fig. 4.4).65
Washington confronted Brazilian anxiety about the lack of arms by
signing a Lend-Lease agreement, on March 3, 1942, for the eventual
delivery of $200,000,000 worth of military equipment, which doubled
the amount agreed to in 1941. At the same time, the army arranged to
ship to Brazil before the year’s end 100 medium tanks, over 200 light
tanks, 50 combat aircraft, and a large number of anti-aircraft and anti-tank
guns. Washington hoped that this would alleviate Brazilian concerns.66
Four days later, Vargas triumphantly informed Ambassador Caffery that
he could tell FDR that he approved his request for “the coming of techni-
cians to care for the aircraft en route to Africa.” Note that his use of techni-
cians rather than soldiers was deliberate because the Brazilian Army still
did not want to see American troops on Brazilian soil. The next day the
German U-boat 155 sank the Brazilian-flagged SS Arabutan off Cape
Hatteras, North Carolina.67
Despite ever closer ties, officers of the two armies continued to be sus-
picious of each other’s motives. The new Lend-Lease agreement cleared
some of the distrust. Shortly after Brazil decided to permit arrival of
American “technicians,” Vargas agreed to “a wide-reaching program for
Northeast Brazil” that involved sending 800 more maintenance person-
nel, new construction, and, most importantly, unrestricted flight privileges
for army aircraft. The Brazilian chiefs of staff and Foreign Minister Aranha
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    121

Fig. 4.4  The Springboard to Victory: Miami to Natal to Africa and points east.
(Source: Charles Hendricks, “Building the Atlantic Bases” in Barry W. Fowle, ed.
Builders and Fighters: U.S.  Army Engineers in World War II (Fort Belvoir, Va.:
Office of History, US Army Corps of Engineers, 1992), p. 36)

drafted a defense agreement to be proposed to Washington.68 While this

was a positive development, Aranha was so bothered by the questionable
activities of the federal district’s (Rio) chief of police, Army Captain Filinto
Müller, a notorious pro-German, that he was again threatening to resign.69
Throughout February and March, Rio was alive with rumors of conspira-
cies. It was in this tense ambience that Vargas received word that the
Brazilian steamer Cairú had been torpedoed. He immediately closed
down all shipping to the United States until Brazilian vessels could be
armed and protected by convoys. He directed Ambassador Carlos Martins,
“in my name” to ask the American government to guarantee the safety of
“our merchant ships traveling between Brazil and the USA.” It was neces-
sary, he thought, that steamers be immediately convoyed and armed with
artillery and provided with armed guards by the Americans. He wanted
the ambassador to keep him meticulously informed about the govern-
ment’s response.70
122   F. D. MCCANN

The embargo kept in port cargoes that were vital to the American war
effort while depriving Brazil of American petroleum and coal. The prob-
lem was resolved in a most unorthodox manner by a private agreement
between Vargas and Admiral Jonas Ingram, commander of US naval oper-
ations in the South Atlantic. In return for Ingram’s promise to assume
responsibility for the protection of Brazilian shipping, the president agreed
to lift the embargo. Calling Ingram his “Sea Lord,” he asked him to be his
secret naval adviser. Vargas went even further by opening Brazil’s ports,
repair facilities, and airfields to the American navy and ordered Brazilian
naval and air forces to operate according to Ingram’s advice. For his part,
Ingram promised to hasten delivery of naval equipment and to train
Brazilian personnel.71 The US Navy did not evoke the concerns about
sovereignty that the American army did, and, thanks to Ingram, it now
had direct access to Vargas. Ingram’s experience with Latin Americans
dated from his participation in the 1914 capture of Vera Cruz for which
he had received the Congressional Medal of Honor.72
In early April 1942, Minister Aranha told Ambassador Caffery that
after the recent Japanese successes in the Pacific, some younger Brazilian
army officers were talking against the policy of close military relations with
the Americans. Specifically, a dozen army captains recently had engaged in
“ugly talk about our alleged intentions of occupying the Natal Region.”73
Such reports were worrisomely plentiful.
Vargas had been unsuccessful in convincing General Miller of the sin-
cerity of his two top generals. Miller had so irritated General Góes that
Vargas had little choice but to request his replacement. As mentioned
above, Miller had grown so disenchanted that he too had asked to be
relieved. Returning to Washington, Miller served on the general staff’s
Operation Plans Division for a few months, where his years of experience
with Brazilians gave him credibility. When Góes wrote to Marshall on
April 22, 1942, the chief of staff’s aide requested that Miller comment on
the letter. Indeed, he wrote a brutally frank analysis saying that he had
known Góes for eight years and that he “cannot be trusted by us.” He said
that Góes was “only pretending a sincere desire to cooperate with the
United States, because Brazil at the present time, is almost entirely depen-
dent economically upon the United States, and because General Góes still
hopes to get as much equipment as possible from us for his army.”74
Another general staff officer and former air attaché in Brazil, Thomas
White, commented that if Góes’s letter was “sincere,” it was “based on a
great lack of understanding of [the] problems at stake.” White did not
know if
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    123

General Góes is himself is pro-Axis. He is surrounded by pro-Axis officers

and is controlled by the ruling military clique. He reflects the opinion of one
of the most selfish classes in the world – the Brazilian armed forces. He does
not reflect the opinion of the average Brazilian who is wholeheartedly in
support of the United States and is willing to do what is needed….
Unquestionably, even if given material the armed forces of Brazil would not
use it effectively. This is particularly true of aviation material. Brazil could do
a great deal now without further equipment. Pro-Axis or anti-American ele-
ments still hold many key positions in both Army and Air Force. The Chief
of Police (Filinto Müller) is an excellent example.75

These American officers had little patience for the apparently cautious
ways of the Brazilian authorities in dealing with Axis espionage and sym-
pathizers. General Miller was bothered, perhaps puzzled, by Góes’s view
that “Brazil’s possibilities are limited and of small account in the present
war.” Miller believed that Brazil “could be of considerable account, if
Brazilian army leaders desired.” Deeply troubled, Miller asked whether
the war material that was to be provided would be “used for or against us
by an army under General Góes?”76
Such suspicion and distrust was slow to dissipate, and the atmosphere
of frustration continued on both sides. In Washington the mix of irritation
and fear produced some fanciful talk of forming a secret “jungle” force
made up of Portuguese-speaking “American woodsmen” to take control
of Northeast Brazil. Apparently to quash such ideas, the then assistant
chief of staff, Major General Dwight Eisenhower, wrote to Sumner Welles
saying that “every practical step is being taken to safeguard our interests.
The policy has been established that all security and defensive measures
affecting Brazilian territory must be taken in harmony with the Brazilian
government. Any clandestine approach involving so many people would
soon be detected and would be fatal to our objectives in this important
area.”77

Army Dissatisfaction with Ambassador Caffery

At the same time, the American army general staff was frustrated with
Ambassador Caffery, who is accused of being uncooperative, particularly
in intelligence matters. Caffery held to the tradition that the ambassador
was in charge of all United States affairs in Brazil and that all embassy
personnel, including the military attachés, were subordinate to him. The
124   F. D. MCCANN

FBI was running a counter-espionage operation in Brazil that was report-

ing to the ambassador and not sharing information with the military atta-
ché. Caffery had been unhappy with the former attachés, Colonel Edwin
L. Sibert and General Miller, because he regarded them as “exceedingly
uncooperative and had done nothing but spoil relations between himself
and the Brazilian Government.” Caffery opposed a War Department pro-
posal to establish a “U.S. Military Observation System throughout
Brazil.”78
Army officials had been complaining about Caffery since at least
November 1941. One of Marshall’s staff thought that the situation was
“dangerous” and that there should be “a show down understanding with
the State Dept. otherwise further rapid decline in our Military Intelligence
in all Brazil will occur and doubtless [in] our whole relations in this critical
area.” He noted at the bottom of a handwritten letter that [Colonel Henry
A.] “Barton and I feel that the situation requires the Chief’s direct inter-
vention soon.”79
General Miller, who was no fan of Caffery, wrote to Marshall that “the
best solution for our present unsatisfactory military problem in Brazil
would be the replacement of the American Ambassador there. As a war-
time ambassador, Mr. Caffery is a failure.” However, admitting that such
a solution was “impracticable of accomplishment at the present moment,”
he recommended that a well-qualified general officer be made “coordina-
tor of all United States military, air, and naval (land) activities in north and
northeast Brazil.” He recognized that Caffery, the State Department, and
the Brazilian government would have to give their consent. Perhaps
accepting that Caffery had too much support from both presidents to be
further contested, Miller admitted that “it is a mistake to expect, however,
that any officer could perform these duties entirely independently of our
ambassador in Brazil.” He recommended that “the problem of collection
of military information in Brazil be discussed by our G-2 Division [intel-
ligence] with the State Department in an attempt to obtain a satisfactory
solution.”80
Miller likely had crossed one of Marshall’s invisible lines. The chief kept
a black book in which he recorded positive and negative comments on the
many officers he met over the years. He was responsible for Miller’s assign-
ment to Rio and for his brigadier star. It is not clear what caused Miller’s
next assignment away from the general staff, but a good guess is that his
negative attitude regarding Góes Monteiro and Ambassador Caffery did
not get high marks in Marshall’s black book. On July 2, 1942, Miller took
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    125

command of the army’s Engineer Replacement Training Center at Fort

Belvoir, Virginia.81 He had ranked nineth in his West Point class of 1915.
While his classmates, such as Eisenhower and Bradley, took on consider-
ably more prestigious assignments, Miller was relegated to training mis-
sions. The need for engineer officers and men was extremely critical, but
the Belvoir assignment was the start of a downward trend. After a year and
a half at Belvoir, he was sent to command Camp Sutton, North Carolina,
where he oversaw training of engineers and POWs from Rommel’s African
Corps; then in November 1944, he was deputy commander of Camp
Claiborne, Louisiana, a major basic training facility, where the 82nd and
101st airborne divisions had been organized, and at war’s end he was
attached to the office of the chief of engineers. It was a sad fall from
grace.82
The State Department position, as expressed by Under Secretary
Welles, was that Caffery was “a singularly successful ambassador.” Welles
passed along to FDR Vargas’s comment that he had complete confidence
in Caffery and that “the United States had never had an ambassador in
Brazil who had shown greater tact or more knowledge of how to deal with
Brazilian officials and with the Brazilian people.” Vargas added his praise
in a letter to Roosevelt saying “this illustrious diplomat practices diplo-
macy as it ought to be practiced: with the sole preoccupation of uniting,
deepening, increasing the friendship of the people in whose midst he lives
for the people whose government he represents.”83 The foregoing contro-
versies highlight that armies and governments are never wholly cohesive
or without guile and that disagreements and clashes of viewpoints are part
of any policy-making process, particularly in wartime.

Lack of Confidence in Brazilian Arms

The tensions and fears of the spring of 1942 have today [2018] largely
receded from collective memory. But, in April and May 1942, the harsh
reality, according to US Army analysts, was that

Germany and Italy have conducted extensive counter blockade measures by

surface raiders, submarines and aviation. The surprise attack of the Japanese
and their early successes, have to a certain extent nullified the superior
American fleet. If the French surrender their fleet or if England should fall
and the British fleet should be eliminated, the situation would become
grave. The Axis would secure the means for aggressive action to the west,
particularly against South America, in a movement by water.84
126   F. D. MCCANN

American Army planners did not believe that the Brazilian or other
Latin American armies could hold off an Axis attack, because those armies
were “neither organized, trained nor equipped to meet first-class troops in
battle.” They firmly believed that only United States troops were “capable
of defending the Western Hemisphere….” They admitted that the ability
of the Axis to launch such feared operations beyond Eurasia and Africa
would depend upon their construction of a merchant marine and navy.
However, if their nightmare of an Axis advance into West Africa occurred,
they were convinced that “control of the Natal area would become vital to
the U.S. if it is to remain a first-class power.”85
The Brazilian attitude at that point was captured by Admiral Jonas
H. Ingram, commanding US naval forces in the South Atlantic from his
base in Recife, when he wrote that “They are afraid of our army. They are
definitely not ready to receive a U.S. Army garrison.” He concluded his
report by emphasizing

that Brazil is now the greatest Latin Nation in the World, with unlimited
resources and that the future of this great country, in a measure, lies with us.
[He urged that] it is the personal touch down here that will attain results….
For the United States to reap the benefits of her [Brazil’s] expansion and
development, a staunch friendship, based on mutual confidence, must be
cultivated and maintained…. It’s a great mistake to try and sell the United
States in South America. More progress will be made by cultivating friend-
ship and developing mutual respect and confidence.

And he cautioned that the Brazilians’ “inferiority complex” should not

be “spot-lighted.” He also pointed out that their attitude toward Britain
had nothing to do with dislike of democracy but was caused by “the arro-
gant attitude of British officials toward Brazil and the stoppage of war
materials purchased from Germany.”86 It is noteworthy that Ingram’s
approach had been successful in securing the trust of the Brazilian govern-
ment for the US Navy, while the army’s style had produced a stalemate.
Washington’s confidence in the stability of the Brazilian situation was not
improved by reported whisperings in Rio de Janeiro that new German
victories on the Russian front might lead the army to overthrow Vargas
and set up a military government.87
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    127

Political-Military Accord, May 1942

After his conversations with Sumner Welles during the Rio Conference,
Vargas had sent his finance minister Sousa Costa to Washington to give
substance to the American promises. He had found that there was a lot of
goodwill, but the Americans were struggling to arm the British and
Russians, as well as their own expanding forces, and had little to give at the
moment. Indeed, four anti-aircraft guns that were shipped south had been
taken from the defenses of New York City. As mentioned above, the Lend-­
Lease funding for Brazil had been doubled, and the US Army pledged to
provide by the end of the year medium tanks  and  light tanks, combat
planes, as well as numerous anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery. The
demand for ammunition, supplies, and aircraft from the fighting fronts
required steadily more air traffic via Natal. Brigadier General Robert Olds,
commander of the ferrying operations, told Roosevelt that he needed
some 750 additional men for the bases at Belém, Natal, and Recife, plus
housing for them, more gasoline storage, and, most importantly, blanket
clearance for flights through Brazil. Secretary of War Stimson asked FDR
to send a personal request to Vargas, commenting: “I cannot tell you how
important I think this Natal danger is. With the redoubled necessity of
planes in Burma and China; with the French fleet moving in the
Mediterranean; with subs in the Caribbean, we can’t allow Brazil, who is
not at war, to hold up our life line across Africa.” Welles pressed Ambassador
Caffery to impress on President Vargas that “we must cooperate, one with
another, to the fullest extent possible in order to attain the defeat of the
totalitarian nations. It has not been easy to convince our Army that tanks
should be taken from our own troops which are still insufficiently supplied
to send to Brazil.” He noted that Roosevelt had decided to increase the
arms going to Brazil “because of considerations broader than the purely
military which demand today the closest working relationship between the
two Governments.”
After representatives of the two countries signed the new Lend-Lease
agreement on March 3, Vargas readily agreed to unrestricted flights and to
the other American requests. Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro, Góes Monteiro
brushed off the draft of an agreement on joint operations that he had
brought back from his 1939 trip to the United States and an agreement
from October 1941 on the northeast and met with the naval and air chiefs
of staff to formulate a proposal for a broad joint political-military accord.
128   F. D. MCCANN

Foreign Minister Aranha handed the draft proposal to Caffery who

forwarded it to the State Department. The objective was to have agree-
ment on how to “regulate their cooperation in military and economic
matters for common defense.” It consisted of 22 articles covering details
of the new relationship. The first article called for the creation of two
mixed commissions in Washington and Rio de Janeiro “to execute the
agreement and to make recommendations to their governments.” The
second importantly specified that Brazilian troops would be used on
Brazilian territory, while the third said that US forces would be requested
if there was “an attack on Brazil or imminent threat” of such an attack. If
that threat came from the Axis, article 15 required that the Americans
“immediately assist” Brazil. Overall the provisions indicated a shift in
Brazilian strategic thinking because the north, northeast, and Rio de
Janeiro were to be considered zones of “prime importance,” and Brazilian
forces were to be concentrated in those zones. The Brazilians committed
to the intensification and expansion of agriculture, manufacturing, and
mining to furnish the United States with raw materials, but the United
States would provide technical and financial assistance in organizing pro-
duction. A bit of caution appeared in article nine that limited American
garrisoning of air and naval bases “only at request of Brazil as reinforce-
ments and under Brazilian Military authorities.” Upon request Brazil
would permit stationing of “technicians and experts” to assist US forces in
transit or engaging in operations. Other articles dealt with army and naval
command arrangements and allowed the United States to build installa-
tions and to organize services for its personnel; also they dealt with convoy
arrangements and pilot training and required the United States to “imme-
diately facilitate” shipment of war material “already requested and other
materials needed to expand its forces and develop military industries and
improve transportation.” Finally, in an obvious nod to long-standing sus-
picions of Argentina, article 16 specified that “in case of other aggression
vs. Brazil, the U.S. would guarantee sea lanes and aerial supremacy and
would supply war material for land forces in new theaters of operations.”
Beyond these negotiations, throughout Brazil the next days were
marked by an awkward nervous tension. According to British sources,
there were food shortages in the Amazonian state of Pará, which were
locally blamed on laborers being sent into the jungle to collect rubber.88
The apparent indifference of authorities to the sudden increase in the cost
of living aggravated the chronic sense of grievance in the Amazonian states
against the Rio government. Integralistas exploited the local resentment
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    129

and stirred up grumbling among soldiers in the army garrison in Pará.

Rumors were rife of an Axis attack and of a responding US occupation.
The handful of US Marines and air transport staff were inadequate to
protect the Belém airfield and fuel tanks. Islands at the mouth of the
Amazon provided good hiding places for Axis submarines and raiders and
were then “very inadequately patrolled.” The Brazilians lacked enough
planes to carry on effective patrolling. From further south at Salvador da
Bahia, the British consul reported that the situation was “peculiar.” He
said that public opinion was pro-ally, but that the attitude of the authori-
ties “was generally held to be sympathetic to enemy. The reason probably
is that their first motive is their personal advantage.” Summarizing the
reports of other consuls, the British Ambassador opined: “There was gen-
erally much evidence to show that men in important positions were under
persuasion of enemy propaganda and were doubtful of chances of allied
victory. German propaganda had been so thorough in the past in civil and
military departments that officials were careful not to cause annoyance in
certain circles so as to be able to readjust their positions rapidly with each
turn of the tide.”
In the week after Caffery telegraphed the draft proposal to Washington,
Aranha several times asked if he had received any reply. The War and Navy
Departments had been urgently studying the Brazilian proposal. On
March 20 Welles received their written assessments and had a meeting in
his office with Army, Navy, and State officials. The Army offered an
article-­by-­article critique, with which the Navy concurred, while offering
only its own general comments. The Army staff thought that articles 3
and 15 conflicted; in the event of an attack, should the United States act
or wait for a Brazilian request for aid? How much control the Brazilians
would have appeared to be an underlying question. The articles regarding
convoys were already covered by the Navy’s agreement with Brazil. The
assistant chief of staff of the Army, Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
thought that they should “strike while the iron is hot, even though the
advantages to be gained for the present may be more political than mili-
tary.” He thought that negotiating via written exchanges would likely
cause difficulties and delays and so suggested a conference in Rio to facili-
tate matters.
The Navy thought that Brazil was asking a great deal and offering very
little. “There was no acceptance of our forces in Brazil and the U.S. was
asked among other things to guarantee lines of communication and aerial
supremacy, even in an inter-continental campaign. Most important, the
130   F. D. MCCANN

U.S. was asked to furnish [the] war material then requested and all neces-
sary to development of war industries and transportation in probable
zones of operations.” This included supporting a possible campaign
against neighboring Argentina. The Navy recommended that agreements
for military and naval collaboration should be approached in three stages:

. Discuss the proposed political-military agreement.

1
2. Elaborate a Brazilian-American combined basic war plan.
3. Develop military cooperation to make the plan effective.

The agreement should contain definite political commitments to guide

the combined military commissions in their formulation of war plans. The
commitments should not deal with the details of military operations, but
should make definite and specific political agreements. Welles thought
that Aranha and Caffery should guide the discussions in Rio. Two Army
officers would be sent to Rio, while the chief of the naval mission could
represent the Navy. He said that once the bases of cooperation were agreed
upon, the “ultimate objective was the creation of a Brazilian-American
military, naval and air commission to sit in Brazil to implement the agree-
ment and for the functioning in Washington of a joint staff, similar to that
then functioning between the United States and Great Britain.” The “sat-
isfactory conclusion” of the discussions in Rio was, he said, “of basic
importance.” The Navy and War Departments thought that because the
agreements were to be “political-military,” the foreign minister and
ambassador should conduct the negotiations with the officers acting as
advisers. They thought that the officers should not discuss policies but
only military matters. The chief of naval operations had sent Welles a letter
to that effect. Welles thought it was a question of emphasis and that the
ambassador and American officers should have sufficient latitude to decide
how far the agreements would go on the purely technical side.
The Army sent Colonel Robert L. Walsh, chief of the air intelligence
staff, and Colonel Henry A. Barber Jr., Ridgway’s successor as Marshall’s
principal Latin American planner, to Rio de Janeiro. They were both West
Point graduates and veterans of the First World War; Walsh had served on
the Mexican border and been air attaché in Paris and Madrid, while Barber
had been military attaché in Havana for two years before moving to the
general staff. Their experiences with Latin cultures would be useful. Their
instructions emphasized that the “primary result” of the discussions
should be the creation of Joint Defense Commissions in Washington and
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    131

Rio for the purpose of preparing staff plans for the joint defense of
Northeast Brazil. They were cautioned that final agreement should not in
any way “jeopardize the operations and functions of present Air Corps
ferrying activities” and, notably, the discussions “should not involve the
question of the stationing at present of large forces of American troops in
Northeast Brazil.” This was a major change in the Army policy aimed at
getting American forces into Brazil and shows that all along its intent had
been defensive and not nefarious as some Brazilians feared.
At a meeting on April 15 of Aranha, Caffery, and the Brazilian chiefs of
staff, the latter agreed to accept, with only minor word changes, much to
the surprise of the Americans, the text that the two colonels had brought
from Washington. Colonel Barber confessed that he had been “entranced”
when the Brazilian side accepted the draft. He had expected that the
Brazilians would want to insure that they would command American
troops in the northeast. His equanimity did not last.
Five days later, to the discomfort of the American side, the Navy
Department telegraphed that they should not conclude negotiations until
“specific understandings” were reached concerning several articles. They
had been getting ready to sign, and Ambassador Caffery responded that to
reopen discussions would have “a disastrous (repeat disastrous) effect” on
the Brazilian government. Colonel Barber was puzzled; he told Caffery
that the whole thing had been thrashed out before they left and that the
Navy had agreed completely with the draft. Aranha expected that they
would sign the agreement that very day at noon. Caffery was at a loss as to
how he could explain things to Aranha. He was afraid that if he conveyed
the Navy’s objections officially, Aranha would not go ahead with any
defense agreements. He thought that the Brazilians might agree orally to
the Navy’s changes, but if asked to alter the written agreement, they would
accuse the Americans of having negotiated in “bad faith.” At several points
during the negotiations, the Brazilians had wanted the Americans to be
more specific. Caffery had remarked that “all this depends on mutual good
faith doesn’t it?” And Aranha had replied “yes,” and they had not insisted.
He asserted that the Brazilians understood the overall situation and inter-
preted the various articles in the same way as the Navy and would not like
rehashing them. Welles broke the stalemate by convincing the Navy that it
was unnecessary to change wording because the Brazilians understood the
matter in the same way as the Navy. What had happened was that the naval
staff had used the “wrong draft” of the agreement to make its analysis. It
seems almost comical, but it was very serious for those involved.
132   F. D. MCCANN

Caffery had several uncomfortable days, “resorting to expedients day

by day,” avoiding Aranha so that he would not have to explain why the
signing was being postponed. Aranha was puzzled as to why the Americans
were delaying. Finally on May 4, Caffery summoned the courage to
explain what had happened and assured the foreign minister that the Navy
had dropped its objections. Even so getting the agreement signed was
slow. Secretary Hull prodded Caffery to get moving with the message that
the War and Navy Departments were anxious to get the two commissions
set up and so “urgently desired” the signing to take place. Signatures were
finally set down on May 27, and attention turned to organizing the two
commissions.

Then the Unexpected Happened

Of course very likely the major reason for the delay in signing the docu-
ment was that on May 1, Vargas suffered a serious automobile accident
that left him with a fractured leg, dislocated hip, an injured hand, and a
broken jaw. Confined to bed and unable to speak, his condition sparked a
political crisis. Government business that required his attention halted.
Pro-Axis agitators whispered that he could no longer govern the country.
If his government collapsed, it would undo much that had been accom-
plished.89 The defense agreement with the United States had been signed,
but the Brazilian army was seemingly doing little to fulfill its commit-
ments. In many ways Vargas was the government. Sadly for historians,
after the accident he gave up keeping the diary that he had maintained
since 1930.90 He did not leave his official residence in Guanabara Palace
again until September 1. After the accident the new Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) surmised that Vargas was “no longer useful even to gamble
with. The only thing that counts today is the Army, the majority of which
has democratic sympathies.” The OSS assessment warned that there
existed “a strong minority, profoundly Nazi and Fascist, which can from
one moment to the next change the course of events” but that it was “dif-
ficult to localize this minority” because its members officially spoke in
favor of the United States while secretly being “very fond of Hitler and
Mussolini….” It was frustrating that “the ‘Fifth Column’ presently is
working to convince the people of Brazil that an alliance with the United
States has only hurt Brazil.”91
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    133

Notes
1. Critic Carleton Beals advocated recalling military missions and cease selling
arms to Latin American governments that were often unpopular arguing
that “we are not supporting the forces of democracy and freedom…. We
are merely playing a conventional game of power politics on the southern
continent.” Carleton Beals, The Coming Struggle for Latin America (New
York: Halcyon House, 1938), pp. 299–316.
2. The complexity of American and Latin American attitudes was carefully
analyzed in Fredrick B.  Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of
Generally Gentle Chaos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995) see espe-
cially pp. 164–176. Quotation is from p. 174.
3. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 452 entry for January 16. He wrote:
“não o fez espontaneamente. Foram coagidos pela pressão americana.”
4. William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 114.
5. Simon Collier and William F.  Sater, A History of Chile, 1808–2002
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.  179–180; Graeme
Stewart Mount, Chile and the Nazis: From Hitler to Pinochet (Montreal:
Black Rose Books, 2002), pp.  63–70. In June 2017, I saw army honor
guard units wearing such helmets during ceremonies at the La Moneda
Palace in Santiago.
6. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos; Conflito
e Integração na America do Sul (Da Tríplice Aliança ao Mercosul) 1870–
2001 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 204–211. Vargas consis-
tently opposed violent American policies against Argentina. As a man of
the frontier he well understood that the two countries would be neighbors
forever.
7. Ronald C. Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931–1947 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1992), pp.  215–217. The “Golden Market”
quotation is on 215–216.
8. Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism
in South America, 1890–1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1983), pp. 122–131.
9. Max Paul Friedman, Nazis & Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign
against Germans of Latin America in World War II (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 27. Joseph S. Tulchin observed that
“The central objective of Argentine policy was to avoid domination by the
United States.” See his Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted
Relationship (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990), p.  83. The Argentines
also attempted to get arms from the United States to keep a balance with
the Brazilians. Importantly, Tulchin commented that there was “evidence
134   F. D. MCCANN

that Argentine leaders often made their wishes the basis for foreign policy”
(p. 83).
10. Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio
Editora, 1943), pp. 187–190. The title of the speech was “O Brasil em paz
perante a guerra.” In Simmons, Rio, January 2, 1942, #6172,
832.00/1454, the embassy reported that the speech received “unusually
favorable editorial comment in the Rio de Janeiro press.”
11. Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist (New York: St
Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 315.
12. Vargas, Diário, Vol. II, 1937–1942, p. 450. He noted that he worked with
three aides to prepare the speech.
13. See his son Benjamin’s biography, particularly Chap. 13 “Growing Links
with FDR,” pp.  134–143. The friendship between the Roosevelts and
Welles families dated from well before Sumner’s birth. As a child he was a
ring bearer in Franklin and Eleanor’s wedding. And Sumner studied at
FDR’s schools: Groton and Harvard. The president had considerable con-
fidence in Sumner. For a detailed biographical sketch, see Pathfinder,
Washington, January 24, 1942, p. 16.
14. The foregoing is from the very detailed telegram that Welles sent to
President Roosevelt; Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de
Janeiro, January 18, 1942, 740.0011 European War 1939/18611:
Telegram as in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. V, pp. 633–
636. Aranha told Caffery about the meeting saying that Vargas had said
that he was for complete cooperation with the United States; Caffery, Rio,
January 2, 1942, 740.0011 European War 1939/18402, Telegram 115,
RG 59, NA. Both Welles and Caffery referred to this as a cabinet meeting,
but Vargas said it was the National Security Council, Vargas, Diário, II,
p. 450.
15. Roosevelt to G.  Vargas, Washington, January 7, 1942, FDR, Papers as
President, Official File 11 Brazil, 1942–1943, FDRL. Welles delivered this
letter personally on January 12.
16. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 451. Vargas wrote: “...fico apreen-
sivo. Parece-me que os americanos querem nos arrastar á guerra, sem que
isso seja de utilidade, nem para nós, nem para eles.”
17. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp. 451–452 entry for January 14.
18. Ibid, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 451 entry for January 13. Getúlio’s
brother Benjamin brought word from Police Chief Müller that Góes was
going to ask to be relieved as chief of staff, and Dutra sent a letter of
resignation. Apparently Góes was acting in solidarity with General Álvaro
Mariante, under whom he had served in the attempt to suppress the lieu-
tenants’ revolts of the 1920s. Getúlio told his brother to return Dutra’s
letter, and the general said he would talk with Góes. Years later, Góes
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    135

explained that he opposed breaking relations simply because Brazil was not
yet militarily prepared. See Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe …
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Coelho Branco, 1956) 3rd Edition, pp. 378–379.
19. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18,
1942, FRUS, 1942, V, p. 634.
20. Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions that Shaped History (New York: Harper,
1950), p. 100.
21. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18,
1942, FRUS, 1942, V, pp.  634–635. This conversation took place on
Saturday, January 17, at an exposition in Petrópolis, the so-called summer
capital in the mountains.
22. Quoted in Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist (New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 315.
23. Curiously they both said that the other had requested the private
meeting.
24. Caffery, Rio, January 3, 1942, 710.Consultation (3)/192, RG59, NARA.
25. Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 453. Unfortunately Vargas did not
explain Guiñazú’s idea.
26. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp. 451–452 (January 12, 13,
15, 1942). He met with Welles on the 12th, Aranha on the 13th, and
Dutra and Góes on the 15th.
27. Welles to FDR (via the State Department), Rio de Janeiro, January 18,
1942, FRUS, 1942, V, p. 635. The importance of this cable was indicated
by Welles marking it as “triple priority”; see B.  Welles, Sumner Welles:
FDR’s Global Strategist, p. 318.
28. B.  Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist, p.  318. General
Marshall’s view of Brazil as dubious does not appear in the January 18
telegram as printed in FRUS. Benjamin Welles cites a copy that is in the
Sumner Welles Papers; see note 21, p. 412. The collection is in FDRL at
Hyde Park, NY.
29. Roosevelt to Welles, Washington, January 19, 1942, 832.24/634, FRUS,
1942, V, p. 636.
30. Ibid, pp.  453–454 (January 19, 1942). This conversation took place at
Vargas’s favorite spot to relax and think—the pavilion on top of Morro
Mundo Novo behind the presidential residence, Guanabara Palace.
31. Ibid, p.  454 (January 19, 1942). For more on the conference and the
Argentine and Chilean positions, see Michael J.  Francis, “The United
States at Rio, 1942: The Strains of Pan-Americanism,” Journal of Latin
American Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (May, 1974), pp. 77–95.
32. B. Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist, p. 318.
136   F. D. MCCANN

33. William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (Athens:
The University of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 115.
34. For a discussion of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border conflict, see Lawrence
A. Clayton, Peru and the United States: the Condor and the Eagle (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1999), pp. 149–150.
35. B. Welles, Sumner Welles: FDR’s Global Strategist., pp. 320–321.
36. Christopher D. Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest
for a New World Order, 1937–1943 (New York: Colombia University Press,
2008), pp. 63–64.
37. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, pp.  455–456 (entries for
January 21, 22, 25, 1942).
38. His language was complicated, discursive, complaining, and tedious,
repeating in many ways that “we are not prepared.” Mauro Renault Leite
e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade (Rio
de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp.  481–491. The Góes
Monteiro letter is on p. 486.
39. Ibid, p. 457 (entry for January 27, 1942).
40. Aranha meant “America” as the whole collective of the American Republics,
not the United States, as its citizens usually use it. Caffery described the
scene in his dispatch Rio, January 28, 1942, Telegram 270, 740.0011
European War 1939/19015, RG 59, NARA.
41. Eugênio Vargas Garcia (Editor), Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa:
Documentos Históricos, 1493–2008 (Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto Editora,
2008), pp. 440–443. For the text of the cables sent to the Brazilian embas-
sies, see pp. 444–445.
42. Ibid, p. 458 (entry for January 28, 1942). “Os discursos tiveram, no geral,
o mesmo da retóric liberalóide, obsoleta e palavrosa.”
43. FDR’s message was in Hull to American delegation, Washington, January
28, 1942, Telegram 98, 740.0011European War 1939/500, RG 59,
NARA.
44. Ibid, p. 458 (Entry for January 29, 1942).
45. For what was happening beyond public view, see McCann, The Brazilian-
American Alliance, 250–258. Dutra repeatedly warned that the armed
forces were unprepared for war. See Dutra to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro,
January 24,1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.  For photos of the
conference and documents, see http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/
AEraVargas1/anos37-45/AGuerraNoBrasil/ReuniaoChanceleres.
46. Report, Military Attaché to Ambassador Caffery, Rio, January 30, 1942,
War Plans Division, 4424-204, MMB, RG165, NARA.
47. Memo, Col Clay for WPD, February 24, 1942, GHQ 381, MMB, RG
165, NARA.
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    137

48. Report, MA Rio to American Ambassador, Rio, January 30, 1942, WPD
4424-204, RG 165, NARA.
49. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Lehman W.  Miller (Military Attaché) to
Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, Rio, January 29, 1942, “Report of a con-
versation with Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes held on January 28, 1940…,”
Office of Strategic Services, RG 228, NARA.
50. The source was Harold J. T. Horan of Time, Life, Fortune in Buenos Aires,
who had just returned there from the Rio Conference. Sent by Lang,
Buenos Aires, February 12, 1942, Brazil 5900, G-2 Regional, RG 165,
NARA.
51. Unsigned, “Transmitted by the FBI,” Memorandum, “Political Situation
in Brazil,” January 7, 1942, G-2 Regional Files, Brazil 5900-5935, RG
165, NARA.
52. On the submarine attacks after the break in relations, see Paulo de
Q. Duarte, Dias de Guerra no Atlântico Sul (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do
Exército – Editora, 1968), pp. 85–108.
53. Brigadier General Raymond E. Lee (Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2), Washington,
March 12, 1942, “Situation in Brasil,” 381 Brazil (8-28-42), Modern
Military Branch, NARA. He noted that the Brazilians believed they had
things in hand, but “qualified United States military authorities” thought
that “Brazilians must have, without delay, strong United States
support….”
54. Col. E.M.  Benitez [Enrique Manuel Benitez ], Washington, March 14,
1942, Memo for Col. [Henry A.] Barber, WPD, Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2 “Highlights of Dean Ackerman’s Report.” The report referred to was
entitled “Volcanoes on our Southern Flank,” OPD 381 Brazil (3-14-42),
MMB, RG 165, NARA.
55. Oficio secreto de Góes Monteiro a Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Rio, 30/10/1941,
CPDOC- FGV “relatando palestra com o Gal. Lehman Miller versando
sobre suspeitas de War Department em relação à colaboração brasileira,
proteção militar para o Nordeste, fornecimento de material para o Brasil e
intenção de Miller de demitir-se das funções que exerce no Brasil” (underline
added).
56. Paul Vanorden Shaw to General George Marshall, Rio, March 4, 1942,
OPD 381, Brazil (3-12-42), RG 165(Records of War Department General
and Special Staffs), MMB, NARA. There are several letters in CPDOC files
that the Brazilian government censor intercepted, copied, and sent to
Vargas’s office, so Shaw was important enough to attract the censor’s
attention. For example, see Paul V. Shaw to A. Kayston, Rio, 16/06/1941
GV Confidential, 1941.06.16/3, CPDOC, FGV, Rio.
138   F. D. MCCANN

57. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 109–112. Hitler and Norway ref-
erence is on p. 112.
58. Jefferson Caffery, Rio, February 14, 1942, No 6528, “Brazilian Opinion
Regard to the War,” Brazil 5900, G-2 Reg., RG 165, NARA.
59. G. Vargas to A. de Sousa Costa, Petrópolis, February 14, 1942, Arquivo
Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, FGV-Rio. For detailed analysis of the Sousa
Costa Mission see my The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945,
pp. 259–269.
60. Brazil was then thought to have no oil, whose discovery lay decades in the
future. Its only coal was a soft variety unsuited for steel production. On
president’s level of focus, see, for example, Vargas to Sousa Costa,
Petrópolis, February 14, 1942 and undated but most likely February 26 or
27, 1942, and Sousa Costa to Vargas, February 25, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio
Vargas, CPDOC, FGV-Rio. Sousa Costa reported the inclusion of all war
materiel along with Volta Redonda in his February 16 cable to Vargas.
Brazil was made eligible for Lend-Lease aid on May 6, 1941; the agree-
ment negotiated by Sousa Costa was dated March 3, 1942, and would be
modified by Brazil signing the UN Declaration on February 6, 1943. On
Lend-Lease, see Official File 4-193 (1941–), FDRL-Hyde Park.
61. Sousa Costa gave Sumner Welles a cable from Vargas dated February 16.
He passed the information on to FDR in Welles to FDR, February 18,
1942, President’s Secretary File, Brazil 1942, Box 95, FDRL.
62. Attaché Augusto do Amaral Peixoto was the brother of Vargas’s son-in-law
Ernani do Amaral Peixoto, interventor of the state of Rio de Janeiro;
quoted material is from his report to Ambassador José de Paula Rodrigues
Alves, Buenos Aires, February 26, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC,
FGV-Rio.
63. The crews of the other three ships—Buarque, Olinda, and Arabutan—
identified the attacking submarines as German. The ships were well-lit and
clearly marked with Brazilian flags. The Cairú was sailing darkened and
camouflaged. The crew could not identify the attacker, but later it was
found to be U-94. For survivors’ testimonies, see Ministério das Relações
Exteriores, O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa
Nacional, 1944), Vol. II, pp.  61–148. For Brazilian maritime losses in
1942–1943, see Ministério da Marinha, Subsídios para a História Marítima
do Brasil, Vol. XII, (Rio de Janeiro, 1953), pp. 11–12 and Office of Naval
Intelligence, “Post-Mortems on Enemy Submarines,” 250-G: Serial 8, US
Naval Archives, NARA. There is a report on the Buarque in Jay Walker,
Pará, February 24, 1942, 832.00/14531/2, RG59, NARA.
64. Vargas had great respect for FDR, and the fact that he personally asked was
influential. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 466 (February
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    139

28 and March 1, 1942); the official authorization was in Decreto-lei no.

4.142, March 2, 1942.
65. Welles to Caffery, Washington, March 21, 1942, 832.20/359, RG 59,
NARA; History of South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command
(SADATC), Part 1, III, pp.  133–137; Part II, IV, pp.  4–5, US Army
Center for Military History, Washington. For a detailed study, see Theresa
Louise Kraus, “The Establishment of the United States Army Air Corps
Bases in Brazil, 1938–1945m” (Ph.D.  Dissertation, University of
Maryland, 1986). Bolling Field is located in Anacostia in the District of
Columbia.
66. “History of United States Army Forces South Atlantic,” Appendix IV
(copy of 3 Mar 42 Lend-Lease Agreement); SADATC, Chap. III, 132–33,
US Army’s Center for Military History, Washington.
67. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 468 (March 7 and March 8,
1942).
68. WPD Memo for Record, WPD 4224-233; Memo, OPD for Cols Robert
L. Walsh and Henry A. Barber, April 1, 1942, OPD 336.6 Brazil-U.S. MMB,
RG165, NARA.
69. For Müller’s biography, see Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds.
Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983. Vol.3 (Rio de
Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp. 2342–2346. On Aranha’s res-
ignation threat, Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 469 (March
10, 1942).
70. Getúlio Vargas to Ambassador Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa, Rio, March
17, 1942, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC-Rio, FGV.
71. War Diary, Commander of South Atlantic Force, April 28, 1942, A12/
Serial 0025 and Commander of Task Force 23, Report of Situation in
Brazil, April 22–26, 1942, Serial 0018, US Navy, NARA.
72. https://www.histor y.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/
us-people/i/ingram-jonas-h.html; on Vera Cruz, see Robert E. Quirk, An
Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz (New
York: University of Kentucky Press, 1962).
73. Jefferson Caffery to Secretary Cordell Hull, Rio de Janeiro, April 7, 1942,
#6952, G2 Regional Brazil 5900, RG165, NARA.
74. BG Lehman W. Miller to Colonel Henry A. Barber, Washington, April 29,
1942, G2 Regional Brazil (4-22-42), RG165, NARA.
75. Colonel Thomas D. White, Memo for chief of staff, Washington, May 8,
1942, 336.4 Monteiro, Gen. Goes (4-22-42), 381 Brazil, RG165,
NARA. Upon the request of Vargas, Col. White, who arrived as attaché in
April 1940 and became chief of the air mission in August 1941, had been
replaced at the same time as Miller. In the post-war, White rose to be the
US Air Force’s fourth chief of staff, 1957–1961. When Police Chief Müller
140   F. D. MCCANN

was removed from his police assignment, he joined War Minister Dutra’s
personal staff.
76. Miller’s marginal comments on pages 2 and 4 of Góes Monteiro to George
Marshall, Rio de Janeiro, April 22, 1942, 336.4 Monteiro, Gen. Góes
(4-22-42), 381 Brazil, RG 165, NARA. Góes asked for yet more muni-
tions citing the situation in Argentina as particularly dangerous.
77. MG David D. Eisenhower (Asst. Ch. of St.) Memo for Under Secretary of
State Welles, Washington, May 15, 1942, OPD 381 Brazil, Box 1238,
MMB, RG165, NARA.
78. Such a “system” would involve stationing officers at various points to
report their observations of military activities. Captain Lloyd H.  Gomes
(Assistant Military Attaché) to Col. Henry A. Barber, Rio de Janeiro, April
24, 1942, Army chief of staff, 381 Brazil, War Dept. General & Special
Staffs, MMB, RG 165, NARA. By the end of the war, Col. Sibert would be
the highest-ranking military intelligence officer in Europe.
79. General Townsend Heard to General Strong, n.p. May 1, 1942, 381 Brazil
(4-24-42) War Dept. General & Special Staffs, MMB, RG 165, NARA. The
chief was, of course, George Marshall.
80. General Lehman W. Miller to George Marshall, Washington, May 4, 1942,
381 Brazil (5-4-42) War Dept. General & Special Staffs, MMB, RG 165,
NARA.
81. Gustav Parson, “Fort Belvoir’s Engineer Replacement Training Center,”
Engineer (September-December, 2011), pp.  36–40. http://www.wood.
army.mil/engrmag/PDFs%20for%20Sept-Dec%2011/Person.pdf.
82. For Miller’s career: http://www.generals.dk/general/Miller/Lehman_
Wellington/USA.html. For Camp Sutton: http://monroenc.blogspot.
com/2012/08/camp-sutton.html and Camp Claiborne: https://www.
facebook.com/Camp.Claiborne.
83. Welles to Roosevelt, Washington, July 1, 1942, OF884 Jefferson Caffery,
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Vargas to Roosevelt, Rio, July 30, 1942,
Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC.
84. Rainbow Plan Lilac. General Headquarters, US Army, “Operations Plan of
Northeast Brazil Theater,” November 1, 1941 (updated April 23, 1942),
Annex 1j, Boxes 38 & 39, MMB, RG 407, NARA. The quotation is from
Box 38, Update, April 23, 1942, pp. 5, see also 13, 18, 19.
85. Ibid, quotations from Box 38, Update, April 23, 1942, pp. 13, 18, 19.
86. J.  Ingram (CO of Task Force 23) to Chief of Naval Operations, USS
Memphis, May 15, 1942, OPD381 Brazil, Box 1238, MMB, RG165,
NARA. The quotations are from pp. 5–7 and 12. He also noted Brazilian
fear of aggression from Argentina and observed that “they will freely trade
any guarantee from us for support against an Argentine attack” [p. 7]. His
command eventually was raised to be the US Navy’s Fourth Fleet. For
   BRAZIL’S OPTIONS NARROW    141

more on Ingram, see McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 276–

277, 293–296, 307–309.
87. J. Edgar Hoover (Dir. of FBI) to Col. William J. Donovan (Coordinator
of Information) Washington, June 13, 1942, OSS Files, 17662, MMB,
RG226, NARA. Hoover did not identify the “reliable source,” but said it
was based on an “overheard conversation” between two high-ranking
Brazilian officers. FDR on June 13, 1942, ordered the creation of the OSS
headed by Donovan. Hoover disliked Donovan and reportedly kept a
derogatory file on him, which mysteriously disappeared. See Curt Gentry,
J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991),
on the creation of OSS, pp.  266–267, on Hoover’s attitude and files,
pp. 734–735.
88. The Brazilian-American campaign to increase the collection of wild rubber
in Amazonia is beyond the scope of this book. It has been studied by Seth
Garfield, In Search of the Amazon: Brazil, the United States and the nature
of a region (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013), especially Chap.
3 “Rubber Soldiers.”
89. Caffery, Rio, May 1, 1942, Teleg. 1485, 832.001: Vargas, Getúlio 10/99,
and series following, such as Caffery’s reports on May 6, 9, July 10, July
18, and September 1, 1942, RG 59, NARA.
90. Getúlio Vargas, Diário, 1937–1942, Vol. II, p. 477 (last dated entry was
April 30, 1942). He did not date his final entry saying he was giving up the
diary. His convalescence lasted three months.
91. “OSS, “Highlights on the General Political Situation in Brazil,” copy in
19354, MMB, RG226, NARA.  The document carried no agent’s name
and no date, but from content it appears to have been written in July 1942.
The unnamed author called for “very careful attention [to] be focused on
the Brazilian army....” The German embassy fed some newspapers with
funds and propaganda: see José Carlos Peixoto Júnior, “A ascensão do
nazismo pela ótica do Diário de Notícias da Bahia (1935–1941): um estudo
de caso” (Tese de Mestre em História Social  – Faculdade de Filosofia e
Ciências Humanas, UFBA, Salvador, 2003) and Igor Silva Gak, “Os fins e
seus meios: diplomacia e propaganda nazista no Brasil (1938–1942)” (Tese
de Mestrado em História, Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia, UFF,
Niterói, 2006). A useful study of the Nazi-influenced newspaper Meio-Dia
(Rio de Janeiro) is João Arthur Ciciliato Franzolin, “Joaquim Inojosa e o
jornal Meio-Dia (1939–1942)” Anais do XXVI, Simpósio Nacional de
História, ANPUH, São Paulo, Julho 2011, http://www.snh2011.anpuh.
org/resources/anais/14/1299918891_ARQUIVO_Textocompleto-
JoaquimInojosaeojornalMeio-Dia(1939-1942).pdf.
 CHAPTER 5

Decision to Fight

Brazil and the United States Became Allies

It is rather surprising that in spite of the atmosphere of suspicion the two
armies and their governments had been able to craft a political-military
agreement that would in effect create an alliance between the United
States and Brazil. The agreement produced joint military commissions,
one in Washington and the other in Rio de Janeiro, and outlined the poli-
cies that would govern their work. The Washington commission was to
prepare a defense plan for Northeast Brazil and make recommendations
appropriate to the changing situation of the war. The Rio commission was
to work with the American army and naval missions to improve the com-
bat readiness of the Brazilian forces.1
On the American side, this outcome was the result of General Marshall’s
calm and patience in dealing with the Brazilians and his willingness to lis-
ten to the advice of the State Department. He believed that the War
Department had “made real sacrifices in many directions to satisfy Brazilian
requirements in military equipment….” He reminded Sumner Welles that
he had “relieved officers at the request of our Ambassador  – officers of
superior qualifications” (likely he had Miller and White in mind). And that
he had “changed the assignments of officers in the War Department con-
cerned with the Brazilian situation because they had become so convinced
that our failure to secure the necessary precautionary measures would
result in a disaster in that region [and] that their feelings were too intense

© The Author(s) 2018 143

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_5
144   F. D. MCCANN

to facilitate negotiations.” He deplored that it was “increasingly apparent

that the Brazilians are not seriously cooperating with us to secure that vital
area, sea and land, against Axis aggression.” He asked Welles to instruct
Caffery to press the Brazilian Air Ministry again on the “urgent necessity”
of carrying out “the immediate detailed and effective reconnaissance of
the Amazon area” and on extending air patrols off the Brazilian coast.2
Marshall then wrote to Góes Monteiro praising the negotiations that had
given rise to the “political-military agreement.” Even though he lamented
“the lost opportunities for close cooperation in the past,” he observed that
it was “futile to dwell on such incidents.” He was certain that Góes agreed
“that this is a time for action with all eyes on the future,” and he was hope-
ful “that the continuation of present measures by Brazil will result in the
speedy elimination” of the Axis threat to ships and aircraft and to the
Panama Canal. He assured Góes that “I have clearly in mind your needs
and shall see that, in return for the cooperation which you have offered on
your part, that we on our part give you the material assistance you request
as far as our capacities will permit” [emphasis added]. He included the
caveat that he was sure that Góes understood that he had to meet “the
minimum requirements of our own forces as well as of other forces in
actual combat with Germany and Japan, and of course Italy.”3
Brazil’s significance in Marshall’s mind was indicated by his replace-
ment for General Miller. The new attaché would be his aide and long-time
friend, Claude M. Adams, whom he called “Flap.”4 Adams had been his
executive officer when Marshall commanded the fifth Brigade of the third
Division at historic Vancouver Barracks in Washington state in 1938; they
became great friends and fishing buddies.5 They were close enough to play
practical jokes on one another. Marshall’s wife Katherine was close to
Adams’s wife Ruth so it was a friendship between the two couples. While
going through the Command and General Staff course at Ft. Leavenworth
(1939–1940), Adams suffered a heart attack but was able to complete the
course. Marshall brought him to the general staff as an all-purpose sort of
aide. So now he had his man in Rio whom he trusted implicitly.
Axis agents were actively broadcasting with clandestine radio transmit-
ters the movements of ships in and out of Guanabara Bay, and the Federal
District Chief of Police Filinto Müller did nothing to stop them. It was
mid-July before Vargas had recuperated enough to replace him with a
trustworthy officer. It was worrisome that Müller then joined the immedi-
ate staff of Minister of War Dutra. After German submarines sank three
more Brazilian ships off Trinidad on July 26 and 28, 1942, Dutra told
   DECISION TO FIGHT    145

Ambassador Caffery that he was as pro-American as Aranha, but com-

plained that the foreign minister wanted to go to war even though Brazil
was absolutely unready. Dutra did not think that the United States could
prepare Brazil for a combat role; therefore Brazil should limit its coopera-
tion to measures short of war.6 The documents did not reveal why Dutra
thought that way, he certainly was not displaying great confidence in his
army.
Brazil’s air force had become active in hunting and attacking German
submarines so it was already in the fight though the nation was officially
neutral, but between August 15 and 19, the sinking of six ships off the
Brazilian coast took the republic into the war. Notably the army wanted to
revenge the deaths of the 16 officers and 125 men of its Seventh Artillery
Group on the passenger ship Baependy (sunk on August 15). The sinking
of the Baependy raised questions that went unaddressed, about the com-
petence of army leaders who did not take adequate precautions against the
known submarine threat. They may have thought that peaceful coastal
traffic would not be attacked. It may puzzle readers that the Brazilian
Navy did not provide an armed escort. The two services were not accus-
tomed to cooperating, and the navy did not yet have an anti-submarine
capability. A Brazilian officer of that era, Nelson Werneck Sodré, in his
memoir, condemned the ineptitude of Dutra and Góes for allowing such
an obviously dangerous troop movement and the insensitivity of the army
bureaucracy in indemnifying the survivors with a mere month’s pay, whose
payment was delayed. Unfortunately Sodré fertilized the Nazi-created
rumors of American responsibility for the sinkings by saying that there was
no proof that the submarines were German.7

