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The Evidence Standard Sept/Oct 2021

The Evidence Standard

Speech and Debate provides a meaningful and educational experience to all who are involved.

We, as educators in the community, believe that it is our responsibility to provide resources

that uphold the foundation of the Speech and Debate activity. Champion Briefs, its employees,

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the goals and vision of this activity.

These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to

advance students’ understanding of the world around them, as is the purpose of educators.

Champion Briefs 5
Letter from the Editor Sept/Oct 2021

Letter from the Editor

Welcome back for another thrilling year of Public Forum Debate! We’re excited to be
returning this year to help you prepare your cases, blocks, and backfiles, and we hope you’re
ready for the resumption of debate season. To those of you joining the debate community for
the first time: welcome! We’re excited to provide you with information that will help you learn
about the magic of debate. The topic we will be addressing in September and October of 2021
is “Resolved, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its defense
commitments to the Baltic states.”
This topic should be exciting not only because it presents an opportunity to discuss
military conflict, but also because it doesn’t specify the type of defense commitments. There is
already somewhat of a presence in the region, though all the resolution requires the affirmative
to defend would be a substantial increase. Debaters can explore what those commitments
would and should entail, meaning that there are a number of ways to approach the topic.
Additionally, there is room within the topic to argue for alternatives – if NATO action
triggers adverse side effects while another actor would not, that would be a reason to negate.
Similarly, if NATO action in the Baltics trades off with NATO action in a more crucial region, that
would also be a reason to negate. The breadth of the topic is always something that excites me,
and with a two-month resolution, it’s great that we will have so many angles to approach.
Ultimately, the first topic of the year is a great chance to get back into good habits with regards
to debate preparation. Always start your preparation by reading thoroughly about the topic to
ensure you have a good background, then begin by cutting the cards you’ll need to have a
foundation for your cases and blocks. This several hundred page file should be a good starting
point as you jump into your research – we wish you luck in the 2021/2022 debate season!

Michael Norton
Editor-in-Chief

Champion Briefs 6
Table of Contents Sept/Oct 2021

Table of Contents

The Evidence Standard ....................................................................... 5

Letter from the Editor ........................................................................ 6
Table of Contents ............................................................................... 7
Topic Analyses.................................................................................. 10
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda ......................................................................................................................... 11
Topic Analysis by Will Watson ....................................................................................................................... 18
Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch ........................................................................................................................... 34

General Information ......................................................................... 46
Pro Arguments ................................................................................. 56
PRO: Baltic deterrence would increase readiness ............................................................................ 57
PRO: The Baltics act as a tripwire ............................................................................................................. 61
PRO: Baltic States are Important to NATO ........................................................................................... 65
PRO: Baltic Deterrence is Key to Credibility ........................................................................................ 69
PRO: Russia Seeks Revisionism in the Baltics ..................................................................................... 73
PRO: Need to Increase Baltic Air Policing .............................................................................................. 77
PRO: Need to increase Defenses to Deter China ................................................................................. 81
PRO: NATO should increase Baltic Cyber Defenses ........................................................................... 86
PRO: NATO should increase Heavy Arms in Baltics .......................................................................... 91
PRO: Baltic security is key to democracy in the region ................................................................... 95
PRO: Deterrence by Denial ........................................................................................................................... 99
PRO: Baltic control of ports is vital to security in the region ...................................................... 103
PRO: NATO has a moral obligation to defend the Baltics .............................................................. 108
PRO: Defending energy independence .................................................................................................. 114
PRO: Defending the Baltic Economic System ..................................................................................... 118

Pro Responses to Con Arguments ................................................... 122
A/2: Syrian Peace Process .......................................................................................................................... 123
A/2: Oil Shocks ................................................................................................................................................ 133
A/2: Russia Economic Diversification ................................................................................................... 139
A/2: Detracts from more important areas .......................................................................................... 144

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Table of Contents Sept/Oct 2021

A/2: Increased Commitments Detract from Diplomacy ................................................................ 147

A/2: Wasteful Use of Resources ............................................................................................................... 150
A/2: Increase Russian Aggression .......................................................................................................... 153
A/2: Decrease readiness .............................................................................................................................. 156
A/2: Denial of Russian aggression .......................................................................................................... 160
A/2: Increased commitments create moral hazard ......................................................................... 162
A/2: Deterrence in the Baltics is ineffective ....................................................................................... 165
A/2: Triggers Russian arms race ............................................................................................................. 168
A/2: Increases threat of Russia / China collaboration ................................................................... 171
A/2: Won’t help military capacity ........................................................................................................... 174
A/2: Baltic allies are self-sufficient ......................................................................................................... 177

Con Arguments .............................................................................. 180
CON: Syrian Peace Process ......................................................................................................................... 181
CON: Oil Shocks ............................................................................................................................................... 186
CON: Russia Economic Diversification .................................................................................................. 190
CON: Detracts from more important areas ......................................................................................... 199
CON: Increased Commitments Detract from Diplomacy ............................................................... 203
CON: Wasteful Use of Resources .............................................................................................................. 207
CON: Increase Russian Aggression ......................................................................................................... 211
CON: Decrease readiness ............................................................................................................................ 215
CON: Denial of Russian aggression ......................................................................................................... 218
CON: Increased Commitments Create Moral Hazard ...................................................................... 220
CON: Deterrence in the Baltics is ineffective ...................................................................................... 224
CON: Triggers Russian arms race ............................................................................................................ 228
CON: Increases threat of Russia / China collaboration .................................................................. 231
CON: Won’t help military capacity .......................................................................................................... 234
CON: Baltic allies are self-sufficient ........................................................................................................ 238

Con Responses to Pro Arguments ................................................... 241
A/2: Baltic deterrence would increase readiness ............................................................................ 242
A/2: The Baltics act as a tripwire ............................................................................................................ 245
A/2: Baltic states are important to NATO ............................................................................................ 248
A/2: Baltic Deterrence is Key to Credibility ........................................................................................ 251
A/2: Russia seeks revisionism in the Baltics ...................................................................................... 254
A/2: Need to Increase Baltic Air Policing ............................................................................................. 257
A/2: Need to increase Defenses to Deter China ................................................................................ 261
A/2: NATO should increase Baltic Cyber Defenses .......................................................................... 265

Champion Briefs 8
Table of Contents Sept/Oct 2021

A/2: NATO should increase Heavy Arms in Baltics ......................................................................... 270

A/2: Baltic security is key to democracy in the region .................................................................. 275
A/2: Deterrence by Denial .......................................................................................................................... 279
A/2: Baltic control of ports is vital to security in the region ....................................................... 282
A/2: NATO has a moral obligation to defend the Baltics ............................................................... 286
A/2: Defending energy independence ................................................................................................... 289
A/2: Defending the Baltic Economic System ...................................................................................... 292

Champion Briefs 9
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda

Resolved: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its

defense commitments to the Baltic states.

Introduction

The September/October topic is often about foreign affairs and national security. This

year is no exception. Much like previous season-opening topics which covered missile defense,

the law of the sea, and nuclear proliferation, this topic is a rich dive into an important security

studies issue. NATO's role in a post-Cold War world and how its structure deters Russia is one of

the central questions of national security in Europe. Beyond the surface, this topic asks

debaters to think about how Russia sees itself and its role in the world, how international

signals are displayed and perceived, and the tradeoffs involved with deploying military force

abroad.

As the starting topic of the debate season, there will be a high bar for research and

analysis. Students will have months before the first national circuit tournaments to prepare

their arguments and vet their sources. The September/October topic often establishes national

frontrunners at big tournaments and sets the tone for the rest of the year. To succeed,

debaters must develop arguments that are both impactful and reasonable.

Champion Briefs 11
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

Background

The core question which governs NATO's entire structure is how to deter Russian

aggression against NATO member states. NATO was originally conceived as a defensive pact

against the Soviet Union and helped protect Western Europe from communist invasion. The key

to NATO's success is Article V, which states that an attack against one NATO member will be

treated as an attack against all of them. This pushes Russia to think of limited war against a

smaller NATO member as a general war against all NATO members. Because NATO consists of

many powerful countries who would ordinarily be outside the scope of a limited ground war in

Eastern Europe – The United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc – Article V tremendously

raises the costs of Russian aggression.

The question of NATO's structure and posture has renewed importance following

Russia's aggression in Eastern Europe. In 2014, Russian forces conducted a covert invasion to

seize and annex the Crimean Peninsula of Ukraine. In the same year, Russia-backed separatists

augmented by Russian military units began a war in Eastern Ukraine's Donbass region to break

the area out of Ukrainian control. These acts of naked aggression and territorial revisionism

created an international crisis and forced NATO leaders to reevaluate their options. True,

Ukraine was not a NATO member country, but the sight of Russian forces conducting a war of

aggression so near to its borders was alarming to many NATO member states.

The Baltic states are on the front line of the conflict with Russia. The Baltic states –

Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia – are the geographically closest NATO member states to Russia.

Furthermore, their low populations and lack of geographic depth make it difficult to defend the

Baltic states in a hypothetical land war. The Baltic states lie East of Russia's Kaliningrad enclave,

Champion Briefs 12
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

a heavily militarized fortress territory. This means that in the event of a full-out Russian

invasion the Baltic states would have to defend themselves from attacks coming from multiple

directions at once.

Strategy Considerations

The primary questions in the minds of policymakers debating the expansion of NATO's

forward presence in the Baltic states are whether any change is necessary to deter Russian

aggression and this particular change is sufficient to deter Russian aggression. The question of

necessity regards Russia's intentions – does Putin want to invade the Baltic states – and status

quo measures – can we defend the Baltics without substantially increasing our military

commitment to them. The second question relates to the utility of NATO's various instruments

of power – would reinforcing the Baltic states have the intended effect, or could it produce

backlash or unintended consequences?

Every debater must have an answer to the question “what does Russia want in the

Baltics.” Reasonable minds differ on the extent to Putin’s ambitions. Some say that Putin wants

the same thing as in Crimea and the Donbass – naked territorial revisionism. Others say that

Russia’s interest in the Baltics is more geared towards establishing a sphere of influence than

outright territorial annexation.

Next, debaters should think about how deterrence works in theory and practice. What

would Russia's reaction be to additional NATO military resources in the Baltics? Would the

reaction be to back off and withdraw, or would it be to increase its aggression in response to

provocation? Reasonable minds may differ.

Champion Briefs 13
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

Lastly, debaters must consider the inherency of the resolution. Inherency means "how

the topic would most likely be manifested in real life." Inherency is important because there are

many possible ways for NATO to increase support to the Baltic States, but not all of them are

equally probable. Debaters cannot simply pick advocacies because that would result in infinite

different scenarios being cherry-picked in each round. Instead, debaters should ground their

arguments in the most likely manifestation of the resolution. This requires teams to look at

public statements from NATO leaders and foreign policy specialists, alongside historical data

over past NATO deployments to accurately gauge how the resolution would be enacted in a

reasonable affirmative world. Inherency is a vitally important question because it governs the

terms of the debate.

The most important aspect of inherency on this topic is what constitutes a “substantial

increase” in defense commitments. What form of military assistance does this take, and what

size does it take? Increased commitments can take man shapes – they can simply be larger

promises such as a commitment to increase defense spending, or they can be specific means of

material support such as the deployment of additional fast-reaction forces. Perhaps, to qualify

as substantial, the increased commitment must be able to fight off local ground forces. In that

case, the size of the commitment would be much larger, potentially taking the form of forward-

deployed armored divisions. The answers to these questions of inherency will determine the

size and scope of affirmative advocacy. This in turn will have serious impacts on both the effect

upon Russia and any negative side effects which result.

Champion Briefs 14
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

Affirmative Argumentation

Teams in the affirmative have a relatively straightforward mission. They need to show

that Russia wants to take over the Baltics and that a substantially increased military

commitment would be sufficient to deter them from those aims. The structure of these

burdens is relatively straightforward and should be made plain to the judge at the start of

constructive. However, fulfilling these burdens is difficult and affords debaters considerable

freedom and flexibility in determining how they want to go about proving that they meet these

claims.

First, affirmative teams must argue that Russia seeks territorial revisionism in the

Baltics. They can do this with an analysis of Putin's statements which opine for the former

Soviet Union, an analysis of military plans, and a careful study of deteriorating diplomatic ties

between Russia and the West. The affirmative team must convince the judge that an invasion

of the Baltics in some form or another may not be inevitable but it is at least possible and likely.

Second, affirmative teams should argue that substantially increasing our commitment to

the Baltic states would indeed deter said Russian aggression. This should be done on the

theoretical as well as the historical level. Many political science scholars write on the

architecture of successful deterrence, what it takes to make nations reconsider aggression. For

example, if Russia thinks that additional commitments to the Baltics signal an American

commitment to come to their aid, they may view any war as unwinnable. This is called

"tripwire" deterrence. This line of reasoning would allow an affirmative team to win even if the

size of the force could not fight a Russian invading army to a standstill.

Champion Briefs 15
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

Negative Argumentation

The negative team should consider multiple avenues to eliminating the affirmative’s

aforementioned two-step path to victory. This means that the negative can consider arguments

about Russia’s intentions not being territorial revisionism in the Baltics and that militarily

reinforcing the Baltics would be counterproductive to that ends. Winning either or both of

these arguments would be sufficient to grant the negative a path to victory.

First, the negative can argue that Russia does not want to invade the Baltics. If this is

true then there is no reason to spend the time and money to reinforce the region. There are

several ways that negative teams can make this argument. They can argue that Putin is already

too tied down in Ukraine to consider broadening the conflict to additional theaters. They can

argue that Russia is outgunned by NATO and would not rationally want to start a war that it

cannot win. They can finally argue that the Baltic countries are fiercely independent and anti-

Russian, and would not be susceptible to the same gray-zone tactics which Russia deployed in

Ukraine. If any of these arguments are true then there is no sense in deploying additional

expensive countermeasures to resist Russian aggression which is not happening anyway.

Second, the negative can argue that increasing our commitment to the Baltic states

does more harm than good. That is to say, that it is counterproductive to the goal of reducing

Russian aggression. Great powers are sensitive to security threats on the borders and it is

reasonable to assume that Russia would be incensed at an expanded NATO presence so close to

home. Negative teams should use a combination of logic and history to make this argument.

Some political scientists argue that the Ukraine crisis was partially caused by talks between

NATO and Ukraine to make Ukraine a part of NATO. If true, this is an analogous situation

Champion Briefs 16
Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda Sept/Oct 2021

because both Ukrainian NATO membership and reinforcing the Baltics trigger the same kinds of

security dilemmas among Russian leadership.

This topic is expansive and touches all the most important aspects of international politics.

Debaters must delve deeply into the research to succeed. Good luck!

About Jakob Urda

Jakob grew up in Brooklyn, New York. He attends the University of Chicago, where he

will receive a BA in Political Science, and is interested in security studies and political economy.

Jakob debate for Stuyvesant High School where he won Blake, GMU, Ridge, Scarsdale,

Columbia, the NCFL national championship, and amassed 11 bids. He coached the winners of

the NCFL national tournament, Harvard, and Blake.

Champion Briefs 17
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

Topic Analysis by Will Watson

Resolved: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its

defense commitments to the Baltic states.

Introduction

As if COVID wasn’t enough, the world may end in Eastern Europe. Before starting

research on this topic (or reading this), Debaters need to have picked up a map, located the

Baltics and noted the surrounding countries. Geography is destiny, and the Baltic States

simultaneously exemplify and defy this cliché in contemporary IR, making debates especially

interesting. The Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) share a border with Russia and

Belarus (and Poland but we like Poland) raising questions about their security especially as

Russia is preparing for the Запад-2021 (Zapad-2021, meaning west in Russian) military

exercises and escalating activity in the near-abroad. Belarus (likely with Russian help) is helping

fly migrants into Lithuania as a form of hybrid aggression. China is attempting to expand its

influence on the Baltics. The B3 nations, according to a 2016 RAND Study, could be overrun by

conventional Russian forces in less than 60 hours (the exercise gave NATO forces a week of

alertness to simulate realism). The Pro’s question is how to stop this attack from being

successful. The Con’s question is how to stop the attack from even happening. Let’s look at the

background of the Baltics (with specific reference to foreign relations), common pro/con, and

best strategies to utilize when tackling this defense-heavy topic.

Champion Briefs 18
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

A few quick notes that'll make research easier and judges happy. When doing specific

searches (putting terms in ") be sure to use both the American and English spelling variants on

words like defence. On that note, American media is growing more focused on the Chinese

threat- if you want to hear about what’s happening in the Baltics, try to use media outlets from

the Baltic States. Additionally, there’s a lot of jargon on this topic. Limit any terms that your

math teacher doesn’t know off the top of their head (NATO is fine, eFP however is not). Even

for experienced judges- NATO defense jargon gets acronym heavy. Either slow down, make eye

contact, and say the full name, then the acronym/jargon or don't say it at all. Finally, a lot of

rounds (and some tournaments) would move faster if debaters effectively weighed their

arguments as early in the round as possible. If you agree on the impacts then weigh the links. If

you are pro talking about Russia and the con is talking about China, explain why a country of

144 million people is a bigger threat than a country of 1.4 trillion people.

Background

The Baltics have faced a history of conquest and losses of sovereignty which formed

their national identities. The Baltics were first included together under the Russian empire after

the end of the Great Northern War in 1721 (Estonia/Latvia) and in 1795 after the Third Partition

of Poland (Lithuania). After World War I, the Baltic States gained their sovereignty, often with

the help of other nations and factions who wanted to fight against the Bolsheviks. After a stint

of independence, they were occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union, and Germany, during

World War II, then under communist occupation until the early 90s. The Baltics, to generalize,

were never particularly happy about this Soviet past and in 2004 joined the EU and NATO. This

Champion Briefs 19
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

aggravates Russia as they view the Baltics as their sphere of influence. All 3 Baltic States have

strong national identities and cooperate relatively well. This also aggravates Russia as, despite

decades of pressure and control, the Baltics resisted the Russification process. There are

Russian links to the Baltics- the largest being; a strong Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia (a

small minority in Lithuania), energy dependency (although that has changed),1 and the general

trade and culture which comes with proximity.

Let’s talk about some of the benefits the Baltics have against aggressors; strong allies

and experience. NATO's Article 5 guarantee states that:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North

America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such

an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-

defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or

Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such

action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the

security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result

thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated

when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain

international peace and security.”2

1
Dr. Frank Umbach, 8-7-2015, "Baltic energy security – no longer a regional energy island," Geopolitical
Intelligence Services, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/baltic-energy-security-no-longer-a-regional-energy-
island,energy,229.html
2
NATO, 2-8-2021, "Collective defence," NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm

Champion Briefs 20
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

A few things to note, despite a barrage of cyber-attacks by Russia and non-state actors,

Article 5 has only been imposed once; after 9/11.3 There are different perspectives when Article

5 can be invoked- specifically if it requires UN approval first. As of today, NATO has stated that

Space/Cyber-attacks can trigger an Article 5 response if the damage is comparable to a

conventional attack.4 However, it is often extremely difficult to achieve consensus among NATO

Allies and all 28 would have to agree to invoke the Article if one of them was attacked.5 As a

result, there is debate if NATO would come to the defense of the Baltics.6 Generally, in NATO,

the U.K., U.S., Baltics, and Poland are in favor of increasing defenses while Germany and France

lead the opposition. Finally, reread the text of Article 5. It does not guarantee a military

response.

The second advantage of the Baltics is their vast experiences dealing with Russia. On

September 6, 2021, the Baltics will celebrate 30 years out of Soviet control. In those 30 years,

they've learned how to live with a Russian minority population, cyber-attacks, and unfriendly

neighbors. This experience has improved their cybersecurity methods, making the Baltics some

of the most advanced cyber-nations in the world. Estonia improved its defenses after a cyber-

attack in 2007 (If you are running a cyber case you need to know the details of the 2007

3 Zelikow, Philip. 2011. “The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the national commission on terrorist attacks
upon the United States”. Government Printing Office. https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf
4
AP, 6-14-2021, "NATO countries ready to collectively respond to attacks in space," No Publication,
https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/nato-countries-ready-to-collectively-respond-to-
attacks-in-space-121061400919_1.html
5
Ivo Daalder, 11-17-2015, "Should Nato invoke Article 5?," No Publication, https://www.ft.com/content/b55fdcc3-
fd12-3b4f-8a21-e2a12b0cc187
6
Hal Brands, 11-12-2019, "How Russia could force a nuclear war in the Baltics," Japan Times,
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/12/commentary/world-commentary/russia-force-nuclear-war-
baltics/

Champion Briefs 21
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

cyber-attacks and the NATO response).7 Lithuania has improved its cyber defenses to respond

to the Russian threat.8 Latvia is the least cyber advanced and has the highest percentage of

Russians.9 On the topic of cybersecurity- cyberattacks have killed 1 person in Germany (A

ransomware attack that shut down a hospital) to date.10 Most attacks are espionage-based-

searching for personal information.11 Whenever your opponent says “over 100,000 cyber-

attacks happen each day” remember that not every attack targets a nation’s nuclear launch

codes, most want money or data.

Now you know some of the Baltic States’ histories and complicated relationships, we

can begin to discuss the arguments teams will likely run. A good place teams may find to start is

by eliminating bad arguments. Accepting that the Baltics are small states, with limited

capacities, and a neighbor who outwardly exhibits provocative behavior will eliminate some of

the harder to argue cases. Additionally, this topic wasn’t the first time someone’s thought to

improve Baltic defenses. Read up on past proposals and determine why they were/weren’t

implemented and their ramifications.

7
Ivana Kottasová, Cnn, 6-18-2021, "How Russian threats turned this country into the go-to expert on cyber
defense," CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/18/tech/estonia-cyber-security-lessons-intl-cmd/index.html
8
Jen Judson, 7-16-2019, "A necessary rise: Lithuania bolsters its cybersecurity, catching the attention of other
nations," Fifth Domain, https://www.fifthdomain.com/smr/a-modern-nato/2019/07/15/a-necessary-rise-lithuania-
bolsters-its-cybersecurity-catching-the-attention-of-other-nations/
9
Cameron Mccord, 11-12-2018, "Russia’s Baltic Cyber Campaign Leaves NATO Endangered," Charged Affairs,
https://chargedaffairs.org/russias-baltic-cyber-campaign-leaves-nato-endangered/
10
Melissa Eddy and Nicole Perlroth, 9-18-2020, "Cyber Attack Suspected in German Woman’s Death," New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/world/europe/cyber-attack-germany-ransomeware-death.html
11 Valeriano, Brandon, 1-15-2019, "The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint," Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint

Champion Briefs 22
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

Pro

The pro has a higher burden for the con on this topic as a less substantial version of the

pro (current defense commitments) exists in the status quo in the form of enhanced forward

presence (eFP), NATO exercises, the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, Polish

deployments, etc. Therefore, the pro cannot solely prove that defense commitments are

beneficial, rather they must prove that increasing defense commitments is beneficial. Pros thus

need to show that (1) current measures do not work and (2) additional methods would cause

more benefit than harms. Proving the first part will be critical to winning upper-level rounds,

however; the reason the status quo is failing cannot link into the con idea that defense

commitments fail. Cons can easily spur this trap in the crossfire:

Con: you say deterrence is failing, correct?

Pro: yes

Con: and NATO increased its defense of the Baltics in 2015 after Crimea, right?

Pro: yes

Con: so isn’t it likely that even with an additional increase, deterrence will still fail, or that

deterrence makes the problem worse?

Therefore, make sure you include in your case the idea that the status quo fails due to

other recent factors such as increased Russian military capabilities, a rise in Russian interests

due to Putin's low approval rating, etc. Another option for the pro is to say that we should no

longer pursue a deterrence strategy, rather a defense strategy. The difference is that

Champion Briefs 23
Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

deterrence attempts to discourage an attack from taking place due to high costs or the

possibility of failure. Defense accepts that an attack is coming and focuses on preventing the

success of the attack. While successful defense deters, deterrence doesn't necessarily mean

successful defense. This would allow the pro to argue that deterrence is not working and we

should therefore give up and focus on defense. This would require a pro team to them prove

that an attack against the Baltics is inevitable, increases the links to any "Russia gets mad" cons

and would cost more. However; there is a substantial body of research for it.

There are 2 key areas for the pro but that won’t stop most cases from running something else:

1) Foreign aggression

2) Politics

Foreign aggression

Foreign aggression will make up 2/3 pro cases (as it should). Historically, the Baltics have

faced foreign aggressors for 100s of years. The times that they have not are times of

exceptions. As a result, Baltic people have a strong sense of defense and nationalistic pride. The

Baltics face a risk of foreign aggression from Russia, Belarus, and (maybe) China. These threats

define the security apparatus and politics of these countries and thus should be the background

of your case even if you want to run non-stock arguments. For example- if you run that

increasing Baltic defense would help modernize the U.S. military, preventing the use of PMCs in

the Middle East, you need to argue that they will modernize against Russia/China, thus

warranting your arguments.

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

The Russian threat to the Baltics comes from abroad and within. Estonia and Latvia have

substantial Russian-speaking minorities that Russia is more than willing to exploit.12 Russia’s

position in Kaliningrad makes it difficult to reinforce the Baltics in event of a conflict. Russian

aircraft frequently violate Baltic Airspace posing a risk to civilian aircraft.13 In a worst-case

scenario where Russia annexes a portion of them (Narva) or the Baltics as a whole, the B3

would be powerless alone. The bigger question is why Russia would do that- the Baltics do not

have substantial resources or a substantial Russian nationalist population; the Russian speaking

population is influenced by Russia but does not desire a Russian state these days (although

Narva and Sillamäe wanted a referendum on autonomy in 1993, this referendum is unlike the

Ukrainian one).14

The China threat is a different question. China's involvement in the Baltics appears to be

defined in their relationship as their participation with Russia in joint military exercises near the

Baltics. China has some economic development in the Baltics- but all the Baltic nations are

skeptical of China and debt-trap-diplomacy.

Now the question is how pros go about addressing foreign aggression. There are

proposals to increase heavy equipment in the Baltics/troop presence. Other proposals involve

increased aircraft/anti-aircraft equipment in the Baltics or stationing nuclear weapons in the

12
Nicholas Waller, 4-8-2021, "How real is the Russian threat to the Baltic States?," New Europe,
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/how-real-is-the-russian-threat-to-the-baltic-states/
13
NATO, 7-29-2021, "NATO Baltic Air Policing fighters intercept Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea," ac.nato.int,
https://ac.nato.int/archive/2021/NATO_BAP_intercepts
14
Kaspar Koort, October 26, 2017, "History: how Ida-Virumaa remained in Estonia," Tartu Postimees,
https://tartu.postimees.ee/4288807/ajaloolugu-kuidas-ida-virumaa-eestile-jai.

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

Baltics. Read up on whatever you want the pro to be and define why this would not just be

good but probable.

Politics

Russian aggression has been the background of European politics for ages so it's no

surprise that the pro can impact political decisions. The pro can argue that absent more

support, the Baltics will pursue their defenses which could aggravate Russia more. They can

also discuss the specific political parties in each nation. Germany and Russia have upcoming

Bundestag/Duma elections, with potential for surprises in each. There is a fine line here that

would have to be walked as it is easy to turn some of these arguments for the con. However, it

is a distinct area and needs acknowledgment. Additionally, internal NATO politics would be

impacted by the pro. If NATO can come to a consensus it may reinforce diplomatic ties and

methods, improving NATO cohesion.

Other Arguments

While I take issue with several other ideas being tossed around by pros, they need to be

mentioned. Cyber security is a sparkling object for the pro, however; all Baltic countries have

above average cyber capabilities with Estonia and Lithuania leading the world in cyber security.

All 3 have NATO Centers of Excellence and NATO has committed to cyberspace being an active

domain that could trigger an Article 5 response. It is difficult to imagine what a substantial

increase would be in cyberspace. Minesweeping is another area I've heard being brought up.

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

Again, the problem is NATO ships are clearing mines already and the Alliance has been

preparing for a minesweeping wartime campaign if needed for several years.15

Con

The con's greatest strength is that in the status quo the Baltics have not been invaded

by Russia. Therefore, empirically, the status quo has deterred aggression in the Baltics. While

the pro may go outside the Baltics and argue about Ukraine or other nations, any pro that

argues that Russia will attack the Baltics shortly has an uphill battle.

There are 4 key areas for the con

1) Substantially increasing defense commitments in the Baltics would increase aggression

2) A militaristic focus is problematic

3) NATO in the Baltics does not work and does not stop Russia

4) Alternative factors reduce the likelihood of hostilities

Keen debate students would look at these areas and notice that half of the con arguments

given are defensive arguments in nature. While this is not normally included in a constructive

speech, they are juggernauts for this topic that can be established in the crossfire and

reinforced throughout the round.

15
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., 3-23-2015, "Minefields At Sea: From The Tsars To Putin," Breaking Defense,
https://breakingdefense.com/2015/03/shutting-down-the-sea-russia-china-iran-and-the-hidden-danger-of-sea-
mines/; Marcom, 5-7-2021, "NATO forces clear mines from the Baltic in Open Spirit operation," mc.nato.int,
https://mc.nato.int/media-centre/news/2021/nato-forces-clear-mines-from-the-baltic-in-open-spirit-operation

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

Essentially:

If you can persuade the judge that Russia will invade the Baltics, then this will happen at

the first notice of a commitment increase- or- If you persuade the judge that deterrence is

flawed in the status quo, then they’re forced to admit alternative factors keep Russia from

invading the Baltics. Either way is a con ballot.

From Trip-Wires to Triggers

If Russia has ambitions of eventually invading the Baltics, announcements, and

intelligence that NATO will substantially bolster its defense commitment in the Baltics risks

miscalculation and could spur a pre-emptive attack. If the commitment discussed is enough to

withstand a Russian assault, Russia could perceive a 'now-or-never opportunity, where they

would mobilize troops faster than NATO allies. It would take several weeks to move the

armored forces required for a substantial increase in defense commitments, giving the nearby

Russians a distinct advantage in a shortened conflict.16 If NATO decided to do a slow

unpublicized increase in defense commitments, Russia could miscalculate the movement as a

NATO pre-emptive attack and decide to respond. Forcing the pro to detail its position early in

the round will improve your strategic decision.

While Russia's political situation is changing due to the Navalny crisis in the status quo,

and increased NATO presence allows top leaders in the Russian government to frame the West

16
David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank”, Rand,

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

as increasingly aggressive, consolidating support behind the current regime. As images of tanks

are easier for citizens to understand than complex deterrence theory, citizens will flock to

stability regardless of the political costs. This opens the door to political arguments about the

upcoming Duma elections.

Even if NATO increased its commitment to the Baltics and there was no retaliation,

Russia has promised to increase its forces concentrated on the Western front, neutralizing any

advantage. This can beat most impact scenarios reliant on tangible increases.17

Assets in one area mean no assets in another area. For example, if assets were needed

in Afghanistan, South China Sea, etc. they'd have to be relocated around the world. Trade-offs

are always a possibility.

Guns vs. Quills

An increase in defense commitments could entail a further focus on a military that

ignores the hybrid threats the Baltics face now. As misinformation, cybernetic warfare, and

economic coercion affect the alliance now and have a higher likelihood than military conflict,

these issues should, for the con, take priority. Further defense commitments encourage a focus

on the military aspects and allow policymakers to be complacent with the Russian threat,

claiming that the problem is solved as Russia cannot invade. The threat from Russia isn’t

necessarily an invasion, rather it’s the continued disregard for democratic institutions and

citizens. Stress the impact weighing here to maximize your arguments.

17
Gabriela Baczynska, Wiktor Szary, 6-15-2015, "Russia says will retaliate if U.S. weapons stationed on its borders,"
U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/cnews-us-russia-usa-europe-idCAKBN0OV17A20150615

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

A Stable Status-Quo

The con can argue that the idea of an increase in defense commitments for the Baltics is

flawed as deterrence does not need to work to preserve the status quo. Consider that if you

accept that there is a lack of deterrence due to a lack of defense commitments, accepting the

claim made that there should be an increase, you also have to acknowledge that there has been

a lack of deterrence since the Baltics left the Soviet Union. Deterrence is not keeping Russian

forces at bay. Instead, there is likely a lack of motivation on the Russian side to expand the

troops and treasure for marginal gains. Analyzing the cyberattacks by Russian actors on the

Baltics, the lack of response by NATO makes it easy to conclude that deterrence has failed,

however; we have not seen a large-scale escalation.18

If one concludes that deterrence is successful in the status quo due to “trip-wires”,

Baltic Air Policing Missions, Enhanced Forward Presence, etc. then there is no reason to divert

more resources to the Baltics.

Non-NATO Deterrence

Independent of NATO, the con can argue that EU action deters Russian aggression. EU

sanctions against Russia have weakened its economic growth and have presented a united

front.19 While past sanctions were never designed to be crippling, sanctions against Russia in

18
Matus Halas (2019) Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics, European Security, 28:4,
431-448, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1637855
19
Juha Rainne, 10-28-2020, "Russia sanctions bite and remind us of the value of transatlantic unity," Atlantic
Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-sanctions-bite-and-remind-us-of-the-value-
of-transatlantic-unity/

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

response to aggression in the Baltics could destroy the Russian economy, as Russia faces an

unstable political environment and impacts from the COVID pandemic. As a result, there has

been a 7.9% increase in food and beverages costs, leading some to suggest Russia will have to

offer food stamps.20

The con should argue that the risk of Russian incursions into the Baltics is minimal

without accounting for any deterrence. Russian military action is advantageous Russophones in

Ukraine desired a higher standard of living and had a nationalistic identity as Russian. The

Baltics are not the same. Baltic countries and border towns have a higher standard of living and

enjoy EU membership rights. As the conflict in Ukraine has lasted, images of the destruction

remind both sides of the costs, deterring further action. Baltic-Russophones understand that

they are in a distinct country with advantages and would be unlikely to start separatists’

movements.21

Additionally, non-NATO partnerships (i.e bilateral security deals) should be raised as

possible solutions. "But wait, isn't that a counterplan that is not allowed in PF?" Yes and no-

counterplans assume a policy idea called fiat where it happens magically in the Debate space

the same way a “should” topic is assumed to happen. The way you can run a counterplan in PF

is two-fold. First, establish the security deal as coming now, but NATO would interrupt it and

prevent it from happening. This allows you to phrase it similar to a political disadvantage in

policy debate and raise the benefits of the security deal that trade-off with the plan. The other

20
Cristian Rosu, 6-30-2021, "How real is the Russian threat to the Baltic States?," New Europe,
https://www.neweurope.eu/article/how-real-is-the-russian-threat-to-the-baltic-states/
21
Andres Kasekamp, “Are the Baltic States Next?”, NATO Allies and Baltic Sea Security: 62-70, 2018.

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

way is by saying that it happens regardless and that NATO would be redundant. This way

doesn't generate offense, however; it is likely more realistic and serves to provide alternative

solvency against the pro.

The con has ample opportunities to win on the risk of offense as in the absolute best-

case scenario there would be a cost to increasing NATO defense commitments. The con has a

guaranteed (though minimal) piece of offense that the pro lacks. A con overview that explains

that the pro has the burden to prove offense to win the round (while redundant in most cases)

could help in rounds with less IR-focused judges. Basing arguments on fundamental human

assumptions (i.e. military cost money) improves your performance with a lay audience. Take

advantage of this for your con strategy.

Strategic notes

The Pro side is likely more difficult to argue unless a pro team clearly defines what the

most probable interpretation of the topic is and uses that to massively limit con ground. For

example, if there is a proposal for an increase in defensive battements in the Baltics, smart pro

teams would say that this is the most probable interpretation of the topic and this is what

should be argued. At that point, any case reliant on troops would immediately be forced to

debate theory.

The pro also has more tangible offensive ideas than the con. For the majority of cons,

competing with war scenarios will require war scenarios of their own which may be difficult to

prove given that past increases have taken place without conflict arising. Cons should stick to a

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Topic Analysis by Will Watson Sept/Oct 2021

probability analysis to win rounds or find a high-impact case. Burying the aff in defense has

never looked better.

About Will Watson

William (Will) Watson is a joint-degree international affairs student at the Bush School

of Government and Public Policy with a focus on Russia and the Baltics. Will previously interned

at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) where he studied NATO defense

policy (specifically Baltic air policing) in Tallinn, Estonia .

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch

Resolved: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its

defense commitments to the Baltic states.

Introduction

The September / October topic always ends up one of the most interesting: it is debated

for two months, and many teams use the summer to prepare, which results in a wide variety of

unique and creative arguments. This year, the broadness of the resolution and its focus on

foreign policy will allow debaters to explore many different routes as the topic progresses. The

beginning of the season tends to reward the teams that are most willing to try out different

strategies, and who continue doing prep throughout the season, even after they write cases

and blocks early on. However, it is still true that the stockist arguments are the truest, and at

the major septober tournaments like Yale and Bronx, it is almost always teams running the

stock arguments with a unique and creative spin that are most successful. This year's topic is

"Resolved: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its defense

commitments to the Baltic states." This topic is prescriptive, arguing that there is an actor,

NATO, which should do something. With topics like these, unlike some of the descriptive topics

of last year, we are asked to imagine a world where NATO does something versus a world

where they do not. Most of the Public Forum topics in recent years have asked about the

United States doing an action, making debating an international organization an interesting

change of pace.

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

Background

To think about this topic, it's important to gain an understanding of the actor, NATO,

and the Baltic States themselves. To start, NATO was formed in 1949, after World War II, to

supposedly increase security for its member nations. It at its beginning contained the United

States and its Western European allies, but would later (controversially) expand to include a

total of 30 member nations. It also now has troops stationed in multiple conflicts around the

globe. NATO members see NATO as a defensive alliance, but Russia's perspective is very

different. This fact is vital to the topic. Russia sees NATO as an explicitly anti-Russian

organization and sees any NATO action as a threat to their national security. They have, in the

past, acted with hostility towards NATO expansion, and are still paranoid of the threat of

European invasion (something that has happened relatively frequently). The Baltic States,

which consist of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, were added to NATO in 2004, along with three

other countries. This was most notable because the Baltics, formerly, were the Soviet Republic.

They were annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II and only regained their

independence when the Soviet Union fell in 1991. Today, the Baltic states are relatively poor,

have a weak military, and are constantly staring down the threat of Russian aggression. They

depend on Russia for their electricity and gas, as well as many other economic interests. They

do, however, have access to the Baltic Sea, which on the one hand is an asset, but also makes

them desirable to the Russians. For the Baltics, joining NATO was a way to increase their

security, because of NATO's Article V provision. Article V of the NATO charter states, essentially,

that an attack against the NATO nations, must be treated as an attack on all of them, provided

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

that every single state agrees to invoke it. Article V was only invoked on time, after the

September 11th attacks on the United States. NATO, then, would invade Afghanistan, an

occupation that ended just this month, 20 years later. There has constantly been a debate

around the credibility of Article V. While it was only invoked one time, the threat of Article V

has been the reason its single invocation was virtually the only attack ever against a NATO

country. NATO allies have for the most part affirmed they believe in it, but during the age of

Trump, where the United States withdrew some of its commitments to its allies, particularly in

Europe, many European countries have wavered on it. For example, French President

Emmanuel Macron called NATO "brain dead", and Germany has also articulated uncertainty

surrounding NATO's cohesion. Russia has long wanted to expose Article V as illegitimate,

because to them, it is the underpinning of the reason they are insecure in Eastern Europe. From

Russia's perspective, countries they share a border with and the countries that invaded them 60

years ago and killed 25 million of their people have signed a virtually all-encompassing military

agreement with the strongest military in the world. It is not difficult to see why that scares

them. Imagine if Imperial Japan had stayed powerful, and then signed an Article V-type

agreement with Mexico and Canada. We, as Americans, would be horrified.

The War Scenarios

On every single international relations topic, nuclear war is everywhere, and this topic

will be no different. To make matters worse for anyone who hopes to hear arguments about

literally anything else, there are good links on both sides.

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

The primary affirmative arguments will center around deterrence. The argument goes,

right now, following Russia's aggression towards Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine, Russia is next

planning to annex or invade the Baltic states, and by placing troops in the region, the cost of

that war would rise so much that Putin would be forced to back down. The link of this

argument will not be difficult for most pro teams to prove: to most judges, it will seem

unreasonable that Russia would be willing to engage in a full-scale war with NATO. However,

the difficulty of this argument is proving that Russia does want to invade. There are many ways

the affirmative can argue they do.

For starters, Putin is currently grappling with declining popularity and economic

destruction from Covid, and the pro can argue he will use a Baltic invasion as a diversionary

war. By rallying nationalism and restoring former Soviet republics, he could give himself the

short-term popularity boost he needs to stay in power. Teams should be prepared to explain

why Putin cares about his popularity, why a war would help him, and why, of all places, he

would choose the Baltics. Centering the debate around Putin's political intentions is likely

strategic for the affirmative because it fits well into the narrative that Russia is a rogue power

that requires military confrontation. Putin's 2014 invasion of Ukraine is likely the affirmative’s

best example because many authors have argued that conflict was a result of Putin's declining

domestic popularity. The reasons for a Russian invasion, though, are not limited to just politics.

Russia would likely also benefit from greater access to the Baltic Sea for trade, which could

incentivize Putin to invade for an economic victory. There is a long history of Russia engaging in

military expansionism for access to warm water ports (ports that don't freeze in the winter),

and it is plausible to argue Russia's current economic condition could motivate them to invade

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

for economic reasons. Additionally, Russia has long sought to prove that NATO's Article V is

fragile, and could use a small invasion of the Baltics to further fracture already declining NATO

unity. Russia also seeks to simply restore its former glory as a global hegemon like it was during

the peak of the Soviet Union. The Baltics were formerly Soviet republics, and the fact they are

currently integrating into NATO and Western Europe is a source of embarrassment for the

Russian state. To reestablish themselves as internationally powerful, they could decide to

invade.

As currently stands, Russia would win the war. (Assuming NATO doesn’t intervene):22

The RAND Corporation’s 2016 report on the Baltic scenario highlighted the region’s

vulnerability, concluding that within 60 hours, Russia could seize enough terrain to

“demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the

alliance.”

As long as Russia could take over the countries in 60 hours, they have little disincentive

to do so. Things, however, change quickly once NATO puts troops in the region. Firstly, the

force would act as a "tripwire." That is, if Russia accidentally were to harm a NATO troop, NATO

would be forced to intervene. Since Russia knows this, they would never risk killing a NATO

troop. Secondly, just having the force there would raise the cost of the war because NATO

forces being there could at least make Russia's time difficult. Air defense, cyber defense, tanks,

and other military technologies only the US and Western Europe possess would make the

invasion significantly more difficult. The affirmative should argue that Putin wants a war for

22https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/rocket-artillery-can-keep-russia-out-of-the-baltics/

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

political or cultural reasons, it's not out of self-defense. This means that if the West can

successfully raise the cost of war high enough, he won't even try. Certainly, troops raise the

cost of war. And if you prove a large-scale Russia-NATO war could be averted, you are likely to

win the round.

