Convergence and Diversity

in the Governance of
Higher Education
Comparative Perspectives

edited by giliberto capano

and darryl s. l. jarvis
 Convergence and Diversity in the
Governance of Higher Education
Comparative Perspectives

For several decades, higher education systems have undergone continuous

waves of reform, driven by a combination of concerns about the changing
labour needs of the economy, competition within the global-knowledge
economy, and nationally competitive positioning strategies to enhance
the performance of higher education systems. Yet, despite far-ranging
international pressures – including the emergence of an international higher
education market, enormous growth in cross-border student mobility, and
pressures to achieve universities of world-class standing, boost research
productivity and impact, and compete in global league tables – the suites of
policy, policy designs, and sector outcomes continue to be marked as much
by hybridity as they are by similarity or convergence. This volume explores
these complex governance outcomes from a theoretical and empirical
comparative perspective, addressing those vectors precipitating change in
the modalities and instruments of governance, and how they interface at
the systemic and institutional levels and across geographic regions.

giliberto capano is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at

the University of Bologna. He has been member of the Executive Committee
of the International Political Science Association, the co-founder of the
International Public Policy Association, and a member of the Executive
Committee of the European Consortium of Political Research. He has
extensively written on public policy, policy change, administrative reforms,
policy design and instruments, and comparative governance in higher
education. His recent publications include Making Policies Work (with
M. Howlett, M. Ramesh, and A. Virani, 2019) and Changing Governance
in Universities: Italian Higher Education in Comparative Perspective (with
M. Regini and M. Turri, 2016).
darryl s. l. jarvis is Professor in the Department of Asian and Policy
Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, at the Education
University of Hong Kong. His recent publications include Transformations
in Higher Education Governance in Asia: Policy, Politics and Progress (with
J. Ka-ho Mok; 2019); Institutional Entrepreneurship and Policy Change:
Theoretical and Empirical Explorations (with C. Bakir, 2018); Asia After
the Developmental State: Disembedding Autonomy (with T. Carroll, 2017);
Markets and Development: Civil Society, Citizens and the Politics of
Neoliberalism (with T. Carroll, 2018); Financialisation and Development
in Asia (with T. Carroll, 2018); and The Politics of Marketizing Asia (with
T. Carroll, 2014).
 Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Public Policy

The Cambridge Studies in Comparative Public Policy series was

established to promote and disseminate comparative research in public
policy. The objective of the series is to advance the understanding of
public policies through the publication of the results of comparative
research into the nature, dynamics and contexts of major policy
challenges and responses to them. Works in the series will draw critical
insights that enhance policy learning and are generalizable beyond specific
policy contexts, sectors and time periods. Such works will also compare
the development and application of public policy theory across
institutional and cultural settings and examine how policy ideas,
institutions and practices shape policies and their outcomes.
Manuscripts comparing public policies in two or more cases as well as
theoretically informed critical case studies which test more general
theories are encouraged. Studies comparing policy development over
time are also welcomed.

General Editors M. Ramesh, National University of Singapore; Xun Wu,

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; Michael Howlett,
Simon Fraser University, British Columbia and National University of
Singapore

In Defense of Pluralism: Policy Disagreement and Its Media Coverage By

Éric Montpetit
Asia after the Developmental State: Disembedding Autonomy Edited by
Toby Carroll and Darryl S. L. Jarvis
The Politics of Shale Gas in Eastern Europe: Energy Security, Contested
Technologies and the Social Licence to Frack By Andreas Goldthau
Healthy or Sick? Coevolution of Health Care and Public Health in
a Comparative Perspective 2018 By Philipp Trein
Policy Accumulation and the Democratic Responsiveness Trap By
Christian Adam, Steffen Hurka, Christoph Knill and Yves Steinebach
Hyper-Active Governance: How Governments Manage the Politics of
Expertise By Matthew Wood
Policy Consultancy in Comparative Perspective: Patterns, Nuances and
Implications of the Contractor State By Caspar van den Berg,
Michael Howlett, Andrea Migone, Michael Howard, Frida Pemer and
Helen M. Gunter
A Matter of Style? Organizational Agency in Global Public Policy By
Louisa Bayerlein, Christoph Knill and Yves Steinebach
Policy Controversies and Political Blame Games By Markus Hinterleitner
Government Statistical Agencies and the Politics of Credibility By
Cosmo Howard
Convergence and Diversity in the Governance of Higher Edited by
Giliberto Capano and Darryl S. L. Jarvis
Convergence and
Diversity in the
Governance of Higher
Education
Comparative Perspectives

Edited by
giliberto capano
University of Bologna
darryl s. l. jarvis
The Education University of Hong Kong
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108483964
DOI: 10.1017/9781108669429
© Cambridge University Press 2020
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First published 2020
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Capano, Giliberto, 1960– author. | Jarvis, D. S. L. (Darryl S. L.), 1963– author.
Title: Convergence and diversity in the governance of higher education :
comparative perspectives / edited by Giliberto Capano, Darryl S.L. Jarvis.
Description: Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2020. |
Series: Cambridge studies in comparative public policy | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020011087 (print) | LCCN 2020011088 (ebook) | ISBN
9781108483964 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108669429 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Higher education and state. | Education, Higher – Administration. |
Universities and colleges – Administration. | Transnational education – Government
policy. | Education and globalization.
Classification: LCC LC171 .C37 2020 (print) | LCC LC171 (ebook) | DDC 379–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020011087
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020011088
ISBN 978-1-108-48396-4 Hardback
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and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
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For mum, Jean Jarvis
DSLJ
For my mamma, Melina
Giliberto
Contents

List of Figures page xii

List of Tables xiii
Notes on Contributors xiv
Preface xxvii
List of Abbreviations xxxiii

Part I Theorizing Governance in Higher Education

1 Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education: Beyond
the ‘Republic of Scholars’ Ontology 3
g i l i b e rt o c ap a n o a n d d ar r y l s . l . j ar v i s
Part II Systems, Processes, and Dynamics of Governance
in Higher Education
2 The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 43
k a n i s h k a ja y a s u r i y a, g r e g m c c a rt h y ,
and xianlin song
3 Systemic Governance: Convergence or Hybridization? 68
g il ib e rt o c ap a n o
4 Institutional Governance: Factors, Actors,
and Consequences of Attempting to Converge
on the Anglo–American Model 103
m a r i n o r eg i n i
5 Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance
Arrangements: The Role of Meta-organizations in Higher
Education Quality Assurance 138
å s e g o r ni t z k a , p e t e r m aa s s e n, a n d b j ø r n
stensaker

ix
x Contents

6 Understanding Convergence and Divergence in the

Internationalization of Higher Education from a World
Society Perspective 156
re n z e k o l s t e r an d d o n f . w e s t e r h e i j d e n
7 Convergence through Research Performance Measurement?
Comparing Talk and Practices in Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom 184
jenny m. lewis
8 Accountability and Governance in European Higher
Education 208
m i c h ae l d ob b i n s a n d je n s ju n g bl u t
9 Towards New Models of Decision Making within
University Governance in Anglophone Nations 246
julie rowlands
10 Governance in Public and Private Higher Education
in Europe: Patterns, Divergences, and Convergences 268
p e d r o n . t e i xe i r a an d r o bi n m i d d l e h u rs t

Part III Geographies of Governance

11 Higher Education Governance in North America 301
gi l i b e r t o c a p a n o an d j u n ji e w o o
12 Governance Trends in European Higher Education 333
h ar r y f . d e b o e r a n d je r o e n h u i s m a n
13 Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast
Asian Higher Education: Close Cousins, Close Encounters 355
an t h o n y w e l c h
14 Fixing the System? Trends in African Higher Education
Governance 396
ro s e a m a z an a n d k a s s a h un k e b e d e d a w o
Contents xi

15 Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals in the Formation

of Governance Regimes in Latin America’s Higher
Education 426
m i g ue l a l e j a nd r o g o nz á l ez - l ed e s m a a n d
g e r m án á l v a r e z - m e n d i o l a

Index 455
Figures

1.1 Triangle of coordination model: higher education

systems page 6
1.2 Research schema of scholarship on higher education 9
1.3 Spending on tertiary education: private/public
percentage of education spending 2016 14
1.4 Global and national markets for higher education 18
1.5 International higher education markets 19
3.1 Clark’s triangle of systemic coordination 74
3.2 Types of systemic governance modes in higher education
policy 78
13.1 Number of Chinese journal articles on academic integrity
and academic misconduct (1999–2013) 372
15.1 Systems of higher education in Latin America:
privatization and enrolment after neoliberal shifts (1998) 433
15.2 Systems of higher education in Latin America:
privatization and enrolment after post-neoliberal shifts
(2016) 440

xii
Tables

1.1 Spending on tertiary education: private/public percentage

of education spending, 2000–2016 page 13
3.1 Classification of policy instruments and their shapes 92
3.2 Types of hybrid systemic governance modes in higher
education 94
7.1 Three nations in comparison 191
7.2 Performance measurement talk in Australia 195
7.3 Performance measurement talk in Canada 197
7.4 Performance measurement talk in the United Kingdom 198
8.1 Overview of Romzek’s four types of accountability 214
8.2 Overview of the different accountability instruments 216
8.3 Overview of accountability mechanisms in four European
higher education systems 234
10.1 Relative importance of the private HE sector in Europe
as percentage of total enrolments 272
11.1 Varieties of federalism according to formal framework
and federal relations 305
11.2 Distribution of US institutions and enrolment by
classification type (2017) 311
11.3 Provincial distribution of public universities in Canada 313

xiii
Notes on Contributors

Editors
Giliberto Capano is Professor of Public Policy at the University of
Bologna, Italy. He is the director of the Italian Centre for Research
on Universities and Higher Education Systems and co-editor of the
journals Policy & Society and the Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis. He specializes in public administration, public policy
analysis, and comparative higher education. His research focuses on
governance dynamics and performance in higher education and
education, policy design and policy change, policy instruments’
impact, the social role of political science, and leadership as an
embedded function of policy making.
His works on higher education have been published in various
international journals, including Higher Education, Higher
Education Policy, South European Society & Politics, Journal of
Legislative Studies, Public Administration, Journal of Comparative
Policy Analysis, Journal of European Public Policy, Comparative
Education Review, European Political Science, Policy Sciences, Policy
and Society, European Policy Analysis, Journal of Public Policy, and
Regulation & Governance. He has recently published Varieties of
Governance (co-edited with M. Howlett and M. Ramesh; Palgrave,
2015) and Changing Governance in Universities: Italian Higher
Education in Comparative Perspective (co-authored with M. Regini
and M. Turri; Palgrave, 2016).
Darryl S. L. Jarvis is Professor in the Department of Asian and Policy
Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at The Education
University of Hong Kong (formally the Hong Kong Institute of
Education). He previously held positions at the National University
of Singapore and the University of Sydney, Australia. He has published
widely in the areas of comparative political economy and comparative
public policy. His publications include Asia After the Developmental

xiv
Notes on Contributors xv

State: Disembedding Autonomy (with Toby Carroll; Cambridge

University Press, 2017), Transformations in Higher Education
Governance in Asia: Policy, Politics and Progress (with Joshua Ka
Ho Mok; Springer, 2019), Institutional Entrepreneurship and Policy
Change: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations (with Caner Bakir;
Macmillan, 2018), Markets and Development: Civil Society, Citizens
and the Politics of Neoliberalism (with Toby Carroll; Routledge,
2015), Financialisation and Development in Asia (with Toby Carroll;
Routledge, 2015), The Politics of Marketizing Asia (with Toby Carroll;
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), ASEAN Industries and the Challenge from
China (with Anthony Welch; Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),
Infrastructure Regulation: What Works, Why, and How Do We
Know? Lessons from Asia and Beyond (with Ed Araral, M. Ramesh,
and Wu Xun; World Scientific, 2011), International Business Risk:
A Handbook of the Asia-Pacific Region (Cambridge University Press,
2011), International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism:
Defending the Discipline (University of South Carolina Press, 2000),
International Relations. Still an American Social Science? Toward
Diversity in International Thought (with R. M. Crawford; State
University of New York Press, 2001), and Post-modernism and Its
Critics: International Relations and the Third Debate (Praeger, 2002).

Contributors
Germán Álvarez-Mendiola received his undergraduate diploma in
Sociology from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, and
Master’s and Doctoral Degrees in Educational Research from the
Centre for Advanced Research and Studies in Mexico. From 2002 to
2004 he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British
Columbia. Since 1993, he has worked for the Department of
Educational Research at the Centre for Advanced Research UNAM,
and is currently Head of the Department. He has extensive experience
as a teacher at secondary and high school levels, and as a professor at
undergraduate and graduate levels. His research interests focus on
public policies and organizational change in higher education, private
higher education, life-long learning policies and institutions, and adult
learners in higher education. He coordinates the book series Higher
Education Library of the National Association of Universities and
Higher Education Institutions (the Rector’s association in Mexico).
xvi Notes on Contributors

He is a member of the International Committee of the International

Workshops on Higher Education annual series.
Rose Amazan is a lecturer in the School of Education, University of
New England, Australia. Rose’s research and teaching is in the area of
international and developmental education. She has extensive
experience in many countries and has contributed to numerous
analyses of issues such as female skilled migration, diaspora
mobility, and gender and higher education in Africa and African
university partnerships. Her current research project explores the
issues surrounding the position of women in Ethiopian society,
particularly in relation to their increased participation as students
and teachers in higher education. She is also examining the
outcomes of Australian scholarships for Africans, including re-
integration, development of networks of practice among returnees,
and gender implications.
Kassahun Kebede Dawo is Director of the Quality Audit and
Enhancement Directorate in the Ethiopian Higher Education
Relevance and Quality Agency. He has participated in various
national and international trainings on higher education quality
assurance. He has served in the Ethiopian education system in
various capacities, including teaching English in two high schools,
leading the Department of Professional Science, and lecturing on
education courses in Hosanna College of Teacher Education from
2001–2005. He also briefly lectured in Dilla University, one of the
new universities in Ethiopia. Kassahun received his PhD in
International and Comparative Education.
Harry F. de Boer is a senior research associate at the Center for Higher
Education Policy Studies, University of Twente, the Netherlands.
Within the field of higher education studies, he specializes in
government–university relationships, steering models, policy analysis,
institutional governance, leadership and management, and strategic
planning. In his field of expertise, he participated in many national
and international studies and research-based consultancy projects, and
has published many edited books, book chapters, journal articles, and
reports on the aforementioned topics. He has lectured several higher
education and public administration courses at the University of
Twente, as well as international programmes. He is on the editorial
Notes on Contributors xvii

board of Higher Education Quarterly. In 2015, he was one of the

editors of and contributors to The Palgrave International Handbook
of Higher Education Policy and Governance and to the book Policy
Analysis of Structural Reforms in Higher Education (Springer).
Michael Dobbins studied political science and Slavic studies at the
Universities of Konstanz, Warsaw, and Rutgers. He completed his
doctoral dissertation in Konstanz, which dealt with comparative
higher education policies in post-communist Central and Eastern
Europe. In 2013 Michael was appointed Assistant Professor for
policy analysis at Goethe University Frankfurt. His main areas of
research are higher education policy, secondary education policy,
policy making in the EU, policy making in the USA, and
transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe as well as
the Caucasus countries.
His education research deals specifically with issues of governance, the
impact of internationalization, and partisan politics. Most recently, he
has focused on issues of school autonomy and educational
decentralization and the influence of teachers’ unions on educational
governance. He is also highly involved in teacher training as part of the
new educational science study programmes in Germany.
Miguel Alejandro González-Ledesma holds a PhD in Political Science
from the Scuola Normale Superior de Pisa, Italy. Since 2016 he has held
a postdoctoral position at the Research Institute on University and
Education of the National Autonomous University in Mexico. He is
also a lecturer on Geopolitics at the School of Philosophy and
Literature. His research interests lie in the area of Higher Education
studies, particularly governance, funding, quality assurance, and
student movements.
Åse Gornitzka holds a doctoral degree from the Faculty of Public
Administration, University of Twente, the Netherlands. She was
previously a senior researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Studies
in Research and Higher Education and at the Center for Higher
Education Policy Studies at the University of Twente. Gornitzka’s
main fields of academic interest are the transformation and
sustainability of the European political order in the area of education
and research policy, the dynamics of European-level governance sites,
xviii Notes on Contributors

the role of expertise in EU policy making, and the domestic impact of

the EU’s soft modes of governance.
Jeroen Huisman is Professor of Higher Education at the Centre for
Higher Education Governance of Ghent University, Belgium. He was
a researcher at the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies at the
University of Twente, the Netherlands (1991–2005) and Professor of
Higher Education Management at the University of Bath (2005–2013).
He is editor of the journal Higher Education Policy, co-editor of the
SRHE/Routledge book series, and co-editor of the Emerald series
Theory and Method in Higher Education Research. He is also
a member of editorial boards of various higher education journals
and a member of the Executive Committee of EAIR, a European
society for linking policy, research, and practice in higher education.
Kanishka Jayasuriya is Professor of Politics and International Studies,
Discipline Leader of the politics group, and Fellow of the Asia Research
Centre at Murdoch University, Western Australia. Prior to his current
appointment, in 2016 he was Professor of International Politics,
Director of the Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre, and
Professor of International Politics at the University of Adelaide. He
obtained his PhD from the Australian National University and served
as a postdoctoral fellow at Griffith University. He has held teaching and
research appointments in several Australian and overseas universities,
including the Australian National University, the University of Sydney,
Murdoch University, the National University of Singapore, and City
University of Hong Kong, China.
His research interests lie mainly in the areas of international and
comparative political economy. He has worked extensively on issues
of regulation, rule of law, and regional governance with reference to
Asia. His research focuses on the relationship between globalization
and the transformation of state structures, including in the areas of
social policy and higher education. He is also working on the dynamics
of capitalist crisis and democracy with particular reference to Asia.
Jens Jungblut is Associate Professor of Public Policy and Public
Administration at the Department of Political Science at the
University of Oslo. Prior to this he held postdoctoral positions at the
Scandinavian Consortium for Organizational Research at Stanford
University and the International Centre for Higher Education
Notes on Contributors xix

Research at the University of Kassel. He received his PhD from the

University of Oslo. Jens serves as a member of the steering committee of
the Standing Group on ‘Politics of Higher Education, Research, and
Innovation’ at the European Consortium for Political Research. His
main research interests include comparative higher education policy,
policy making and governance in higher education, and healthcare,
political parties and party politics, and organizational change of higher
education institutions. He has published several peer-reviewed articles
on topics relating to higher education policy, governance in higher
education, institutional change of higher education institutions, and
the role of student unions.
Renze Kolster is a research associate at the Center for Higher Education
Policy Studies of the University of Twente, the Netherlands, where he
mainly researches topics related to the internationalization of higher
education, higher education relevance, excellence in higher education,
and graduate employability. Recent publications include ‘Introducing
Excellence in Higher Education. Honours Programmes in the
Netherlands and Students’ Preferences’ (with R. L. Dijk and
B. Jongbloed; Journal of the European Higher Education Area,
2016), ‘Study Success in Higher Education’ (with F. Kaiser; Global
Challenges, National Initiatives, and Institutional Responses, Sense
Publishers, 2016), and ‘Academic Attractiveness of Countries:
A Possible Benchmark Strategy Applied to the Netherlands’
(European Journal of Higher Education, 2014).
Jenny M. Lewis is Professor of Public Policy in the School of Social and
Political Sciences, and Associate Dean of Research for the Faculty of
Arts at The University of Melbourne. She is also the founding Director
of the Policy Lab. Jenny is a public policy expert, with particular
interests in governance, the policy-making process, policy influence,
public sector innovation, and networks. She has published widely in
a range of international journals, is the author of six books (including
Academic Governance: Disciplines and Policy; Routledge, 2013), and
has been awarded American, European, and Australian research prizes.
Jenny spent nearly three years as a professor in Denmark before
returning to Australia as an Australian Research Council Future
Fellow in 2013. She is the President of the International Research
Society for Public Management, and a past President of the
Australian Political Studies Association.
xx Notes on Contributors

Peter Maassen is a professor of Higher Education Studies and deputy

head/research coordinator at the Department for Educational
Research, Faculty of Education, University of Oslo, Norway, where
he is also the academic coordinator of an Erasmus Mundus joint
master’s degree programme. Previously, he was the director of the
Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, University of Twente, the
Netherlands (1997–2000). His areas of academic specialization include
public governance (including policy reform and institutional change) of
higher education, university leadership and management,
organizational change in higher education, and the economic role of
higher education institutions in OECD countries as well as in Sub-
Saharan Africa. He is a member of the Executive Board of
the University College Oslo (Høyskole i Oslo), and of the Board of
the Centrum für Hochschulentwicklung. He was a member of the
international panel evaluating the Danish university reforms (2009),
and of the Norwegian governmental commission on higher education
(Stjernø Commission – 2007/08), as well as of the OECD review teams
for Japan and Finland.
Greg McCarthy is Professor and BHP Chair of Australian Politics at
Peking University, China. He also holds the Chair of Australian Politics
at the University of Western Australia. His main research interests and
extensive publications are on Australian politics and political culture.
His long-standing research focuses on transitional change within and
between nations. Recently, he has written on the internationalization
of Australian higher education governance, and the political
implications of the conversion of Australian higher education from
an elite to a mass and internationalized education system. In
addition, he has investigated the international relationship between
Australia and China as read through the policies of contemporary
Australian governments.
Robin Middlehurst is Professor of Higher Education and External
Policy Adviser in the Vice Chancellor’s Office, Kingston University,
London. She also serves as a policy adviser to the Higher Education
Academy, is a trustee of the British Accreditation Council, and is an
Advisory Board member of the Observatory on Borderless Higher
Education. Robin’s research includes borderless education and
internationalization, governance and leadership, and quality
assurance and enhancement in higher education. Her abiding interest
Notes on Contributors xxi

is in ‘higher education futures’. Her previous roles include Director of

Strategy, Research and International at the Leadership Foundation,
United Kingdom, co-designing and co-directing the UK’s Top
Management Programme for Higher Education; Director of the
Quality Enhancement Group of the Higher Education Quality
Council (and Director of Development at QAA), United Kingdom;
and academic posts at the University of Surrey and the Institute of
Education, London, England. Professor Middlehurst has published
extensively on higher education policy, leadership, and governance,
both nationally and internationally, and acts as a consultant for
governments and higher education agencies in the United Kingdom
and overseas.
Marino Regini is Professor Emeritus of Economic Sociology at the
University of Milan, Italy, where he has served as Dean and Vice-
Rector. He has been a visiting professor at several universities,
including Harvard, MIT, Johns Hopkins, and Duke. He has also
served as the President of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-
Economics, of which he is an honorary fellow; as President of the
Research Committee 44 of the International Sociological Association;
and as a member of the editorial boards of several journals, including
Socio-Economic Review, European Sociological Review, and European
Journal of Industrial Relations. Among his major books are Uncertain
Boundaries: The Social and Political Construction of European
Economies (Cambridge University Press, 1995), From Tellers to
Sellers: Changing Employment Relations in Banks (with J. Kitay and
M. Baethge; MIT Press, 1999), Why Deregulate Labour Markets? (with
G. Esping-Andersen; Oxford University Press, 2000), European
Universities and the Challenge of the Market. A Comparative Analysis
(Elgar, 2011), and Changing Governance in Universities (with Giliberto
Capano and M. Turri; Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
Julie Rowlands is a senior lecturer in education leadership within the
School of Education at Deakin University, Australia, and a member of
the strategic research centre, Research for Education Impact. Julie
researches in the areas of governance, higher education systems,
academic quality assurance, leadership, academic work, and
organizational change, taking a feminist, critical sociology of
education perspective. She is passionately interested in the role and
place of universities within social relations, and in the creation and
xxii Notes on Contributors

maintenance of power within and by universities, and at what cost.

Julie’s work has led to governance reform at a number of universities in
Australia and abroad. Her writing has been published in international
journals, including the British Journal of Sociology of Education,
Critical Studies in Education, Studies in Higher Education, Higher
Education Research, and Development and Discourse. Julie’s
monograph Academic Governance in Contemporary Universities:
Perspectives from Anglophone Nations was published by Springer in
2017, and she co-edited and contributed to the edited volume Practice
Theory and Education: Diffractive Readings in Professional Practice
(Routledge, 2017).
Xianlin Song is Associate Professor in the Department of Asian Studies
at the University of Western Australia. Her research focuses on the
current cultural transition and gender issues in contemporary China,
and more recently on international higher education. Her recent
publications include Women Writers in Post Socialist China (co-
authored with Kay Schaffer; Routledge, 2014), Bridging
Transcultural Divides: Teaching Asian Languages and Cultures in
a Globalising Academy (co-edited with Kate Cadman; University of
Adelaide Press, 2012), and Transcultural Encounters in Knowledge
Production and Consumption (co-edited with Youzhong Sun;
Springer and Higher Education Press, 2018).
Bjørn Stensaker is Professor of Higher Education at the University
of Oslo, and a research professor at the Nordic Institute for Studies
in Innovation, Research and Education in Oslo, Norway. He has
a special interest in studies of governance and change in higher
education, including studies of how external and internal quality
assurance impacts the higher education sector. He has published
widely on these issues in a range of international journals and
books. Professor Stensaker holds a master’s degree in Political
Science from the University of Oslo and a PhD from the Center
for Higher Education Policy Studies at the University of Twente,
the Netherlands. He is currently a member of the Danish
Accreditation Council, and a member of the International
Advisory Board of A3ES (the Portuguese Quality Assurance
Agency). He is also the current President of EAIR (the European
Higher Education Society). His latest book is Strengthening
Teaching and Learning in Research Universities. Strategies and
Notes on Contributors xxiii

Initiatives for Institutional Change (co-edited with G. T. Bilbow,

L. Breslow, and R. Van der Vaart; Palgrave MacMillan, 2017).
Pedro N. Teixeira is Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs and Associate
Professor of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Porto,
Portugal. He is also Director of CIPES (the Center for Research in
Higher Education Policies). He has been a member of Portugal’s
National Council of Education since 2014, and has served as an
adviser on higher education to the President of Portugal since
April 2016. He has also served on the evaluation panels for the
European University Association and the European Association for
Quality Assurance in Higher Education, on the Board of the BIAL
Foundation since 2015, and as a member of the Education Advisory
Board of the Foundation Francisco Manuel dos Santos, Lisbon.
He has published widely on higher education policy in a broad range of
scientific journals, and is the editor of Human Capital: Critical
Concepts in Economics, 4 vols. (with Christine Musselin; Routledge,
2014), Policy Design and Implementation in Higher Education
(Springer, 2013), and Public Vices, Private Virtues? Assessing the
Effects of Marketization in Higher Education (with David Dill; Sense
Publishers, 2011). He is also the editor of The Changing Public–Private
Mix in Higher Education – Patterns, Rationales and Challenges (Sense,
2017) and The International Encyclopedia of Higher Education
(4 vols, with Jung Sheol Chin; Springer, 2018). He is a member of the
Editorial Boards of Higher Education, the European Journal of Higher
Education, the Journal of the European Higher Education Area, and of
OEconomia: History/Methodology/Philosophy. He is also a member
of the Board of Governors and Secretary General of the Consortium of
Higher Education Researchers, a Research Fellow at the Institute for
the Study of Labor, and a member of the Scientific Committee of the
Réseau d’Etudes sur l’Enseignement Supérieur and the European
Network of Higher Education Doctoral Students.
Anthony Welch is Professor of Education at the University of Sydney,
Australia. His numerous publications address education reforms,
principally within Australia, and the Asia-Pacific. He has advised
state, national, and international agencies, and governments,
institutions, and foundations, in Australia, Asia, and the USA. Project
experience includes East and South-East Asia, particularly in higher
xxiv Notes on Contributors

education. His work has been translated into numerous languages, and
he has been Visiting Professor in the USA, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Japan, Malaysia, and Hong Kong (China).
A Fulbright New Century Scholar (2007–2008), DAAD Scholar, and
Haiwai Mingshi awardee, his recent books include The Professoriate:
Profile of a Profession (Springer, 2005), Education, Change and
Society (4th ed.; Oxford, 2017), ASEAN Industries and the
Challenge from China (with Darryl S. L. Jarvis; Palgrave, 2011), and
Higher Education in South East Asia (Routledge, 2011). He was
a consultant to the ADB project Higher Education in Dynamic Asia,
and directed the ARC project The Chinese Knowledge Diaspora (with
Rui Yang).
Don F. Westerheijden is a senior research associate at the Center for
Higher Education Policy Studies at the University of Twente, the
Netherlands, where he coordinates research on quality management.
Don mostly studies quality assurance and accreditation in higher
education in the Netherlands and Europe and its impacts, as well as
university rankings. Policy evaluation is another area of research
interest. Since 1993 he has co-developed the CRE/EUA Institutional
Evaluation Programme. He led the independent assessment of the
Bologna Process in 2009/2010. He was a member of the team that
developed U-Multirank, the online, multidimensional worldwide
university ranking. He is a member of the editorial board of the
journal Quality in Higher Education, and serves on international
boards of quality assurance agencies in Portugal and Hong Kong. His
publications include Policy Analysis of Structural Reforms in Higher
Education: Processes and Outcomes (with H. de Boer, J. File,
J. Huisman, M. Seeber, M. Vukasovic´, and D. F. Westerheijden;
Springer, 2017) and ‘Next Generations, Catwalks, Random Walks
and Arms Races: Conceptualising the Development of Quality
Assurance Schemes’ (with D. F. Westerheijden, B. Stensaker,
M. J. Rosa, and A. Corbett; European Journal of Education, 2014).
Jun Jie Woo is Assistant Professor in the Department of Asian and
Policy Studies, Faculty of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, the
Education University of Hong Kong, and was previously Assistant
Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. He received his PhD from the Lee
Notes on Contributors xxv

Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore,

and holds a Master of Science in International Political Economy from
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University. Prior to his current appointment, Dr Woo
was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew Centre for
Innovative Cities, Singapore University of Technology and Design. He
also serves as assistant editor for Policy & Society, an interdisciplinary
journal of policy research.
Preface

For historians, the rise and fall of civilizations have been relatively
contiguous exercises in force projection, colonization, economic
aggrandizement, overextension, exhaustion, and collapse, where the
competition for territory, markets, and physical and economic
resources has defined the ebbs and flows of history, explaining why
‘some parts of the world have grown rich and others have lagged
behind’ (Kennedy, 1989; Maddison, 2007, p. 1).
In the twenty-first century, the wealth of nations continues to rest on
trade and commerce, to be sure, but much less so on territory, extra-
territorial wealth extraction, mercantilist trade practices, or resource
competition. Ever-increasing amounts of wealth derive from
knowledge, information, and technology – commodities that defy the
confines of national borders or their amassing through military
acquisition. The rise of the fourth industrial revolution (i.e., the nexus
of technologies situated between the physical, digital, and biological
spheres and represented by fields such as artificial intelligence,
biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, and informatics) is largely
supplanting industrial and manufacturing-based economic activity as
core drivers of growth, employment, and national wealth (Klaus,
2017). While in 1917, for example, the largest economic enterprises
(by share value) listed on the New York Stock Exchange were energy,
steel, manufacturing, and resource-based firms, by 2017 it was
knowledge and technology firms – the likes of Apple Inc., Alphabet
Inc. (Google), Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, financial services,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms. Indeed, just 2 firms (AT&T
and General Electric) listed in the top 50 firms on the New York bourse
in 1917 remain there today, with the rest either delisted, acquired by
larger conglomerates, or having ceased trading (Kauflin, 2017).
This transformation from industrial-manufacturing to knowledge-
based economic power is no better personified than by Apple and the
iPhone. The value-capture in the development, manufacture, and

xxvii
xxviii Preface

assembly of the iPhone accrues disproportionately to the knowledge-

ownership of the technology rather than the physical production and
assembly of the hardware itself. As Gereffi demonstrates, assembled
entirely in China (via a Taiwanese firm, Foxconn), with a per unit
export value of $194.41, the value actually captured by China is
a mere $6.54. If the costs per unit of technology imports required to
assemble the iPhone are taken into account, then China’s share is
dwarfed by Korea at $80.85, Germany at $16.08, and by the rest of
the world at $62.79 (Gereffi, 2014, pp. 20–21). By far the greatest value
per iPhone produced accrues to Apple Inc., which retails the phone for
approximately $700 and uses the platform to generate stream revenues
through app and content sales, making Apple the most valuable
publically traded company in the world (Carroll and Jarvis, 2017, pp.
27–28; Feiner, 2019; Gereffi, 2014, pp. 20–21). Brains, not industrial
brawn, are what drive modern-day economic dynamism.
Little wonder that moving ‘up the value chain’ and positioning
economies in knowledge-based activities has become the dominant
policy mantra of the contemporary era. It also explains the ever-
increasing interest in and emphasis on the ‘knowledge factories’ of
the twenty-first century: higher education systems which collectively
produce the human capital and know-how that nurtures creativity,
innovation, and technological discovery – the zeitgeist of national
economic competitive advantage (Marton, 2006; Raunig, 2013). If
there are contemporary ‘empires’ they increasingly nestle around
those spaces where the metabolic rate of creativity is most intensive:
the ‘silicone valleys’ and hinterlands of commerce that leverage off
higher education systems and the complex, myriad talent networks
that arise. Richard Florida labels this the location geographies of
creative classes; or, in more formulaic policy terms, it is what
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff term the triple helix paradigm – the
interface between universities, government, and industry (Etzkowitz
and Leydesdorff, 1995; Etzkowitz and Zhou, 2009; Florida, 2002,
2005). Regardless of the nomenclature employed, the point is clear:
universities and higher education systems are the pillars that make
possible the knowledge economy of the twenty-first century and the
economic rewards that flow from it. They sit at the centre of modern-
day economic empires.
This reality has made higher education fertile ground for policy reform
as governments the world over seek to create universities of ‘world class
Preface xxix

standing’ and make higher education systems ‘fit for purpose’ (Gleason,
2018a, 2018b; Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). Transforming higher
education has become de rigueur, with higher education policy ‘being
“done” in new locations, on different scales, and by new actors and
organizations’ as never before (Jules and Jefferson, 2017, p. 124). The
introduction of new forms of managerialism, regulation, accreditation,
sector financing, institutional reporting and accountability regimes,
metrics-driven performance assessment of institutional and sector
outcomes, national and international rankings and benchmarking
practices, and performance-based remuneration are recasting higher
educational landscapes and the mechanisms by which they are governed.
But if the policy reform mantra surrounding higher education
appears universally singular, it would be wrong to conclude a form of
policy convergence, or, indeed, convergent trajectories or sector
outcomes. Any rudimentary survey of the landscapes of higher
education systems globally reveals contradictory realities – processes
of both convergence and divergence. Indeed, despite far-ranging
international pressures, the emergence of an international market in
higher education and enormous growth in cross-border student
mobility, pressures to achieve universities of world-class standing,
recruit high-calibre international academic talent, boost research
productivity and impact, or compete in global league tables, the
suites of policy, policy designs, and sector outcomes are as much
marked by hybridity as they are of similarity (King, 2010).
This volume grapples with this conundrum. It focuses on the
governance of higher education, exploring those vectors precipitating
change in the modalities and instruments of governance, and how they
interface at the systemic and institutional levels, and across geographic
regions.
By its very nature, however, focusing on governance is a necessarily
amorphic activity, composed of both inductive and deductive forms of
investigation. There is no settled analytical lens able to stabilize the
language of governance or explicate and fix the parameters of its
dimensions in a way that cartographers are able to map and reference
points in geographic space. As a conceptual rubric, governance remains
intellectually incongruent. While it is not the intention of this volume to
grapple with these larger meta-theoretical and conceptual issues, the
practical orientation of policy studies does require the emplacement of
ordering devices, or at least frameworks, that permit the comparative
xxx Preface

application of the concept (Brennan, 2007, p. 168). To that end, this

volume approaches governance in higher education across two
interrelated spectrums, each broken down into their constituent
parts. In Part II, governance is treated analytically and broken down
into sub-categories such as regulation (the tools and instruments of
governance, including quality assurance, accountability, and
management), system or structural elements of governance (the
composition and institutional design of the sector, including the
public–private mix), sub-structural elements of governance
(organizations and institutional-level decision making), and meta-
structural elements (internationalization). In Part III, the governance
of higher education is explored geographically, addressing regional
variations and similarities in the case of Europe, North America,
Asia, Africa, and South America. The volume is thus designed to
facilitate a thematic analysis of specific elements of governance, but
referenced more generally in relation to governance trends globally.
Ultimately, of course, no analysis of the governance of higher
education, especially viewed macroscopically and comparatively, can
hope to be exhaustive. Despite the increasing prevalence of relatively
uniform, meta-structural forces impacting national systems of higher
education, the manner in which these articulate and traverse
institutional settings and socio-political and economic national
contexts makes for a series of empirically rich landscapes. That said,
it is also the case that reform and transformations in the governance of
higher education have never been so intense and far reaching,
impacting not just the competitive dynamics of how higher education
systems are positioned, but the treatment of academic labour and the
opportunities for participation.
We hope this volume contributes to a deeper understanding of those
forces impacting and transforming the governance of higher education.
Giliberto Capano and Darryl S. L. Jarvis

References
Brennan, J. (2007) On researching ourselves: The difficult case of autonomy
in researching higher education. In C. Kayrooz, G. Akerlind, and M. Tight
(Eds), Autonomy in social science university research – The view from the
UK and Australian universities, pp. 167–182. London: Elsevier.
Preface xxxi

Carroll, T., and Jarvis, D. S. L. (2017) Disembedding autonomy: Asia after

the developmental state. In T. Carroll and D. S. L. Jarvis (Eds), Asia after
the developmental state: Disembedding autonomy, pp. 3–50. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Etzkowitz, H., and Leydesdorff, L. A. (1995) The triple helix – University-
industry-government relations: A laboratory for knowledge based
economic development. EASST Review, 14(1), 14–19.
Etzkowitz, H., and Zhou, C. (2009) Evolution of the university’s role in
innovation and the new Asian model. In J. A. Douglas, C. J. King, and
I. Fekker (Eds), Globalization’s muse: Universities and higher education
systems in a changing world, pp. 229–247. Berkeley: Berkeley Public
Policy Press.
Feiner, L. (2019) Apple is once again the most valuable public company in
the world. www.cnbc.com/2019/02/06/apple-is-once-again-the-most-valu
able-public-company-in-the-world.html
Florida, R. L. (2002) The rise of the creative class and how it’s transforming
work, leisure, community and everyday life. New York: Basic Books.
Florida, R. L. (2005) Cities and the creative class. New York; London:
Routledge.
Gereffi, G. (2014) Global value chains in a post-Washington consensus
world. Review of International Political Economy, 21(1), 9–37.
doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.756414
Gleason, N. W. (2018a). Introduction. In N. W. Gleason (Ed.), Higher
education in the era of the fourth industrial revolution, pp. 1–12.
Singapore: Springer; Palgrave Macmillan.
Gleason, N. W. (Ed.) (2018b). Higher education in the era of the fourth
industrial revolution. Singapore: Springer; Palgrave Macmillan.
Jules, T. D., and Jefferson, S. S. (2017) The next educational bubble –
educational brokers and education governance mechanisms: Who
governs what! In T. D. Jules (Ed.), The global educational policy
environment in the fourth industrial revolution: Gated, regulated and
governed, pp. 123–147. Bingley: Emerald.
Kauflin, J. (2017) America’s top 50 companies 1917–2017. Forbes. www.f
orbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2017/09/19/americas-top-50-companies-1917
-2017/#37a343b41629
Kennedy, P. M. (1989) The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic
change and military conflict from 1500–2000. London: Fontana Press.
King, R. (2010) Policy internationalization, national variety and governance:
Global models and network power in higher education states. Higher
Education: The International Journal of Higher Education and
Educational Planning, 60(6), 583–594.
xxxii Preface

Klaus, S. (2017) The fourth industrial revolution. New York: Crown

Business.
Maddison, A. (2007) Contours of the world economy, 1–2030 AD: Essays in
macro-economic history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marton, S. (2006) Education policy. In B. G. Peters and J. Pierre (Eds),
Handbook of public policy, pp. 231–248. London; Thousand Oaks:
Sage Publications.
Raunig, G. (2013) Factories of knowledge, industries of creativity. Los
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Johns Hopkins University Press.
Abbreviations

AACU Association of American Colleges and Universities

AAU Association of American Universities
AASCU American Association of State Colleges and Universities
ACCT Association of Community College Trustees
ACU American Capital University
AERES Agence de l’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseigne-
ment supérieur
AIU Asian International University
ARACIS Agenția Română de Asigurare a Calității în Învățământul
Superior
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BAN Badan Akredtitasi Nasional
BFUG Bologna Follow-Up Group
BHMN Badan Hukum Milik Negera
CAE Crédito con Aval del Estado
CAP changing academic profession
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences
CCDI Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CEI International Campus of Excellence
CEO chief executive officer
CEQ Course Experience Questionnaire
CHEA Council for Higher Education Accreditation
CIC Council of Independent Colleges
CMEC Council of Ministers of Education, Canada
CNE Comité National d’Evaluation
CNRS Centre national de la recherche scientifique
CPI Corruption Perception Index
DAAD Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst
E4 ENQA, EUA, ESU, and EURASHE
EEA European Economic Area

xxxiii
xxxiv List of Abbreviations

EMBA executive master of business administration

ENQA European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher
Education
EPRDF Ethiopia Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERA Excellence in Research for Australia
EROD Education Resource Organizations Directory
ESC Education Strategy Centre
ESG European Standards and Guidelines for Quality
Assurance
ESIB now known as ESU
ESU European Students’ Union
ETP Education and Training Policy
EU European Union
EUA European University Association
EURASHE European Association of Institutions for Higher
Education
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FTE full-time equivalent
GDP gross domestic product
HE higher education
HEI higher education institution
HEP Higher Education Proclamation
HERQA Higher Education Relevance and Quality Agency
HEs higher education system
IHE international higher education
IIEP International Institute for Educational Planning
ILO International Labour Organization
IPB Institut Pertanian Bogor
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education
ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung
IUCEA Inter-University Council for East Africa
KEJN Komitet Ewaluacji Jednostek Naukowych
KKN Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme
KNOW Krajowe Naukowe Ośrodki Wiodące
KRASP Polish Rectors Conference
LOLF Loi organique relative aux lois de finance
MBA master of business administration
MoE Ministry of Education
List of Abbreviations xxxv

MOET Ministry of Education and Training

NAICU National Association of Independent Colleges and
Universities
NASULGC National Association of State Universities and Land-
Grant College
NCBR Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju
NCCC National Counter Corruption Commission
NCN Narodowe Centrum Nauki
NGO non-governmental organization
NPM New Public Management
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
ONESQA Office for National Education Standards and Quality
Assessment
PRC People’s Republic of China
PRHEI private higher education institutions
PTP Perguruan Tinggi yang Diselenggarakan Pemerintah
QA quality assurance
REF Research Excellence Framework
SAP Structural Adjustment Programme
SHEEO State Higher Education Executive Officer Network
SSA Sub-Saharan African
(S)SCI (Social) Science Citation Index
STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and Medicine
TI Transparency International
TNE transnational education
TVET technical and vocational training
UMcedel Universiti Malaya’s Centre for Democracy and Elections
UMNO United Malays National Organisation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
VC Vice Chancellor
VPAR Academic Vice President
VPN virtual private network
part i

Theorizing Governance in Higher

Education
1 Theorizing the Governance of Higher
Education
Beyond the ‘Republic of Scholars’ Ontology
gi l i be rto c apan o a n d d ar r y l s . l . j a r v i s

1.1 Introduction
Theorizing the governance of higher education is a fraught business.
Not only can the experience of everyday interaction with the university
get in the way of ‘wider empirically informed theorizing about univer-
sity systems’, but the dominance of particular theoretical traditions
can cast a long shadow over how actors, systems and the governance
of higher education is studied (Brennan, 2007, 2010, p. 231).
Scholarship on higher education has long been dominated by organiza-
tional and functionalist literatures, with universities understood as
atomized organizational actors, each with discrete cultures and
characteristics, and analysed in relation to their functional attributes
(teaching, research, funding, recruitment), organizational composition
(structure, management, decision making), and the articulation of
sub-organizational interests (the professoriate, disciplines, students,
administrators).
Burton Clark’s influential analysis, The Higher Education System
(1983), epitomized such approaches, drawing on organizational sociol-
ogy as a key medium of inquiry and prism for theory building. Cross-
national variation in higher education systems, for example, Clark
situated in the distribution of authority across organizational socio-
logies and the degree to which they enjoyed autonomy relative to the
state. Continental European higher education systems Clark character-
ized as neo-Weberian, hierarchal, bureaucratized, and centrally coor-
dinated, with institutional autonomy constrained and academic
matters dominated by academic guilds. The British system, by contrast,
was more diffuse, characterized by state steering, with government
overseeing funding and sector composition but otherwise devolving
operating autonomy to universities, and institutional governance
characterized by academic collegiality and loose patterns of academic

3
4 Capano and Jarvis

organization. The American model, on the other hand, was fundamen-

tally diffuse. Institutional autonomy was procedurally ingrained but
accountable to multiple external stakeholders through public monitor-
ing of quality, outputs, and market needs, while institutional governance
was bifurcated between professional university/college administrators
who set strategic directions and academics exercising autonomy over
recruitment and academic matters in strongly organized disciplinary
contexts (Capano, 2011 Clark, 1983).
A central preoccupation of scholarship has thus concerned organiza-
tional forms and the interplay between authority and interests: how
these shape organizational, systemic and social-political environments,
and how they fundamentally impact or distort disciplinary authority
and professional autonomy.1 For a generation of scholars, institutional
interest articulation has thus dominated intellectual inquiry, informed
by a combination of institutionalist/neo-institutionalist perspectives
(March and Olsen, 1989; Olsen, 2007; Peters, 2001), the sociology of
organizations literature (Bowey, 1976; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983;
Eldridge, 1974; Silverman, 1970), neo-managerialist and public sector
management perspectives (Öberg and Bringselius, 2014; Reed, 2002;
Smeenk et al., 2009), and organizational/practitioner literatures in
leadership studies and human resource management (Brennan, 2007,
p. 171; Pusser, 2015, p. 61).

1.2 The ‘Republic of Scholars’ Ontology: Methodological

Upwardness, Downwardness, and Inwardness
This legacy of organizationally focused frameworks and questions of
disciplinary authority continues to cast a long shadow over contem-
porary scholarship – much, if not most, preoccupied with mapping
changes in the locus of authority and its impact on the ‘republic of
scholars’ (Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007). King (2007, 2009, 2010), Deem
(2010), Deem and Brehony (2005), Waks (2007), Morrissey (2013),
Enders, Kehm, and Schimank (2015), Lucas (2014), McCarthy, Song,
and Jayasuriya (2017), Miller (2014), and Dill (1997, 1998), for exam-
ple, explore the assault on disciplinary authority and the subjugation
of academic labour through processes of university corporatization,
the rise of managerialism, and the encroaching dominance of market
rationality. Slaughter, Rhoades, and Leslie (1997, 2004), Cantwell and
Kauppinen (2014), Fischer and Mandell (2018) and Mandell (2018)
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 5

address the rise of ‘academic capitalism’: the repurposing of universi-

ties as commercially driven/market responsive (entrepreneurial) enter-
prises and how this impacts professional autonomy, the organizational
sanctity of disciplines and academic leadership in organizational
management.
Ball (2010), Cloete (2006), Mok (2010), Mok and Cheung (2011),
Marginson (2007), and Sam and Sijde (2014) focus on the systemic
disruptions of globalization and the emergence of an international
market for higher education: how this drives institutional transforma-
tion and traditions of collegiate governance, and repositions authority
within management and dynamic international market forces.
Douglass (2009, 2012), Douglass, King, and Feller (2009), Jayasuriya
(2001, 2010, 2015a, 2015b), and Sandel (2012) similarly address the
sublimation of the ‘publicness’ of universities with the rise of regulatory
capitalism, the commodification of knowledge and the repurposing of
the university towards instrumental ends driven by the interests of
capital and the state, and which collectively discipline academic labour
(see also Castells and Cloete, 2017). Musselin (2012), Bleiklie and
Kogan (2007), Bladh (2007), Enders, de Boer, and Weyer (2013),
Enders, Kehm, and Schimank (2015), Rip and Kulati (2015), Taylor,
Webber, and Jacobs (2013) and Gumport and Snydman (2006) con-
cern themselves with mapping the directionalities of change rather
than attributing causality, identifying relatively uniform cross-
national challenges to academic autonomy, including the rise of man-
agerialism, metrics-based performance management of academic
labour, competitive rankings and impact dynamics, and the extensive
introduction of market- or quasi-market-based governance tools.
While it would be wrong to suggest such scholarship simply grapples
with the same sets of issues as did Clark and his contemporaries,
they are nevertheless clearly informed by the same ontological disci-
plinary standpoint and ‘triangle of coordination’ framework, where
competitive interest articulation between the state, market and disci-
pline defines the research landscape and outer analytical markers of
intellectual inquiry (see Figure 1.1) (Dill, 2014). Much contemporary
research, for example, continues the tradition of Cartesian triangula-
tion, positioning higher education systems within a three-dimensional
geometry in order to characterize governance types, hybridity, direc-
tionalities of change, and the extent of organizational and disciplinary
autonomy – a model that otherwise serves as the episteme of
6 Capano and Jarvis

State
Authority

Sweden
France USA
Canada Market
Japan Authority
UK
Italy
Academic
Authority

Figure 1.1 Triangle of coordination model: higher education systems

Source: Adopted from Clark (1983), p. 143.

comparative higher education studies (Becher, 1989; Clark, 1983b;

Dobbins et al., 2011; Jürgen Enders et al., 2013; Goedegebuure and
van Vught, 1996; Kosmützky and Krücken, 2014; Lapworth, 2004;
Teichler, 1996, 2014). As Jessop observes, research effort has tended to
focus on the rise of managerialism and ‘shifts in internal management
organization and capabilities’, knowledge commodification and ‘fit for
purpose’ market logics that reward commercializable research effort
and the ‘training’ needs of the economy, the ‘introduction of internal
markets and quasi-markets’, and the collective impact of these on
academic labour, ‘differentiated career tracks and growing [work]
precarity’ (Jessop, 2018, p. 105). Triangulation and empirical mapping
of the academic guild, in other words, has often triumphed over
broader and more sustained theoretical efforts focused on explanatory
causality.
Part of the reason for this doubtless lies in the aetiology of (academic)
guildism and how scholarship has investigated the professions. As
Musselin observes, ‘academics have always developed their activities
in organizational structures called universities’, producing a ‘mix
between professional power and autonomy on the one hand and
bureaucratic features on the other’ (Musselin, 2012, p. 26). This has
lent itself to studies exploring the sociology of professions, including
professional autonomy, practices of self-regulation, the construction
of group identity and the management of group membership through
specialist language, knowledge skills, processes of accreditation and,
in turn, how these manifest as barriers to control by the state and
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 7

market (see, for example, Freidson, 2001). When situated within an

organizational matrix, guildism has fused with Weberian analytical
tomes focused on organizational hierarchies, bureaucratization,
power, and interest articulation in intra- and extra-organizational
contexts to inform much, if not most, scholarship on higher education
(Donaldson, 2010; Musselin, 2014). Doubtless, too, this has been
amplified by a professional preoccupation with self-comparison.
Academic fraternities like to compare. Questions of working condi-
tions, salaries, research expectations, career progression, research sup-
port, academic autonomy, organizational and managerial cultures,
existential threats (organizational and discipline restructuring) and
resource issues tend to inform conversations and the ‘data points’ of
comparative assessment, reinforcing the ‘republic of scholars’ ontology
as the key prism of inquiry (Becher, 1989; Sultana, 2012, p. 353).
The result, we argue, has tended to entrench scholarship in relatively
narrow, somewhat insular, typically descriptive atheoretical terrains,
reflecting four interrelated and self-reinforcing methodological
tendencies – and which operate largely without acknowledgement or
critical scrutiny. First, what we term an implicit and overreaching
standpoint-guildism, in which the ontological centrality of the disci-
pline and of disciplinary authority serves as a kind of Rawlsian original
position or referent point, and from which change or, inter alia, ‘devia-
tion’ is plotted, measured and assessed (Rawls, 1999). Second, and
because of this, a tendency to exogenize agency responsible for change –
that is, change to the standing of disciplinary authority is nearly always
assumed to emanate from outside the academy/discipline, with organic
or internal disciplinary agency conceptually confined to group issues of
fidelity and protection. And third, because of the legacy of sociological-
organizational Weberian-informed scholarship, a tendency to locate
explanatory causality engendering change in mechanistic institutional-
group processes that are seen to emanate from above, external to the
organization, morph internally into the organization, cascading down-
wards and inwards to the discipline – methodological upwardness,
downwardness and inwardness. Fourth, methodological nationalism,
in which the locus of governance, its apparatus (laws, rules, methods,
tools, instruments) and geographic scope is predominantly confined to
sub-state and state localities – a tendency to ‘focus on internal institu-
tional processes and influences (e.g., faculty senate, shared governance,
administration, governing boards), and when external issues are
8 Capano and Jarvis

examined’ the tendency to situate these within national methodological

containers, largely refracting the influence of supra-national causalities
of change through state and sub-state institutional actors (Shahjahan
and Kezar, 2013, p. 25).
These methodological fiats have been far reaching, shunting research
into common thinking spaces and engendering relatively uniform con-
clusions about the causes and directionalities of change in higher
education systems globally. As Figure 1.2 depicts, by far the dominant
mode of conceptualization of higher education environments is
of increasingly complex, multilevel, multi-stakeholder governance
mechanisms, predominantly formal in nature but also situated among
informal cascading environmental norms/pressures, some interna-
tional in scope, that shape the operating environments of universities
and influence/steer decision making at the university/institutional level,
with consequential outcomes for organizational/disciplinary authority
and the structure of higher education systems – with most intellectual
effort focused on levels B and C and emblematic of a pervasive meth-
odological nationalism (Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007; Shahjahan and
Kezar, 2013 Sultana, 2012).
If there has been a shift in research effort and focus in the last few
decades, then clearly this has resided in level A-type scholarship, with
a growing number of studies examining the rise of international influ-
ences and how these create coercive pressures that informally/formally
reorient and reshape organizational level–outcomes and national
higher education systems. Erkkilä and Piironen’s study of the emer-
gence of de facto global policy instruments in knowledge governance –
such as international university rankings and research impact metrics,
for example – suggests their increasingly pervasive influence in govern-
ing the ‘conduct and policies of individuals and organizations’, steering
national research production and knowledge dissemination, and defin-
ing policy thinking about how to assess (measure) the performance and
competitiveness of higher education institutions/systems (Erkkilä and
Piironen, 2018, pp. 19, 83, 123; see also Espeland and Sauder, 2012,
pp. 100–107; Hazelkorn, 2011, 2014, 2017; Zlatkin-Troitschanskaia
et al., 2015). Relatedly, work focusing on regulatory regionalism
(Jayasuriya, 2008, 2009; Jayasuriya and Robertson, 2010; Nelson,
2013; Robertson, 2010; Robertson et al., 2016) has likewise high-
lighted the increasingly pervasive influence of regional governance
regimes (the Bologna Process, the MERCOSUR-Educativo and the
 Regulatory International
International
Regionalism
(Bologna, ALBA. standards/best
International
knowledge based
organizations
Global/national
university
International
student
International HE
Research impact me-
trics/Patents/scientific
International
academic
A
MERCOSUR- practices/policy /HE market discovery/Research
competition rankings mobility mobility
Educativo)* transfer policy (OECD) leadership

Stakeholders &
Minister/political Ministries/
Government community
head of HE Regulators
groups
University Senate/
Governing Board

Directionality of change
Lobbyists Community Sub-national/
and interest stakeholders federal/state/
groups (employer regional agencies B
groups, parents,
students)
University & sub-
University Fund-raising &
commercialization/ university advisory
Accreditation/ Research management Endowment
Electorate & Knowledge Transfer/ boards
quality assurance funding
voters agencies agencies research spin-offs
operating arms of
the university

Sub-organizational
managers (vice
presidents/senior
administrators

Pedagogy/
Teaching Colleges & External review/
& Learning Faculties benchmarking C

Students

Quality Research
assurance Academic
Curriculum
Discipline
Academic
labour

* European Union Bologna Process; Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA); the MERCOSUR-Educativo.

Figure 1.2 Research schema of scholarship on higher education

* European Union Bologna Process; Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA); the MERCOSUR-Educativo.
10 Capano and Jarvis

Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas) on domestic systems of higher

education governance, including standards, accreditation, skills recog-
nition and comparability (EHEA, n.d.; Elken, 2017; Gornitzka and
Stensaker, 2014; Jayasuriya and Robertson, 2010, p. 2; Magalhães
et al., 2013).
Importantly, however, we argue that the increasing volume of level
A-type scholarship has not so much disrupted organizationally focused
or ‘triangle of coordination’ frameworks as added another ‘influencing’
layer, ensconcing the same methodological fiats previously identified.
The directionalities of influence (Figure 1.2), for example, continue to
be viewed through methodologically national lenses and studied pre-
dominantly in relation to their modality of articulation downwards in
national, organizational/disciplinary/academic labour contexts.
In essence, scholarship on higher education has thus proceeded
uninterrupted, keeping intact the ‘republic of scholars’ ontology but
in the current context subject to influencing processes that increasingly
emanate from international and other spaces reflecting growth in
multi-stakeholder constituencies and thus more complex governance
environments (Figure 1.2, level A) (Bleiklie and Kogan, 2007).

1.3 Higher Education Research and the Governance Dilemma:

Convergence, Divergence, Variegation, or Hybridity?
Despite its contribution to a booming and voluminous literature, the
‘republic of scholars’ ontology has proven a far from adequate prism
for theory development or deepening explanatory insight into the
changing dimensions of governance in higher education. Indeed, we
argue that such an ontology has contributed to theoretical paucity and
confusion. In particular, the ‘republic of scholars’ ontology remains
conflicted about the degree of homogeneity and convergence around
what are typically identified as a narrowing range of policy approaches,
the forces driving these changes and the governance trajectories that
result. Methodological fiats such as standpoint-guildism, for example,
are used to remonstrate against the rise of academic capitalism by
mapping internationalization, efficiency and effectiveness metricization
(performance-based management, rankings, impact), market-based
intrusion and the adoption of instrumental rationalities (knowledge-
based economic activity) into an ever-widening number of jurisdictions –
on the one hand stressing their encroaching international omnipresence
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 11

and the uniformity of the outcomes that result, on the other highlighting
their localized modalities of articulation in discrete national/institutional
contexts (see, for example, Benavides et al., 2019; Croucher and
Woelert, 2016; Espinoza, 2017; Huang et al., 2018; Kail, 2011;
Provini, 2018; Thorkelson, 2019; Westerheijden, 2018). Sameness and
difference are venerated simultaneously, producing contradictory
empirical observations but without theoretical explanation. As Taylor
et al. (2013) observe, while higher education institutions, individuals,
and countries face unique issues – indeed, display national and institu-
tional specificity – many of these are in fact the same throughout the
world, producing policy convergence and ‘globalizing models’ of higher
education (Jarvis, 2017; King, 2007, 2010; Pilkington, 2014; Taylor
et al., 2013).
Such observations are generally explained with reference to exogen-
ous agency – in particular, structuralist and policy learning literatures.
Structuralist accounts, for example, emphasizing the increasingly per-
vasive imperatives of competitive international dynamics (rankings,
internationalization, and growth in the global higher education
market – now worth an estimated USD1.9 trillion), are seen as coercive,
producing convergence in higher education governance trajectories
because of common sets of structural constraints that impact all nation
states (Jürgen Enders, 2004; King, 2009, 2010; Marginson, 2014).
Similarly, learning literatures, emphasizing policy transfer (or diffu-
sion), where national decision makers and policy practitioners learn
through peer-to-peer interaction in discrete policy communities, or
adopt specific policy designs as a result of international benchmarking,
the standard-setting activities of international organizations (e.g.,
OECD, EU), or gravitate towards the adoption of ‘best practice’ frame-
works reflecting the dominant ideational values of international policy
communities, are likewise seen as conspiring to produce convergence,
or at least reducing diversity in the composition, structure and govern-
ance of higher education systems (Blanco et al., 2011; Busch and
Jörgens, 2005; Cao, 2012; Fawcett and Daugbjerg, 2012; Howlett
and Ramesh, 2002; Jarvis, 2014; Jayasuriya, 2001; Marsh and
Sharman, 2009; Obinger et al., 2013; Peck, 2011).
Theoretical indeterminacy and explanatory paucity have thus been
the hallmarks of the ‘republic of scholars’ ontology – an inability to
explain divergence, variegation, hybridity or, indeed, coextensive pro-
cesses of convergence and divergence.2 Despite the oft-heralded advent
12 Capano and Jarvis

of governance convergence around New Public Management (NPM)

approaches, or more broadly of liberalization, privatization, deregula-
tion, and marketization a quick survey of Australasian, European,
North American, or Asian states, for example, reveals vast and con-
tinuing differences in the degree to which these new governance modes
have been deployed – if at all (Capano, 2011; Goldfinch and Wallis,
2010). While liberalization is evident in some West European states
(England, Netherlands), Australia, and New Zealand, where reforms
have transformed universities into corporate actors and constructed
governance mechanisms to foster institutional competition in resource
allocation, identifying these same governance modalities in countries
such as Germany, Italy, Finland, and France, for example, proves more
difficult. Equally, the sense in which we can talk about the emergence
of a ubiquitous approach to sector governance across Asia, or conver-
gence in institutional forms, regulatory systems, or even of similar
national/institutional responses to the emergence of global rankings
and increasing international student mobility, overstates the degree to
which convergence as opposed to divergence epitomizes the govern-
ance of higher education (Jarvis and Mok, 2019).
These same observations apply to sector financing and the spread
of marketization, where higher education systems are typically
characterized as experiencing a general diminution in the degree
to which governments fund the sector relative to the rise of fee-for-
service and user-pays financing models. As Table 1.1 highlights,
these changes have been less than might be supposed. Indeed, the
percentage of private expenditure on higher education has
increased in some countries, remained static in others, and in
some countries declined. While the OECD average level of private
expenditure on higher education increased from 24.3 per cent in
2000 to 30.1 per cent in 2016, the composite differences between
countries such as Finland, Germany, and Belgium compared to
Korea, the United States, and the United Kingdom is stark. As
Figure 1.1 demonstrates, the mix of public versus private sector
financing displays continued variation rather than convergence
around a market–private funding financing norm.
While this is not to dismiss the emergence of important cross-
national governance trends or growth in global systemic forces
impacting national higher education systems, it does suggest that
cultures of governance continue to display national specificity and
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 13

Table 1.1 Spending on tertiary education: private/public

percentage of education spending, 2000–2016

Country 2000 2007 2013 2016

Chile 80.5 85.6 62.5 67.5

Korea 76.7 79.3 67.5 63.8
United States 68.9 67.4 63.7 64.7
United Kingdom 32.3 64.2 42.7 71.4
Australia 50.4 55.7 57.5 62.1
Israel 43.5 48.4 49.7 41.6
Canada 39.0 43.4 n/a 50.6
New Zealand – 34.3 48.1 48.4
Italy 22.5 30.1 32.8 35.3
OECD Average 23.4 30.9 n/a 30.1
Portugal 7.5 30.0 41.9 31.5
Mexico 20.6 28.6 32.2 29.1
Poland 33.4 28.5 19.6 16.1
Netherlands 23.5 28.5 29.7 29.2
Slovak Republic 8.8 23.8 24.5 19.7
Spain 25.6 21.0 30.7 31.7
Czech Republic 14.6 16.2 23.0 19.9
France 15.6 15.5 21.1 20.3
Germany 11.8 15.3 14.4 15.2
Austria 3.7 14.6 5.4 6.2
Ireland 20.8 14.6 22.3 26.3
Sweden 8.7 10.7 10.5 11.2
Belgium 8.5 9.7 10.7 14.2
Iceland 8.2 9.0 8.8 8.2
Finland 2.8 4.3 3.9 3.4

Source: OECD (2019).

that there are limits, or at least differences, in the degree to which

internationalizing forces or ‘globalizing models’ impact national con-
texts. More obviously, it also highlights the continuing problem of
theory development, the limitations of standpoint-guildism and the
‘republic of scholars’ ontology as analytical vantage points able to
adequately explain international/national governance trajectories or,
more fundamentally, whether the ‘triangle of coordination model’
remains fit for purpose.
 Key
100

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fi
nl
an
Lu No d
xe rw
m ay
bo
D urg
en
m

= Private
ar
Au k
st
r
Ic ia
el
a
Sw nd

Source: OECD (2019).

ed
G en
re

= Public
Sl ece
ov
Ar enia
ge
nt
Be ina
lg
G ium
er
m
Sl a
ov P ny
ak ola
C R n
ze ep d
ch u
R blic
ep
ub
Fr lic
an
c
La e
tv
Es ia
t
In oni
do a
ne
s
Tu ia
rk
Li ey
th
ua
n
Ire ia
la
nd
N Mex
et
he ico
rla
Po nds
rtu
ga
Sp l
a
R in
us
si
a
Ita
H
un ly
ga
ry
N
ew Isr
Ze ael
al
a
C nd
an
ad
Au a
Figure 1.3 Spending on tertiary education: private/public percentage of education spending 2016

st
ra
lia
Ko
C re
U o a
ni lom
te
d bia
St
at
es
C
U hi
le
ni
te Ja
d p
Ki an
ng
do
m
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 15

1.4 Beyond the Republic of Scholars Ontology: Theorizing

Convergence and Diversity in the Governance of Higher
Education
In this section we suggest the need to move beyond the ‘republic of
scholars’ ontology: in part as a corrective to the methodological fiats
associated with it, in part to support serious theory-building efforts able
to adequately account for contradictory governance patterns across
higher education systems. To do so we suggest three elemental but
necessary correctives to the analytical focal plane that has traditionally
informed studies of higher education governance. First, abandoning
standpoint-guildism and adopting political economy and market segmen-
tation lenses of inquiry. Second, abandoning methods of inquiry that
situate the locus of change predominantly in mechanistic institutional-
group processes and adopting instead frameworks that focus on the
sociology of goods, their classification and value construction (esteem,
reputation) as central drivers in market stratification and coextensive
processes of divergence and convergence. And third, adopting more
analytically rigorous conceptions of convergence and governance as
a means of overcoming what we term is a false empiricism – that is, the
tendency to conflate policy labels and political rhetoric with policy instru-
ments and governance tools to produce overly inflated images of con-
vergent governance trajectories. As the core object of inquiry, we argue,
governance needs greater analytical precision and should be understood
as constituted by three interrelated, yet distinctive elements which are
nearly always in tension with one another: politics, polity and policy
(Treib, Bähr, and Falkner, 2007). We explore each of these issues in turn.

1.4.1 Political Economy and Market Segmentation

As noted, the countervailing forces of internationalization and national
specificity have been a persistent theoretical black hole for scholars
concerned with the governance of higher education – that is, observa-
tions about ever-greater levels of convergence around ‘globalizing
models’ but set amid continuing national distinctions. As also noted,
in part this has arisen as a result of scholars mapping the impact of what
have been seen as international structural forces encroaching into
domestic governance contexts, with variation and diversity explained
in relation to residual (institutional and national) path dependencies
16 Capano and Jarvis

(Berger and Dore, 1996; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, 2010; Peck and
Theodore, 2015). Such approaches, we contend, are methodologically
flawed since they assume international structural forces (benchmark-
ing, rankings, league tables, internationalization, etc.) to be relatively
uniform and spatially ubiquitous – again, in part reflecting methodo-
logical fiats such as standpoint-guildism, the propensity to identify
and locate agency-effecting change in exogenous processes because of
methodological upwardness, downwardness, and inwardness, and to
analyse these processes predominantly through methodologically
national lenses producing contradictory empirical observations about
convergence and diversity.
In contrast, we suggest that notions of structural or internationally
coercive pressures need to be understood not by their ubiquity across
national spaces but by their spatial unevenness. Here, we look outside
higher education studies to other disciplines for appropriate analytical
frameworks. Borrowing spatial concepts from economic geography
provides a particularly useful means of disaggregating notions of glo-
balization, ‘globalizing models’, or an ‘international market place’ for
higher education and thus the supposed pressures of league tables,
student mobility, global knowledge competition, or international
benchmarking practices as omnipresent structural forces shaping the
policy choices of countries in essentially similar ways. Christaller’s
place theory (Christaller and Baskin, 1966), for example, explains
urban/market hierarchies as a function of their spatial and intrinsic
inequalities. These result as a consequence of the differing efficiencies/
qualities/technicalities to which goods/services can be supplied to
markets relative to the distance that consumers need to travel to acquire
them. In Christaller’s thesis, goods have differing ‘thresholds’: the
higher the value of the good, the higher the ‘range’ or maximum
distance consumers will travel to acquire the good and the higher the
price they are willing to pay for that good/service. This inverse relation-
ship between the ‘threshold’ of goods and the ‘range’ tolerance for
purchasing them thus produces a spatial configuration of urban cen-
tres, dispersing them hierarchically relative to the value order of the
goods and services they produce. This creates distinctive spatial pat-
terns with a relatively small number of large urban centres producing
higher-order goods and services separated by large distances (specialist
financial services, for example, in New York and London), while
numerous smaller urban centres produce lower-order goods and
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 17

services which are separated by smaller distances (printing, computer

repair, or diagnostic services, for example) (Jarvis, 2011; Neal, 2008).
Christaller’s conceptualization helps us differentiate between markets
and the discrete spaces within which specific goods and services compete.
For example, if we take the threshold of financial services produced in
London or New York and attempt to identify the market space these
occupy relative to competitor financial centres, it would obviously be
inaccurate to view Manila’s or Managua’s financial services sector as
competitor cities producing similar goods and services with similar
thresholds. Rather, London and New York compete in highly discrete
market spaces reflecting a complex series of specialist capacities and
financial technologies that are not spatially dispersed but highly concen-
trated – that is, dense networks of financial knowledge, large capital
markets, specialist systems of valuation, clearance and settlement, risk
products and underwriting (derivatives markets), international debt
securities, global insurance underwriting, and specific regulatory systems
and practices. By contrast, Jakarta’s and Malaysia’s financial services
sectors operate in more circumspect market spaces, including Islamic
banking, insurance, back office treasury processing, and, in the case of
Labuan (an offshore financial facility in Malaysia), ship registration,
commodity trading, and wealth management, competing with financial
centres such as Dubai rather than London, New York, Singapore or
Hong Kong (Gipouloux, 2011; Woo, 2016).
We can apply place theory and this same logic to higher education
and assumptions about an ‘international market for higher education’
or processes of internationalization and ‘global knowledge competi-
tion’. Different countries and HEIs compete in distinct markets, and
not necessarily in a unified or vertically integrated global higher educa-
tion market. This reflects the different thresholds of educational ser-
vices produced in, say, the United States compared to Malawi, to use an
extreme example; or by Harvard University compared to Southern
Arkansas University: Harvard University has a global market thresh-
old, while the market threshold for Southern Arkansas University is
predominantly local and regional.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 attempt to depict the idea of market segmentation
and that different countries and HEIs have different market thresholds
(real or perceived) for the educational services and research they
produce. As Figure 1.4 also suggests, assumptions that competition
between countries and among HEIs is distributed uniformly, or that in
18 Capano and Jarvis

United Kingdom
ROK

o
xi c
lia
tra

Me
US s
Au

Japan
A

NZ

International
s Market Sw
land itz
ther er
lan
Ne d
Sw
ce ed
an en
Fr Ita
ly
S. Africa

Norway
Canada

Spain
Finland

an
m
G er

Figure 1.4 Global and national markets for higher education*

* This figure attempts to represent the relative spatial thresholds of countries
participating in what might be termed a ‘global’ higher education market
relative to the size of their higher education sectors. Nominally, this reflects
the number of inbound international students relative to domestic students.
Further, the figure also attempts to represent the number of HEIs as
a proportion of the total HEIs in that country ranking highly in international
league/reputational tables. The idea is to depict the greater weight, exposure or
leadership in higher education that some countries enjoy relative to others, and
thus the highly uneven segmentation and spatial distribution of centres
(countries and HEIs) of higher education.

the case of ‘global knowledge competition’ Spain, the United States,

Japan, or Mexico compete in the same sets of research domains and with
the same coextensive sets of commercial–industry research collabora-
tions, research impact, or research networks, is clearly inaccurate.
The composite endowments of higher education systems in the
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and some Western
European states, for example, are manifest in terms of research leader-
ship, the number of international students they attract, levels of academic
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 19

mobility, scientific patents, and investment in research infrastructure –

and are non-comparable to countries in the Global South, the Middle
East, or South America. Similarly, within countries such as the United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, or Australia, market segmentation is
institutionally stratified, with only some HEIs competing in certain inter-
national research spaces (or producing educational services or research
outputs with similar thresholds), while others compete in more circum-
scribed, domestically focused domains specializing in vocational training
or liberal arts education, for example.
Added to these processes, we can also observe religious and language
segmentation as well as the existence of regional education markets (see
Figure 1.5). In Southeast Asia, for example, the emergence of Islamic
higher education services, most recently in Malaysia and Indonesia, has

Islamic Higher Education

Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia

Language Markets
Bhasa, Francophone

Regional Education Markets

South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina,
Chile, China

Regional Education Hubs

Singapore, Hong Kong, Qatar,
Dubai, Abu Dhabi

Global Higher Education

Market
USA, UK, Australia, Canada,
Germany, France, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
New Zealand

Figure 1.5 International higher education markets

20 Capano and Jarvis

seen enormous growth in inbound international students from the Middle

East and Africa, while Singapore and Hong Kong’s education hubs
compete predominantly for Asian students – in the case of the former,
predominantly for students from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) countries, and in the case of the latter, overwhelmingly for
students from mainland China (Jarvis and Mok, 2019; Welch, 2017).
The point, obviously, is that notions of globalization, internatio-
nalization, or top-down systemic ‘global’ forces impacting countries
and HEIs in broadly similar ways are anomalous in contexts of deep
market segmentation. Indeed, market segmentation is the principal
driver precipitating divergence in the governance trajectories of
higher education systems, and it explains why structural or ‘global’
pressures are necessarily uneven in their distribution and impact on
countries and HEIs.