Operation Brazil and Lone Wolf U-507 1942

Of course there was proof, Sodré was either ignoring it or perhaps he did
not want to believe it. Both Germany and Italy had submarines operating
in the South Atlantic. On June 2, 1942, the Brazilian press reported that
Brazilian air crews flying B-25s had sunk two Italian subs. Radio Berlin
warned that retaliation would be swift. Authorities in Natal ordered a
blackout to make night attacks more difficult. Marines at the Natal Air
Base dug trenches and set up machine guns. Fear gripped the people of
Natal because of the radio threats. The German government saw Brazilian
cooperation with the American forces as the end of Brazilian neutrality
and believed that when Brazil was ready it would formally enter the war.
146   F. D. MCCANN

Likewise German officials seemed offended that a military nonentity of

mixed race would dare take defensive measures against Axis vessels. The
commander of the German Navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, on June
15, 1942, met with Hitler, who approved a massive submarine attack on
Brazilian ports and coastal shipping, called “Operation Brazil.” Thereafter
a number of subs, variously reported as eight to ten, left French ports for
the South Atlantic (Fig. 5.1).8
The Brazilian fleet was all but obsolete and had no experience or
appropriate vessels to combat submarines. The great 305 mm guns on
its two 1910 battleships were useless against subs. The ports without
anti-­submarine nets were defenseless. Submarines could stealthily enter
the great bays at Rio de Janeiro and Salvador da Bahia to sink vessels
anchored there, and at Recife the area protected by the seawall was so

Fig. 5.1  General Gustavo Cordeiro de Faria explaining Natal’s harbor defenses
to Roosevelt, Vargas, and Admiral Ingram. (Courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Library, Hyde Park, NY, NARA)
   DECISION TO FIGHT    147

small that many ships were anchored outside it. They made easy prey.
The German submarines would encounter a Brazilian fleet “incapable of
efficiently reacting to a surprise attack.” The hard truth was that “the
extreme fragility of Brazilian naval defense was similar to that in the
Army and in the recently created Air Force.” Brazil was paying the price
for successive governments’ inability to pull the country out of its deep
underdevelopment.9
The reader should recall that Brazil of 1942 was totally dependent on
the sea for transport among its coastal cities north of Rio de Janeiro.
Vitória, Salvador, Maceió, Recife, Natal, Fortaleza, São Luis, and Belém
were basically islands separated one from the others by vast stretches of
land. Brazilians, at the time, described the country as an archipelago.
There were no long-distance connecting railroads or all-weather high-
ways. Indeed in 1942–1943, “there were eighty miles of paved road in
that vast country outside of the cities.”10 Rudimentary aviation was avail-
able only to a small portion of the elite. The first regular flight between
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo began in August 1936 with two 17-­passenger
German-made Junkers. That same year construction began on Brazil’s
first civilian airport, Rio’s Santos Dumont, which would be completed
only in 1947!11 Significantly it was built on landfill in Guanabara Bay
partly to accommodate the seaplanes of international airlines. Everything
moved by water, which meant that the Brazilian economy could be shat-
tered by submarines.12 The consequences of such an attack for the politi-
cal situation could only be bad. Vargas was slowly recovering from his
May automobile accident and would be in no condition to hold things
together. Moreover, despite the political-military accord signed with the
United States in May, the Brazilian high command was not hurrying to
implement it.
Providentially, Hitler had approved “Operation Brazil” with the stipu-
lation that before it was launched there should be a review of the diplo-
matic situation. That brought the plan to the foreign ministry and the
desk of former ambassador to Brazil, Karl Ritter, the same who had been
declared “persona non grata” and expelled by Oswaldo Aranha. Ritter was
responsible for liaison between the foreign ministry and the military. Such
a submarine offensive against still officially neutral Brazil would mean
expanding the war. Ritter argued that pushing Brazil into the conflict
could have negative consequences for interactions with Chile and
Argentina, who still had diplomatic and commercial relations with the
Axis. Besides he thought that Italy and Japan ought to be consulted before
such an attack. From an operational point of view, an attack was complicated
148   F. D. MCCANN

by the great distance from Europe and the submarine’s vulnerability dur-
ing the 26 days en route. The submarines would have to surface regularly
to recharge their batteries and so would be vulnerable to attack. It was
true that because Brazil was neutral, its cities would be lit up at night mak-
ing it easier to see targets in silhouette, and Brazilian coastal shipping
would likely still be brightly lit. It should be noted that submarine attacks
on ports had some recent precedence. In February 1942, a German sub-
marine attacked a refinery on Aruba and a Japanese sub fired on a refinery
at Santa Barbara, California.13
There is some confusion regarding when “Operation Brazil” was can-
celled and when and who ordered the attacks in August. Colonel Durval
Lourenço Pereira carefully reconstructed the dating and origins of the
various orders and contra-orders showing that Admirals Donitz and
Raeder in their defense testimonies during the Nuremberg trials and
American historians were inaccurate about timing and responsibility.14
The startling reality is that, instead of a wolf pack of submarines, there was
only one submarine, U-507, commanded by Lieutenant Commander
Harro Schacht, whose attack procedures were strikingly inhuman.15
U-507 was one of the original vessels designated for the campaign
against Brazil. When the foreign ministry, that is, Karl Ritter, objected to
“Operation Brazil,” it was cancelled and the submarine commanders were
told to destroy their orders. They were given other missions in the Atlantic.
On August 7 Lieutenant Commander Schacht requested by radio to
“freely maneuver” along the Brazilian coast. Jürgen Rower, a distinguished
German historian, was puzzled by U-507’s mission, but suspected that it
might have been motivated by the naval command’s desire for retaliation
for Brazil’s participation in allied anti-submarine operations. He thought
that it contradicted Hitler’s cancelation of “Operation Brazil” and that it
was a “foolish mistake.”16 It was a mistake that had frightful consequences
for the passengers and crews of defenseless Brazilian coastal transports.
On the afternoon of July 4, 1942, Schacht’s U-507 and a companion
vessel U-130 headed into the open ocean from the port of Lorient on the
coast of Brittany. Their destination was a stretch of ocean between the tiny
Brazilian islets of São Pedro and São Paulo and the islands of Fernando de
Noronha. The islets are 590 miles from Brazil’s northeastern shore. Their
mission was to patrol one of the quadrants by which the German navy
divided the vast ocean.17 The outward voyage was uneventful except for an
encounter with a sonar-equipped destroyer, which detected the U-507
and launched four depth charges. The charges missed the submarine but
   DECISION TO FIGHT    149

caused some slight damage that produced a constant loud pinging sound
that Schacht feared could be detected at a distance.
After passing the Azores, Schacht was ordered by radio to operate
jointly with U-130 commanded by Captain Ernst Kals and the Italian sub
Pietro Calvi, but that very day a British destroyer sank the Calvi. On the
afternoon of July 23, the two German subs were given their patrol quad-
rants being told that traffic crossed those quadrants in scattered fashion in
a northeasterly direction and vice versa. They were patrolling a stretch of
the Atlantic narrows between Dakar and Brazil, focused on convoys and
single vessels coming from Trinidad and Georgetown. Their orders took
the two subs in autonomous directions. Brazil itself was beyond their area.
So how did U-507 end up in Brazilian waters?
Schacht’s U-507 was now on its own and seeing no targets, the crew
practiced submerging and firing the deck gun. Isolated from his colleagues
deployed across the South Atlantic, Schacht was the only commander who
did not have any “victories.” His earlier companion Kals had sunk two
ships, but in more than a month since leaving Lorient, U-507 had not
fired a single torpedo. For ten days he did not see any ships at all, which
led him to think that maritime traffic had been diverted westward toward
the Brazilian coast.18 The boredom and tedium must have been corrosive
on the crew’s morale. On the surface the heat of the equatorial zone, the
glare of the sunlight reflecting off the sea would have been physically
draining, and while submerged the stink of the diesel engines and the sul-
furic acidy smell from the electric batteries mixed with the odors of the
unwashed crew wearing the same uniforms for weeks must have been
extremely distasteful. There was only one toilet available for the 56 crew
men. On August 3 the sub was 90 nautical miles from the coast of Ceará
when it turned back toward the open ocean. Reaching a point northeast
of the islets São Pedro and São Paulo, Schacht made a decision that “would
bring unexpected consequences for the Axis war effort.”19
Late on the night of August 7, he asked permission from the Submarine
Command to operate freely on the Brazilian coast. Some 15 hours later,
he received the go-ahead from Submarine Command: “Change course
and head for Pernambuco.” This exchange of radio messages shows that
historians have been wrong for decades attributing the attacks on Brazilian
coastal shipping to the considered planning of the German navy or to
orders from Hitler. In reality, it was the decision of a lone sub commander
seeking victims. It coincided with the presence of a convoy (AS-4) at
Recife ready to head to Africa carrying critically important Sherman tanks
150   F. D. MCCANN

for British forces,20 and German naval leaders hoped that U-507 could do
some damage to it and subsequent convoys. In an analysis related to
“Operation Brazil,” German naval planners had given Pernambuco con-
siderable importance for the security of Allied convoys. On August 14, a
radio message to Schacht emphasized Recife as a resupply and gathering
point for convoys and ships from Florida via Georgetown to Natal, St.
Helena Island, and Cape Town.21 Schacht had other ideas. He considered
heading toward Rio de Janeiro, however, was dissuaded by his declining
fuel supply. The meaning of Submarine Command’s repeated instructions
to Schacht was that he was to attack the allied convoys heading toward
Cape Town and not Brazilian coastal shipping. On his own he did the
opposite. Did Schacht’s disobedience allow Convoy AS-4 to escape
unscathed? If so perhaps he contributed to the German defeat at El
Alamein? He apparently believed that the reason he had not encountered
ships during the previous days was that the Allies had shifted their routes
further to the west along the Brazilian coast. He had the idea that oil tank-
ers were coming into the Atlantic through the Strait of Magellan and up
the South American coast to a crossing point to Freetown in Africa. He
shied away from Pernambuco, which perhaps he thought was too heavily
protected. Admiral Ingram had chosen Recife for his headquarters because
he believed that Recife’s closeness to Cape São Roque, the nearest ­location
to Africa and thus “most strategic point in South America,” made it the
best port for his operations.22

August 1942 Disaster on the Coast of Sergipe

and Bahia

Schacht took up station off the coast of Bahia and its great port of São
Salvador.23 There he ran less chance of discovery before he could strike. If
U-507 was detected, it could plunge into the deep waters off Bahia. The
captain was not a coward, but he was cautious. He was one of the German
Navy’s 2% of submarine commanders responsible for 30% of sinkings dur-
ing the war. It is notable that of the 870 U-boats sent after Allied shipping,
fully 550 did not sink or damage a single ship. Of a total of 2450 Allied
merchantmen sent to the bottom, 800 were sunk by only 30 commanders.
Harro Schacht was among that number and was one of Germany’s most
intrepid and daring submariners.24 It is not clear whether he thought he
was disobeying orders, perhaps he considered a radio message of July 5
authorizing attack without warning “against all Brazilian merchant ships,
   DECISION TO FIGHT    151

including disarmed and recognized as Brazilian” as sufficient sanction. Of

course, the July 5 message did not give permission to attack vessels in
Brazilian waters. The German Submarine Command never gave an order
to attack Brazilian coastal shipping. Recall that Hitler had expressly vetoed
“Operation Brazil.” At the Nuremberg trials, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder,
commander of the German Navy, testified that his submarines had attacked
Brazilian ships because they lacked clear identification as neutral and that
Germany had advised all South American countries to illuminate their ves-
sels so that they could be recognized at night. However, Brazil had not
been so advised, even though Raeder’s testimony implied that it had.25
Schacht did not long survive these events and left no explanations of his
conduct, but all the evidence points to his action as violating orders by
sinking seven ships in Brazilian coastal waters. The leading scholar of the
submarine attacks, Durval Lourenço Pereira, reached the firm condemn-
ing conclusion: “The massacre in the waters of the northeastern litoral
happened thanks to the initiative and the personal decision of Lieutenant
Commander Harro Schacht” (Fig. 5.2).26
Since February 1942 Brazil had lost 12 ships to Axis submarines, but
they had all been off the East Coast of the United States or in the Caribbean
and adjacent waters.27 Somehow such losses could be accepted as costs of
doing business traversing known war zones. Being attacked while traveling
from one state to another via “our territorial waters” would elicit very dif-
ferent emotions. Meanwhile the South Atlantic took on increasing impor-
tance in the summer of 1942 because the Germans successfully shut down
British convoys using the Arctic above Scandinavia to reach the Russian
port of Archangel. The losses were so heavy that the Arctic route had to
be discontinued. FDR and Churchill were determined to keep the Soviet
Union fighting. The best alternative route was to convoy from the United
States via the South Atlantic, around Africa through the Indian Ocean to
Iran and thence overland to Soviet territory. An idea of the importance of
the route can be seen in the 47,874 aircraft that were shipped disassem-
bled to Russia via the “Persian Corridor.” The route was some 10,000
nautical miles longer than the Arctic one, but there was no other choice.
This meant that Brazil and the bases there increased in significance. Brazil
was literally the keystone in the edifice of the logistical war. And the war
was not going well for the Allies. On January 2, 1942, Manila fell to the
Japanese, who also swept over the Netherlands East Indies, then in the
next month, the British surrendered Singapore, losing 130,000 troops
taken captive. The Doolittle Raid on Tokyo on April 18 was predictive of
152   F. D. MCCANN

Fig. 5.2  This grid map was the type the German navy used to track the location
of its vessels. The dark box shows the area assigned to U-507 and the light gray to
U-130. The dark lines show U-507’s route to and along the Brazilian coast. (Map
was prepared by Col. Durval Lourenço Pereira for his Operação Brasil: O ataque
alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora
Contexto, 2015), p. 198. Reproduced by permission of Col. Durval.)

the future and boosted Allied morale, but did little to change the immedi-
ate dark trend. In Egypt, on June 21, Rommel’s supposedly weakened
Africa corps surprised the British by seizing Tobruk in a relatively brief
combat, losing another 6,000 soldiers to the Nazi forces, along with all
their armament. Loss of the Suez Canal loomed as an alarming possibility.
The Germans would get to 70 miles from Alexandria before being stopped
at El Alamein on June 29. Without doubt the war could be won or lost in
the South Atlantic. Armies cannot fight without weapons and all sorts of
supplies and so safe routes for shipping were crucial to obtain victory. That
is why the Axis was sending submarines into the South Atlantic and why
the Allies had to destroy them.
Ironically Schacht’s impatience and decision to head to Brazil caused
him to miss the S.S. Seatrain Texas which was carrying 250 Sherman tanks
steaming for Cape Town and, via the Red Sea, for Port Suez. At Cape
   DECISION TO FIGHT    153

Town the British gave it the code name “Treasure Ship.” The US Merchant
Marine history concluded that “These Sherman tanks, the first Allied
tanks which matched the German Mark IV Panzer in firepower, were a
decisive factor at the battle of El Alamein which began on October 23,
1942, and resulted in an Allied victory.”28 Of course, the intense air cover
that Army Air Corps planes gave to the British Eighth Army played an
extremely important role, and they would not have been there without
Brazilian cooperation and the Parnamirim base at Natal.29
Leaving his assigned quadrant caused U-507 to miss the important
cargo targets. Schacht’s next action would cause war between Brazil and
Germany. He was heading south away from Recife and toward Salvador da
Bahia. Submarine Command’s instructions allowed attacking without
warning all merchant vessels cruising with their lights out. He was aware
that Brazilian coastal ships carried both cargo and passengers. Strictly
speaking passenger vessels were not on the list of approved targets, but he
could have been frustrated after 40 days at sea and still carrying his com-
pliment of 22 torpedoes. He was moving southeast and would encounter
the passenger steamer Baependy on a north-northeast heading. The con-
frontation of these two vessels had a certain irony to it. They had the same
birthplace, at the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg. The Baependy had
been launched 40 years before and had fallen into Brazilian hands during
World War I. U-507 was laid down in 1939. The Brazilian vessel had its
running lights on, but its flag and name were in the dark. As Schacht
maneuvered into attack position, he saw a light on the horizon, likely
another ship. If he acted quickly, he could get two victims. He launched
two torpedoes each with an explosive mixture equal to 280 kilos of TNT.
It was 1825 hours and the unwary Baependy was 1500 meters away
[1600.4 yards]. On board the Brazilians had just finished dinner and were
gathering to celebrate a crew member’s birthday. Soldiers, most of whom
were Cariocas, were on the rear deck playing their pandeiros, drumming
on cans, and singing sambas. This happy scene was undisturbed as both
torpedoes missed their mark and continued on in the darkness. Schacht
had miscalculated the speed of the Baependy. He raced ahead and came
back at a better angle before launching two more torpedoes at 1912 hours.
In his diary he noted “two shots to prevent any possibility of radio trans-
mission by the steamer.”30 An SOS from the ship could reveal the subma-
rine’s presence. Even if the captain of the Baependy could have seen the
torpedoes, at their 40 knot speed, he could not have avoided them. The
two torpedoes hit the Baependy about 30 seconds apart.
154   F. D. MCCANN

The 320 passengers were stunned, some frozen in absolute fear, others
screaming and trying to reach the deck. Captain Lauro Mourinho dos Reis
of the Seventh Artillery Group recalled that glass and wood fragments flew
in every direction cutting and killing indiscriminately. The second torpedo
had hit the engine room; the lights went out, leaving everyone to struggle
for a way out in the dark. Up on deck flames shot into the night. It had
happened so rapidly that, despite frenzied efforts, only one of the lifeboats
could be let down. Finally on deck Captain Lauro understood that he had
to jump overboard to avoid getting sucked under by the sinking ship. A
machinist saw the ship’s captain covered in blood on the bridge sounding
the ship’s whistle repeatedly as it went under. Those who could not swim
thrashed about uselessly, while others held on to floating pieces of wreck-
age. It had been four minutes from impact to the ship going down prow
first. For the 28 survivors in the lone lifeboat, it would be a long dramatic
night of terror before they reached land.31
Schacht knew he had hit a passenger vessel but did nothing to help the
survivors. Instead he attacked the second ship, the Araraquara, a rela-
tively new, luxury vessel. He noted that it had its running lights on and
was “brilliantly illuminated” but it lacked any mark of neutrality. Two
hours after sinking the Baependy, the U-507’s torpedo exploded amidship
plunging the Araraquara into darkness. It listed and broke in half and
within five minutes it and its 131 passengers were gone. Four crewmen
clung to wreckage, one hallucinated and threw himself into the sea, and
the others lived to tell the tale.32
On August 16 at 0210 in the morning, on the north coast of Bahia, the
third victim was the Anibal Benevolo, with 154 passengers and crew on
board. Asleep, they had no time to panic; the vessel went down in 45 sec-
onds. Only four crewmen managed to save themselves. U-507 continued
toward Salvador. So far it was very successful from a coldly martial point
of view. The three ships had not been able to sound an SOS; the German
submarine was advancing on Salvador undetected. One of the reasons
Schacht chose this region is that the depth of the sea plunges from 40
meters north of the city to 1000 meters at the bay’s mouth. If discovered,
he could easily dive to the sub’s maximum depth of 230 meters. Unhappily
for Schacht nothing seemed to be afloat in the great bay, except a small
sailboat that he did not regard as worth his bother.33 Before dawn on the
17th, he went back to deep water, where at 0841 he spied a steamer going
north. It was the Itagíba, carrying the rest of the army’s Seventh Artillery
Group among other passengers. At a distance of 1000 meters, the torpedo
   DECISION TO FIGHT    155

hit the ship in the middle. Its passengers managed to get off in lifeboats,
although two of the boats were hit or dragged under by the sinking ship.
Ten minutes had elapsed.34
In an act of temporary mercy, Schacht chose not to sink the yacht
Aragipe which came to rescue the people in the crowded lifeboats. Likely
he simply did not want to surface to use his deck gun, so as not to reveal
his position. The Aragipe was able to crowd on 150 terrified survivors; the
remainders were picked up by two of the lifeboats. Meanwhile in Salvador
an alarm had been sounded and vessels were held in port. One ship, the
Arará, unaware of the warning, had gone amidst the floating wreckage to
pick up 18 survivors. Observing through his periscope from 200 meters
away, he waited until all were onboard before firing the torpedo. Raising
the periscope again to survey the scene, he could only see one lifeboat
with five “non-whites” in it.35
Later in the afternoon, Schacht saw a passenger ship coming his way. It
was painted gray and did not have a flag or other marks of neutrality. He
fired and the torpedo hit its mark but it did not explode. The unnamed ves-
sel was moving too fast for U-507 to catch it before it reached safety in the
port. He noted in his log: “It is not possible to stop it with artillery during
the day, considering the nearness of the port and the aerial danger.”36
It was now clear to the Brazilian and American authorities that subma-
rines were operating in Bahian waters. From Recife the destroyer USS
Somers and cruiser USS Humboldt steamed south, and seaplanes from VP-­
83 squadron flew out on patrol. Meanwhile Schacht, on August 18, had
taken U-507 out to sea to make repairs on a mechanical problem in a
launch tube. The seaplane PBY  Catalina 83P6 found it exposed on the
surface and attacked with machine guns and depth charges. U-507 dived
rapidly. The pilot, Lt. John M.  Lacey, USN, thought he had sunk it
because an oil slick and air bubbles appeared on the surface. But all the
attack had done was cause a leak in an oil tank. Schacht steered his boat
south toward Ilhéus in search for more targets.37 But the only vessel
encountered was a small coastal sailing boat, on August 19, that his crew
boarded but not understanding Portuguese learned nothing useful. The
Jacyra was carrying a disassembled truck, cases of empty bottles, and
cacao. The mestiço crew were sent toward shore and the Germans blew up
the vessel. Why they took the trouble to destroy such a harmless craft is a
mystery. The smell of fuel oil alerted them to the leak in the tank and the
need for repairs. The next day U-507 returned to the entrance to the Bay
of All Saints where he found the lighthouses were shut down, but oddly
156   F. D. MCCANN

Salvador was still lit up brightly. On the 22nd Schacht encountered the
Swedish ship Hammarem without lights and launched a torpedo, but
missed. A second one hit its mark but did not explode. As dawn broke he
surfaced and fired the 105 mm gun on the rear deck hitting the bridge.
The crew abandoned the burning ship, while Schacht maneuvered to fire
his last torpedo from the stern tube. Turning north he set course for
France.38 He left behind a Brazil lusting for revenge.
Businesses with German names were sacked. Police rounded up
Germans. What some called Brazil’s “Pearl Harbor” provoked clamorous
street demonstrations throughout the country. The streets of Fortaleza,
Ceará, filled with people breaking into stores owned by real or supposed
Germans and Italians and setting them afire. The police could not control
the mob.39 In Vitória, Espírito Santo, on the 17th the authorities could
not quell the rioters, who wrecked some 25 buildings, but took all Axis
nationals into custody, while in Belém do Pará, news of the sinkings
resulted in mobs destroying some 20 stores, offices, and houses of alleged
Axis nationals and sympathizers. In Manaus there were loud anti-Axis
demonstrations that saw numerous Axis nationals being beaten and
injured. In Natal there was destruction of Axis property and “genuine
enthusiasm against enemy for the first time….” São Paulo saw large groups
of students shouting for war and a huge number in the plaza in front of
the Cathedral clamoring for action. The US Consulate in Porto Alegre
reported that there was a systematic smashing of shops belonging to sup-
posed Axis sympathizers. “All around the Consulate at this minute stores
are being demolished.” The material damage was already great.40 The out-
raged Brazilian people demanded a response.
Inadvertently, U-507 would contribute to the eventual Allied victory by
its unauthorized attack on Brazilian shipping. After pulling Brazil into the
war, Schacht returned to his home base at Lorient in France. Unlike a previ-
ous voyage this time there were no medals and the reception was not warm.
U-507 retuned to sea in late November and cruised back to Brazil, where it
patrolled off of Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte. In conducting attacks
Schacht changed his procedure to take prisoner the fated ship’s captain to
obtain precise information about cargoes and navigation routes. By New
Year’s 1943, he had three British merchant marine captains on board the
U-507. In a twist of fortune, on January 13, 1943, a USN Catalina PBY,
flying out of the base at Fortaleza, spotted the submarine and dropped four
depth charges totaling 884 kilos of TNT making direct hits.
U-507’s voyages of death were ended thanks to the Brazilian-American
alliance.41
   DECISION TO FIGHT    157

Brazil Goes to War, August 1942

The government in Rio was stunned. For a couple of days, Vargas, who was
“far from well: he attempted to walk too soon and developed water on the
knee; was in severe pain during the cabinet meetings …,”42 seemed uncer-
tain of what to do. Foreign Minister Aranha recalled that time as “the worst
days” as he drafted a note of protest to be sent via Portugal to Berlin, basi-
cally saying that the German attacks created a state of war and that Brazil
was accepting the challenge. He seemed ready to declare war, according to
General Dutra and Ambassador Caffery. Góes proposed that instead of
declaring war they should make use of reprisals. Vargas initially was inclined
to agree, thinking that reprisals could include confiscating German busi-
nesses and interned German ships. At least on August 16, he was not think-
ing of declaring war on Germany. Góes and Dutra suggested decreeing a
“state of war” (akin to martial law) in the 6th and 7th Military Regions,
which would legally increase government control of the threatened coast.
They thought to follow that with a partial mobilization without making
any communication with the Reich.43 The cabinet held inconclusive meet-
ings arguing about the wording of a note to be sent to Berlin.
While this internal debate went on, Aranha showed Consul General
John F. Simmons parts of alternative drafts of the war note and explained
the cabinet’s discussions. This was an example of the closeness between
the foreign minister and the embassy. Vargas ultimately opted for Aranha’s
formula, recognizing “the state of war which, in an inhuman and brutal
manner, has been forced upon us by the German Reich.” Aranha explained
to Caffery that “recognition of the existence of a state of war … was more
in line with Brazilian tradition.” That is what had been done the last time
Brazil had gone into a foreign war—against Paraguay in May 1865! Aranha
had built his arguments slowly until he had 12 of them. Dutra reminded
the cabinet that Brazil was practically defenseless. He conceded that they
had received some very good material from the United States; “but, so
very little of it ….” Aranha admitted to Caffery that “I don’t like Dutra
personally, but I cannot criticize his attitude.”44 The other ministers wor-
ried about shortages of coal, gasoline, and other fuels. Brazil was certainly
not prepared for war. Even so, meeting at 3 p.m. on August 22, the cabi-
net voted unanimously for war.45
Three days later Admiral Jonas Ingram advised the Navy Department
that Brazil’s naval minister had directed the senior officer in the northeast
to report to him for duty.
158   F. D. MCCANN

The Brazilian navy was to be under the command of the American

admiral. Joined by the Brazilian army’s senior officer in the northeast, they
agreed tentatively that naval forces had the paramount responsibility for
defending the region. They agreed that Ingram would take full responsi-
bility for offshore and coastal operations and that the Brazilian army would
assume security measures ashore. In any contingency Brazilian and
American forces would cooperate fully. The air forces would also operate
under the admiral’s joint operations plans. The Americans were much
encouraged by the Brazilian attitude, which exceeded their most optimis-
tic expectations.46
The Brazilian armed forces were willing to operate under American
control, but curiously, not under Brazilian joint command. At a cabinet
meeting in Guanabara Palace on August 29, Dutra proposed that the
three services place themselves under a single commander to improve
coordination. The ministers agreed except for the naval and air force min-
isters, who energetically opposed the idea. To end the argument, Vargas
said he would gather the chiefs of staff of the services “to study the ques-
tion.” At that point the ministers had yet to authorize the mobilization of
the army.47 They did manage to approve a decree, issued on August 31,
putting Brazil on a war footing internally by establishing a “state of war”
in all of Brazil. That step limited rights and increased executive power by
suspending several articles of the Estado Novo constitution. It might
strike the reader as a mere formality, after all this was a dictatorship, but
showed Brazilian respect for the idea of law.48 Brazilian ships heading for
the United States now steamed in well-guarded convoys, even so sinkings
continued. In a few months, Brazil had lost 75% of its commercial fleet.
Looking back years later, Dutra stubbornly commented “that nothing jus-
tified the haste with which we broke relations with the Axis countries.”49
As Brazil’s Independence Day, September 7, drew closer, Rio took on
the cautious appearance of a city under threat of attack. The spotlights
illuminating the Statue of Christ on Corcovado Mountain were darkened,
as were the lights on Urca and Sugar Loaf at the entrance to the great bay.
The light of the clock tower of Mesbla department store went off as did all
advertising signs on mountains and upper floors of tall buildings. On
September 6 the beaches of Leme, Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon had
their first total blackout.50
   DECISION TO FIGHT    159

The Idea of a Brazilian Expeditionary Force

Given the indecision and uncertainty of the previous years, it is notable
that now opinion in the Brazilian military shifted toward an active combat
role abroad. The idea first took shape in informal discussions among
Brazilian officers, who were infuriated and deeply frustrated by the sinking
of the Baependy, which had killed 250 soldiers and 7 officers.51 Their help-
lessness in the face of the German submarine onslaught clearly illustrated
Brazil’s military and naval weakness. Although in August the cabinet had
recognized that there existed a state of war with Germany and Italy, it was
not immediately clear what role in the war Brazil would claim for itself.
Minister of War Dutra’s proclamation to the army declared that Brazil was
experiencing “moments of intense gravity” and condemned the sinking as
“a monstrous and criminal act” asserting that the army stood unified to
defend the country, but oddly it never mentioned Germany or the Axis.52
The situation was becoming clearer, but American officials continued
to worry about pro-Axis Brazilian officers. A few of the officers on Dutra’s
ministerial staff were vocally pro-German. In the army itself, there may
well have been a difference of opinion between junior and field-grade offi-
cers. US Army intelligence reported that lieutenants and captains in civil-
ian dress were seen leading marchers in anti-Axis street demonstrations.
Supposedly such junior officers were dissatisfied with “the regime of the
two generals” (Dutra and Góes) who reportedly had stronger backing
among majors and lieutenant colonels.53 One wonders if such junior offi-
cers had been among the cadets at the Realengo Military School in October
1940, who booed and jeered when Hitler appeared on screen during a
showing of German army war films depicting the Spanish Civil War and
the invasions of Poland and Czechoslovakia. One of the cadets later
recalled that while the films were well made and that the cadets were at
first curious and a bit perplexed, when they realized that the films were war
propaganda, a “deafening booing, and vigorous foot stamping” broke
out.54 The US military attaché emphasized that there was “only a small
proportion of officers in the Brazilian Army who are pro-Nazi, but they
are in key positions where their influence is great.” Furthermore they
appeared to be protected by Dutra and Góes.55
Recent graduates of the army’s Command and General Staff School in
Rio were enthusiastic about getting into the fight. The majority of officers
in the class of 1942 had been part of the Tenente movement of the 1920s.56
On October 31, at the Staff School’s graduation ceremonies, in the pres-
160   F. D. MCCANN

ence of Dutra and Góes, the class spokesman, Colonel Newton Estillac
Leal, gave an energetic speech in which he called Hitler a pig and a swine
and demanded adherence to the Atlantic Charter57 and full cooperation
with the United Nations. He labeled Nazism-Fascism-Integralism a
­“sinister trinity.”58 Furthermore, he asserted that Brazil should take an
active part in the war and form an expeditionary force. Leal was one of the
Tenentes and apparently had convinced a number of them to support the
Allied cause. Military Attaché Claude Adams noted happily that the speech
was the first time that “any Army group [had] defied the Politicos by
openly declaring solidarity and friendship with the United States….” The
newspapers responded favorably, which meant that the censors (DIP) had
given approval.59 Dutra appeared friendlier to the American embassy, but
the military attaché noted that the minister had not yet mentioned the
army taking an active part in the fighting. Correct or not, the military
attaché believed that Góes was “an obstructionist to active measures
against the Axis.” The pro-Allied officers had three objectives: (1) the
formation of an expeditionary force to fight alongside the allies; (2) the
removal of Axis sympathizers and those who were lukewarm toward the
Allied cause from responsible positions in the government, particularly
Dutra and Góes; (3) they would accomplish the foregoing by “quiet pres-
sure on President Vargas, in whom they have confidence….”60
Meanwhile, army officers talked about attacking Vichy France’s colony
Guiana, on Brazil’s northern border, or even Dakar in French West Africa.
Brazil had neither the shipping nor the armament, or, indeed, trained
troops to mount such independent operations so such actions would be
dependent on American approval and support. Washington feared that an
assault on French Guiana would upset its delicate negotiations seeking to
separate the French forces in North Africa from Axis-tolerant Vichy. In
December 1942, with the Allied invasion of North Africa underway, the
Brazilian General Staff discussed sending troops there. To test public reac-
tion, Minister of War Dutra inspired newspaper articles favoring an expe-
ditionary force to Africa. The Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro) declared
that street demonstrations were not enough, Brazil should be doing “what
our North American allies are doing.” Góes Monteiro wrote a letter to
Dutra recommending the preparation of a fighting force to go overseas
and went so far as to offer to be its commander. Somewhat dismissively US
Attaché Adams commented that “Góes realizes that something of this
nature is in the wind and as usual [he] wants to claim credit for the idea.”61
   DECISION TO FIGHT    161

Foreign Minister Aranha gave a speech arguing that Brazil should take
a more active role in the war.62 Aranha reportedly had allied himself with
the tenente group, which spoke ever more loudly for committing troops.
It is interesting that the tenente officers were saying openly that following
the war Brazil would return to a democratic form of government.63 In his
Diário Carioca (Rio de Janeiro) column, José Eduardo de Macedo Soares
highlighted the dissatisfaction with Brazil’s seemingly passive stance; he
asserted that the armed forces were able and willing to fight and were only
awaiting orders. Then, on December 31, President Vargas spoke at a lun-
cheon of officers saying that it was impossible to tell how the war would
develop but that the nation should not limit itself to supplying raw materi-
als or to being a way station for foreign troops en route to the battlefields
of Africa. Instead, Vargas declared, Brazil should prepare to intervene out-
side the hemisphere with large numbers of well-trained and well-equipped
troops. He cautioned the officers to stay united and reminded them that
they embodied “national honor and the very future of the Pátria.”64
On Christmas Eve, Franklin Roosevelt had sent Vargas a message say-
ing that during the coming year “the statesmen of our two countries,
continuing their traditional collaboration, will draw the blueprint for the
new and lasting peace.”65
Minister Dutra was often accused of being dubious of alliance with the
Americans and of being slow to prepare his army for combat, yet in the
first week of January 1943, he advised Vargas that the American necessity
of confronting the Japanese would likely compel the United States to send
more forces to the Pacific. Because the need for troops in Africa and
Europe would continue to be great, he thought that Washington would
want Brazilian troops. They had to prepare. He thought that their combat
force should be an expeditionary army of two corps, one of which should
be motorized, plus a supporting armored division. Such a force would
require 4,700 officers and 140,450 soldiers. They would need an addi-
tional number to keep order in Brazil. He lamented that they did not have
the equipment for such a force. Mobilization would be difficult, he noted,
because many would flee from being drafted. “Unhappily, we will have to
admonish harshly the educated part of the population, whose sons – the
most capable and competent – are the desired element to sustain armies in
this ultra-civilized century so steeped in science and mechanics.” He
complained that the army was handicapped by so many officers being
assigned to non-military functions. And he reminded Vargas that “not
every theater of operations would be appropriate for our congenitally
162   F. D. MCCANN

weak and physically debilitated soldiers.” He suggested that they send

officers to Europe to observe how their forces would be used.66 Not
exactly the most confident endorsement of the abilities of Brazil’s soldiers.
It is puzzling why Dutra did not use his considerable power to launch a
vigorous training program and to persuade Vargas to mobilize more
troops.

Natal Conference: Roosevelt

and Vargas, January 1943

Vargas would soon be preparing for a “secret” conference at Natal with

Roosevelt who would be flying back from the Casablanca Conference.67
Initially Roosevelt was thinking of meeting Vargas “in some central loca-
tion like Trinidad.”68 Roosevelt likely realized that because he would have
to pass through Brazil, it would be more diplomatic to meet at Natal.
Foreign Minister Aranha wrote a long letter to Vargas analyzing
Brazilian foreign policy and making a careful examination of the Brazilian-­
American alliance. His basic point was that the United States would be the
leader of the post-war world and Brazil should be at its side; not to do so
would be a fateful error. Pan Americanism could not succeed without
Brazil. Aranha believed that Brazil and the United States were “cosmic
and universal” nations, whose futures could only be continental and
worldwide. He knew that Brazil was still “a weak country economically
and militarily,” but he was confident that natural growth and a flood of
immigration and investments after the war would give it the population
and capital to be “inevitably one of the great economic and political pow-
ers of the world”—as it was already second in the Western Hemisphere.
He believed that Brazilians would gain economically by subjecting them-
selves to the war economy.69 Aranha was aware, as he told Dutra, that
complete cooperation with the United States could be risky, but weak
Brazil was at the mercy of stronger nations and that without a powerful
ally “the future of Brazil will be everyone’s, except the Brazilians.”70
Aranha said that he did not think it was necessary at that moment to
send Brazilian forces to Africa or Europe, even as he encouraged army
leaders to think that they should, but he conceded that the course of the
war might make it in Brazil’s interest to do so later. He urged Vargas to
ask Roosevelt about future allied operations and plans for European occu-
pation and reconstruction so that they could plan better. The bi-national
   DECISION TO FIGHT    163

military commissions in Rio de Janeiro and Washington already managed

their military relations; however, Aranha thought that the two govern-
ments should have intimate contact and a continuous flow of ideas at the
ministerial level. Brazil, he said, should not await events, but prepare mili-
tarily as if it were to enter combat immediately. Such preparation, he
argued, whether Brazil fought or not, would give it more weight at the
peace table. In addition to participating in planning for the United
Nations, he wanted Brazil to secure a seat on the supreme military coun-
cils. Aranha’s memoranda for Vargas prior to the presidential conference
at Natal, complete with its 11 war objectives, in effect laid out what
became goals of Brazilian foreign policy for the next decades.71
Aranha’s objectives for Brazil’s participation in the war were as
follows:

1. An improved position in world politics;

2. Consolidation of its preeminence in South America;
3. A more confident and intimate solidarity with the United States;
4. Greater influence over Portugal and its possessions;
5. Development of maritime power;
6. Development of air power;
7. Development of heavy industries;
8. Creation of war industries;
9. Creation of industries—agricultural, extractive, and light min-
eral—which would be complementary to those of the United
States and necessary for world reconstruction;
10. Extension of Brazil’s railways and highways for economic and stra-
tegic purposes;
11. Exploration for essential combustible fuels.

He hoped that these “hurried and general lines” would better prepare
Vargas to deal with Roosevelt.
Vargas and Roosevelt had met in Rio de Janeiro in 1936 when Roosevelt
was en route to Buenos Aires for an Inter-American Conference; they got
on well and spoke in French with each other. In the intervening years,
Vargas had enriched FDR’s stamp collection with numerous examples
from Brazil. The fact that Getúlio’s son had returned from his studies at
John’s Hopkins, and almost immediately had contracted polio and was
then slowly dying in São Paulo, must have deepened their bond. Because
Getúlio was still limping slightly from his injuries in the auto crash the
164   F. D. MCCANN

previous May, Roosevelt gave him his cane. In their Natal conversations,
Roosevelt told him that he would like to have him at his side during the
peace conference. He described the progress of the war, some hopes and
plans for the post-war, and some of his ideas for the future of French
African colonies. He was especially concerned about Dakar, which he
thought should be made a trusteeship under three commissioners, an
American, a Brazilian, and a third from another American Republic. In a
general way, they talked about “the future of Brazil’s industrial develop-
ment.” FDR was intent that Brazil formally join the United Nations,
which Vargas readily agreed to arrange. That gave Vargas the opportunity
“to say again that we need equipment from you for our military, naval and
air force.” Vargas emphasized that the Americans could depend upon the
Brazilian military’s “integral cooperation with no restrictions.” He added
“everything the United States judges necessary and useful as cooperation
from Brazil we shall continue to give” (Fig. 5.3).72
They talked and joked throughout their inspections of the huge
Parnamirim Air Base that was the keystone of the allied transatlantic sup-
ply line and was then “one of the finest [airfields] in the world.”73 Indeed,
an officer with wide experience throughout the Air Transport Command
observed that “Natal, Brazil, was a comfortable, almost luxurious post. I
enjoyed my quarters, found the officers’ mess splendid, and the officers’
club delightful.”74 Their joint press statement asserted that “Brazil and the
United States seek to make the Atlantic Ocean safe for all.”75
A negative aspect of the conference was that the American officials at
Natal knew what was happening but the local Brazilians did not. One can
only imagine what people in Natal thought when they saw a car bearing
the two presidents followed by one with American guards, but no
Brazilians. The Brazilian regional army commander resented not being
forewarned and was alarmed that American troops were “blockading our
President.” After all, he complained, “Natal is a city garrisoned and policed
by troops of the Army, Navy, and Air Force of Brazil, and is not yet an
occupied city.” Despite the considerable American presence, Vargas
appeared comfortable; he commented to Ambassador Caffery that he had
arrived the night before Roosevelt’s arrival because “The host should
await the visitor” (Fig. 5.4).76
The Natal Conference was a key, perhaps the emblematic, event in the
wartime relations between the two countries. It was kept secret until it
happened. The Rio de Janeiro newspaper A Manhã captured the general
press reaction saying that Natal was the “high point of our alliance with
   DECISION TO FIGHT    165

Fig. 5.3  Vargas and his American allies aboard the USS Humboldt. (Courtesy of
the Franklin D.  Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.  NARA.  Bottom from left:
Harry Hopkins, Vargas, FDR, Jefferson Caffery. Standing from left: Rear Admiral
Ross McIntire, Major General Robert L.  Walsh, Admiral Jonas Ingram, Rear
Admiral Augustin T. Beauregard)

the United States and shows the absolute solidarity which unites us.” A
columnist in another Rio paper, A Noite, prodded the military and the
government with the comment that if Brazil already had its forces in com-
bat there would have been a Brazilian delegate at Casablanca.77
At Natal, the two presidents discussed possible military roles for Brazil.
FDR said that the American military preferred that instead of sending
troops to North Africa, Vargas should arrange with Salazar to replace
Portuguese forces on the islands of the Azores and Madeira. Vargas said he
was willing to send troops to the Portuguese islands, but stressed that he
would not be able to do so “unless you furnish adequate equipment for
them… we need equipment from you for our military, naval, and air
166   F. D. MCCANN

Fig. 5.4  Vargas, Roosevelt, and Caffery Natal conversations on the USS
Humboldt. (Courtesy of the Franklin D.  Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
NY. NARA)

force.”78 Apparently Roosevelt agreed because when he returned to

Washington, the War Department dropped its opposition to a Brazilian
combat role and “supported the employment of Brazilian troops aboard.”79
The American generals, particularly Eisenhower, had been reluctant to
crowd the battlefields with allies of dubious preparation. Also the United
States was then struggling to produce enough arms for itself, the United
Kingdom, and for Russia. Brazil was not the only one waiting for arms.
It should be recalled that when the war began in 1939 the United
States Army was the 17th in size among the world’s armies. It had 174,000
men in the regular army and a like number in the reserves. Its regiments
and battalions were understrength and undertrained. Its weaponry was
left over from the first great war. Its officer corps was old, the average
captains were in their late 30s and early 40s, and they were unprepared to
command troops in combat. The general officers who would lead armies
in Africa, Europe, and the Far East were still majors and lieutenant colo-
nels. The country’s war-related industries were few. The extensive training
   DECISION TO FIGHT    167

maneuvers held in Louisiana and East Texas in 1940 and 1941 reshaped
the officer corps, the army’s tactics, and weapons. Brazil faced many of the
same problems, but, though it increased its army from 60,000 to 90,000,
it held no mammoth training exercises to test the command abilities of its
officers and had no industrial base to manufacture the required weapons.
It did, however, hold limited exercises at its Saican training grounds in Rio
Grande do Sul that organized the troops into an infantry division, which
was a step away from the French pattern it had followed through the
1920s and 1930s.80
By early December, Góes had become seriously ill and had taken leave
of his duties. A strange set of events showed the impatience of some mem-
bers of the Brazilian elite about Brazil’s war role. There were reports that
Foreign Minister Aranha and Francisco Assis Chateaubriand, owner of the
Diários Associados newspapers, were promoting the creation of a “Latin
American Volunteer Legion” for overseas service. Chateaubriand, if not
Aranha, was convinced that the Estado Novo government would avoid
direct involvement in the fighting. “We [have been] transformed into a
pile of cowardly frogs,” he complained. He was convinced that he could
raise 6000 volunteers from Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, and Paraguay to
fight on the Allied side. He told the new military attaché, General Claude
Adams, that he had a million dollars for initial financing, but needed a
guarantee from the United States that it would arm and maintain such
troops. He had gone so far as to sound out Colonel Osvaldo Cordeiro de
Farias about his interest in commanding such a force. Taking the idea to
Dutra, for whom he had little regard, the minister threw cold water on the
plan, saying that he would order the arrest of any army officer who joined
“this Falange that the Diários Associados wants to create.” He told him to
talk to Getúlio.
Chateaubriand met Vargas, at the end of February 1943, at the Palácio
Rio Negro, the summer residence in Petrópolis. Vargas showed him copies
of telegrams and American documents indicating that he had been follow-
ing his conversations about a volunteer legion. Without telling him about
his discussions with Roosevelt at Natal regarding Brazil’s war role, he let
him read a Dutra memo proposing an expeditionary force. Chatô, as he
was nicknamed, must have realized that, although he was king of the
Brazilian press, his sources within the secretive military were limited.
The Natal Conference marked a shift in United States policy toward
Brazil. Officials in Washington began considering the post-war situation.
If another American Republic joined the fighting, it would, they thought,
168   F. D. MCCANN

strengthen the United States position as leader and spokesman for the
Western Hemisphere after the war.
Seemingly on cue, the Brazilian army shuffled its regional commanders
in what American intelligence observers labeled “the most widespread
shake-up in the Brazilian High Command since the outbreak of the war.”
General João Batista Mascarenhas de Morais, who had been commanding
the 7th Military Region at Recife, was transferred to the more prestigious
post of the 2nd Military Region in São Paulo. The Americans had rated
him as “an average officer” but pro-democratic.81 It is worth noting that
there was no unity of command among Brazilian forces in the northeast.
The army, navy, and air force headquarters operated independently of each
other, and there was never a joint regional or theater commander.
Combined operations training was not held. Instead a lot of energy was
expended on inter-service negotiations.82
An incident shows the looseness of the army’s command structure.
Mascarenhas expressed his interest in taking a group of his officers to visit
the North African front, an idea General Robert L. Walsh, commander of
the newly established US Army Forces South Atlantic (USAFSA),
endorsed. Significantly, Mascarenhas had not requested approval from his
superiors in Rio de Janeiro. Walsh commented that since Brazil’s entry
into the war, “there has been a constantly increasing interest by Brazilian
commanders” regarding the part Brazil would play. They “are reacting
very definitely and favorably toward our war effort and it is becoming
more and more apparent to them that they must participate directly in
combat operations across the seas, in conjunction with Allied combat
units.” In order to give Brazilian officers an “unvarnished” idea of the
realities of combat operations, “the time is ripe,” Walsh recommended, for
sending a small number of their officers to North Africa.83 At that time,
the thinking in the Brazilian army was that troops from the northeast
would be sent to Africa.
Dutra himself was angling for a visit to Eisenhower’s headquarters in
North Africa, and Marshall was responding with delay. He was alarmed
that too many foreign delegations wanted to engage in war tourism drain-
ing Eisenhower’s valuable time. He radioed Adams in Rio, “Delay is due
to necessity of making arrangements convenient to Eisenhower. He is
swamped with a fierce battle, with other preparations, with visitors from
China, England, the United States, and elsewhere. We have to protect him
and you must do your part. General Gomez, [sic] representing Brazil, has
just been in Africa, so your references to loss of goodwill do not impress
   DECISION TO FIGHT    169

me. A similar Mexican party is just leaving for Africa and every official in
Africa is head over heels in work, accommodations limited, planes over-
taxed, etc.”84
Leaving Rio out of “the picture,” as General Mascarenhas asked General
Walsh to do, could have created problems. A serious weakness in the
Brazilian army was the strong tendency toward top-down control, with a
countervailing tendency for local commanders to act independently when-
ever possible. And with Góes Monteiro’s illness, Minister of War Dutra
was firmly in charge. So much so that American intelligence officers now
called the army a “one man show.” Dutra would “not allow any subordi-
nate to make any important decision without his approval.” For Brazil-US
military cooperation to work, everything had to be handled directly with
him. He enjoyed Vargas’s full confidence so that it was foolhardy to try to
go around him. This centralization not only slowed decision-making, it
was troubling because Dutra was “surrounded by some staff officers who
are unfriendly to the United States and who act as obstructionists.” Dutra
himself did not excite American enthusiasm, but he had to be treated with
caution. “Although he is retiring” [that is reserved], the intelligence
report stated, “and not brilliant, he is very determined.”85
It is ironic that Americans tended to distrust Dutra as being pro-­German,
because he had since becoming minister worked to keep non-­Brazilian
influences out of the army. He certainly admired the German army, but he
was a Brazilian patriot. He and likely many other high-­ranking officers were
deeply concerned that Brazil could break apart, and to preserve national
unity, it was necessary to keep out foreign influences. Such officers believed
that ultimately it was only the army that held Brazil together. And so the
army’s ranks, especially the officer corps, could not tolerate, even minimally,
any “exotic tendency.” Since December 1937 the Vargas government had
suppressed German language schools, clubs, and Nazi Party activities in
German immigrant communities.86 True, Dutra did not focus on Nazism or
Germany as threats, but he imposed a kind of racial, religious, and intel-
lectual purity on the officer ranks that appeared uncompromising. He
wanted the army to be as completely Brazilian as possible. Immigrants, even
Brazilian-born sons of immigrants, were not accepted into the military
school, neither were Negroes, Jews, nor Muslims. While this discrimination
reflected broader attitudes in society and certainly in the Estado Novo
regime, Dutra played a key and personal role in imposing the exclusions.
Showing his penchant for control, he went so far as to have doubtful cases
in military school admissions sent to his office for decision.87
170   F. D. MCCANN

After the successful landings in North Africa in November 1942, the

War Department had considered using Brazilian troops in that theater.
The State Department wanted to send a Brazilian battalion to the region,
but, after studying the matter, the army was reluctant because it feared
that if the Brazilians went, other Latin American countries would want to
go too; moreover “none could be sent before they [were] … supplied,
reequipped, and properly trained.”88 Which other Latin American
Republics the army planners had in mind is not clear, nor explained in the
archival files. As a result of the Natal Conference, the American Army
reconsidered and thereafter supported employing Brazilian troops in
combat.
At Natal, Roosevelt had encouraged the idea of Brazil committing
troops, telling Vargas that he wanted him with him at the peace table. If
Brazil sent its soldiers to fight, it could legitimately claim a larger role in
post-war restructuring of the world. After the first war, in which it was an
ally but without a combat role, it played a minor part at the peace confer-
ence, and although active in the League of Nations, it had resigned in
frustration at not obtaining a permanent council seat in 1926. In addition
to international reasons, Vargas likely thought that distracting the military
with a foreign campaign would give him some political space in which to
develop a populist base with which to preserve the gains of the freshly
labeled Estado Nacional. The dictatorship’s opponents quickly regarded a
combat role as guarantee that the regime would not outlast the war. They
asserted that Brazilians could not fight against tyranny overseas and return
to live under it at home. Although tyranny was likely too strong a term to
describe the Estado Novo, it certainly was not a democratic government.
Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha saw the war and an expeditionary
force as a way to expand Brazil’s historic cooperation with the United
States into “a true alliance of destinies.” That policy of cooperation had
been, Aranha noted, “a source of security” for Brazil, that by giving the
United States assurance of Brazil’s support in international questions,
Brazil could “count on them in [South] American ones.” The FEB would,
in his view, convince the Americans that Brazil was committed to an alli-
ance “materially, morally, and militarily.” The alliance was his strategy for
gaining United States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he
saw as “the first defense against external and internal danger.” He argued
that the FEB was the start of a wider collaboration, involving Brazil’s total
military reorganization. Moreover, he did not believe that they could
restrict themselves solely to an expeditionary force if they wanted to insure
   DECISION TO FIGHT    171

American involvement in other Brazilian military matters, such as develop-

ment of the navy and air force, and defense of Southern Brazil. Looking
ahead, he believed that Brazil would have to keep its forces mobilized for
some time after the peace to help maintain the post-war order. In a cabinet
meeting, he asserted that they should work to convince the Americans that
“having chosen the road to follow and our companions for the journey we
will not change our course or hesitate in our steps.”89
For some Brazilian officers, especially the military school graduates of
the class of 1917, committing troops would vindicate their not having
fought in World War I; it would also revenge the deaths of friends and
colleagues killed in German submarine attacks, and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, it would increase the military’s effective strength and ability to deal
with various contingencies. Among the latter were the strong United
States military and naval bases in Northeast Brazil, which the Brazilians
wanted to insure that the Americans would vacate after the war; the
German immigrant populations in Southern Brazil, which they wanted to
be able to control; and, the ever-present fear of Argentina, which was then
under a military regime. But the army was not about to ship overseas and
trust that all would be well at home or on the frontiers. Its leaders were
particularly concerned about Argentina. In July 1943, Minister of War
Dutra declared that whatever number of troops went abroad, he wanted
an equivalent force left in Brazil “to guarantee sovereignty and the main-
tenance of order and tranquility here.” Clearly, the home front had to be
secure, but to achieve that objective, Brazilian leaders would have to pry
sufficient weapons from the Americans, who then were struggling to arm
their own troops and those of their Allies already fighting. The Brazilian
government decided that it would have to send troops to the battlefields.
Washington favored the idea because if the largest Latin American
country fought with the Allies, it would enhance the image of the United
States as leader of the hemisphere. The Roosevelt administration also
hoped that it would make Brazil a pro-American bulwark in South
America. Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw Brazil as a counterweight to
Argentina. Both the Brazilians and the Americans adroitly played on the
other’s worries about Argentina to bolster their policy goals. But, of
course, the closer Brazil and the United States became, the more nervous
the Argentines grew.
Some American army leaders were reluctant to accept the Brazilian
offer of troops. Their willingness to accommodate the Brazilians was in
direct proportion to what they wanted from them. By the end of 1942,
172   F. D. MCCANN

the United States Army had its Brazilian air bases and related supply lines
through them to North Africa, so why worry about the Brazilians? A
debate took place in American military and diplomatic circles over the
merits of accepting or deflecting Brazilian desires. Earlier in 1942, the two
governments had considered a Brazilian occupation of French and Dutch
Guiana, and, at Natal (Jan. 1943), Roosevelt suggested to Vargas that
Brazil replace Portugal’s troops in the Azores and Madeira, so that the
Portuguese could reinforce their home defenses. Nothing came of that
idea, but after the Natal Conference, it was not if Brazil would fight, but
where? In mid-April 1943, the Brazilian military representative in
Washington, General Estevão Leitão de Carvalho, told Chief of Staff
George Marshall that Brazil wanted to form a three or four division expe-
ditionary Corps, and, in May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea.
It is important to emphasize that the expeditionary force was a Brazilian
idea, that it resulted from a calculated policy of the Vargas government
and not from an American policy to draw Brazil directly into the
fighting.