While this at first seems persuasive, the negative can very persuasively argue the

affirmative have this backward. One should start on uniqueness. While the invasions of

Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia did happen, the Baltics, because they are in NATO, are a whole

different animal. Argue Putin is not going to take these massive risks for political or minor

economic reasons. And the neg has an obvious perceptual advantage here--we aren't at war

and haven't been, for a long time. Why is it different now? And even if it is, when does this war

happen? Why hasn't it happened? Once the negative proves war is unlikely to break out, it is

easy to understand why the chance of war is higher in the affirmative world. Placing troops

would increase tensions. It would raise the stakes, and remember from before, Russia has

gotten invaded often and hates the West.

The thesis of the negative should be that Russia is not some aggressive, revisionist state,

but one that is deeply paranoid about its security, and only increases its aggression when it

feels threatened. In other words, "defensive realist." While it seems counterintuitive, the

Australian Institute of International Affairs explains it like this:23

23 https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/threat-or-threatened-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-era-of-nato-
expansion/

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

It is vitally important that the West understands that Russia's conduct in Ukraine

is a rational response to the strategic pressure that has been placed on the

country by an encroaching military alliance, NATO. The Kremlin's foreign policies

conform to the expectations of defensive realism. A defensive realist foreign

policy prioritizes state security, which is maximized when a stable balance of

power is established in the international system.[7] Defensive realists advise

against imperialism and aggression, but they do advocate power projection by

threatened states to the extent that is necessary to restore the international

system to a stable state of equilibrium.[8] As Robert Person argues, Putin has

been pursuing a defensive realist strategy because his, "the ultimate objective is

to maximize his security, not his power."[9] NATO's hubristic expansion has

destroyed the balance of power that existed in Europe during the Cold War and

engendered feelings of insecurity and vulnerability in the minds of Russia's

leaders. These attitudes are rooted in a rational conception of the international

as a realm in which the threat of war is constant and each state must take

responsibility for its survival.

John Mearsheimer, the original author of this theory, would also like to point out: "This

is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive to potential threats near their home

territory" To all types of judges, this can be a very persuasive narrative. Frame it like that while

yes, Russia has done bad things, what choice do they have. It is really important to understand

Russia's history here, and that NATO would be doing all of the things Russia hates: threatening

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

its Eastern border and just being NATO. Russia believes in a doctrine of "escalate to de-

escalate." It would very likely resort to a large show of force to make NATO leave it alone, and

this would be a hugely dangerous situation. NATO could respond, causing an all-out war, and

when Russia starts to lose the war, the nuclear button could seem attractive.

And thus, after we affirm and negate, everything goes boom. Something necessary in all

war arguments is a clear and specific chain of events. Many teams argue that “the chance of

miscalculation is high '' without telling the judge what that miscalculation is. These types of

arguments are infinitely more persuasive, so researching exactly why it is that both countries

decide to go to war is imperative.

Non-War Pro Arguments

There are a few other non-war arguments the affirmative can write. The first of which

concerns cyber defense. The Baltic states have been victims of Russian cyberattacks for years,

including misinformation campaigns and intellectual property thefts. Also, there is the constant

threat of Russia attacking one of these country's power grids, something they in all likelihood

can do. The affirmative always benefits by including cyber defense as a "defense commitment,"

and can argue that with NATO allocating more cyber defense, Russian cyberattacks will stop.

The affirmative should impact this both with the consequences of the cyber attacks that have

already happened, and the cyberattacks that could happen in the future. In particular, grid

failure is likely the biggest impact the aff can win off of a cyber defense contention.

The affirmative also have grounds to argue that troop placement would benefit the

Baltic economy. There are two ways in which this would occur. First, to physically put troops in

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

the Baltics, it would require NATO to construct various forms of infrastructure. For example, to

place tanks near the border, they would need to build roads and to fly in large military plans,

new runways would need to be constructed. Most of this infrastructure would, once NATO

missions are over, be able to be used for infrastructure. This is particularly necessary because

while the Baltic states were under the rule of the Soviet Union, their infrastructure was

underinvested in, and since they gained their independence, there has not been any massive

economic turnaround, leaving their infrastructure insufficient. Second, the affirmative can say

that placing troops would give investors confidence in the security of the region, leading to an

increase in investment from Western countries and China. With this argument, teams should be

careful of the turns to foreign investment, which are far more common than they probably

should be. While these links are largely winnable, the issue with this argument is in its impact.

The impact is simply not big enough to win impact weighing against the majority of negatives

on this topic. The Baltics have a population just north of 6 million, which pales in comparison to

the consequences of cyberattacks, wars, oil shocks, etc. And, since death over poverty seems to

be a favorite in the PF circuit, winning weighing becomes even more difficult. This is not to say

that this argument cannot win rounds, but if this is the route you choose, you should have well-

prepared blocks and should be willing to go all-in on defensive arguments in your final focus.

Additionally, framing the debate in terms of probability over magnitude could be a viable

strategy. Arguing something along the lines of that allowing 6 million people to suffer in poverty

for the negligible chance a war breaks out is bad policymaking could persuade many judges.

A third pro argument concerns the stability of NATO and US global hegemony. Russia's

threatening posture in Eastern Europe is probably not a threat to American global hegemony,

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Topic Analysis by Ben Kirsch Sept/Oct 2021

but a strong military response to it is a major symbolic effort by the United States, especially

immediately following the age of Trump and the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan. US

hegemony has a particularly strategic impact because it is flexible and turns most other

arguments. Arguing that US hegemony is the best route towards global stability will likely

enable you to win impact weighing, but many judges will be turned off by how “cloudy” the

impact can sound.

Finally, the argument that I believe is most strategic, is about the potential for our allies

to proliferate if they feel abandoned by the United States. As was discussed above, the United

States is currently to some extent becoming more isolationist. And, NATO countries and our

Asian allies rely on us not being isolationist for their security. Countries like Germany, Japan,

and South Korea refrain from the construction of nuclear weapons because they believe the US

will back them in. Seeing the United States look inwards and abandon its international

commitments makes them uneasy: their security would no longer be assured if they lost the

blanket guarantees America offers them. All of these countries are wealthy and militarily

proficient and would be able to build a nuclear weapon if they felt they needed to. The

affirmative can argue, because of declining US influence, we are trending towards these

countries making that decision. NATO placing troops in the Baltics is a way to reverse this trend.

If these countries see the United States make a large commitment to their allies in the face of

Russian aggression, that could be enough to convince these countries that America is still going

to protect them, and turn them away from nuclear development. If we continue to watch

Russia threaten our allies and do nothing, they would feel like they need the nuke. The impact

of nuclear proliferation is also significant. When states proliferate, their enemies follow. It is not

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a coincidence that when the US-built nukes, China and Russia followed, and that India and

Pakistan both had the bomb. And, when states first build nuclear weapons, it is very unstable

because other countries become worried about their intentions, weak security systems make

the bombs themselves vulnerable to terrorists, and states may attempt pre-emptive strikes (à la

Israel-Iran, Saudi Arabia-Iran, North Korea-South Korea, etc.) believing second-strike capability

doesn't exist yet. It will not be difficult to find evidence and warranting why cascading

proliferation is harmful and dangerous.

Non-War Con Arguments

While there are some peripheral arguments, the negative should primarily be focused

on how Russia would retaliate to NATO's force increase. It is not debatable that Russia would

be angry, and Putin has a plethora of ways to retaliate. Debaters should be creative in how they

argue Russia would respond, but I'll list out some of the main ones here. Firstly, any increase in

tensions could jeopardize the peace process in Syria. Putin is the only mechanism the US has to

negotiate with the Assad regime, and Russia could easily intervene whenever they please, so if

US-Russia relations deteriorated, the peace process could be at risk. Secondly, Russia could

raise the price of oil or cut off the Baltic states entirely. Russia provides a large chunk of

European natural gas and oil, and could easily scale back production, raising prices. Thirdly, they

could cyber attack the West and attempt to increase right-wing extremism. Fourthly, they could

pull out of nuclear agreements or other bilateral agreements, like the New Start program. Any

of these events would have severe consequences. These arguments are particularly strategic

because it is very easy to read reasons why war would never happen and get rid of all the

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affirmative offenses. It allows you to not even get into the whole war debate, and, let's face it,

even if the arguments are true many lay judges will reject war arguments on face.

Overall, this Septober topic promises to be diverse and interesting, and teams should

pursue all kinds of creative avenues beyond what I’ve talked about here.

About Ben Kirsch

Ben is from New York City, where he attended the Hackley School and debated for four

years. He amassed ten bids to the Tournament of Champions and served as the captain of his

team. Now, he is a freshman at the University of Michigan, studying philosophy and economics.

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General Information

Resolved: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization should substantially increase its

defense commitments to the Baltic states.

Foreword: We, at Champion Briefs, feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as
valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the
topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As
such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel
will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built
from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build
that foundation.

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What are the Baltic States?

According to Encyclopedia Britannica24,

“Baltic states, northeastern region of Europe containing the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic states are bounded on the west
and north by the Baltic Sea, which gives the region its name, on the east by Russia, on the
southeast by Belarus, and on the southwest by Poland and an exclave of Russia.”

24
https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states

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The subject of linguistic nationalism has been important in the Baltic States since time
immemorial. The Encyclopedia Britannica continues:

“The vast majority of ethnic Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians live within the borders of their
respective states. In all three countries virtually everyone among the titular nationalities speaks
the native tongue as their first language, which is remarkable in light of the massive Russian
immigration to the Baltic states during the second half of the 20th century. Initially, attempts to
Russify the Baltic peoples were overt, but later they were moderated as Russian immigration
soared and the sheer weight of the immigrant numbers simply served to promote this objective
in less-blatant ways. Independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed the Baltic states to
place controls on immigration, and, in the decade following, the Russian presence in Baltic life
diminished. At the beginning of the 21st century, the titular nationalities of Lithuania and
Estonia accounted for about four-fifths and two-thirds of the countries’ populations,
respectively, while ethnic Latvians made up just less than three-fifths of their nation’s
population.”

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What is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, also known as NATO, is a military alliance of 28
European Countries, Canada and the United States.

According to NATO itself25:

“The Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet
expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North
American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.

Fortunately, by then the United States had turned its back on its traditional policy of diplomatic
isolationism. Aid provided through the US-funded Marshall Plan (also known as the European
Recovery Program) and other means fostered a degree of economic stabilisation. European
states still needed confidence in their security, however, before they would begin talking and
trading with each other. Military cooperation, and the security it would bring, would have to
develop in parallel with economic and political progress.

Accordingly, after much discussion and debate, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April,
1949. In the Treaty’s renowned Article 5, the new Allies agreed “an armed attack against one or
more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all” and that following such an
attack, each Ally would take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force” in response. Significantly, Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty had important purposes not
immediately germane to the threat of attack. Article 3 laid the foundation for cooperation in
military preparedness between the Allies, and Article 2 allowed them some leeway to engage in
non-military cooperation.”

25
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_135843.htm

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What are the Baltic States’ Relationship to NATO?

The Baltic States’ geographic proximity to NATO makes deterring Moscow’s revisionist
aspirations a primary security concern. According to the Congressional Research Service26:

“The United States supported the Baltic states’ accession to NATO and the European Union (EU)
in 2004. Especially since Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, potential threats posed to the Baltic
states by Russia have been a primary driver of increased U.S. and congressional interest in the
region. Congressional interest in the Baltic states has focused largely on defense cooperation
and security assistance for the purposes of deterring potential Russian aggression and
countering hybrid threats, such as disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks. Energy security
is another main area of U.S. and congressional interest in the Baltic region.

U.S., NATO, and Baltic leaders have viewed Russian military activity in the region with concern;
such activity includes large-scale exercises, incursions into Baltic states’ airspace, and a layered
build-up of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities. Experts have concluded that defense of
the Baltic states in a conventional military conflict with Russia likely would be difficult and
problematic. The Baltic states fulfill NATO’s target of spending 2% of gross domestic product
(GDP) on defense, although as countries with relatively small populations, their armed forces
remain relatively small and their military capabilities limited. Consequently, the Baltic states’
defense planning relies heavily on their NATO membership.”

NATO is currently engaged in a multidimensional partnership with the Baltic States to deter
Russian aggression. The Brookings Institution: “Since 2014, when Russia seized Crimea in
Ukraine and stoked a conflict in Ukraine’s east that continues to this day, NATO has been
gradually fortifying its eastern flank, in the Baltic states and Poland. It now has a multinational
battalion-size battlegroup (of about one thousand soldiers) in each of the three Baltic states,
plus a larger U.S. brigade-sized presence in Poland (with occasional, but intermittent, American
deployments into the Baltic states for exercising and signaling resolve). The battalion in

26

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Lithuania is backstopped by Germany, with additional major contributions from the Czech
Republic and the Netherlands. These battalions are collectively described as the “enhanced
forward presence” or eFP program, following NATO’s Operation Atlantic Resolve; the U.S.
element is often described as the European deterrence initiative.”

What is the concern with Russia?

The discussion surrounding the defense of the Baltic States is inseparable from Russia’s foreign
policy over the last decade. Russia has engaged in an assertive foreign policy which has worried
its neighbors. According to the Council on Foreign Relations27:

“Ukraine became a battleground in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began arming and
abetting separatists in the Donbas region in the country’s southeast. Russia’s seizure of Crimea
was the first time since World War II that a European state annexed the territory of another.
Some fourteen thousand people have died in the conflict, the bloodiest in Europe since the
Balkan Wars of the 1990s.

27
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia

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For many analysts, the conflict marked a clear shift in the global security environment from a
unipolar period of U.S. dominance to one defined by renewed competition between great
powers. Russia has deep cultural, economic, and political bonds with Ukraine, and in many
ways Ukraine is central to Russia’s identity and vision for itself in the world.

By seizing Crimea, Russia has solidified its control of a critical foothold on the Black Sea. With a
larger and more sophisticated military presence there, Russia can project power deeper into
the Mediterranean, Middle East, and North Africa, where it has traditionally had limited
influence. Meanwhile, to the south, Russia is strengthening its military and energy ties with
Turkey, another Black Sea power.”

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Works Cited

Andris Banka. “The Breakaways: A Retrospective on the Baltic Road to NATO.” War on the
Rocks. 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/the-breakaways-a-retrospective-on-
the-baltic-road-to-nato/

Derek Mix. “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations.” Congressional
Research Service. 2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R46139.pdf

Jonathan Masters. “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia.” Council on
Foreign Relations. 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-
crossroads-europe-and-russia

Michael O’Hanlon. “A report from NATO’s front lines.” Brookings Institute. 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/13/a-report-from-natos-
front-lines/

“NATO: Origins.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_135843.htm

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PRO: Baltic deterrence would increase readiness

Argument: Stationing more forces in the Baltic Countries would increase NATO’s readiness to
respond to any number of Russia related contingencies.

Warrant: Baltic deterrence is essential for responding quickly to Russian provocation

Olevs Nikers. “Baltic Security Assurances in Wake of NATO Summit and Biden-Putin
Meeting.” July 2017. Jamestown Foundation.
https://jamestown.org/program/baltic-security-assurances-in-wake-of-nato-
summit-and-biden-putin-meeting/

“President Biden’s sideline meeting with the leaders of the Baltic States in Brussels
additionally confirmed the US’s support and readiness to participate in strengthening
NATO’s effective deterrence and defense potential in the face of growing geopolitical
tensions along the Alliance’s eastern flank. “This meeting was really important for the
Baltic States. The United States understands the threats facing the Baltic States and is
well aware that Russia’s position is becoming more aggressive and that it is trying to
integrate Belarus into its military structures,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda
noted following the summit. “We have been assured that the United States considers
our region strategically important,” he added. During the meeting with Biden, he
emphasized that US participation in strengthening security and defense in the region is
“the most important factor in controlling Russia.” According to the president of
Lithuania, a larger US military presence in the Baltic States is highly desirable as “the
best” and “most important” expression of Washington’s attention to the security of the
region (Lrt.lt, June 14)..”

Warrant: Moscow is already pushing the limits of acceptable status quo behavior

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Olevs Nikers. “Baltic Security Assurances in Wake of NATO Summit and Biden-Putin
Meeting.” July 2017. Jamestown Foundation.
https://jamestown.org/program/baltic-security-assurances-in-wake-of-nato-
summit-and-biden-putin-meeting/

“This year’s NATO summit conspicuously took place against the background of Biden’s
much-ballyhooed one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Geneva. That June 16 Biden-Putin summit marked a key step in the White House’s
goal of making the turbulent US-Russian relationship more stable and predictable. So
far, one of the practical effects of the “reset”-like reopening of strategic-level dialogue
with Moscow has been a commitment by Russia on the one hand and the United
States and its NATO allies on the other to observe one another’s “red lines.” For the
transatlantic community, this means holding Russia to account for any further
attempts to destabilize NATO or compromise peace and security throughout Europe.
But Moscow is already testing or crossing those Western red lines while almost
haphazardly declaring its own, which routinely undermine the security of the
countries along NATO’s eastern flank (see EDM, April 27, June 21, July 1). It is, thus,
instructive to recall former US President Barack Obama’s so-called “reset” with Russia in
2010 (embraced two years after Russia’s aggression in Georgia), which was followed
soon thereafter by Moscow’s forcible annexation of Crimea in 2014. Taking that recent
history into account, it will be important to complement any kind of cooperative policies
that might be put on the table right now with concrete capabilities to contain Russia
whenever the latter crosses a NATO red line (Xtv.lv, June 18).”

Warrant: Major NATO militaries suffer from a readiness deficit

Josh Campbell. “Why NATO should adopt a readiness initiative.” War on the Rocks.
2021. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/why-nato-should-adopt-a-tactical-
readiness-initiative/

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“In January 2018, the German news site Deutsche Welle released a bombshell report.
It exposed, in excruciating detail, the degraded readiness of the German military. One
year before assuming command of the NATO Very High Readiness Task Force, the
alliance’s multinational immediate response force, the Bundeswehr was forced to admit
it lacked basic equipment needed to fulfil its role: spare parts for armored vehicles,
night-vision devices, body armor, and even winter clothes and tents. Subsequent
investigations revealed similar readiness problems in the nation’s air and naval forces.
In short, NATO’s most important European member was not ready for war.”

Warrant: Stop gap measures are not sufficient

Josh Campbell. “Why NATO should adopt a readiness initiative.” War on the Rocks.
2021. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/why-nato-should-adopt-a-tactical-
readiness-initiative/

“When first introduced two years ago, the readiness initiative lacked a clear definition
of readiness, a means to evaluate individual units allocated to the initiative, and a
routine mechanism to test the responsiveness of these forces. Since NATO defense
ministers are still discussing the details of the initiative, it is likely that these
fundamental gaps still exist. The initiative still has not been formally tested. Exercise
Defender 2020, slated for June of this year, should have been an excellent opportunity
to do so. However, the exercise was greatly reduced due to COVID-19, and it would
have most likely been an inauspicious start for the alliance’s latest initiative. NATO’s
next opportunity will be Exercise Steadfast Defender in 2021, which gives NATO and
states contributing forces to the initiative a little under a year to address these
deficiencies and ensure the success of this important initiative. As a first step, NATO
should establish oversight on the readiness of national forces allocated to the “Four
Thirties.” Then, the alliance should adopt additional strategies that support tactical

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readiness for these forces by standardizing training methodologies and establishing

their wartime task organization before a crisis starts, not after. Given the challenges
associated with NATO’s land component, the alliance should start with member
states’ armies rather than the other services.”

Analysis: This argument shows that the Baltics are critical to NATO’s readiness, and that
alternative measures of solvency have not worked. Weigh readiness as an important
preventative measure for deterring conflict.

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PRO: The Baltics act as a tripwire

Argument: Russia is a declining power with a second tier economy. NATO must spend more
time and energy on new and emerging threats.

Warrant: NATO needs to reinforce tripwires to make deterrence credible

Ulrich Kuhn. “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics” December 2018. Carnegie

Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-
75883

“NATO could also seek to improve its existing trip wire approach in the conventional
realm and eliminate some of the ambiguities inherent to the alliance’s nuclear
deterrence approach. Different options are available. First, if NATO wants to increase
its capability to impose costs on Moscow, while at the same time avoid escalating
general tensions with Russia and maintaining alliance unity, it could add additional
personnel and equipment significantly below the level of seven permanently deployed
heavily armed brigades. Whether NATO could reach consensus on deploying, for
instance, two additional brigades is nevertheless not sure at all. Moscow, meanwhile,
would probably view this as an invitation to reciprocate—something it has not done so
far in response to EFP deployments. Furthermore, it is more than questionable from a
military point of view whether two additional brigades would be able to hold off a
Russian attack long enough for NATO to send in reinforcements. That said, even two
additional brigades would raise the military costs Russia would face for invading a
NATO member, thereby threatening pain that Moscow might hope to avoid.”

Warrant: The Baltic states are critical tripwires

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Ulrich Kuhn. “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics” December 2018. Carnegie

Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-
75883

“Second, a more modest approach would be for NATO to address some of its existing
military shortcomings—by increasing the chance that the trip wire were triggered and
would result in a timely political decision by NATO to respond—with the goal of
strengthening the credibility of NATO’s deterrence approach and thus preventing
deliberate Russian escalation. For instance, if NATO wants to make sure that the EFP is
involved in combat as early as possible in the event of a Russian attack, it could
rethink the geographical location of EFP bases or add an additional small element of
forward-deployed forces that would continuously patrol and monitor the borders with
Russia. That way, NATO would limit Russia’s ability to send small disguised units over
the border. NATO could also consider asking Washington to add some U.S. forces to the
three Baltic states to address any concern that some of the EFP’s contributing nations
might lack resolve in the event of a Russian attack. In doing so, NATO would strengthen
assurance by heeding calls by the Baltics for U.S. boots on the ground.”

Warrant: Enhanced Forward Presence forces are key to tripwires in the Baltics

Ulrich Kuhn. “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics” December 2018. Carnegie

Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-
75883

““Another necessary adjustment, if not already under way, would be to forge a clear
political understanding within NATO of its role pertaining to possible domestic
protests that Russia may foment in the three Baltic states. In a similar vein, NATO
should seek to avoid any overlapping or even conflicting chains of command for the EFP
and consider the additional option of devising harmonized rules of engagement before

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its Graduated Response Plan comes into play. Beyond the EFP, NATO should seek
greater clarity internally about what military or perhaps even political events would
trigger deployment of the Spearhead Force and the eNRF. This process should result in
streamlined political and military decisionmaking in the event of a crisis. NATO has
already started to rehearse its crisis decisionmaking,3 but that is not the same as
streamlining necessary processes. Perhaps allies should determine, in advance, which
general contingencies will trigger reinforcement so that, in times of crisis, the North
Atlantic Council can act swiftly..”

Warrant: Tripwires are key to deterrence

Harry Lye. “Defence in a new decade: NATO prepares for new threats” Army
Technology. June 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/defence-in-
a-new-decade-nato-prepares-for-new-threats/

“Tripwire deterrence works on a different principle and does not require regional
military superiority: This is deterrence by punishment. The tripwire would not stop a
Russian offensive; rather, it ensures that if Moscow ever decided to invade the Baltic
states, it would need to engage the forces of different NATO member states directly.
Although these forces would be easily defeated, the casualties they incurred would
trigger a reaction by the entire alliance, which has global superiority in conventional
forces. The tripwire is thus seen to deter. The prospect of the unacceptable damage
that would stem from an alliance-wide response, driven by the states that bore the
brunt of the casualties, should discourage Moscow from pursuing any such aggression.”

Warrant: Tripwires are necessary and require less forces than traditional deterrence

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Harry Lye. “Defence in a new decade: NATO prepares for new threats” Army
Technology. June 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/defence-in-
a-new-decade-nato-prepares-for-new-threats/

“Nevertheless, despite these measures, Russia continues to enjoy overwhelming

military dominance in the Baltics—as it has for decades—and the current level of
NATO reinforcements will not change that. Hence, within NATO there is a growing
consensus that the alliance cannot practice “deterrence by denial,” which would
require deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat a possible invasion, without
being caught in a security dilemma. The issue is that any force sufficiently large to
achieve denial would present an intolerable threat to Russia and be misinterpreted as
an offensive posture. The obvious gap between the initial expectations of the Polish
government and the final US commitment suggests that some people in the Pentagon
are aware of such risks.

Analysis: This argument shows that the tripwire style of deterrence is clearly preferable to
traditional deterrence in terms of likelihood of success and anticipated costs. To make this
posture work, we need to reinforce the Baltics.

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PRO: Baltic States are Important to NATO

Argument: The Baltic states are vital elements of NATO – the are the front line of defense
against Russia. NATO should support them in any capacity possible.

Warrant: The Baltics are on NATO;s front line

Rachel Hoff. “US NATO Commitments are Not Optional” American Action Forum. 2016.
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/u-s-nato-commitments-not-
optional/

“The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share borders with Russia to the
east and south. After witnessing Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Baltic states are
increasing defense spending—in the past year by an average of 18 percent.
The United States should honor its treaty commitment to defend the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and stand strongly against Russian aggression.
Introduction Shortly before becoming the Republican presidential nominee, Donald
Trump indicated that he would place new conditions on collective security within NATO.
When asked about Russia’s regional aggression and specifically a potential Russian
attack on the Baltic States, Mr. Trump stated that he may withhold U.S. military
assistance if the states have not “fulfilled their obligations” to “make payments.” The
following is an analysis of the NATO treaty obligation for collective defense as well as
the membership goal of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and an evaluation of
how the Baltic states fit in to the equation. Along with four other Eastern European
countries, the Baltic states joined NATO in 2004. Membership in NATO came with the
promise under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that an armed attack against one
member would be considered an attack against all members. As a consequence,
members are obligated to exercise collective self-defense to assist members that are
attacked.”

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Warrant: The Baltic states are important NATO members

Rachel Hoff. “US NATO Commitments are Not Optional” American Action Forum. 2016.
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/u-s-nato-commitments-not-
optional/

“In 2006, defense ministers of NATO member states collectively pledged to spend at
least 2 percent of each country’s GDP on defense. Estonia currently meets that goal.
Latvia and Lithuania each spend around 1 percent of GDP on defense. All three Baltic
states, however, have demonstrated a commitment to significantly increase domestic
defense spending in recent years. From 2014 to 2015, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
boosted military expenditures by 6, 14, and 33 percent, respectively. The United
States should encourage these efforts to increase defense spending. Moreover,
alliances are not merely about dollars and cents—they are about strategy and
statecraft. NATO members do not buy their way into the alliance by spending 2 percent
of GDP on defense. NATO existed for over 50 years before its members collectively
pledged to work toward increased defense spending. The 2 percent goal is just that, not
an obligation and certainly not a condition of collective defense.”

Warrant: Expanded NATO presence is key to deterring Russia

Jen Judson. “Do the Baltics Need More US Military Support to Deter Russia.” Defense
News. 2021. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/07/15/do-the-baltics-
need-more-us-military-support-to-deter-russia/

“The deployment of the enhanced forward presence, or EFP, battalions in Latvia,

Lithuania and Estonia, for instance, have significantly reduced the risk of military
conflict in the Baltic region, Lithuanian Defence Minister Raimundas Karoblis recently

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told Defense News and a group on an Atlantic Council-organized, fact-finding mission in

Lithuania. “On the other hand, let me be very clear: [The] U.S. is the most powerful ally
and its deterrent effect is not comparable to other allies,” he told Defense News in a
statement. “I am convinced that Russia would not dare to test NATO if U.S. military units
are deployed on [a] persistent basis in the three Baltic states.”.”

Warrant: NATO is needed because Russian aggression has increased

Jen Judson. “Do the Baltics Need More US Military Support to Deter Russia.” Defense
News. 2021. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/07/15/do-the-baltics-
need-more-us-military-support-to-deter-russia/

“Lithuania, in a tenuous position bordering Belarus and Kaliningrad, has dramatically

ramped up its military capability since Russia’s move on Crimea. Lithuania is joined to
Poland by a short 40-mile border — the Suwalki Gap — that separates Belarus from
Kaliningrad. Should Russian forces close the gap, it would isolate Lithuania and its
northern Baltic state neighbors from the rest of Europe. The country hasn’t sat idly by,
waiting for Europe or America to help; it has taken steps to modernize its military by
buying new infantry fighting vehicles, tactical vehicles, howitzers and medium-range
air defense systems, and it’s grown its ranks by adding another brigade and reinstating
conscription. Lithuania also met the NATO pledge to spend 2 percent of its gross
domestic product on defense in 2018, and it’s planning to increase that effort to 2.5
percent by 2030. But despite Lithuania’s military buildup and its Eastern European
neighbors’ moves to strengthen defense of the eastern front, Russia continues to build
up its military might in the Western Military District, increase cooperation in military
exercises with Belarus, and militarize Kaliningrad with missiles and tanks, all to make
Russia capable of succeeding in a regional conflict. Then there are the allegations of
Russia’s unconventional operations in the gray zone of conflict aimed at fracturing

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NATO and Europe by tampering with elections, engaging in cyberattacks and

attempting to influence populations through false narratives in social media.”

Analysis: This argument focuses on how NATO relies on the Baltic states for important strategic
purposes. If this is the case then it should be easy for the judge to agree with supporting them
through additional resources.

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PRO: Baltic Deterrence is Key to Credibility

Argument: The Baltic states are the most vulnerable and visible in US-Russia contests.
Reinforcing them serves to bolster the credibility of NATO assurances

Warrant: The Baltics are symbolic of NATO solidarity and resistance to Russian revisionism

Sally Painter. Could Putin Launch Another Invasion” Atlantic Council. 2020.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-must-remain-
committed-to-nato-and-the-baltic-states/

“The three Baltic countries of Northern Europe have long been allies of the United
States and valued members of the NATO community. In the 20th century, the United
States refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s claim on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia
and supported the restoration of their independence in 1991. Our Baltic friends never
forgot this important solidarity, and since then have promoted democracy and
stability in their corner of Europe and worked diligently to attain membership in NATO
and the EU community through systemic reforms to their economy, governance, and
security. Rightfully so, the Baltics saw their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions
as an important deterrent to Russian influence, which continues to loom as a regional
threat to their sovereignty and national security. These threats have only escalated
since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in
2014. In this context, it is vital that the United States firmly recommit to NATO and
increase its support of the Baltic countries to ensure the continuation of strong bilateral
relations and the effective partnerships that have strengthened the entire transatlantic
community.”

Warrant: The Baltic states are important for NATO’s credibility

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Sally Painter. Could Putin Launch Another Invasion” Atlantic Council. 2020.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-must-remain-
committed-to-nato-and-the-baltic-states/

“Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have strongly demonstrated their dedication to the
transatlantic alliance and have worked diligently to implement systematic reforms on
a variety of shared concerns ranging from energy security, transparency, and
economic vitality. It is therefore highly unfortunate to witness recent statements and
actions taken by US President Donald Trump that do not appear to recognize these
important achievements nor the Baltics’ role as vital allies. Recent public comments by
the president and in private conversations reported by former National Security Advisor
John Bolton indicate that rather than strengthening and appreciating the value of the
NATO Alliance, if elected to a second term, President Trump may wish to pull the United
States out of the North Atlantic Treaty. This has not gone unnoticed by our European
friends. A recent New York Times article notes analysis by the Atlantic Council’s Jorge
Benitez that some European officials “see the escalation of negative steps, and they are
definitely concerned that that negative pattern could continue if Trump is re-elected.”
This concern is not only worrying to Europeans but also to many leaders in the US
Congress. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations warned in the same article that “withdrawing from NATO would be
nothing short of catastrophic.””

Warrant: NATO credibility is low

Kevin Blachford. “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against
Russia?.” National Interest. 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-
nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711

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“The regional imbalance between NATO’s and Russia’s conventional forces, NATO’s own
deterrence loopholes, and the geography of the Baltics all make both deliberate and
inadvertent escalation possible. Although NATO as a whole has much greater
conventional military capabilities than Russia, Moscow enjoys a significant margin of
conventional superiority in the wider Baltic region (see map). Russia has been heavily
funding and modernizing its aging armed forces over the last decade, making them a
credible force again. In addition, Moscow continues to expand its arsenal of long-
range cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions. To be fair, Russian
modernization efforts continue to experience serious setbacks, as a result of
widespread corruption and mismanagement, for instance. The Kremlin’s goal of
equipping 70 percent of its forces with the latest military equipment by 2020 is
generally considered largely aspirational.10 Nevertheless, Western analysts assume
that in case of an open military attack on one or more of the Baltic states, Russian
forces would most likely overrun Baltic defenses within only a few days, presenting
NATO with a military fait accompli..”

Warrant: Credibility is needed to deter Russia

Kevin Blachford. “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against
Russia?.” National Interest. 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-
nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711

“Against this backdrop, the new 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) argues that
to “credibly deter Russian nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attacks . . . the President
must have a range of limited and graduated options, including a variety of delivery
systems and explosive yields.”53 Such capabilities, the drafters of the NPR argue,
would “pose insurmountable difficulties to any Russian strategy of aggression against
the United States, its allies, or partners and ensure the credible prospect of
unacceptably dire costs to the Russian leadership if it were to choose aggression.”54

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In concrete terms, the NPR recommends new sea-based nuclear options, including low-
yield nuclear warheads, designed to introduce additional tailored nuclear responses.
Those proposals are most likely welcome in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Poland,
where some analysts and officials have debated the option of making Polish F-16 fighter
jets nuclear-capable to support NATO’s nuclear missions.”

Analysis: This argument is strong because it emphasizes the symbolic value carried by the Baltic
states for boosting NATO’s credibility. Argue that without credibility the whole value of the
NATO system deteriorates.

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PRO: Russia Seeks Revisionism in the Baltics

Argument: Russia wants to redraw the map in Eastern Europe to its own advantage. Expanding
its influence in the Baltics is a major part of that.

Warrant: A Russian War with the Baltics is Putin’s Dream

Leon Aron. Could Putin Launch Another Invasion” Politico. 2021.

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/15/russia-putin-invasion-
ukraine-baltics-nato-475527

“Should Putin want to launch another short, victorious war, there is no shortage of
potential targets. At least five neighboring countries are obvious candidates. Three of
them—Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine—are the sites of “frozen conflicts” that can be
easily thawed by Russian troops or their proxies inside those countries or on their
borders. Another, Belarus, is half of a formal “Union State” with Russia. The fifth,
Kazakhstan, has more ethnic Russians—3.5 million—than any post-Soviet state except
Ukraine, with most conveniently living in the six northern provinces that border Russia.
Once the Taliban takes over Afghanistan and starts expanding into the Central Asian
states, an Anschluss could be portrayed as the “defense” of Kazakhstan’s ethnic
Russians. But these five potential wars would not quite measure up to Putin’s
ambition for “big ideas,” or to his self-imposed mission to restore and avenge. That
criteria would be met by a fast and victorious poke at NATO’s eastern flank, the
member states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Could there be a more satisfying coda
to Putin’s desire to recover past glory, a more condign retribution for the fall of the
beloved Soviet motherland, than a feat that even the mighty Soviet Union could not
pull off? A victory over the alliance that embodies the democratic West’s solidarity and
its will to defend itself? A be-all and end-all roll of the dice that would expose NATO as a
paper tiger?.”

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Warrant: Russia could use hybrid war against the Baltics

Leon Aron. Could Putin Launch Another Invasion” Politico. 2021.

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/15/russia-putin-invasion-
ukraine-baltics-nato-475527

“Although Putin has bragged of getting to Riga and Tallinn in two days, an imperial
Reconquista is unlikely. No tanks would need to roll into Riga or Tallinn. Instead, Russia
could conduct a tight, Crimea-style “hybrid” operation by mostly special ops forces
and elite paratroopers drawn from Russia’s Western Military District: three special
forces regiments and the air assault division currently deployed close to the Estonian
and Latvian borders. A cross-border assault’s most likely targets include Estonia’s Idu-
Viru County, which is 74 percent ethnic Russian, and its largest city, Narva (83
percent), and Latvia’s Latgale region (36 percent Russian) and the city of Daugavpils
(48 percent). After one or both of them have been “reunited” with the motherland,
recovering them would mean a war with Russia. Gen. John Nicholson, former
commander of U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, estimated that it would take NATO
approximately 90 days to mobilize and build up a conventional force in the Baltics that
outnumbers the Russians. By contrast, it took just three weeks from the invasion of
Crimea to the “referendum” and “acceptance” of Crimea into the Russian Federation—
Putin’s euphemisms for the annexation..”

Warrant: Defending the Baltics is hard

Kevin Blachford. “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against
Russia?.” National Interest. 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-
nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711

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“But showing the capabilities to quickly respond to a crisis by having the capacity to
move resources to the region would enhance NATO’s deterrence in the long term. NATO
should therefore consider developing its forces in Germany and even Poland, but with
the added caveat of being able to move these forces quickly to where they are needed
in the Baltics. The lack of infrastructure across the Baltic region, therefore, creates two
main problems. Firstly, it limits NATO’s credibility to respond to a crisis on the border
with Russia. Secondly, infrastructure serves a dual purpose in both war and
peacetime. The lack of European investment and interest in the region creates
opportunities for Russia to undermine the societies of the three Baltic nations. This
shows the primary challenge facing NATO in European defense. The European Union
needs to do more to show its commitment to the East. Continual expansion eastwards
has not had the de-securitizing effect once expected. The lack of German commitment
and Brussel’s interest in the region is also effecting NATO’s ability to defend the
Baltics..”

Warrant: The Baltics would seriously test NATO’s resolve

Kevin Blachford. “Can NATO and The EU Really Defend the Baltic States Against
Russia?.” National Interest. 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-
nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-against-russia-121711

“Primarily, the challenge facing NATO is dealing with the possibility of Russia using the
Baltics as a way to test the credibility of the NATO alliance. The Baltic states of Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia currently rely on NATO’s enhanced forward presence and air
policing missions to deter Russian aggression. But this provides only short term
reassurance to the region and overlooks the lessons of the Cold War in which West
Germany played a vital role in the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture. The
reluctance of Germany to think seriously about the military security of Europe is,
therefore, becoming a hindrance to NATO’s deterrence capabilities. Germany has

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repeatedly emphasized its aversion to militarism in recent years and its military has
faced numerous bouts of austerity. But this reluctance to be seen as a military power
overlooks the role of the West German Bundeswehr which acted as the first line of
NATO’s defense in the Cold War. The history of the Cold War provides clues to how
deterrence could be increased in the Baltic region today. The defense and deterrence
capability of West Germany revolved not just around the nuclear deterrent, but on the
ability of the United States and its allies to deploy forces quickly. This related to the
logistic capabilities to move forces quickly to the border with East Germany. An
important part of NATO strategy therefore relied on the West German autobahns as a
way to move both goods and people.”

Analysis: This argument shows why the Baltics are a prime target for Russian revisionism. They
are important to Putin’s ambitions and also present an opportunity to dramatically alter the
credibility of the NATO alliance.

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PRO: Need to Increase Baltic Air Policing

Argument: Baltic Air Policing needs to increase in anticipation of a growing Russian threat.

NATO, 6-23-2021, "NATO Air policing: securing NATO airspace ," NATO,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132685.htm

Safeguarding the integrity of Alliance members’ sovereign airspace is a permanent peacetime

task contributing to NATO’s collective defence. It is a clear sign of cohesion, shared
responsibility and solidarity across the Alliance. Moreover, NATO Air Policing forces also
provide support to civilian aircraft in distress – for example, when they have lost
communication with air traffic control. The NATO Air Policing mission is carried out using the
NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). The Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR) has the overall responsibility for the conduct of the NATO Air
Policing mission. Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), headquartered at Ramstein, Germany,
oversees the NATO Air Policing mission with 24/7 command and control from two Combined
Air Operations Centres (CAOCs): one in Torrejon, Spain, which covers European NATO airspace
south of the Alps, and one in Uedem, Germany covering the north.

Warrant: an increase is needed as Russia has increased its violations

NATO, December 28, 2020, "NATO intercepts hundreds of Russian military jets in 2020," NATO,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180551.htm

RAMSTEIN, Germany - NATO air forces across Europe scrambled more than 400 times in 2020
to intercept unknown aircraft approaching Alliance airspace. Almost 90 percent of these
missions - around 350 - were in response to flights by Russian military aircraft. This is a
moderate increase from 2019. Russian military aircraft often do not transmit a transponder
code indicating their position and altitude, do not file a flight plan, or do not communicate with

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air traffic controllers, posing a potential risk to civilian airliners. We are always vigilant - Air
Policing is an important way in which NATO provides security for our members text "In recent
years, we have seen an increased level of Russian military air activity close to the Alliance's
borders," said NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu. "We are always vigilant. NATO fighter jets
are on duty around the clock, ready to scramble in case of suspicious or unannounced flights
near the airspace of our Allies. Air policing is an important way in which NATO provides security
for our members," she said.

Warrant: decline in fleet numbers could hurt air policing mission

Martin Hurt, 3-16-2021, "The UK’s Integrated Review Is Not Reassuring from a Baltic
Perspective," ICDS, https://icds.ee/en/the-uks-integrated-review-is-not-reassuring-
from-a-baltic-perspective/

Today’s security environment does not necessarily imply that more forces are needed, but they
should be more capable. Increasing quality while at the same time reducing quantity does not
make the UK armed forces more capable or better suited to face future threats. Retiring the
Tranche 1 Typhoons by 2025 without committing to replace them on a one-to-one ratio
suggests that the number of fighter aircraft may decrease in the future. This may eventually
reduce the UK’s ability to contribute to the Baltic Air Policing mission and would send
unfortunate signals to Moscow. On the other hand, a deployable medium-range ground-
based air-defence capability would, once operational, without doubt be useful to support the
eFP battlegroup

Warrant: Air Policing can be improved with new technologies

Chivvis, Christopher S. et al, “NATO's Northeastern Flank: Emerging Opportunities for

Engagement.” RAND Corporation, 2017. P. 132.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1467.html

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Baltic Air Policing will remain the mainstay of Estonia’s air defenses in the short term. It is
thus important that NATO continue to invest in ensuring that its air policing mission can be
scaled up to a full air-defense mission when needed. This means, among other things,
identifying protected assets, developing and agreeing upon robust rules of engagement (ROE)
that go well beyond those of the Baltic Air Policing mission, and ensuring adequate links to
NATO Combined Air and Space Operations Center and command and control (C2) in general.
NATO’s defensive strategic plans could eventually involve partial reliance on native Estonian
Joint Tactical Air Control (JTAC) capabilities, and preparations for communications in a crisis
would need to be adequate. If NATO airpower will be the backbone of conventional air
deterrence in Estonia, there may be reason to explore possibilities in the future for the use of
UAVs or small, manned aircraft for operations over Estonian airspace. If armed, such assets
could help to inhibit and deter incursions from adversary UAVs or other ISR, a likely element
of an unconventional effort in the region.