1.4.2 Commodification and Stratification: The Sociology

of Higher Education Markets
A second, and related, theoretical lens useful to framing how we might
explore the forces propelling change in the organization and govern-
ance of higher education relates to notions of commodification and
the classification of goods: specifically, the sociology of markets and
market operation – how goods are classified, quality is constructed,
value differentiation is determined, and market stratification is pro-
duced. As noted, higher education is typically viewed in relation to an
encroaching ‘academic capitalism’: the commodification of academic
labour outputs (research, knowledge commercialization, innovation,
patents), the commodification of academic (and vocational) training in
relation to students and the labour needs of the economy, or the
reorganization of higher education as a result of the systemic forces
of international market/knowledge competition. As also noted, mar-
ketization and commodification have become the central, if not domi-
nant, motifs through which assaults on disciplinary autonomy have
been understood – in part a reflection of the continuing dominance of
the ‘republic of scholars’ ontology.
Strangely, however, this scholarship has been less than insightful in
terms of the workings or actualization of marketization and commodi-
fication in higher education and its relationship to governance transfor-
mation, sector organization, or processes of differentiation among
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 21

higher education systems (nationally and institutionally). Too little

work, for example, has explored the sociology of markets in relation
to value construction or how higher education goods become classified –
processes that are necessary to both market formation and operation,
but also instrumental to segmentation and product differentiation.
Much scholarship on higher education, for example, explores the ‘inter-
national market’ for higher education (Davis, 2016; Gachon, 2013),
often in reference to increasing international student mobility, and often
in relation to the greater value now placed on higher education in terms
of access, participation, social mobility, and competitiveness. Virtually
absent from such perspectives, however, has been any examination or
theoretical explication of what the international or national ‘market’
for higher education is: how goods are delineated, prices determined,
demand distributed, and value apportioned – in essence, the social
demand drivers which influence how governments and institutional
actors respond to and organize governance of the sector or, more
fundamentally, how institutional power, prestige, networks of influence
and the management of access (the creation of product/access scarcity)
creates supply-driven demand (Musselin, 2010).
In part this is not the fault of scholars of higher education, but reflects
a deeper intellectual neglect among economists more generally. As Lie
notes, while the ‘market’ is a central category in economics, it ‘receives
virtually no extended discussion in most works of economic theory or
history’ (Lie, 1997, p. 342). Instead, the ‘market’ is typically denoted by
abstraction: price uniformity within specific categories of goods or
areas, market clearance when the supply of goods matches demand,
and transactional relationships in the supply and consumption of
goods and services – what Lie terms an ‘ontological indeterminacy’
which allows for the universal application of the ‘market’ concept
(Lie, 1997, p. 342).
This is also true of its usage among scholars of higher education,
where the ‘market’ is treated as a central variable in terms of its role
in structurally ordering, or at least strongly influencing, the supply of
products relative to the demand of consumers (students, business,
governments, the economy) and institutional decisions in terms of
resource allocation, hiring, and planning. In doing so, however, the
‘market’ concept is reduced to a set of demand-driven externalities
that create incentives to which governments and organizational actors
are seen to respond – a highly reductive ‘exchange economy’
22 Capano and Jarvis

framework that is ill-equipped to capture the complex decisions of how

institutions/higher education systems are valued relative to others, or
how agential decisions about value and the selection of programmes,
institutions, and countries occurs in the absence of information
transparency given the ethereal nature of the educational services
‘consumers’ are ‘purchasing’. Most ‘consumers’ (students, parents,
the public – indeed, academic labour), for example, are ill-equipped
to assess quality or understand the product on offer, the value of the
product once conferred (in terms of impact on opportunities, life-time
earnings, career progression and, more broadly, social mobility), or the
tangible skills/knowledge that will be ‘delivered’ upon purchase. At the
same time, as DiMaggio notes, for the ‘market’ concept to work and
have theoretical veracity, common categories and understandings must
operate, since they are what enable economic actors to make decisions
and engage in ‘economic action’ (as quoted in Beckert and Musselin,
2013, p. 5). Attempting to explain higher education governance exclu-
sively in relation to the market concept and an exchange economy
framework thus remains problematic, especially in the absence of
common market categories or understandings and in a context where
market opacity and deep information asymmetries tend to typify the
sector.
Similar examples of theoretical indeterminacy in the application of the
market concept are also displayed in recent research on rankings (see
Figure 1.2; Erkkilä and Piironen, 2018; Espeland and Sauder, 2012;
Hazelkorn, 2011, 2017; Marginson, 2014), which evolved ostensibly
to overcome information asymmetries and provide consumers with
a means of mapping the global and national markets of higher education
in terms of institutional quality (measured against specific performance
metrics and reputational esteem measures). Yet much of the research
focus has concerned itself with addressing the utility of rankings: how
the information they generate is used in terms of institutional strategic
positioning strategies, or how they impact policy making and the percep-
tions of decision makers in terms of sector performance. Scholarship has
thus far failed to appreciably integrate rankings into fuller theoretical
explanations in ways that are able to situate their role in mediating
governance outcomes or the ‘structural’ role they play in determining
national governance practices and sector organization.
Noticeably absent too from research on rankings are discussions
about the construction of quality, reputation, and the emergence of
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 23

market classification regimes. The construction of quality is not

a socially or politically benign process. Classification regimes are, by
definition, reflexive – they reflect specific values. More obviously, they
also reflect power relations, the distribution of materiality (resources),
influence, and the institutional reproduction of ‘prestige’ through cre-
dentialism, hierarchies and access to networks (i.e., elite ‘club’ goods)
(Jessop, 2018, p. 104). Intrinsically, rankings reflect inequalities, how
certain institutional actors possess specific traits relative to others, or
how they confer on those who access those institutions specific advan-
tages relative to others (Beckert and Musselin, 2013; Fligstein, 2001;
Jessop, 2017).
Critical research frameworks around rankings, however, have
gained little traction, failing to feature as part of a broader theoretical
attempt to explain the spatially uneven distribution of ‘quality’ and
‘esteem’, the persistence of dense networks of research concentration
in relatively few geographic/institutional locations, or the apparent
embeddedness of institutional esteem within relatively few countries/
institutions and which changes seemingly very little over time. Absent
from such perspectives, for example, has been any sustained theoretical
analysis of how higher education goods and the markets for them
evolve, why certain higher education markets display relative consis-
tency or equilibrium in the distribution of institutional forms,
specializations and esteem measures, why others fail, or how markets
(especially around issues such as reputation) consolidate and dominate.
In highlighting these perspectives, we are not suggesting their adop-
tion as the primary lens for exploring the governance of higher educa-
tion. Rather, we note them insofar as they are significant because of
their absence and because of the potential theoretical pathways they
offer for more powerful explanatory accounts of governance patterns
in higher education.

1.4.3 Convergence and Governance: Definition

and Exposition
A third and necessary corrective to conceptualizing and theorizing the
governance of higher education rests in definitional precision, particu-
larly in the deployment of key variables such as convergence and
governance. Both concepts have tended to be employed intuitively,
often without analytical exploration, in the process obviating their
24 Capano and Jarvis

explanatory veracity and hindering theory development. As Pollit

(2001) notes, as an analytical concept convergence is conceptually
fungible and highly fragile, and typically operationalized in ways that
are unable to capture the complexity of processes that occur at multiple
levels (government, civil service, organization, sector), through multi-
ple filters and actors, and across national and institutional spaces which
produce a spectrum of convergent and divergent outcomes. In the
context of higher education these observations are particularly cogent.
While institutional isomorphism and changes in higher education
governance are often characterized as systemic, exogenous, hierarchical,
and top down (methodological upwardness, downwardness, and
inwardness), such changes often have less to do with the ‘dictates of
the global economy or the functional necessity of increased efficiency’ as
with the local and national contexts within which political symbolism,
governance fashions and the rhetoric of political discourse manifests.
Policy transfer and the language of convergence, in other words, often
conceal ideological-political agendas, with agential actors seeking
to preserve or advance particular interests. The language of reform,
increased efficiency, deregulation, or marketization, for example,
might often be present but absent an ‘equivalent amount of action’ in
terms of implementation of these practices, or they may be embraced and
celebrated in the rhetorical sense as political agendas to press for or resist
change. Indeed, what might seem like the adoption of a similar institu-
tional or policy design may in practice conceal fundamentally divergent
on-the-ground institutional/system norms (Pollitt, 2001, p. 934).
Goldfinch and Wallis (2010) take this analogy further, stratifying the
notion of convergence along a continuum: the convergence of ideas
(including paradigms, models, values, and interpretations of policy
approaches in terms of the relationship between state and market, the
role of government and the mechanisms of governance); convergence
around ‘policy rhetoric’, in which buzzwords, clichés, and a specific
language becomes the dominant discourse; convergence in legislation,
organizational/institutional structures and policy design, in which
organizational characteristics might be copied or transferred; and con-
vergence around policy practice and implementation, in which styles
of decision making, the methods of framing policy choices, and the
ideas and values that inform them might be emulated and executed
(Goldfinch and Wallis, 2010, pp. 1101–1102). The point, of course, is
that each type of potential convergence is subject to variation reflecting
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 25

agential authority and interests, organizational and institutional socio-

logies, the socio-political environment, resource capacities, institu-
tional legacies, and the socio-legal context – and which collectively
produce inherent diversity (or what might be termed ‘hybridity’; n2)
in how policy ideas are translated into practice and deployed in specific
organizational and institutional contexts. As Goldfinch and Wallis
note, ‘structures that seem similar at a distance may vary widely in
practice’ (2010, p. 1102).
Holzinger and Knill (2005) have also attempted to address what they
perceive as ‘theoretical deficits in the study of convergence’, in part by
expanding the theoretical and analytical scope of the concept in order to
understand both its multi-causality and the varying forms of conver-
gence that may obtain. Specifically, they differentiate between (a) the
degree, (b) the direction and (c) the scope of convergence. The degree of
convergence refers to the similarity of policy outputs (the policies
adopted by a government) and policy outcomes (the actual effects of
a policy in terms of goal achievement). In higher education, policy out-
puts might include certain governance arrangements, policy instruments,
and the policy solutions adopted for specific issues or goal attainment
(funding, student grants, internationalization). Policy outcomes refer to
the results achieved in respect of various internationally recognized
indicators, such as higher education participation rates; the percentage
of citizens with a tertiary degree in a specific age cohort; the percentage of
students getting the degree in a specific time period; research productivity
in terms of patents, impact, or quantum; equality (i.e., the level of social
mobility ensured by the HE system); or the number of foreign students
enrolled in the higher education system – among others.
The direction of convergence, by contrast, indicates the extent to
which convergence coincides with an upward or downward shift of
the mean from time t1 to t2. The mean can refer to both policy outputs
and policy outcomes. Finally, the scope of convergence focuses on
the absolute number of policy domains that are actually affected by
a certain convergence mechanism(s): for example, the total number
of countries and policy areas which demonstrate some form of
convergence.
In Holzinger and Knill’s schema, convergence is thus disaggregated,
such that the adoption of similar policy instruments designed to realize
specific goals may appear broadly similar across multiple domains,
while the policy outputs (i.e., the actual achievements or attainment
26 Capano and Jarvis

of the policy goals) may show substantial variation. At one and the
same time, convergence and divergence can thus inform the outcomes
in particular policy domains (Knill, 2005).
Goldfinch and Wallis’, Pollitt’s, and Holzinger and Knill’s theoretical
schemas thus suggest the need for greater caution in making definitive
observations about convergent governance trends or assuming decreas-
ing diversity in in the governance of higher education as a result of
structural or ‘globalizing’ forces. Rather, their approaches highlight
the more complex, dynamic, and often contradictory mechanisms at
play in governance, whether from the perspective of agential interests,
ideational formation, or the political ends to which governance
approaches and tools are adopted and deployed, and how. Taking
such perspectives seriously, we suggest, and operationalizing them in
scholarship on higher education is necessary if theory development is to
be realized and transformations in the governance of higher education
more adequately explained in both national and comparative contexts.
Finally, we note similar observations in relation to governance:
a core concept employed in countless studies – indeed, the undergirding
intellectual rationale of comparative higher education scholarship –
but typically invoked absent definition or analytical dissection. Too
often, governance is conflated with government and, in turn, with
public management and administration, or in other contexts serves as
a proxy for empirical/historical description of sectoral/system compo-
sition or reductive institutional mapping of higher education systems
and their regulatory/institutional frameworks. Largely absent from
scholarship on higher education governance, for example, have
been attempts to break down governance into distinctive analytical
components in order to facilitate more nuanced research supporting
theory development. A useful approach pioneered by Treib et al.
(2007), for example, disaggregates governance into three interrelated
dimensions: politics, polity, and policy – each necessary to the other,
but in ways that are often in tension. In Treib’s schema, for example,
politics reflects the ways and means by which the myriad preferences of
public and private interests are accommodated within policy choices
and modulated into specific actions, and how political processes are
deployed to achieve enforcement of these actions. Political governance
is understood along a continuum of two opposing ideal types: (1)
a decision-making system where only public actors are involved; and
(2) a decision-making system where only private actors are involved.
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 27

Obviously, these ideal types rarely obtain in practice, and thus politics
is constituted by myriad forms of hybridity (n2). The polity dimension,
on the other hand, considers the institutional architecture and the
constellation of authority and its location in relation to decision
making and implementation (concentrated, hierarchical, or diffuse),
and whether authority is highly institutionalized or informal, inclusive,
or exclusive. And finally, the policy dimension refers to the ‘mode of
political steering’ in terms of the instruments present: the nature of legal
‘bindingness’ or hard versus soft law, ridged versus soft approaches to
policy implementation, directed versus consultative (suggestive), stan-
dards versus procedurally based, sanctions versus incentive based
(Tollefson et al., 2012; Treib et al., 2007, pp. 5–11).
Again, we highlight this scholarship not as a definitive account or
settlement of the analytical constitution of governance, which remains
a vexed and highly contested theoretical concept (Bevir, 2013; Bevir
and Krupicka, 2011; Peters, 2012; Voegelin, 2003). Rather, we do so as
a means of suggesting the need for greater analytical rigour in the
deployment of the concept if the problem of false empiricism and the
endless, and analytically non-grounded, observations about govern-
ance, governance trajectories, and governance convergence in higher
education are to be overcome. To paraphrase Fligstein and Dauter,
because so many scholars use the same or similar concepts but ascribe
to them different meanings and apply them in different contexts, con-
ceptual clarity and theory development become at best muddied and
at worst impossible (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007, p. 106). Analytical
precision remains key to theory building and enhancing explanatory
power and insight.

1.5 Conclusion
The predominance of the republic of scholars ontology arises in part
because of its institutive appeal. As we have argued in this chapter,
however, it is also theoretically problematic, limiting the prospects for
theory development because of the methodological fiats associated
with it – in particular, the tendency to explain governance in relation
to mechanistic group processes mediated by standpoint-guildist per-
spectives and viewed predominantly through the sociology of organi-
zations and methodologically national lenses. To be sure, we are not
suggesting that such perspectives are entirely without merit. Rather, we
28 Capano and Jarvis

suggest that much of the research produced has tended to be empiri-

cally descriptive as opposed to analytically explanatory, and tends to
produce circular and inconclusive perspectives that generate often
contradictory observations about the drivers and pathways of govern-
ance in higher education.
The three potential research domains we have identified suggest a
possible way forward. They offer the possibility of theoretical
accommodation in explaining the twin realities of heterogeneity
and convergence in the governance patterns of higher education,
and simultaneously of overcoming methodological nationalism and
organizational sociologies as the dominant vantage points for
explaining governance types. In highlighting these perspectives,
however, we are not proscribing their necessary adoption as the
sole or primary frameworks through which theory development
must proceed. There are many other potentially useful frameworks
that could be explored (see, for example, Capano et al., 2015; Jones,
2010; Parreira Do Amaral, 2010; Peters, 2011; Wiseman et al.,
2010). Rather, our motivation has been more circumspect – an
attempt to highlight the methodological tropes that have accompa-
nied a style of scholarship that has dominated in the field for the last
several decades – and diagnostic, in the sense of attempting to out-
line how these have in turn limited the potential for theory building.
From our perspective, theory development rests first in a wide-
ranging analysis of the limitations of our achievements and why
this has been the case, and second in commencing a far-reaching
exploration beyond the narrow confines of higher education studies
for analytical and theoretical frameworks on which research can
proceed.

Notes
1. Indeed, for Clark, disciplinary authority was the ontological starting
point, shaping everything else of importance and exemplified in his five
key framing questions: how is work in the university arranged, how are
group (discipline) beliefs sustained, how is authority distributed, how are
systems integrated, and how does change take place? (Amaral and
Magalhães, 2013; Brennan, 2010, p. 231; Clark, 1983; Etzioni, 1966;
Williams, 2010).
Theorizing the Governance of Higher Education 29

2. We define variegation and hybridity as distinctive categories: variegation

refers to a coextensive set of policy or governance instruments premised
on a single policy ideal/design, e.g., marketization, but where
marketization can assume various forms – e.g., privatization, the
introduction of user-pays tuition fees, market-based pricing for specific
courses, degrees, or the use of market or quasi-market instruments in
resource allocation; hybridity refers to two or more distinctive policy
designs that are mixed – e.g., marketization and centralized planning –
producing a distinctive governance model.

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part ii

Systems, Processes, and Dynamics

of Governance in Higher
Education
2 The Regulatory State and the Labour
Process
k a ni s h k a j a y a s u r i y a , g r e g m c c a r t h y ,
a n d xi a n l i n s o n g

2.1 Introduction
This chapter argues that changes to the academic labour process have
fundamentally deskilled or deprofessionalized academic labour over
recent decades. The chapter is based on a neo-Marxist appraisal of the
proletarianization of academic labour. We argue, firstly, that univer-
sities in Anglosphere countries have become commodified due to the
privatization of their funding. Secondly, the decline in public funding
and its replacement by student fees has resulted in the decomposition of
academic labour so as to minimize costs and increase the surplus from
student fees. Thirdly, the capacity of the state and universities to break
down the skills of academic labour is enhanced and then restructured in
terms of market veridiction; in the process, universities become corpor-
atized and locked into a state regulatory regime that interpellates
(Althusser, 1971) and cajoles academics into that market-driven mis-
sion. Lastly, the chapter contends that academics are alienated from
their labour and proletarianized in the process, although they do show
forms of resistance which can be regarded as ‘weapons of the weak’
(Scott, 1985) to counterattack the commodification process, and they
rely on the remnants of professionalism to defend their conditions. In
terms of the framework outlined by the introductory chapter to this
volume, we focus on the way changing politics – that is, mode of
governance – has played out in the reconstitution of academic labour.
We suggest that the politics – the reconstitution of authority – is
reflected in the way academic labour is governed and regulated. This
regulation of academic labour in turn profoundly changes the relation
and allocation of authority at the ‘shop floor’ level of the university.
Using Australia as a case study, we examine this deprofessionalizing
process at close quarters, maintaining that the privatization of univer-
sity funds drives a market model to extract surplus values out of student

43
44 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

fees, and that this, combined with the commodification of the degree,
brings universities into the process of uneven and combined develop-
ment. Once part of the commodification system, Australian universities
are corporatized and integrated into a market verification model orche-
strated by state regulatory agencies. To achieve commodity relations,
the state and university management dissect and then appropriate the
skills of the academics – a deskilling process which has in effect prole-
tarianized academic labour in Australia.

2.2 Commodifying Universities and Proletarianizing

Academic Labour
The chapter contends that the commodity form enters universities and
subsumes their management structures in order to extend the reach of
commodity relations throughout society. As Harootunian (2015)
points out, commodification creates uneven and combined develop-
ment between and within national territories, but in an innovative twist
this also includes the combined development of different temporalities.
In the higher education sector this combined development of tempor-
alities is reflected in the tension between commodification and pure
knowledge production. That is, universities have existed within capit-
alism yet retained a unique structure and culture; however, as commo-
dification spreads, universities become vulnerable to full integration
into the market. In the past, universities have been afforded some
protection from marketization by their role in nation building, which
requires knowledge and expertise that cannot always be in the service
of commodity production. However, when the state comes to regard
universities as principally serving the market, as it did in Australia, then
such protection is lost. The first step towards marketization in
Australia was the privatization of university financing, which meant
that students rather than the public became the major source of
Australian university funds. The second step was to divest university
life of its traditional, almost feudal, trappings, in which the professori-
ate ran the court, and to corporatize universities according to industry
templates, with vice chancellors becoming CEOs. The third step was to
bring universities under a state regulatory system that imposed market
tests on what was taught and researched. To achieve that end, academic
labour was dissected through quantification, measurement, and com-
parison within the university and across the sector, so the skills of
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 45

academics were laid open to appropriation by management and the

state. The court of the professoriate became divided, with some seeing
material benefits in joining the corporate model and others bemoaning
the changing times. Australian universities exhibit elements of com-
bined and uneven development: while gowns at graduation ceremonies
bear the hallmark of feudal trappings, the degree parchment and what
it stands for carry the trademarks of commodity production.
Graduation ceremonies provide a good example of what Balibar
(2010) terms the fabrication of myths to produce the illusion of shared
historical universality, which we see as responding to the ambiguity
caused by the universities’ uneven absorption into commodity produc-
tion. Universities continually create and promote myths of heritage in
order to assert continuity even when the university has been essentially
divided and commodified. For Balibar (2010), universality must
include liberty and equality; however, following Marx, he recognizes
that the universality of commodity production provides an ontological
basis of labour that appears equal but embodies unequal exchange
relations. Chakrabarty (2000) makes a similar point when he depicts
equivalence or commensurability to labour value as a dominant form,
which as a meta-narrative disguises the untranslatable, the contradic-
tions of inequality and authoritarianism in universal myths and prac-
tices. Here Chakrabarty alerts us to how forms of authoritarian rule in
democracies involve Foucault’s procedures of control with vicarious
forms of coercion, which are colonial in their roots. This phenomenon
is clearly evident in the casualization of academic labour into
a subaltern caste: one that cannot speak, in Spivak’s (1988) sense of
not being heard. Similarly, Butler and Athanasiou (2013) regard aca-
demic casual labour as the extension of precarious work into univer-
sities, carrying with it the unequal character of excessive vulnerability
associated with oppressed minorities.
In analysing the roots of capitalist industrialization in Britain, Marx
depicted capitalist industries as producing not just commodities but
different kinds of humans, via an extremely forceful process. He
described how industrialization is transformed as soon as surplus
value is no longer conceived as compatible with equal human values
but, rather, in terms of disciplining the body and the worker’s psychol-
ogy of self. Industrialization, in Marx’s depiction, was brutal and
violent; what is occurring in universities is more civil but just as effec-
tive in shaping academic psychology. Similar to the transformation of
46 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

craft workers into a proletariat, as analysed by Braverman (1974), the

commodification of academic labour has led to the loss of professional
autonomy and control in way that is akin to the real subsumption of
labour to capital. This transition remains somewhat partial and con-
tingent given the still strong presence of notions of professionalism
within the academic labour process – what Foucault (2002) would
see as anti-conduct of conduct, or what Balibar (2015) terms the
‘heresy’ in Foucault’s theory of subjectivity. In our formulation, the
real subordination of academic labour takes place with the quantifica-
tion of professional skills and the regulation of work intensity. This
deprofessionalization is crucial to the development of a form – in the
Marxian sense – of abstract labour that is transforming the nature of
the academic labour process. Here, abstract labour becomes divorced
from the concrete conditions and processes so that it is equalized in the
social division of labour through the equal valuing of commodities on
the market (Rubin, 1972).
For Marx, this duality between concrete and abstract labour was
crucial to the production of the commodity form. This logic has now
overtaken universities, as evidenced by shifts in the academic labour
process. An important dimension of this process of abstraction is the
social validation of this labour through various forms of measurement
and quantification of the activities of academic labour. This does not
mean that concrete activity disappears, but rather that abstract labour
is materialized in the concrete activities of academics. It is this process
of validation, which we describe as the loss of academic control over
the products of labour, that leads to a fundamental change in the labour
process. The distinctive characteristics of this process are, first, the way
in which the attributes of academic labour are subject to quantification
and, second, the way the products of this academic labour are then
‘equalized’ through various forms of measurement. In this way, the
labour process within universities becomes the economic validation
and measurement of academic labour. What is measured is no longer
transference of knowledge per se, but knowledge for market
capitalism.
Under this commodity form, there occurs a loss of control over the
coordination, planning, and allocation of academic work (research or
teaching) – in other words, the expropriation of the ‘skills’ of the academic
and the power over their working conditions by management. One
manifestation of this is the segmentation of academic skills, most
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 47

noticeably in casual contracts but also in the proliferation of teaching-only

academics. The shift in academic labour has so segmented academics’
skills that it has caused deprofessionalization. Such deprofessionalization
is an example of what Harootunian (2015, p. 9) regards as the ‘remnant’
or ‘archaic’ elements within the broader commodification of academic
labour. In general, academics no longer have the ultimate say over their
labour; this has been abrogated to ‘central’ management, overseen by
regulations that flow down to the academic ‘periphery’ (Fitzgerald et al.,
2012), causing the deskilling of academics. The remnants of the older
semi-feudal university model of research for research’s sake endure in
abstract knowledge production; however, this is continually being sub-
limated to the imperatives of the market in both teaching and in research.
The transformation in academic labour, Harvey argues, is a general
trend under late capitalism: ‘[w]hat is on capital’s agenda is not the
eradication of skills per se but the abolition of monopolisable skills’
(Harvey, 2014, p. 120). Harvey asserts that in the current era of
globalization, the segments of labour with monopoly skills are an
impediment to profits, so there is a perpetual process to break down
these skills (Harvey, 2014, p. 120). For Harvey, ‘capital logic’ enters
the public sphere to deskill labour so that the labourer is disempowered
by decisions taken within the ‘managerial machine’ (Harvey, 2010,
p. 103). Macfarlane (2011) argues that the ‘proletarianization’ of aca-
demic labour is based on the deskilling of the ‘all-round’ academic, so
that their skills are controlled by others or jettisoned altogether.
Similarly, Barry et al. (2001) use a Taylorist metaphor to depict aca-
demics as assembly line workers with targets to meet and where teach-
ing is a standardized product. This subsumption of labour has
paradoxically intensified state regulations over universities, which
direct teaching to serve the market at the expense of academic auton-
omy (Willmott, 2011). Likewise, in research, academics now have their
skills regulated by market imperatives which are deeply embedded in
the university global ranking status. For academics, this involves a loss
of control over work practices in a highly structured, regulated, and
managed environment (Roberts and Peters, 2008).

2.3 The Regulatory State

The transformation of academic labour is the result of deskilling, and it
is essential to note that regulatory governance reinforces this process.
48 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

This creates an ‘accountability architecture’ that makes universities

accountable to the market (Jayasuriya 2015). Under this state regula-
tory framework, universities are obligated to develop regulatory com-
pliance units, instruments, and managers, to ensure that the student
and research production processes fully accord with the logic of capital.
A whole new layer of senior managers act as regulatory intermediaries,
policing academics to conform to the market discourse (Forsyth,
2014). The role of these intermediary regulators is to respond to the
auditing culture imposed by the state. Indeed, Anderson argues that
this is the very essence of the ‘audit culture’ which has emerged in
Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand for regulating aca-
demics. This auditing culture places universities under extreme pres-
sure to standardize academic teaching to ensure student-customer
satisfaction (Anderson, 2006).
One of the consequences of the higher education regulatory frame-
work is that it reaches deep into the administrative structures and
everyday interactions within universities, turning them into localized
sites of regulation. Within these sites, centrally defined objectives and
benchmarks are implemented through more specific local regulatory
tools and accountability architectures. The analysis of the emergence of
the enterprise university by Marginson and Considine (2000) percep-
tively explored the shifts of power and resources in the unification era
of Australian higher education, which mirrored what had occurred in
the United Kingdom. But the power shifts over the last decade have
been even more substantial, with interventions in what Black (2002)
calls ‘regulatory conversations’ – the processes of interaction over
externally defined quality or research performance benchmarks –
which have shaped the narrative through which administrative inter-
action takes place within the university. It is via these regulatory con-
versations that it is possible to see the constitution of a distinctive local
regulatory site within the university which empowers new actors,
identities, and forms of authority over academics. These local institu-
tions are critical spaces within a larger regulatory geography that links
higher education sites to broader national and even global systems of
regulatory governance.
Academic labour is most readily managed by controlling its visible
elements – that is, teaching and research – while invisible elements, such
as service to students or the community, are secreted away, treated as
non-important remnants of academic practice. Jayasuriya (2015)
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 49

asserts that these visible aspects are those directly related to market
citizenship – for instance, the employability of students and the global
marketing of the university. Shore (2008) observes that managerial
power over academics has been greatly enhanced by reducing academic
labour to mathematical scorecards to establish a university-wide stan-
dard which is applied irrespective of discipline-specific expertise. The
application of this standard is part of the interlocutory function of the
regulatory state and its intermediaries for regulating academic prac-
tices. However, Shore contends that what is measured ‘at a distance’ by
the state is not the ‘archaic’ Harootunian (2015) norm of ‘critical
intellectual skills’ but the ‘marketable skills’ of the students (Shore,
2008, p. 289). Shore and Wright (2015) extend this argument to stress
that the audit culture alters universities fundamentally and changes the
way people think within them – from being collegial with the sense of
a civic purpose, to being nothing more than cogs in the machinery of
production. In her survey of academic reaction to the regulatory cul-
ture, Cheng (2011) finds that it was regarded as highly corrosive of
academic professionalism and was coercively reinforced. She notes that
academics were obliged to accept the top-down regulations as they
were tied to the line managers’ ‘power over academic careers via
probation, tenure, promotion, and performance reviews’ (Cheng,
2011, p. 189). Brunetto, in her survey of university managerialism,
highlights the control exercised over degrees and courses, to the point
of undermining the academic’s specific skills. She adds, however, that
as these instructions flow down to the departments, the level of com-
pliance will vary between institutions and disciplines (Brunetto, 2002).
In theoretical terms, the regulatory state operates to oversee what
Foucault terms the discourse of ‘market verification’, where activities
are measured and verified in terms of the capitalist market (Foucault,
2008). However, Foucault’s analysis needs to be augmented with an
appreciation of what Harootunian (2015) would see as ‘uneven rem-
nant elements’ of academic labour regulated differently to the market
verification components of academic labour. For instance, regulations
can be imposed directly onto academics via managerial course
approvals and student satisfaction and employment rates. In contrast,
academic autonomy to conduct research (including, for example,
working from home) must be brought under a more factory-like frame-
work via requirements of office hours. In other words, Foucault’s
(2008) notion of bio-power has different effects depending on the
50 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

relationship to commodification or the aspects of academic labour

(non-commodified) left as remnants that are continually being drawn
into the logic of capitalist accumulation. The role of the state is to
maintain market pressure on universities, which in turn will bring these
remnants of professional autonomy into a factory rather than
a monastic model.
To illustrate the argument, Australian higher education will be used
as a case study. The following section will outline, firstly, the funda-
mental changes in Australian higher education caused by commodifi-
cation, through the trend towards the internationalization and
massification of student cohorts; secondly, the corporatization of man-
agement and its relationship to the regulatory state; and thirdly, the
deskilling of Australia’s academic labour sector. This will be followed
by an analysis of the concept of alienation and resistance to
proletarianization.

2.4 Case Study: Australian Higher Education

The 1989 unification of the Australian higher education system was
driven by a social-democratic government, which introduced a funding
model in which students partly pay for their education via a deferred
taxation process (Jayasuriya, 2015). The introduction of this system
became both a means for reducing government contributions to higher
education and a powerful regulatory tool, opening the way for the
transformation of students into commodities and academics into
a proletariat (Moodie, 2013; 295–310; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). In
1987, at the beginning of what has been called the neoliberal turn in
Australian universities (McCarthy et al., 2017), public funding
accounted for 87 per cent of Australian university funds; by 2015
public funding had fallen to 45 per cent, and it is expected to decline
further (Marginson and Marshman, 2013; Norton, 2015). Norton
(2015, p. 1) calculates that in 2015 universities took A$3.2 billion
from student fees as surplus, above what they spent on teaching the
students. He also observes that international students generate the
greatest surplus, and their contribution to university revenues is critical
for university strategies (2015, p. 1). With declining public research
funds, universities redirected more than A$2 billion of this surplus into
research – that is, one dollar in five of student fees is shifted away from
teaching into research (Norton, 2015). Australian universities are thus
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 51

doubly dependent on student surpluses, and are at especially high risk

from any fall in international student enrolments (Fitzgerald et al.,
2012).
In broad terms, the total export income generated by international
students to the Australian economy ranks third in importance, after
iron ore and coal. In 2016 it reached A$20.3 billion, with China
accounting for 26 per cent of this income (UA, 2016). The dependence
of Australian universities on international student enrolments, and the
magnitude of the growth in this sector, can be seen in the following
data. In 1996 there were 53,188 international enrolments; in 2016 this
figure had jumped to 330,000 (DET, International Student Data, 2016,
p. 1; see also Marginson, 2008; Norton and Cherastidtham, 2015). In
addition, as universities became dependent on student funds, they also
increased their domestic student load: in 1986, 11 per cent of 18- to 24-
year-olds went to higher education institutions; by 2015, 36 per cent of
this age cohort were enrolled in Australian higher education institu-
tions (Parr, 2015). In 1970, student enrolments in higher education
numbered 117,000; in 1998 the figure was 400,000; and by 2016 there
were 1.3 million domestic and international students enrolled in
Australian higher education institutions (DET, 2016).
Australian universities responded to the rise in student numbers and
the need to extract surplus from each student in two ways: an increase
in student to staff ratios, and the casualization of the workforce
(Marginson, 2000). When the unification of universities began in
1990 and the student fee system was introduced, there were 13 students
for every teacher; by 2000 it was 19; and in 2012 it had risen to 24
students per teacher. By 2016, the Australian university student/staff
ratio was averaging 30:1, with the lowest at 13.2:1 and the highest at
44:1 (UA, 2017). Furthermore, universities replaced tenured, full-time
staff with casual staff. From 1989 to 2013, the percentage of academic
staff employed on contingent contracts increased from 40 per cent to
56 per cent, with a corresponding decline in the percentage of academic
staff employed in continuing appointments (Andrews et al., 2012).
According to May et al. (2013), by 2011 there were more academic
staff working on casual contracts than on continuing contracts of
employment, and 90 per cent were employed to conduct teaching.
Using superannuation records, May and her colleagues estimate that
60 per cent of Australian academic labour is hired on a casual basis (of
which 57 per cent are women) and that they conduct 60 per cent of the
52 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

teaching (May et al., 2013). According to a report by the Australian

Learning and Teaching Council (Percy et al., 2008), the casual aca-
demic workforce is basically a ‘proletariat’ with limited industrial
protection and minimal professional standards, such as adequate
superannuation or leave entitlements, and with restricted research
capacity and constrained academic freedom (see also Kenway et al.,
2014; Norton, 2014).
Casualization has thus produced a fundamental shift in the
Australian academic labour market, with most teaching now con-
ducted by casual staff, who are highly exploited workers with limited
research and course design capacity, and little opportunity to obtain
continuing positions (Percy et al., 2008). Where once casual employ-
ment was the entry point for a long-term academic career in an
Australian university, this is no longer the case. Andrews et al. (2012,
p. 7) report that casual staff have limited career prospects and tend to
be ‘permanent casual staff’. In their analysis of a large-scale survey,
May et al. (2013) found that 81 per cent of the casual labour force
reported moderate to high levels of financial anxiety. A survey by the
National Tertiary Education Union found that, over the last decade,
nine out of ten Australian university jobs were casual or part-time, with
universities uniformly resisting union efforts to convert casual con-
tracts to full-time positions (Kenna, 2017).
Butler and Athanasiou (2013) regard casual academic labour as
meeting the criteria of precarious work, whereby a vulnerable minority
are so disadvantaged as to limit their life chances. In Marxist terms,
casualization in Australia has reached such a level of exploitation that
the casual academic does not even reproduce the level of wage
exchange needed to sustain their labour power. In addition, the emer-
gence of such a large pool of casual teachers impacts the working
conditions of permanent staff in such forms as teaching-only positions
and managerial directives towards standardized teaching. A clear
Australian example of this Taylorist managerialism is given by
Schapper and Mayson, who demonstrate how the standardization of
labour has undermined academic autonomy and deskilled the academic
labour force. They outline their efforts to apply their skills in inter-
cultural knowledge to develop a commerce programme, to be taught in
Australia, Malaysia, and South Africa. However, their intercultural
perspective was rejected when the course was ‘standardized’ on an
Australian–American-centric model to provide ‘flexible delivery of
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 53

[the same] material to large numbers of students’ in numerous coun-

tries (Schapper and Mayson, 2005, p. 189).
Driving casualization and standardization was the introduction of
an overarching regulatory regime to measure and normalize academic
labour to serve the burgeoning Australian student market. The rise of
internal mechanisms within universities to intensify systems of control
over academics in both teaching and research is well recognized in the
literature (Deem, 2004; Mingers and Willmott, 2013; Willmott, 2011).
Similarly, Roberts and Peters (2008) have observed that the strength of
central managerial power within universities has revolved around the
assessment and valuing of academic labour based on universal, stan-
dard forms of measurement. However, there has been no analysis of
how this is linked to the manner of Australian university corporatiza-
tion and the influence of the regulatory state. These two aspects inter-
lock through the role of corporate leaders, especially vice chancellors,
in strategically positioning the university community into the state’s
market verification system (Marginson and Considine, 2000; Slaughter
and Rhoades, 2004) by setting the corporate direction of the enterprise
culture (Collini, 2012; Deem, 2004; Hil, 2012).
As the CEO of the enterprise, the vice chancellor is now an impor-
tant facet of the state’s regulatory architecture. The role of the vice
chancellor is no longer that of ‘first among equals’ in the academic
community; rather, it is that of a crucial regulatory interlocutor,
between local, national, and increasingly global regulatory frame-
works. As regulatory interlocutors, vice chancellors are expected to
formulate specific institutional missions in a way that demands con-
stant re-engineering and experimentation to respond to regulatory
challenges and to create distinctive university brands for the local,
national, and international markets. A good example of such experi-
mentation to create a distinctive brand is the implementation of the
‘Melbourne model’ by Vice Chancellor Davis in first conceptualizing
and then gaining Commonwealth government approval for post-
graduate entry to professional degrees, which restructured and trans-
formed undergraduate education at the University of Melbourne
(James, 2012). The process of implementing such a model required
extensive deliberation within the university about the process of
organization change. Such forms of institutional re-engineering are
an inevitable product of the higher education regulatory state as it
becomes implanted into universities.
54 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

A further important local consequence of the higher education reg-

ulatory state, as noted by O’Brien (2013), is the increased assertion of
managerial prerogative over the professional work of academics, in
terms of what they do, how they are evaluated, and who they are
accountable to. As noted, these issues have become the subject of
contention and resistance within Australian universities, but the struc-
tural imperatives of the regulatory state have intensified the oversight
of professional work through, for example, workload formulas and
benchmarks for research intensiveness, which substantially reduce
professional autonomy. The issue here is the ability to control profes-
sional work – often using the tools of ‘regulatory conversations’ –
rather than the command model of deskilling as analysed by labour
process theorists such as Braverman (1974). The interlocutory model
now dominant in Australian universities (and in the wider
Anglosphere) is subtler but equally effective in the deprofessionaliza-
tion of academic labour. The point is that the regulatory state trans-
forms the nature and control of academic work and the way it is
organized at individual higher education institutions.
As in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, a plethora of regula-
tory tools has emerged in Australia to regulate academic teaching to the
needs of the market. The Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) is
the first and most prominent instrument in evaluating the ‘quality’ of
academic teaching, which has concentrated on measuring student post-
degree employability (Blackmore, 2009, p. 858). According to Henman
and Phan (2014), the CEQ plays a critical role in the Australian
Graduate Survey, specifically in measuring the part played by academic
teaching in directly training students for the demands of the capitalist
market, as quantified by after-graduation employment results. For
Coates (2005), these capitalist market measurements of teaching
come at the expense of knowledge formation in students or effective
responses to student diversity. More critically, universities use the CEQ
as a performative tool to standardize, compare and regulate academic
labour to satisfy the market (Henman and Phan, 2014). Anderson
(2006) argues that the measurement of student satisfaction by univer-
sities and the regulatory state, as the certified means of attesting to the
quality of teaching, is not only crude but is perceived by academics as
alienating them from their labour. The regulatory state, using neolib-
eral verification, asserts that the sole role of teaching is to ensure that
students are ready for the labour market; academic claims of
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 55

knowledge transference are read as self-serving. As such, it is difficult

for academics to challenge the imperative of evaluation as it is couched
in the discourse of accountability to students vis-à-vis their future
employment (Magnusson, 1998). Likewise, Blackmore argues that
the student evaluations are a ‘pincer movement of managerial and
market accountability’ over academics, which reflect a lack of trust in
academics (Blackmore, 2009, p. 858). If academics do not perform to
the regulatory standards of student employability, they are deemed to
be the problem within the new commodified system (Connell and
Manathunga, 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2012).
A similar pattern of measuring academic performance in the global
market, especially the university ranking system, is also evident in
academic research. Mingers and Willmott state that what is measured
in research is a science-based ‘one size fits all’ model, which is akin to
a Taylorist ‘one best way’ approach (Mingers and Willmott, 2013,
p. 1053). Following the United Kingdom, Australia adopted this homo-
genizing approach through the government’s Excellence in Research
for Australia (ERA) ranking exercise in three tranches: 2010, 2012, and
2015. As a result, Australian universities shape their research data to
maximize their rankings. For example, the ERA process in Australia
uses the Elsevier-owned Scopus platform to collect citation data for use
in discipline rankings. In turn, these products have been promoted
within the university sector as a means of measuring and controlling
the publication output of academic staff. The point is that these ‘tech-
nological’ platforms have become a crucial part of the armoury of the
higher education regulatory state, and a key mechanism for the sub-
sumption of academic labour. It also means that private providers such
as Elsevier have become significant regulatory intermediaries that link
the state regulatory objectives with more localized reorganization of
the academic labour process.
Naturally, this ranking procedure has internal implications for aca-
demics, as it has become a system for standardizing research to fit
a scientific model (Young et al., 2011). As Gable (2013) notes, the
ERA presented Australian universities for the first time with a national
comparator, which in turn entered the global ranking system; as such,
academic research is weighted in terms of its role in the global position-
ing of the university. In this process, certain research is recognized as
having ranking effects whereas other research is discarded and not
entered into ERA submissions. Similarly, Vanclay writes of the
56 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

paradox between managerial directives and disciplinary knowledge,

noting that academics are rewarded for publishing in certain presti-
gious outlets and punished for publishing in popular but low-ranked
outlets (Vanclay, 2012, p. 54). Moreover, as Henman (2015) has
extensively shown, universities use their discretionary power to ‘game
the process’, meaning that the published results are an unreliable
measure of quality.
As in the United Kingdom, the selection of what outputs to submit to
ERA exercises and which individuals are selected by the management
to be measured by the university remains opaque and deliberately
divisive (Sayer, 2014; Willmott, 2011). Where once research was dri-
ven by academics in a purist (‘archaic’) form of knowledge production
(knowledge for knowledge’s sake), it has now become an essential part
of research ranking, a marker for international student recruitment. As
a result, management seeks to coerce academics to conduct research in
ways that enhance the university’s reputation (Probert, 2013). Connell
(2014) notes that research results are used to close departments and
terminate staff who are deemed research-inactive in an ad hoc and post-
factum manner. Through such regulations within universities, sup-
ported by research agencies outside, academic research is now a part
of commodification. The quality of research is measured by its citation
ratio, and management makes decisions over what counts as good
research. In this process, control over academic research is asserted
by the institution and verified by the state’s research agencies, leading
to the deskilling of academic research labour.

2.5 Alienation and Resistance

A substantial amount of research has been published on feelings of
alienation among academics in Australian universities (Bexley et al.,
2013; Connell and Crawford, 2007). At an applied level, Bexley et al.
(2013) note that Australian academics are highly dissatisfied over the
continual ‘surveillance’ of their performances (p. 396) and that they
feel so overworked by teaching and administration that their creative
research time had been reduced to a minimum (p. 397). Their study
suggests that the underlying cause of academic dissatisfaction is how
universities are so market driven that they have lost the notion of
‘servicing the wider society’ (p. 398). Critically, they note that casua-
lization is so deeply entrenched in Australian universities that this is
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 57

‘undermining the sustainability of the academic profession’ (p. 398).

Likewise, O’Shea et al. (2016) record that causal staff see themselves as
outsiders, and have an overwhelming ‘sense of powerlessness’ because
of their inability to control the sale of their labour or be part of the
university processes (p. 332). Bentley et al. (2013) observe that the most
satisfied academics are those who have retained their status by adapting
to the research performance criteria and being rewarded by promotion.
In contrast, the highest level of dissatisfaction is recorded by the wider
academic workforce: firstly, over the erosion of the research–teaching
nexus in mass ‘remedial teaching’; and, secondly, over being directed to
publish in accordance with management-determined criteria (Bentley
et al., 2013, p. 44).
The concentration on academic feelings of alienation tends to eschew
materialist analysis (Connell, 2004) in favour of subject perceptions,
where neoliberal subjectivity takes centre stage (Brown, 2015). Connell
notes that academic labour has divided subjectivities, where self-
interested economic maximizers are oblivious to the class inequalities
that surround them, while others look romantically back to the pro-
fessorial past (Connell, 2004, 2015). Harootunian (2015) regards this
bifurcation as offering the seeds of resistance, where the remnants of
unevenness offer a space for struggle against combined development –
a space to restate and recapture academic professionalism and demo-
cratic governance. In contrast, Balibar (2010) argues that struggles
over the subsumption of academic labour to the market go beyond
(professional) remnants and towards a larger philosophical question
regarding the basis for a liberal and equitable social order. In this
scenario, the role of academics is to recapture the philosophical sense
of universality against the narrow myths of the corporate university
and its foundation on ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ staff.
The prevalent sense of alienation inherent in the process of depro-
fessionalization calls for forms of resistance against such structural
change. We believe that academics do seek to resist proletarian identity,
but their resistance takes weak forms. In this context, Anderson (2008)
argues that while neoliberal subjectivity has been imposed by manage-
rialism, academics use discursive and non-compliant means to retain
their identity. Utilizing Scott’s (1985) anthropological notion of ‘weap-
ons of the weak’, Anderson (2008) contends that while these acts may
be weak, they can be effective in disarming management. It is for this
reason that the strategic direction set by the VCs is important in seeking
58 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

to lock university staff into the process of serving the university’s

products and brand. Willmott (2013) makes a similar point when he
argues that the pervasive spread of ‘corporate culturalism’ in univer-
sities inculcates compliance (Willmott, 2013). Churchman (2006)
asserts that this compliance is deliberately imposed because of the
pluralistic nature of the university labour force, and that university
managements use homogenizing policies to weaken resistance. Winter
(1995, 2009), on the other hand, is less convinced that management
can inculcate academics into a unifying view, believing that the divide
between academics and academic managers is too great a chasm. Ryan
(2012) contends that Australian academics tend to passively resist
conformity by withdrawing from university activities as a way of
coping with their disempowerment. Lorenz (2012), however, regards
academic resistance via subject acts of dissociation and disapproval as
ineffectual against the systemic power of the state and university
management.
It is worth noting here that there is a dialogue between Marx and
Foucault on subjectivity and resistance. For Marx, there is an inse-
parability between economic practice and the shaping of the subject
in responding to the logic of capital. For Foucault, in his earlier
works on prisons and mental institutions, power and knowledge
relations shaped the technologies of self beyond the production sys-
tem. When Foucault developed his ideas further in his work on
governmentality, he noted that while there is power that creates the
conducts of conduct, there are also counter-conducts that push domi-
nant practices against normalization within a more pastoral care
frame (see Foucault, 1991, 2008). In Marxist terms, such counter-
conducts as forms of resistance have eventually to confront the
human need for income to survive; in this way neoliberalism encap-
sulates its counteracting tendencies by creating insiders and outsiders.
This notion of counter-conducts also has resonance with Barnett’s
(2005) view that insider academics on tenure resist ‘being directed’
(p. 12), while Sparke (2008) looks to collective resistance across
casual and tenured academics in the shape of academic networks,
which are an expression of a form of counter-conduct (p. 434).
Similar to Balibar’s notion of expanding resistance to universal ques-
tions, Cook and Jacks (2006) regard the attack on academic freedom
as a broad social and political issue, which can unite academics and
the broader university community. This is very much the point that
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 59

Heath and Burdon (2013) make when they argue that academics
faced with increased student loads, job insecurity, and corporate
surveillance are looking for new ‘prefigurative programs of resis-
tance’, a form of ‘counter-power within and across institutions’ (p.
400). They argue for action that cuts across disciplinary spaces to
challenge both neoliberal marketization and university corporatiza-
tion, especially when these curtail the rights of academics to criticize
governments.
These arguments on resistance address the issue of how aca-
demics confront cultural, structural, and material processes
involved in the appropriation of their skills. Academics have multi-
ple subjectivities but are interpellated (Althusser, 1971) into prole-
tarianization through economic necessity and a will to conformity;
yet there remains a counter-conduct sense of professionalism, which
seeks to challenge norms. In theoretical terms, Butler (1997) argues
against Althusser’s interpellation theory as it presumes who would
be called into the law of capital rather than seeing how one learns
to performs one’s subjectivity, separate from a notion of being
ideologically hailed into or out of subject conformity. We believe
that both sides of this debate have merit. Althusser’s (1971) inter-
pellation is akin to Bourdieu’s (1980) habitus, inculcating subjects
by a disciplinary path into compliance to the logic of capital. Butler
(1997), however, alerts us to the fact that authority is not pre-given,
and subjects are more free-floating from authority – that is, they
perform their roles not as an expression of an authoritative essence.
Balibar’s (2015) solution to the paradox of subjectivity is to regard
the subject as contested from within by an otherness (of consciousness
and affect), and the subject as a citizen interpellated by political power
and myth-making that divides citizenry into insiders and outsiders.
Therefore, for Balibar (2012), it is impossible to conceive of the subject
becoming a citizen without at the same time imagining the citizen
becoming an emancipated subject. In practice, academics have a sense
of subjectivity (of otherness) but are invoked into proletarian subjec-
tivity by the regulatory state and by university-level engineering. Or, in
Butler’s terms, they perform their roles as a citation of a norm – now
a neoliberal norm. However, their otherness may be the basis of resis-
tance, for example by playing along with corporate power, while
retaining their academic subjectivity in research and publications. At
issue here is the notion of reflection on the essentializing process that
60 Jayasuriya, McCarthy, and Song

academics face in a marketized academy, where they are situated in

a general commodification process.

2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed academic labour from the perspective of
uneven and combined development. We noted that globalization has
brought international students into universities, in numbers never seen
before; at the same time, the reduction in public funding has opened
universities to mass enrolment. To manage these fundamental changes,
universities, along with the regulatory state, have imposed controls on
academic labour, leading to the deprofessionalization of that labour.
This deprofessionalization has been effected via the regulatory state
and the market-based rules embedded in the universities by ‘regulatory
intermediaries’, and via a discursive practice of regulatory interlocu-
tors, driven from above, with the aim of strategically placing univer-
sities within the global ranking system (Jayasuriya, 2015).
This chapter has noted that while there is general recognition of the
corporatization of universities, insufficient attention has been paid to
the deskilling of academics. It has argued that the pervasive nature of
management and the shift from public to private funding, notably
through student fees, has segmented the academic workforce. The
case study of Australia mirrors what is occurring in other
Anglosphere countries, where academics are alienated from their
own labour, and where academic work is segmented through casua-
lization and a segregation between teaching and research. This seg-
mentation is facilitated by centralized quantification, verification, and
surveillance systems which are used to divide and rule academics. As
in other countries, the solidarity of Australia’s academics is under-
mined as individuals compete against each other for students,
research funds, and forms of escape into research-only positions,
which are akin to the what Harootunian (2015) theorizes as rem-
nants of the past academic life. While there is evidence of academic
resistance, it is complex in its responses, contained by the insider/
outsider academic separation, and divided across departments and
universities. Furthermore, over the last two decades, universities in
Australia have concluded enterprise agreements with the academic
and professional staff union, the National Tertiary Education Union,
which reflect this division. While such agreements were once based
The Regulatory State and the Labour Process 61

on the old professional association principles of academic autonomy,

these conditions have gradually been undermined by the universities
and employer groups, which seek to impose an industry model that
strips away both professionalism and the pastoral care aspects of the
agreements. University employer groups aim to sweep away the last
vestiges of the professional-based agreements, seeking to erase tenure,
academic freedom, and welfare rights such as extended maternity
leave, and to reduce employee protection levels to those of the vul-
nerable casual staff. This shift in university bargaining position
reflects the proletarianization of academic labour by the management
and university employer groups; union resistance is couched in the
remnants of professionalism and reflects the playing out of the con-
tradictions in combined and uneven development. The defence of
academic professionalism in the face of proletarianization has some
way to go in Australia; nevertheless, the continual state regulations
over academic life to meet market demands and the increased efforts
of university management to control academic labour and undermine
academic unionism infer that academic resistance to commodification
is still an active element in the labour process.

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3 Systemic Governance
Convergence or Hybridization?
giliberto capano

3.1 Introduction
Governments try to steer their higher education systems (HESs).
One way or another, based on the characteristics of their political
systems and their HESs, governments want to have a say in direct-
ing their HESs, and their presence in systemic governance arrange-
ments is inescapable.
Systemic governance in higher education – that is, the way in which
higher education policy is coordinated through institutionalized
arrangements and practices – has received particular attention from
scholars over the last four decades, the exact period during which the
inherited characteristics of HESs have been significantly changed by the
effects of massification, welfare state financial crises, and globalization/
internationalization (Huisman, 2009; Paradeise, 2009; van Vught,
1989). Changes in the traditional ways of governing HESs were chal-
lenges that governments had to meet. Massification obliged govern-
ments to imagine ways in which HESs could afford increasing numbers
of students (and, thus, new ways of organizing and funding HEs).
Internationalization has implied increasing cooperation and more
academic exchange initiatives. In Europe, this kind of cooperation
has even led to the Bologna Process (de Wit et al., 2015; Knight,
2006). Globalization has dramatically increased student mobility and
led to the creation of higher education hubs, branch campuses and
foreign-backed institutions, and a global market for higher education
(thus increasing the commodification of higher education) (van der
Wende, 2017; Varghese, 2007). Since the 1970s, financial crises have
pushed governments to find different ways of funding higher education
and increase the efficiency of universities.
These structural changes have been a matter of interest to govern-
ments that have increasingly intervened in the field, especially to tackle

68
Systemic Governance 69

the aggregate behaviour of HESs to address these changes according to

specific political visions and goals. Governments have been obliged to
redesign the ways in which they govern HESs, and in doing so they have
had to refocus on the main structural problem in higher education: the
issue of how to coordinate universities, which are characterized by
loose relationships among their internal components and by very dif-
ferent interests.
Thus, governmental reforms have modified not only the organiza-
tional characteristics of HESs (e.g., creating vocational tracks in higher
education, granting universities more autonomy), but also the way in
which these systems are coordinated and steered (e.g., introducing new
forms of institutional accountability, evaluation, accreditation, and
performance funding).
Overall, a process of convergence has started in which different
national and continental traditions have abandoned their historically
rooted systemic governance arrangements and have become more similar
by steering the governance of HESs from a distance. For example, in
continental Europe, the centralized command and control system has
been abandoned for a more autonomous design (where governments are
apparently more interested in goals than in procedures), whereas in
Anglo-Saxon countries, governments have become more interested in
leading the system and have become more intrusive. This apparent
convergence has also been emphasized in different ways from other
perspectives, such as those who have underlined how the introduction
of New Public Management (NPM) has radically redesigned the systemic
governance of HESs (Braun and Merrien, 1999) and scholars who have
emphasized that this convergence is a direct product of neoliberalism
(Harvey, 2005; Marginson, 2009).
However, as underlined in the introductory chapter, the analysis
of governance shifts in higher education should not take for granted
the apparent convergence that observers and scholars too often
emphasize. This means that the major top-down processes that
have influenced public policy in recent decades – globalization,
internationalization, and marketization – have not necessarily dri-
ven the same concrete policy solution, at least in the field of govern-
ing HESs.
What has really happened in terms of these governance shifts? Is this
convergence real or only marginal? How can we theoretically grasp
these changes?
70 Capano

In this chapter, I focus on these questions from the sceptic’s perspec-

tive-by not taking the convergence mantra for granted-to 1) show how
scientific research, especially in its theoretical developments, has been
obliged to significantly change its assumptions and conceptualizations
to address real changes happening in the world of higher education
policies and reforms, and 2) assess the existing empirical evidence of
a process of national convergence or, even better, of a kind of diversi-
fication through hybridization.
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 3.2, I describe how
and why the main problem of systemic governance (coordinating
higher education policies) is represented by the loose coupling of
HESs. In Section 3.3, the new governance conceptualizations offered
by the specialized literature over the last two decades are presented and
discussed. In Section 3.4, I characterize the observed waves of reform
in the systemic governance of higher education. Section 3.5 is devoted
to unpacking systemic governance in HESs from a policy instrument
perspective; owing to this theoretical lens, it will be possible to better
understand and assess the changes that have occurred and to imagine
the future of systemic governance as a world of hybrids and as con-
sequences of either conscious policy design or contingent incremental-
ism (Section 3.6).

3.2 The Structural Problem of Governing Universities

3.2.1 Universities as Loosely Coupled Organizations

The governance problems in higher education are basically twofold:
one concerns the institutional dimension (i.e., how an individual uni-
versity is coordinated and produces its own policies), while the other
concerns the systemic dimension (i.e., how national higher education
policy is designed and implemented). These two dimensions are strictly
connected to each other. In fact, the way in which institutional govern-
ance operates is structurally influenced by what governments do or do
not do, while systemic governance must take into account the intrinsic
characteristics and ways of working of universities as organizations
and institutions.
Universities are sui generis institutions whose constitutive nature
(the fact that they are federations or confederations of academic
subjects and niches) has structural implications for their internal
Systemic Governance 71

dynamics, as it creates never-ending problems in their institutional

governance, and thus has implications for the ways governments
design their lines of systemic coordination. Universities bring together
groups of individuals performing very different jobs (e.g., the job of
a biologist versus that of a historian, or the job of a computer techni-
cian versus that of a help desk employee), numerous intertwined
decision-making processes, and a great variety of institutional out-
puts (from basic to applied research and PhD programmes to con-
tinuing education courses, etc.). There is a kind of inescapable
organizational and functional complexity in universities, and to
grasp this complexity, some scholars have proposed terms such as
‘multiversity’ (Kerr, 1963) and the ‘federal or conglomerate form of
organization’ (Clark, 1995).
Because of such features, universities are considered typical loose-
coupling organizations – that is, a form of organized anarchy (Weick,
1976). From this perspective, universities as loose-coupling institutions
are characterized (Orton and Weick, 1990) by the following:
a. causal indeterminacy;
b. a fragmented external environment;
c. a fragmented internal environment.
Causal indeterminacy means that the actions of universities are
characterized by intrinsic ambiguity and uncertainty regarding
means–ends relations and by a variety of contradictory goals. For
empirical evidence of this point, one only has to read the statutes of
certain universities or the decisions made by their collegial governing
bodies to see that linear rationality and causality do not really apply to
higher education institutions: universities see themselves as pursuing
excellence in research and providing freedom to teach, as well as
contributing to the socio-economic development, equity, and account-
ability of their society. At the same time, they are subdivided into
a variety of niches (academic disciplines), each with its own mission,
epistemological basis, and professional rules. In such a context, caus-
ality is very often the result of chance or serendipity.
A fragmented external environment simply means that a large num-
ber of external stakeholders continuously demand several contradic-
tory things from universities (e.g., local economic development,
technological applications, and a higher-quality stock of human capi-
tal, as well as the selection and education of social and political elites
72 Capano

and social mobility). Thus, the expectations of the external environ-

ment may be incompatible with those of the universities.
A fragmented internal environment simply refers to the constitutive
variety of internal components of universities. Universities are com-
posed of different academic ‘tribes’, which constantly seek to defend
their territories (Becher, 1989); various groups of students who
demand very different services; and non-academic staff, who place
their own demands on universities. At the same time, there are a variety
of institutional levels and structures within universities: collegial gov-
erning bodies, faculties, departments, committees, research centres,
and institutes. In other words, universities are overcrowded with nested
institutional arenas. This internal fragmentation is self-reproducing
and self-sustaining, in accordance with self-referential rationality.
Loose coupling complicates the institutional coordination – that is,
the internal governance of universities; at the same time, loose coupling
explains their ability to adapt and survive. For example, internal frag-
mentation enables institutions to register a large range of external
inputs and demands and to subsequently offer a variety of responses:
this ability is an essential resource for institutional adaptation to exter-
nal challenges. Furthermore, loose coupling provides universities with
buffers that mitigate or isolate disturbances from the external world.
This buffering capacity also explains an intrinsic feature of the institu-
tional development of universities: they are capable of change, but only
by adapting to external changes; their institutional change is based on
what Schon (1971) called ‘dynamic conservatism’.
All these intrinsic characteristics of universities as organizations
represent the object of systemic governance. Overall, their nature as
loose-coupling organizations is the real goal of systemic governance
arrangements: in fact, due to their nature, higher education institutions
are quite difficult to govern at the internal level. If left free to self-
govern, they would behave as a confederation (of different disciplines,
academic ranks, administrative staff ranks). Thus, the real goal of
systemic governance is to steer this fragmented set of institutions and
to oblige them to reinforce their internal governance, decreasing the
range of loose coupling and pushing them to behave like a corporate
organization by assuming a strong institutional mission. So, the real
game of systemic governance is determining how to oblige universities
and other higher education institutions to behave in a way that is
congruent with systemic socio-political goals.
Systemic Governance 73

3.2.2 Governance in Higher Education: Inherited Solutions

and New Challenges
The governance quandary in higher education is, above all, repre-
sented by the intractable problem of how to coordinate a specific
institution – the university – which is intrinsically fragmented and
composed of a variety of loosely connected groups and interests, and
to render it accountable and responsible at both the institutional
and systemic levels. Basically, the governance problem consists of
inducing universities to behave as institutions and ensuring that the
higher education sector as a whole responds effectively to the needs
of society.
Overall, systemic governance in higher education perfectly fits the
well-accepted assumption that governance is simply a label for grasp-
ing how policies are coordinated (problems are identified and defined;
solutions are then formulated and implemented) through institutiona-
lized patterns of intertwining behaviours (formal and informal). Thus,
systemic governance in higher education can be defined as ‘the set of
institutionalised arrangements of the modes and practices of policy
steering by which all the components of higher education systemic
policy making (policy makers, implementers, goals, means, procedures,
plans, formal rules, clients and customers) are interrelated and coordi-
nated’ (cf. Capano, 2011; Capano et al., 2015). Governance arrange-
ments, therefore, are a set of actors, coordination principles, and policy
instruments that together enforce the expected systemic coordination.
Clearly, the main target of these governance arrangements in higher
education is ensuring that universities behave as expected with respect
to the established systemic goals (e.g., increasing the number of citizens
with advanced degrees, increasing the average time needed to obtain
such a degree, increasing the socio-economic impact of research,
increasing the social relevance of the activities of higher education
institutions).
This definition of systemic governance obliges us to reason in terms
of how the three constitutive elements of any governance arrangement –
actors, principles of coordination and policy instruments (such as types
of evaluation, types of regulation and types of funding) – are theoreti-
cally held together.
Most theoretical efforts to grasp the various ways in which systemic
higher education can work have focused primarily on general
74 Capano

State Authority

Market Academic Oligarchy

Figure 3.1 Clark’s triangle of systemic coordination

principles of coordination that have often taken into account the

specific characteristic of HESs and their idiosyncratic character.
The best-known attempt produced Clark’s triangle (1983), which
consists of the interaction of three mechanisms of systemic and institu-
tional coordination: the state, the market and the academic oligarchy
(see Figure 3.1).
Clark proposed three ideal forms of higher education governance:
the continental, American, and British types. The constitutive elements
of the continental model are systemic, strongly hierarchical coordina-
tion through state-centred policies; a lack of institutional autonomy;
the powerful, all-pervasive authority of the academic guilds; and facul-
ties and schools constituting confederations of ‘chair-holders’. The
British model is characterized by substantial institutional autonomy,
collegial academic predominance, and a moderate role of the state.
Finally, the American model consists of strong procedural autonomy,
which is counterbalanced by substantial public monitoring of the
quality of performance and results;1 an important role of external
stakeholders (which also means a significant role of political institu-
tions in public universities); and a weaker role of academics in deter-
mining the strategic objectives of universities, which is
counterbalanced, in accordance with the principle of shared govern-
ance, by their more substantial powers in traditional academic matters
(e.g., staff recruitment, course content).
This definition of higher education governance has been, and con-
tinues to be, the benchmark for any attempt at adjusting theoretical
analysis to the radical process of transformation and reform that all
HESs have undergone over the last 30 years, albeit at different times
and speeds.
Systemic Governance 75

This definition is also important since it provides clear examples of

how different ways of governing higher education coexist in different
geopolitical contexts. However, its characteristics (which substantially
commence from the principles of coordination) make this typology
slightly static. It also tends to put the three principles of coordination
(hierarchy, market and oligarchic power) on the same level: this ten-
dency makes the typology useful from a descriptive perspective, but less
fruitful from an explanatory perspective. It appears slightly static
because, overall, its ideal-typic nature emphasizes some deep attributes
that have characterized a specific historical period (from the 19th
century to the 1960s). However, based on the structural trends and
changes outlined in the introductory chapter (massification, internatio-
nalization, globalization), it is important to be conceptually clear to
understand the dynamic evolution of systemic governance. A dynamic
perspective needs to focus on the possibility that the three general
principles of coordination can combine to create hybrid shapes of
systemic governance.

3.3 New Systemic Governance Modes in Higher Education

The historically rooted models of governance in Western countries,
masterfully represented by Clark’s ideal types, have shown their
limitations when faced with contemporary challenges. Each inherited
governance equilibrium has been obliged to change. In the past, uni-
versities were never subjected to similar pressure to dramatically
change their hundred-year-old governance practices and equilibria:
after different waves of reform, the landscape is now almost
unrecognizable.
We know perfectly well what happened: societies and govern-
ments started to take great interest in higher education because of
a global context of strong competition in which the quality of
human capital must be continuously improved and new technologi-
cal solutions found to support economic development. Society (and
governments) began to demand increasingly more from higher edu-
cation. For example:
– a rapid increase in participation rates to transform an elite system
into a mass system and universal education, as Martin Trow theo-
rized more than 30 years ago (Trow, 1974);
76 Capano

– increased diversification of educational demands (general education,

specialized education, life-long learning courses, distance learning
courses, internationalization of courses, research training);
– greater knowledge generation;
– development of training and technology for local communities;
– education designed to spur economic development.
These new demands have arisen, almost paradoxically, as public
funding has been cut in response to state fiscal crises. Public funding
is of fundamental importance for all HESs (with the partial exception
of that of the United States). Thus, HESs have been required to do more
than they had to in the past and, if possible, to do it faster, continued
reductions in public funding notwithstanding. Moreover, universities
have suddenly been asked to be transparent and accountable. Unlike in
the past, universities are being asked to report on their use of resources
(both public and private) and on the results of their utilization. They are
held accountable for financial and physical resources, teaching quality,
student recruitment, faculty appointments, research resources, produc-
tivity, knowledge transfer, rigour in management and quality assur-
ance, and the well-being of students and staff.
This tremendous external pressure has definitively torn down the
walls of the ivory tower. One inevitable consequence of this trend has
been the structural pressure to change inherited and historically rooted
governance arrangements. Thus, Clark’s triangle no longer captures
what is taking place in higher education because, overall, his triangle is
focused on the distribution of authority in a specific system, and
because it allows us to understand which of the three principles of
coordination is prevalent or what mix of authority is at work; it is
less capable of explaining ongoing changes or governance dynamics.
Overall, Clark’s theorization captures three possible principles of
coordination in higher education; in doing so, he adds the academic
oligarchy to the two most commonly adopted theoretical principles of
social coordination (hierarchy and the market). However, the massifi-
cation of society and, consequently, of higher education has not only
drastically reduced the national influence of the academic oligarchy
(whose power, for example, has been clearly diminished in continental
Europe owing to the autonomist policies adopted by governments),
but has also forced governments to play a different role in higher
education. On the basis of the empirical evidence, the role of
Systemic Governance 77

government in higher education and, above all, in addressing its sys-

temic governance is inescapable.
This theoretical shift has been captured by the dichotomization pro-
posed by van Vught (1989), who outlines two possible governance mod-
els: the state control model and the state supervising model. In the first,
which is characteristic of the continental European tradition, the state
regulates the procedural aspects and often the content of student access,
the recruitment and selection of academic staff, the examination system,
the degree requirements, and the content of curricula. At the same time,
academics maintain considerable power over the internal life of univer-
sities. In this model, universities are weak institutions because the impor-
tant power relationships are those connecting local academic guilds to
central bureaucracies. The state supervising model is characteristic of the
English-speaking world, where universities are stronger (and are usually
governed based on academics and internal management sharing) and the
state plays a subtler role by steering from a distance. Other types, designed
to encapsulate the features of other forms of higher education governance,
have also been proposed (see, for example, Becher and Kogan, 1992, and
Braun and Merrien, 1999). In all of the aforementioned cases, the state
plays an important role, whether positive or negative.
The focus on state/government proposed by van Vught was a watershed
in the analysis of systemic governance in higher education because it
emphasizes that the role of government is the real point of reference for
any theorization with respect to systemic governance in higher education.
Capano (2011) has proposed an extension of this theoretical framing
of the centrality of public authority by assuming that governments
design systemic modes for the governance of higher education by
exercising their power in determining the goals of the system (and,
thus, of the institutions) and the means that can be adopted in pursuit
of these goals. This dichotomization produces a typology of systemic
governance modes within higher education (see Figure 3.2). It must be
emphasized that this typology assigns to each of the four types of
governance arrangements specific policy instruments that are consid-
ered internally consistent with each of them.
Hierarchical governance and procedural governance represent the two
traditional governance modes in which the state plays a pivotal role in
command and control. With hierarchical governance, governance directly
decides the goals and means through detailed directives. The government
is a hegemonic actor, and it therefore directly coordinates all aspects of
78 Capano

Level of governmental specification

of the means to be used
+

Procedural mode Hierarchical mode

(policy instruments: detailed national (policy instruments: totally earmarked financing;
regulation of the procedures for recruitment of numerus clauses for student access; substantial
academic and non-academic staff, student content of degrees established at the national level;
access; curricula design; item-line budget; strict direct substantial regulation on the output and the
regulation on internal management working; outcome to be pursued both in teaching and in
ex-ante evaluation) research)

Level of governmental
specification of the goals
to be achieved
– +

Self-governance mode Steering-from-a-distance mode

(Policy instruments: Sectorial coordination is (Policy instruments: financial incentives to pursue
‘market-driven’ and based on the specific outputs and outcomes in teaching and
institutionalization of relations between participants. research; regulated competition; ex-post evaluation
Government is a kind of ‘hidden’ stake-holder. It is done by public agencies; contracts; benchmarking;
involved in games of participation, persuasion, provisions by law for greater institutional autonomy;
negotiation, partnership and competition. However, structural constraints to institutional differentiation)
it can intervene to shift the systemic mode of
governance towards the other quadrants.)