Notes
1. Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 318–319; and
two unpublished manuscripts “History of US Army Forces South Atlantic,”
34–36, and “History of South Atlantic Division Air Transport Command,”
Part I, III, pp. 137–140. These two manuscripts were written by staff his-
torians at the bases in Brazil. There are copies in the US Army, Center for
Military History, Washington. The military alliance would endure until
1977.
2. Memo, Marshall to Welles, Washington, May 10, 1942 “Situation in
Northeastern Brazil” in Larry I. Bland, Editor, The Papers of George Catlett
Marshall, Vol. 3, pp.  193–195; also appears in Foreign Relations, 1942,
Vol. 5, pp. 659–661.
3. Marshall to Góes Monteiro, Washington, May 12, 1942 in Larry I. Bland,
Editor, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 3, p. 196.
4. On the nickname, see Larry L.  Bland, Ed, The Papers of George Catlett
Marshall, vol. 2, “We Cannot Delay,” July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),
pp. 502–503. http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-
lieutenant-colonel-claude-m-adams/ Adams had a heart attack while com-
pleting the command course at Ft. Leavenworth. Marshall’s correspondence
with him shows a close friendship. Adams was from Tennessee and had
   DECISION TO FIGHT    173

served in the National Guard in World War I and obtained a commission

in the Regular Army in 1920. Marshall had requested his transfer from an
ROTC assignment at the University of Florida to Vancouver Barracks to be
his executive officer. Larry L.  Bland, Ed. The Papers of George Catlett
Marshall, Vol. 1, “The Soldierly Spirit” December 1880–June 1939
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 551, note 2. Also
Marshall to Mrs. Claude M.  Adams, August 24, 1939, Papers of George
Catlett Marshall, #2-036 [2: 39–40.) and Marshall to Claude M. Adams,
December 28, 1939, #2-093. http://marshallfoundation.org/library/
to-major-claude-m-adams-2/.
5. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880–1939
(New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 311–312. As commander Marshall
oversaw the area’s CCC activities.
6. McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance, p. 281. For Müller’s biogra-
phy see “Filinto Müller” in Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds.
Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983. Vol. 3 (Rio de
Janeiro: Forense-Universitária, 1984.), pp.  2342–2346. He retired from
the army as a Lt. Colonel in 1947. Later he was elected to the Brazilian
senate.
7. Nelson Werneck Sodré, Memórias de um Soldado (Rio de Janeiro: Ed.
Civilização Brasileira, 1967), p. 207. He labeled the two generals Nazista.
By the time he wrote he was disenchanted with American Cold War poli-
cies and likely let his criticism of the United States affect his historical
judgment.
8. Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Objetiva, 1994), p.  398; McCann, The Brazilian-American Alliance,
p.  278; USN, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German
Navy, pp. 89–90.
9. Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o
curso da Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015),
pp. 133–134. For analysis of Brazilian economic history see Warren Dean,
“The Brazilian Economy, 1870–1930” in The Cambridge History of Latin
America, Vol. 5, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp.  685–724; and the classic Werner Baer, The Brazilian
Economy: Growth and Development, 5th edition (Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press/Praeger, 2001).
10. General Vernon Walters, The Mighty and the Meek: Dispatches from the
Front Line of Diplomacy (London: St. Ermin’s Press, 2001), p. 172.
11. In 1936 it was a seven-day trip from New York to Rio on Pan American
Airways’ seaplanes. This whole section is based on Durval Lourenço
Pereira, Operação Brasil: O Ataque alemão que mudou o curso da Segunda
Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Editora Contexto, 2015), pp. 111–149.
174   F. D. MCCANN

12. Two-thirds of Brazil’s salt came from Rio Grande do Norte and was
shipped by sea to other regions. See ibid, p. 136.
13. Ibid, p. 138.
14. Colonel Durval is retired from the Brazilian army and has had interest in
World War II since his cadet days. His account will likely be definitive.
Durval Lourenço Pereira, Operação Brasil, pp.  183–191. The American
historians were Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere Defense,
pp. 323–324. They had a “pack of ten submarines” attacking coastal ship-
ping. Previously I had assumed that they were correct about ten subma-
rines. Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha, uma biografia, p. 398, said there
were eight subs.
15. Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um
sumbarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” Revista Navigator:subsidios spara
a história maritima do Brasil Rio de Janeiro, V. 2—No. 3 (Junho de 2006),
pp. 56–71.
16. Jürgen Rower, “Operações navais da Alemanha no literal do Brasil durante
A Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Revista Navigator:subsidios spara a história
maritima do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, n. 18 (Jan/Dez. 1982), p. 15.
17. See Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 192–193 for a detailed description of the
German Navy’s Quadrant map system.
18. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 194–197.
19. Ibid, p. 199.
20. Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943 Vol. 1 of History
of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1964), p. 381. The tanks later contributed to the British
victory at El Alamein. Convoy AS-4 stopped off at Recife for 40  hours.
The Germans knew it was there, but no submarines reached an attack
position.
21. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp.  200–202. Durval used the Submarine
Command’s operations diary to study the radio messages.
22. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943, p. 378. The Ingram state-
ment was from September 1941. He went on to say that as a port, Salvador
da Bahia was far superior to Recife in every way except for location. It was
400 miles further south from the United States.
23. For the atmosphere and occurrences in Bahia during this time, see
Consuelo Novais Sampaio, “A Bahia na Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Olho
da História: Revista da Teoria, Cultura, Cinema e Sociedades, UFBA.
http://www.ufba.br/search/node/Bahia%20na%20Segunda%20
Guerra%20Mundial.
24. The data on numbers of sinkings by so few captains is from Durval,
Operação Brasil, p. 210. U-boat net listed Schacht as a “top U-boat Ace.”
Site lists U-507 movements. In four patrols the vessels it had sunk were
   DECISION TO FIGHT    175

seven American, one Norwegian, one Swedish, two Ho, three British, and
six Brazilian. http://uboat.net/men/schacht.htm.
25. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 208–213.
26. Ibid, p.  217. The question of responsibility is mixed up in orders and
counterorders. The effect of the sinkings on the coastal population was
deep and striking. The rumor that the submarine was American apparently
had one root in Northeast Brazil. See Luiz Antônio Pinto Cruz and Lina
Maria Brandão de Aras, “Submarinos alemães ou nort-americanos nos
malafogados de Sergipe (1942–1945)?” Navigator 17, pp. 69–81; and by
same authors “A guerra submarina na costa sergipana” Revista Navigator
15, pp. http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig15/art/N15_art1.pdf.
27. In February and March, the following were sunk in the Atlantic off the
United States: Cabedelo, Buarque, Olinda, Aratutã, and Caíru. From May
to July, they were followed by seven more in the Caribbean: Parnaíba,
Gonçalves Dias, Alegrete, Pedrinhas, Tamandaré, Piave, and Barbacena.
Many of these were attacked near the islands of Trinidad, Tobago, and
Barbados. Each incident was carefully reported on by Brazilian diplomats,
who also interviewed survivors. The reports and interviews are in Ministério
das Relações Exteriores, O Brasil e a Segunda Guerra Mundial, Vol. II (Rio
de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1944), pp. 61–148. For overall context, see
Victor Tempone, “A Batalha do Atlântico e o Brasil na II Guerra Mundial,”
http://www.revistanavigator.com.br/navig18/art/N18_art3.pdf.
28. The SS Seatrain Texas left New York on July 29, without escort or convoy
for the 18-day voyage to Cape Town. It had air cover for a few days. Orders
for the risky solo voyage came from FDR himself. At that point the belea-
guered British had only 70 tanks to face Rommel’s Panzers. See “American
Merchant Marine at War” www. usmm.org. 1998–2001. http://www.
usmm.org/images/seatrainroute.gif. See also Durval, Operação Brasil,
pp. 269–273.
29. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1948), p. 1423.
30. Durval, Operação Brasil, p.  158. “Dois disparos para prevenir qualquer
possibilidade de transmissão de rádio pelo vapor.”
31. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp.  152–161. Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine
Successes of World War Two: German, Italian and Japanese Submarine
Successes, 1939–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), p. 116. This is the
definitive listing of all sinkings. For various details of the Baependy sinking,
see Elísio Gomes Filho, “u-507: um estudo interpretativo das ações de um
sumbarino alemão nas águas do Brasil,” Navigator, Rio de Janeiro, V. 2 –
No. 3, (Junho de 2006), p. 61.
32. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 162–163.
176   F. D. MCCANN

33. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 165–166.

34. Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 167.
35. Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 168.
36. Durval, Operação Brasil, p. 169.
37. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 170–171.
38. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 173–176. For photos of U-Boats see http://
www.gazetadopovo.com.br/ra/mega/Pub/GP/p3/2012/08/25/
VidaCidadania/Imagens/submarino_alemao_240812.jpg.
39. For a close-up of what happened in Fortaleza and elsewhere, see José
Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou ao Ceará
(Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), pp. 129–136.
40. John F. Simmons, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, Rio, August
19, 1942, Telegram 3121, (forwards cable from Fortaleza); 832.00/4242,
Simmons, Rio, August 18, 1942, Telegram 3091 (forwards cable from
Vitória), 832.00/4238; Walker, Pará, August 18, 1942, 832.00/4244;
Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942 m, Telegram 3118 (forwards cable from
Manaos),832.00/4245; Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3126
(forwards cable from Porto Alegre) 832.00/4247; Simmons, Rio, August
19, 1942, Telegram 3124 (forwards cable from Natal), 832.00/4248;
Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3127 (forwards cable from São
Paulo), 832.00/4249 all RG 59, NARA.
41. Durval, Operação Brasil, pp. 295–299. The captured British captains on
board U-507 and their ships were James Stewart (SS Oakbank), Donald
MacCallum (SS Baron Dechmont), and Frank H. Fenn (SS Yorkwood). See
also José Henrique de Almeida Braga, Salto Sobre O Lago e a guerra chegou
ao Ceará (Fortaleza: Premius Editora, 2017), p. 425.
42. Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59,
NARA.
43. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O
Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983),
pp. 502–504.
44. Caffery, Rio, August 28, 1942, Telegram 3296, 832.00/4268, RG 59,
NARA.
45. Simmons, Rio, August 19, 1942, Telegram 3122, 832.00/4346, RG 59,
NARA. Aranha asked that Caffery, then in Washington, be informed that
“Brazil will declare war on Germany tomorrow.” Simmons, Rio, August
21, 1942, Telegram 3182, 832.00/4254, RG59, NARA. See also Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1942, American Republics, V, pp. 666 ff.
46. A.D.  Struble, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Memo for State
Department, August 25, 1942, 832.20/434, RG 59, NARA.
47. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O
Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 507.
   DECISION TO FIGHT    177

48. Caffery, Rio, September 1, 1942, Airgram 203, 740.0011 European War
1939/24081, RG 59, NARA. The decree suspended Constitutional arti-
cles 122, 136,137, 138, 156, and 175. For a discussion of Estado de Guerra
see Patricia Aparecida Ferreira & Rodrigo Borges de Barros, “O Papel das
Forças Armadas na Defesa Nacional” (Universidade de Uberaba, MG,
2016), pp.  6–9. http://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/cadn/artigos/xiii_
cadn/o_papel_das_forças_armadas_na_defesa_nacional.pdf.
49. Mauro Renault Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O
Dever da Verdade (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), p. 509.
50. Simmons, Rio September 4, 1942, #8367, 832.20/437 and Caffery, Rio,
September 7, 1942, Airgram 249,832.20/440, RG59, NARA.
51. The 7th Pack Artillery was on board with all its equipment. Among the
passengers were the wives and children of the unit’s officers and soldiers.
There is a report on the Seventh Group of the army’s pack artillery located
outside Recife: Major Charles H. Dayhuff, Recife, July 21, 1943, 6010,
G2 Regional Brazil, MMB, RG165, NARA. There is a survivor’s account
of the terrifying event: http://www.brasilmergulho.com.br/port/­
naufragios/artigos/2005/019.shtml.
52. Military Intelligence Division, War Dept. General Staff, MID 6300,
745,009, Aug. 26, 1942, G2 Regional, WFRC, RG165, NARA. An OSS
report, Sept 18, 1942, #22875, RG226 (Office of Strategic Services), NA,
said that though Dutra has signed it, the proclamation had been written by
Chief of Staff Góes Monteiro. Dutra had reportedly opposed the recogni-
tion of the state of war. The text of his proclamation is in Mauro Renault
Leite e Novelli Júnior, Marechal Eurico Gaspar Dutra: O Dever da Verdade
(Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1983), pp. 504–505.
53. “Area Controller, MID 350-05 9-11-42 (7-23-41)” Extract, September
11, 1942, 6300, G2 Files, Box 273, RG165, NARA.
54. Randolph Harrison Jr. (2nd Secretary), Rio, October 4, 1940, 3697
“Anti-Nazi Demonstration at Brazilian Military Academy” 6300, G-2
Regional Brazil, Box 273, RG165, NARA. The German military attaché,
General Gunther Niedenfuhr, had offered the films and was present at the
showing. Hitler’s appearance caused “pandemonium” to break loose and
caused the session to be ended. The school’s commander reprimanded the
cadets and suspended leave for a week. The cadet who participated was
Octavio Pereira da Costa, who said that the incident showed that “the
great majority of the cadets positioned themselves in a irrefutable manner
in favor of liberty and democracy.” História Oral do Exército na Segunda
Guerra Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001),
Vol. 5, p. 23.
55. Extract, Military Attaché Weekly Estimate of Stability, No. 4548,
September 30, 1942, 6300, G2 Regional, Box 273, RG165, NARA. He
178   F. D. MCCANN

gave the names of the officers and their positions. A study comparing such
officers with their personnel files would be interesting. Oddly, he said that
pro-German feelings were strong in the Coast Artillery, which had been
advised by American officers since 1934.
56. The comment about the Tenentes in the class of 1942 is from Captain
Richard T. Cassidy (Asst. Mil. Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, October 22, 1942:
“Brazilian Army Officers to Visit the U.S. [for training]” Report 6979,
6770, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. He indicated which ones were
“tenentes”. For the so-called tenente movement, see McCann, Soldiers of
the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2004), pp. 209–211, 260–277.
57. The Atlantic Charter was a statement of post-war aims drawn up by FDR
and Churchill at their shipboard meeting off of Newfoundland in August
1941 that asserted the right of all peoples to choose their form of govern-
ment, freedom of the seas, freedom from want and fear, disarmament of
aggressor nations, and renounced territorial aggrandizement.
58. Integralism was a Fascist-like movement in Brazil in the 1930s. See Marcus
Klein, Our Brazil Will Awake! The Acção Integralista Brasileira and the
Failed Quest for Fascist Order in the 1930s (Amsterdam: Cuadernos del
CEDLA, 2004). The classic study is Hélgio Trindade, Integralismo: o fas-
cismo brasileiro na década de 30 (São Paulo: Difusão Européia do Livro,
1974).
59. “Estillac Leal,” Beloch, Israel, & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds. Dicionário
Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Forense-
Universitária, 1984), Vol. 2, 1753; Claude M.  Adams, military attaché,
Rio, Nov. 6, 1942, G2 Regional Brazil 5900, RG165, NARA. This report
was important enough to be forwarded to Chief of Staff Marshall immedi-
ately; see W. Sexton, Memo for Chief of Staff, Nov. 6, 1942, OPD 336
Brazil (11-5-42) (Sec I), MMB, RG 165, NARA. For an idea of the gen-
eral staff school’s program, see translation of a Brazilian army document,
“Program of Instruction for the School Year 1943–1944,” General Staff,
Directorate of Instruction, 6740, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. The
censorship agency, DIP, also doubled as the government propaganda arm:
see “Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda” Israel & Abreu, eds.
Dicionário Histórico-Biografico Brasileiro, Vol. 2, 1076–1079. Leal rose to
be a prominent general commanding at Natal in 1943. In the second
Vargas government in 1951, he was minister of war.
60. Col. Claude M. Adams, Rio, December 3, 1942, Report # 4683, MID:
“Movement of Group of Military Officers,” 6210, G2 Regional Brazil,
RG165, NARA.
61. Col. Claude M.  Adams, Rio, December 12,1942, #4716, 6905, G2
Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
   DECISION TO FIGHT    179

62. Correio da Manhã, Rio, December 23,1942.

63. Col. Claude M.  Adams, Rio, December 21, 1942, #4738: “Pro-Allied
Political Faction in the Army,” 6110, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
64. Diário Carioca, Rio, December 24, 1942; text of Dec 31 speech is in
Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1938–1947),
IX, pp. 323–327.
65. Roosevelt to Vargas, n.p., December 24, 1942, President’s Personal File
4473 (Vargas), Franklin D.  Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY.  For the
American Ambassador’s review of the political-military situation at the start
of 1943, see Jefferson Caffery, Rio, February 6, 1943, 832.00/4349, NARA.
66. Eurico Dutra to Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1943, APG, Caixa II,
Pasta 4, Doc 2, Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro.
67. Probably the best account of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Casablanca
is Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 674–693.
68. Caffery, Rio, January 6, 1943, 832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/ 134 ½: telegram,
and Memorandum, FDR to S.  Welles, Washington, January 8, 1943
832.001 Vargas, Getúlio/134 2/3 in FRUS, 1943, Vol. V, pp. 653–654.
69. Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha,
CPDOC-Rio.
70. Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha,
CPDOC-Rio.
71. Aranha to Vargas, Rio, January 25, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha,
CPDOC-Rio. This document is one of the most important in the history
of Brazilian foreign relations. Aranha had let Ambassador Caffery read it,
so he was able to brief Roosevelt exactly as to Brazilian thinking before he
sat down with Vargas. For more detailed analysis and listing of the 11
objectives, see McCann, Brazilian-American Alliance, pp. 304–309. For
the Brazilian edition: Aliança Brasil-Estados Unidos, 1937–1945 (Rio de
Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1995), 242–246.
72. Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President’s Secretary File, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY; on Brazil’s cooperation see Caffery
to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European
War 1939/27590; Telegram in Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V, 655–656.
Caffery was present during the conversations.
73. Caffery, Rio, January 30, 1943, 740.0011 European War
1939/27588:Telegram in FRUS, 1943, Vol. V, p. 656.
74. Oliver La Farge, The Eagle in the Egg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co.,
1949), p. 150. As a Reserve Lt. Colonel, La Farge was the Air Transport
Command’s chief historian. He was a noted anthropologist and Pulitzer
Prize (1929) novelist. For a pictorial history, mixed with memories of a
navy man, regarding US military in northeast, see John R.  Harrison,
180   F. D. MCCANN

Fairwing Brazil: Tales of South Atlantic in World War II (Atglen, Pa.:

Schiffer Publishing, 2014), pp. 24–73, 182–224.
75. Press release, Natal, Jan. 30, 1943, in “Política Exterior do Brasil, 1938–
1944,” Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC-Rio. For analysis of the Natal
Conference and its relationship to Casablanca, see Hélio Silva, 1944: O
Brasil na Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira, 1974),
pp. 45–61. For images of Natal and FDR with Getúlio, see https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=-fkffohEIEc and https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=MdGxLvxG4wA.
76. BG Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias (Commander of Inf. Div. 14 & Natal
Garrison), Natal, February 1,1943: “Conferencia dos 2 Presidentes em
Natal,” Relatório, Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa II, Pasta 4, Doc 7,
Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro. The Vargas “host” com-
ment is from Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, January 30, 1943,
740.0011 European War 1939/27588; Telegram in Foreign Relations
1943, Vol. V, 655–656. It is noteworthy that Vargas flew to Natal in an
American aircraft, in the company of Admiral Ingram. He did have two
Brazilian aides with him.
77. The Rio embassy created a clipping file of newspaper stories and editorials:
“News Summary for week ending February 4, 1943,” 832.9111/34,
National Archives. See also “Natal,” Brazil, 17, No. 172 (March 1943), 19.
78. Caffery to Roosevelt, Rio, Feb. 9, 1943, President’s Secretary File, Franklin
D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, NY. As it turned out, the British were not
pleased with the idea and arranged with Salazar for their forces to go to the
islands. On Portugal, see Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal (New
York: Hawthorn Books, 1970).
79. Caffery, Rio, Jan. 30, 1943, 740.0011 EW 1939/27588, NA. The sum-
mary of the Vargas-FDR conversations is about as detailed as the record
allows. The fullest documentary record is in “Conference between
President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil at Natal” in Foreign
Relations 1943, Vol. V, 653–658.
80. For Brazil’s mobilization, see Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, O Brasil
na II Grande Guerra (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora,
1960), pp. 77–79. On army training, officer education, and the influence
of the French Military Mission, see McCann, The Soldiers of the Pátria,
pp. 241–253.
81. Captain T. L. Ridge (USMC, Asst. Naval Attaché), Rio de Janeiro, July 3,
1942, OSS Files 20,128, MMB, RG226, NARA. Mascarenhas described
the problems he faced as regional commander at Recife in his Marechal
Mascarenhas de Morais: Memórias (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora,
1969), Vol. 1, pp. 110–116. He had about 50,000 under his command, all
in fixed and small-scale urban military posts. Such facilities lacked space for
combat training.
   DECISION TO FIGHT    181

82. Mascarenhas complained to his staff about the lack of unity of command;
see Carlos Meira Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Morais e sua Época
(Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. 1, pp. 82–83.
The author was the general’s aide de camp.
83. Lt. Colonel John M.  Raymond (MIS) to Ch. of Staff USAFSA, Recife,
January 13, 1943, “Changes in Brazilian High Command” OPD 319.1
Brazil, MMB, RG 165 and BG R.L. Walsh to Colonel Kenner F. Hartford
(Operations Division, Gen. Staff), Recife, January 14, 1943, OPD 336
Brazil (Sec I) MMB, RG165, NARA. Walsh commented that Mascarenhas
“desires to not bring Rio into the picture.” Walsh had also spoken to Gen.
Marshall about arranging a visit to North Africa for General Eduardo
Gomes, air force commander in the northeast, whom Walsh considered an
important ally. He thought that such a trip would strengthen Gomes’s
position in the prestige jockeying going on in Brazil. Not long after that,
Gomes did in fact go to Africa at the invitation of General Eisenhower. See
Military Attaché (Rio), “Weekly Estimate of Stability,” Report No.5094,
March 23, 1943, 6300, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
84. Marshall to Brigadier General Claude M. Adams, Washington, April 16,
1943 Radio No. 872 Secret, “From Marshall to Adams for his eyes only.
Reference your 1028 regarding Dutra.” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, NARA.
85. Military Attaché (Rio), “Weekly Estimate of Stability,” Report No. 4968,
February 23, 1943, 6300 G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165, NARA.
86. The anti-Nazi campaign was publicized at the time, see Aurélio da Silva Py,
A 5a Coluna no Brasil: A Conspiração Nazi no Rio Grande do Sul (Porto
Alegre: 1942). The government had expelled the German Ambassador
Karl Ritter for his protests against the anti-Nazi policies. The campaign was
studied in William N.  Simonson’s “Nazi Infiltration in South America,
1933–1945” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts
University, 1964) and in Priscila Ferreira Perazzo, “O perigo alemão e a
repressão policial no Estado Novo.” Revista Histórica, Vol. 3, no. 4
(jul/2001), pp. 69–73.
87. Fernando da Silva Rodrigues, “Discriminação e intolerância: os inde-
sejáveis na seleção dos oficiais do Exército Brasileiro (1937–1946).”
Antíteses, vol. 1, no. 2, (jul.-dez. de 2008), pp. 464–465 http://www.uel.
br/revistas/uel/index.php/antiteses The full article is on pp. 455–474.
88. Minutes, War Council meeting, December 16, 1942, Secretary of War
Conference Binder 2, Office of Chief of Staff Records, RG 165, NARA.
89. Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra, Rio, August 11, 1943, Arquivo Oswaldo
Aranha, CPDOC. He wrote this to Dutra who was then visiting the United
States to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close alliance
carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty and inter-
ests, but that it was the course with the fewest risks and greatest security. It was
a lesser evil and they would have to be constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.
 CHAPTER 6

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force:

The Smoking Cobras

As 1942 ended the American forces in North Africa, under General

Marshall’s deputy, Dwight Eisenhower, had taken Casablanca, Oran, and
Algiers and were advancing on Tunisia. The French fleet at Toulon had
been scuttled by its crews to keep the ships out of German hands. The
British Eighth Army took Tripoli and in the first week of February
Eisenhower was made commander of all Allied forces in North Africa. In
a fluctuating struggle, the Americans were first pushed back at the
Kasserine Pass, but then days later they stopped Rommel’s Afrika Korps.
In April and early May, American and British armies encircled the 250,000
Axis troops in Tunisia and took their surrender. They went on to invade
Sicily, and by August 17 they controlled the island which provided the
springboard for assaults on the Italian peninsula and Sardinia making the
Mediterranean safer for Allied shipping. The Brazilians would have to
move more quickly to get into the fighting.
In mid-April 1943, President Vargas wrote to General Estevão Leitão
de Carvalho, the army representative on the mixed defense commission in
Washington, authorizing him to discuss with the War Department the
formation of a Brazilian Expeditionary Force. Vargas said that such a force
would consist of a maximum of three infantry divisions, one armored and
motorized division, plus suitable supporting troops and a fighter squad-
ron. The president estimated that it would take nine to twelve months to
train these expeditionary troops “if equipment is made available.” Leitão

© The Author(s) 2018 183

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_6
184   F. D. MCCANN

de Carvalho formally presented the letter to General Marshall on April 19.

Major General James G. Ord, who chaired the Joint Brazil-United States
Defense Commission, analyzed the situation for the chief of staff. He took
care to say that he did not believe that the proposal was “motivated by a
desire to obtain larger quantities of Lend-Lease materiel from the United
States.” He pointed out that “our own supply and shipping problems
preclude the immediate formation of any sizeable Brazilian Expeditionary
Force.” However, the fact that Vargas recognized that at least a year of
training would be required made “it difficult to refuse at this time to dis-
cuss plans for possible future use of Brazilian troops in extra-continental
theaters of operations.”1 Marshall was suitably grateful and promised that
the proposal “would receive careful and prompt consideration.” Leitão de
Carvalho for his part pressed Ord to begin planning immediately.
General Ord stressed the importance of the Brazilian proposal:

This is a major decision by Brazil to take an active part in the war [and] has
the appearance of being both realistic and sincere. The significance of this
step, both from a military as well as a political viewpoint, cannot fail to affect
profoundly Brazil-United States relations, not only during the war but also
during the post-war period. Brazil’s position as the dominant South
American nation and definite stand on the side of the United States cannot
be overlooked in the consideration of plans for both the conduct of the war
and the negotiations at the peace table.2 (emphasis added)

By April 1943, the idea of a Brazilian expeditionary corps had the back-
ing of key policy makers of the two countries. At that time North Africa
was the favored projected zone of employment, but in truth the actual
zone was secondary in most discussions. The idea was to get the Brazilians
into combat. Marshall agreed with the proposal and sent it on to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who approved it in principle in the first week of May.3 The
Americans nodded positively, but were worried that equipping such a
force would be difficult.

Reorganizing the Brazilian Army for War

In 1943, the Brazilian army did not have standing divisions ready for
intensified training and transportation, but rather it was organized in static
geographic regional commands which presided over dispersed regimental-­
sized units. These in turn were quartered in barracks that often had scant
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    185

room to receive additional mobilized troops, and the surrounding grounds

had little space for training of the sort the American army was then receiv-
ing. Moreover, most of the barracks were in urban areas. And because the
troops were mainly drafted from the locality, to form a division from one
region would place a politically unacceptable sacrifice on that region.
Considerable reorganization was necessary to create division-sized units
ready to fight abroad.
On May 8, Minister of War Dutra gave the inaugural address on the
Mutual Broadcasting System’s new hook-up from Brazil to some 227
radio stations in the United States. In appropriately flowery language, he
gave a deep historical context to the Brazilian-American alliance saying:
“We are the allies of the country of Washington, and we wish to contrib-
ute our small but resistant grain of sand to the magnificent monument
which you are erecting at this moment of the world’s history.” Then he
quoted the words that José Joaquim de Maia wrote to Thomas Jefferson
in 1786: “In the present state of affairs, we look, and with reason, only to
the United States, and we shall follow its example, for nature, making us
inhabitants of the same continent has bound us together as though we
were all of one common country.”4
While Dutra was reassuring Americans of Brazil’s sincerity in wishing to
send troops into combat, General Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, interventor
in the important frontier state of Rio Grande do Sul, gave a speech on May
1 exhorting the Gaúcho state with its many army posts to make ready for
active participation in the war. A few days later, he told the American con-
sul in Porto Alegre that it would strengthen the power of the United
States to speak for the Americas in the post-war conferences if Brazil “shed
its blood in the struggle.” He confided to the consul that he hoped to be
relieved of his political duties so he could return to active military service,
which, of course, is what happened.5
The generals seemed to be accepting the American alliance and the pos-
sibility of combat operations, but at the key army base, Vila Militar in Rio
de Janeiro, fascistic Integralista propagandists were at work. The reservists
who had been called to duty included “a fairly large proportion of Green
Shirts.” A large number of Brazilian officers were “not openly pro-­German
[but] were great admirers of the German Military Organization.” The
Integralistas cautioned their adherents to keep strict discipline so as to
gain the confidence of unit officers. They did not use any printed propa-
ganda, everything was oral. They were particularly friendly to reservists.
They whispered complaints about the very bad food and inadequate
186   F. D. MCCANN

accommodations and spread the story that the generals who drew Brazil
into the war had been “bought by the Americans”; and that money that
should have been used to feed and house them was going to buy more and
more officers. Unfortunately regular officers, especially junior and non-­
commissioned officers, showed “marked ill-will” toward middle-class
reservists. These fellows did not help their cause by acting uppity “trying
to impose their ‘doctoral’ status upon the corporals, the sergeants and
sometimes even other officers.” In that era, educated men in Brazil were
often addressed as “doctor” even when they did not hold such a degree.
Integralista officers had instructions “to show every possible sympathy
towards the reservists in the way of granting leaves easily, conferring
exemptions and other small ‘acts of comradeship’, which, little by little,
win over the unmilitary reservists.” Discontent was “specially felt in the
units of the Villa Militar where the propaganda [had] been more active.”
As a result a noticeable number of military personnel in Rio de Janeiro,
according to a well-informed source, made little effort and “still are not
convinced that we are in this to the finish, wherever that may be, probably
on the other side of the Atlantic.” The situation was made worse by the
fact that many “real soldiers” had been sent to units in north and Northeast
Brazil. This discouraging report ended by listing four Integralista ring-
leaders at Vila Militar.6
General Ord flew down from Washington to make an extensive inspec-
tion of Brazilian units in Rio de Janeiro, Recife, and Natal in June 1943.
He noted the depth of French influence in the planning and execution of
tactical operations.7 From his observations he commented that “French
ideas of defense and counter-stroke, rather than seizing the initiative have
been impressed on the Brazilian Army.” After observing a number of
infantry and artillery training operations, he noted that infantry training
was similar to that used by the French before the war. There were some
notable problems: the differences between defensive and offensive machine
gun fire was not always well understood; riflemen were not trained to fire
at every opportunity; local maneuver by small units was seldom used; in
the northeast many soldiers dressed in badly worn or torn uniforms; the
lack of an infantry school was apparent; “they need a more realistic type of
training”; and the offensive use of tanks and defense against tanks was not
well understood. At the Belém Air Base, the anti-aircraft units had been
“trained in the theory [of] firing at airplanes, but have had no training
[firing at actual] … towed targets.” The mix of artillery pieces was extreme.
“The artillery weapons are French, German, English, and now United
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    187

States. Standardization is badly needed.” He concluded with three points:

“The Air and Ground Forces are so completely separate and independent
that there is practically no cooperation outside the Belém garrison”;
“Brazil has a real army, and it should be able to fight well, if given four to
eight months of modernized training per division”; “the question of the
durability of the Brazilian soldier under modern air and artillery pounding
can only be settled by the test of war.”8 Three days after Ord wrote the
foregoing comments, arrangements were completed to send the first
group of 57 officers by air to army schools in the United States.9
That there had been a sea change in the opinions of key Brazilian gen-
erals can be exemplified by General Gustavo Cordeiro de Farias, comman-
dant of the Natal garrison. The American consul at Natal, Harold Sims,
analyzed the change in General Gustavo in the two years that he had
known him. The general had spent 1939–1940 in Germany as head of the
Brazilian purchasing commission. He had been responsible for assembling
the largest arms purchase Brazil had ever made. The Nazis had showered
him and his family with “meticulous care and attention.” He was pro-
foundly angry with the British as the result of its navy seizing the pur-
chased arms on the Brazilian ship Siqueira Campos in 1940. That seizure
nearly caused a break in relations with the British. When he arrived at
Natal in November 1941, “he was notoriously famous among his own
countrymen as a rabid pro-Nazi, and he himself left no doubt in the mind
of anyone as to his admiration for Germany.” Some in Natal considered
him “more German than Brazilian.” After the arrival of the US Naval
Patrol Squadron in December 1941 and definitely after Brazil broke rela-
tions with Germany at the Rio Conference in January, “the General turned
off his Nazi enthusiasm and turned on his American enthusiasm.” He
began referring to Harold Sims as “Nosso [our] Consul” and sharing his
prized private stock of Scotch with him. Sims thought him to be “a first
rate soldier” much respected by his troops, but noted that he was “an
opportunist, intelligent, astute, and possesses an uncanny knowledge of
the political and economic factors of the present war.” He was “fervently
anxious that the Brazilian Army participate” in the war. Sims thought that
he had been most helpful to US military and naval activities at Natal, but
he cautioned “that his cooperative attitude developed only after the Vargas
government joined the ranks of the allied nations.” It would be foolhardy
to think that he was the only Brazilian officer who changed his views in
such fashion.10
188   F. D. MCCANN

As the Brazilians began to assemble and send to the United States the
officers who would command expeditionary force units, the American army
collected information on exactly who they were, especially what their ideo-
logical leanings were. Among a list of 22 officers then in American service
schools, some like Lt. Colonels Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco and
Aurelio de Lyra Tavares were unquestionably pro-ally, while others such
as Colonel Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro and Lt. Colonel Ivano Gomes
were considered pro-German. Altogether 13 were rated as pro-American
or pro-ally, while the rest were pro-German or dubious. Of course, Lt. Col.
Castello Branco became the force’s operations officer, and Col. Caiado de
Castro commanded the 1st Infantry Regiment, so what did the Americans
intend to do with such evaluations?11
By July 1943, Brazilian officers anxious to get into the fight were con-
cerned that the process was moving too slowly. Some disparaged the
Vargas government’s attitude as lackadaisical. Realizing that they could
not take untrained troops into combat, they were frustrated that each day
the army lost in organizing an intensive training schedule could not be
recovered. They feared that their war would be over before they could get
into battle against Germany and Italy. Other officers complained that they
had accepted assignment to the northeast thinking that those units would
be the first sent to a combat zone, but the decision to keep those divisions
in Brazil meant that what they laughingly called the “Battle of Recife”
would be all the action they would see. They predicted that when the war
ended the Vargas regime would be overthrown. As one officer expressed
their attitude: “we want democracy in Brazil and we are going to get it.”12
It was very odd, with all this activity, that there was no official public
announcement that the expeditionary force was being organized until
August 1943. And that seems to have been provoked when a group of
university students in Rio de Janeiro wrote President Vargas offering to
join such a force and the newspapers reported it.13
It is equally odd that with so much to do to prepare his forces, in
August Minister of War Dutra took time to go to the United States for an
extensive tour of army facilities. This was the first time he had ever left
Brazil, so it was probably an expansive experience and it certainly con-
vinced him that his government had been correct to follow Aranha’s
advice and not his. Perhaps that change of heart was symbolized by his
decision to take Aranha’s son Oswaldo, a volunteer soldier, along as
interpreter.14 As Dutra flew north, the one-half of an infantry division’s
equipment to be used to train the three divisions of the expeditionary
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    189

corps was en route to Brazil. The 53 officers who would serve as unit
commanders, division staff, and various support services were then
undergoing courses at US Army schools and training centers and would
return to Brazil around October 1. Because many of the American
interpreters spoke Spanish rather than Portuguese, one wonders how
efficient the learning was. The mixed commission and the Brazilian
General Staff had reached an informal agreement that the expeditionary
force would be under the strategic direction and command of the United
States Army. The Brazilians made clear that they did not wish to serve
under British command. The War Department also decided that “if and
when Brazilian troops are sent overseas,” they would be employed in the
European-African theaters. Most likely that would mean in the
Mediterranean area.15 It is interesting that at the highest levels of the
American military, the expression “if and when” was being used.
Meeting with Marshall on September 2, 1943, Dutra raised the ques-
tion of when and where the force would be sent. They discussed whether
the first division should go as soon as it was trained, or should they wait
until all three could go as a full corps? From Marshall’s point of view, it
would depend on available equipment and shipping. He wanted to see the
leading division start overseas in February or March. Dutra thought that
two other factors had to be considered, namely, “Brazil’s desire that the
force should be more than symbolic; and the psychological effect of the
sending of a large force so that people would not say, ‘One echelon has
gone, and that’s the only one.” He added that his government “would
prefer to wait until the Second and Third Divisions were well along with
their training.” Holding off until the entire corps could be sent would
simplify the War Department’s shipping problem. Dutra agreed that such
a delay was reasonable. Where the force would go, of course, would
depend on the strategic situation some months hence, but it appeared that
the Mediterranean would be likely. Marshall assured Dutra that “the place
where they would be used would be carefully chosen because of the
importance of the event.” Marshall observed that he had 60 divisions in
the United States, “some of which had been in training for more than
three years.” The American army now totaled about 8,000,000. Was he
subtly telling Dutra that training was a slow process? They also discussed
Dutra’s desire to get some modern tanks and anti-tank weapons. Marshall
commented that some of the divisions in the States were being held to
50% of basic equipment and that they were rearming French divisions in
Africa, Polish ones in the Near East, and large shipments were going to
190   F. D. MCCANN

Russia. He did not say no, but he did not say yes. He ended by telling
Dutra that “the war must be fought to the bitter end of unconditional
surrender.”16
In mid-October, there was a key discussion in the American General
Staff regarding the timing of shipping the Brazilians overseas. Colonel
Kenner Hertford, who had been following Brazilian matters, closely as
chief of the Western Hemisphere section of the General Staff’s Operations
Division (OPD),17 argued that the first Brazilian division would be ready
for movement in late December 1943 and that the Brazilian government
would prefer an early date. Brigadier General John E.  Hull of the War
Department’s Operations Division admitted that “the advantage from a
political standpoint of sending Brazilian troops overseas is self-evident.”
But General Hull doubted that “the equipment situation will ever permit
the training of three divisions at one time in Brazil,” and although Dutra
and Marshall had agreed that the corps should be sent as a unit, “I person-
ally don’t think that it is practicable… furnishing of enough equipment to
train three divisions in Brazil is, in my opinion, out of the question.” The
divisions would have to be sent with some interval between them. Staging
for the Normandy invasion (Operation Overlord) would be consuming all
available shipping for months ahead. Hull suggested that “unless the
Brazilians themselves request one of their divisions be sent overseas earlier
than next May, June, or July we should take no further action at this
time….” He recommended the “target date of May 15, 1944 for moving
the first Brazilian division overseas.”18
The question of departure date bedeviled relations between the two
countries for months. Colonel Hertford asked Military Attaché Adams for
his opinion concerning the possible Brazilian reaction to the idea of send-
ing a Brazilian division to North Africa for training, to be followed by a
second one shortly thereafter. The seemingly straightforward question
produced some confusion and consternation, and maybe a heart attack, in
the US Embassy. The attaché asked Ambassador Caffery, who took the
question to Vargas, who liked the idea and accepted it “in principle.” The
president then wondered if they should not reconsider sending several
generals to the United States for general staff training. Their departure
date was approaching. The Operations Division (OPD) in Washington
had only wanted advice, not action; it wanted “information concerning
Brazil’s sincerity [regarding] active participation in the war before any
action was initiated in Washington to obtain specific approval for the
employment of Brazilian troops.” The question was being asked because
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    191

the Brazilian Aviation Minister Joaquim P. Salgado Filho had refused “the
specific proposal to equip and train a fighter squadron of the Brazilian Air
Force for service overseas.” The tension on the American side likely con-
tributed to Attaché Adams falling ill with “coronary occlusions” which
required his return to the States.19 The Operations Division hoped there
would be no change in sending the generals because the training was “an
essential preliminary to possible joint operations.” OPD’s General Hull
cautioned that “it should be thoroughly understood that plans for sending
Brazilian troops overseas will have to be approved by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff and that problems of shipping and the like are not yet resolved.”20
The War Department was “unwilling to put the proposition before the
Chiefs of Staff … until it knows that Brazil actually does want to send
troops into combat areas and finds acceptable the pattern of operation
suggested.” Colonel Hertford commented that Generals Eisenhower and
Clark had said that “they would be glad to have them and could use
them.” But he worried that the “good atmosphere in the War Department
… may change, depending upon the progress of the war. For one or
another reason General Marshall and General Eisenhower may lose inter-
est.” He believed that the Brazilians should make their interest clear. This
did not mean “that we think Brazil should be persuaded that it should
send troops” only that it would be well for them to proceed.21 This dia-
logue shows that the Americans were avoiding saying anything that would
put pressure on the Brazilians. The decision to send troops into combat
had to be theirs.
Dutra told Ambassador Caffery that he understood that “no definite
plans can be made without the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff”
but that the Brazilian army was “making all preparations and will be ready
to send the first division in December.”22 What is strange here is that
Dutra knew in October that the First Expeditionary Division could not be
transported in December, and most likely not until May or June 1944. He
mounted a charade, asking that the Americans not tell “anybody else
because he did not want the Brazilian Army to know of this change in
plans.” Assistant Military Attaché Richard Cassidy thought that Dutra
wanted to wait until December to tell the army that the division was not
ready to embark.23
There was still the problem of the Brazilian public’s perception of the
idea of the expeditionary force. The Time magazine reporter in Rio de
Janeiro, Jane Gray Braga, told the military attaché that American army
personnel were “more enthusiastic about the Brazilian Expeditionary
192   F. D. MCCANN

Force than the Brazilians themselves. Many Brazilians laugh at the idea
and consider the whole plan as typical Latin American optimism and wish-
ful thinking.” A sarcastic remark making the rounds in Rio de Janeiro
quipped that if such a force actually reached a war zone, the Brazilians
would be “used to police occupied territories.” Mrs. Braga observed that
if that happened, it “would be fatal and offending to their national pride.
They expect to fight….”24
Rumors were also flying regarding who would command the expedi-
tionaries. Dutra wanted to be corps commander, although “the general
opinion in Brazil” was that the logical man was General Osvaldo Cordeiro
de Farias, who was “young, energetic, capable and, unlike his brother
Gustavo, very pro-American.”25 The army’s intelligence office in Miami
detailed a colonel to assist and entertain Brazilian officers passing through
that city. He reported a conversation with General Dutra in which the
minister had mentioned as possible commanders Generals João
B. Mascarenhas de Morais, José Pessoa Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, and
Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias. Ambassador Carlos Martins in Washington
opined that “Vargas would select the Commander as late as possible …
when the force was ready to leave the country.” He thought it unwise “to
place anyone in command of the largest South American army, on South
American soil.”26 It is strange that Dutra did not admit that in August
1943 he had invited Mascarenhas, who was then commanding the 2nd
Military Region (São Paulo), to command one of the corps’ divisions and
that he had immediately accepted.27
After all of the bureaucratic and diplomatic infighting, it was disturbing
that the massing and training of the expeditionary force had not yet begun!
Indeed, only in late October 1943 was the site of the training grounds
selected. For a time Resende in the state of Rio de Janeiro, which would
soon be the site of the new military school, had been under consideration,
then rejected because its hilly, even mountainous terrain was not consid-
ered suitable for training. Considering that the FEB eventually fought in
the mountains of Italy, the Resende site, braced by the Mantiqueira moun-
tain peaks of Agulhas Negras, would have been excellent. Another site was
chosen, also in the state of Rio de Janeiro between the towns of
Guaratinguetá and Cachoeira, where a US$3,000,000 camp was “to be
located.” The plans at that moment called for the First Expeditionary
Division to begin its training on January 1, 1944, devoting 11 weeks to
basic training, 8 weeks to unit training, and 8 weeks to combined arms
training. The startled assistant military attaché, who reported on these
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    193

moves, concluded with the comment: “Because of the highly theoretical

nature of the Brazilian army’s preparations … There is no certainty that
there will be no change of minds….”28 In fact, he was correct, shortly
before December 8, the Guaratinguetá/Cachoeira site was cancelled in
favor of Vila Militar on the outskirts of Rio as the training ground.29
In mid-November Góes Monteiro, who had returned from sick leave,
had a significant falling out with Dutra over the expeditionary force. The
animosity was so bad that Vargas had to decide between his two generals.
Dutra apparently won because Góes was packed off to a decorative posting
in Montevideo. His successor as chief of staff was an odd choice, General
Maurício José Cardoso, who when he commanded the 2nd Military
Region (São Paulo) had been evaluated by American observers as “pro-­
democratic but not an able soldier” and rather “inept,” allowing himself
to get manipulated into situations “which were not helpful to the Allied
cause.” Cardoso was near retirement age and so socially active that he was
called “General Banquete.” He may have gotten the post because “he
would do what Dutra wanted him to do.”30
Renewed doubts were building in the minds of the military attaché’s
staff. The office reported that the names of the first division staff had been
announced, even though the commander’s name had not. The usual
Brazilian practice was for a unit commander to be appointed first and for
him to select his staff. The Americans were also bothered by the choice of
Colonel Aguinaldo Caiado de Castro to be commander of the 1st Infantry
Regiment at Vila Militar, which would be part of the expeditionary force.
Recently high-ranking officers had been referring to the force as the
Brazilian Expeditionary Corps or simply as the Corps and had taken to call-
ing Dutra “Corps Commander.” To avoid prophesying “the eventual size
of the proposed force,” the military attaché continued to refer to it as the
Brazilian Expeditionary Force.31 The more familiar with the Brazilian army
that the American observers became the more skepticism crept into their
reports. In selecting officers for the force, little attention was being paid to
replacing them quickly in the units that were losing them. For example, 14
officers were suddenly transferred from the 10th Infantry Regiment “com-
pletely disorganizing” it. As a result one reserve lieutenant was command-
ing two companies and the work of the regiment’s executive officer had
been added to his duties as a battalion commander. The military observer
in Belo Horizonte commented that “the Brazilian army is not based on
sound organizational principles, judged by U.S. standards. The command
and staff of a Brazilian battalion consisted of but two ­officers.” Perhaps
194   F. D. MCCANN

worse, the field-grade officers “do too much direct commanding, and so
do not leave enough function of command to the initiative of their junior
officers.” As a result “team spirit and initiative [was] lacking among the
junior officers, who for the most part are officers of the Reserve, some of
whom are serving in the Army with little enthusiasm.”32
In mid-December Secretary of War Henry Stimson announced to the
press that the United States and Brazil were preparing a Brazilian
Expeditionary Force for overseas duty. The same press report mentioned
that Generals Mascarenhas de Morais and Ord were then in North Africa
and southern Italy touring the battlefields.33 It seems that back in August
after accepting the offer of a division command, Mascarenhas learned
from Dutra that Vargas had chosen him to lead the first division. He was
60 years old and would be faced with terrible tensions and stress in Italy.
He had taken advantage of Dutra’s trip to the United States to have sur-
gery for an unexplained ailment. The units assigned to the division had
never worked or trained together and were under strength. The hurried
call-up of raw recruits to fill the ranks was rather sloppy. Mascarenhas
admitted in his memoirs that the selection process was not rigorous. The
ill health of a large percentage of the rural poor who bore the weight of
the recruitment resulted in numerous rejections.34 Reportedly the army
wanted men who were 5 foot, 9 inches or taller, which the assistant
American military attaché unkindly observed was “to show the world what
big husky people the Brazilians are.”35 The army’s medical examinations
of recruits and army personnel assigned to the expeditionary units left
much to be desired and showed that Brazil’s health standards and quality
of care were low. The second set of examinations in Rio de Janeiro discov-
ered that a large number of regular soldiers in such units were medically
unfit. Poor teeth were a particular problem.36 In fact, there is reason to
suspect that some medical reports were not scrutinized.37 By February
1945 it was clear to American officers that Brazil could not supply any
more healthy replacements. The medical examinations had eliminated
12,000 men out of a pool of 18,000. Equally troubling was the discovery
that some of the replacements “had had very little training prior to their
movement to Rio de Janeiro for shipment overseas.” This failure had been
discovered too late to postpone their departure.38
From his tour of the Italian battlefields in December 1943, Mascarenhas
realized that the typical Brazilian uniforms and boots would never do for
the cold and rugged conditions in Italy, but he could not get Dutra’s team
to secure proper gear. Eventually the troops would be clothed from
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    195

American stocks in Italy. The reality of what they were about to face must
have been made clear by the horrific American losses at Anzio which were
nearly equal to the total that the Brazilians were assembling. The appoint-
ment of Mascarenhas as division commander was only made official on
December 28, 1943, shortly before his return from Italy.39 His headquar-
ters was set up in the Tijuca district of Rio de Janeiro, miles from Vila
Militar and even further from where the division units gathered near
Valença and Tres Rios a couple of hours drive from the capital. Mascarenhas
decided that he and his staff would remain in Rio de Janeiro. Reportedly
he quipped that he preferred “the ‘softie’ life of Rio to the hard life of the
training camp.” However, Generals Zenobio da Costa, commander of the
division’s infantry, and Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, the artillery com-
mander, moved to the training camp.40
In reality under such conditions it was an “impossibility to instruct and
train” an infantry division. It was a victory of sorts just to gather all of the
division’s units in the Rio area. Emphasis was placed on physical condition-
ing so that the troops would be fit enough to march the 30 kilometers
from the center of Rio de Janeiro to Vila Militar at the end of March 1944.
That display and a second parade through the city in May were partly to
show the public that the expeditionary force really existed. The fifth col-
umn spread insistent rumors that the division would never embark.41
What the Brazilians did not know was that British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill was refusing his approval. He thought it “would be a serious error
to permit more than a token force or a brigade to be sent overseas from
Brazil….” Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius made an extended
trip to London to confer with the British. On April 15, he “impressed on
Churchill” that the embarkation of the expeditionary force was important
for Brazil’s domestic politics and for projecting the republic’s prestige as an
ally. Perhaps grudgingly Churchill withdrew his objections. From the docu-
mentation it is not clear why he had opposed the Brazilian role.42

Organization and Commitment
of the Expeditionary Force

There was some difference of opinion between the Brazilians and

Americans over which troops should be used to form the expeditionary
force. The American military, and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense
Commission, which had been set up to coordinate military relations,
thought it logical to use the units in the northeast, but the Brazilians
196   F. D. MCCANN

looked at the 15,000 American personnel at bases in that region and

thought differently. Minister Dutra wanted to build three regional train-
ing camps to prepare three divisions simultaneously, thereby creating valu-
able facilities for the post-war era. But the United States could not provide
the weapons and equipment necessary to outfit three camps, that is to say,
50% of the equipment for three divisions. Moreover, because neither
Brazil nor the United States had enough ships to carry even one full divi-
sion all at once, the Pentagon came up with the idea of providing 50% of
a division’s equipment for training, which would be left behind for the
training of each successive division. They would all be armed and equipped
in the theater of operations.
Just before he visited the United States in August 1943, Minister of
War Dutra, who wanted to command the planned corps, sounded out
various generals as to their interest in leading one of the divisions. General
João Batista Mascarenhas de Morais, who had commanded the northeast-
ern military region (the 7th) from June 1940 to January 1943, responded
immediately, while the others hesitated. Eventually two other division
commanders were designated and preparations begun, but the plans were
not carried out, and the force was fixed at one division.43
Without already formed divisions and without barracks to receive
mobilized troops and a recruitment system that largely kept recruits near
their home areas to form a division from one region would place a politi-
cally undesirable cost on that region. So the unwillingness to use north-
eastern units was related to more than worry about the American
presence.
To form the expeditionary division, units were called in from across the
map of Brazil. On the negative side, this meant that these units were not
accustomed to working together. On the positive side, planners argued
that since the army had been trained and organized on a French model
since 1919, it would be easier to shift to an American model if the division
was composed of units which had no previous joint experience. Adaptation
would be faster.
Oddly, instead of using the coming combat experience to enhance the
professionalization of a maximum number of regular junior officers, the
army called up a considerable number of reserve officers, many of whom
were professional men in civilian life. Of the 870 infantry line officers in
the force, at least 302 were reservists. Fortunately for historians, a group
of them produced one of the most useful books on the expeditionary
force.44 It is not clear whether the call-up of reserve officers was a political
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    197

decision or a purely administrative one. But it does seem that there were
not enough junior officers to staff the expeditionary force. Later, in Italy,
referring to the shortage of military school graduates and to the profes-
sional deficiencies of the reserve officers, Mascarenhas requested, as late as
April 1945, to commission 60 infantry sergeants to serve as platoon
leaders.45
There was also considerable difficulty filling the ranks of the designated
units. Lacking military police units, the army took in policemen from São
Paulo’s Força Pública, it created signal units with men from electric and
telephone companies, and it organized a nursing detachment by public
recruitment of interested women.46 The fact that draftees were being sent
overseas persuaded many to escape service, but, since the draft was imposed
in 1916, the army always had large numbers who evaded duty. For exam-
ple, in the 7th Military Region in Northeast Brazil, while Mascarenhas was
commander, the 1941 call-up of 7898 men had an evasion rate of 48.9%,
and of those who did present themselves, fully 41% were medically unfit.
Indeed, this was an improvement, the previous year the evasion rate had
been 68%! Among the 3434 volunteers in that region, 2201 or 64% were
found fit for service. These figures were fairly typical of the national expe-
rience. The rejection rate for medical and health reasons was high for both
draftees and active-duty troops. In forming one of the later echelons,
18,000 soldiers in regular units were examined to obtain 6000 men. In
the case of the fourth echelon, the 10,000 active-duty soldiers examined
netted only 4500 physically fit for embarkation. I have discussed elsewhere
in more detail the recruitment and medical examinations; suffice to say
here that it was the nation’s poor health that stalled the mobilization.
Medical officers complained that unit commanders were not cooperative
about treatment of venereal diseases. Two days before the fourth echelon
embarked, a final physical examination discovered 150 with acute stage
venereal disease. On the eve of embarkation, the fourth echelon was short
500 men because of prior failed health examinations. A majority of the last
minute rejections were mostly due to defective dental conditions. In
January 1945, General Ralph Wooten observed that the Brazilian army
was “near the bottom of the barrel” in finding combat personnel and that
it was “a mistake to expect any additional assistance from Brazil in this
respect.”47 It should be noted that sons of President Vargas and Foreign
Minister Aranha served in the expeditionary force. Lutero Vargas went as
a medical doctor and Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha as an interpreter and driver
with the division’s artillery.
198   F. D. MCCANN

The training of the force functioned on multiple levels. Brazilian offi-

cers had been sent to the United States for courses since 1938, mostly in
coast artillery and aviation. Indeed, in early 1941, well before Pearl
Harbor, Brazil was sending groups of officers for training in a variety of
specialties. The pace continued to accelerate to the point where, by the
end of 1944, somewhat over 1000 Brazilian military personnel had gone
to the United States. The American army created a special Brazilian course
at its Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
that enrolled 259 officers, the largest contingent of any one foreign nation
to pass through its classrooms. The school commandant said that the
Brazilians, who had already completed their own three-year general staff
course, “knew more than most of his instructors.”48 Leavenworth’s pro-
gram provided a common basis for officers’ approach to conducting war.
Instruction focused on tactics and operations employing practical exer-
cises and problem solving as the instructional methodology. In the late
1930s, it had added instruction on corps and army-level operations to
prepare officers for command and staff duties at the level of division and
corps. Thirty-three of the thirty-four US Army combat corps commanders
in World War II were Leavenworth graduates.49 The Brazilians were being
given what the Americans considered their premier combat command
instruction.
Finally, in late June 1944, the long awaited American transport ship
USS General W. A. Mann arrived to transport the first echelon of the divi-
sion abroad. Mascarenhas was enough of a leader to know that he should
embark with his troops, even though Dutra wanted him to fly. On the
night of June 30, 1944, in what passed for secrecy in Rio de Janeiro, 5000
Brazilians soldiers filed on board the huge ship. Vargas and Dutra came to
wish them well. As the General Mann steamed out of Guanabara Bay
under Sugar Loaf, only Mascarenhas knew that their destination was
Naples.50 Now, all they had to do was to fight the German Army (Fig.
6.1).