Impact: planes flying without a flight plan pose a danger to civilian aircraft

Airforce Technology, 8-2-2021, "Nato fighter jets intercept Russian aircraft over Baltic Sea,"
Airforce Technology, https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/nato-fighter-jets-
intercept-russian-aircraft/

Nato has announced the tracking and intercepting of four Russian military aircraft over the
Baltic Sea. Aircraft of the Air Policing force, including Spanish Eurofighters and Italian F-35
fighter planes scrambled to intercept two Russian Il-22PP MUTE electronic warfare
reconnaissance planes, a Su-24 fighter plane, and an Il-76 transport aircraft (known by Nato
codename ‘Candid’). Nato noted that the Russian planes travelled without flight plans or
transponder codes. After the Russian fighter jets left the Baltic Sea enclave of Kaliningrad, they
were tracked and identified by Nato’s Combined Air Operations Centre at Uedem in Germany.
Staff Allied Air Command chief major general Karsten Stoye said: “The Alliance Air Policing

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system monitors the airspace across Europe 24/7 and responds when aircraft are identified
flying without a flight plan or without a transponder signal. “The air and sea lanes in this
region are congested with large volumes of civilian traffic transiting through the area, so
aircraft not following international air safety regulations pose a potential danger to civilian
traffic.”

Impact: Baltic Air Policing currently is unable to stop an invasion

Michael Peck, 7-19-2021, "Bad News: NATO Isn't Enough to Stop a Russian Invasion of the
Baltics," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/bad-news-nato-isnt-
enough-stop-russian-invasion-baltics-189969

The Baltic states do belong to the NATO-wide NATINAMDS air defense command network and
they have set up their own Baltic Air Surveillance Network. Because the Baltic States don’t
have much in the way of air forces, and no jet fighters, NATO provides the Baltic Air Policing
initiative, which bases four to eight fighters on Baltic airfields. Nonetheless, that’s a pretty
thin shield against Russian airpower. “The air defense capabilities of the three Baltic states
are acutely lacking,” the study concludes with remarkable understatement. In particular,
researchers pointed to lack of medium- and long-range anti-aircraft missiles, insufficient
stockpiles of missiles, lack of integration of missiles with battle command systems, gaps in low-
level radar coverage and interoperability issues between BALTNET and NATO systems.
Interestingly, the study notes a lack of connectivity between the Baltic States and Swedish and
Finnish air operations centers, indicating the importance of neutral—but increasingly NATO-
leading—Sweden and Finland to any relief of the Baltic nations against invasion.

Analysis: the pro should clearly lay out that Russian intrusions near and in NATO airspace pose a threat
to civilian aircraft (winning an easy low magnitude impact) and then explain how the current structure
is not enough to deter/stop a Russian invasion, possibly winning a high magnitude impact.

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PRO: Need to increase Defenses to Deter China

Argument: China needs to be deterred from involvement in the Baltics

Warrant: China has a growing military presence in the Baltics

Patsy Widakuswara, Steve Herman, 6-14-2021, "NATO Reaffirms Strength of Alliance, Calls Out
Russia, China," Voice of America, https://www.voanews.com/europe/nato-reaffirms-
strength-alliance-calls-out-russia-china

China Stoltenberg said China's growing military presence from the Baltics to Africa means
NATO has to be prepared. "China is coming closer to us. We see them in cyberspace, we see
China in Africa, but we also see China investing heavily in our own critical infrastructure," the
NATO secretary general said. China is “the new the new kid on the block,” said Alice Billon-
Galland, a research fellow at London-based Chatham House, and one of the NATO Young
Leaders selected to advise the NATO 2030 process. Billon-Galland said European allies need to
work with both the U.S. and China but ultimately want to avoid being dragged into a binary
Washington versus Beijing confrontation. “European allies are quite careful in terms of how
they approach this and a bit reluctant for NATO to get too involved in China-related issues or
Indo-Pacific issues,” she said.

Warrant: China has broad interests in the Baltics

Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavičius, August 2020, “Between the Chinese Dragon and
American Eagle, 5G Development in the Baltic States,” ICDS, https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS-Brief_Between-the-Chinese-Dragon-and-American-
Eagle-5G-development-in-the-Baltic-states_August-2020.pdf

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China’s broader influence in the Baltic region cannot be ignored in the 5G context. China is
one of the Baltic states’ largest trade partners outside of the EU, and the region possesses key
predispositions to become a Chinese equipped distribution centre in the Baltic Sea for cargo
transportation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Baltic policymakers and business leaders
often tout China as an important export market and source of investments. The Baltic states
are also part of the 17+1, a cooperation framework created in 2012 between China and 16
Central and Eastern European countries to facilitate the arrival of Chinese investments and
technology in the region.11 Chinese companies have also been active in shaping public
perceptions in the Baltics: by the end of March 2020, Lithuania had received over 20,000
protective masks and 120,000 pairs of gloves from Huawei and other Chinese companies to
help fight the Covid-19 pandemic— aid that Lithuanian security analysts believe was in part
meant to soften the Lithuanian approach to Chinese involvement in 5G.

Warrant: China is reaching into the Baltics and NATO

Pierre Morcos, 6-8-2021, "NATO’s Pivot to China: A Challenging Path," No Publication,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-pivot-china-challenging-path

China’s military reach is also getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic region. The Russian and
Chinese navies have conducted joint military exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas,
signaling a burgeoning military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. Collaboration
between China and Russia grows stronger in the Arctic, where both countries invest in natural
gas projects as well as in transport corridors as part of an effort known as the “Polar Silk Road”
or the “Northern Sea Route.” Beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, China is developing modern
military capabilities (long-range missiles, aircraft carriers, and nuclear attack submarines) with
potentially serious security implications for NATO given their global reach. Likewise, China is
investing in counterspace weapons that could potentially threaten any NATO satellite. Allies
are also regularly the targets of cyberattacks originating from China-based hackers. Allies
have faced an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy as well. Amid the Covid-19

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pandemic, Beijing has notably intensified its disinformation efforts directly targeting NATO
countries. Beijing has also tried to leverage its close economic ties with some NATO countries
through the Belt and Road Initiative to erode allies’ cohesion and unity in an effort to impede
criticism of Beijing’s human rights violations and its violations of Hong Kong’s Basic Law.

Warrant: China’s cyber-attacks threatens NATO

Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova, January 4, 2021 “#NATO2030. Towards a NATO China

Strategy,” ICDS, https://icds.ee/en/towards-nato-china-strategy/

The Allies’ different regional priorities, rooted in historic and geographic factors, are quite
visible in their security policies and statements. While China's military capabilities in the Indo-
Pacific region are, for example, seen as an issue by France, the Netherlands, and the UK, they
do not seem to matter to other Allies, including the Baltic states and Poland. China's growing
presence in the Arctic, on the other hand, apparently matters to Canada and Denmark, and is
also mentioned as one of Latvia’s foreign policy concerns, but does not attract interest across
the board. Neither, contrary to what might be expected, is China's investment in European
infrastructure viewed as an overarching concern, mentioned in the documents reviewed only
in the context of the Netherlands, the UK, Poland and Latvia—and then in neutral or even
optimistic tones. Several Allies cite the use of cyber tools, including those of Chinese origin,
by various non-state and state actors as a threat to NATO in the coming decade (Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the UK name China explicitly in this regard; Estonia, Germany and Canada
include an implicit mention).

Warrant: The Baltics feel abandoned in the face of a full pivot to Asia

Jessica Larsen, 11-18-2020, "Chinese influence in the Baltic?," DIIS,

https://www.diis.dk/en/research/chinese-influence-in-the-baltic

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The Baltic states could coordinate their approach on screening laws, and EU toolboxes could be
firmed up through binding rules. On security, Baltic states’ perceptions of China as a security
threat relate not only to 5G and cyber espionage, they are also shaped in part by China’s
relations with Russia. The US pivot to Asia leaves the Baltic states with the feeling of
dwindling US interest, despite NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic states. This is
hardly a disadvantage for China and Russia. And NATO is still thinking about its posture. The
EU’s renewed talk of strategic autonomy is of little help here; the Baltic states’ position is
that, although European defence cooperation may complement NATO, it can never replace it.

Warrant: while focusing on China, NATO needs to demonstrate its commitment to Europe

Toms Rostoks, 2020,“Towards #Nato2030: The Regional Perspective Of The Baltic States And
Poland.” Lativian Institute of International Affairs,
https://liia.lv/en/publications/towards-nato2030-the-regional-perspective-of-the-baltic-
states-and-poland-896?get_file=1

Depending on the scope of NATO taking a more global approach, this would entail a partial
renegotiation of the principles upon which the Alliance was founded in 1949. The geographical
scope would shift as a result, and so would considerations about the circumstances under
which members of the Alliance would consider using military force. A more global NATO
would also entail a different military toolset. Ultimately, a greater focus on China would
include the risk of European member states of NATO being drawn into a great power conflict
between the US and China. Although NATO can probably do both – deter Russia and
increasingly focus on China – the consequences of a more global approach are likely to be
profound. NATO will need to be reminded that its core responsibility is ensuring the security
of Europe.

Impact: an increase in China’s regional power emboldens Russia

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David Scott, February 9 2018, “China and the Baltic States: strategic challenges and security
dilemmas for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia,” Journal on Baltic Security,
https://sciendo.com/abstract/journals/jobs/4/1/article-p25.xml

Baltic security issues remain dominated by the presence of Russia, and its drive for control of
Baltic waters between St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad – i.e. the waters off the Baltic States
(Juntunen, 2010). The readiness of Russia to tacitly lend support to China in East Asia is now
being matched by tacit Chinese support for Russian influence in the Baltic and Black seas - as
demonstrated through their joint military exercises in those waters. China shows no signs of
reversing such a policy, “Beijing has shown that its desire to have good political and economic
relations with EU countries in the Baltic region will not prevent it from increasing the intensity
and the scope of its strategic/geopolitical co-operation with Russia” (Kaczmarski and
Rodkiewicz, 2017, p.1), and this facilitation of Russia remains the negative indirect result of
the joint military exercise in the Baltic. Of course there may not be another such joint
exercise in the Baltic for a few years, but the damage has already been done for the Baltic
States faced by rising pressure from Russia

Analysis: this argument forces the debate away from Russia and will likely require careful
analytical explanations to be worthwhile. Arguing that by improve the defenses of the Baltics
you deter China through (1) deterring direct Chinese action in the Baltic region and (2) you
provide a reassurance that the Baltics won’t be abandoned can generate unique offense that
your opponents may not prepare for with spikes in constructive. This could also be argued as a
smaller scenario within a larger deterrence narrative.

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PRO: NATO should increase Baltic Cyber Defenses

Argument: As the Baltics mainly face cyber threats, NATO needs to bolster Baltic cyber defenses

Warrant: Russia uses cyber-attacks against the Baltics

AP News, 3-4-2021, "Report: Russian hackers exploit Lithuanian infrastructure," AP NEWS,

https://apnews.com/article/lithuania-coronavirus-pandemic-covid-19-pandemic-
national-security-russia-4f643495296f645e8957594034ec0367

“Nevertheless, Russian intelligence operations pose a major threat to Lithuania’s national

security,” State Security Department head Darius Jauniskis told Lithuanian lawmakers as he
presented the report at Seimas, the Parliament, on Thursday. Jauniskis added that Moscow was
using military and economic means and influencing by information “for the implementation
of its political aims” in the Baltic nation of 2.8 million. The report estimated that the overall
threat of cyber and information attacks has increased in Lithuania as the number of cyber-
attacks was continuing to grow annually. Jauniskis accused Russia of trying to use the
pandemic as a way to create havoc in Lithuania, which he said had witnessed “dozens” of such
“failed attempts” recently. “Those activities were well-coordinated and fueled by anti-Western
propaganda coming out from the Kremlin,” Jauniskis said. Similarly to its neighbors Estonia and
Latvia, Lithuania’s relations to Russia have remained icy since the nation regained its
independence amid the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency
published its annual report last month saying that Russia is counting on the COVID-19
pandemic to weaken unity in the West, which would help Moscow gain a more prominent role
in international affairs and allegedly lead to declining Western influence on the global stage.

Warrant: cyber-attacks attempt to spread disinformation during pandemic

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Linas Kojala, 5-28-2020, "Baltic Security: The Same Challenges Remain, Even During a
Pandemic," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/baltic-security-the-same-challenges-remain-even-
during-a-pandemic/

Fighting disinformation attacks remains a crucial aspect of Baltic security. For example, in late
April, Lithuanian National Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis, Lithuanian media outlets,
state institutions, and addressees at the NATO headquarters in Brussels received a falsified
email from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announcing an alleged decision to
withdraw NATO troops from Lithuania. In other instances, fake news was spread about a U.S.
soldier allegedly infected with the coronavirus in Lithuania, and the allegedly expressed
intention of the Ministry of National Defense not to halt international military exercises. In late
May, some Russian-backed media outlets in Baltic and Eastern European countries reported
false information that the Canadian-led NATO battle group in Latvia had “a high number” of
cases of the deadly virus. These instances fit into a pattern of previous attempts seeking to
discredit NATO in the eyes of the Baltic citizens, as well as seeding doubt about the Baltic
countries’ full-fledged membership in the alliance.

Warrant: the Baltics are vital for NATO’s cyber security efforts

Kenneth Geers, August 2020, “Alliance Power for Cyber Security,” The Atlantic Council,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Alliance-Power-for-
Cybersecurity_Geers.pdf

No fewer than twenty-five nations now staff the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia, which publishes a free library of cybersecurity
research, holds the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), and manages
the world’s largest cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields.”62 Small nations can punch well
above their weight in the asymmetric world of IT. Elsewhere in the Baltics, Latvia has built the

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NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,63 and Lithuania has created the
region’s newest showpiece, the National Cyber Security Centre, where all practical aspects of
cyber defense are housed under one roof, including research and development, analysis, and
incident response.64 The Centre manufactures its own secure hardware on-site and is working
to incorporate securely developed software into critical cyber infrastructure such as systems
involved in elections in Lithuania.6

Impact: Russian hackers are targeting the energy networks of the Baltic States

Stephen Jewkes, Oleg Vukmanovic, 5-11-2017, "Suspected Russia-backed hackers target Baltic
energy networks," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-cyber-insight-
idUSKBN1871W5

Suspected Russia-backed hackers have launched exploratory cyber attacks against the energy
networks of the Baltic states, sources said, raising security concerns inside the West’s main
military alliance, NATO. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all members of NATO and the European
Union, are on the political front line of tensions between the West and Moscow. The Baltics
are locked into Russia’s power network but plan to synchronize their grids with the EU.
Interviews with more than a dozen law-enforcement and private investigators, insiders and
utility officials show hackers have quietly made incursions into Baltic networks over the past
two years, in parallel with more serious attacks in Ukraine that plunged swathes of that
country into darkness. They say Russian state organizations are suspected of being behind the
campaigns. Reuters could not independently verify the sources’ allegations. At the end of 2015,
hackers attacked an Internet gateway used to control a Baltic electricity grid, disrupting
operations but not causing blackouts, a source familiar with the matter said. He declined to
give details due to ongoing private investigations into the incident, which has not been
previously reported. The attack was a distributed denial of service (DDoS), where Internet
gateways are bombarded with large amounts of data, a blunt but sometimes effective
technique in an age when energy networks are being modernized with digital technology. The

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source also said suspected Russia-backed hackers had targeted a Baltic petrol-distribution
system at around the same time in an unsuccessful denial of service attack that aimed to
cause widespread disruption in petrol deliveries. The system coordinates deliveries from
storage tanks to a network of petrol stations, the source added.

Impact: Russian cyber capabilities prevents effective defense of the Baltics

Capt Daniel Ince, 6-17-2021, "The Russian Antiaccess/Area Denial Security Issue over
Kaliningrad and the Baltics," Air University (AU), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-
Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2659250/the-russian-antiaccessarea-denial-
security-issue-over-kaliningrad-and-the-balti/

The first threats to American air operations to defend the Baltics and eastern NATO countries
are Russia’s space and cyber capabilities. Russia’s space capabilities include imagery
intelligence (IMINT) collection and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection satellites. Russia’s
IMINT satellites are used to observe American military movements in Europe and in the
continental United States.5 Russia’s SIGINT satellites have an assessed capability to intercept
land-, air-, and sea-based communications as well as to possibly “determine the direction of the
transmitter from the satellite's position.” Once this data is collected, “analysts on the ground
can then combine the data from seven satellites to pinpoint the location of the receiver and to
determine the type of the emitter.”6 Russian cyber capabilities could also be used to exfiltrate
data for analysis.7 Russian IMINT, SIGINT, and cyber capabilities can provide indications and
warnings to Russian leadership of an imminent attack on Russian facilities or adversary
positions in the Baltics or Kaliningrad area.

Solvency: only through an Alliance approach can we secure cyberspace

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Kenneth Geers, “Alliance Power for Cybersecurity,” Atlantic Council, Summer 2020.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Alliance-Power-
for-Cybersecurity_Geers.pdf

The moral of this story is clear: In the Internet era, allies have never been more important.
The power of IT will hopefully lead to a more peaceful world. However, the intractability of
traditional geopolitics, and the specter of increasingly powerful cyberattacks, suggest that all
nations are likely to invest significant sums in cyberattack as a military weapon, both for
proactive deterrence and potential retaliation. Given the limitations of any single nationstate
in the digital domain, we are therefore likely to see tangible cybersecurity progress (at least in
the near term) only within political and military alliances. Indeed, the only credible cyber
superpower is a robust alliance.

Analysis: debaters need to be familiar with cybersecurity to argue almost any topic these days.
The pro has the advantage of addressing the hybrid rather, than conventional, threats the Baltic
states face which are more persistent and probable. Through this approach, the pro can win a
medium magnitude high probability impact by showing that this is the area that is currently
under attack.

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PRO: NATO should increase Heavy Arms in Baltics

Argument: Heavy armaments (i.e tanks, armored vehicles, etc.) are needed for Baltic Security

Warrant: increasing heavily armored vehicles needed to prevent quick overrun of the Baltics

Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge
to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to
emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of
the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing
the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring
the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should elimi- nate
the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deterrence
of overt, opportunistic aggression. There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy
forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks.
For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward
in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and
plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or
could employ some combination of these approaches

Warrant: it is difficult to get this force in the area unless stationed there

Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

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The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms
battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equip-
ment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.14 Getting this unit into
the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equip-
ment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support
vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and
road- marching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10
days.

Warrant: Russia has an advantage in heavy forces that overcomes other gaps

Hooker Jr, Richard D. "How to defend the Baltic states." The Jamestown Foundation (2019).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-
full-web4.pdf

On the ground, the forces in place are currently far from adequate for defense, but the
situation is not hopeless. Because the defender has certain inherent advantages (such as
knowledge of the terrain and the ability to emplace obstacles and fortifications), the forces
required to defend can be smaller. The standard planning figure is a ratio of one to three—
that is, the defender requires approximately one-third of the attacker’s combat power to
successfully defend. In the Baltics, these ratios are achievable. At the same time, however,
combat power is more than numbers. For example, Russian preponderance in heavy forces
and artillery greatly increases the striking power of their brigades relative to NATO light or
motorized brigades. Training, leadership, morale and better technology can help to offset an
opponent’s numerical superiority.

Impact: heavy forces would be key for NATO to secure and win a conflict

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Hooker Jr, Richard D. "How to defend the Baltic states." The Jamestown Foundation (2019).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-
full-web4.pdf

For the first 30 days following a Russian incursion, in-place Baltic forces as described above,
with some early arriving NATO reinforcements, might effectively hinder and degrade Russian
forces if supported by theater air defense and long-range fires as well as NATO air and naval
forces. The parameters of success can be defined as retaining control of national capitals for
30 days, denying linkup with forces in Kaliningrad and attriting Russian first echelon forces by
50%. However, these forces are “not sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or to
restore NATO members’ territorial integrity.” To restore national borders and remove Russian
forces, reinforcing NATO or coalition heavy forces will be needed.

Frontline: Putin cannot see this as provocative due to a lack of offensive threat

Hooker Jr, Richard D. "How to defend the Baltic states." The Jamestown Foundation (2019).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-
full-web4.pdf

An obvious solution is to upgrade Baltic military forces and to station one combat-capable,
rotational heavy NATO brigade in each of the Baltic States. This option has met with strong
opposition from NATO officials and leaders in capitals, usually on the grounds that Putin will
see such a deployment as “provocative,” a charge easily dismissed since a force of this size
cannot possibly pose an offensive threat. A “lack of infrastructure” in the Baltic States is also
cited as a reason to avoid stationing US or NATO troops there. Interestingly enough, in 1944 the
existing infrastructure could support an entire German army group of 700,000 troops, including
a mechanized panzer army. The Baltic States today are far more advanced and modern than in
1944. That they could support the introduction of NATO troops in far smaller numbers than in
WWII seems assured.

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Analysis: this argument benefits from specificity as generic responses made by the con don’t anticipate
specific pro arguments. Using this argument as a scenario to access your impacts may diversify your
pro strategy and improve your performance in key rounds.

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PRO: Baltic security is key to democracy in the region

Argument: Baltics are key to maintaining democracy in the region

Significance: The Baltics are geographically unique as a defense of liberty in the region.

Coffey, Luke and Kochis, Daniel. “NATO Summit 2021: Reinforcing Collective Defense in the
Baltics”. Heritage.org. 11 June 2021. https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-
summit-2021-reinforcing-collective-defense-the-baltics

The Baltic region is one of the most complex regions that the Alliance is obligated to
defend. While small in size and population, the Baltic states represent something
much bigger geopolitically: They are staunch defenders of economic freedom, liberal
democracy, and human rights. They experienced Russian treachery during more than
five decades of Soviet occupation in ways that few other countries did. This horrific
experience means that the Baltic states do not take for granted the democracy, liberty,
and security they enjoy today.

Warrant: The Baltics defend democratic values in the region

Dempsey, Judy. “The Baltic States Rally for Change in Belarus and Russia”. Carnegie Europe. 26
Jan 2021. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/83728

But today, Poland’s role is being superseded by the three small Baltic states of Estonia,
Latvia, and—in particular—Lithuania. They have been vocal and active in defending
the peaceful protests in neighboring Belarus, where citizens for nearly six months since
August 2020 have been calling for the resignation of Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko. The Baltic states have also unambiguously come out in support of
the demonstrators in Russia, calling for the release of opposition leader Alexei Navalny.

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Navalny was promptly detained on January 17, 2021, when he returned to Moscow
from Berlin, where he was treated for a chemical attack for which the Kremlin denies
any involvement yet refuses to open a criminal investigation. Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania are doing what they can to mobilize opinion in the rest of the EU, something
Poland was able to do in the past, but no longer.

Solvency: The NATO Enlargement act requires that we protect democratic values.

U.S Helsinki Commission. “REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCESS OF NATO
ENLARGEMENT”. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1 June 1997.
https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/report-human-rights-and-
process-nato-enlargement?page=57

The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified
statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human
rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the
human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obligations and
commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

Impact: Russia does not uphold democratic values and rights.

Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU), the
Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC)1 and Human Rights House Foundation (HRHF).
“Human Rights Violations in Crimea: Ending Impunity Prepared for the 72nd session of
the United Nations General Assembly.” Human Right’s House.Org. 2017.
https://humanrightshouse.org/noop-media/documents/22847.pdf

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Since the occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, the human rights situation
has seriously deteriorated. The Russian Federation has unlawfully imposed its laws
and justice system in Crimea, and imposed new authorities who have conducted a
severe crackdown on civil society and perceived political opponents. The imposition of
a new citizenship and legal framework and the resulting administration of justice have
significantly limited the enjoyment of human rights for the residents of Crimea. The
Russian Federation has extended its laws to Crimea in violation of international
humanitarian law.

Impact: There is a strong link between democracy and security gains.

Katz, Jonathan and Taussig, Torrey. “/ An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic

backsliding within NATO.” Brookings. 10 July 2018.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-
inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/ An
inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO

There is a strong link between democratic governance and security gains. Liberal
democracies have historically been less likely to experience intra- and interstate
conflict, generate refugees, and harbor violent extremists. They are also better at
maintaining transparent institutions, civilian control of the military and intelligence
services, and working together on confidence-building measures, all of which are core
features of NATO’s ability to collectively defend its members. On the other hand,
corruption and insecurity grow under politicized institutions and poor rule of law. This
hurts NATO’s renewed efforts to combat terrorism, as military and security
communities have long acknowledged the connection between corruption and the
existence of criminal networks, traffickers, and terrorists within state borders.

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Analysis: Democratic values are proven to have advantages economically, politically, and
socially in promoting human rights and freedoms. The Baltic states have long respected and
valued these democratic values, are willing to defend them with their lives, and are a beacon of
hope to those in the region because of this. Russia does not respect these values in their own
nation, let alone others. NATO should increase its defense commitments in order to defend and
protect the Baltic states as allies in the fight for human rights and democratic values in the
region.

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PRO: Deterrence by Denial

Argument: NATO needs to increase defenses of the Baltics to deter and deny Russia from invading

Warrant: the status quo is not enough to always deter Russia due to a fait accompli assumption

Jonatan Vseviov, “Constructing Deterrence in the Baltic States,” ICDS, February 2021.
https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/ICDS_Analysis_Constructing_Deterrence_in_the_Baltic_State
s_Jonatan_Vseviov_February_2021.pdf

It is nevertheless possible for a potential adversary to conclude that it could, under certain
circumstances and with the element of surprise on its side, conduct a rapid operation to crush
the conventional forces of the Baltic states before significant reinforcements could arrive.
This could lead to a problematic assumption that, even if conflict is unavoidable in principle,
an adversary could create, perhaps in a limited area, a fait accompli with such speed and
decisiveness that it would incapacitate the Baltic states’ response before it even begins. This
leads to the conclusion that, in addition to conventional manoeuvrecapable forces, the Baltic
states would need to deploy survivable unconventional capabilities in the form of Special
Forces and a territorially dispersed militia that would communicate an intent and capability to
sustain armed resistance even in situations where manoeuvrecapable forces are either
destroyed or unable to respond.

Warrant: the status quo trip wire force does little to deter Russia

Alexander Lanoszka, 12-5-2016, "Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike
Challenge in the Baltic Region," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.srv-
proxy1.library.tamu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367

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Although it is unlikely that Russia will resort to armed force in the Baltic region, these scenarios
are useful, not because they are probable, but because they suggest how Russia might choose
to use violent means if deterrence were to fail. To the degree that NATO can anticipate how
Russia might use military force in the Baltics, the Alliance can calibrate its deterrence threats so
as to make war less likely in the first place. The problem is that NATO is contemplating
solutions that are unlikely to resolve the underlying problem. Russia’s precision strike and
A2/AD capabilities render existing forward-deployed ground troops vulnerable, making it
easier for Russia to present NATO with a fait accompli. NATO’s current solutions largely
involve pre-positioned heavy military hardware, four battalion-sized battlegroups, and
modest deployments of rotational forces. If this analysis is correct, it suggests a different
approach to deterrence in the Baltics.

Warrant: if attacked, NATO could not enter the Baltics, rendering the tripwire force insufficient

Alexander Lanoszka, 12-5-2016, "Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike
Challenge in the Baltic Region," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.srv-
proxy1.library.tamu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367

First, these military assets simply provide instant targets that would be the first to suffer from
long-range Russian strikes. Second, they do not address the fundamental problem of
reassurance and deterrence. Small rotational forces will suffer heavily against a Russian
onslaught without appreciably slowing it. Even if such forces serve as a ‘tripwire’, larger
follow-on forces will experience extreme difficulties forcibly entering the theatre of
operations, are likely to find their pre-positioned equipment heavily damaged or inaccessible,
and may well arrive to discover that the issue has already been settled.

Warrant: the only factor preventing a Russian attack is a current lack of Russian interests in the Baltics

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Matus Halas, “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics, European
Security,” European Security Journal, July 2019.
https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/773053/mod_resource/content/0/halas2019.pdf
Deterrence does not work at the conventional level, but it still did not fail thanks to the
missing interest of the other side. Yet at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare, where
deterrence matters most today, it failed repeatedly. Russia currently does not seem to be
deterred by NATO or its individual members at the sub-conventional level, where hybrid
threats naturally belong. Moscow regularly conducts actions which would normally amount to
deterrence failure and there are no signs on its part of any intention to change this practice.
To put it simply, the insufficient conventional capabilities of NATO on the Eastern Flank (Luik
and Jermalavičius 2017, Cornish 2017, p. 9) do not have negative consequences only thanks to
the lack of Russian interest in challenging the status quo in the Baltics in the first place.
Moreover, where it matters the most, deterrence does not work simply because the number
of attacks below the conventional level prove it completely ineffective.

Warrant: Russia’s reinvigorated great power ambitions increases potential for conflict in Baltics

Heinrich Brauß, 1-7-2021, "Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region,"
German Council on foreign Relations,
https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-
baltic-region

As a consequence, Moscow’s actions in foreign, security and defense policy have been
designed to restore Russia’s great power status while at the same time re-establishing the
cordon sanitaire it enjoyed until the end of the Cold War. In particular, it wants to regain
control of Russia’s “near abroad,” making demands for an allegedly historically justified “zone
of privileged interest.” This would come at the expense of the sovereignty and security of
neighboring states. While Russia’s actions may have defensive origins, these insecurities are
manifested in an aggressive and unpredictable manner. Standing in the way of Russia’s

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expansionist ambitions are the EU and NATO, and above all the U.S. military presence in
Europe. If NATO unity were sufficiently undermined, its decision-making capability paralyzed,
its ability to defend itself undercut, the organization itself could collapse.

Impact: War with Russia would kill millions

Vanguard News, 9-17-2019, "Research: How a war between US and Russia would kill 34 million
in hours," https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/09/research-how-a-war-between-us-
and-russia-would-kill-34-million-in-hours/

Researchers have developed a terrifying simulation that shows how an escalating nuclear war
between the United States/NATO and Russia would play out. The simulation of the model
according to MailOnline report is based on realistic data on nuclear force postures, targets and
causality estimates predicts that 34.1 million people would die within hours. The catastrophic
conflict would leave another 55.9 million injured figures which do not include subsequent
deaths from nuclear fallout and other effects. In the first three hours alone, Europe would be
devastated and an estimated 2.6 million people would be either killed or injured. The following
90 minutes would see key cities in both the US and Russia hit with 5–10 nuclear bombs each,
leaving another 88.7 million dead or injured.

Analysis: this argument may be the ‘stockiest’ of stock arguments for this topic as well as
overgeneralized. To argue it effectively, Debaters need to understand what deterrence by
denial, punishment, and tripwire forces are as well as their differences. This argument should
be improved by factoring specific scenarios (energy, cyber, etc.) into the broader narrative of
deterrence by denial.

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PRO: Baltic control of ports is vital to security in the region

Argument: Baltic control of Ports are key to maintaining security.

Significance: Russia is currently violating air space over Baltic Seas.

Kuczyńsk, Grzegorz. “RussiaViolates Airspace over Baltic Sea in the Shadow of Geneva
Summit.” Warsaw Institute: Russia Monitor. 22 June 2021.
https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-violates-airspace-baltic-sea-shadow-geneva-
summit/

First, Russia sent a strategic bomber to the Baltic Sea and then its fighters intruded
Lithuanian airspace to flex its military muscles in this part of Europe just before the
Putin-Biden meeting. This means that Moscow has no intention of refraining from
belligerent activities close to NATO’s eastern flank. A pair of Russian Su-24s had
breached NATO’s airspace a day before the U.S. and Russian leaders met in Geneva.
Also on June 15, two Russian Tu-160 strategic bombers flew over neutral waters of the
Baltic Sea, putting NATO air forces on alert. The flight of the missile carriers,
accompanied by Russia’s Su-35S and Su-27 fighters, took eight hours. At certain stages
of the mission, the Russian aircraft were followed by Italian (F-35), Danish (F-16), and
Swedish (Gripen) warplanes. The Tu-160 jets were escorted by the Su-27s and the Su-35
fighters. The crews of Russian long-range aircraft regularly perform flights over the
neutral waters of the Arctic, the North Atlantic, the Black and Baltic Seas, and the
Pacific Ocean, according to Moscow officials. They have seen an increase in recent
years, though. Russian air forces are often responsible for some incidents as they tend
to act provocatively towards naval or air forces of neighboring countries, especially
NATO members.

Warrant: Russia seeks access to increase economic and political strength.

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Mauldin, John. “10 Maps That Explain Russia's Strategy”. Forbes. 26 Feb 2016
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/02/26/10-maps-that-explain-
russias-strategy/?sh=403c022f23ec

Russia’s access to the world’s oceans, aside from the Arctic, is also limited. What
access it does have is blocked by other countries, which can be seen through the map
below. During the Cold War, air bases in Norway, Scotland, and Iceland, coupled with
carrier battle groups, worked to deny Russia access to the sea. This demonstrates the
vulnerability Russia faces due to its lack of access to oceans and waterways. It also
reveals why Russia is, for all intents and purposes, a landlocked country. A country’s
access to the sea can greatly influence its economic and political strength.

Warrant: Russia uses the Baltics to fight it’s political war with the West

Galeotti, Mark. “The Baltic States as Targets and Levers: The Role of the Region in
Russian Strategy” George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies.
Number 027. April 2019.
https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/baltic-states-
targets-and-levers-role-region-russian-strategy-0

The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are coming under constant, multi-
vector Russian pressure, yet, rather than a prelude to kinetic operations, this pressure
is part of Moscow’s wider “political war” with the West.
The Baltic states are considered targets not because the Russians believe that these
states can be returned to Russia’s sphere of influence—indeed, Russians lost that belief
long ago. Rather, Russia uses the Baltic states to exert leverage against a variety of
other actors, including the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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(NATO), the European Union (EU), the neutral Nordic states (e.g., Sweden), and even
Belarus.
Russia considers the independence of the Baltic states and their active role in NATO
and the EU as threats to Russia’s security, sovereignty, and autonomy. The Vladimir
Putin regime’s operational code inclines it to respond with multiple, varied, and often
independent covert political means.

Impact: The Baltic Sea ports are vital to security and human rights.

Foggo III, James G. “The importance of Baltic navies ensuring Baltic Sea security” New
Atlanticist. 13 Sept 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/

Beyond maintaining the sea lanes open for all, a strong naval presence is the only
concrete way to deter aggression and monitor unknown intentions, including Russia’s
robust Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) network, and the deployment of Iskander
ballistic missile batteries to the Kaliningrad enclave. Over the past decade, Russia has
displayed a general disregard for sovereign neighbors’ territory and maritime
international laws. They invaded Georgia, illegally annexed Crimea, and all but claimed
the Sea of Azov as their own—stopping and detaining cargo ships and mariners at will.
For these reasons, a capable naval presence in the Baltic Sea is critical. A strong
alliance of navies will enable us all to maintain the most basic human rights: freedom
and safety. We must remain dynamic in our capabilities while also prioritizing our
resources to maintain and expand naval capabilities that remain far ahead of those who
seek to disrupt stability. Continued investment in our collective naval capabilities will
allow us to ensure regional security and prosperity well into the future.

Impact: Russian nuclear first use policy endangers security of region.

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M. Hays Jr, Joseph. “ESCALATION IN THE BALTICS: AN OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN INTENT”

Air University. December 2020.
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ISR/student-papers/AY21-
22/Escalation_Baltics_Russian_Intent_Hays.pdf

Specifically as it pertains to a nuclear response, Russia may invoke an “escalate to de-

escalate” strategy, threatening nuclear war with intermediate-range warheads. This
escalation would take place through lose interpretation of Russian doctrine and policy
that is supposedly designed to protect the very existence of the Russian state. This
paper concludes by discussing ways forward with research, specifically addressing
NATO’s full spectrum of response to Russia’s escalation through hybrid warfare.

Solvency: NATO’s presence inhibits Russia’s access to the sea.

Anirban Paul, “Russia and the ‘Geo’ of its Geopolitics”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 202,
July 2019, Observer Research Foundation.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/russia-and-the-geo-of-its-geopolitics-
52857/

To be a great power, Russia needs to be a naval power too. However, the NATO has
expanded to the west coast of the Black Sea, as well as to Turkey and Greece. Thus, it
is difficult for the Russian Navy to pass through the Black Sea and reach the
Mediterranean. The Baltic states, too, are members of the NATO. While Russia has an
enclave, Kaliningrad, between Poland and Lithuania, the other side of Kaliningrad is
Denmark, another NATO state. The NATO’s presence in critical locations effectively
ensures that Russia cannot project its power in the sea.

Analysis: Russia seeks to regain its naval power in the Baltic sea and has been taunting NATO
and regional forces. Through aggressive displays of nuclear arsenals, violations of airspace,

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and “first use policy” NATO’s increase of defense commitments will ensure Russia cannot
endanger the region or the world.

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PRO: NATO has a moral obligation to defend the Baltics

Argument: NATO has a moral obligation to defend the Baltics.

Framework: NATO’s purpose is to guarantee freedom and security of its members..

NATO. “A POLITICAL AND MILITARY ALLIANCE”. NATO International. 2021.

https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html

Security in our daily lives is key to our well-being. NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the
freedom and security of its members through political and military means.
POLITICAL - NATO promotes democratic values and enables members to consult and
cooperate on defense and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in
the long run, prevent conflict. MILITARY - NATO is committed to the peaceful
resolution of disputes. If diplomatic efforts fail, it has the military power to
undertake crisis-management operations. These are carried out under the collective
defense clause of NATO's founding treaty - Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or under a
United Nations mandate, alone or in cooperation with other countries and international
organizations.

Framework: NATO has an obligation to protect human rights

US Helsinki Commission. “HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCESS OF NATO

ENLARGEMENT.” Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1 June
1997. https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/report-human-
rights-and-process-nato-enlargement?page=35

The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996 (PL 104-208) included an unqualified
statement that the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human

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rights are integral aspects of genuine security. The law also makes clear that the
human rights records of emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
interested in joining NATO should be evaluated in light of the obligations and
commitments of these countries under the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act.

Significance: Russian military build up is alarming given precedence.

Cesare, Matt. “Russian Encroachment in the Baltics: The Role of Russian Media and
Military”. Foreign Policy Research Institute. 14 December 2020.
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/12/russian-encroachment-in-the-baltics-the-
role-of-russian-media-and-military-2/

Given that Putin will not shy away from his commitment to protect the lives of
Russians living beyond Russia’s borders, the military force stationed on the outskirts of
the Baltics can give some insight into how the Kremlin views the security situation, as
well as the country’s goals going forward. Around the time of the Crimean annexation
and in its aftermath, Russia began to enhance its military equipment presence in
Kaliningrad. Added capabilities were anti-ship weaponry, air defenses, electronic
warfare equipment, and about 20,000 military personnel. On top of that, in Russia’s
Western Military District, which includes St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and border
regions around the Baltic states, additional ground units were stationed along
with modernized equipment, and the military conducted more intense exercises.
About 120,000 troops and a tank division are stationed in this district. These units,
hypothetically, can be used for attacks against the Baltic states through the likes of
Belarus. The Kremlin has also stationed at different periods of time nuclear capabilities
in Kaliningrad, alarming NATO greatly.

Inherency: It is better to protect and current forces are not enough.

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Coffey, Luke and Kochis, Daniel. ”NATO Summit 2021: Reinforcing Collective Defense in
the Baltics” Heritage.org. 11 June 2021.
https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-summit-2021-reinforcing-
collective-defense-the-baltics

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Brussels on June 14, 2021,
offers an opportunity for the Alliance to continue its focus on bolstering collective
defense in the Baltic region. While great strides have been made over the past seven
years to deter Russian aggression, the effort is far from complete. The Alliance must
keep a focus on the region, avoiding any premature belief that additional measures
are no longer necessary.
Defending the Baltic states and deterring Russian aggression will be far easier and
cheaper than liberating them. In Brussels, the U.S. must ensure that NATO thinks
strategically about continuing to put in place durable, robust measures to deter Russian
aggression in the region. Deterrence requires more than token actions; it requires a
sustained commitment to reinforcing the security of the Baltic region while addressing
the Baltics’ unique security challenges.

Impact: Past invasion of Baltics led to human rights violations.

Černoušek, Štěpán. “Soviet repression and deportations in the Baltic states”. Gulag
Online. June 2020. https://gulag.online/articles/soviet-repression-and-
deportations-in-the-baltic-states?locale=en2021

The first invasion of the Baltics led to massive deportation, deaths and human rights
violations. The first waves of repression and deportation took place as early as summer
1940, when the Baltic states still formally existed. This chiefly concerned active
opponents (see the story of Roberts Pūriņš), senior state officials and political and

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military representatives. However, repression in all three countries took on a mass

aspect in June 1941, just a week before Germany attacked the USSR. On the night of
13–14 June 1941, a long-prepared operation run by the NKVD, the Soviet secret service,
was launched with the aim of purging the Baltic space of the most active anti-Soviet
forces. During that week, NKVD organs jailed or deported an estimated 34,000 men,
women and children (often entire families) from Lithuania, 15,500 from Latvia
(including 2,400 children under the age of 10) and 10,000 from Estonia (see the story
of Erika Palmipuu). What became known as the June deportations impacted virtually all
levels of society, from bourgeois “class enemies” to the intelligentsia to the proletariat.

Impact: Human Rights violations in Crimea are no different than past.

Gorbunova, Yulia. “European Court Accepts Case to Adjudicate Abuses in Crimea

Decision Recognizes Abuses in Crimea Are Attributable to Russia”. Human Right
Watch. 15 Jan 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/01/15/european-court-
accepts-case-adjudicate-abuses-crimea

On January 14, the European Court of Human Rights issued a significant decision
accepting Ukraine’s complaint alleging that Russia is responsible for multiple human
rights violations in Crimea. In March 2014, as Russia moved to consolidate control in
Crimea, Human Rights Watch was on the ground, documenting abuses by the so-called
“self-defense units”, paramilitary groups without insignia or a clear command
structure, which ran amok and acted with complete impunity. These groups were
implicated in attacks on reporters and activists, enforced disappearances,
and abductions and torture of pro-Ukraine activists, while the authorities made no
attempts to reign them in.
Having extending Russian legislation and policy to Crimea in violation of international
law, the authorities have continued to flout binding norms of humanitarian law:
from relentlessly persecuting Crimean Tatars, who dared to openly, peacefully voice

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criticism of Russia’s actions in Crimea to effectively forcing civilians under its control
to choose between taking Russian citizenship or facing discrimination — and worse.

Weigh: Russia violates human rights in recovered territories

Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union
(UHHRU), the Human Rights Information Centre (HRIC)1 and Human Rights
House Foundation (HRHF). “Human Rights Violations in Crimea: Ending Impunity
Prepared for the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly.” Human
Rights House. Sept 2017/18. https://humanrightshouse.org/noop-
media/documents/22847.pdf

More than 60 people have been prosecuted in politically motivated cases in Crimea
since the occupation of the peninsula. 40 of those are currently serving sentences in
places of detention, 10 people are under investigation, 10 people were convicted in
criminal cases, the judgments for which were conditional or in the form of a fine. The
number of political prisoners continues to grow. These cases are characterized by
gross falsifications, illegal methods of investigation, torture and psychological
pressure. Politically motivated cases against Ukrainian citizens are closely linked to the
use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the
Russian authorities in Crimea Enforced dissappearances. The occupation of Crimea was
accompanied by a number of enforced disappearances including the arrests,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
Russian Federation or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of them.