Figure 3.2 Types of systemic governance modes in higher education policy

policy making. The hierarchical governance of higher education is typified

by situations in which the state imposes its goals and methods on uni-
versities (which means that universities have limited procedural or sub-
stantial autonomy, the assigned funding is completely targeted by the
state, and there is little or no quality assessment). This is the case with
earmarked funding (for technological research, for example) or where
a set number of students are allowed to enrol in a specific subject.
In procedural governance, the actors involved (regardless of whether
they are public or private) are sufficiently free to choose their goals, but
to pursue those goals they are obliged to follow the procedural regula-
tions decided by public institutions. In such cases, the prevailing actor is
the central bureaucracy, frequently leading to privileged relationships
with the most important sectoral interest groups (which, in the field of
higher education, are the academic guilds and academic subjects them-
selves). For example, in many continental European countries, the state
obliges universities to follow rules governing academic staff recruit-
ment and promotion, tuition, and curricula. The procedural quadrant
perfectly fits Burton Clark’s defined continental model of systemic
university governance. Here, it must be noted that the procedural and
hierarchical modes may overlap. In fact, the hierarchical mode absorbs
Systemic Governance 79

the policy instruments of the procedural mode, although there is

a substantial difference in the working logic of these two forms of
direct government intervention: the procedural mode is characterized
by room for substantial decisions to be made from the bottom up. In
fact, the procedural mode gives the academic oligarchies of universities
the freedom to choose the content of academic business. This freedom
of choice is considerably limited under the hierarchical mode simply
because this mode imposes substantial constraints on the content of
decisions. Furthermore, in both governance mode types, the direct role
of the government profoundly constrains the capacity of universities to
act as corporate bodies.
The steering-from-a-distance and self-governance modes represent
two models in which governmental influence is apparently of an indir-
ect nature. In the steering-from-a-distance mode, the government is
strongly committed to the pursuit of collective targets but nevertheless
leaves policy actors enough freedom to choose the means by which they
will reach those targets. In doing so, the government adopts certain
specific policy strategies designed to encourage policy actors to comply
with governmental objectives (e.g., increasing student numbers, invest-
ing in applied research). In this mode of systemic governance, systemic
policy coordination is guaranteed by a complex set of regulations and,
very often, by the presence of a public institution (agency or authority)
acting as a broker. The government tries to influence institutional
behaviour not by issuing direct commands but by applying soft rules,
providing financial incentives and evaluating performance. In this
governance arrangement, the government may directly intervene to
redesign the internal institutional governance of public higher educa-
tion institutions, depending on the nature of national trajectories and
traditions. This situation has occurred in many continental European
countries, where since the beginning of the 1990s, governments have
changed the rules of the internal governance of universities by assuming
that they must behave as corporate actors to be effective in following
the strategy of steering from a distance. The steering-from-a-distance
mode assumes that both sides of systemic governance – the government
and the individual universities – act in a responsible and accountable
manner. Governments are supposed to clearly indicate their systemic
goals and the nature of the incentives and constraints that universities
are to take into account when planning their actions. Universities are
supposed to establish their own institutional strategies in a rational
80 Capano

manner – that is, by trying to identify the equilibrium among govern-

mental input, their own internal resources, and the socio-economic
context in which they operate.
In the self-governance mode, on the other hand, the government
leaves the policy arena almost completely free. It is assumed that the
fundamental criterion of sectoral coordination is based on the institu-
tionalization of relations between participants. However, the govern-
ment reserves the right to intervene when necessary, thus changing the
governance mode and policy tools. Simply put, in the self-governance
model of higher education, institutions are free to choose what they
want to do and how to do it. In contrast to what one may imagine, the
self-governance model is not a marginal model; indeed, the British and
American forms of systemic governance, as proposed by Clark, fit (or,
rather, fitted) perfectly within this quadrant.
This typology can be quite useful not only in reconceptualizing govern-
ance in a specific way that continues to give a pivotal role to governments
in the ‘age of governance’, but also in understanding the direction of
governance shifts in higher education. However, real problems emerge
when the governance of all countries converges on one of the quadrants,
as is certainly the case with higher education policy. In fact, there is
a shared opinion that most countries have been shifting towards the
model of steering from a distance. At the same time, studies have begun
to underline that this convergence is only presumed and that although all
countries have followed a common template, they are redesigning the
governance of their HESs by following specific national interpretations of
that template. Overall, this typology helps clarify the move towards
a common template, but apparent convergence towards the same quad-
rant does not necessarily mean that differences in national systemic
governance approaches are decreasing. In this sense, the spatial represen-
tation of the four quadrants clearly indicates that what can make the
difference is the precise location of each country in the four spaces and, in
the case of convergence towards the steering-at-a-distance quadrant, the
exact place and time inside and eventually outside this quadrant.

3.4 Governance in Higher Education: Waves of Reform

Governments have changed their higher education governance policies
to address new challenges that have called for a radical rethinking of
governance models at the institutional and systemic levels.
Systemic Governance 81

In general, the basic levers of reform can be summarized as follows:

institutional autonomy, funding mechanisms, quality assessment of
research and teaching, internal institutional governance, and chan-
ging state roles (see Amaral et al., 2002; Capano et al., 2016; CHEPS,
2006; Enders and Fulton, 2002; Gornitzka et al., 2005; Huisman,
2009; Jarvis and Mok, 2019; Lazzaretti and Tavoletti, 2006; Maassen
and Olsen, 2007; Paradeise et al., 2009; Shattock, 2014; Trakman,
2008).
It should be noted that governments had, and continue to have,
a predominant role in the reform of governance in higher education.
This is also the case with public universities in the United States, where
state governments have been very active (Capano and Woo, Chapter 11
in this volume; El-Khawas, 2005; Leslie and Novak, 2003; McLendon,
2003a, 2003b).
The basic levers mentioned above have been moulded differently at
the national level, although some common features have emerged:
– In European countries, governments have abandoned the state control
model in favour of steering universities from a distance (by granting
more autonomy to institutions). In countries in Europe, such as the
Netherlands (De Boer, Enders, and Leisyte, 2007), Sweden (Bladh,
2007), Denmark (Carney, 2006), and Austria (Lanzendorf, 2006),
and outside Europe, such as Japan (Oba, 2010), China (Yang et al.,
2007), and South Korea (Rhee, 2010), governments have radically
changed the institutional arrangements of universities by abandoning
the traditional democratic mechanisms for electing institutional lea-
ders and governing bodies and replacing them with an appointment
system. The supervisory role of the state (Neave and van Vught, 1991)
is implemented by steering founded on new methods of coordination
that are no longer based on ‘hard’ rules but on ‘soft’ contracts, targets,
benchmarks, indicators, and continual assessments.
– In the English-speaking world, governments have increased their
intervention and regulation, despite a tradition of institutional auton-
omy. In the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, govern-
ments have substantially restructured their governance frameworks
by creating national agencies for the assessment of research and
teaching and through a strong commitment to realigning the beha-
viour of universities with socio-economic requirements. At the same
time, public universities in the United States have been strongly
82 Capano

encouraged to adopt a more competitive stance to obtain more fund-

ing from private sources in a substantial process of marketization
(Altbach et al., 2011; Geiger, 2004).
– In Asia and Latin America, more complex dynamics exist due to
different academic traditions, political contexts, and financial situa-
tions. Here, it is necessary to underline structural differences in terms
of the ratios of public to private institutions between Europe and the
USA, Latin America, and Asia. Above all, it must be underlined that
in India and East Asia, as well in many Latin American countries,
there is a high number of private institutions and that, in many cases,
the number of such institutions, which are favoured by governmen-
tal policies, has increased in recent decades (Brunner and Villalobos,
2014; Varghese, 2015). In some cases, the expansion of private
higher education is due to the lack of public funding (and thus
governments have pushed for this expansion to include more citizens
in higher education) or to the specific goal of perpetuating the elitist
nature of their public systems. However, in these different structural
contexts, governments have also been very active in introducing
different forms of institutional accountability, research evaluation,
contractualization, and performance funding. Furthermore, in East
Asia, governments have extensively redesigned higher education gov-
ernance to push institutions towards differentiation and competition
(Jarvis and Mok, 2019; Shin, 2018).
In this context of substantial redesign of the borders and general
frameworks of systemic coordination in higher education, certain other
features are present in all of the most important countries:
– Institutional autonomy does not mean independence, nor does
it mean academic freedom. Rather, it means the capability and the
right of a higher education institution to determine its own course of
action without undue interference from the state, but in a context
that is strongly influenced by the state. In this sense, the common
interpretation of institutional autonomy is that of a policy instru-
ment designed to increase the effectiveness of higher education poli-
cies. Thus, in countries operating under the continental mode (which
includes most East Asian systems), where institutional autonomy
was either weak or non-existent, governments have started to
grant greater institutional autonomy; on the other hand, in systems
Systemic Governance 83

where university institutions have traditionally been highly autono-

mous (not only in the English-speaking world but also in Latin
American public universities), governments have started to interfere
in institutional behaviour by, for example, introducing new regula-
tions, assigning targets, and increasing pressure for inter-institutional
competition. In Asia, for example, especially in the Eastern part, the
interpretation of the autonomist policy has led to the ‘incorporation’
of universities in a context where the role of the state has increased
(Shin, 2018).
– Funding traditionally earmarked for the functioning of universities
has been abandoned in favour of lump-sum grants; additionally,
different types of targets and performance funding mechanisms
have been introduced.
– The amount of the public funds assigned to universities is often
based on output-oriented criteria and performance-based contract-
ing systems.
– There is strong pressure to increase private funding (by increasing
tuition fees and selling services and research to private actors).
– National agencies or committees for the evaluation and assessment
of the quality and performance of teaching and research in higher
education institutions have been established in most countries in
Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
– Increasing the rate of privatization of a system can be a tool used by
governments to pursue specific systemic goals.
– In recent years, many governments have pushed their HEs to diver-
sify their institutional missions.
– Competition for funding (not only in research but also in teaching)
has increased.
– Evaluation has been introduced in different ways and is often linked
to funding.
From the comparative picture sketched here, the forms of systemic
governance within higher education policy are radically changing. The
question remains, how are they changing? If we examine the plethora
of comparative studies of governance shifts in higher education
that have been produced over the last 20 years, clearly, at the systemic
level, governance arrangements have shifted towards steering from
a distance.
84 Capano

First, it is interesting to observe that the bureaucratic arrangement

(the traditional method of the controlling state) has been abandoned
(or at least significantly reduced) by European countries and by coun-
tries such as China, Japan, and South Korea.
Second, the principal shift in the governance mode is clearly in the
direction of steering from a distance (albeit via different trajectories
and at differing speeds), indicating that the prevailing governance
arrangement is characterized by the main steering role of the govern-
ment, which corresponds to increased autonomization and corporati-
zation of universities. Clearly, this trend is influenced by the specific
nature of national contexts and policy legacies since it is a process
whereby each governance arrangement is redesigned and remoulded
by remixing the components of the previous arrangement.
Third, the governance shift towards steering from a distance
underlines the actual need for governments to control policy per-
formance by stating targets and the means by which they are to be
pursued. In the sphere of higher education, this governmental com-
mitment means that universities are considered instruments for the
implementation of governmental policy (and in this sense, institu-
tional autonomy is considered functional – that is, for producing
systemic results, rather than an intrinsic characteristic of universi-
ties). Furthermore, this shift means that governments are dissatisfied
with the traditional bureaucratic arrangement: procedural power
and control (the bureaucratic arrangement) are no longer consid-
ered either efficient or effective.
A point of contact emerges between the type of analysis that I am
proposing and the scholars who characterize all reforms in higher
education policy as ‘neoliberal’ and, thus, based on privatization,
deregulation, managerialization and limitation of academic freedom
(Marginson, 2009; Olssen and Peters, 2005). The shift towards
the steering-from-a-distance governance mode represents a peculiar
watershed in the historical evolution of higher education in which
universities, probably for the first time, are being asked to prove their
social value and are less free to pursue their research and teaching goals.
However, from my perspective, which is focused on governance
shifts in higher education, this watershed is not necessarily negative.
Increasing pressure on the academic world from external elements
(asking for more social relevance from higher education), the use of
managerial techniques in higher education institutions, the reduction
Systemic Governance 85

of regulation (more institutional autonomy), and the introduction of

evaluation have redesigned higher education systemic governance to
ensure it is still functional and relevant in its social context. Can we
really imagine that HESs could be left alone to respond to the chal-
lenges of massification, globalization, and internationalization? From a
governance perspective, what is included under the definitional
umbrella of neoliberalism in higher education means, from the empiri-
cal point of view, something different: more state and not less state;
more governmental presence and not privatization (although some
forms of privatization are used, they are always tools to reach systemic
goals).
Finally, the corporatization and autonomization of universities are
also ways by which academic guilds are deprived of power, which
could be positive for accountability and fit purposes (because academic
power is very often self-interested). From this perspective, then, the
increasing institutional autonomy of universities and the related
increase in accountability requested by governments should be not
confused with decreasing academic freedom. Here, there is a risk of
overlap in individual rights (the freedom to teach and to research),
institutional property (autonomy), and related accountability. Often, it
seems that the weakening of academic power in ruling universities is
confused with decreasing academic freedom, yet they are two different
phenomena.

3.5 Unpacking Governance Modes: Towards Hybrid

Modes of Systemic Governance

3.5.1 The Governance Equalizer: Five Dimensions

of Governance Modes in Higher Education
If there is a general trend towards designing and implementing the
steering-from-a-distance mode in higher education, does this mean
that there is finally a clear process of convergence worldwide? This
could be the case, although there are signals of different national
interpretations and of different ways in which the elements of the
common template have been followed.
This issue was dealt with for the first time by de Boer, Enders, and
Schimank (2007, 2008), who proposed analysing governance shifts
not through a typological approach but by focusing on changes in the
86 Capano

main components of governance arrangements (which compose the

‘governance equalizer’). They hold that the following five dimensions
are the most relevant for composing every systemic governance
arrangement:
1) State regulation, which refers to the authority of governments and
state bureaucracies and the degree to which these actors prescribe
and regulate institutional behaviours;
2) Stakeholder guidance, which refers to the degree to which actors
external to higher education institutions are capable of addressing
them;
3) Academic self-governance, which refers to the degree to which
academic communities, disciplines, and guilds have a real role in
and impact on decision making with respect to other actors/
stakeholders;
4) Managerial self-governance, which refers to the role of university
leadership in steering institutions and in affecting the systemic level;
and
5) Competition, which refers to the degree to which coordination
based on resource scarcity influences institutional behaviours and
thus addresses systemic governance arrangements and dynamics.
According to the authors, these five constitutive dimensions are
independent of each other and do not follow a zero-sum logic. For
example, less state regulation does not mean more competition or more
academic self-governance, and more competition does not mean less
state regulation or less academic self-governance. These five dimen-
sions can be combined in different ways, creating various possible
configurations and, thus, various national hybrid modes of systemic
governance. In this book, De Boer and Huisman (Chapter 12) demon-
strate that this way of thinking can be fruitful in describing the char-
acteristics and many variants of systemic governance in the European
context. Certainly, this way of thinking and analysing governance
allows us to better comprehend the phenomenon itself and, above all,
to go further with respect to some traditional views, such as the intrin-
sic antinomy between state regulation and marketization and between
academic self-governance and the influence of external stakeholders.
The truth is that combinations of these dimensions can vary greatly and
take unexpected shapes, contradicting certain theoretical assumptions.
Systemic Governance 87

Thus, the governance equalizer helps us go further and analyse govern-

ance arrangements in higher education in terms of hybrids.
This framework should be considered an absolute watershed. In fact,
in the literature on higher education governance, and in the more
extensive literature on governance, there is a tendency to expect that
the actual modes of governance are intrinsically coherent, which means
that the policy instruments adopted are coherent (ideationally) with the
prevailing general principle of coordination. Thus, strong regulations
are expected when hierarchy prevails, and incentives and competition
are expected when market logic prevails. In reality, things are more
complex, and it appears that these kinds of categorizations work only
up to a certain point, in the sense that they are capable of grasping the
trend but are too generic to grasp the substance. Thus, the governance
equalizer represents a first effort to overcome genericity and to open
the world of intrinsic hybridity of governance arrangements in higher
education.

3.5.2 Going Deeper: The Policy Mix and Hybridity in Higher

Education Systemic Governance
This theoretical assumption matches perfectly with the rising aware-
ness of the idea that any coherence between policy instruments and
a given ideational framework or goal has been superseded (Bressers
and O’Toole, 2005; Capano et al., 2012; Howlett, 2005;
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1999) for the simple reason that it is
empirically fallacious and inconsistent with the facts.
This is very often justified as an outcome of the ambiguous prefer-
ences of policy makers. However, it could also be assumed that inco-
herence between the general principles of coordination and the
instruments adopted is intrinsic to any governance arrangement. In
fact, any selection of policy instruments is characterized by an intrinsic
policy-mix trend (Bressers and O’Toole, 2005; Howlett, 2004) and
should therefore be considered the result of miscellaneous ideas, inter-
ests, and technologies and deemed institutionalized in certain specific,
recurrent contingences. Thus, in keeping with the literature, a policy
mix is a combination of policy instruments belonging to different
instrument categories or pertaining to different policy paradigms/belief
systems/ideologies (Ring and Schröter-Schlack, 2012; Del Rio and
Howlett, 2013).
88 Capano

The policy-mix concept originated in the economics literature during

the 1960s and was largely restricted to the field of economics until the
early 1990s (Flanagan, Uyarra and Laranja, 2011). It has since been
adopted in other policy fields, such as childcare policy (Gunningham
and Young, 1997; Stroick and Jenson, 1999), environmental policy
(Sorrel and Sijm, 2003) and innovation policy (Borràs and Edquist,
2013). Furthermore, all studies of good governance promoted by the
OECD and by other international organizations tend to focus on the
best mix of policy instruments adopted in pursuit of certain specific
policy goals (OECD, 2007, 2010). By focusing on the base elements of
governance arrangements, this literature on policy instruments sub-
stantially underlines that hybridity is more common than expected
and that finding strictly coherent governance modes is empirically
improbable. Additionally, the potential hybrid nature of systemic gov-
ernance in higher education has been clearly hypothesized in the spe-
cialized literature. In fact, almost 20 years ago, based on a comparative
study of Europeans HESs, Gornitzka and Maassen (2000) clearly
stated that although they had identified a ‘general move towards the
supermarket steering model’, ‘in practice this model will not be found
in its pure form’ (p. 284). They thus proposed the empirically evident
hybrid nature of the steering-from-a-distance model, at least in the
European case. However, this evidence can certainly push for a more
general assumption regarding the intrinsic nature of hybrid governance
in HESs in the contemporary world. In fact, as I have tried to show,
a brief look at the content of various waves of reform of governance in
HESs that have been pursued worldwide gives the impression that there
is much in common, but also much that is different. In fact, while
governance arrangements everywhere try to mix state steering with
institutional autonomy, the shapes of these mixes are very different in
terms of the real content of the design adopted.
Explaining these differences is very important, and Jungblut and
Vukasovic (2013) show what kind of theoretical interpretation could
be proposed for this purpose. However, from an analytical perspective,
a more fine-grained categorization or an analytical framework for
grasping the content of hybrids in systemic governance in higher edu-
cation is, for me, more urgent. To that end, the emerging literature on
policy mixes is a source of inspiration. Overall, if governance modes
are hybrids that mix together different things and encompass ‘different
steering instruments, institutional structures and steering relationships’
Systemic Governance 89

(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2000, 283), why not start from policy
instruments?

3.5.3 Focusing on Policy Instruments to Unpack

the Governance Conundrum
An analytical grid is needed to determine what really happened in the
governance shifts in higher education in recent decades. This fine-
grained grid is necessary not only to better describe the characteristics
and composition of the actual governance arrangements (the different
varieties of steering-from-a-distance modes), but also because without
a reliable classification, it will be impossible to really connect these
governance shifts with policy performance (considering that, overall,
governments have continuously changed systemic governance arrange-
ments precisely to improve systemic policy performance).
Basing this analytical grid on policy instruments means focusing on
what governments really do when they design policies and on the real
components of policy reforms (that are composed of policy instru-
ments). It is by bringing together policy instruments and making them
work that governments steer systemic governance (Howlett, 2000;
Salamon, 2002; Vedung, 1998). But how can policy instruments be
used to distinguish the different hybrids in higher education systemic
governance? This question is not a simple one, because there could be
different points of departure. Better operationalizing the concept of
evaluation, for example, would be important. Very often, evaluation is
conceived in the literature as a new strategic tool of recent reforms.
How can we operationalize it and identify its various potential
impacts? Additionally, precisely because at least one evaluative practice
has been introduced in every country, how can we distinguish among
these practices?
To address these questions, a specific research design has been pro-
posed to analyse governance shifts and their effects on HESs in Western
European countries (Capano and Pritoni, 2019a; 2019b; Capano et al.,
2019). This research design is based on a specific conceptualization that
draws from the classification tradition of policy instruments (Ingram
and Schneider, 1990; Phidd and Doern, 1983; Vedung, 1998; Howlett,
2011) and combines the Vedung and Salaman proposals. Following
this perspective, four specific families of substantial policy instruments
are established: expenditure, regulation, information, and taxation
90 Capano

(which is considered the bearer of a different political economy with

respect to expenditure and thus must be taken into account separately).
Each family of policy instruments is conceptualized as inducing
specific behaviours. Expenditure drives remuneration, regulation
drives behavioural control, information is the bearer of persuasion,
while taxation – depending on the way in which it is designed – can
induce both behavioural control and remuneration. It must be
observed that all four families of substantial tools can drive higher or
lower degrees of coercion based on how much they leave individuals
free to choose among alternatives. For example, taxation can be highly
coercive when a general tax increase is established, but at the same
time it can have a low degree of coercion when many targeted tax
exemptions exist. Regulation can be really strong or very soft based
on the type of behavioural prescription. Expenditure can be non-
coercive in the case of subsidies but very demanding when targeted
funding is delivered. Information can be very coercive when compul-
sory disclosure is imposed or really soft when monitoring is applied.
This specification regarding coercion is very important when the ana-
lytical focus is on governance modes in higher education because it
sheds light on why the steering-from-a-distance model has too often
been assessed as very coercive or, in some cases, as a kind of reregula-
tion (Donina et al., 2015; Enders et al., 2013): the real point is that, as
shown by the conceptualization of policy instruments proposed earlier,
governments can also be quite regulatory when steering from a distance
if they adopt highly coercive types of regulation, taxation or informa-
tion. Less regulation does not mean less steering; thus, coercion can
also be applied from a distance and in different ways.
This distinction becomes even clearer when, by following the lessons
of Salamon (2002), for each family of policy instruments the specific
forms through which they can be delivered are extracted and designed.
Thus, for each type of substantial policy instrument, there are different
ways of delivery in which regulation, expenditure, taxation, and infor-
mation can affect reality. For example, what matters when governments
use expenditure to steer the system is not only the amount of money on
the table but also the various forms through which it can be delivered,
such as grants, subsidies, loans, lump-sum transfers, and targeted trans-
fers. According to the same logic, regulation can be designed by imposing
specifying behaviours (such as a national procedure for staff recruit-
ment), enlarging the range of opportunities (such as granting more
Systemic Governance 91

autonomy to the internal organization of universities), or establishing

specific public organizations (such as national agencies for accreditation
or evaluation). Information can take the shape of neutral administrative
disclosure, annual monitoring, diffusion, etc. Taxation can be delivered
through tuition fees, user charges, exemptions, etc.
Thus, different recruiting systems, mechanisms for gaining access to
higher education, or quality assurance systems have different effects
even though they can all be classified as regulatory tools; however,
based on how they are designed, they can be more or less coercive.
Grants are less coercive than loans and can be bearers of different
effects; even though they are both classified as expenditures, lump-
sum transfers and performance-based funding are profoundly different
ways through which higher education institutions can obtain funding:
the former leave more autonomy for universities, while the latter is
more coercive and thus consistently limits behaviour. Nationally driven
tuition systems, very decentralized systems, and income/merit/service-
based fees systems induce different behaviours (in both institutions
and students) because they are different forms of delivering taxation.
Finally, ranking systems, national monitoring, quality assurance, and
research assessments are all delivery vehicles belonging to the informa-
tion family; however, they induce quite different effects on behaviours.
Developing this argument, Capano and Pritoni (2019b) and Capano,
Pritoni and Vicentini (2019) proposed two specific classifications of
the shapes of policy instruments in higher education. The simpler of the
two classifications is presented in Table 3.1.2
Unpacking governance modes through the shapes of these 24 instru-
ments opens the analysis to many different research opportunities:
1. It increases the analytical and descriptive capacity to grasp how
governments change the instrumental side of governance arrange-
ments over time and, thus, to detect the real content of the govern-
ance arrangement that governments have been pursuing over time.
Then, by focusing on the different shapes of policy instruments,
a more detailed reconstruction of governance shifts can be provided
with respect to the usual description in terms of a greater or lesser
market or more or less hierarchy or by putting every country in only
one basket (currently, the steering-from-a-distance mode).
2. It offers an analytical tool to better define the characteristics of the
governance hybrids possible.
92 Capano

Table 3.1 Classification of policy instruments and their shapes

Family
of Policy
Instruments Shapes

Regulation R1 Assessment, evaluation and accreditation

(procedural rules)
R2 Agency for assessment, evaluation, and accreditation
R3 Content of curricula: more constraints
R4 Content of curricula: more opportunities
R5 Academic career and recruitment: more constraints
R6 Academic career and recruitment: more
opportunities
R7 Regulation on students (admission and taxation):
more constraints
R8 Regulation on students (admission and taxation):
more opportunities
R9 Institutional and administrative governance: more
constraints
R10 Institutional and administrative governance: more
opportunities
R11 Contracts
R12 Rules on goals in teaching
Expenditure E1 Grants
E2 Subsidies and lump-sum funding
E3 Targeted funding
E4 Loans
E5 Performance-based institutional funding
E6 Standard cost per student
Taxation T1 Tax exemption
T2 Tax reduction for particular categories of students
T3 Service-based student fees
Information I1 Transparency
I2 Certifications
I3 Monitoring and reporting

Source: Capano et al. (2019)

Systemic Governance 93

3. It could offer a theoretical framework for assessing the results

obtained by reforming systemic governance.

3.5.4 Discovering Varieties of Hybrid Governance in Higher

Education
By following this logic, it is possible to disentangle the problem of the
hybridity of systemic governance and, at the same time, to better
understand how policy mixes have been selected and composed from
a comparative perspective. Furthermore, this way of working should
allow a more fine-grained description of how the same policy template
has actually been adopted in different countries in recent decades, thus
making it possible to abandon the steering-from-a-distance label for
something that better describes reality.
Here, I can only show the considerable potential of this way of
reasoning and operationalizing governance arrangements. The point
of departure is the three varieties of steering from a distance that
Capano and Pritoni (2019a) drew from their analysis of changes in
the instrumental composition of the systemic governance modes in 12
European countries (by also considering the level of public funding and
the level of tuition fees). Table 3.2 presents these three types of hybrid
steering-from-a-distance modes.
The three hybrids show that the mode of steering from a distance can
be implemented in at least three ways. First, the performance-oriented
mode focuses on performance, which means that a significant part of
public funding is based on the assessment of teaching and research.
Some might expect this mode to be the most diffused hybrid (due to
the rhetoric that characterizes the public discourse on evaluation
worldwide), but this expectation does not correspond to the empirical
evidence. In fact, among the 12 cases that the authors investigated, only
England (and, in part, Italy) fits this hybrid. The peculiarity of this
hybrid probably explains why it is limited to these few cases and
systems. The Americas (except, perhaps, Brazil) and Asia have empha-
sized performance as the pillar criterion for governing their HESs (with
the exception of New Zealand, which has pioneered the performance-
oriented hybrid since the 1980s).
The reregulated mode is characterized by strong proceduralization
imposed by governments, a relevant presence of target/performance
94 Capano

Table 3.2 Types of hybrid systemic governance modes in higher

education

Main/leading instruments
Types of steering from different mixes of R, Ex, Tax, and Info + public
a distance funding + tuition fees

Performance-oriented – Significant percentage of public funding; based on

mode the results of research assessment
– Use of information tools
– Many regulations for administrative procedures
– Significant percentage of public funding based on
evaluation of teaching performance
– Student support based on loans
– Relatively high tuition fees
Reregulated mode – Many procedural constraints on the main activ-
ities (recruitment, promotion, postdoc, teaching
content and organization of degrees, student
admissions)
– Proceduralization of quality assurance
– Target funding/performance funding
– Average/low public funding
– Low tuition fees
Goal-oriented mode – Clear systemic goals stated by governments
– Many opportunities in admissions, curricula, and
institutional autonomy
– High public funding
– Information instruments (monitoring, reporting)
– Strategic use of target/performance funding
– Student support based mostly on grants
– High performance and target funding
– No/low tuition fees

funding, and the tendency to not increase tuition fees. In this hybrid,
evaluative practices are proceduralized and push for compliance over
performance. This hybrid is adopted by governments that cannot invest
too much in higher education and that try to steer their HEs by mixing
common procedural rules and different types of evaluation and quality
assurance. This hybrid appears to have the most potential for diffusion
worldwide (especially in countries with legacies of bureaucratic sys-
temic governance in higher education).
Systemic Governance 95

The goal-oriented hybrid is characterized primarily by the presence

of clear goals stated by governments that then design their systemic
steering by mixing high public funding, strategic use of evaluation, and
enormous student support. This hybrid is likely to be another European
peculiarity since it is present in the Nordic countries, which maintain
broad welfare states. However, what makes the difference here is the
strong capacity of the government to design clear systemic goals to
which the institutions are asked to contribute.
These three types of hybrid governance provide a useful point of
departure for further research and for analysing systemic governance
from a comparative perspective. For example, many Asian govern-
ments (China, Japan, Malaysia) seem to steer their HESs through
a reregulatory approach, while others (Singapore, Hong Kong) do so
through a goal-oriented approach. It would also be interesting to apply
this framework to Latin America and to the states and provinces of the
United States and Canada where, for example, Quebec has clearly
adopted a reregulative mode, while most other provinces have adopted
the goal-oriented hybrid, although with the substantial difference that
many of them have increased tuition fees.
These three hybrid types of governance show that it is possible to
conceptually reduce the variety of national interpretations of the
steering-from-a-distance mode that have been implemented in
Europe. At the same time, this way of theoretically and empirically
analysing systemic governance appears to be quite promising because it
allows us to shed light on the characteristics of the policy mixes in
a very detailed manner. Clearly, these three hybrids could be biased
because they are continental specific and thus cannot be considered
exhaustive, especially because in European HESs the private sector is
marginal, whereas in other national systems the private sector can be
large in size. However, this missing dimension could certainly be
included in a revised framework of systemic governance in higher
education.

3.6 The Age of Hybridity

Governing HESs is not an easy task. Societies are very demanding,
while HESs are fragile and intrinsically fragmented. One way or
another, governments are in charge of addressing their HESs. To
address new socio-economic challenges, governments have partially
96 Capano

(although, in some cases, substantially) inherited their ways of govern-

ing HESs. Consequently, they have ostensibly followed a common
template (the steering-from-a-distance mode), but there is clear empiri-
cal evidence that the results are very different. In every country, evalua-
tion, quality assurance, performance/target funding, and
contractualization have been mixed in different ways. Thus, we need
a better theorization to grasp what has happened and to understand
what could happen. I propose taking the public policy literature on
policy instruments seriously and focusing any analytical framework for
systemic governance on the operationalization of policy instruments.
Therefore, this instrumental framework can be accompanied by other
dimensions, such as the percentage of public funding, the structure of
tuition fees, and the public/private divide in the organization of higher
education itself. With this toolbox, it will be possible to describe and,
most likely, to gauge the many differences and to finally transcend the
generic meaning of steering from a distance. We have entered the age of
hybridity, and in this age we must stay. This hybridization of govern-
ance in higher education raises a relevant issue with respect to more
general themes related to the characteristics of governance and their
relationships with issues of political and social relevance.
First, the hybridization of governance makes it more complex to
reason about the effects of marketization in higher education.
Marketization does not necessarily mean privatization, nor does it
mean more competition between institutions. On the contrary, it
seems that what is hidden by the hybrid forms of governance is that,
in some countries, families and students face higher financial costs.
Second, globalization and internationalization have not been con-
ducive to a common way of steering higher education governance. The
hybridization I have shown demonstrates that national paths and social
values are resilient, and the need to change higher education govern-
ance has been dealt with through national interpretation.
Third, governments can steer their HESs from a distance in different
ways and through different policy mixes. They can also strongly rere-
gulate the system through specific procedures regarding accreditation,
evaluation, and funding that do not appear to be but are in fact very
constraining.
Finally, governance shifts in higher education reflect a complex
process through which governments respond to external challenges
and structural environmental changes by drastically redesigning
Systemic Governance 97

their systemic governance arrangements to make their HESs respon-

sive and accountable. In doing so, governments have not followed
specific ideological lines, but have mixed coordination principles
and policy instruments according their needs, legacy, and contexts.

Notes
1. The important influence exercised by US governments (both federal and
state) on the institutional behaviour of universities is often underestimated.
The federal government plays a crucial role in the earmarking of enormous
amounts of funds for research and student aid programmes, using its
financial weight to profoundly influence both public and private
universities (especially those that are particularly committed to high-
quality research). State governments play a crucial role since they are both
the ‘owners’ and the ‘regulators’ of public universities (Berdahl, 1999).
2. In this format, 24 instrumental shapes are proposed. In Capano and
Pritoni (2019a), the instrumental specification is even more detailed and
proposes 43 instrumental shapes.

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4 Institutional Governance
Factors, Actors, and Consequences
of Attempting to Converge
on the Anglo–American Model
marino regini

In this chapter I will analyse the factors, actors, and consequences of the
changes in institutional governance that have taken place in European
universities in the last 30 years. These changes are often described as an
incremental process of convergence, with higher education (HE) insti-
tutions in continental Europe increasingly assuming characteristics
associated with the Anglo–American model of university governance.
Although national reforms of HE governance have been conducted
independently, they have nevertheless been based on similar assump-
tions and have largely shared the same goals. This is why, in a very
general sense, the governance reforms undertaken in continental
Europe may be seen as repeated attempts to converge towards what is
generally regarded as the most successful HE model – namely, the
Anglo–American one.
The view that the European HE systems are becoming increasingly
uniform is supported by various versions of the ‘theory of convergence’
of social institutions within the advanced economies (Kerr, 1983). Yet
a convergence of goals does not necessarily imply convergent trajec-
tories to achieve those goals. And a convergence of attempts does not
necessarily mean converging results. What recent reforms of the gov-
ernance of European HE systems have tried to achieve is an increased
convergence of different universities’ institutional features and beha-
viour. In a general context of policy convergence, governments have
tried to force their universities to adopt similar institutional and orga-
nizational forms. However, although inspired by the same common
template – the Anglo–American university governance model, actively
promoted by the EU (European Commission, 2006) – national strate-
gies have clearly interpreted this template according to their inherited

103
104 Regini

legacies. This has made the convergence process more problematic.

National reforms have been elaborated and implemented by the uni-
versities’ internal actors – with their power resources, culture, learning
abilities – which have acted as ‘filters’ vis-à-vis the planned reforms
(Capano and Regini, 2014). Even more importantly, this has meant
that the consequences of national reforms of university governance
have largely differed from the expected results (Regini, 2015).
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I will address a few
preliminary questions. Is there anything like an ‘Anglo–American
model’ of HE governance? If so, to what extent can we speak of
attempts at ‘convergence’ on such a model by continental European
universities, and to what extent do the actual trajectories of change
differ in the various European HE systems? Also, what are the main
objectives and directions of change? I will then turn to the different
factors of change of institutional governance, assessing their respective
explanatory power. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the
role of the main internal and external actors in changing institutional
governance. Finally, I will analyse the unintended consequences of
university governance reforms and will propose a few factors that can
account for such unexpected outcomes.
The focus of the analysis will be on changes in institutional (or
internal) governance, although these changes can often be understood
only in relation to specific aspects of systemic (or external)
governance,1 such as university autonomy, competition, and assess-
ment. In fact, it is on changes in systemic governance that most HE
scholars tend to focus. In the words of Ferlie et al. (2009, p. 6), ‘most
publications analysing how HE systems work and are transformed pay
exclusive attention to the state–universities relationships’. Yet, these
authors continue, ‘the content of recent public policies most likely
consist in reconfiguring the status, internal structures, governing
bodies, field of responsibilities, decision-making processes, and scope
of action of HE institutions’.

4.1 Attempts to Converge: On What and to What Extent?

4.1.1 The Anglo–American Model

The United Kingdom and the United States have two very different HE
systems in terms of the role of the state, public/private composition,
Institutional Governance 105

type of internal differentiation, etc. Yet, in terms of institutional gov-

ernance, changes that have taken place in the United States are not too
dissimilar from the ‘liberalization plus managerialism’ that has char-
acterized the British HE system over the last 30 years. Schulze-Cleven
and Olson (2017) see the American ‘trajectory of corporatization’ as
a combination of three main trends: a decline in the public funding of
universities based on number of students enrolled, the increased parti-
cipation in the HE sector of for-profit providers supported by public
authorities, and the adoption by public universities of governance and
management styles similar to those of for-profit providers.
The first two trends – and especially the shrinking of resources
provided by the state – fostered a transformation of the American HE
system that, in the widely used typology of institutional change pro-
vided by Streeck and Thelen (2005), would be termed ‘institutional
drift and conversion’. This has paved the way for the third trend. The
for-profit providers’ practices – from the organization of education
delivery to human resource management – have become a benchmark
for all American HE institutions. Similarly, growth in the number of
managers has occurred at a much faster pace than faculty positions
across all types of public institutions (Schulze-Cleven and Olson,
2017).
In the United Kingdom, the HE system was traditionally based on
a large degree of autonomy of individual universities that were not
regulated by general laws except for common frameworks on a few
matters such as salaries. Universities were financed by a funding agency
that, until 1986, planned distributive block grants in a highly conser-
vative manner. Internally, the universities drew on a large administra-
tive apparatus, but did not conceive of themselves as organizations
with their own strategies. Internal distribution of power was based
on the pre-eminent role of professors and on collegial decisions. This
changed in 1985, when the Jarrett Report repudiated academic collegi-
ality and election of vice-chancellors as the governing rules of univer-
sities: the United Kingdom thus became the first European country to
offer individual universities the possibility to appoint a CEO type of
leader (Paradeise et al., 2009a).
More generally, the United Kingdom has been the frontrunner in the
reform of both systemic and institutional governance, moving towards
a vision of universities as ‘corporate enterprises’ and towards new
models of verticalized governance. This means that HE in the United
106 Regini

Kingdom is now strictly managed and market driven (Ferlie et al.,

2009). A continuous process of reform characterized by a series of
official reports that followed the 1985 Jarrett Report (e.g. the
Dearing Report in 1997 and the Lambert Report in 2003), focusing
in particular on the question of governance, led to the redesigning of the
overall framework of the United Kingdom’s HE policy. Although uni-
versities have preserved their formal status as self-governing bodies
(with the exception of the former polytechnics, whose institutional
governance was established by a law passed in 1992), increasing gov-
ernmental pressure has led to the substantial verticalization of the
internal decision-making process, and thus to a weakening of the self-
governing academic bodies’ collegial power (Capano and Regini,
2014). Governmental pressure has encouraged universities to
strengthen their ‘steering core’ through the internal verticalization of
power (Middlehurst, 2004) and a process of substantial reorganiza-
tion. As a result, internal governance has undergone significant
changes, through the reinforcement of a managerial mode of govern-
ance and the shift from a private to a state-driven approach (Shattock,
2008).

4.1.2 Objectives and Directions of Change in the Governance

of European Universities
In the last 20 years or so, most continental European countries have
attempted to converge on these Anglo–American trends by reforming
both the systemic and the institutional governance of their universities.
This has involved a major process of transformation, as the traditional
model rooted in these countries was at odds with the principles and
objectives that informed the governance of American and British uni-
versities. In continental Europe, HE systems were regulated by
a number of laws defining detailed substantive rules implemented by
the relevant ministries. Both resource allocation and organizational
decisions were made by central bureaus in the ministry, without taking
the individual universities’ specific circumstances into account. As to
the universities themselves, they were not asked to make strategic
decisions but were seen as administrative bodies, although professors
usually enjoyed a high degree of individual autonomy. Degrees and
curricula were nationally defined, and universities were usually not
responsible for most financial and human resource decisions.
Institutional Governance 107

The key features of institutional governance in this traditional model

were collegiality, consensual (often collusive) decision making, and
distributive outcomes. The internal structure of university governance
reflected its organizational weakness: at each organizational level (uni-
versity, faculty, department), appointed administrative staff shared the
floor with elected academic leaders. Neither party had much strategic
capacity, with both lacking the tools of strategic decision makers.
Consequently, leadership functions were usually restricted to represen-
tation and internal consensus building across disciplinary fields. Rather
than a CEO heading a big organization, the rector was a sort of
‘institutional integrator’ among colleagues, a primus inter pares using
status resources rather than a functional position to lend academic
legitimacy to university decisions (Paradeise et al., 2009a). These deci-
sions were taken by the academic oligarchy, often in direct interaction
with the ministry, and ratified by an executive board.
In the 1970s other groups, such as non-permanent teaching and
research staff, students, and non-academic personnel, gained some for-
mal rights of participation, but the dominant position of the professors
was not shaken. This ‘democratization’ of the universities – namely, the
involvement of all internal actors in university governance – had the
effect of adding more bureaucracy and never-ending meetings at which
no decisions were taken at all. Partly for this reason, this ‘democratic
revolution’ gave way in the following decades to a ‘corporate enterprise
model’ of university governance.
This process of change has been described by various authors, who
highlight different aspects of the transformation of both systemic and
institutional governance. Some of them focus on major policy changes
that have taken place over recent decades in areas such as the rise of
quality assessment and accreditation (Musselin and Teixeira, 2014;
Schwarz and Westerheijden, 2004) or on transformations in the struc-
ture and modes of funding (Amaral et al., 2002; Meek et al., 2010).
Others highlight different types of policies: the facilitation and freeing
of market forces by the adoption of competitive mechanisms for the
allocation of government support for universities; empowering users by
mandating the provision of academic quality information to students
as well as by increasing utilization of tuition fees for university funding;
and specifying contractual relations between government and the uni-
versities by tying research funding to clearly defined indicators of
university output (Dill, 2014). Finally, a further group of authors
108 Regini

point to the fact that, starting in 1997 in the Netherlands, university

leaders have increasingly become accountable no longer to an elected
university council but to a board of trustees. In countries such as France
and Italy the elective model remained unquestioned, yet even there,
presidential power has been gradually strengthened (Paradeise et al.,
2009a). In Germany, too, the formal strengthening of managerial
governance started in the 1990s, with an increase in the decision-
making competencies of rectors and deans in all states. Thus, academic
self-governance has indeed been formally weakened (Schimank and
Lange, 2009).
This turn towards a ‘corporate enterprise model’ of institutional
governance has several objectives, which in continental Europe have
been carried out by the state. We highlight four main components of
this model (Regini, 2015):
a) Verticalization of decision-making processes. The objective is to
enhance the efficiency of universities through a strong leadership,
insulated from veto powers and spoils-system practices. This objec-
tive explains why all the national reforms have attributed crucial
functions of strategic management to the rector/president/vice
chancellor. Some of these reforms go so far as to assume that the
rector is chosen on the basis of managerial capacity and not on the
basis of the consensus that s/he enjoys; and the same assumption
applies to the heads of the intermediate structures (deans or depart-
ment chairs), increasingly seen as the rector’s partners in the uni-
versity’s governance.
b) Openness to the external world. The goal here is not only to
promote greater transparency in the management of universities
and to make them better tuned to the needs of the economy and
society, but also to draw on abilities that have been developed in
corporate organizational contexts, which are presumed to be more
efficient. This entails the allocation of decision-making functions
concerning the budget, and, more generally, supervision/control of
the work of the rector’s office, to a relatively small body (board of
governors) in which members external to the university have
a significant weight and role, and counterbalance the greater execu-
tive powers of the rector.
c) Disempowerment of the self-governing bodies. The collegial body
traditionally representative of the academic community (e.g. the
Institutional Governance 109

academic senate) is increasingly assigned only consultative func-

tions, mostly limited to the management of teaching and research.
This process often extends to the collective bodies representing the
intermediate structures (faculty councils).
d) Rationalization of the university’s structures or organizational
units. This implies a more precise allocation of responsibilities to
faculties, departments, and schools in order to introduce a simple
and consistent organizational model by embedding them more
closely in the overall organization. A further purpose of rationaliza-
tion is to achieve economies of scale and a well-defined chain of
responsibility.
If we take these four components together, we might say that they
aim at modifying the nature of universities as loosely coupled sys-
tems through the tightening of the internal decision-making process,
not by means of bureaucratic rules and procedures, but by redistri-
buting power, roles, and competencies, and by moving towards
a more managerial organizational model based on a functional hier-
archy. Universities are asked to become ‘organizational actors’
(Krücken and Meier, 2006) capable of behaving strategically
(Whitley, 2008).

4.1.3 Differences in the Design and the Implementation

of Reforms
European governments’ HE policies have tried to converge towards
a common template of systemic governance – that is, the ‘steering from
a distance’ model (Kickert, 1997; Neave and van Vught, 1991; van
Vught, 1989). To pursue this strategy, as noted, European governments
have adapted the institutional governance arrangements of their univer-
sities, which according to Clark’s (1983) typology belong to the
Continental governance model,2 to the model of the English-speaking
countries. They have fostered more institutional leadership, more man-
agerial steering, and fewer collegial decisions. This process, strongly
supported by the European Union, has entailed a significant break with
tradition. Although national reforms of HE governance have been con-
ducted independently, they have been based on similar assumptions and
have largely shared the same goals, leading to the perception that the
governance reforms undertaken in continental Europe represent an
110 Regini

attempt to converge towards the Anglo–American model (Capano and

Regini, 2014).
However, Paradeise et al. (2009a, p. 218) argue that ‘it is tempting
but probably wrong to infer from similar trends towards autonomy,
rational management, and control that reform outcomes result from
implementation of identical ideas, the theoretical and operational
model of which would have been provided by the UK’. In fact, they
maintain, communication between national university systems was
quite poor as recently as the beginning of the 1980s. Each system
tended to see the problems it faced as specific problems, rather than
as manifestations of more general trends. Foreign experiences were
either ignored or rejected as inadequate. So, while the repertoire of
reform instruments might appear to be shared between all European
governments, ‘this does not mean that they spread by benchmarking or
diffusion of good practices. It is only ex post that we can evoke
a “repertoire”, since it did not necessarily exist as such before being
called up to face local issues’ (2009a, p. 218).
Be this as it may, there is no doubt that all European HE systems have
been exposed to largely similar pressures for change. But have the
responses to these pressures been equally uniform? Or have Europe’s
universities responded to the common challenges in different ways?
This is of course a key question addressed by several contributions to
this volume (see, for example, Chapters 3, 5, 8, and 10). As already
noted, the view that the responses of national HE systems have grown
more uniform – through mechanisms of isomorphism, explicit imita-
tion of best practices, or organizational learning via trial and error – is
supported by the various versions of a ‘theory of convergence’ of social
institutions within the advanced economies. This theory, which peri-
odically reappears in the social sciences, holds that external challenges
and pressures for change are so powerful that they drastically reduce
the likelihood of any alternative responses. All convergence theories are
underpinned by the idea that the modernization of institutions must
follow established paths, essentially dictated by exogenous factors
(Kerr, 1983). Although pre-existing institutional arrangements, as
well as ‘loser’ groups, may offer some resistance, all they really manage
to do is to delay the course of history.
As far as HE is concerned, however, convergence theories run the
risk of reductionism when assuming that a general policy strategy, or
a national law reforming universities’ institutional governance, can
Institutional Governance 111

directly determine the meso-/micro-level outcomes in a homogeneous

way. If we focus on individual institutions and not just on national
systems, we can get a better understanding of the interaction between
external pressures and internal institutional features, and we can
better evaluate the actual ways in which universities respond to
external pressures for change. The expected changes are interpreted,
elaborated, and implemented by the internal governance arrange-
ments, which ‘filter’ the planned reforms. Hence, despite a series of
common national policy goals and reform strategies, important dif-
ferences persist, grounded not only in the national interpretation of
the common policy template that governments wanted to pursue, but
also in the different institutional trajectories and internal dynamics.
The eventual outcome in terms of institutional governance and orga-
nization is influenced by pre-existing internal governance styles and
by the behaviour of the internal actors in question. More precisely, the
differences in the design of reforms may be due to path dependency or
to the role played by different actors in different national contexts. On
the other hand, the differences in implementation are usually due to
policy legacies, to the various degrees of resistance that the actors
concerned may raise, or to the unintended consequences of reforms
that, for contingent reasons, appear more clearly in some contexts
than in others.
These observations can be accommodated within a neo-institutionalist
framework. Neo-institutionalism comes in numerous guises (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010;
North, 1990; Williamson, 1985). The basic idea, however, is that pre-
existing institutions play a key role in shaping responses to exogenous
factors by acting as a filter or intervening variable between external
pressures and the responses to them. The pre-existing institutional con-
text, in fact, provides actors with a set of resources and constraints which
they must necessarily take into account when choosing among different
alternatives, and which consequently shape their actions. The strong
influence of legacies is precisely what makes institutional change necessa-
rily adaptive. Change can take a variety of forms, such as ‘displacement,
layering, drift, conversion, or exhaustion’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005,
pp. 19–30 [qt. p. 24]). Since the institutional context varies from one
country to the next, rooted as it is in their diverse histories, the neo-
institutionalist perspective has no difficulty in recognizing, and account-
ing for, the divergent responses to common challenges: different options
112 Regini

are pursued because the pre-existing institutions, and their role in mediat-
ing the impact and direction of change, are different.
So, what appears at first sight as a striking convergence between
European countries actually covers a great variety of implementation
processes, in terms of the rate and pace of change as well as in terms of
path dependence of national patterns (Paradeise et al., 2009a).
Whether or not they were inspired by the same common template –
the English-speaking HE systems’ governance model – European
national reforms have clearly interpreted the ‘common policy strat-
egy’ according to their inherited legacies. Although all countries have
opted for similar policy instruments (greater institutional autonomy,
stronger institutional governance, increased competition for funding
and students, greater reliance on assessment and evaluation), the
national policy strategies have combined these common policy tools
in different policy mixes, according to their past legacies and tradi-
tions. These variations are expected to affect the governmental design
of the reform of institutional governance in universities, and to sig-
nificantly influence the set of constraints upon the institutional beha-
viour of the universities.
Furthermore, national reforms have to be implemented, and thus
their outcome is in the hands of the very target of the reforms – that
is, the universities themselves. Despite the fact that they share the same
traditions, differences can emerge even between universities within the
same country, and thus their interpretation of the ‘common policy
strategy’ may well differ. Not only may universities within the same
country belong to different types, their traditional internal dynamics,
specific institutional cultures, and legacies may significantly influence
the process of change itself. The provision of reform laws, or the
features of governmental policies, influence but do not determine the
nature of the relationship between external pressures, institutional type,
and internal political-cultural factors. Hence, we may expect to find
significant differences in the organizational effects of national reforms
and of external pressure for change, not only at the national level but
also at the level of individual universities (Capano and Regini, 2014).
Finally, even the new traits of institutional governance that we find in
all European universities and that differ most markedly from the tradi-
tional arrangements of 20 or 30 years ago do not appear stable, as
‘reforms continue everywhere’ (Paradeise et al., 2009b, p. 227). Or, in
the words of Schimank and Lange (2009, p. 66), ‘the university system
Institutional Governance 113

was forced out of its old equilibrium without having found a stable new
one. As a result, the picture drawn here might be a snapshot that does
not cover events and developments that may happen tomorrow.’

4.2 Factors of Change of Institutional Governance

The literature that discusses the factors behind change of institutional
governance tends to focus on two broad types of factors: on the one
hand, the role of ideas, paradigms, narratives, and, more specifically, of
the set of assumptions and prescriptions that are known as New Public
Management (NPM); and on the other, the role of interests and of power
relations among the actors, stakeholders, and interest groups concerned.
While these are undoubtedly key factors of change, I maintain that
the specific directions that change has taken in the last 20 years or so
can be better understood if a further factor is taken into account. This is
what we may call the failure or unsustainability of the previous institu-
tional arrangements. This failure can help to explain the lack, or at least
the weakness, of alternative ideas to challenge the hegemony of NPM
recipes even when it becomes clear that these recipes have major short-
comings or unintended consequences. This failure may also account for
the dramatic shifts in power relations and for the relatively weak
opposition by the ‘losers’ of the process – that is, the individual and
collective actors whose roles are diminished in the new configuration of
institutional governance.

4.2.1 The Role of Ideas: The Diffusion and the Limits

of NPM
The rationales underlying changes in European HE systems have been
the subject of significant debate, with many authors pointing to the
influence of NPM recipes to explain the reforms in higher education
and research. For Musselin and Teixeira (2014), however, these inter-
pretations are convincing at an aggregated level but are not backed up
by empirical data and more precise analysis.
Some authors have suggested that the rationales which were mobi-
lized to push for changes, and the rhetoric used to make sense of these
changes, can be linked to two main narratives of public service reform:
New Public Management, and Network Governance (Ferlie et al.,
2009). However, only the first one is fully spelled out to show how it
114 Regini

could influence HE reforms. In this view, the NPM relies on three

things: (1) markets (or quasi markets) rather than planning; (2) strong
performance measurement, monitoring, and management systems,
with a growth of audit systems rather than tacit or self-regulation;
and (3) empowered and entrepreneurial management rather than col-
legial public sector professionals and administrators.
It has been noted that the post-war European welfare states, espe-
cially those characterized as ‘universalistic’ (Esping-Andersen,
1990), did not develop the notion of evaluating public investments
by measuring their returns. The idea of linking investments and
returns in education and research was a new phenomenon that
emerged during the 1980s, together with the idea of correlating
education supply with the needs of the economic system: ‘Indeed,
the increasing influence of rational choice theories, translated in the
public sector as New Public Management, led analysts to consider
continental European universities of the 1980s as loosely coupled
professional bureaucracies (Weick, 1976) lacking major properties
of formal organizations such as strong principal–agent relationships’
(Paradeise et al., 2009a, p. 203).
A number of more general assumptions have also been identified that
formed a background to the reforms carried out in the last 20 years and
that were widely shared even by scholars and policy makers who were
not sympathetic to the NPM prescriptions. First, and most widespread,
is the assumption that competition among independent organizations is
superior to state monopolies as a means of achieving the social benefits
of increased innovation and efficiency. But, as Dill (2014) suggests, two
further assumptions are also relevant: the public choice assumption
that rational user choice is more efficient than government bureaucracy
as a means of controlling the rent-seeking behaviour of government-
supported organizations; and the principal–agent assumption that
transaction costs, including monitoring the self-interested behaviour
of professionals, can be minimized through better specified contracts.

4.2.2 The Role of Actors’ Interests and Power Relations

The second factor that is commonly referred to in explaining recent
changes in university governance is the transformation of power rela-
tions among the main HE actors with their different interests. A major
problem with this explanation, however, is that the various actors of
Institutional Governance 115

HE systems have not just different, but often also internally contra-
dictory, interests.
• Governments have a ‘structural’ interest to improve the performance
of their HE systems in order to increase both the competitive advan-
tage of their economies and the employability of their citizens. But
they must, at the same time, contain the enormous growth of public
expenditure entailed by mass university systems and the cost of basic
research.
• Universities and other HE institutions, when designing curricula,
must take into account the demands for skills coming from the
economic system and especially from the local context. But they
must, at the same time, consider the types of scientific specialization
of their faculty, so as to exploit their strengths in the competition
with other HE institutions.
• Academic oligarchies may resist institutional change, seeing it as an
attack on their prerogatives and routines, or on traditional values of
the scientific community, or even on the need for high-quality educa-
tion independent from external demands. But they may also appreci-
ate the modernization of educational methods and the closer links
with the labour market that go with it; and some faculty members
can even welcome the chance to pursue their own interests as ‘aca-
demic capitalists’ (Amaral et al., 2003) outside their institutions.
• Students and their families could potentially benefit from a moder-
nization and rationalization of the educational supply which is
geared towards improving employability in the labour market for
graduates. But this potential benefit may not materialize, as the
‘democratization’ of access to tertiary education also increases
competition for highly qualified jobs, leading to an ‘inflation of
credentials’ (Collins, 1979). Also, families often try to contain the
costs of enrolling their children in higher education institutions, an
attempt which contradicts their demand for better quality from
such institutions.
• Finally, firms usually demand a type of training and research strictly
related to their specific needs. But they may also recognize the desir-
ability of a wider repertoire of knowledge beyond what is needed
immediately, as this may be a condition for helping innovation.
In short, the role played by each of these actors and stakeholders in
the transformation of institutional governance cannot be simply
116 Regini

deduced from their own interests, as these are not unambiguous and are
susceptible to modification by external factors or through interaction
(Regini, 2011).
That said, the most urgent need to change university governance and
the most powerful pressures to undertake such reform have come from
the interest of governments of any colour who face the rising costs –
financial and organizational – of the massification of their HE systems.
As a consequence of these costs, spending per student has decreased.
The problem was exacerbated in the 1990s with the emergence in
Europe of the notion of knowledge-based economies, putting higher
education at the very core of engines of economic dynamism:
The tension between the increasing perceived role of higher education as
a source of competitive strength for knowledge-based societies and the ineluct-
able decrease of per capita public investment in higher education was to be
solved by reorganizing the national system of higher education and research to
do things better, quicker and at lower costs, and to differentiate missions
between HE institutions. (Paradeise et al., 2009a, pp. 199–200)

In terms of power relations between the relevant HE actors, the main

trends during this period were the collapse of the academic commu-
nities’ power, as the growth in their numbers undermined their role as
oligarchies, and the increase in the influence of external stakeholders.
Again, the advent of a knowledge-based economy, and the rhetoric
surrounding the ‘Lisbon strategy’ launched by the European Council in
March 2000, reinforced these trends. They highlighted an interest by
external actors in the utilization of HE products (human capital and
research results) to an extent previously unknown. For university
administrations and academic communities, a new trade-off thus
emerged between the chance to increase the employability of their
graduates and to partly compensate for reduced state funding, on the
one hand, and the risk of losing control over processes of knowledge
creation, use, and transmission on the other. A less oligarchic and less
cohesive academic community felt forced to somehow redefine its
values and objectives, as well as to integrate its traditional teaching
and research duties with a plethora of new organizational and service-
provision roles. More generally, the traditional values of academic
communities, university administrations, and states were often super-
seded by managerial–entrepreneurial considerations that infiltrated
these actors’ behaviour to varying degrees. A divergence between
Institutional Governance 117

traditional models of governance of HE institutions and the new needs

of the sector became apparent everywhere (Regini, 2011).

4.2.3 The Failure/Unsustainability of the Previous

Governance Arrangements
Ideas, interests, and power relations are undoubtedly key factors of
change. However, we may assume that the NPM ideas on changing
institutional governance could have become less hegemonic, and the
academic communities could have exercised a far greater influence in
effecting this change, if the traditional governance arrangements had
not repeatedly shown their severe limitations. In what follows I will try
to briefly substantiate this assumption.
In all continental European countries, HE had traditionally developed
as a sector of public administration ruled by laws and central norms but
actually governed by academic oligarchies. The traditional distribution of
power in academic systems was termed ‘collegial’, but the reality has often
been described as a sort of ‘co-optation oligarchy’. The well-known
problems of such collegial governance were conflicts of interests, amateur-
ism, unclear attribution of responsibilities, and decisional inefficiency.
‘Even though external pressures to some extent succeed imposing man-
agerialism, the traditional assets of power within the oligarchies are
simply reshuffled and reconstructed in order to minimize the changes’
(Marini and Reale, 2016, p. 112). Collegialism, it has been argued,
developed as a sort of zero-sum game, where power was exercised by
influential senior chairs and other dominant individuals in an oligarchy of
guilds and fiefdoms (Trowler, 2010). As a consequence, institutional
governance in continental European universities has continued to be
largely based on a spoils system, often leading to collusive decisions rather
than selective ones and to situations of stalemate when external challenges
required more radical change.
On the other hand, attempts to ensure the ‘democratic revitalization’
of pathological and over-bureaucratized forms of public administra-
tion within the university context suggested strong stakeholder parti-
cipation in the governance of the institution. This took different forms.
Some countries (Germany, the Netherlands) passed new laws and
created university boards consisting partly or exclusively of non-
university members, expected to play the role of the American board
of trustees and to set priorities, approve the budget, etc. Other
118 Regini

countries, such as the United Kingdom, introduced non-academic

members in their national research councils (Ferlie et al., 2009).
Again, the problem was exacerbated in the 1990s with the emergence
in Europe of the notion of a knowledge-based economy. This new
vision of the social and economic role of higher education in society
coincided with the perception that it was unable to answer the labour
market’s needs. This led to the emerging idea that the HE institutions
might be used more effectively as policy instruments in this connection
(Paradeise et al., 2009a).
Overall, the sense of the failure of university governance to stand up
to old problems and new challenges became so widespread that an
alternative type of institutional arrangement was generally regarded as
necessary by political élites that often were not even aware of NPM
recipes. Quite simply, the previous arrangements seemed no longer
sustainable and the obvious alternative was to look at forms of institu-
tional governance that seemed appropriate to the new situation.

4.3 Relevant Actors and Types of Action

4.3.1 The Traditional Actors

In the traditional type of university governance that characterized
continental European countries up to the 1980s, the only two relevant
actors were the state on the one hand and the academic communities on
the other.3 Universities were just ‘loosely coupled organizations’
unable to pursue institutional strategies beyond those of their profes-
sors, and key stakeholders such as students or firms were seen as merely
passive users. The concept of a ‘market’ for HE had no actual room for
application, because the market can only operate where the supply of
goods or services is oriented towards a demand, and exchanges are
based on prices determined by the interaction of such supply and
demand. This was not the case in the traditional European university.
In that institution, the ‘goods supplied’ were the production of culture
and knowledge through research, and the transmission of this culture –
and the values and lifestyles which accompanied it – to the national
élites who could access it and who had been socialized to it. The almost
exclusive ‘producers’ of this particular type of goods were (academic)
communities which acted on the basis of norms and values shared
among themselves. They were regulated by the state, which set the
Institutional Governance 119

rules and standards for their recognition but delegated the definition of
their objectives to the institutions. The organization of the supply of
such goods was thus left to the self-regulation of the academic commu-
nities, within limits and at ‘prices’ fixed by the state.
Furthermore, not only was the supply not organized in relation to
a demand, but no real demand existed – or at least, it would be difficult
to identify the bearers of such a demand, capable of orienting the
supply and influencing the terms of trade. First, a diffuse demand for
higher education in the sense that is understood today did not exist. The
very limited segment of the youth population who enrolled in the
universities (usually less than 10–15 per cent of the relevant age cohort)
wanted to acquire the credentials to access the professions or the
technical and managerial positions which required that level of educa-
tion, and had little reason to worry about the correspondence between
the content of their studies and their future occupational roles. Their
families, like the enterprises, the public administrations, and the pro-
fessional associations, focused on the credentials and thus on the status
which could be acquired within the social stratification system, rather
than on the content and methods of education, set by the academic
communities within a general regulatory framework provided by the
state.
Second, the demand for ‘social appropriation’ of the results of
research carried out in the universities was very weak and dispersed.
A Fordist production system such as that prevailing in Europe based its
competitiveness on the mass production of standard goods and on low
labour costs, rather than on constant product and process innovation
that depended in a crucial way on research. The laboratories of the
large enterprises were mostly sufficient for their own needs, while
university research did not respond, except in particular cases, to
specific demands advanced by the production system.
To summarize, in the traditional HE systems, education and research
were conceived of not so much as specific goods ‘supplied’ by an orga-
nization (the university) in response to an articulated demand, but rather
as public goods whose production was financed and regulated by the
state but entirely delegated to academic communities, which were the
sole depositories of the know-how necessary to decide how to organize
this production. From this also derived the traditional governance mod-
els of the universities of continental Europe, often described as sets of
lecturers organized into faculties headed by a minister.
120 Regini

4.3.2 ‘New’ Actors Enter the Scene

Such a traditional HE structure was destabilized only when other
parties besides the state and the academic community were recog-
nized as legitimate actors by the latter and hence acquired some
degree of power or influence. The first such ‘new’ actor is the indivi-
dual university, as an organization endowed with its own interests,
distinct from those of the academic communities within it, and with
enough autonomy from the state to pursue these interests, even in
competition with each other. The existence of autonomous univer-
sities, which appears to be taken for granted today, was what differ-
entiated the HE systems of the Anglo–American world from those of
continental Europe until relatively recently. In the latter, it was only
in the 1980s and 1990s that the granting by the state of some
managerial autonomy – though often limited and partial – to the
universities enabled them to become subjects with interests distinct
from the academic communities and from the state. This process has
been described as ‘turning the university into an organizational
actor’ (Krücken and Meier, 2006. See also De Boer et al., 2007;
Musselin, 2006; Whitley, 2008).
The shift from administrative bodies to strategic actors requires the
strengthening of individual universities’ internal steering capabilities.
A common feature in all countries is the promotion of strategic plan-
ning at the level of individual universities, most often as a basis for
negotiating the allocation of resources. By making plans compulsory
before budgetary negotiations, ministries have stimulated identity
assertion by universities (Paradeise et al., 2009a).
Patterns of decision making within universities have thus clearly
evolved. They reflect the emergence of universities as collective actors
and their increasing institutional autonomy (Berdahl, 1990). Of
course, this autonomy is criticized: strategic plans are easier to write
than to implement, and although more decisions are made, they are
generally more incremental than radical (Musselin and Paradeise,
2009). Nevertheless, all this has made possible (though not necessa-
rily effective) the adoption by university administrations of a logic of
action different from the previous one, which was limited to making
agreements between the academic communities, and to the bureau-
cratic management of the funds provided and the rules dictated by the
state.
Institutional Governance 121

Hence, the first ‘new’ actor was the individual university acquir-
ing an identity and the ability to pursue its organizational interests
autonomously. But in the same time period, two other key groups
acquired awareness of their collective identity as legitimate actors in
the HE system, or were recognized as performing such a role by the
state: the potential students and their families on the one hand, and
enterprises on the other. Obviously, these actors have always
existed, but it is only when they start being conceived as bearers
of interests (stakeholders) in the HE system, or when they are
invited to elaborate and articulate a coherent ‘demand’ for the
products and the functioning of such HE systems, that universities
are induced to enter an exchange relationship with them. It is in
these situations that a market logic can, at least theoretically,
become relevant in both the reorganization of the traditional func-
tions of universities (teaching and research) and their modes of
operation and management (provision of services to students and
enterprises, management of their funds, assessment mechanisms,
governance structures, etc.) (Regini, 2011).

4.4 The Unintended Consequences of Institutional

Governance Reforms
According to Musselin and Teixeira (2014), there are three different
but complementary ways of looking at reforms. The first is to be
attentive to their evolution, to identify their internal contradictions,
the redefinitions and the reorientations they experience. The second is
to look at their implementation in a comparative way. The third and
final way is described thus:
[A]nother major issue when analyzing policy reforms in higher education
refers to the frequent contrast between expected and actual results. Higher
education is particularly well known for being a traditionally complex field
to be reformed, and higher education institutions have a reputation for
resistance to change and subversion of policy initiatives, mainly due to the
strong devolution of power to lower levels of the institution. (Musselin and
Teixeira, 2014, p. 12)

I believe that this last way of looking at reforms – namely, the ‘contrast
between expected and actual results’ – is by far the most fruitful for
understanding actual change in institutional governance. I will,
122 Regini

therefore, focus on the unintended consequences of recent reforms of

university governance in Europe, and will then try to understand why
the production of such unintended consequences tends to be the rule in
all European HE systems.4
Various strands of literature in the social sciences have highlighted
how top-down change processes, such as the reforms of university
governance in Europe, inevitably produce effects somewhat different
from those expected. Those who are subject to the change but have not
been involved in the reform design tend to put up resistance and to
deploy their power or cognitive resources in order to blunt the most
disruptive effects of the change. Cerych and Sabatier (1986), for
instance, examine a series of university reforms conducted in Europe
in the 1970s to understand the factors behind policy success or policy
failure. On the basis of these findings they conclude that higher educa-
tion reforms may succeed, but they highlight the forces that work
against reforms: the most powerful of these forces is the capacity of
various groups to mobilize resistance against the introduction of
a reform.
However, I maintain that it is more interesting – besides being more
original – to focus on the unintended consequences of governance
reforms in the Mertonian meaning of outcomes that are not the ones
anticipated by the actors. In his seminal article on the ‘unanticipated
consequences of purposive social action’, Merton (1936) was not deal-
ing with the obvious and often widespread resistance and obstacles to
‘purposive social action’, but with how this action is designed by actors
who do not fully anticipate its consequences for one of the following
reasons: ignorance stemming from the existing state of knowledge;
error; immediacy of interests, namely exclusive concern with short-
term effects of action; or basic values that lead to an action irrespective
of its long-term results. In Merton’s analytical framework, therefore, it
is cognitive limits, value orientations, and the shortcomings of ration-
ality that account for the unintended outcomes of reforms, even in the
absence of significant resistance to them. Moreover, these unforeseen
consequences are not necessarily undesirable: in fact, they may be
unexpected benefits as much as unexpected drawbacks.
Reforms of HE governance are no exception to the type of ‘purposive
social action’ that produces important unanticipated consequences, but
to date little attention has been paid to this aspect. In what follows
I will, therefore, focus my analysis on this. If set in relation to the four
Institutional Governance 123

main components of the corporate enterprise model described earlier,

we may highlight the following unintended consequences:
• The resilience of self-government. Undermining the self-government of
collegial bodies does not remove the need for the expertise of academics
when decisions are to be taken and strategies devised. Nor does it affect
the ‘resilience’ of a culture and practice of self-government typical of
the academic community. This need and this resilience produce unin-
tended consequences that can be summarized as the emergence of new
forums for discussion (or the strengthening of old ones) between the
university executive and representatives of the academic staff, which
work as functional substitutes for the self-governing bodies that have
been dramatically weakened. In some countries, these forums consist of
institutionalized meetings between rector and deans or department
directors. In other countries they more often take the form of
a number of advisory or preparatory committees (specified in the
university statutes or established ad hoc), which draw on the expertise
of academics. Finally, informal relational and consultative networks
come to the fore. Of course, networks of this kind have always existed,
but they assume new importance precisely where the old collegiate
bodies (senate, faculty council) have been most disempowered.
• The weakness of governing boards with lay members. At best, the
obvious lack of internal knowledge by the external members of the
boards of governors tends to cause difficulties in the effective func-
tioning of those bodies. But at many universities this has an even
more damaging unintended consequence: the bodies comprising
external members – to whom the reformers assigned the role of
supervising and counterbalancing the executive (the rectorate) by
leveraging their economic and social role – are often ‘captured’ by
the very same executive bodies over which they are supposed to
exercise supervision and control.
• The emergence of a collective leadership. If a ‘rector leader’ is to fulfil
the crucial strategic management functions deriving from the verti-
calization of decision-making processes, s/he needs a team more
stable and better able to work as a group compared with the colla-
borators of the former ‘primus inter pares rector’, who were usually
assigned only specific tasks. All the reforms conceive the rector as an
individual leader in charge of a formally monocratic role, but they
design a set of key functions that in practice require a collective
124 Regini

leadership. The role assumed by the rector’s team has the unintended
and ‘beneficial’ consequence of attenuating the problem of the
dependence of the university’s governance on the personal charac-
teristics of an individual leader, so that the decisions taken by the
executive are more shared and less random.
• The fluctuations between centralization and decentralization.
Finally, rationalization of organizational structures has had tempor-
ary positive effects, but at the same time it has revived unresolved
organizational dilemmas which the old model of governance had
remedied with compromises. To what extent can the university
executive decentralize functions and responsibilities to the internal
units in order to involve them in the overall organization, and to
what extent should it instead centralize them so as to obtain stan-
dard performances? The resurgence of these dilemmas has the
unforeseen consequence of a frequent oscillation between decentra-
lization and centralization, which seems to contradict the pursuit by
universities of a coherent pattern of reorganization.
These unexpected outcomes are evidenced, to varying extents and in
different ways, by many universities in different European countries.
I shall now illustrate them in some detail.