Performance of the Expeditionary Force

The troops sent to Italy in five echelons eventually totaled 25,334. In July
1944, the first echelon arrived in Naples. After some delays with equip-
ment and training, on September 15, the 6th Infantry Regiment and sup-
port troops, under Brigadier General Euclydes Zenobio da Costa, went
into the line of the Fourth Corps of the US Fifth Army. Army commander,
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    199

Fig. 6.1  Lt. General Mark Clark, commander of US Fifth Army, in front seat. In
the rear, Captain Vernon Walters, interpreter with FEB commander João Batista
Mascarenhas de Morais. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de
Janeiro)

Mark Clark, decided on this partial commitment because he needed to

beef up the Fourth Corps, which had dwindled to barely the level of a
reinforced division because of units being detached for the Seventh Army’s
invasion of southern France in July. The Fifth Army had lost fully seven
divisions to the French operation, so the Brazilians’ arrival at that moment
was opportune. The American Fifth and British Eighth Armies were ready-
ing a drive on the German’s Gothic Line, in an attempt to reach the Po
Valley and Bologna before Christmas. The Fifth Army’s three corps (from
west to east: US Fourth, US Second, and British Twelfth) were to attack
with the Second Corps as spearhead and the Fourth immobilizing and
harassing the Germans before it. Clark thought that this would give the
Brazilians a relatively smooth introduction to combat (Figs. 6.2 and 6.3).
200   F. D. MCCANN

Fig. 6.2  Map of Italy showing area north of Firenze where FEB fought. From
The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 by Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Copyright
© 1973, renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)

It is interesting to note the different reactions of the Brazilians and the

Americans to the subsequent action. The Brazilians moved along nicely
pursuing retreating German units from September 16 to October 30,
when they suffered a sudden counterattack that they held back for about
ten hours, until they ran short of ammunition and were forced to fall back.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    201

Fig. 6.3  Generals Willis Crittenberger, C.O. of Fourth Corps, and Zenobio da
Costa, C.O. of FEB Artillery. (Courtesy of the Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio
de Janeiro)

A steady cold rain had turned into snow, which by itself was an event for
these tropical men. The German attackers were fresh elite S.S. troopers
who got between two of the Brazilian companies attempting to encircle
them. From the American records, we can see that this was perceived as a
normal combat occurrence, but the accounts published by Brazilian offi-
cers are full of finger-pointing and acrimony. On the scene, Mascarenhas
blamed and reprimanded the troops for their imagined cowardice, lack of
caution, and fleeing before “a patrol of demoralized enemy.” Of course,
he was anxious that they do well, and he was still a bit inexperienced him-
self in the nature of this war. It would have been General Zenobio’s
responsibility to make sure that there were reserves in position to back up
the frontline units being attacked. They had done about as well as anyone
could have under the difficult circumstances. The US 92nd Division which
replaced them, when they moved over to the Reno Valley, was likewise
unable to drive the Germans from the ridge line that they held for the next
five months (Fig. 6.4).51
202   F. D. MCCANN

Fig. 6.4  Map of FEB’s principal area of engagement. From The Brazilian-­
American Alliance, 1937–1945 by Frank D.  McCann, Jr. (Copyright © 1973,
renewed 2001 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission)

The role of the expeditionary force (FEB from here on) was a tactical
one; the bulk of its combat experience was at the platoon level. The divi-
sion’s combat diary is largely a summary of patrol actions, as was the case
for the Fifth Army generally in the autumn and winter of 1944–1945. The
Brazilians recognized this; they did not claim that their role or its impact
was strategic, although, with age, a few veterans have made that assertion.
In his memoirs, the division’s chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner,
observed that at “no time did the FEB engage in strategic level opera-
tions.”52 And after the war, to symbolize the level of the role they had
played, the army erected a monument to the FEB lieutenants at the
Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
how one division could have played anything but a tactical role in the
campaign in northern Italy.
This point has been lost sight of by some observers, such as journalist
William Waack, whose As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados
e inimigos53 seems based on the premise that the Brazilians claimed a
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    203

greater importance for the FEB than they actually did. He contrasted
some German veterans’ lack of knowledge and remembrance of the
Brazilian force and the criticism of American liaison and inspection reports
with the “grandiloquence” of Brazilian narratives on the FEB.
The principal German division facing the Brazilians had a large number
of very young and rather old soldiers and was commanded by officers who
had served long years and had survived the rigors of the Russian front.
Some of these men may have been worn out, but most were veterans who
had immeasurably more combat experience than the Brazilians. Indeed,
the FEB sailed from Brazil with most of its troops insufficiently trained.
The officers were startled by the intense training program that the
Americans insisted upon.
The literature on the FEB makes much of its struggle to take an eleva-
tion called Monte Castello during the winter of 1944–1945. In combat,
everything is a matter of perspective and scale. The front for an army com-
mander is measured in miles, for a corps commander it is narrowed to a
mountain ridge, for a division commander the focus is a hill, for a com-
pany commander the objective is part of the slope, for platoon leaders it is
a matter of certain pillboxes and gun positions, and for the soldier it is the
few feet and inches ahead of him. Each one experiences a different battle.
The Italian campaign was brutal because the Allies had to fight continu-
ously uphill to dislodge the Germans from commanding elevations. When
the FEB reached division strength in November, it took its place with the
US Fourth Corps in the mountains north of Florence and west of Bologna.
The Fifth Army’s objective was to break through the German’s so-called
Gothic Line and descend into the Po Valley to take Bologna. The Fourth
Corps confronted an imposing mountain ridge known as Mt. Belvedere—
Mt. Torraccia, from which German artillery and mortars could harass traf-
fic on the west-to-east highway #64 that cuts its narrow way through the
mountains from Pistoia to Bologna. It is difficult to imagine driving
defenders from such a place. Just beyond the spa town of Poretti Terme,
the mountains open into a huge basin flanked by low elevations on its
right and left and blocked by the suddenly rising Belvedere-Torraccia to
the front. On its left, the ridge is a sheer rock wall that appears smooth
from a distance, to the right the ridge becomes jagged and broken, with a
road winding upward around it off in the direction of Montese, a key
point before descent into the Po Valley. The American 92nd “Black
Buffalo” Division and later the l0th Mountain Division faced Belvedere.
The Brazilians were on their eastern flank. The FEB confronted a hill that
204   F. D. MCCANN

juts out below Torraccia. From that hill, the Germans could rake the lower
slopes to the west (left) from well-prepared positions. That hill, which
German maps labeled simply “101/19,” was what local people called
Monte Castello. Walking up it today is hardly even tiring, but going up it
under artillery, machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire would have been miser-
able, very nearly suicidal. Monte Castello held the Brazilians at bay in four
assaults—November 24, 25, 29, December 12—before falling to them on
February 21. They spent four out of their nine months of combat under
its guns. The German defenders admired their stubbornness. After the
failed December 12 assault in which the Brazilians suffered 145 casualties,
compared with a German loss of 5 killed and 13 wounded, a German cap-
tain told a captured FEB lieutenant: “Frankly, you Brazilians are either
crazy or very brave. I never saw anyone advance against machine-guns and
well-defended positions with such disregard for life …. You are devils.”54
Though the elevation itself pales beside its neighbors, it became symbolic
of the FEB’s combat ability and, in a larger sense, of Brazil’s coming of age
as a country to be taken seriously. The Rio newspaper, A Manhã, editorial-
ized that “The young Brazilians who implanted the Brazilian banner on its
summit will conquer for Brazil the place that it merits in the world of
tomorrow” (Fig. 6.5).55
Monte Castello was and is a minor elevation lost amidst some of the
most rugged terrain in Italy. It does not show up on large-scale maps of
Italy and one has to search out local hiking maps to find it. It was not
labeled clearly on American battle maps, and likely the German defenders
did not even know its name. In fact, in the FEB war diary, the first men-
tion of that name was the day of its capture, February 21. It would be
surprising if anyone besides the Brazilians remembered the name. Naturally
they gave more importance to the names of the terrain that they captured
than did either the defending Germans or the Americans concerned with
the broader front. The American liaison detachment diarist commented
that “this feature had been the objective of two previous Brazilian attacks,
in which they suffered considerable casualties, its capture was a distinct
loss to the enemy, since it deprived him of his last good observation”
point. From Monte Castello the Germans had an open field of fire along
the sheer face of Belvedere that the 10th Mountain Division would be
climbing to surprise the defenders on top. The FEB’s mission was to
destroy the German’s ability to fire on the exposed Americans.56
After the war, the Brazilian veterans and the Brazilian army made much
of Monte Castello. For them the battle had great symbolic importance.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    205

Fig. 6.5  Italians cheering victorious FEB troops. (Courtesy of Arquivo Histórico
do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

Their part in the capture of Belvedere-Castello convinced the Brazilians

that they were up to the task that they had taken on. The fact is that the
FEB and the US l0th Mountain Division were effective in the joint opera-
tion which drove the Germans off important elevations that allowed the
Allied spring offensive to move forward. If either of the two divisions had
failed, that offensive would have been delayed.57
Relations between the Brazilian troops and the Americans were some-
times tense. It was awkward for the Brazilians to be totally dependent on
the American forces for training, clothing, arms, equipment, and food.
The American stress on training, training, and more training, even of
frontline personnel, bemused the Brazilians. It was a clash between two
cultures, one that so believed in education that its army’s terminology was
drawn from the language of the school house58 and the other that left
most of its people unschooled. The outcome was a successful example of
206   F. D. MCCANN

coalition warfare, which always requires determined effort and under-

standing to blend national styles into a winning combination. But the FEB
went beyond the standard idea of coalition warfare because of its total
integration into the American army. It was not a colonial unit, as were the
British Indian ones, or a Commonwealth military, such as the Canadian,
New Zealander, or South African, nor a Free “this or that,” such as the
Polish or French contingents. It was a division from an army of an inde-
pendent, sovereign state that voluntarily placed its men and women under
United States command. The connection could not have been tighter and
still have preserved the FEB’s integrity of command and its Brazilian iden-
tity. It never lost either.
The FEB completed all the missions confided to it and compared favor-
ably with the American divisions of the Fourth Corps. Unfortunately, the
heavy symbolism of Monte Castello has obscured the FEB’s victory at
Montese on April 16, in which it took the town after a four-day grueling
battle, suffering 426 casualties.59 In the next days, it fought to a standstill
the German 148th Division and Fascist Italian Monte Rosa, San Marco,
and Italia Divisions, which surrendered to General Mascarenhas on April
29–30. In a matter of days, the Brazilians trapped and took the surrender
of 2 generals, 800 officers, and 14,700 troops. The 148th was the only
intact German division to surrender on that front. The Brazilians com-
pleted this feat on their own and with considerable pride waited until the
surrender was complete and the prisoners under guard before calling the
American headquarters.60 Although they had little preparation and served
under foreign command, against a combat-experienced enemy, the
“Smoking Cobras,” as the FEB was nicknamed, had shown, as one of their
songs put it, the “fiber of the Brazilian army” and the “grandeza de nossa
gente” [greatness of our people].61
The origin of the term “Smoking Cobras” is a bit obscure. At the time
some sources attributed a supposed statement by Hitler to the effect that
Brazil would send troops when Brazilian snakes started smoking.62
Probably more accurate was the story that related the old train called
“Maria fumaça” (Smoky Mary) in Minas Gerais to the image of a slither-
ing snake. That train carried the 11th Regiment from its barracks in the
quaint colonial town of São João del Rei on its way to Rio de Janeiro.
With smoke pouring from the engine stack as the train ran on the twisting
railbed through the mountains, it looked like a gigantic Smoking Cobra.
Reportedly as the regiment’s departure approached, the soldiers began
saying “a cobra vai fumar” (the cobra is going to smoke).63 Certainly by
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    207

the time they arrived in Italy in 1944, the expression had become com-
monplace. And at the request of Rio de Janeiro’s O Globo newspaper,
Disney made a design of a helmeted pipe Smoking Cobra firing two six-­
shooters which the army used in morale-building posters. The final ver-
sion eliminated the helmet and six-shooters (Fig. 6.6).
When the first FEB troops shipped off to Italy, their unit patch was
simply a green shield embossed with Brasil in white. At some point,
Liaison Officer Vernon Walters may have made a suggestion to Fifth Army
commander, Mark Clark, who spoke with Mascarenhas about the need for
a more distinctive insignia. For his part Mascarenhas said that when
Minister Dutra visited Italy in September–October, 1944, he saw the vari-
ous American division patches and suggested to Mascarenhas that the FEB
should have its own. It is not certain if the Disney design was the model,
but that seems reasonable even though the date of April 3, 1945, does not
correspond. During the war the Disney studios drew 1,272 such insignias
for American and allied units.64 Mascarenhas said that Lt. Col. Aguinaldo
José Senna Campos designed the patch, but historian Cesar Campiani
attributed it to 3rd Sergeant Ewaldo Meyer, who worked under the colo-
nel on the division’s general staff. Brazilian officers were not accustomed
to giving credit to enlisted men. In a YouTube interview, Sergeant Meyer
asserted that Vernon Walters asked him to make the design, which he
would then show to Mascarenhas. It is possible that Senna Campos made
improvements on Sgt. Ewaldo’s sketch. Ewaldo said that he drew a helmet

Fig. 6.6  FEB patch

with combined colors of
Brazil and the United
States
208   F. D. MCCANN

on the cobra, which, of course, does not appear in the final product.
Though there were those that thought that a snake was not refined enough
to symbolize the FEB, it became popular with the troops and remained so
with the veterans. If Walters played any role, he kept silent about it.65
The Americans sounded out the Brazilians about participating in the
occupation of Europe, but the Brazilians were not interested.66 On March
21, Dutra told General Kroner that he did not want expeditionary troops
to stay for a long period as part of the allied occupation.67 Unhappily, over
American objections, the Brazilian government also decided to disband
the FEB upon return to Brazil. The American military had hoped that the
division would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete refor-
mation of the Brazilian army. FEB veterans would slowly introduce the
lessons of the war into the General Staff School and military school cur-
ricula. But the chance to use the FEB experience to project Brazilian influ-
ence on the post-war world order was lost. Those making the rapid
decisions in 1945 that led to the FEB’s demise could not know how
quickly the United States would demobilize or how swiftly the alliance
with the Soviet Union would collapse. Perhaps if Brazil had maintained
occupation troops in Europe and a standing cadre of combat-hardened
troops at home, it would have had a different post-war international
position.
The FEB was incorporated into the American army for 229  days of
continuous combat, achieving the distinction of trapping and taking the
surrender of the German 148th Division and remnants of three Italian
Fascist divisions. This was the only intact German division captured on
that front. The Brazilians lost 443 dead, 1577 wounded, 9625 sick and
injured in accidents (Fig. 6.7).68
Of the sick and wounded, 600 were evacuated to Brazil, of these 234
first went by sea to the United States, where some were hospitalized and
received intensive care. The most severe periods of combat in December
1944 and February and April 1945, not surprisingly, generated the most
casualties that were sent Stateside (84 in December, 75 in February, and
50 in April). Another 307 were flown back home via the Air Transport
Command by way of Natal. The heaviest evacuation by air was in April
1945 when 131 wounded made the journey.69
Many soldiers likely nursed unseen mental wounds from the grueling
experience. The American surgeon general commenting about his own
forces said that “practically all men in rifle battalions who were not other-
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    209

Fig. 6.7  German prisoners captured by the FEB. (Photo courtesy of the Arquivo
Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro)

wise disabled ultimately became psychiatric casualties,” often this occurred

following 200 to 240  days in combat.70 Psychologists cautioned that
“combat skills began to decline after a month of fighting” with many
“close to a vegetative state” after 45 days. Eisenhower was told by medical
­personnel that “each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that
men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of
their exposure.” Indeed, “psychiatric casualties are as inevitable as gunshot
and shrapnel wounds in warfare.” The American public would not be told
that the US Army had “hospitalized 929,000 men for ‘neuropsychiatric’
reasons in World War II, including as many as one in four admissions dur-
ing the bitter fall of 1944.”71 US Army authorities showed particular con-
cern for the mental state of the Brazilian troops. Some were sent to the
States for treatment, with accompanying Brazilian medical personnel to
care for them “but also to protect the position of the U.S.  Army.” In
December 1944, “forty-nine Brazilian mental cases” arrived at New York.72
210   F. D. MCCANN

Oddly, after all the concern about having a weak military, the govern-
ment sought the immediate return of its troops who were quickly dis-
banded. Despite Minister Dutra’s declaration that his ministry was
“resolved to use to the maximum the experience of the FEB units,”
American officers feared that the lessons of combat would be largely lost
to the post-war army.73 Although the army did not organize combat teams
of veterans to train large units, as the Americans had hoped, it did send
veteran captains and lieutenants to staff the new Academia Militar das
Agulhas Negras and the advanced officer course (ESAO) at Vila Militar to
give cadets and junior officers the benefit of their war experience.74
What was unexpected was that by the end of March 1944 the Brazilian
government had already decided to demobilize the force immediately
upon its return. Dutra said that once the war in Europe ended, he planned
to discharge or transfer the FEB soldiers to the reserve while keeping a
number of officers and sergeants on active duty for training purposes. He
justified the discharge by saying that his army lacked suitable housing for
such troops. The US Army’s Operations Division expressed dismay at this
“most unfortunate” idea and protested saying that it believed that demo-
bilization would vitiate much of the benefit to Brazil from the experience
of the expeditionary force. The American military had hoped that the divi-
sion would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete reforma-
tion of the Brazilian army. General Ord warned that “This means in effect
the destruction of the one United States trained major unit in the Brazilian
Army. ... [Such action would] seriously reduce the effectiveness of the
Brazilian Army and every effort should be made to persuade the Brazilian
Government to retain this unit as it is a major contribution to the security
of the hemisphere.”75 Apparently the real reason for the demobilization
was that the government feared having a cohesive body of combat v­ eterans
in the country as it worked its way through ending the Vargas dictator-
ship. But exactly who made this decision is unknown and the documents
for appropriate research have disappeared.
Brazil’s entry into an intense electoral campaign to replace the Vargas
government did not help the decision-making process. Anything involving
American policy took on a heavy emotional character. The question of
Brazil’s role in the new United Nations was not developing as the govern-
ment expected and since mid-April relations had deteriorated somewhat.
The end of war decisions by the Brazilian government require further
research, which is hampered by missing documents, such as the minister of
war’s annual reports for 1945 and 1946.76
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    211

The First Brazilian Fighter Squadron of 41 pilots was part of the US

350th Fighter Group based at Pisa. Between October 1944 and mid-­
January 1945, they had flown 167 missions and 999 sorties, having lost
one pilot killed and two missing in action. By the German surrender in
May, the squadron saw seven more pilots killed and eight taken prisoner.
Their American commander thought that their results were “just about
the same as those of an US squadron.”77 A successor commander of the
fighter group, Colonel Ariel W. Nielson, was even more emphatic, he said
that the squadron was “the best unit I have under my command!” He
recommended that it receive a Presidential Unit Citation, but was denied
because the squadron was not American. Decades later President Ronald
Reagan approved a renewed request for the citation, making the Brazilian
unit the second in the world to receive the prestigious award, the other
one was English.78
The string of air bases that the United States had in Brazil was extremely
valuable to the allied war effort. Among the Air Transport Command’s
routes throughout the world, the Brazilian route was the busiest.
Parnamirim airfield at Natal expanded from a single runway to the largest
Air Transport Command base in the world. Indeed, by 1943 the Brazil
route was “the air funnel to the battlefields of the world.”79 All together
there were 17 bases of various sizes and purposes north of Rio de Janeiro
and several more in the south. President Roosevelt passed through the
Natal base twice, going to and from the Casablanca and Teheran confer-
ences in January and November 1943. The South Atlantic ferrying traffic
was always heaviest in winter, when the North Atlantic route was closed. It
reached its peak in March 1944, when 1,675 tactical fighters flew east via
Natal with planes taking off every three minutes.80 In the sea war, accord-
ing to naval historian Samuel E. Morison, Brazil’s entry into the war was
“an event of great importance in naval history.” Without Brazilian partici-
pation, it would have been impossible to shut the “Atlantic narrows” to
Axis blockade runners and submarines.81 In April 1944, Roosevelt wrote
Vargas saying that “History will surely note that the turning point of the
war in the European theater was coincident with the action of your gov-
ernment in providing bases and facilities which contributed so materially
to the African campaign.” He expressed the appreciation of the American
people and government for this “very vital aid … to our common fight
against the Axis powers.”82 American observers believed that the Brazilian
military and the people in general were “fully aware” of the opportunities
that the war had provided. “They are taking every advantage to make their
212   F. D. MCCANN

nation self-sufficient and independent of raw materials and supplies from

other countries. … [with American assistance and training] they will
emerge from the present war as the leading nation of South America.”
Brazilians, the Americans were convinced, “are determined to achieve a
place of potent economic force in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere
and of the World.”83 On June 13, 1945, FDR’s successor Harry S. Truman
told his new ambassador to Rio de Janeiro, Adolf Berle, that he wanted “to
maintain good relations with Brazil even above any other country in Latin
America.”84
In 1944, the Americans had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate an agree-
ment to keep the chain of bases for ten years after the war’s conclusion.
President Vargas favored extending the arrangement, but toward the war’s
end, he had less control of the situation and he was forced from office in
October 1945 in a coup d’état led by the Góes Monteiro-Dutra duo.85 The
latter was elected president to succeed him. Then escalating objections “to
the continued occupation of Brazilian soil by foreign troops” insured that
the bases would be turned over to Brazilian control by October 1946.86
Brazil took an active part in World War II as a supplier of strategic raw
materials, as the site of important air and naval bases, as a skillful supporter
of the United States in Pan American conferences, as a contributor of
naval units, a combat fighter squadron, and a 25,000 strong infantry divi-
sion. It lost 1,889 soldiers and sailors, 31 merchant vessels, 3 warships,
and 22 fighter aircraft. It came out of the war with modernized armed
forces, thanks to its receipt of 70% of all United States Lend-Lease equip-
ment sent to Latin America.
Zé Carioca, Walt Disney’s dapper parrot, who was Hollywood’s car-
toon characterization of Joe Brazilian, taught Donald Duck how to samba
in the film Saludos Amigos, but the Americans, like Donald, could not
quite catch the beat. So with the restoration of peace, instead of the war-
time alliance heralding an era of two national destinies bound together for
mutual benefit, as Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha had dreamed, the
Cold War turned Americans in other directions and left Brazilians with a
vague sense of having been exploited. Brazil’s rejection of further overseas
military operations in the Korean and Vietnam wars is partly related to a
national perception that the United States did not adequately appreciate
its contribution in World War II.
Even so, the war changed Brazil. The wartime air and naval bases were
turned into civilian airfields and port facilities, the joint operations set new
standards for military education and training, and the experiences abroad
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    213

that the thousands of veterans brought back began a process of modern-

izing the nation’s mentality. The industrialization spurred by the building
of the Volta Redonda steel mill propelled Brazil during a single generation
from the age of the bull-cart to that of the internal combustion engine.
Without the infrastructure, experiences, import-substitution processes,
and transfer of know-how acquired during the war, it is difficult to imag-
ine how Brazil would be today.87 Its role in World War II has grown in
importance in the minds of Brazilians, and they resent that American and
European historians are not as enthusiastic as they are about Brazil’s mul-
tiple contributions to Allied victory. The more extreme see a deliberate
downplaying of Brazil’s role “to deprive Brazil of the credit it deserves for
helping to win the war.”88

Notes
1. MG J. G. Ord to George C. Marshall, Washington, April 16, 1943, OPD
336 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA.
2. MG J. G. Ord to George C. Marshall, Washington, April 21, 1943, OPD
336 Brazil (Sec I), MMB, RG165, NARA. Brazilian readers might notice
that this letter was written on Tiradentes Day.
3. In a marginal note, Colonel Kenner F.  Hartford (Operations Division,
Gen. Staff) said that the Joint Chiefs received Marshall’s endorsement on
May 4 and the next day gave their approval in JCS 284. Hartford stated
that equipment for training one division could be shipped within about
three months; see BG John E.  Hull (Acting Asst. Ch. of Staff) to Gen.
Marshall, Washington, April 28, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (4-21-43) (Sec I),
MMB, RG165, NARA; Memo from Marshall to Joint Chiefs of Staff:
“Armament of Brazilian Expeditionary Force,” May 4, 1943, 314-1 (JCS
284) (apparently prepared on May 3) attached to BG J.E.  Hull to MG
J. G. Ord: “Proposal of Brazil that an Expeditionary Force be formed in
Brazil,” May 5, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (4-21-43) MMB, RG 165, NARA.
4. Major Lloyd H. Gomes, Military Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, IG 5990, Report
5508, May 8, 1943, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA. José Joaquim de
Maia was a student in France who in the name of a pro-independence
movement made secret contact with Jefferson seeking US help.
5. US Naval Observer, Porto Alegre, May 13, 1943, G2 Regional Brazil,
6900 BEF Part II, RG165, NARA. The consul was Daniel M. Braddock
who met with Cordeiro on May 4, 1943. Cordeiro commanded the artil-
lery of the FEB in Italy. An interventor was the appointed governor of the
state, which had about a third of the army’s units. For Cordeiro’s experi-
ence with the FEB, see his oral history testimony in Aspásia Camargo &
214   F. D. MCCANN

Walder de Góes (Eds), Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de

Farias (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1981), pp. 293–380.
6. This “secret” report was unsigned, but was sent to G2 and Naval
Intelligence. Rio de Janeiro, May 25, 1943: “Integralism in the Army”
6300, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
7. The French had an extensive mission in Brazil in the inter-war period. For
background on the French Military Mission, see McCann, Soldiers of the
Pátria, A History of the Brazilian Army, pp. 202–219, 245–251.
8. MG J. G. Ord, memo for Asst. Chief of Staff: “Observations of Certain
Brazilian Forces,” June 16, 1943, OPD 336.2 Brazil (Sec I), MMB,
RG165, NARA.
9. Note for the Record, June 19, 1943: “Instruction in the U.S. of Brazilian
Officers for Expeditionary Force,” OPD 350.2 (Sec I), MMB, RG 165,
NARA.
10. Harold Sims, US  Consul, Natal, June 19, 1943: “Example of Friendly
Relations between American and Brazilian Military Authorities,”
711.32/178 and 6210, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
11. BG Claude M. Adams (Mil. Attaché) to Col. W.W. Cox (AIS Miami), Rio
de Janeiro, July 30, 1943 6900 BEF Part II, G2 Regional Brazil, RG 165,
NARA. Castello Branco would rise to be army chief of staff and then presi-
dent via the “revolution” of 1964. Caiado de Castro would be a federal
senator from 1954 to 1963.
12. BG Claude M. Adams, Recife, July 31, 1943, 5900, G2 Regional Brazil,
RG 165, NARA. Likely the army administration was responsible for the
slowness of organizing the force.
13. Clark D.  Burton (Asst. Military Attaché), August 2, 1943, 6905, G2
Regional Brazil, MMB, RG165, NARA.
14. Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha had become fluent in English, while his father
was ambassador in Washington 1934–1938. He accompanied Dutra
throughout his 1943 visit to the United States. Later he would serve in the
FEB as a soldier interpreter and motorist in the artillery. “Economista
Oswaldo Gudolle Aranha,” Aricildes de Moraes Motta (Coordenador),
História Oral do Exército na Segunda Guerra Mundial, Tomo 6 (Rio de
Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2001), pp. 199–215.
15. MG J.  G. Ord, memo for Ch. of Staff, Washington, August 12, 1943,
OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of General and Special Staffs, RG165,
NARA.  Dutra was to meet with Secretary of War Stimson and General
Marshall on August 18.
16. Conversation between Chief of Staff & Gen. Dutra, September 2, 1943,
OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of General and Special Staffs, RG165,
NARA.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    215

17. http://apps.westpointaog.org/Memorials/Article/6964/. Hertford was

graduated from West Point (USMA) in 1923. He had a civil engineering
degree from Cornell, had seen service in Nicaragua and in France, and had
ability with languages.
18. BG John E.  Hull (Chief, Theater Group, OPD) to General Handy,
Washington, October 15, 1943, OPD336 Brazil (Sec II), Records of
General and Special Staffs, RG165, NA. “Overlord” was the code name for
the invasion of Normandy (June 6, 1944). For Hull’s career, see https://
www.redirectify.com/people/john-e-hull.html. He was one of the top
planners. In the next decade, he would be commander in chief of the Far
East Command.
19. Claude Adams had had a heart attack while an officer student at the
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1939.
20. Telegrams, Col. Kenner F. Hertford to Selser and Adams, October 1, 1943
& October 4, 1943 [“Only investigation and report are desired and no
specific proposal should be submitted for Brazilian approval or disap-
proval.”]; Caffery to Secretary of State, Rio de Janeiro October 4, 1943,
#4695; Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, October 4, 1943, #4707; Col. K.  F.
Hertford to General Hull, OPD, October 7, 1943, OPD 336 Brazil (Sec
I), MMB, RG165; Hull to Caffery via State Dept. Washington, October 6,
1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/31419 in Foreign Relations 1943,
Vol. V, p. 642.
21. Laurence Duggan (Head of State’s Latin American Division) to Caffery,
Washington, October 8, 1943, 740.0011 European War 1939/31617a in
Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V, pp. 642–643.
22. Caffery to Sec. of State, Rio de Janeiro, October 13, 1943, 740.0011
European War 1939/31644, Airgram in Foreign Relations 1943, Vol. V,
p. 644.
23. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 1943, Report
6406, G2 Regional Brazil, 6110, RG165, NARA.  Cassidy was Class of
1940, US Military Academy.
24. Colonel Charles G.  Mettler (Mil. Intelligence, BOMIS Miami) October
26, 1943, Report 354, G2 Regional Brazil 6900, BEF, RG 165, NARA.
25. Ibid.
26. Colonel Charles G.  Mettler (Mil. Intelligence, BOMIS Miami) October
31, 1943, Report 364, G2 Regional Brazil 6900, BEF, RG 165,
NARA. The officer gleaning information was Lt. Col. E. J. Hall.
27. João B. Mascarenhas de Morais, Memórias (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio
Editora, 1969) Vol. I, pp. 117–126. The telegram from Dutra was dated
August 10, 1943. On August 17 Mascarenhas left the regional command
and went to Rio “a fim de tratar do apresto da tropa Expedicionária”[to
deal with preparing the Expeditionary troops] (p. 118).
216   F. D. MCCANN

28. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, November 4, 1943, Report

376, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900 BEF Part II, RG165, NARA.
29. Captain Richard T.  Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1943, Report
6323, G2 Regional Brazil, 6115, RG165, NARA.
30. “General Banquete” (General Banquet), see Captain Richard T. Cassidy,
Rio de Janeiro, December 21, 1943, Report 6406, G2 Regional Brazil,
6110 RG165, NARA; Captain T. L. Ridge (USMC, Asst. Naval Attaché),
Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1942, OSS Files 20128, MMB, RG226, NARA. This
report evaluated the regional commanders. Cardoso headed the 2nd
Military Region 1939–1942 and was commander of the 1st Military
Region in Rio when named chief of staff. He retired from that position in
December 1944.
31. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, November 8, 1943, Report
6153, G2 Regional Brazil, 6900, BEF Part II, RG165, NA. The staff offi-
cers were Col. Floriano Lima Brayner (C of S), Col. Henrique Baptista
Duffles Teixeira Lott (Asst C of S), Lt. Col. Thales Montinho Ribeiro da
Costa (G1), Lt. Col. Amaury Kruel (G2), Lt. Col. Humberto de Alencar
Castello Branco (G3), and Major Aguinaldo Sena Campos (G4). Even at
this late date, the Brazilian War Ministry was saying that it preferred the
US War Department’s proposal to train the FEB divisions in the European
theater because it would leave the equipment and camps free to train the
home divisions sooner. The new Centro de Instrução Especializada that was
supposed to train 2,600 specialists had not opened on schedule.
32. Major Frank G.  Burns (Military Liaison Officer), Belo Horizonte,
November 26, 1943, 6210, G2 Brazil 6900 BEF, RG165, NARA.
33. Diário Carioca (Rio), December 17, 1943; Mascarenhas de Moraes,
Memórias (Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1969) Vol. I, 131–136;
he detailed the events of his North African trip. General Carlos de Meira
Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época (Rio de Janeiro:
Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I, 99–106.
34. Mascarenhas, Memórias, 130–131.
35. Captain Richard T.  Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, December 8, 1943, Report
6328, MID 6115, G2 Regional Brazil, RG165, NARA.
36. Carlos Paiva Gonçalves, Seleção Medica do Pessoal da F.E.B.: Histórico,
Funcionamento e Dados Estatisticos (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército,
1951), pp. 67–142. The author was an army doctor involved in the pro-
cess. He praised the quality of the exams for discovering cases of tubercu-
losis, imbecility, hernia, color blindness, parasites, circulatory and
respiratory ailments, and two cases of leprosy. See p. 82.
37. Alfredo Oscar Salun, “Zé Carioca” vai à guerra: Histórias e memórias sobre
a FEB (São Paulo: Edições Pulsar, 2004), pp. 39–41.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    217

38. Memo: Colonel D. R. Patrick (Hdqs. US Army Forces South Atlantic) to
Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, “Brazilian Replacements,” Recife, February 23,
1945, OPD336.2 Brazil (Sec IV), RG165, NARA.  The colonel com-
mented “Obviously, this situation makes it inadvisable to call upon Brazil
for any further shipments of personnel overseas if it can be avoided.”
39. There is a detailed account of Mascarenhas’s trip to Italy in General
Aguinaldo José Senna Campos, Com a FEB na Itália: Páginas do meu
diário (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Exército, 1970), pp.  30–57. The
Americans lost 25,000 in the hard fighting at the Anzio beachhead from
January 22 to June 5, 1944; among the dead was General Marshall’s
stepson.
40. Captain Richard T. Cassidy, Rio de Janeiro, March 10, 1944, Report 6706,
G2 Regional Brazil, 6900, BEF, MMB, RG165, NARA. Likely Mascarenhas
wanted to be close to the army ministry to prevent bureaucratic
problems.
41. The headquarters was a building at Rua São Francisco Xavier 409, and he
had “a command post” in borrowed space in the Diretório do Material
Bélico in the Palácio da Guerra. Mascarenhas, Memórias, 136–137; Meira
Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época (Rio de Janeiro:
Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I, 112–113. Mascarenhas
apparently commented to his staff: “Agora que vencemos o inimigo
interno, vamos ver de perto o Exército alemão” (113).
42. E.  R. Stettinius, Washington, May 12, 1944, 740.0011 European War
Stettinius Mission/112 1/2, RG 59, NARA. This is a report on his trip of
April 7–29, 1944.
43. Carlos de Meira Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua época
(Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1983), pp. 89–90; Meira Mattos
comments to author, Rio, December 1991. He was aide de camp to
Mascarenhas. The other two divisions were to be led by Generals Newton
Cavalcanti and Heitor Borges.
44. The book was Democrito Cavalcanti de Anuda, et  al., Depoimento de
Oficiais de Reserva Sóbre a F.E.B. (Rio de Janeiro: Cobraci Publicações,
1949). On the number of reservists, see McCann, The Brazilian-American
Alliance, p. 368, n. 40.
45. J.B.  Mascarenhas to E.  Dutra, Cifrado #33-G.1, 7 Apr. 1945, Cifrados
FEB, de 15/9/44 a 5/ 7/45, 433.40, “1944/1945,” MG665c,
CDOC-EX, Brasilia. He saw the FEB’s prestige at stake. The Americans,
too, were concerned about junior officers. Mascarenhas report when he
commanded the 7th Military Region indicated a shortage of lieutenants
(165 authorized, but 123 on duty = 46 shortfall), Mascarenhas,
“Relatório..0.7 RM, l941” (Recife, 12 Feb. 1942), p. 25 in CDOC-EX,
Brasilia. Unfortunately the army’s documentation center (CDOC-EX) has
218   F. D. MCCANN

been disbanded since I made these notes. I cite them here to aid others
who might want to chase them down. Likely they are now in the Arquivo
Histórico do Exército in Rio. General Ralph Wooten, who played a large
role in relations with the Brazilians, called General Dutra’s attention “to
the lack of leadership in the lower officer and non-commissioned officer
grades,” suggesting various remedies. MG Ralph H. Wooten to Assistant
Chief of Staff, OPD, Recife, 23 Jan. 1945, “Resume of Situation in this
Theater,” OPD 336 Latin American Section IV, Cases 80–93, RG 165,
Modem Military Branch, NARA.
46. Virginia Maria de Niemeyer Portocarrero, “A Mulher Brasileira
Apresentou-se Voluntar- iamente,” Revista do Exército Brasileiro, Vol. 131,
No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 59–63.
47. For the recruitment data on the 7th Military Region, see João
B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, “Relatório apresentado ao Exmo. Sr. General
de Divisáo [Eurico Dutra] Ministro de Guerra pelo General de Brigada
João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes Comandante da 7a. Regioo Militar,
Ano de 1941” (Recife, 12 Fevereiro de 1942), CDEX- Brasilia, pp. 32–34.
On FEB selection, see Lt. Col. Carlos Paiva Gonçalves, Seleção Medica do
Pessaol da F.E.B., Histórico, Funcionamento e Dados Estatisticos (Rio de
Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 195 l), pp. 67–142. For American reports,
see MG Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, Jan. 23, 1945, “Resume
of Situation in this Theater,” OPD 336 Latin American (Sec. IV) Cases
80–93; and Col. Charles B.B. Bubb to Commanding General MTOUSA
(Mediterranean Theater), Rio, 6 Dec. 1944, “Medical Report on the
Fourth Echelon of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,” OPD336.2 Brazil
(Sec. IV), RG165, MMB, NARA. That report is a distressing and depress-
ing account of Brazil’s low state of public health. McCann, The Brazilian-
American Alliance, pp. 369–372.
48. Gen. Eurico Dutra to Col. Edwin L.  Sibert, Rio, 8 Jan. 1941, 2257
K18/247; and Col. Edwin L. Sibert to ACS G2, Rio, 18 Mar. 1941, No.
2650, “Student Officers from Brazil to US Service Schools,” 2257
K18/306, RG165, WD, GS, MID, NARA.
McCann, The Brazilian- American Alliance, pp.  353–354, n. 18. By
comparison, the Chinese sent 249 officers to Ft. Leavenworth, the British
208, the Venezuelans 73, the Mexicans 60, and the Argentines 31.
Command and General Staff School Commander General Karl Truesdell’s
comment about quality of Brazilian officers was reported by Major General
J.G.  Ord in a speech to the staff of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs, August 11, 1944, BDC 5400, RG218 (Records of the US Joint
Chiefs of Staff), NARA.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    219

49. Robert H. Berlin, “United States Army World War II Corps Commanders:
A Composite Biography,” The Journal of Military History 53 (April 1989):
pp. 9–10, 147–167.
50. Ibid, 137–140. Meira Mattos, O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua
época (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1983), Vol. I,
p. 113. For the best study of the front the Brazilians were about to join, see
Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007). Unfortunately he ended
the book with the capture of Rome and thus ignored the last difficult
months of the Italian campaign. He does not even mention the Brazilians.
The USS General Mann sailed with the second echelon on September 22,
1944. The USS General Meigs left Rio with the third, fourth, and fifth
echelons on September 22 and November 23 and with the fifth on
February 8, 1945.
51. Entries for October 30–31, 1944, Combat Diary, Report l/Inf. Div. BEF,
US  Army Center of Military History, Washington; José Alío Piason,
“Alguns Erros Fundamentais Observados na FEB,” Depoimento de
Oficiais da Reserva, pp. 103–107. Piason was a sub commander of one of
the companies involved (3d Co. 1/6 IR). Mascarenhas, Memórias, I,
pp. 183–188. On an aerial observer’s report of German buildup prior to
the action, see Elber de Mello Henriques, A FEB Doze Anos Depois (Rio de
Janeiro: Ed. Biblioteca do Exército, 1959), pp. 72–74. The most balanced
account is Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, 0 Brasil na II Grande Guerra
(Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1960), pp. 206–214.
52. Floriano de Lima Brayner, A Verdade Sóbre a FEB: Memórias de um Chiee
de Estado- Maior, na Campanha da Itália, 1943–1945 (Rio de Janeiro: Ed.
Civilização Brasileira, 1968), p. 234.
53. William Waack, As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e
inimigos (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1985). The underlying tone
of the book questions the importance of the FEB. It is interesting that the
Germans took it seriously enough to broadcast a daily radio program called
“Ouro e Verde” over Radio Victoria from near Como, Italy, that used two
Brazilian nationals as commentators—Margarida Hirschman and Emilio
Baldino, who were tried and given jail sentences after the war. Daniels to
Secretary of State, Rio, Dec. 9, 1946, 832.203/12-946, RG 59, NARA.
54. Emilio Varoli, “Aventuras de um prisonero na Alemanha Nazista,” in
Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva Sóbre a F.E.B., p. 447. This contempo-
rary participant account is at variance with Waack’s report that German
veterans in the 1980s did not recall fighting Brazilians. Unhappily, the
pertinent German army records reportedly were destroyed in a post-war
fire.
220   F. D. MCCANN

55. A Manha (Rio de Janeiro), February 27, 1945. I visited the battle site in
late February 1994.
56. Waack assumed that because the German veterans he interviewed decades
after the war did not remember a Monte Castello, it must have been insig-
nificant; see As Duas Faces, pp. 90–93. FEB Combat Diary, 35, Entry for
February 21, 1945, in “Report on the 1st Infantry Division, Brazilian
Expeditionary Forces in the Italian Campaign from 16 July 1944 to the
Cessation of Hostilities in May 1945,” 301 (BEF)-033, NARA.
57. It is worth noting that this was the 10th Mountain Division’s “first major
engagement with the enemy.” “Fourth Corps History,” p.  512. In May
1994, Brig. Gen. Harold W. Nelson, Chief of Military History, US Army,
and General de Divisão Sérgio Ruschel Bergamaschi, Director of Cultural
Matters, Brazilian Army, led a joint American-Brazilian “Staff Ride” to
retrace the side-by-side campaigning of the l0th Mountain and the FEB;
see Sérgio Gomes Pereira, “Ação conjunta 1 DIE (BR) / l0 a Div. MTH
(EUA), Revista do Exército Brasileiro, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994),
pp. 54–56.
58. For a valuable discussion of the “school of the soldier,” see Paul Fussell,
Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52–65.
59. Col. Newton C. de Andrade Mello, A Epopéia de Montese (Curitiba:
Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1954).
60. Gen. Mascarenhas ordered his men: “Only after the Germans are here we
will inform the Americans.” Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, Meio
Século de Combate: Diálogo com Cordeiro de Farias (Rio de Janeiro: Ed.
Nova Fronteira, 1981), p.  368. Gen. Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias com-
manded the FEB artillery.
61. On the songs of the Febianos, see McCann, The Brazilian-American
Alliance, pp. 432,435; and the recording “20 Anos Depois: Expeditionaries
em Ritmos” (Chantecler Records, São Paulo, release CMG 2397, 1965).
For a more recent commentary on the FEB’s sambas, see Cesar Campiani
Maximiano, “Neve,fogo e montanhas: a experiência brasileira de combate
na Itália (1944/45),” in Celso Castro, et  al., Nova História Militar
Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2004), pp. 352–354. And there
is Maria Elisa Pereira, “Você sabe de onde eu venho? O Brasil dos cantos
de Guerra (1942–1945)” Doutora em História, Universidade de São
Paulo, 2009.
62. The New York Times, September 2, 1945.
63. Octavio Costa, Trinta Anos Depois da Volta: O Brasil na II Guerra
Mundial (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 1976), p.  61.
“Em meados de março de 1944, o Onze estava pronto para seguir rumo
ao Rio. Foi aí que ouvi, pela primeira fez, a expressão “a cobra vai fumar,”
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    221

que os soldados usavam para indicar a proximidade da partida, assemel-

hando o trem à cobra.” Cobra is snake in Portuguese. How the expression
turned into the FEB shoulder patch has been rather vague. See Costa,
pp. 32–33.
64. John Baxter, Disney During World War II: How the Walt Disney Studio
Contributed to Victory in the War (New York: Disney Editions, 2014),
p. 123.
65. João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes., Memórias, Vol. 1, p.  189. Senna
Campos said that Clark had urged Mascarenhas to create a division patch
and that he adopted the “Cobra Fumando” which was already a popular
expression among the troops. There is a photo in his book of Senna
Campos and Mascarenhas purportedly showing Dutra the design. General
Aguinaldo José Senna Campos, Com a FEB na Itália: Páginas do meu
Diário (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa do Exército, 1970), pp. 95–98. Cesar
Campiani Maximiano, Barbudos, Sujos e Fatigados: Soldados brasiliros na
Segunda Guerra Mundial (São Paulo: Grua Livros, 2010), pp. 303–306.
The YouTube statement of Sargento Ewaldo [Meyer]: criador do desenho da
cobra fumando Força Expedicionária Brasileira) https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Uug5DvQ0UHU. Filmed by Nahor L. de Souza Jr.
Antonio Pedro Tota has a slightly different version in O Imperialismo
Sedutor: A Americanização do Brasil na Época da Segunda Guerra (São
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000), pp.  138–139. Sgt. Ewaldo stated
that Walters said he would send it to Disney for polishing. Walters made no
mention of any role in creating the Smoking Cobra patch in his autobiog-
raphy Silent Missions (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1978).
66. John W. F. Dulles, Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), p.  167–168.
Castello thought that if the Allies abandoned Italy, “it will catch fire and,
moreover, nazi-fascism will resurge a little from the ashes….” But he
admitted to his wife that “I am saturated with all this and it is high time to
return.” Ambassador Vasco commented that “A razão de ser da FEB foi
mais política que militar. Foi uma confirmação com sangue da nossa aliança
com os Estados Unidos. E foi uma confirmação para os Aliados da nossa
posição antinazista e antifascista. … E nós não soubemos aproveitar essa
vantagem, ficamos com fofoquinhas, coisas de somenos, quando tínhamos
um aliado natural. Ficamos de pé atrás com os Estados Unidos.” Vasco
Leitão da Cunha, Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio
de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 104–106.
67. BG Hayes Kroner to Ord, Rio, March 21, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil Sec IV,
Cases 56–84, MMB, RG165, NARA.
68. João Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes, A FEB pelo Seu Comandante (Rio de
Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora, 2005), pp. 312–314.
222   F. D. MCCANN

69. Charles M.  Wiltse, United States Army in World War II: The Medical
Department: Medical Service in the Mediterranean and Minor Theaters
(Washington, DC, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965) p. 506;
see Table 35.
70. Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007), pp. 508–509. Prior to the
taking of Rome, a study of the divisions in Italy found that an infantryman
did not question “whether he will be hit, but when and how bad.”
71. Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: the War in Western Europe, 1944–
1945 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2013), pp. 340–341.
72. Major General J. G. Ord, Memo for Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, Subject:
“Brazilian sick and wounded from Italy” Dec. 6, 1944, OPD 336.2 Brazil,
Sec. III, Cases 38–55, RG 165, Box 967, MMB, NARA.
73. Eurico Dutra to General Hayes Kroner, Rio, May 15, 1945, OPD 336
Brazil, RG 165, NA. Dutra had conversations with Kroner on March 21,
April 30, and May 11 about the FEB’s return, and he was anxious to have
it carrying the arms it used in Italy and bringing the material captured from
the enemy. He wanted the first shipload to arrive at Rio de Janeiro by the
end of June. Because the government planned a big celebration, “it would
be very desirable that the troops arrive here well-equipped and armed.”
74. My thanks to Colonel Sergio Paulo Muniz Costa, Brazilian Army Retired,
for pointing this out to me.
75. Memo for Record: “Demobilization of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force,”
April 6, 1945, OPD336.2, Brazil, Sec V, Cases 85-, Box 967, RG165,
MMB, NA; see also Memo by Col. P.W.  Edwards (Deputy Chief, Pan
American Group, OPD.
76. These valuable reports were not transferred to the Brazilian army’s archives
but were kept in the minister’s office. A thorough search by archive staff
and, at my request, by officers in the commander’s office in Brasília in June
2011 could not find them. Hopefully they are safely gathering dust on
some shelf and will eventually be discovered.
77. Notes taken by Col. C.H.  Calais during visit to base and conversations
with the 350th commander, Lt. Col. John C. Robertson, Pisa, January 17,
1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil (Sec. IV), RG 165, NARA. On killed and POWs
see Major John W. Buyers, US Liaison Officer, June 16, 2001, in Aricildes
de Moraes Motta, Coordinator, História Oral do Exército na Segunda
Guerra Mundial, Tomo 8 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército Editora,
2001), p. 228. Many pilots had completed their required 35 missions, but
could not be sent home because of a lack of replacements. For 350 Fighter
Group, 8th US Army Air Corps https://www.8thafhs.org/fighter/350fg.
htm.
   THE BRAZILIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: THE SMOKING COBRAS    223

78. Quotation in “Major John W. Buyers,” US Liaison Officer, June 16, 2001,
in Aricildes de Moraes Motta, Coordinator, História Oral do Exército na
Segunda Guerra Mundial, Tomo 8 (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército
Editora, 2001), p. 226.
79. The quotation is from Conn and Fairchild, Framework of Hemisphere
Defense, p. 326. For a study of the airbases, see Therese L. Kraus, “The
Establishment of United States Army Air Corps Bases in Brazil, 1938–
1945” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1986), p. 185.
The senior American officer in Rio de Janeiro summarized “Brazil’s con-
tribution, in the present conflict, to Hemisphere Defense (sic), in order of
importance: Air Bases in Northeast Brazil; strategic materials; troops for
overseas combat; naval and air assistance in anti-submarine warfare; and
neutralization of Axis activities. To these should be added the moral value
of having one South American country actively participating in the war
against the Axis powers.” BG Hayes Kroner, Rio de Janeiro, May 18,
1945, “Notes on “THE PRESENT AND FUTURE POSITION OF
BRAZIL (Sic),” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, MMB, NARA.
80. Charles Hendricks, “Building the Atlantic Bases,” p.  43  in www.SACE.
army.mil.publications/eng_pamphelts/ep870-42/c-1.3.pdf. There is a
list of bases and discussion of negotiations for continued use in Maj. Gen.
Ralph H. Wooten (Commander, US Army Forces South Atlantic) Memo:
“Implementation of Airbase Agreement between Brazil  –
U.S. Governments,” April 15, 1945, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG
165, NARA.
81. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1943 (Boston,
1964), p.  376. For the Brazilian navy’s view of the war, see Dino Willy
Cozza, “A Marinha do Brasil na II Grande Guerra,” Revista do Exército
Brasileiro, Vol. 131, No. 3 (Jul./Set. 1994), pp. 64–66.
82. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Getúlio Vargas, Washington, April nd, 1944, GV
44.01.08, XLIV.8, Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC-Rio. In the micro-
film copy, it appears as frame 0014.
83. Lt. General George H. Brett to Chief of Staff, HDQ, Caribbean Defense
Command, Dec. 6, 1944, OPD 336 Brazil, FW78/2, General and Special
Staffs, RG 165, NARA.
84. Joseph C.  Grew (Acting Secretary of State), Memo of Conversation
(Truman, Grew, Berle), June 13, 1945, 711.32/6 -1345, RG59, NA. Also
J.C.  Grew, Secret “Circular Air gram to Certain American Missions,”
Washington, June 27, 1945, 711.32/6 – 2745, CS/D, RG 59, NARA. This
dealt with deterioration in relations with Brazil. It spoke of Brazil being
“disgruntled” by its treatment at the San Francisco Conference (April 25
to June 26, 1945).
224   F. D. MCCANN

85. There is extensive documentation that still has not been studied suffi-
ciently, for example, the minutes of the 11 meetings of generals at army
headquarters in Rio in August to October 1945. “Resumo das Reuniões
de Generais realizadas no edificio do Ministerio da Guerra, em Agosto,
Setembro e Outubro de 1945”; Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa 11,
Arquivo Histórico do Exército, Rio de Janeiro.
86. Maj. Gen. Ralph H.  Wooten (Commander, US Army Forces South
Atlantic) Memo: “Implementation of Airbase Agreement between Brazil –
U.S. Governments,” April 15, 1945, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), RG
165, NARA.
87. The changes included such common things as ice cream. The popular
Kibon ice cream products appeared on the market in 1942. An American
company (US Harkson do Brasil) fled Japanese-occupied China and set
itself up in Brazil. Kibon comes from “que bom,” how good! “Ice Cream
in Brazil,” Business Week (November 21, 1942), p. 24.
88. Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed (New
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2012), p.  248. For a summary of Brazil and
United States in World War II, there is Frank D. McCann and Francisco
César Alves Ferraz, “Brazilian-American Joint Operations in World War
II” in Sidnei J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-
U.S.  Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da
Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 83–128.
 CHAPTER 7

Post-World War Disappointment

At the end of the war, relations between the two countries, and especially
their two military establishments, could not have been closer. Unfortunately,
American demobilization was so deep and rapid that succeeding American
governments lost sight of the importance of the relationship. Changes in
presidents, cabinet officials, and department-level staffs resulted in a loss
of institutional memory. The documents on the relationship lay undi-
gested in the archives for decades. Brazil’s war role faded under archival dust.
It is worth noting that the voluminous documents in the American archives
about the construction of the air bases, the intense military negotiations,
improvement of ports, and diplomatic relations generally, and particularly
about the FEB, were still classified “Secret” as late as 1964, others until
1976.1 The histories of World War II gave priority to relations among the
Big Three—United States, Britain, and Soviet Union—and only slowly
turned to the secondary powers. Historians emphasized United States
combat operations, not how the supply and support networks had been
created and functioned. Brazil rarely entered the American worldview.
American officials had implied that Brazil would have a privileged posi-
tion after the war. Even before the Brazilian troops reached Italy, the two
governments signed an agreement that would have allowed the American
military to have use of air bases at Natal, Recife, and Belém for ten years
after the war ended. It appeared as if the two countries would remain close
allies in the post-war period.