Solvency: The Baltic states rely on NATO to deter Russian aggression

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Painter, Sally A. “US must remain committed to NATO and the Baltic States”. New
Atlanticist. 8 SEP 2020 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/us-
must-remain-committed-to-nato-and-the-baltic-states/

The three Baltic countries of Northern Europe have long been allies of the United States
and valued members of the NATO community. In the 20th century, the United States
refused to recognize the Soviet Union’s claim on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and
supported the restoration of their independence in 1991. Our Baltic friends never
forgot this important solidarity, and since then have promoted democracy and stability
in their corner of Europe and worked diligently to attain membership in NATO and the
EU community through systemic reforms to their economy, governance, and security.
Rightfully so, the Baltics saw their integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions as an
important deterrent to Russian influence, which continues to loom as a regional threat
to their sovereignty and national security.

Analysis: There is a distinct moral imperative of NATO to protect Baltic States and their people
per their mission. The Baltics are in a vulnerable location, with every right to be concerned
about possible invasion and what that would mean for them, their freedoms and their very
lives. NATO has an obligation to uphold its mission to protect these countries and their lives and
increasing defense commitments would be the best way to deter the increasing Russian threat
from escalation, or be prepared for it in event of actuality.

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PRO: Defending energy independence

Argument: NATO must protect Baltic energy independence

Significance: The Baltics were reliant on Russia for their energy

Hoellerbauer, Simon. “Baltic Energy Sources: Diversifying Away from Russia.” Foreign
Policy Research Institute. 14 June 2017.
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/06/baltic-energy-sources-diversifying-away-
russia/

Until they began addressing their dependence in the past few years, the Baltic states
depended on Russian gas for three main reasons. First, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia
inherited their entire gas infrastructure from the Soviet Union, so after the three
countries’ independence, their networks were disconnected from the rest of Europe
and received gas only from Russia. This situation made them susceptible to gas cut-off.
Second, because of the constraints imposed by this infrastructure, until recently, the
Baltic states depended almost entirely on Russia for their natural gas imports, paying
some of the highest prices in Europe. Third, Russian state-owned energy company
Gazprom maintained a considerable stake in the natural gas companies of the Baltic
states, owning 37% of Estonia’s Eesti Gaas (a further 10% was owned by another
Russian gas company, ITERA), 34% of Latvia’s Latvias Gāze (16% also owned by ITERA),
and 37% of Lithuania’s Lietuvos Dujo at the point of its greatest involvement in 2014.
These ownership levels gave Gazprom considerable say in the policies and strategies
employed by these companies. After 2014, however, Gazprom began to sell its shares
due to new European regulatory requirements.

Harms: Dependence on Russian Energy leaves Baltics uncertain.

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Sytas, Andrius. “ 'You never know': Baltics rush to end reliance on Russian power grid”.
Reuters. 14 May 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/you-never-know-baltics-
rush-end-reliance-russian-power-grid-2021-05-14/

Thirty years after splitting from the former Soviet Union and 17 years since joining the
European Union, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia still depend on Russia to ensure stable
power supplies. "We deal with the Eastern neighbour - you never know what can
happen," Energy Minister Dainius Kreivys told Reuters on Thursday in Klaipeda port, as
the auto-transformer was loaded on to the barge. "For this reason, we are installing
this emergency system now just to be sure that we are secure."

Warrant: Russia has used its control of energy to punish before.

Harned, Lena Surzhko. “ How Vladimir Putin uses natural gas to exert Russian influence
and punish his enemies.” The Conversation. 23 June 2021.
https://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-uses-natural-gas-to-exert-
russian-influence-and-punish-his-enemies-162413

For example, in 2006 and 2009, when the Ukrainian government adopted more pro-
Western policies and upset the Kremlin, Russia outright shut off the country’s gas
supply – and by extension, shut off the gas of countries down the supply line in
Central and Western Europe, including Germany.

Inherency: The Baltics are freeing themselves from Russian energy

Grzegorczyk, Marek. “Baltic states take major step towards full energy independence”.
Lithuania Radio Television. 16 December 2020. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1299920/baltic-states-take-major-step-towards-full-energy-
independence

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The largest ever grant from Brussels should allow the three Baltic states to gain full
control of their electricity networks by 2025 and complete their transition away from
Russian infrastructure. Emerging Europe, partners of LRT English, report. The European
Union has agreed to provide Poland and the Baltic states with a grant worth 719.7
million euros to carry out phase two of a project to link the electricity networks of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the Continental European Network (CEN).

Impact: Dependence on Russian energy could cost lives.

Vilnius. “Why the Baltic states are reconfiguring their electric grids”. The Economist. 13
Aug 2020. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/08/13/why-the-baltic-
states-are-reconfiguring-their-electric-grids

As a legacy of the Baltic states’ past as involuntary members of the Soviet Union, the
mains frequency of their ips/ups power system is controlled from Moscow. This
means that Russia’s regime could switch off the Baltics’ power for the better part of a
dark and possibly cold week, perhaps longer, while Baltic operators scrambled to
restore power with local means. The first three days alone of such a blackout would
cost the Baltics €2.3bn ($2.7bn) in lost output, says Taavi Veskimagi, boss of Elering,
Estonia’s grid operator. Deaths and instability could add to the toll, especially if
meddling took place during a pandemic.

Impact: Baltics independence relies on energy independence.

Holland, Andrew. “The Baltic States Celebrate 100 Years Since Independence by Building
Energy Security”. American Security Project. 3 April 2018.
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-baltic-states-celebrate-100-years-
since-independence-by-building-energy-security/

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Because of the tenuous nature of their political independence, it is important for these
countries to demonstrate their independence from their Russian neighbor in other
ways, and to integrate further with the EU and the West. In the last decade, Russia,
and the long arm of Gazprom, had worked to keep Eastern Europe dependent on
Russian natural gas so that Russia could use gas as a tool of geopolitics. Today, thanks
to smart investments in natural gas infrastructure, the Baltic states are poised to be
more secure in their independence than ever before.

Impact: Energy security is vital to Baltic economic health.

Augutis, Juozas & Krikštolaitis, Ričardas & Martišauskas, Linas & Urbonienė, Sigita &
Urbonas, Rolandas & Ušpurienė, Aistė Barbora, 2020. "Analysis of energy
security level in the Baltic States based on indicator approach," Energy, Elsevier,
vol. 199(C). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.117427

Energy security for small countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are called
the Baltic States, is vital for ensuring energy independence and is a driving force for
the development of a strong economy. The aim of the study presented in this paper is
an analysis of the Baltic States regarding the performance of energy security level based
on indicators.

Analysis: For decades the Baltics have been at the mercy of Russia when it comes to energy
infrastructure and grid. Russia has used this as a way to punish those who oppose them, and
maintain political and economical influence and power in the region. For true Baltic
independence, they must also be ensured that their efforts to have energy security is
protected. NATO must protect and defend the Baltics and their energy independence from
Russia.

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PRO: Defending the Baltic Economic System

Argument: NATO must defend Baltic economic system

Significance: The Baltics have risen to highest economic freedom since leaving USSR

Madan, Saarthak. “How The Baltic States’ Economies Exploded Post-U.S.S.R.” Borgen
Magazine. 1 April 2021. https://www.borgenmagazine.com/baltic-
stateseconomies/

The Baltic States’ ability to transition from the state-run enterprise to a free-market
approach is nothing short of remarkable. According to the Economic Freedom of the
World Index, the Baltic States’ economies have the highest levels of economic
freedom in all of Eastern Europe. From the economic low point in 1995 to 2017,
Estonia’s economic freedom rose from 53 to 13, Latvia’s rose from 77 to 24 and
Lithuania rose from 82 to 16.

Significance: Baltic Sea ports are vital to their citizens and Economy

Aigars, Juris; et all “HELCOM (2017) Economic and social analyses in the Baltic Sea
region – supplementary report to the first version of the HELCOM ‘State of the
Baltic Sea’ report 2017.” 2018. http://stateofthebalticsea.helcom.fi/about-
helcom-and-theassessment/downloads-and-data/

Economic and social analyses illustrate the importance of the Baltic Sea marine
environment to society, the contribution the marine environment makes to the well-
being of current and future generations, and to national and regional economies. The
economic impacts originate from two sources: the use of marine waters and the state of
the marine environment. Human activities that are dependent on the sea bring

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substantial economic benefits, both in terms of their effect on the national economy
and employment and more broadly on citizens’ well-being. Actions to protect the
marine environment may also create economic benefits for economic sectors as well
as citizens.

Inherency: Russia seeks to move west to gain economic access through the Baltic waters.

Mauldin, John. “10 Maps That Explain Russia's Strategy”. Forbes. 26 Feb 2016
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/02/26/10-maps-that-explain-
russias-strategy/?sh=403c022f23ec

As a land power, Russia is inherently vulnerable. It sits on the European plain with few
natural barriers to stop an enemy coming from the west. East of the Carpathian
Mountains, the plain pivots southward, and the door to Russia opens. In addition,
Russia has few rivers, which makes internal transport difficult and further reduces
economic efficiency. What agricultural output there is must be transported to
markets, and that means the transport system must function well. And with so much
of its economic activity located close to the border, and so few natural barriers, Russia
is at risk. It should be no surprise then that Russia’s national strategy is to move its
frontier as far west as possible. The first tier of countries on the European Peninsula’s
eastern edge—the Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine—provide depth from which Russia
can protect itself, and also provide additional economic opportunities.

Impact: Russian annexation of Baltics means economic decline and poverty

Pifer, Steven. “Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation”. Brookings. 17 Mar 2020.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-
years-after-illegal-annexation/

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The economic picture is mixed. Trying to create a success story, Moscow has poured in
more than $10 billion in direct subsidies as well as funding major construction and
infrastructure projects, such as the highway and railroad bridges that now cross the
Kerch Strait to link Crimea directly to Russia. On the other hand, small business has
suffered, particularly with the decline in tourism, which once accounted for about one
quarter of Crimea’s economy. Crimea also remains subject to a variety of Western
economic and other sanctions. It is probably fair to say that the reality of the
economic situation today falls short of what many in Crimea expected, or hoped for,
with Russia’s annexation.

Impact: Economic decline and poverty leads to low development and conflict.

Kim, Namsuk and Conceição, Pedro “THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT “. International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15,
Number 1. 2010.
https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf

An adverse economic shock can be dangerous because its impact may be long-lived if
countries are forced into a vicious cycle of low human development and conflict.
Drawing on a review of both theoretical and empirical literature, this paper frames the
connection between economic factors and conflict within a conceptual framework in
which levels of human development and the risk of conflict are linked. While conflict
might be caused by many factors, low levels of human development increase the risks
of conflict outbreaks and recurrence. Conflict, in turn, destroys the accumulated
physical, social and human capital. The linkage between conflict and human
development may form a self reinforcing cycle. And consequently, policy measures to

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sustain human development would also have an additional indirect impact in lowering
the risk of conflict.

Impact: Economy decline impacts physical and mental health

Catalano, Ralph. “The Health Effects of Economic Decline. “Annual Review of Public
Health Vol. 32:431-450 (Volume publication date April 2011). 2 November 2010
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-031210-101146
.
Risk factor research supports a countercyclical association in that individuals appear to
consume more alcohol after losing jobs or suffering long bouts of unemployment. The
net effects research, however, appears mixed and defies clear inference. The relative
rarity of studies focused on substances other than alcohol makes conclusions regarding
cyclical and procyclical effects for these substances more tenuous.
Most of the risk factor and net effects research concerning suicide converges,
suggesting that economic decline increases the incidence of self-destructive behavior.
The diversity of the populations and time periods studied strengthens this inference.
Nevertheless, the lack of clarity regarding mechanisms operating in the pathway
between economic adversity and suicide suggests an important area for future research.

Analysis: The Baltic economy is growing and becoming a world wide trade partner critical to the
global economic ecosystem. Russia on the other hand is struggling economically and seeks
economic advantages through the Baltic states. NATO must defend the Baltic economy in order
to stave off the inevitable economic ruin that would follow as it did in Crimea. Economic ruin
would lead to poverty and the compounding affects that brings to individuals and others.

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A/2: Syrian Peace Process

Answer: Turkey and Russia re-instating the war. Acts as an Alt cause (because turkey) and
Thump for the Russia Scenario

Warrant: Russia launched new airstrikes in Syria which angered Turkey. This means that the
peace process fails regardless because Turkey isn’t on board but also means that Russia is
already undermining the deal.

Ap, No Publication, 3-22-2021 ["UN official: Airstrikes on Turkey-Syria border ‘extremely

worrying’", https://www.timesofisrael.com/un-official-airstrikes-on-turkey-syria-
border-extremely-worrying/, 8-17-2021] Srikar T. S.

BEIRUT — Airstrikes in northwest Syria near the Turkish border that killed a person
and set afire trucks used to distribute aid targeted areas considered the safest in the
rebel-held region, a top UN official said Monday. The strikes on several locations a day
earlier angered Turkey, prompting it to place its troops on high alert. Turkey’s Defense
Ministry said it asked Russia to secure an immediate halt to the attacks. Mark Cutts, UN
deputy regional humanitarian coordinator for the Syria crisis, called the attacks
“extremely worrying” because they endangered the lives of the area’s most vulnerable
population. The US condemned the attacks and called for a nationwide ceasefire. In a
statement Monday, it said the strikes near the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey
had put access to much needed assistance at risk. The area along the border with Turkey
in rebel-held northwestern Syria had been considered one of the safest spots in the
conflict-stricken region, and had attracted aid groups who located their offices and
warehouses there. The rebel-held enclave divided between Idlib and Aleppo provinces is
home to more than 2.7 million displaced people, mostly living in camps and temporary
shelters, many having escaped repeated rounds of military offensives and fighting.
“Many of the camps are in that area, about a million people in camps around that area.

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They are highly vulnerable when airstrikes and shelling happen,” Cutts told The
Associated Press. “It is also the area where many of the humanitarian organizations
have offices and warehouses. They put their warehouses and offices there thinking that
was the safest part of Idlib. So when that starts coming under attack that is extremely
worrying.” Turkey and Russia support rival parties in Syria’s 10-year conflict. The
countries reached a ceasefire deal last March that stopped a Russian-backed
government offensive on Idlib, in the last major rebel stronghold in war-torn Syria.
Opposition activists claimed that Russian warplanes carried out the attacks near the
Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey late Sunday, hours after government artillery
shells hit a major hospital in Atareb, another rebel-controlled town. Six patients,
including a 10-year-old child, were killed. Medical staff were wounded, forcing the
facility to shut its doors. The Bab al-Hawa border crossing is the main point from which
international aid is brought to rebel-held parts of northwest Syria. The crossing “remains
the only UN-authorized humanitarian border crossing in Syria and remains the most
efficient and effective way to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance” every month
to residents of the area, US State Department spokesman Ned Price said. Cutts called
the attack on the hospital “really horrific,” adding that the same facility came under
attack years before, forcing it to go underground to continue to operate. Idlib-based
journalist Salwa Abdul-Rahman said one of the strikes hit an area near the town of
Sarmada, setting afire trucks used by aid workers to distribute assistance. “The targeted
locations were civilian with no military presence,” she said. One person was killed in the
strikes, according to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an
opposition war monitor, and the opposition’s Syrian Civil Defense, also known as White
Helmets. The civil defense said the strikes also targeted a cement factory. An AP video
from the area showed about a dozen trucks on fire as civil defense members sprayed
them with water. Turkey’s Defense Ministry blamed Syrian government forces for the
attack, saying it left several people wounded. Cutts said the year-old ceasefire has
held in some parts, but not everywhere, saying that shelling in some areas has
happened every day.

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Turn: Turkey does not want commitments in the Baltics, and they are a necessary part of the
peace process

Warrant: Turkey blocking enactment of commitments until the kurds are recognized as
terrorists

Robin Emmott, John Irish, U.S., 6-17-2020 ["Turkey still blocking defence plan for
Poland, Baltics, NATO envoys say", https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-
france-turkey-plans/turkey-still-blocking-defence-plan-for-poland-baltics-nato-
envoys-say-idUSKBN23O1TN, 8-18-2021] Srikar T. S.

RUSSELS/PARIS (Reuters) - Turkey continues to block a NATO defence plan for Poland
and Baltic states despite a deal last year between Turkey’s president and allied
leaders, three allied diplomats and a French defence official said on
Wednesday. Diplomats said while Ankara has approved the plan, known as Eagle
Defender, it has not allowed NATO military chiefs to put it into action. The dispute,
first reported by Reuters in November, is a sign that divisions remain between Ankara,
Paris and Washington over Turkey’s offensive last year in northern Syria and that
frictions over broader NATO strategy have not been resolved. The Turkish government
did not immediately respond for request for comment. NATO defence ministers are due
to meet later on Wednesday and Thursday via secure video call. “Turkey
is refusing to accept these plans unless we recognise the PYD/PKK as a terrorist
entity,” a French defence official said, referring to Syrian and Turkish Kurdish groups
that Ankara regards as dangerous rebels. “We say no. We need to show solidarity for
eastern allies and it’s not acceptable to block these plans,” the official said. At a NATO
summit in December, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan agreed with NATO Secretary-
General Jens Stoltenberg and other allied leaders to drop such demands. Turkey began

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its offensive in northern Syria after the United States pulled 1,000 troops out of the area
in October. Ankara’s NATO allies have said the incursion undermines the battle against
Islamic State militants. The plan for the Baltic states and Poland, drawn up at their
request after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, has no direct bearing on
Turkey’s strategy in Syria, but it raises issues about security on all of NATO’s frontiers.
Under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s 1949 founding treaty, an attack on one
ally is an attack on all, and the alliance has military strategies for collective defence
across its territory.

Impact Turn: The peace process ruins regionalism

Warrant: There isn’t any agreement because foreign actors have alternative motives for peace
deals

Barbara Bibbo, No Publication, 2-28-2021 ["Analysis: Syria’s peace process and the
Russian and US roles", https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/28/analysis-
syrias-peace-process-and-the-russian-and-us-role, 8-18-2021] Srikar T. S.

The failure of the last round of United Nations-led talks between the Syrian regime
and the opposition in Geneva last month has left diplomats and analysts pondering
how to redirect diplomatic efforts in the face of Damascus’s staunch refusal to engage
in any negotiated process. The inability of the two sides to achieve any meaningful
developments in the fifth meeting of the constitutional talks pushed the UN special
envoy Geir Pedersen to suspend the negotiations indefinitely. The Norwegian diplomat
implicitly put the blame on representatives of the Syrian government for rejecting any
proposal put before them. After 15 months and five meetings since its inception, the
committee has not yet agreed on basic procedural matters and does not have a plan
forward. The discussion of substantial constitutional points and the beginning of a
drafting process thus cannot commence. The impasse has prompted the opposition

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represented by the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) to declare the constitutional

committee is past rescuing. “We cannot tolerate any further waste of time,” its
president, Nasr al-Hariri, told journalists recently, speaking from Azaz in northern Syria.
Al-Hariri said the government’s refusal to engage is leaving the international community
with no other option but to circumvent Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and impose
“the transitional process called for by relevant UN resolutions, without giving Damascus
any further opportunity to be disruptive”. The collapse of the Geneva process did not
come as a surprise, but rather as a fresh realisation that neither the Syrians nor the
helpless UN envoy can achieve any progress without a clear commitment in support of
a political settlement by the international community. But are foreign players with a
stake in Syria interested in achieving a settlement? The UN alone cannot mastermind
a political process that would take into account the aspirations of the Syrian people,
the survival instinct of the Syrian government, the ambitions of a fragmented political
opposition, and the conflicting agendas of at least seven regional and international
powers, let alone the militia groups on their payroll. Astana limited scope The Astana
process launched in 2017 by Russia, Turkey and Iran has proved a useful mechanism to
de-escalate the conflict militarily, but has not turned into an alternative forum for a
political settlement, despite fears it would have eventually disrupted and replaced the
UN efforts. “Astana has a limited scope and we should not have too high expectations
about what it can achieve,” said Andrey Kortunov, director of the Russian International
Affairs Council. Through Astana, Russia has further divided a fragmented Syrian
opposition by bringing in new figures who did not ask for al-Assad’s removal. It has
lured Turkey into a bilateral relationship with Moscow away from its NATO allies and
has succeeded in excluding the already reluctant American administrations of former
presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump from playing a decisive role in drawing the
future outcome of the conflict. Russia has used the Astana process to set short term and
limited military objectives that mainly suited Moscow’s tactical goals and, in so doing, it
assisted the regime in chipping away territory from the opposition and armed groups.
But apart from formal declarations of support for the UN process, Moscow and Ankara

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have stood clear from delving further into divisive political issues, such as the removal
of al-Assad or the drafting of a new constitution. “There is a misreading of Astana
[process]. It is a channel for dialogue between three countries with very different
agendas,” said Murat Aslan, a security researcher at SETA, a policy think-tank close to
the Turkish presidency. “They meet while they check and balance the other actors.” If
Astana is not the venue for a political agreement despite bringing together the three
main sponsors of the conflict, questions arise over Russia’s inability or unwillingness to
exert any political concessions from al-Assad’s government. Analysts agree the Kremlin
would like to see a unified and more stable Syria and are growing impatient with its
president. But in the eyes of Moscow, the factions within the opposition are hostage of
their foreign sponsors and do not represent a credible alternative. The main bloc, the
SNC is divided, Kurdish interests are underrepresented or absent, and the influence of
Salafism on parts of the Syrian opposition and leniency towards armed groups is
worrying Syrian secularists. In the absence of an alternative, the Kremlin will continue
to maintain the status quo as the most economical and the least disruptive of all
solutions, analysts say. Moscow is not yet ready to tip the scale of a fragile balance of
power between its strategic interests and those of its regional competitors – Iran,
Turkey, Israel and, to some extent, the United States. “I don’t see a clear exit strategy
for Russia right now,” said Kortunov. “After five years the Syrian operation has been
routinised and the current situation is something Moscow can live with, both financially
and militarily. It is not perfect, but it is affordable.” Russia’s expenditure in Syria
amounts to between $1bn to $2bn a year, according to government figures, a modest
amount if compared to US expenditures in Iraq. The country has lost some 200 men in
five years of war, and while every life matters, said Kortunov, figures are far from the
15,000 losses of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Syrians are turning with
hope to the Biden administration for a more active policy than that of its predecessors.

Empiric: Regional Organization are better

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Juliana Velasco, STARS, xx-xx-xxxx ["Regional Organizations And The Durability Of

Peace", https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd/2701/, 8-18-2021] Srikar T. S.

With a significance of 0.027, regional organizations were found to be roughly 3.5 times
more likely to craft an agreement that ceases hostilities for at least five years.
Furthermore, although regional organizations did not reach statistical significance upon
testing hypothesis four, it was discovered that contrary to the hypothesis that
intractable conflicts were far less likely to end in peace, territory is the most difficult
incompatibility to end peacefully, when controlling for third party involvement.
Additional regressions also showed that when controlling for all other variables,
regional organizations are 6.728 times more likely to craft an agreement that ceases
hostilities between dyads for a period of at least five years.

Impact Turn: Doing the Syrian Peace Process without Russia is better

Jakub Grygiel, Hoover Institution, 12-12-2019 ["Russia’s Return To The Middle East",
https://www.hoover.org/research/russias-return-middle-east] Srikar T. S.

The reinsertion of Russia into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is one of
the big stories of the past decade. Although Russia’s recueillement after 1991 resulted
in its effective disappearance from the Middle East, her presence in the region is of
course not a new reality in history. Tsars and Soviet leaders pushed their military might
and political influence into the region for the last three centuries, clashing with various
great powers, from the Ottoman sultanate to the British empire and the United States.
But the speed at which the current Russian advance has occurred is surprising and
troubling. Moscow has inserted an enormous level of instability and unpredictability
to the already murky local power dynamics. For the United States, a destabilizing
Russian presence in the region is deeply unhelpful. As the competition with China ramps
up and the problems in Europe augment, the U.S. will naturally have to prioritize those

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regions. The Middle East will simply not get as much American attention as it did over
the past twenty years. It is therefore in the U.S. interest to prevent a degeneration of
the already tenuous regional order that would require a sizeable commitment of
American resources and attention. But Moscow is working in the exact opposite
direction of the United States here – and the U.S. should limit Russia’s ability to create
more tribulations. Russia returned to the Middle East because the U.S. left a window of
opportunity for her. Putin was emboldened by the lofty but empty rhetoric of the
Obama administration. In 2011, President Obama had loudly proclaimed that Assad
had to “step aside” in Syria. In 2012, he added that Assad had crossed a “red line” by
using chemical weapons. The bold words, however, were never matched by an equally
bold policy. Russia had for many years supported Assad, and in fact, his regime was the
last quasi-ally of Moscow in this region; calling for Assad’s removal without following up
with serious actions was a cost-free invitation to Putin to shore up the Syrian dictator.
Moreover, the Obama administration sought to weaken Assad on the cheap, by arming
groups such the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). This created deep and lasting
tensions between the U.S. and Turkey as Ankara considers this particular Kurdish entity
too close to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist organization that has battled
Turkish forces since the early 1980s. The resulting strain in U.S.-Turkish relations further
enticed Russia to return to the region, forcing Erdogan to accept Putin’s influence in
Damascus and to seek some sort of understanding with Moscow. Erdogan, in fact,
embarked on an astounding change in posture. Early on, in 2013-2014, Erdogan
supported the idea of removing Assad from power while Putin protected the Syrian
dictator. In November 2015, in a period of great tensions between the two countries, a
Turkish F-16 shot down a Russia SU-24, killing its pilot. Half a year later, however,
after Russia imposed various sanctions on Turkey, Erdogan apologized to Moscow for
the shooting and began a tilt in favor of Russia, to the point of acquiring Russian anti-
air missile systems (S-400) and incurring sanctions from Washington. Over the course of
five years, Putin managed not only to retain the Syrian government as an outpost of
Russian influence in the region, but also to push a key NATO member, Turkey, to

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realign in a more sympathetic posture toward Moscow. This swift Russian projection
of power to Syria – and extension of influence to the wider Eastern Mediterranean
region – is anomalous but not surprising. It is anomalous for two broad reasons. The
first is that land powers such as Russia usually expand in concentric circles, gradually
advancing mile after mile. Seapowers do not have the need of controlling contiguous
real estate and expand by hopping from one outpost to another. As Nicholas Spykman
observed, “a land power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a central
point of control, while a sea power thinks in terms of points and connecting lines
dominating an immense territory.”1 Russia in Syria has jumped to the southern side of
Turkey, effectively creating two fronts for this NATO member. The second reason why
this Russian advance is anomalous is that it is a distant projection of power, at the
outer limits of sustainability for the Russian military. The 2016 deployment of the
smoke belching Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier (and its string of plane accidents) in
the Eastern Mediterranean is a symptom of the serious limitations of the Russian
military. Russian military presence in Syria is still relatively small, measuring in the low
thousands. It is doubtful that Moscow can afford a much larger persistent presence,
even though this theater has offered a valuable combat experience to the Russian
military forces (by some accounts, for instance, two-thirds of the tactical air force
rotated through the Syrian battlefield in the past four years). In brief, Russia here has
projected military force farther than it can establish political control. Both anomalies,
however, are puzzling only if we think that Russia’s objectives are analogous to ours: to
instill order and maintain effective political control in a state or a region. But Russia is
not interested in these goals. Moscow is not eager to rebuild Syria or to ameliorate the
humanitarian disaster caused by Assad and the Islamist terrorist groups – but it
merely seeks bases from which it can [to] exercise some influence over the Eastern
Mediterranean. Moreover, Putin’s approach is to destabilize a region, creating a
problem to which he can then offer a solution. This is a time-tested strategy that
Russia has employed since its rise in the early 18th century: sowing instability in order
to be able then to reorder the area according to its interests. Thus, Russia has

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presented itself to European leaders as a staunch defender of Christians against the

depredations of Islamist terrorists and, to the more secular politicians in Western
Europe, as a force to limit the flow of refugees – while at the same time doing little to
fight ISIS and aiding Assad in his gruesome suppression of the opposition.

Analysis: Impact turning this argument is strategic as people probably will not expect it, but be
sure to not double turn yourself – ie say turkey will screw up the process and the process is bad.
That will generate offense for your opponent instead of you.

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A/2: Oil Shocks

No Link: Due to US shale Reserves, oil prices will be constant

Ed Morse, 02-14-2018 ["US set to become swing oil supplier",

https://www.ft.com/content/49354866-117d-11e8-8cb6-b9ccc4c4dbbb, 8-19-
2021] Srikar T. S.

US runaway crude oil production and total oil export growth is having dramatic
impacts on global oil markets, positioning the US to be the major oil export hub in the
world. No doubt there is much brouhaha over the US overtaking Saudi Arabia and
Russia sometime this year as the largest crude oil producing country in the world. But
the fact is that it is already the world’s largest total producer of liquids, now marketing
close to 15.5m barrels a day including crude oil, bio fuels and natural gas liquids. By
year-end, total US oil liquids output should be well over 50 per cent higher than either
Russia or Saudi Arabia. Also by this time next year, the US should add over 1m b/d not
only to production, but also to exports, with total liquids exports at over 8.3m b/d,
larger than either Russia or Saudi Arabia. October 2017 data were already remarkable,
indicating a year-on-year increase of 2.2m b/d of which crude oil was close to 1m b/d,
the remainder being oil products and liquid petroleum gas. There’s no doubt US oil
production is now rising at a scorching rate, as the world remarks at the extraordinary
nearly 400,000 b/d correction made by the US Energy Information Administration for US
output last November. We expect US crude production to grow about 1.4m b/d this
year (vs the EIA’s projection of 1.26m b/d) while US natural gas liquids should grow
another 550,000 b/d. This means that total US exports could rise by anywhere from
1.1m to 1.6m b/d this year. While the US still imports around 2.5m b/d more of crude oil
and petroleum products, we expect US production to rise by at least 3m b/d by 2020,
making it an oil surplus country. Far more important than that number is that fact that
the US is already the largest oil trading hub in the world, with recent trade totalling

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around 16.5m b/d. That’s about half the overall output of Opec and amounts to about a
quarter of total trade in crude and petroleum products globally. No other country comes
close. Meanwhile both the absolute volume and percentage of total world oil trade are
expected to increase over the next half decade or longer. Let’s look at some of the
repercussions of the US becoming the global hub for oil. With US volume increases
leading to growing global market share, the two other giant producers — Russia and
Saudi Arabia — will in the end either try to protect their revenues by limiting their own
output or fight for market share to protect their sales volumes. They need co-operation
from the US to find a goldilocks price, but the US comprises numerous independent,
competitive companies with limited incentive and no legal ability to co-operate with one
another. Yet they have an ability to produce more and more for a very long time at
prices much lower than today’s. The US, with its shale oil, becomes the effective swing
supplier and the “call on US” — the demand for US crude to balance the market —
becomes far more important a benchmark than the “call on Opec”. The short-cycle of
shale also means that it is fairly responsive to price signals and in itself could be the
main factor in making price stability elusive. Citi expects oil prices to swing by $25 or
more annually for the next five years as it has for the last five. This also reinforces the
role of the US dollar as a means of settling global trade. The world of petro-dollars was
based on an implicit bargain with Middle East producers with a structural current
account surplus; they would either hold their earnings in dollars or use them to buy
military equipment from the US. Many analysts — and certainly Chinese policymakers —
are aiming to replace the US dollar with China’s renminbi as not just the means to pay
for oil but to settle general trade. That’s the thrust of Beijing’s “Belt and Road” strategy
as China has already replaced the US as the largest oil importing country in the world.
But petro-renminbi confronts a major obstacle in replacing the petro-dollar: the US has
a dominant and growing role as the hub of global oil and gas trade, and the US will both
buy and sell in US dollars and not in renminbi. Ironically China is becoming one of the
top two or three buyers of US crude oil and US liquefied natural gas, further denting the
effort for petro-renminbi. The new geopolitics of energy puts the US at the heart of

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global oil and gas trade. This deprives the other two huge producers, Saudi Arabia and
Russia, of both pricing power and policy influence. It also means the US, by reinforcing
market trends, becomes the world’s pricing hub, albeit one deprived of a direct ability to
tame market volatility. Indeed, oil markets ahead look to see prices capped at around
$65-$70 a barrel with a price floor of around $40, as US shale output ebbs and flows,
lagging the global “call on US shale”.

Impact Turn: High Oil prices mean more renewable energy

John Parnell, No Publication, 3-13-2020 ["Could the Oil Price Collapse Drive More
Investment Into Renewables?",
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/oil-price-means-renewables-
are-a-better-investment-for-the-majors, 8-20-2021] Srikar T. S.

Low oil prices will test the resolve of the majors’ energy transition plans, but analysts
expect the companies' long-term commitments to decarbonization and renewable
energy to remain intact. A dispute between Russia and Saudi Arabia has sent a flood of
cheap oil and gas into global markets just as the COVID-19 pandemic is stifling demand.
This market dislocation comes at a time when European oil majors including Shell, Total,
Repsol and BP are embarking seriously down a path toward emission reductions and the
diversification of their businesses into renewables, e-mobility and other energy services.
Oil companies have been notoriously slow in pivoting their businesses toward cleaner
energy sources. Will the current market storm change that? Might it even accelerate the
transition? “The argument that has often been put forward is that they can't invest in
renewables because renewable projects offer much lower returns than oil and gas
projects. That argument no longer holds at $35 per barrel,” Valentina Kretzschmar,
director of corporate research at Wood Mackenzie, told GTM. “Average returns from oil
and gas projects are now the same as renewables projects and, in fact, renewables
projects are much lower risk. Already, we have seen companies like Occidental cutting

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dividends by 90 percent. It's a discretionary spend,” she added. By that same token,
the current headwinds for oil companies could mean a negative impact on carbon-
reduction measures that would also be considered by the industry as discretionary
spending. The oil and gas sector currently accounts for just 2 percent of investment in
renewables, according to Wood Mackenzie. So a slowdown in the near term would
not derail the flow of finance to solar and wind projects. This isn’t the first time that oil
prices have suffered a shock. During such “black swan” events, many types of
diversification strategies are used to protect against commodity prices, said Luke
Fletcher, senior analyst for investor research at the environmental reporting nonprofit
Carbon Disclosure Project. “Traditionally, the integrated companies had their
‘downstream’ to mitigate against low oil prices,” said Fletcher. Essentially, low oil prices
mean the profit margin for converting that into motor oil or other products is higher. “In
the future, having exposure to other diversified energy assets, such as renewables,
could provide a bit of a hedge against oil price volatility as well. They have
fundamentally very different cash flow profiles and are obviously less reliant on oil and
gas and other commodity prices,” Fletcher said. While some oil companies may choose
to trim capex in the energy transition in the immediate term, others may choose to
signal their longer-term strategy and double-down on diversification across the broader
energy sector. As oil companies are hit hard by the price collapse, cost-cutting will
dominate, and companies with weaker balance sheets will be more concerned with
survival, Kretzschmar said. Yet longer-term strategies to expand revenue streams in
the power sector are not likely to be shelved. “One thing is clear: The energy
transition is not going to go away,” said Kretzschmar, pointing out that this week’s
U.K. budget announcement had climate change woven throughout. “It's still a key
priority for the government.” With that in mind, Kretzschmar warned against business
as usual for oil companies. “The sector is already very much unloved by investors, and
it's only going to get worse. I would like to see the oil and gas sectors starting to seize
opportunities in the megatrend that is the energy transition. Because there are

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opportunities. It is a growing trend, and the pressures to transition and to tackle climate
change are only going to increase."

Impact turn: Higher oil prices are good for western nations

Tobias Rasmussen, No Publication, 8-1-2011 ["Oil shocks around the world: Are they
really that bad?", https://voxeu.org/article/oil-shocks-around-world-are-they-
really-bad, 8-20-2021] Srikar T. S.
Increases in international oil prices over the past couple years, explained partly by
strong growth in large emerging and developing economies, have raised concerns that
high oil prices could endanger the shaky recovery in advanced economies and small
oil-importing countries. The notion that oil prices can have a macroeconomic impact is
well accepted; the debate has centred mainly on magnitude and transmission
channels. Most studies have focused on the US and other OECD economies. And much
of the discussion has related to the role of monetary policy, labour markets, and the
intensity of oil in production (Hamilton 1983, 1996, 2005, 2009, Barsky and Kilian 2004,
Bernanke et al 1997, Blanchard and Gali 2007). The manner in which oil prices affect
emerging and developing economies has received surprisingly little attention compared
with the large body of evidence for advanced economies. In an attempt to provide a
broader and more encompassing view on the impact of oil price shocks, we document in
recent research (Rasmussen and Roitman 2011) key stylised facts that characterise the
relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic aggregates across the world. It is no
surprise that import bills go up when oil prices increase. It is more surprising that GDP
often goes up too. Figure 1 depicts the correlation between oil prices and GDP for 144
countries from 1970 to 2010. More precisely, it shows the cyclical components of oil
prices and GDP, with long-term trends excluded. The set includes 19 oil-exporting
countries, represented by red bars, and 125 oil-importing countries, represented by
blue bars. A positive correlation indicates that when oil prices go up, GDP goes up, and
when oil prices go down, GDP goes down. The message is clear. In more than 80% of the

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countries, the correlation between oil prices and GDP is positive, and in only two
advanced economies – the US and Japan – it is negative. One of the contributing factors
to this pattern is that in 90% of the countries, exports tend to move in the same
direction as oil prices. Given that periods of high oil prices have generally coincided
with good times for the world economy, especially in recent years, it is important to
disentangle the impact of oil price increases on economic activity during episodes of
markedly high oil prices. Following Hamilton (2003), we identify 12 episodes since 1970
in which oil prices have reached three-year highs. The median increase in oil prices in
these years was 27%. We study the behaviour of macroeconomic aggregates
during these episodes by comparing the median annual change in a particular variable
during oil shock years to the median annual change over the entire sample period. This
tells us of any unusual observed changes (Figure 2). We find no evidence of
a widespread contemporaneous negative effect on economic output across oil-
importing countries, but rather value and volume increases in both imports and
exports.

Analysis: The United States will not need to worry about oil shocks due to its own shale
reserves, but even if a shock did occur, it could spur a shift to renewables which would be a
good thing in the long-term.

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A/2: Russia Economic Diversification

Answer: Nationalists have firm control over Putin Rationale

Anders ÅSlund, Atlantic Council, 11-11-2020 ["Putin’s Karabakh victory sparks alarm in
Ukraine", https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-karabakh-
victory-sparks-alarm-in-ukraine/, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have achieved a significant victory this
week in Nagorno-Karabakh that threatens to alter the geopolitical balance throughout
the former Soviet space in his favor. By brokering a Kremlin-friendly peace between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, Putin has succeeded in considerably expanding Russia’s
military presence in the strategically important Southern Caucasus region. Crucially,
he has done so without encountering any Western pushback. This unchecked advance
should set alarm bells ringing in other ex-Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Belarus, and
Moldova. The big lesson of the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace settlement is that military
power rules. In a matter of weeks, the use of force has achieved what decades of
diplomacy failed to deliver. The only two relevant international players in the South
Caucasus region are Russia and Turkey. The United States has taken leave, while the
European Union is a paper tiger without troops.
.
Turn: Siloviki are getting too radical, Putin’s popularity is key to check it.

Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11-2-2020 ["Unconsolidated: The Five

Russian Elites Shaping Putin’s Transition",
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81037, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

The result is that Putin’s associates are being replaced by political technocrats. This
serves both parties. On the one hand, the president’s associates are glad to avoid the

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responsibilities and risks of state service. On the other hand, Putin himself prefers to
deal with young technocrats, who are much easier to work with than those who see the
president as an old friend. The Political Technocrats are an expanding category of
Putin’s elite. They are the workhorses of the system, serving as its stabilizers and
entrusted with implementing government policy. These are figures who were not close
to the president from the beginning, but who have earned his personal trust through
their professionalism and track record in government. These professionals manage
domestic policy (Kremlin First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko), defense policy
(Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu), and foreign policy (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov).
They are also charged with control over the state’s financial well-being (Finance Minister
Anton Siluanov), economic growth (new First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov),
and oversight of monetary policy and the banking sector (Central Bank Governor Elvira
Nabiullina). None of these figures lost their positions in the January reshuffle of the
cabinet, but none of them are irreplaceable either. The Protectors. This group is
comprised of the “watchmen” of the current regime and its ideologues. The hallmark
of the protectors is that they share a conservative, conspiratorial, anti-Western
ideology, argue for more repressive policies, and use aggressive rhetoric. They should
not be confused with the siloviki, a narrower group which oversees the military and
security and law. They include well-known front-line figures like Sergei Naryshkin and
Alexander Bastrykin, but also more bureaucratic figures such as Nikolai Patrushev and
Vyacheslav Volodin. The group is thus an opportunistic alliance between those who
employ the repressive apparatus of the state and those who legitimate it through laws.
Their ideology is becoming increasingly prominent in the official discourse, and their
political influence is on the rise.

No Uniqueness: Technocrats currently have no power

Andrei Kolesnikov, Denis Volkov, Carnegie Moscow Center, 02-13-2020 ["Putin’s

Children: The Russian Elite Prepares for 2024",

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https://carnegie.ru/2020/02/13/putin-s-children-russian-elite-prepares-for-
2024-pub-81055, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

The official backers of these schemes hope that the new technocrats they appoint at
the mid-level of the government pyramid will start rising up to the top and gradually
impact higher-level government policy in a more rational and liberal way. Of course,
this can only work up to a certain point before political limitations come into play. A
winner of a Leaders of Russia competition simply can’t hold a top job like defense
minister or be a candidate for governor of St. Petersburg. This is the sphere of the
exclusive influence of the security services officials, the siloviki. The influence of the
technocrats is limited by the continuing power of the siloviki political community.
New appointments to government positions must still be cleared with the siloviki. This
logic explains Putin’s choice of a loyal colorless bureaucrat Alexander Beglov as his
candidate for St. Petersburg governor. The technocrats in government are primarily
accountable to the Kremlin rather than the public they are supposed to serve. Their
main obsession is not to serve the people, but to make a good report, sometimes with
imitative results and corrected figures. “Reporting takes precedence over
development,” as one of our interviewees put it. Many high-ranking political and
oligarchic positions in Russia are still filled by men with a past in the security services
who are personally close to Putin. He has appointed officers from his security detail to
several high-ranking positions. These security and law enforcement officials remain the
people the president instinctively trusts. THE LIMITATIONS OF TECHNOCRACY The
Russian elite is gearing up for the year 2024 as a year of transition. They know that they
will have to live with a decision that will be made by a very narrow circle of people
around Vladimir Putin. It is less important for them exactly what this decision is than to
fashion a survival strategy. This waiting game is already having a deleterious effect on
the way that Russia is managed. Contrary to the belief of many outsiders, the country is
not being micromanaged by the Kremlin and most edicts from the top have a didactic
purpose, recommending how officials should behave. Bureaucrats and managers are

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given a great deal of latitude. An average member of today’s elite can be described as a
kind of “little Putin.”15 That person’s administrative decisions and political behavior are
guided by the question “What would Putin do in my place?”—a question that can be
interpreted in different ways. So countless “little Putins” try to guess how the “big
Putin” in the Kremlin would behave in their place and add their own personal agendas
into the equation. Russian Elite Opinion After Crimea It is true that the technocrats now
have a more solid organizational base, thanks to training programs that enjoy serious
support from the Kremlin. But none of the interview respondents believe that the
technocrats’ projects are deeply embedded. Instead, they believe that the programs
could easily be reversed or abolished. They note that in the current political system, the
departure of one individual responsible for a particular project probably spells the end
of this project. One example is the Open Government Project, a transparency initiative,
which was the brainchild of minister Mikhail Abyzov. His resignation from the
government in 2018 ended the scheme. A year later he was arrested on fraud charges,
further tainting the image of the project. The reality is that, for all its rhetorical support
for professional technocrats, the ruling regime defaults to relying on bureaucrats who
are more loyal than they are competent, many of whom come from the security
services. “The system discards active and experienced forty- and fifty-year-olds, forcing
them to emigrate or go fishing,” as one of the experts put it. Russia’s technocrats and
entrepreneurs have no say in the coming political transition in the country. Civil
society actors, drawing attention to local issues of concern to the public, are likely to be
more influential, if only insignificantly so.16

No Link: Nato does not matter to the inner circle

Alexander Lanoszka, International Politics, 4-7-2020 ["Thank goodness for NATO

enlargement", https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fs41311-020-00234-
8, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

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Predictions that NATO enlargement would undermine Russian democracy and US–
Russia security cooperation might initially seem to have been correct. But such
conclusions, and thus such explanations of present Russian behavior, do not survive
scrutiny. Correlation does not imply causation. Critics would be wrong to ascribe
Russia’s democratic failings to NATO enlargement. After all, as Russian scholar Andrei
Kortunov (1996, 69) wrote when these policy debates unfolded, ‘Even for the minority
of Russians who do care about foreign policy, NATO remains mostly irrelevant.’ The
impact of NATO enlargement on daily life was too uncertain and marginal, with wide-
ranging interpretations thereof possible among elites who did follow the NATO
debate. NATO enlargement may have played some role in the failure of Russian
democracy and deterioration of Russian–US relations, insofar as it symbolized Russian
weakness during the 1990s. But other, more local factors likely had far greater
influence on Russia’s domestic political developments.