4.4.1 The Resilience of Self-government

All European reforms of institutional governance have drastically disem-
powered the traditional collegial bodies. But, as the empirical evidence
drawn from several case studies of European universities shows, this has
generally produced an unexpected outcome: the emergence of new, less
institutionalized forms of self-government by the academic community.
As far as formal decision-making processes are concerned, a probably
unsurprising finding is the widespread use of advisory and preparatory
committees, or of similar forms of assembly composed mainly of aca-
demics. These committees and assemblies apparently play a more crucial
role than in the past not only in the university’s management, but also in
decisions on strategy. As concerns outcomes, on the other hand, top-
level decisions taken without broad consensus seem to be extremely rare
at all the universities for which we have empirical information. The
reason is that an extensive informal network of relationships and con-
sultation is activated before any such decisions are reached. Taken
Institutional Governance 125

together, these two findings indicate that the disempowerment of the

traditional collegial governing bodies of the university has produced an
unexpected outcome: self-government by the academic community still
continues, in different, less institutional forms, by means of what we may
refer to as ‘functional substitutes’ (Regini, 2015). In the words of
Paradeise et al. (2009a, p. 224), ‘decision-making competencies of rec-
tors and deans have been extended in many countries, for instance in the
1990s in Germany, and in 2007 in France. Yet academic self-governance
remains very strong in most countries, because daily operations are
based on informal, long-lasting, and non-hierarchical peer relationships,
and academic contributions remain largely based on personal commit-
ment.’ Or, to quote Schimank and Lange (2009, pp. 65–66):
[A]cademic self-governance [in Germany] . . . has indeed been weakened
formally. It, however, continues to more-or-less stay alive in a more informal
manner. At the moment, most measures to build managerial self-governance
remain incomplete. The prevailing consensus-oriented culture of the aca-
demic profession compels many, in leadership positions, to act as if they
had no new powers. Thus, formal competencies remain unused, and con-
sensus, among professors at least, is still sought by rectors and deans . . . But
the most important reason for ‘cooperativeness’ is that many persons in
leadership positions have internalized the traditional organizational culture
of consensus during their long academic socialization.

This unexpected outcome, of course, can partly be explained by the

‘resilience’ at all levels of a self-government culture typical of the academic
community. But it probably also indicates the limitations – highlighted in
the next section – of a managerial approach to university governance and
the need to make the most of the expertise of academic staff, albeit in more
informal, less institutional terms.

4.4.2 The Weakness of Governing Boards with Lay

Members
Almost everywhere, university governance reforms inspired by a cor-
porate enterprise model have assigned crucial governing functions to
relatively small non-elective bodies (boards of governors or equivalent)
which include stakeholders or external members expected to represent
general interests, particularly those of the socio-economic system in
which the university is embedded. An assumption of these reforms has
126 Regini

been that because external members are used to dealing with strategic
alternatives in their own work environment, they can do so more
effectively than members working within the university. But the every-
day practice of universities raises several doubts about this assumption.
Even in countries where the reforms have been most radical, the boards
of governors seem to be rather weak bodies.
The empirical evidence, drawn from case studies of universities in
several European countries, clearly shows the shortcomings of boards
of governors in assuming the role of effective counterweights to the
power of the rector in the highly verticalized decision-making system
established by the reforms. In fact, in a governance structure where the
rector and his/her team perform strategic functions, and not just execu-
tive and managerial ones, it becomes difficult for the board of gover-
nors to contribute actively to those functions or to exercise effective
supervision. The more the realm of decisions extends from such issues
as housing or student fees to research strategies or choice of the pro-
ducts to be evaluated, the less the external members of the board of
governors are able to contribute, as they obviously lack these skills or
sufficient knowledge of the scientific environment.
Hence, for various reasons, governing boards with lay members prove
largely ineffective in their intended role of acting as counterweights to the
rector and the senior management team by virtue of their economic and
social backgrounds. These difficulties are particularly evident at the uni-
versities of countries which most radically gave key governing functions to
these small, non-elected bodies with a considerable presence of lay
members.

4.4.3 From Individual to Collective Leadership: The Growing

Importance of the Rector’s Team
One major objective of all institutional governance reforms in
Europe, as we saw earlier, has been the verticalization of decision-
making processes in order to enhance the efficiency of universities
through a strong leadership, shielded against veto powers and
spoils-system practices. This objective has largely been achieved in
all countries, but the empirical evidence shows that the team flank-
ing the rector has become increasingly important as an effective
management body. The verticalization of the decision-making pro-
cess is therefore to some extent counterbalanced by the
Institutional Governance 127

institutionalization of a collegiate structure of governance.

Consequently, decisions are the result of collective work, and less
dependent on the rector’s individual traits. As Ferlie et al. (2009,
p. 17) put it, ‘in terms of senior management style, there is an
emphasis on softer leadership skills, visioning and networking
based approaches; there is an emphasis on distributed leadership
and team based approaches rather than the highly individualized
management typical of NPM’.
At British universities the number of pro-vice chancellors has increased
substantially in recent years, and the senior management team has
extended its range of action in response to the need to strengthen the
‘strategic capacity’ of universities to undertake their more extensive
functions (Middlehurst, 2013; Shattock, 2013). Besides the vice-rectors,
the presence of senior professionals in the collegial governing body
resolves the historical duality between academic decision-making bodies
and administrative ones. Usually the rector’s team works as a strong
executive able to take decisions and implement them. More generally, the
idea that university leadership can only be collective now appears well
established. Hence, the rector’s individual traits are somewhat tempered
by the collective nature of the decision-making process.

4.4.4 The Fluctuations between Centralization and

Decentralization
Two studies by Hogan, carried out in 2005 and 2012, respectively, and
reported by Shattock (2013), show that between 1993 and 2002, of 81
British universities examined, 74 per cent reorganized their intermediate
structures (usually by reducing the number of faculties, but sometimes by
abolishing them altogether or by converting them into colleges) and their
departments (sometimes by merging them into schools which may or
may not pertain to the faculty); and that between 2002 and 2007 this
process accelerated further. Hence, British universities began to reorga-
nize their academic structures well before their continental counterparts,
primarily in order to create a few, generally large, units. This reorganiza-
tion brought with it a decentralization of financial management, which
in many universities has extended to decisions concerning human
resources allocation. This decentralization of functions and powers has
been justified by the argument that increased numbers due to the explo-
sion of the ‘mass university’ caused a decision-making overload for the
128 Regini

university’s centre, forcing it to delegate numerous decisions to the lower

levels. However, Shattock (2013) argues that the recent economic crisis,
with the widespread perception of the volatility of the financial situation
and the risks connected therewith, has led to recentralization. The pro-
spect of downsizing due to austerity policies has persuaded senior uni-
versity leaders to retrieve decision-making powers regarding resources
previously delegated to the periphery. The same effect is produced by
national research assessment exercises, which raise expectations of
rewards and incentives to be managed by the centre.
The empirical evidence drawn from case studies of universities in
different European countries shows that these uncertainties – or this
oscillation between decentralization to the university’s periphery and
centralization to its senior leadership – concern not only British uni-
versities but also those of other countries. Overall, these fluctuations
between decentralization and recentralization appear to be the unex-
pected outcome of rationalization policies that seek uniform, simpli-
fied answers to complex organizational dilemmas for which there is
no one-size-fits-all solution. What is the optimal size of a university’s
organizational units? Should they be large enough to allow for econo-
mies of scale and for a strong voice in negotiations with the executive,
or small enough to foster identity and a sense of membership? To
what extent can the university executive decentralize functions and
responsibilities to these units in order to involve them in the overall
organization, and to what extent should it centralize instead so as to
obtain standard performances? The rationalization policies have led
to the resurfacing of these and other organizational problems which
the old governance model had attempted to resolve through compro-
mise solutions (Capano and Regini, 2014).

4.5 How Can We Account for the Unexpected Outcomes

of Institutional Governance Reforms?
Why did these unintended consequences of the reforms of university
governance, which entail a partial failure of the objective to converge
on the Anglo–American model, occur, to a greater or lesser extent, in
most European higher education systems? In the HE literature we find
different answers to this question.
A first answer has already been mentioned when discussing the
seminal work by Cerych and Sabatier (1986), namely the ability of
Institutional Governance 129

academic communities to mobilize against reforms that tend to shift

power from them to the institutional leadership. This type of explana-
tion is still the most widespread in the HE literature. It is well synthe-
sized, for instance, by Paradeise et al. (2009a, p. 225): ‘The most radical
reform programs may turn out to be counter-productive each time they
crash with the harsh realities of power distributions.’ More recently,
Musselin and Teixeira (2014, p. 12) have written along the same lines:
‘Higher education is particularly well known for being a traditionally
complex field to be reformed, and higher education institutions have
a reputation for resistance to change and subversion of policy initia-
tives, mainly due to the strong devolution of power to lower levels of
the institution.’
A second explanation is what, in game theory, we could call a failure
by states and universities to build a cooperative game between them, as
mutual distrust leads to a vicious circle. This is the account that
Schimank and Lange (2009, p. 63) offer of the German case:
Ministries have fallen back to regulation because they began to distrust the
universities’ willingness to continue in the direction of the agreed-upon
targets. This distrust is not totally unjustified because the ability of the
university leadership, with whom the ministry negotiates to implement gen-
eral goals one level below in faculties and institutes, is still rather limited . . .
However, the ministry’s behaviour has generated, on the university side,
distrust in the commitment of the political side to the proclaimed shift from
regulation to external guidance. Thus, mutual distrust has reinforced itself.
But as long as nobody believes that the other side believes in mission-based
contracts, they remain a facade behind which the old game is continued.

These and other explanations implicitly assume that these trends are
not to be found only in the HE system, but exemplify a dynamics
typical of all public sectors based on highly professionalized commu-
nities: a dynamics of mutual suspicion and power confrontation
between the communities holding onto their traditional values, and
States that try to make them more accountable by streamlining and
‘rationalizing’ the decision-making system. This assumption is clearly
spelled out by Ferlie et al. (2009, pp. 2, 7):
The organizational similarities with other professionalized public sector
settings such as health care are more important than the differences:
European universities are largely dependent on the state for financing; the
state is concerned to regulate their behaviour as they influence citizens’ life
130 Regini

chances significantly; they contain a mix of professional and bureaucratic

elements and they operate within strongly structured institutionalized
fields . . . We can thus develop the argument that European nation-states
are increasingly seeking to steer their HE systems, along with other key
public services, in directions which are consistent with national policies.

There is, however, an alternative type of explanation. I will argue

that the reasons for the production of unintended consequences of
institutional governance reforms reside in a generalized and systema-
tic underestimation by the reformers of the specific nature of univer-
sities and their functioning, which makes it difficult to import models
developed in other contexts such as businesses or public administra-
tions. In addition, we often find a generalized and systematic under-
estimation of two other characteristics of university institutions
everywhere: the organizational complexity due to the plurality of
functions entrusted to universities, which makes rationalization
aimed at simplification problematic and sometimes counterproduc-
tive; and the marked diversity of higher education institutions, which
makes the adoption of homogeneous and standardizing models diffi-
cult and often ineffective.

4.5.1 The Specific Nature of Universities

An underestimation of the specific nature of universities seems to be
largely responsible for the first two types of unintended consequences
mentioned herein – that is, the difficult functioning of governing bodies
comprising members from outside the university, and the emergence of
new forms of self-government that appear to be functional substitutes
for the disempowerment of the traditional collegial bodies. The corpo-
rate enterprise model of governance, which has inspired national
reforms to varying extents, assumes that decisions should be taken
not by the representatives of those who benefit or suffer from such
decisions (the academic staff), but by persons representing the broader
interests of society; society finances the universities and therefore wants
to ensure that it optimizes the available benefits.
This governance model is undoubtedly legitimized by the vices of
self-government, which Adam Smith (1776) identified more than two
centuries ago as opportunism and collusive or self-referential choices.
In fact, the problems of the collegial self-government of universities are
Institutional Governance 131

even broader: they include inefficient decision making, an opaque

chain of responsibility, spoils-system practices, and amateurism. The
corporate enterprise model finds legitimacy in these vices of self-
government and proves superior in terms of efficiency, rapidity, and
the ability to make selective choices. However, the unresolved problem
of this model when applied to institutions such as universities is that
scientific communities are the only ones in a position to assess the
problems and prospects within their own areas. The public goods
produced by universities (highly qualified human capital and research
results) are very specialized goods, the features of which can only be
determined by their producers, and not by the bureaucracy or the
market. The most promising directions for research, which researchers
are most likely to achieve which results, the most appropriate knowl-
edge to be conveyed – these are all choices which only the scientific
communities can make, and university bureaucracies are obliged to
leave such choices to those communities (Whitley, 2000).
The main organizational dilemma thus becomes the following:
should preference be given to solutions that prevent collusive and
self-referential choices, or to inside knowledge of the situations
requiring action to be taken? The absence of collusive and self-
referential choices implies that the bodies which propose or decide
the allocation of resources cannot consist of those that use such
resources. On the other hand, as indicated, only scientific commu-
nities are in a position to evaluate problems and prospects in their
own areas. It is not easy to find balanced solutions to this dilemma.
However, policy makers often lack even an awareness of the very
terms of the dilemma. The reasons for this, in Mertonian terms, are
a mix of errors of analysis (concerning the university’s specificities),
the prevalence of short-term interests in productive and efficient
universities over a long-term interest in the effective production of
public goods, and the predominance of a value system that tends to
neglect the very idea of public goods.

4.5.2 The Plurality of University Functions

and Organizational Complexity
The verticalization of decision making that has led to a strengthening of
rectors’ powers everywhere has also been inspired to a large extent by
a corporate model of governance. To make rapid, effective, and non-
132 Regini

collusive decisions possible, it appeared necessary to protect the rector

from veto powers and to define his/her role no longer in the traditional
terms of primus inter pares, but in terms similar to those of the mana-
ging director of a large company.
However, rectors (at least at European universities) are not
managers by profession, but academics. As such, they are directly
aware of the enormous complexity of universities as organizations
called upon to perform several different functions – teaching,
research, knowledge transfer, social engagement, support to local
development – usually by reconciling the needs and habits of very
different subject areas. These are complex organizations that, for
this very reason, require an executive possessing a range of widely
varied characteristics and abilities. As argued by Middlehurst
(2013, p. 283):
[V]ice-chancellors’ own perceptions of their roles and the characteristics
associated with them suggest four sets of necessary competences: academic-
related characteristics associated with gaining credibility and influence; busi-
ness-related characteristics to deal with diversified funding streams and
‘branding’ of institutions; managerial and leadership characteristics asso-
ciated with two key responsibilities: an external representative profile
(locally, nationally and internationally) and working with and through
a senior management team, an Academic Board or Senate and a governing
body; and fourth, personal characteristics including physical and intellectual
resilience (emotional resilience is increasingly important too).

All this requires a collective leadership that can only be exercised by

a team more stable and better able to work as a group compared with
the collaborators of the former rector primus inter pares, who were
usually assigned only specific tasks.

4.5.3 The Heterogeneity of HE Institutions

Finally, the uncertain and contradictory effects of rationalization can
be accounted for by an underestimation not only of the organizational
complexity, but also of the heterogeneity of universities, which makes
adoption of homogeneous and standardizing models difficult and often
ineffective.
A good example of this is the Italian reform of universities intro-
duced in 2010, which was designed to simplify the internal structure
Institutional Governance 133

of universities by abolishing faculties and transferring all functions to

departments, without considering the very different effects that this
‘simplification’ would produce in large universities compared to small
ones. In general, the goal of simplification proved much easier to
achieve in small and medium-sized universities than in large and
very large ones. In fact, at small and medium-sized universities, the
pre-reform departments have been replaced by larger departments
roughly equal in number to the old faculties. At these universities,
therefore, the reform has achieved the goal of unifying, in one single
organization, competences that were previously shared between the
faculties and the old departments. Consequently, the new organiza-
tional structure enables the university executive to frequently and
directly interact with the organizational units (still few in number),
and simultaneously enables the organizational units to maintain their
right to representation in the governing bodies (in particular, the
academic senate).
At the larger universities, however, the reform has led to the creation
of new departments, often surpassing – sometimes considerably – the
number of the old faculties. At these universities, therefore, the compe-
tences previously assigned to the faculties and departments have indeed
been unified, but to the detriment of the organization’s compactness.
Hence, while at the small and medium-sized universities the net effect
of the reform on internal organizational structures has been actual
simplification – that is, the concentration of decisions into organiza-
tional units of the same size as the old faculties – at the large and very
large universities the concentration of decisions has been accompanied
by a fragmentation of organizational units.
To conclude, one reason for the occurrence of unintended conse-
quences of institutional governance reforms may be identified as the
generalized, systematic underestimation by reformers of certain spe-
cific characteristics of universities. Some authors argue that ‘para-
doxes’ (Hood, 2000) or unintended consequences of reforms have
occurred in many other public sectors as well, following their subjec-
tion to NPM. However, while the strict implementation of this ideol-
ogy may contribute to the emergence of the unintended consequences
discussed herein, it is the specificity of university institutions that
seems to play a key role. Evidence suggests that this specificity is
very poorly understood, leading to it being underestimated or totally
overlooked by policy makers (Regini, 2015). In other words, some
134 Regini

outcomes of university reforms were not anticipated and could not

have been anticipated even by a very careful policy design, not just
because the reforms were value-driven, but because of the clear cog-
nitive limits of policy makers, unable to grasp the specificity of higher
education institutions.

Notes
1. By ‘governance’ in the HE field, we mean the ‘process’ and the ‘structure’
by which decisions are formulated and implemented as a result of the
interaction of all those involved (Capano, 2011; Klijn, 2008). This
definition can be applied at both the institutional and the systemic
levels. The latter refers to the relationships between universities and the
state as regulator. Institutional governance – which is the object of the
current analysis – relates to the way individual universities are internally
governed, namely by authority relations at the organizational level.
2. According to Burton Clark (1983), the Continental model is
characterized by systemic, strongly hierarchical coordination through
state-centred policies; no institutional autonomy; the powerful, all-
pervasive authority of the academic guilds; and faculties and schools
constituting confederations of chair-holders.
3. This section and the following one draw heavily on Regini (2011).
4. This section and the following one draw on Regini (2015) and on Capano
et al. (2016).

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5 Capture and Drift in Emerging
International Governance
Arrangements
The Role of Meta-organizations in Higher
Education Quality Assurance
ås e g o r n i t z k a , p e t e r m a a s se n , an d b j ø r n
stensaker

5.1 Introduction
In a number of countries and in a number of policy areas throughout
the world, the last two decades have witnessed the emergence of new
agencies in public sector governance (Trondal, 2014). Such agencies
are normally established through public law, take on distinct func-
tions specifically delegated from national governments, and are
granted some autonomy in their operations (Christensen and
Lægreid, 2006). The governance of higher education has reflected
this development, and new national agencies – not least within the
area of external quality assurance – have been created in a range of
countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America (Stensaker,
2011; Westerheijden et al., 2007). As such, trends in the governance
of higher education can be said to converge with trends in public
sector governance in general.
However, as part of a more connected world, driven by growing
internationalization and globalization, it is also possible to identify the
emergence of new types of regulatory organizations at the supra-
national level (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2008). These organizations may
be involved in the creation of new voluntary standards in areas that are
internationally unregulated (Brunsson et al., 2000); they may be an
international extension of existing national agencies (Levi-Faur, 2011);
or they may, as in the case of Europe, be created through legislative
delegation from the European Union (Thatcher and Coen, 2008). The
agencification that has taken place at the national level has been

138
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 139

conducive to the transformation of the emerging European admin-

istrative order (Curtin and Egeberg, 2008, p. 640). Agencies with
relative autonomy from ministerial departments at the national
level are able to connect to ‘sister’ agencies in other European
countries and to executive bodies at the European level. New
executive capacity has been amassed through the establishment of
supra-national agencies with pan-European responsibilities, repre-
senting a parallel agencification at the European level (Levi-Faur,
2011; Thatcher and Coen, 2008; Trondal, 2014). In the literature
on governance, this development is often associated with increased
regulatory complexity, which some characterize as multilevel and
multi-actor governance networks (Danielsen and Yesilkagit, 2014;
Maggetti, 2014).
While much attention has been given to agencification within the
European Union (EU) in governance studies in general (Trondal and
Peters, 2013), the field of higher education has not reflected this
development due to the EU’s lack of formal competence in this specific
policy area (Maassen and Olsen, 2007). However, the fact that formal
European agencies cannot be established in the field of higher educa-
tion does not imply that there is a total absence of regulatory initia-
tives in this area (Gornitzka and Stensaker, 2014). For example, new
organizational forms in higher education quality assurance have
emerged in Europe during the last decade, hinting at new ways in
which governance beyond the level of the nation state may develop.
We believe that higher education and the recent developments within
quality assurance in Europe are interesting examples of emerging
attempts to regulate higher education at the supra-national level,
and may also be of relevance to other regions in the world where
processes of internationalization and globalization are unfolding in
policy spaces with limited formal competence.
This chapter therefore examines the establishment and functioning
of two European meta-organizations in the area of higher education
quality assurance, and how these organizations have contributed to
changing the governance of European quality assurance. We do this
by: 1) describing these meta-organizations and their development; 2)
analysing how these meta-organizations have worked to establish
new rules and standards in the quality assurance area; and 3) analys-
ing their role in the emerging governance space of higher education in
Europe.
140 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

5.2 Reforming European Higher Education: A Short

Description of the Empirical Context
European higher education has experienced two decades of reform and
change following the introduction of the Bologna Process in the early
2000s (Kehm et al., 2009). Through the Bologna Process a number of
European countries agreed to harmonize their higher education systems
through changes in degree structures, credit systems, and, not least, in
building up external quality assurance as a way to ensure transparency
while also upholding academic standards (Westerheijden et al., 2007).
Following the Bologna Process, external quality assurance has become
one of the most visible activities driving European integration in this
sector. While external quality assurance might have many purposes, this
chapter focuses on how it can be linked to governance of higher educa-
tion (Stensaker and Harvey, 2011), and specifically to the increasingly
multilevel and multi-actor dynamics emerging in the sector, where issues
relating to governance go beyond national borders.
At the national level, external quality assurance has played an impor-
tant role as a regulatory instrument ensuring quality in countries aim-
ing for more university autonomy, in deregulated and in more market-
driven systems (Dill and Beerkens, 2010; Olsson and Peters, 2005;
Westerheijden, 2001). As part of this process, governments have set
up new national systems of external quality assurance, and new
national agencies have emerged with special responsibilities for con-
ducting and overseeing the quality assurance systems (Brennan and
Shah, 2000; Schwarz and Westerheijden, 2004). Such agencification
is a rather familiar development at the national level in many European
countries that have initiated reforms in the public sector (Christensen
and Lægreid, 2006; Fisher, 2004).
As part of the Bologna Process in Europe, new so-called meta-
organizations – organizations whose membership consists of other
organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2008) – have been established at
the pan-European level in the quality assurance area. These organiza-
tions belong to the increasing number of new organizations, networks,
and agencies occupying and developing the EU administrative space
(Egeberg and Trondal, 2009; Levi-Faur, 2011; Trondal and Peters,
2013). Two such meta-organizations are particularly interesting.
ENQA (European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher
Education) is an umbrella organization which represents quality
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 141

assurance agencies from the member states of the European Higher

Education Area. ENQA was, for example, given responsibility for
developing European standards and guidelines in the area of quality
assurance – standards that countries signing onto the Bologna declara-
tion at a later date have adopted nationally (Stensaker et al., 2010).
EQAR (European Quality Assurance Register for Higher Education) is
a register listing all agencies that comply with standards and guidelines
for quality assurance in Europe; listing on EQAR allows quality assur-
ance agencies to operate within the European Higher Education Area.
These meta-organizations can be said to play a range of different roles
and to have many different functions. However, an overlapping pur-
pose is their ambition to develop, implement, and oversee standards for
how external quality assurance should be conducted at the European,
national, and institutional levels. As such, one could claim that these
meta-organizations are key instruments for achieving greater conver-
gence within the European Higher Education Area and represent
a significant development of transnational governance initiatives in
higher education.

5.3 Meta-organizations, Multilevel, and Multi-actor

Governance: Theoretical Considerations
Quality assurance in higher education has many links to governance,
including but not limited to governmental reform initiatives aiming at
institutional decentralization, autonomy, and accountability (Dill and
Beerkens, 2010; Stensaker, 2003; Stensaker and Harvey, 2011;
Westerheijden, 1999; Westerheijden et al., 2007). In Europe, quality
assurance has been a vital part of the Bologna Process, and several
policy initiatives have been taken to strengthen the European dimen-
sion in this area, creating new regulatory standards and guidelines with
considerable impact (Gornitzka and Stensaker, 2014). These develop-
ments are of interest to those studying public administration, globali-
zation, and European studies, implying the possibility of linking these
areas which tend to be treated independently in the scholarly debate
(Trondal, 2014).
In principle, the creation of agencies is about transferring govern-
mental activities vertically to more specialized organizations (Trondal,
2014, p. 545). Public sector reforms in general, and regulatory reforms
in particular, have seen both vertical specialization, where tasks are
142 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

hived off from ministries and transferred to relatively independent

agencies positioned at arm’s length from direct political and ministerial
steer, and horizontal specialization, where agencies are differentiated
according to the government’s tasks as administrator, regulator, or
purchaser versus service provider (Christensen and Lægreid, 2006).
Normally, such developments take place within national borders.
In Europe, interesting developments have arisen when these national
agencies travel abroad and form networks which, over time, tend to
create new meta-organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson, 2008). Thatcher
and Coen (2008) have suggested that many European networks have
gradually developed stronger organizational structures. The European
Commission may be a key driver behind the transformations of such
organizations (Levi-Faur, 2011); alternatively, the Commission may
develop its own agencies, often building on established transnational
networks of national agencies (Trondal, 2014).
Due to the limited formal competence of the EU in matters con-
cerning higher education, it has not been possible for the EU to
establish its own agencies, and some of the tasks usually taken on
by European agencies have instead been given to other types of
organizations, such as ENQA and EQAR. The development of new
meta-organizations in the quality assurance arena gives rise to some
theoretically interesting puzzles. While the creation of new supra-
national agencies is often related to strengthening political capacity,
coordination, and convergence (Maggetti, 2014, p. 482), it also
signifies new multi-actor and multilevel governance processes in
Europe, which could potentially increase what some have labelled
organizational uncertainty (Power, 2007) and others, institutional
complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011). This is because national agen-
cies gain some autonomy from their ministries by engaging in EU
networks and meta-organizations (Bach and Ruffing, 2013). New
meta-organizations and transnational regulatory networks tend to
gain bureaucratic autonomy and become increasingly independent
of their founders (Danielsen and Yesilkagit, 2014) while at the
same time becoming more open to influences from individual experts,
organized expertise, and other interest organizations (Neshkova,
2014). This dynamic can be described from different perspectives;
based on existing research on European governance arrangements
and their development, we distinguish between what we will label
a capture perspective and a drift perspective.
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 143

The basic assumption of the capture perspective is that new meta-

organizations are created either as an external ‘takeover’ of existing
informal networks or as an extension of the responsibilities of existing
national agencies (Levi-Faur, 2011; Maggetti, 2014). The European
Commission is normally a key driver behind such developments, and
there are currently more than 30 EU agencies (Trondal, 2014, p. 546)
that have become integral components of the Commission’s policy-
making and implementation processes. Although neither ENQA nor
EQAR are meta-organizations under European Commission jurisdic-
tion, they can still be exposed to capture – for example, if they are
assigned important tasks by the EU, or if projects they carry out
are funded by the EU. This could be seen as a case of supra-
national capture. However, these meta-organizations can also the-
oretically be captured by various expert and interest organizations,
not least due to the (democratic) legitimacy provided by the latter
(Neshkova, 2014, p. 72). Elken (2015) has recently shown how the
development of the European Qualification Framework can be
explained by the latter perspective. A potential implication is that
what was created as an autonomous meta-organization may
become dependent on and co-opted by other external actors
(Trondal, 2014, p. 546) – that is, subject to expert or stakeholder
capture.
The basic assumption of the drift perspective, on the other hand, is
that new meta-organizations are able to maintain a relatively high
level of autonomy vis-à-vis other actors, and that they might even try
to strengthen their autonomy and influence in the governance of
a specific area (Maggetti, 2014). There are a number of possible
variations within this broader perspective. One is that these meta-
organizations gain a ‘life of their own’ and over time find their place in
an institutional order. Bureaucratic autonomy of such meta-
organizations can be seen as a precondition for developing competent
governance capacity in a policy area. Yet, new meta-organizations
may have a ‘dark’ side, as Maggetti (2014, p. 481) has suggested,
leading them to become selective, opaque, and more inward looking
in their activities (see also Ahrne and Brunsson, 2008). In principle,
the work that ENQA and EQAR do, could – deliberately or by
chance – serve to extend their regulatory powers, for example through
the development or adoption of specific regulatory procedures or
activities that are taken up as templates for reform within the
144 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

governance domain. In European higher education quality assurance,

the growth and expansion of accreditation as a specific and dominant
form of external quality assurance may be seen as an example of such
creeping influence on regulatory practices (Stensaker, 2011). Two
implications of such ‘drift’ may be weakened democratic account-
ability and the rise of more technocratic governance arrangements.
These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive: combinations of
capture and drift are indeed imaginable. However, in the analysis that
follows, these two perspectives will be treated independently to aid our
understanding of the directions of change in this governance area. In
our discussions of the findings, we will come back to the possible links
between capture and drift, and their possible implications for the
governance of the sector.

5.4 Data and Methods

In analysing the development and roles of ENQA and EQAR, we
draw on two different data sources. First, we have collected, sys-
tematized, and analysed publicly available reports, policy initia-
tives, and policy briefs on and by these two meta-organizations
from the time of their establishment onwards. This written mate-
rial includes historical reflective accounts by individuals central to
the development of the two organizations, but also external eva-
luation reports of the agencies, and their strategic plans. These
documents have been thematically analysed with respect to how
the agencies describe their role, how they position themselves as
interest organizations, and the internal dynamics between ENQA
and EQAR. Second, this has been complemented by a review of the
existing literature on European quality assurance in higher educa-
tion, focusing particularly on descriptions and analyses of the
development of ENQA and EQAR with respect to governance
and regulation in the field. This allows for a more reliable way of
establishing knowledge of key events and processes in the develop-
ment of the agencies.
When systematizing the data, we looked especially for examples of
capture and agency drift in line with our initial expectations. In the
reporting of our findings, we will first describe the historical develop-
ment of the European agencies in quality assurance, before going into
the indications of capture and drift respectively.
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 145

5.5 The Establishment and Functions of New

Meta-organizations in European Higher Education
Quality Assurance

5.5.1 National Developments Leading to the Establishment

of ENQA and EQAR
A number of contributions have described the build-up of European
quality assurance in higher education (see, for example, ENQA, 2008,
2012, 2015; Gornitzka and Stensaker, 2014; Rozsnyai, 2003; Schwarz
and Westerheijden, 2004; Westerheijden, 1999; Westerheijden et al.,
2007). Hence, these developments will not be described in detail here.
Nevertheless, national developments, not least the creation of national
agencies in quality assurance, provide an important historical back-
drop for later European developments in this area and are worthy of
some introductory attention.
The first governmental agencies in Europe were established in the
United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark in the mid- to
late 1980s, with other countries quickly following suit. It did not take
long for national agencies to expand their activities to the European level
(Westerheijden, 1999; Westerheijden et al., 1994). The formal argument
driving this expansion was the stimulation of policy learning between
countries, not least concerning methodologies and their application
across geographical borders. When the Bologna Process was initiated
a few years later (Schwarz and Westerheijden, 2004), activities in the
quality assurance area were seen as a way of addressing the need to build
trust in the mobility and mutual recognition schemes for students and
academic staff that were central to the Bologna Declaration.
Quality assurance was high on the political agenda in Europe, as
evidenced by numerous ministerial meetings, and in 2000 a new net-
work consisting of national quality assurance agencies (ENQA) was
established. Together with the other members of the so-called E4
group – the European University Association (EUA), the European
Student Union (ESU), and EURASHE (the association for non-
university higher education institutions in Europe) – the ENQA net-
work, which in 2004 was formalized into a new association with its
own staff and office, was given responsibility for developing the first
European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG)
which was launched in 2005 (Thune, 2010).
146 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

As part of this process, ENQA had also committed itself to develop-

ing a European register for quality assurance agencies (Thune, 2010,
p. 12), although the initial development of this register gave rise to what
Williams (2010, p. 16) described as ‘long and protracted discussions
among the E4 group about the precise structure and function of such
a register’. A key point of discussion was whether the register should be
developed as part of ENQA, or as a separate entity scrutinizing poten-
tial members in an independent procedure (Williams, 2010, p. 17).
While ENQA argued for the former option, the rest of the E4 – EUA,
ESU, and EURASHE – argued for the latter position.
After lengthy discussion, the register, named EQAR, came into
operation in 2008 as an independent stakeholder-driven meta-
organization. ENQA had to relinquish its ambition to host the register
as part of the ENQA structure, although it did reach a compromise
with the rest of the E4 group that ENQA members should not have to
submit two independent evaluations to become members of the two
respective agencies (Williams, 2010, p. 17). The background to the
disagreement among the E4 members was mainly related to the possi-
bility that EQAR creates for universities and colleges to ‘select’ their
own evaluators in a more deregulated market for quality assurance
(Gornitzka and Stensaker, 2014). This option depends on the opening
up of domestic quality assurance to foreign providers, which a number
of European countries currently allow (EQAR, 2013, p. 2). In short, the
formalization of quality assurance in Europe has created the opportu-
nity for a transfer of regulatory power from the domestic to the
European level.
Interpreting this shift in regulatory responsibility is a challenging
task as it is not clear who is actually in control of this development,
and because national governments are still quite influential with respect
to the design and function of quality assurance domestically
(Westerheijden et al., 2014). For domestic quality assurance agencies
in Europe, registration in EQAR is on a voluntary basis. However,
becoming a member is not a straightforward process. In EQAR, all
important decisions about whether agencies should be included or not
are taken by the so-called Register Committee, consisting of 11 mem-
bers; the E4 group together have control through their combined eight
members (two members each). This means that the two key meta-
organizations in this field are tightly interwoven in their internal gov-
ernance, but also that interest organizations such as ESU, EUA, and
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 147

EURASHE, through their combined six votes, have the majority of

votes in this important decision-making body.

5.5.2 Indications of Capture

ENQA and EQAR are thus two different meta-organizations with two
different purposes. While ENQA started out as a member and interest
organization for domestic quality assurance agencies, with a history
stretching back before the Bologna Process, EQAR can be seen more as
a child of that process, with various interested parties wanting to have
a say in how it should be designed and how it would work.
Given its focus on quality assurance, it is perhaps not surprising that
ENQA wanted to be in control of the new Register that was to be
developed. In the early days of the Bologna Process, ENQA argued
strongly that the new Register should be under the wings of ENQA, and
that EQAR should be no more than ‘a small database’, as one of the
previous presidents of ENQA formulated it (Williams, 2010, p. 17).
This attempt by ENQA to capture EQAR failed (Curvale, 2010, p. 22),
mainly because the other members of the E4 group resisted the idea of
ENQA having control of the new Register. For example, when the E4
group was mandated to develop the first version of the European
Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (ESG) – which forms
the regulatory basis for both ENQA and EQAR – ENQA tried to take
control by coordinating the various working groups involved in the
process. The other group members did not cooperate, as the then
president of ENQA has stated: ‘I invited EUA, EURASHE, and ESIB
[now ESU] to appoint members for the ENQA working groups . . .
However, the three other organisations preferred to set up their own
background groups’ (Thune, 2010, p. 13).
Hence, it seems that the different interest groups involved in the
development of the standards and guidelines did not want to be too
closely associated with ENQA in this crucial phase. As described, the
process ended with EQAR being established as an independent agency,
and the E4 group sharing their influence over the key regulatory deci-
sion-making body within EQAR, the Register Committee. The fact that
the E4 group has 8 out of 11 members of this body, and that the ESU,
EUA, and EURASHE together control six out of the 11 members, is an
indication that EQAR may indeed have been captured by interest
groups.
148 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

For ENQA, this situation was seen as unfortunate, not only because
the other E4 members had a vital say in the decision making of EQAR,
but also because it created the potential for an EQAR ‘takeover’ of
ENQA members, making the latter meta-organization seem less impor-
tant: ‘Given that expertise in quality assurance is in general short
supply, it would be sad if a listing in the Register were to be preferred
to access to the developmental opportunity of ENQA membership’
(Williams, 2010, p. 18).
Although the European Commission can be said to have played only
a modest part in the establishment of the Register – this formally being
a decision taken by the signatory countries of the Bologna
Declaration – the role of the Commission is still significant. As one of
the former presidents of ENQA has stressed, ‘there may come a point
where the Register is seen as more politically important than ENQA. Its
relationship to the European Commission has always been close, not
least because of the Commission’s financial support and its evident
desire to loosen the links between national agencies and national higher
education systems’ (Williams, 2010, p. 18). The worries hinted at in
this statement suggest that the European Commission also has consid-
erable interest in EQAR and that it sees the Register as a tool for
strengthening its influence on European higher education – fuelled by
the ability of the Commission to fund EQAR’s operations.
What, then, is EQAR’s view of this development? An external eva-
luation of EQAR in 2011 stressed that EQAR saw the relationship with
ENQA as critical to the future (Daniel et al., 2011, p. 13). Being a very
small organization, it seems that the legitimacy of EQAR is partly
dependent on ENQA members applying for membership of the
Register. In the early days of the Register, some ENQA agencies did
not apply for EQAR membership, as they waited to see what value-
added would be provided by the new organization (Daniel et al., 2011,
p. 12). However, over time membership of ENQA agencies in EQAR
has steadily increased (EQAR, 2013). Whether this means that ENQA
is in the process of being captured by EQAR is an open question.

5.5.3 Indications of Drift

While our data provide evidence of possible capture, there are also
ample indications of drift with respect to both ENQA and EQAR. The
fact that the E4 group was given the mandate to develop regulatory
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 149

measures in the quality assurance area seems not only to have caused
some tensions within the E4 group, but also led on certain occasions to
the group joining forces. For example, in the early days of the Bologna
Process, when some governments were not convinced about the advan-
tages of increasing the regulatory machinery in this area, and when
ENQA was still quite optimistic about its ability to control the new
Register, a former president of ENQA described his actions in the
following way: ‘I succeeded, with the support of the EUA,
EURASHE, and ESIB [now ESU], in convincing several ministerial
sceptics that the proposed Register was not an unduly bureaucratic
prospect’ (Thune, 2010, p. 14).
This statement can be read as an example of agency drift, not least
since the president of a sample of governmental agencies had to engage
in activities to persuade their founders about the need to allocate more
regulatory power to quality assurance agencies. The statement also
suggests that ENQA had, in the early days, the ambition to be more
than a network for exchange of expertise, seeing itself as a key actor in
building the European Higher Education Area (see also Curvale, 2010,
p. 21). Over time, the meta-organization became a consultative mem-
ber of the Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG), which strengthened its
role in the political decision-making process in Europe. Later presi-
dents of ENQA have underlined this and pointed to the need for ENQA
to strengthen its role as a key political actor with material influence on
European higher education developments (Hopbach, 2010, p. 24). In
this context, it is interesting to read the self-reflections of one of the
former presidents of ENQA: ‘[an] important lesson we had learned is
that the main cornerstone of all the ENQA activities must be to serve its
member agencies, and work on European quality assurance issues on
the basis of the secured mandates from its members’ (Thune, 2010,
p. 14).
The question one can ask here is, of course, whether serving the
interest of national member agencies is the same as serving the interest
of the national founders of the agencies? One might also speculate
whether EQAR has started to drift. Several voices have expressed
concerns about whether the initial voluntary registration of agencies
in EQAR may shift over time. In the words of one of the former
presidents of ENQA: ‘Will the current voluntary status of inclusion in
the Register eventually become the norm, then an expectation and
finally a requirement?’ (Williams, 2010, p. 18).
150 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

According to the external panel evaluating EQAR in 2011, the

Register should indeed develop its strategic capacity (Daniel et al.,
2011, p. 8), although the panel acknowledged that many of those to
whom it spoke during the evaluation process argued that EQAR’s role
was regulatory, and not strategic, and that focusing more on strategic
aspects would lead to ‘mission drift’ (Daniel et al., 2011, p. 7). After the
external evaluation, EQAR decided to strengthen its strategic capacity,
and in the subsequent strategic plan developed in 2013, EQAR empha-
sized its more autonomous role, downplaying the stakeholder interests
and highlighting its ability to take proportionate, consistent, fair, and
objectives decisions (EQAR, 2013, p. 1). Whether such autonomy will
be given to EQAR by those stakeholders already tightly involved in its
decision making remains to be seen.

5.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Based on the data available, the development of quality assurance in
higher education in Europe shows indications of both capture and drift
in the two key meta-organizations established. When returning to our
initial assumptions, the case of EQAR can be more easily linked to the
capture perspective, while the case of ENQA fits more closely with
assumptions related to the drift perspective. If we compare higher
education to other governance areas, the results demonstrate both
convergence and divergence. The historical establishment of
European meta-organizations in the quality assurance area are quite
similar to developments in other policy areas. The fact that ENQA
started out as a more informal network before establishing itself as
a formal association is in line with a number of similar transformations
of networks into new meta-organizations (Levi-Faur, 2011). Over
time, ENQA has developed its capacity to take on more developmental
projects related to quality assurance, and although the organization has
not built up a large administrative staff in Brussels, it still runs
a number of projects, drawing on the sizeable capacity found in its
member agencies. It is also possible to identify a stronger formalization
of rules and regulations associated with membership activities, which
could be interpreted as a sign of emerging drift. The development of
EQAR followed a very different trajectory, and the agency has far
fewer capabilities to draw upon compared with ENQA. The lack of
such capabilities is also an argument for the potential capture of EQAR
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 151

from various stakeholders. In this perspective, it is quite easy to see the

significance and role of the European Commission driving the devel-
opment of the administrative space in the region (Trondal, 2014) –
although the Commission plays a more behind-the-scenes role in higher
education than in other policy arenas.
Our case study also highlights some unusual aspects that may stimulate
renewed reflection with respect to multilevel and multi-actor governance
arrangements in Europe, and may also have relevance for other regions in
the world. As the field of higher education continues to be exposed to
growing internationalization and globalization processes, issues of how
such developments should be governed have been on the agenda for quite
some time (Stensaker and Harvey, 2011; Westerheijden, 1999). What
makes European higher education quality assurance an interesting case in
regulatory matters is that it provides an example of how governance
arrangements may develop in previously unregulated international policy
spaces. It allows us a glimpse into the ways future global governance
arrangements might emerge, even when national governments attempt to
maintain control over their higher education systems.
While the creation of EU agencies in other policy areas is normally
associated with the aims of convergence and harmonization (Maggetti,
2014), the field of higher education quality assurance is somewhat
ambivalent about this aim. As one former president of ENQA stated
some years ago: ‘ENQA does not promote the creation of a unified, pan-
European quality assurance regime’ (Hopbach, 2010, p. 24). The inter-
esting twist here is, of course, that ENQA has been a key driver behind the
development of the current European Standards and Guidelines (ESG) in
the field of quality assurance, suggesting that it is not quite clear what
these standards and guidelines should mean in practice. Moreover,
empirical studies have demonstrated the diverse ways in which standards
and guidelines have been applied when domestic agencies have been
evaluated in the past (Stensaker et al., 2010). This flexible practice sug-
gests that international meta-organizations might function as buffers
mediating between the global trends towards convergence, standards,
and accountability, and the needs for national autonomy and control.
The fact that there are two agencies operating in the European area of
quality assurance also hints at the potential competition that may arise
when unregulated policy spaces develop new governance arrangements.
When these two meta-organizations entered into the policy discussion
about the future of higher education quality assurance, they became
152 Gornitzka, Maassen, and Stensaker

involved in considerable political rivalry. Over the course of time, the

relationship between ENQA and EQAR has been quite turbulent, char-
acterized by both inflexibility and considerable tensions (Curvale, 2010,
p. 20), although there are also periods where ENQA and EQAR seem to
function and collaborate in a consensual and constructive manner
(Hopbach, 2010, p. 24). From an outside perspective, the two agencies
appear to be tied together and quite dependent on each other. EQAR
provides ENQA with the legitimacy of being an ‘objective’ and ‘neutral’
verifier of expertise in the quality assurance area. ENQA provides EQAR
with its core membership, signifying the importance of EQAR as
a regulatory gatekeeper. ENQA could also be seen as one of the core
actors behind the founding of EQAR, having committed to the establish-
ment of this organization in the early 2000s. While one could argue that
ENQA had its own plans for capturing EQAR in the beginning, other
interest organizations also entered the game, creating a policy dynamic
in which national governments and even the European Commission
were left on the sidelines. This may indicate that new international
multilevel governance arrangements – and the political rivalry that can
develop as a consequence of them – may give more power to and increase
the influence of interest and stakeholder organizations.
The establishment of EQAR, and the ambition to create a ‘market’ for
quality assurance where universities and colleges can choose their eva-
luators inside and outside national borders, is another example of the
potential global relevance of the European case reported here. These
types of meta-organizations could, on the one hand, become the basis for
establishing regional regulatory networks of a similar nature outside
Europe, matching developments in regulation of other sectors (see Berg
and Horrall, 2008). Or the ENQA and EQAR could extend their activ-
ities to give them a global reach. While exporting quality assurance
services is an aspiration for many governments in different corners of
the world, it is not yet a common form of internationalization of quality
assurance, or a strong focus for many national agencies (ENQA, 2015,
p. 5). Some national agencies that are a member of both ENQA and
EQAR are nevertheless quite active in such cross-border activities.
Recent evidence suggests that when these agencies operate abroad,
only half of them inform the local agencies of the jurisdictions within
which they operate (ENQA, 2015, p. 24). Whether this development –
from a governance perspective – stimulates more transparency and
accountability is another question.
Capture and Drift in Emerging International Governance 153

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6 Understanding Convergence
and Divergence in the
Internationalization of Higher
Education from a World Society
Perspective
r e n z e ko l s t e r a n d
don f. westerheijden*

6.1 Introduction
Changing discourses frequently put new demands on higher education
systems,1 giving rise to new objectives, responsibilities, and expectations
(Meyer et al., 1997). At the macro level, the forces which change dis-
courses include globalization, demographic fluctuations, and shifts in
economic hegemony (Maassen et al., 2012; de Wit et al., 2015). Put in
more practical terms, higher education systems and institutions are, inter
alia, expected to:
• Compete with other higher education systems/institutions around
the world for funding and students;
• Collaborate with other higher education systems/institutions around
the world on research, education, and valorization to solve the grand
challenges facing the world;
• Contribute to a country’s competiveness (e.g. innovation capacity)
and diplomatic strength (i.e. soft power);
• Prepare students for the twenty-first century by teaching the skills
that will enable them to be engaged global citizens and to find
sustainable employment in a globalized world.
The way governments around the world have reacted to these new
demands and pressures has been surprisingly similar. Governments
*
The authors would like to thank Jelena Brankovic (Bielefeld University) and
participants of the 2016 HKU-USC-Conference of Public Policy for their valuable
comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

156
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 157

ranging from Estonia and Kazakhstan to Australia and Malaysia want

their higher education systems to internationalize. This means that the
purpose, function, identity, mission, strategy, and delivery of higher
education at the national, sectoral, and organizational levels must all
have an international, intercultural, or global dimension (Knight, 2015).
Even where higher education systems and local conditions could hardly
be more different in terms of, for example, history, status, connected-
ness, student backgrounds, and the number and type of institutions, the
rationales, strategies, and policies that governments use to promote
internationalization are strikingly similar – focusing on the economic
benefits of incoming international students, attracted through national
promotion strategies, based on the higher education system’s reputation
and quality. It is as if there was some kind of overarching authority
obliging countries to internationalize their higher education systems.
This chapter will argue that, while the similarities in approaches to
internationalization lead to convergence across higher education systems,
actual practices and governance arrangements also show continued diver-
gence. By adopting a cultural/phenomenological approach as part of the
world society theory perspective (Meyer et al., 1997), this chapter aims to
provide a cultural rather than a functional explanation for the remarkable
degree of convergence, while not losing sight of divergence. Taking this
cultural perspective to both frame and explain the proliferation of the
internationalization discourse in higher education – and the resulting
convergence and divergence – has, to the best of our knowledge, not
been done before in the academic literature.
To further our understanding of the internationalization discourse
and the implications for the governance of higher education, we ask the
following research question: how can the rationales and practices
underpinning the internationalization of higher education be under-
stood from a world society perspective? To answer this question, we
first outline the world society theory (Section 6.2). We then highlight
patterns of convergence (Section 6.3), followed by signs of divergence,
in rationales and practices (Section 6.4). The chapter closes with
a discussion and conclusion (Section 6.5).

6.2 World Society Theory and Internationalization

Overall, convergent and divergent rationales and practices are little
explored in the academic research on internationalization (Buckner,
158 Kolster and Westerheijden

2017). A number of theoretical insights can be helpful in such an

exploration. First, convergent and divergent rationales and practices
may be indications of the ‘garbage can model’ in higher education
(Cohen et al., 1972), explaining the decoupling between policy inten-
tions and outcomes (Hasse and Krücken, 2014). Decoupling could
explain how the convergence of internationalization rationales and
strategies can coexist with divergence from these rationales in policies,
and thus in outcomes.
Second, convergence and divergence may be explained from the
perspective of the Europeanization of higher education policies
(Maassen and Stensaker, 2011), in which European directives increas-
ingly influence the logics, and thus the policies, at national and institu-
tional levels. For European higher education, the Bologna Process is the
visible policy force that influences national higher education policy
arenas. However, countries have implemented the Bologna action
lines (convergence) with various interpretations and at differing rates
of adoption (divergence) (Westerheijden et al., 2010). Most relevant
for our argument are the Bologna actions lines that focus on the
mobility of students and staff, the overall internationalization of higher
education systems and institutions, and the international visibility of
the European Higher Education Area. Convergence is visible, for
example, in the growing number of agencies tasked with internationa-
lization of higher education systems, while divergence is shown in the
intensity of national marketing efforts directed towards prospective
international students (BFUG, 2009).
The Europeanization perspective might explain some of the con-
verging rationales and practices among and within European coun-
tries. However, given that converging internationalization rationales
and practices are also apparent in many non-European countries,
other underlying forces must be at play. This leads us to the third
theoretical perspective: world society theory, which sees the world as
an integrated social system driven by a shared world culture, on which
rationalized scripts for progress are based. The world culture and the
related scripts (in terms of rationales, strategies, and policies) lead to
convergence and divergence – with convergence being easier to see.
From this world society perspective, we contend that convergence
results from isomorphism – that is, actors across the world following
the same models, norms, or scripts to a much higher degree than their
very different positions, interests, and resources would lead one to
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 159

expect if actions were purely (economically) rational. World society

theory maintains that many national socio-economic developments
are influenced by global scripts for progress (Meyer, 2000; Ramirez
and Tiplic, 2014). Scripts emerge in a global environment; they shape
the identities, rationales, and activities used and undertaken by
nation states, organizations, and individuals (Ramirez and Tiplic,
2014). The driving force is the so-called world culture, comprising
a preferred set of activities, behaviours, principles, and objectives
(ideals). It has been argued that today’s world culture is ‘character-
ized by a belief in individual and collective progress, justice and
equality, which are pursued through science and rational action’
(Buckner, 2017, p. 475). More specifically, science has become the
leading rationale in contemporary world culture, and its implications
can be seen in every global discourse, including higher education
(Drori et al., 2003; Meyer, 2010). Science provides the ‘causal and
normative arguments on how different actors all around the world –
from nation-states to individuals – should behave and organize their
affairs to be recognized as legitimate, modern actors’ (Krücken and
Drori, 2009, p. 17).
A number of actors are involved in the diffusion of world culture,
including international organizations (e.g. OECD, EU, UNESCO),
public and private organizations (e.g. consultants and NGOs), and
individuals. These actors can promote scripts of progress to nation
states, thus introducing scripts that have rationality and legitimacy on
the world stage. This process can explain the isomorphism found in
many aspects of nation states’ governance arrangements (e.g. in terms
of followed rationales, policies, and involvement of actors; Meyer
et al., 1997). An important aspect of this perspective is the
‘Otherhood status’ of certain actors, which allows them to – in an
apparently disinterested way – promote scripts with authority, so that
they ‘instruct and advise actors on how to be better actors in light of
general principles’ (Meyer, 2010, p. 7). The Otherhood status of, for
example, supra-national organizations, scientists, and consultancy
firms (i.e. ‘therapeutic authorities’; Meyer, 2000, p. 239) is seen as
important for the diffusion of world culture.
Particularly for higher education strategies and policies, the emergence
of – or an increase in the authority ascribed to – international and supra-
national organizations is relevant (Hasse and Krücken, 2014; Martens
and Wolf, 2009). These actors undertake standard-setting activities; they
160 Kolster and Westerheijden

provide and incentivize global scripts. Illustrating the role of such actors,
the OECD and UNESCO collect data on international mobility flows
and benchmark the performance of different countries. Through their
efforts, we know that higher education worldwide comprises an increas-
ing number of students who study outside their country of citizenship:
numbers have jumped from 0.8 million in 1975 to 4.5 million in 2012
(OECD, 2015). By 2025, it is predicted that up to 8 million students will
study abroad (Helms, 2014). These statistics lead to country-specific
insights. One example is the OECD’s comparison of the internationali-
zation of doctoral and master’s studies, which shows that ‘The United
States hosts 38% of international students enrolled in a programme at
the doctoral level in OECD countries. Luxembourg and Switzerland host
the largest proportion of international students, who make up more than
half of their total doctoral students’ (OECD, 2016, p. 1). The OECD’s
role in advising governments on how to approach internationalization is
also relevant here (see Hénard et al., 2012). In the world society per-
spective, such examples demonstrate the Otherhood status of these
actors, and thus their role in the diffusion of the internationalization
script.
In Europe, the European Union (EU) is the prime example of a supra-
national organization promoting standardization, harmonization, and
alignment of European higher education systems (Tight, 2007).
Internationalization of higher education has become a preferred
means to this end. Consequently, the EU has introduced policies that
facilitate mobility of staff and students, such as the Erasmus pro-
gramme, as well as international cooperation between higher education
institutions (HEIs), such as the Erasmus Mundus programme, encoura-
ging HEIs to start joint programmes. Inspired by the activities and
scripts emerging from the EU’s example, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other regional groupings of countries
began to introduce similar policies – for example, the ASEAN
International Mobility for Students programme.
It should be noted that actors promoting the internationalization of
higher education script have not only materialized on the international
level, but also at the level of national government entities. Examples of
such national agencies are CampusFrance, the British Council, DAAD
(Germany), and Nuffic (Netherlands). These ‘national government
entities are increasingly sharing the policy-making space with regional
government entities and a broad community of quasi-governmental
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 161

and independent non-profit organizations – as well as with higher

education institutions themselves’ (Helms et al., 2015, p. 51; also see
Dodds, 2009).
Explaining the diffusion and legitimization of global developments
through the lens of world culture is a key insight of world society
theory. For instance, proponents of world society theory argue that
the diffusion and legitimization of the nation state model is a key
example of the existence of a world culture (Meyer, 2000; Meyer
et al., 1997). Without there being a dictating central authority, the
nation state model has become the standard script for newly estab-
lished countries. It is further argued that nation states act on other
globally accepted and promoted scripts, such as human rights, democ-
racy, and economic development (Meyer, 2010). Similarly, through
the diffusion of world culture, education came to be seen as a highly
rationalized script for the development of nation states (Krücken
et al., 2007). As part of this, scientifically rationalized models for
the governance, functioning, and goals of higher education spread
across the globe as part of the shared world culture, despite the lack of
any central authority. Buzzwords circling around higher education
strategies and policies can be attached to this shared culture – for
example, excellence, world-class, accountability, third mission,
employability, and indeed, as argued in this chapter, internationaliza-
tion (Buckner, 2017; Horta, 2009). All can be seen as transnational
principles of progress that are part of the world culture shared by
a wide range of actors (Frank and Gabler, 2006, cited in Ramirez and
Tiplic, 2014).
Yet, world culture may also lead to divergence. Inherent within world
culture are inconsistencies and conflicts; activities, behaviours, princi-
ples, and objectives (ideals) may be at odds with each other (Meyer et al.,
1997). For example, objectives of economic development often contra-
dict objectives of equality (Buckner, 2017). Likewise, internationaliza-
tion of higher education may contradict other objectives, such as equal
access to higher education or the importance of higher education systems
to national knowledge economies. Objectives themselves might even
create conflicts (Meyer et al., 1997) – for example, by increasing compe-
tition between actors for resources, such as higher education institutions
competing for international students. It should also be noted that objec-
tives of world culture are translated differently in local contexts. For
example, most countries claim to adhere to the objectives of democracy,
162 Kolster and Westerheijden

yet democratic practices and their institutional embodiments vary

widely. It is probable that this also applies to internationalization:
while adhering to the same ideal, HEIs’ practices within and between
countries may vary. Taking mobility as an obvious example, some focus
on outgoing mobility, others focus on incoming mobility. Similarly,
countries may claim to be internationalized, while most of the interna-
tional students are from one particular, neighbouring country (e.g.
mainly German students in the Netherlands). Furthermore, the domi-
nant model for progress may claim expected outcomes, ‘regardless of
whether the expected outcomes are actually attained’ (Ramirez and
Tiplic, 2014, p. 440), thus suggesting a disconnection between objectives
and outcomes. Divergent practices suggest symbolic ceremonial action
or conformity, meaning divergence between objectives, rationales, and
practices – that is, a loose coupling or decoupling (Buckner, 2017; Hasse
and Krücken, 2014; Meyer, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997).
To sum up our argument, it appears that internationalization of
higher education is, by and large, a globally favoured and chosen
script for the further development of higher education systems. This
implies that internationalization of higher education has become part
of world culture, with actors of Otherhood status promoting the
internationalization script, and agentic actors (nation states, HEIs,
and students) acting upon it (Meyer, 2010). The implication is that
every higher education system must internationalize if it is to be
taken seriously in the wider world (Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014,
p. 453).
Having outlined the world society theory and its connection to the
internationalization of higher education, we can highlight several the-
oretical expectations, which we will explore in the following sections.
First, we expect to see convergence in scripted rationales, suggesting
that increasingly similar rationales are used to justify the internationa-
lization of higher education. Second, we expect these scripts to lead to
convergence in internationalization strategies and policies. Third,
world culture is not without inconsistencies, hence we expect to see
some divergent practices. After a reflection on the limitations of this
chapter, the next sections will discuss these aspects.
With the goal of furthering the theoretical understanding of the
internationalization of higher education, this chapter takes a macro
perspective. Such a perspective contains the inherent risk of over-
generalization. The evidence presented in the chapter is inevitably
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 163

based on limited, and at points anecdotal, examples, which can be

deceptive: in the words of Goldfinch and Wallis (2010, p. 1102),
‘structures that seem similar at a distance may vary widely in practice’.
The chapter should be read and interpreted with this limitation in
mind. Indeed, the same applies to the interpretation of world culture;
it is not static, it can and does change over time (Meyer et al., 1997).
Hence, recent trends towards greater nationalism – embodied, for
instance, by the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the 2016
presidential election outcomes in the United States – may signal
a tension in the norms and values of the contemporary world culture
(Buckner, 2017). Will this change the discourse of internationaliza-
tion? The world society theory offers some comfort to the proponents
of internationalization; all signs indicate that internationalization is
embedded within both Otherhood and agentic actors, such as
UNESCO, the OECD, HEIs, and students, making it far more difficult
for any nation state to alter the discourse fundamentally (Meyer et al.,
1997). This argument, in combination with the eternal quest for
resources, means that internationalization is unlikely to be just
a temporary fashion (Alasuutari, 2015).

6.3 Signs of Convergence

6.3.1 Convergence in Scripted Rationales

If internationalization of higher education has indeed become part of
the world culture, and through that a scripted activity of higher educa-
tion, we would expect to see HEIs and national governments across the
world undertake similar activities based on similar rationales. This
process of isomorphism would decrease national distinctiveness in the
organization of higher education and its goals (Meyer et al., 1997;
Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014). Yet, there is legitimacy and claims of
relevance in conformity. Uniqueness in socio-economic development
can be seen as a sign of divergence from the global script, and thus from
the global world culture, and may be seen as both less legitimate and
less relevant (Meyer, 2000; Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014). Framed in the
context of converging pressures on higher education systems world-
wide, for example through international benchmarks, this section
describes the rationales behind the internationalization of higher
education.
164 Kolster and Westerheijden

6.3.1.1 Performance of Higher Education Systems

It appears to have become a common understanding in the inter-
nationalization discourse that to be excellent in teaching and
research, an institution has to be international (Marginson, 2016;
Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014). The key contributors to this discourse
are the international benchmarks of higher education performance.
For example, transnational standards for internationalization are
diffused through the indicators included in university rankings. In
fact, with the exception of the Shanghai Academic Ranking of
World Universities, all the major global university rankings include
at least a few indicators for internationalization, mainly the number
or ratio of international students and staff (Federkeil et al., 2012),
as well as a heavy focus on internationally published and cited
articles. The proliferation of global rankings as such is a sign of –
and impetus for – increased global competiveness (Alasuutari, 2015;
Teichler, 2009; van Vught and Ziegele, 2012) and has been criti-
cized for promoting a script – namely, the world-class research
university as the only viable model for successful universities
(Marginson, 2009; Salmi, 2009).
The importance of research being of international standard is also
highlighted in research performance assessments, such as the United
Kingdom’s Research Excellence Framework or Hong Kong’s Research
Assessment Exercise. The former assesses research output on a scale
ranging from nationally recognized to world-leading.2 The latter uses
the number of refereed articles in prestigious international journals as
a proxy for research productivity (de Boer et al., 2015). It is not only the
global university rankings and national research assessments that con-
tribute to benchmarking of higher education systems: the new interna-
tional and supra-national actors are also active in this area. As
discussed, the OECD and UNESCO both publish data on international
mobility flows, and in that way provide benchmarks for the perfor-
mance of countries.

6.3.1.2 The Rationales

The overarching objectives of internationalization of higher education
can be categorized in four, partially overlapping, rationales: academic,
social/cultural, economic, and political (de Wit, 1999, 2009, also see
Seeber et al., 2016).
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 165

• The academic rationale is related to the idea that internationaliza-

tion can improve the quality of higher education in the host country
(e.g. internationalization of curricula and improved didactical/ped-
agogical approaches). Key here is mobility, which facilitates colla-
boration among previously separated groups of students and
academics. Related to this may also be the rationale of prestige and
reputation, which links to the visibility of the higher education
system and its HEIs.
• The social/cultural rationale encompasses internationalization with
the aim of meeting global challenges, increasing mutual understand-
ing, and enhancing students’ sense of global citizenship; it thus
stresses the responsibility of students, and higher education, to
address and solve these global challenges.
• Economic rationales for internationalization relate to workforce
development, and short-term as well as long-term economic gains.
The workforce rationale recognizes, first, that graduates are vital
for knowledge economies. In order to become or remain economic-
ally competitive, graduates should have international competences
that allow them to operate in globalized work environments.
Second, it recognizes that countries may benefit. Host countries
benefit from brain-gain: incoming students may contribute to the
economy as graduates contributing their skills to the host country.
Home countries benefit from brain-circulation: students educated
abroad bring new and increased competencies to the economy
when they return as graduates. The economic gains rationale
focuses on long-term national economic development (with
a clear link to the workforce rationale), as well as on the short-
term revenue accrued through tuition fees and students’ expendi-
ture on living costs.
• The political rationale focuses on gains in public diplomacy and soft
power. Related to this are the establishment of relationships abroad
between individuals and between organizations (i.e. brain-circulation).
The image or brand recognition abroad of the country and its higher
education system are also relevant here. The political rationale may
entail links to national interests, for instance by allowing students to
gain linguistic and intercultural competences; strengthening bonds
between historically or geographically connected countries may also
be seen as political arguments for internationalization.
166 Kolster and Westerheijden

A number of publications indicate that the political and economic

rationales have gained in importance in global internationalization
trends (Seeber et al., 2016; van Vught et al., 2002; de Wit et al.,
2015). This is apparent in ‘the increased importance of reputation
(often symbolized by rankings), visibility and competitiveness; the
competition for talented students and scholars; short-term and/or long-
term economic gains; demographic considerations; and the focus on
employability and social engagement’ (de Wit et al., 2015, p. 27). The
focus on employability is a strong component of the political and
economic rationales for internationalization. Ilieva and Peak (2016,
p. 4) found that ‘While the majority of the countries have introduced
student-friendly and welcoming visa policies, a much smaller number
(Australia, Germany and more recently Russia) have widened access to
their labour market for international students’. However, in a footnote
they indicate that they have seen other countries also giving greater
access to their labour markets to international students: these include,
inter alia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and New Zealand (Ilieva
and Peak, 2016, p. 4; see also Helms et al., 2015). This development is
in line with the increased focus on privatization of international higher
education through revenue generation (de Wit et al., 2015). In other
words, the economic rationale of internationalization triumphs over,
for example, the academic (improved quality of higher education)
rationale of internationalization (Luo and Jamieson-Drake, 2013;
Seeber et al., 2016; van Vught et al., 2002).

6.3.1.3 How Rational Are the Rationales?

The convergence on rationales described above can be linked to scientific
evidence. As indicated, the economic rationale of internationalization
has been most prominent, and has been promoted since at least the
beginning of this century (van Vught et al., 2002). An increasing number
of countries justify their focus on internationalization (particularly
mobility) by showing its economic benefits. Examples can be drawn
from Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, the USA, and the United
Kingdom, where studies often focus on measuring the impact of inter-
national students on monetary gains to the local economy or to higher
education, in terms of consumer expenditure and tuition fees, respec-
tively (e.g. EP-Nuffic, 2016; Munch and Hoch, 2013). Australia pro-
vides perhaps the most telling example (Rizvi, 2011). Its international
education sector contributes A$20 billion (around US$15 billion) to the
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 167

national economy; it is the country’s leading services export, and overall

has been the third-biggest export sector for more than a decade (Ross
and Hare, 2016; van Vught et al., 2002). At the individual level, studies
on international experiences commonly focus on students’ increased
employability (see, e.g., Brandenburg et al., 2014; Crossman and
Clarke, 2010; Jones, 2013; King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003).
However, scientific evidence is also available for the academic ben-
efits of internationalization. Studies linked to this rationale mainly
focus on the academic benefits to students. As the overview paper by
Malicki and Potts (2013) shows, students whose higher education
experience has included a component of studying abroad do better
academically upon return to their regular study programme. They
achieve improved academic performance and higher graduation rates.
This might be related to findings that suggest that an international
experience increased students’ independence, self-confidence, and
openness to new ideas. Those that had a longer international experi-
ence (more than one year) were more likely to obtain a PhD.
Intergenerational effects were also found: students whose parents had
had an international study experience were more likely to study
abroad. Although improved academic quality of classrooms hosting
international students, or being taught an international curriculum by
international faculty (i.e. the international classroom), are often
claimed (Delgado-Márquez et al., 2013; Jones, 2013), empirical evi-
dence to support these claims appears to be largely absent (Luo and
Jamieson-Drake, 2013). Nevertheless, internationalization has been
linked to the prestige and reputation of HEIs (Delgado-Márquez
et al., 2013).
Studies on the social/cultural benefits of internationalization also
largely focus on the benefits to students. Evidence has been found for
students gaining international competences, such as intercultural
awareness, global perspectives, and cultural understanding through
an international experience or through interacting with students from
diverse backgrounds, making them better equipped as global citizens
(Chieffo and Griffiths, 2004; Luo and Jamieson-Drake, 2013; Malicki
and Potts, 2013; Trede et al., 2013). In the specific case of Europe,
a European identity (King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003) is often claimed as
an outcome of internationalization of higher education. Yet, the evi-
dence is not consistent, with some studies claiming a relationship, while
others find weak or no correlation.3 Moreover, while Europe’s Bologna
168 Kolster and Westerheijden

Process was originally connected to a ‘cultural rationale linked to

European citizenship and identity, Bologna evolved towards an eco-
nomic programme’ (Sin and Neave, 2016, p. 1448), suggesting once
again that social and cultural benefits may be becoming less important
than economic ones.
One weakness of studies looking into the benefits of internationali-
zation to students is that they rely heavily on self-reported gains. In
other words, gains in international competences and skills are rarely
measured objectively.4 Nevertheless, self-reported gains might have an
important signalling function to employers. This function is important,
as studies indicate that employers value graduates with international
competences, especially foreign language proficiency, knowledge and
understanding of differences in culture and society, and the ability to
work with people from different cultural backgrounds (see Crossman
and Clarke, 2010; Malicki and Potts, 2013).
The political rationale – that is, gains in public diplomacy and soft
power – appears to be the least researched of the four rationales. Yet,
there are claims that international education in general, and specific
policies such as the USA’s Fulbright Scholarship programmes, can be
linked to a country’s soft power (Altbach and Peterson, 2008; Nye,
2004; Rizvi, 2011). Although scarce, the available evidence does
indeed suggest a positive relationship between internationalization
(through exchange, scholarships, and education hubs) and public
diplomacy (Ferreia de Lima, 2007; Lee, 2015). Political and economic
issues related to brain-drain – with its negative consequences for the
sending countries – and brain-gain, for host countries, are rationalized
using the concept of brain-circulation. Brain-circulation stresses the
mutual benefits of international mobility: knowledge and practices
are shared between sending and host countries. Some evidence suggests
that this is indeed taking place (Appelt et al., 2015). Interestingly, this
implies that world culture is not only taught through higher education,
but also spreads through higher education (Meyer, 2000, 2010).
Although this discussion of academic evidence on the effects of
internationalization is by no means exhaustive, it does suggest that
there is research-based evidence for many of the claimed effects of
internationalization, while others may be collectively claimed – or,
rather, presumed (Meyer, 2010; Meyer et al., 1997). We can therefore
state that internationalization of higher education is a largely, though
not fully, rational activity, based on institutionalized rationales, as
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 169

maintained by the world society perspective. As such, internationaliza-

tion is a scripted activity that is legitimized not necessarily because of its
‘real’ benefits, but primarily because it is part of world culture – the
collectively believed benefits that are institutionalized among actors
mimetically (Meyer, 2010). Consequently, we expect to find diffusion
of the ‘internationalization script’ echoed in internationalization prac-
tices, resulting in convergence (Meyer et al., 1997).