© The Author(s) 2018 225

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_7
226   F. D. MCCANN

Military Staff Negotiations

On August 1, 1944, the Department of State alerted diplomatic missions
in Latin America that they were to propose that bilateral staff conversa-
tions lay “the foundations for continued military collaboration between
[sic] the American Republics in the post-war period.”2 A little later in
August, Cordell Hull wrote to the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral William D. Leahy, saying that the conversations with Brazil and
Mexico should be held before they were initiated with any other republic.3
The objective was to standardize the weaponry, training, and organization
of the Latin American armed forces so that if there was another attack on
the hemisphere, there would be a massive defense force ready. Also the
idea was to prevent European countries from selling arms or placing mili-
tary missions in the region. The difficulty was that the Brazilians were not
interested in standardization, but in establishing their predominance in
South America. They wanted to insure that Argentina would never be able
to attack Brazil successfully so that Brazil and the United States entered
into these discussions with different objectives. A further problem was
that Americans were not united in their own estimate of the situation.
On October 10, 1944, the staff conversations were officially begun
with fanfare presided over by Getúlio Vargas in Rio’s Catete Palace. The
president commented that what they were doing “for all practical pur-
poses amounted to a military alliance” and recalled that their “highly sat-
isfactory military collaboration” had begun “even before Pearl Harbor.”4
With this auspicious beginning, the two militaries held detailed staff dis-
cussions about the structures, armaments and equipping, stationing, mis-
sions, and cooperative arrangements with the Brazilian armed forces after
the war. Similar conversations were to be held with other Latin American
countries.5 The discussions were conducted between Brazilian and
American officers without any involvement of civilian diplomats. The
resulting “papers” or studies were the official views of the Brazilian armed
forces and had been approved by President Vargas. The American officers
assumed that the United States wished Brazil to have “a strong and coop-
erative role in the maintenance of hemispherical defense as a component
of post-war world order, thereby relieving the United States of the mili-
tary burden and political embarrassment of playing this role directly in
South America.”6 The Americans believed that “Brazil was willing and
anxious to become a southern partner of the United States in a military
sense,” that they wanted assistance to become self-sufficient, rather than
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    227

having “continued help.” The army “program was scaled to cover defense
of Brazil from attack within or from without South America, in conjunc-
tion with possible United States help.”7
The Brazilian navy hoped for the transfer of some 32 warships that
included two battleships, two light aircraft carriers, four cruisers, fifteen
destroyers, and nine submarines, which would “make the Brazilian Navy
incontestably the strongest naval force in South America….” However,
Adolf A. Berle, who had succeeded Jefferson Caffery as US ambassador in
January, doubted that the Brazilian navy could maintain such “compli-
cated and formidable” machinery.8 He argued that “The money and effort
used in organizing a naval force at this point in Brazilian history would be
infinitely better spent on putting in an internal transport system, and
building and maintaining public schools.”9 He may have been correct, but
apparently he forgot that such policy decisions were for Brazilian leaders
to make and were not the purview of the American ambassador. The staff
conversations raised the expectations of the Brazilian navy, which were
stimulated even higher due to comments that Admiral Jonas Ingram,
commander of the 4th US Fleet based at Recife, made to reporters in early
July 1945  in which he said that a number of American ships would be
ceded to Brazil.10 Ingram’s comments and the promise of ships were
“unauthorized” but that did not reduce their impact.11 Somewhat frus-
trated, Berle observed that “we have to cope with the results. To throw
overboard the Naval Conversations now would undoubtedly create a very
considerable crisis.” He recommended keeping “the program as an ideal,
propose measures designed to make progress toward realizing it without
commitments as to time.”12 [Italics added]
The proposal for the army, at least in the American view, emphasized
instruction and training. It called for the insertion of American instructors
at every level of training of officers and enlisted specialists. American offi-
cers would be assigned to the “tactical schools, the military academy, and
officers pre-military schools.” Although the document did not mention
the French Military Mission’s long attempt to reshape the Brazilian army,
the considerable American insertion into Brazilian army institutions would
be more profound than what the French had done. Within two years of
the proposal’s approval, the Brazilians wanted to receive “sufficient war
materiel with which to equip … [a] peace-time Army of 180,000 and … a
reserve sufficient to equip the 26 divisions contemplated in … initial
mobilization plan.” Ambassador Berle doubted that within the specified
two years, the army would be ready to receive so much equipment and
228   F. D. MCCANN

arms. He thought it would involve “an extremely large factor of waste.”

He asserted that “the Brazilian record for maintenance is not good; and
there is always a tendency to ask for new equipment as a solution.”
However, he observed that “the capacity for maintenance is there if it can
be developed.”13
The staff conversations also proposed the expansion of the Brazilian air
force from 14,000 officers and men to 25,654 by 1948, with a like increase
in aircraft from the current 60 fighter bombers to 200 by 1949.14 If
adopted, Berle believed that “Brazil would have unquestioned air suprem-
acy so that no nation or group of nations in South America could oppose
her. Technically she would have the continent at her mercy. Given her
pacific tendencies, this is not of itself a danger.” Indeed, underlying the
three sets of staff talks was the belief that “Brazil if armed would be a force
for peace and defense, and not for war and expansion; and on the historical
and psychological record of Brazil,” Berle concurred that “this assump-
tion seems warranted.”15
The reports resulting from the staff conversations, which had been
approved at the highest levels of the Brazilian government, were sent to
Washington with Brazilian expectations soaring, but then nothing hap-
pened. Rio was not even notified of their receipt. Some nine months later
at the end of December, Colonel José Bina Machado, who had been
Brazil’s first military attaché in Washington from 1938 to November 1941
and was considered a friend of the United States, paid an unsettling visit
to the American embassy. During the previous months, he had been chief
of Minister of War Dutra’s office and was close to Generals Dutra, Góes
Monteiro, and other high officers.16 He said he was alarmed at the “recent
growth of anti-American sentiment in high Brazilian army circles, gravely
threatening the future of Brazilian–American military cooperation.” He
declared that Brazilian officers were thinking that the United States “was
inclined to treat Brazil as a small brother rather than an important nation”
and doubted American sincerity about “a wholehearted policy of coopera-
tion with Brazil.” The chargé d’affaires quickly reported Bina Machado’s
comments warning that it was “obvious that immediate action must be
taken … to produce concrete results pursuant to the staff conversations.”
If action was not taken, he predicted that it would “prejudice the standing
of our military personnel in Brazil, and gravely threaten the whole future
of American-Brazilian military cooperation.”17 In addition it would, he
emphasized, have “effects far transcending the immediate military neces-
sity.” Secretary of State James F. Byrnes replied that there had been no
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    229

change in Washington’s policy of “full cooperation with Brazil” and that

it was “our most earnest desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the
same intimately friendly basis that has existed traditionally….” He was
concerned that “certain elements” might be trying to stir up trouble.18
Also of concern was the appearance in Rio of an agent of the British
company Vickers-Armstrongs with offers to sell to the Brazilian navy at
scrap prices a large number of fully equipped combat vessels. The agent
was making the rounds of South American capitals seeking prospective
buyers. Minister of Navy Jorge Dodsworth Martins told the American
naval attaché that he was worried that such sales could be the start of an
arms race. He questioned the status of the staff conversations’ recommen-
dations. Ambassador Berle urged the State Department to act, but he
seems to have immediately tried to restrain the British, rather than to pres-
sure Washington for the implementation of the staff proposals.
The Brazilians could not understand the American attitude, Truman
and his team said the right things, but failed to act on the recommenda-
tions.19 What was going on? In 1945 there were two sets of opposing
attitudes in Washington regarding Brazil’s military status and relationship
with the United States. From 1938 onward the War and Navy Departments
had gradually eclipsed the State Department in the realm of foreign policy
making, particularly in the Americas. Secretary of State Cordell Hull had
not favored the idea of a special relationship with Brazil, and after President
Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, Truman’s team had little familiarity
with Brazilian-American relations and even less sympathy for Brazilian
ambitions. And that view eventually spread to the army staff. Perhaps
because so much of what had happened in Brazil was in the shadows,
Brazilian contributions were not well known, even in the War Department.20
FDR’s death marked the end of a remarkable relationship between the
American president and Brazil. His passing was mourned publicly by ordi-
nary citizens. From Manaos in the north to Porto Alegre in the south, the
newspapers reported the shock and profound pain of loss that people on
the streets expressed. The interventor in Recife commented that
Roosevelt’s name would be “indelibly linked to Brazil in the fight for free-
dom and justice.” Recife businesses closed and the government shut
down. The interventor Rui Carneiro in Paraiba observed that Roosevelt
was gone but that “‘rooseveltismo’ is the eternal unperishable dogma of
good will among men and nations.”21 President Vargas, at a memorial
held at the foreign ministry on May 12, declared that it was not a protocol
ceremony, rather “the demonstration of friendship of the Brazilian nation
230   F. D. MCCANN

for a foreign statesman, who was so much a friend as to be considered by

all of us as a quasi-national name.”22 The impression that he made on
Brazilians as a reformer was so long lasting that President Fernando
Cardoso (1995–2003) liked to compare his program to FDR’s, and some
commentators tagged President Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) as a
“Roosevelt Brasileiro” in 2010.

American Military Views

The Army General Staff was divided between those with direct experience
with the Brazilians and those who had more theoretical views on how to
deal with the American Republics. The two groups of officers saw things
very differently. Those in Brazil recommended recognizing Brazil’s emer-
gence “as the dominant military power in South America.” Referring to
“Brazil’s contribution, in the present conflict, to Hemispheric Defense,”
they advised building “Brazil into a power in the South American conti-
nent comparable to that of the United States in the North American con-
tinent….”23 The problem was that such a policy collided with the fault line
between the Spanish-American Republics and Portuguese-speaking Brazil,
and the desire of Washington’s bureaucracies to craft policies that engaged
all of Latin America. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved a statement
(JSC 629) that provided “for an integration of all Latin American armed
forces into a hemisphere defense force equipped with United States mate-
rial and organized and trained in accordance with United States stan-
dards.” The War Department’s intelligence section candidly admitted that
“one of the main purposes” of the integration policy was “to prevent
European powers from providing arms and military missions to Latin
American republics.” If Brazil alone were provided with substantial
American arms and equipment it would be “inevitable that European
powers” would move into the breach with arms and military missions,
particularly in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. The G-2 critics asserted that “a
reversal of the policy would have a disastrous effect upon United States
relations with Latin America … [and] would lead to a Spanish-speaking
bloc which would be hostile to both the United States and Brazil.” Pan
American unity “would be destroyed and Inter-American military coop-
eration disrupted.” The negative evaluation concluded acidly: “The
friendship of Brazil for the United States … is a recent development and
there is no assurance of its permanence.”24 On June 9, 1945, the Army
staff’s Operations Division (OPD) agreed with the foregoing assessment
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    231

and recommendation against a pro-Brazil policy. OPD, showing lamen-

table ignorance of reality, reduced Brazil’s wartime contributions to allow-
ing American personnel in Northeast Brazil to construct strategic air bases
and to participate in the defense of the region. The author’s final line
caught the mood in Washington by saying: “Assurance of Brazil’s friend-
ship for the United States is no less than that of other Latin American
countries.”25
How different in tone was OPD’s assessment from that of officials
more aware of the importance of those very same air bases. In an August
1943 report to the Senate investigation of the airfield projects, a special
assistant to the Secretary of War declared that without the Brazilian route
to Africa, “the entire course of the war might have been changed.” For
Brazilian aspirations it was most unfortunate that “the entire project has
from the beginning been treated as a secret one.”26 Obviously, secret proj-
ects are not widely known and can be easily forgotten.
Brazilian leaders in the second half of 1945 were slow to realize that
their “blood sacrifice” was lost from view in the rivers of blood shed on
the world’s battlefields. Historians have not been inquisitive as to Brazil’s
immediate post-war role in world affairs. They have concentrated on the
fall of Vargas, the successor Eurico Dutra government, and Brazilian activ-
ity in the new United Nations.27 For example, no one has asked why Brazil
did not participate in the occupation of the defeated Axis countries.

No Occupation Role
While the above was going on in Rio de Janeiro and Washington, a differ-
ent dialogue had taken place in Italy. At some point in February 1945,
likely after the victory at Monte Castello, General Mark Clark, former
commander of US Fifth Army, asked General João Batista Mascarenhas de
Morais about contributing troops to the occupation. Clark would eventu-
ally head the occupation of Austria and apparently had the idea of transfer-
ring the FEB there. It is significant that little is known about this inquiry,
sources such as the Foreign Relations papers are silent and I have not found
anything in the military files in the National Archives.
The Brazilian sources tell us more but in shadowy fashion. Without any
prompting Mascarenhas wrote Minister of War Dutra that he did not favor
an occupation role because it would necessarily involve Brazilian troops in
an uncomfortable disciplinary function that could easily turn violent. As
the least powerful force in that theater of operations under the control of
232   F. D. MCCANN

one of the strongest nations, he did not think his troops cut a figure of
sufficient authority for such a role. He noted that the poor quality of their
uniforms compared unfavorably with those of the Americans and English,
and worse, he regarded their discipline and military instruction as defi-
cient. He concluded by writing that “It seems to me [to be] contra-­
indicated to employ the Força Expedicionária Brasileira as occupation
troops in any country of this continent.”28
The FEB’s chief of staff Colonel Floriano de Lima Brayner argued
against participating in the post-war occupation. He apparently thought
that Brazil was paying the full cost of the FEB, and so “staying in Italy,” he
observed bitterly, “would cost incalculable and onerous fortunes of our
public moneys.” He complained that “The only thing the Americans did
not charge for was the air we breathed because the banks could not mea-
sure it.”29 Sadly, he was unaware that in early April 1945 the Lend-Lease
agreement between the two governments was modified to include the cost
of FEB operations. Decades later he still believed that the Americans did
not appreciate them.30 General Willis D. Crittenberger, commander of the
Fourth Corps of the US Fifth Army, met with FEB staff officer (G-3)
Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco in Milan on May 10, 1945. He
asked Castello why the Brazilians were in such a hurry to go home.
Castello replied that Brazil was not represented on the allied council for
governing Italy and so it should not contribute troops. He said that Brazil
had no political interest in Europe. Castello and Brayner believed that the
FEB had completed its mission and there was no reason for it to be part of
the occupation of Italy or anywhere else.31 But, of course, this was not a
decision for field officers to make. Exactly who made the decision and why
is not known. It is possible that the missing 1945 and 1946 Relatórios of
the Minister of War might shed some light on why Brazil did not partici-
pate in the occupation.32
If the Brazilian army had taken part in the occupation, it likely would
have given Brazil a louder voice in post-war diplomacy and likely would
have strengthened its relationship with the United States. Ambassador
Vasco Leitão da Cunha in his oral history testimony observed that British
General Harold R.  L. G.  Alexander, commander of the 15th Group of
Armies, had said to him: “The Brazilian is a fine soldier. I’m sorry to hear
they want to go home and not go to Austria.” Leitão da Cunha was in
Rome at the time and immediately telegraphed the Brazilian foreign min-
istry saying “that the FEB ought to stay.” He argued that the reason for
the FEB was more political than military, it was a confirmation of our
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    233

a­ lliance with the United States, “written in blood.” It was to show the
Allies that Brazil was “anti-Nazi and antifascist.” Apparently in the
Itamaraty, the diplomats were not looking to expand Brazilian influence
and prestige; one of them responded: “This is an easy way for them to earn
gold.” [“Isso é cavação deles para ganhar ouro.”] As if the war-weary veter-
ans were thinking only of lining their pockets! The Ambassador summa-
rized his reaction by saying: “we give up conquered gains.” [“Nós
abdicamos das vantagens conquistadas.”] “And we did not know how to
take advantage of what we had done; we got stuck in intrigues, lesser
things, when we had a natural ally. We strayed out of step with the United
States.” He concluded by saying that “the Germanophiles [in the War
Ministry] did not lose their Germanophilia. They fought without enthusi-
asm.” Because of its role in the war, “Brazil stopped being an adolescent
country and became a serious country.” “We do not know how to take
advantage of the things that we do well. We ought to celebrate [them],
but Brazilians don’t know what the pracinhas did.”33 If Brazil had partici-
pated in the occupation, its visibility and, perhaps, status in the post-war
world would have been different.
Even before World War II ended, the United States negotiated a ten-­
year extension of its access to air bases at Belém, Natal, and Recife.
American policy aimed at excluding all other foreign military influences
from the Western Hemisphere and to solidify American leadership in mili-
tary matters. Brazil was to be the model for the other American Republics
of the value of such an arrangement of hemispheric defense. The United
States which before the war had not been interested in training and sup-
plying Latin American forces now made this the core of its relations with
the region.34

The Pacific War

When Brazil entered the war in August 1942, it recognized that a state of
war existed with Germany and Italy, but it did not include Japan. The
other two Axis powers had sunk Brazilian ships, in effect attacking Brazil.
Japan had attacked another American Republic, so Brazil broke relations
with the three, but did not recognize war with Japan because the Empire
had not attacked it. Brazil’s tradition was to go to war only if attacked.
There was a large Japanese immigrant population in the country dating
from 1906, with communities in the southern states and in Pará in the
Amazon. The government imposed harsh repressive controls on the
234   F. D. MCCANN

Japanese. With the end of the war in Europe in early May 1945, all eyes
turned toward the Pacific. Peace in Europe also meant the end of Brazilian
participation in the Lend-Lease program. The exact thinking of the Vargas
government is not clear, but it must have seen advantages to joining the
fight in the Pacific, especially because Argentina still maintained its
neutrality.
The Vargas government let it be known that it would respond favorably
to an American request that it enter the war with Japan. Washington
demurred saying it would welcome a Brazilian declaration, but it would be
up to Brazil to act without an invitation. On May 8, Vargas, rejoicing in
the victory in Europe, told journalists that Brazil was standing with the
United Nations and that the bases in the north would continue to serve
the war effort until Japan was defeated. He emphasized that if the United
Nations needed Brazilian troops in the Pacific, “the country was ready to
supply them.”35 So he was ready to set aside the tradition of declaring war
only if attacked. Meanwhile some American troops in Italy were being
shipped to the Pacific theater.36 And Brazil’s troops would soon be head-
ing home.
At that time the United Nations was being organized in San Francisco.
Brazil was angling for a seat on the Security Council, but faced resistance
from the British and the Russians and lack of enthusiasm from the
Americans.37 The chief Brazilian representative at the conference Pedro
Leão Veloso met with President Truman to discuss Lend-Lease issues and
possible Brazilian entry into the war with Japan.38 The Department of
State opined that “it would be politically advantageous to have Brazil
declare war on Japan.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved “a token partici-
pation of the Brazilian Air Force in the Pacific,” but because of transporta-
tion and retraining difficulties, they could not make use of Brazilian
ground troops. On June 6, 1945, Brazil announced that “having for some
time considered the aggression of Japan against the United States of
America as though it were directed against Brazil itself and desiring to
cooperate for the final victory of the United Nations…,” it declared that a
state of war existed with the Empire of Japan.39 President Truman tele-
graphed to Vargas his “deep satisfaction” that Brazil “will be solidly at our
side until the total defeat of the one remaining Axis aggressor.” He noted
that the action was “an additional bond in the historic friendship” that had
its “roots in the beginnings of our respective histories as independent
nations.”40 However, it may be that the Brazilian declaration and offer of
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    235

troops were more related to a desire to keep Lend-Lease arms and equip-
ment flowing than to a real desire to see action in the Pacific.
It is worth noting that historians have paid little attention to Brazil’s
entry into the war against Japan. The many thousands of Japanese immi-
grants in Brazil suffered discrimination and severe repression in the late
1930s nationalist campaigns and even worse after the 1942 break in rela-
tions. Because of their extreme cultural and physical isolation, most of
them did not believe that Japan had lost the war.41 Recently, one team of
Brazilian historians has questioned why Brazil delayed including Japan in
the recognition of a state of war from 1942 to 1945. Their continuing
research may provide answers. They noted that even without such action,
Brazilian authorities treated the resident Japanese as harshly as they did
the Germans and Italians.42 The intense political agitation that led to the
ousting of President Vargas at the end of October 1945 likely distracted
and deflected historians’ attention to other questions such as the forma-
tion of the United Nations.
By the end of December 1945, a significant number of Brazilian offi-
cers had doubts about American sincerity regarding their relationship.
Such officers thought that the Americans were “inclined to treat Brazil as
a small brother rather than an important nation pledged to full military
cooperation.” Secretary of State James F.  Byrnes tried to counter such
feelings by saying that it was the Truman administration’s “most earnest
desire to keep our relations with Brazil on the same intimately friendly
basis that has existed traditionally and particularly throughout the
war….”43

Vargas Overthrow
That goal would be affected by a regime change in Brazil as 1945 pro-
gressed. The military and right-wing civilian opposition became concerned
about Getúlio’s attempt to mobilize the working class as a political actor.
As the wartime development projects became a reality, the labor and social
decrees of the Estado Novo gave Vargas increasing influence over unions
and the working class. His image as “father of the poor” and friend of
workers took on more substance. The end of dictatorship and the return
of elected government meant that the working class would have an unprec-
edented role in Brazilian politics. Getúlio’s apparent acceptance of the
idea of holding a constitutional convention while he was still in office was
seen by his opponents as a step toward keeping power. Moreover, support
236   F. D. MCCANN

for the idea by the Communist Party of Brazil and the similarity of the
situation to the Peronist phenomenon in Argentina were enough to drive
a wedge between Vargas and the military. The army was then searching
out and watching Communist cells in its ranks. Vargas maneuvered to
secure the backing of the recently freed left-wing political prisoners and
their related worker allies. At a meeting of generals on September 28,
1945, Góes, speaking now as Minister of War, said that Vargas’s re-­election
could not happen, that it would be “inadmissible.”44 The mood in the
country, at least among the middle and upper classes, as expressed in
newspaper editorials, was that, as the Diário Carioca (Rio) stated it, “the
decisive role in this hour of transition falls to the armed forces. … We
appeal to the armed forces….” Vargas had to go.45
But why did he have to go before the elections scheduled for December
2? Coups are often related to political instability, yet in 1945 Brazil was
remarkably stable. It is true that in 123 years of independence, it had had
4 constitutional regimes that were barely representative and tended toward
increasing authoritarianism. In the eight previous years under the Estado
Novo appointed leadership, changes were at the ministerial and state levels
without social violence. There were few manifestations against the Vargas
regime in the early 1940s and in the first ten months of 1945. Vargas’s
economic programs had strong public support. Various features of the
state direction of the economy appealed to business and consumers alike.
“Most obviously, anti-foreign measures that placed foreign capital at a
relative disadvantage were attractive to domestic entrepreneurs hard-­
pressed to compete with the superior resources of outside investors.”
Vargas had shifted politically during the war. Clearly democracy was the
trend of the moment. He cultivated the emergent working class and
soothed the conservative landowners of the interior. He created the Labor
Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB) and the Social Democratic
Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD) imagining a return to elective
democratic politics in which he would persist as a key figure. “The combi-
nation of economic nationalism, with the state greatly contributing to
industrialization, and the political maneuvers by Vargas helped sustain his
popularity among most of the Brazilian population. 1945 witnessed the
polarization of politics with the working class and Vargas’s side (for him to
remain in office) and the forces rallying against the dictator.”46
There were no strikes against the government. The cost of living in the
center south hovered a bit above 1 percent during the Estado Novo. There
were more rallies in his favor than against him. Growth was steadily upward
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    237

throughout the dictatorship, even though productive capacity lagged, and

the industrial plant was deteriorating and tending toward obsolescence.47
Likely poor maintenance contributed to both. However, public support
was consistent up to the coup.
What did Vargas have to say about his intentions? He had given up on
his diary after the accident in 1942, so the only entries into his thinking
are what he said to others during what became the 1945 crisis. On the
evening of Friday, September 28, at Getúlio’s request, Ambassador Adolf
Berle went to Guanabara Palace. The president said he wanted to know
the thinking of the Truman government “without going through the
bureaucracy of Foreign Offices.” They talked about the status of the nego-
tiations over the air bases that seemed to be progressing satisfactorily.
They discussed the multilateral civil air agreements resulting from the
international civil aviation conference in Chicago in 1944, Brazil’s prefer-
ence for a bilateral accord, and the next aviation conference to be held in
Montreal.48 As head of the American delegation at Chicago, Berle was an
expert. They went on to talk about the exchange of Argentine wheat for
Brazilian-made tires, which Vargas felt placed Brazil at an uncomfortable
disadvantage. Berle indicated that he would explore the possibility of the
United States shipping wheat to Brazil. With the question of Argentina in
the air, they turned to the wisdom of Vargas attending the dedication of
the international bridge at Uruguaiana, Rio Grande do Sul, on October
12, now that Perón had ordered the arrest of thousands of Argentines and
the level of public anger in Argentina was rising. The American press had
been linking Vargas with Perón in a supposed “league of dictators,” and
Berle was worried that a meeting at the bridge would give impetus to such
speculations and might even alienate popular opinion in Brazil, which
“would probably be misinterpreted in the press of the United States.”
Berle suggested putting off the visit until after the Rio Conference on
Continental Peace and Security (held August 15–September 2, 1947). Of
course, by then Vargas would be out of office.
Then the president asked what Berle thought of the situation in Brazil.
The ambassador replied that it “would be very closely watched in the
United States. We had admired as acts of great statesmanship his putting
Brazil back on the democratic rails….” Referring to Vargas’s speech of
September 7, 1945 declining to run again, Berle characterized it as “forth-
right, direct and honest,” noting that “we had not taken any stock in his
enemies who had tortured this speech into the exact opposite of what it
said.” Talk of coup d’état by Vargas or against him was then being reported.
238   F. D. MCCANN

They chatted a bit about Communist activity. “The President said

rather grimly that the Communists knew very well that the masses were
with him and not with them; that all they wanted was a chance to organize
and that their real goal was 20 or 30 years ahead.” Vargas asserted that he
did not intend to be a candidate for two reasons: he had said he would not
and that he intended to keep his word; the second was that he was tired
and that he “proposed to leave while he had the affection and applause of
his people.” He did not want to go out with either their hatred or their
indifference. “For this reason he was going through with elections and he
had made that plain.” He said that he would resolve the agitation for a
Constituinte and that “this was the end of a government and he was put-
ting things in order.”
Berle took that as an opening to ask Vargas to look at a draft of a speech
he planned to give about the situation. After reading it, Vargas asked one
question: “whether this meant we were opposed to a Constituinte.” “I
told him certainly not … Our fear was lest the hotheads would defeat the
policy he had so wisely and brilliantly worked out during the last year.”
They parted pleasantly. Berle summarized his reaction saying: “I got the
sense of a tired, sincere man struggling with many forces, no longer anx-
ious for great power, caught to some extent in the shackles of his past.”49
Berle had grasped the nature of the crisis. Vargas had set the date of the
presidential election for December 2. The opposition party, the União
Democrática Nacional (UDN), had nominated Air Force Brigadier
Eduardo Gomes, and the government’s PSD had selected Army Minister
Eurico Dutra, which many saw as Vargas’s attempt to split the armed
forces. His good intentions aside, Ambassador Berle precipitated a crisis
by giving the speech the next day before the Sindicato de Jornalistas
(Journalists Union). Berle emphasized the interest of the United States in
Brazil’s re-democratization and confidence in Vargas to see the process
through. Getúlio had made a solemn promise to hold free elections and
the United States considered his word as “inviolable.” Raising the
Constituinte Berle declared that there was no conflict in holding elections
while taking measures to organize a constituent assembly “in the form the
people indicate.” The opposition press emphasized selected words to give
the impression that the ambassador meant the opposite of what he said. As
a result Vargas was livid and Góes suggested that he have him recalled,
indeed the foreign ministry protested strongly. British Ambassador Gainer
called the speech an explicit and flagrant intervention in internal Brazilian
affairs.50 But there are some peculiar inconsistencies in all this. Some his-
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    239

torians have written—for example, Hilton and Neto—that Vargas read the
text, while the CPDOC account has Berle reading it to Vargas. Góes
Monteiro’s comments have Berle reading the text aloud, which Góes said
Vargas had difficulty understanding. Moreover, Berle and Vargas each said
the other had requested the meeting.51
On October 10, when Vargas moved the state-level elections, which
had been scheduled for May, to occur simultaneously with the presidential
one, the opposition cried foul. They suspected Getúlio’s every move as
related to a plot to stay in power. The ghost of the coup of 1937 hung
over everything Vargas said or did not say, everything he did or did not do.
It is not known if he wanted to keep power or not, nor if his actions were
geared to staying in office, as he said, only until elections allowed him to
pass the presidential sash to his successor. There was too much distrust,
misunderstanding, and suspicion for unemotional rational thought. His
opponents simply wanted him gone, his allies Góes Monteiro and Dutra
now had their own reputations to save and goals to achieve. Vargas’s seem-
ingly straightforward gesture in replacing the federal district’s chief of
police set off the explosion of coup d’état. What Stanley Hilton labeled
“The Unnecessary Golpe” of October 29 set the tone for the post-war era
and eventually contributed to the military regime of 1964–1985.52 Its
perpetrators envisioned deposing Vargas as “restoring” democracy and
redeeming the military for supporting the Estado Novo.
Dutra would win the elections and become a rather lackluster president
who gained little popularity. Worse his years in office were “a return to the
Estado Novo’s style of industrial relations.” The 1946 Constitution was
not the guidebook for a democratic society but rather a continuation of
the Estado Novo’s “corporatist control over labor.”53
The difficulty was that the role of the Communist Party in Brazilian
unions was significant enough to allow the government to mask labor
repression behind a façade of combatting communism. The repression was
not limited to workers, but was also aimed at the military, the diplomatic
corps, and government employees.54 Such repression was not seen from
abroad as limiting citizens’ rights but as protecting Brazil from the Russian
bear. As long as Dutra was cooperative about allowing American investors
free rein, Washington did not concern itself with the realities of his
government.55
Somewhere in Góes’s mind, he may have felt that his long-time ambi-
tion of achieving the presidency himself was slipping beyond reach. He
had turned aside Getúlio’s suggestion that he should succeed him. He
240   F. D. MCCANN

truly wanted to reform and strengthen the army, which desire constantly
conflicted with his recurrent presidential fantasies. His tendency of talking
too much and drinking too much diminished his ability to accomplish his
own ideas. Throughout the 1930s each time those fantasies took hold,
they faded quickly and he contritely renewed his partnership with Getúlio.
1945 proved different because the very idea of dictatorship was in decline,
and, moreover, the power balance had tipped toward the now better
armed, equipped, and organized army. The Lend-Lease tanks were used in
the coup to control the streets and to directly threaten Vargas. Seemingly
Góes and the other generals no longer needed Vargas.56 But considering
that the deposition of Vargas took place in a matter of hours and was
ostensibly caused by the president’s appointment of his brother Benjamin
as the capital’s police chief, it should have raised deeper doubts in the
minds of historians. It was Benjamin who had called his brother’s atten-
tion to Eurico Dutra’s command abilities during the suppression of the
1932 Paulista uprising. Certainly the younger Vargas had a streak of
unpredictable behavior, but would he have been able to keep his brother
in power? Vargas did not create the dictatorship alone, it would not have
happened without Dutra and Góes. Brazilian historiography has often
portrayed Vargas as the scheming dictator who fell before the winds of
democracy. That portrayal transforms General Dutra, who had been the
mainstay of the Estado Novo, into the bearer of democratic, constitutional
government. Yet the Dutra years were not an experiment in democracy,
but more accurately a political closing or perhaps a veiled continuation of
the Estado Novo in more acceptable dress.
It was not a surprise that the formal Estado Novo was at an end in 1945.
In retrospect it is doubtful that Getúlio intended the regime to continue.
He never held the plebiscite that would have ratified the constitution of
1937, he refused to create a party or a youth movement to support the
regime, and he knew, as the country did not, that the regime has its ori-
gins in the agreement that he, Dutra, and Góes Monteiro [these two
speaking for the army’s generals] had made in 1937 to close down the
existing political system so that they could arm and industrialize Brazil.
The decision to close the system based on the 1934 constitution had
been, in the first instance, a military one, made by the senior generals,
who preferred to act with Vargas at their head than risk possible rivalries
among themselves. But they were determined to act with or without
Vargas. Given Getúlio’s political style as far back to his governorship in
Rio Grande do Sul, it is unlikely that he would have tried to create the
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    241

Estado Novo on his own. In effect, however, by the war’s end, he was left
as the sole parent of the dictatorship, while the generals minimized the
importance of their roles.
Vargas had committed himself to arming and equipping the military
and building a national steel complex in return for military support in
prolonging his presidency with dictatorial powers that would eliminate
politics and regionalism. The public implementation of this arrangement
proceeded in the hesitant, indirect way in which Getúlio usually
maneuvered.
The signals that he flashed were certainly mixed. It is most common for
historians to see his contradictory moves as deliberate diversions intended
to confuse. It is more likely, however, recalling his hesitant behavior in
1930, that such moves really indicated his indecision and caution. Set
against the creation of the Estado Novo in 1937, the events of October
1945 suggest that Getúlio was left holding the bag of responsibility.
The Dutra government’s continuance of the wartime alignment with
the United States did not bring any more benefits than the wartime alli-
ance had already secured. Because Brazil’s status during the war was dif-
ferent from that of its neighbors, Brazilian leaders then and since have
expected the great powers to accept the country into their councils. They
have often been disappointed when the powers, especially the United
States, did not accord proper recognition of Brazil’s status. Policy makers
in foreign capitals, in particular Washington, have frequently been puzzled
by, what they considered to be, the Brazilians’ pretensions. Their perplex-
ity was perhaps feigned at times, because such recognition was not in har-
mony with their own policy objectives, but it is likely that many of them
were, like the world at large, ignorant of the history of Brazil’s wartime
roles. Those roles had been often secret or were lost.

Notes
1. I applied for access to the military records in 1963; it took a year for the
army to give me a “top secret” clearance to do research, and it took another
year for the army to return my “censored” notes.
2. Edward R.  Stettinius to Certain Diplomatic Representatives in the
American Republics, Washington, August 1, 1944, 810.20 Defense/8–144,
as in FRUS, 1944, Vol. VII, pp. 105–106.
3. Cordell Hull to William D.  Leahy, Washington, August 24, 1944,
810.24/5–3044, as in FRUS, 1944, Vol. VII, p. 115.
242   F. D. MCCANN

4. The three Brazilian armed forces ministers, the chiefs of staff, the foreign
minister, Admiral Jonas Ingram of the 4th Fleet, the commander of the 6th
Air Force in the Canal Zone, and other officers were present. Chargé
Donnelly, Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1944, 810.20 Defense/10–1044:
Telegram as in FRUS, 1944, Vol. VII, pp. 123–125. The possibility of staff
conversations was raised with President Vargas on July 10, 1944; see
Caffery’s memo of that date in ibid. p. 125. It spoke of an agreement to
guarantee collaboration in case of aggression against either country and
that the United States would “obligate itself to furnish war material to
Brazil” under an agreement that would “be substituted for the present
Lend-Lease agreement.” Similar conversations had taken place in the
much tenser time near the end of 1940.
5. Interestingly the instructions for the American officers who participated
were sent out in January 1945 and involved some 16 countries. See notes
to “Discussions Regarding Military and Naval Cooperation between the
United States and Brazil,” FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, p. 600. The army paper
was signed on March 31, 1945, the air force one on April 12, 1945, and
the naval one on April 15, 1945.
6. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No. 2186, 810.20
Defense/7–2645 as in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, pp. 600–606 ff. Here Berle
analyzed the naval staff conversations document in considerable detail; the
same day he did the same with the army document (pp. 606–614) and the
next day discussed the air force one (pp. 614–620).
7. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary of State, Rio, July 26, 1945, No. 2187, 810.20
Defense/7–2645 as in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, p. 607. Argentina was then a
concern. Thanks to the proposed program, Berle said that “Brazil will be
able, granted the power of organization, to put an Army into the field
larger than any South American state, and possibly larger than any combi-
nation of them.”
8. See Berle’s comment in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, pp. 602–603. Poor Brazilian
maintenance of war materials transferred by the United States was fre-
quently commented upon by Americans. Often this was done to criticize
future transfers. Oddly, World War II vehicles and ships were in service in
Brazil for decades indicating a high level of maintenance. In May 1965 I
visited the navy base at Recife and found the machine shops using equip-
ment left behind when the Americans withdrew.
9. Ibid, p. 603.
10. “U.S. Navy to Give Vessels to Brazil,” The New York Times, July 5, 1945,
p. 3; and “Brazil Takes Over Bases Tomorrow,” The New York Times, July
7, 1945, p. 6.
11. Berle called it “unauthorized” and “very unfortunate” FRUS 1945, IX,
p. 606. He noted that Ingram was then “a Brazilian hero for having prom-
ised the Brazilians a Navy free of charge.” Oddly Berle inflated Ingram’s
actual comments.
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    243

12. Berle as in note 20 above, FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, p. 606.

13. Ibid, pp. 610–611.
14. The increase in aircraft would include as well 57 light bombers to 60, 41
medium bombers to 120, 12 heavy bombers from none to 12 (1948), 9
transports to 150, and 21 patrol planes to 60. Adolf A. Berle to Secretary
of State, Rio, July 27, 1945, No. 2196, 810.20 Defense/7–2745 as in
FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, p. 615.
The memorandum produced by the staff conversations was entitled
“Missions and Plans of the Brazilian Air Force,” Rio de Janeiro, April 12,
1945.
15. Ibid, 615.
16. “José Bina Machado,” biographical sketch in Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves
de Abreu, eds., Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983, Vol.
3, p.  1981. To make things slightly confusing, his brother João Bina
Machado was an army officer at the same time; see ibid. p. 1980.
17. Daniels (Chargé), Rio de Janeiro, December 28, 1945, 711.32/12–2845:
Telegram, as in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX, pp. 620–622.
18. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12–
2925: Telegram, as in ibid., pp. 622–623. He did not identify the “certain
elements.”
19. Back on June 12, 1945, President Truman, in a meeting with Ambassador
Berle and Acting Secretary Grew, told Berle that “he was more anxious to
have good relations with Brazil than any other country in Latin America.”
Joseph C.  Grew, Memorandum of Conversation, June 13, 1945,
711.32/6–1345, RG 59, NARA.  It is noteworthy that Grew shared
Truman’s statement with 26 American missions in Europe, the Middle
East, and Canada, but none in Latin America; see Grew, Circular Air gram,
June 27, 1945, 711.32/6–2745, RG 59, NARA.
20. The senior American officer in Rio de Janeiro summarized “Brazil’s contri-
bution, in the present conflict, to Hemisphere Defense (sic), in order of
importance: Air Bases in Northeast Brazil; strategic materials; troops for
overseas combat; naval and air assistance in anti-submarine warfare; and
neutralization of Axis activities. To these should be added the moral value
of having one South American country actively participating in the war
against the Axis powers.” BG Hayes Kroner, Rio de Janeiro, May 18,
1945, “Notes on “THE PRESENT AND FUTURE POSITION OF
BRAZIL (Sic),” OPD 336 Brazil, RG165, Modern Military Branch,
NARA.
21. For a summary of newspaper reactions, A Noite (João Pessôa, Paraiba),
Domingo, April 15, 1945, p.  12. http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/
Hotpage/HotpageBN.aspx?bib=348970_04&pagfis=33235&url=
http://memoria.bn.br/docreader#.
244   F. D. MCCANN

22. Getúlio Vargas, A Nova Política do Brasil: O Brasil na Guerra Vol. XI (Rio
de Janeiro: José Olympio, 1947), p.  163. The expression in Portuguese
was very warm: “tão amigo que chegou a ser considerado por todos nós
um nome quase nacional.”
23. Ibid. Kroner admitted frankly that the pro-Brazil policy he recommended
would reduce Argentina “to the relative power of Mexico or Canada.” But
by way of justifying his view observed that “the attitude of Argentina dur-
ing this war has demonstrated clearly that what the United States needs
and must have, is, definitely, one strong friend in South America.”
(Emphasis was in original.)
24. MG Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, June 1, 1945
and BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington,
June 6, 1945, OPD 336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General
and Special Staffs, MMB, NARA.
25. MG J.E. Hull, Asst. Chief of Staff, OPD, Washington, June 9, 1945, OPD
336 Brazil, Section IV, RG 165, Records WD General and Special Staffs,
MMB, NARA. This document was initialed as “Noted” by the army chief
of staff on June 12, 1945. For a study of the broader debates then in prog-
ress, see Sonny B.  Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States
Military Relations, 1945–1977 (Niwot, Colorado: University Press of
Colorado, 1996), pp.  43–54. Davis commented (p.  51) that “The JCS
members suffered from myopia” and that “U.S. leaders saw Brazil- U.S.
ties as episodic.”
26. Julius H.  Amberg (Special Asst. to Secretary of War) to Hugh Fulton
(Chief Counsel, Truman Committee), Washington, August 13, 1943, Tab
A, OPD 580.82 Brazil (3-30-42), MMB, NARA.
27. For example, Leslie Bethell’s well-done study of the post war stressed
internal politics: “Brazil,” in Leslie Bethell & Ian Roxborough, eds. Latin
America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944–1948
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 33–65.
28. J.B. Mascarenhas de Morais to General Eurico Dutra, Italia, 27 Feb 1945,
Oficio No. 90: Tropa de ocupação (ponderação), Pasta FEB 1945, Arquivo
Histórico do Exército (Rio). He said that no one had asked his opinion; he
just wanted to give Dutra his “personal and frank opinion.” He was “try-
ing to look ahead at the consequences and political advantages for Brazil
that could result from a measure that would have a purely policing charac-
ter.” What had provoked Mascarenhas to send his views to Dutra is not
clear, but it indicates that the future occupation was being discussed. It is
notable that this letter was written after the Brazilian victory at Monte
Castello, when his confidence would likely have been very high.
29. He did not understand that the American army had to account for all its
expenditures, but all the accounting did not mean that Brazil would be
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    245

handed a bill at the end of the war. It is a shame that he did not understand
how the Lend-Lease system worked. Floriano de Lima Brayner, A Verdade
Sobre a FEB: Memórias de um chefe de estado-maior na campanha da Itália,
1943–1945 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1968), pp. 511–
513. He described the American attitude as one of “ingratitude”
[ingratidão].
30. There are many documents on adjusting the Lend-Lease agreement; see,
for example, MG J. E. Hull (ACS, OPD) Memo for Commanding General,
Army Services Forces, Washington, April 5, 1945, OPD 336.2 Brazil,
Section IV, Cases 56–84, MMB, NARA.
31. John W. F. Dulles, Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President
(College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), pp.  167–168.
Castello thought that if the Allies abandoned Italy, “it will catch fire and,
moreover, Nazi-fascism will resurge a little from the ashes….” But he
admitted to his wife that “I am saturated with all this and it is high time to
return.”
32. The 1945 and 1946 Relatórios (annual reports) of the Minister of War are
missing from the Arquivo Histórico do Exército (Rio de Janeiro). Dutra
considered them to be so secret that he ordered them held in a special
archive in his office. Even though, in 2010, the army commander ordered
a search for the Relatórios, they continue to be missing.
33. Pracinhas was what the FEB soldiers were called. Ambassador Vasco com-
mented that “A razão de ser da FEB foi mais política que militar. Foi uma
confirmação com sangue da nossa aliança com os Estados Unidos. E foi
uma confirmação para os Aliados da nossa posição antinazista e antifas-
cista.” … E nós não soubemos aproveitar essa vantagem, ficamos com fofo-
quinhas, coisas de somenos, quando tínhamos um aliado natural. Ficamos
de pé atrás com os Estados Unidos. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Diplomacia
em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV,
2003), pp.  104–106. CPDOC (Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de
História Contemporânea do Brasil) holds a large number of personal
archives, carries on historical research, and has an academic program,
located in the Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro.
34. See Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 44–45.
35. “Brazil Pledges Aid for War in Pacific,” The New York Times, May 9, 1945,
p. 16.
36. “GI’s on Italian Front Go Direct to Pacific,” The New York Times, May 10,
1945, p. 17.
37. Eugênio V. Garcia, “De como o Brasil quase se tornou membro perman-
ente do Conselho de Segurança de ONU em 1945,” Revista Brasileira de
Política Internacional, Vol. 54 No. 1 (Brasília 2011) http://www.scielo.
br/scielo.php?pid=S0034-73292011000100010&script=sci_arttext.
246   F. D. MCCANN