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A/2: Detracts from more important areas

Turn: NATO Should not engage on China

Warrant: NATO is not well suited to handle China

Henrik Larsen. “NATO Shouldn’t Try to Do Too Much on China.” The Diplomat 2021.
https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/nato-shouldnt-try-to-do-too-much-on-china/

“On the other hand, NATO cannot veer too much off in that direction and needs to
make sure that it stays within its core mandate of ensuring the security and defense of
its members – the chief reason why the alliance was created and has endured more
than 72 years. In short, NATO must respond to illiberal challenges posed by China to
the extent they endanger allied security. The alliance must get this balance straight by
focusing on three areas. First, as NATO is pulling out of Afghanistan, it must resist
renewed temptations to “go global,” simply because it is ill-suited and cannot agree to
project power beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO should, however, explore the
meaningfulness in strengthening its existing partnerships in the Asia-Pacific. Australia,
New Zealand, Japan, South Korea are further ahead in their adaptation to China in terms
of resilience and supply-chain security and thus may prove useful for the development
of joint resilience capacity.”

Warrant: NATO is not equipped for the task

Henrik Larsen. “NATO Shouldn’t Try to Do Too Much on China.” The Diplomat 2021.
https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/nato-shouldnt-try-to-do-too-much-on-china/

“Conversely, NATO is hardly the right forum to gather worldwide counter-coalitions

against China on, for instance, human rights issues. Instead, NATO should concentrate

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on high-tech with military implications, which is an aspect of China’s global rise where
the alliance enjoys a clear comparative advantage. As China is pressing ahead with the
application of artificial intelligence in its military, NATO has a natural role in the
definition of gold standards for interoperability between defense systems of its allies
and its partners in the Asia-Pacific."

Answer: Russia is a serious threat

Warrant: Russia threatens NATO’s European Members

Alexis Mrachek. “Yes, Russia Is a Threat to the United States” The Heritage Foundation.
2020. https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/yes-russia-threat-the-
united-states

“Russia's conventional weaponry and warfare tactics directly threaten the 29 European
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as its partners. By
treaty, the U.S. and other NATO members are obligated to "seek to promote stability
and well-being in the North Atlantic area" and are "resolved to unite their efforts for
collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security." This one-for-all and
all-for-one arrangement commits the U.S. to come to the defense of any NATO member
attacked by any foreign power.”

Warrant: Russia poses new and evolving threats

Alexis Mrachek. “Yes, Russia Is a Threat to the United States” The Heritage Foundation.
2020. https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/yes-russia-threat-the-
united-states

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“Moscow is a hacking superpower—arguably the best in the world. And Russian

hackers clearly have their sights set on the U.S. For example, in September 2017, then-
President Donald Trump ordered American civilian agencies to remove Kaspersky Lab
anti-virus software from their networks because of concerns that Russian intelligence
agencies could utilize it to spy on the U.S. government.

Last December, the U.S. government suffered multiple data breaches due to Moscow's
hacking of SolarWinds software—an attack NPR described as "a master class in novel
hacking techniques." And just this month, Washington revealed that hackers working
for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service "are actively exploiting five known
vulnerabilities to target U.S. companies and the defense-industrial base.".”

Analysis: This evidence shows that Russia is not particularly interested in working within
Western institutions. Instead, it wants to undermine them and sap their strength. This must be
met with force.

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A/2: Increased Commitments Detract from Diplomacy

Turn: Force helps diplomacy

Warrant: Military force helps establish credibility and commitment

Will Inboden. “10 reasons US military strength remains essential.” The Hill 2019.
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/421970-10-reasons-us-military-
strength-remains-essential

“Induces fence-sitters to lean our way. To take just one example, Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat’s decision to expel all Soviet military advisers in 1972 came in part from
his desire to forge closer ties with the United States, which, after years in the Soviet
orbit, he saw as the stronger, more reliable partner. Helps secure and preserve peace
treaties. America’s burgeoning ties to Israel and Egypt eventually led to President Jimmy
Carter’s negotiation of the Camp David accords and the landmark Egypt-Israel peace
treaty. Part of the cement that solidified Camp David came from the U.S. guarantee of
large arms packages to both countries, which continue to this day, and were possible
only because of the appeal to Egypt and Israel of the superior quality of American
weapons systems.”

Warrant: Force strengthens our negotiating posture

Will Inboden. “10 reasons US military strength remains essential.” The Hill 2019.
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/421970-10-reasons-us-military-
strength-remains-essential

“Strengthens our negotiating posture with adversaries. Perhaps the most notable
arms control agreement of the past half-century is the Intermediate Range Nuclear

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Forces (INF) Treaty signed by the United States and Soviet Union in 1987. This came
about only because of Reagan’s controversial deployment of Pershing II and ground-
launched cruise missiles in Western Europe four years earlier, which brought
tremendous pressure on the Soviet system and induced Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev to make significant concessions that he previously resisted."

Answer: Russia is revisionist

Warrant: Russia wants to redraw boundaries by force

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“The China-Russia relationship has become an increasingly robust, pragmatic strategic

partnership since 2014, in part because the United States is pursuing policies that have
driven the two countries closer together. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping are
both authoritarian leaders whose primary preoccupation is regime survival and who are
allergic to Western criticisms of their domestic systems and the repressive policies of
their respective governments. China and Russia are revisionist powers in as much as
they share a commitment to creating a “post-West” global order which takes their
interests into account and is conducive to authoritarian rule. Since Russia’s 2014 seizure
and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine and the West’s subsequent attempts to isolate
Russia, Putin has increasingly turned to China, which has enabled Russia to surmount
the isolation and flourish on the world stage. Sino-Russian economic and energy ties are
expanding. China is economically more important to Russia than vice versa and is
Russia’s number one trading partner and the second-largest purchaser of Russian
military hardware..”

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Warrant: Russia is working with China to undermine the West

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“The new Power of Siberia gas pipeline will increase their energy interdependence.
Sino-Russian cooperation in the military and high-tech fields is also growing. Their
joint military exercises and air patrols, as well as joint work on artificial intelligence
and biotechnology pose challenges to the United States. There are significant
asymmetries in the relationship, and mutual mistrust remains, especially in Russia’s
rapidly depopulating Far East, where Chinese traders and entrepreneurs are
abundant. Nevertheless, Russia appears to have accepted its role as a junior partner
to China. This is in part because China, unlike the United States, is not perceived to
represent a threat to Putin’s rule. Those who believe that Russia would be willing to
distance itself from China and align itself with Washington against Beijing underestimate
the extent to which China’s unequivocal support of Russia’s domestic system is an
existential issue for the Putin regime. Moreover, the twin U.S. policies of sanctioning
Russia and pursuing a trade war with China have pushed the two countries closer
together. Washington could promote closer ties to Russia by lifting sanctions, extending
the New START treaty and even modifying its stance on the Ukraine conflict. But it is
unlikely that this would lead Russia to distance itself from China.”

Analysis: This evidence shows that Russia is not particularly interested in working within
Western institutions. Instead it wants to undermine them and sap their strength. This must be
met with force.

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A/2: Wasteful Use of Resources

Turn: NATO serves many purposes

Warrant: NATO is important for collective security

James Stavridis. “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former
Commander.” TIME 2019. https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-
world-peace/

“To many who lived through the Cold War, the alliance may seem like an obvious good
deal. By binding Europe’s democracies together, NATO decreased the chances of the
brutal conflicts that dominated the continent through the end of World War II. NATO
provided a strong counterweight to Russia, and communism more broadly, helping
defeat that ideology virtually without firing a shot. And when the U.S. went to war in
Afghanistan after 9/11, the NATO allies went with us in their first and only exercise of
Article 5. Most of all, for decades NATO–the alliance for which I was Supreme Allied
Commander from 2009 to 2013–was America’s forward operating base for democracy,
embodying shared values that were worth defending and even dying for.”

Warrant: Putin’s threats justify NATO commitments

James Stavridis. “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former
Commander.” TIME 2019. https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-
world-peace/

“It was the avowed NATO hater Vladimir Putin, ironically, who revitalized the alliance
and launched NATO 3.0. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 gave
new purpose to NATO. I vividly remember attending an alliance meeting shortly after I

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took command in 2009 during which Chiefs of Defense of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
laid out a passionate, intelligence-based briefing on the possibility of Russian
intervention in the Baltic countries. I assessed it to be a very low probability at that
moment, but in the years afterward, I became increasingly concerned. We updated our
NATO defensive war plans, conducted significant training exercises and requested
additional forces across the organization to maintain a higher level of readiness. Putin’s
subsequent actions, including the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines jet over Ukraine
and increased aggression in the air and on the high seas around NATO’s periphery, drew
the alliance together."

Answer: NATO is a good financial deal

Warrant: NATO members are burden-sharing

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“Germany will increase its contribution to the NATO budget by €33 million ($36 million)
to match what the US contributes, officials have announced. A week before their 70th
anniversary summit in London, the 29 NATO member states agreed to changes in how
the military alliance's costs are covered. Starting in 2021, the share of the NATO budget
covered by Germany will increase from 14.8% to 16.35%, while the share covered by the
US will decrease from 22.1% to 16.35%. The alliance's budget will be used to invest in
infrastructure as well to finance NATO's headquarters in Brussels, among other
projects..”

Warrant: NATO countries proactively respond to financial issues to create equitable funding

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Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“The new agreement means Germany's annual contribution to the NATO budget will
increase by about €33 million, while the US will save around €120 million.

"All allies have agreed a new cost-sharing formula. Under the new formula, cost shares
attributed to most European allies and Canada will go up, while the US share will come
down," a NATO official told the Agence France-Presse on Thursday. "This is an important
demonstration of allies' commitment to the alliance and to fairer burden-sharing."
NATO officials hope the new agreement will alleviate some of the tension around the
topic of NATO financing. US President Donald Trump has complained that the US covers
more than its fair share of the costs for the alliance. He has demanded that other
member states make good on their pledges to increase their NATO contribution to 2%
of GDP by 2024, a goal that Germany will not reach.”

Analysis: This response demonstrates that even if there are some financial issues with NATO,
the overall trend is to collaborative solve these issues together.

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A/2: Increase Russian Aggression

De-link: NATO expansion does not lead to aggression

Warrant: Russia has not always been aggressive

Michael McFaul. “Moscow’s Choice.” Foreign Affairs 2014.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2014-10-
17/faulty-powers

“Even more difficult for Mearsheimer to explain is the so-called reset of U.S.-Russian
relations, an era of cooperation that lasted from the spring of 2009 to January 2012.
Both U.S. President Barack Obama and then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed
to moves that they considered in the national interest of their respective countries. The
two leaders signed and ratified the New START treaty, voted to support the UN Security
Council’s most comprehensive set of sanctions against Iran ever, and vastly expanded
the supply route for U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan that travels in part through Russia. They
worked together to obtain Russian membership in the World Trade Organization,
created a bilateral presidential commission to promote cooperation on everything
from nuclear energy to counterterrorism, and put in place a more liberal visa regime.
In 2010, polls showed that over 60 percent of Russians held a positive view of the
United States. Russia has pursued both cooperation and confrontation with the
United States since this century began. Mearsheimer’s single variable of NATO
expansion can’t explain both outcomes. For the real story, one needs to look past the
factor that has stayed constant and focus on what has changed: Russian politics.”

Warrant: Russia does not care about NATO expansion

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Michael McFaul. “Moscow’s Choice.” Foreign Affairs 2014.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/2014-10-
17/faulty-powers

“What he did not mention was NATO expansion. In fact, in the five years that I served
in the Obama administration, I attended almost every meeting Obama held with Putin
and Medvedev, and for three of those years, while working at the White House, I
listened in on every phone conversation, and I cannot remember NATO expansion
ever coming up. Even months before Putin’s annexation of Crimea, I cannot recall a
single major statement from a senior Russian official warning about the dangerous
consequences of NATO expansion. The reason is simple: for the previous several years,
NATO was not expanding eastward. "

Answer: NATO expansion lowers Russian bellicosity

Warrant: NATO expansion limits escalation

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“Had NATO not grown to its present size and borders, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine
would be far more dangerous than what is occurring today. Western leaders would be in
a state of near panic as they tried to figure out, in the middle of a confrontation, which
eastern European countries deserved security guarantees and which did not. At a
moment of sudden tension, they would be obliged to improvise. Finding the right
middle ground between recklessness and acquiescence would be a matter of
guesswork, with unpredictable life-and-death results.”

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Warrant: NATO commitments stabilize crises outside of NATO as well

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“The addition of so many new NATO members in recent years does mean that the
alliance needs to think carefully about how to implement the commitments it has made.
But the job of promoting security in eastern Europe has been made much easier
because a basic strategic framework is already in place. Ironically, even Putin, for all his
complaining, benefits. Despite the rude jolt of his aggression against Ukraine, Western
governments are less frightened than they would be without the comfort of a larger
NATO and the relatively stable European order that U.S. policy has created. Putin
faces less push-back today in part because the United States succeeded in solving the
problems of the 1990s.”

Analysis: This response is powerful because it shows how NATO expansion helps calm member
nations thereby decreasing the likelihood of armed conflict in any scenario.

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A/2: Decrease readiness

Answer: Stationing more forces in the Baltic Countries would increase NATO’s readiness to
respond to any number of Russia related contingencies.

Warrant: Baltic deterrence is essential for responding quickly to Russian provocation

Olevs Nikers. “Baltic Security Assurances in Wake of NATO Summit and Biden-Putin
Meeting.” July 2017. Jamestown Foundation.
https://jamestown.org/program/baltic-security-assurances-in-wake-of-nato-
summit-and-biden-putin-meeting/

“President Biden’s sideline meeting with the leaders of the Baltic States in Brussels
additionally confirmed the US’s support and readiness to participate in strengthening
NATO’s effective deterrence and defense potential in the face of growing geopolitical
tensions along the Alliance’s eastern flank. “This meeting was really important for the
Baltic States. The United States understands the threats facing the Baltic States and is
well aware that Russia’s position is becoming more aggressive and that it is trying to
integrate Belarus into its military structures,” Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda
noted following the summit. “We have been assured that the United States considers
our region strategically important,” he added. During the meeting with Biden, he
emphasized that US participation in strengthening security and defense in the region is
“the most important factor in controlling Russia.” According to the president of
Lithuania, a larger US military presence in the Baltic States is highly desirable as “the
best” and “most important” expression of Washington’s attention to the security of the
region (Lrt.lt, June 14)..”

Warrant: Moscow is already pushing the limits of acceptable status quo behavior

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Olevs Nikers. “Baltic Security Assurances in Wake of NATO Summit and Biden-Putin
Meeting.” July 2017. Jamestown Foundation.
https://jamestown.org/program/baltic-security-assurances-in-wake-of-nato-
summit-and-biden-putin-meeting/

“This year’s NATO summit conspicuously took place against the background of Biden’s
much-ballyhooed one-on-one meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in
Geneva. That June 16 Biden-Putin summit marked a key step in the White House’s
goal of making the turbulent US-Russian relationship more stable and predictable. So
far, one of the practical effects of the “reset”-like reopening of strategic-level dialogue
with Moscow has been a commitment by Russia on the one hand and the United
States and its NATO allies on the other to observe one another’s “red lines.” For the
transatlantic community, this means holding Russia to account for any further
attempts to destabilize NATO or compromise peace and security throughout Europe.
But Moscow is already testing or crossing those Western red lines while almost
haphazardly declaring its own, which routinely undermine the security of the
countries along NATO’s eastern flank (see EDM, April 27, June 21, July 1). It is, thus,
instructive to recall former US President Barack Obama’s so-called “reset” with Russia in
2010 (embraced two years after Russia’s aggression in Georgia), which was followed
soon thereafter by Moscow’s forcible annexation of Crimea in 2014. Taking that recent
history into account, it will be important to complement any kind of cooperative policies
that might be put on the table right now with concrete capabilities to contain Russia
whenever the latter crosses a NATO red line (Xtv.lv, June 18).”

Warrant: Major NATO militaries suffer from a readiness deficit

Josh Campbell. “Why NATO should adopt a readiness initiative.” War on the Rocks.
2021. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/why-nato-should-adopt-a-tactical-
readiness-initiative/

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“In January 2018, the German news site Deutsche Welle released a bombshell report.
It exposed, in excruciating detail, the degraded readiness of the German military. One
year before assuming command of the NATO Very High Readiness Task Force, the
alliance’s multinational immediate response force, the Bundeswehr was forced to admit
it lacked basic equipment needed to fulfil its role: spare parts for armored vehicles,
night-vision devices, body armor, and even winter clothes and tents. Subsequent
investigations revealed similar readiness problems in the nation’s air and naval forces.
In short, NATO’s most important European member was not ready for war.”

Warrant: Stop gap measures are not sufficient

Josh Campbell. “Why NATO should adopt a readiness initiative.” War on the Rocks.
2021. https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/why-nato-should-adopt-a-tactical-
readiness-initiative/

“When first introduced two years ago, the readiness initiative lacked a clear definition
of readiness, a means to evaluate individual units allocated to the initiative, and a
routine mechanism to test the responsiveness of these forces. Since NATO defense
ministers are still discussing the details of the initiative, it is likely that these
fundamental gaps still exist. The initiative still has not been formally tested. Exercise
Defender 2020, slated for June of this year, should have been an excellent opportunity
to do so. However, the exercise was greatly reduced due to COVID-19, and it would
have most likely been an inauspicious start for the alliance’s latest initiative. NATO’s
next opportunity will be Exercise Steadfast Defender in 2021, which gives NATO and
states contributing forces to the initiative a little under a year to address these
deficiencies and ensure the success of this important initiative. As a first step, NATO
should establish oversight on the readiness of national forces allocated to the “Four
Thirties.” Then, the alliance should adopt additional strategies that support tactical

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readiness for these forces by standardizing training methodologies and establishing

their wartime task organization before a crisis starts, not after. Given the challenges
associated with NATO’s land component, the alliance should start with member
states’ armies rather than the other services.”

Analysis: This argument shows that the Baltics are critical to NATO’s readiness, and that
alternative measures of solvency have not worked. Weigh readiness as an important
preventative measure for deterring conflict.

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A/2: Denial of Russian aggression

Answer: NATO needs to increase defenses of the Baltics to deter and deny Russia from invading

Warrant: the status quo is not enough to always deter Russia due to a fait accompli assumption

Jonatan Vseviov, “Constructing Deterrence in the Baltic States,” ICDS, February 2021.
https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/ICDS_Analysis_Constructing_Deterrence_in_the_Baltic_State
s_Jonatan_Vseviov_February_2021.pdf

It is nevertheless possible for a potential adversary to conclude that it could, under certain
circumstances and with the element of surprise on its side, conduct a rapid operation to crush
the conventional forces of the Baltic states before significant reinforcements could arrive.
This could lead to a problematic assumption that, even if conflict is unavoidable in principle,
an adversary could create, perhaps in a limited area, a fait accompli with such speed and
decisiveness that it would incapacitate the Baltic states’ response before it even begins. This
leads to the conclusion that, in addition to conventional manoeuvrecapable forces, the Baltic
states would need to deploy survivable unconventional capabilities in the form of Special
Forces and a territorially dispersed militia that would communicate an intent and capability to
sustain armed resistance even in situations where manoeuvrecapable forces are either
destroyed or unable to respond.

Warrant: the status quo trip wire force does little to deter Russia

Alexander Lanoszka, 12-5-2016, "Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike
Challenge in the Baltic Region," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.srv-
proxy1.library.tamu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367

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Although it is unlikely that Russia will resort to armed force in the Baltic region, these scenarios
are useful, not because they are probable, but because they suggest how Russia might choose
to use violent means if deterrence were to fail. To the degree that NATO can anticipate how
Russia might use military force in the Baltics, the Alliance can calibrate its deterrence threats so
as to make war less likely in the first place. The problem is that NATO is contemplating
solutions that are unlikely to resolve the underlying problem. Russia’s precision strike and
A2/AD capabilities render existing forward-deployed ground troops vulnerable, making it
easier for Russia to present NATO with a fait accompli. NATO’s current solutions largely
involve pre-positioned heavy military hardware, four battalion-sized battlegroups, and
modest deployments of rotational forces. If this analysis is correct, it suggests a different
approach to deterrence in the Baltics.

Warrant: if attacked, NATO could not enter the Baltics, rendering the tripwire force insufficient

Alexander Lanoszka, 12-5-2016, "Confronting the Anti-Access/Area Denial and Precision Strike
Challenge in the Baltic Region," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.srv-
proxy1.library.tamu.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2016.1253367

First, these military assets simply provide instant targets that would be the first to suffer from
long-range Russian strikes. Second, they do not address the fundamental problem of
reassurance and deterrence. Small rotational forces will suffer heavily against a Russian
onslaught without appreciably slowing it. Even if such forces serve as a ‘tripwire’, larger
follow-on forces will experience extreme difficulties forcibly entering the theatre of
operations, are likely to find their pre-positioned equipment heavily damaged or inaccessible,
and may well arrive to discover that the issue has already been settled.

Analysis: It is true that increasing troop presence could aggravate Russia, but as of now they are
woefully unprotected, and there’s little that could stop a Russian invasion without more support.

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A/2: Increased commitments create moral hazard

Turn: NATO serves many purposes

Warrant: NATO is important for collective security

James Stavridis. “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former
Commander.” TIME 2019. https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-
world-peace/

“To many who lived through the Cold War, the alliance may seem like an obvious good
deal. By binding Europe’s democracies together, NATO decreased the chances of the
brutal conflicts that dominated the continent through the end of World War II. NATO
provided a strong counterweight to Russia, and communism more broadly, helping
defeat that ideology virtually without firing a shot. And when the U.S. went to war in
Afghanistan after 9/11, the NATO allies went with us in their first and only exercise of
Article 5. Most of all, for decades NATO–the alliance for which I was Supreme Allied
Commander from 2009 to 2013–was America’s forward operating base for democracy,
embodying shared values that were worth defending and even dying for.”

Warrant: Putin’s threats justify NATO commitments

James Stavridis. “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former
Commander.” TIME 2019. https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-
world-peace/

“It was the avowed NATO hater Vladimir Putin, ironically, who revitalized the alliance
and launched NATO 3.0. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 gave
new purpose to NATO. I vividly remember attending an alliance meeting shortly after I

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took command in 2009 during which Chiefs of Defense of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
laid out a passionate, intelligence-based briefing on the possibility of Russian
intervention in the Baltic countries. I assessed it to be a very low probability at that
moment, but in the years afterward, I became increasingly concerned. We updated our
NATO defensive war plans, conducted significant training exercises and requested
additional forces across the organization to maintain a higher level of readiness. Putin’s
subsequent actions, including the shooting down of a Malaysia Airlines jet over Ukraine
and increased aggression in the air and on the high seas around NATO’s periphery, drew
the alliance together."

Answer: NATO is a good financial deal

Warrant: NATO members are burden-sharing

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“Germany will increase its contribution to the NATO budget by €33 million ($36 million)
to match what the US contributes, officials have announced. A week before their 70th
anniversary summit in London, the 29 NATO member states agreed to changes in how
the military alliance's costs are covered. Starting in 2021, the share of the NATO budget
covered by Germany will increase from 14.8% to 16.35%, while the share covered by the
US will decrease from 22.1% to 16.35%. The alliance's budget will be used to invest in
infrastructure as well to finance NATO's headquarters in Brussels, among other
projects..”

Warrant: NATO countries proactively respond to financial issues to create equitable funding

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Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“The new agreement means Germany's annual contribution to the NATO budget will
increase by about €33 million, while the US will save around €120 million.

"All allies have agreed a new cost-sharing formula. Under the new formula, cost shares
attributed to most European allies and Canada will go up, while the US share will come
down," a NATO official told the Agence France-Presse on Thursday. "This is an important
demonstration of allies' commitment to the alliance and to fairer burden-sharing."
NATO officials hope the new agreement will alleviate some of the tension around the
topic of NATO financing. US President Donald Trump has complained that the US covers
more than its fair share of the costs for the alliance. He has demanded that other
member states make good on their pledges to increase their NATO contribution to 2%
of GDP by 2024, a goal that Germany will not reach.”

Analysis: The actions considered to generate moral hazard are necessary; there is no
alternative to NATO proactivity in the region.

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A/2: Deterrence in the Baltics is ineffective

Answer: Existing forces are not sufficient to defend against Chinese aggression.

Warrant: China has a growing military presence in the Baltics

Patsy Widakuswara, Steve Herman, 6-14-2021, "NATO Reaffirms Strength of Alliance, Calls Out
Russia, China," Voice of America, https://www.voanews.com/europe/nato-reaffirms-
strength-alliance-calls-out-russia-china

China Stoltenberg said China's growing military presence from the Baltics to Africa means
NATO has to be prepared. "China is coming closer to us. We see them in cyberspace, we see
China in Africa, but we also see China investing heavily in our own critical infrastructure," the
NATO secretary general said. China is “the new the new kid on the block,” said Alice Billon-
Galland, a research fellow at London-based Chatham House, and one of the NATO Young
Leaders selected to advise the NATO 2030 process. Billon-Galland said European allies need to
work with both the U.S. and China but ultimately want to avoid being dragged into a binary
Washington versus Beijing confrontation. “European allies are quite careful in terms of how
they approach this and a bit reluctant for NATO to get too involved in China-related issues or
Indo-Pacific issues,” she said.

Warrant: China has broad interests in the Baltics

Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavičius, August 2020, “Between the Chinese Dragon and
American Eagle, 5G Development in the Baltic States,” ICDS, https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS-Brief_Between-the-Chinese-Dragon-and-American-
Eagle-5G-development-in-the-Baltic-states_August-2020.pdf

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China’s broader influence in the Baltic region cannot be ignored in the 5G context. China is
one of the Baltic states’ largest trade partners outside of the EU, and the region possesses key
predispositions to become a Chinese equipped distribution centre in the Baltic Sea for cargo
transportation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Baltic policymakers and business leaders
often tout China as an important export market and source of investments. The Baltic states
are also part of the 17+1, a cooperation framework created in 2012 between China and 16
Central and Eastern European countries to facilitate the arrival of Chinese investments and
technology in the region.11 Chinese companies have also been active in shaping public
perceptions in the Baltics: by the end of March 2020, Lithuania had received over 20,000
protective masks and 120,000 pairs of gloves from Huawei and other Chinese companies to
help fight the Covid-19 pandemic— aid that Lithuanian security analysts believe was in part
meant to soften the Lithuanian approach to Chinese involvement in 5G.

Warrant: China is reaching into the Baltics and NATO

Pierre Morcos, 6-8-2021, "NATO’s Pivot to China: A Challenging Path," No Publication,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-pivot-china-challenging-path

China’s military reach is also getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic region. The Russian
and Chinese navies have conducted joint military exercises in the Mediterranean and
Baltic Seas, signaling a burgeoning military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow.
Collaboration between China and Russia grows stronger in the Arctic, where both
countries invest in natural gas projects as well as in transport corridors as part of an
effort known as the “Polar Silk Road” or the “Northern Sea Route.” Beyond the Euro-
Atlantic area, China is developing modern military capabilities (long-range missiles,
aircraft carriers, and nuclear attack submarines) with potentially serious security
implications for NATO given their global reach. Likewise, China is investing in
counterspace weapons that could potentially threaten any NATO satellite. Allies are
also regularly the targets of cyberattacks originating from China-based hackers. Allies

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have faced an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy as well. Amid the Covid-19
pandemic, Beijing has notably intensified its disinformation efforts directly targeting
NATO countries. Beijing has also tried to leverage its close economic ties with some
NATO countries through the Belt and Road Initiative to erode allies’ cohesion and unity
in an effort to impede criticism of Beijing’s human rights violations and its violations of
Hong Kong’s Basic Law.

Analysis: Existing forces can defend against a singular threat, but Russia is not the only power
pursuing interests in the Baltics anymore. To defend against China and other modern threats,
NATO will need to expand its presence.

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A/2: Triggers Russian arms race

Answer: Russia is already pushing towards an arms race.

Warrant: Russia’s reinvigorated great power ambitions increases potential for conflict in Baltics

Heinrich Brauß, 1-7-2021, "Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region,"
German Council on foreign Relations,
https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-
baltic-region

As a consequence, Moscow’s actions in foreign, security and defense policy have been
designed to restore Russia’s great power status while at the same time re-establishing the
cordon sanitaire it enjoyed until the end of the Cold War. In particular, it wants to regain
control of Russia’s “near abroad,” making demands for an allegedly historically justified “zone
of privileged interest.” This would come at the expense of the sovereignty and security of
neighboring states. While Russia’s actions may have defensive origins, these insecurities are
manifested in an aggressive and unpredictable manner. Standing in the way of Russia’s
expansionist ambitions are the EU and NATO, and above all the U.S. military presence in
Europe. If NATO unity were sufficiently undermined, its decision-making capability paralyzed,
its ability to defend itself undercut, the organization itself could collapse.

Warrant: The only factor preventing a Russian attack is a current lack of Russian interests in the Baltics

Matus Halas, “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics, European
Security,” European Security Journal, July 2019.
https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/773053/mod_resource/content/0/halas2019.pdf
Deterrence does not work at the conventional level, but it still did not fail thanks to the
missing interest of the other side. Yet at the sub-conventional level of hybrid warfare, where

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deterrence matters most today, it failed repeatedly. Russia currently does not seem to be
deterred by NATO or its individual members at the sub-conventional level, where hybrid
threats naturally belong. Moscow regularly conducts actions which would normally amount to
deterrence failure and there are no signs on its part of any intention to change this practice.
To put it simply, the insufficient conventional capabilities of NATO on the Eastern Flank (Luik
and Jermalavičius 2017, Cornish 2017, p. 9) do not have negative consequences only thanks to
the lack of Russian interest in challenging the status quo in the Baltics in the first place.
Moreover, where it matters the most, deterrence does not work simply because the number
of attacks below the conventional level prove it completely ineffective.

Warrant: The status quo is not enough to always deter Russia due to a fait accompli assumption

Jonatan Vseviov, “Constructing Deterrence in the Baltic States,” ICDS, February 2021.
https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/ICDS_Analysis_Constructing_Deterrence_in_the_Baltic_State
s_Jonatan_Vseviov_February_2021.pdf

It is nevertheless possible for a potential adversary to conclude that it could, under certain
circumstances and with the element of surprise on its side, conduct a rapid operation to crush
the conventional forces of the Baltic states before significant reinforcements could arrive.
This could lead to a problematic assumption that, even if conflict is unavoidable in principle,
an adversary could create, perhaps in a limited area, a fait accompli with such speed and
decisiveness that it would incapacitate the Baltic states’ response before it even begins. This
leads to the conclusion that, in addition to conventional manoeuvrecapable forces, the Baltic
states would need to deploy survivable unconventional capabilities in the form of Special
Forces and a territorially dispersed militia that would communicate an intent and capability to
sustain armed resistance even in situations where manoeuvrecapable forces are either
destroyed or unable to respond.

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Analysis: Russia is already becoming more aggressive and moving towards an arms race in the
Baltics. NATO’s presence there is not the tipping point, as Russia will inevitably start arming the
region if nothing is done, given that the status quo protections are insufficient.

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A/2: Increases threat of Russia / China collaboration

Answer: China is already making moves in the Baltic region regardless of NATO presence;
collaboration is inevitable.

Warrant: China has a growing military presence in the Baltics

Patsy Widakuswara, Steve Herman, 6-14-2021, "NATO Reaffirms Strength of Alliance, Calls Out
Russia, China," Voice of America, https://www.voanews.com/europe/nato-reaffirms-
strength-alliance-calls-out-russia-china

China Stoltenberg said China's growing military presence from the Baltics to Africa means
NATO has to be prepared. "China is coming closer to us. We see them in cyberspace, we see
China in Africa, but we also see China investing heavily in our own critical infrastructure," the
NATO secretary general said. China is “the new the new kid on the block,” said Alice Billon-
Galland, a research fellow at London-based Chatham House, and one of the NATO Young
Leaders selected to advise the NATO 2030 process. Billon-Galland said European allies need to
work with both the U.S. and China but ultimately want to avoid being dragged into a binary
Washington versus Beijing confrontation. “European allies are quite careful in terms of how
they approach this and a bit reluctant for NATO to get too involved in China-related issues or
Indo-Pacific issues,” she said.

Warrant: China has broad interests in the Baltics

Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavičius, August 2020, “Between the Chinese Dragon and
American Eagle, 5G Development in the Baltic States,” ICDS, https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2020/08/ICDS-Brief_Between-the-Chinese-Dragon-and-American-
Eagle-5G-development-in-the-Baltic-states_August-2020.pdf

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China’s broader influence in the Baltic region cannot be ignored in the 5G context. China is
one of the Baltic states’ largest trade partners outside of the EU, and the region possesses key
predispositions to become a Chinese equipped distribution centre in the Baltic Sea for cargo
transportation as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Baltic policymakers and business leaders
often tout China as an important export market and source of investments. The Baltic states
are also part of the 17+1, a cooperation framework created in 2012 between China and 16
Central and Eastern European countries to facilitate the arrival of Chinese investments and
technology in the region.11 Chinese companies have also been active in shaping public
perceptions in the Baltics: by the end of March 2020, Lithuania had received over 20,000
protective masks and 120,000 pairs of gloves from Huawei and other Chinese companies to
help fight the Covid-19 pandemic— aid that Lithuanian security analysts believe was in part
meant to soften the Lithuanian approach to Chinese involvement in 5G.

Warrant: China is reaching into the Baltics and NATO

Pierre Morcos, 6-8-2021, "NATO’s Pivot to China: A Challenging Path," No Publication,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/natos-pivot-china-challenging-path

China’s military reach is also getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic region. The Russian and
Chinese navies have conducted joint military exercises in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas,
signaling a burgeoning military cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. Collaboration
between China and Russia grows stronger in the Arctic, where both countries invest in natural
gas projects as well as in transport corridors as part of an effort known as the “Polar Silk Road”
or the “Northern Sea Route.” Beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, China is developing modern
military capabilities (long-range missiles, aircraft carriers, and nuclear attack submarines) with
potentially serious security implications for NATO given their global reach. Likewise, China is
investing in counterspace weapons that could potentially threaten any NATO satellite. Allies
are also regularly the targets of cyberattacks originating from China-based hackers. Allies
have faced an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy as well. Amid the Covid-19

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pandemic, Beijing has notably intensified its disinformation efforts directly targeting NATO
countries. Beijing has also tried to leverage its close economic ties with some NATO countries
through the Belt and Road Initiative to erode allies’ cohesion and unity in an effort to impede
criticism of Beijing’s human rights violations and its violations of Hong Kong’s Basic Law.

Analysis: China and Russia will collaborate regardless of NATO presence as we are seeing now, as both
countries have interests in the Baltics. Expansion may increase tension, but the collaboration and
expansion of Russia and China is nothing new and cannot be attributed to NATO expansion in the
region.

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A/2: Won’t help military capacity

Answer: NATO enhancements are needed to ensure Baltic stability.

Warrant: increasing heavily armored vehicles needed to prevent quick overrun of the Baltics

Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge
to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to
emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of
the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing
the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring
the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should elimi- nate
the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deterrence
of overt, opportunistic aggression. There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy
forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks.
For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward
in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and
plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or
could employ some combination of these approaches

Warrant: it is difficult to get this force in the area unless stationed there

Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html.

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The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms
battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equip-
ment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.14 Getting this unit into
the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equip-
ment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support
vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and
road- marching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10
days.

Warrant: Russia has an advantage in heavy forces that overcomes other gaps

Hooker Jr, Richard D. "How to defend the Baltic states." The Jamestown Foundation (2019).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-
full-web4.pdf

On the ground, the forces in place are currently far from adequate for defense, but the
situation is not hopeless. Because the defender has certain inherent advantages (such as
knowledge of the terrain and the ability to emplace obstacles and fortifications), the forces
required to defend can be smaller. The standard planning figure is a ratio of one to three—
that is, the defender requires approximately one-third of the attacker’s combat power to
successfully defend. In the Baltics, these ratios are achievable. At the same time, however,
combat power is more than numbers. For example, Russian preponderance in heavy forces
and artillery greatly increases the striking power of their brigades relative to NATO light or
motorized brigades. Training, leadership, morale and better technology can help to offset an
opponent’s numerical superiority.

Impact: Heavy forces would be key for NATO to secure and win a conflict

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Hooker Jr, Richard D. "How to defend the Baltic states." The Jamestown Foundation (2019).
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/How-to-Defend-the-Baltic-States-
full-web4.pdf

For the first 30 days following a Russian incursion, in-place Baltic forces as described above,
with some early arriving NATO reinforcements, might effectively hinder and degrade Russian
forces if supported by theater air defense and long-range fires as well as NATO air and naval
forces. The parameters of success can be defined as retaining control of national capitals for
30 days, denying linkup with forces in Kaliningrad and attriting Russian first echelon forces by
50%. However, these forces are “not sufficient for a sustained defense of the region or to
restore NATO members’ territorial integrity.” To restore national borders and remove Russian
forces, reinforcing NATO or coalition heavy forces will be needed.

Analysis: NATO forces are needed insofar as the current troops and military presence are not
enough. Due to the uniqueness of the region, as well as Russia’s existing military presence,
there needs to be an aggressive move by NATO to ensure Baltic stability.

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A/2: Baltic allies are self-sufficient

Answer: As the Baltics mainly face cyber threats, NATO needs to bolster Baltic cyber defenses

Warrant: Russia uses cyber-attacks against the Baltics

AP News, 3-4-2021, "Report: Russian hackers exploit Lithuanian infrastructure," AP NEWS,

https://apnews.com/article/lithuania-coronavirus-pandemic-covid-19-pandemic-
national-security-russia-4f643495296f645e8957594034ec0367

“Nevertheless, Russian intelligence operations pose a major threat to Lithuania’s national

security,” State Security Department head Darius Jauniskis told Lithuanian lawmakers as he
presented the report at Seimas, the Parliament, on Thursday. Jauniskis added that Moscow was
using military and economic means and influencing by information “for the implementation
of its political aims” in the Baltic nation of 2.8 million. The report estimated that the overall
threat of cyber and information attacks has increased in Lithuania as the number of cyber-
attacks was continuing to grow annually. Jauniskis accused Russia of trying to use the
pandemic as a way to create havoc in Lithuania, which he said had witnessed “dozens” of such
“failed attempts” recently. “Those activities were well-coordinated and fueled by anti-Western
propaganda coming out from the Kremlin,” Jauniskis said. Similarly to its neighbors Estonia and
Latvia, Lithuania’s relations to Russia have remained icy since the nation regained its
independence amid the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency
published its annual report last month saying that Russia is counting on the COVID-19
pandemic to weaken unity in the West, which would help Moscow gain a more prominent role
in international affairs and allegedly lead to declining Western influence on the global stage.

Warrant: cyber-attacks attempt to spread disinformation during pandemic

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Linas Kojala, 5-28-2020, "Baltic Security: The Same Challenges Remain, Even During a
Pandemic," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/baltic-security-the-same-challenges-remain-even-
during-a-pandemic/

Fighting disinformation attacks remains a crucial aspect of Baltic security. For example, in late
April, Lithuanian National Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis, Lithuanian media outlets,
state institutions, and addressees at the NATO headquarters in Brussels received a falsified
email from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announcing an alleged decision to
withdraw NATO troops from Lithuania. In other instances, fake news was spread about a U.S.
soldier allegedly infected with the coronavirus in Lithuania, and the allegedly expressed
intention of the Ministry of National Defense not to halt international military exercises. In late
May, some Russian-backed media outlets in Baltic and Eastern European countries reported
false information that the Canadian-led NATO battle group in Latvia had “a high number” of
cases of the deadly virus. These instances fit into a pattern of previous attempts seeking to
discredit NATO in the eyes of the Baltic citizens, as well as seeding doubt about the Baltic
countries’ full-fledged membership in the alliance.

Impact: The Baltics are vital for NATO’s cyber security efforts

Kenneth Geers, August 2020, “Alliance Power for Cyber Security,” The Atlantic Council,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Alliance-Power-for-
Cybersecurity_Geers.pdf

No fewer than twenty-five nations now staff the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia, which publishes a free library of cybersecurity
research, holds the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), and manages
the world’s largest cyber defense exercise “Locked Shields.”62 Small nations can punch well
above their weight in the asymmetric world of IT. Elsewhere in the Baltics, Latvia has built the

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NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence,63 and Lithuania has created the
region’s newest showpiece, the National Cyber Security Centre, where all practical aspects of
cyber defense are housed under one roof, including research and development, analysis, and
incident response.64 The Centre manufactures its own secure hardware on-site and is working
to incorporate securely developed software into critical cyber infrastructure such as systems
involved in elections in Lithuania.6

Analysis: While it’s true that the majority of attacks the Baltics are facing are in cyberspace, their
advanced technology is still not enough to stop the Russian threat. Inevitably, NATO will need to offer
support as Russia continues to push forward with its cyberoffensive.

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CON: Syrian Peace Process

Argument: Russia is diversifying their economy, but will be forced to militarize

Claim: The Syrian Peace Process is succeeding right now because of Russia

David A., Atlantic Council, 4-15-2020 ["Idlib ceasefire is holding and could open door to
long-term Syria solution, US envoy says",
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/idlib-ceasefire-is-holding-
and-could-open-door-to-long-term-syria-solution-us-envoy-says/, 8-17-2021]
Srikar T. S.