6.3.2 Signs of Convergence through the Internationalization

Script
Following world society theory, to be taken seriously in the wider
world a higher education system needs to be open to international
students. Internationalization has become a method through which
national governments signal the relevance of their higher education
system. One way to do this is to copy ‘best practices’ (Meyer, 2000;
Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014), which is a term to rationalize the mimicking
of scripts that seem to be part of the world culture, even if they have not
been proven to be ‘best’ in the national context.
‘Best practice’ scripts are more likely to be copied from nation states
that are perceived to be successful in terms of their economy, military,
politics, or other social aspects (Meyer et al., 1997); in short, policy
emulation is a consequence of the political rationale. Nation states that
are seen as successful ‘occupy a higher stratum in the world system and
exert greater influence on other nation-states by providing global models
and examples’ (Jang, 2000, p. 253). Consequently, we would expect to
see countries that are performing well in terms of internationalization
providing models that are adopted by other nation states. The best
performing countries in terms of incoming mobility are the USA, the
United Kingdom, and Australia.
Following scripts implies convergence of governance arrangements.
For instance, many countries introduce national scholarship pro-
grammes for international mobility, increase their international mar-
keting efforts abroad, launch study programmes taught in the language
of the successful countries (i.e. English), join international university
networks to facilitate student exchange, introduce more lenient policies
to allow international students to find employment in their host coun-
try, and add indicators of internationalization to their performance
funding models (Becker and Kolster, 2012; European Commission
170 Kolster and Westerheijden

et al., 2015). Related to such ‘best practices’, and largely based on

recent studies (Helms et al., 2015; Ilieva and Peak, 2016), we discuss
in more detail below the convergence in national internationalization
strategies, the focus on mobility, and promotion strategies.

6.3.2.1 Internationalization Strategies

Reinforcing the role of states as enablers of internationalization
(Horta, 2009), a wide range of higher education authorities have
introduced strategies with that aim (de Wit et al., 2015). Among
these are Belgium (Flemish community), Canada, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland.5 The intro-
duction of internationalization strategies in countries that are not
widely known for academic excellence is noteworthy. Consequently,
even small or upcoming higher education systems are actively con-
verging towards the internationalization script (e.g. Latvia, Estonia,
Turkey, Egypt, and Vietnam; see Ilieva and Peak, 2016). Reflecting on
the internationalization efforts of 26 countries, Ilieva and Peak (2016,
p. 4) conclude: ‘There is a rise in the number of countries with
commitment towards international higher education at the national
level, which is evidenced through their IHE [international higher
education] strategies, some of which are reflected in reformed higher
education legislations. These are strong signals of readiness to engage
internationally and to support their higher education systems’ global
positioning.’

6.3.2.2 Focus on Mobility

The political and especially economic rationales are evident in the
strategies mentioned earlier. Taking a closer look, many internatio-
nalization strategies focus on mobility. In fact, mobility is often the
only national internationalization goal (Ilieva and Peak, 2016). This
is also observed by Helms et al. (2015, p. 52): ‘Finally, when it
comes to the myriad approaches to internationalization articulated
by policies around the world, there is one dimension seen across the
vast majority: mobility.’ Ilieva and Peak (2016, p. 4) add: ‘Student
mobility is one of the best developed areas of national-level policies
on IHE. This is evidenced by the strong performance of 23 out of
the 26 countries studied here.’ Many countries have set recruitment
targets for incoming as well as for outgoing mobility to encourage
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 171

higher education institutions to internationalize their learning envir-

onments (Ilieva and Peak, 2016). This suggests that countries are
mainly interested in short-term economic output (Helms et al.,
2015) rather than in the academic or social/cultural rationales of
internationalization (Helms et al., 2015; Seeber et al., 2016; de Wit
et al., 2015).

6.3.2.3 Promotion Strategies

An important part of the strategy for internationalization introduced
in many countries is marketing and promotion, aiming to attract
international students (Dodds, 2009). Again, many countries have
adopted converging approaches. First, the governments’ internatio-
nalization agencies have adopted similar online promotion strategies,
as indicated by the proliferation of ‘study in . . . [country]’ websites
(Helms et al., 2015). Second, the larger host countries, particularly,
have established overseas offices, often linked to their embassies,
where services are provided to prospective students, country-
focused promotion is disseminated, and international academic col-
laboration is smoothed (Ilieva and Peak, 2016). Third, promotion
strategies are largely based on similarity rather than on unique selling
points: all claim reputation and quality for their higher education
systems (Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014).6 As a proxy for reputation or
quality, the countries’ performances in global rankings have been
widely adopted in marketing efforts. Countries – and their higher
education institutions – strive to move up the ladder, for example by
attracting international students and staff, but even more by under-
taking international research, which on average leads to more pub-
lications in international journals and has a higher impact.
Consequently, international research collaboration has increasingly
become part of the national-level research assessments which deter-
mine the levels of funding for HEIs (see Section 6.3.1.1 on
‘Performance of Higher Education Systems’, and Ilieva and Peak,
2016).
Convergence may also be observed in the aspects that make coun-
tries attractive to international students (Cremonini and Antonowicz,
2009; Kolster, 2014). We have already mentioned the national scho-
larship schemes to support inbound and outbound student mobility
(see also Ilieva and Peak, 2016). Such scholarship schemes – like the
marketing efforts – may be targeted specifically at certain countries
172 Kolster and Westerheijden

that are deemed to be of particular interest. Indeed, there is also

a degree of convergence in the choice of target countries (Dodds,
2009), with China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia featuring
quite frequently.

6.4 Signs of Divergence

Notwithstanding the many signs of convergence, and partly indicated
by recent studies (Helms et al., 2015; Ilieva and Peak, 2016), the
rationales and practices associated with internationalization also
show signs of divergence to other scripts, rationales, and practices.
This divergence can to some extent be attributed ‘to the eclectic
adoption of conflicting principles’ (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 154). In
other words, divergence can be explained by internationalization
contradicting and being contradicted by other scripts and rationales
of the same or different actors, which in turn leads to conflicting
practices. Divergent practices might occur where ‘it is easier to alter
policy talk than to promote substantial organizational change’
(Ramirez and Tiplic, 2014, p. 443). To illustrate this divergence, the
next section discusses divergent, decoupled practices in the interna-
tionalization of higher education related to conflicts between national
and international interests, migration regulations, mobility, employ-
ment, and tuition fees.

6.4.1 Higher Education to Serve International or National

Interests?
Helms et al. (2015, p. 63) state: ‘Without question, approaches to inter-
nationalization of higher education should be firmly rooted in the needs of
each country’s particular higher education system and squarely focused
on advancing our own specific institutional and national objectives.’ Yet,
as indicated by their focus on mobility, countries’ needs and interests
appear to boil down to obtaining resources, rather than the nobler aca-
demic, social, and cultural rationales (see Seeber et al., 2016). The inter-
nationalization objective is partly founded on the hypothesized necessity
of higher education systems to be international in order to compete on the
same level (European Commission, 2013). However, the connection to
the national agenda highlights the economic rationale for education and
research to serve the national knowledge economy (Maassen, 2014;
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 173

Nybom, 2007). Similarly, as a result of internationalization, the work and

the population of HEIs are becoming more international and diverse,
while national governments simultaneously regard the same HEIs as
belonging to and serving the nation (Buckner, 2017; Kolster, 2014;
Maassen, 2014). In other words, governments are more likely to view
the knowledge and the graduates produced within their higher education
system as vital for their national economy, while the academics producing
the knowledge and the graduates absorbing it might frame their work
more in terms of global interests, such as addressing global challenges. As
Sutton and Deardorff (2012) suggest, overcoming the divergence between
collective and individual interests would need a reconceptualization of the
ideas behind comprehensive internationalization, thus ‘requiring a more
internationalized form of internationalization, one that positions global
engagement, collaboration, goals, and responsibilities at its core’ (cited in
Helms et al., 2015, p. 64). Arguably, this should happen not only at the
organizational level, but also at the national level.

6.4.2 Migration Regulations and Mobility

Strict immigration regulations frequently affect HEIs’ capacity to
achieve international mobility goals (Becker and Kolster, 2012). Visa
restrictions clearly highlight divergence in national policies; while
internationalization strategies are generally accepted in the higher edu-
cation community, opening borders and removing barriers remains
a sensitive issue more widely. In other words: ‘The prospect of losing
the economic returns from international students and the income pro-
vided by fee-paying students does not seem to dissuade some govern-
ments from imposing stricter regulations on international students’
(Van Damme, 2016). The United Kingdom might be the prime example
of this: with its highly successful internationalization strategy, it has
nevertheless – perhaps responding to popular demand – restricted
access through visa restrictions over recent years (Ilieva and Peak,
2016; also see King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). In contrast, Australia’s
efforts to streamline student visa applications are thought to have
positively affected international demand for its higher education sys-
tem (Helms et al., 2015).
As outlined in in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 on convergence in inter-
nationalization strategies and policies, countries’ internationalization
goals stress student mobility. However, the long-term effect of mobility
174 Kolster and Westerheijden

on the internationalization of higher education might be limited, as

connections are largely lost once students have returned to their home
countries. International connections are also lost under the slowly
emerging trend for many host countries to retain international students
for their own labour market. Moreover, international students appear
to have little interaction with domestic students unless induced to do so
by deliberate interventions (see, e.g., Leask, 2009; Luo and Jamieson-
Drake, 2013). Longer-lasting effects on the internationalization of
higher education could be achieved by focusing on the mobility of
teachers and academics rather than students. Connections created
through academic mobility are thought to have greater permanence,
yet staff mobility appears to have a much lower priority in the inter-
nationalization strategies of all countries (Helms et al., 2015).
The focus on mobility may also have a shadow side. The inflow of
international students can put pressure on the accessibility of higher
education for domestic students: ‘Some Singaporeans now wonder
whether such a warm embrace of globalization has restricted opportu-
nities for them and their children . . . There appears to be a prevailing
sense of frustration with the government’s perceived efforts to attract
international students while not providing sufficient places for local
students’ (Waring, 2014, p. 880, cited in Helms et al., 2015, p. 58).7

6.4.3 Employment and Tuition Fees

Making higher education more international will undoubtedly lead to
students seeking and obtaining employment abroad: studies have
found that mobile students are more likely to live abroad after obtain-
ing their degree (European Commission, 2014; Helms et al., 2015;
King and Ruiz-Gelices, 2003). This provokes questions about the
costs and benefits of public financial support to students (Kolster,
2014): why would either the host or the sending country invest in the
education of mobile students if there is uncertainty about their con-
tributing to the country’s economy afterwards? The increased efforts of
host countries to keep foreign students in their labour market can be
seen in the light of this contradiction (de Wit et al., 2015).8 Likewise,
the focus on stimulating outgoing mobility by some countries (e.g.
China and Germany) may have a negative effect on the domestic return
to higher education as skilled graduates might well remain abroad to
find (better) employment opportunities. Knowing that mobile students
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 175

are likely to become mobile professionals, combined with the increas-

ing importance attached to the economic rationale for internationali-
zation, may ultimately affect the paradigms governing public/private
funding rationales (Kolster, 2014).
A practice which follows the economic rationale for internationali-
zation but at the same time exemplifies divergence is the trend for many
European higher education systems to charge higher tuition fees to
students from outside the European Economic Area (EEA). This accep-
tance and even promotion of inequality, with students from different
backgrounds paying different prices for the same ‘product’, makes
foreign students in Europe more like ‘consumers’ than their privileged
EEA counterparts (Neave and Maassen, 2007). Short-term gains from
tuition fees apparently override longer-term gains for the labour mar-
ket (as emphasized in the preceding paragraph). With respect to tuition
fees and funding for higher education, Finland is an interesting case.
Finland offers free tuition for EEA students, but plans to introduce
tuition fees for non-EEA students, which would make Finnish HEIs less
attractive to international students. At the same time, internationaliza-
tion indicators rewarding mobility figure in the Finnish performance
funding model (de Boer et al., 2015).9

6.5 Discussion and Conclusion

The world society theory suggests that there is a world culture that
provides nation states and other actors with scripts for progress. These
scripts are promoted through Otherhood actors, rationalized through
scientific research, and provide legitimacy to those enacting them. This
chapter has framed the emergence of internationalization of higher
education in this perspective, viewing internationalization as a global
script for progress, where cultural enactment is more important than
the actual realization. This provides a valuable insight into why and
how countries – from a cultural perspective – strive for internationali-
zation of higher education. It may also explain why the rationales and
practices of the internationalization of higher education show a high
degree of convergence, but also some divergence, as there are conflicts
with other scripts.
In terms of convergence, many countries started to internationalize
their higher education systems on the basis of converging economic and
political rationales. This made attracting international students,
176 Kolster and Westerheijden

academics, and funding a top priority. The ways in which countries try
to realize this priority are largely similar: marketing, scholarships, in-
country offices or agents, branch campuses, strategic alignments in
(international) networks, and by highlighting their quality and reputa-
tion. In other words, countries are using similar internationalization
practices, and base them on similar rationales (Kolster, 2014; van
Vught et al., 2002; de Wit et al., 2015). Consequently, we observe
convergence of ideas and aspirations; convergence of external pres-
sures; convergence in legislation, organizational structures, and policy
design around ‘policy rhetoric’ and around policy practice and imple-
mentation (de Wit et al., 2015). The high degree of convergence can be
explained by nation states enacting global scripts for progress.
Yet, enactment of these scripts may not actually lead to making higher
education systems more international. Following the world society per-
spective, legitimacy derives from claiming to be internationalized.
This phenomenological perspective may explain the divergence
associated with the internationalization of higher education. To be
more specific, despite countries’ visible and formal commitment to
the internationalization of higher education (e.g. active promotion
and internationalization strategies), several diverging practices, such
as migration policies and tuition fee regulations, suggest the pre-
valence of symbolic or ceremonial conformity and the decoupled
nature of countries’ internationalization policies. As Helms et al.
(2015, p. 45) state in relation to the notion of internationalization
as a comprehensive, cross-cutting phenomenon: ‘there are a small
number of policies visible on the global landscape that take a more
expansive position on what can and should be undertaken and
achieved in this arena’. In other words, the internationalization
rationales and practices of countries appear to pay lip-service to
the inherent implications of internationalization, but – as illustrated
by the divergent practices discussed here – do not fully follow these
objectives. From a world society perspective, these are indications
that there is a degree of decoupling between the implications of
internationalization and policies, as well between practices and
implementation (Buckner, 2017; Hasse and Krücken, 2014; Meyer
et al., 1997).
Regarding these divergences, we focused in this chapter on inherent
contradictions and decouplings, but we did not highlight the correla-
tions with governance arrangements in governments, other system-
Understanding Convergence and Divergence 177

level actors, or higher education institutions. It is apparent, though,

that in systems which have more powerful international and supra-
national actors (such as the EU in the context of the Bologna Process)
there are stronger pressures towards convergence than in higher educa-
tion systems without (e.g. New Zealand or South Africa).
Moreover, the conflicts among objectives allow some room for
agency: when world culture scripts contradict one another, authorities
may use other arguments to legitimize their policy choices. This does not
mean, however, that policy choice in the absence of clear guidance from
world culture is completely free or random. Path dependencies, local
power balances, and economic and other contexts may push towards
certain choices and arrangements. For instance, the economic rationale
for the internationalization of higher education is much less controver-
sial in the USA, the United Kingdom, and Australia as compared to
Scandinavian countries, while countries in the Global South with grow-
ing populations hold different views on student mobility and brain-
circulation than those in the global North with ageing populations.
That said, the overview of convergent and divergent rationales and
practices presented in this chapter suggests that the calls by Helms et al.
(2015) and Ilieva and Peak (2016) for greater synergies in countries’
internationalization practices are justified. Further research is needed
to explore the convergence and divergence of the internationalization
of higher education and its implications for the governance of higher
education through more empirically grounded studies.

Notes
1. In our conceptualization, a higher education system is the collection of
higher education institutions under the jurisdiction of a governmental
authority, which sets rules and provides conditions under which the
higher education institutions operate.
2. For more information, see www.ref.ac.uk/.
3. For an overview of the European identity literature, see Bergmann
(2015).
4. Admittedly, this is difficult to do given the vagueness surrounding the
concepts and their learning outcomes (Trede et al., 2013).
5. See www.iau-aiu.net/content/national-policies.
6. This might be the rational thing to do, as ‘nation-states do not want to
appear too different from each other’ (Alasuutari, 2015, p. 167)
178 Kolster and Westerheijden

7. Similar pressures on the accessibility of higher education to domestic

students appear to exist in Hong Kong (international students taking up
scarce places) and in China (lower admission standards for international
students). See Leung and Sharma (2017); Sharma (2017).
8. Note that for host countries, this also contradicts the brain-circulation
argument: it is an effort to increase brain-gain (hence brain-drain for the
sending country), but not brain-circulation.
9. Similar arrangements in performance funding models have been made in
Croatia and Poland (European Commission et al., 2015).

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7 Convergence through Research
Performance Measurement?
Comparing Talk and Practices in Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom
jenny m. lewis*

7.1 Introduction
At any given moment in the world today, individuals, small groups of
people, and organizations of any size, as well as sub-national and
national governments and world regions, are busy comparing their
performance with that of others. With an ongoing attachment to the
idea that governments (or, at least, Western liberal democracies)
should be held accountable, and a continuing adherence to what is
loosely called New Public Management (NPM), publicly funded ser-
vices have, accordingly, been subjected to ever-greater levels of scrutiny
through the lens of performance measurement.
Higher education has been at the forefront of this emphasis in
measurement, particularly with regard to research. Many governments
have used national research performance assessment regimes as
a means to pursue their strategic goals for the higher education sector.
Such systems evaluate and sort universities into tiers that are (more or
less) visible to the public gaze. The impact of these performance mea-
surement exercises is in some cases reputational, and in others more
financially consequential, with substantial effects on the funding allo-
cated to universities. Internationally, the mushrooming of world rank-
ings of universities is testament to the fact that in higher education there
is a strong emphasis on ‘measuring up’ to some world standard.
University executives pay close attention to the Times Higher
Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong, Quacquarelli Symonds, and other

*
This work was supported by an Australian Research Council Future Fellowship
(FT110100110). Many thanks to Isabel Jackson for her second coding of the
interview transcripts.

184
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 185

world rankings of universities to see how their reputation in this global

market is holding up.
National measurement systems can be seen to serve an important
function with regard to governance, and a desire to control (Radin,
2006; Smith, 1995) and to steer policy sectors in particular directions.
Performance measures became increasingly fashionable with the rise of
NPM because they provide the opportunity for government to retain
firm control over departments using a hands-off strategy (Carter,
1989), and to incentivize the behaviour of subordinate governments
(Bertelli and John, 2010). This dynamic is in operation in the higher
education sector of many nations. Performance measurement is closely
linked to a governance strategy of steering universities in terms of what
type of research is done, how it is conducted, and what kind of research
is most highly valued (Lewis, 2013).
This chapter begins from an assumption that research performance
measurement is an important instrument of governance (Bjørnholt and
Larsen, 2014), designed to steer the higher education sector in a specific
direction. Performance measurement is always a political decision, and
it is about both accountability and control (Lewis, 2015a). It is directed
at many different entities – policy making processes, organizations,
individuals (see Talbot, 2005); it serves multiple purposes (Behn,
2008); and it represents a variety of goals and values. In order to
focus on the level of convergence between nations, this chapter exam-
ines the range of stated purposes that sit behind the decision to measure
performance.
The empirical examination that follows looks at Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom, and is focused on assessing con-
vergence in ‘talk’ about performance measurement by senior admin-
istrators, rather than convergence in content and practices (Pollitt,
2001). It seeks to uncover how performance measurement is labelled
and represented in these countries, and to examine the level of
similarity across the three nations. Hence, performance measurement
is a specific example of a governance instrument which is utilized to
shed light on how the higher education sector is being steered in
various locations. Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom were
chosen because of the broad similarities in their global position in
higher education. But there is also an important difference: Canada,
unlike the other two countries, has no national research assessment
framework. Hence, this chapter provides a comparison of divergence
186 Lewis

in practices, given that two of the cases have implemented such

systems while the third has not.

7.2 Higher Education Policy

Much has been written about an apparent similarity in the transfor-
mation of higher education in numerous nations, related to
a common set of exogenous processes, political and economic logics,
and governance trajectories (see the Introduction to this volume). The
literature generally concludes that this uniform set of pressures
results in convergence in the application of particular tools and
governance outcomes. We will return to this assumption of conver-
gence shortly. For the moment, it is important to briefly summarize
these international trends.
Over the last three decades, Western governments have substantially
altered their strategies for governing higher education and research
policy. Nation states have become more proactive in defining what is
valued as research ‘outputs’ and in identifying research priority areas.
States have taken up new modes of governance to address concerns
about value for money, and to direct attention and funds towards
research in a way that brings it closer to national economic policy.
This has redefined the relationships between governments, individual
universities and groups of universities (such as the Russell Group of
research-intensive universities in the United Kingdom), and academic
discipline-based societies and associations. Governments and funding
agencies have become far more influential in setting directions and
priorities for research (Whitley, 2010).
To achieve this, governments have used both NPM and Network
Governance-based instruments. These have different sets of drivers asso-
ciated with them, but they have both been used in many countries
(Lewis, 2015b). The rise of performance measurement is closely related
to the spread of NPM, which has flourished as a policy paradigm and
control technology in higher education in the United Kingdom (Deem
et al., 2007), but also in other nations. One of its most important tools
has been the measurement of academic productivity and the increasing
specification of which kinds of research outputs are most highly valued.
The spread of a performative and evaluative culture has been implemen-
ted through research performance evaluation systems in many countries
(Scott, 2009). The United Kingdom exported performance-based
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 187

research assessment systems to Australia and New Zealand. These sys-

tems have also had impacts in European countries and beyond (Whitley
and Gläser, 2007; Whitley et al., 2010).
However, as King (2010) has argued, even in states where liberal-
ization, deregulation, and NPM ideas have dominated the reform of
higher education in recent decades, there is remarkable variation in
how these ideas and policy instruments have been adapted to local
conditions, and they have been utilized in quite different ways. The
insights of institutionalism should lead us to not be surprised by this
finding – after all, governance in any nation is surely shaped by the
particular institutional arrangements that are in place, which con-
tinue to have an important effect on any new ideas and reform
directions. The growing corporatization of universities and
increased reliance on managerial and market rationalities to allocate
resources are both widespread, but also uneven in application and
effects.
Convergence is a fuzzy analytical concept, unable to capture the
complexity of reform when it is put into motion in different con-
texts (Pollitt, 2001). While the pressures on higher education gov-
ernance are similar in many countries, and the effects of isomorphic
pressures are certainly apparent both within and across nations,
change is also influenced by local ideas, interests, and institutions.
As Pollitt (2001) argues, we should think about convergence in
terms of talk, practices, and labels, which rarely line up with deci-
sions, actions, and results. Talk often converges across nations
around a set of ideas that ought to be applied. Practices sometimes
become more similar, but not always. Labels often converge, but
this does not carry through to actual content. And in the final
analysis, even when talk and labels converge, decisions, actions,
and results often do not.
In summary, a rising interest in universities as tools of the knowledge
economy, a desire to evaluate the productivity of universities, and the
more general shift to allocating funds based on activity and outputs
have all contributed to the introduction of performance measurement
systems in many nations. They are tools used very deliberately by
governments to steer universities (at arm’s length) in line with their
strategic interests. However, we should not leap to the conclusion that
these systems are naturally or necessarily convergent with regard to
decisions, actions, and results.
188 Lewis

7.3 Performance Measurement as a Tool for Governing

The escalation of performance measurement in the public sector, begin-
ning in the 1970s, is often associated with economic decline, increased
international competition, and a new set of objectives related to cutting
budgets and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of public
bureaucracies. NPM came to be seen as the solution to the budgetary
challenges facing all sectors and all levels of government in many
different countries. Christopher Hood’s (1991) classic statement of
NPM describes it as containing a number of doctrinal components,
including hands-on professional management, explicit standards and
measures of performance, and greater emphasis on output controls.
Performance measurement is clearly central to NPM, which supported
a new belief that previous problems could be avoided if there was more
measurement and more management.
On paper, the explicit purpose behind performance measurement is
to improve performance. Beyond this, there are many different reasons
why it might be introduced. It may be for the purposes of evaluation, to
discover if a programme is doing what it is supposed to do. It might be
used to control the performance of those working in a programme or
service of interest. It might be simply a means of controlling the budget
for a particular area, or determining how much money is being spent to
achieve some desired output. It might even be a means of driving
centrally determined goals and priorities. Sometimes performance mea-
surement is undertaken in order to eliminate a programme, sometimes
it is used to support a new direction, and sometimes it is about max-
imizing returns on taxes and accountability to the public (Radin,
2006). Among the many different reasons why public managers mea-
sure performance, Behn (2008) has listed eight: to evaluate, control,
budget, motivate, promote, celebrate, learn, and improve.
The institutional approach to the topic of performance measurement
by Brignall and Modell (2000) shows the need to go beyond the
assumptions underpinning much of the literature on performance mea-
surement. Their analysis demonstrates the different interests and values
represented by funding bodies, professional service providers, and
purchasers of public services. Some significant questions about perfor-
mance measurement include who decides on the measures and how
they are linked to an organization’s structure and functioning. Multiple
stakeholders inside and outside compete to set performance measures
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 189

that will advance their own interests (Kanter and Summers, 1987).
Despite the explicit purpose of improvement, it is clear that the implicit
purpose of performance measurement can be any number of things,
and that it is ultimately about some form of control (Lewis, 2015a).
Further to this, political institutions are the structural means by
which those in power pursue their interests (Moe, 1990). Hence, public
bureaucracies, whether the performance measurement criteria are
externally or internally devised, are institutions of coercion and redis-
tribution: the structural choices made in their creation are implicitly
linked to the need of governments to control them, while providing
them with some autonomy. If these organizations are also the creators
of (their own or others’) performance measures, their control is expli-
citly observable in the decisions they make about goals, targets, and
which data to collect.
Talbot (2005) lists a number of the possible functions of perfor-
mance measurement. It may be used for accountability and transpar-
ency; for generating information to inform user choice; for reporting on
success against stated aims; for improving efficiency; for increasing the
focus on outcomes and effectiveness; for assisting decision making
about resource allocation; and for adding value through issues such
as equity, probity, and building social capital. This list points to some
of the different audiences for performance information (governments,
managers, service users). It also indicates some different purposes for it
(meeting targets, making the best use of resources, improving out-
comes), and some possible values that might underlie it other than the
purely economic (equity, justice, inclusion).
Clearly, performance measurement has multiple concerns. As noted
earlier, these include what is done and how (processes as the key
concern), as well as the results of what is done (outputs or outcomes
as the key concern). In addition, it might serve merely as
a presentational device to assure the intended audience that all is well
(ceremonial) (Collier, 2008). Some claim that performance measure-
ment has become an end in itself, its main purpose being to generate
measures (Schick, 2001). But the mere existence of performance mea-
sures certainly has an impact on the functioning of individuals and
organizations.
A question that logically follows the decision to measure perfor-
mance is the question of what should be measured. A good place to
begin in answering this question is to distinguish between policy
190 Lewis

performance, organizational performance, and individual performance

(Talbot, 2005). A policy focus is the most complete, because it is not
confined to a single organization or tier of government. But it is diffuse
and difficult to pin down, and attributing performance to a particular
policy is problematic. Focusing on organizations is easier because it
allows for performance to be related to resourcing and accountability
and for models from the private sector to be imported and used.
Individual performance is more closely related to human resource
management. So performance measurement might occur at the policy
or system level (nations), at the organizational level (universities), or at
the individual level (academics).
Performance measurement is a specific policy instrument, aligned
with NPM as an overall governance mode. It has been increasingly
applied to higher education and numerous other policy sectors in many
countries since the 1980s, and so provides a useful focal point for
examining convergence in the sector. Higher education has witnessed
its widespread application as reforms have focused on competition as
a means to direct the behaviour of universities. An emphasis on demon-
strating that expenditure is not ‘wasteful’, and that public funds are
being used in an efficient and effective manner, ensures that the sector is
scrutinized carefully. A more detailed examination of the research
performance systems in each of the three nations considered in this
chapter follows in the next section.

7.4 Comparing Three Nations

Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have much shared history
and similar political institutions. In relation to the concerns of this
book about convergence and diversity, all three compete in the global
higher education market. This, plus other institutional factors, lead
these three nations to be considered as quite similar cases, and therefore
likely to be strongly convergent in rhetoric but also in actions.
However, some important institutional differences are worth surveying
before the examination of convergence begins.
Each of these countries has a Westminster model of parliamentary
government in place. The United Kingdom is a unitary state – although
devolution has seen some instances where Scotland and Wales have
begun to assert a degree of local autonomy against the UK government.
It is institutionally the most centralized of the three nations under
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 191

Table 7.1 Three nations in comparison

United Kingdom Australia Canada

State structure Unitary Federal, strongly Federal, loosely

centralized coordinated coordinated
coordinated
Dominant Core NPM Core NPM NPM limited
governance
mode1
National Research Excellence in None
performance Excellence Research for Linked to funding
framework Framework Australia (related to
for higher Linked to substan- (ERA) a range of indi-
education tial amount of Linked to small cators, not
(research)2 funding (25%) amount of solely research)
funding (6%) in Alberta and
Ontario

Notes and sources

1. Based on Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) classification of main public management
reform type in these nations.
2. From Hicks (2012); OCUFA (2006).

consideration in this chapter. Australia and Canada are both federa-

tions of states/territories/provinces, but they have disparate versions of
federalism. Australia represents a strongly coordinated version of fed-
eralism, while coordination in Canada is weaker (see Table 7.1). In
effect there is not one higher education system in Canada, but 13
systems (one for each province and territory).
In Australia, the constitution enumerates the powers of the
Commonwealth (federal) level, leaving the residual powers with the
states. The Commonwealth has very few exclusive areas of power, and
the concurrent powers of legislation suggest a system focused on inter-
governmental cooperation (Emy and Hughes, 1988). However, the
Commonwealth’s largely exclusive power over direct taxation makes
the Commonwealth a powerful policy actor (Painter, 2000). State/terri-
tory governments depend to a large extent on Commonwealth grants,
but they retain varying levels of control over a range of important policy
areas. They have a relatively small amount of control in higher
education.
192 Lewis

Canada has a highly competitive and decentralized political structure

and, as a result, quite uncoordinated public policies (Tomblin, 2000).
Braun et al. (2002) label the Canadian system as a ‘power separation
model’, in which a separation of jurisdictional authority and bipolarity
predominates, in addition to competition. Indeed, the system was
designed to protect cultural and economic diversity and to make it
correspondingly difficult to impose/coordinate policies. With respect
to fiscal federalism, the Canadian federal government has considerable
scope to take unilateral action in terms of developing and using fiscal
instruments, raising revenues, and restricting the transfer of revenue.
The federal level and the provinces have some autonomy from each
other in terms of elements such as sales taxation and in expenditures
where each level has exclusive responsibilities (Braun et al., 2002).
However, an element of fiscal interdependence has entered into several
core policy sectors where provinces have had traditional jurisdiction,
including higher education.
These different government arrangements are reflected in the differ-
ent approaches to (national) performance measurement of these
nations. The United Kingdom was an early adopter of NPM reforms,
and has applied a raft of managerial reforms followed by market-based
reforms. Australia was not far behind on these trajectories. In Pollitt
and Bouckaert’s (2011) classification, these are both core NPM states,
meaning that they most fully embraced the principles of both manage-
rialism and competition (Considine and Lewis, 1999). Performance
measurement at the national level is widespread in both Australia and
the United Kingdom.
While Canada shared much of the rhetoric of NPM in the early days,
it did not go as far as other nations in implementing NPM. It embraced
the marketization idea, but it also held on to the tradition of a fairly
stable and neutral civil service, which moderated the pace and scope of
change (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Higher education exemplifies
this difference. There is no national framework or set of performance
measures. There is, however, substantial funding for research activities
and infrastructures that support research collaboration and specific
research priorities. A national Performance Measurement Framework
applies to all programmes and all government departments and is
aligned with setting strategic objectives for these. The decentralized
governmental regime of Canada, along with its different governance
approach (more limited managerialism and competition and greater
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 193

institutional autonomy) and its greater emphasis on research grants to

direct priorities, make it distinctive (Capano, 2015).
As noted earlier, since the 1980s, many nation states have become
proactive in defining and measuring research ‘outputs’. The United
Kingdom was the first mover in 1986, and Australia followed in
1995. A total of 14 countries had some kind of system by 2010
(Hicks, 2012). These systems account for relatively small amounts of
funding compared to grants and teaching funding: they amount to
around 6 per cent of total revenue in Australia, but a more substantial
25 per cent in the United Kingdom (Hicks, 2012). In addition, they
have important reputational effects, and universities are keenly aware
of this.1 Research status and standing are significant because of the
influence of world rankings of universities. These are substantially
based on measures of research quantity and quality.
The research assessment systems of Australia and the United
Kingdom are broadly comparable, and have influenced each other’s
attempts to measure research performance. They rest on assessments
that include publication quantity and quality as important compo-
nents. Unlike other countries (Whitley and Gläser, 2007), there are
funding allocations tied to these research performance measures. As
such, these two national systems are among the most interventionist
variants of research assessment. The central steering by these national
governments, backed up by the rewards for increased research produc-
tivity, can only be ignored by individual universities if they are willing
to accept significant losses of funding (Lewis, 2013).
Canada, on the other hand, has not introduced a national-level
system of measurement for research performance. Several provinces
(Alberta, Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and the Maritime
provinces) have introduced indicators: performance indicators related
to enrolments and graduations in Alberta and Ontario; a range of
indicators in British Columbia; institution-specific indicators in
Saskatchewan; and student outcomes, resources, and labour market
analysis in the Maritimes. Only two provinces (Alberta and Ontario)
have tied these to funding (OCUFA, 2006). Some summary informa-
tion on the three case nations is provided in Table 7.1.
This comparison highlights the similarities and differences of the
three nations’ dominant governance modes, and their research perfor-
mance practices (specifically related to national research assessment
systems). An in-depth empirical examination of ‘talk’ was undertaken
194 Lewis

through the use of interviews. These were conducted with senior

administrators in departments, funding agencies, and performance
measurement agencies related to higher education in each of the three
countries during 2014–2015. In government departments, these people
were generally at director level, with some line responsibility for per-
formance measurement. In other agencies, the individuals were gener-
ally the CEO or equivalent. A total of 16 people were interviewed, and
these were split fairly evenly across the three nations (see the Appendix
for more details).
The number of different organizations involved in measuring perfor-
mance is large, and a small number of interviews cannot possibly hope
to cover the entire gamut of perspectives. Hence, the analysis that
follows should be considered as representing the views of just a few
of the many individuals and organizations involved, which might
potentially be a small subset of the range of responses that would be
uncovered by interviewing more people in different agencies.
Nevertheless, these interviews provide an insight into these senior
administrators’ understandings of the purpose of performance mea-
surement in higher education, at the policy and strategy-setting level.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. In answering a set of
broad questions, the interviewees responded in different orders and in
varied combinations, not closely following a tightly ordered, question-
and-answer script. The transcripts were then read with two different
aims: first, to uncover the multiple stated purposes of performance
measurement; and second, to identify common and unique themes.
The first reading was centred on creating lists of answers under the
headings shown in Tables 7.2 to 7.4, regardless of where the responses
occurred within the interview. The second reading was used in combi-
nation with the lists shown in the tables, to identify themes that were
common across the nations for a particular policy sector and themes
that were unique.
To increase the reliability of this process, the author (and inter-
viewer) and a second coder individually extracted the first lists for
each case, and then searched for commonalities and differences across
the nations and the policy sectors. There was substantial overlap
between the two different coders, but additional detail was also picked
up by the second coder. Where differences in interpretation occurred,
the second coder’s version was rechecked against the transcript by the
first coder (author and interviewer). In cases where there were
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 195

Table 7.2 Performance measurement talk in Australia

Who is National government and departments/agencies:

involved? The Government. The Minister. Politicians. Cabinet.
Opposition. Prime Minister and Cabinet. Treasury.
Department of Education. Carrick Institute (now
Australian Learning and Teaching Institute, Department
of Education). Department of Finance. Department of
Industrial Relations. Department of Health. Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Office of the Chief Scientist.
National Health and Medical Research Council.
Australian Research Council.
Accreditation and standards:
Accreditation bodies. Tertiary Education Quality Standards
Association. Council of Private Higher Education. TAFE
Directors. Higher Education Standards Panel.
The university peak bodies:
Group of 8. Universities Australia. Innovative Research
Universities. Regional Universities Network (2). Deputy
Vice Chancellors Research Networks.
Learned societies:
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and
Engineering (3). The four learned academies. Australian
Council of Learned Academies.
Others:
Business Council of Australia.
Why National and global competitiveness (2). Diversification.
measure? Knowledge economy. Alignment with industry desires.
Compliance. Money, spending, wastage.
Training.
Quality assurance. Risk. Transparency. Integrity.
Influence the behaviour of universities (3)
Measure Research quality. Publications. Impact factors. Citations.
what? Metrics. Research income. Impact, industry collabora-
tion. Patents.
Teaching quality. International student attrition. Student
satisfaction and outcomes (retention, completion, gradu-
ate outcomes). Research Higher Degree completions.
Threshold standards. Governance.
196 Lewis

Table 7.2 (cont.)

Measure Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA). Block grants to

how? universities (SRE). Higher Education Research Data
Collection. Peer assessment.
Teaching awards.
Regulation and standard-setting agencies (AQF, HESP,
TEQSA). Statutory accounts to parliament. Financial
analysis.
Reviews by universities, experts, consulting firms, overseas
experts.
Who Academics. The Group of 8. Universities Australia. Vice
resists? Chancellors. Deputy Vice Chancellors Research.
Why? Workload of collating data (e.g. ERA). Lack of clarity of
processes.
System not capturing what it should. Not comparable across
disciplines.

conflicting interpretations, the author’s version was used. When the

same response was recorded from different interviewees – this was
mostly with regard to the ‘who is involved?’ question – the number of
mentions is shown in brackets in Tables 7.2 to 7.4.

7.5 Performance Measurement in Three Nations

The responses from interviewees for the three countries are shown in
Tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4. In answering the question ‘who is involved?’,
interviewees named a series of national political positions and organi-
zations (e.g. government, ministers, Cabinet), government departments
and authorities, and research funding agencies as being involved in
measuring performance. In Canada, provincial ministers and ministries
and agencies (where this work occurs) were nominated. Regulation,
accreditation, and standards bodies were mentioned in Australia and
the United Kingdom, but not in Canada. Peak groups for universities
(e.g. The Group of 8 in Australia, the Russell Group in the United
Kingdom) and Vice Chancellors were mentioned in Australia and the
United Kingdom, but not in Canada. Learned societies were nominated
in Australia and Canada, but not in the United Kingdom. Individual
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 197

Table 7.3 Performance measurement talk in Canada

Who is National government and departments/agencies:

involved? Federal Government. Science and Technology Innovation
Council. Statistics Canada. Canada Foundation for
Innovation (CFI). Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC). Canadian Institutes for
Health Research (CIHR). National Science and
Engineering Research Council (NSERC).
Provinces:
Provincial Ministers. Provincial Ministries. Provincial
Directors General. Premiers. (Ontario) Ministry of
Training, Colleges and Universities. Higher Education
Quality Council, Ontario (HEQCO).
Learned Societies:
Council of Canadian Academics.
Others:
Individual Institutions (universities, colleges).
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada
(AUCC). Students.
Why measure? Global competitiveness. Research priorities and funding.
Access. Quality. Accountability. Funding (value for money).
Match learning outcomes with labour market needs (2).
Training the next generation.
Data used for provincial policy direction. Institutional
planning.
Celebrating success.
Measure what? Costs (funding ratios). Value per dollar.
Enrolments. Rates of graduation (2). Graduate employ-
ment (3). Student attrition. Satisfaction (students,
graduates, employers).
Outputs not outcomes. Conferences. Papers published.
Bibliometrics.
Innovation. Commercialization.
No targets, not research impact.
Measure how? Financial audit, Performance Measurement Framework.
Surveying graduates and employers. Survey of student
engagement. Strategic research plans. Knowledge
mobilization plan. Achievement report.
Maclean’s ranking, international rankings.
198 Lewis

Table 7.3 (cont.)

Who resists? Individual institutions (universities, colleges), academics.

Why? Causes problems via increased expectations and workload.
Institutional autonomy. It’s ‘un-Canadian’.

Table 7.4 Performance measurement talk in the United Kingdom

Who is National government and departments/agencies:

involved? The Government. No. 10 Downing Street policy unit.
Treasury. Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills. The Home Office. Office of Fair Access. Higher
Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE).
Research councils. Higher Education Statistics Agency.
Regulation and standards:
Competing regulators. Quality Assurance Agency for
Higher Education.
The university peak bodies:
The sector. Universities UK. Russell Group. University
Alliance.
Others:
Individual universities. Oxford and Cambridge. Imperial,
University College London. Vice Chancellors.
Charities that fund research. The market.
Why measure? Economic policy – the knowledge economy. International
competitiveness. Innovation.
‘Something for something’. To ‘cut the costs’. Efficiency.
Accountability. Quality.
Social mobility (access) (2).
Measure what? Income. Impact of research. Business–industry links.
Research excellence. Bibliometrics. Reputation. Financial
position. Return on investment.
Teaching quality. Numbers into higher education, reten-
tion and graduation rates. Graduate earnings. Student
experience and satisfaction.
Measure how? Research Excellence Framework (REF). Research block
grants.
International league tables. Universities’ own indicators.
Graduate surveys. National Student Survey (2).
Memorandum of Assurance and Accountability.
Who resists? Institutions. Individuals. Nobody (‘resistance is difficult’)
Why? Distorts academic practice (2). Focuses on the wrong things.
Burden of data collection. Will cost people’s jobs.
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 199

universities were mentioned in Canada and the United Kingdom,

including powerful individual universities (e.g. Oxford and
Cambridge) in the United Kingdom. These lists reflect the different
national arrangements and contexts, but also are likely to reflect the
slightly different mixes of people interviewed in each case.
In all three nations, common responses regarding the purpose of
measurement (‘why measure?’) were a desired shift to the knowledge
economy and global competitiveness, and a set of issues related to
costs, value for money, accountability, quality, and efficiency.
Training and workforce requirements were mentioned in Australia
and Canada. Policy and planning were mentioned in Canada, social
mobility was mentioned in the United Kingdom, and driving the beha-
viour of universities was mentioned in Australia. Celebrating success
was nominated in Canada, but not the other two nations.
For interviewees in all three nations, the response to ‘measure what?’
was based around the three general areas of teaching and learning,
research, and impact/engagement. Funding and costs were also nomi-
nated and industry collaboration was emphasized in all three cases.
Measures of student retention, completion, satisfaction, and graduate
outcomes were also seen as important in all three nations. The most
notable discrepancy is that in Canada there are no targets set and no
evaluation of research impact.
For Australia and the United Kingdom, not surprisingly, their respec-
tive research assessment frameworks were mentioned (the ERA and the
REF) in answering the ‘measure how?’ question, as were several other
national data collections, funding allocations, and regulators/standard-
setting agencies. Statutory accounts and financial audits were nomi-
nated in Australia and Canada, and teaching awards and reviews by
a range of organizations were mentioned in Australia. International
rankings were reported as important for Canada and the United
Kingdom. Canada’s general Performance Measurement Framework
(for public sector departments), the learned academies’ work on bib-
liometrics, and Maclean’s newspaper rankings were nominated in the
absence of a national research assessment system.
Finally, the ‘who resists?’ question came down to individual institu-
tions and academics in all three nations, as well as peak university
groups, Vice Chancellors, and Deputy Vice Chancellors Research in
Australia. In the United Kingdom, ‘nobody’ was the reply from one
interviewee. Reasons for any resistance to performance measurement
200 Lewis

were cited as concerns about the distortion of priorities and practices,

increased workload (all three nations), and focusing on the wrong
things (Australia and the United Kingdom). One Canadian interviewee
described resistance as occurring because such assessment was seen to
be ‘un-Canadian’, while the interviewee in the United Kingdom who
stated that nobody resisted said that this was because it would cost
people’s jobs.
Based on this analysis, there seems to be a high level of convergence
in talk about performance measurement between the three nations.
First, there is a good deal of agreement that the main purposes are to
support the knowledge economy, innovation, and links to business. An
example that captures this is:
To foster world class research through our investments; to make sure that
we attract and retain top talent; to ensure that the investments we make
allow for the training of the next generation – i.e. the, what we call, highly
qualified personnel in Canada; and the most challenging one to measure is
that we foster innovation and commercialization through our investments.
(Canada)

Some of the main divergences were, for Australia, the discussion of

measurement as a means to influence the behaviour of universities
(‘That’s what the metrics are about doing; changing behaviour’),
while in the United Kingdom the social mobility agenda was mentioned
by two different interviewees, one in relation to the knowledge econ-
omy – ‘Social mobility is, well first of all, widening participation, which
is more people going to university, . . . it’s about the fact that we need to
have a high skills economy’ – and one pointing out the differing views
on what this means:
Social mobility is an interesting example . . . Do you care about opportunities
for the few so that everyone has the opportunity of going to Oxford or
Cambridge if they want to? Or do you say ‘That’s absurd, that’s only going
to benefit a small number even though the opportunity is open to everyone’
and in practice, what matters is the hundreds of thousands of students who
go to universities.

The Canadian example (with no direct link between measurement and

funding at the national level) describes a different view of measurement:
Performance measurement and reporting, you know, shouldn’t – it
shouldn’t be a burden, it should be a celebration [laughs], and that the
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 201

more we can do in a way that recognizes things that are already valued
by the research community, the more organic it will be . . . The less it’s
about accountability, and the more it’s about celebrating the results of,
you know, the hard work that people have done, and the importance of
it, the better . . . there are no explicit performance targets set, and
they’re – I think, unlike the UK and Australia, we haven’t gone so far
at the federal research level in terms of allocating funding on such a –
quite a controlled basis.

For the ‘measuring what?’ question, interviewees in all three nations

identified the common themes that appear in this quote:
There’s teaching and learning, there’s research and there’s impact or knowl-
edge exchange . . . there’s a general acceptance that these are the core
business of universities, significant spend is made by government in support
of those core businesses and it’s appropriate that they should be really on
the receiving end of some scrutiny around the acquittal of those funds.
(Australia)

This was either combined with notions of accountability for funds – as

in the above quote – or this was mentioned separately, but it was
common to all nations.
The narratives that highlight some distinctive approaches to the
purposes of performance measurement for each of the three nations
are disclosed in the following quotes. The Australian example empha-
sizes costs, and perceptions of wastage and lack of relevance of the
higher education sector:
So every time budget process comes around, Finance and to an extent, PM
and C will say, ‘Well there’s all this wastage. We need to clean up the
wastage. We’ll take a cut and we’ll, you know, administer you a dose of
medicine and then we’ll also require you to better target . . . Just don’t spend
as much on all those basket-weavers’. (Australia)

Accountability and regulation driven by measurement was apparent in

all three cases, but strongest in the United Kingdom:
This is actually to do with notions of accountability, and accountability
running into governance . . . how do they know how things are going? They
don’t unless they’ve got a measure. And so we are driven towards measure-
ments. (United Kingdom)
Essentially we regulate on the basis that, ‘if you want our money you have
to do this’. (United Kingdom)
202 Lewis

7.6 Conclusion
The analysis contained in this chapter about the convergence and
diversity of higher education governance across nations, represented
in the talk of senior administrators about performance measurement,
suggests several conclusions. The first is related to the impact of
systems of measuring performance, which sit within different national
structures of government. As could be expected, the United Kingdom
has the strongest and clearest line of measurement of higher education
across the country, from the Higher Education Funding Council of
England to the universities. In the Australian case, the performance
measurement of universities is centrally driven without having to
negotiate with states/territories. This effectively bypasses the sub-
national level of government. A number of umbrella groups of uni-
versities appear to be particularly important actors in the Australian
context.
For Canada, a national newspaper and international rankings provide
performance information at the national level and in relation to the rest of
the world. Of course, the provinces/territories are active in creating per-
formance measures for the policy sector themselves. Some provinces/ter-
ritories have developed their own performance measurement systems, and
two have tied funding to these, although student enrolments and outcomes
feature more prominently than research in these areas. In summary, who is
involved, and who resists, is substantially shaped by higher education
governance arrangements in the specific country context.
An examination of government documents and websites, combined
with an analysis of these interviews, supports a fairly strong conver-
gence on what is measured across nations – at least in broad terms
(research excellence and impact, teaching quality and student outcomes
for higher education). Not surprisingly, given the original reason that
performance measurement became popular as a tool of NPM refor-
mers, value for money seems to be paramount as a purpose. The
purposes are also surprisingly convergent in general. Overarching
goals can be discerned, such as supporting the knowledge economy
and increasing competitiveness for higher education in all nations –
even for Canada, which stands apart given its lack of a national
research performance framework. What is measured also shares
a good deal of commonality across these three nations.
Convergence through Research Performance Measurement? 203

On the other hand, the means of collection and reporting (the ‘how’)
varies in line with different national governance arrangements. Clearly,
the combination of national structures and the broad direction of
governance trends in these three countries combine so that policy
instruments (such as research performance measurement) are centra-
lized and consequential for the higher education sector in some cases,
and absent in others. However, the stated purposes attributed to per-
formance measurement have a good deal in common, although local
contexts and current policy agendas and directions help to frame the
purposes of measurement, or reframe measurement to fit the new
policy direction.
Canada’s lack of a research performance measurement framework
suggests the persistence of governance drivers for higher education in
that nation that are different to those in operation in the United
Kingdom and Australia. Given this, perhaps it is surprising that the
level of convergence in talk about its purpose and what is measured is
so high across all three nations. However, this fits with Pollitt’s (2001)
point that convergence is ill-defined and needs to be interrogated as
convergence of rhetoric, decisions, actions, and results. In this case,
convergence of rhetoric seems to be in place, despite the lack of con-
vergence in specific actions.
Treating performance measurement as an important instrument
for governing higher education, and analysing performance mea-
surement talk in different nations, points to a high level of conver-
gence, despite local differences in the tools applied to steer national
systems. This finding also serves to highlight the effects of globali-
zation on higher education: countries without national research
performance measurement systems appear to be articulating the
same goals and measuring similar things. Global mechanisms for
defining high performance, such as world university rankings, no
doubt play a substantial role in this standard-setting and diffusion
of ideas about what is important and how it should be measured.
Such mechanisms of governance, established by actors other than
national governments, and copied around the world, may turn out
to be exerting greater convergence pressures on the governance of
higher education than the application of policy tools which are
translated and adjusted to the national context. But that is a line
of inquiry for a different research project.
204 Lewis

Appendix: List of Agencies (and Numbers of People)

Interviewed

Australia
• Department of Employment and Training, Higher Education
Division (1)
• Department of Employment and Training, Research Funding and
Policy Division (1)
• Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (1)
• Group of 8, current Chair (1)
• Universities Australia, current President (1)
Canada
• Association of Universities and Colleges Canada (1)
• Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario (1)
• Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2)
• Canada Foundation for Innovation (1)
• Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities (2)
United Kingdom
• Higher Education Funding Council of England (2)
• The Russell Group, current Chair (1)
• Universities UK, CEO (1)
• REF expert panellist (1)

Notes
1. The American system of research evaluation run by the National
Research Council is private and not linked directly to funding at all,
but it still generates a significant response from institutions (Hicks,
2009).

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8 Accountability and Governance
in European Higher Education
m i c h a e l d o b b i n s a n d je n s j un g b l u t

8.1 Introduction
Varying notions of societal, political, scientific, and socio-economic
accountability have always been inherent in the missions of universi-
ties. However, in the past two or three decades, accountability has
surged to become a guiding concept and primary justification for
a multitude of higher education (HE) reforms in Europe and beyond.
Leveille goes as far as to define accountability as the ‘lingua franca of
higher education’ (2006, p. 8), which prompts action from policy
makers, educational leaders, students, employers, and various other
stakeholders.
Although accountability is at least touched on in nearly every
account of current HE developments, only a few HE scholars have
attempted to further theorize accountability and its forms, implica-
tions, and practical significance. In this chapter, we attempt to
advance the debate by focusing on European HE in the age of
Bologna, international rankings, massification, and underfunding.
We begin our analysis by addressing the manifold socio-economic
forces which have put accountability centre stage in contemporary
HE discourse and reforms. We then outline numerous state-of-the-art
conceptualizations of accountability in general and in HE specifically.
Following the lead of Huisman and Currie (2004), we wish to move
beyond normative statements and generalized descriptions by analys-
ing the emergence of ‘accountability regimes’ in four large European
countries – Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), France, Poland, and
Romania – with distinctly different paths of development in HE. This
will enable us to identify cases of convergence and divergence in
different settings.

208
Accountability and Governance 209

8.2 The Growing Relevance of Accountability in Higher

Education Governance
Universities in Europe have traditionally enjoyed a large degree of
public trust, which came with extensive rights to self-government.
The ideal of professional autonomy and academic freedom were justi-
fied by a widespread view of universities as distinct societal institutions
that required a special status (Enders et al., 2013). This high degree of
freedom was based on a pact between HE, the state, and society, which
was grounded in the belief that the independence of universities from
political or corporate influence was a necessary precondition for them
to function properly (Gornitzka et al., 2007). Therefore, the state often
acted as a guardian of the university, providing it with public funding
and the legal guarantee of self-governance and protection of academic
freedom (Enders et al., 2013). Van Vught (1997) referred to this form
of governance as ‘state control’, as the government directly interfered in
procedural decisions in HE.
This general description of the relationship between the state and
universities holds true for both models of HE governance that have
most significantly shaped HE in continental Europe: the state-centred
model and the Humboldtian model of academic self-rule. In the state-
centred model, universities were perceived as appendages of the state
bureaucracy and subordinate institutions to the ministries responsible
for HE. They were often regulated through uniform national laws, and
were directly accountable to the state (Clark, 1983). This mode of
governance relied mainly on hierarchical forms of accountability,
with state bureaucrats in ministries as key decision makers. On the
other hand, the Humboldtian model, which put great emphasis on the
professional autonomy of university professors, guaranteed
a considerable amount of substantive freedom, for example, in curri-
cula or areas of research. However, the state tightly regulated proce-
dural matters, while laws prescribed in great detail the tasks and duties
of universities in order to justify the public funding invested in them
(Berdahl, 1990; Clark, 1983). Academics operating in a Humboldtian
tradition have generally perceived themselves as primarily or solely
accountable to their scientific community (Dobbins et al., 2011).
These different modes of governance, which relied mainly on hier-
archical forms of accountability through direct control, have under-
gone significant changes in recent decades. First, HE massification has
210 Dobbins and Jungblut

made it an increasingly important political issue (Jungblut, 2016). As

a growing percentage of the electorate is directly affected by HE and
increasing shares of public budgets are spent on it, politicians sense
a greater need to control the quality and delivery of universities’ ser-
vices to society. This trend is intensified by shrinking public funds and
growing demands for efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector
(Huisman and Currie, 2004; Pierson, 1998; Trow, 1996). For HE
systems characterized by high public spending, governments must jus-
tify the expenditure of tax money to electorates, while universities in
systems with high private spending (i.e. tuition fees) must prove that
they are delivering what their ‘consumers’ (i.e. students and parents)
are paying for (Leveille, 2006, p. 6).
Second, relationships between the state and HE providers have also
undergone significant changes in the ‘knowledge society’ (Gornitzka
et al., 2007). Most notably, the decision-making autonomy of univer-
sities and HE providers regarding procedural, financial, personnel, and
substantive matters has been significantly enhanced (Estermann et al.,
2011). Governments have retreated from direct control of the inner
workings of universities and moved towards ‘arms-length steering’, or
what van Vught (1997) defines as ‘state supervision’. As a result, ex
ante control through legislation and bureaucratic procedures has been
replaced by demands for providers to justify their operations ex post
through diverse accountability measures (Neave, 2009, 2012).
A third important rationale behind the move towards more autonomy
and accountability was the realization that HE, with its increased com-
plexity of tasks, is becoming harder, if not impossible, to steer through
direct ministerial intervention. This coincided with a burgeoning dis-
course on the weakening capacity of governments to regulate various
social spheres (Rose, 2000) and to coordinate local stakeholder interac-
tions (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Therefore, governments have
increasingly relied on principal–agent relationships, which enable uni-
versities to use their expertise and proximity to the primary activities of
the sector (teaching and research) to ensure the quality of provision,
while governments employ accountability measures to monitor the per-
formance of the agents (Clark, 1998; Enders et al., 2013).
These trends are by no means exclusive to HE, but are also affecting
the broader public sector. Following the rise and popularity of New
Public Management (NPM) since the 1980s, many countries have
revisited the governance of public organizations (Pollitt and
Accountability and Governance 211

Bouckaert, 2011). With a focus on institutional autonomy, learning

from the private sector, and creating a leaner state, NPM reforms were
geared towards improving efficiency, enhancing the responsiveness of
public agencies, and improving managerial accountability (Christensen
and Lægreid, 2015). The key promise was that better public sector
performance would follow from effective vertical managerial account-
ability. This was often accompanied by a growing reliance on market
mechanisms (Gingrich, 2011); in HE, this included the strengthening of
executive leadership, professionalization of management structures,
development of strategic capacities, and increased university competi-
tion (Dobbins et al., 2011; Enders et al., 2013).
These changes in governance arrangements were further expedited
by the increasing international coordination through transnational
platforms for policy learning, such as the Bologna Process.
Internationalization was reinforced by growing global markets for
HE services, global university rankings, and activities of international
organizations such as the OECD (Gornitzka, 2007; Martens and
Jakobi, 2010; Martens et al., 2010; Vögtle et al., 2011). One specific
idea promoted in the context of the Bologna Process was the inclusion
of stakeholder groups in HE governance (Vukasovic et al., 2017). The
incorporation of representatives of diverse organized interests in newly
created governance structures such as university boards has shifted the
thrust of accountability, as universities now often have to justify their
performance not only to the state but also to societal representatives
directly involved in their steering. This also accords with a post-
materialist understanding of participatory models of governance and
a more democratic form of public sector steering (Olsen, 1988, 2007),
through which increasingly critical and sophisticated citizens not only
assess the performance of public service providers, but also wish to
shape decision-making processes within them (Inglehart, 1997).
Overall, increased institutional autonomy and accountability can be
seen as two sides of the same coin. It is thus not surprising that after the
wave of reforms aimed at increasing institutional autonomy, there are
a growing number of scholars claiming that these reforms did not fulfil
their purpose or even decreased the level of ‘real’ autonomy. In other
words, the expansion of accountability-oriented mechanisms has
imposed greater restraints on the ability of HE providers to act autono-
mously (Christensen, 2011; Enders et al., 2013). Regardless, HE govern-
ance can increasingly be seen as a balancing act in a multi-actor,
212 Dobbins and Jungblut

multilevel, and multi-issue environment, in which universities are under

pressure to justify and legitimize academic processes and outputs
(Huisman and Currie, 2004; Marginson and Rhoades, 2002). Thus,
many HE systems are still in a phase of experimentation to identify the
levels of autonomy and accountability-promoting measures most appro-
priate for them (Estermann et al., 2011).

8.3 Forms and Conceptualizations of Accountability

The overview of the multitude of catalysts for increasing accountability in
HE has shown that accountability can take different shapes and forms. It
has been described as a ‘complex and chameleon-like term’ (Mulgan,
2000, p. 555). One key question is whether accountability is seen as
a virtue or a normative concept, or whether it is regarded as
a mechanism or an institutional relationship in which an actor can be
held to account by others (Bovens, 2010). We focus on the latter under-
standing in this chapter.
Despite covering a broad set of understandings, different
accountability concepts have a common core as they pertain to
some form of answerability for performance (Romzek, 2000) or
an ‘obligation to explain and justify conduct’ (Bovens, 2007,
p. 450). This means that universities are expected to report to
others, and explain, justify, and answer questions about how
resources have been used and with what kind of results (Trow,
1996). According to Burke (2004, p. 2) one has to ask: ‘Who is
accountable to whom, for what purposes, for whose benefit, by
which means, and with which consequences?’
Given the broad variation in definitions of accountability it is not
surprising that there are many different typologies with varying levels
of detail. Bovens et al. (2008) offer a tool to assess public accountability
structured along three perspectives. First, the democratic perspective
follows the central idea that accountability helps to control and legit-
imize government actions by connecting them with the democratic
mandate provided through the chain of delegation from the electorate.
Second, the constitutional perspective sees accountability as a way to
prevent or uncover abuses of public authority. Third, the learning
perspective sees accountability as a way to generate feedback so that
governments and public agencies can increase their effectiveness and
efficiency. Christensen and Lægreid (2015) also distinguish three
Accountability and Governance 213

different forms of accountability. However, their approach follows

a different logic and differentiates between actors’ relations. Their
first category, political accountability, is similar to the first perspec-
tive of Bovens et al. (2008), and is based on principal–agent relation-
ships that describe the delegation of authority from voters through
politicians to public agencies. Their second category is related to the
position of an actor within a public sector hierarchy, where superiors
hold subordinates accountable for performance, which they term
administrative accountability. The final category is based on the
idea of monitoring outputs and results and making actors who are
responsible carry out accountability tasks if the output is not in line
with agreed performance criteria. This form is called managerial
accountability.
In yet another conceptualization, Romzek (2000) differentiates four
types of accountability. These types are structured along two dimen-
sions. The first dimension measures the degree of autonomy of actors,
which can be either low or high, while the second dimension addresses
whether the source of control is internal or external. In situations of
low autonomy and internal control, hierarchical accountability
describes relationships based on close supervision of individuals who
have low work autonomy and minimal discretion. In situations of low
autonomy and external control, principal–agent relationships based on
legislative and constitutional structures establish an external oversight
of performance and compliance with mandates. This legal account-
ability differs from hierarchical accountability as it describes relation-
ships between two actors who are not interlinked through hierarchy,
but rather controlled through outside rules and regulations. In situa-
tions where the actors have significantly more discretion to pursue
relevant tasks, meaning there is a high degree of autonomy, Romzek
differentiates between professional and political accountability. The
difference between these types is based on the source of the standard
against which their actions are measured. While in professional
accountability the standards are derived from internalized norms and
appropriate practices, political accountability is based on the ideal of
responsiveness to concerns from key stakeholders, where actors have
the discretion to decide whether and how to respond to key stakeholder
concerns.1 Table 8.1 provides an overview of these four types of
accountability.
214 Dobbins and Jungblut

Table 8.1 Overview of Romzek’s four types of accountability

Low autonomy High autonomy

Internal control Hierarchical accountability Professional accountability

External control Legal accountability Political accountability

These conceptualizations share common components that focus on

procedural or managerial accountability, meaning how things are
done, and components that assess substantive accountability, mean-
ing what is done. These foci reflect the basic dichotomy that
Berdahl (1990) proposed regarding different forms of university
autonomy, in which procedural autonomy encompasses issues
related to the management of the institution, while substantive
autonomy refers to issues relating to main areas of scholarly
work – teaching and research. Based on Romzek’s (2000) concep-
tualization, we now present different groups of accountability
instruments used in HE and link them to the values and beha-
vioural expectations inherent in the four types of accountability. In
general, the instruments of accountability can have varying char-
acteristics. They can be soft mechanisms based on monitoring or
explanation, or hard mechanisms based on justification (Huisman
and Currie, 2004). Further, they can be tied to real consequences
or to the act of reporting and making performance transparent,
instruments which may otherwise be perceived to exert sufficient
pressure to ensure compliance (Christensen and Lægreid, 2015).
Finally, the different types of instruments can be used in arrange-
ments between diverse sets of actors. In HE this can include, for
example, the state and its ministries, public sector agencies such as
quality assurance agencies or funding councils, HE institutions and
their management, representative bodies of academics and stu-
dents, trade unions, employers or business representatives, and
umbrella organizations such as rectors’ conferences.
For the purposes of our study we structure accountability instru-
ments in HE into three groups. The first group includes performance
indicators and performance-based funding mechanisms. This encom-
passes public funding distribution based on output-oriented formulas
Accountability and Governance 215

as well as performance contracts between ministries and universities

(de Boer et al., 2015; Jongbloed and Vossensteyn, 2001). These
measures have become more popular in light of massification and
increasing tuition fees and are often used by governments as forms
of softer steering in situations of increased institutional autonomy.
This type of instrument emphasizes efficiency as a core value and,
depending whether the performance agreement used is within
a university or between a ministry and a university, it can be seen as
either a hierarchical or a legal form of accountability in Romzek’s
(2000) terms.
The second group of accountability instruments involves var-
ious forms of quality assurance and quality control. These instru-
ments have become increasingly widespread, in part due to their
prominence in the Bologna Process. Public authorities often play
a key role in quality assurance (QA) systems as they provide the
necessary legitimacy and, even in highly decentralized HE
arrangements such as the United States, the state remains a key
actor (Gornitzka and Stensaker, 2014). QA systems can entail
differing components, such as accreditation, student evaluations,
or peer review (Dill and Beerkens, 2010), and are typically based
on the values of expertise, but also responsiveness. Depending on
whether the instrument is based on internal values and norms or
the perceptions of different stakeholder groups, it can be seen as
either a professional or a political form of accountability.
The third group of accountability instruments addresses the idea of
directly including stakeholders in HE governance. This may involve
internal stakeholders, such as academics and students, and thus reflect
a democratic vision of the university (Olsen, 2007), as well as external
stakeholders, such as trade unions and employer federations, which
indicates greater responsiveness to the university’s relationship with
civil society (Jongbloed et al., 2008). These different groups can be
incorporated into either existing or new structures, such as university
boards or quality assurance bodies. While instruments focusing on
internal stakeholder groups can be viewed as professional accountabil-
ity measures, instruments focusing on external stakeholders are a form
of political accountability. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the
different accountability instruments and how they relate to Romzek’s
types of accountability.
216 Dobbins and Jungblut

Table 8.2 Overview of the different accountability instruments

Accountability instrument Type of accountability

Performance indicators & - If used within university: hierarchical

performance-based funding accountability
- If used between ministry and univer-
sity: legal accountability
Quality assurance - If based on internal values:
professional accountability
- If based on external values: political
accountability
Stakeholder involvement in higher - If focus is on internal stakeholders:
education governance professional accountability
- If focus is on external stakeholders:
political accountability

8.4 Accountability in Contemporary Higher Education

Governance
Following these classifications, we now focus on the emergence of
accountability-oriented policies in the university systems of France,
Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia), Poland, and Romania. Originally
entrenched in a highly state-centred governance tradition, French univer-
sities have undergone a striking transition towards academic entrepre-
neurialism and a stronger emphasis on research since the mid-2000s
(Dobbins, 2017; Musselin, 2009). Facing tremendous pressures to remain
internationally competitive, German HE has recently shifted towards
a marketized paradigm, while upholding crucial elements of its
Humboldtian tradition. Polish HE offers a particularly fascinating case.
After quickly eradicating most traces of its communist, centralized-
bureaucratic governance model and reinvigorating its Humboldtian tradi-
tion after 1989, Polish public HE has proven relatively reform-resistant
until recently, despite the parallel expansion of one of the world’s largest
private HE systems (Duczmal, 2006). Historically embedded in an extre-
mely bureaucratic, state-centred model, Romania was quicker to embrace
market-oriented steering practices in the mid-1990s and, as will be shown,
devised a multitude of new mechanisms and instruments to institutionalize
the concept of accountability in HE governance (Dobbins, 2011).
Accountability and Governance 217

8.4.1 France
The original French tradition of academic freedom and autonomy
(Gieysztor, 1992, p. 108) was uprooted during a phase of all-embracing
nationalization in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under
Napoléon, universities essentially became teaching institutions entrusted
with the realization of national political and ideological objectives (Neave,
2001, p. 37), while specialized elitist institutions (grandes écoles) were
created. Until the 1960s, universities did not exist autonomously due to the
devolution of decision making to the faculties. In 1984, universities were
declared autonomous institutions, but remained under the supervision of
the Education Ministry (Chevaillier, 2007) and were thus primarily subject
to hierarchical accountability to the state. The gradual increase in auton-
omy of French universities in the past 25 years entailed the emergence of an
extensive multilateral accountability regime, which manifests across three
interlinked dimensions: performance indicators and performance funding,
quality assurance, and stakeholder participation.

8.4.1.1 Performance Indicators and Performance-based Funding

Foundations for a greater performance orientation were laid in the
early 1990s with the introduction of the so-called contractualisation
procedure. Universities were called on to present strategic development
plans, on the basis of which they concluded four-year contracts with
the state. The politique contractuelle subsequently not only prompted
university management to more systematically reflect on accountability
issues, but also led to the introduction of state-defined performance
criteria in the mid-1990s. The state then began to allocate funding in
a more selective manner, a trend reinforced by the 2001 funding law for
public institutions (‘Loi organique relative aux lois de finance’ –
LOLF). As of 2006, state funding for all public institutions – including
nearly all HE institutions – was to be increasingly distributed on
a performance basis (logique de performance). Universities were
required to draw up expenditure reports for parliament (projets
annuels de performance), on the basis of which parliament set priorities
and objectives for universities, which were operationalized in the four-
year contracts (Kaiser, 2007). Upon successful performance, universi-
ties were granted extra crédits which they could expend at will. Thus,
this form of accountability enabled universities to acquire additional
autonomy over teaching.
218 Dobbins and Jungblut

Due to the still comparatively low degree of university autonomy,

contractualisation essentially still functioned as a hierarchical account-
ability measure until the mid-2000s, whereby the performance compo-
nent remained relatively limited. However, rattled by its very poor
standing in international HE rankings (Dalsheimer and Despréaux,
2008) and a burgeoning discourse on France’s declining innovative and
competitive potential (Aghion and Cohen, 2004), French HE was
increasingly affected by the ‘governance by comparison’ (Martens
et al., 2007) wave in the late 2000s. This led to a sustained push for
university autonomy, while the state aimed to reinforce the performance-
oriented accountability dimensions. Specifically, the ministry broke with
the tradition of state control of content (e.g. study programmes and
curricula) and again drew on the politique contractuelle as a vehicle to
grant universities greater substantive and procedural autonomy. The
2007 law, ‘Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités’
(also known as LRU 2007 or ‘Loi Pécresse’) massively enhanced uni-
versity autonomy and the powers of university management, thus turn-
ing contractualisation into a more legal accountability measure based on
a principal–agent relationship (Comité de Suivi/LRU, 2011). Unlike the
previous line-item budgeting process, universities now effectively receive
global budgets (LRU 2007: Art. L. 712–9). In addition to a series of new
stakeholder-oriented and QA-related accountability instruments (see
below), university management (conseil d’administration) became both
the beneficiary of newly granted autonomy and the ‘enforcer’ of a new
managerial accountability regime. Although some employment and pro-
motion procedures are still state-defined (Estermann et al., 2011), uni-
versity presidents now employ staff on a terminable or indefinite basis
and even pay performance bonuses to staff members (LRU 2007: Art.
19). University researchers and academics are therefore increasingly
subject to managerial oversight. University teachers and researchers
now must cope with expanded managerial accountability measures
towards the increasingly powerful administrative councils (conseils d’ad-
ministration) and university presidents, who still find themselves accoun-
table to the state via the formal legal contractualisation procedure and
other QA measures (see below).