38. Correspondence relative to San Francisco Conference, GV 45.04.30,

Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Rio.
39. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C.  Grew to Chargé Daniels (Rio),
Washington, June 6, 1945, 740.0011 P.W. /6–145: Telegram; and Acting
Minister of Foreign Affairs Macedo Soares to Secretary of State, Rio de
Janeiro, June 6, 1945,740.0011 P.W./6–645 as in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX,
pp. 627–627.
40. Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Ambassador Berle, Washington,
June 6, 1945, 740.0011 Pacific War/6–645 as in FRUS, 1945, Vol. IX,
p. 628. This contains text of Truman’s telegram to Vargas.
41. For excellent studies of Japanese immigration, see Kozy K.  Amemiya,
“Being Japanese in Brazil and Okinawa,” Japan Policy Research Institute
Occasional Paper No. 13, May 1998: http//www.jpri.org/publications/
occasionalpapers/op13.htm; and Marcia Yumi Takeuchi, O Perigo
Amarelo: imagens do mito, realidade do preconceito, 1920–1945 (São Paulo:
Associação Editorial Humanista, 2005).
42. See Fábio Koifman and Humberto Manabu Oda, “A declaração brasileira
de guerra ao Japão,” XXVII Simposio Nacional de História, Associação
Nacional de História, Natal, RN, (22–26 Julho 2013), pp. 6–8.
43. Byrnes to Chargé Daniels, Washington, December 31, 1945, 711.32/12–
2925: Telegram, as in FRUS, 1945, IX, pp. 622–623.
44. See meeting of September 28.“Resumo das Reuniões de Generais realiza-
das no edificio do Ministerio da Guerra, em Agosto, Setembro e Outubro
de 1945; Acervo Pessoal General Góes, Caixa 11, Arquivo Histórico do
Exército, Rio de Janeiro. The placards calling for a constitutional conven-
tion (Constituinte) held aloft during the Independence Day (September 7)
celebration in Rio’s Vasco da Gama stadium troubled Góes Monteiro.
45. Quoted in Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in
Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 102–103.
46. Mariano Magalhães, “Civil-Military Relations in Brazil and the Coup of
1945: The Application of a New Model to Explain Military Behavior,”
Delaware Review of Latin American Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (August 15,
2002), pp. 16–17. http://www.udel.edu/LASP/Vol3-2Magalhaes.html.
47. Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Its Growth and Development
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Publishing, 1979), pp. 38–45.
48. Referred to as the Chicago Convention, the multilateral agreement’s offi-
cial name was the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
49. Adolf A.  Berle, Memorandum of Conversation (with President Vargas),
Rio de Janeiro, October 1, 1945, President’s Secretary’s File, Foreign
Affairs – Brazil, Box 171, Harry S Truman Library. This memo was declas-
sified in 1976.
   POST-WORLD WAR DISAPPOINTMENT    247

50. Stanley E. Hilton, Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle,
Jr. E a Queda do Estado Novo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987),
pp. 90–95. Lira Neto, Getúlio: Do governo provisório à ditadura do Estado
Novo (1930–1945) (São Paulo: Companhis das Letras, 2013), pp.  476–
477. CPDOC biographical sketch of Adolf A. Berle http://www.fgv.br/
cpdoc/acervo/dicionarios/verbete-biografico/adolf-augustus-berle-
junior.
51. Lourival Coutinho, O General Góes Depõe... (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria
Editora Coelho Branco, 1956), pp.  430–432. The general asserted that
there was no American involvement in Getúlio’s deposition.
52. Stanley E. Hilton, “The Overthrow of Getúlio Vargas in 1945: Diplomatic
Intervention, Defense of Democracy, or Political Retribution?” Hispanic
American Historical Review, Vol. 67, No.1 (Feb. 1987), pp. 1–37. Hilton’s
study is best documented.
53. Joel Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men: São Paulo and the Rise of
Brazil’s Industrial Working Class, 1900–1955 (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1993), p. 158.
54. For a study of repression in the military, see Shawn C. Smallman, Fear and
Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889–1954 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
55. Frank D. McCann, “Commentary for Dialogos,” Diálogos, Vol. 6 (2002)
pp. 61–66. www.dialogos.uem.br (241-707-1-PDF).
56. On the evolution of the relations between Vargas and the military, see José
Murilo de Carvalho, Forças Armadas e Política no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro:
Jorge Zahar Editor, 2005), pp.  102–117. The complicated story of the
deposition of Vargas is documented in Hélio Silva, 1945: Porque depuseram
Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1976).
 CHAPTER 8

Cold Wind from the East

When peace turned into tension and then into harsh relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union, the Brazilian military easily adhered
to the Cold War; after all, they had confronted the Communist menace
head on in 19351 and thus were willing to back the Americans against the
Russians. That willingness would have negative long-term results in the
extreme military intervention from 1964 to 1985. More immediately, at
the world war’s end, the US Army’s plans for Latin America aimed at stan-
dardizing arms, equipment, and training. Military planners envisioned a
multimillion-dollar aid program that would integrate the region’s armies
and would stimulate broad development of its societies. Such thinking
relied on the continuation of the wartime levels of funding. The US
Congress wanted to reduce spending and had little interest in Latin
American economic and military development. The perception of
American civilian leaders was that Brazil, indeed, Latin America, was safe
from the communist threat and that Washington should focus on the hot
spots. It soon became clear to Brazilian leaders that Brazil would not
receive the extensive economic development assistance that they had been
led to expect for wartime support.
American policies and Brazilian expectations proceeded at odds. The
Americans wanted to continue using their wartime bases. The commander
of the US Army Air Forces in the South Atlantic, Major General Robert
L. Walsh, thought that “the problem of post-war use … can no longer be

© The Author(s) 2018 249

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1_8
250   F. D. MCCANN

avoided” to insure that “a fair return is achieved by both Brazil and our
own government.” After the war, he believed that the bases would become
“without doubt vital links in the transoceanic airline operation[s]. They
are a part of the only all-weather year-round important transoceanic route
from the Western Hemisphere to Europe and Africa. It is also part of the
East Coast route between North and South America.” He pointed out
that “relations between the two nations have never been at a more friendly
stage than right now.”2 Commenting on Walsh’s ideas, Robert A. Lovett,
assistant secretary of war for air, warned: “Frankly we better take advan-
tage of every favorable situation to now arrange things for the post-war
period. This is our last chance before the others start to work.” He advised
that joint control “might be more acceptable if the US committed itself to
train Brazilian personnel with a view to putting them in a position at as
early a date as possible to maintain and operate their own fields and the
technical services that are of such particular importance in connection
with the transoceanic flights.”3 The War Department considered it a “very
high priority” to obtain continued use of bases at Amapá, Belém, São
Luiz, Fortaleza, Natal, and Recife. In January 1944 Roosevelt had asked
the State Department “as a matter of high priority” to initiate negotiations
regarding future usage. If it was not possible to obtain ownership or long-­
term lease of such bases, the president suggested exploring whether Brazil
would be willing to allow US military aircraft use of the bases and that the
two air forces “for a stated period of time” jointly control, operate, and
maintain them. “Such an arrangement,” he stated, “would be of great
value to our post-war defenses.”4
Despite the millions of dollars that the United States spent in building
the air bases, it never challenged Brazilian ownership of the facilities.
Brazilian air force officers were not interested in the sort of joint control
that the Americans proposed, “they wanted to gain control of [the] bases
without it.”5 Those officers led by Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes wanted to
prevent Pan American Airways and its subsidiary Panair do Brasil from
getting sway over the airfields that they had been so instrumental in estab-
lishing. Gomes especially long harbored a dislike of PAA and Panair. He
would be the key man in destroying Panair in 1964 when he became
aeronautics minister. For decades after the war, the Brazilian air force
would control Brazil’s airfields and its civil aviation.
Although the two governments negotiated an agreement to allow a
ten-year period of use by American forces, the growing opposition to the
Vargas government also objected to the “continued occupation of Brazilian
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    251

soil by foreign troops.” In mid-April 1945, the senior US commander in

Brazil, Major General Ralph H. Wooten, advised the War Department that
it was “not deemed advisable to proceed with preparation of plans for put-
ting this joint agreement into effect ….” The end of American bases in
Brazil was in sight.6
The prospects had been bright back in February 1944 when President
Roosevelt suggested a joint Brazilian-American air base in either West
Africa or in the Cape Verde Islands and Vargas had said that “he would
gladly participate” in such a venture. It should be said that the United
States did not have any rights to such bases, and so the offer to Vargas was
being made on a “if and when” basis.7 It is likely that this joint base idea
provoked him to say to Ambassador Caffery: “Well, you may tell President
Roosevelt that I am willing to make an agreement with you permitting
some sort of continuing military use of those fields [in the northeast].”8 In
conversations with Caffery, Vargas repeatedly sought assurances of sup-
port in case Argentina attacked, and the Americans understood that they
had to “at least go through motions sympathetic to Vargas’ desires” if they
wanted to conclude an agreement on the use of the bases. Throughout the
resulting secret negotiations, there was concern by those involved about
opposition from Brazilian air force officers, who were suspicious of
American intentions.9 All of the foregoing unraveled when Aranha,
Roosevelt, and then Vargas were no longer managing the relationship.
Before Aranha was forced to resign in August 1944, Secretary Hull had
written asking if he could come to Washington in mid-August to discuss
the future of relations and Brazil’s role in the security organization of the
post-war world. Perhaps his inability to make the trip negatively affected
Brazil’s role in that world?10
At the same time, Washington’s policy, as expressed in the 1945
Chapultepec resolution, called for equal treatment for all Latin American
countries.11 Washington seemed to want both a strong bilateral relation-
ship with Brazil and a multilateral relationship with all of Latin America.
This contradiction resulted from a deep divide in the American govern-
ment between the State Department, which favored multilateralism, and
the War Department that was more, if not completely, inclined toward a
bilateral relationship with Brazil. As a result, the messages the Brazilians
received from Americans were often confusing. The negative position in
the army was succinctly expressed by Brigadier General John Weckerling
of the general staff’s intelligence section, rejecting a more favorable status
for Brazil in arms supply to Latin America; he declared:
252   F. D. MCCANN

One of the main purposes of [the arms supply policy] is to prevent European
powers from providing arms and military missions to Latin American repub-
lics. Should Brazil alone receive large amounts of arms it is likely that the
others would turn to Europe, especially Argentina, Chile and Peru.12

Although Brazil, particularly its military, wanted close friendship with

the United States, the Brazilian attitude was not subservient, the Brazilians
wanted a relationship of equals that enhanced rather than diminished their
nationalism. In 1948 the new CIA correctly warned that in any choice
between cooperation and national sovereignty, the Brazilian leadership
would follow an independent course. Washington “should not assume
Brazil would make concessions incompatible with its national goals.”13
After the war the United States did not provide the arms the Brazilians
expected, and, more worrisome from the perspective of Rio de Janeiro, it
sought a rapprochement with Argentina. This aspect of American multi-
lateralism deeply disturbed the Brazilians who still had a third of their mili-
tary forces permanently arrayed in defensive positions in the south against
a long-expected Argentine invasion. Brazilian strategic planning was based
on the premise of war with Argentina.14 In 1947 they were somewhat
mollified by the arrival of enough “surplus” American equipment to outfit
a division of infantry and an airborne combat team. But surplus items were
not new and recalled the used French equipment they had obtained after
World War I. The Brazilians felt inferior and had a sense that somehow
they were being cheated. This was especially so because the Truman
administration was working hard to prevent the Brazilian Congress from
passing laws that would shut out foreign participation in Brazilian petro-
leum development. Most of the American pressure came from the State
Department, but that did not prevent Brazilian officers from feeling
distrustful.
The Pentagon regarded Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela as the Latin
American countries whose interests appeared “to be most closely allied to
the U.S. national interest or which for other reasons should be granted the
highest priority of training assistance.” The basic idea was that “training
and education were tools for maintaining influence.”15 Not surprisingly,
the Pentagon was enthusiastic about helping the Brazilians create their
new Escola Superior de Guerra, loosely modeled on the American “National
War College,” to prepare their military and civilian elites in finding solu-
tions for Brazil’s development problems.16
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    253

While the American government, at the level of the presidency, always

said soothing words of friendship, beyond the White House its actions
gave the impression of hardness vis-à-vis Brazilian development, indeed
American officials had little interest in or knowledge of Latin America, let
alone Brazil. George F. Kennan, then in the State Department, who would
be influential in shaping the policy of containment of the Soviet Union,
saw the region’s racially mixed populations as “unhappy and hopeless,”
and he judged Brazil by the “noisy, wildly competitive traffic” in Rio de
Janeiro and was repulsed by the “unbelievable contrasts between luxury
and poverty.”17 He viewed the region as insignificant: “we have really no
vital interests in that part of the world” and should “not be greatly con-
cerned for their opinion of us.”18 Of course, he had spent all of a month
in the region and was ignorant of its languages and histories.
Kennan’s 1950 report on the region was shelved and did not influence
Washington’s policies toward Latin America.19 But his attitudes were not
far removed from those of other officials who used more diplomatic
language.

Petroleum Development and Korean War

Oil was a central issue that was viewed differently in the two countries.
The United States’ position was that Brazil should allow American com-
panies to search for, develop, and basically to own the resulting oil. Free
trade and free investment were the American mantras of the era. The
Brazilian military was divided as to the best way to develop the crucial
resource. Some absolutely opposed foreign corporate involvement, while
others thought that foreign money and know-how were necessary. The
resulting argument within the armed forces weakened and delayed the
development of a concerted national policy.
Most senior Brazilian officers had come out of the 1930s with broad
and ill-formed ideas about Brazilian politics. The lack of organized parties
during the Estado Novo had left opinion-makers thrashing about for ideas
on how the now strengthened Brazilian state should best function. After
the Estado Novo collapsed, some hoped to undo the Vargas legacy, others
wanted to build upon it, some wanted to follow a strictly nationalist devel-
opment line, others wanted an economy and society open to foreign
investment, ideas, and participation, but openness was hotly debated. The
uncertainty was not eliminated by the post-war parties, but heightened by
their overly partisan approaches. Moderation and compromise were often
254   F. D. MCCANN

the victims in the political arguments and debates of those years. Often
debates on, for example, investment in petroleum development were cover
for desires for revenge over some aspect or injury of the Vargas years.20
The division of military opinion regarding oil development was
embroiled further by the outbreak of war in Korea. Those officers who
opposed American involvement in petroleum tended to blame the United
States for the Korean crisis and, hence, opposed any suggestion that Brazil
should send troops. The lack of American economic assistance since World
War II and a sense of unfulfilled wartime promises were the backdrop for
a heated debate over Korea. Anti-American sentiment was notable and
growing. Ardent pro-American Foreign Minister João Neves da Fontoura
believed that Brazil should not make the mistake it had in 1942 by going
to war without guarantees that it would benefit. Naturally Brazil would
cooperate with the United States, but the cooperation should be recipro-
cal; after all a modern, functional Brazil would be a bulwark for the defense
of the United States. During the world war, American analysts, such as the
Cooke Mission, had recommended massive investments in infrastructure
to allow more exports and expansion of the Brazilian internal market. The
mission reasoned that trade increased between rich nations, not between
rich and poor ones, and so creation of a prosperous Brazil was in the
national interest of the United States. The objective should be to build up
the purchasing power of Brazilians.21 The Brazilian press heralded such
views as prelude to the dawning of a new era for the country hand in hand
with their American allies. It was a euphoric rising of expectations.22
Encouraging belief that industrialization, education, housing, electrifica-
tion, and trade would be the results of allied victory appeared to have been
a ploy to hold Brazil at the side of the United States. Post-war requests for
assistance were sidelined; for example, in 1946 when Brazil requested
$200 million in loans or grants to build and modernize its railways,
Washington’s bureaucracies could not agree, and the cold response con-
fused and disillusioned Brazilian officials.23 Americans were more inter-
ested in rebuilding their defeated enemies than in helping their friends,
which may have been economically logical but it cut deeply. Even worse,
the Americans were too willing to treat Argentina as equal to Brazil in
distributing war surplus arms and equipment. Juan Perón’s unrepentant
German partisanship was seemingly unimportant.24
Since 1945 Washington had not cooperated with Brazil, during the
Dutra government it had not given (loaned) a cent to Brazil nor to the
rest of Latin America. However, on the surface relations appeared quite
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    255

friendly and positive, Truman went to Rio for the closing of the Inter-­
American Conference that produced the Inter-American Reciprocal
Assistance Treaty (commonly called the Rio Treaty) in 1947, and Dutra
repaid the honor with a 12-day visit to the United States in September
1949. Because Dutra was the first Brazilian head of state to visit the
United States since Emperor Pedro II in 1876, this should have been a
remarkably important event. It seemed that the Americans would support
Brazilian economic development. The so-called Abbink Mission
(1947–1948) updated the wartime Cooke Mission’s recommendations
with yet another diagnosis of Brazilian necessities.25 Dutra told the
Brazilian Congress that Truman had emphasized that the United States
was interested in collaborating in Brazil’s economic development and
social progress. And he noted that the two governments would soon be
negotiating a treaty to stimulate American investment in Brazil.26 But it
did not turn out that way.
The elections of October 3, 1950, returned former dictator Getúlio
Vargas to the presidency. Vargas was not the same as he had been when
overthrown in 1945. He was the wartime ally and understood the benefits
of close ties with the United States. But he also understood that American
promises, real and implied, were not always fulfilled. And he nursed a
gnawing wound from Ambassador Berle’s misconstrued interventionist
role in his unseating in 1945. Also, he had less mental and physical energy
to deal with a hugely complicated political scene with many more turbulent
actors and issues than had been the case earlier. The task of creating a sup-
portive legislative coalition was not in his skillset. He wanted to continue
Brazil on the road to national development. He was particularly desirous of
creating a program of planned industrialization by means of government
intervention exercised in such fashion so as not to alarm private initiative
but to attract it and foreign investment as partners in the economic devel-
opment of the country.27 Truman gave the impression of favoring support
of such development efforts by sending as his representative to Getúlio’s
inauguration, Nelson Rockefeller, head of the American government’s
International Development Advisory Board, charged with implementing a
program of technical assistance for Latin America. A year earlier, while
Dutra was president, the two countries had agreed to form a bi-national
commission to organize establishment of basic industries and to end
Brazil’s status as a dependent nation simply exporting natural resources.
Rockefeller and Vargas discussed how to make the commission a reality.28
256   F. D. MCCANN

Now, with the crisis in the Far East, the United States wanted Latin
America to send troops to fight in Korea. The signing of an alliance
between China and the Soviet Union in February 1950 had caused
Washington to fear the spread of communism in Asia and to embrace the
idea that the world was again under threat. In June 1950, the North
Korean invasion of the south had made the threat all too real. Before
Washington spoke the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) waged a hotly
worded press campaign along with marches and demonstrations against
any Brazilian military participation. The armed forces could see advan-
tages and disadvantages and struggled to maintain unity in the face of
deeply felt emotional division.29 The unfulfilled American promises
weighed heavily on the side of staying out of it. Washington made repeated
overtures to Brazil to send an infantry division. In the first half of 1951,
the Brazilians did not quite say no, but they never said yes. In April
Truman made a direct appeal to Vargas for troops, saying that after nine
months of combat, the American forces needed relief and could only get
it if capable troops such as Brazil’s took their place.30 In June 1951, when
the secretary-general of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, requested
Brazilian troops, the Brazilian National Security Council discussed the
matter and decided the country could not afford the costs of organizing
and maintaining an expeditionary force in Asia, but it could furnish, in
return for military and financial aid, strategic materials for war industry,
including minerals related to producing atomic energy. The Americans
had offered to train Brazilian forces in Brazil and to pay for arms, equip-
ment, and transportation. Truman had written Vargas pleading that it
would be a “great help to the United Nations effort in Korea if Brazil
could send an Infantry Division….”31 The Truman administration sought
the Organization of American States (OAS) approval to invoke the recent
Rio Treaty, which would oblige the Latin Americans to enter the conflict.
But the Latin Americans pointed out that the treaty related to hemispheric
security and Korea was far away. Washington was beset by fear that the
fighting in Korea was preparation for a Soviet attack in Europe, but could
not convince the Latin Americans to adopt its worldview.32
It is worth noting that it was the Korean crisis that led the United States
to expand its facilities to train Latin American officers in hopes that their
countries might “respond increasingly to United Nations requests for
assistance in Korea.” Several Latin American countries had requested
training in joint staff planning and operations for their senior officers, and
because security restrictions, limited capacity, and language difficulties
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    257

made such training in existing installations impractical, the Joint Chiefs

took steps to create an appropriate school in the Canal Zone.33 That insti-
tution eventually became the infamous School of the Americas.
For Brazil the question of sending troops to Korea was intimately linked
to economic assistance. Even Oswaldo Aranha, who had been chiefly respon-
sible for the World War II alliance and who continued to be a major propo-
nent of “supporting the United States in the world in return for its support
of our political, economic and military preeminence in South America,” was
opposed to committing troops. To show solidarity with the Americans, he
suggested sending a division to Germany to free United States troops for
Korea.34 An important army general and commander of the FEB artillery in
Italy, Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, thought that the United States was in the
Korean War to “maintain its authority in the [Far East] region.”35
The Brazilians wanted assistance signed and delivered before they made a
decision about sending troops. General Pedro de Góes Monteiro36 was sent
to Washington with the goal of obtaining that type of agreement. But his
instructions specified delaying matters until the fighting ended or until
World War III broke out. The Brazilian government did not have domestic
political support for a war role; indeed, Vargas’s own party, the PTB, opposed
such a role, yet Vargas did not want to say no to the American request and
so delayed a response. Góes found that Brazilian prestige in Washington had
declined conspicuously and that there was uneasiness about the Vargas gov-
ernment. As a result he and the Americans talked past each other; even so the
Americans drafted the text of an agreement aimed at refurbishing the war-
time alliance. That draft was what Góes brought back to Rio de Janeiro.37

1952 Political-Military Accord

In the United States, the McCarthy anti-communist campaign was on,
and in Brazil’s suspicion of American “imperialism” infected politics and
discussions of foreign affairs. Calm and reason were often absent. Brazil
was still adjusting to electoral democracy after the many years of dictator-
ship and censorship. Remarkably, it was in this tense climate that the two
governments successfully negotiated a military accord along the lines of
their 1942 agreement. Its purpose was to keep the military alliance alive
by promising the supply of arms and training, but it muddied that intent
by committing Brazil to export monazite and radio-active sands to the
United States for its atomic program. Brazil was rich in uranium deposits
and very interested in developing atomic technology, which the Americans
258   F. D. MCCANN

blocked at every turn. It appeared that Washington wanted to obtain

Brazil’s minerals while keeping it underdeveloped. The heated debates in
the press agitated public opinion for and against the military accord and
contributed to a rising wave of anti-American sentiment. And many feared
that the war in Korea was a prelude to World War III.38 It took the Brazilian
Congress a year of fierce debates to approve the accord. The fallout from
obtaining approval was such that it forced the resignations of Foreign
Minister João Neves da Fontoura, who had favored its passage, and the
ousting of War Minister Newton Estillac Leal, who had opposed it. The
accord appeared to contradict Vargas’s efforts to protectively nationalize
key natural resources.39
Within the Brazilian army, this turmoil caused a wave of dismissals and
punishments of officers regarded as ultranationalists, who questioned con-
tinued close ties with the United States. This purge had the effect of mak-
ing Brazilian military opinion more homogenous and less questioning of
American motives. Petroleum continued as an irritant in relations because
Brazil’s requests for funds to develop it were met by the Eisenhower
administration’s insistence that the Brazilian government open its devel-
opment to private American investment. Potential American investors
attacked the Petrobras law as Communist-inspired. President Vargas
responded by denouncing investors’ intent to sabotage Brazilian develop-
ment. Political Scientist Ronald Schneider commented on those turbulent
years saying that “Polemics largely replaced dialogue as radicalizers on
both extremes played upon class interests and the tensions and insecurity
engendered by the process of modernization.”40
Brazilian politics, with the military actively participating, descended
into a struggle between nationalists and internationalists that was poorly
understood in a Washington infected with McCarthyism. Opposition to
American views was easily labeled as Communist. From the perspective of
the Brazilian government, Eisenhower was the creature of Wall Street.
Pro-American Oswaldo Aranha wrote Vargas that the Eisenhower admin-
istration would be a Republican and military government, with Wall Street
serving as the general staff. He predicted that “capitalism in power will not
respect limitations, especially those of international order.”41 With the
Americans insisting on private investment, which the Brazilian govern-
ment did not want to accept, Brazil would have to develop itself. On
October 3, 1953, the Brazilian Congress approved the Petrobras law
­placing petroleum development under state control. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles responded by reducing drastically the amount of an
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    259

already agreed upon loan from the Export-Import Bank. Considering that
55% of Brazilian trade was then with the United States, Dulles’s action was
as hurtful as it was ill-considered. Brazil responded with a decree limiting
the repatriation of profits of American firms operating in Brazil.
It should have been clear that “military” relations cannot be isolated
from the overall relations between countries. And in the Brazilian case,
military relations with the United States contributed negatively to the
political climate. In February 1954 Brazilian officers issued a manifesto
protesting low salaries and lack of proper arms and equipment and asserted
that there was a “crisis of authority” in the army. Vargas became even more
defensive against American trade controls and lack of development assis-
tance. In April he sent Congress the bill that created Electrobrás national-
izing the electric power grid, at the expense of Canadian and American
companies.42 Former Foreign Minister Neves da Fontoura turned up the
political heat with a press interview charging that Vargas had been negoti-
ating with Juan Perón to create an Argentine-Brazilian-Chilean alliance
against the United States. The reality of what Vargas had in mind was
complicated, but seemed to hold the possibility of increasing bargaining
power with Washington; even so it infuriated his enemies, who used it to
argue that he wanted to stay in power.43 Anti-Vargas plotting commenced
in the officer corps, especially in the air force. These political tensions
mixed with economic ones as wages could not keep pace with inflation,
credit demands outpaced availability, and currency exchange was unfavor-
able. At the time Brazil, heavily dependent on coffee exports, watched
demand in the American market fall as the Brazilian government tried to
keep the price above market levels.
Events in Brazil reached such a pass that a State Department official could
speculate about a possible coup d’état. Worse, he thought that a coup “would
not seriously affect our interests. The Army is conservative, anti-Communist
by a large majority, and would respect existing agreements. …It would be
unfortunate in principle… [though] our practical security objectives might
even be enhanced.”44
In a misguided attempt to help the beleaguered president, his bodyguard
organized a murder attempt of his most vociferous enemy, Carlos Lacerda,
but the shots missed their target and killed an accompanying air force offi-
cer. The resulting indignant reaction led to the military demanding Vargas’s
resignation, but ended in his dramatic suicide on August 24, 1954.45
260   F. D. MCCANN

Post-Vargas Era Relations

Vargas’s tragic death ushered in a decade that began with a political-­
military crisis over the outcome of the 1955 elections and then happily
entered a period of relative peace and achievement during the presidency
of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1960). Those years were marked by the
building of Brasília, massive road construction, the establishment of the
automotive industry, and the beginning of Brazil as an industrial power.
Throughout, Kubitschek was a major voice calling for serious American
investment in Latin American development that would eventually lead to
the Alliance for Progress in 1961. But Washington did not support
Brazilian industrialization, and American private enterprise gave it a cold
shoulder. Ford and General Motors refused to set up factories, and so
Volkswagen became the leading Brazilian automotive producer. The
United States actively undermined Brazilian efforts to create capability in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy.46 Brazilian leaders felt that they had
little choice but to turn to Germany for assistance in developing an atomic
capacity.
More positively, in 1956 the United States had negotiated placement of
a missile tracking station on Brazil’s Fernando de Noronha Island and
military radio stations in the northeast and expanded facilities for its
Military Air Transport System (MATS).47 Unfortunately, American offi-
cers injured Brazilian pride by asserting that Brazilians would have limited
and guarded access to such American stations. Equally irritating, as histo-
rian Sonny Davis observed, was the American failure “to acknowledge and
treat Brazil as more important than its Spanish-speaking neighbors.”48
United States Ambassador Ellis O.  Briggs argued that Brazil should be
treated as the “first friend and ally” in Latin America. He asserted that “we
should recognize [the] reality of Brazil’s emergence as [the] dominant
Latin American power” and should treat it as such.49 Briggs warned of
military dissatisfaction with the small size and slowness of arms transfers
and the tendency to give Brazil and its smaller South American neighbors
identical treatment. Brazil did not want to be treated the same as Uruguay
or Paraguay.
Kubitschek was dependent on the military for his government’s secu-
rity and so he was concerned that their needs be met. He was committed
to continuing Brazil’s traditional pro-United States foreign policy, but in
economic and military matters, he had to defer to the Congress and to the
armed forces, both of which were “highly sensitive to any development
which appears to infringe upon Brazilian sovereignty.”50
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    261

The Soviet Union’s success in launching Sputnik (October 4, 1957)

caused Brazilians to doubt the long-heralded technological preeminence
of the United States, and the space launch gave a certain prestige to com-
munism. Military critics of the traditional relationship asked what value it
had in a world where Soviet science was outpacing American science and
technology.
The White House woke up a bit when Vice President Richard Nixon
was received with hostility in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela in May
1958. The Eisenhower administration increased its military assistance to
Latin America but basically was opposed to development aid. Kubitschek
took advantage of Washington’s renewed focus on the region by asking
that the United States pledge $40 billion over the next 20 years to support
what he called “Operation Pan America,” which was to be a Marshall Plan
for Latin America.51 The American government received the idea coldly.
The Eisenhower years saw relations with Brazil in evident decline, along
with American prestige in all of Latin America.
Despite the foregoing, Eisenhower personally wanted to improve rela-
tions with Brazil and the rest of Latin America. He was fascinated by the
construction of Brasília as Brazil’s new capital. In February 1960 he flew
to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and then Uruguay receiving great public dis-
plays of welcome.52 Kubitschek was charmed and honored to be in the
presence of the distinguished war hero, but Eisenhower, although appalled
by the evident poverty in Brazil, was not moved to support JK’s position
that economic growth was the best way to combat communism.
Eisenhower could see that “the private and public capital which had flown
bounteously [emphasis added] into Latin America had failed to benefit the
masses….” Kubitschek argued that poverty and frustration had “far greater
capacity for stirring discontent” than did communists.53
The visit was marred by the collision over Rio’s bay of a Brazilian airliner
with an American plane carrying members of the US Navy band. The acci-
dent seemingly heightened empathy between the two presidents but noth-
ing more. A behind-the-scenes incident revealed American ignorance of
Brazilian history and culture. When embassy staff unwrapped Eisenhower’s
official gift for Kubitschek, they were aghast to see a Steuben Glass model
of the Wright Brothers’ Kitty Hawk. The Brazilians regarded their country-
man, Alberto Santos-Dumont, as the first to fly a ­heavier-­than-­air machine,
and so the Steuben Glass model would have been an affront.54 A replace-
ment gift was quickly sought.
262   F. D. MCCANN

Castro Era
Fidel Castro’s victory over Fulgencio Batista in Cuba in January of 1959
changed the relative importance of Latin America to Washington. The
ineptness of the Eisenhower administration helped radicalize the Castro
government and pushed it into the willing arms of Moscow. The Military
Review at the US Army’s Command and General Staff School began pub-
lishing articles on “unconventional warfare.” And to deal with the per-
ceived threat so close to the United States, the Eisenhower team embarked
on intense intervention. His 1960 trip to South America did not deter him
from authorizing the CIA to overthrow Castro. Washington’s nervous
attention to communists in Brazil soared to a whole new level. The gov-
ernment perceived Latin America as an undifferentiated mass. If it could
happen in Cuba, it could happen in Brazil.
The successor government of John F. Kennedy had better instincts but
succumbed to the anti-communist, anti-Castro wave. The new president
was fascinated by “unconventional warfare” and gave approval for the cre-
ation of the army’s green beret-adorned Special Forces. The official vision
of Latin America was distorted even more as the Kennedy administration
became convinced in 1961 that the Northeast of Brazil was about to erupt
into a vast Cuban-style revolution. In 1962 this “fear” was such in
Washington that the government gave funds to the enemies of Brazilian
President João Goulart to weaken his position.55
In 1962 understanding in Brazil of how American military assistance
functioned was so confused that officers on the president’s military staff
(Casa Militar) thought that Americans officials decided which Brazilian
units received American arms and equipment. Obviously that would be an
“interference of a foreign country in matters of our exclusive compe-
tence.” It is noteworthy that the chief of Brazil’s General Staff of the
Armed Forces (EMFA) felt compelled to write a long memo denying any
American involvement in the distribution of material.56 Clearly alliances
require considerable explanation to all involved.

1964 Coup and After: Dominican Republic

and Vietnam

The Brazilian political situation deteriorated steadily, and the military was
drawn intimately into plotting against President João Goulart. Suffice to
say that he and his government were tarnished with a communist and fel-
low traveler label. From the day he took over, after President Jânio
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    263

Quadros resigned in 1961, the American government paid close attention

and tried to foretell his views and actions. He made an extensive visit to
the United States in 1962, met twice with President Kennedy, and
addressed the Congress. He admired Kennedy and they got on well. But
he faced a difficult political situation in Brazil, where the opposition had
imposed a parliamentary system to weaken his power. On July 30, 1962,
Kennedy and his ambassador to Brazil, Professor Lincoln Gordon, wor-
ried that Goulart was being too tolerant of the left and feared the rise of
communism.57 In 1963 a plebiscite returned Brazil to a presidential sys-
tem with Goulart holding full executive powers. The US Embassy, espe-
cially the new Military Attaché Colonel Vernon Walters, followed currents
and plans within the officer corps. Walters had been liaison officer and
interpreter for FEB commander Mascarenhas and had been assistant atta-
ché (1945–1948) in Rio. He had easy access throughout the Brazilian
officer corps. The atmosphere of crisis recalled the memory of Vargas who
had been Goulart’s neighbor in Rio Grande do Sul and his political men-
tor; it also called up the 1945 solution, namely, another coup. As events
moved toward a breaking point, United States officials reportedly advised
Brazilian captains and majors that if the coup failed, they should get out of
Brazil and reassured them that the American government would support,
train, arm, and reinsert them to carry out a guerrilla war against the win-
ners. More directly Washington assembled a naval task force called
“Operation Brother Sam” with petroleum and arms in case the anti-­
Goulart forces needed them. As it turned out, Goulart’s people folded
immediately and Brother Sam steamed back north. Unhappily, President
Lyndon Johnson had the bad taste to recognize the new government
while Goulart was technically still president.58
A purely military coup d’état was not part of Brazilian political culture;
previous coups had been civilian-military mixes. This one was no different,
but the military had the guns. Army Chief of Staff Humberto de Alencar
Castello Branco had been a major player in the plotting and organizing
elite opinion. The various “revolutionary” factions could not agree on a
civilian politician to take the presidency, but a majority backed Castello
Branco.59 He had been the operations officer of the FEB in Italy and was
well regarded by the American military. He agreed to serve as president
only until the end of Goulart’s term of office, and he refused to institution-
alize the military’s hold on power. He wanted to reform the political-eco-
nomic system by restructuring the political parties and launching a land
reform program that was similar to Goulart’s. The situation was radicalized
264   F. D. MCCANN

by military hardliners seeking a complete cleansing of leftist and populist

influences and by civilian politicians delaying and obstructing Castello’s
reforms. The former pressed him to recess and purge the Congress, to
remove questionable state governors, and to decree the expansion of presi-
dential powers at the expense of the Congress and the courts. He restrained
the populist left, but in doing so created the basis for authoritarian rule by
his successors.60 Castello tried to maintain a degree of democracy but in
the end was forced to accept continued army control by agreeing to the
succession of Minister of Army Artur Costa e Silva. On the positive side, he
maintained the tradition of presidential supremacy over the military and
kept potential coup-makers in check. He also limited the time an officer
could serve in general’s rank to 12 years. There would be no more multi-
decade generals, such as Góes Monteiro, whose time as a general stretched
from the early 1930s to the mid-1950s.
It was now apparent that the armed forces officer corps was divided
between those who believed that they should confine themselves to their
professional duties and those who regarded politicians as scoundrels ready
to betray Brazil to communism or some other menace. Many officers
believed that they were upholding democracy, even as they were distorting
and limiting it. The regime did not attempt to eliminate the trappings of
liberal constitutionalism because it feared disapproval of international
opinion and damage to the alliance with the United States. As the citadel
of anticommunism, the United States provided the ideology that the
Brazilian military used to justify their hold on power. But Washington also
preached liberal democracy, which forced the authoritarians to assume the
contradictory position of defending democracy by effectively destroying
it. Their concern for appearances caused them to abstain from creating a
personalist dictatorship as in Spanish-American countries by requiring
each successive general-president to pass power to his replacement.61
The role of the United States in these events was complex and at times
contradictory. Throughout 1963 in the United States, there had been an
anti-Goulart press campaign, and in 1964 the Johnson administration
gave moral support to the conspiracy. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon later
admitted that the embassy had given money to anti-Goulart candidates in
the 1962 elections and had encouraged the plotters; that there were many
extra CIA and American military personnel operating in Brazil; and that
four US Navy oil tankers and the carrier Forrestal, in “Operation Brother
Sam,” had stood off the coast. Washington immediately had recognized
the new government and joined the chorus chanting that the coup d’état
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    265

of the “democratic forces” had restrained the hand of international com-

munism. In retrospect it appears that the only foreign hand involved was
the American one. But it would be going too far to say that Brazilian pup-
pets were dancing to Washington’s tune, the United States was not the
principal actor in this play.62
With the military in power, one might think that military relations with
the United States would greatly improve, but that would be a mistake. On
the surface they certainly were friendly, but out of public view, it was
another matter. The American intervention in the 1965 crisis in the
Dominican Republic under the guise of preventing another Cuba obtained
the blessing of the Organization of American States (OAS), but the
American request for Latin American troops was approved with the pro-
viso that the commander be Latin American. The Latin Americans were
upset that Washington sought OAS approval only after it sent troops.63
President-General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco agreed to send
a Brazilian contingent partly because he opposed such unilateral interven-
tion by any American Republic, especially the United States.64 Effectively,
the Dominican intervention became a multilateral operation. The symbol-
ism of having a Brazilian general command American troops was profound
for the Brazilian military. Lt. General Bruce Palmer was not pleased being
told by General Hugo Panasco Alvim that the language of his headquarters
would be Portuguese and that Palmer had better find himself an interpreter.
Not surprisingly Palmer and Alvim did not get along, and eventually they
were both relieved under guise of rotation of commanders. An important
grouping of Brazilian intellectuals expressed their “vehement repulsion at
the Brazilian government’s complicity in the hateful armed intervention of
the United States.” Likewise, there were protests within the armed forces,
particularly, from hardline officers. As a result Castello Branco lost so much
prestige that he was unable to fulfill his promise of turning the presidency
over to an elected civilian.65 Brazilian participation in the Dominican affair
was a factor in prolonging military control of the government.
Hard on the Dominican crisis was the Vietnam situation. This time the
United States was acting without the cover of the United Nations or any
other international body. In repeated letters between 1965 and 1967,
President Lyndon Johnson asked Castello Branco for Brazilian troops.
The request was somewhat sweetened by Johnson’s approval of a $150
million loan to Brazil. Castello Branco told Ambassador Lincoln Gordon
that the military would have objections. Given the intense popular opposi-
tion to the war, and the likelihood of high casualty levels without clear
266   F. D. MCCANN

recompense, Castello Branco said no.66 Close on that decision, in an effort

to control spending, the Johnson administration cut back on the military
assistance that Brazil had been receiving. This had the consequence of
Brazil turning to Europe for weaponry. French Mirage jets replaced
American F-5s, and from 1968 to 1972, Brazil spent some $500 million
on European arms.
At the end of the 1960s, President Richard Nixon called for a careful
reassessment of relations with the considerably more authoritarian
Brazilian regime. The reassessment recognized the need for “a mature,
friendly, and mutually beneficial relationship … because of Brazil’s long-­
run potential” and because it had half the land and half the population of
South America. Trade and investment were judged to be of prime impor-
tance, while diplomatic and military interests were secondary.67 The
Congress had declared that “military sales should not be made if they
would arm military dictators who are denying the growth of fundamental
rights or social progress to their own people unless the President deter-
mines it to be in the security interests of the U. S.”68 The administration
decided to sidestep that “sense of Congress” because of Brazil’s “impor-
tance to the interests of the U.S.” and allow cash sales to go forward and
to release $30 million in credits for helicopters and transport aircraft. To
do otherwise would “be a very serious irritant causing damage to our rela-
tions out of proportion to the requests themselves.”69 Concurrent with
these actions, President Richard Nixon told Henry Kissinger that “I want
a stepped up effort for closer relations with Brazil’s government….”70 He
said that he preferred democratically elected governments but believed
they had to be pragmatic. He strove to assure the Brazilian government
and the military that “we are [not] looking down our noses at them
because of their form of government.” He thought it was possible to have
close relations without “embracing their form of government or condon-
ing their internal actions.”71
In theory such relations might be possible, but from a Brazilian per-
spective, close relations were regarded as support and approval. Meanwhile
1968 saw increasing protests and street demonstrations against the
military-­controlled government. In March 1968 some 60,000 gathered
for the burial of a high school student shot by the police during a protest
against the closing of a student restaurant in Rio, then after the Seventh-­
Day Mass at the Candelária Church in the city center, crowds outside the
church were dispersed with considerable violence. Protests and marches
took place, throughout Brazil. More repression and arrests of students led
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    267

to a massive march of some 100,000 through Rio’s streets. In April 72

university professors, some with international reputations, were summarily
dismissed and forbidden to teach. Hundreds of people had been arrested,
frustration and anger were widespread. One general warned that “exces-
sive repression brings a rising radicalization of demands.” Instead of eas-
ing the tension, police and military repression intensified in August,
Brazil’s darkest and tragedy-laden month, with hundreds of students
arrested in São Paulo and Rio and 14,000 soldiers on the streets of the
latter. The Supreme Federal Tribunal denied habeas corpus for an arrested
student leader, and the Chamber of Deputies rejected a bill of amnesty for
the student demonstrators. The Universidade de Brasília was invaded by
military police, and the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais was closed
after a similar invasion.72 Throughout the country university professors
and labor leaders were arrested. Overstating the reality, radical military
officers saw the student unrest as sign that a “revolutionary war” was
under way.
At the end of 1968, the government of Costa e Silva issued the draco-
nian Institutional Act No. 5 taking Brazil into a dark dictatorship.
Hundreds more were arrested; disappearances and “the widespread use of
severe torture” became commonplace. The US military was very reluctant
to accept the truth of the reports because, according to Ambassador John
Crimmins, “they did not believe that the Brazilian Army was capable of
doing this.” Crimmins noted that the torture “wasn’t just electrical shocks;
this was the real medieval stuff.”73 The years 1968 and 1969 were the
worst years of the military era.
In August 1969, when President Costa e Silva was incapacitated by a
cardiovascular problem, the three armed forces ministers declared them-
selves a ruling junta until a new president could be chosen. And the mili-
tary did the choosing. The senior generals and admirals gleaned the
favorite candidates by polling their subordinate flag officers, and a
­seven-­member armed forces high command ratified the choice of General
Emílio Garrastazú Médici, who had headed the National Intelligence
Service (SNI). The National Congress, which had been forcibly recessed
for ten months and thoroughly purged, was called into session to endorse
the military’s decision.74
Who was Médici? When Goulart was deposed in 1964, Médici was
commander of the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras and supported
the coup more from a commitment to hierarchy and discipline and army
cohesion than from a political position. Costa e Silva sent him to
268   F. D. MCCANN

Washington as military attaché for just short of two years. Promoted to

major general, Costa made him head of the National Intelligence Service
(SNI) saying he wanted someone nearby who was capable of telling him
when he was wrong. Within the regime Médici argued that exceptional
measures were not necessary to guarantee stability and national security.
Even so the climate became steadily more repressive. In March 1969,
Médici was promoted to four-star general and sent to command the Third
Army in Rio Grande do Sul. So when Costa e Silva became ill, Médici was
one of the small cluster of generals considered eligible to succeed him.75
As Elio Gaspari observed: “To Castello Branco the dictatorship appeared
an evil. For Costa e Silva it was a convenience. For Médici it was a neutral
factor, an instrument of bureaucratic action, a source of power and
strength.” As he said to one of his ministers: “I have the AI-5, everything
is possible.”76
Médici professed dismay at the reports of mistreatment and torture of
prisoners. According to his head of SNI, General Carlos Alberto Fontoura,
in two or three meetings of the armed forces chiefs and cabinet ministers,
Médici said that he did not “accept torture, or the mistreatment or killing
of captives. There is no way that I accept this.”77
But the mistreatment, torture, and murder continued beyond the con-
trol of the military president of the republic.
In November 1969 a group of European clergymen and intellectuals
delivered a dossier to the Pope documenting torture in Brazil, and in the
next month Amnesty International issued a report on Brazilian torture
that gave the topic worldwide attention. On March 8, 1970, the Sunday
New York Times carried a letter from 102 professors, most of whom had
done research in Brazil, protesting against “torture, imprisonment with-
out cause, and suppression of civil rights.” “We doubt,” they declared,
“that ever in the history of Brazil has there occurred more systematic,
more wide spread, and more inhuman treatment of political dissidents.”
In April 1970 there was a flood of exposés: The Washington Post published
Brady Tyson’s “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews …”; noted American academ-
ics launched a dossier entitled “Terror in Brazil”; the Catholic Commonweal
magazine carried Ralph Della Cava’s article “Torture in Brazil.”78 After
months of denials, in December the Minister of Education, Jarbas
Passarinho, admitted that “isolated” cases of torture had occurred.79
The reality was that state-managed violence had become part of the
daily political culture. Brazil was locked in a culture of fear that immobi-
lized the population. The deep involvement of the armed forces in repres-
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    269

sion and the use of torture was something new. Mistreatment of prisoners
could be traced back in Brazilian history, but earlier cases were poor, mar-
ginal people, this time the victims were middle class, even women and
clerics were not immune. The personal actions of military officers in the
repression implicated them in crimes that could have no legal justification
and thereby assured their support for the whole terrible system. Fear of
the reach of justice insured their loyalty to the regime and their fierce
opposition to dismantling the system. Of course, it damaged the reputa-
tion of Brazil’s military.80 Besides it hurt its effective readiness, despite
having increased the number of generals from 124  in 1964 to 155  in
1974. Reportedly some 7000 trucks had been added to the various bar-
racks motor pools, but not a single mechanic. The army bought old
American tanks for which ammunition was no longer made, and every
other one did not run.81
The foregoing was the situation when President-General Médici visited
the United States in December 1971. Nixon famously toasted him: “we
know that as Brazil goes, so will go the rest of that Latin American
Continent ….” Médici’s response included the line “United States always
knows that it will find in Brazil a loyal and independent ally.”82 An attuned
ear would have caught the importance of the word independent. Nixon’s
toast would take on dark meaning in the next years as Uruguay, Bolivia,
Chile, and Argentina fell under military dictatorships.83 In a meeting in
the White House, Médici emphasized that continued American military
assistance was “essential” and that contact between the two nation’s mili-
taries was “indispensable.” He opposed “any reduction of either.”84 But
the nature of the military regime would ultimately produce that effect.
Médici enjoyed noticeable popular support; after all Brazil was in an
impressive economic boom that seemed to be making life better, at least
for the middle and upper classes. In addition, of course, Brazil’s team won
the World Cup in 1970. Authoritarianism seemingly provided benefits.
Médici repeatedly said that he wanted to be followed by a civilian presi-
dent. He was thinking of his chief of staff (Casa Civil) João Leitão de
Abreu, who would have been appointed as he himself had been, not
elected. But because there was still guerrilla activity in the Araguaia region
of the Amazon, he believed that another general was necessary. Médici
was linked with his predecessor Costa e Silva, yet he and his closest advis-
ers settled on General Ernesto Geisel to succeed him.85
Geisel was retired from the army and was president of Petrobrás, but
more importantly, he had been the principal military aide to Castello
270   F. D. MCCANN

Branco. In the Brazilian army, there was a division between those officers
who adhered to Costa e Silva’s attitudes and those who were more attuned
to the ideas of Castello Branco. The major difference between the two
related to the nature of government, the Costistas favored long-term
authoritarian military control, while the Castellistas leaned toward reform
and preservation of constitutional structures. The latter tended to be more
sophisticated and better educated, the former were found in the ranks of
the hardliners. Likely Médici was somewhat deluded about Geisel. But he
thought that because Geisel had been away from the army for a time and
was sort of a businessman in his Petrobrás role, choosing him would show
that the situation had evolved positively.
It should be said that Geisel’s older brother Orlando was Médici’s army
minister. There were whispers that Orlando was behind his brother’s rise
to the presidency, but they were not accurate. There was some hope
among the Costistas that Médici would stay in office, but he would not
hear of any continuation. He voted for Ernesto Geisel and his was the vote
that counted. A recently fashioned electoral college gave its assent, but it
was Médici’s decision that mattered. Geisel took office in mid-March
1974.86
General João Batista Figueiredo, while briefing Geisel on the poor
readiness status of the army, concluded “God help us … they are throwing
money away.” Geisel had reason to observe that “the army, from a moral
point of view, had fallen considerably.” Besides, his choice for minister of
the army, General Dale Coutinho lamented that in fighting subversion,
they had no legal cover; there were laws for foreign war, but not for their
specific type of war.87
Geisel told his cabinet that the goal was “gradual, but sure democratic
refinement” with increased participation of “responsible elites” aiming at
the complete institutionalization of “the principles of the Revolution of
1964.” The exceptional powers would be kept, but used only as a last
resort. Clearly there would be no quick return to democratic rule; instead,
Brazil entered a period of slow “decompression” (distensão). Geisel
intended to set the pace for political change. He and his immediate adviser
General Golbery do Couto e Silva “envisioned a gradual and highly con-
trolled opening.” Brazil could not continue as it was, even if change took
a long time.88 Médici had urged him to keep his brother Orlando as min-
ister of the army, but Geisel knew that he and his brother thought differ-
ently. Instead he appointed General Coutinho, with whom, despite his
hardline reputation, he shared a sense of common purpose regarding the
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    271

army; they agreed that the hardline officers had to be controlled; unfortu-
nately after two months in office, he took ill and died suddenly. Geisel
named the chief of staff General Sylvio Coelho da Frota to replace him.
Frota was also a hardliner and did not share Geisel’s vision. Geisel had
to gain control of the armed forces, and to do that he had to have the army
behind him. The key was to limit the autonomy of the Centro de Informações
do Exército (CIEx), which had been operating throughout the country,
often without the knowledge of local regional commanders. New orders
specified that the CIEx would continue its intelligence work, but that it had
to obtain the approval of regional commanders to operate in their areas. In
effect this stopped clandestine operations in Rio and São Paulo, and the
number of cases of reported torture declined sharply.89 He also moved its
headquarters from Rio to Brasilia, thereby tightening control. The hardlin-
ers fought back, according to an admitted killer, by “resolving to act on
their own account outside the chain of command.”90 Repeated appeals for
military unity had much to do with Geisel’s struggle to suppress the rogue
hardliners. But Geisel on April 1, 1974, approved continuation of the CIEx
policy of executing certain captured subversives, with the proviso that
future cases be submitted to SNI director General Figueiredo for approval.91
In the meantime he was reshaping Brazilian foreign relations. He
described his foreign policy as pragmatic. There would be no more auto-
matic alignment with the United States, Brazilian foreign policy would be
ecumenical. Brazil was “of the west, but not an ally of the United States.”92
It would act primarily in its own best interests. Partly this attitude built on
evident trends in the Quadros and Goulart foreign policies and partly was
stimulated by Brazil’s dependence on imported oil. Geisel aimed at insur-
ing good relations with the oil-rich Arab countries and opened new
embassies in the Gulf States and Iraq. Saudi Arabia provided money for a
Middle Eastern study program at the Universidade de Brasília. Brazil had
been a major supporter of the creation of Israel, and so it was symbolic of
its shift toward the Arab states when it voted for the anti-Zionist resolu-
tion in the UN General Assembly in November 1975. The decision on the
vote resulted from some sloppiness in the foreign ministry and American
quickness to criticize. Asked for his approval of a vote in favor, Geisel con-
curred, but then the next day thought better of it and ordered the minis-
try to vote no, but in the meantime the State Department criticized their
position wounding the Brazilians’ sense of dignity, making it impossible to
back down.93 Brazil sought new markets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, not because it had changed its view of communism, rather it
272   F. D. MCCANN

wanted to diversify its markets and trade partners. Recognizing that the
Portuguese revolution of 1974 had cut loose the mother country’s African
colonies, Brazil recognized the independence of Angola, Mozambique,
and Guinea-Bissau. Echoing Oswaldo Aranha on seeking greater influ-
ence over Portugal and its colonial possessions, historian Jerry Dávila
commented that “Africa was its natural sphere of influence … [and] Africa
would help propel Brazil industrially and bring autonomy from the cold
war powers.”94 Also in 1974 Brazil exchanged ambassadors with the
People’s Republic of China and warmed up to Cuba. It was notable that
Geisel made state visits to England, France, and Japan while avoiding the
United States.
The low point in Brazilian-American military relations came in 1977.
Having been blocked by the United States (1951) in obtaining centrifuges
for an atomic program, Brazil had joined the American Atoms for Peace
program (1955) that gave it an atomic plant powered by American-­
supplied reactor fuel. In 1974 India’s explosion of a nuclear device so star-
tled the United States that it told the Brazilians that it would not fulfill its
agreement to provide the contracted enriched fuel. Coming on the heels
of the OPEC oil embargo, this put Brazil in a difficult spot. Worse, that
same year, Argentina’s Atucha reactor came on line. With some evident
desperation, the Brazilians negotiated a vast contract with West Germany
for the construction of enriched uranium heavy-water reactors, for exten-
sive transfer of technology for full fabrication and processing from uranium
ores to transmission of electricity via an extensive electrical grid.95
It was rather startling to see atomic enrichment mix with human rights
violations to create a volatile situation that ended the military alliance. But
first in 1976, there was a brief interlude when it looked as if Brazil and the
United States would deepen their traditional cooperation. Foreign
Minister Azeredo da Silveira, who had a friendly relationship with Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, arranged a joint memorandum that provided for
regular consultation on issues of interest.96 The sound idea behind the
consultative mechanism was that it would reduce the possibility of misun-
derstandings reaching the level of crisis. The Brazilians interpreted the
memorandum as meaning that the United States recognized Brazil’s sta-
tus as the region’s paramount economic power. Kissinger asserted that the
United States welcomed “Brazil’s new role in world affairs” and that their
“institution of consultation” would give “meaning and strength and per-
manence to our cooperation.”97
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    273

In June 1976, the foreign aid bill passed the American Congress with
the requirement (Harkin Amendment) that the State Department make
an annual report on human rights in all the countries receiving military
assistance. The first report prepared before the presidential elections of
that November criticized Brazil. Throughout the campaign the Democratic
candidate Jimmy Carter had condemned the human rights situation in
Brazil, as well as the Brazilian-German atomic agreement. In October, the
Ford White House issued a strong statement on non-proliferation, which
the Brazilians appeared to shrug off. The Geisel team was betting that
Gerald Ford would win the election and that the “close friendship”
between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira would pro-
tect them. “The Brazilians were shocked that Carter won,” and they dug
in their heels on the nuclear problem. The situation was “aggravated
severely” by Vice President Walter Mondale’s going to Bonn to try to
convince the Germans to withdraw from the agreement. The Americans
decided to work on the West Germans, as Ambassador Crimmins put it,
“based on the belief that we couldn’t do anything with Brazil.”98
The Brazilians felt depreciated by the American maneuver to pressure
the Germans. Shortly after taking office, Carter sent Deputy Secretary of
State Warren Christopher to Brasília for a broad examination of the situa-
tion. There were no threats, contrary to what the Brazilian press reported.
The Americans explained why they hoped that “the Brazilians would
adopt comprehensive safeguards for all their nuclear activities.” And they
explained the “legislative prohibitions” in the foreign assistance laws,
which could be regarded as a subtle warning. The Brazilians put out the
story that they had resisted strong American pressures. They believed that
their national prestige required that they have nuclear technology and
were determined to obtain it. The Americans were concerned that Brazil
would one day develop a bomb, which the Brazilians claimed not to want.
Ambassador Crimmins observed that “the Brazilian nerves were very raw
about the nuclear thing. They were worked up about it. A lot of phony
stuff issued, planted by the government about this. Then the human rights
question intervened.”99
President Jimmy Carter emphasized dual policies of respect for human
rights and non-proliferation of nuclear technology.100 He first tried to con-
vince Germany to withdraw from the agreement and failing that pressured
Brazil to halt its program. The stubborn, hostile reaction in Brazil was
remarkable for it succeeded in unifying all sectors of society against the
American intrusion into what was commonly thought to be an important
274   F. D. MCCANN

element of Brazilian development.101 Besides, as President Geisel later

noted, the program with Germany had nothing to do with the military or
military objectives. “The United States, England, France, Russia, and
China could have nuclear technology, but not Brazil? Are we inferior to
the others?”, Geisel asked.102 The obvious lack of American trust in
Brazilian intentions caused an intense rallying around the flag.
Ambassador John Crimmins took pains to deliver a copy of the report
on Brazil’s human rights before it became public in Washington. The very
next morning, Crimmins was called to the foreign ministry to be told that
they were renouncing the [1952] military accord. The human rights
report was very positive about Geisel’s efforts to reign in the security
apparatus, but by then Geisel had already decided to end American mili-
tary assistance as a sign of independence. Both sides believed that the
accord no longer served the relationship, but the hardline officers espe-
cially felt that it kept the military subservient to the United States. Geisel’s
act of bravado increased his prestige among those officers. Indeed, it may
have helped his relations with the opposition as well. It contributed to his
ability to remove hardline Minister of the Army Frota in October,
strengthen his hold over the armed forces, and allowed him to continue
the policy of decompression and, eventually to impose, his chosen succes-
sor General João Batista Figueiredo.103
While the anti-atomic energy policy of the Carter government angered
Brazilians as a whole, the human rights campaign seemed two-faced to the
Brazilian military.104 There was an intense debate going on within the
armed forces regarding torture and mistreatment of political prisoners.
President Ernesto Geisel had long opposed such behavior and was then
engaged in an internal struggle to eliminate it from the military’s “sup-
pressive apparatus,” as it was called. By doing so Geisel would effectively
weaken the influence of the hardline officers. Jimmy Carter’s moralizing
confused officers involved in repression because they had learned harsh
interrogation techniques from Americans. Between 1965 and 1970, 70
Brazilian officers trained at the School of the Americas in Panama, of
whom 38 (63%) were in intelligence. Comparing the names of those who
went to the school with those who were later accused of torture or the
death of prisoners, there was a ratio of one in every ten.105
The effect of Carter’s dual policy of human rights and anti-nuclear devel-
opment was more than the Geisel government could tolerate. Geisel said
that “our foreign policy had to be realistic and, as much as possible, inde-
pendent. We had walked too much in tow (subordinate) of the United
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    275

States. We had to live and treat with the United States, as much as possible,
as equal to equal, even though they are much stronger, much more power-
ful than us.” He believed that Brazilian development was tied to the
Northern Hemisphere, and so he intensified relations with England, France,
Germany, and Japan. “We could not do more with the United States because
the demands that they were making seemed to me to be improper.”106

No Longer Allies But Still Friends?