The ceasefire negotiated between Russia and Turkey to halt fighting in the Syrian
province of Idlib appears to be holding, US Special Representative for Syria Engagement
and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey
said on April 30. “We have heard from many sources, even many Russian [ones], that
there is a general feeling that this ceasefire is living up to expectations,” according to
Jeffrey, who spoke at an Atlantic Council event moderated by Atlantic Council IN
TURKEY Director Defne Sadıklar Arslan and Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center and
Middle East Programs Director William F. Wechsler. “Attacks by various terrorist
elements out of Idlib are at an all-time low and that there is a good chance the
ceasefire will hold,” Jeffrey said. The ceasefire followed months of fighting between
Turkish-backed rebel forces and the army of Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia, in the
last significant territory in Syria outside of Assad’s grip. Turkish forces had prevented the
assault of the last rebel strongholds in the province, which Jeffrey argued would have
led to “a humanitarian disaster.” The United States, he said, is “delighted that the
Syrian army and its Russian and Iranian allies were halted [in Idlib] by action by the
Turkish military and that there is now a Russian-Turkish ceasefire.” Jeffrey also
acknowledged that “Turkish forces are keeping various terrorist groups, notably Hay’at

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Tahrir al-Sham, under control as part of the original ceasefire agreement from
September 2018.” Ambassador Ibrahim Kalin, Turkish presidential spokesperson,
ambassador, chief adviser, and deputy chairman of the Security and Foreign Policy
Council of the Turkish Presidency, agreed that the ceasefire appears to be holding for
now. “Turkish and Russian militaries have been having their regular patrols there…and it
seems to be holding,” he explained. He warned, however, that the Assad regime has
never been in favor of the pause in fighting and “we know that they will do everything in
their capacity to undermine it.” The tentative success of the ceasefire means that
attention can hopefully now turn to “a political settlement of the conflict under
[United Nations] resolution 2254,” Jeffrey suggested. He reported that the United
States remains committed to making progress on a resolution to the civil war, which
must focus on the work of the Constitutional Committee, which will bring “a new
constitution and eventual new elections under the United Nations,” according to
Jeffrey. He said that there has been some progress on this issue, as “the Russians were
helpful…in pressuring Assad to negotiate.” Jeffrey argued that while the international
community has spent years trying to come up with a political settlement to the conflict,
“we think the ceasefire in Idlib, the encouraging—if small steps—for the Constitutional
Committee, as well as the bad situation the Assad regime has found itself in
economically in terms of its reputation, leaves the door a bit more open for success in
these discussions.” Kalin agreed that “the political process needs to advance” and that
“we have to keep this on our agenda all the time. We can have free and fair elections in
Syria if the Constitutional Committee is allowed to do its work.”

Warrant: Putting troops in the Baltics would undermine the Syrian Peace Process

Kiesewetter, R., Zielke, I, European View, 4-20-2016 ["Permanent NATO deployment is

not the answer to European security",
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12290-016-0392-8, 8-14-2021] Srikar
T. S.

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In the short term, a permanent NATO deployment could undermine US–Russian efforts
to find common solutions in Syria without significantly enhancing the safety of the
Baltic states. In contrast, a rapprochement between the US and Russia on the internal
peace process in Syria might spill over into a more stable bilateral relationship between
Iran and Saudi Arabia, thereby making the broader region more peaceful. The decision
to permanently deploy significant military infrastructure in the Baltics and Poland
would unnecessarily jeopardise the Syrian peace process and the medium-term
cohesiveness of the transatlantic alliance, without adding much to the security of
NATO’s Eastern European allies.

Warrant: Russia is uniquely key

Kiesewetter, R., Zielke, I, European View, 4-20-2016 ["Permanent NATO deployment is

not the answer to European security",
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12290-016-0392-8, 8-14-2021] Srikar
T. S.

In addition to setting the wrong priorities, the abrogation of the NATO–Russia Council
pledges could undermine stabilisation efforts in the Middle East. Whilst it would be
wrong to neglect the fate of Ukraine, in the face of the severe challenges to NATO’s
coherence in the Turkish–Russian conflict over Syria and the migration crisis, solutions
to the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars are only possible if the West pursues cooperation with
Russia. As Anatol Lieven (2015) has recognised, an increasing number of US intelligence
and policymakers has realised that Washington and NATO would benefit from
cooperation with Moscow and other states in order to restructure Iraq and Syria by
implementing autonomous Sunni regions in Eastern Syria and Northern Iraq, as well as a
Kurdish area in Northern Iraq. Russian participation in Europe’s Middle East strategy is
essential for two reasons: first, because Russia has a highly effective air force based in

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Syria, no political solution can be reached without Moscow’s agreement. Second,

because Iran’s agreement to any settlement in Syria will also be essential, Russia’s
influence in Tehran will be necessary to its achievement (Lieven 2015).Preventing a
further deterioration in the bilateral relationship will only be possible if Germany and
the EU as a whole preserve diplomatic and economic ties with both the long-standing
NATO ally Turkey, as well as Russia. Whilst a NATO–Russian rapprochement on Syria
might play to Russia’s desire to make up for its failures in Ukraine (Lukyanov 2016), a
confrontation with Russia over the permanent deployment of NATO infrastructure in
Eastern Europe would unnecessarily undermine diplomatic opportunities that could
emerge when dealing with the Turkish–Russian conflict.

Impact: Even if the peace process doesn’t result in more negotiations, undermining squo
progress risks 1 million lives

United States Mission To The United Nations, 1-29-2020 ["Remarks at a UN Security

Council Briefing on the Humanitarian Situation in Syria",
https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-briefing-on-the-
humanitarian-situation-in-syria-24/, 8-1-2021] Srikar T. S.

Russia has denied principled humanitarian aid for those in need throughout Syria for
over eight years. Now, with China blindly following its lead, Russia has escalated its
campaign to restrict humanitarian access in Syria through a cynical and politicized effort
to undermine the cross-border resolution. The step taken by Russia and China on
January 10 to drastically reduce aid delivery is part of a clear strategy to completely
sever the cross-border lifeline on which four million people rely. We cannot let that
happen. This Council must work with, not against, humanitarian partners on the most
important task at hand – ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches the millions of
civilians in need across Syria, including in the northeast, where more than one million
lives hang in the balance.

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Analysis: This argument takes the debate away from the stock Russia Invasion scenario, and
thus can be strategic to not have to engage in the messy uniqueness debate of whether Russia
will invade the Baltics or not. There is also probably a lot of precedent for Russia reacting to
western aggression with riling up proxy conflicts.

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CON: Oil Shocks

Argument: Russia will cut off oil

Warrant: Russia uses oil to control the Baltics since they are dependent

Hamish Cruickshank, Human Security Centre, 11-20-2020 ["Hard and Soft Power: An
Analysis of Russian Influence in the Baltic States",
http://www.hscentre.org/uncategorized/hard-and-soft-power-an-analysis-of-
russian-influence-in-the-baltic-states/, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

Moscow’s use of hard power in the Baltics has been most visible in the energy sector.
A 2012 study found that all three states were around 90% dependent on Russian oil
and nearly 100% dependent on Russian gas. Soviet-era energy infrastructure
combined with a lack of domestic natural resources meant that the Baltics were
forced to turn to their Eastern neighbour for oil and gas, and Moscow has often taken
advantage of this situation. Oil sanctions,[and] energy disruptions and the dissuasion
of foreign firms from collaborating with Baltic energy projects have all
been utilised to further Russian interests in the region. For example, in 2006 Russia
halted oil supplies to the Lithuanian oil refinery Mažeiku Nafta (MN) in response to
the Lithuanian Government’s decision to transfer ownership of the refinery to
Poland’s PKN Orlen in May 2006 instead of to the Kremlin-linked Lukoil. Another
example came in 2007, when the Government in Tallinn voted in favour of relocating a
Soviet memorial from the city centre to a military cemetery on the city’s outskirts. The
memorial represented Soviet glory for Moscow and was a stark reminder of the Soviet
occupation for Estonia. The move was met by Russia halting rail deliveries of crude oil
and gasoline. The oil embargo was also accompanied by riots in Tallinn involving
roughly 1,500 local Russians that were widely believed to have been organised by
Moscow and cyber-attacks on Estonian Government, financial and media computer

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systems. From 27 April, these ‘distributed denial of service’ attacks disrupted online
banking, wreaked havoc with governmental communications and prevented media
outlets from delivering the news. Cyber-attacks have become an important foreign
policy instrument of the Kremlin in the 21st century and the Baltic States have
experienced numerous other cyber-attacks believed to have been launched by Russia,
such as in 2015 and 2017. With regards to soft power, Moscow has historically sought to
influence Baltic policy making through a number of different means. For a start, Moscow
has sought to cultivate Kremlin-friendly networks in the Baltics that hold influence in the
political, economic and cultural sectors. Political and business elites have been co-opted
via financial incentives or bribes into furthering Russian interests and influencing the
political process. Emily Ferris contends that Russia maintains a “significant influence in
the Baltic business community, particularly in Latvia and Estonia” and states that
Russian interests dominate the business and banking sectors.

Warrant: Europe is dependent on Russia

Eia, No Publication, 10-31-2017 ["International",

https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/RUS, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

Russia is the world’s largest producer of crude oil (including lease condensate) and the
second-largest producer of dry natural gas. Russia also produces significant amounts of
coal. Russia’s economy is highly dependent on its hydrocarbons, and oil and natural gas
revenues account for more than one-third of the federal budget revenues. Russia is a
major producer and exporter of oil and natural gas. Russia’s economic growth is driven
by energy exports, given its high oil and natural gas production. Oil and natural gas
revenues accounted for 36% of Russia's federal budget revenues in 2016.[1] Russia was
the world’s largest producer of crude oil including lease condensate and the third-
largest producer of petroleum and other liquids (after Saudi Arabia and the United
States) in 2016, with average liquids production of 11.2 million barrels per day (b/d).

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Russia was the second-largest producer of dry natural gas in 2016 (second to the United
States), producing an estimated 21 trillion cubic feet (Tcf). Russia and Europe are
interdependent in terms of energy. Europe is dependent on Russia as a source of supply
for both oil and natural gas. More than one-third of crude oil imports to European
countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in
2016 came from Russia. More than 70% of natural gas imports to those countries also
came from Russia in 2016.[2] Russia is dependent on Europe as a market for its oil and
natural gas and the revenues those exports generate. In 2016, nearly 60% of Russia’s
crude oil exports and more than 75% of Russia’s natural gas exports went to OECD
Europe.[3] Russia was the fourth-largest generator of nuclear power in the world in
2016 and had the fifth-largest installed nuclear capacity. With seven nuclear reactors
under construction, Russia is second to China in terms of number of reactors under
construction as of October 2017.[4] According to the BP Statistical Review, Russia
consumed 26.74 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) of energy in 2016, most of which
was natural gas (52%). Petroleum and coal accounted for 22% and 13% of Russia’s
consumption, respectively (Figure 1).[5]

Warrant: Affirming would cause Russia to manipulate oil in retaliation

Mamdouh Salameh, OilPrice, 8-13-2021 ["How Russia Could Kickstart Another Oil Price
WarHow Russia Could Kickstart Another Oil Price War",
https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Europe/How-Russia-Could-Kickstart-Another-
Oil-Price-War.html, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

At the same time, new sanctions or even a full-out (proxy) confrontation are looming
on the horizon, looking at the tensions at the Russian-Ukrainian border. Putin’s
reactions are straightforward, threatening asymmetric responses to any Western
pressure or military interference in the coming months. Others are wondering if a
possible Russian retaliation could be through blocking oil and gas supplies to Europe

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and and or the U.S. Increased energy supply dependency of the EU and the US
increases Moscow’s geopolitical leverage. This situation has divided the leading
European powers. Germany, for example, is hinting at opening up to Moscow, while
France and the UK are taking the opposite approach.

Impact: Since oil is inelastic, it leads to a shock

Tim Mullaney, CNBC, 07-23-2018 [“Risks are rising that oil prices will cause next
recession”, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/risks-rising-that-oil-prices-will-
cause-next-recession.html, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

In July 2008, even when the Federal Reserve was still betting that it had a handle on the
economy, Warren Buffett warned that “exploding” inflation — whether in the price of
oil or steel — was the biggest risk to the U.S. economy.“Quickly rising oil prices have
been a contributing factor to every recession since World War II,” said Moody’s chief
economist Mark Zandi. Odds of a 2020 U.S. recession have risen to 34 percent, from 28
percent before this year’s spike in crude oil, Moody’s stated in a report.

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CON: Russia Economic Diversification

Argument: Russia is diversifying their economy but that will stop if they are threatened by
NATO

Uniqueness: Right now, Putin is listening to Liberal Technocrats

Tatiana Stanovaya, Carnegie Moscow Center, 11-2-2020 ["Unconsolidated: The Five

Russian Elites Shaping Putin’s Transition",
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81037, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

Members of this tier are the main candidates for moving upward into the circle of
political technocrats. Russia has now officially entered a period of political change. The
Kremlin’s principal goal is to modify the political regime and give it a new lease on life
while preserving the political system and heading off any threat to that system from
a domestic upheaval or Western pressure. As the Kremlin searches for new mechanisms
to safeguard the viability of the system in anticipation of Putin’s departure from the
presidency (and, eventually, from power), the Russian political regime is inevitably
becoming less reliant on one person. The contours of a future configuration of power
are beginning to take shape. In the new political regime, the system is designed to be
more important than the current leader. Yet the system is also riven with many internal
contradictions. From afar, Russia may seem a country with a powerful and consolidated
elite, closely knitted around its leader, Vladimir Putin. In reality, the Russian elite is
becoming increasingly fragmented and conflict-ridden. The conflicts are arising not
only over issues of influence or ownership; they are ideological in nature, too. That
presents a very serious challenge for Putin, who has led his regime into a situation in
which the most vocal and active section of the elite has turned out to be more radical
than he himself is. This lack of unity and growing fragmentation within the elite mean
that virtually no lasting coalitions can be formed. Instead, each player acts according to

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their own corporate or political priorities. If one examines the five key tiers that make
up Putin’s elite, it is clear that only one of them—the protectors—is taking on the role of
the main internal irritant, and a source of systemic and ideological conflicts. This is
something the power vertical has not seen on this scale since 1993, during the period of
the standoff between President Boris Yeltsin and his parliament, the Supreme Soviet,
which ended in bloodshed. The protectors are a category whose rise and ideological
domination is a matter of concern to almost all of the other influential groups, whether
they be Putin’s longtime associates such as Sergei Chemezov, the head of Rostec, or the
linchpins of state policy, such as former president and prime minister Dmitry Medvedev
(who will now hold a newly created position as Deputy Chairman of the Security
Council) and head of the central bank Elvira Nabiullina. The inter-elite schism is forming
along one main dividing line: between the increasingly technocratic civilian section of
the elite—i.e., those who are forced to remain politically neutral but who continue to
be responsible for the country’s modernization—and the conservative, anti-Western
“protectors” who occupy the vacuum left by the hollowing-out of public politics. It is an
escalation of the disagreements over conservation versus progress, repression versus
liberalization, pressure versus dialogue, and aggression versus reconciliation. The
regime will have to deal with these conflicts during the implementation of any scenario
for the transition of power. Regardless of whether Putin remains the key player
even after 2024 or allows a handpicked successor to actually rule the country, a
deepening of this schism is unavoidable. In the meantime, the actions of the leadership
are becoming less coordinated and more disjointed. The foreign policy backdrop will
continue to play an important role that heavily influences domestic policy changes in
Russia. The more confrontational the external environment and the more intransigent
the positions the regime takes with regard to the West, the more political advantages
the protectors will receive, along with the moral justification to demand a tightening of
the screws and an unceasing battle against both foreign and domestic threats. At the
same time, there is little hope today of a domestic thaw, even in the event of a
hypothetical improvement of relations with the West. Any decrease in the much-hyped

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foreign threat is unlikely to be able to stop the momentum of continuing conservatism

and state repression. It might slow that process down, but cannot halt it altogether. As
the 2020s begin, Russia is entering a phase in which only some kind of domestic crisis
can break the accumulated impact of political inertia. This could be provoked
by serious blunders by the authorities, a major failure to address some huge national
problem, or a breaking point when the estrangement of the authorities from society
becomes so great that the bulk of the population refuses to keep faith with the
existing system. It is precisely this domestic dynamic that can eventually lead to the
formation of a non-Putin elite, which would at first be amorphous, but could gradually
become more clearly defined. The core of this alternative elite would most likely be
composed of the same class of technocratic modernizers, who would both have
experience and be disillusioned by their service to the Putin regime.

Warrant: Nationalists accuse putin and gain power of being soft which could escalate

George Beebe, St. Martin's Publishing Group, Sep 3, 2019 [“The Russia Trap: How Our
Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Nuclear
Catastrophe”,https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Russia_Trap.html?id=
bo5xDwAAQBAJ] Srikar T. S

The Russian response does not prove nearly as restrained. Since the presidential
election of 2012, Russian president Putin has had to contend with growing Communist
and nationalist movements on his political right flank. They accuse Putin of not doing
enough to defend Russian interests with military force and complain that he naïvely
seeks compromise with the West when he should instead be taking aggressive
measures to roll back NATO influence in Russia’s legitimate sphere of interest.
According to one particularly popular Communist critique, Putin has failed to protect the
predominantly Russian-speaking people of Donbass from what is portrayed as a
Ukrainian ethnic-cleansing campaign.15 The Communists charge, with overwhelming

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popular support, that this killing of a priest demonstrates the need to act immediately
and decisively to protect Russian compatriots in Ukraine. They use this opportunity to
again demand formal Russian recognition of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and
the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), something that they have sought since 2015. Putin
has to this point resisted calls for open and direct Russian military involvement in
Donbass, a move that would invite serious international repercussions. But doing
nothing in the face of the Ukrainian religious violence would play into the hands of his
de tractors, whose hawkish calls to action reflect the country’s mood better than Putin’s
caution. Actively preventing Russian mercenaries from defending their co-religionists
would be seen as an act of betrayal. The Kremlin settles for a response that stops just
short of recognizing the Donbass: Russian emergency ministry units, supported by the
Russian national guard, will cross into Donbass to establish a safe zone around the
Luhansk area, replete with field hospitals to treat Ukrainians wounded over the course
of the civil conflict. Kiev calls this move not merely an invasion but an act of war, and it
appeals to Washington for immediate military aid. Poland supports this call and offers to
host additional American military forces to respond to Russia’s aggression. With
Congress and influential segments of American public opinion demanding a forceful
response, the White House has neither the political capital nor the diplomatic tools to
de-escalate with Moscow. American tactical missile defense systems, air assets,
artillery, and heavy armor pour into western Poland over the next several weeks. The US
president announces that he has ordered US military personnel that had been rotating
through Poland on temporary assignments to be increased in number and stationed
along the border with Ukraine, ready for action should Russian military forces move
toward the western portions of Ukraine. He explains that this show of force is not to
help Kiev retake Donbass but to be ready to defend the rest of Ukraine against Russia.
Moscow views the US announcement with alarm. Despite Washington’s denials, Russian
military leaders conclude that Washington and Kiev are preparing for joint military
action against Donbass. From here, both sides become constrained by an increasingly
narrow field of policy options. Moscow officially recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as

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independent of Ukraine in a desperate last bid to deter what it sees as an imminent

invasion. To protect what it has now acknowledged as two sovereign states, Russia
establishes and enforces a no-fly zone across Donbass while stationing military forces
across the border from Kiev-controlled territory. The United States, in turn, has no
choice but to support a Ukrainian military buildup on the other side of the Donbass
border, putting the two sides within a hair’s breadth of kinetic conflict. A single shot
across the unofficial border serves as the spark to war. It was not ordered in Moscow,
Kiev, or Washington, however. Rather, it comes from the many “volunteer” forces active
in and around the Donbass region, including the Kuban Cossack Host, which had long
threatened to “come to the defense of our homeland and mother church” in response
to acts of persecution against Russian Orthodox believers, and from ultranationalist
paramilitary groups within Right Sector that had long been convinced that the Ukrainian
government is unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to retake Donetsk and
Luhansk. As limited conventional skirmishing between Russian and Ukrainian forces
begins, the United States does its best to avoid being drawn directly into the fighting,
providing intelligence, arms, and advice to Ukrainian forces while keeping its own forces
far from the line of contact, ready to defend against a Russian offensive. But a
Ukrainian-operated antiaircraft unit shoots down a Russian fighter plane on combat air
patrol over the Donbass, and Russian aircraft and artillery retaliate against several sites
where US advisers were assisting Ukrainians, killing four American military personnel. A
direct US-Russian military conflict starts climbing the ladder of escalation.

Warrant: US Involvement would uniquely grow support for the Siloviki who are the hardliners
in Putin’s inner circle

Sean T., National Interest, 8-2-2018 ["NATO 'Encirclement' May Be Creating a New Crisis
with Russia", https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/nato-encirclement-may-
be-creating-new-crisis-russia-27617, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

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American meddling is sure to only reinforce the worldview held by Patrushev, Putin,
and the other siloviki, and the way that information flows through Putin’s
administration can do nothing but fan the flames of the new cold war. According to
The New Tsar, written by former New York Times correspondent Steven Lee
Meyers, Putin’s office computer reportedly lacks an Internet connection, a purposeful
design so that he can solicit information from only his most trusted advisers, many
of whom are siloviki. Putin has even come to favor certain security officials over others.
According to Mark Galeotti, he has politically isolated the SVR and military intelligence,
ensuring his primary flow of information comes from the Federal Security
Service (FSB), the agency he (and Patrushev) once headed and many of whose members
share the view that the West is trying to encircle and bring down Russia.

Empiric: Hardliners get emboldened like they did in 2014

Kimberly Martin, International Politics, 4-16-2020 ["NATO enlargement: evaluating its

consequences in Russia", https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057%2Fs41311-
020-00233-9, 8-18-2021] Srikar T. S.

What impact has NATO’s post-Cold War geographic enlargement had on Russia and
Russia’s policies toward the West? One prominent view among both US analysts and the
general public is that NATO expansion threatened Russia and caused it to turn against
the West. Cold War diplomat George F. Kennan famously called NATO enlargement ‘the
most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold-War era’ (1997), predicting
that it would mark ‘the beginning of a new Cold War,’ where ‘the Russians will gradually
react quite adversely’ (Friedman 1998). His concerns were echoed, with a more subtle
and deeper causal argument, in an open letter to US President Bill Clinton by the so-
called Eisenhower Group, 40 prominent academics and former diplomats and security
ofcials led by Susan Eisenhower. The letter argued in part that NATO enlargement

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would ‘strengthen the nondemocratic opposition [in Russia], undercut those who
favor[ed] reform and cooperation with the West, [and] bring the Russians to question
the entire post-Cold War settlement’ (‘Opposition to NATO Expansion’ 1997). Henry
Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft expressed similar sentiments independently at that time
(Winter 1997). More recently, prominent analysts including John J. Mearsheimer,
Stephen M. Walt, and Stephen F. Cohen have argued that these predictions more or
less came true, pinning Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia and occupation of the disputed
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, along with the 2014 seizure of Crimea and
military intervention into eastern Ukraine, on fears of further NATO expansion
(Mearsheimer 2014a, b; Walt 2014; Cohen 2017).

Warrant: Liberal technocrats will diversify the economy

Bryan Frederick, RAND, xx-xx-2017 ["Assessing Russian Reactions to U.S. and NATO
Posture ",
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR18
79/RAND_RR1879.pdf, 8-19-2021] Srikar T. S.

Liberal technocrats are most concerned about economic and structural reforms of the
Russian government. Most liberal technocrats, notably Aleksei Kudrin, view the
dramatic increase in defense and security spending as being detrimental to the
Russian economy, which many liberals feel is underdeveloped and lacks
diversification. Although any Russian government would likely continue to oppose
such actions as further NATO expansion, the liberal technocrats would be more likely
than the siloviki to seek improved political and economic ties with the West.

Warrant: Russia is diversifying now

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Dominique Fruchter, COFACE Economic Publications, 10-3-2019 ["The "Made in Russia"

strategy: a limited instrument for economic diversification",
https://www.coface.com/News-Publications/News/The-Made-in-Russia-
strategy-a-limited-instrument-for-economic-diversification, 8-19-2021] Srikar T.
S.

In an effort to accelerate the diversification of its economy following Western sanctions

linked to the annexation of Crimea, Russia has implemented a series of mechanisms to
reduce its dependence on imports and hydrocarbons. But the willingness to substitute
local production for imports depends on many factors, not all of which are present.
Special investment contracts to encourage foreign investment, selective tax cuts for
"Made in Russia" products, privileged access to public procurement – there are many
initiatives to help companies change scale. Aiming to promote modernisation,
technology, and innovation, a number of incentive schemes (special economic zones,
public funding, bringing research and industry closer together, export support, etc.) have
been embodied in the creation of the Russian Export Centre. More mainly concerned
with this attempt to promote local production, agri-food, pharmaceutical, automotive
and the information technology sectors are already enjoying their own regulations
and promotion mechanisms. The most significant results have been achieved in the
agri-food sector, with an embargo imposed on agri-food imports from countries that
have imposed sanctions on Russia. The subsequent shortages have led to higher prices,
which has diverted Russian consumers from imported to locally-produced products,
leading to a significant increase in food production. This has allowed Russia to achieve
self-sufficiency for its meat production. Nevertheless, the lower quality of certain local
products in some cases supports imports, despite the price difference. For the ICT
sector, the public sector is now prohibited from importing computer,
telecommunications and household equipment where there are local producers offering
the same goods. At the same time, the authorities are seeking to expand electronic
component production to match the Western embargo on the sale of technologies for

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the energy, intelligence and defence sectors – but the return remains modest. The same
desire to reduce import dependency is evident in the pharmaceutical sector, with tax
incentives to produce locally and benefits for local products in public markets. Foreign
industrialists that sign a special investment contract with Russian authorities can also
benefit from an exclusivity with the state. But here again, the stated objectives are far
from being achieved. Finally, in the automotive sector, special investment contracts
with foreign manufacturers provide tax incentives, privileged access to public
procurement, and protection against future tax developments in exchange for
commitments to produce locally and promote innovation. But if Opel announces its
return to the Russian market, Ford will close its factories there. The market for
commercial vehicles and trucks is more dynamic and attractive.

Analysis: This argument is strategic as it solves for much of the AFF arguments about relations
as liberal control over Russia would repair relations.

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CON: Detracts from more important areas

Argument: Russia is a declining power with a second tier economy. NATO must spend more
time and energy on new and emerging threats.

Warrant: Russia sees NATO differently than the US

Robin Emott. “NATO must focus more on challenge of rising China, report to say.”
December 2019. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-diplomacy-
future-idUKKBN28A1TB

“NATO must think harder about how to handle China and its military rise, though
Russia will remain its main adversary during this decade, according to a report to be
published on Tuesday on reforming the Atlantic alliance. The report “NATO 2030”,
prepared by a group of so-called ‘wise persons’ and containing 138 proposals, comes
amid growing doubts about the purpose and relevance of an alliance branded last year
by French President Emmanuel Macron as “brain dead”. “China is no longer the benign
trading partner that the West had hoped for. It is the rising power of our century and
NATO must adapt,” said one NATO diplomat who has seen the report, pointing to
Chinese activity in the Arctic and Africa and to its heavy investments in European
infrastructure.”

Warrant: China poses new and difficult challenges to NATO

Robin Emott. “NATO must focus more on challenge of rising China, report to say.”
December 2019. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-diplomacy-
future-idUKKBN28A1TB

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“Part of NATO’s response should be maintaining a technological advantage over

China, protecting computer networks and infrastructure, the diplomat said, citing the
report, although not all recommendations will be adopted. The 30-member alliance
could also forge closer ties with non-NATO countries such as Australia and focus more
on deterrence in space, where China is developing assets, the report suggests. In
comments on Monday ahead of the report’s publication, NATO Secretary-General Jens
Stoltenberg said China’s rise posed “important challenges to our security”. “China is
investing massively in new weapons. It is coming closer to us, from the Arctic to Africa.
China does not share our values ... and tries to intimidate other countries,” he told a
news conference, urging allies to come together on the issue.”

Warrant: China is developing new weapons systems

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

““NATO is now looking at the ways in which new and emerging technologies will
continue to change the threat landscape, from hypersonic missiles to reducing our
decision-making time in the face of an attack.” Wallace said. This was echoed by the
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg as he discussed the rise of China, after NATO
mentioned the country for the first time in an official declaration. After NATO’s
December summit in Watford near London, Stoltenberg said: “A few weeks ago, they
[China] displayed a new intercontinental ballistic missile, able to reach Europe and
North America. They displayed hypersonic missiles, gliders. They have deployed
hundreds of intermediate- range missiles that would have been violating the INF
Treaty if China had been part of the INF Treaty.”.”

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Warrant: NATO needs to move into new. Non-kinetic domains

Harry Lye. “Defence in a new decade: NATO prepares for new threats” Army
Technology. June 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/defence-in-
a-new-decade-nato-prepares-for-new-threats/

“NATO’s approach to China, however, is not about creating a new foe in a new region.
Instead, it aims to monitor the country more closely and work towards arms control
agreements. As Stoltenberg said at the NATO Engages event the day before the
summit, “this is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it’s about
taking into account that China’s coming closer to us.” The idea that China is moving
closer to the West is echoed by Robert Vass, founder and president of the Globsec
think tank, who told us: “Chinese investments are quite heavy in Europe and are
increasing, they are building the Belt and Road initiative, and it is an economic but
also political project, which is bringing the political influence of China to Europe. We
have to be aware of that. I’m not saying it is good or bad, but we have to be very
much aware of the leverage that has.” Vass added: “Now, we don’t want to create
Chinese walls between our two worlds. It’s not a good answer.” He explained that it is
important to avoid a confrontation with China, although ongoing trade wars could
complicate that..”

Warrant: This new approach requires all of NATO’s attention

Harry Lye. “Defence in a new decade: NATO prepares for new threats” Army
Technology. June 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/defence-in-
a-new-decade-nato-prepares-for-new-threats/

“The US has long challenged NATO allies’ use of Chinese infrastructure and European
nations have long been willing to accept Chinese investment, while decrying the same in

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other continents. Now, however, the alliance seems to have come to a united approach.
Stoltenberg said: “For the first time, we addressed the rise of China – both the
challenges and the opportunities it poses, and the implications for our security.
Leaders agreed we need to address this together as an alliance.”
The “together” is the crux of argument. Wallace, although not specifically on the topic
of China, also pointed out in his speech that a united response to emerging threats is
vital: “We must stand together; no side deals, no separate voices. Our adversaries
strive for that division, they fund that division, and target that division. We will not let
them succeed.”

Analysis: This argument shows that there is a new more dangerous threat on the horizon and
that NATO needs to pivot to stop it. Weigh timeframe by telling your judge that China will only
grow as a threat in the future.

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CON: Increased Commitments Detract from Diplomacy

Argument: Military force is only one tool in the toolbox of national power. Often it trades off
with diplomacy and makes it difficult to accomplish those goals.

Warrant: Russia sees NATO differently than the US

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“In Russia, NATO is generally viewed as part of the American war machine and an
instrument of U.S. global dominance. That view is shared by almost the entire Russian
political spectrum. In fact, the same view also prevails among NATO members from
eastern Europe, where the alliance is seen as an instrument of U.S. influence and U.S.
defense assurances. That is why Russia is utterly baffled by U.S. accusations that the
Kremlin — and President Vladimir Putin specifically — are trying to “drive a wedge
between NATO partners.” No one in Moscow has ever regarded NATO as an
independent entity that exists separately from the United States. There is a deep
conviction in Russia that NATO is nothing more than an instrument of U.S. military
policy, and that Washington will always be able to ram any decision through the NATO
governing bodies, regardless of what its Western European partners might think of
that decision.”

Warrant: NATO is regarded as an anti-Russian ruse

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.

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https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“That explains why any NATO enlargement is automatically regarded in Russia as a

ruse to deploy U.S. forces in close proximity to Russian borders; NATO’s own role in
that ruse is seen as a cover story — nothing more. The ongoing deployment of NATO
forces in eastern Europe with the ostensible purpose of “containing and deterring
Moscow” is seen in Russia as another piece of evidence to confirm that view. These
new deployments are conducted under direct U.S. leadership, and most of the new
forces deployed are American. The military presence of other NATO members in
places such as the Baltic states is insignificant and purely symbolic. Washington and
NATO describe these deployments as a “clear signal to Moscow.” In Moscow itself,
that signal is read as clear evidence that all the Russian criticisms and concerns about
NATO have always been entirely justified, and that the moderate Russian reaction to
NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s was a colossal strategic blunder..”

Warrant: NATO enlargement is seen as a potentially existential threat

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“The West does not realize that Russia views NATO enlargement as a threat of U.S.
forces (potentially including missile systems) deployed ever closer to critical Russian
targets. As a result, Western decision-makers underestimate the strength of the
Russian national consensus on this issue. There is a popular opinion in the West that
Russia opposes NATO only because of President Putin’s personal animus. That opinion is
a gross and primitive misreading of the situation.”

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Warrant: Moving NATO Eastward spurs backlash

Jeremy Bender. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.”
Business Insider. June 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-
explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2

“For Putin, the peeling away of countries from Russia towards NATO comes as both an
existential threat and a personal insult. As a former agent in the KGB and an avowed
nationalist, Putin has dreams of resurrecting the glories of Imperial Russia — a goal
that is seriously hampered by the inclusion of what Putin would deem rightful Russian
lands, such as the Baltics, into the NATO alliance. With this in mind, it is easy to see
why Putin signed off on Russia's new military doctrine in December 2014. The doctrine,
which placed explicit focus on NATO being Moscow's main existential enemy and threat,
called on the further militarization of three geopolitical frontlines: the Russian Baltic Sea
exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland, the annexed Crimean peninsula, and the Arctic.”

Warrant: For example, Russia saw Ukraine’s movement towards the West as unacceptable

Jeremy Bender. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.”
Business Insider. June 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-
explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2

“Putin almost certainly saw the uprising in Ukraine — during which the country's pro-
Russian leadership was replaced in favor of a more western-friendly one in the
beginning of 2014 — as the last straw. The subsequent annexation of Crimea and the
backing of separatists in the east served to delay Ukraine's eventual pivot towards the
European Union and NATO. "Expanding NATO further into post-Soviet space is a red
line with Russia, and the US is frankly not in a position to challenge it without running a

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huge risk," Greg Scoblete of RealClearWorld told Forbes. "Put bluntly, Russia will be able
to invade eastern Ukraine faster than the West could admit Ukraine into NATO to deter
Russian aggression." Indeed, Ukraine called for full integration into NATO in August
2014 once Russian armaments began to freely enter into the country. But NATO has
steep membership requirements and there's no current timetable for admitting
Ukraine into the alliance.”

Analysis: This argument shows that there are real tradeoffs between diplomatic conflict
resolution and military force. We should be skeptical of methods which leave military power as
the only ways of resolving disputes.

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CON: Wasteful Use of Resources

Argument: Spending more money on NATO commitments is wasteful and unnecessary, causing
economic problems.

Warrant: NATO is an anachronism

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

“NATO was created in 1949 for the three main reasons outlined above. These reasons
are no longer valid. The security landscape in Europe is totally different today than
seventy years ago. Russian president Vladimir Putin actually proposed a new
continental security arrangement “from Dublin to Vladivostok,” which was rejected
out of hand by the West. If accepted, then it would have included Russia in a
cooperative security architecture that would have been safer for the global community.
Two: It is argued by some that the threat of present-day Russia is why America needs
to stay in Europe. But consider this: The economy of the EU was $18.8 trillion before
Brexit, and it is $16.6 Trillion after Brexit. In comparison, the economy of Russia is only
$1.6 trillion today. With an EU economy more than ten times the economy of Russia,
do we believe that Europe cannot afford its own defense against Russia? It is
important to note that the UK will surely stay in a Euro defense alliance and will very
likely continue to contribute to that defense.”

Warrant: NATO is not a useful construct

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

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“The only time a NATO member has invoked Article 5 (the “attack on one is attack on
all” clause) was the United States after the terrorist attack of Sept 11, 2001. The real
enemy was not another nation but the common threat of terrorism. Russia has
consistently advanced this reason for cooperation—indeed Russia provided invaluable
logistical intelligence and base support for the post–9/11 Afghan engagement.
Coronavirus has dramatized another grave concern: that of terrorists possessing and
using biological weapons. This cannot be underestimated in the climate in which we
now live. Five: When Russia has a potential enemy on its border, as with 2020 NATO
military exercises, Russia will be more compelled to veer toward autocracy and the
weakening of democracy. When citizens feel threatened, they want leadership that is
strong and affords them protection.”

Warrant: NATO commitments generate existential risks

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

“Along with climate change, the greatest existential threat is that of a nuclear
holocaust—this sword of Damocles still hangs over all of us. With NATO having bases
in twenty-nine countries, many along Russia’s borders, some within artillery range of
St. Petersburg, we run the risk of a nuclear war that could destroy humankind. The risk
of accidental or “false alarm” was documented on several occasions during the Cold
War and is even more frightful now, given the Mach 5 speed of today’s missiles”

Warrant: Continued NATO presences only destabilize the region

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

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“Ultimately the alliance decided to expand its membership, even though the enemy
had disappeared. Doing so violated multiple assurances given to Moscow. NATO also
initiated “out-of-area” activities, which meant defending other than member states.
This ironically turned the pact into an offensive instrument, first used to dismember
Serbia in 1999. In essence, NATO had gone from a means to an end, with war the new
means. Said Sen. Richard Lugar, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the organization would “go out of area or out of business.” And, as public
choice economists would predict, no one involved in the alliance wanted the latter.”

Warrant: NATO brings increasing costs and diminishing benefits

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“The Soviet Union’s collapse triggered European disarmament, which in turn

intensified American demands for greater burden-sharing, which the Europeans
continued to ignore. The process continued for years, demonstrating, perversely, that
the less Europe did the more America would. Hence the bizarrely named “European
Reassurance Initiative” after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine: the Europeans were
essentially promised that even if they did nothing Washington would remain at their
side—though whining all the way. U.S. policymakers appeared to accept the need to
subsidize the Europeans in order to keep them dependent. Washington opposed any
proposals for independent spending and action, preferring that Europe do more, but
only under America’s direction. The alliance continued to add members. Most recently
it accepted Montenegro, with North Macedonia awaiting treaty approval by the 29
current members. Next up, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, featured in the novel The
Mouse that Roared!.”

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Analysis: This argument says that NATO is generally not effective at meeting its policy goals.
Use it as a big picture analysis for why policies like the affirmative are misguided.

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CON: Increase Russian Aggression

Argument: Bringing troops closer to the Russian border is needlessly provocative and could
generate conflict

Warrant: Russia has always hated NATO’s eastward expansion

John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in
Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified
Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow
any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The
Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began
pushing for NATO to expand. The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and
brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it
included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow
complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the
Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of
what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ...
The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were
too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not
look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save
for the tiny Baltic countries..”

Warrant: Pushing forces eastward spurs backlash

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John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was
no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and
their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO
to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy
because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed
expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a
one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that
enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe.
The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview,
shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the
Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I
think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was
threatening anyone else.”.”

Warrant: The Benefits of NATO expansion are unclear

“The Debate Over NATO Expansion.” Arms Control Association. June 1997.
vhttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-09/features/debate-over-nato-
expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key

“The administration admits NATO faces "no imminent threat of attack" [emphasis
added], and claims a larger NATO will be "better able to prevent conflict from arising
in the first place" and better able to address "rogue states, the poisoned appeal of
extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds," such as Bosnia. The
administration does not explain how NATO might actually accomplish this. Would a

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larger NATO have prevented Bosnia or Chechnya or Nagorno Karabakh? Does the
administration mean that, at a time when we are wavering in our commitment to the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the United States would be more willing to lead a
larger NATO into additional peacekeeping activities? The Bosnia experience suggests
that expanding NATO will not affect the willingness or reluctance of national capitals to
deal with "ethnic, racial and religious" problems. The administration argues that
expansion "will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe
that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and long range delivery systems." NATO expansion is irrelevant to the spread of
WMD and ballistic missiles outside of Europe, whereas cooperation with Russia on such
issues as arms control, arms sales and dealings with "rogue" states is clearly critical..”

Warrant: Eastward deployment triggers a Russian response and undermines pro-western

elements

“The Debate Over NATO Expansion.” Arms Control Association. June 1997.
vhttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-09/features/debate-over-nato-
expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key

“The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility
that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although
we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our
policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia
Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of
democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut
Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's
nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult.
The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by
the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in

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Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in
dispute. The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the
historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line."
[Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending
democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that
organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but
is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next
decade.”

Analysis: This argument shows that the taproot of Russian aggression is NATO presence in
Eastern Europe. Deploying more forces to the Baltics would only make things worse.

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CON: Decrease readiness

Argument: non-NATO methods are able to better defend the Baltics

Warrant: The U.S. directly helping the Baltics works better, improves readiness

Cameron Mccord, 11-12-2018, "Russia’s Baltic Cyber Campaign Leaves NATO

Endangered," Charged Affairs, https://chargedaffairs.org/russias-baltic-cyber-
campaign-leaves-nato-endangered/

The United States also has a role to play in assisting its Baltic allies in cyber defense.
The most effective means will not be through new, high-level NATO engagements, but
rather through proven, existing channels for targeted assistance like the State
Partnership Program (SPP). Started in 1993 as a mechanism for linking U.S. National
Guard programs to former Soviet Union countries, the SPP has transferred U.S. military
and technological expertise to countries around the world. Indeed, one of the more
successful partnerships on cybersecurity has been between Estonia and the Maryland
National Guard. Partnerships with Latvia and Lithuania, taking the Estonia one as a
model, would benefit both the Baltics and the United States, since the cyber tactics
that Russia perfects in the Baltics are applied elsewhere, including, it is suspected, in
Russian sponsored cyber attacks of U.S. infrastructure as early as 2016. The SPP allows
the United States to gain insights from allies to help grow collective cyber defensive
capabilities. The mechanisms to improve the Baltic region’s cyber vulnerability are
already in place among NATO member states, ready to be used.

Warrant: through bilateral defensive agreements, the U.S. helps the Baltics

Derek E. Mix “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations”, CRS,
January 2, 2020.

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https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200102_R46139_b58c10db8e0a8f4764
76c93a09edbf8fabb5b1fb.pdf

The United States and the Baltic states cooperate closely on defense and security
issues. New bilateral defense agreements signed in spring 2019 focus security
cooperation on improving capabilities in areas such as maritime domain awareness,
intelligence sharing, surveillance, and cybersecurity. The United States provides
significant security assistance to the Baltic states; the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) increased and extended U.S. assistance for
building interoperability and capacity to deter and resist aggression. Under the U.S.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014, the United States has bolstered
its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of the associated Operation
Atlantic Resolve, rotational U.S. forces have conducted various training activities and
exercises in the Baltic states.