8.4.1.2 Quality Assurance

Even before the massive Bologna-related push for QA in the 2000s,
France had operated a state-centred QA system for HE. The so-called
Accountability and Governance 219

Bayrou Reform of 1997 introduced the obligatory evaluation of univer-

sities by the state Comité National d’Evaluation (CNE), in order to
increase their public accountability (Musselin, 2001). However, the
evaluations generally had a soft character without any significant sanc-
tions for any quantifiable weak performance of individual institutions or
academics. The Bologna Process and repeated poor French performance
in international rankings, however, triggered profound institutional
changes aimed at enhancing the political and hierarchical accountability
of universities. In 2007, the pre-existing evaluation bodies responsible
for different types of HE2 were merged into the Agence de l’évaluation de
la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur (AERES), which now exter-
nally evaluates study programmes, entire HE institutions, and research
institutions. The agency is unique due to its diverse membership: AERES
not only consists of French and international academics and researchers,
but also student and university management representatives and mem-
bers of the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS).
These procedures reflect a shift away from the traditional model of
control-oriented ministerial evaluation and towards evaluation of aca-
demic ‘products’. The output-based indicators range from research and
teaching performance, study offers, student satisfaction, and quality of
student life to relationships with external research institutes and manage-
ment of human resources. Importantly, the agency is one of the first in
Europe to rely on bibliometric criteria (i.e. journal impact factors) to assess
the research performance of individual academics and pass on the results
to university management.3 The ex post focus on research output and the
inclusion of CNRS representatives are indicative of an increasing research
orientation in French universities and thus the re-embracing of traditional
Humboldtian notions of professional accountability towards the research
community. As shown, however, the new accountability regime is multi-
polar and aims to safeguard both internal accountability (i.e. university
management and internal stakeholders) and external accountability (i.e.
towards the state) in the provision of services to students, the research
community, and civil society stakeholders (see below). In fact, to bolster its
legitimacy, the AERES regularly subjects itself to an evaluation of its own
operations by European experts.

8.4.1.3 Stakeholder Governance

As an additional form of political accountability, French HE began to
embrace the notion of stakeholder governance at an early stage. In the
220 Dobbins and Jungblut

early 1990s, for example, policy makers started to focus on university

modernization and mobilization in terms of addressing the economic
needs of the French economy. The contractualisation procedure
increasingly focused on the development of HE steering strategies in
line with local socio-economic interests (INRP, 2005, p. 41). For
example, the programme ‘Université du troisième millénaire’ was
geared towards fostering more systematic coordination with local
and regional public authorities and businesses, especially regarding
the funding of HE research projects (Quinio, 1998). With these new
‘alliances’, existing forms of vertical state steering and hierarchical
accountability were juxtaposed with new forms of accountability
towards external stakeholders, resulting in novel polycentric govern-
ance patterns (INRP, 2005, p. 41; Musselin and Paradeise, 2009).
While the politique contractuelle was initially applied to align aca-
demic outputs with national socio-economic interests, the government
has more recently recalibrated its stakeholder accountability strategy.
One core component of the LRU 2007 law is the state-imposed reform
of the main university government body, the conseil d’administration,
whose membership structure is now prescribed by the state. It must
consist of 20 to 30 members (instead of the previous 60), approxi-
mately 40 per cent of whom are supposed to be lecturing researchers
(enseignants-chercheurs). A significant change is the co-agenda-setting
power for external stakeholders, of which at least one is to be head of
a leading enterprise, while regional representatives (two or three),
students (approx. one-fifth of the membership) and administrative
staff (approx. one-tenth of the membership) are also included (LRU
2007: Art. 7). Thus, France has taken a different path to Germany (see
below) by merging academic and administrative management into one
body and by refraining from governing bodies exclusively under aca-
demic control (i.e. academic senates).

8.4.2 Germany (North Rhine-Westphalia)

Due to Germany’s federal structure and the responsibility of the
Bundesländer for HE policy and governance, this chapter will focus
on one of the Länder in order to explore accountability-related devel-
opments. We have selected North Rhine-Westphalia, which has the
largest population, a large number of HE institutions, and has recently
been subject to several reform initiatives that increased institutional
Accountability and Governance 221

autonomy and accountability. Historically, German HE followed

the Humboldtian model and was characterized by the strong role of
the professoriate, especially regarding substantive matters, and the
direct influence of the state on procedural issues (Dobbins and Knill,
2014; van Vught, 1997). This is also one reason why there was no
quality assurance or monitoring of HE activities before Bologna
(Dobbins and Knill, 2014). The situation in Germany is thus similar
to that of France in the sense that hierarchical governance prevailed
with regard to procedural matters. Contrary to the French example,
however, and due to stronger professorial control over substantive
matters and internal university decision-making structures,
Germany historically relied on professional accountability. Since
the end of the 1990s there has been a decisive shift towards institu-
tional autonomy, state supervision, and accountability measures
instead of the classical forms of direct control (Dobbins and Knill,
2014; Schimank and Lange, 2009). As we show in the following
sections, performance agreements, performance-based funding,
quality assurance, and stakeholder governance have been crucial
components of this development.

8.4.2.1 Performance Indicators and Performance-based Funding

Contrary to many other Länder, performance has long been a part of
the HE funding model in North Rhine-Westphalia, even before the
most recent wave of governance reforms (Keller and Dobbins, 2015).
However, these reforms put a greater emphasis on using performance
agreements to move from hierarchical decrees to a form of HE funding
that is negotiated between the ministry and the universities, thus loos-
ening the hierarchical form of accountability. In 2004, the Ministry for
Science and Research started to negotiate performance agreements
(Zielvereinbarungen) with single HE institutions with the aim of grant-
ing them more autonomy. In these agreements the ministry used pro-
duction goals to incentivize universities to move towards a form of
management by objectives and thus pay greater attention to their
organizational output. However, the agreements generally lacked ser-
ious sanctions for universities that did not perform, as they only
entailed fiscal rewards for fulfilment of the agreement and no means
of sanctioning those institutions that failed to perform (Dobbins and
Knill, 2014). They can therefore be seen as soft instruments of
accountability.
222 Dobbins and Jungblut

The large-scale governance reforms of the Christian-democratic and

Liberal coalition government in 2006 led to a greater focus on output-
oriented steering by increasing the share of performance-based funding
to 20 per cent of overall budgets (Keller and Dobbins, 2015).
Moreover, decisions on student numbers admitted to each university
were now based on performance agreements. By turning universities
into bodies under public law, the reform also made HE institutions in
North Rhine-Westphalia almost completely autonomous regarding
procedural matters (de Boer et al., 2015). The legal changes can thus
be described as a shift from hierarchical accountability towards legal
accountability. The performance agreements run over a period of two
years and have specified areas that are covered and are subject to output
measurements.4 These include, for example, research, teaching, gender
issues, internationalization, and institutional profiling (de Boer et al.,
2015).
With these new performance agreements, the state also shifted
towards an indicators-based funding scheme in which the number of
graduates, the number of completed PhDs, and the amount of third-
party research funding would constitute part of the HE budget.
Nevertheless, at 20 per cent, the share of this performance-based
component remained rather low and the largest part of university
funding still came from the lump-sum basic grant (Dobbins and Knill,
2014). In 2013, the new Social-democratic and Green governing coali-
tion changed the indicators of the performance-based component,
replacing the number of PhD graduates with the share of female pro-
fessors, while at the same time increasing the overall share of the
performance-related portion of the HE budget to approximately
23 per cent. Thus, 77 per cent of funding is still distributed through
the basic block grants (de Boer et al., 2015).
In reaction to the perceived excessive university autonomy, the coali-
tion of Social-democrats and Greens again increased the role of the
state in the strategic development of HE by giving parliament and the
ministry more power (Jungblut, 2016). In addition, the 2014 HE law
also required universities to report in greater detail on how they spent
their basic funding (de Boer et al., 2015) and compiled a new state-wide
plan for university personnel, developmental, and budgetary affairs.
Finally, the government introduced a clause allowing the ministry to
penalize universities that did not fulfil their performance agreements
(de Boer et al., 2015). This last decision in particular turned the
Accountability and Governance 223

performance agreements into hard tools of accountability, placing

universities under more pressure to justify their performance and align-
ing this with financial consequences. These changes in the governance
arrangements reflect a move away from a focus on internalized norms
and thus a shift from legal accountability to hierarchical accountability
with a greater role for the parliament and the ministry. At the same
time, the shift in the performance indicators suggests a stronger focus
on political rather than professional accountability.

8.4.2.2 Quality Assurance

As mentioned previously, Germany did not have a formalized QA
system prior to the Bologna Process. While teaching and research
quality was assured through forms of professional accountability and
the internalized norms of the academic community, the quality of
procedural decisions was assured through hierarchical accountability
and ministerial control. However, Bologna heralded the introduction
of a sophisticated QA system in Germany. This process began with the
creation of the Accreditation Council (Akkreditierungsrat) in 1998,
whose task is to certify QA agencies that are then allowed to perform
accreditations of study programmes and HE institutions. These accred-
itations are performed both ex ante and ex post in the form of regular
re-accreditations. In particular, the 2006 decision to transfer the power
to approve new study programmes from the ministry to the accredita-
tion agencies (Keller and Dobbins, 2015) brought about a shift from
hierarchical accountability to professional but also political account-
ability. The QA agencies had to include in their assessment panels both
professors and students – that is, internal expertise that follows the
internalized norms of HE – but also work-life representatives who
introduced external expertise from key stakeholders. However, the
majority of the panel members were always from within HE, thus
reinforcing professional accountability.
The system evolved further in the following years, but the central role
of QA agencies and the dominance of internal actors in their auditing
panels did not change significantly. One of the key developments was
a general move towards institutional evaluations of internal QA pro-
cedures instead of detailed accreditations of single study programmes.
If the QA system of a university is deemed acceptable in these institu-
tional evaluations, then the institution is allowed to evaluate its own
study programmes using the same principles that are applied by QA
224 Dobbins and Jungblut

agencies. These institutional accreditations are also subject to re-

accreditation after a number of years. Additionally, HE institutions in
North Rhine-Westphalia have the responsibility to evaluate teaching
activities and, if determined necessary by the ministry, they can be
required to hold a peer review audit of the institution’s QA system at
any given time (Hochschulfreiheitsgesetz 2006 §7: para. 2). These
recent developments have strengthened the focus on professional
accountability as more trust is placed in universities to organize their
own QA based on the general principle of inclusion of both internal
and external expertise. As successful accreditation is a pre-requisite for
a university to be able to run a study programme, the QA system can be
seen as a hard mechanism of accountability, which is tied to real
consequences.

8.4.2.3 Stakeholder Governance

The internal governance of German universities has traditionally been
based on the central role of professors, who hold the majority of seats
in senates and all other internal governance bodies. Students, academic,
and non-academic staff are also represented. As a result, the traditional
governance structure emphasized internal norms and values, and thus
professional accountability. As part of the large-scale university
reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s, nearly all Bundesländer
started to introduce university boards (Hochschulräte) (Mayntz,
2002). These new governance bodies aimed to enhance university
autonomy by transferring some of the decision-making power from
the ministries to the university boards. The boards include representa-
tives from diverse stakeholder groups, both from within the universities
and from outside, and the Bundesländer have different procedures for
naming or selecting members of these boards (Hüther, 2010).5 North
Rhine-Westphalia introduced university boards in 2006 and trans-
ferred a large part of the supervisory power of the ministry to these
boards (Keller and Dobbins, 2015). This represents a shift from hier-
archical accountability of the university to a ministry and towards
more professional and political accountability to internal and external
groups of stakeholders.
Compared to the other Länder, the university boards in North
Rhine-Westphalia have a particularly high level of personnel and pro-
cedural competencies (Hüther, 2010). At the same time, they are based
on the principle that representatives of external stakeholders form the
Accountability and Governance 225

majority in the board and thus put a greater emphasis on political

accountability. Following the shift in the governing coalition from the
Christian-democrats and Liberals to the Social-democrats and Greens
in 2010, the role of the university boards was re-evaluated and some of
their powers transferred to other internal governance bodies (Jungblut,
2016). In particular, following the 2014 HE law, university boards lost
responsibilities to the university senates and the newly introduced
student commissions on examination regulations (de Boer et al.,
2015). This represents a shift away from political accountability and
towards professional accountability.
Overall, North Rhine-Westphalia has seen a significant reduction in
the level of hierarchical accountability and direct state control of HE
since the early 2000s through increases in the autonomy of universities.
This came with a parallel increase in other forms of accountability.
Using Romzek’s (2000) conceptualization one can say that North
Rhine-Westphalia started from a high level of hierarchical account-
ability and moved towards a mixture of other forms of accountability.
While the use of performance agreements can be seen as a form of legal
accountability, the quality-assurance system relies mainly on profes-
sional accountability. Stakeholder governance initially focused on poli-
tical accountability and moved, after the change in the governing
coalition, towards professional accountability.

8.4.3 Poland
We turn now to explore the emergence of HE accountability regimes in
two post-communist countries. As noted, Poland quickly reverted to its
pre-war Humboldtian governance model, while granting public uni-
versities extensive autonomy over their organizational structures as
well as personnel and funding matters (Kwiek, 2014). The transfer of
decision making to high-ranking academics, who governed universities
through academic senates, left few possibilities for university manage-
ment, the state, or other external stakeholders to counterbalance
autonomy with a comprehensive accountability regime (World Bank,
2004, p. viii). Simultaneously, though, liberal state regulations fostered
the expansion of non-research-oriented private universities (Duczmal,
2006), which structurally aligned themselves with Anglo–American
management methods and frequently employed public university aca-
demics seeking extra pay. This led to a dualism of two distinctly
226 Dobbins and Jungblut

different governance regimes, with public universities sticking to the re-

institutionalized model of academic self-rule (Dobbins, 2014). Despite
the shocks inherent in the introduction of the market economy, and the
burgeoning market-oriented private HE sector, public HE remained
insulated from socio-economic stakeholders, as the professoriate was
quick to create institutions to assert academic interests vis-à vis the
state. This included the General Council for Higher Education (Rada
Glówna Szkolnictwa Wyż szego) and Polish Rectors Conference
(KRASP), which vigorously promoted the principle of academic self-
governance as a vehicle for democratizing Poland.

8.4.3.1 Quality Assurance

To the detriment of an all-embracing accountability regime, Polish HE
policy makers spent much of the 1990s coping with the democratiza-
tion of universities, the enormous expansion of HE, and the severe
underfunding of public HE. The Bologna Process and concerns over the
quality of programmes delivered by private providers gave a crucial
impetus to the institutionalization of a new quality assurance regime. In
2001, the State Accreditation Commission (Państwowa Komisja
Akredytacyjna; since 2011 Polska Komisja Akredytacyjna) began eval-
uating the quality of programmes in public and private universities,
while authority to close ineffective programmes was returned to the
state. The Commission members are appointed by the Ministry of
Higher Education and Science upon nomination by academic senates
and the General Council for HE, but also professional and employers’
associations. The relatively strict minimal standards aim to ensure
strong external stakeholder participation and influence over the
orientation of programmes. However, in its early stages state accred-
itation focused primarily on teaching quality and services to students,
with research output subject – at best – to weakly institutionalized
peer review mechanisms. In other words, Polish academics – unlike
their French counterparts – were still largely unburdened by hierarch-
ical accountability towards the state, at least with respect to the QA
regime.
The ministry thus used the Bologna process as a lever to reinforce the
hierarchical accountability of universities. While many Polish public
universities still design their own structures and programmes autono-
mously, they now require consent from the Accreditation Committee
for all structural and substantive matters (Polish HE Law 2004: Art. 8).
Accountability and Governance 227

The Bologna process thus served to balance academic self-rule with

quality assurance and broader socio-economic pressures. The mem-
bers of the committee are appointed by the minister responsible for
HE after nomination by university senates, KRASP, the General
Council, and national scientific associations, whereby employers’
organizations and student and parliamentary representatives are
also formally included.6 However, the heavy presence of the aca-
demic profession still gives primacy to professional accountability
over hierarchical accountability towards the state. The recent
Polish HE Act of 2011 does place greater emphasis on managerial
accountability within universities. Similar to France, the act enables
university management to employ lecturers temporarily, and to
subject them to performance evaluations of research and teaching
activities. While non-professorial teaching and research staff are
evaluated every two years, academics with a professorial title are
evaluated at least every four years (Polish HE Act 2011: Art. 132;
see also Dakowska, 2015). Thus, the new managerial accountabil-
ity regime constitutes a shift away from the idea of ‘almighty
professors’.

8.4.3.2 Performance Indicators and Performance-based Funding

The funding system has also recently undergone substantial changes.
Poland initially maintained its system of incremental, input-based
funding from the communist and early post-communist phase. The
funding algorithm was based on the number of students and the ratio
of students to highly qualified teaching staff (Jongbloed, 2003; World
Bank, 2004), and funds were distributed proportionately to the
previous year’s expenditure after adjustment for inflation. At the uni-
versity level, highly autonomous faculties and professorial chairs hin-
dered the emergence of proactive university management structures
and hence the strategic intra-university allocation of funds. The parallel
existence of a large private university sector, in which public university
professors often earned a side income, left little space for introducing
new performance-based funding incentives at public universities (see
Dobbins, 2011).
Yet the 2011 HE Act injected new dynamics into the HE funding
policy. While the lion’s share of funding still remains input-based,
several performance-oriented mechanisms were introduced.
Specifically, the government now awards extra funding to a select
228 Dobbins and Jungblut

group of 25 leading faculties designated as ‘National Scientific

Leading-Edge Centres’ (Krajowe Naukowe Os´rodki Wiodą ce –
KNOW). To this end, the state conducts an evaluation of qualitative
scientific output indicators every five years (Dakowska, 2015).
Moreover, the government is currently attempting to include HE
institutions in its research funding system, which has been strongly
output-driven since the early transformation phase. Similar to the
previous British Research Assessment Exercise (replaced by the
Research Excellence Framework in 2014), HE institutions are
increasingly subject to evaluations focusing on publications, patents,
registered contacts with industrial partners, and awarded degrees.
These are conducted by a national institution for the evaluation of
scientific units (Komitet Ewaluacji Jednostek Naukowych – KEJN)
and two institutions dedicated to applied research (Narodowe
Centrum Badań i Rozwoju – NCBR) and fundamental research
(Narodowe Centrum Nauki – NCN), which fund projects on
a competitive basis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
research-generated revenues account for less than 20 per cent of
public university budgets.

8.4.3.3 Stakeholder Governance

Recently, there have been noticeable attempts to juxtapose professional
accountability (i.e. to the scientific community) and hierarchical
accountability (i.e. to the state) with external socio-economic account-
ability and internal accountability through stakeholder-oriented poli-
cies. Despite the formal inclusion of employer representatives in the
General Council in the 1990s, notions of an isolated scientific commu-
nity and academic self-rule prevailed until recently. Due to frequent
simultaneous commitments to public and private institutions, high-
ranking academics have shown little interest in allowing external eco-
nomic stakeholders to participate in institutional governance. Hence,
few linkages to promote contracted or joint research, personnel
exchanges, sharing of equipment, and joint patenting activities have
been established (World Bank, 2004).
In addition to formally stipulating external stakeholder participation
in the Accreditation Commission (approximately 10 per cent) (Art.
46.1), the 2011 HE Act also introduces various additional modifica-
tions to align HE services with stakeholder preferences. For example, it
requires universities to create systems to follow up on the professional
Accountability and Governance 229

development of alumni and mandates the inclusion of employer stake-

holders in the General Council (Art. 46.1). Analogous to the French
approach, the ministry is also pushing to incorporate employer repre-
sentatives into curriculum design at the university management level,
but has refrained from legally prescribing their obligatory participation
(Shaw, 2014). Nevertheless, the ministry has heavily invested in the
organization of joint activities with business and HE representatives,
not least through the targeted allocation of EU cohesion funds to
technology transfer centres (so-called incubators). This strategy has
also coincided with efforts to forge closer ties between the Polish
regions (województwa) and self-governing territorial districts
(samorzą d) (OECD 2006).
Besides these new external accountability measures, the Bologna
Process has resulted in a stronger focus on internal political account-
ability, somewhat at the expense of professional accountability. One
notable Bologna side effect is the greater incorporation of students into
decision-making matters.7 This entails the direct representation of
students in academic senates, which has increased pressure on faculties
to design curricula in line with student and labour market demands and
to pursue improvements in teaching quality.

8.4.4 Romania
Similar to Poland, Romania experienced an impressive educational
expansion during the phase of democratization, resulting in
a 250 per cent increase in student numbers and a nearly three-fold
increase in the number of institutions, from 42 to 111, between 1990
and 1999 (OECD, 2000, pp. 125, 129). Yet the path towards uni-
versity autonomy was much more sluggish than in Poland, as rem-
nants of the previous state-centred bureaucratic system persisted well
into the 1990s. While some groups of academics mobilized to protect
academic freedom and greater university autonomy, the state was
reluctant to grant HE institutions greater procedural self-
management capacities (Reisz, 2004). Thus, a mixture of extensive
state planning and restricted academic autonomy prevailed, while –
aside from the removal of its ideological component – the bureau-
cratic-hierarchical accountability regime inherited from communism
remained largely intact. However, the Romanian accountability tra-
jectory differed significantly from that of Poland. While Poland
230 Dobbins and Jungblut

pursued policies of ‘economic shock therapy’, which only marginally

manifested themselves in public HE, Romania applied a policy of
‘higher education shock therapy’, with significant ramifications for
the accountability regime.
Long before their Polish counterparts, Romanian policy makers
drew on the rhetoric of the entrepreneurial university, NPM, and
performance-based governance. This resulted in a large-scale strategy
pursued by education minister Andrei Marga to ‘remove the last ves-
tiges of communist heritage’ (Marga, 2002, p. 123) and bring the HE
system into line with the socio-economic needs of Romania and
Western models of HE governance (Marga, 2002, p. 122). The sweep-
ing 1997 reform resulted in an all-encompassing overhaul of the system
of governance and a massive increase in university autonomy, reshap-
ing the role of the Ministry of Education, university management, and
university–society relations. As shown in the following, accountability-
enhancing instruments were rapidly introduced in all three of our core
dimensions.

8.4.4.1 Performance Indicators and Performance-based Funding

In the late 1990s, the Romanian government aimed to align its HE
funding model with the market-oriented governance ideal-type
(Dobbins et al., 2011). In significant contrast to Poland, the 1997
reform package introduced lump-sum funding, while also forcing
universities to diversify their funding base through tuition fees and
non-state sources (Ministerul Educaţ iei Naţ ionale, 2002). The
increase in procedural autonomy and subsequent strengthening of
university management enabled university managers to strategically
distribute both state and non-state funding on the basis of competitive
negotiations with individual faculties, taking account of their perfor-
mance (Consiliul Naţ ional pentru Finanţ area Învăţ ământului
Superior, 2005). This policy of accountability towards university
management was aimed at promoting educational innovations at
the faculty level and was mirrored by the policy pursued in France
10 years later.
The Bologna Process gave a further impetus to performance-based
funding on two levels. While the lump-sum funding granted to univer-
sities after the 1997 reforms was mainly input based, the ministry
increased the performance-based component in the 2000s (CNpFÎS,
2005). A new system of competitive grants, which prioritized research
Accountability and Governance 231

relevant to contemporary socio-economic developments in Romania,

was established. Along these lines, several pilot projects for doctoral
studies were introduced, enabling the state and universities to quanti-
tatively evaluate the progress of dissertation projects (Curaj et al.,
2015). And, again similar to the French case, the Romanian govern-
ment expanded the use of bibliometric data and domestic university
ranking systems to all HE institutions, departments, and individual
researchers (Vîiu et al., 2012).

8.4.4.2 Quality Assurance

The early paradigmatic shift towards managerialism, product con-
trol, and marketization was also reflected in the QA system developed
in the context of the Bologna Process and introduced in 2006. The
Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education
(Agenț ia Română de Asigurare a Calităț ii în Învăț ământul
Superior – ARACIS), for example, authorized academic curricula
and programmes developed by faculties and approved by academic
senates. Largely modelled on British practice (see Dobbins 2011), the
new Romanian accreditation procedure constitutes a shift towards
‘product control’ and focuses on an elaborate catalogue of account-
ability- and quality-promoting measures for institutions and univer-
sity programmes. The process, which is followed up by re-
accreditation every five years, involves evaluation of an extensive
range of performance indicators, including a combination of self-
evaluation, external assessment, peer review, and student evalua-
tions. The initial self-evaluation report provides the basis for external
evaluation by ARACIS through a three-dimensional process focusing
on institutional capacity, quality management (including student eva-
luations), and educational efficiency. In additional to professional
accountability to the research community, the evaluation attaches
priority to the relevance of academic programmes for the labour
market and financial efficiency (ARACIS, 2006). The procedure thus
moves beyond mere peer review mechanisms. However, it is impor-
tant to note that while external stakeholders (i.e. members of profes-
sional organizations, non-academic business professionals, and
international assessors) were heavily involved in the process in the
2000s (ARACIS, 2006), senior academics have since then regained
control over the agency, thus tilting the balance towards professional
accountability.8
232 Dobbins and Jungblut

8.4.4.3 Stakeholder Governance

Interestingly, Romanian universities draw on a much longer tradition
of university–industry synergies than is true of the other three case
studies. In the communist era, Ceauşescu attempted to turn universities
into industrial breeding grounds by forcing universities and industrial
firms to cooperate closely, as the state attempted to synchronize the
demands of the planned economy with university programmes
(Dobbins, 2011).
In the late 1990s, Romania sought to revive this historical practice.
Specifically, a crucial aim of the government’s push for decentralized
decision making and university autonomy was to encourage partner-
ships between the academic and business spheres, thus creating incen-
tives for universities to match the skills of graduates with labour
market demands (Nicolescu et al., 2000, p. 5). Thus, somewhat con-
trary to the Humboldtian ideal, universities were supposed to become
vehicles for problem solving and regional economic growth
(Ministerul Educaţ iei Naţ ionale, 2002). The push for external, socio-
economic accountability was also reflected comparatively early in the
systematic integration of external stakeholders into university man-
agement structures. The impetus here was essentially a mixture of
domestic policy emulation and transnational pressures for the mar-
ketization of universities. Two rather successful post-communist
Romanian universities, Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca and
the University of Iaşi, have each involved employers’ representatives
in the design of the strategic university plans since the 1990s,9 an
approach which was quickly emulated by other institutions. This
trend was reinforced by tax incentives granted to firms for collabor-
ating with HE institutions, thus bringing Romania into line with
Anglo-Saxon market-oriented approaches.
With the aim of greater political accountability, the state is now
also pushing for multiple HE institutions to form university consortia
as a means to boost their research capabilities and cater to the needs of
regional businesses (Curaj et al., 2015). The state is also providing
new funds for universities and university consortia to create business
start-ups. Driven by the new discourse centred on notions of knowl-
edge transfer and the capitalization of knowledge, these reforms aim
to enhance scientific production per se and explicitly push for
a stronger orientation towards the economic utility of research
outputs.
Accountability and Governance 233

8.5 Comparative Conclusions

In the past 15 years we have witnessed a diverse array of efforts to
further institutionalize the notion of accountability in the academic
heartlands of the four countries examined in this chapter. As a result,
governance arrangements have become more multilateral and multi-
faceted. The preceding analysis has admittedly painted a simplified
picture of a much more complex set of underlying realities, each
comprising nuanced national accountability arrangements subject to
wide-ranging perceptions concerning how these have impacted differ-
ent actors. Our overview is an attempt to contribute to disentangling
rhetoric from reality by providing a systematic framework to assess
cross-national experiences in HE reform in terms of the evolution of
governance regimes and the focus on accountability. Table 8.3 presents
our overall findings for these four large HE systems. The results reveal
that all four systems have implemented accountability-oriented
changes across all three of our analysed dimensions, often in the con-
text of decreasing direct control of the state and increasing institutional
autonomy of universities.
The question that now arises is: what role have pre-existing HE
legacies and governance/institutional arrangements played in explain-
ing the direction and degree of policy change? In other words, did
countries rooted in the Humboldtian tradition (Germany and Poland)
pursue different reform trajectories than those rooted in the state-
centred tradition (France and Romania)? Historical institutionalists
might be inclined to argue that state-centred systems are more likely
to favour hierarchical and political accountability mechanisms due to
the pre-eminent role of the state in coordinating HE, whereas
Humboldtian-oriented systems may tend to double-down on their
stronger tradition of professional accountability due to the dominant
position of the professoriate. The empirical evidence, however, seems
to suggest the contrary. For example, we can observe efforts to apply
performance-based funding and accountability to university manage-
ment, establish far-reaching quality assurance systems, and promote
external stakeholdership in all four countries. Thus, despite extremely
heterogeneous starting points, all four systems have embraced and
visibly implemented new forms of accountability in all analysed dimen-
sions. While the two countries with a stronger hierarchical account-
ability tradition (France and Romania) have expanded professional
Table 8.3 Overview of accountability mechanisms in four European higher education systems

Traditional form Performance Stakeholder

Country of accountability Overall trend indicators Quality assurance governance

France Hierarchical Strong shift towards - Performance-based - New QA body - Heavy presence in
accountability administrative criteria applied in and bibliometric conseil
accountability, shift to contractualisation data (hierarchical d’administration
legal accountability procedure (hierarch- accountability) (political
through ical accountability) - Strong inclusion accountability)
contractualisation; - More performance- of researchers
increased political based funding allo- (professional
accountability (via cation within uni- accountability)
external versities (adminis- - Focus on student
stakeholders); trative outcomes/satis-
increased professional accountability) faction (political
accountability accountability)
Germany Hierarchical Reduction in - Zielvereinbarungen - New QA proce- - Introduction of
(North accountability hierarchical (state–university dures of accredi- powerful univer-
Rhine- + professional accountability and agreements) with tation and re- sity boards with
Westphalia) accountability shift towards more strong performance accreditation strong represen-
political component (hier- - Strong inclusion tation of diverse
accountability archical of academics stakeholder
through a growing accountability) (professional groups (until
 involvement of - Universities are accountability) 2014) (political
stakeholder groups; transformed into and students/ accountability)
persisting importance bodies under public practitioners - Recent loss of
of professional law (more legal (political power of univer-
accountability in the accountability) accountability) sity councils
context of quality - More performance- (more profes-
assurance and recent based funding by sional
shifts in the role of state and growing accountability)
university boards influence of parlia-
ment and ministry
after 2014 (more
hierarchical
accountability)
Poland Non-existent Increased efforts to - Performance-based - Accreditation - Presence in
account- balance hierarchical rewards from state system (primarily General Council,
ability accountability with to leading faculties professional Accreditation
regime professional (hierarchical accountability) Commission
(1990– accountability; accountability) (political
2000) creeping managerial - Performance- accountability)
accountability oriented - State-promoted
research joint activities
evaluation with external
(hierarchical stakeholders
accountability) (political
accountability)
Table 8.3 (cont.)

Traditional form Performance Stakeholder

Country of accountability Overall trend indicators Quality assurance governance

- Performance evalua-
tions of individual
researchers/teachers
(administrative
accountability)
Romania Hierarchical Strong shift towards - Performance-based - Multidimension- - Involvement in
accountability administrative funding allocation al QA procedures design of univer-
accountability, within universities - Shift towards sity strategic
increased political (administrative professorial plans (political
accountability (via accountability) dominance (pro- accountability)
external - State-administered fessional
stakeholders); competitive research accountability)
increased professional grants (hierarchical
accountability accountability)
Accountability and Governance 237

(i.e. the academic profession) and political (i.e. external stakeholders)

accountability, the Humboldtian-oriented countries have complemen-
ted pre-existing forms of professional accountability with new instru-
ments of hierarchical and political accountability. Thus, it is legitimate
to speak of a broad convergence of national HE accountability regimes
at least with regard to the scope and depth of accountability, although
not necessarily with regard to the type of instruments used. For exam-
ple, we could identify stronger efforts to institutionalize managerial
accountability (i.e. university management) in the two countries
embedded in the state-centred tradition (France and Romania). This
process has been more sluggish in both countries with stronger struc-
tural remnants of the chair system: Germany and Poland.
Similar to developments in other parts of the public sector, the HE
systems also moved away from uniform modes of governance towards
a more pluralist mix of accountability measures. While this overarch-
ing trend is clearly visible in all four cases presented in this chapter, the
differences that persist between the countries are also a key finding.
This applies, for example, to the absence of target agreements (con-
tractualisation in France, Zielvereinbarungen in Germany) in the two
post-communist countries analysed here, as well as in most other
Central and Eastern European countries. This may reflect the absence
of historical continuity of public administration bodies in Central and
Eastern European countries and an ongoing mistrust between aca-
demics and the state.
These general findings of overall convergence upon preservation
of peculiar national policy instruments are in line with previous
studies which found that the Bologna Process – while triggering
a certain degree of convergence – still has not led to completely
similar HE systems throughout Europe (Estermann et al., 2011;
Vögtle et al., 2011). Thus, with regard to the rearranged relation-
ship between the state and HE, European reform agendas interact
with national traditions (or institutional path dependences) when
shaping policy developments (Gornitzka and Maassen, 2014). Yet
despite national idiosyncrasies, our findings give credence to the
far-reaching impact of processes of Europeanization and globaliza-
tion in HE, which in some cases have transformed pre-existing
policies and structures and in others have, at the very least, led
to the accommodation of new accountability instruments within
historical configurations.
238 Dobbins and Jungblut

Our analysis opens up several avenues for future research. Above

all, scholars should consider taking a more actor-centred approach to
HE accountability. For example, future studies should further scruti-
nize our finding of converging accountability regimes, at least regard-
ing the scope of instruments applied. As we have largely focused on
legislative amendments and innovations, it would be useful to assess
how the new accountability mechanisms function in practice ‘on the
ground’ and to what extent various actors have mobilized in order to
water down their actual impact and effectiveness. Moreover, it would
be interesting to discern whether, and to what extent, partisan pre-
ferences have shaped the accountability regimes over time. Here one
might consider exploring not only the classical right–left divide, but
also the impact of liberal or green parties on forms of accountability.
One might be inclined to assume that liberal parties will pursue
a tougher, more comprehensive QA regime in the name of university
competition and performance and force the incorporation of eco-
nomic stakeholders, while green parties may prefer stronger (non-
economic) stakeholder regimes in the name of university democrati-
zation. In this context, another avenue for research would be to assess
the role of academic interest groups (e.g. student unions, professorial
interest groups) in shaping the accountability regimes, while also
focusing on issues of executive capacity in education policy. Here,
public policy theories that highlight the interaction of diverse sets of
actors in shaping policy processes might be helpful tools to unpack the
increasingly complex interactions in this multi-actor policy field.
Finally, we hope that our conceptual and empirical analysis will
stimulate research on the impact of accountability and governance
structures on crucial dimensions of institutional performance in HE,
such as research output, student satisfaction, graduate employability,
and university–industrial collaboration.

Notes
1. One of the most detailed conceptualizations of accountability is
presented by Bovens (2007). He differentiates a total of 15 types of
accountability, which are grouped in 4 bigger clusters.
2. Comité national d’évaluation (CNE), Comité national d’évaluation de la
recherche (CNER), and Mission scientifique, technique et pédagogique
(MSTP).
Accountability and Governance 239

3. Numerous university presidents have expressed their displeasure with the

purportedly overbearing state quality assurance and evaluation activities
(Le Monde, 2008).
4. The average length of these agreements is 40 pages, and they are
published by the ministry.
5. Only Bremen does not have any form of a university board, while
Brandenburg has one board for all universities in the state.
6. See the website of the Polska Komisja Akredytacyjna: http://www
.pka.edu.pl/
7. Interview with the Director, Center for Higher Education Policy Studies
(CBPNiSzW), University of Warsaw (November 2008)
8. See the ARACIS website – Consiliul ARACIS: www.aracis.ro/consiliul/
9. Interview with Pro-rector of the University of Iaşi, December 2008; see
also Marga (2002).

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9 Towards New Models of Decision
Making within University Governance
in Anglophone Nations
j u l i e ro w l a n d s

9.1 University Decision Making within Institutional

Governance
Decision making involves choosing a course of action from a range of
options; it forms the basis for much of the governance that takes place
within higher education (Amaral et al., 2003). Within the context of
academic governance, decision making generally involves the oversight
of teaching and/or research and the protection and enhancement of
their quality and standards (Austin and Jones, 2016). Academic gov-
ernance sets the parameters around how teaching and/or research take
place (Marginson and Considine, 2000) and is therefore central to their
effectiveness and success.
Universities are large and complex organizations with multiple
inputs to almost every decision. Much research and scholarship has
been devoted to tracing how university decision making has changed
in the face of developments such as the widespread adoption of
management practices imported from the public and private sectors
(Shattock, 2014), and requirements for increased autonomy and
accountability (Ball, 2016), resulting in the dominance of corporate
and managerial forms of governance over more traditional collegial
forms (Middlehurst, 2013). However, contemporary universities are
not fiefdoms, and even the most managerial is not a dictatorship
(Shattock, 2006). Thus, although collegial and managerial govern-
ance can be characterized as being at opposite ends of a spectrum,
some scholars have argued that multiple forms of governance are
enacted simultaneously; new modes, such as network and entrepre-
neurial governance, do not replace old ones but are instead added to
the mix, with the balance shifting between and among them in
response to internal and external demands (e.g. Blackmore, 2011;

246
Towards New Models of Decision Making 247

McNay, 1999; Rhodes, 1996). Recent empirical research has also

highlighted the complex ways in which the asymmetries of power
within university decision making are established and maintained
under circumstances where many line managers were formerly aca-
demics and many professional staff undertake tasks that might for-
merly have been thought of as academic in nature (Rowlands, 2017,
2018).
Despite these more nuanced ways of understanding power rela-
tions within university decision making, this chapter reports data
from a comparative study of academic governance within England,
the USA, and Australia showing that, on average, opportunities for
currently practising academics to contribute to decision making
about matters that affect teaching and research have declined
(Rowlands, 2017). Other studies highlight reduced opportunities
for student participation in university decision making (Planas
et al., 2013) and substantial gaps between those who support stu-
dents and staff, and those who make decisions about what those
support services should be and how they should be delivered
(Johnson and Deem, 2003). Taken together, these shifts expose uni-
versities to what are largely unacknowledged but significant risks and
negative consequences, leading to reduced efficiency and effectiveness
and an increased risk of failure (Bolden et al., 2015). This chapter
argues the case for new models of university decision making that
minimize these risks and negative consequences. Such models should
facilitate the development of trust and collaboration between uni-
versity executives, academics, professional staff, and students, ensur-
ing that there is adequate input from academics and students to
decisions about academic matters. There must also be increased
input from professional staff to decisions that they are expected to
implement.
The chapter commences with a brief outline of university decision
making within the context of institutional-level academic governance
before discussing ways in which university decision making has chan-
ged in recent years (Section 9.2). The chapter then outlines the potential
impact of these changes on the effectiveness of university decision
making, highlighting four specific consequences and unanticipated
risks (Section 9.3). Finally, Section 9.4 briefly explores two alternative
models of university decision making and considers the extent to which
248 Rowlands

these models demonstrate some capacity to respond to these conse-

quences and unanticipated risks.

9.2 How and Why Has Decision Making within University

Governance Changed?
As an institution, the university has changed significantly in the past 40
years, continuing an evolution that began more than 1,000 years ago
(Burnes et al., 2014). Seen through the eyes of many governments
worldwide, but especially those within Anglophone nations, universi-
ties are now more like any other form of commercial entity rather than
the special organizations that they once were, to be protected and
cultivated (Marginson, 2013). At the same time, universities have
become central to goals related to knowledge economy and innovation
discourses, deployed as part of broader positioning strategies by nation
states in relation to global marketplaces (Jessop, 2017). Within the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in particular, state
policies increasingly treat higher education as a personal benefit rather
than a public good, with a significant financial burden falling on
individual students (Marginson, 2014); in these three nations, student
fees are now among the highest in the industrialized world (OECD,
2017). These shifts have driven the changes in university governance
noted earlier. As a result, there is now faster and more externally
focused decision making, dominated by managerial and corporate
practices including quality assurance and internal and external
accountability (Stensaker and Harvey, 2011). In turn, these processes
both demand and enable a demonstration of return on public and
private investment in higher education (Blackmore, 2009).
There have also been organizational changes within universities that
have impacted on where and how decisions are made. For example,
academic areas have been consolidated to create mega schools and
faculties, centralizing some academic and administrative decision mak-
ing (Shattock, 2014). The number of deputy and pro-vice chancellor
appointments has also burgeoned, consolidating power within the centre
of the university (Morley, 2015) and away from traditional academic
governance bodies such as the academic board or equivalent, especially
in universities in the United Kingdom and Australia (Rowlands, 2018).
The locus of power within most contemporary universities in
Anglophone nations is indisputably the vice chancellor (also known as
Towards New Models of Decision Making 249

the president or principal) supported by his or her senior executive team,

rather than elected academic first-among-equals, as may have been the
case in the past (Blackmore and Sawers, 2015).
This has had a direct and profound impact on university decision
making and governance processes. Some of these changes are perceived
as positive. For example, in many universities, decision making has
become faster, makes more efficient use of resources such as time and
numbers of staff involved, and is more strategically aligned than was
previously possible. As a result, the use of public resources is more
transparent and responsive (Marginson and Considine, 2000). It is also
argued that the introduction of professional managers to university
organizational areas means that teaching and research academics are
freer to concentrate on their core roles, and that this has been
a necessary shift in what is now a highly competitive academic envir-
onment (Taylor, 2006). However, this is hotly contested: there are
extensive and well-documented critiques of these recent changes in
university governance. For example, managerialism is accused of prior-
itizing financial and strategic matters over students and academics
(Filippakou and Williams, 2014; Robertson and Dale, 2013) and of
introducing top-down decision making that emphasizes control and
measurable outputs over democracy and trust (Broucker et al., 2018).
At the same time, it cannot be assumed that all universities everywhere
have experienced these changes in the same ways. For example, some
universities in the United Kingdom and the USA have retained their
collegial governance structures (Rowlands, 2017), while universities
established in England and Australia in the 1990s and later may have
been more managerial from the beginning (Rowlands, 2013).
So far this chapter has traced some of the best-known recent changes
in university governance and their effects on decision making. The
remainder of the chapter draws on a large cross-national comparative
study of academic governance in the USA, England, and Australia to
highlight some of the consequences of these changes and the risks they
bring to universities’ core business of teaching and/or research. These
three countries are useful exemplars because while their governance
systems have each evolved from the Anglo–American governance
model, however differently, they have also pursued quite marketized
approaches to public higher education, again however differently. In
turn, these can potentially impact significantly on decision-making
processes and practices (Rowlands, 2017).
250 Rowlands

The chapter draws principally on two data sets. The first comprises
data from a purposively selected sample of 93 publicly funded doctoral-
granting universities on a very wide range of characteristics of the
academic board – or equivalent principal academic decision-making
body – in each university. The sample included 37 comprehensive
Australian teaching and research universities with data collected in
2010 and 2015 (enabling some comparison over time), as well as 29
universities in the USA and 27 in England, with data collected in mid-
2015. In each country the universities were a mix of ages, sizes, geo-
graphic locations, and levels of research intensity. The publicly available
data collected in respect of each university include the name, size,
composition, and key powers or responsibilities of the academic board
or equivalent body, information about the place of each academic board
within the governance structure of its respective university, details of the
basis upon which each board was established (e.g. the nature of the
legislative instrument), and the number and name of academic board
standing- and sub-committees. Data were drawn from institutional
websites and were cross-checked against relevant policy and legislation
to ensure accuracy and currency.
The second set of information was developed from five detailed
case studies of institutional-level academic governance undertaken
within Australia and the USA, with the sample comprising
a purposively chosen mix of elite research, teaching-focused, and
comprehensive teaching and research universities, all publicly
funded. The case studies focused on university power and authority
arrangements and decision-making structures. Data collection was
undertaken in Australia from 2010 to 2012 and in the USA in 2016,
and involved academic board (or equivalent) and committee-meeting
observation; document analysis relating to current and historic agen-
das, minutes, and subsidiary attachments; and interviews with 46
executives, current and former academic board members, university
chancellors, practising academics, and others. The same interview
questions were used in all universities in the USA and Australia,
subject to minor modifications to accommodate differences in termi-
nology and university structure. Data analysis included both within-
and cross-case comparison of data types (Miles and Huberman,
1994). The case study data were then compared and contrasted
with the publicly available data reported earlier, and with published
historical records.
Towards New Models of Decision Making 251

It is noted that the case study data are limited to Australia and the
USA while the publicly available data are from all three nation states.
However, the English publicly available data are a very useful point of
comparison for the Australian data, given the similarities between
English and Australian higher education and university governance
systems. A limitation of this study is the sample size of five cases and
the gap of five years between the time of data collection in Australia and
the USA. The publicly available data help to offset this limitation to
some extent. This data can also assist in the identification of themes from
the case study findings that might potentially be more broadly reflective.
One of the dangers of cross-national research involves comparing
data which appear similar and which may be described using similar
words but which in fact can mean quite different things (Bleiklie,
2014). This risk is heightened in relation to comparisons of divergent
higher education systems such as the United Kingdom and the USA.
However, even within nations, universities are as different as they are
similar. Thus, common themes may manifest differently within nation
states and within universities. Such differences add complexity and
nuance to the following analysis.
A further issue in cross-national comparative research is terminology;
similar words may mean completely different things in different con-
texts. For example, in the USA the word ‘faculty’ describes those who
teach and/or research, whereas in England and Australia ‘academics’ or
‘academic staff’ are the more commonly used descriptors. The principal
academic governance body is commonly described as a faculty senate or
academic senate in the USA, whereas in England and Australia the
names academic board or academic senate are most commonly used.
In the USA, the chief executive of a university is generally known as the
president, whereas in England and Australia the most common title is
vice chancellor. In this chapter, titles most commonly used in England
and Australia are used generically (that is, academics, academic board,
vice chancellor) unless data specifically collected in the USA are being
discussed in which case USA titles are used.

9.3 The Potential Impact of Changes on the Effectiveness

of University Decision Making
Elsewhere I have reported findings showing that many of the changes in
universities themselves and in university decision making have been
252 Rowlands

welcomed, or at least accepted, as inevitable and necessary by aca-

demics undertaking teaching and/or research (Rowlands, 2017). Vice
chancellors are expected to behave like chief executives, within reason-
able limits, and are universally seen as the locus of power for their
university (Rowlands, 2015). However, my research and that of others
has also shown that there are some consequences arising from these
current decision-making models. In the following sections I highlight
four such consequences and the significant risks they bring. The first of
these is a loss of academic voice.

9.3.1 Consequence 1: Loss of Academic Voice

In general, there has been a significant reduction in opportunities for
practising teachers and researchers – those for whom teaching and/or
research is their main job – to contribute to university decision making
about academic matters. There are many reasons for this, but they
include three key factors. First, within Anglophone nations in particu-
lar, there has been a significant reduction in the proportion of univer-
sity staff who are practising academics due to the increase in
administrators and administrative structures, often at the centre of
the university (Bexley et al., 2011; Locke, 2014; Stromquist, 2012).
In addition, fewer academics than was previously the case are tenured
or in continuing positions. For example, recent Australian data show
that casual and fixed-term academic appointments increased substan-
tially between 1989 and 2013, with casual academics estimated to
undertake somewhere between 50 and 70 per cent of all undergraduate
teaching in Australian universities (Andrews et al., 2016). Casual or
sessional academics are frequently ineligible for election or appoint-
ment to decision-making bodies such as university councils and aca-
demic boards (Locke et al., 2011).
Second, within many universities the drive for efficiency and centra-
lization of decision making has resulted in consolidation of schools and
faculties (Shattock, 2014). Many of the decisions about academic
matters are made by bodies that are faculty- or school-based and so
there are now proportionately fewer decision-making bodies to which
practising academics can seek to contribute. Further, in the United
Kingdom and Australia especially, academic boards, as the principal
academic decision-making body, are generally smaller than they once
were, with comparatively fewer places reserved for practising teachers
Towards New Models of Decision Making 253

and/or researchers (Rowlands, 2017; Shattock, 2014). For example, in

the oldest two Australian case study universities considered for this
chapter, where it was possible to examine shifts in academic board
composition over time, the size of the academic board had reduced by
approximately 30 members in each case between 1990 and 2010.
Third, in many Australian and United Kingdom universities, includ-
ing the research elite, there may be many more appointed senior execu-
tives and senior managers on academic boards and their committees
than there are elected academics. The publicly available data collected
for this study show that in 2015, 45 per cent of the members of the
academic boards from the Australian sample and 50 per cent of mem-
bers of the academic boards from the English sample were there by
virtue of a management position they held (most often as a member of
the senior executive or as a dean) and therefore their primary role was
not teaching or research.
The data also show that between 2010 and 2015 the percentage of
members of the academic boards from the Australian sample who were
ex officio increased from 42 per cent to 46 per cent. That is, in five years
the proportion of Australian academic board members who were prac-
tising academics decreased by 4 per cent to a little over half of all
members. The significant proportion of English and Australian aca-
demic board members who are senior managers reduces the proportion
of voting members who are grassroots, practising academics. It also
affects the power dynamic during meetings, impacting on the willing-
ness of those who teach and/or research to engage in robust debate or
even to ask questions (Rowlands, 2018).
Although many deans and senior executives were once teachers and
researchers, there is increasing empirical data to show how difficult it is
for those who hold these positions to remain in touch with what it is
actually like, in the current moment, to teach and research – to have to
implement the decisions that are being made (Blackmore and Sawers,
2015). As Australian research has shown, it is almost impossible to
maintain a genuine involvement in either teaching or research (or both)
while undertaking 70–80 hours per week of senior management work,
including a heavy schedule of meetings (Blackmore and Sawers, 2015;
Marginson and Considine, 2000). Yet there are significant risks to
universities where there is insufficient academic input to key decisions
that affect teaching and research, including as regards curriculum and
assessment. Recent studies, including one by the UK Leadership
254 Rowlands

Foundation for Higher Education conducted in 2015, have shown that

overly strong central control actively inhibits the development of an
entrepreneurial culture, including within research (Bolden et al., 2015;
see also Clark, 1998; McNay, 2015). In turn, this has significant
negative implications for innovation, transformation, and the quality
of research output – stated goals of many universities and nations
(Bolden et al., 2015). It also limits the potential for network decision
making, at least partly because networks are horizontal rather than
hierarchical arrangements (Ferrare and Apple, 2017).

9.3.2 Consequence 2: Loss of Student Voice

Student participation in university decision making has declined over-
all within Anglophone nations, including within Australia, at least
partly because there tend to be fewer places reserved for students within
decision-making bodies (such as academic boards and councils) than
there once were (Shattock, 2014). The consolidation of organizational
areas to create mega schools and faculties, as described earlier, has
meant that there are now fewer decision-making bodies to which
students can seek to contribute. Many students must also work long
hours in addition to their studies and so are less able or willing to spend
time on campus than was the case in the past (Planas et al., 2013),
inhibiting their capacity to learn about and contribute to university
decision making.
Unfortunately, there is little current research in the area of student
contributions to university decision making. However, one study
conducted across 16 universities in the United Kingdom in the
2000s showed that although university policies often put an emphasis
on students, the focus tended to be on the implications for the students
rather than on what students themselves might need or what they
could potentially contribute (Johnson and Deem, 2003). As the study
reported: ‘It is not that senior managers interviewed had no concern
for the student. Rather it is . . . that these preoccupations are predo-
minantly driven by financial and resource issues, rather than by
students’ actual demands or needs’ (Johnson and Deem, 2003,
p. 310). The same study found that in their day-to-day work senior
executives and senior manager academics such as deans were far
removed from students and needed to become much more directly
aware of student needs. The following quote from an interview with
Towards New Models of Decision Making 255

a student representative on the academic board equivalent body at

a US university illustrates this very powerfully:
We’re not consulted. Things that directly impact or affect us directly are not
considered for consultation. (Elected student member of academic senate, US
teaching-intensive university)

Among practising academics, the predominant view was that univer-

sity executives saw students as objects to be measured, or counted,
rather than as valued and contributing members of the university
community:
You know all this measuring stuff? . . . It doesn’t make anybody a better
student or a better teacher. (Elected member, state-wide academic senate, US
teaching-focused university)

Student participation in university decision making is critically

important. Despite this, students are largely absent from the most
commonly implemented models of university governance or decision
making except at the margins (Luescher-Mamashela, 2010). This has
significant implications not only for students themselves but for uni-
versities more broadly, both in terms of the quality of decisions made
and student engagement (Carey, 2013).

9.3.3 Consequence 3: Separation of Academic Strategy

from Academic Work
The third consequence of changes in university decision making is the
separation of academic strategy from academic work. Within many
universities in Australia and elsewhere, long-term strategic planning in
relation to academic matters (such as the development of university
academic or research plans) is no longer part of the terms of reference
of any committee of which students and practising academics can be
members. Where this is not the case, these committees may lack the
resources, time, or expertise for such a task, and they are often too far
removed from the necessary inputs, such as shifts in government policy,
market positioning, and market demand (Rowlands, 2017).
However, where academic strategy becomes separated from academic
practice, or academic work, there is the potential for a split between the
academic directions the university wants to take and what is desirable
and even possible from a teaching and research perspective. Sometimes
256 Rowlands

such a dichotomy might be part of a deliberate strategy to shift the

university quickly in one direction or another, but there can also be
negative consequences where practice does not or cannot meet the vision
and strategic direction. One of the important roles of university decision-
making structures is ensuring that there is ownership of and commitment
to academic goals and plans, and that there is alignment between the
priorities set out in plans and the messages that are purveyed through on-
the-ground mechanisms such as academic workload models and aca-
demic development support structures. A generic example of the poten-
tial for a split between overall university goals and what is possible on the
ground might involve a university whose education plan calls for teach-
ing to have an increased focus on student engagement at the same time
that the faculty-based academic workload model for teaching reduces
time allocated to each academic for student consultation and feedback.
Another example could be a university whose research plan calls for
greater focus on producing quality publications (that is, quality over
quantity) at the same time that the faculty-based workload model
rewards all journal articles equally, regardless of the status or rank of
the journal. Both of these examples are completely hypothetical, but it is
possible to envisage them (or variations thereof) occurring in many
universities in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, as
elsewhere.
This lack of alignment between what the university as a whole says it
wants to do and what deans or equivalent feel able or want to achieve
through mechanisms available to them appears to be common in uni-
versities. In my own research, deans and heads of school consistently
reported feeling deeply frustrated by a perceived lack of control over
directives that came down from the top, but at the same time were
expected to deal with everything that came up from the bottom with
few or diminishing resources. This is reflected in the following com-
ment from a dean in an Australian university when asked which groups
were influential in university decision making:
Well the deans aren’t. We’re not part of the Vice-Chancellor’s executive. We
actually run the University but we are not part of the executive because it has
just got so big that we are just not part of it. (Dean and ex-officio academic
board member, elite research-intensive Australian university)

Other recent Australian research on higher education leadership and

management has shown similar findings (Blackmore, 2014). However,
Towards New Models of Decision Making 257

data from elsewhere present a more complex picture. For example,

Apkarian et al. (2014) examined academic decision making within US
four-year colleges and universities between 2000 and 2012 and found
little evidence of managerial control. Conversely, the results of the
international study of the changing academic profession (CAP), based
on a common survey across 18 countries and 5 continents, show that
while some US academics may have a narrower role in university
decision making than some colleagues elsewhere, they report feeling
more informed about decisions being taken within their university and
are less likely than academics from other nations to report lack of
involvement in university decision making as being a problem
(Finkelstein et al., 2011).

9.3.4 Consequence 4: Gaps between Decision Makers

and Service Providers
The fourth unintended consequence involves gaps between those
general and professional staff who support students and academics
and those who make decisions about what support services should
be and how they should be provided. Data from the United
Kingdom and Australia show that many professional staff feel
they have significant (and growing) workloads and responsibility,
but little autonomy to influence those decisions (Szekeres, 2006).
For example, one large study in the United Kingdom found that
while few senior managers aimed to exclude those who deliver the
services from decision making (indeed, many of the managers
expressed a strongly inclusive philosophy), the end result was deci-
sions that did not take sufficient account of the view of professional
staff about what was needed and what would work (Johnson and
Deem, 2003).
A further issue in relation to service delivery within universities
relates to a tendency to focus on structural issues, such as reporting
arrangements, role titles, position descriptions, policies, and proce-
dures, and outputs, such as data, against key performance indicators
and targets, rather than functional matters such as what service is
required and how it can be provided, or even how the process might
work. Research in the USA by Kezar and Eckel (2004) indicates that by
focusing on structural approaches and outputs universities can
improve efficiency but not effectiveness of service delivery. A more
258 Rowlands

recent study at a large London university found that focusing on

aspects of service delivery such as documented roles, operating proce-
dures, and performance standards does not improve performance
because relationships are more important than structures and processes
(Greenhalgh, 2015). In terms of decision making, the same study found
that ‘it matters less what form the structures of governance take than
the extent to which they allow effective deliberation on the numerous
tensions and paradoxes that characterise contemporary university life’
(Greenhalgh, 2015, p. 208).
So far, this section has highlighted some potential, and possibly
unintended, consequences arising from current models of university
decision making within nations such as the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Australia. These potential consequences include
a loss of academic and student voice in university decision making
about academic matters, the separation of academic strategy from
academic work, and gaps between decision makers and service provi-
ders such as professional and general staff. In turn, these consequences
pose significant potential risks for universities that I would argue are, as
yet, largely unacknowledged. First is a potential lack of ownership of
new initiatives by those who must implement them, leading to an
increased risk of failure (Cardoso et al., 2018). Second is the potential
for reduced creativity and entrepreneurship within the university as
a whole, including in research practice, arising from reduced academic
and professional autonomy (McNay, 2015; Wardale and Lord, 2016).
Third is reduced effectiveness of functional areas and services (Kezar
and Eckel, 2004).
However, while these risks are of significant concern, I suggest that
the situation is more complex than it might first appear. For example,
although in recent years managerial and corporate modes of decision
making have been widely dominant (Blackmore, 2011), it is also
known that many academics have taken up line management posi-
tions through appointments at executive dean and pro- or deputy-vice
-chancellor levels (Blackmore et al., 2010). This tendency has been
more pronounced as the number and scope of senior executive level
positions has increased (Rowlands, 2019). It is also the case that the
nature of everyday academic work has changed and there is a now
a need for teaching and research academics to undertake a broader
range and greater number of tasks that might formerly have been
thought of as administrative or managerial in nature (Bansel and
Towards New Models of Decision Making 259

Davies, 2010). Professional staff in universities increasingly require

high-level academic credentials and many undertake roles that have
an academic component, such as course and career advice, support
for the student experience, community partnerships and learning
support. As a result, the divisions between academic and adminis-
trative work, and between academia and management, are increas-
ingly blurred. Celia Whitchurch (2013) calls these ‘third space’
roles – that is, roles that sit in between the traditional academic and
administrative divide. This means there is much less clarity about
what were formerly clear-cut divisions between executive, academic,
and professional roles within universities. The divide between what
is ‘academic’ and what is not in terms of decision making is continu-
ing to evolve.

9.4 Towards New Models of Decision Making

in Universities
The substantial consequences and significant risks for universities
arising from current models of decision making and the shifting
nature of executive, academic, and professional staff roles within
universities suggest that these current models are neither efficient
nor effective. This raises the question of what alternative models of
university decision making might exist. There are numerous pub-
lished ‘best practice’ guides to improving university governance,
and these have been extensively critiqued elsewhere for underplaying
the impact of relationships and power distributions on governance
effectiveness and for underestimating the impact of local context by
erroneously assuming that what works well in one university will
work well in all (see Rowlands, 2017). Additionally, these guides
tend not to focus on the fundamental decision-making aspect of
university governance. As a result, alternative models of university
decision making are exceedingly rare.
One genuinely alternative approach is provided by the Mondragon
University of Spain, established in 1997.1 This university operates as
a non-profit cooperative within which every staff member is an owner
with a personal stake in the success of the institution through an
investment of the equivalent of 12 months’ salary (Wright et al.,
2011). All members have an equal vote on the annual business plan,
which includes investment decisions, remuneration to the worker-
260 Rowlands

owners, and other central business matters (Wright et al., 2011).

However, this is far removed from the structure and function of uni-
versities in many (especially English-speaking) nations, where
approaches to higher education tend to be much more strongly cor-
poratist than in some European countries. It is therefore almost impos-
sible to imagine the Mondragon model being implemented in the
Anglophone world.
A further alternative was developed by the UK Leadership
Foundation for Higher education, described as ‘shared leadership’
(Bolden et al., 2015). Their empirical research has identified three
common dimensions of a genuinely shared approach to leadership
within universities. These can be summarized as follows:
1. Context and culture – where leadership relies less on positional
power and control, and more on placing trust in knowledge, experi-
ence, and expertise;
2. Change – where leadership takes place at multiple levels of an
organization, not only at the top, and functions as a mix of top-
down, bottom-up, and middle-out contributions;
3. Relationships – where leadership arises from collaborations between
individuals working together to create a collective identity (Bolden
et al., 2015, p. 63).
In terms of governance, a shared leadership approach of the type
advocated by Bolden et al. would first involve looking at which
bodies (e.g. committees or individuals) make which decisions and
who is part of the decision-making process. Within all of my
research in Australia and abroad, the most frequently made com-
ment from academic and professional staff is that they wished
their university would rely more on in-house knowledge and
expertise when facing challenges or crises. Contrary to popular
perceptions, staff are not opposed to change and almost all are
strongly committed to the success of their university – but they
want to have a more meaningful and constructive role in decision
making than they are currently ‘allowed’.
The approach advocated by Bolden et al. is underpinned by the idea
that decision making is more effective when more than the senior
management group gets to participate. They go on to provide four
criteria that universities can use when evaluating whether their current
leadership model is genuinely ‘shared’:
Towards New Models of Decision Making 261

1. People: the involvement of a broad range of staff from a range of

roles, backgrounds, and levels, all contributing knowledge;
2. Processes: support for individuals sharing expertise across tradi-
tional organizational boundaries;
3. Professional development: the active development of both indivi-
dual and collective skills and behaviours;
4. Resources: that enable collaboration, networks and partnerships
(ibid.).
Bolden et al. indicate that fear is a key barrier to implementing this
model. This fear potentially comes from two key sources: fear from
senior managers and executives that they will lose their decision-
making authority, and fear from grassroots academics and professional
staff that they will either not be listened to, or that they will be landed
with additional tasks and responsibilities for which they are not remun-
erated and which they don’t have time to undertake properly. Lack of
trust is central to these concerns (Bolden et al., 2015). Trust is needed at
multiple levels within university decision making but is rarely directly
addressed. This is significant given how frequently lack of trust is cited
as a reason for failure or breakdown in university decision-making
models or frameworks (Rowlands, 2017). Empirical data also show
that where such trust exists, the effectiveness of university decision
making is improved (Kezar, 2004).
Through my research I have identified a number of factors that can
potentially contribute to both a lack of trust and to relationship difficul-
ties that surround university decision making. The first of these relates to
the immense financial pressures faced by many publicly funded univer-
sities in nations such as Australia. These pressures are especially extreme
in universities that are not research-intensive or elite, where income is
primarily drawn from large-scale teaching. The second relates to compo-
sition of key decision-making bodies in the committee structure. Where
the memberships of these bodies are dominated by executives (and some-
times dominated to a very significant extent: in some Australian univer-
sities up to 80 per cent of members of the academic board or equivalent
are there by virtue of a management position they hold and not because of
their teaching and research) there are simply far fewer opportunities for
grassroots staff to participate in university decision-making processes. As
universities become more streamlined and bodies such as faculty and
school boards are reduced and abolished, as is happening in many
262 Rowlands

universities, these tendencies for exclusionary decision-making processes

are enhanced.
A third factor arises from the tendency for the most powerful people
in any decision-making body to speak most often. In my studies of
decision making in Australian and US universities it was not unusual
for me to observe meetings where both executives and grassroots staff
were present but only the executives spoke. The fourth and related
factor is the knowledge base and skill level of the grassroots staff. If
staff from all levels are going to participate in university decision
making, then they need to know enough about the university and the
internal and external issues it is facing for that participation to be
meaningful.
This chapter has shown that decision making within universities
has changed markedly within the past 40 years and can be expected
to continue to change into the future. Many of the changes in uni-
versity decision making are perceived as being positive, resulting in
reduced inefficiencies and less elitism. However, the chapter has also
reported data showing that, on average, opportunities for those who
actually teach and/or conduct research to contribute to decisions that
affect teaching and research have reduced. I have also argued that
there are fewer opportunities for students and professional staff to
contribute to university decision making of any kind. These gaps
have the potential to expose universities to significant risks and
negative consequences, such as a loss of ownership of new initiatives,
reduced creativity and entrepreneurship, and reduced effectiveness of
services.
It is therefore time to think about new models of decision making
within universities that provide for the development of trust and col-
laboration despite differences in roles and levels. Executives, aca-
demics, professional staff, and students must all play a part in
university decision-making processes, and we must recognize the
necessity, in particular, of meaningful academic input to decisions
about matters such as academic and research planning, curricula, and
assessment. However, this is not a problem for senior management
alone. All staff at all levels of a university have a responsibility to
contribute to decision-making structures and processes, even if it
might not always be the most convenient or interesting way to spend
one’s time. This means putting up our respective hands to serve on
committees and working parties, and undertaking our committee work
Towards New Models of Decision Making 263

constructively and conscientiously, rather than shutting our eyes and

hoping someone else will do it so that we don’t have to.

Notes
1. See the website of the MU Mondragon Unibersitatea: www.mondragon.edu
/en/home

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10 Governance in Public and Private
Higher Education in Europe:
Patterns, Divergences, and
Convergences
p e d r o n . te i x e i r a a nd r o b i n
middlehurst

10.1 Introduction
Governance in higher education has been described as ambiguous
(Keller, 2001) and an elusive and abstract concept (Austin and Jones,
2016). Both the concept and the practice of governance are also recog-
nized as contested, given tensions between different levels of authority
and constituency interests: lay or state, academic or institutional,
faculty or students (Locke et al., 2011; Shattock, 2017; Stensaker and
Harvey, 2011). Additionally, scholars have commented that studies of
governance in higher education often lack explicit theoretical frame-
works (Huisman, 2009). Despite these difficulties and shortcomings,
the topic of higher education governance has gained in prominence,
propelled to the fore by the modernization and reform agendas of
governments from the 1980s to the present, themselves a response to
new challenges in the operating environments of higher education
systems and institutions. It is timely, therefore, to take a closer look
at governance, using developments in ‘public’ and ‘private’ higher
education to illuminate potentially contradictory trends of convergence
and divergence in emerging governance arrangements. This chapter
will also seek to plug a scholarly gap by drawing on a range of dis-
ciplinary and theoretical perspectives to assist in interpreting current
governance arrangements in the field of higher education, or to point to
gaps in our understanding.
There are sound reasons for describing governance in higher edu-
cation as elusive and ambiguous since concepts and practices of
governance are intricately linked to contexts, whether historical,

268
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 269

geographical or cultural, and these contexts are fluid and dynamic.

For example, governance arrangements in the medieval universities
of Bologna or Paris differed markedly, given particular relationships
between students and professors in Bologna and between the teach-
ing faculty and the supervisory authority of the church in Paris
(Austin and Jones, 2016). In the case of the United Kingdom,
Shattock (2006) identifies four distinct models of governance that
emerged at different historical periods, reflecting different cultural
and political traditions: the Oxbridge model, the Scottish model
(both medieval in origin), the civic university model from the nine-
teenth century, and the Higher Education Corporation, born in the
late twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, new types of
higher education provider exhibit different types of governance, as
we will explore herein, again expanding the range of models and
concepts of governance. English traditions are different from those in
continental Europe, where two different types of university model
with different forms of governance emerged in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries: the Napoleonic model, with a pattern
of strong administrative influence from the state over university life,
and the Prussian or Humboldtian model, with distinctive academic
influence aimed at protecting academic freedom (Neave and van
Vught, 1991).
Over several centuries, dimensions of elusiveness and ambiguity in
governance have also applied to notions of ‘public’ and ‘private’ higher
education. In continental Europe, the universities grew to be part of
a public higher education system, regulated by the state (at national or
provincial levels), while in the United Kingdom, until the twentieth
century the majority of universities were established as private institu-
tions with more independence from the state. However, in both cases,
relationships with the state have changed over time, affecting not only
governance arrangements, but also classifications of institutions as
‘private’ or ‘public’.
Another dimension of ambiguity is that the focus of governance
theories and practices can be at different levels. Austin and Jones
(2016, p. 2) distinguish three levels – the micro level of the academic
department, the meso-level of the organization or institution, and the
macro level of the higher education system – while others distinguish
broadly between the system and institution levels (Middlehurst and
Teixeira, 2012). These different levels interact with each other, and
270 Teixeira and Middlehurst

changes at the system level, for example, will likely have consequences
for governance at the level of the institution. Economic and political
changes in the operating environments for higher education have
impacts on the governance of higher education institutions (Shattock,
2017) as well as systems; hence, relationships between these different
levels of governance are also fluid and dynamic.
Finally, changes in governance may appear to be clear-cut when
enacted through formal legislation or policy rubric. However, as
researchers have demonstrated, there is often divergence between
policy rhetoric and the reality of governance practices on the ground
(Middlehurst and Teixeira, 2012; Musselin, 2005). This may be
because of temporal issues, in that proposed changes in governance
arrangements take time to embed in working practices; or it may be
because such changes reflect differences in values or power relations
between the different actors involved, so that proposed changes meet
resistance and can be enacted only partially, or not at all. Further
possibilities are that new governance arrangements do not displace
earlier modes, but incorporate them in ways that make higher educa-
tion governance multi-layered and complex. Alternatively, our
explanations of how governance works in theory and practice may
be overly simplistic, or may miss important dimensions and interac-
tions. What is clear is that offering a single definition of governance,
an all-embracing theory, or definitive assertions about converging or
diverging trends in governance arrangements is neither feasible nor
desirable. Instead, it is more useful to draw on different disciplinary
and theoretical lenses to illuminate the landscape of governance in
higher education.
The difficulties of pinning down ‘governance’ also apply to its setting
of ‘higher education’, where definitions of the territory are neither
static nor clear-cut. In international classifications (such as ISCED),
higher education is part of tertiary education, covering different kinds
of intellectual and practical domains: academic education, advanced
vocational education, and professional education at four post-
secondary levels of qualification (levels 5 to 8 inclusive). In different
countries, higher education may include a wide range of types of
providers and provision (as in the USA) or be divided into different
categories of institution (as in the binary higher education systems of
the Netherlands or Germany). If one adds other dimensions such as
modes of delivery or types of learning space – open, distance,
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 271

e-learning, on-campus higher education – or domains of practice such

as research and education, then the forms of higher education institu-
tion or provider become even more diverse. With developments in
technology, institutional boundaries are becoming increasingly
blurred; they can also vary across jurisdictions. In many parts of the
world, both higher education systems and institutions are changing as
a result of changing operating conditions and legislative and policy
reforms such as the ‘modernization agenda’ of the European
Commission, initiated in the early twenty-first century. Our discussion
of developments in public and private higher education is part of this
dynamic and fluid picture just as much as shifts in governance. This
chapter, then, needs to be viewed as a kaleidoscope of moving parts,
wherein explanations of what is happening are likely to be partial,
incomplete, and temporary – but also, hopefully, illuminating.
The chapter is organized into three main sections. Section 10.2
addresses the changing landscape of higher education and public–
private distinctions in particular. Section 10.3 focuses on governance
arrangements in the two arenas of public and private higher education
and at the two levels of system and institutional governance. Section
10.4 discusses theories of governance and their application to public
and private higher education domains. All three sections discuss diver-
gence and convergence in theories and practices. The concluding sec-
tion draws the analyses together, noting gaps and pointing to
promising directions for further research.