The cancelling of the 1952 military accord and the elimination of the
mixed military commission that had existed since 1942 altered the nature
of Brazilian-American relations. The old intimate alliance was gone. Some
might call it a more mature relationship. However, relations between the
two armed forces remained cordial with officer and military school
exchanges continuing, but the close cooperation could no longer be
assumed. The fading controversy over atomic energy continued until
1990, but suspicions lingered.107 Brazil turned toward space research
partly to enhance its continuing bid to obtain a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council and partly to give itself greater auton-
omy from United States’ influence which had been irritating it since the
end of World War II and, of course, to exhibit that it has a higher level of
development than its neighbors.108 The two countries signed an agree-
ment in 1997 relative to Brazilian participation in the International Space
Station. It was to stimulate Brazil’s technology industry by having it man-
ufacture components for the station.109 A Brazilian was designated for
astronaut training, and it looked as if a promising new area of cooperation
had been opened, but it turned out that Brazilian industry could not meet
the specifications and the effort withered.
In the meantime the Brazilians had been actively engaged in rocketry
research with 381 low-altitude launches between 1965 and 1972 from its
Barreira do Inferno facility in Rio Grande do Norte and had built a more
advanced space launch site at Alcântara in Maranhão. The Brazilian objec-
tive was to develop capability to place their own satellites in orbit with
their own rockets.110 The Alcântara facility was Brazil’s answer to the
European space station in French Guyana. That station is a little above the
equator and the Brazilian site is slightly below the equator. Launches from
both sites are more economically efficient in reaching obit than from the
American site in Florida. Because of international control agreements on
space rocketry, the Brazilians could not obtain necessary components
276   F. D. MCCANN

from signatory countries. Because the space program was controlled by

the Brazilian air force until 1994, it was viewed with suspicion by American
authorities still wary of possible Brazilian nuclear ambitions. Washington
sought to dissuade them from pursuing advanced rockets. For a time it
seemed that some collaboration might result, but that was not to be.
In 2000–2002, the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and
Bill Clinton completed an agreement that would have given a section of
the Alcântara facility over to the Americans.111 Supposedly Brazilians
would not have had access to that portion of the base. The American
negotiators could not have known much about the history of the two
countries’ relations or of Brazilian attitudes. Would they have agreed to a
similar arrangement with foreigners on American soil? The Brazilian mili-
tary was aghast to put it mildly.112 They saw it as the creation of an
American military base in Brazil that might give the Americans a way to
control the vast Amazon region. Vociferous Brazilians regarded it as ced-
ing sovereignty. Worse they feared it was linked not so much to space but
to the bases that the Americans were acquiring in Colombia, Ecuador, and
Bolivia. The Americans touched a sensitive nerve and made it considerably
worse by proposing to limit Brazilian access. When more independent-­
minded Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became president, he vetoed the
Congressional enabling bill in May 2003.113
That year was not a good one for space exploration or for cooperation.
The American Space Shuttle Columbia had disintegrated upon re-entry,
killing its crew of seven in February 2003, and later in August disaster
struck the Brazilian space program when in a pre-launch test its VLS
rocket exploded, destroying the launch pad and killing 21 scientists, tech-
nicians, and workers.114 Potentially the two countries could have united in
grief, but instead imaginative Brazilian rumors blamed the tragedy at
Alcântara on the Americans! Like the rumors that the Americans sank the
ships in 1942, they are hard to combat.115 This is especially so when retired
military officers cast doubt on the results of official investigations.116
In 2006 Brazil paid the Russian government $10.5 million to carry
astronaut and air force Lt. Colonel Marcos Pontes on its Soyuz spacecraft
for an 11-day mission on the International Space Station. The mission was
criticized by Ennio Candotti, president of the Brazilian Society for the
Progress of Science, as merely “space tourism.” The Brazilian Space
Agency thought it would bring publicity to its work and help increase its
budget. That negative view aside, it is certainly significant that Brazil’s first
astronaut went into space from a Russian base in Kazakhstan than from
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    277

Florida or Maranhão.117 Worthy of note too is that Lt. Col. Pontes had his
year of fighter pilot training at Parnamirim Air Base at Natal, which con-
tinues to be Brazil’s principal pilot training facility.
It does not help relations that ill-informed Brazilians believe that the
United States has military installations at Alcântara and that it wants to
control the space station to “undermine Brazilian sovereignty in the
Amazon.”118
It should be clear that to maintain easy, friendly, cooperative relations
constant, open communication is necessary. While it may puzzle Americans
that some Brazilians actively see the United States as a threat, the two
giants of the Western Hemisphere cannot change the reality of their geog-
raphy. They have grown ever more interdependent economically, even as
Brazil continued to lag behind in education and research. The collapse of
the Soviet Union had created new dynamics and possibilities, while the
recast Russia proved a competitor in supplying Brazil with modern arma-
ments and seeking entry into its space program. Partly to prevent Russian
sales, the United States revamped its military relations with Brazil, at a
moment when the Brazilian military was concerned to enhance its research
and development, logistics systems, education and training, and the acqui-
sition of weapons and services.119 And so in 2010, when, as Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates observed, their “common interests” made “Brazil’s
growing involvement and significance in global affairs a welcome develop-
ment for the United States,” and the two signed a new military agree-
ment.120 In 2012 a study done at the Army War College urged
re-establishment of the “Unwritten Alliance” with Brazil. Lt. Colonel
Lawrence T.  Brown argued that “Failure to substantially improve U.S.
relations with Brazil will cause its leaders to seek more advantageous rela-
tionships elsewhere—to the detriment of the United States.” He proposed
energizing the relationship by building a strategic partnership based on
common interests throughout the world. Treating relations as a partner-
ship would appeal to the self-image of Brazilians.121 In 2015 during
President Dilma Rousseff’s visit to Washington, she and Barack Obama
signed a number of cooperative agreements including some related to
military relations. These allowed for greater cooperation in defense mat-
ters, especially in research and development of arms and equipment, logis-
tical support, and technology security. The agreement promoted joint
exercises, exchange of information and equipment, particularly to improve
international peacekeeping operations. The White House press release
described “a Mature and Multifaceted Partnership.”122
278   F. D. MCCANN

The political turmoil engendered by the enormous corruption scandal

involving important corporations and vote buying in the Brazilian
Congress in 2015–2017 has cast a deep pale over Brazil. With President
Dilma Rousseff being impeached in August 2016 and ex-President Lula
da Silva being charged with crimes of corruption, and numerous business
and political figures being jailed, Brazil’s future is less certain than it was a
decade ago.123
Relations between the two militaries have been sufficiently friendly for
Brazil to invite the American military to participate in a training exercise
in humanitarian and disaster relief in Amazonia with Brazilian, Colombian,
and Peruvian troops in November 2017. This was called the largest such
military exercise in Amazonia in history. A decade or so earlier, such
American involvement would have been most unlikely. The defense min-
ister, Raul Jungmann, observed the exercise and then went to Washington
for talks with American officials. The relationship continues to be based on
negotiating its form, substance, and practice.124

The Last American125

Natal’s Alecrim cemetery held the graves of 146 US servicemen who died
at Natal. Some died from illness or accidents, others with battle wounds
died while being transported home. One soldier’s body, by his own wish
or family decision, remained when a US Navy ship collected the remains
in April 1947.
Twenty-two-year old Sergeant Thomas N.  Browning of Cincinnati,
Ohio, of the 22 AAF Weather Squadron of the Air Transport Command,
died suddenly from infectious spinal meningitis on July 18, 1943.
Apparently enchanted by Brazil, he studied Portuguese, made friends with
Brazilians, and loved the beaches. He had been stationed in Bahia for two
months prior to assignment to Natal. His grave is an enduring reminder of
the American wartime presence.

Notes
1. For the Moscow-sponsored and financed revolts of 1935, see McCann,
Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889–1937
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 375–388; Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, Estratégias da Ilusão: A Revolução Mundial e o Brasil, 1922–
1935 (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), pp. 287–326; and Hélio
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    279

Silva, 1935  – A Revolta Vermelha (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização

Brasileira, 1969). For a study that shows how the Cold War mixed with
relations, see Sidnei J. Munhoz, “At the Onset of the Cold War: the USA
and the repression of communism in Brazil” in Sidnei J.  Munhoz &
Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th
and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de
Maringá, 2013), pp. 128–164.
2. MG Robert. L.  Walsh (USAFSA) to Jefferson Caffery, November 28,
1943, Aviation Agreement between US and Brazil, OPD, 580.82 Brazil,
NARA. This was a draft letter that Walsh sent to War Department for
approval. State Department was to take the first step. It seems that all
later discussions resulted from Walsh’s suggestions.
3. Robert A.  Lovett [letter] to Adolf A.  Berle, Asst. Secretary of State,
Washington, December 7, 1943, OPD, 580.82, NARA.
4. On January 8, 1944, Roosevelt had written to the Secretary of State, and
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson commented on and quoted from a
copy of the letter in Stimson to Secretary of State, January 14, 1944,
OPD 580.82 Brazil, NARA.
5. Lt. Colonel Eiseman, Memo for OPD Record, December 19, 1945,
“Use of US Controlled Brazil owned real estate and buildings for
Brazilian Air Force program,” OPD 336 Brazil, NARA. For a discussion
of Brazilian ownership, the role of Pan American and Panair, and future
maintenance, see Col. George A. Brownell to Asst. Chief of Staff, Plans,
August 13, 1945, “Implementation of Air Base Agreement,” OPD
580.82 Brazil, NARA.
6. MG Ralph H. Wooten to Adjutant General War Dept., Recife, April 15,
1945, OPD580.82 Brazil, NARA.
7. Walter N.  Walmsley, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of
Brazilian Affairs, Washington, Feb. 24, 1944, 711.3227/47 as in FRUS
1944, Vol. VII, pp. 554–556.
8. Jefferson Caffery, Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 1, 1944, 711.32/206: Telegram,
as in FRUS 1944, Vol. VII, p. 551. In June 1944 the Rio Embassy and
the foreign ministry exchanged texts in their respective languages of a
Military Aviation Agreement that would have allowed use and mainte-
nance of the bases for ten years by civilian clothed, unarmed American
personnel. See FRUS1944, Vol. VII, pp.  561–565. Caffery had been
directed by President Roosevelt to pursue continued access to the bases.
9. Caffery reported that Vargas wanted a strong tie to the United States,
unconnected directly to the continued use of the bases, and going
through sympathetic motions was necessary. Caffery, Rio de Janeiro,
April 25, 1944, 711.3227/79: Telegram as in FRUS 1944, Vol. VII,
pp. 559–560. On air officers opposition see p. 559.
280   F. D. MCCANN

10. Cordell Hull to Oswaldo Aranha, Washington, July 17, 1944, AGV c
1944.07.17, CPDOC- FGV-Rio. It would be interesting to know why
this personal letter ended up in Vargas’s archive rather than Aranha’s.
11. Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace held at
Chapultepec, Mexico City, March 1945: http://academic.brooklyn.
cuny.edu/history/johnson/chapultepec.htm.
12. BG John Weckerling, Deputy Asst. Chief of Staff G2 to Major General
Clayton Bissell, Asst. Chief of Staff G2, Washington, “Comments on …
Memo on Brazil of 18 May 45,” June 6, 1945, OPD 336
Brazil, NARA.
13. Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 63. The CIA report was dated
Nov. 30, 1948, and is in the Truman Library.
14. Frank D. McCann, Soldiers of the Pátria, pp. 251–258; and “The Brazilian
General Staff and Brazil’s Military Situation, 1900–1945,” Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1983), pp. 299–
324. The premise of war with Argentina persisted at least until 1977, after
which both republics pursued cooperation as the basis of their relations.
15. Sonny B. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 86–87. For an excellent anal-
ysis of military relations in the post-war era, see Davis, “Brazil-United
States Military Relations in the Twentieth Century,” in Sidnei J. Munhoz
& Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S.  Relations in the
20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de
Maringá, 2013), pp. 291–324.
16. The ESG is most famous for organizing a doctrine of national security
that would encourage economic development while keeping society
orderly. There is a big literature on the ESG.  A good starting place is
Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil
(Princeton University Press, 1971), pp.  178–183; Wayne A.  Selcher,
“National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government,”
Military Issues Research Memorandum, Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College (16 July 1977); Sonny B.  Davis, A Brotherhood of
Arms, pp.  93–115; Antônio de Arruda, A Escola Superior de Guerra:
História de Sua Doutrina (São Paulo: Edições GRD, 1983);; Francisco
César Alves Ferraz, Á Sombra dos Carvalhos: Escola Superior de Guerra e
política no Brasil (1948–1955) (Londrina: Editora UEL, 1997), pp. 108–
120; ESG, Departamento de Estudos, Manual Básico (Rio de Janeiro:
ESG, 1975).
17. Wilson D.  Miscamble, George F.  Kennan and the Making of American
Foreign Policy, 1947–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
p. 315.
18. Quoted in Mark Gilderhus, “An Emerging Synthesis? U.S.  – Latin
American Relations Since the Second World War” in Michael J. Hogan,
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    281

ed. America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign

Relations since 1941 (University of Cambridge Press, 1995), p. 442.
19. Miscamble, George F. Kennan, pp. 317–318.
20. The petroleum question was at the heart of the turmoil that led to
Getúlio’s suicide. For an excellent account of those turbulent days, see W.
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American Relations,
1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) espe-
cially pp. 48–50, 71–79. And also the fine analysis in Peter S. Smith, Oil
and Politics in Modern Brazil (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976).
21. Morris L.  Cooke, Brazil on the March: A Study in International
Cooperation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1944).
22. See the many newspaper clippings on the Cooke Mission in the State
Department files, 832.60/52, RG59, NARA.
23. C.  Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups d’état: Brazilian-American
Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1993), pp. 19–21. One of the problems in Washington was uncertainty
over the respective jurisdictions of the Export-Import Bank and the
“International Bank” (later World Bank). Adding to the confusion was
the Brazil-United States Joint Economic Development Commission, cre-
ated under the authority of the International Development Act (Section
410) and the Point Four Program, could not really get underway until
the banks sorted themselves out. See Dean Acheson, Memo of
Conversation: “Financial Aid for Development Projects in Brazil,”
October 19, 1950, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 65, Harry S Truman
Library, Independence, Mo.
24. Vágner Camilo Alves, “Ilusão desfeita: a ‘aliança especial’ Brazil-Estados
Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra
Mundial,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol. 48, No. 1,
Brasília, Jan – Junho 2005, pp. 151–177. The Brazilians could not under-
stand Washington’s equal treatment policy. Juan Perón, who had “sympa-
thy for Germany and everything German,” denounced the Nuremberg
trials; see Ronald C.  Newton, The ‘Nazi Menace’ in Argentina, 1931–
1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 381.
25. The instructions to the mission leader, John Abbink, from Paulo H. Nitze
(Deputy to Asst. Secretary of State for Economic Affairs), set out the
American view of such economic assistance. See Joint Brazil-United
States Technical Commission, FRUS, 1948, Vol. IX, pp. 364–366.
26. Mensagem apresentada ao Congresso Nacional por occasião da abertura da
Sessão Legislativa de 1950 pelo General Eurico G.  Dutra, Presidente da
República, (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), pp.  101–102. Paulo Fagundes
Visentini, “Populism and Brazil-USA Relations (1945–64): the dialectic
of alignment and autonomy” in Sidnei J.  Munhoz & Francisco Carlos
Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries
282   F. D. MCCANN

(Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013),

pp. 165–193.
27. Berle gave a speech seemingly praising the scheduled elections, but it was
seen in Brazil as placing the United States behind the opposition to
Vargas. The ambassador did not have State Department approval and
wounded Vargas and his supporters. In some versions of the event he read
the speech to Vargas in a private meeting, but later the president said he
could not understand Berle’s garbled Portuguese. As my text shows Berle
said that he handed Vargas the speech to read. For the Berle affair, see
Stanley Hilton, O Ditador & O Embaixador: Getúlio Vargas, Adolf Berle
Jr. e a Queda do Estado Novo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 1987),
pp. 75–99; and Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), pp. 122–131. On his develop-
ment ideas: Lira Neto, Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicí-
dio (1945–1954) (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2014), p. 208.
28. Neto, Getúlio: Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio, p. 208.
29. Alex Semm, “O Capitão X, Herói ou Vilão? Considerações sobre os efei-
tos político-militares da guerra da coreia no Brasil (1950–1953),” in
Thiago Mourelle and André Fraga (Organizers), Olhares sobre o governo
Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Autografia, 2017), pp. 174–206.
30. Neto, Getúlio:Da volta pela consagração popular ao suicídio, p. 211.
31. Truman to Vargas, Washington, Sept. 4, 1951, Arquivo de Getúlio
Vargas, CPDOC- Rio.
32. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 121; for a summary of the Rio treaty see
Robert H. Holden & Eric Zolov, eds, Latin American and the United
States: A Documentary History (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000),
pp. 187–189. They did convince Colombia to send an infantry battalion
and a warship.
33. Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, US  Army for the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: “Establishment of Joint School for Senior Latin American Officers,”
28 May 1951, JCS 1976/53, CCS 352 (5-25-51), Records of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA.
34. Stanley Hilton, Oswaldo Aranha: Uma Biografia, (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Objetiva, 1994), p. 463, p. 467; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Presença
dos Estados Unidos no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilização Brasileira,
1973), pp. 327–332.
35. Aspásia Camargo & Walder de Góes, eds. Meio Século de Combate: Diálogo
com Cordeiro de Farias (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1981),
note 6, p. 440.
36. Góes Monteiro was then chief of the new Brazilian joint staff. He had
heart problems and had slowed down noticeably.
37. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, pp.  128–129; Memo of Conversation,
“Farewell Visit by General Goes Monteiro  – Brazil- U.S.  Military
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    283

Cooperation,” October 15, 1951, 452  S/S, Papers of Dean Acheson,

Box 66, Harry S Truman Library.
38. Alex Semm. “Carne pra canhão!” A imprensa e o Acordo Militar Brasil-­
Estados Unidos (1950–1953),” Dissertação (mestrado), Universidade do
Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2016, p. 49.
39. Interesting analysis of the accord and its passage in Vasco Leitão da
Cunha, Diplomacia em Alto-mar: Depoimento ao CPDOC (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2003), pp. 186–187, 214–215; for a discussion of
the impact of the accord on the ideological debates, especially in officer
ranks, see Maria Celina Soares D’Araújo, O Segunda Governo Vargas,
1951–54 (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982), pp. 148–159; for text
and memos commenting on the “Mutual Defense Assistance” agreement
which entered into force May 19, 1953: Joint Chiefs of Staff File, 092.2
Brazil, Modern Military Branch, NARA.
40. Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 178.
41. Aranha to Vargas, Washington, Feb. 2, 1952, Aranha Archive,
CPDOC-Rio.
42. Thomas E.  Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964 (NY: Oxford
University Press, 1967), p. 132.
43. The best documented study of Vargas and Perón is Moniz Bandeira,
Brasil, Argentina e Estados Unidos: Conflito e Integração na América do
Sul (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Revan, 2003), pp. 251–259.
44. W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American
Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1993), p. 77.
45. The crisis leading to the president’s suicide is carefully documented in
Hélio Silva, 1954: Um Tiro no Coração (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização
Brasileira, 1978). Ronaldo Conde Aguiar raised serious questions about
the reality of the attack on Carlos Lacerda in his Vitória na Derrota: A
Morte de Getúlio Vargas (Rio de Janeiro: Casa da Palavra, 2004).
46. Dense documentation on the topic can be found in Moniz Bandeira,
Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil, pp. 354–376.
47. The tracking station agreement text is in J.  F. Dulles, Washington,
December 22, 1956, Telegram 512, FRUS, 1955–1957, pp. 732–734.
48. Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, p. 150.
49. Briggs, Rio de Janeiro, December 18, 1956, Telegram 619, FRUS, 1955–
1957, Vol. VII, pp. 731–732.
50. National Intelligence Estimate 93–57, Washington, January 8, 1957:
“Probable Developments in Brazil,” as in FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. VII,
pp. 737–746. Quotation is from p. 738.
284   F. D. MCCANN

51. Stephan G.  Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of
Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988),
pp. 100–110.
52. FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. V, 267–286. For analysis of Eisenhower’s Latin
American policies, see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 64–69,
94–99,135–137.
53. Ibid. pp. 136–137.
54. Ambassador John Crimmins as a junior foreign service officer in the Rio
Embassy had witnessed the scene. He told me about this in 1976, when he
was chief of mission in Brasília. On Santos-Dumont, see http://www.smith-
sonianeducation.org/scitech/impacto/graphic/aviation/alberto.html.
55. W.  Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups d’état: Brazilian-American
Relations, 1945–1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1993), pp. 161–166.
56. BG Albino Silva (Chief of Casa Militar) to Chefe do Estado-Maior das
Fórcas Armadas, Oficio # 76–2 s, Rio, 22 Outubro 1962, HL62.10.22,
CPDOC -Rio and response E.M.  No.337-c/57. Rio, 30 Novembro
1962, HL62.10.22, CPDOC- Rio. Both documents were stamped
SECRET.
57. “Meeting on Brazil on 30 July 1962,” Tape 1, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection, Presidential
Recordings Digital Edition [The Great Crises, vol. 1, ed. Timothy
Naftali] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL:
http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/8010002.
58. My principal source for American promises to the younger officers was
Col. Luiz Paulo Macedo de Carvalho; for the coup see Davis, A
Brotherhood of Arms, pp. 179–183; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of
Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (NY: Oxford University Press, 1988),
pp.  3–17; Moniz Bandeira, Brasil-Estados Unidos: A Rivalidade
Emergente, 1950–1988 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização Brasileiro,
1989), pp. 103–138.
59. The best studies of Castello’s role are Lira Neto, Castello, A Marcha para
a ditadura (São Paulo: Editora Contexto,2004), especially pp. 218–245;
and Elio Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada (São Paulo: Companhia das
Letras, 2002), pp. 45–125.
60. The Institutional Act #2 of October 1965 expanded arbitrary powers of
the executive, and Castello had no choice but to accept the succession of
Minister of the Army, General Arturo Costa e Silva (1967–1969).
61. This did not happen according to a prior plan but from a process of evo-
lution. Symbolic of this attitude was that president-generals wore civilian
clothes rather than military uniforms. Costa e Silva had a heart attack and
died in 1969. He was succeeded by General Emilio Garrastazú Médici
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    285

(1969–1974), General Ernesto Geisel (1974–1979), and General João

Batista Figueiredo (1979–1985).
62. See the Editorial Note (summarizing actions), FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol.
XXXI, pp.  431–432; John W.F.  Dulles, President Castello Branco:
Brazilian Reformer (Texas A & M University Press, 1981); Skidmore,
The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988); Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of
Brazil (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Phyllis
R. Parker, Brazil and the Quiet Intervention, 1964 (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1979). Hélio Silva, 1964: Golpe ou Contragolpe? (Rio de
Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); René A. Dreifuss, 1964: A Conquista
do Estado: Ação Política, Poder e Golpe de Classe (Petrópolis: Editora
Vozes, 1981); Edgard Carone, A Quarta República (1945–1964):
Documentos (São Paulo: Difel/Difusão, 1980); Daniel Drosdoff, Linha
dura no Brasil: O governo Médici, 1969–1974 (São Paulo: Global, 1986);
Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil,
1961–1969 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1990).
63. Ambassador John Hugh Crimmins, Interview, May 10, 1989, Association
of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project,
Library of Congress, pp. 27–28. Http://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/
mssmisc/mfdip/2004/2004cri01/2004cri01.pdf Lingering irritation
undid American efforts to organize a similar intervention in Nicaragua
years later.
64. Luís Vianna Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Biblioteca do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2,
pp. 433–435.
65. Lira Neto, Castello: A marcha para a ditadura (São Paulo: Editora
Contexto, 2004), pp. 330–331.
66. The Americans apparently used several routes to request Brazilian partici-
pation. A news story had General Maxwell Taylor asking for Brazilian para-
troopers. “Taylor Pede Tropas do Brasil para o Vietnã,” Folha de São
Paulo, 12 de Março de 1965. Ambassador Gordon made an official plea:
Geneton Moraes Neto, Entervista: “O Dia em Lincoln Falou…,” O Globo,
Rio, 21/12/09: http://g1.globo.com/platb/geneton/2009/12/21/
o-dia-em-lincoln-gordon-falou-sobre-dois-temas-explosivos-primeiro-os-
estados-unidos-queriam-que-o-brasil-participasse-da-guerra-do-vietnam-
segundo-a-cia-financiou-a-campanha-de-candidatos-simpati/. The Navy
minister was ready to send his marines, but Army Minister Costa e Silva
opposed sending any troops. See Orivaldo Leme Biagi, “O (Quasi)
Envolvimento Militar do Brasil na Guerra do Vietnã,” http://www.his-
torica.arquivoestado.sp.gov.br/materias/anteriores/edicao05/mate-
ria03/militar.pdf. On the Johnson-Castello correspondence, see Luís
286   F. D. MCCANN

Vianna Filho, O Governo Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Biblioteca

do Exército & Editora José Olympio, 1975), Vol. 2, pp. 442–443.
67. Brazil Program Analysis, Washington, November 1, 1969, National
Security Council, Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–49, Senior Review
Group, NSC Files 12–1–70, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.  The
study set out three policy objectives regarding Brazil: “a pro-United
States Government, economic growth, and helping to promote a more
modern social structure.”
68. This was done in the so-called Reuss amendment to the Foreign Military
Sales Act as an expression of the sense of Congress.
69. Viron P. Vaky, Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, National Security Council,
May 19, 1970, Subject: Brazil and Reuss Amendment to Foreign Military
Sales Act; NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Latin America, Brazil, Vol.
1, Through August 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
70. He wrote that instruction on a memo from Kissinger: NSC Files., Box
29, Country Files, Brazil, President’s Daily Briefing, Chronological File,
December 1–15, 1970, NARA.
71. Memorandum of Meeting, White House, Washington, Dec 14, 1970,
Nixon, Ambassador William Rountree and Arnold Nachmanoff (NSC),
Subject: Brazil;, NSC Files, Box 771, Country Files, Brazil, Volume 2,
September 1970–31 July 31 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA.
72. “Passeata dos Cem Mil,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds,
Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro:
Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2616–2619.
The cautioning general was Carlos de Meira Mattos, who did a report
noting numerous problems in the universities. Meira Mattos had been
Mascarenhas’s aide-de-camp during the FEB.
73. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and
Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p.  37.
http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
74. Ronald M. Schneider, “Order and Progress”: A Political History of Brazil
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 261–262.
75. “Emílio Garrastazu Médici,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds,
Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro:
Editora Forense-Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 2159–2172.
76. Elio Gaspari, As Ilusções Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada (São Paulo;
Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 129–130.
77. “Mas não aceito tortura, nem que se maltrate o preso, nem que se mate
preso. Não aceito de jeito nenhum isso.” Oral History Interview,
FONTOURA, Carlos Alberto da. Carlos Alberto da Fontoura (depoi-
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    287

mento, 1993), (Rio de Janeiro, CPDOC, Fundação Getúlio Vargas,

2005), p. 128.
78. Richard Morse, Thomas Skidmore, Stanley Stein, Charles Wagley, and 97
others, “A Protest to the Brazilian Government,” The New York Times,
March 8, 1970 (I was one of the 97);William L. Wipfler, “Repression and
Terror, The Price of “Progress” in Brazil, Christianity and Crisis (NY),
March 16, 1970, pp. 44–48; Brady Tyson, “Brazil Twists Thumbscrews…”
The Washington Post, April 5, 1970; American Committee for Information
on Brazil, “Terror in Brazil: A Dossier,” April 1970: reported that there
were nearly 12,000 political prisoners; Ralph Della Cava, “Torture in
Brazil,” Commonweal, Vol. XCII, No. 6, April 24, 1970, pp. 135–141;
James N.  Green, “Opposing the Dictatorship in the United States:
Human Rights and the Organization of American States,” in Sidnei
J. Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations
in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual
de Maringá, 2013), pp. 391–413.
79. Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 154.
80. Many officers opposed such behavior and made attempts within the
armed forces to resist it. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, Estado e Oposição
no Brasil (1964–1984), (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1984), pp. 166–181.
In later years those opposed would publicly defend their colleagues’
behavior as lamentable but necessary. While doing research in the army
headquarters in Brasília in 1976–1977, a number of field-grade officers
without prompting told me they opposed the repression.
81. Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo:
Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288.
82. Richard Nixon: “Toasts of the President and President Medici of Brazil,”
December 7, 1971. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley,
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=3247.
83. The Brazilian Truth Commission uncovered considerable evidence of
Brazilian support for the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende’s govern-
ment to the extent of providing training in torture and military equip-
ment. The Brazilian embassy was fully behind the Chilean coup. See the
report: “Memória das trevas: Arquivos revelam como o Brasil ajudou a
ditadura chilena,” Diário do Poder, 27 de abril de 2014. http://www.
diariodopoder.com.br/noticias/arquivos-revelam-como-o-brasil-­
ajudou-a-ditadura-chilena/.
84. Nixon- Médici meeting in White House, Dec 7, 1971 FRUS, 1969–
1976,Vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972,
288   F. D. MCCANN

Document 141 ­http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-

76ve10/d141.
85. “Ernesto Geisel,” Israel Beloch & Alzira Alves de Abreu, eds, Dicionário
Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, 1930–1983 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora
Forense-­Universitário & FGV/CPDOC, 1984), pp. 1450–1459.
General João Batista Figueiredo was Médici’s close aide, but he also
had long ties to Geisel and his close advisers. He played a role in Médici’s
decision for Geisel and he would succeed Geisel as the last general-presi-
dent of the military regime.
86. Because of intense press censorship, the selection process was hidden
from the Brazilian public. There are excellent reconstructions in Ronald
M. Schneider, “Order and Progress” A Political History of Brazil (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 262–266; Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics
of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), pp.  149–154; Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A
Ditadura Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003),
pp. 215–228.
87. Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura Derrotada (São
Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), pp. 287–288. On page 322: “Os
comandantes do exército estão sem um respaldo legal para esse problema.
A verdade é essa. … Para a guerra externa a gente tem legislação, mas para
a nossa guerra específica, não temos.”
88. Thomas E.  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 167 and 364, note 18. In an
interview in 1974, Geisel told Alfred Stepan that “not only did he not
have a mandate for distensão but significant military opinion … opposed
distensão.” Namely, the “security apparatus” was opposed. Alfred Stepan,
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 35–39.
89. Between 1965 and 1968, reported cases averaged 71 per year. In Médici’s
last year there had been 736; in 1974 there were 67 reported cases of
torture or death. See Elio Gaspari, O Sacerdote e o Feiticeiro: A Ditadura
Derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), p. 403. It seems
that the hard-liners tried to avoid detection and record keeping by simply
eliminating suspects instead of arresting them; Brazil: Nunca Mais
(Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1985), p. 64. According to this report, at the
time Geisel took office, some 20 individuals simply disappeared after
being detained.
90. Cládio Guerra, Memórias de um guerra suja (Rio de Janeiro: Top books
Editora, 2012), pp. 151–152. Some former torturers testified about their
crimes before the National Truth Commission.
91. CIA, office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80 M01048A:
Subject Files Box 1, Folder 29:B-10 Brazil. Secret memorandum from
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    289

Director of Central Intelligence William Colby to Secretary of State

Kissinger, Washington, April 11, 1974, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume
E-11, Part 2 Documents on South America, 1973–1976, document 99.
92. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and
Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, p.  49.
http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
93. Walder de Góes, O Brasil do General Geisel (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova
Fronteira, 1978), p. 30.
94. Jerry Dávila, Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African
Decolonization, 1950–1980 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010),
p. 51 and James G. Hershberg, “‘No Longer Anyone’s Sacristan’: New
Evidence on Brazil’s Surprise Recognition of the MPLA Government in
Angola” (Paper at the “Southern Africa in the Cold War Era Conference”
in Lisbon, Portugal, May 2009).
95. Dani K. Nedal & Tatiana Coutto, “Brazil’s 1975 Nuclear Agreement with
West Germany,” Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Wilson
Center: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazils-1975-nuclear-
agreement-west-germany. “Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister
Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian
Responses,” February 25, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea
do Brasil (CPDOC), Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV), Azeredo da Silveira
Archive, 1974.08.15 pp. 544–549.
96. They signed the memo in Brasilia on February 21, 1976. Frank
D. McCann, “The Value of U.S.-Brazilian Consultation,” Op-Ed Page,
The New York Times, March 6, 1976.
97. Quotes from Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, March
15, 1976, text of agreement, pp. 337–338. Brazil negotiated similar con-
sultative agreements with France, Britain, and Germany. Hopeful observ-
ers saw it as reinforcing the traditional alliance. For more analysis, see
Thomas E.  Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 95–196.
98. The whole paragraph is based upon Ambassador John H.  Crimmins,
Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral
History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 44–45. http://www.loc.gov/item/
mfdipbib000247.
99. Ambassador John H. Crimmins, Association of Diplomatic Studies and
Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 10, 1989, pp. 45–46.
http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000247.
100. For an internal State Department analysis of US human rights policy, there
is Human Rights S/P Study—Policy Planning Vol. II, L/HR Files: Lot 80
290   F. D. MCCANN

D 275, RG 59, NARA. ­http://history.state.gov/­historicaldocuments/

frus1969-76ve03/d264.
101. Robert Wesson, The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence (NY:
Praeger, 1981), pp. 75–89. I was then resident in Brasília and observed
these events closely.
102. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. Ernesto Geisel (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp.  305; 340–341; Dani K.  Nedal,
“U.S.  Diplomatic Efforts Stalled Brazil’s Nuclear Program in 1970s,”
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-efforts-
stalled-brazils-nuclear-program-1970s.
103. See Andre Gustavo Stumpf & Merval Pereira Filho, A Segunda Guerra:
Sucessão de Geisel (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1979). For Frota’s
views see Sylvio Frota, Ideais Traídos: A Mais Grave Crise dos Governos
Militares (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006), especially
pp. 499–536.
104. Brazilian reaction was discussed in “Impact of the US Stand on Human
Rights,” Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, May 11, 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, Vol. II, Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 42 http://history.state.gov/­
historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v02/d42.
105. Elio Gaspari, As Ilusões Armadas: A Ditadura Escancarada (São Paulo:
Companhia das Letras, 2002), pp. 305–306; for an extensive study, see
Martha K.  Huggins, Political Policing: the United States and Latin
America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). Of course police
mistreatment of prisoners had been commonplace, what was unusual was
its institutionalization by the armed forces.
106. Maria Celina D’Araujo & Celso Castro, eds. Ernesto Geisel (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1997), pp.  336–337; Paulo Fagundes Visentini,
“Brazil-USA relations during the Military Dictatorship (1964–1985)” in
Sidnei J.  Munhoz & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-­-
U.S.  Relations in the 20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da
Universidade Estadual de Maringá, 2013), pp. 195–216.
107. “O programa nuclear secreto brasileiro (Programa nuclear paralelo)”
Gamevicio, 17 Dez 2011. http://www.gamevicio.com/i/noticias/106/
106426-o-programa-nuclear-secreto-brasileiro-programa-nuclear-para-
lelo/.
108. Robert C.  Harding, “Ergue-se Marte!A Evolução do Programa Espacial
Brasileiro em Apoio à Segurança Nacional,” Air & Space Power Journal
[U.S. Air Force] Vol. XXI, No. 4, December 2009; http://www.au.af.mil/
au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-p/2009/4tri09/harding.html.
109. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/106612.pdf. It was
signed in Brasília on October 14, 1997.
   COLD WIND FROM THE EAST    291

110. Décio Castilho Ceballos, “The Brazilian space program: a selective strat-
egy for space development and business” (November 16, 1999). https://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/026596469592254B.
111. Cardoso overlapped with Clinton and Bush. His goal was to make good
relations the norm; see Paulo Roberto Almeida, “Brazil-USA relations
during the Fernando Henrique Cardoso governments,” Sidnei J. Munhoz
& Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S.  Relations in the
20th and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de
Maringá, 2013), pp. 217–238.
112. Even officers who had long personal history of being unequivocally pro-­
American were deeply angry at the American insensitivity to the point of
talking about returning their coveted American medals.
113. Ricardo Pereira Cabral, “The Foreign Policy of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva’s
Government and its relations with the USA” in Sidnei J.  Munhoz &
Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva, Eds. Brazil-U.S. Relations in the 20th
and 21st Centuries (Maringá: Editora da Universidade Estadual de Maringá,
2013), pp. 247–287. “Brazil to Say ‘No, Thanks’ to US,” Brazzil, Brazil/
US, May 2003; http://www.brazzil.com/p128may03.htm.
114. Stephan Clark, “Brazilian rocket explodes on launch pad,” Spaceflight
Now, August 22, 2003. VLS stands for Veiculo Lançador de Satélites.
115. Though investigations dismissed rumors of sabotage, they continue to
circulate. Sean T.  Mitchell, Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race &
Utopia in Brazil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017),
pp.  80–90, 159–164. Statements in the press hinted at “gradual sabo-
tage” of the project, Edwardo Hollanda & Hélio Contreiros, “Jóia da
coroa: Interesse estrangeiros pela base de Alcântara põe o Brasil mais
perto do sonho de lançar seu próprio satélite,” Isto É (São Paulo)
2/25/2004, https://istoe.com.br/27183_JOIA+DA+COROA/.
116. Likely the best example of implying sabotage is the “study” by Ronaldo
Schlichting and Colonel Roberto Monteiro de Oliveira, “A sistemáteca
sabotage contra a Missão Espacial Completa Brasileira (MECB) e contra
o projeto VLS-1,” Curitiba, December 8, 2004, Analiíses Estrategicas:
Polítical Nacional e Global. http://www.suaaltezaogato.com.br/arq/
Gavetao/Ronaldo_Schlichting_(Sabotagem_Programa_Espacial
Brasileiro).pdf.
117. After the 2003 disintegration of the Columbia spacecraft, the Americans
were dependent on Russian vehicles to reach the space station at the cost
of $60 million per astronaut. The fee charged by Brazil was a bargain by
comparison. The life and career of Colonel Pontes are laid out in http://
www.marcospontes.com/$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html. “First
Brazilian astronaut returns to Earth,” New Scientist, Daily News, April
10, 2006, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn8972-first-­
brazilian-astronaut-returns-to-earth/; Marcos C.  Pontes (Lieutenant
292   F. D. MCCANN

Colonel, Brazil Air Force Astronaut, Brazilian Space Agency), https://

www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/htmlbios/pontes.html.
118. Sean T.  Mitchell, Constellations of Inequality: Space, Race & Utopia in
Brazil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 160.
119. Frank D. McCann,“Brasil: Acima de Tudo!! The Brazilian Armed Forces:
Remodeling for a New Era,” Diálogos vol. 21 no. 1 (2017), pp. 57–95.
https://doi.org/10.4025/dialogos.v21i1.
120. “Why Brazil signed a military agreement with the US,” The Christian
Science Monitor, April 13, 2010.
121. Lt. Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, “Restoring the ‘Unwritten Alliance’ in
Brazil—United States Relations, Strategy Research Project, U.S.  Army
War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA) March 12, 2012, ADA 560773.pdf.
122. The White House, “Fact Sheet: The United States and Brazil – A Mature
and Multifaceted Partnership,” June 30, 2015. https://­obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/fact-sheet-united-states-
and-brazil-mature-and-multi-faceted-­partnership.
123. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-
dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html and https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/05/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-lula-
corruption-workers-party.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FDa%­
20Silva%2C%­20Luiz%­20In%C3%A1cio%­20Lula&action=click&­content
C o l l e c t i o n = t i m e s t o p i c s & r e g i o n = s t r e a m &­m o d u l e = s t r e a m _
unit&version=­latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=­collection.
124. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-usa-military/u-s-military-
joins-brazil-army-exercises-in-­amazon-idUSKBN1D8347.
125. Rostand Medeiros, “Sengunda Guerra Mundial: O ultimo militar Americano
em Natal,“Tok de História, 17/12/2012. https://­tokdehistoria.com.
br/2012/11/17/4341/ Medeiros specializes in  the  history of  Natal.
He  was  my guide and  host in  a  visit to  the  city and  the  air force base at
Parnamirim in June 2013. For the affect of the war and American troops on
Natal see João Wilson Melo, A Cidade e o trampolim (Natal: Sebo Vermelho,
2003); Clyde Smith Junior, Trampolim para a Vitória: os americanos em
Natal - RN: Brasil durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (Natal: Editora do
UFRN, 1992); Giovana Paiva de Oliveira, Natal em guerra: as transformações
da cidade na Segunda Guerra Mundial (Natal: Editora do UFRN, 2014).
 Index

A Fortaleza, 64, 250

Abbink Mission, 255 in Latin America, 81
Abreu, João Leitão de, 269 Maceió, 64
Abyssinia, 32 Natal, 64, 65, 81, 115, 127, 145,
Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras, 211, 225, 250, 277
202, 210, 267 post-war, 249–251
Academics, 116, 268 Recife, 64, 115, 127, 225, 250
Adams, Claude M., 144, 160, 167, Salvador, 64
168, 190, 191 São Luiz, 250
Adams, Ruth, 144 Vila Militar, 185, 193
Aeronautics minister, see Gomes, West Africa, 251
Eduardo Air Corps Ferrying Command, 86
Africa, 85, 149, 161, 162, 166, 250 Aircraft, 9, 11, 68, 77, 78, 117, 120,
Africa corps, see Rommel, Erwin 127, 151, 228
African colonies, 78, 272 American, 120, 250
Agriculture, 128, 163 Axis threat to, 144
Agulhas Negras, 192 carriers, 227, 266
Air bases, 211–212 combat, 85
Amapá, 250 fighter, 212
Belém, 64, 127, 129, 186, French carrier Bearn, 61
225, 250 German, 65
Camoçim, 64 Airfields, 11, 40, 63–64, 68, 86, 102,
Cape Verde Islands, 251 122, 164, 212, 250
Fernando de Noronha Island, 34 See also Air bases

© The Author(s) 2018 293

F. D. McCann, Brazil and the United States during
World War II and Its Aftermath,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92910-1
294   INDEX

Air force American Mongolia, 66

Brazil, 145, 191, 228, 234, 250, 251 Ammunition, 35, 81, 86, 104, 127,
Brazilian and space program, 276 200, 269
Airlines Amnesty International, 268
Air France, 64 Amnesty, student, 267
Cia. Aêropostal Brasileira, 64 Angola, 272
Lufthansa, 64 Anibal Benevolo (passenger ship), 154
Pan American Airways (PAA), 63, See also Operation Brazil
65, 86, 250 Anti-aircraft, 73
Panair do Brasil, 63, 64, 86, 250 artillery, 127
Air Intelligence Staff, 130 batteries, 39
Airplanes, 85, 114, 186 defense, 25
Airport Development Program (ADP), guns, 120, 127
62–66 regiments, 85
See also Military Appropriation Act; units, 186
Pan American Airports Anti-Americanism, 22, 26, 123, 228,
Corporation 254, 258
Air Transport Command, 120, 164, Anti-Axis, 72, 156, 159
211, 278 Anti-Castro, 262
Alcântara, 275–277 Anti-communism, 257, 264
Alecrim cemetery, 278 Anti-communist, 262
Alexander, Harold R. L. G., 232 Anti-Goulart, 264
Alexandria, 152 See also Gordon, Lincoln; Johnson
Algiers, 183 administration
Alliance, 8, 185, 208, 212, 241, 256, Anti-Goulart forces, 263
257, 264, 272 Antigua, 67
Alliance for Progress, 260 Anti-submarine, 145, 146
Allied merchantmen, 150 Anti-tank artillery, 127
Allies, 39, 114, 150, 152, 171, 203, Anti-tank guns, 120
233 Anti-Vargas, 259
Alvim, Hugo Panasco, 265 Anti-Zionist resolution, 271
Amazon, 61, 118, 119, 129, 233, Anzio, 195
269, 276, 277 Aquarela do Brasil (song), 69
reconnaissance of, 144 Aragipe (yacht), 155
Amazonia, 108, 278 See also Operation Brazil
Amazonian states, 128 Araguaia region, 269
American Atoms for Peace program, 272 Aranha, Oswaldo, 7, 21, 41,
American embassy, 116, 160, 228 64, 74, 81, 84, 101–105,
American F-5s, 266 107–111, 114, 115, 122,
American General Staff, 76, 123, 230 128, 130–132, 147, 167,
American military 188, 197, 212, 257,
Brazilian views of, 31, 33 258, 272
views, 230–231 Brazilian-American alliance, 170
  INDEX 
   295

Northeastern Brazil defense Brazilian, 66, 71, 125–126

agreement, 120 delivery, 43, 80, 101, 118
and political accord, 132 development of, 73, 277
and relations with United States, 27 force of, 64
and state of war, 157–158 German supply of, 39, 41, 60, 66
war objectives, 162–163 need for, 66, 71, 78, 105, 120, 259
Aranha, Oswaldo Gudolle, 188, 197 in Northeast Brazil, 29
Arará, see Operation Brazil policies, 21
Araraquara (luxury vessel), 154 post-war supply of, 229, 230, 252
See also Operation Brazil production of, 104, 166
Araújo, Cauby C., 63, 64 purchase of, 9, 21, 35, 60, 67, 71,
Archangel, Russia, 151 187, 256, 266
Archives, 12, 225, 231 race, 229
Argentina, 7, 21, 38, 102, 106, 112, Russian sales of, 277
147, 167, 230, 269 sales, 20, 35–36, 226
aligned with rebels, 40 shipments, 67, 71
arms, 252 standardization of, 249
as Brazil’s rival, 21 supply, 31, 35, 251, 257
campaign against, 130 surplus, 254
and Chaco War, 20–21 trade, 24
distrust of, 106 training, 73–74, 192, 205
German and Italian populations transfers, 260
in, 27 US supply of, 34–36, 41, 65–67,
Inter-American Conference, 100 71–73, 78, 81, 101, 104, 110,
“Nazi Menace” in, 100 115, 127, 228
negative image of, 100 See also Lend-Lease arms
neutrality, 119 Army
and Peronist phenomenon, 236 Argentina, 118
relationship with Germany, 100 Brazil, 4, 9, 10, 28, 126, 168–170;
relations with axis, 105 alliance with US, 27–37; prior
and Richard Nixon, 261 to war, 19–23; reorganization
threat of, 171, 226, 252 before war, 184–195
as threat to Brazil, 12 Chile, 100
worries about, 118–119 France, 9
Argentine-Brazilian relations, 107 Germany, 100
Argentine-Brazilian-Chilean Latin America, 126
alliance, 259 Latin American Section of US, 116
Armaments, 37, 60, 71, 104, 106, South America, 192
226, 277 US, 25, 65, 73, 76, 113, 126, 127,
Arms 166–167, 170, 171, 189, 191,
American, 21, 262 208; alliance with Brazil,
appeal to, 32 27–37; Operations Division
and army, 32 (OPD), 190, 210, 230
296   INDEX