Warrant: NATO lacks the cohesion and resources to bolster Baltic Cyber- should utilize existing
means

Cameron Mccord, 11-12-2018, "Russia’s Baltic Cyber Campaign Leaves NATO

Endangered," Charged Affairs, https://chargedaffairs.org/russias-baltic-cyber-
campaign-leaves-nato-endangered/

Of all social-media posts in Latvia that mentioned NATO, an estimated 53% are from
Russian-language bots, intended to carry messages that “NATO is a threat to Russia.”
The final Baltic country of Lithuania falls in between Estonia and Latvia on the spectrum
of defensive cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities. A commonly suggested solution is
that NATO, collectively, should invest more in cyber defense and offer support to the
lacking Baltic region. But in a resource-constrained world, this solution is economically
unrealistic, and the planning and agreement for the support would likely take far too

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long, given the urgent threat. Moreover, it risks relying on Estonia’s approval. Estonia,
worried about angering Russia, has been content to merely observe its neighbors as it
builds its own cyber defenses. As a solution, NATO should take advantage of its pre-
existing but underutilized training institutions, accredited as “Centres of Excellence,” to
promote cooperation among the Baltics. These Centres can efficiently share NATO
member-states’ best practices and lessons learned in cyber-preparedness with Baltic
leaders and specialists.

Analysis: Direct support by the United States has proven more successful up to this point;
furthermore, NATO can do little to help on the front lines with regards to cybersecurity.

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CON: Denial of Russian aggression

Argument: Deterrence by Denial Increases chances of conflict

Warrant: Deterrence by Denial causes insecurity

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

Second, instead of preventing deliberate Russian escalation this deterrence-by-denial

approach could, in fact, reinforce Russian perceptions of insecurity. Russia would be loath to
accept a NATO force that size so close to its borders. Moscow might seek to prevent NATO
force deployments through various means, including, not inconceivably, by considering the
preventive use of force (that is, Russia might wage a war because it could only see its position
deteriorating in the future).

Warrant: deterrence by denial stretches NATO members politically and financially

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

First, a deterrence-by-denial approach would risk overstretching the delicate political

consensus among NATO members about conventional deterrence and assurance. A number
of member states, perhaps led by Germany and France, would not support such a policy and
would seek to block it. Even more importantly, perhaps, not even the Baltic states are
supportive of such a maximalist approach. While many Baltic officials and experts would like
to see greater U.S. military engagement in the region, some of them are highly skeptical of
the assumptions underlying the RAND war games and think that they are too pessimistic

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Impact: Deterrence by denial risks nuclear war

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

This risk might become more acute in the early stages of a crisis when Russia could
misinterpret the large-scale movement of sizable forces, such as the 70,000 personnel
reinforcement the RAND study suggested, as NATO preparations for a preemptive attack on
Russia. Third, large-scale conventional deployments could help further solidify Russian
reliance on its nuclear deterrent and could even serve to lower Russia’s threshold for nuclear
use, making the early employment of nuclear weapons more likely.

Analysis: this big impact answer can be swung like a bat at any case revolving around a large
conventional force increase. Making your opponents define early in the round what the size of
the force would be will provide a further link.

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CON: Increased Commitments Create Moral Hazard

Argument: If NATO commits more to the Baltics, members states may become more risk prone
and cause problems for the entire alliance.

Warrant: The base need for long term alliances is in question

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

“U.S. alliances were formed by two goals. One was to balance the power of states
viewed, usually with some exaggeration, as threats to overwhelm local rivals and
become local hegemons threatening to the United States. The other was to integrate
past rivals Germany and Japan into coalitions less threatening to others. The fear of
regional hegemons is significantly diminished today. With an economy smaller than
Italy’s and demography only a tad better than a death spiral, Russia is not able to
restore its Soviet empire. China is investing a steady share of its growing economy in its
military but has little ability, whatever its desire, to overcome East Asia’s defense-
dominant geography by bringing its forces across water or mountains to conquer rich
and technologically proficient rivals. Technological trends are heightening the
advantages afforded the defender in a conflict and should make U.S. rivals more self-
reliant.”

Warrant: NATO increases free-riding

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

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“When making wars or deterring imminent aggression, allies are mostly good to have.
The trouble is making defense commitments permanent. Open-ended security
obligations encourage free-riding and moral hazard among those protected. They also
require the maintenance of excessive U.S. force structure, which wastes money,
encourages needless war, and perpetuates the myth that our security demands global
dominance. Free-riding is the most obvious problem. President Trump’s treatment of
NATO allies has created much Beltway consternation, but the United States has
complained about its NATO allies’ defense spending since the midst of the Cold War,
albeit more politely. The reason these complaints are not heeded, besides limited
threats, is that U.S. defenses undercut European incentives to heighten their own.
Washington’s rhetoric insisting that U.S. alliances are sacrosanct, regardless of
conditions, tells allied leaders that they can safely genuflect to, but essentially ignore,
U.S. demands for bigger military investment. Complaints notwithstanding, free-riding is
largely an intended consequence of U.S. defense strategy. As the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance admitted, protecting allies prevents them from emerging as rivals to U.S.
preeminence. Allies are meant to be useful but infantilized, like little brothers that do
our bidding without too much guff. That thinking explains Washington’s hostility to
independent European military capability—better to have NATO subordinates than a
European superpower that is not dependent.”

Warrant: NATO creates moral hazard

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

“U.S. security guarantees also encourage moral hazard—where a person takes greater
risk because someone else bears the cost. The protection of the world’s preeminent
military can make allies incautious in dealing with rivals. Even non-allies fall prey to
the phenomenon if they think they have something approaching a U.S. security

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guarantee, as occurred with Georgia and Russia in 2008. Using NATO to aid Ukraine
could produce similar results today. Saudi Arabia’s recent adventurism is another
example. Alliances can cause instability among neighbors, via moral hazard, pulling
the United States into wars it unintentionally encouraged. Were allies more concerned
about losing U.S. protection, this problem would be reduced.
A related phenomenon occurs when states that the United States protects abuse their
citizens. Turkey, Hungary, Poland—all NATO allies that have recently backslid away from
liberal values—are examples, along with various Middle-Eastern states. No doubt, these
countries’ rulers would still abuse civil liberties if U.S. protection were less assured, but
the assurance removes an incentive for better behavior.”

Warrant: NATO is akin to a moral hazard generating insurance policy

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“Promises of admission to NATO, even to Ukraine and Georgia, were perceived as low-
cost, since the insurance contracts — that is, the commitment to protect the new
NATO members against a serious Russian attack — would never be exercised. After all,
that scenario assumed a Russia that was strong and bad, and that was impossible.
Now suppose that you are Vladimir Putin and you see the U.S. selling this insurance to
all your neighbors. You do not have to be a genius to see the implications. One
important consequence of any insurance is moral hazard. The insured party takes
greater risks because it has insurance to fall back on. That is exactly what happened in
the case of new NATO members, Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance. Barely
three years after their admission into NATO, the two countries began lobbying to have
American missile defense systems deployed on their soil — a move regarded by many
Russians as a more serious threat to Russia’s security than NATO enlargement itself.”

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Warrant: Moral Hazard generates conflict through perverse incentives and preemption

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“The moral hazard created by NATO expansion clearly made the international system
more fragile. The United States is issuing all of these contingent liabilities, and if you
are Putin, you want to indicate to the U.S. the cost of this. When repeated verbal
protests do not suffice, as they clearly had not throughout the 1990s and then into the
2000s, the message has to be delivered in stronger fashion. Hence, the Georgia
conflict of August 2008. Regardless of who started it, the conflict should have
demonstrated with utmost clarity the cost of those insurance policies that the U.S.
had been selling. The message was not received, however, much like the collapse of
the subprime market should have foretold what was to come in the financial crisis.
What we should have recognized — but few did — in the period between August 1998
and August 2008 was that the unimaginable had occurred. Russia had become strong,
but “bad.” It had become strong again without “becoming like us.”

Analysis: The tragedy of collective security is that great power competition creates perverse
incentives to subvert and preempt such agreements. While good on paper, moral hazard
ensures that NATO will not actually help create stability.

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CON: Deterrence in the Baltics is ineffective

Argument: NATO presence would do little to deter Russia

Warrant: Deterrence benefits are exaggerated

Paul Post. “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter
Aggression.” Texas National Security Review. 2021.
https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-
deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/

“The United States has sometimes sought to achieve deterrence on the cheap through
the deployment of smaller “tripwire” forces. While tripwire forces are too small to shift
significantly the local balance of power, the idea is that such small deployments can still
boost deterrence by increasing the likelihood of American intervention. According to
this approach, the deaths of these troops in the early stages of fighting would compel a
larger military response because, if America’s leaders were to do nothing in response to
those deaths, they would be punished at home and the country would suffer damage to
its international reputation. Thus, tripwire-force deployments boost deterrence by
increasing credibility. However, we argue that the deterrence benefits of tripwire-force
deployments are exaggerated. These forces will not boost deterrence for two related
reasons. First, tripwire deployments do not, in reality, significantly increase the
credibility of the deterrent threat. The deaths of troops in combat will not necessarily
create a strong public motive to intervene in order to seek revenge or protect a
country’s reputation, even given the prospects of broader casualties. Second, even if
the deaths of such troops could create these motives to intervene, potential attackers
could strike anyway in order to achieve a fait accompli and create a strong defensive
position.”

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Warrant: Deterrence requires numerical parity and real fighting strength

Paul Post. “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter
Aggression.” Texas National Security Review. 2021.
https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-
deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/

“In contrast to tripwire forces, the deployment of a larger contingent of troops can
actually boost deterrence success. If forward-deployed forces are sufficient to shift the
local balance of power, potential attackers will be less confident that they can succeed
and less confident that they can achieve a fait accompli before reinforcements arrive.
As a result, potential attackers will be less likely to actually launch an attack. After
presenting these general arguments below, we apply them to three empirical cases.
We demonstrate that North Korea elected not to attack South Korea in 1949 because of
the substantial deployment of U.S. troops to South Korean territory. On the other hand,
the deployment of a small American tripwire force to South Korean territory in 1950
failed to deter a North Korean attack. Finally, we argue that, had Britain deployed a
sufficient body of troops to Belgium before the July 1914 crisis, Germany would have
been deterred from attacking Belgium and escalating the Austrian-Serbian crisis,
permitting World War I to be avoided. "

Answer: Existing forces are sufficient to deter.

Warrant: NATO currently has heavy arms in Baltics

Reuters Staff, 6-14-2015, "U.S. plans to store heavy arms in Baltic, Eastern Europe," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-europe-
idUSKBN0OT0TR20150614

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The United States plans to store heavy military equipment in the Baltics and Eastern
European nations to reassure allies unnerved by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and
to deter further aggression, U.S. officials said. The move would be the first time
Washington has stationed heavy military equipment in the newer NATO member states
that were once in the Soviet sphere of influence or - in the case of the three Baltic
republics - part of the Soviet Union. Though no final decision has been taken, the
Pentagon is poised to store battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other heavy
weapons for as many as 5,000 troops, one U.S. official told Reuters on condition of
anonymity. The official said the proposal envisages storing a company’s worth of
equipment, enough for 150 soldiers, in each of the three Baltic nations: Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia. Enough equipment for a company or possibly a battalion, or about 750
soldiers, would also be located in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Hungary.

Warrant: US forces in Poland can be redeployed to Baltics

Urbelis, Vaidotas. "The New United States Defence Strategy: Consequences for the
Baltic States." Lithuania in the Global Context: National Security And Defence
Policy Dilemmas (2020)
https://vb.lka.lt/object/elaba:68867305/68867305.pdf#page=65

Over the past year, the U.S. has dramatically increased the number of troops deployed
in Europe. In addition to two brigades stationed in Italy and Germany, the U.S. added
artillery and combat aviation units and prepositioned stocks under the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI). In Poland, the U.S. deployed a rotational armoured brigade
combat team, NATO battle group close to the Lithuanian border and prepositioned
heavy brigade set of equipment. These forces form the “iron fist” of the U.S. combat
power in Europe which can be quickly deployed to the Baltic region or anywhere in
Europe. Reactivated V Corps Headquarters would provide a command and control
capability for the European battlefield. The U.S. has also strengthened antisubmarine

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warfare capabilities in the North Atlantic to fight Russian attempts to threaten

reinforcement of Europe by sea.

Analysis: Existing forces can already be mobilized if need be, but in reality the benefits of
adding to that threat are exaggerated. Expanding NATO presence would do little, therefore, to
meaningfully increase deterrence.

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CON: Triggers Russian arms race

Argument: Bringing troops closer to the Russian border is needlessly provocative and could
generate conflict

Warrant: Russia has always hated NATO’s eastward expansion

John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in
Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified
Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow
any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The
Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began
pushing for NATO to expand. The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and
brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it
included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow
complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the
Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of
what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ...
The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were
too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not
look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save
for the tiny Baltic countries..”

Warrant: Pushing forces eastward spurs backlash

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John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was
no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and
their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO
to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy
because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed
expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a
one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that
enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe.
The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview,
shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the
Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I
think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was
threatening anyone else.”.”

Warrant: Eastward deployment triggers a Russian response and undermines pro-western

elements

“The Debate Over NATO Expansion.” Arms Control Association. June 1997.
vhttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-09/features/debate-over-nato-
expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key

“The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility
that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although
we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our
policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia

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Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of
democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut
Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's
nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult.
The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by
the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in
Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in
dispute. The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the
historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line."
[Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending
democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that
organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but
is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next
decade.”

Analysis: If NATO is to expand eastward into the Baltics, this will only further stoke Russian
aggression. Russia will likely feel threatened, and push NATO into an arms race within the
region.

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CON: Increases threat of Russia / China collaboration

Argument: Currently, Russia poses little threat, but aggressive eastward action on behalf of
NATO will lead to collaboration and action from Russia and China.

Warrant: Estonian intelligence says that the threat is low unless Russia needs to prevent an
offensive in the Baltics

Jari Tanner, 2-12-2020, "Estonia: Russia attack not likely but Baltics under threat," AP
NEWS, https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency says the likelihood of a
military attack from neighboring Russia remains low, but that any confrontation
between Russia and the West could quickly turn into “a threat situation for Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Director General Mikk Marran of the Estonian Foreign
Intelligence Service said Wednesday that while Moscow wants to refrain from a
conflict with NATO, it may opt for “a preventive military offensive” in the Baltic region
if it anticipates an escalation of a conflict “even if this occurs in another region”. “The
main security threat for Estonia in the year 2020 is Russia. That threat hasn’t changed as
Russia hasn’t changed,” Marran told reporters during a news conference following
unveiling of the agency’s annual review in Tallinn, the capital of the former Soviet
republic of 1.3 million.

Argument: Expansion leads to cooperation.

Warrant: Alternate Factors stop Sino-Russian cooperation

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Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, 6-17-2021, "Chinese-Russian Defense Cooperation Is More

Flash Than Bang," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/17/chinese-russian-defense-cooperation-is-
more-flash-than-bang-pub-84787

With access to Western technology cut off by sanctions, Russia’s defense industry has been
looking to China as an alternative source of innovation that it cannot develop indigenously.
This trend is likely to continue, with Russia becoming more reliant on Chinese technology for
its weapons development as long as Beijing is willing to sell it. It is telling that all of the
Kremlin’s touted defense cooperation with China has done little to alleviate the major
deficiencies in Russia’s military posture, which include unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic
warfare, and conventional precision strike capabilities. Chinese-Russian defense cooperation
has generated significantly greater gains for China than it has for Russia. Over time, Moscow is
poised to grow more dependent on Beijing as long as its standoff with NATO continues.
Russia’s and China’s adversarial relations with the United States could prompt them to
undertake closer geopolitical coordination in different theaters. But their partnership has its
limits. China has not recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia is highly unlikely to risk
an outright conflict with the United States in the event of a major crisis between Washington
and Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. But Russia could engage in provocative posturing in Europe or
the Middle East, or even in the Pacific, as a demonstration of its geopolitical stature. The
partnership with China is an incalculable force multiplier for Russia—more so than it is for
China. Defense cooperation is an important element of the partnership but not the most
important one. This is not an alliance, Chinese diplomats routinely stress in conversations
about relations with Russia, and Chinese academics openly question the value of the
partnership. The utility of defense cooperation with Russia will probably diminish for China as
Russia is likely to have less to offer over time as a function of its modest technological
capabilities. However, for the same reasons, the alignment with China is likely to remain
important for Russia as Moscow seeks to retain its position as a global actor and to modernize
its military and domestic security apparatus. Moscow and Beijing, both facing confrontation

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from the West, are likely to strengthen their alliance regardless of the outcome of a US-Russia
summit, observers say.

Warrant: Hardlines on Russia and China increase cooperation

Amber Wang, 6-16-2021, "China and Russia ‘have no choice but to strengthen ties’," South
China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137417/china-russia-have-no-
choice-strengthen-strategic-and-military

US President Joe Biden is expected to raise contentious issues with his Russian counterpart
Vladimir Putin when they meet in Geneva on Wednesday to discuss the deteriorating
relationship between the Kremlin and the West. China and Russia, meanwhile, have “no
choice” but to move closer, especially after the G7 and NATO leaders took a tough line on the
two countries this week, according to one observer.

Analysis: NATO expansionism triggers a defensive response from Russia, which in turn leads to
more aggression on multiple fronts. Ultimately, the question of whether NATO’s presence
would improve things in the Baltics is not a short term one – if the region becomes a multi-
fronted war in the long-term, many lives would be lost.

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CON: Won’t help military capacity

Argument: The Baltics are already well defended, deploying more troops and weapons would be
prohibitively expensive.

Warrant: NATO currently has heavy arms in Baltics

Reuters Staff, 6-14-2015, "U.S. plans to store heavy arms in Baltic, Eastern Europe," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-europe-
idUSKBN0OT0TR20150614

The United States plans to store heavy military equipment in the Baltics and Eastern
European nations to reassure allies unnerved by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and
to deter further aggression, U.S. officials said. The move would be the first time
Washington has stationed heavy military equipment in the newer NATO member states
that were once in the Soviet sphere of influence or - in the case of the three Baltic
republics - part of the Soviet Union. Though no final decision has been taken, the
Pentagon is poised to store battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other heavy
weapons for as many as 5,000 troops, one U.S. official told Reuters on condition of
anonymity. The official said the proposal envisages storing a company’s worth of
equipment, enough for 150 soldiers, in each of the three Baltic nations: Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia. Enough equipment for a company or possibly a battalion, or about 750
soldiers, would also be located in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Hungary.

Warrant: US forces in Poland can be redeployed to Baltics

Urbelis, Vaidotas. "The New United States Defence Strategy: Consequences for the
Baltic States." Lithuania in the Global Context: National Security And Defence

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Policy Dilemmas (2020)

https://vb.lka.lt/object/elaba:68867305/68867305.pdf#page=65

Over the past year, the U.S. has dramatically increased the number of troops deployed
in Europe. In addition to two brigades stationed in Italy and Germany, the U.S. added
artillery and combat aviation units and prepositioned stocks under the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI). In Poland, the U.S. deployed a rotational armoured brigade
combat team, NATO battle group close to the Lithuanian border and prepositioned
heavy brigade set of equipment. These forces form the “iron fist” of the U.S. combat
power in Europe which can be quickly deployed to the Baltic region or anywhere in
Europe. Reactivated V Corps Headquarters would provide a command and control
capability for the European battlefield. The U.S. has also strengthened antisubmarine
warfare capabilities in the North Atlantic to fight Russian attempts to threaten
reinforcement of Europe by sea.

Argument: The costs of deploying heavy arms are too high

Warrant: Full improvements would cost $2.7 billion

Doug Bandow, 2-7-2016, "Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-
baltics

The Rand researchers recommended a substantial allied—which, in practice, means

U.S.—military presence. Seven brigades, three armored, would “prevent the rapid
overrun of the Baltic states.” This would prevent Moscow from, as the report says,
Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion, but more
commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly would
fall upon America rather than the Europeans. Just like the administration’s new

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initiative for Eastern Europe involving a single brigade. Nevertheless, argued the report’s
authors, better to deter than invite “a devastating war.” The surging fear over Russian
adventurism distorts Moscow’s interests and ambitions. Their conclusion illustrates the
folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new members which
were irrelevant to the continent’s security and possessed minimal military capabilities.
At the time, Russia was too weak to make much of a fuss and U.S. officials assumed that
mere words would suffice to defend those inducted. NATO expansion was considered a
great success. But now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear-
armed Russia on behalf of three essentially indefensible countries.

Warrant: NATO’s support discourages militaristic self-sufficiency

Doug Bandow, 2-7-2016, "Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-
baltics

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from
doing much for their own defense. After the administration announced its plans for the
new rotating brigade, Roman Kuzniar of the University of Warsaw said “It is clear that
the European Union can no longer adequately respond to Russia’s demonstrations of
power, so it is comforting that at least the United States is finally stepping up.” Actually,
the problem is not that the EU cannot, but that it will not, step up. In contrast, the
United States has been stepping up for more than six decades. The three Baltics never
hesitate to insist that they at great risk, but they spend little on their militaries.
Despite recent outlay increases, only Estonia spends more than $200 per capita. Last
year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to
the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO
standard. No one believes the Baltic states are capable of defeating their large
neighbor in a full-scale war. But if they truly believe themselves to be at risk they

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should spend sacrificially to create a military capable of inflicting substantial pain on

any invader. Being ill-prepared militarily is the most important invitation to a Russian
attack.
Analysis: this answer goes well with a greater con narrative of NATO freeriding by the
Baltics and a ‘no impact’ probability analysis of a Russian invasion. If the con can prove
there is a nonexistent probability of Russian invasion and win that this costs too much
they can win the argument especially if they use backfiles to link overspending in the
military to decreases elsewhere.

Analysis: Plenty of troops are already stationed nearby, meaning that there is little reason to
expand upon the existing presence. Doing so would be costly, and would have long term
implications on the Baltic states’ ability to defend themselves from threats.

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CON: Baltic allies are self-sufficient

Argument: Baltic states have found ways to protect themselves, and providing NATO support
would decrease self-sufficiency in the long-term.

Warrant: empirically the Baltics are at the head of cyber defenses

Jenna Mclaughlin, 7-2-2019, "How Europe's smallest nations are battling Russia's
cyberattacks," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung,
https://us.boell.org/index.php/en/2019/07/02/how-europes-smallest-nations-
are-battling-russias-cyberattacks

Hannes Krause, the head of policy and analysis for Estonia’s Information System
Authority, the country’s cyber agency, says the Baltic nation is succeeding in defending
its online network of government services, which ranges from internet voting to
ordering prescription drugs, in part because officials have worked to replace outdated
technology and software and to educate the public. “We were untouched by the
WannaCry and NotPetya campaigns,” says Krause, referring to devastating cyberattacks
that spread around the world in 2017. The damage caused by the malware cost
companies like FedEx and hospitals throughout the U.K. millions of dollars. But in
Estonia, the virus didn’t spread. “Then we realized we had probably been doing
something right,” Krause continued. “It left us literally untouched,” he continued,
particularly in comparison to the global devastation elsewhere. (A few Home Depot-
style stores were hit by the malware, but that was because their servers in France were
infected.) Today, even as larger and more advanced countries struggle with
cyberattacks, whether politically motivated hacks or finance-related crimes, Estonia has
become one of the most digitally connected — and secure — societies in the world.
And as the United States approaches the 2020 presidential election mired in debates

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over how best to secure its voting process against the type of attack Russia carried out
in 2016, some of the smallest European countries have modernized at a fast pace.

Warrant: having capabilities outside of NATO provides better defenses

Viljar Veebel, 1-26-2017, "Baltic States and Cyber Deterrence: Taking or Losing Initiative
against Russia?," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/baltic-states-cyber-deterrence-taking-
losing-initiative-russia/

Third, globalization and limited legal regulation of cyber security and deterrence must
be fully exploited. There is no need to limit preparation and actions to traditional state
boundaries, “best-practices” of the public sector, moral considerations, and legal
hesitation. Cyber security units can and should have cells outside NATO territories,
employ private contractors, and use unexpected retaliation tactics. Taking these
actions can create the best possible deterrence against Russia’s model of aggressive
hybrid warfare. Governments must equip their cyber units with the best possible
resources in advance, and these units should have permission to test their tactics and
tools and tolerance for failure during the development of these procedures. To start,
more visible power, initiative, and agility will help to create effective deterrence against
Russia. In practical terms, cyber defense action needs to follow a pre-emptive
mentality because if Russian forces attack first, they might disable further defense or
counterattack capabilities. By limiting cyber defense only to self-defense in the spirit
of best moral and legal considerations, the Baltic states and NATO in general give
Russia a comfortable zone of action. NATO voluntarily restricts itself from efficient
strategies and warfare. Crimea was a clear sign for the West that in a hybrid war
restricting oneself to a reactive role and “playing a Russian game” without innovation
and initiative will lead to defeat.

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Impact: NATO’s support discourages militaristic self-sufficiency

Doug Bandow, 2-7-2016, "Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-
baltics

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from
doing much for their own defense. After the administration announced its plans for the
new rotating brigade, Roman Kuzniar of the University of Warsaw said “It is clear that
the European Union can no longer adequately respond to Russia’s demonstrations of
power, so it is comforting that at least the United States is finally stepping up.” Actually,
the problem is not that the EU cannot, but that it will not, step up. In contrast, the
United States has been stepping up for more than six decades. The three Baltics never
hesitate to insist that they at great risk, but they spend little on their militaries.
Despite recent outlay increases, only Estonia spends more than $200 per capita. Last
year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to
the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO
standard. No one believes the Baltic states are capable of defeating their large
neighbor in a full-scale war. But if they truly believe themselves to be at risk they
should spend sacrificially to create a military capable of inflicting substantial pain on
any invader. Being ill-prepared militarily is the most important invitation to a Russian
attack.

Analysis: As of now, the Baltic states are largely facing cyberattacks from Russia, but they have
proven they are more than capable of handling that threat on their own. If the United States
and their NATO allies are to provide physical support, there would be little reason for them to
develop their own, and in the long term that region would be less stable.

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A/2: Baltic deterrence would increase readiness

De-link: Russia won’t attack the Baltic States

Warrant: Russia does not want to take the Baltics

Doug Bandow. “Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States.” DC. March 2016.
https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states

“Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with
America, and sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine
always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural
reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a
trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and
Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward
Russia. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response
was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin
continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia’s tender
mercies. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate substantial popular
resistance..”

Warrant: The Baltics currently do not threaten Russia

Doug Bandow. “Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States.” DC. March 2016.
https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states

“Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no
potential threat to Russia. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though
significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural

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connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing
tactics deployed against Ukraine. So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics?
A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary
nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. "

Answer: NATO is already ready

Warrant: NATO can defend against Russia

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“NATO’s top general in Europe on Thursday poured a bit of cold water on the notion
that the Baltics are sitting defenseless against Russian military whims. Gen. Curtis
Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme allied
commander Europe, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia’s
conventional overmatch on the continent should not be seen as assured victory if
fighting was to break out. Citing a recent study by the think tank Rand, committee
Chairman Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., wanted to know if the general subscribed to the
conclusion that NATO would be “overwhelmed by superior firepower” from Moscow’s
forces. “I don’t agree with that,” Scaparrotti responded. “When you look at NATO writ
large, it has the strength of 29 nations. The effort that’s being made in NATO and
that’s being made here in the United States is to increase our capability to deter and,
if necessary, defend.”.”

Warrant: NATO can fight multi domain against Russia

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Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“That assessment still holds true today, Scaparrotti said at the hearing, arguing that still
more U.S. troops are needed to bolster allies. But he also offered a caveat, saying the
judgment applies only to the balance of ground forces and only in the context of Eastern
Europe. “We fight multidomain, however,” he said, referring to the military term for
integrating two or more of the domains of warfare: land, sea, air, space and
cyberspace. And while Russian forces might have the immediate upper hand should
fighting break out, “in the longer run NATO has great advantages that they actually
recognize and fear,” he said.”

Analysis: This response allows you to show that even if the aff wins their argument the impact
is largely nonunique because we are ready either way.

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A/2: The Baltics act as a tripwire

Turn: Tripwires don’t work

Warrant: Deterrence benefits are exaggerated

Paul Post. “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter
Aggression.” Texas National Security Review. 2021.
https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-
deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/

“The United States has sometimes sought to achieve deterrence on the cheap through
the deployment of smaller “tripwire” forces. While tripwire forces are too small to shift
significantly the local balance of power, the idea is that such small deployments can still
boost deterrence by increasing the likelihood of American intervention. According to
this approach, the deaths of these troops in the early stages of fighting would compel a
larger military response because, if America’s leaders were to do nothing in response to
those deaths, they would be punished at home and the country would suffer damage to
its international reputation. Thus, tripwire-force deployments boost deterrence by
increasing credibility. However, we argue that the deterrence benefits of tripwire-force
deployments are exaggerated. These forces will not boost deterrence for two related
reasons. First, tripwire deployments do not, in reality, significantly increase the
credibility of the deterrent threat. The deaths of troops in combat will not necessarily
create a strong public motive to intervene in order to seek revenge or protect a
country’s reputation, even given the prospects of broader casualties. Second, even if
the deaths of such troops could create these motives to intervene, potential attackers
could strike anyway in order to achieve a fait accompli and create a strong defensive
position.”

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Warrant: Deterrence requires numerical parity and real fighting strength

Paul Post. “The Truth About Tripwires: Why Small Force Deployments Do Not Deter
Aggression.” Texas National Security Review. 2021.
https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-
deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/

“In contrast to tripwire forces, the deployment of a larger contingent of troops can
actually boost deterrence success. If forward-deployed forces are sufficient to shift the
local balance of power, potential attackers will be less confident that they can succeed
and less confident that they can achieve a fait accompli before reinforcements arrive.
As a result, potential attackers will be less likely to actually launch an attack. After
presenting these general arguments below, we apply them to three empirical cases.
We demonstrate that North Korea elected not to attack South Korea in 1949 because of
the substantial deployment of U.S. troops to South Korean territory. On the other hand,
the deployment of a small American tripwire force to South Korean territory in 1950
failed to deter a North Korean attack. Finally, we argue that, had Britain deployed a
sufficient body of troops to Belgium before the July 1914 crisis, Germany would have
been deterred from attacking Belgium and escalating the Austrian-Serbian crisis,
permitting World War I to be avoided. "

Answer: Russia is not a serious threat

Warrant: Russia does not threaten NATO’s European Members

Alexis Mrachek. “Yes, Russia Is a Threat to the United States” The Heritage Foundation.
2020. https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/yes-russia-threat-the-
united-states

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“A similar point applies to Russian intervention in states along its borders, such as
Georgia and Ukraine. For sure, Russian actions have led to death and destruction. The
relationship of these actions to American interests, however, is unclear. Far from
premeditated aggrandizement, Russian intervention is best understood as a response
to events on the ground. After all, Moscow has long asserted Georgia and Ukraine to
be central to its security, and only intervened militarily when the EU and NATO looked
ready to bring the states into their orbit.”

Warrant: Russia is not very powerful

Alexis Mrachek. “Yes, Russia Is a Threat to the United States” The Heritage Foundation.
2020. https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/yes-russia-threat-the-
united-states

“The case for Russia as a threat is overhyped by hawks and threat inflators. Outside
the nuclear realm (addressed below), Russia's military might is a shadow of the
USSR's. Although capable of generating impressive military power close to its border,
Europe has an array of capable regional actors, such as Germany, who are capable of
checking Moscow's strength. Russia simply lacks the wherewithal to upset Europe's
balance of power, much less conquer the continent. This situation is cold comfort to
the Eastern European members of NATO proximate to Russia. Nevertheless, the
vulnerability of states such as Lithuania and Estonia is fundamentally geographic—
they would be threatened even if Russia were militarily denuded—and, in any case, that
vulnerability does not seriously imperil Washington's interest in a stable European
balance of power..”

Analysis: This evidence demonstrates that Russia does not pose enough of a threat to justify
the deployment of new tripwire forces in the Baltics. If the status quo solves then there is no
reason to affirm.

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A/2: Baltic states are important to NATO

Turn: Boosting the Baltics increases Russian aggression

Warrant: Russia is nervous about NATO in the Baltics

Max Fischer. “The Credibility Trap.” Vox. March 2016.

https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war

“In March 2004 NATO accepted seven new member states including the three Baltic
states. For the first time, NATO was right on Russia’s border. Twelve hundred miles
had separated Saint Petersburg from NATO during the Cold War, but that distance had
been reduced to less than one hundred miles. Later that year Georgia and the Ukraine
signed Individual Partnership Action Plans, and joint NATO-Ukraine military exercises in
Crimea soon followed. Whilst Putin downplayed the importance of these events,
others in his administration expressed much alarm. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
warned “we cannot, of course, watch impartially the military structure of the alliance
moving ever closer to our borders.”

Warrant: Empirically it does not matter

Max Fischer. “The Credibility Trap.” Vox. March 2016.

https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war

“It was quite reasonable for the Kremlin to view NATO’s incorporation of the Baltic
States as an outright threat. Unlike the existing NATO members and former Warsaw
Pact states, the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which was designed
to prevent any country from amassing the weaponry required to launch an offensive
war, didn’t bind the Baltic nations. NATO now held the legal right to deploy an

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unlimited quantity of troops and military hardware in the Baltic. Plans were made for
the Baltic states to accede to an adapted CFE treaty, but a series of diplomatic
stalemates resulted in the US and its NATO allies refusing to ratify the new agreement. "

Answer: The Baltics are not under attack

Warrant: Russia is not going to go to war unless provoked

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency says the likelihood of a military attack from
neighboring Russia remains low, but that any confrontation between Russia and the
West could quickly turn into “a threat situation for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Director General Mikk Marran of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service said
Wednesday that while Moscow wants to refrain from a conflict with NATO, it may opt
for “a preventive military offensive” in the Baltic region if it anticipates an escalation of
a conflict “even if this occurs in another region.”

Warrant: Frosty Relations are nothing new

Jari Tanner. “Russia Attack Not Likely” Associated Press. 2020.

https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

“Moscow’s relations with Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius have remained icy for nearly 30
years since independence of the Baltic nations in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Estonia and Latvia both have sizable ethnic-Russian minorities, while

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Lithuania’s ethnic-Russian population is more minor. Last month, Putin watched over
naval exercises involving multiple missile launches in the Black Sea. More than 30
warships and 39 aircraft took part.”

Analysis: This response downplays the Russian threat, allowing you to make the argument that
your opponents links have a low probability of materializing.

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A/2: Baltic Deterrence is Key to Credibility

De-link: Credibility boosts are unnecessary

Warrant: Reputations do not matter

Max Fischer. “The Credibility Trap.” Vox. March 2016.

https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war

“Under this line of thinking, if the US fails to follow through on a threat or stand up to a
challenger in one part of the world, then its allies and enemies globally will be more
likely to conclude that all American threats are empty, and that America can be pushed
around. If the US backed down once, it will back down again. It's easy to see how people
could be attracted to this idea, which puts complicated geo-politics in simple and
familiar human terms. It encourages us to think of states as just like people. But states
are not people, and this theory, for all its appealing simplicity, is not correct. There is
no evidence that America's allies or enemies change their behavior based on
conclusions about America's reputation for credibility, or that such a form of
reputation even exists in foreign policy. "Do leaders assume that other leaders who
have been irresolute in the past will be irresolute in the future and that, therefore,
their threats are not credible?" the University of Washington's Jonathan Mercer
wrote, in introducing his research on this question. "No; broad and deep evidence
dispels that notion," Mercer concluded. "As the record shows, reputations do not
matter.".”

Warrant: Empirically it does not matter

Max Fischer. “The Credibility Trap.” Vox. March 2016.

https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war

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“A 1984 Yale University study, for example, examined dozens of cases from 1900 to
1980 to look for signs that, if a country stood down in one confrontation, it would face
more challengers elsewhere. The answer was no: "deterrence success is not
systematically associated … with the defender's firmness or lack of it in previous
crises." Historians have also looked at specific incidents where the US thought its
credibility was on the line and determined that we were simply mistaken. Acheson's
warning that the US had to invade Korea to reassure its European allies, for example,
turned out to be wrong: British and French officials in fact worried the Americans were
going to pull them into a far-away war. "

Answer: Russia is weak

Warrant: Russian military power is declining

Pavel Baev. “Russia is not strong. Putin is even weaker” Brookings. 2016.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/06/08/russia-is-not-
strong-and-putin-is-even-weaker/

“What is less obvious for many Russia-watchers is that the military strength
demonstrated so pompously on the Red Square during the May 9 Victory Day parade
is also in decline. In Ukraine, the lack of any meaningful political or strategic Russian
goals erodes the morale of the troops who are clandestinely deployed there. Nervous
about the domestic political consequences of growing casualties, Putin has classified
information about warzone deaths as a state secret. The costs of the war are
mounting, and over-spending in the Armaments 2020 priority procurement program is
yet another item in the list of embarrassing fiscal setbacks. It is clear to serious Russian
economists that military expenditures have been out of control for the last four quarters

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at least. Such spending cannot be sustained indefinitely, and deep cuts in the defense
budget are certain this year.”

Warrant: Russia cannot afford another war

Pavel Baev. “Russia is not strong. Putin is even weaker” Brookings. 2016.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/06/08/russia-is-not-
strong-and-putin-is-even-weaker/

“It is prudent of NATO to be vigilant along its northern flank, but Russia has little or no
capacity for simultaneously waging two “hybrid wars.” Back in 1940, Stalin amassed
some 600,000 troops for the swift occupation of three defenseless Baltic states; now,
Putin can deploy only about 50,000 troops for the (very probable) upcoming offensive
in Donbass. Finally, even the strengths that Russia genuinely possesses do not
necessarily strengthen President Vladimir Putin’s grasp on power. The example of
Russian gas exports to Europe is a case in point. As Aleksashenko rightly points out,
Russia has leverage in some ways. Russian gas exports to Europe, for instance, are
essential for the economies of both, whatever proposals for alternative “green” sources
the EU energy strategy entertains.”

Analysis: This response shows that even if NATO is weak in some respects, Russia is weaker.
Thus there is no threat of escalation.

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A/2: Russia seeks revisionism in the Baltics

De-link: Russia can not invade

Warrant: Russia is not ready to invade

Maxwell Stangl. “Russia Won't Start a (Conventional) War in the Baltics.” The National
Interest. March 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-wont-start-
conventional-war-baltics-57317

“Russia is simply not prepared or properly positioned to execute a well-coordinated,

conventional attack on the Baltics. The amount of Russian units in close proximity to
make a rapid assault is limited, and most of these formations would take significant
time and resources to mobilize. It would require a large and complex movement of
troops, vehicles, and equipment to successfully plan and execute such an operation.
Such activity would surely catch the eye of NATO members, alerting them to a likely
invasion. Instead, Russian posture is best suited for hybrid warfare against these
neighboring countries.”

Warrant: Russian forces are not prepared

Maxwell Stangl. “Russia Won't Start a (Conventional) War in the Baltics.” The National
Interest. March 2019. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-wont-start-
conventional-war-baltics-57317

“Although speed and experience is great, especially in a hypothetical Baltic campaign,

these air assault units simply do not have the heavy weaponry, equipment, or logistics
to maintain an offensive posture against NATO combat units. They are outfitted for
quick and rapid deployments rather than sustained fighting with a superior force such as

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a U.S. Army Armored Brigade Combat Team. To counter this, Russia would have to
mobilize their armored and mechanized forces, turning the conflict into an even bigger
conventional conflict, something Putin knows would not fare well against
American/NATO airpower."

Answer: Russia does not want to invade the Baltics

Warrant: Baltics matter less than Ukraine

Doug Bandow. “Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?” CATO. 2016.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-baltics

“Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical
and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, Russia
accepted an independent Ukraine, even when ruled by the hostile, incompetent Viktor
Yushchenko, who also pushed for his nation’s membership in the alliance—then
opposed by the majority of Ukrainians. Yushchenko’s failure opened the way for the
election of Viktor Yanukovich, nominally pro-Russian, though he resisted Moscow’s
control. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine
away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against
Yanukovich.”

Warrant: Baltics are less easy a target

Doug Bandow. “Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?” CATO. 2016.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-baltics

“Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate similar resistance. They developed
separate identities under the Russian Empire and enjoyed brief independence

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between World Wars I and II. They also have the advantage of having joined NATO
before Moscow could cause much trouble. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian
populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother
Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for
the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. Wrote Robert Person, a
professor at West Point: “the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian
hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and
citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism.”.”

Analysis: This response takes out the motivation behind aff’s arguments. Use it to convince the
judge that aff’s impacts are unlikely.

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A/2: Need to Increase Baltic Air Policing

Answer: Current Air Policing Solves

Warrant: Baltic Air Policing has increased since 2015

Richard Martyn-Hemphill, 9-2-2015, "NATO scales back Baltic Air PolicingThe Baltic
Times, https://www.baltictimes.com/nato_scales_back_baltic_air_policing/

The Crimea annexation, in particular, has evoked chilling memories across the three
Baltic States, which were annexed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War,
only regaining their independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite, however, believes NATO’s recent decision to
halve its Baltic air-policing mission was made in relation to NATO substantially
strengthening its defensive capabilities in the Baltics elsewhere. She pointed out that
she considers the downsizing “not that significant.” “I would like to pay attention to
the fact that eight fighter jets will remain in the Baltic States.That’s twice as many as
we had before the Ukrainian crisis,” Grybauskaite informed the press. “So, we retain
the double air policing mission. “Poland will handle things on its own, so that
downsizing is not that significant.”

Warrant: additional increases and attentions provide security guarantees

Richard Martyn-Hemphill, 9-2-2015, "NATO scales back Baltic Air PolicingThe Baltic
Times, https://www.baltictimes.com/nato_scales_back_baltic_air_policing/

According to Grybauskaite, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia still enjoy NATO allies’ major
attention. She believes the support is reflected by NATO’s decision to establish a
headquarters in the region, plus its decision to deploy U.S. heavy weaponry in the

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Baltic States of autumn 2015. The president added that the scope and intensity of
NATO military exercises across the region is “unprecedented.” “We need to look into
the security situation on the whole, and I think there’s no need for us to react to the
downsizing of the air policing mission that much,” she continued. “These are decisions
that are made by taking into account all security bolstering elements in the region.”

Answer: Increasing Air Policing would increase Russian Aggression

Warrant: Current situation walks a line between aggression and deterrence

Richard Martyn-Hemphill, 9-2-2015, "NATO scales back Baltic Air Policing," Baltic Times,
https://www.baltictimes.com/nato_scales_back_baltic_air_policing/

Eoin MacNamara, a NATO specialist at the University of Tartu in Estonia, and an

associate fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs agrees with the
Lithuanian president’s assessment. “From the perspective of military planning, this
lightening of the air policing mission is consistent with NATO’s overall strategy for its
eastern flank,” he tells The Baltic Times. “At NATO, the word “scalability” is often used,
this means providing enough protection and deterrence through a light presence that
will not give Russia an excuse to fuel a dangerous security dilemma around the Baltic
Sea.” MacNamara also points to the need for NATO to show it is prepared to deescalate
its military involvement in Russia’s backyard to present a more accommodating
environment for the European politicians and diplomats attempting to make inroads
into solving the wider crisis. He does remark, however, that in private the decision for
NATO to scale back its Baltic Air Policing mission “will privately disappoint many Baltic
leaders and planners.”