10.2 A Changing Landscape: Convergences and Divergences

between ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Higher Education
Various studies in the United Kingdom, continental Europe, and the
USA (Altbach et al., 2009; Fielden et al., 2010; Levy, 2009; Teixeira
et al., 2014, 2016, 2017) have reported growth in recent decades in the
number of private higher education institutions, in the number of
students enrolled in these institutions, or in the relative share of the
higher education market held by private rather than public providers of
higher education. Kinser et al. (2010) have suggested that private sector
growth is a global phenomenon, with certain regions expanding sig-
nificantly. For example, by 2010 Latin America had a higher education
system that was 49 per cent private, while Asia’s private higher educa-
tion share was 36 per cent private. These two regions exceeded the
272 Teixeira and Middlehurst

Table 10.1 Relative importance of the private HE sector* in Europe as

percentage of total enrolments

Country 1998 2012 2015 Country 1998 2012 2015

Austriaa 0.0 0.0 0.0 Latvia 9.5 28.7 26.1

Bulgaria 10.0 18.5 15.4 Liechtensteinb 18.6 1.8 12.5
Croatiab 2.5 7.1 7.1 Lithuania 2.7 10.8 9.7
Cyprusc 53.3 62.3 61.3 Poland 19.6 29.6 25.4
Czech 0.0 12.2 10.0 Portugal 34.5 20.2 16.4
Republicd
Denmarke 0.0 0.1 0.1 Romania 30.7 22.9 14.3
Estonia 22.1 11.0 7.5 Slovakia 0.0 17.9 15.5
France 10.2 17.3 17.3 Slovenia 0.4 7.5 7.4
FYROMf 5.7 15.7 14.8 Spain 10.5 13.0 15.6
Icelandg 0.0 0.0 0.0 Switzerlandd 6.7 8.9 9.6
Ireland 5.5 2.2 0.0 Turkeyh 3.2 5.2 7.4
Italy 12.8 9.4 10.3 United 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kingdom

Notes
*
we have used the definition of private government-independent institutions
a
data end in 2005;
b
data start in 2003;
c
data start in 1999;
d
data start in 2002;
e
data start in 2006;
f
data start in 2005;
g
data end in 2007;
h
data start in 2001.
Countries omitted due to lack of information on the private sector for a considerable
number of years: Albania, Belgium (French and Flemish Communities), Finland,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden.
Source: Compiled from EUROSTAT data base, Education and Training: URL https://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/education-and-training/overview

private higher education share at that time in the USA (26 per cent),
Europe (16 per cent), and Africa (15 per cent).
While data are often incomplete, Table 10.1 is nonetheless indicative
of growth in continental Europe, which has been particularly pro-
nounced in southern and eastern Europe and less so in western and
northern Europe. The data also indicate that in recent years there has
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 273

been some decline in the size of private sectors in those countries that
experienced a stronger growth in previous decades, mainly due to the
combination of demographic declines in the younger age cohorts and
persistent expansion of public supply.
To understand this growth, including the drivers behind it and the
implications arising from it in relation to system or institutional gov-
ernance, it is first necessary to examine the categories of ‘public’ and
‘private’ higher education more closely. Whether an institution or
system of higher education is categorized as public or private is typi-
cally related to sources of funding (the state through public taxes, or
individuals through private investments); ownership and control of
staffing or operations (by states or governments for public institutions,
and individual entrepreneurs, families, or corporations in the case of
private institutions); and the beneficiaries of higher education services
(for example, the general public and society, or private individuals).
Further distinctions have become prominent in recent decades – for
example, between ‘non-profit’ private and ‘for-profit’ private higher
education (Levy, 2009). These latter distinctions refer to the distribu-
tion of any surpluses made. In the case of non-profit private higher
education institutions, surpluses are expected to be distributed back
into the core functions of education and research; in the case of for-
profit private higher education providers, profits can also be distributed
to shareholders.
These distinctions (public, private, non-profit, for-profit) are not
only crude, but also increasingly misleading. England provides a case
study of how the boundaries between categories of higher education
system and institution are blurring as the operating environment for
institutions is changing. Types of higher education institution in
England include universities (a legally controlled title), colleges and
other institutions providing higher education programmes (including
further education colleges), and ‘alternative providers’ (independent,
private for-profit, and non-profit providers). English universities are
typically described as ‘independent and self-governing’. However, this
status has not remained constant over the last century and the reality
today is more nuanced than it may at first appear. A significant mile-
stone was the takeover of university financing by the state in 1946;
prior to this, the state provided only about one-third of universities’
funding, the rest being raised from private sources (Shattock, 2017).
This change in funding source shifted the universities, in policy and
274 Teixeira and Middlehurst

political terms, into the realm of public institutions, although their legal
autonomy deriving from charters, statutes, or Acts of Parliament
remained formally unchanged. Further policy and political shifts
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s: the state first encouraged competition
between universities by expanding student numbers on the basis of
price; then, in 2012, it changed the funding of teaching virtually
entirely from grants and contracts between the state and institutions
to a consumer-based system of tuition fees supported by a student-loan
system, where the ‘teaching contract’ lies between the institution and
individual students. As Shattock comments: ‘This radical inversion of
the funding system placed the management of universities on a very
similar basis to that of private enterprises, and was accompanied by the
freeing up of the conditions for the establishment of private universi-
ties, although the state retained the ability to influence the market
through its control of the financing of student loans’ (2017, p. 11).
These policy developments, along with others that encouraged uni-
versities to diversify their income sources away from dependence on
state funding sources, have led to an increasing ‘privatization’ or ‘com-
mercialization’ of universities, which we will discuss in more detail.
This privatization of public universities has been noted by researchers
in several countries (Altbach et al., 2009; Bok, 2003; Brown, 2010).
One aspect of privatization – and one that has supplied a significant
element of diversified income for UK universities – has come from
internationalization, both in the recruitment of international students
to the United Kingdom and the export of programmes overseas in
various forms of transnational education (TNE). The expansion of
universities’ TNE activities has brought a further twist to distinctions
between ‘public’ and ‘private’ institutions in that English (and other
UK) universities, when operating in other jurisdictions around the
world, are typically defined in legal terms as private enterprises, and
are thereby subject to the regulations applying to these types of orga-
nizations. Hence, universities can be perceived as public institutions at
home, supported by public funding, while also operating as private
enterprises abroad, supported by privately sourced income streams.
Both these elements, privatization and internationalization, have
resulted in a significant blurring (or convergence) across the categories
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ higher education. This blurring of boundaries
has consequences for governance structures, levels of authority
between different actors involved in governance processes, and
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 275

attitudes and behaviours at operational levels, as we discuss in subse-

quent sections.
While there is notable convergence across public–private bound-
aries, there is also divergence, as several studies have shown.
A common observation is to note the degree of institutional diversity
across the private sector of higher education by comparison with
a more homogeneous public sector, as displayed in much of western
continental Europe, reflecting the instrumental and regulatory reach of
the state in relation to public institutions in areas such as funding, staff
policies, and student recruitment. The heterogeneity of so-called pri-
vate sectors of higher education (which are not ‘sectors’ in any mean-
ingful sense of sharing a common mission and similar structural
features) include a variety of types of institution with different mis-
sions, ownership, and funding structures. Fielden (2008) describe four
different types of institution: identity institutions (religious, cultural,
and specialist providers of higher education, typically non-profit), elite
non-profit private universities (as in the USA) and semi-elite private
universities (as in Latin America, Pakistan, Thailand, Poland, and
Turkey), demand-absorbing non-elite private providers often serving
working adult populations, and for-profit global education businesses
(such as Laureate or Kaplan). Levy (2009) includes a fifth, hybrid
category made up of public–private partnerships. Such partnerships
feature in the recent growth of private higher education in England as
well as in Australasia. They are also part of the privatization of public
higher education institutions and systems, with consequences for gov-
ernance. Teixeira et al. (2012a, 2012b, 2013) note that many private
higher education institutions are not universities, but specialist provi-
ders of higher level training in one or a few fields of study. These
authors comment that the model of the university as an institution
with a research mission is largely absent across private higher educa-
tion institutions (which may be colleges, not universities). A notable
exception is the USA, where elite private universities such as Yale,
Harvard, Stanford, and Princeton have gained legitimacy through
their research with both public authorities and society. The focus of
much private provision in Europe is at the level of undergraduate
education (Bachelors’ degrees) as well as specialist diplomas and certi-
ficates. The absence of research in many private institutions makes
doctoral study typically the preserve of publicly funded and regulated
universities.
276 Teixeira and Middlehurst

Other areas of divergence between public and private ‘sectors’

include the size of institutions and range of fields of study. Private
higher education providers typically have small numbers of enrolments
(Levy, 2002). In recent research for the government in the United
Kingdom (BIS, 2016) across a sample of 732 institutions, the size of
privately funded institutions ranged from just 100 students to more
than 5,000, with only 5 providers having more than 5,000 enrolled
students. This contrasts with UK universities in receipt of public funds
which have anywhere from 10,000 to 40,000 students, while others in
continental Europe are larger still, with comprehensive universities in
major cities such as Vienna, Madrid, and Rome having up to 100,000
enrolled students. In relation to fields of study, many publicly funded
universities have a wide subject offering while privately funded institu-
tions typically offer a narrower range of subjects, focusing on low-cost
programmes with strong student demand, such as law, economics, and
management (Fielden et al., 2010; Teixeira et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2013).
The nature of the subjects offered by private providers relates (to an
extent) to the reasons behind their expansion, namely rising demand
for higher education which in many countries exceeds public supply.
The increasing demand for higher education reflects demographic
growth, economic expansion, a rising middle class, rising levels of
educational attainment, increasing social aspirations, and expanding
labour markets (Kinser et al., 2010; Shah and Nair, 2016). In such
contexts, the need for business-related studies is clear.

10.3 Governance Arrangements in Public and Private Higher

Education: System and Institutional Levels
Governance is concerned with the structures and processes for deci-
sion making at different levels of the higher education system. As
Keller (2001) states, the term – bearing in mind the ambiguities out-
lined earlier – may refer to those who administer the affairs of an
organization at an institutional level, to those who manage the num-
ber and range of institutions at the system level, and to levels of power,
authority, and influence that different constituencies have within the
decision-making structures and processes. Other researchers note that
governance is concerned with institutional goals (strategy), purposes
(mission), and values, hence the practice of governance is about
determining what is important and what counts (Marginson and
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 277

Considine, 2000). Much of the research and debates about govern-

ance in higher education refer to publicly funded institutions and
systems, and there is limited focus on the governance structures of
the private ‘sector’ at the institutional or system level. Poor data
collection systems with respect to private (compared to public) provi-
ders of higher education lead to a perceived lack of transparency
concerning private sector motivations and operations and to potential
suspicion and mistrust of private providers. The lack of data also
produces a skewed depiction of the changing landscape of higher
education which ignores or overlooks private sector developments.
Lack of knowledge and insight has other governance implications. It
may hinder the capacity to regulate or steer private aspects of the
higher education system – perhaps towards delivering greater or dif-
ferent contributions to social and economic goals – or to control
unacceptable behaviour among providers seeking profits at the
expense of students or taxpayers, as recent scandals in the United
States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have
revealed (Fielden and Middlehurst, 2017). In this section we present
the limited evidence from small-scale studies of governance arrange-
ments in private higher education that are illuminating, but require
wider validation.
In a paper on global trends in university governance, Fielden (2008)
focuses on governance at the system level, described as the way that
governments plan and direct their tertiary education sectors. The study
notes that with the expansion and diversification of higher education
systems, there has been a shift from an old model of central control of
operational details delivered by a ministry of education to a more
distant model based on forms of strategic direction from a central
source accompanied by more sophisticated models of performance
and review. These models have been described by Neave and van
Vught (1994) as a continuum from a ‘state control model’ to a ‘state
supervising or steering model’ where institutions have more autonomy
over their governance structures and processes. Different countries
continue to occupy different locations on this continuum with respect
to system-level governance of both public and private sectors. In addi-
tion, as some of the detailed analysis in Fielden’s study shows, there is
not always a clear-cut distinction between system-level and institution-
level governance in that some national legislation not only defines the
constitutional status of institutions as legal entities (with certain
278 Teixeira and Middlehurst

obligations) but may also define the composition of institutions’ gov-

erning boards, their terms of reference, and rules for the conduct of
business, as well as the powers and responsibilities of institutional
leaders and their relationship with the structures and processes of
academic governance.
With regard to the regulation of private higher education institu-
tions, system-level governance includes: decisions to allow or prevent
a provider establishing a new institution or campus; authorization to
issue or recognize awards and transfers of academic credit; financial
arrangements such as the granting of operating incentives or collection
of taxes, and the eligibility of students to access public loans and
scholarships; and the collection of information on financial and aca-
demic performance. At a strategic level, regulatory frameworks may
also include policy statements on the role of the private sector and its
contribution to national higher education goals, perhaps linked to
access and equity targets; and, at the more operational level, there
may be directives on the composition of institutional governance
arrangements as described earlier (Fielden and Varghese, 2009). If we
shift the lens from system-level to institution-level governance, devel-
opments within publicly funded national systems have been investi-
gated more fully than developments across private providers of higher
education.

10.3.1 Developments in Governance in Public Institutions

in Europe
As noted earlier, higher education has faced significant expansion in
recent decades and this expansion has been linked to economic motiva-
tions and purposes. This economic discourse has prioritized the crea-
tion of an institutional context favourable to the development of
innovation and entrepreneurship, strengthening the view that the accu-
mulation of human capital can improve the economic prospects of
different communities (Grubb and Lazerson, 2004). Changes of moti-
vations as to the purposes and outcomes of higher education at both the
individual and societal levels have had an impact on the external and
internal governance of higher education institutions, notably by stres-
sing this economic dimension and the potential of institutions to benefit
individuals and to contribute to socio-economic goals. This has had
particular significance for systems of public higher education, for
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 279

example those in western continental Europe which had previously

been more closely associated with wider dimensions of higher educa-
tion such as social equality and opportunity, construction of the nation
state, and the training of skilled professionals for service in the public
sector.
This shifting view of the primary purposes of public institutions has
required new conceptualizations and adaptations of the contextual
framework in which these organizations operate. If we regard institu-
tions as part of an industry, then the context in which they operate
should promote a rational use of resources in order to maximize the
social return relative to the resources allocated to the sector. Hence, we
have seen a reconfiguration of the higher education sector along market
lines, often through policy initiatives and government interventions
actioned through funding mechanisms, with the goal of promoting
closer interaction between public universities and industry. Such recon-
figuration has been particularly noticeable in countries with a long-
standing and well-developed higher education sector. Government
policies have stimulated institutions to view students as consumers
and have nurtured commercial links between universities and private
companies.
A further economic issue is that the expansion of higher education
has brought significant financial challenges for public expenditure;
hence, the cost of the system has become a major issue in almost
every country in Europe and beyond. The financial challenges faced
by higher education have been exacerbated by an adverse financial
situation within the wider public sector over much of the last two
decades (Barr, 2004; Teixeira, 2009). As higher education has moved
from being an expanding sector to a mature industry (Levine, 2001),
political attitudes to it have altered. In its expansion phase, growth was
seen as a sign of improvement and higher education managed to keep
public and social actors satisfied by accommodating larger numbers of
students. In its mature phase, external stakeholders have become more
demanding in relation to institutional efficiency and responsiveness in
the deployment of public funds (Birnbaum and Shushok, 2001). This
has had important consequences for prescribed modes of internal
governance, notably through more explicit participation of external
stakeholders in formal and informal mechanisms of governance. These
developments have made the governing boards of institutions more
280 Teixeira and Middlehurst

corporate in style, suggesting convergence with private sector modes of

governance.
A parallel development associated with the pervasive economic dimen-
sion of institutions has been the rising influence of academic management
(Gumport, 2001; Meek et al., 2010). This has challenged the traditional
sovereignty of intellectual and professional expertise as the legitimate
foundation for institutional decision making. The internal allocation of
resources within higher education institutions has increasingly prioritized
financial and economic criteria over intellectual and epistemological
ones. Furthermore, the contribution of a subject, a programme, or
a staff member to the ability to generate resources is increasingly used
as an indirect measure to assess the social and economic relevance of that
unit or individual and their effectiveness in responding to wider
(national, regional, or international) social and economic needs.
These internal changes in governance in continental Europe have
altered the balance of authority and control by the state over higher
education institutions, shifting institutions towards greater levels of
autonomy (although in England, similar operating pressures have led
to contrasting trends towards less institutional autonomy and more
government regulation). The policy rhetoric on the continent over the
last 25 years has been about increasing levels of institutional autonomy
(de Boer and File, 2009); however, autonomy has different meanings
and this issue has fuelled substantial debate. Researchers describe
various dimensions of autonomy: for example, ‘substantive’ (meaning
control over academic and research policy, the award of degrees,
curriculum design, student selection, and portfolio of programmes),
and ‘procedural’ (meaning authority over financial management,
human resource management, the deployment of physical and other
assets) (Berdahl, 1990). Where institutions have gained more auton-
omy and authority from state direction and control, the first level has
been concerned with institutional strategy development, typically
within a broad mission determined by national authorities. Internal
governance structures may also be determined through national legis-
lation, but institutional leadership, academics and students, and, to an
extent, external stakeholders are also typically involved. Financial
autonomy has increased in terms of internal budgeting and resource
allocation, but does not always include extensive income diversifica-
tion as yet (with national exceptions, such as the United Kingdom).
Determining tuition fee levels occurs at the institutional as opposed to
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 281

the state level in a few countries. Human resource management, staff

selection, and recruitment have also been devolved to institutions,
typically within framework conditions set by governments. However,
with regard to student selection and admissions and access policies,
while there is a trend towards more autonomy, centralized national
procedures and regulations are still largely in play.
Finally, in pursuing their own priorities and in responding to
a more globalized and competitive environment, institutions have
engaged in a variety of partnerships at several levels. In relation to
organizational autonomy, while most countries have external regula-
tions relating to the form and structure of decision-making bodies in
universities, there is still a degree of independence available to insti-
tutions, with clear national variations (Estermann and Nokkala,
2009). Along with trends towards the inclusion of external members
in university decision-making processes, especially where dual gov-
ernance structures exist (such as a board/council and senate), there is
also a clear shift towards ‘CEO-type rectors’, and where this is the
case, it is associated with greater autonomy in the design of internal
management structures. However, this is not universal, with
a significant number of more traditional modes of governance exist-
ing where the rector is an academic ‘primus inter pares’, selected by
the academic community from among the professors of the
university.
Greater institutional autonomy has been accompanied by various
forms of accountability so that institutions are required to report on
and to be audited or inspected in relation to their funding and financial
management, their quality and academic management, their overall
performance, and their responsiveness to students and wider stake-
holders. In a detailed study of accountability in different countries
around the world and in transnational contexts (including across
Europe) several common trends were identified, suggesting conver-
gence across national systems (Stensaker and Harvey, 2011). First,
there was increasing government interest in accountability and govern-
ment was a key player in new initiatives, with external and upward
forms of accountability (between institutions and the state) dominat-
ing. Second, in many countries, special agencies set up by governments
have emerged, charged with producing information for accountability
purposes for government, but also for prospective students, their par-
ents, and future employers. A third trend was that accountability in
282 Teixeira and Middlehurst

most countries was increasingly associated with the quality assurance

of educational provision. While there are a number of other account-
ability measures, including funding instruments, developmental con-
tracts, research indicators, and legal obligations, educational quality
assurance has become a core accountability instrument, mainly
through accreditation schemes.
History matters, particularly for developments in governance, since
the latter depends significantly on the timing of the creation of each
higher education institution and the very particular development of
each higher education system. Thus, older universities still tend to
retain some aspects of governance that reflect their medieval origins.
Likewise, universities created through state initiatives, and systems that
were largely shaped by state intervention throughout the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, reflect this state intervention in their
modes of governance. These same institutions also evolve their modes
of governance to reflect fashions and trends in higher education policy
and regulation, and these quite often leave traces even after being
displaced by subsequent modes of governance. Currently, therefore,
there is a certain degree of eclecticism in university governance, with
many institutions combining historical modes of collegial and bureau-
cratic governance with more recent corporate-like and market-oriented
ones. The multi-layered nature of governance arrangements combining
historical and modern influences has been described in symbolic terms
as ‘academic-expert’, ‘bureaucratic-civil society’, and ‘corporate-
market’ perspectives on governance (Middlehurst and Teixeira, 2012).
The eclecticism in governance arrangements also reflects
a contemporary tension between an institutional leadership willing to
assert its power and authority and a significant resistance from tradi-
tional academic sources of power and governance. This tension is often
solved through degrees of compromise with joint committees and what
some would call dual or shared governance (Keller, 2001; Shattock,
2006). This type of governance consists of sharing authority between
various constituent groups and interested parties (Rosser, 2002). The
ensuing balance is often regarded as a particular strength of university
institutions, even in periods of change, since various stakeholders are
involved in processes of transformation. However, this balance is
under pressure as institutional leadership is strengthened in response
to increasing external pressures towards greater market orientation for
institutions. Despite criticisms about the ineffectiveness of more
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 283

collegial modes of governance and oft-expressed fears about the crisis

and replacement of collegiality, a recent study (Kaplan, 2004) has
shown that the actual situation is far more positive. Faculty (and
students) continue to play a significant role in governance in many
institutions and their participation continues to be valued.
Nonetheless, the same study also confirmed that the balance of power
has been changing over time, with visible advances in the power of
management in decision making. These advances have been more
prominent in some institutions, especially in those with lower research
intensity, where the prestige and symbolic power of faculty tends to be
lower. In his recent overview of the impact of external and internal
pressures on the distribution of authority in British universities,
Shattock (2017) corroborates the pressures towards convergence of
governance across the publicly funded institutions, but also points to
divergence across types of institutions, with sharper variation between
research-intensive and ancient institutions compared to more teaching-
intensive and newer institutions.

10.3.2 Governance Arrangements in Private Higher

Education
Knowledge about the private higher education sector in Europe and the
way it operates has not yet caught up with the development and
expansion of this (very heterogeneous) sector; it also lags behind
research on publicly funded systems. Knowledge and practice vary
across countries; in some cases, the private sector is more integrated
within the higher education landscape, and is more strongly regulated
and accountable, with data available about several of its major fea-
tures. In other cases, the degree of knowledge about this sector is
limited as it is not regarded as a relevant part of the higher education
system. There are also significant variations in information disclosure
and reporting between different types of higher education providers
(Middlehurst, 2016). This limited knowledge is particularly acute
when it comes to the internal organization, management, and distribu-
tion of power and authority.
One recent small-scale study (Fielden, 2014) has provided insights
into the governance of a sample of privately funded higher education
providers, focusing on their internal governance arrangements. The
study firstly examined the ways in which 16 regulatory agencies in
284 Teixeira and Middlehurst

different parts of the world addressed the governance of private provi-

ders. Building on earlier work on governance of private providers at the
system level (Fielden, 2008), the author argued that there were impor-
tant aspects to which governments should give regulatory attention,
including the role of board members with a personal or family financial
interest in the organization, the controls exercised on a private provider
by a parent body (‘related entity’) in terms of the influence that could be
exercised on substantive decisions concerning the institution or its
educational functions, and the role of faculty in decision making to
ensure the integrity of the institution’s educational programmes and
effective consultation with students. In the regulations of many coun-
tries, it is expected that board members will not be involved in the day-to-
day operations of the organization, that owners or investors will not hold
executive positions, and that faculty members will have sufficient oppor-
tunity to participate in decision making on matters related to curriculum,
assessment, and academic integrity. In several countries, the provision of
education is considered to have a particular public and societal relevance
so that even if providers are interested in private returns from the business,
they also have societal obligations. This may be interpreted in different
ways – for example, ensuring that students succeed in their studies, or
expecting the provider to participate in the socio-economic activities of
the community in which it is located.
Fielden’s 2014 study also examined five areas of corporate governance
at the institutional level as indicators of how governance worked in
practice among a small sample of seven providers with a location in
England, suggesting that these indicators might also have a bearing on
what counts as ‘good governance’ among privately funded providers.
The five indicators were legal forms of providers and strategic control
exercised by the corporate board; board membership, size of boards, and
frequency of board meetings; disclosure of information (including out-
puts and outcomes for students); adoption of particular governance
codes; and the relationship between academic governance arrangements
and the corporate board. The findings from this study illustrate consid-
erable diversity of governance arrangements across providers. The
majority of arrangements diverge somewhat from the expectations of
the regulatory agencies investigated. For instance, as regards strategic
control, very few providers had students involved in central decision-
making bodies, let alone on the corporate board. Moreover, in no case
was there a majority of independent non-executive members. Several
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 285

providers had board members who were nominees of the owners, and
there were even situations in which all the shares of the education
company were owned by the executives who sat on the board.
Respondents reported that there was unanimity about objectives and
targets between corporate owners and the institution’s board, with
mutually agreed financial and educational targets and objectives.
However, there was some (limited) evidence that a corporate parent
could potentially steer the operations of an institution through informal
meetings outside formal boards, could hide ownership structures
through tax havens, or could create different corporate forms including
charitable trusts. Notwithstanding these potential situations, respon-
dents maintained that financial and academic sustainability were both
mutually reinforcing and of parallel interest to all parties.
As regards board membership, size, and committees, there were
other interesting findings. The size of boards varied between 12 and
26 members, and were not dissimilar to the size of traditional university
governing bodies where the trend has been towards smaller boards,
showing some convergence between public and private universities.
The non-profit private providers also showed similar numbers and
types of sub-committee structures as those of public universities,
including audit and risk, remuneration, and nominations committees.
From the small sample, and among for-profit and non-profit providers,
it was clear that a close connection existed between the board and
academic matters; key academic committees reported to or were closely
linked to corporate boards and, in many cases, boards were directly
involved in (or received reports on) academic performance.
In relation to academic governance with staff and student involve-
ment, many of the privately funded providers in the sample had the
main academic committee as a formal committee of the board (rather
than having a binary system with a separate senate or academic board).
This differs markedly from traditional public universities in Europe,
suggesting that the executive boards of privately funded providers tend
to be more closely involved in issues of academic and reputational risk.
Where academic councils or committees report to the board, they may
involve non-executives with strategic academic expertise as well as staff
and student representatives.
Fielden’s study noted the variety of different governance arrangements
among providers and the divergence of practice from the typical expecta-
tions of higher education governance currently enshrined in the regulatory
286 Teixeira and Middlehurst

standards of many countries. However, some of the academic reporting

arrangements were highlighted as of potential interest to publicly funded
institutions, as they increased their own commercial activities, notably in
transnational education. Governing bodies of traditional universities and
colleges might in future expect to monitor academic quality, risk, and
performance more closely and directly, rather than relying on the current
dual and separated structures of academic board or senate and governing
body or university council. The examples from ‘alternative’ providers may
hold some useful lessons for efficiency, for mitigation of risk, and poten-
tially for enhancing performance. Indeed, there are important signals from
the already more market-oriented higher education systems of England
and Australia, of areas of convergence (as well as the divergence described
earlier) at the system level in terms of common regulatory frameworks
across publicly and privately funded institutions, and more universal codes
of governance at institutional level (CUC, 2014).

10.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Higher Education

Governance: Illuminating Public and Private Sector
Convergences and Divergences
While there is no single grand theory of higher education governance,
Austin and Jones (2016, p. 23) argue that there are some leading
theories that can help in understanding different conceptions of gov-
ernance. In addition, given our focus on higher education, it is impor-
tant to remember that these leading theories sometimes build on, but
sometimes also ignore, the vast array of theoretical perspectives on
governance beyond higher education (Ansell and Torfing, 2016).
Given our topic of public and private higher education, we have been
selective in choosing leading theories that can illuminate convergences
and divergences of governance across these domains. The focus is
principally on external influences on higher education and their impact
on governance at the system and institutional levels and not on the
internal dynamics of meso- and micro-levels of governance inside
institutions. Theoretical perspectives include institutional theory
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), itself derived
from organizational theory (Egeberg et al., 2016); resource dependence
theory (Drees and Heugens, 2013); agency and stewardship theories
(Davis et al., 1997); and stakeholder theory (Seyama, 2015).
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 287

Important aspects of governance take place within an organization,

hence institutional theory is concerned with organizational variables
such as structures, processes, and activities within organizations. It is
also concerned with the social environment of the organization – social
rules, norms, and expectations – and how these act as pressures on
institutions and individual actors to conform. This theory explains
convergence across particular types or classes of institution (such as
research universities) whereby environmental norms, values, and
expectations shape structures and drive specific practices such as
collegiality.
In addition to convergence of governance within classes of institu-
tion, theorists also contend that environmental pressures are felt by
organizations in two key ways. First, technical, economic, and physical
pressures are associated with the sale of goods and services in markets.
Second, social, cultural, legal, and political expectations pressurize
institutions to act in specific ways. Both pressures apply to public and
private sectors of higher education. An organization that aligns itself
favourably in relation to external expectations may be seeking accep-
tance and legitimacy through such conformity. Adopting the govern-
ance arrangements of publicly funded institutions, as non-profit higher
education providers in Fielden’s small sample have done, is one possi-
ble example of ‘legitimacy-seeking’ behaviour. Alternatively, the chan-
ging nature of governance in publicly funded institutions may be an
example of ‘coercive isomorphism’, whereby conformity is achieved
through the coercive pressure of governmental regulations. Variants of
coercive isomorphism include mimetic isomorphism – or voluntary
imitation of structures and practices adopted from other sectors in
the face of uncertainty – and normative isomorphism, which involves
professionally based conformance to conditions of work, values, and
norms. Some of the tensions that exist between institutional-level and
faculty-level governance can be explained in terms of the balance
between normative isomorphism and coercive or mimetic isomorph-
ism. Tensions and associated reframing of governance also derive from
competition in a market-based and more economically driven higher
education system. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) contend, organizations
are social and cultural systems embedded in an institutional context
where pressures come from the state, professional associations, interest
groups, and public opinion as well as market forces. This social context
leads institutions to incorporate rules and practices from elsewhere into
288 Teixeira and Middlehurst

their own structures, thereby creating the kinds of convergences, as

well as divergences, discussed earlier within the field of higher educa-
tion and across different types of provider. Further complexities are
added when considering the boundary between institutions and their
environments. Where institutional theory emphasizes the boundary
between the organization and its environment, open systems theory
(Scott, 2003) emphasizes the permeability of the institution’s bound-
aries to external influences. As noted, the boundaries between privately
and publicly funded institutions are blurring, suggesting such perme-
ability, with implications for governance at the system and institutional
levels. As institutions have been encouraged to become more closely
connected to businesses and the corporate sector and to foster strategic
partnerships nationally and internationally, new ‘network type’ gov-
ernance models are emerging (Austin and Jones, 2016, p. 29).
Resource dependence theory is based on the assumption that orga-
nizations are dependent on their environment for critical resources, and
at the heart of this dependency lies an exchange between different sets
of interests with differential levels of power and dependency. Power lies
in the control of resources, and the agent with power can restrict access
to the resources needed or dictate how the resources are used. This
exchange relationship creates a form of governance that is rooted in
compliance and accountability, and there is much evidence of it in the
modernization and reform agendas of publicly funded higher educa-
tion systems since the 1990s (European Commission, 2011). The sub-
sequent emphases on the exercise of institutional autonomy and the
pursuit of diversified income sources are arguably targeted at minimiz-
ing the institution’s vulnerability in accessing funding from a single
(state) source. For privately funded institutions, the dependency lies in
a different direction (on tuition-fee income or private investments) but
the governance task remains the same: to track and manage the critical
resource dependencies. Resource dependence theory goes some way
towards explaining the changing composition of governing boards
(with more external than academic members) as well as the growth of
an academic management cadre capable of managing the relational
dynamics of governance internally as well as externally.
Agency theory (or principal–agent theory) has become influential in
organizational theory and strategic management, particularly in
explaining governance in the corporate sector (Austin and Jones,
2016). The principals are the owners (shareholders in public
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 289

corporations) and the agents are executives hired to manage the orga-
nization. At the heart of the theory lies the assumption that principals
and agents will each seek to increase their individual utility. The theory
presumes a hierarchical contractual relationship between the principal
and the agent where there is a delegation of authority to agents and an
expectation that agents will act in the best interests of the principal.
However, agency theory allows for a (likely) divergence of interest and
utility choices between principals and agents (known as ‘the agency
problem’); thus, when agents are hired by owners, both monitoring
mechanisms and incentive schemes are used to reduce self-advancing
utility-maximizing behaviours on the part of agents, which may act
against the interests of owners. Governance structures are used to
minimize misalignment between principals’ and agents’ goals, mini-
mize agency costs, and keep agents’ self-advancing behaviours in check
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Boards of directors in privately funded
institutions are an example of agency theory in operation and, increas-
ingly, agency theory may help to explain government–university rela-
tionships. It may also help us to understand the changing internal
governance structures of publicly funded institutions where the board
of governors has gained power at the expense of ‘the staff’, both
academic and professional, and where boards formally delegate
authority to strengthened executive managers.
There is a further dimension of the ‘agency problem’ that may be
illuminating. This involves understanding the nature of ‘opportu-
nism’ in the behaviour of agents to act in their own or the principals’
interests. While misalignment of interests can lead to negative out-
comes, alignment of interests may be created by increasing opportu-
nities for utility-maximizing behaviours on the part of institutions.
Governance reforms that emphasize institutional autonomy (with
accountability) suggest the potential for increasing opportunities to
align the interests of government and institutions in relation to
national or societal goals; the promotion of entrepreneurialism may
also be seen as a utility-maximizing behaviour. An emphasis on
autonomy and enterprise has been accompanied by a shift in govern-
ance from traditional hierarchical authority-based governance (as
seen in traditional publicly funded universities in continental
Europe) to contractual exchange-based governance, where contracts
may be behaviour-based or outcomes-based. Where governments
dictate the composition of boards and reporting mechanisms,
290 Teixeira and Middlehurst

including government-driven quality assurance and evaluation sys-

tems, behaviour-based contracts tend to be in operation; where gov-
ernments instead reward institutions for delivering policy goals,
outcomes-based contracts are likely to be in use. In different coun-
tries across Europe, both approaches are used.
Where agency theory assumes individualistic and self-serving beha-
viours on the part of agents, stewardship theory, originating in psy-
chology and sociology, assumes that agents will act in the best interests
of the collective, deriving greater utility from cooperative behaviours at
the expense of self-interest (Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory
resonates with the model of the university as a public institution; it is
associated with governance models that grant large degrees of auton-
omy to universities on the basis of trust and delegate strategic leader-
ship and management responsibilities from governing boards to
university presidents. Underlying agency and stewardship theories are
different sets of psychological assumptions. In agency theory, the
expectation is that agents will be motivated by extrinsic rewards and
control mechanisms are structured around this expectation.
Stewardship theory, by contrast, assumes that stewards are motivated
intrinsically, driven by the need for growth opportunities, achievement,
affiliation, and self-actualization (Davis et al., 1997). Furthermore,
where stewards identify with the institution, their relationship with
the organization is as a member; they willingly pursue its mission,
vision, and objectives, thus bringing them into positive alignment
with the principal’s views of organizational success. These two theories
also have different underpinning expectations of the bases and uses of
power. Where agency theory is based on reward power and legitimate
power (that is, power linked to status and position), deployed through
formal organizational structures and processes, stewardship theory
assumes that authority and influence are gained through personal
power, built and deployed through relationships. Both theories have
cross-overs into the management and leadership literature
(Middlehurst, 1993), and these intersections may be useful in under-
standing the changing internal dynamics of institutions.
Critics of agency and stewardship theories argue that they are based,
at most, on a triad of relationships between principals (owners or share-
holders), agents (managers), and the board of directors (representing the
principals) (Clarke, 2005). This does not capture the full range and
complexity of social obligations and third party interests – such as
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 291

communities, businesses, and civic organizations – with whom higher

education providers now interact. These stakeholders can have signifi-
cant impacts on the organization and structures of governance, in prac-
tice, reflecting these stakeholder influences in the composition of
governing boards and in the construction of other bridging or network
governance structures. Stakeholder theory assumes a more interdepen-
dent governance relationship with the external environment for both
public and private higher education institutions, reflecting the reality of
both market-based influences and government policy objectives.

10.5 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, we have reflected upon governance in public and
private higher education institutions, with a particular focus on
the European situation, albeit with reference to parallel develop-
ments across the world. We have highlighted that, although con-
tinental European higher education is still dominated by public
provision, private institutions have become an important part of
the system in many parts of Europe, and this needs to be taken
into account when investigating existing governance mechanisms
and their effectiveness in an increasingly diverse institutional
landscape.
In our analysis, we observe that divergences in patterns of govern-
ance in public and private institutions are influenced by legal status,
which shapes internal balances of power and decision making. These
sectors also have different histories and, despite important waves of
reforms in recent decades, governance is still influenced by that history.
Given that publicly funded institutions tend to be older and associated
with the structure of public administration, older forms of governance
have predominated, not least those reflecting medieval types (or recon-
structed types) and political and bureaucratic modes of governance. In
the private sector, this situation is more diverse, with non-profit provi-
ders presenting similarities to their public counterparts and those emer-
ging in more recent waves of privatization presenting a stronger
business and managerial approach to internal governance. However,
these legal and historical factors should not be regarded as the only
ones when analysing possible differences in governance between public
and private sectors. The dynamics of public institutions in many coun-
tries has blurred the boundaries between the public and private sectors
292 Teixeira and Middlehurst

in terms of funding structures and type, size, and composition of

decision-making bodies. Governance arrangements also reflect the
size and age of institutions, comprehensiveness of the range of subjects
offered, qualifications and contracts of academic staff, and research
intensity.
The range of challenges facing higher education – notably, financial
and wider economic challenges – has arguably also led to convergences
between public and private higher education institutions and their
structures and processes of governance. There may yet be longer-term
consequences at the system level, giving rise to new regulatory frame-
works and potential challenges to existing quality assurance or
accountability arrangements. At the institutional level, there is the
potential for conflict between academic and commercial interests.
Increasing complexity in university operations brings challenges for
the exercise of governance as well as the selection of governors (aca-
demics, students, and lay people) capable of giving the necessary time
and expertise to the role. The combination of universities becoming
more permeable to external influences and the internal need to negoti-
ate between different interests has increased tensions, and perhaps the
ultimate challenge for governance will be to make this a creative rather
than a destructive force.
A related issue concerns the balance between universities’ economic
and non-economic dimensions and the implications of this for institu-
tional governance. Governmental tendencies to perceive publicly
funded higher education institutions increasingly as quasi-economic
organizations has overshadowed the view that these are a peculiar
type of organization with roles beyond the purely economic
(Weisbrod et al., 2008). Furthermore, we should not forget the fact
that higher education institutions (particularly universities) are more
than ‘an organization’. Universities are institutions, with a mission, and
not merely organizations (Gumport, 2001). A focus on the organiza-
tion tends to (over)simplify the nature and social role of higher educa-
tion institutions, devaluing the role of history, tradition, norms, and
path dependency. It also contributes to a narrower view of the scope
and legitimacy of higher education as a contributor to societal well-
being and national and regional development.
We have examined a number of theoretical perspectives on govern-
ance that are relevant to publicly funded and privately funded higher
education. We have also noted that both governance and higher
Governance in Public and Private Higher Education 293

education are complex, and therefore multilevel and multi-layered

theories have more explanatory value than single-dimensional theories.
In the theories discussed here, the main focus is on how governance is
enacted and impacted when external influences and pressures are felt in
higher education systems and institutions. There is more work to be
done to explore the micro- and meso-levels of governance, particularly
in terms of the internal dynamics of governance inside public and
private higher education institutions. Examining governance from con-
ceptual and theoretical perspectives is useful in understanding the
changes and developments that are occurring; indeed, governance
may be regarded as a lightning-rod for observing and interrogating
the social, cultural, and psychological impacts of changes in the oper-
ating environments of higher education institutions, both public and
private. A fuller understanding of governance across all kinds of higher
education provider and provision should help to us appreciate both the
different contributions that these providers make to a well-functioning
system and how best to achieve efficiency and effectiveness at the
system and institutional levels.

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part iii

Geographies of Governance
11 Higher Education Governance
in North America
g i l i b e r t o ca p a n o a n d j u n ji e w o o

11.1 Introduction
The process of ongoing change that has characterized systemic
governance in Higher Education (HE) around the world over the
last three decades (Capano 2011; Shattock 2014) has involved
federal countries as well as non-federal ones. Even in federal coun-
tries, governments have attempted to readdress the whole higher
education system in an effort to circumvent or supersede previous
governance modes and the existing distribution of vested interests
(especially the tendency of higher education institutions to be self-
referential). Additionally, in federal countries, both governmental
levels have wanted the higher education systems to better serve their
respective societies and have pursued this systemic goal by trying to
address them in different ways with respect to the past (less direct
command; more evaluation, accountability, and performance
funding).
This common process of redesigning governance is particularly inter-
esting in federal countries since the presence of two levels of strong
government has rendered the governance shift process particularly
complex but, above all, extremely fascinating. The process is more
complex for scholars than for policy makers since the composite nature
of federal states makes it difficult to generalize any specific trend: the
multilevel institutional system and the fragmented nature of such
countries make it inherently difficult to reason in terms of a national
system of higher education while what exists are federal state-level
systems. This complexity is accompanied by the intriguing fact that in
countries such as Canada and the USA, while the constitutions clearly
provide for granting exclusive powers regarding higher education to
federated units, federal governments have nonetheless constantly dis-
regarded said constitutional design.

301
302 Capano and Woo

From this point of view, Canada and the USA are interesting not only
due to the conflicting nature of each country’s federalism, but also because
the two are often considered more similar than they truly are. From
a general, systemic point of view, this similarity is a stereotype, and this
is true also regarding higher education. From a systemic point of view, the
significant political and cultural differences between Canada and the USA
have been masterfully sketched by Lipset (1989), who has underlined the
political and cultural reasons for the deep divide between the two socie-
ties: anti-statism, egalitarianism, individualism, and populism character-
ize the USA; elitism, statism, collectivism, and particularism characterize
Canada. Then, there is a difference in the form of government (presiden-
tialism vs. parliamentarism). Finally, there is a different type of federalism
because Canada includes Quebec, thereby showing a linguistic cleavage
not present in the composition of US federalism. Notwithstanding the fact
that the two federalisms are considered to be quite similar (usually the two
countries are both considered part of the so-called competitive federalism
model), the real ways these two federalisms work are very different, as we
will show in the following paragraph.
As the two countries are so different, we should expect significant
variations in their higher education policies. The reality is that not only
are the structures of their respective higher education systems differ-
entiated to a greater degree than expected, but the ways in which their
state/provincial higher education systems are organized, ruled, and
funded are also considerably different. Furthermore, their federal poli-
cies differ significantly and overlap only to a limited extent.
However, this diversity can be better understood by focusing on how
the two levels of government have acted to pursue the worldwide
common trend through which the systemic governance modes have
been significantly changed in many countries.
Grasping the nature of this shift in federal countries is somewhat
complicated due to the two levels of political power and the fact that
every member state has its own policy legacy. Thus, we assume that the
above-sketched diversity between the two countries must be seriously
taken into consideration when analysing how the USA and Canada
have interpreted the common template that has characterized the uni-
form shift in systemic higher education.
This shift has been characterized by a specific governmental emphasis
on evaluation, institutional accountability, accreditation, competition,
changes in the allocation of public funding, and increased pressure on
Higher Education Governance in North America 303

universities to behave like corporate organizations (Capano and Pritoni,

2019; Dobbins and Knill, 2014; Lazzaretti and Tavoletti, 2006;
Maassen and Olsen, 2007; Shattock, 2014).
This governance shift has also meant that all countries have experienced
the rise of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) policy practices, such as the
privatization, outsourcing, and contracting out of public services (Bleiklie,
1998; Braun, 1999; Broucker and De Wit, 2015; Deem and Brehony,
2005). Such shifts towards NPM have been accompanied by the increasing
use of regulatory tools as a means of governing and managing the higher
education sector (Robertson, 2010). As with the NPM movement, this
shift towards a ‘regulatory state’ has much to do with policy makers’ desire
to introduce greater accountability and increase the performance of higher
education institutions, even as these institutions become imbued with
a greater degree of autonomy (Blackmur, 2007; Enders et al., 2013;
King, 2007; Moja et al., 1996; van Vught, 1988, 1989).
In light of this general trend, we adopt a narrower understanding of
the concept of higher education governance, which focuses on
a government’s ability to guarantee that higher education institutions
perform their key functions of education and research. In doing so, we
do not delve into issues pertaining to the internal governance of uni-
versities and higher education institutions (although some of these will
be present in our discussion of overall higher education governance).
However, it has to be underlined that the other side of the systemic
governance reforms has been, in the USA and Canada, as well in the
other countries, the adoption of New Public Management techniques
and tools, especially in governing institutions. Finally, in complex
systems such as federal ones, it should be expected that the multilevel
structure of policy making could be a kind of structural incentive to
develop networks among the different actors to allow them to play
more effective roles in multilevel policy dynamics (and thus networks
could be considered a specific dimension of systemic governance).
Therefore, to grasp the characteristics of governance and account-
ability in the higher education systems of Canada and the USA, we need
to focus on the systemic characteristics of such systems (the types of
institutions are distinguished by their respective missions and owner-
ship), on the role of and eventual changes to the state/provincial and
federal governments across time, on the impact of NPM in the activities
of the systems, and, finally, on the characteristics and roles of policy
networks.
304 Capano and Woo

By focusing on these four dimensions, it is possible to better describe

and understand how systemic governance works in the USA and
Canada, and how those countries have been changing by remaining
quite diversified.

11.2 Higher Education Governance in Federal Countries:

A Conceptual Overview
The problem of governance in higher education in federal countries is
fascinating because of the joint presence of two different centres of
political authority – the federal government and the state government –
and, consequently, because of the presence of different systems of
administration, reporting, and accountability requirements that often
vary between states.
The joint presence of two governmental levels also matters in cases
such as the USA and Canada, where the constitutions exclude the
exercising of any formal powers by the federal state over higher educa-
tion. The exclusion of the federal level with respect to the matter of
higher education does not mean the absence of the federal power in the
real world of policy making. In fact, federal policy and political
dynamics often reveal attempts by the federal government to interfere
in matters that are the exclusive preserve of the state/provincial govern-
ment. Thus, the presence of a federal structure of political power requires
a specific analytical focus when systemic governance and institutional
accountability in higher education are the objects of study. While the
question of who determines the priorities, strategic direction, and opera-
tions of a country’s higher education system, and how they do so, lies at
the heart of higher education governance, federal countries are compli-
cated cases when the issues of who and how are being analysed. In
federal countries there is usually a clear constitutional separation of
powers between the two levels of government regarding higher educa-
tion: there is not just one national mode of systemic governance in higher
education, there are as many such modes as there are units constituting
the federation, and the federal government attempts to play some role in
addressing/coordinating the overall system.
However, before focusing on higher education, we need to grasp the
characteristics of federal dynamics as the way by which formal consti-
tutional provisions are interpreted according to actual intergovernmen-
tal relationships, thus assuming that policy making in federal systems is
Higher Education Governance in North America 305

Table 11.1 Varieties of federalism according to formal framework

and federal relations

Formal framework

Federal relations Disintegrated Integrated

Centripetal Balanced Unitary
Centrifugal Segmented Accommodating

Source: Colino (2013)

characterized not only by the formal constitutional framework but also

by the patterns of intergovernmental relations. This double focus (on
the formal framework and on intergovernmental relations) can facil-
itate an understanding of how federal dynamics influence the actions of
governments (at both levels) in redesigning public policy governance
arrangements.
This perspective – which echoes Elazar’s (1987) distinction between
the structure and process of federal systems, Friedrich’s (1962) empha-
sis on the processual nature of federalism, and those studies that have
focused on the structural interdependence between the two levels of
government in federal countries (Bolleyer and Thorlakson, 2012;
Braun, 2011; Erk, 2008; Erk and Koning, 2010; Thorlakson, 2003) –
has recently been further developed by Colino (2010, 2013) in order to
construct a typology of federal systems that helps frame the empirical
analysis of governmental dynamics and interaction in policy making.
This typology is based on the dichotomization of the aforementioned
two dimensions: the formal framework (which can be integrated or
separated to a greater or lesser degree), and federal relations (which
may be more or less centripetal or centrifugal). The result is a four-fold
typology based on four ideal types of federalism – or rather, federal
dynamics (see Table 11.1). According to Colino (2013):
1. Balanced federalism derives from the aggregation of previously exist-
ing political communities or states. The constitutional pact guaran-
tees the original powers of the founding members of the federation.
The main value is thus the balance of powers. The constitutional
design is normally interstate, while the intergovernmental structure
of decisions and resources is independent. The strategies of govern-
mental actors tend to be self-assertive, with conflict lines and
306 Capano and Woo

intergovernmental coalitions being more of a partisan type, although

they are sometimes also territorially driven. The cases closest to this
ideal type are those of the USA, Brazil, Australia, and Switzerland.
2. Unitary federalism usually originates from the decentralization of
a previously centralist state or from the renewal of a federal tradi-
tion abandoned in the past as a result of a phase of totalitarian or
authoritarian rule. Since unitary federalism originates in times of
crisis, its value is that of guaranteeing agreement and cooperation
among units. This is the type of federalism usually adopted by
culturally homogeneous societies. The intergovernmental structure
of decisions and resources is usually interdependent, based on
shared competencies and aimed at guaranteeing similar conditions
for the lives of all citizens. The intergovernmental rules of decision-
making are usually of a hierarchical nature, dominated by federal
initiatives but mitigated by certain mandatory joint decisions.
Intergovernmental relations are normally based on a cooperative
approach, and conflict lines and coalitions are partisan rather than
territorial. Germany, South Africa, Austria, and, to a certain degree,
Spain are closer to this ideal type.
3. Segmented federalism is characteristic of those federations where
two different cultural communities coexist, one being in the
majority. The typical executive–legislative configuration of this
subsystem is parliamentarianism. The constitutional design is
interstate, in which agreements between the leaders of the cultu-
rally diverse communities and intergovernmental institutions pre-
vail. The intergovernmental structure of decisions and resources
is highly independent because powers are mainly exclusive and
separated. Intergovernmental decisional rules are usually nego-
tiated between the two orders of government, and interaction
tends to be of a competitive character, while the strategies of
governmental actors tend to be self-assertive, with conflict lines
and intergovernmental coalitions being predominantly of the
territorial type. This ideal type is reflected in the fundamental
evolution of federalism in both Canada and Belgium.
4. ‘Accommodating’ federalism originates in societies with a certain
degree of cultural heterogeneity, through a process of devolution or
disaggregation of a centralist state as a means of preserving
a common state. The values of accommodating federalism are
usually the autonomy of the various units and cultural affirmation,
Higher Education Governance in North America 307

which is usually associated with asymmetric arrangements that are

designed to satisfy different self-government aspirations. The
‘accommodating’ type system usually has a constitutional design
of an interstate nature, with weak second chambers and the devolu-
tionary process being controlled by the centre, which traditionally
determines the pace and scope of the devolution. The intergovern-
mental structure of decisions and resources is usually characterized
by the interdependence of the levels, reflected clearly in the depen-
dence of the units on central funding. Intergovernmental decisional
rules are of the hierarchical type, and, in practice, interaction styles
may be either cooperative or quite competitive, depending on the
nature of the constituent units. Conflict lines and intergovernmental
coalitions may be both territorial and partisan. This ideal type is
reflected in the federal dynamics of India and, to a certain extent,
Spain.
Thus, thanks to this typology, we can understand not only how
different federal political systems can be, but also that the two
federalisms under analysis here are quite different. In fact, accord-
ing to Colino’s typology, the USA represents a balanced type of
federalism, while Canada can be considered an example of segmen-
ted federalism. Unlike the more commonly adopted classificatory
distinction in which the USA and Canada are grouped in the same
family of competitive federalism (Elazar 1987), the distinction
proposed here places the two countries in different categories,
which is helpful when trying to understand certain peculiar char-
acteristics of their higher education policies and of the roles of the
federal governments in regard to such. Indeed, we argue that the
different forms of federalism should be taken into consideration
when analysing the shift in the systemic governance of higher
education over the last three decades.

11.3 An Overview of Higher Education Systems: Historical

and Structural Aspects

11.3.1 Historical Organizational and Institutional Legacies

Canada and the United States differ to a greater degree than is com-
monly believed. Not only do they have different political-institutional
308 Capano and Woo

arrangements (presidential system vs. Westminster-type system) and,

as we have already noted, different federal dynamics, they also differ in
terms of certain important features of higher education:
1. the substantial lack of any private higher education sector in
Canada, or of church-affiliated institutions;
2. the lack of hierarchical stratification and differentiation in Canada,
whereas in the United States these can be considered a structural
characteristic of the country’s higher education system;
3. the limited number of higher education institutions in Canada (in
relative terms);1
4. the absence of a Canadian federal department of education – the
only such case in a federal country (Berdahl, 1971; Jones, 2014;
Skolnik and Jones, 1992).
These structural differences are a legacy of the different historical
paths the two countries have followed, but they need to be taken into
consideration nevertheless. This is because while the two levels of
government in Canada steer, or try to steer, their respective higher
education systems, in the United States the large number of private
universities does not allow the government to fully address the corre-
sponding systems. As Lipset notes (1989), the Canadian experience is
characterized by the historical emergence of a statist ideology that has
institutionalized a collective belief that education, including higher
education, should be considered a public good and is thus subject to
a regime of quasi-monopoly. On the other hand, in the United States,
HE is considered to be an important aspect of individual freedom, and
thus while still a good, it can be treated as a private good.
A further institutional difference that merits examination is the way
in which higher education systems have been coordinated or steered at
the provincial/state level. While in Canada the coordination of the
provincial system has always been the responsibility of the provincial
government, and no intermediate body has ever had any real steering
power (Fisher et al., 2014), in the United States each state has estab-
lished a specific organization (board) mandated with the task of steer-
ing that state’s higher education system. These boards may have
different roles: there are ‘state-wide/consolidated’ governing boards
that possess direct control over the organizational, fiscal, and employ-
ment aspects of all campuses, and there are ‘coordinating’ boards that
are only in charge of monitoring campus policies and making
Higher Education Governance in North America 309

recommendations to the legislature or government, depending on what

is provided for by the states’ respective constitutions (McGuinness,
2003; McLendon, Heller, and Young, 2005; SHEEO, 2009). Thus,
from a governance point of view, a substantial difference between the
two countries at the sub-federal level has been emerging and institutio-
nalizing over time.
Despite these two differences, both countries have dealt with the
massification of higher education starting from the same historical
watershed moment – namely, the end of World War II. In both coun-
tries, veterans were encouraged and given help to enrol at university,
and the federal governments established programmes favouring uni-
versity education (Cameron, 1991; Cohen and Kisker, 2010).
In Canada, the federal government has been directly involved in funding
universities for almost 20 years, but this has led to a degree of political
unrest because while universities were happy to receive funds directly from
the federal government, some provinces began to argue that this behaviour
was unconstitutional (Quebec, for example, has prohibited its universities
from accepting federal money since 1952). This issue has been resolved
through a new system of indirect funding (by means of provincial grants
and allocations). Thus, the federal government’s direct involvement has
consisted of financial support offered to students (together with, of course,
the funding of research) (Jones and Noumi, 2018).
The end of World War II also witnessed the advent of a new activism
on the part of the US federal government in addressing and/or influen-
cing the functioning of the state higher education system, especially in
three main policy domains: financial aid to students, research, and
social justice (Schmidtlein and Berdahl, 2011). This intervention was
institutionalized through the Higher Education Act, approved in 1965
and variously amended thereafter. This act aimed to strengthen the
educational resources of US colleges and universities and to provide
financial aid to post-secondary students. Furthermore, starting in 1958
and continuing during the Cold War, the federal government chan-
nelled a significant amount of money into universities for the purpose
of applied research (Antonio et al., 2018).
Overall, following the historical watershed represented by the mas-
sification of higher education that began after World War II, both
countries have witnessed signs of their respective federal government’s
interest in becoming involved in higher education, albeit in different
ways and to different degrees.
310 Capano and Woo

11.3.2 The Structure of the Two Higher Education Systems

The two higher education systems have different origins and have devel-
oped in dissimilar ways. The US higher education system is highly differ-
entiated and hierarchically diversified, while the Canadian one is much
simpler and is characterized by a very limited degree of differentiation.
The incredible variety of US higher education has not been represented
by any official typology; however, thanks to the Carnegie Classification of
Institutions of Higher Education, it is now possible to categorize institu-
tions within the complex US American HE system. The Carnegie classifi-
cation categorizes American universities and colleges according to the
types of degree programmes they offer (Carnegie Classification of
Institutions of Higher Education 2017). This is shown in Table 11.2.
The complexity of the system also lies in the significant percentage of
private universities and colleges. In fact, out of more than 4,000 institu-
tions, only 38.2% are public, while 40.3% are private non-profit organi-
zations, and 21. 5% are private for-profit institutions. Furthermore, the
majority of research universities are public: of 130 higher research institu-
tions, 97 are public. The large number of private institutions is unique to
the US higher education system and represents the structurally highly
competitive nature of the American HE system, which makes it unlike
those of other Western nations. This structural and historical characteristic
thus makes the US system more prone to marketization dynamics than
other HE systems elsewhere are.
Public institutions receive a certain annual allocation of state fund-
ing, they sometimes stand on publicly owned land, and they may be
subject to state regulations; private institutions, on the other hand, are
free from state control, although they may sometimes receive state
operating funds to provide public services, such as publicly funded
academic programmes (US Department of Education, 2008).
Regardless of whether they are public or private institutions, higher
education institutions in the USA are generally organized and are
licensed or chartered as non-profit or for-profit corporations. As with
most corporate entities, American higher education institutions are
governed by a board of trustees; the board members of public univer-
sities are appointed by a governor or legislature, while those of private
institutions are generally elected by the board itself (US Department of
Education, 2008). One very important fact is that, starting in 1990, the
nation’s states have gradually reduced public funding for their
Table 11.2 Distribution of US institutions and enrolment by classification type (2017)

Institutions Enrolment

Types of Institution Number Per cent Total Per cent Average

Doctoral Universities: Very High Research Activity 130 3.0% 3.797.803 19.0% 29.214
Doctoral Universities: High Research Activity 134 3.1% 1.915.536 9.6% 14.295
Doctoral/Professional Universities 159 3.7% 1.504.472 7.5% 9.462
Master’s Colleges & Universities: Larger Programmes 346 8.0% 2.972.624 14.8% 8.591
Master’s Colleges & Universities: Medium Programmes 192 4.4% 604.310 3.0% 3.147
Master’s Colleges & Universities: Small Programmes 134 3.1% 322.540 1.6% 2.407
Baccalaureate Colleges: Arts & Sciences Focus 241 5.6% 381.761 1.9% 1.584
Baccalaureate Colleges: Diverse Fields 333 7.7% 514.020 2.6% 1.544
Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges: Mixed Baccalaureate/ 157 3.6% 432.885 2.2% 2.757
Associate’s
Baccalaureate/Associate’s Colleges: Associate’s Dominant 112 2.6% 887.990 4.4% 7.928
Associate’s Colleges: High Transfer–High Traditional 300 6.9% 2.758.404 13.8% 9.195
Associate’s Colleges: High Transfer–Mixed Traditional/Non- 30 0.7% 143.012 0.7% 4.767
traditional
Associate’s Colleges: High Transfer–High Non-traditional 13 0.3% 37.314 0.2% 2.870
Associate’s Colleges: Mixed Transfer/Career & Technical–High 245 5.7% 1.486.961 7.4% 6.069
Traditional
Associate’s Colleges: Mixed Transfer/Career & Technical–Mixed 53 1.2% 389.715 1.9% 7.353
Traditional/Non-traditional
Table 11.2 (cont.)

Institutions Enrolment

Types of Institution Number Per cent Total Per cent Average

Associate’s Colleges: Mixed Transfer/Career & Technical–High 12 0.3% 45.993 0.2% 3.833
Non-traditional
Associate’s Colleges: High Career & Technical–High Traditional 265 6.1% 672.603 3.4% 2.538
Associate’s Colleges: High Career & Technical–Mixed 58 1.3% 156.557 0.8% 2.699
Traditional/Non-traditional
Associate’s Colleges: High Career & Technical–High Non- 24 0.6% 76.192 0.4% 3.175
traditional
Special Focus Two-Year: Health Professions 268 6.2% 123.455 0.6% 461
Special Focus Two-Year: Technical Professions 67 1.5% 33.649 0.2% 502
Special Focus Two-Year: Arts & Design 31 0.7% 5.938 0.0% 192
Special Focus Two-Year: Other Fields 68 1.6% 23.279 0.1% 342
Special Focus Four-Year: Faith-Related Institutions 304 7.0% 91.241 0.5% 300
Special Focus Four-Year: Medical Schools & Centers 35 0.8% 47.633 0.2% 1.361
Special Focus Four-Year: Other Health Professions Schools 287 6.6% 291.178 1.5% 1.015
Special Focus Four-Year: Engineering Schools 7 0.2% 10.440 0.1% 1.491
Special Focus Four-Year: Other Technology-Related Schools 15 0.3% 21.615 0.1% 1.441
Special Focus Four-Year: Business & Management Schools 79 1.8% 89.985 0.4% 1.139
Special Focus Four-Year: Arts, Music & Design Schools 121 2.8% 106.311 0.5% 879
Special Focus Four-Year: Law Schools 36 0.8% 18.791 0.1% 522
Special Focus Four-Year: Other Special Focus Institutions 46 1.1% 41.581 0.2% 904

Tribal Colleges 34 0.8% 16.424 0.1% 483

All Institutions 4.336 100.0% 20.022.212 100.0% 4.618

Higher Education Governance in North America 313

respective higher education systems. In 2015, such funding was half

what it had been 25 years earlier (Antonio et al., 2018). At the same
time, average tuition fees have almost doubled.
The Canadian system is much less complicated, and there is no real
distinction between universities (in terms of ‘teaching’ or ‘research’
missions). However, as in the USA, it is somewhat difficult to classify
Canadian institutions, particularly given the number of colleges that
actually exist. According to the CMEC (2019), there are 163 univer-
sities in Canada, 96 of which are public. However, it must be
emphasized that there are almost 200 colleges (including two-year
degree-granting institutions that are mainly vocational – though in
some provinces, such as Alberta and British Columbia, such institu-
tions also have a university-transfer function). It must also be empha-
sized that universities receive two-thirds of the enrolment, while
colleges receive one-third of enrolment. In 2017, universities enrolled
approximately 1,100,000 FTE students, while colleges enrolled almost
600,000 FTE students (Usher, 2018). The distribution of public uni-
versities per province is shown in Table 11.3.

Table 11.3 Provincial distribution

of public universities in Canada

Provinces and Territories Universities

Alberta 9
British Columbia 10
Manitoba 6
Nova Scotia 11
New Brunswick 5
Newfoundland and Labrador 1
Ontario 32
Prince Edward Island 1
Quebec 19
Saskatchewan 2
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Yukon

Total 96
314 Capano and Woo

The private sector plays a marginal role within the system due to
the low number of students enrolled in private universities in
Canada. Public universities are considered ‘public’, although they
are not public enterprises. In fact, they operate as autonomous
non-profit corporations created by provincial acts or charters
(Jones et al., 2001). Within each province, public universities are
legally chartered as private not-for-profit corporations, even
though they serve public interests (Jones, 2002, p. 215). From
a policy perspective, there is little by way of federal-level authority
or control over the higher education system, with higher education
policy and governance delegated to provincial governments. For
example, Ontario’s Ministry of Training, Colleges and
Universities is responsible for:
• Developing policy directions for universities and colleges of applied
arts and technology.
• Planning and administering policies related to basic and applied
research among higher education institutions.
• Authorizing universities to grant degrees.
• Distributing provincial funds to colleges and universities.
• Providing financial assistance to post-secondary school students.
• Registering private career colleges.
(Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities, 2018)
It should be pointed out that vis-à-vis provincial government,
Canadian universities have been granted considerable institutional
autonomy, which was reinforced through the introduction of bicamer-
alism in Canadian university governance by the 1906 Royal
Commission on the University of Toronto. This aimed to reduce direct
political interference in universities by their respective provincial gov-
ernments and to prevent universities from becoming an ‘arm of the
state’ (Jones, 2002, p. 216). Under this bicameral system, provincial
government interests are restricted to a ‘governing board’ that is
responsible for the administrative and operational affairs of the uni-
versity, while academic decision makers form a ‘senate’ that oversees
academic affairs. As Jones has noted:
Bicameralism represented a governance structure that attempted to bal-
ance the need for external accountability to the state which financially
Higher Education Governance in North America 315

supported the institution with the need for the participation of the
professoriate in decisions that focused on academic standards. (Jones
2002, p. 216)

As Kirby notes, ‘[i]n the Canadian context, national post-secondary

education policy is in essence represented by the amalgamation of the
common interests across postsecondary education policy in each pro-
vince’ (Kirby, 2007, p. 3). However, this is not to suggest a complete
lack of federal governmental involvement in Canada’s higher education
system, as we shall see.
It is important to observe that although there is no national system,
universities play an active role at the national/federal level. Universities
Canada – formerly known as the Association of Universities and
Colleges of Canada – serves to advocate for Canadian universities at
the federal level, as well as to foster collaboration among universities,
governments, the private sector, local communities, and international
partners (Universities Canada, 2018). Like the various university and
college associations in the American higher education landscape,
Universities Canada plays a crucial role in influencing higher education
policy and providing policymakers with the necessary policy feedback
and input.

11.4 Key Themes and Shifts in Higher Education Governance

in Canada and the United States

11.4.1 Federal and State/Provincial Governance

Arrangements
11.4.1.1 The Federal Role
Over the last 30 years, these two North American countries have
witnessed not only a process of change in the state/provincial systems
of higher education coordination and governance, but also a close
degree of interaction between the state and federal levels, with the
latter attempting to increase its influence in various ways.
With regard to the federal level of governance in the United States,
the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its subsequent reiterations
constitute a cornerstone of the institutionalized role of the federal
government in higher education. In fact, thanks to this act, the US
316 Capano and Woo

federal government is able to implement various programmes that have

a significant impact on the system. The most important such pro-
grammes concern financial aid for students and families (grants and
loans), institutional aid (especially for historically black colleges), and
teacher quality enhancement. Regulations have been continuously
introduced to oblige higher education institutions to be transparent
with regard to all aspects of university activity – including, for example,
criminal acts of violence committed on university campuses (and the
2008 Higher Education Act provides for the withdrawal of federal
funding in cases of non-compliance) (Maes, 2015). Furthermore, the
Federal Department of Education is responsible for accrediting almost
100 organizations acting as accreditors for nearly 3,000 institutions. It
is important to note here that starting with the Obama presidency,
there has been a specific focus on developing a federal system of uni-
versity monitoring to provide US citizens with due information about
university activities.
However, while the US federal government has been trying to reg-
ulate several aspects of higher education, it has not been entirely cap-
able (and neither have state governments) of preventing the private
costs of higher education from rising. These increasing costs are the
result not only of significant government cuts to higher education that
have characterized state policies over the last 15 years, but also of
extreme institutional competition; together, these factors have led to
the accumulation of an incredible amount of collective debt by students
and their families.
Two data points can be noted here regarding state appropriations
to higher education systems: a decrease of 10% from 2000 to 2008,
and an additional 20% from the beginning to the 2008 crisis until
2012 (SHEEO, 2016). This 30% decrease has been slowly recovered
in the seven subsequent years (Center for the Study of Education
Policy and SHEEO, 2019). These 15 years of financial difficulties
have deeply influenced the system: universities have increased tuition
fees, reduced faculty, and reorganized their campuses. These effects
will not be easily reversed now that state funding has returned to the
situation of 2008 (Mitchell et al., 2018). Here, it must be emphasized
that in 2008, 30% of the revenue of public institutions came from
tuition fees, while this percentage grew to 46% in 2017. Regarding
the high level of student debt, in 2006 this amounted to 0.5 trillion
dollars, while in 2018 it reached 1.5 trillion dollars – almost
Higher Education Governance in North America 317

45 million Americans have educational debt, and almost 10 million

have educational debt higher than 100,000 dollars (Federal Reserve
Bank, 2018).
Finally, it should be noted that federal funding represents one of the
main sources of income for research universities (in 2015, the federal
transfer of funds for research was 70 billion dollars, representing
approximately 55% of the total research income of research
universities).
In Canada, the role of the federal government has been less intrusive,
following years of direct funding of the country’s universities. To better
understand the Canadian federal government’s role, one needs to con-
sider the fact that in 1967, the Council of Ministers of Education,
Canada (CMEC) was established specifically to facilitate intergovern-
mental coordination and relations with pan-Canadian education orga-
nizations. This measure resulted in subsequent intergovernmental
declarations and the launch of the Pan-Canadian Assessment
Programme based on the voluntary participation of Canada’s pro-
vinces, with the aim of providing a uniform measure of student profi-
ciency. This attempt to create a national education policy, while
respectful of the dualistic, segmented structure of Canadian federalism,
was clearly inspired by the desire to design a results-based system of HE
governance.
However, the real change has been seen in the federal government’s
policy on the funding of higher education. While on the one hand there
has been a reduction in the standard transfer of funds to the provinces
for higher education spending, on the other hand this has been accom-
panied by an increase in the specific funding of research activities and
infrastructure (starting with the ‘Network Centre of Excellences’
launched in 1998, followed by other measures such as the Canadian
Foundation for Innovation, set up in 1997; the Canadian Research
Chair programme, established in 2000; and the so-called New
Innovation Agenda). The federal government’s policy of funding
research has directly influenced the strategic planning adopted by
many universities, especially the more research-oriented ones, while
simultaneously creating the prerequisites for greater institutional diver-
sity (Jones 2006). Thus, even if institutional governance has not been
formally modified, the government’s dual strategy (provincial/federal)
has meant the presence of stronger ties, more targets to be met, more
substantial funding, and a greater degree of targeted accountability to
318 Capano and Woo

be taken into consideration, and ultimately proven, by the institutions

themselves. Furthermore, this strategy has meant the increased market-
ization of higher education policy, due to both the need to compete for
federal funding and the pressure to market research findings (Kirby,
2007). All of these changes have forced universities to adopt more
managerial, verticalized internal governance modes; however, the
expected results have yet to be seen, and the pre-existing consensual
legacy remains important (Boyko and Jones, 2010).

11.4.1.2 State/Provincial Governance

In the United States, the method of governing public higher education
at the state level has been a matter of ongoing reform and partisan
politics. From this point of view, what emerges is a constant process of
changing governance arrangements in addition to changes to the ways
of funding state higher education systems. Regarding state governance
arrangements, since 1980, for example, most states have changed their
governance arrangements in higher education at least once (McLendon
et al., 2007; Smith and Fulton, 2013). This process of change has seen
swings to and fro between centralization and decentralization, and
these fluctuations often depend on the dynamics of specific local poli-
tics. However, there has undoubtedly been considerable pressure exer-
cised at the state level to increase the efficiency and accountability of
universities, which would account for the growing shift towards con-
solidating state-wide bodies (Tandberg, 2010). Furthermore, there is
empirical evidence pointing to the fact that not only has the role of
governors in leading state higher education systems been strengthened,
but also that there is a clear partisan divide in the way in which
governors exercise their powers when they have to decide on how the
state’s HE system should be governed (McLendon and Ness, 2009;
Tandberg and Anderson, 2012).
As far as funding is concerned, there is also evidence that the amount
of money put into higher education, as well as the way this is distrib-
uted and spent, strongly depends on the specific economic context
(Weerts and Ronca, 2006). Furthermore, many states have introduced
performance-based funding, although this policy has not been as effec-
tive as expected (Rutherford and Rabovsky, 2014).
In Canada, a significant redesigning of provincial governance began
with radical cuts in federal funding between 1995 and 1997. The
reactions to these cuts by Canada’s different provinces varied
Higher Education Governance in North America 319

considerably, although certain common trends may be observed

(Fisher et al., 2014). First, there has been a strong tendency to rein-
force the direct relationship between provincial governments and
higher education institutions by, among other things, abandoning
the pre-existent intermediary advisory bodies (Jones and Noumi,
2018; Shanahan and Jones, 2007). Moreover, soft-competitive stra-
tegies regarding public funding (and, in all the English-speaking pro-
vinces, substantial increases in tuition fees) have also been gradually
adopted; institutional accountability has been pursued in all of the
provinces, in particular through the stipulation of contracts and
agreements between universities and the nation’s provincial govern-
ments. In some provinces, such as Ontario, for example, government
policy has benefitted from the advice of an agency established in 2005:
the Higher Education Quality Council of Ontario. However, gener-
ally speaking, provincial governments, unlike similar bodies in other
Western countries, have not developed policy sets that are focused on
the assessment of institutional performance. From this point of view,
the case of Canada’s provinces is an exception since pressure for
institutional accountability and effectiveness has not been exercised
through those policy instruments that have generally been adopted in
other countries. Indeed, it seems that there is a common value shared
at both the political and social levels that assumes that access to higher
education should be a prominent objective; it is no coincidence that in
Canada 40% of the share of GDP invested in education (2.5%) is
allocated to tertiary education.