Army Air Corps (US), 31, 40, 84, 85, break with, 110
117, 153 breaking relations with, 105
Army bases, Vila Militar, 186, 193, influence, 22
195, 210 and Inter-American Conference, 104
Army Chief of Staff, see Góes invasion of Brazil, 39
Monteiro, Aurélio Pedro de propaganda, 70, 116
Army War College (US), 25, 39, 41, relations with, 158
72, 73, 252, 277 relations with Argentina
Arnold, Henry H., 31 and Chile, 147
Artic route, 151 submarines, 119–120
Artillery school, 9 sympathizers, 123, 156, 160
Aruba, 148 threat, 11, 23, 45, 67, 73, 119,
AS-4 convoy, 149, 150 126, 144
Asia, 84, 256 troops in Tunisia, 183
Astronaut, 275, 276 vessels, 146
See also Industry, space war with Brazil, 104
Atlantic Charter, 160 Axis alliance, 23
Atlantic narrows, 211 Axis nationals, 156
Atomic agreement, 273 Azores, 74, 149, 165, 172
Atomic energy, 6, 256, 260, 275
Atomic program, 257, 260, 272
Atomic technology, 257 B
Atucha (reactor), 272 B-17, 36, 65
Austria, 231 B-25, 120
Authoritarianism, 43, 236, 264, 266, Baependy (passenger steamer),
269, 270 145, 153, 159
Automobiles, 4 See also Operation Brazil
Aviation, 9, 125, 147, 198 Bahamas, 67
advances in, 39 Bahia, 69, 129, 146–156, 278
civil, 63, 250 Balkans, the, 23
civil conference, 237 Barber, Henry A., Jr., 130, 131
material, 123 Barra da Tijuca, 105
military, 31, 63 Barreira do Inferno, 275
ministry, 64 Barroso, Ari, 69
ministry of aeronautics, 63 Barton, Henry A., 124
naval, 114 Batista, Fulgencio, 262
Axis, 8, 66–68, 82, 85, 86, Battle of Recife, 188
99, 101–103, 107, 108, Battleships, 146, 227
110, 112, 119, 123, 125, Bay of All Saints, 155
128, 129, 149, 159, 231, See also Operation Brazil
233, 234 Belém do Pará, 31, 65, 82, 83, 85,
advance in West Africa, 126 119, 147, 156, 187
agents, 144 See also Air bases
  INDEX 
   297

Belgium, 23, 42 General Staff of the Armed Forces

Belo Horizonte, 29, 31, 39, 193 (EMFA), 262
Belvedere, 204 government forms of, 6
Belvedere-Torraccia, 203 Northeast, 67
Berle, Adolf, 109, 212, 227–229, Northeast as German target, 71
237–239, 255 perception of, 10–11
See also Constituinte; Vargas, Getúlio public opinion of World War II, 71
Berlin, 41, 43, 62, 111 relations with axis, 106
See also Government, German Brazilian Air Force, 114
Bermuda, 67 Brazilian Air Ministry, 144
Bilateralism, 36, 237, 251 Brazilian-American alliance, 45,
Bittencourt, Amaro Soares, 71 66–67, 74–75, 79, 86–87, 132,
Black people, 69 143–145, 156, 158, 162, 185
Blockade post-war negotiations, 226–230
American, 61 post-war relationship, 252–253
Axis, 211 Brazilian-American military relations,
British, 61, 67 11, 130, 272
German, 125 contemporary, 275–278
Italian, 125 Brazilian-American relations, 25,
Blohm & Voss (shipyard), 153 78–80, 102, 104, 115, 117,
Bolivia, 20, 269, 276 229, 275
Bolling Field, 120 Brazilian-Argentine relations, 100–101
Bologna, 199, 203 Brazilian bulge, 24, 73, 85, 113
Bombers, 84, 120, 228 Brazilian Empire, 9
Bonds, 5 Brazilian Expeditionary Corps,
Bonn, 273 see Divisions, 1st Infantry
Books Regiment, Brazil
The Brazilian-American Alliance, Brazilian Expeditionary Force,
1937–1945, 8 6, 10, 172, 183–184, 188,
Casa Grande e Senzala, 69 189, 191–193, 195
Os Sertões, 69 organization of, 195–198
Bradley, Omar, 73, 125 performance of, 198–213
Braga, Jane Gray, 191 See also Força Expedicionária
Brasília, 260, 261, 273 Brasileira (FEB)
Brazil, 8, 147 Brazilian fleet, 20, 146
army, 29 Brazilian general staff, 37, 60, 75, 76,
attitude to US help, 59 115, 160, 189
and Chaco War, 20–21 Brazilian High Command, 106, 168
Chamber of Deputies, 5, 267 Brazilian military
Constitution of 1934, 5, 32 attitude towards entering war,
Constitution of 1937, 240 75, 78, 172
Constitution of 1946, 239 cooperation with United States, 38,
defense of, 37, 40 59, 114, 116, 169, 228
298   INDEX

Brazilian military (cont.) Buarque (ship), 119

German supplies to, 20, 22, 41 Buenos Aires, 100, 118, 163
justification of power, 264 See also Inter-American Conference
marches and demonstrations Burdett, William C., 39
against, 256 Bureaucracy, 2, 145, 237
and national security, 19, 22 Burma, 127
nature of, 2 Byrnes, James F., 228, 235
opposition to American troops in
northeast, 65
position of, in Cold War, 249 C
post-Cold War relations with United Cacao, 155
States, 277 Cachoeira, 192
post-war occupation, 231–233 Caffery, Jefferson, 37, 41, 62, 74, 75,
reform of, 19 81, 82, 117, 122, 127, 130–132,
training in United States, 39 191, 227, 251
United States military supplies of, 19 amd, 158
use of United States for military and Brazilian arms, 125–126
supply, 128, 198 correspondence to, 114
view of partnership with United dissatisfaction with, 123–125
States, 10, 36, 113, 228 and Inter-American Conference,
weakness, 25, 30, 32 101–112
Brazilian neutrality, 23–27, 34, and political accord, 127–132
37, 39–41, 59, 63, 65, 78, Caiado de Castro, Aguinaldo, 188, 193
86, 145, 147 Cairú (steamer), 119–121
Brazilian Pavili, 33 Calibers, 66
Brazilian proposal, 129 California, 148
Brazilian Society for the Progress Camp Claiborne, 125
of Science, 276 Camp Sutton, 125
Brazilian Space Agency, 276 Campiani, Cesar, 207
Bridges, 33, 118, 237 Canal Zone, 257
See also Golden Gate Bridge Canary Islands, 40
Briggs, Ellis O., 260 Candee, Robert C., 86, 112
British Admiralty, 40 Candelária (church), 266
British colonies, 23 Candotti, Ennio, 276
British consul, 129 Cape Hatteras, 120
British Empire, 67 Cape São Roque, 60, 150
British forces, 65, 82, 150 Cape Town, 150, 152
British Guiana, 67 Cape Verde, 40
Brittany, 148 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 230, 276
Broadcasting, 26, 144 Cardoso, Maurício José, 193
Broadway, 69 See also Divisions, 2nd Military
Brown, Lawrence T., 277 Region, Brazil
Browning, Thomas N., 278 Caribbean, 61, 99, 127, 151
  INDEX 
   299

Cariocas, 153 Chilean-Brazilian relations, 107

Carl Zeiss Company, 22 Chilean-German relations, 100
Carneiro, Rui, 229 China, 32, 35, 127, 168, 256
Carter, Jimmy, 273, 274 Christopher, Warren, 273
Casablanca, 183 Churchill, Winston, 24, 117, 119,
Casablanca Conference, 162, 165, 211 151, 195
Casa Civil, 269 Cincinnati, 278
See also Abreu, João Leitão de Civilian-centrist governments, 6
Casa Militar, 262 Civil war, 3, 19, 35, 40, 60
Cassidy, Richard, 191 Clark, Mark, 199, 207, 231
Castellistas, 270 See also Crittenberger, Willis D;
Castello Branco, Humberto de Divisions, 5th Army, US
Alencar, 188, 232, 263, 265, Clay, Lucius D., 86, 112, 113
268, 270 Clergy (clerics), 268, 269
Castillo, Ramón, 104, 108, 119 Cleveland, Grover, 8
Castro, Fidel, 262 Clinton, Bill, 276
Catalina 83P6, 155 Coalition, 72, 206, 255
See also Operation Brazil Coffee, 4, 43, 259
Catete Palace, 110, 120, 226 Cold War, 212, 249
Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, José Colombia, 20, 100, 276
Pessôa, 192 Columbia University, 116
Ceará, 149, 156 Combat, 31, 152, 163, 166,
Censors, 119, 160 170, 184, 185, 188, 191,
Central America, 99 196, 198, 199, 203, 204,
Central do Brazil, 117 208, 210, 252, 256
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), aircraft, 120, 127
252, 262, 264 arms, 68
Centro de Informação do Exército cars, 118
(CIEx), 271 engineers, 73, 84
Chaco, 32 experience, 202, 206
Chaco War, 20 operations, 168, 185, 204, 225
Chaney, James E., 31 personnel, 197
Chapultepec resolution, 251 planes, 12
Chargé d’affaires, 39, 111, 228 role, 166, 170
See also Burdett, William C. skills, 209
Chateaubriand, Francisco Assis, 167 teams, 210
See also Newspapers and magazines troops, 68, 208, 212
Chatô, see Chateaubriand, units, 168, 198
Francisco Assis vessels, 229
Chicago, 237 veterans, 210
Chief of Staff, see Marshall, George C. zone, 188, 191
Chile, 32, 102, 106, 147, 230, 252, 269 Command and General Staff School,
Inter-American Conference, 100 144, 159, 198, 262
300   INDEX

Communism, 30, 239, 249, 256, 258, Crittenberger, Willis D., 232
261, 263–265 See also Castello Branco, Humberto
Communist, 236, 238, 249, 258, 262 de Alencar; Divisions, 4th
Communist Party of Brazil (PCB), Corps, US; Divisions, 5th
236, 239, 256 Army, US
Compensation trade, see Trade Cuba, 262, 265, 272
Congress Czechoslovakia, 26, 159
Brazil, 252, 255, 258–260, 264,
267, 278
US, 35, 63, 249, 263, 266, 273 D
Congressional Medal of Honor, see da Gama, Domicio, 21
Ingram, Jonas H. da Silva, Ignacio Lula, 230
Conspiracy, 121, 264 Dakar, 24, 74, 81, 82, 149, 160, 164
Constituinte, 238 DaMatta, Roberto, 3
See also Berle, Adolf Darlan, Jean-Francois, 74
Constitutional government, 5 Dávila, Jerry, 272
Convoys, 121, 129, 149–151 Davis, Sonny, 260
Cooke Mission, the, 254, 255 de Lima Brayner, Floriano, 202, 232
Cooke, Morris, 7 de Lyra Tavares, Aurelio, 188
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs De Macedo Soares, José Eduardo, 161
(OCIAA), US, 69 See also Newpapers and magazines
See also Rockefeller, Nelson A. de Maia, José Joaquim, 185
Copacabana, 158 de Paula Rodrigues Alves, José, 119
Copacabana Palace Hotel, 109 de Sousa Costa, Artur, 117, 118, 127
Corcovado Mountain, 158 Decree, 63, 64, 158, 259, 264
Cordeiro de Farias, Osvaldo, 167, Aiport Development Program
185, 192, 195, 257 (ADP), 63–65
Corps of Cadets, 33 Estado Novo, 235
Corregidor, 117 legalizing Natal Air Base, 120
Costa e Silva, Artur, 264, 267–270 state of war, 157–158
Cost of living, 128, 236 Decree-laws, 64
Costistas, 270 Defense, 28, 30, 33, 43, 60
Cotton, 43 against Argentina, 29
Counter-espionage, 124 Brazilian coast, 34
Coup, 27, 80, 236, 237, 239, 240, Brazilian naval, 147
263, 264, 267 Brazil’s coast, 24
Coup d’état, 212, 237, 239, 263, 264 hemispheric, 37
Coutinho, Dale, 270 joint, 29
Couto e Silva, Golbery, 270 New York City, 127
CPDOC, 239 North Atlantic, 67–68
Craig, Malin, 27, 29 Northeast Brazil, 24, 120, 128
Crimmins, John, 267, 273, 274 Defense agreement, 121, 132
  INDEX 
   301

Della Cava, Ralph, 268 1st Expeditionary, Brazil, 191, 192

Demobilization, 210, 225 1st Infantry Regiment, Brazil,
Democracy, 4, 24, 42, 67, 102, 126, 188, 193
188, 236, 239, 240, 257, 264 2nd Division, Brazil, 189
Demonstrations, 156, 159, 160, 256, 2nd Military Region, Brazil,
266–268 168, 192, 193 (see also
Denmark, 67 Cardoso, Maurício José)
Department of Civil Aviation (DAC), 64 3rd Army, Brazil, 268
Destroyers, 67, 227 3rd Division, Brazil, 189
Development, 3, 5, 8, 126, 253, 4th Army, US, 31
258–261, 274, 275, 277 4th Corps, US, 198, 203, 206, 232
air power, 163 4th Fleet, US, 227
Amazonian, 6 5th Army, US, 198, 199, 207,
anti-nuclear, 274 231, 232
Brazilian, 7 5th Brigade of the 3d Division,
economic, 118, 249, 255 US, 144
forces, 171 6th Military Regions, Brazil, 157
industries, 60, 130, 163, 164 7th Army, US, 199
investment, 258 7th Artillery Group, Brazil, 145, 154
maritime power, 163 (see also Operation Brazil)
military, 249 7th Military Region, Brazil, 157,
oil, 254 168, 196, 197
petroleum, 252, 254, 258 8th Army, British, 183, 199
wartime, 235 10th Mountain, US, 205
See also Arms; Industry 15th Group of Armies, British, 232
Diário Oficial, 64 22 AAF Weather Squadron, US, 278
Diários Associads, see Newspapers and 82nd Airborne, US, 125
magazines 92d “Black Buffalo,” US, 201, 203
Dictatorship, 4, 6, 21, 27, 158, 170, 101st Airborne, US, 125
210, 235, 237, 240, 241, 257, 148th Division, German, 206, 208
264, 267–269 350th Fighter Group, US, 211
See also Argentina; Bolivia; Chile; British 8th Army, 153
Uruguay Fascist Italia, 206
Diplomacy, 120, 125, 232 Fascist Monte Rosa, Italian, 206
political, 80 Fascist San Marco, Italian, 206
Disaster relief, 278 French, 189
Discrimination, 169, 235 Italian Fascist divisions, 208
Disney Studios, 70, 207 Polish, 189
Disney, Walt, 69, 212 Tenth Mountain, US, 203, 204
Dissidents, 268 Dominican affair, 265
Divisions, 154, 193 Dominican Republic, 265
1st Division, Brazil, 189–191, 194 Donald Duck, 212
302   INDEX

Donitz, Admiral, 148 Education, 227, 254, 277

Donovan, William, 70 American, 205
Doolittle raid, 151 Chilean, 100
Dos Reis, Lauro Mourinho, 154 civil and moral, 30
See also Divisions, 7th Artillery military, 212, 252, 277
Group, Brazil; Operation Brazil public, 3
Duggan, Lawrence, 106 Egypt, 152
Dulles, John Foster, 258, 259 Eisenhower administration,
Dunkirk, 23 258, 261, 262
Dutch Guiana, 172 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 73, 123,
Dutra, Enrico Gaspar, 26, 29, 37, 45, 125, 129, 166, 168, 183, 191,
59, 66, 72, 77, 83, 84, 109, 144, 258, 261
145, 157–162, 167–169, 171, El Alamein, 150, 152, 153
190, 193, 196, 207, 208, 210, Elections, 5, 236, 238, 239, 255, 260,
212, 228, 231, 238–240, 255 264
American distrust of, 169 Electric power grid, 259
and Brazilian-American alliance, 185 Electrobrás, 259
conditions for US alliance, 38 Eleventh Regiment, Brazilian, 206
and discrimination, 169 Embargo, 122
elected president, 239 Emergency Fund, US, 63
and Estado Novo, 21 Emmons, Delos C., 36
forces in Pacific, 161–162 Empire of Brazil, 1
and the Mutual Brodcasting Empire of Japan, 234
System, 185 Engineer Replacement Training
meeting with Marshall, 189 Center, 125
and state of war, 157–158 England, see Great Britain
talk of resignation, 104, 105, 110 English Channel, 23, 42
tour of US army facilities, 188 Equipment, 11, 12, 25, 32, 60, 65,
visit to Eisenhower, 168–169 67, 71, 78, 79, 81, 82, 102, 104,
113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 161,
164, 165, 183, 188–190, 196,
E 198, 205, 212, 227, 230, 235,
East Africa, 23 249, 252, 254, 256, 259, 262,
Eastern Europe, 271 277
East Indies, 151 Escola Superior de Guerra, 252
Economic power, 272 Espionage, 26, 116, 119, 123
Economy Espirito Santo, see Vitória
American, 3, 4 Estado Nacional, 170
Brazilian, 147, 236, 253 Estado Novo, 5, 21, 158, 169, 170,
colonial-era, 7 235, 236, 239–241, 253
war, 117, 162 Ethiopia, 35
Ecuador, 108, 276 Eurasia, 126
  INDEX 
   303

Europe, 39, 44, 62, 65, 84, 161, 162, Florence, 203
166, 208, 232, 234, 250, 252, Florida, 150, 275, 277
256, 266 Fontoura, Carlos Alberto, 268
European-African theaters, 189 Food, 12, 185, 205
European colonies, 61 Food shortages, 128
European conflicts, 43 Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB),
European countries, 226 7, 192, 202–204, 206–208, 210,
European occupation, 162, 208 225, 263
European powers, 230, 252 Brazilian-American alliance, 170
European space station, 275 in Italian campaign, 11
European theater, 211 role in Occupation, 231–233
European war, see World War II role of, 202–210
Export and Import Bank, 60, 71, 259 Força Pública, 197
Exports, 4, 42, 100, 254, 255, 259 Ford, Gerald, 273
Ford Motors, 260
Foreign debt, 21
F Foreign Minister, see Aranha, Oswaldo
Factories, 35, 116, 260 Foreign Minister, Brazil,
Fairbanks, Douglas Jr., 70 see Ruiz-­Guiñazú, Enrique
Far East, 84, 166, 256, 257 Foreign Ministry, Brazil, 147, 148,
Fascism, 26–27, 41, 132, 160 229, 238, 274
Fascista, 34, 72 Foreign Relations papers, 231
Fausto, Boris, 11 Forrestal (carrier), 264
FDR, see Roosevelt, Franklin D. See also Operation Brother Sam
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Fort Belvoir, 125
100, 124 Fort Benning, 39
Federal District of Rio, 121 Fort Leavenworth, 198
Federal Forces, Brazil, 40 Fort Monroe, 39
Fernando de Noronha islands, 60, Fort Sill, 39
148, 260 Fortaleza, 147, 156
Ferrying operations, 120, 127 France, 9, 23, 41, 42, 61, 156, 199,
Fifth Army, Brazil, 202 272, 275
Fifth Column campaign, 115, 119, 132 Franco, Francisco, 104
Figueiredo, João Batista, 270, 274 Freetown, 150
Films, 8, 70, 116 French African colonies, 164
The Boys from Brazil, 8 French Guiana, 160, 172
Donald Duck, 69 French Indo-China, 23
It’s All True, 69 French Mirage jets, 266
military training, 70 Friedrich Krupp Company,
Saludos Amigos, 69, 212 22, 32, 60
war, 159 Frota, Sylvio Coelho da, 271, 274
Zé Carioca, 69 Ft. Leavenworth, 144
304   INDEX

Fuels Gleason, Everett, 8

coal, 118, 122, 157 Góes Monteiro, Pedro Aurélio de,
gas, 29 3, 5, 31, 34, 39, 41, 44, 65,
gasoline, 127, 157 77, 82, 83, 110, 115, 116,
imported oil, 271 124, 127, 144, 160, 212,
oil, 29, 117, 118, 253 228, 239, 240, 257, 264
petroleum, 122, 254, 258, 263 and Estado Novo, 21
petroleum development and Korean illness, 167, 169, 193
War, 253–257 meeting with Miller, 75, 77
talk of resignation, 105
visit to Europe, 37
G visit to United States, 33
G-2, 230 Gold, 21, 61, 233
G-2 Division, 124 Golden Gate Bridge, 33
Gaspari, Elio, 268 See also Bridges
Gates, Robert, 277 Gomes, Eduardo, 113, 120, 168,
Gaúcho state, 185 238, 250
Geisel, Ernesto, 269–271, 273, 274 Gomes, Ivano, 188
Geisel, Orlando, 270 Good Neighbor Policy, 70, 99,
General Banquete, see Cardoso, 100, 115
Maurício José See also Inter-American Conference;
General Motors, 260 Rio Conference on Continental
Georgetown, 149, 150 Peace and Security
German agents, 75, 118 Gordon, Lincoln, 263–265
German businesses, 156, 157 Gothic Line, 199, 203
See also Friedrich Krupp Company; Goulart, João, 262, 263, 267, 271
Carl Zeiss Company Government, 2, 5–6, 74, 235
German-Chilean community, 107 American Republics, 44
German communities, 26 Brazil, 2, 9, 19, 27, 32, 63,
German embassy, 26 64, 116, 157, 161, 208
German Mark IV Panzer, 153 Carter, 274
German Military Organization, 185 Castro, 262
Germanophiles, 10, 42, 233 Dutra, 231, 240, 241, 254
German Submarine Command, 151 Eisenhower, 258
German weaknesses, 24 Estado Novo, 167, 170
Germany, 20, 26, 27, 44, 62, 80, 275 Ford administration, 273
armed forces, 22 German, 43, 77, 115, 119, 145, 157
declaration of war on Goulart, 262
United States, 84 Kennedy, 262
state of war with, 159 Portugal, 157
Gerow, Leonard, 82 US, 8, 27, 35, 44, 63, 75, 84, 102,
See also War Plans Division (WPD), US 106, 110, 116, 121, 251, 253,
Gettysburg, 33 255, 261, 263
  INDEX 
   305

Vargas, 26, 64, 115, 169, 172, 187, Homestead Act, 3

188, 234, 250, 257 House of Representatives, US, 86
Vichy, 74, 81, 160 Housing, 254
See also Brazilian-American alliance Hull, Cordell, 8, 33, 60, 100, 101,
Great Britain, 23, 41, 62, 65, 67, 72, 109, 132, 171, 226, 229
81, 82, 126, 130, 166, 168, 225, Hull, John E., 190
272, 275 Human rights, 272–274
Great Depression, the, 4 Humanitarian relief, 278
Great War, The, see World War I
Greece, 23
Greenland, 67 I
Green Shirts, 185 Iceland, 67, 81, 82
Guanabara Bay, 112, 144, 147, 198 Ilhéus, 155
Guanabara Palace, 102, 105, 107, Illiteracy, 3, 30
132, 158, 237 Immigrants, 2, 25–26, 29, 116, 169,
See also Berle, Adolf; Vargas, Getúlio 171, 233, 235
Guaratinguetá, 192 Imperialism, 63, 257
Guerrilla war, 263 Independence Day, Brazil, 158
Guinea-Bissau, 272 India, 272
Gulf States, 271 Indian Ocean, 151
Industrialization, 5, 7, 43, 66, 170,
213, 236, 254, 255, 260
H Industrial power, 260
Hamburg, 153 Industry, 166
Hammarem (ship), 156 arms, 73
See also Operation Brazil space, 275–277
Harbors, 25 technology, 275
Harkin Amendment, 273 war, 163, 256
Hasslocher, Paulo Germano, 44 weapons, 32, 39
Havana, 61, 75, 99, 130 Influence, 3, 62, 85, 104, 163, 169,
Health, 194, 197 233, 235, 272, 274
Hegemony, 7 African, 2
Hemispheric defense, 31, 36, 79, 81, American, 99, 275
82, 87, 126, 226, 230, 233 Axis, 22
Hertford, Kenner, 190 foreign, 233
Highways, 147, 163 French, 186, 196
Hilton, Stanley, 239 German, 26, 64, 75
Hitler, Adolf, 34, 44, 117, 132, 146, Italian, 26
151, 160, 206 political, 28, 64
Operation Brazil, 149 populist, 264
See also Operation Brazil pro-Nazi, 159
Hollywood, 2, 69, 70, 212 Ingram, Jonas H., 122, 126, 157, 227
306   INDEX

Institutional Act No. 5, 267 and East Africa, 23

Integralism, 160 state of war with, 159
Integralistas, 27, 30, 115, 116, 128, Itamaraty, 233
185, 186 Itanhangá Club, 105
Intellectuals, 2, 265, 268
Intelligence
American, 59, 168, 169 J
American army, 22, 26, 65, 116, Jacyra (carrier), 155
124, 159 See also Operation Brazil
American military and naval, 12, 34 Jamaica, 67
Brazilian army, 10, 19 Japan, 26, 99, 106, 116, 147, 233,
and Caffery, 123 235, 272, 275
Centro de Informação do Exército See also Treaty of Triple Alliance, the
(CIEx), 271 Japanese embassy, 100
military, 124 Jefferson, Thomas, 185
United States War Department, 230 Jeitinho, see Jeito
Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), 69–71 Jeito, 3
Inter-American Conference, 99, 105, Jews, 169
163, 255 Jockey Club, 44
See also Buenos Aires Joe Brazilian, 212
Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance John’s Hopkins University, 163
Treaty, 255, 256 Johnson administration, 264, 266
International Development Advisory See also Anit-Goulart; Gordon,
Board, US, see Rockefeller, Lincoln
Nelson A. Johnson, Lyndon, 263, 265
Internationalists, 258 Joint Brazil-United States Defense
International Space Station, 275, 276 Commission, 184, 195
International trade, see Trade Joint Chiefs of Staff, 172, 184,
Interventor, 185, 229 230, 234
Investment, 253, 255, 258, 260, 266 Joint Defense Commissions, 130
Ipanema, 158 Joint Military Board, 113
Iran, 73 Joint military commissions, 143, 163
Iraq, 271 Jungmann, Rual, 278
Itagíba (steamer), 154 Junkers, 147
See also Operation Brazil
Italian campaign, 11, 203
Italian peninsula, 183 K
Italy, 27, 37, 62, 72, 84, 147, 188, Kals, Ernst, 149
192, 194, 197, 198, 202, 204, Kansas, 198
207, 231, 232, 234, 257 Kasserine Pass, 183
Brazilian troops in, 225 Kazakhstan, 276
declaration of war on United States, 84 Kennan, George F., 253
  INDEX 
   307

Kennedy administration, 262 Leme, 158

Kennedy, John F., 262, 263 Lend-Lease Act, 67, 71, 80, 104
Kimberley, Allen, 44, 62 Lend-Lease agreement, 117, 118,
Kissinger, Henry, 266, 272 120, 127, 184, 212, 232, 234
Kitty Hawk, 261 Lend-Lease arms, 107, 235
Knox, Frank, 3 Lend-Lease funding, 127
Korea, 256 Lend-Lease materials, 12
Korean War, 212, 256–258 Leticia, western Amazon, 20
Kubitschek, Juscelino, 260, 261 Liberal constitutionalism, 264
Lie, Trygve, 256
LILAC, 61, 83
L See also Rainbow war plan
Laborers, 128, 239 Lima, 99
Labor leaders, 267 London, 195
Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Lone Wolf, 145–156
Brasileiro-PTB), 236 Lorient, 148, 149, 156
Labor systems, 3 Louisiana, 125, 167
Lacerda, Carlos, 259 Lovett, Robert A., 250
Lacey, John M., 155 Low salaries, 259
See also Operation Brazil
Land forces, 30, 115, 128
Langer, William, 8 M
Langley Field, 33 MacArthur, Douglas, 117
Latin America, 2, 63, 69, 70, 212, Maceió, 147
226, 230, 249, 251, 253–256, Machado, José Bina, 228
260–262 Machine guns, 86, 145, 155
view of United States, 99 Madeira, 165, 172
Latin American Volunteer Legion, 167 Madrid, 130
Leadership, 6, 7, 22, 102, 112, 233, Manaos, 156, 229
236, 252 Manganese, 35, 36
League of Nations, 170 Manila, 151
Leahy, William D., 226 Mantiqueira mountains, 192
Leal, Newton Estillac, 160 Manufacturing, 35, 104, 128
Leão Veloso, Pedro, 234 Maranhão, 275, 277
Leavenworth, 198 Maria fumaça (Smoky Mary), 206
Leblon, 158 See also Smoking Cobras
Lee, Raymond E., 116 Marines, US, 115
Leitão da Cunha, Vasco, 232 Maritime traffic, 149
Leitão de Carvalho, Esteváo, 45, 172, Market, 6, 82, 254, 259
183, 184 Market levels, 259
See also Brazilian Expeditionary Marshall Plan for Latin America, 261
Force See also Operation Pan America
308   INDEX

Marshall, George C., 38, 63, 65, 67, regimes, 6, 171, 239
68, 71, 73–75, 80–81, 85, reorganization of, 35
104–106, 116–117, 122, reorganization, 32
124–125, 143–144, 172, 191 schools, 38, 159, 169, 171, 187,
and Brazilian Expeditionary 189, 192, 197, 208, 275
Force, 184 training, post-war, 227–228
meeting with Dutra, 189 Military accord, 127–132, 147, 257,
tour of Southern Brazil, 30 258, 274, 275
visit exchange with Goes Monteiro, Military Air Transport System
27–37 (MATS), 260
visit to Eisenhower, 168 Military Appropriation Act, 62
Marshall, Katherine, 144 Military cooperation, 72–76, 120
Martial law, see Decree, state of war Brazil and US, 36
Martinique, 61 See also Policy, arms supply; Army,
Martins, Carlos, 121, 192 Brazil; Army, US
Martins, Jorge Dodsworth, 229 Military mission
Mascarenhas de Morais, Joáo Batista, France, 227
168, 196, 197, 201, 206, 207, 263 US, 31, 34, 36, 39, 43, 44, 61, 66,
post-war occupation, 231 73
Mato Grosso, 20, 61 Military Observation System, US, 124
McCarthyism, 257, 258 Miller, Lehman W., 35, 41, 59–60, 62,
Médici, Emílio Garrastazú, 267–270 66, 72–74, 113–117, 122–125,
Medieval era, 2 143–144
Mediterranean, 127, 183, 189 meeting with Góes Monteiro, 75–79
Mental health, see Health Minas Gerais (flagship), 4, 41, 206
Mesbla, 158 Minister of Education, see Passarinho,
Mestiço crew, 155 Jarbas
Mexico, 100, 117, 130, 169, 226, 252 Minister of War, see Dutra, Eurico
Meyer, Ewaldo, 207 Gaspar
Miami, 11, 192 Ministry of Transportation and Public
Middle class, 186, 269 Works, 64
Middle East, 84, 85 Miranda, Carmen, 69
Milan, 232 Miscegenation, 4
Military, 124 Missile tracking station, 260
collaboration between Brazil and Monazite, 257
United States, 66 Mondale, Walter, 273
Commonwealth, 206 Monroe Doctrine, 24
equipment, 35, 36, 84, 113, 116, Monroe, James, 1
117, 120, 122, 143 Monte Castello, 203, 204, 206, 231
Latin American, 28, 59 Montese, 203, 206
negotiations between Brazil and Montevideo, 193
United States, 69 Morison, Samuel E., 211
  INDEX 
   309

Morrill Act, 3 Nationalism, 42, 235, 236, 252,

Mortars, 66, 203 253, 255
Mt. Belvedere, 203 Nationalists, 116, 258
Mt. Torraccia, 203 National security, 66, 102, 268
Moura, Gerson, 43 National Security Council, Brazil,
Movies, see Films 64, 101, 256
Mozambique, 272 National Territory, 72
Mulatto people, 69 Natural resources, 1, 6, 7, 24, 258
Müller, Filinto, 121, 123, 144 Naval forces, 126, 158
Multilateralism, 251, 252 Naval Mission, US, 9
Munich Conference, 26 Naval Patrol Squadron, US, 187
Munitions, 12, 29, 31, 35, 40, 118 Navy
Murder, 259, 268 American, 61, 114, 117
Muslims, 169 Brazilian, 145
Mussolini, Benito, 41, 104, 132 British, 61, 187
Mutual Broadcasting System, 185 German, 146, 149, 151
See also Dutra, Enrico Gaspar United States, 122
United States, cooperation with
Brazil, 129–130
N Navy Department
Naples, 198 Brazil, 129
Natal, 40, 65, 147, 150, 153, 156, US, 130–132, 157, 229
164, 186, 187, 233, 278 Nazi Germany, 22
air bases and supply centers in, 82 Nazi Party, 26, 169
air defense of, 83 Nazi sympathizers, 22
American occupation of, 122 Nazism, 75, 76, 132, 160, 169
American troops in, 85 Nazista, 34, 63, 72
American troops sent to, 83 Near East, 189
Americans in, 126 Negotiations, 11, 27, 37, 38, 66, 67,
Axis submarines in, 85 108, 115, 118, 128, 130, 131,
decree legalizing air base at, 120 144, 160, 168, 184, 225, 237,
German seizure of, 24 250, 251
possible German attack on, 81 Negroes, 3, 169
proposed American ground Netherlands, 23, 42, 151
force at, 83 Neutrality Act, 35
survey of, 61 Neutrality law, US, 9, 35, 36, 38
US marine guards stationed at, 65 Neves da Fontoura, João,
Natal Conference, 162–172 254, 258, 259
National debt, 5 Newfoundland, 67
National Defense Act, 32 Newspapers and magazines
National Guard, 72 American, 41, 70
National Intelligence Service (SNI), Brazilian, 43, 160, 188
267, 268 Brazil Twists Thumbscrews…, 268
310   INDEX

Newspapers and magazines (cont.) American troops in, 81–84,

Buenos Aires, 119 123, 131
Commonweal, 268 Axis-inspired revolution in, 106
Correio da Manhã, 160 defense of, 104, 113–114, 131
Diário Carioca, 161, 236 defense plan for, 143
Diários Associados, 167 joint Military Board for, 86
German lanugage, 26 surveys of, 78, 112–113
A Manhã, 164, 204 See also Air bases
Military Review, 262 Northeastern, bulge, 11
New York Times, The, 22, 70, 268 Northern Hemisphere, 275
A Noite, 165 Norway, 117
O Globo, 207 Nova Scotia, 67
Terror in Brazil, 268 Nuclear ambitions, 276
Time, 191 Nuclear technology, 273
Torture in Brazil, 268 Nuremberg trials, 148, 151
Washington Post, The, 268
See also Inter-American Affairs
(OCIAA) O
New State, see Estado Novo Obama, Barack, 277
New World, 99, 103 Office of Production Management,
New York Times, The, see Newspapers US, 67
and magazines Office of Strategic Services,
Niedenfuhr, Gunther, 77 see Inter-American Affairs
Nielson, Ariel W., 211 (OCIAA)
Nixon, Richard, 261, 266, 269 Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
Non-proliferation, 273 US, 70, 132
Normandy invasion, see Operation Officers Advanced Training School
Overlord (Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de
North Africa, 73, 80, 85, 117 Oficiais, ESAO), 210
Allied invasion of, 160, 170, 183 Ohio, 278
Brazilian troops in, 190 Olds, Robert, 120, 127
Brazilian visit to, 165, 168, 184 Oligarchy, 4
German forces in, 24, 65, 74 OPEC oil embargo, 272
US supply lines in, 172 Operation Brazil, 145–150
North American route, 250 Operation Brother Sam, 263, 264
North Atlantic See also Forrestal (carrier)
air route, 12, 84 Operation Overlord, 190
Axis submarines in, 117 Operation Pan America, 261
defense of, 67, 81, 117 Operation Plans Division, US, 122
route, 81, 211 Oran, 183
North Carolina, 120, 125 Ord, James G., 184, 186, 187, 210
Northeast Brazil Organization of American States
American participation in, 76–81 (OAS), 256, 265
  INDEX 
   311

P Pernambuco, 149, 150

P-40, 120 Perón, Juan, 119, 237, 254, 259
Pacific, 122 Persian Corridor, 151
Pacific War, 233–235 Peru, 20, 108, 230, 252
Palácio Rio Negro, 167 Petrobrás, 258, 269, 270
Palmer, Bruce, 265 Petrópolis, 63, 105, 167
Panama, 60, 75, 99 Philippines, 84, 117
Panama Canal, 11, 24, 27, 144 Pilot training, 128, 277
Pan American Airports Corporation, 63 Pinto, Francisco José, 29, 63, 64
See also Airport Development Pires, Ary, 115
Program; Military Pisa, 211
Appropriation Act Pistoia, 203
Pan American Airways, see Airlines Pistolão, 3
Pan American unity, 230 Plaza de Armas, 107
Pan American conference, 212 Plebiscite, 240, 263
Pan Americanism, 44, 61, 110, Poland, 23, 37, 159
111, 162 Police, 30, 116, 118, 121, 144, 156,
Panelinha, 2, 3 192, 197, 239, 240, 266, 267
Pará, 61, 128, 233 Policy, 167
Paraguay, 20, 100, 157, 167, 260 American foreign, 60
Paraguayan war, 41 anti-atomic energy, 274
Paraguay River, 20 anti-nuclear development, 274
Paraiba, 229 Argentinian foreign, 119
Paraná, 9, 25 arms supply, 252
See also Immigrants Brazilian foreign, 20, 37, 38, 43,
Pardos, 3 44, 71, 102, 122, 162, 163,
Paris, 39, 130 170, 172, 260, 271
Parnamirim, 153 Brazilian national, 253
See also Air bases, Natal Brazil’s foreign, 274
Passarinho, Jarbas, 268 defense, 21
See also Demonstrations; Torture human rights, 274
Pátria, 5, 101, 107, 161 United States Brazilian, 31, 74, 116,
Paulista uprising, 240 123, 131, 167, 210, 228, 229
Peace conference, Buenos Aires, 32 (see also Natal Conference)
Pearl Harbor, 12, 65, 83, 84, 86, 99, United States Cold War, 249
100, 156, 198, 226 United States foreign, 229, 233, 253
Pedro I, Emperor of Brazil, 8 United States Latin American, 230,
Pedro II, Emperor, 5, 255 251, 253
Peixoto, Amaral, 110, 118, 119 United States pro-Brazilian, 231
Pentagon, US, 196, 252 Polio, 163
People’s Republic of China, 272 Political-military agreement, 130, 143,
Pereira, Durval Lourenço, 148, 151 144, 277
312   INDEX

Politicos, 160 Góes Monteiro and Dutra as leading

Politics Nazi faction, 71
Brazilian domestic, 2, 5, 195, 235, and Natal Conference, 164
253, 258 and Vargas, 238, 259
international, 44, 163 Prisoners, 206, 236, 269, 274
polarization of, 236 Pro-ally, 129, 188
power, 7 Pro-American, 7, 21, 72, 145, 171,
US national, 2 188, 192, 254, 258
Pontes, Marcos, 276 Pro-Axis, 132, 159
Pope, 268 Pro-British, 72
Populism, 170, 264 Pro-democratic, 168, 193
Poretti Terme, 203 Pro-Fascist, 26
Port Suez, 152 Professors, 267, 268
Porto Alegre, 29, 30, 156, 185, 229 Pro-German, 21, 59, 84, 121, 159,
See also Demonstrations 169, 185, 188
Ports, 4, 29, 68, 102, 114, 122, 146, Project X, 84
148, 151 Pro-Nazism, 27, 159, 187
Portugal, 8, 37, 85, 163, 172, 272 Propaganda, 26, 76, 101, 116, 129,
Portuguese 159, 186
Americans speaking, 34, 70, 116, See also Inter-American Affiars
123, 155, 189 (OCIAA)
home defenses, 172 Protestant missionaries, 118
islands, 165 Protestant Reformation, 2
language, 7, 26, 39, 70, 265 Protests, see Demonstrations
Posadas, Missiones, 118 Prüfer, Kurt M., 43, 79
“Pot of Gold,” 40 Prussianization, 100
Po Valley, 199, 203
POWs, 125
Pracinhas, 233 Q
Prata, viceroyaltyof the, 20 Quardos, Janio, 263
Presidential elections, 61, 273
Presidential papers, 19
Presidential Unit Citation, 211 R
Press Racial prejudice, 4
American, 71, 237 Racial segregation, 3
attacks on Vargas, 62 Radical Party, 107
Brazilian, 62, 145, 273 Radio Berlin, 145
Brazilian entrance in war, 78 Radio stations and communications,
and Brazilian Expeditionary Force, 194 70, 109, 112, 118, 144, 145,
Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) 148–150, 153
campaign, 256 See also Inter-American Affairs
entry of Spain into war, 62 (OCIAA)
German, 62 Raeder, Erich, 146, 148, 151
  INDEX 
   313

Railroads, 4, 40, 116, 117, 147, 254 United States, 7, 39, 80, 265
Rainbow war plan, 39, 61, 72, 83, 85 Republican, 4, 258
See also LILAC Resende, 192
Raw materials, 6, 35, 42, 128, 161, 212 Reserves, 79, 166, 194, 210
Reagan, Ronald, 211 Reservists, 185, 186, 196
Realengo, see Military, schools Reston, James, 70
Rearmament, 5, 32 Revolution, 4, 19, 106, 262, 267, 272
Rebel Forces, Brazil, 40 Revolution of 1964, 270
Rebellion, 9, 19 Riachuelo, 41
Rebello, José Sylvestre, 1 Ridgway, Matthew B., 31, 72, 74
Recife, 31, 61, 65, 82, 83, 85, 146, Rifles, 10, 66
147, 149, 150, 153, 168, 186, Rio Conference, 187, 237
227, 229 Rio Conference on Continental Peace
Reciprocal Assistance Declaration, 61 and Security, 109, 115–117, 119,
Reconstruction of its armed forces, 127, 237
REORG OF MILITARY, 22 Rio de Janeiro, 40, 99, 146, 147,
Red Sea, 152 186, 195
Refinery, 148 Rio de Janeiro commission, see Joint
Reform military commissions
constitutional, 270 Rio Grande do Norte, 156, 275
of land program, 263 Rio Grande do Sul, 25, 26, 30, 167,
military, 19, 32, 208, 210, 240 185, 240, 263, 268
political, 19, 263 See also Immigrants
Reich, German, 8, 60, 67, 75, 79, 157 Rio Treaty, see Inter-American
Relatórios, 232 Reciprocal Assistance Treaty
Renaissance, 2 Ritter, Karl, 147, 148
Reno Valley, 201 River of Doubt, 5
Reorganization Plan, 30 RKO (movie studio), 69
Reprisals, 157 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 69, 70, 255
Republic See also Inter-American Affairs
American, 44, 59, 61, 80, 99, (OCIAA); International
104, 112, 164, 167, 226, Development Advisory
230, 233, 265 Board, US
Argentina, 112 Rocketry research, 275
Brazil, 7, 79, 268 See also Space research
Caribbean, 99 Rockets, 275, 276
Central American, 99 Rodríguez, Manuel A., 20
Chile, 112 Romania, 23
Latin American, 39, 71, 115, Rome, 111, 232
170, 252 Rommel, Erwin, 73, 117, 125, 152, 183
South American, 104 Rondon, Cândido, 5
Spanish-American, 230 Roosevelt administration, 10
314   INDEX

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 5, 33, 44, São João del Rei, 206
45, 61, 66, 68, 74, 125, 127, São Luis, 147
211, 229, 250, 251 São Paulo, 40, 116, 147, 168, 192,
American fears and Brazilian 193, 197
neutrality, 23–27 See also Civil war; Demonstrations;
Brazilian neutrality and cooperation, Força Pública; Immigrants;
40–44 Revolution
Inter-American Conference, 99–118 São Pedro and São Paulo, islets, 149
and Natal Conference, 172 São Salvador, 150
Roosevelt, Theodore, 5 Sardinia, 183
Rossetti, Gabriel, 100 Satellites, 275
Rossetti, Juan Bautista, 106, 107 See also Industry, space; Rocketry
Rousseff, Dilma, 277, 278 research; Space research
Rower, Jürgen, 148 Saudi Arabia, 271
Rubber, 118, 128 Scandinavia, 151
Ruiz-Guiñazú, Enrique, 103–105, Schacht, Harro, 152–156
107, 108 Schneider, Ronald, 258
Russia, 82, 85, 127, 151, 166, 190, School of the Americas, 257, 274
234, 249, 277 Secret agents, 26
Russian base, 276 Secretary of State, see Hull, Cordell;
Russian front, 126, 203 Kissinger, Henry; Christopher,
Russian government, 276 Warren
Selective Service Act, 85
Senna Campos, Aguinaldo José, 207
S Sergipe, 148–156
Sabotage, 65, 258 Shaw, Paul Vanorden, 116, 117
Sadlier, Darlene, 69 Sherman tanks, 149, 152
Saican training grounds, 167 Shipping
St. Helena Island, 150 allied, 11, 67, 150, 183
St. Lucia, 67 Atlantic, 68
St. Peter and St. Paul, islets, see São Brazilian, 122, 148, 149, 151, 156,
Pedro and São Paulo, islets 190, 191
Salgado Filho, Joaquim P., 191 to carry troops, 73
Salvador da Bahia, see Bahia; Operation restricted, 70
Brazil shortage of, 83
San Francisco, 31, 33, 234 United States, 116, 189, 237
Santa Barbara, 148 Sibert, Edwin L., 124
Santa Catarina, 9, 25, 26 Sicily, 183
See also Immigrants Silva, Ignacio Lula da, 276, 278
Santiago, 100, 107 Silveira, Azeredo da, 272, 273
Santos Dumont airport, 101, 112, 147 Simmons, John F., 157
Santos-Dumont, Alberto, 261 Sims, Harold, 187
  INDEX 
   315

Sindicato de Jornalistas (Journalists Spain, 27, 32, 62, 85

Union), 238 Spanish Civil War, 159
See also Berle, Adolf See also Films
Singapore, 117, 151 Spanish language, 189
Siqueira Campos (ship), 187 Spanish-speaking countries, 62, 70,
Slave labor, 2, 3 230, 260
Slave trade, 4 Special Forces, US, 262
Slavery, 3, 4, 76 Special Strategic Study of Brazil, 25
Smoking Cobras, 183–184 Sputnik, 261
See also Brazilian Expeditionary SS Arabutan, 120
Force S.S. Seatrain Texas, 152
Social Democratic Party (Partido Stack, Harold R., 68
Social Democrata, PSD), 236 Standing Liaison Committee, 27–28
Sodré, Nelson Werneck, 145 State Department, US, 7, 62, 70, 71,
South America, 61, 62, 67, 82, 119, 81, 105, 116, 124, 125, 128,
125, 150, 163, 171, 212, 230, 143, 170, 226, 229, 234,
257, 262 250–253, 271, 273
Brazilian naval force in, 227, 228 Statue of Christ, 158
Brazilian post-war predominance Steel, 7, 21, 44, 60, 61, 79, 213, 241
in, 226 See also Volta Redonda (steel mill)
route, 250 Stettinius, Edward R., 195
South Atlantic, 40, 73, 126, 149, 152 Steuben Glass model, 261
Axis in, 82, 85 Stimson, Henry L., 63, 80, 127, 194
defense of, 67, 81, 114 Stocks, 117, 195
importance of, 151, 152 Strait of Magellan, 150
route, 11, 81, 211 Students, 156, 188, 266, 267
Southern Brazil, 61, 118, 171 Submarine Command, 149, 150
Sovereignty, 12, 25, 60, 122, 171, See also Operation Brazil
260, 277 Submarines, 6, 10, 20, 117, 125, 146,
defense of, 61, 66, 72, 276 147, 227
national, 6, 37, 59, 78, 79, 119, 252 Axis, 6, 11, 85, 115, 117, 129, 151,
Soviet Union, 73, 81, 82, 151, 152, 211
208, 225, 249, 253, 256, German, 119, 144, 145, 147, 148,
261, 271, 277 151, 155
Soyuz spacecraft, 276 Italian, 145
Space exploration, 276 Japanese, 148
Space launch, 261 Pietro Calvi, 149
Space program, 276 See also Operation Brazil; Schacht,
Space research, 275 Harro
See also Rocketry research Suez Canal, 152
Space Shuttle Columbia, 276 Sugar Loaf, 158, 198
Space tourism, 276 Supreme Federal Tribunal, 267
316   INDEX

T Under-Secretary of State, see Welles,

Talleyrand, 44 Sumner
Tankers, 117, 150, 264 União Democrática Nacional
Tanks, 65, 66, 102, 104, 107, (UDN), 238
120, 127, 129, 153, 186, United Kingdom, see Great Britain
189, 240, 269 United Nations, 160, 163, 164, 210,
Technicians, 36, 78, 120, 128, 276 231, 234, 256, 265, 271, 275
Teheran conferences, 211 Universidade de Brasília, 267, 271
Tenente, 161 Universidade de São Paulo, 11, 116
Tenente movement, 159 Universidade Federal de Minas
Tenth Infantry Regiment, Brazil, 193 Gerais, 267
Texas, 167 The Unnecessary Golpe, 239
Theater of Operations, 196 Unwritten, 277
Third Consultative Conference of the Uranium, 257, 272
Foreign Ministers of the American Urca, 158
Republics, 101 Uruguaiana, Rio Grande do Sul, 237
Tiradentes Palace, 105 Uruguay, 27, 118, 167, 260,
TNT, 153, 156 261, 269
Tobruk, 117, 152 US Army Forces South Atlantic
Tokyo, 111, 151 (USAFSA), 168
Torture, 267, 268, 271, 274 US Consulate, 156
Toulon, 183 US Embassy, 190, 263
Trade, 2, 22, 25, 43, 253, 254, 259, US Navy Secretary, see Knox, Frank
266, 272 USN Catalina PBY, 156
arms, 24 USS General W. A. Mann, 198
competition for Brazilian, 24 USS Humboldt (cruisier), 155
See also Arms, trade See also Operation Brazil
Treasure Ship, see S.S. Seatrain Texas USS Nashville, 27, 31, 33
Treaty of Triple Alliance, the, 62 USS Sommers (destroyer), 155
Tres Rios, 195 See also Operation Brazil
Trinidad, 67, 144, 162
Tripoli, 183
Truman, Harry S., 212, 229, 234, V
235, 237, 255, 256 Valença, 195
Tunisia, 183 Vancouver Barracks, 144
Tyson, Brady, 268 Vargas government, 35, 71, 85, 101
Vargas, Benjamin, 240
Vargas, Getúlio, 5, 38, 40, 60, 63, 65,
U 68, 72, 74, 75, 81, 83, 100, 118,
U-507, see Lone Wolf 122, 125, 127, 161, 183, 188,
U-boat, 120, 150 212, 226
Unconventional warfare, 262 1952 political accord, 257–259
  INDEX 
   317

automobile accident, 132, 147, 163 War Department Operations Division,

Brazilian military before war, US, 191
19–22 War Department, US, 24, 59, 61–63,
Brazilian neutrality and American 65, 83, 112, 124, 130, 132, 143,
concerns, 26–27 166, 170, 183, 189–191, 229,
Estado Novo, 22 230, 250, 251
and Germany, 43–45 War materiel, 43, 64, 66, 75, 80,
Inter-American Conference, 106, 109, 112, 123, 126, 128,
101–110 130, 227
and Natal Conference, 162–172 War Plans Division (WPD), US, 25,
“On The Threshold of a New Era” 26, 61, 80, 82, 85
(speech), 41–43 See also Gerow, Leonard
overthrow of, 235–241 War tourism, 168
return to presidency, 255–257 Washington commission, see Joint
speeches, “On the Threshold of a military commissions
New Era,” 41 Washington, D.C., 67, 261, 277
and state of war, 157 Washington Post, The, see Newspapers
Vargas, Lutero, 197 and magazines
Venezuela, 67, 100, 117, 252, 261 Weaponry, 102, 166, 226, 266
Vera Cruz, 122 Weckerling, John, 251
Vickers Armstrong, 229 Wehrmacht maneuvers, 27
Victims, 269 Welles, Orson, 69
Vietnam, 265 Welles, Sumner, 8, 28, 74, 81, 85,
Vietnam War, 212 101–110, 112, 113, 125, 127,
Violence, 32, 236, 266, 268 129–131, 143
Virginia, 125 West Africa, 24, 82, 85, 160
Vitória, 147, 156 West Germans, 273
Volkswagen, 260 West Point, 73, 125, 130
Volta Redonda (steel mill), 7, 117, Western Hemisphere, 67, 69,
118, 213 86, 100, 103, 162, 190,
See also Steel 212, 233, 277
von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 79 route, 250
VP-83, see Operation Brazil Wheat, 237
VP-83 squadron, 155 White House, 33, 81, 107, 109,
269, 277
White House conference, 24
W White people, 3
Waack, William, 202 White, Thomas D., 62, 122
Wall Street, 258 Wolfe, Joel, 4
Walsh, Robert L., 130, 168, Women, 197, 206, 269
169, 249 Woodring, George, 33
Walters, Vernon, 207, 263 Wooten, Ralph H., 197, 251
318   INDEX

Working class, 235, 236 Y

World Cup, 269 Youth movement, 240
World Fair, 33 YouTube, 207
World War I, 9, 12, 22, 25,
130, 153, 166, 170,
171, 252 Z
World War II, 62, 70, 198, Zé Carioca, 212
209, 212, 213, 225, Zenobio da Costa, Euclydes, 195,
233, 254 198, 201
World War II alliance, 257 See also Clark, Mark; Divisions, 4th
World War III, 257, 258 Corps, US