Impact: if Russia increased air activities a crash could cause military conflict

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Aaron Korewa, 1-6-2017, "A Necessary Response to Russian Aggression in the Baltics,"
McCain Institute, https://www.mccaininstitute.org/blog/necessary-response-
russian-aggression-baltics/

Russian president Vladimir Putin has dismissed Baltic concerns by saying that “only an
insane person” would think that Russia is planning to attack a NATO member. Leaving
aside the fact that Putin also denied invading Ukraine, this is missing the point. The
threat to the Baltics doesn’t come from a planned Russian campaign of re-conquest.
Rather, there is the risk that one of these Russian military provocations can lead to an
accident and the situation subsequently spiraling out of control. For the past years, the
Kremlin has engaged in a massive propaganda campaign portraying the democratic
Baltic states as run by “fascists” who oppress Russian speakers. Should a Russian plane
violating Baltic airspace crash for instance, there is a chance that the Kremlin will find
itself compelled to respond with military action, trapped by its own words. As Rand
recently showed in a series of wargames, NATOs defense of the Baltic states is
dangerously inadequate at this point. It is the Russian capabilities that pose the threat,
not possible motives, which as we have seen before, are often manufactured.

Warrant: the Russian threat is no longer conventional; air policing wouldn’t stop it

Cristian Rosu, 4-8-2021, "How real is the Russian threat to the Baltic States?," New
Europe, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/how-real-is-the-russian-threat-to-
the-baltic-states/

Though they remain in danger as a result of the geographic positions, as NATO

members the Baltic States have a powerful ally that can act as an effective strategic
defense buffer in the event that Moscow makes any attempt to launch an incursion into
one of the three countries. Furthermore, the Baltics know that Russia has never lacked
the theoretical ability to occupy their capitals – Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn. Regardless,

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Russia’s intelligence services – the FSB (the successor to the KGB) and GRU – will try to
destabilize the Baltics, even if those actions do not risk sparking a full-blown war with
NATO. The threat from Russia has, in fact, ceased to be a long line of tanks ripping
through the countryside of Eastern Europe, in a relentless march towards one of the
region’s national capitals. Instead, Moscow’s means of applying pressure has greatly
diversified in recent years and includes a mix of tactics, disinformation and fake news,
propaganda, messianic prophecies, Russian capital, organized crime and money hidden
deep in certain offshore fiscal paradises that are at the core of Russia’s power that it
uses against the Baltics and other countries in Europe. This new mixture is far more
powerful than the full scope of Russia’s historic military might.

Analysis: Turning the argument by saying that Russia would respond aggressively to an increase
in air policing is the route most Debaters will want to take- it generates offense on the flow and
puts the pro on the defensive. However; it is unlikely that Russia’s aggravation would seriously
damage the Baltics. Winning the probability that your conflict is more likely than the pro’s may
be an uphill battle.

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A/2: Need to increase Defenses to Deter China

Answer: the Baltics need China for trade

Warrant: Baltic companies are competing for Chinese trade deals

Inna Steinbuka and Andris Kuznieks, 2020, “Cooperation Between China, Eu And The Baltic
States – Economic Benefits And Risks,” Faculty Of Business, Management, And
Economics.
https://dspace.lu.lv/dspace/bitstream/handle/7/54231/Steinbuka_I_Kuznieks_A_NC_20
20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Latvia’s strength is its geographical position. It is a natural transport hub with three largest
ports and the biggest airport in the Baltics. Therefore, there are more negotiations taking place
between China and Latvia under the framework of the “One Belt One Road” initiative. Recent
investment project of China in the field of life sciences of Latvia has opened the new chapter in
the Latvian -China economic relations. China’s “One Belt One Road” Initiative provides a great
opportunity for the Baltic countries to get integrated into the global trade-investment-
transport network that could generate growth and jobs. The Baltic States are still under
negotiation with China on long-term investment projects related to the Road and Belt Initiative.
One of the biggest threats is the competition among Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Being a
very integrated and small region, the Baltic countries should make more efforts on
cooperating rather than competing. The world's largest DNA gene sequencing corporation with
headquarters in Shenzhen, China – BGI recently has chosen Latvia as the main base for the
production of gene sequencing equipment and reagents, as well as a research and development
centre serving the whole Europe. This investment project of China is perceived with cautious
optimism as a “success story”.

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Warrant: the Baltics are part of the 17+1

Scott D. McDonald and Michael Burgoyne, Sepetmber 2019, “China’s Global Influence:
Perspectives and Reccomendations,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies. https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CHINA-GLOBAL-INFLUENCE-
revised-final.pdf

In the fast-growing Eastern European region, prices for acquisition are lower, demand for
preferential lending is high, human capital is cost-effective, and concessions for Chinese
investors are plentiful. Above all, its location is a perfect bridgehead to the EU market and a
key transit corridor for OBOR. In 2012—before the launch of OBOR—China formally launched
the “16+1” Cooperation, which includes countries in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern
Europe (from the Baltic to the Balkans), with the aim to increase trade, investment, cultural
exchange, and people-to-people connectivity.23 In April 2019, Greece joined the group,
bringing the number of EU member states to 12 and changing the name to “17+1.”24 These
countries present a heterogeneous group, including 11 EU countries and five EU candidate
countries in the Balkans.25 The differences across the region are significant, including the level
of economic development, per capita income, and institutional framework. Despite this, China
approaches them as one region that maps to its main objectives: transportation networks for
OBOR and investment locations for further capital expansion across the EU.

Answer: Increasing Baltic defense won’t stop Sino-Russian cooperation

Warrant: Alternate Factors stop Sino-Russian cooperation

Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, 6-17-2021, "Chinese-Russian Defense Cooperation Is More

Flash Than Bang," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/17/chinese-russian-defense-cooperation-is-
more-flash-than-bang-pub-84787

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With access to Western technology cut off by sanctions, Russia’s defense industry has been
looking to China as an alternative source of innovation that it cannot develop indigenously.
This trend is likely to continue, with Russia becoming more reliant on Chinese technology for
its weapons development as long as Beijing is willing to sell it. It is telling that all of the
Kremlin’s touted defense cooperation with China has done little to alleviate the major
deficiencies in Russia’s military posture, which include unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic
warfare, and conventional precision strike capabilities. Chinese-Russian defense cooperation
has generated significantly greater gains for China than it has for Russia. Over time, Moscow is
poised to grow more dependent on Beijing as long as its standoff with NATO continues.
Russia’s and China’s adversarial relations with the United States could prompt them to
undertake closer geopolitical coordination in different theaters. But their partnership has its
limits. China has not recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia is highly unlikely to risk
an outright conflict with the United States in the event of a major crisis between Washington
and Beijing in the Asia-Pacific. But Russia could engage in provocative posturing in Europe or
the Middle East, or even in the Pacific, as a demonstration of its geopolitical stature. The
partnership with China is an incalculable force multiplier for Russia—more so than it is for
China. Defense cooperation is an important element of the partnership but not the most
important one. This is not an alliance, Chinese diplomats routinely stress in conversations
about relations with Russia, and Chinese academics openly question the value of the
partnership. The utility of defense cooperation with Russia will probably diminish for China as
Russia is likely to have less to offer over time as a function of its modest technological
capabilities. However, for the same reasons, the alignment with China is likely to remain
important for Russia as Moscow seeks to retain its position as a global actor and to modernize
its military and domestic security apparatus. Moscow and Beijing, both facing confrontation
from the West, are likely to strengthen their alliance regardless of the outcome of a US-Russia
summit, observers say.

Warrant: Hardlines on Russia and China increase cooperation

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Amber Wang, 6-16-2021, "China and Russia ‘have no choice but to strengthen ties’," South
China Morning Post,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3137417/china-russia-have-no-
choice-strengthen-strategic-and-military

US President Joe Biden is expected to raise contentious issues with his Russian counterpart
Vladimir Putin when they meet in Geneva on Wednesday to discuss the deteriorating
relationship between the Kremlin and the West. China and Russia, meanwhile, have “no
choice” but to move closer, especially after the G7 and NATO leaders took a tough line on the
two countries this week, according to one observer.

Analysis: this argument can be set up in crossfire by asking “what motivates Russia and China to
cooperate?” The answer is NATO- and you can expand on this idea by exploring how the pro’s case my
further push Russia and China together in an alliance that would not normally happen.

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A/2: NATO should increase Baltic Cyber Defenses

Answer: non-NATO methods are able to better defend the Baltics

Warrant: The U.S. directly helping the Baltics works better

Cameron Mccord, 11-12-2018, "Russia’s Baltic Cyber Campaign Leaves NATO

Endangered," Charged Affairs, https://chargedaffairs.org/russias-baltic-cyber-
campaign-leaves-nato-endangered/

The United States also has a role to play in assisting its Baltic allies in cyber defense.
The most effective means will not be through new, high-level NATO engagements, but
rather through proven, existing channels for targeted assistance like the State
Partnership Program (SPP). Started in 1993 as a mechanism for linking U.S. National
Guard programs to former Soviet Union countries, the SPP has transferred U.S. military
and technological expertise to countries around the world. Indeed, one of the more
successful partnerships on cybersecurity has been between Estonia and the Maryland
National Guard. Partnerships with Latvia and Lithuania, taking the Estonia one as a
model, would benefit both the Baltics and the United States, since the cyber tactics
that Russia perfects in the Baltics are applied elsewhere, including, it is suspected, in
Russian sponsored cyber attacks of U.S. infrastructure as early as 2016. The SPP allows
the United States to gain insights from allies to help grow collective cyber defensive
capabilities. The mechanisms to improve the Baltic region’s cyber vulnerability are
already in place among NATO member states, ready to be used.

Warrant: through bilateral defensive agreements, the U.S. helps the Baltics

Derek E. Mix “Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations”, CRS,
January 2, 2020.

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https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200102_R46139_b58c10db8e0a8f4764
76c93a09edbf8fabb5b1fb.pdf

The United States and the Baltic states cooperate closely on defense and security
issues. New bilateral defense agreements signed in spring 2019 focus security
cooperation on improving capabilities in areas such as maritime domain awareness,
intelligence sharing, surveillance, and cybersecurity. The United States provides
significant security assistance to the Baltic states; the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (P.L. 116-92) increased and extended U.S. assistance for
building interoperability and capacity to deter and resist aggression. Under the U.S.
European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), launched in 2014, the United States has bolstered
its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. As part of the associated Operation
Atlantic Resolve, rotational U.S. forces have conducted various training activities and
exercises in the Baltic states.

Warrant: NATO lacks the cohesion and resources to bolster Baltic Cyber- should utilize existing
means

Cameron Mccord, 11-12-2018, "Russia’s Baltic Cyber Campaign Leaves NATO

Endangered," Charged Affairs, https://chargedaffairs.org/russias-baltic-cyber-
campaign-leaves-nato-endangered/

Of all social-media posts in Latvia that mentioned NATO, an estimated 53% are from
Russian-language bots, intended to carry messages that “NATO is a threat to Russia.”
The final Baltic country of Lithuania falls in between Estonia and Latvia on the spectrum
of defensive cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities. A commonly suggested solution is
that NATO, collectively, should invest more in cyber defense and offer support to the
lacking Baltic region. But in a resource-constrained world, this solution is economically
unrealistic, and the planning and agreement for the support would likely take far too

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long, given the urgent threat. Moreover, it risks relying on Estonia’s approval. Estonia,
worried about angering Russia, has been content to merely observe its neighbors as it
builds its own cyber defenses. As a solution, NATO should take advantage of its pre-
existing but underutilized training institutions, accredited as “Centres of Excellence,” to
promote cooperation among the Baltics. These Centres can efficiently share NATO
member-states’ best practices and lessons learned in cyber-preparedness with Baltic
leaders and specialists.

Answer: The Baltics do not need additional cyber defenses

Warrant: empirically the Baltics are at the head of cyber defenses

Jenna Mclaughlin, 7-2-2019, "How Europe's smallest nations are battling Russia's
cyberattacks," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung,
https://us.boell.org/index.php/en/2019/07/02/how-europes-smallest-nations-
are-battling-russias-cyberattacks

Hannes Krause, the head of policy and analysis for Estonia’s Information System
Authority, the country’s cyber agency, says the Baltic nation is succeeding in defending
its online network of government services, which ranges from internet voting to
ordering prescription drugs, in part because officials have worked to replace outdated
technology and software and to educate the public. “We were untouched by the
WannaCry and NotPetya campaigns,” says Krause, referring to devastating cyberattacks
that spread around the world in 2017. The damage caused by the malware cost
companies like FedEx and hospitals throughout the U.K. millions of dollars. But in
Estonia, the virus didn’t spread. “Then we realized we had probably been doing
something right,” Krause continued. “It left us literally untouched,” he continued,
particularly in comparison to the global devastation elsewhere. (A few Home Depot-
style stores were hit by the malware, but that was because their servers in France were

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infected.) Today, even as larger and more advanced countries struggle with
cyberattacks, whether politically motivated hacks or finance-related crimes, Estonia has
become one of the most digitally connected — and secure — societies in the world.
And as the United States approaches the 2020 presidential election mired in debates
over how best to secure its voting process against the type of attack Russia carried out
in 2016, some of the smallest European countries have modernized at a fast pace.

Warrant: having capabilities outside of NATO provides better defenses

Viljar Veebel, 1-26-2017, "Baltic States and Cyber Deterrence: Taking or Losing Initiative
against Russia?," Foreign Policy Research Institute,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/01/baltic-states-cyber-deterrence-taking-
losing-initiative-russia/

Third, globalization and limited legal regulation of cyber security and deterrence must
be fully exploited. There is no need to limit preparation and actions to traditional state
boundaries, “best-practices” of the public sector, moral considerations, and legal
hesitation. Cyber security units can and should have cells outside NATO territories,
employ private contractors, and use unexpected retaliation tactics. Taking these
actions can create the best possible deterrence against Russia’s model of aggressive
hybrid warfare. Governments must equip their cyber units with the best possible
resources in advance, and these units should have permission to test their tactics and
tools and tolerance for failure during the development of these procedures. To start,
more visible power, initiative, and agility will help to create effective deterrence against
Russia. In practical terms, cyber defense action needs to follow a pre-emptive
mentality because if Russian forces attack first, they might disable further defense or
counterattack capabilities. By limiting cyber defense only to self-defense in the spirit
of best moral and legal considerations, the Baltic states and NATO in general give
Russia a comfortable zone of action. NATO voluntarily restricts itself from efficient

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strategies and warfare. Crimea was a clear sign for the West that in a hybrid war
restricting oneself to a reactive role and “playing a Russian game” without innovation
and initiative will lead to defeat.

Analysis: Lithuania and Estonia are extremely advanced in cyberspace (Latvia is catching up)
even compared to other NATO nations. This argument relies of the idea that NATO resources
are not only redundant in the Baltics, but the Baltics would be better improving their defenses
outside of NATO.

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A/2: NATO should increase Heavy Arms in Baltics

Answer: The Status quo solves the deficiency making it redundant to affirm

Warrant: NATO currently has heavy arms in Baltics

Reuters Staff, 6-14-2015, "U.S. plans to store heavy arms in Baltic, Eastern Europe," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-europe-
idUSKBN0OT0TR20150614

The United States plans to store heavy military equipment in the Baltics and Eastern
European nations to reassure allies unnerved by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and
to deter further aggression, U.S. officials said. The move would be the first time
Washington has stationed heavy military equipment in the newer NATO member states
that were once in the Soviet sphere of influence or - in the case of the three Baltic
republics - part of the Soviet Union. Though no final decision has been taken, the
Pentagon is poised to store battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other heavy
weapons for as many as 5,000 troops, one U.S. official told Reuters on condition of
anonymity. The official said the proposal envisages storing a company’s worth of
equipment, enough for 150 soldiers, in each of the three Baltic nations: Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia. Enough equipment for a company or possibly a battalion, or about 750
soldiers, would also be located in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Hungary.

Warrant: US forces in Poland can be redeployed to Baltics

Urbelis, Vaidotas. "The New United States Defence Strategy: Consequences for the
Baltic States." Lithuania in the Global Context: National Security And Defence
Policy Dilemmas (2020)
https://vb.lka.lt/object/elaba:68867305/68867305.pdf#page=65

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Over the past year, the U.S. has dramatically increased the number of troops deployed
in Europe. In addition to two brigades stationed in Italy and Germany, the U.S. added
artillery and combat aviation units and prepositioned stocks under the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI). In Poland, the U.S. deployed a rotational armoured brigade
combat team, NATO battle group close to the Lithuanian border and prepositioned
heavy brigade set of equipment. These forces form the “iron fist” of the U.S. combat
power in Europe which can be quickly deployed to the Baltic region or anywhere in
Europe. Reactivated V Corps Headquarters would provide a command and control
capability for the European battlefield. The U.S. has also strengthened antisubmarine
warfare capabilities in the North Atlantic to fight Russian attempts to threaten
reinforcement of Europe by sea.

Answer: the costs of deploying heavy arms are too high

Warrant: full improvements would cost $2.7 billion

Doug Bandow, 2-7-2016, "Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-
baltics

The Rand researchers recommended a substantial allied—which, in practice, means

U.S.—military presence. Seven brigades, three armored, would “prevent the rapid
overrun of the Baltic states.” This would prevent Moscow from, as the report says,
Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion, but more
commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly would
fall upon America rather than the Europeans. Just like the administration’s new
initiative for Eastern Europe involving a single brigade. Nevertheless, argued the report’s
authors, better to deter than invite “a devastating war.” The surging fear over Russian

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adventurism distorts Moscow’s interests and ambitions. Their conclusion illustrates the
folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new members which
were irrelevant to the continent’s security and possessed minimal military capabilities.
At the time, Russia was too weak to make much of a fuss and U.S. officials assumed that
mere words would suffice to defend those inducted. NATO expansion was considered a
great success. But now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear-
armed Russia on behalf of three essentially indefensible countries.

Warrant: NATO’s support discourages militaristic self-sufficiency

Doug Bandow, 2-7-2016, "Why on Earth Would Russia Attack the Baltics?," Cato
Institute, https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-
baltics

Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from
doing much for their own defense. After the administration announced its plans for the
new rotating brigade, Roman Kuzniar of the University of Warsaw said “It is clear that
the European Union can no longer adequately respond to Russia’s demonstrations of
power, so it is comforting that at least the United States is finally stepping up.” Actually,
the problem is not that the EU cannot, but that it will not, step up. In contrast, the
United States has been stepping up for more than six decades. The three Baltics never
hesitate to insist that they at great risk, but they spend little on their militaries.
Despite recent outlay increases, only Estonia spends more than $200 per capita. Last
year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to
the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO
standard. No one believes the Baltic states are capable of defeating their large
neighbor in a full-scale war. But if they truly believe themselves to be at risk they
should spend sacrificially to create a military capable of inflicting substantial pain on

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any invader. Being ill-prepared militarily is the most important invitation to a Russian
attack.
Analysis: this answer goes well with a greater con narrative of NATO freeriding by the
Baltics and a ‘no impact’ probability analysis of a Russian invasion. If the con can prove
there is a nonexistent probability of Russian invasion and win that this costs too much
they can win the argument especially if they use backfiles to link overspending in the
military to decreases elsewhere.

Answer: Russia won’t attack

Warrant: Estonian intelligence says that the threat is low unless Russia needs to prevent an
offensive in the Baltics

Jari Tanner, 2-12-2020, "Estonia: Russia attack not likely but Baltics under threat," AP
NEWS, https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-estonia-moscow-latvia-
4c93bbb92085e3350a19bcdb5e04122e

TALLINN, Estonia (AP) — Estonia’s foreign intelligence agency says the likelihood of a
military attack from neighboring Russia remains low, but that any confrontation
between Russia and the West could quickly turn into “a threat situation for Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. Director General Mikk Marran of the Estonian Foreign
Intelligence Service said Wednesday that while Moscow wants to refrain from a
conflict with NATO, it may opt for “a preventive military offensive” in the Baltic region
if it anticipates an escalation of a conflict “even if this occurs in another region”. “The
main security threat for Estonia in the year 2020 is Russia. That threat hasn’t changed as
Russia hasn’t changed,” Marran told reporters during a news conference following
unveiling of the agency’s annual review in Tallinn, the capital of the former Soviet
republic of 1.3 million.

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Analysis: The threat is not significant enough to justify the risk of heavily arming the Baltics;
Russia is unlikely to make the first move, but putting weapons right on their border may entice
them to do so. Even still, there already are heavy arms in the Baltics, and they should be self-
sufficient anyway.

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A/2: Baltic security is key to democracy in the region

Answer: Bringing troops closer to the Russian border is needlessly provocative and could
generate conflict

Turn: Russia has always hated NATO’s eastward expansion

John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in
Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reunified
Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow
any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The
Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began
pushing for NATO to expand. The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and
brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it
included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow
complained bitterly from the start. During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign against the
Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of
what could happen when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. ...
The flame of war could burst out across the whole of Europe.” But the Russians were
too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not
look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a border with Russia, save
for the tiny Baltic countries..”

Warrant: Pushing forces eastward spurs backlash

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John Measheimer. “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault.” July 2014. Foreign
Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault

“Pundits advanced a variety of arguments for and against enlargement, but there was
no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and
their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted NATO
to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy
because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed
expansion, in the belief that a declining great power with an aging population and a
one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that
enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe.
The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview,
shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the first round of NATO expansion. “I think the
Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies,” he said. “I
think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was
threatening anyone else.”.”

Warrant: The Benefits of NATO expansion are unclear

“The Debate Over NATO Expansion.” Arms Control Association. June 1997.
vhttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-09/features/debate-over-nato-
expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key

“The administration admits NATO faces "no imminent threat of attack" [emphasis
added], and claims a larger NATO will be "better able to prevent conflict from arising
in the first place" and better able to address "rogue states, the poisoned appeal of
extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial and religious hatreds," such as Bosnia. The
administration does not explain how NATO might actually accomplish this. Would a

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larger NATO have prevented Bosnia or Chechnya or Nagorno Karabakh? Does the
administration mean that, at a time when we are wavering in our commitment to the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the United States would be more willing to lead a
larger NATO into additional peacekeeping activities? The Bosnia experience suggests
that expanding NATO will not affect the willingness or reluctance of national capitals to
deal with "ethnic, racial and religious" problems. The administration argues that
expansion "will help guard against non traditional security threats from outside Europe
that threaten NATO members, such as the spread of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and long range delivery systems." NATO expansion is irrelevant to the spread of
WMD and ballistic missiles outside of Europe, whereas cooperation with Russia on such
issues as arms control, arms sales and dealings with "rogue" states is clearly critical..”

Warrant: Eastward deployment triggers a Russian response and undermines pro-western

elements

“The Debate Over NATO Expansion.” Arms Control Association. June 1997.
vhttps://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-09/features/debate-over-nato-
expansion-critique-clinton-administrations-responses-key

“The administration then notes that the alliance must be prepared for "the possibility
that Russia could...return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period, although
we see such a turn as unlikely." [Emphasis added.] The administration claims that "our
policy of engaging Russia...the process of NATO enlargement and the NATO Russia
Founding Act, increase the likelihood that Russia will continue on the path of
democratic and peaceful development." In reality, NATO enlargement has undercut
Russian democrats, hampered efforts to reduce and make more secure Russia's
nuclear arsenal, and made President Boris Yeltsin's political life much more difficult.
The Founding Act has been equally controversial; it has been vigorously attacked by
the right in the United States (for providing too much influence to Russia) and in

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Russia (for not providing Russia with enough influence), and its basic meaning is in
dispute. The administration's final point is that NATO expansion "will help secure the
historic gains of democracy in Europe and erase Stalin's artificial dividing line."
[Emphasis added.] A military alliance is not the preferred means for extending
democracy in Central Europe—that task should fall to the European Union (EU). But that
organization, primarily for economic reasons, has identified potential new members but
is not expected to extend them membership until at least the middle of the next
decade.”

Analysis: This argument shows that the taproot of Russian aggression is NATO presence in
Eastern Europe. Deploying more forces to the Baltics would only make things worse.

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A/2: Deterrence by Denial

Answer: Deterrence by Denial stretches Alliance Unity

Warrant: deterrence by denial stretches NATO members politically and financially

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

First, a deterrence-by-denial approach would risk overstretching the delicate political

consensus among NATO members about conventional deterrence and assurance. A number
of member states, perhaps led by Germany and France, would not support such a policy and
would seek to block it. Even more importantly, perhaps, not even the Baltic states are
supportive of such a maximalist approach. While many Baltic officials and experts would like
to see greater U.S. military engagement in the region, some of them are highly skeptical of
the assumptions underlying the RAND war games and think that they are too pessimistic
about Baltic defenses. While they would like to see a strong, unified allied response to the
growing threat from Russia, they also recognize the need to avoid unnecessarily escalating
general tensions with Russia.2 Also, against the background of often contentious debates
within NATO about financial and military burden sharing, it would not be clear at all who
would provide the necessary funds and forces for such a large military footprint. Neither the
United States nor most other allies currently seem to be both willing and capable.

Impact: Unity is key to preserve NATO and the EU

Kalev Stoicescu, June 2021 “Dialogue with Russia, Russia Needs to Reset Relations with the
West,” ICDS. https://icds.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/ICDS_Report_Dialogue_with_Russia_Stoicescu_June_2021.p
df

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First, the West, in order to succeed, must define and implement a solid common approach
and strategy towards Russia and demonstrate unity and determination. This is easier said
than done, given a wide spectrum of Western perceptions and interests towards Russia that are
further differentiated and accentuated by the Kremlin. However, there is no better way to
preserve a strong and coherent NATO and EU, and Europe’s security.

Answer: Deterrence by Denial Increases chances of conflict

Warrant: Deterrence by Denial causes insecurity

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

Second, instead of preventing deliberate Russian escalation this deterrence-by-denial

approach could, in fact, reinforce Russian perceptions of insecurity. Russia would be loath to
accept a NATO force that size so close to its borders. Moscow might seek to prevent NATO
force deployments through various means, including, not inconceivably, by considering the
preventive use of force (that is, Russia might wage a war because it could only see its position
deteriorating in the future).

Impact: Deterrence by denial risks nuclear war

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-28-2018, "NATO’s Options,"

https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/28/nato-s-options-pub-75883

This risk might become more acute in the early stages of a crisis when Russia could
misinterpret the large-scale movement of sizable forces, such as the 70,000 personnel
reinforcement the RAND study suggested, as NATO preparations for a preemptive attack on

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Russia. Third, large-scale conventional deployments could help further solidify Russian
reliance on its nuclear deterrent and could even serve to lower Russia’s threshold for nuclear
use, making the early employment of nuclear weapons more likely.
Analysis: this big impact answer can be swung like a bat at any case revolving around a large
conventional force increase. Making your opponents define early in the round what the size of
the force would be will provide a further link. This argument would likely play out well in cross
and should be raised by the constructive speaker, requiring the 1st speaker and 2nd speaker to
communicate on an effective strategy. Take the 15 seconds of prep to talk before cross and hit
the pro with this early on.

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A/2: Baltic control of ports is vital to security in the region

Answer: If NATO commits more to the Baltic ports, members states may become more risk
prone and cause problems for the entire alliance.

Warrant: The base need for long term alliances is in question

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

“U.S. alliances were formed by two goals. One was to balance the power of states
viewed, usually with some exaggeration, as threats to overwhelm local rivals and
become local hegemons threatening to the United States. The other was to integrate
past rivals Germany and Japan into coalitions less threatening to others. The fear of
regional hegemons is significantly diminished today. With an economy smaller than
Italy’s and demography only a tad better than a death spiral, Russia is not able to
restore its Soviet empire. China is investing a steady share of its growing economy in its
military but has little ability, whatever its desire, to overcome East Asia’s defense-
dominant geography by bringing its forces across water or mountains to conquer rich
and technologically proficient rivals. Technological trends are heightening the
advantages afforded the defender in a conflict and should make U.S. rivals more self-
reliant.”

Warrant: NATO increases free-riding

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

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“When making wars or deterring imminent aggression, allies are mostly good to have.
The trouble is making defense commitments permanent. Open-ended security
obligations encourage free-riding and moral hazard among those protected. They also
require the maintenance of excessive U.S. force structure, which wastes money,
encourages needless war, and perpetuates the myth that our security demands global
dominance. Free-riding is the most obvious problem. President Trump’s treatment of
NATO allies has created much Beltway consternation, but the United States has
complained about its NATO allies’ defense spending since the midst of the Cold War,
albeit more politely. The reason these complaints are not heeded, besides limited
threats, is that U.S. defenses undercut European incentives to heighten their own.
Washington’s rhetoric insisting that U.S. alliances are sacrosanct, regardless of
conditions, tells allied leaders that they can safely genuflect to, but essentially ignore,
U.S. demands for bigger military investment. Complaints notwithstanding, free-riding is
largely an intended consequence of U.S. defense strategy. As the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance admitted, protecting allies prevents them from emerging as rivals to U.S.
preeminence. Allies are meant to be useful but infantilized, like little brothers that do
our bidding without too much guff. That thinking explains Washington’s hostility to
independent European military capability—better to have NATO subordinates than a
European superpower that is not dependent.”

Warrant: NATO creates moral hazard

Benjamin Friedman. “Bad Idea: Permanent Alliances.” December 2018. Defense360.

https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-permanent-alliances/

“U.S. security guarantees also encourage moral hazard—where a person takes greater
risk because someone else bears the cost. The protection of the world’s preeminent
military can make allies incautious in dealing with rivals. Even non-allies fall prey to
the phenomenon if they think they have something approaching a U.S. security

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guarantee, as occurred with Georgia and Russia in 2008. Using NATO to aid Ukraine
could produce similar results today. Saudi Arabia’s recent adventurism is another
example. Alliances can cause instability among neighbors, via moral hazard, pulling
the United States into wars it unintentionally encouraged. Were allies more concerned
about losing U.S. protection, this problem would be reduced.
A related phenomenon occurs when states that the United States protects abuse their
citizens. Turkey, Hungary, Poland—all NATO allies that have recently backslid away from
liberal values—are examples, along with various Middle-Eastern states. No doubt, these
countries’ rulers would still abuse civil liberties if U.S. protection were less assured, but
the assurance removes an incentive for better behavior.”

Warrant: NATO is akin to a moral hazard generating insurance policy

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“Promises of admission to NATO, even to Ukraine and Georgia, were perceived as low-
cost, since the insurance contracts — that is, the commitment to protect the new
NATO members against a serious Russian attack — would never be exercised. After all,
that scenario assumed a Russia that was strong and bad, and that was impossible.
Now suppose that you are Vladimir Putin and you see the U.S. selling this insurance to
all your neighbors. You do not have to be a genius to see the implications. One
important consequence of any insurance is moral hazard. The insured party takes
greater risks because it has insurance to fall back on. That is exactly what happened in
the case of new NATO members, Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance. Barely
three years after their admission into NATO, the two countries began lobbying to have
American missile defense systems deployed on their soil — a move regarded by many
Russians as a more serious threat to Russia’s security than NATO enlargement itself.”

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Warrant: Moral Hazard generates conflict through perverse incentives and preemption

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“The moral hazard created by NATO expansion clearly made the international system
more fragile. The United States is issuing all of these contingent liabilities, and if you
are Putin, you want to indicate to the U.S. the cost of this. When repeated verbal
protests do not suffice, as they clearly had not throughout the 1990s and then into the
2000s, the message has to be delivered in stronger fashion. Hence, the Georgia
conflict of August 2008. Regardless of who started it, the conflict should have
demonstrated with utmost clarity the cost of those insurance policies that the U.S.
had been selling. The message was not received, however, much like the collapse of
the subprime market should have foretold what was to come in the financial crisis.
What we should have recognized — but few did — in the period between August 1998
and August 2008 was that the unimaginable had occurred. Russia had become strong,
but “bad.” It had become strong again without “becoming like us.”

Analysis: Ultimately, the point of this response is to argue that whether the ports need
defending is irrelevant given that defending them would further increase the risk of conflict in
other ways. While securing the ports may help in some ways, it increases risk of adventurism
and dangerous actions on behalf of NATO members, which could scale up the probability of
conflict dramatically.

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A/2: NATO has a moral obligation to defend the Baltics

Answer: Military force is only one tool in the toolbox of national power. Often it trades off with
diplomacy and makes it difficult to accomplish those goals.

Warrant: Russia sees NATO differently than the US

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“In Russia, NATO is generally viewed as part of the American war machine and an
instrument of U.S. global dominance. That view is shared by almost the entire Russian
political spectrum. In fact, the same view also prevails among NATO members from
eastern Europe, where the alliance is seen as an instrument of U.S. influence and U.S.
defense assurances. That is why Russia is utterly baffled by U.S. accusations that the
Kremlin — and President Vladimir Putin specifically — are trying to “drive a wedge
between NATO partners.” No one in Moscow has ever regarded NATO as an
independent entity that exists separately from the United States. There is a deep
conviction in Russia that NATO is nothing more than an instrument of U.S. military
policy, and that Washington will always be able to ram any decision through the NATO
governing bodies, regardless of what its Western European partners might think of
that decision.”

Warrant: NATO is regarded as an anti-Russian ruse

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.

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https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“That explains why any NATO enlargement is automatically regarded in Russia as a

ruse to deploy U.S. forces in close proximity to Russian borders; NATO’s own role in
that ruse is seen as a cover story — nothing more. The ongoing deployment of NATO
forces in eastern Europe with the ostensible purpose of “containing and deterring
Moscow” is seen in Russia as another piece of evidence to confirm that view. These
new deployments are conducted under direct U.S. leadership, and most of the new
forces deployed are American. The military presence of other NATO members in
places such as the Baltic states is insignificant and purely symbolic. Washington and
NATO describe these deployments as a “clear signal to Moscow.” In Moscow itself,
that signal is read as clear evidence that all the Russian criticisms and concerns about
NATO have always been entirely justified, and that the moderate Russian reaction to
NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s was a colossal strategic blunder..”

Warrant: NATO enlargement is seen as a potentially existential threat

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

“The West does not realize that Russia views NATO enlargement as a threat of U.S.
forces (potentially including missile systems) deployed ever closer to critical Russian
targets. As a result, Western decision-makers underestimate the strength of the
Russian national consensus on this issue. There is a popular opinion in the West that
Russia opposes NATO only because of President Putin’s personal animus. That opinion is
a gross and primitive misreading of the situation.”

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Warrant: Moving NATO Eastward spurs backlash

Jeremy Bender. “This is the simplest explanation of why Putin is so opposed to NATO.”
Business Indsider. June 2015. https://www.businessinsider.com/simplest-
explanation-of-why-putin-hates-nato-2015-2

“For Putin, the peeling away of countries from Russia towards NATO comes as both an
existential threat and a personal insult. As a former agent in the KGB and an avowed
nationalist, Putin has dreams of resurrecting the glories of Imperial Russia — a goal
that is seriously hampered by the inclusion of what Putin would deem rightful Russian
lands, such as the Baltics, into the NATO alliance. With this in mind, it is easy to see
why Putin signed off on Russia's new military doctrine in December 2014. The doctrine,
which placed explicit focus on NATO being Moscow's main existential enemy and threat,
called on the further militarization of three geopolitical frontlines: the Russian Baltic Sea
exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland, the annexed Crimean peninsula, and the Arctic.”

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A/2: Defending energy independence

Answer: Russia is less of a threat than it once was – allocating resources to check its power
would be a waste when there are more significant looming threats.

Warrant: Russia sees NATO differently than the US

Robin Emott. “NATO must focus more on challenge of rising China, report to say.”
December 2019. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-diplomacy-
future-idUKKBN28A1TB

“NATO must think harder about how to handle China and its military rise, though
Russia will remain its main adversary during this decade, according to a report to be
published on Tuesday on reforming the Atlantic alliance. The report “NATO 2030”,
prepared by a group of so-called ‘wise persons’ and containing 138 proposals, comes
amid growing doubts about the purpose and relevance of an alliance branded last year
by French President Emmanuel Macron as “brain dead”. “China is no longer the benign
trading partner that the West had hoped for. It is the rising power of our century and
NATO must adapt,” said one NATO diplomat who has seen the report, pointing to
Chinese activity in the Arctic and Africa and to its heavy investments in European
infrastructure.”

Warrant: China poses new and difficult challenges to NATO

Robin Emott. “NATO must focus more on challenge of rising China, report to say.”
December 2019. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-nato-diplomacy-
future-idUKKBN28A1TB

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“Part of NATO’s response should be maintaining a technological advantage over

China, protecting computer networks and infrastructure, the diplomat said, citing the
report, although not all recommendations will be adopted. The 30-member alliance
could also forge closer ties with non-NATO countries such as Australia and focus more
on deterrence in space, where China is developing assets, the report suggests. In
comments on Monday ahead of the report’s publication, NATO Secretary-General Jens
Stoltenberg said China’s rise posed “important challenges to our security”. “China is
investing massively in new weapons. It is coming closer to us, from the Arctic to Africa.
China does not share our values ... and tries to intimidate other countries,” he told a
news conference, urging allies to come together on the issue.”

Warrant: China is developing new weapons systems

Ruslan Pukhov. “NATO is the obstacle to improving Russian-Western relations.”

December 2019. Defense News.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/03/28/nato-is-the-
obstacle-to-improving-russian-western-relations/

““NATO is now looking at the ways in which new and emerging technologies will
continue to change the threat landscape, from hypersonic missiles to reducing our
decision-making time in the face of an attack.” Wallace said. This was echoed by the
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg as he discussed the rise of China, after NATO
mentioned the country for the first time in an official declaration. After NATO’s
December summit in Watford near London, Stoltenberg said: “A few weeks ago, they
[China] displayed a new intercontinental ballistic missile, able to reach Europe and
North America. They displayed hypersonic missiles, gliders. They have deployed
hundreds of intermediate- range missiles that would have been violating the INF
Treaty if China had been part of the INF Treaty.”.”

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Warrant: NATO needs to move into new. Non-kinetic domains

Harry Lye. “Defence in a new decade: NATO prepares for new threats” Army
Technology. June 2020. https://www.army-technology.com/features/defence-in-
a-new-decade-nato-prepares-for-new-threats/

“NATO’s approach to China, however, is not about creating a new foe in a new region.
Instead, it aims to monitor the country more closely and work towards arms control
agreements. As Stoltenberg said at the NATO Engages event the day before the
summit, “this is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it’s about
taking into account that China’s coming closer to us.” The idea that China is moving
closer to the West is echoed by Robert Vass, founder and president of the Globsec
think tank, who told us: “Chinese investments are quite heavy in Europe and are
increasing, they are building the Belt and Road initiative, and it is an economic but
also political project, which is bringing the political influence of China to Europe. We
have to be aware of that. I’m not saying it is good or bad, but we have to be very
much aware of the leverage that has.” Vass added: “Now, we don’t want to create
Chinese walls between our two worlds. It’s not a good answer.” He explained that it is
important to avoid a confrontation with China, although ongoing trade wars could
complicate that..”

Analysis: Russia is no longer the looming hegemon that it once was; meanwhile, other powers
like China have risen and strengthened themselves without a response from the United States
or NATO – allocating resources towards checking our rival from the cold war is certainly less
efficient.

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A/2: Defending the Baltic Economic System

Answer: NATO could not protect the Baltic economy

Warrant: NATO is costly in and of itself

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

“NATO was created in 1949 for the three main reasons outlined above. These reasons
are no longer valid. The security landscape in Europe is totally different today than
seventy years ago. Russian president Vladimir Putin actually proposed a new
continental security arrangement “from Dublin to Vladivostok,” which was rejected
out of hand by the West. If accepted, then it would have included Russia in a
cooperative security architecture that would have been safer for the global community.
Two: It is argued by some that the threat of present-day Russia is why America needs
to stay in Europe. But consider this: The economy of the EU was $18.8 trillion before
Brexit, and it is $16.6 Trillion after Brexit. In comparison, the economy of Russia is only
$1.6 trillion today. With an EU economy more than ten times the economy of Russia,
do we believe that Europe cannot afford its own defense against Russia? It is
important to note that the UK will surely stay in a Euro defense alliance and will very
likely continue to contribute to that defense.”

Warrant: NATO is not a useful construct

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

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“The only time a NATO member has invoked Article 5 (the “attack on one is attack on
all” clause) was the United States after the terrorist attack of Sept 11, 2001. The real
enemy was not another nation but the common threat of terrorism. Russia has
consistently advanced this reason for cooperation—indeed Russia provided invaluable
logistical intelligence and base support for the post–9/11 Afghan engagement.
Coronavirus has dramatized another grave concern: that of terrorists possessing and
using biological weapons. This cannot be underestimated in the climate in which we
now live. Five: When Russia has a potential enemy on its border, as with 2020 NATO
military exercises, Russia will be more compelled to veer toward autocracy and the
weakening of democracy. When citizens feel threatened, they want leadership that is
strong and affords them protection.”

Turn: NATO presence would undermine the Baltic economy.

Warrant: NATO commitments generate existential risks

Sharon Tennison. “Is NATO Still Necessary.” April 2020. The National Interest.
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-still-necessary-145917

“Along with climate change, the greatest existential threat is that of a nuclear
holocaust—this sword of Damocles still hangs over all of us. With NATO having bases
in twenty-nine countries, many along Russia’s borders, some within artillery range of
St. Petersburg, we run the risk of a nuclear war that could destroy humankind. The risk
of accidental or “false alarm” was documented on several occasions during the Cold
War and is even more frightful now, given the Mach 5 speed of today’s missiles”

Warrant: Continued NATO presences only destabilize the region

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Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“Ultimately the alliance decided to expand its membership, even though the enemy
had disappeared. Doing so violated multiple assurances given to Moscow. NATO also
initiated “out-of-area” activities, which meant defending other than member states.
This ironically turned the pact into an offensive instrument, first used to dismember
Serbia in 1999. In essence, NATO had gone from a means to an end, with war the new
means. Said Sen. Richard Lugar, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the organization would “go out of area or out of business.” And, as public
choice economists would predict, no one involved in the alliance wanted the latter.”

Warrant: NATO brings increasing costs and diminishing benefits

Doug Bandow. “NATO No Longer Serves American Interests.” CATO Institute. June 2019.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-no-longer-serves-american-interests

“The Soviet Union’s collapse triggered European disarmament, which in turn

intensified American demands for greater burden-sharing, which the Europeans
continued to ignore. The process continued for years, demonstrating, perversely, that
the less Europe did the more America would. Hence the bizarrely named “European
Reassurance Initiative” after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine: the Europeans were
essentially promised that even if they did nothing Washington would remain at their
side—though whining all the way. U.S. policymakers appeared to accept the need to
subsidize the Europeans in order to keep them dependent. Washington opposed any
proposals for independent spending and action, preferring that Europe do more, but
only under America’s direction. The alliance continued to add members. Most recently
it accepted Montenegro, with North Macedonia awaiting treaty approval by the 29

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Con Responses to Pro Arguments Sept/Oct 2021

current members. Next up, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick, featured in the novel The
Mouse that Roared!.”

Analysis: The cost of moving NATO into the Baltic states, as well as the accompanying
disruption to the regular Baltic economy, would likely not outweigh the security provided.
Furthermore, if NATO presence proves to be a more destabilizing force, then the Baltic
economy will be in even more danger.

Champion Briefs 295