11.4.2 New Public Management

From as early as the 1960s, American universities and higher education
institutions have sought to ‘rationalize’ their managerial and operational
processes, with a desire for greater efficiency in resource allocation,
which has driven a shift towards what was previously known as ‘scien-
tific management’ (Rourke and Brooks, 1964). This predisposition
towards ‘scientific’ modes of management and accountability was an
effort to encourage a subsequent ‘managerial revolution’ among
American universities and higher education institutions, with these insti-
tutions often adopting New Public Management (NPM) approaches
involving the extensive privatization, outsourcing, and contracting out
of managerial functions and decisions (Amaral et al., 2003; Dunleavy
320 Capano and Woo

and Hood, 1994; Hood, 1995; Keller, 1983; Osborne and Gaebler,
1993; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Rourke and Brooks, 1964).
The shift towards NPM in higher education governance has also
been attributed to shifts in state–university relationships, with the
massification and internationalization of higher education, the growing
power of experts and the private sector, and the economization and
democratization of society all leading to greater managerialism in
higher education, together with the decentralization of regulatory and
policy authority away from governments and towards higher education
institutions (Amaral et al., 2003; Maassen, 2003; McDaniel, 1996).
The impact of introducing NPM into higher education management
can be far-ranging. For instance, Slaughter and Rhoades (2003, 2004)
have found that the privatization of knowledge and the growing
emphasis on profit-making among higher education institutions have
given rise to an ‘academic capitalist knowledge regime’ that places
institutional and corporate interests above public interests. Such priva-
tization has also been associated with a gradual decoupling of the
public and private missions and interests among American universities
(Morphew et al., 2018).
This has, in turn, impacted higher education policy and regulatory
practices. For instance, states moved from minimal policies to more
expansive approaches as universities’ intellectual property activity
grew between the 1970s and the early 2000s, with the laws on conflicts
of interest amended so that universities and their faculties could hold
equity positions in private corporations (even those that are in business
relations with the university) (Slaughter and Rhoades 2003).
The introduction of NPM practices to the higher education sector has
been similarly prevalent in Canada. For instance, Kirby (2007) argues
that Canadian higher education policy reforms in the mid-2000s were
aimed at incorporating NPM practices such as privatization, market-
ization, quality assurance, and internationalization into the higher edu-
cation institutions of several major Canadian provinces. Ironically, this
shift in higher education policy and management towards NPM has also
been associated with greater government power over the establishment
of the priorities and directions of higher education institutions. This is
often achieved through the linking of provincial higher education fund-
ing to performance and the erosion of public sector monopolies on
degree granting through the introduction of more private degree-
granting institutions and higher education providers (Kirby, 2007,
Higher Education Governance in North America 321

p. 19). However, this increasing number of private institutions has not

been very successful in terms of attracting students (Jones, 2014).
In short, the introduction of NPM into North American higher educa-
tion has served two key purposes. First, NPM practices were introduced
to ensure greater transparency and competitiveness among higher edu-
cation institutions, often in response to the needs of stakeholders as well
as those of an increasingly competitive and globalized higher education
landscape. Second, this introduction of private sector incentives and
managerial practices and prerogatives into higher education institutions
has also allowed governments to strengthen their ability to determine the
goals and directions of higher education institutions. Overall, even in its
rhetorical usage, NPM has been useful from the governmental point of
view to reinforce the corporate behaviour of HE institutions. The more
that HE institutions, and especially universities, act as corporate actors,
the more likely it is that they will react as expected to governmental
policies. It is clear that this consequence of NPM adoption and rhetoric
happens to the detriment of the power of the faculty and deeply impacts
the principle of shared governance (on the dynamics of this and its
evolution, please see Chapter 4 in this book).
By linking higher education funding to institutional performance
and by introducing greater private sector involvement, governments
have been able to dilute the autonomy and influence of traditional
higher education institutions by reducing their sectoral monopoly and
limiting the scope of their activities. However, this is not to say that HE
institutions are powerless in the face of such pressures. As we will
discuss in the next section, the North American higher education land-
scape is also characterized by a third major policy shift: the formation
of influential policy networks.

11.4.3 Policy Networks

While the widespread adoption of NPM in the North American higher
education landscape has introduced a significant degree of transpar-
ency and managerialism to higher education governance and university
management, and while the government has changed the boundaries
and instruments of sectoral governance arrangements, there has also
been an ongoing process of institutionalization of policy networks. In
fact, both the Canadian and American higher education systems are
characterized by the presence of powerful policy networks, which are
322 Capano and Woo

defined as an actor-centric set of structured interactions that includes

both state and non-state actors (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Benner
et al., 2003; Howlett 2002). This process of networkization, and thus the
presence of structured persistent interactions among various actors, is
not unexpected. Networks, as is well known, are a way through which
policy actors try to coordinate with each other and find allies for pursu-
ing common interests. In federal higher education systems, these net-
works are ‘necessary’ because policy actors need to act in a multilevel
governance system and thus in a very complex environment. Hence,
networkization could be very useful in terms of gathering continuous
information and organizing political and policy strategies.
In his study of the Canadian higher education system, for example,
Jones found that university governance tends to be dominated by
a policy network comprising the governing board, senate, central uni-
versity administration, and student and faculty associations. Typically
nominated by the provincial government, the governing board is parti-
cularly influential in terms of university administration, possessing the
ability to appoint university presidents and other senior staff, approve
major institutional policies and financial decisions, and even lobby for
change in broader government policies (Jones, 2002).
The presence of a policy network in Canadian university governance
suggests a greater extent of state control and politicization than is initially
obvious. For instance, the strong role of the state-appointed governing
board in determining key institutional policies and decisions suggests the
continued ability of the provincial state to influence, and even control,
higher education institutions. Like any other policy network, Canada’s
higher education policy network also allows interest groups to articulate
the interests of their members and influence both institutional and state
policy processes through their lobbying activities (Jones, 2002, p. 231).
Furthermore, the application of a policy network heuristic in under-
standing Canadian higher education also reveals the presence and
influence of the federal government through its role in funding univer-
sity research (Jones and Oleksiyenko, 2011). Hence, while provincial
governments are in charge of governing and regulating higher educa-
tion institutions, the federal government continues to play a key role in
funding university research and providing the resources needed for
establishing research infrastructure.
However, this presence of a policy network is also tempered by efforts
to introduce institutional diversity into the higher education system, with
Higher Education Governance in North America 323

the Ontario government formally adopting a policy framework aimed at

introducing greater institutional diversity in its public higher education
system – that is, greater diversity and competition among higher educa-
tion institutions (Piché and Jones, 2016). Such endeavours are also evident
in other Canadian provinces, such as Alberta, British Columbia,
Newfoundland, and Labrador (Kirby, 2007).
In the USA, higher education policy networks tend to be much more
institutionalized in the form of associations at the federal level, while
they are more diversified and informal at the state level (according to
the specific context). Broadly speaking, key institutional representa-
tives that make up the American higher education policy network at the
federal level include the Directory of State Higher Education Agencies
(EROD), which provides contact information and links for all state and
territorial higher education commissions; the State Higher Education
Executive Officer Network (SHEEO), a national network of state post-
secondary education officials who head state higher education boards
and post-secondary agencies; and the Association of Community
College Trustees (ACCT), a national association representing specia-
lized boards of trustees that oversee public community colleges and
two-year associate degree programmes.
Associations representing public (state) higher education institutions
include: the American Association of State Colleges and Universities
(AASCU), a national association representing state-funded and state-
affiliated higher education institutions in the United States; the
Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU), a national
association of higher education institutions, including both public and
private institutions as well as universities offering graduate studies, that
are committed to undergraduate (bachelor’s level) education in the
traditional liberal arts; the Association of American Universities
(AAU), a national association of comprehensive research universities
that focus on doctoral studies in a wide variety of subjects and are
concerned with issues of scientific research, research funding, and related
policy issues; the Council of Independent Colleges (CIC), a national
association of private higher education institutions, especially indepen-
dent undergraduate colleges and small to mid-sized universities, that
focus on undergraduate teaching as well as research; the National
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (NAICU),
a national association of private higher education institutions of all
types that focus on both teaching and research; and the National
324 Capano and Woo

Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC),

a national association of state colleges and universities established and
partially funded under the American Government’s First and Second
Morrill Acts (1862 and 1890), together with other state higher education
institutions. All of these national associations participate in the contin-
uous lobbying through which universities and colleges try to influence
federal higher education policy (Cook, 1998)
Furthermore, at the state level, public colleges and universities are
affiliated with state governments, and occasionally municipal govern-
ments, through agreements, charters, budget allocations, state-
appointed boards of trustees, state regulations of various types, and
sometimes the state oversight of facilities. These relations underlie the
strong pluralism that characterizes policy making in higher education
at the state level, which has been little studied by scholars due to the fact
that the states appear to be in quite a strong position in terms of their
power to fund and address higher education institutions and thus seem
substantially impermeable to the influence of external actors or
dynamics (Ness et al., 2015).
However, the policy field of higher education is replete with diverse
actors, and it is quite clear that a formalistic reading of policy making
cannot be considered realistic. In many cases, local networks are signifi-
cant at the state level, depending on the context. There is still insufficient
empirical evidence in regard to this, although the activism of many actors
is clear: not only institutional actors (such as state higher education
agencies, politicians, and governing boards) but also individual lobbyists,
university heads, chambers of commerce, faculty organizations, student
associations, and political action committees are involved (Ferrin, 2005;
Goodall, 1987; Hines, 1997; Ness, 2010). This plethora of actors would
suggest the need for further research into the dynamics of networking,
although it is a clear sign of the networkization of the field.

11.5 Conclusion
The governance of higher education has undergone significant changes
in both the USA and Canada over the last few decades. These changes,
although apparently inspired by the same general policy ideas, have
followed different paths and have produced different outcomes. We
have adopted the theoretical assumption that the differences between
the two cases are related to the way in which the federal dynamics and
Higher Education Governance in North America 325

the characteristics of the higher education systems have interacted with

one another. This assumption has been confirmed by our analysis.
In fact, in the USA, balanced federalism has allowed the federal
government to regulate various aspects of higher education policy,
and the federal government is considered the political point of reference
when certain problems require an aggregate response (as in the case of
students accumulating massive debt, or with regard to the issue of
transparency and the disclosure of correct information about the qual-
ity of universities). In Canada, on the other hand, segmented policy
dynamics that are due particularly to the role of Quebec have only
allowed the federal government to use specific financial tools to encou-
rage universities to produce innovations and high-quality research.
Thus, there are more ‘national’ guidelines in higher education in the
USA than in Canada. At the same time, however, the structural char-
acteristics of the American system (its incredible diversity and the
presence of a strong private sector) have continued to result in highly
competitive dynamics whereby the role of the federal government is
substantially weak (except when market failures call for the federal
government’s direct involvement). However, it is quite clear that the
marketized dynamics of US higher education tend to create negative
social effects. For example, there is a clear risk of the increasing cost of
higher education resulting in more limited access to such education,
and if this negative effect is not dealt with by the states, then the federal
government will have to intervene (Antonio et al., 2018).
Thus, the American federal government can be considered to be more
likely to intervene in higher education when a specific problem extends
beyond the borders of an individual state to become a national problem.
In contrast, the Canadian federal government is not allowed to do so.
This is where the different types of federal dynamics truly matter.
Regarding the role of state/provincial governments, in both countries
there has been intense activism in recent decades, aimed at regulating
the two higher education systems. One characteristic regarding this
governmental level that is common to both countries is the financial
dimension of both state and provincial efforts to redesign the systemic
governance arrangements in higher education. This financial dimen-
sion has been particularly evident in the United States, while in Canada
it appears to have been less pronounced (except during the period
1995–1997) but has nevertheless contributed towards increased tuition
fees in a country where such fees had always been very low.
326 Capano and Woo

There are also clear differences in the ways the two countries’
respective higher education systems are steered: in the United States
most states have adopted frequent and partisan governance reforms,
and, generally speaking, after two decades of decentralization begin-
ning in the late 1990s, there has been a more recent tendency towards
the recentralization of state HE system steering. Canada has followed
a very different path as governance reforms have been characterized by
bi-partisan dynamics and substantial trust in higher education institu-
tions, and have been favoured by the public’s deep-rooted belief in the
importance of education to quality of life for all concerned. Overall,
while in the United States there is a perception that governmental
intervention at both the federal and the state level is needed to guaran-
tee the required minimal accountability of higher education institu-
tions, in Canada there is less pressure in terms of this dimension of
governance.
These two North American countries thus continue to differ in
a period characterized by the deep redesigning of governance in higher
education, and it does appear that the two countries are not converging
at all towards more similar governance arrangements and policies.

Notes
1. Obviously it is difficult to compare two systems that are structurally so
different. However, it emerges that there is a more capillary presence of
higher education institutions in the USA than in Canada (due to the strong
presence of private institutions as well as the typical tripartition of public/
state systems in research universities, state universities, and community
colleges). Both countries have a high percentage of enrollment rates in
higher education – in fact, the rates are higher than the OECD average
(OECD, 2018)

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12 Governance Trends in European
Higher Education
h a r r y f . d e bo e r a n d j e r o e n h u i s m a n

12.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on developments in governance in European
higher education, with a focus on Western Europe. It presents an
overview of the literature on this topic, including the various modes
of governance as well as the changes in European higher education in
recent decades. Our point of departure is to understand governance
broadly as a system of ‘authoritative direction and control’. All over
Europe, policy makers and other stakeholders have been reconsidering
the rules of the game to encourage higher education institutions to
deliver high-quality services in an effective and efficient way (de Boer
and Jongbloed, 2012; Broucker and de Wit, 2015). In recent decades,
‘[c]hanges have taken place in the forms and mechanisms of govern-
ance, the location of governance, governing capacities and styles of
governance’ (van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004, p. 143), in
higher education as well as in other public sectors.
In continental Europe, the traditional ‘bureaucratic-professional’
approach, in which the coordination of higher education systems was
driven by governments and academic oligarchies, has gradually shifted
towards governance systems in which the logics of markets and net-
works are prominent (e.g. Bleiklie et al., 2011; Paradeise et al., 2009).
There have been a number of reasons, applying in varying degrees to
many European countries, for reconsidering the traditional modes of
governance (de Boer et al., 2007; de Boer and Jongbloed, 2012; Pierre
and Peters, 2000). First, economic recessions, combined with
a growing demand for higher education, presented governments with
fiscal pressures. There was a general belief that the emerging welfare
state model, in which the state plays a key role in the protection of the
socio-economic well-being of its citizens, was becoming unaffordable.
Second, there was growing disillusionment and distrust in the potential

333
334 de Boer and Huisman

of governments to solve societal problems centrally. One of the con-

sequences of this was an ideological turn towards the market as the
superior mode of coordination. Government failures paved the way for
neoliberal values, including market preference for the allocation of
goods and services and the restructuring of public sectors known as
New Public Management (NPM). Third, globalization, internationali-
zation, and Europeanization caused governments and other national
higher education stakeholders to reconsider their position and action
potential. Increasingly, higher education and research became
a dynamic global ‘industry’, with new actors entering the scene.
Finally, there has been a growing awareness of the importance of
having a strong and competitive higher education sector in the emer-
ging knowledge society, calling for new rules of the game.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We start by describing
different conceptual models used to address and analyse higher educa-
tion governance (Section 12.2). Next, based on these conceptualiza-
tions, we present general tendencies with regard to governance (Section
12.3). This section demonstrates that states have been delegating some
of their powers to other levels in the higher education system, in four
directions: an upward shift to the supra-national level, a horizontal
shift to ‘independent’ agencies, a downward shift to the institutions
(‘autonomy’), and an outward shift (‘privatization, contracting’). As
a result of these shifts, often cited as a move from government to
governance, the modes of system steering and coordination have
become more complex and dynamic, including more stakeholders at
different policy levels (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1996). The
shift from government to governance is seen as one of the more note-
worthy developments in (studying) public sectors (Sundström and
Jacobsson, 2007). It concerns, in general terms, the transition from
hierarchical to network-based forms of steering, the overlapping of
roles of political and societal actors, and a blurring of boundaries
between the public and private domains. In higher education systems
the new configurations of authority distribution can be seen as multi-
level, multi-actor, and multi-domain. The latter refers to the increasing
interconnectedness of the higher education, research, and innovation
domains.
While it has been argued that in these new configurations state
authority has been hollowed out, we will argue that ‘steering from
a distance’, to characterize the state’s new philosophy towards higher
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 335

education, or the state stepping back, is not identical to the state

stepping out. In fact, we will argue that a state-centric view still prevails
in the new governance modes, although in certain areas (such as
appointment of staff, spending matters, managing buildings and cam-
pus infrastructure, engaging in contracting with external partners)
higher education institutions have gained more autonomy. Despite all
the policy initiatives and changes to empower other stakeholders, such
as the institutions or students in demand-driven systems, the state
continues to determine the rules of the game to a large extent (‘meta-
governance’), even if the tools that it uses differ from those of previous
decades. It has been argued that the shift from government to govern-
ance is overestimated, indicating, as we will also argue, the persistence
of hierarchy, or at least the prominence of government in steering
public sectors (Koch, 2013).
We follow this with a discussion of how structural reforms impact
governance (Section 12.4). Many governments have taken forceful
initiatives and introduced reforms to change the higher education land-
scape in their countries. Such structural reforms (e.g. mergers, excel-
lence initiatives, redefining institutional mandates) illustrate our view
that in governing contemporary higher education, despite NPM, mar-
ketization, and the like, the government remains a key player; its
interventions seriously affect the higher education institutions and
other stakeholders, and the interactions among them. We will then
argue that governance configurations in European higher education
not only have some similarities but also differ from each other in
various ways: these European variants will be addressed in Section
12.5. Section 12.6 summarizes the key points of the chapter.

12.2 Higher Education Governance Conceptualized

Governance is a highly contested concept and is closely related to such
terms as ‘organization and management’, ‘steering’, and ‘coordination’
(OECD, 2008, p. 69). In our eyes, it concerns the exercise of collective
control towards common goals (de Boer and File, 2009, p. 10).
Following Eurydice (2008, p. 12), we define governance as ‘the formal
and informal exercise of authority under laws, policies and rules that
articulate the rights and responsibilities of various actors, including the
rules by which they interact’. There have been several attempts to
develop useful classifications and conceptualizations of governance
336 de Boer and Huisman

for description and analyses. We present a few that have garnered much
attention in studying higher education governance.
In higher education, Clark’s triangle of coordination (1983) is the
most well-known example and is regularly used as a point of departure
to study higher education governance. Clark distinguished three
dimensions forming a triangular space: state authority (varying from
centralized to limited state intervention), the market (different degrees
of market forces), and academic oligarchy (the different degrees of
impact of the academic profession and communities). This triangle of
coordination was conceptualized in the 1970s and early 1980s, before
reform movements swept across higher education systems globally.
Since then, the coordination triangle has been adapted by several
authors (see Salazar and Leihy, 2013). Instead of a triangle, Braun
and Merrien (1999) developed the cube of governance, also based on
three dimensions: the procedural, the substantive, and the political
culture dimensions. The procedural dimension concerns the degree of
administrative control of higher education institutions by administra-
tors, ranging from tight to loose. The substantive dimension relates to
the goal-setting capacity for teaching and research by the government,
also ranging from tight to loose. As regards the third dimension, Braun
and Merrien make a distinction between utilitarian and non-utilitarian
belief systems, referring to the role of higher education in the public
service system.
Another widely used governance conceptualization is van Vught’s
(1989, 1995) distinction between two classic models of coordination:
the state control model and the state supervision model. The state con-
trol model, derived from the model of rational planning and control,
portrays the government as a hierarchical actor that micro-manages the
higher education system. In its ultimate form, the government is fully
informed and has complete control over higher education. The state
supervision model, by contrast, relies heavily on the self-regulating
capabilities of the higher education institutions. The government’s role
is far more modest, acknowledging its limited capacity to control the
sector. It sets the rules of the game in such a way that the higher
education sector itself is able to make fundamental decisions about
missions, goals, services, and activities.
In between the poles of state control and state supervision, hybrid
models can be conceptualized, such as the ‘state contract model’, which
is based on Williamson’s transaction cost reasoning (de Boer and van
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 337

Vught, 2016; van Vught and de Boer, 2015; Williamson, 1991). The
state contract model focuses on the ‘attempt to achieve some level of
central coordination and protection for specific investments while
retaining the high-powered incentives of market relations’ (Klein,
2005, p. 438). Key elements of the state contract model are also clearly
visible in the concept of market-based governance, which encompasses
not only the delegation of state authority to other (private) actors, but
also the introduction of market-style management and mechanisms of
accountability in public organizations (de Boer and Jongbloed, 2012,
p. 555). It represents a combination, or compromise, between the
benefits of central coordination and control and the advantages of
decentralized decision making. In the context of higher education, the
model respects the autonomy of higher education institutions without
denying the existence of government coordination by means of setting
conditions and framing the game hierarchically (‘meta-governance’).
Cooperation between government and institutions, by means of agree-
ments of mutual consent, is the core mechanism and provides oppor-
tunities to pursue self-interest conditionally: agreements allow for
discretion but are not free of rules.
The last conceptualization of governance that concerns us here is the
governance equalizer, developed by de Boer et al. (2007). These
authors assume that governance configurations are made up of
a specific blend of five dimensions at a particular point in time. These
dimensions are: i) state regulation (the degree to which central actors
such as the state prescribe institutional behaviour in detail); ii) stake-
holder guidance (the degree to which external stakeholders set and
guide directions for institutional behaviour); iii) academic self-
governance (the role and impact of academic communities in higher
education systems such as peer-review-based self-steering); iv) manage-
rial self-governance (the role and impact of university leadership in
steering the higher education system); and v) competition (coordina-
tion based on competition among institutions for scarce resources).
Although the five dimensions are interrelated, the equalizer assumes
that these dimensions are, to a large extent, independent. For instance,
less state regulation does not automatically lead to more competition or
more academic self-governance. As de Boer and Jongbloed (2012,
p. 555) argue, the choice between markets and hierarchies is not a zero-
sum game. The relative independence of the five dimensions implies
that many different governance configurations are possible. This seems
338 de Boer and Huisman

to hold in practice, as demonstrated in Section 12.5, which discusses

European variants.

12.3 The General Picture

Based on studies on higher education governance in the last two dec-
ades, an overarching picture can be painted – or, at least, some general
tendencies can be observed. Obviously the role of the state towards
higher education has changed, often referred to as the shift from
government to governance. Governance has become more complex
and dynamic and involves more participants from different levels.
Governance as exercise of authority increasingly concerns intercon-
nected policy levels, with multiple actors influencing different parts of
the decision-making process and shaping its outcomes. Traditional
state authority over higher education in Europe has been redistributed
across various policy levels.
In fact, there have been shifts in four different directions. There has
been an upward shift, moving state authority to the supra-national
level. The Bologna Process and its consequences may serve as a clear
example here; decisions of the European Court (see, e.g., van
Wageningen, 2015) have also affected national policies (among others,
in the area of policies for student support). We have seen a tendency of
‘moving out’ – a transfer from state to market (marketization, privati-
zation, contracting). The rise of private higher education and the
introduction of pricing systems serve as examples of this. There has
also been a tendency to transfer state authority to national bodies at
arm’s length from the state (‘agencification’) – in other words, ‘moving
sideways’. We observe, for example, the introduction of new accred-
itation bodies or greater responsibilities for funding agencies in system
coordination. And finally, as part of political deregulation and liberal-
ization agendas, we have seen the devolution of authority towards
higher education institutions (‘moving down’) – enhancing organiza-
tional autonomy and encouraging institutional strategic actorhood
(Whitley, 2012). There have been numerous reforms across Europe
which aim to enhance organizational autonomy with different objec-
tives. In some countries, universities have achieved a legally indepen-
dent status (e.g. Portugal, Finland). In other countries, universities have
acquired the role of employer, giving them more authority in staff
matters, or have gained ownership over property and buildings (e.g.
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 339

the Netherlands). And in many countries new public funding schemes

have given universities more discretionary powers in allocating and
spending budgets.
This redistribution of authorities does not imply that the government
is stepping out, rolling back, or hollowing out. In Europe, governments
still play a pivotal role in this ‘network of governance’ by establishing
frameworks, objectives, and priorities in and for the system. In steering
higher education systems, governments – facing market as well as
government failures (Dill, 1997; Jongbloed, 2003) – found themselves
in a position to develop hybrid steering models, blending characteris-
tics of central steering and ‘spontaneous ordering’ through market-
ization. In these hybrid situations, governments still shape the rules of
the game to a large degree, but in a different way and by using new
devices, which fit general tendencies in public sector management that
stress the demand for performance, including obligations to publicly
demonstrate performance (Bolton, 2003; Broucker and de Wit, 2015;
Fryer et al., 2009). New funding schemes (output- and/or competition-
based), mandatory quality assurance and accreditation systems, and
explicit contractual obligations serve to maintain or improve system
performance, seen as the primary task of the state. They embody both
a changed government role and a continued one. This state contract
model, characterized by bargaining, reciprocity, and mutual consent,
indicates both the government’s responsibility and the institutional
autonomy of higher education institutions. It provides the government
with the possibility to attach conditions, in the form of outputs to be
realized and other (reporting) obligations, in return for public funding
and other facilities.
The prominence of government in European higher education govern-
ance is also illustrated by various studies on institutional autonomy (e.g.
Bennetot Pruvot and Estermann, 2017). The empowerment of higher
education institutions through the devolution of authorities and decision-
making capacities from the state to the institutions assumes that power
balances are tilted towards the institutions at the expense of the state. Such
a conclusion, however, would be both premature and too simplistic. De
Boer and Enders (2017) argue that enhanced formal autonomy does not
automatically correspond with the actual space that an institution has to
make its own decisions. Organizational autonomy is a relational concept,
which implies that external influences – state policies, for example – affect
the decision-making space that institutions have. Based on the data from
340 de Boer and Huisman

an eight-country study, de Boer and Enders conclude that most univer-

sities experience strong to medium levels of influence from the govern-
ment and its agencies on their internal decision making, regardless of the
degree of formal autonomy they possess. While the role of the state has
changed, universities continue to operate in the shadow of hierarchy. As
a result of funding, regulation, audit, and normative pressures, in reality
institutions cannot escape from government interference and the govern-
ment remains a key actor in governing the system. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that governments, apart from fine-tuning their governance
architectures over time, do – once in a while – significantly ‘shake up’ their
higher education systems.

12.4 Big Reforms

The prominence of government is visible not only in the day-to-day
steering arrangements, but also in what we term ‘big reform’ projects.
The comparisons of governance arrangements in previous studies do
highlight some dynamics over time, but often do not reveal the ways
that (other) structural reforms in higher education systems impact
governance. That is, by focusing on relatively stable policy areas
(funding, quality assurance, institutional governance, programme
provision, etc.), these studies offer significant insights in changes in
key policy areas. But at the same time, such a focus does not pay
sufficient attention to bigger reform projects that may – directly or
indirectly – impact governance arrangements. In this section, we
address a couple of these reforms and explore how they impact
governance arrangements.
In their study on structural reforms, de Boer et al. (2017) investigate
system-wide policy change, with specific attention to government poli-
cies that intend to metaphorically ‘change the landscape’ by bringing
less/more horizontal or vertical differentiation into the system, or to
change the (inter)relationships between higher education institutions.
In themselves, these reforms cause governance changes, for the govern-
ment clearly sets the ‘rules for the game’ and supplements the policy
ideas and changes with instruments such as regulation, funding, and
information (see also de Boer and van Vught, 2016). Examples of
horizontal differentiation are the introduction of a private higher edu-
cation sector in Poland and non-university higher education institu-
tions in Croatia. The possibility to ‘upgrade’ colleges in Norway also
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 341

fits this category. With vertical differentiation, governments intend to

increase (performance) differences between higher education institu-
tions, for example through excellence initiatives, such as the UNIK
(Investment Capital for University Research) reform in Denmark, the
CEI (International Campus of Excellence) reform in Spain, and
a combination of similar policies in France. Reforms pertaining to
interrelationships include merger processes in Finland and Wales, but
also the setting up of associations (collaborative arrangements between
universities and non-university hogescholen) in Flanders.
The Finnish case may serve to illustrate governance dynamics.
Nokkala and Välimaa (2017) focus on merger initiatives in the
Finnish higher education system and stress that Finnish higher educa-
tion policies have been characterized for decades by gradual and slow
change. In line with the Nordic welfare state model, governments were
key stakeholders in setting strategies and policies for higher education,
based on the idea of all higher education institutions being equal. The
context of globalization and increasing international competition
caused the government to rethink the landscape and to introduce
various measures to increase efficiency and competitiveness. Mergers
(i.e. creating larger, more efficient units that would be able to compete
with universities abroad) were seen as a major instrument to achieve
the government’s goals. While it may be tempting to see these reforms
as stand-alone landscape changes, implemented in parallel to the more
stable policy areas, there were clear implications for the latter areas. In
line with, or as a consequence of, the ‘upscaling’ of higher education
institutions, many other governance changes were brought about. For
instance, a minimum size was introduced for departments and other
organizational units, alongside a minimum overall size for all higher
education institutions. The legal foundation of higher education insti-
tutions was changed. Institutional governance structures were adjusted
to make room for the involvement of external stakeholders in decision
making, and executive powers of the rector were strengthened. Finally,
and just as controversial as the changes to the institutional governance
structures, academics’ civil service status was changed into
a contractual relationship, with higher education institutions as
employers (Nokkala and Välimaa, 2017). Measured against either
the governance equalizer (de Boer et al., 2007) or the dimensions of
institutional autonomy (Bennetot Pruvot and Estermann, 2017), it is
clear that ‘one-off’ structural reforms like the one in Finland have
342 de Boer and Huisman

enduring impacts on the exercise of authority and control, and thus on

governance arrangements.
Although the Finnish case is an extreme one (compared, for example,
to mergers in Wales that did not entail many accompanying governance
changes), the widespread occurrence of structural reforms across
Europe suggests that in many other countries structural reform pro-
cesses are having significant repercussions for governance regimes (see
de Boer et al., 2017; Paradeise et al., 2009; see also Dobbins, 2011, on
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, and Huisman et al., 2018, on
reforms in post-Soviet states).

12.5 European Variants

In this section we first offer theoretical views on why similar or different
governance trends might be expected, and then present a number of
empirical examples. The last sub-section reflects on the question of
whether there are any (regional) patterns discernible between diver-
gence and convergence.

12.5.1 Convergence and Divergence?

As already noted, some countries have moved quickly and others more
slowly in governance changes. Some started early and others were late
adopters (see Kehm and Lanzendorf, 2006). And changes are not
always unidirectional. Dobbins and Knill (2014, p. 186) conclude in
their four-country study that:
Great Britain . . . has pulled back on several market-oriented policies, for
example in the area of quality assurance, while the state is also increasingly
exerting its leverage over academic content. And along these lines, there are
few indications the HE governance in any of the four systems will become
more market-oriented in the foreseeable future. For example, Germany is
also in the process of retracting some market-oriented instruments, most
notably tuition fees.

That said, the previous sections have demonstrated that there is

indeed a broad governance trend in European higher education that
can be summarized under the heading ‘from government to govern-
ance’. It has been argued that this broad trend, observable in so many
countries, is the result of the adoption of international and global
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 343

pressures. Higher education systems, traditionally organized nation-

ally, are exposed to common reform agendas and global scripts
(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2014). The agendas, policy positions, and
ideas of supra-national and international organizations travel across
national and sectoral boundaries and, it is argued, produce similar
reforms and policies for national higher education systems. In the last
two decades, for example, many national governance reforms have
entailed elements of governance approaches that have been advocated
by the EU’s modernization agenda for higher education or reflect the
views of the OECD on governance. The impressions of NPM as
a ‘global script’ to organize public sectors are clearly visible and have
been reported widely (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).
Nevertheless, studies on governance in higher education reveal that,
next to similarities, differences across higher education governance
persist. As Gornitzka and Maassen (2014, p. 26) argue, ‘[a]lthough
national reform agendas for higher education have become more alike,
the reform outcomes can be argued to show many diverging tenden-
cies’. Various authors have offered explanations for the differential
governance developments (Ferlie et al., 2008; Gornitzka and
Maassen, 2014; Jungblut and Vukasovic, 2013; Perellon, 2005): they
suggest that the key factor in countering the converging effect of global
scripts is the existence of national and sector-specific filters that inter-
pret and modify these scripts. Agents such as national policy makers
and institutional leaders do not share the same beliefs systems, nor are
they passive recipients of new ideas. They have their own beliefs and
preferences and try to translate external pressures accordingly. The
likely outcome of the dynamic interactions among various agents
within a national higher education system is a system-specific response
to global scripts. This implies that within the big picture, portrayed in
the previous sections, variety flourishes.
The convergence hypothesis can be challenged in other ways as well.
First, change may not materialize as intended. Cerych and Sabatier
(1986) noted this phenomenon, and other authors have offered the
same explanations for implementation failures and unintended conse-
quences. Higher education institutions are known for relatively high
levels of organizational and professional autonomy (including a belief
in academic freedom). The nature of higher education institutions,
characterized by unclear technologies, many uncertainties, and goal
ambiguity, means that external control is hard to achieve (van Vught,
344 de Boer and Huisman

1989). Deviations from intentions are to be found particularly when

those who are to implement the changes do not fully subscribe to
the reform intentions. As Gornitzka and Maassen (2014, p. 29) put
it, ‘[s]ector specific characteristics and issues lead to variations in
how major public-sector reforms are enacted’.
To take this argument further, agents can by definition exercise
discretion. Global scripts do not prescribe action in detail. They also
may carry internally conflicting norms or elements that are valued
differently. Whereas there may have been support for some aspects of
new governance approaches (such as more organizational autonomy),
other aspects of governance (e.g. marketization) might be met with
scepticism and resistance. New governance modes may also conflict
with existing logics. New governance elements are implanted into
existing institutions and policy areas and do not necessarily fit well
(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2014). The room for interpretation and the
potential conflict that this creates are sources for agency. Paraphrasing
Scharpf (1997, p. 42), new ideas on governing a system ‘will define
repertoires of more or less acceptable outcomes of action that will leave
considerable scope for the strategic and tactical choices of purposeful
actors’. It is highly unlikely that this ‘considerable scope’ will be used in
the same way in each country and, therefore, variation in governance
modes seems self-evident.
A second challenge to the convergence hypothesis comes from path
dependency. This overlaps to some degree with the previous explana-
tion, for it alludes to existing power configurations and to the firmly and
historically rooted institutionalized structures within higher education
systems. In fact, the argument goes back to the emergence of the nation
state (Neave, 2001). Although governments addressed similar aspects of
the fabric of higher education – for instance, funding, certification, and
academic employment – there were important differences between coun-
tries, resulting from their specific histories and domestic points of depar-
ture. There is general acknowledgement that contemporary governance
developments are to some extent institutionally path-dependent
(Krücken, 2003). Even if there would be convergence to – for example –
a state supervision or market-type model of governance, significant
differences would still remain because of the deeply ingrained and per-
sisting norms, values, and interests that shine through in current govern-
ance arrangements (de Boer, 2003). A variant of this argument, rooted in
Scandinavian institutionalism (Czarniawski and Sevón, 1996), is that
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 345

many governance reforms are translated, filtered, converted, or adjusted

because of particular institutional heritages and hence lead to new
governance configurations that deviate from the global models (see,
e.g., Dobbins and Knill, 2014) or are a combination of old and new
configurations through a process of layering (Mahoney and Thelen,
2010).
Besides these two major factors, the literature also points to conflict-
ing institutional logics (e.g. the market logic versus the bureaucracy
logic) that play out differently in different national contexts (Jungblut
and Vukasovic, 2013). This leads to crises or punctuated change
(Gornitzka and Maassen, 2014), or to temporal sorting, where policy
and governance developments are determined not so much by means–
ends arguments, but rather by the coupling of policy problems and
solutions (see Gornitzka and Maassen, 2014; Jungblut and Vukasovic,
2013).
Reviewing the recent literature on policy and governance change, the
balance tilts towards the importance of agency as well as contextual
and situational factors that may have a significant impact on the direc-
tion, pace, and nature of governance change. There are good reasons to
assume that behind generic trends considerable variety looms. In the
next section we will address a number of studies that support our claim
of the establishment of governance arrangements in higher education
across European countries that have both similarities and differences.
We will then explore whether there are specific governance configura-
tions emerging in response to global scripts.

12.5.2 Comparative Studies on Higher Education Governance

across European Countries
It appears safe to say that most European higher education systems
have picked up elements of new governance approaches. De Boer et al.
(2007), using the governance equalizer, noted that England, the
Netherlands, Germany, and Austria were all moving, generally speak-
ing, towards a NPM model (see also Kehm and Lanzendorf, 2006).
Nevertheless, striking differences were visible, particularly in the
dimension of ‘competition’. With strong competition for students,
and research funding based on performance, England was a clear out-
lier in this dimension and it is therefore worthwhile to juxtapose this
governance mode with the one in Austria at that time. In Austria, there
346 de Boer and Huisman

was very limited competition between institutions. When universities

were invited to develop specific profiles, the key driver was not so much
competition, but the government’s wish for country-wide educational
planning. Likewise, performance did not play an important role, either
in university–government relations, or internally in relations between
rectors and deans (de Boer et al., 2007, p. 145).
In a study across 32 European countries, including Central and
Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, the CHEPS
Consortium (2006) note similarities in terms of governmental attention
to changing funding arrangements, increasing institutional autonomy,
introducing market mechanisms and quality assurance mechanisms, and
changing internal governance structures, but stress that ‘the range of
governance reforms across Europe not only differs in terms of content
but also in terms of timing’ (p. 27). De Boer and File (2009, p. 15) echo
this – again based on a comparison of governance trends in Europe – by
summarizing that governance reforms are complex and target different
areas of the higher education fabric, and that many governments ‘have
developed their “own versions” of the very same tidal wave’. Zooming
in on institutional autonomy, Estermann and Nokkala (2009) make an
inventory of how European governments shape aspects of autonomy
(e.g. financial autonomy and academic autonomy). They conclude that
there is a general trend towards more autonomy, but they emphasize
differences across countries and even report some cases where autonomy
has decreased. Their follow-up report (Bennetot Pruvot and Estermann,
2017, p. 41–52) offers scorecards for various dimensions of institutional
autonomy and gives examples of significant differences. For instance, on
the dimension ‘organizational autonomy’, the United Kingdom ranks
first among 28 countries (and is therefore allocated a score of
100 per cent), Lithuania is ranked fifth (88 per cent), Hungary 23rd
(56 per cent), and Luxembourg at the bottom (34 per cent). But in
another dimension, the pattern is different: for ‘academic autonomy’,
Estonia leads with 98 per cent, the United Kingdom is in the third
position (89 per cent), as is Luxembourg (89 per cent), and Lithuania
is ranked 26th (42 per cent).
Dobbins (2011) analyses governance reform in the Czech Republic,
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria and arrives at the conclusion that
convergence towards the market has taken place. It is important to
note that this study mapped the governance arrangements (as a mixture
of state steering, market steering, and academic self-rule) through the
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 347

recent history of these countries, from pre-communist to current times,

with the Bologna Process being an important driver for change. While
there is undeniably a trend towards the market, the author acknowl-
edges that there are significant differences in how exactly marketization
has taken place, and how close governments have come to the market
model. The Czech Republic and Poland – with roots in the
Humboldtian model – have moved far less in the direction of the
market model than Bulgaria and Romania. The latter countries showed
more signs of entrepreneurialism in university management, a stronger
third-party funding basis, and a clearer move towards the introduction
of student tuition fees. Huisman et al. (2018) analysed structural
reforms in higher education in post-Soviet countries and reached simi-
lar conclusions: indeed, Bologna, internationalization, and marketiza-
tion were important drivers of change, and, consequently, similar
policy developments in these systems, while at the same time local
institutional conditions produced convergence.
A recent encompassing comparative approach to governance in higher
education is provided by Broucker and de Wit (2015). This study looks
at NPM developments in the area of market(ization), budgetary policies,
institutional autonomy, and institutional management in England,
Portugal, the Netherlands, and Finland and concludes that ‘NPM has
found its way in HE and HEIs, but at a different speed and with varied
intensity . . . Governments use the “toolbox” of NPM as they see fit’ (p.
70). Leisyte and Kizniene (2006), analysing NPM developments in
Lithuania, illustrate that instruments may actually also be lacking,
with policies largely – at the moment of their analysis – being rhetoric.
Based on these studies, it seems safe to conclude that there is
a general trend: many countries have introduced reforms in the same
areas. Nevertheless, one has to be cautious in declaring convergence.
While at first sight there may appear to be increasing similarity across
European countries, two caveats lead us to be hesitant regarding a firm
claim. First, most research – however sophisticated some of the studies
may be – has not comprehensively compared the situations pre- and
post-reform (Dobbins, 2011, and Dobbins and Knill, 2014, being
noteworthy exceptions). Rather, trends have been identified in
a rather interpretative way. Moreover, these trends are often based
on the formal governance arrangements, which do not necessarily
reflect actual implementation let alone reveal the perceptions of those
experiencing the reforms. Second, the studies show that assessments
348 de Boer and Huisman

very much depend on the object of focus and the level of detail being
sought. For example, there has been a development towards stronger
executive leadership, but if one zooms in on how university leaders are
elected or selected and the composition of boards, there is an enormous
variety of arrangements across Europe (e.g. de Boer et al., 2016).

12.5.3 Specific Configurations?

Not only in relation to governance reform, but also to higher education
systems in general, there is often reference to the historical background
of the systems (see also our reflections on the role of path dependency),
with particular attention to elements of the political-administrative
system (Bleiklie and Michelsen, 2013). This explains why notions
such as the Anglo-Saxon, Napoleonic, Humboldtian, and Nordic mod-
els figure prominently in the discussion on the emergence and evolution
of European higher education systems (see, e.g., Neave, 2001). While
such labels are generally helpful as sensitizing devices, there are limits
to their application. They may aptly describe a model at the time of its
emergence (e.g. Humboldtian and Napoleonic models at the beginning
of the nineteenth century), but not necessarily reflect contemporary
governance arrangements. There may also be a considerable contrast
between the model and reality. Whereas the Humboldtian model
appears to have some clear and tangible elements (freedom in teaching,
learning, and research; unity of teaching and research; university edu-
cation as cultivation of the self – Bildung), some analysts prefer to
speak of the Humboldtian model as a Weberian ideal type (see, e.g.,
Scott and Pasqualoni, 2016); others are more outspoken in calling it
a myth (Ash, 2006). In a similar vein, Antikainen (2016) – citing Rinne
(2012), but also referencing Esping-Andersen’s (1990) notions of the
welfare state – is able to list distinctive elements of the Nordic higher
education model (e.g. lack of institutional hierarchy, the provision of
higher education free of charge, fostering social equality), while at the
same time stressing that recent reforms go against the traditional
model. In their in-depth analysis of reforms in Scandinavian higher
education, Gornitzka and Maassen (2010) emphasize that the ‘result is
that even in a region with a high level of policy integration and con-
vergence, with similar traditions, and values and norm systems, the
reform instrumentation gets a very specific national flavour and colour’
(p. 36).
Governance Trends in European Higher Education 349

We therefore have some reservations as to whether specific models

can be detected in Europe. For some aspects of higher education, it
clearly makes sense to speak of such models: for example, Pechar and
Andres (2011), using OECD data on expenditure, participation, tui-
tion, and financial aid for students, convincingly show the continuing
relevance of welfare regimes (conservative, liberal, social-democratic).
On the other hand, there is much variation which cannot be explained
by European models (Dobbins and Knill, 2014; Gornitzka and
Maassen, 2010) and there are many outliers and counter-examples in
the studies discussed so far (even Pechar and Andres, 2011, found the
United Kingdom and Finland to be out of step with expectations;
Huisman et al., 2018, also found much variation across post-Soviet
countries), strongly suggesting that the usefulness of ideal typical mod-
els is decreasing. This has led some authors to speak of hybridization of
models. The notion of hybridity is already implicit in the title of one of
the early analyses of governance – ‘An intriguing Janus-head’ (Maassen
and van Vught, 1988) – which analyses how the Dutch government of
the mid-1980s showed elements of steering from a distance but at the
same time demonstrated traditional features of state steering.
Gornitzka and Maassen (2000), using Olsen’s notion of state models,
pick up the theme of hybridity and argue that it applies to many
European countries. Subsequent research has confirmed the relevance
of the notion of hybridity (e.g. Jungblut and Vukasovic, 2013), but has
not advanced the mapping of (hybrid) governance models.

12.6 Conclusions
Using different conceptual models to address change in higher education
governance in Europe, we have illustrated the shift from government to
governance. At first glance, this development appears to represent
a change from a combination of government control and academic
oligarchy in coordinating higher education, towards a network- and
market-based governance approach, characterized by a dynamic, inter-
dependent mixture of multiple levels, actors, and domains. In the new
governance configuration that we are witnessing in Europe, the relation-
ship between state and institutions has changed, among other things by
empowering institutions, and by giving a more visible role in system
coordination to other stakeholders, including agencies which operate at
arm’s length from the government, institutional leaders, and students.
350 de Boer and Huisman

There are, however, three important qualifications to be made. First,

more organizational autonomy does not mean that the state is actually
‘stepping back’. Governments retain ultimate authority, despite higher
education institutions having more organizational autonomy. Market
forces may offer institutions opportunities for self-directed strategic
action, but with governments still deciding on the rules of the game,
real autonomy will be limited (de Boer and Enders, 2017). Second, like
other reforms in public sectors (see, e.g., Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004),
change comes in different shapes. Our analysis has confirmed this for
higher education, showing important differences across systems and
time. Third, the many attempts to ‘map’ governance are often snap-
shots, largely overlooking the extent to which different governance
models and instruments overlap and impact on each other, and also
ignoring the fact that, besides their regular governance mode, govern-
ments often intervene by embarking upon large reform projects. We
deem these qualifications to be important for those analysing future
governance change in higher education.

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13 Governance and Corruption in East
and Southeast Asian Higher
Education
Close Cousins, Close Encounters
anthony welch

Fighting fraud is like the woodpecker:

always pecking at the tree, and digging out the pest.

WAN Gang, Minister of Science and Technology, China (2010)

13.1 Introduction
No analysis of governance in East and Southeast Asian higher educa-
tion could be complete without treatment of its close cousin, corrup-
tion. As illustrated in this chapter, of the countries of East Asia – China,
(including Macao and Hong Kong), Taiwan, Korea, and Japan – and
Southeast Asia (the 10 member states of ASEAN), all suffer from the
taint of corruption, albeit to substantially differing degrees. The
selected examples herein chart cultures of corruption pervading higher
education in the region, which are closely linked to system and institu-
tional governance.
What is the link between governance and corruption? Good govern-
ance consists of far more than simple administrative efficiency
(Farazmand, 2015): it promotes transparency and ethical behaviour,
emphasizes and implements behavioural norms and associated practices,
and sanctions transgressors. Poor governance, by contrast, licences var-
ious irregularities, both financial and organizational. As the recent IIEP/
CHEA ‘Advisory Statement for Effective International Practice’ under-
lines, there are clear links between poor governance and corruption:
nothing less than the integrity of academic governance and institutions
is imperilled by the ‘malignant tumour’ of corruption (IIEP/CHEA,
2016; Yang, 2008). Defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private

355
356 Welch

gain (personal or material), corruption includes nepotism and cronyism,

fraud, theft, bribery, collusion, extortion, cheating, plagiarism, misre-
presentation, and sexual harassment, among others (Heyneman, 2004).
The analysis herein initially reviews the literature on governance in
higher education and posits the close, if complex, link between govern-
ance and corruption – notably, the ways that corruption is antithetical
to good governance. Subsequently, the chapter details instances and
forms of corrupt behaviour in China and several ASEAN member
states, in both public and private sector higher education, revealing
the close connection of governance to corrupt practices, and under-
lining the force of what is, in effect, ‘a wake-up call to higher education
worldwide . . . HEIs, governments, employers and societies generally, in
both developed and developing countries, are far too complacent about
the growth of corrupt practices, either assuming that these vices occur
somewhere else, or turning a deaf ear to rumours of malpractice in their
own organisations’ (IIEP/CHEA, 2016, p. 2).

13.2 Government, Governance, and Higher Education

As the role of government has changed in recent decades, so too has
governance, including in higher education. In an era of globalization,
the role and reach of the nation state has been problematized, although
in East Asia in particular the dominance of the developmental state
model ensured that a major role persisted for government, and also in
higher education (Carroll and Jarvis, 2017; Green, 2013; Welch,
2017). However, some have claimed that there are limits to the devel-
opmental state model. China, for example, has been argued to present
something of a paradox: dramatic economic growth and progress have
been achieved without ‘good governance’, a trend which to some extent
parallels the dramatic rise of Chinese universities in various global
ranking schemes over the past decade or so (Khan, 2015; Levin,
2010; Welch, 2016; Welch and Cai, 2011; Yang and Welch, 2012).
Debates around this claim raise the issue of what the constitutive
elements of good governance are, and how they might be measured.
International agencies have paid close attention to notions of good
governance, particularly in recent times. This has included, for exam-
ple, making certain ‘structural adjustment’ strictures a requirement –
a condition for receipt of development loans (Farazmand, 2015). But in
practice, what is commonly invoked in the name of good governance is
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 357

very much of a neoliberal form: ‘market approaches with emphasis on

market-like competition among public organizations, results-oriented
outputs, performance measurements, empowering managers to fire and
hire temporary employees, privatization, efficiency, steering govern-
ment versus rowing government, and getting rid of bureaucratic rules
and regulations’ (Farazmand, 2015, p. 14).
This, in turn, raises two questions. Firstly, do the elements listed here
actually constitute good governance? Many have argued that the fissi-
parous effects associated with their implementation contradict any
such claims. Data from the USA which show that the bottom
90 per cent of workers endured income stagnation over the past three
decades, while the top 1 per cent were the major beneficiaries, is
paralleled to a greater or lesser degree in East and Southeast Asia,
where although hundreds of millions have been lifted from poverty
over recent decades, most spectacularly in China, the gap between rich
and poor has nonetheless widened. The current rise of right-wing
populist nationalist movements both in Europe and in parts of Asia
speaks, at least in part, to a rejection of capitalist globalization that,
contra the claims of neoliberal economists, has not lifted all boats. In
practice, while increasing economic growth overall, capitalist globali-
zation has at the same time widened the gap between rich and poor, and
left too many (women, indigenous minorities, rural dwellers, the less
educated, and urban poor) on the margins, or simply left out (Atkinson,
2015; Held et al., 1999; Piketty, 2014; Sassen, 1998; Sklair, 2001,
2002, 2016; Stiglitz, 2002, 2016). Even such stoutly economic organi-
zations as the World Bank have acknowledged its limitations
(Robertson et al., 2009).
If, as is argued here, market-like, capitalist globalization yields such
highly unequal results, there is a need for a more inclusive model of
globalization. It is for this reason that the notion of sound governance
has been put forward. This can include both indigenous governance
traditions (powerful versions of which, for example, were evident in
ancient times, in both the Persian and Chinese empires) and the contem-
porary role of global agencies (such as UNESCO, ILO, UNDP, and
UNICEF), as well as NGOs in areas such as the environment, migration,
health, education, and women’s empowerment, that represent, in various
ways, inclusive, counter-capitalist forms of globalization. Rather than an
emphasis on social control, cheap labour, and profit, the focus here is on
transparency, cooperation around capacity development, democracy,
358 Welch

equity, legitimacy, and resistance to predatory, capitalist forms of globa-

lization (Sklair, 1999, 2001, 2002). While there is no one version, such
models of governance are more about ‘concertation, cooperation and
alliance formation rather than the traditional processes of coercion, com-
mand and control [that are more reflective of traditional models of
government]’ (van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004; Levi-Faur,
2012, 2013). Given the above account, then, the link between good
governance and capitalist globalization is not tenable.
Secondly, are the above models of globalization, with their associated
forms of governance, universal or another Western import? East Asia
suggests an alternative, with the state traditionally closely involved in all
aspects of national development, governance, and institution building.
This includes the higher education sector, which has often been seen as
both a pillar of economic growth and human capital development, and
as a major repository of national history and culture. There is wide-
spread consensus as to the key contribution that education has made to
the overall development of East Asia, and even today, in both East and
Southeast Asia, universities are seen as having ‘played a remarkable role
in the accelerated process of state formation’ (Green, 2013, p. 305).
One point on which most analysts would agree is that governance is
not coextensive with government (Capano et al., 2015). As an early
report indicated, ‘governance transcends the state to include civil society
organizations and the private sector, because all are involved in most
activities promoting sustainable human development’ (UNDP, 1997,
p. 11). This certainly includes higher education, particularly in
Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent some parts of East Asia. Even
this wider concept, however, still omits key international dimensions –
both the phenomena of growing regionalism and of globalization, the
latter of which, in particular, is argued to be having a greater and
greater impact on the state, including forms of governance:
‘Governance in developing nations is more dominated by these global
forces, and less domestic dynamics’ (Farazmand, 2015, p. 17). Equally,
governance is dynamic, with modes shifting according to changing
circumstances. In education, for example, this could result in either
greater institutional autonomy or more intrusion by the state
(Capano et al., 2015). At times, in the name of accountability, the
rhetoric of the former is paralleled by the reality of the latter: the so-
called steering from a distance at times results in more steering, with less
distance.
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 359

13.3 Governance in East and Southeast Asia

Context, however, is critical. While much of the literature on higher
education governance still stems from the West, the allusion to distinct
forms of governance in East and Southeast Asia makes an understand-
ing of this context indispensable to any assessment of prevailing pat-
terns. The extraordinary diversity evident in East and Southeast Asia
makes this no easy task. Reforms include moves towards market soci-
alism (Viet Nam and China); limited decentralization of university
governance (Indonesia, Malaysia, and China); distinctions between
public and private higher education sectors (China and ASEAN); mas-
sification outstripping regulatory capacity (China, Viet Nam,
Indonesia, and Thailand); the selection of some leading universities
for pilot projects featuring greater, if still limited, administrative auton-
omy (Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia); efforts to transform at least
a few universities into ‘world-class’ institutions (China, Malaysia, and
Viet Nam); devolution of the administration of the large majority of
universities to provincial or municipal levels (China); privatization and
corporatization of public universities (Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Thailand); the spread of more or less radical forms of Islam in higher
education (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines); incipient
higher education regionalism (ASEAN and ASEAN-China); a greater
emphasis on competition, rankings, and league tables (ASEAN and
China); and recent steps towards greater regulation of certain functions
within Chinese universities.1
As will be seen, this diversity of context also includes notable ele-
ments that undermine good governance in the sector: cronyism in
senior higher education appointments (Malaysia and Viet Nam), and
various forms of entrenched corruption in higher education govern-
ance (China and ASEAN). In China and several ASEAN states, leaders
of HEIs are effectively selected by government/the ruling party, either
explicitly or in practice. Equally, quality assurance processes are by no
means always independent of government. In some cases, as elaborated
below, reforms to license greater autonomy in at least some universities
have only been partially implemented, as, despite proclamations of
‘empowered governance’, governments have proved reluctant to cede
centralized power, or have implemented the schemes poorly, or very
slowly (Aminudin and Welch, 2012; Malaysian Education Blueprint,
2015; Wan and Ahmad, 2015; Welch, 2012b, 2016). Such controls are
360 Welch

poor guards against cronyism or corruption of governance through

political interference.

13.3.1 Governance in Chinese Higher Education

China provides a good example of both powerful indigenous governance
traditions from the past, some of which have left a powerful legacy, and
contemporary forms that impart a distinctive character to governance,
including in higher education. The two terms zizhiquan and zizhuquan
describe two different concepts of autonomy, only one of which is more
commonly used in Western governance discourse. The former term
refers to the notion of autonomy as independence (connoting, in
Chinese, a form of political sovereignty), while the latter refers to
a concept of autonomy as self-mastery. It is this latter term that best
captures the notion of university governance within China, that, in
setting overall institutional goals as well as managing academic, person-
nel, and financial matters, ‘focuses not only on the possession of power
but also on the ability and skills of using that power to create conditions
for universities to fulfil their historical goal of meeting the needs of
society’ (Zhong, 1997, p. 7; see also Zhong and Hayhoe, 2001).
Effectively, this is a form of power-sharing between universities and the
Chinese government, whose recent re-assertion of ideological and admin-
istrative control over Chinese universities has arguably altered the bal-
ance. The dual system of university leadership, comprising the University
President on the one hand, and the Party Secretary on the other, is another
important element, echoed at individual Faculty level and in administra-
tive departments such as Human Resources, or the ubiquitous
International Office. In key universities under direct control of the
Ministry of Education (MoE), the President and Communist Party
Secretary are appointed by the MoE. Vice-Presidents and Vice-Party
Secretaries are also appointed by the Ministry, but in consultation with
the President and the Party Secretary (Li and Yang, 2014, pp. 32–33).2
There is no linguistic equivalent within the Chinese language for the
notion of university autonomy as it is understood in English. This has
shaped a different governance tradition in Chinese higher learning
institutions. Ancient China had two sets of institutions of higher learn-
ing (for which there are some parallels in proximate East Asia). On the
one hand, there were institutions at the provincial and prefectural level
that supported the ‘ladder of success’ that led ultimately to the imperial
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 361

examination system and institutions such as the Hanlin Academy,

Guozijian (college for the sons of the Emperor), and Taixue
(Institution of Supreme Learning) (He, 1967).3 Such institutions were
effectively ‘an arm of bureaucratic power’ (Hayhoe, 1996, p. 41). On
the other hand, there were the Shuyuan (scholarly academies, or socie-
ties), often headed by a famous scholar, whose scholarship attracted
acolytes and colleagues (Hayhoe, 1996; Zhong, 1997). The important
point here is that, as Hayhoe highlights, neither of the two sets of
institutions ‘were characterized by the kind of autonomy enjoyed by
the European university’. The former institutions ‘were clearly an arm
of the state for the recruitment and training of civil officials’, while the
experience of the latter varied between ‘fragile autonomy’ and ruthless
suppression, ‘on the grounds that they were subversive to imperial
authority’ (Hayhoe, 1996, pp. 11–12; see also Cheung, 2010).
Much the same was true after the revolution of 1949. The current
governance system, outlined initially in the 1950s and 1960s, accorded
little autonomy to universities. It was ‘one-way and top-down’, cover-
ing such fields as teaching, syllabi, and textbooks (Li and Yang, 2014,
p. 22). The later ‘Decision on the reform of the educational system’
(1985) featured autonomy as a priority, and was followed in 1993 by
the ‘Programme for Education Reform and Development in China’ that
saw government as a facilitator, ceding more autonomy to universities.
The subsequent ‘Higher Education Law of the PRC’ (1998) brought
into being the ‘President responsibility system’ (校长负责制) and spe-
cified seven domains in which HEIs were to exercise autonomy: student
admissions, specialized establishment, teaching affairs, research and
service, international exchange and cooperation, administrative struc-
tures and personnel management, and financial affairs, including prop-
erty management (PRC, 1998, Articles 30–38). A subsequent survey
found, however, that autonomy was lacking in all domains, with the
exception of academic staff recruitment (Li and Yang, 2014, p. 24),
while national ‘buffer agencies’ such as the Centre for Degree and
Graduate Education or National Evaluation Committee remain affili-
ates of the MoE. Quality assurance, too, remains in practice effectively
under the control of the MoE, with only limited transparency (Raza,
2010).
The contradictions found between policies of enhanced autonomy
on the one hand and ‘the reality of constraints that universities continue
to experience’ (Yang et al., 2007; see also Raza, 2010, pp. 8, 11), on the
362 Welch

other, have been exacerbated in recent years by government-imposed

guidelines that are limiting research access and affecting academic staff
recruitment and evaluation, as well as curriculum and pedagogical
content. The so-called Document 9, for example, reasserted the central
role of the Party, and party ideology, explicitly warning of the dangers
from foreign influences (such as constitutional democracy, universal
values, freedom of the press, and civil society), including in higher
education (ChinaFile, 2013; Xi, 2017, p. 7). Subsequent government
orders banning the use of VPNs (virtual private networks) led to public
expressions of concern about the effects on research by members of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, as well as of the National People’s
Congress (UWN, 2017). Issued by organs such as the Central
Committee of the CCP’s General Office and the State Council
General Office, the tenor of recent guidelines to HEIs has been to
consolidate Party leadership and control and strengthen ideology
(China Copyright and Media, 2015; Xi, 2017).4 A further document –
‘Strengthening and improving propaganda and ideology work in
higher education’ (2015) – re-emphasized building higher education
into ‘a strong battlefield for studying, researching and propagating
Marxism’, and strengthening ideology, by ensuring that the theoretical
system of Socialism with Chinese characteristics suffused textbooks,
classrooms, and minds (China Copyright and Media, 2015).5
Reinforced in President Xi’s speech to the 19th Party Congress in late
2017 (Xi, 2017), its implementation has affected a range of staffing
processes in higher education, including recruitment, regular perfor-
mance appraisal (conducted by relevant Party Secretaries), and promo-
tion procedures, albeit thus far in the absence of precise metrics.
Without checks and balances, this increasing extent of political control
can be exploited at system and institutional levels, and has been asso-
ciated with forms of cronyism and corruption.
A further key feature of Chinese governance patterns, including in
higher education, is guanxi. In Chinese institutions, which are relation-
ship oriented, rather than rule oriented, guanxi – defined as building
personal relationship networks – is a long-standing, basic building-
block of Chinese culture, referring to connections or relationships
between people, including in higher education. It implies preferential
treatment given to the partners in an exchange, via easier access to
limited resources, increased access to controlled information and
grants, and protection from external competitors. In the current highly
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 363

competitive situation in Chinese universities, it is widely acknowl-

edged to often operate in perverse ways: ‘Naturally, if someone has
a good guanxi with the official in charge, the official could inter-
pret the rules in the way that is favorable for that person’ (Guan,
2011 p. 2; see also Yang, 2002). As such, it can undermine merit-
based appointments and promotions in Chinese universities, as well
as proper access to research grants. Chinese scientists, both at
home and abroad, regularly complain about the extent of political
interference and guanxi that is often important for successful grant
applications. As will be shown, it ‘encourages researchers not to
devote their time on research but on schmoozing with those in
power. In some cases, bribery and corruption also take place’ (Qiu,
2014, p. 162; see also Welch and Hao, 2014; Yang and Welch,
2010). While guanxi is basic to an understanding of Chinese
society, its effects in higher education are not always consonant
with transparency and good governance.
It has been widely argued that guanxi operates along lines of super-
ior–subordinate relations, which value ‘hierarchical obedience’ (Shin,
2012; Tu, 1993, 1996; Zhai, 2017). In Chinese culture, ‘deference to
supervisor can be viewed as a typical behaviour and an important
outcome’ (Liu and Shi, 2017, p. 600). As part of their socialization,
Chinese individuals ‘learn to be deferential to superiors in higher
statuses’; in both social interactions and in the workplace, ‘people
show respect for seniors and consult them when making decisions’
(Zhai, 2017, p. 122). The seniority-based promotion system that dom-
inates the workplace is at times exploited, denying opportunities to
more junior talent. Within higher education, and more generally, inter-
nalized values of deference to authority ultimately support the repro-
duction of a hierarchical, paternalistic workplace culture that, along
with obedience to family (filial obedience) and teachers, emphasizes
obedience to seniors in the workplace. Such a paternalistic workplace
governance culture may leave talented younger staff accepting unfair
treatment, and feeling vulnerable and impotent; it has also been asso-
ciated with values of political deference in China, which, in
a patriarchal society, are more strongly evident among women than
men (Zhai, 2017, p. 132). Such a culture of deference to one’s super-
iors, and the associated legitimation of power, is open to abuse and
corruption, including exploitation of younger staff, often female.
‘Supervisor’s power in the Chinese context expands subordinate’s
364 Welch

attachment to supervisor and strengthens subordinate’s deference to

supervisor’ (Liu and Shi, 2017, p. 604).

13.3.2 Governance in Southeast Asian Higher Education

In Malaysia, too, the above-mentioned promise of devolved govern-
ance has not been entirely fulfilled. In 2012, five research universities
were formally vested with autonomy: Universiti Malaya (UM),
University Sains Malaysia (USM), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
(UKM), Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), and Universiti Teknologi
Malaysia (UTM). But the fact that universities fall within the category
of Badan Berkanun Persekutuan (Federal Statutory Bodies) means they
are effectively semi-government entities, whose activities are ‘closely
monitored and controlled by the respective ministries’ (Saleh and
Aiman, 2015, p. 38). As will be shown, in practice this means that
institutional leaders are effectively appointed by the ruling party (or
coalition), and tend to be aligned with that party/coalition. Cronyism is
one alleged outcome.
Indonesia has also displayed a parallel arc of moves towards greater
university autonomy being later supplanted by proposals to withdraw
it. In the onset of post-1998 democracy, which included significant
moves to decentralize education, Indonesia introduced a scheme to
reform its higher education system. Of the more than 3,000 higher
education institutions across the archipelago, four were selected for
a pilot programme that gave greater academic freedom and financial
autonomy. Universitas Indonesia (UI), Institut Teknologi Bandung
(ITB), Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), and Universitas Gadjah Mada
(UGM) were accorded the status of Badan Hukum Milik Negera
(BHMN), or ‘state-owned legal institution’. The system proved robust
enough for two further institutions to be added in 2004: Universitas
Sumatera Utara (USU) and Universitas Perdidikan Indonesia (UPI),
Bandung. Later, in 2006, Universitas Airlangga in Surabaya became
the seventh institution to be granted BHMN status, which gave uni-
versities ‘greater power to decide on academic programmes, including
curriculum and staffing matters, including promotion of academics, as
well as the autonomy to elect university leaders, from the Rector to
heads of departments’ (Aminudin and Welch, 2012). The substantial
reform, however, did not last, and was replaced by a proposal that saw
universities revert to the pre-2000 status of Perguruan Tinggi yang
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 365

Diselenggarakan Pemerintah (PTP), or Government-Administered

Universities. Effectively, public universities returned to the status of
a ‘unit of a government agency under the direction of the Department
of National Education’ (Kusumadewi and Cahyadi, 2013).
Widespread bribery and corruption were associated with Indonesian
civil servants, including in the higher education sector (Prabowo and
Cooper, 2016).

13.4 The Scope and Role of Corruption

While corruption is by no means new in East and Southeast Asia,
three contemporary trends in regional higher education have opened
the door more widely to corrupt practices. While governments,
agencies, and ministries of (higher) education in the region have
been chary of loosening the reins over HEIs, the opposing trend
towards decentralization, with its diffusion of authority, has
increased opportunities for engaging in illicit behaviour – it has at
times been characterized as the decentralization of corruption.
A second and widespread trend, towards greater privatization of
higher education, has been argued to have a Janus face (Welch,
2007a, 2007b, 2011). An artefact of the increasing mismatch
between spiralling demand and limited government resources, one
face has overseen the swift growth of private higher education, which
often outpaced the growth of public higher education. The often
poorly regulated quality of this expansion has licensed various cor-
rupt practices, including over entry procedures, at times with the
collusion of government officials. Rapid expansion and massifica-
tion, including of the private sector, ‘puts great demand on admis-
sions processes’, as the Advisory Statement put it, somewhat coyly
(IIEP/CHAE, 2016, p. 4). Meanwhile, the gaze of the second Janus
face focuses on the increasing privatization of public HEIs, numbers
of which, across the region, have established private for-profit arms,
aimed at boosting institutional bottom lines. As illustrated below,
however, such ventures have often been associated with inadequate
transparency, both financial and organizational.
Lastly, the widespread and ongoing pressure across the region to lift
research productivity, especially in (S)SCI journals in English, has
helped stimulate an increase in various corrupt research practices in
the region, including plagiarism, misrepresentation of students’
366 Welch

research as being that of the professor, payment for publication,

misuse of research funds, and falsification of research results. Now
more subject to the unrelenting pressure of global competition, HEIs
have been, at times, too willing to turn a blind eye to such malfeasance
in the relentless quest to boost their institutional rankings (Hunter,
2015). Individually and collectively, the three trends not only enhance
options for corrupt practices in higher education, but also serve to
underscore the close connection to evolving governance norms and
practices.

13.4.1 Corruption in East and Southeast Asia

The publication by Transparency International (TI) (2015a) of the
corruption ratings of various ASEAN member states was both reveal-
ing and hotly contested by some of the listed countries. Nonetheless,
the widespread, impressive array of corruption scandals across
ASEAN in 2015 made the overall assessment of the region hard to
deny (The Diplomat, 2015). They included Malaysia’s massive and
ongoing 1Mdb scandal,6 another embracing the Indonesian parlia-
mentary Speaker, charges against the Vice President of the
Philippines, and corruption allegations against Thailand’s military
junta (The Diplomat, 2015, 2016). In East Asia, the ongoing anti-
corruption campaign of China’s President Xi unearthed spectacular
cases involving vast sums of illegal money, abuse of power, nepotism,
illegal property dealings, and even murder.7 High-flying leaders
brought down to earth included some from higher education, where
practices of using bribery to gain promotion, and the buying and
selling of positions in public organizations such as universities, had
long been widespread (Xinhuanet, 2015b). Beyond the corrosion of
public trust, exacerbation of inequalities, and the weakening of insti-
tutions and governance more generally, such practices have been
estimated to represent about 8 per cent of total budget spending
(Pei, 2007).
Overall corruption ratings for a range of ASEAN member countries,
and China, as measured by Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index (CPI), reveal that only Singapore ranks high on
transparency (TI, 2014), while the explicit link between governance
and corruption in the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index again
singles out Singapore (World Bank, 2014).
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 367

13.4.2 Regionalism
In an era of galloping globalization, however, corruption is by no
means limited to the nation state; increasingly, it is a cross-border
phenomenon (Welch, 2016, 2017, 2018). As the recent Advisory
Statement highlights, ‘the steadily developing sophistication and bor-
derless nature of information and communications technology has
expanded the opportunities for fraudsters in all walks of life’ (IIE/
CHAE, 2016, p. 4). Moreover, the growth of cross-border corruption
has outpaced the responses of many nation states in East and
Southeast Asia, who have been slow to act to counter such flows:
‘where cross-border trade, cultural exchange and regional peace and
stability will be so vital, it is worrying that so little effort has been
made to tackle corruption at the regional level’ (TI, 2015a, p. 4).
Links between cross-border corruption, governance, and achieving
both national and regional goals was a focus of TI’s charter document
‘ASEAN Integrity Community’: ‘the current AEC mission will not
achieve its stated goal of creating a single competitive market unless
we improve governance structure and practices’ (TI, 2015a, p. 10; see
also TI, 2015b).
In practice, however, regionalism extends well beyond ASEAN,
embracing substantial cross-border flows between several ASEAN
member states and parts of southern China, notably Yunnan,
Guizhou, and Guanxi.8 What makes such regional cross-border flows
significant is that so much is corrupt and illegal: trafficking of young
women as wives or prostitutes; selling of babies; smuggling of jade,
vehicles, and drugs; gambling; illegal logging; and mining (Shen, 2011).
These activities are sustained by significant levels of bribery, corrup-
tion, and collusion (see Chan, 2013, pp. 89–105, 108–115; China
Daily, 2014; Eimer, 2014, pp. 186ff, 200, 225–231; Evans et al.,
2000; INYT, 2015a, 2015b; NY Times, 2015a; SMH, 2015, Welch
2016, 2018).
Each of these cases highlights governance as an issue, with both
borders and distance from the centres of governance being long-
standing issues, as the traditional Chinese idiom emphasizes: ‘The
Mountains are High and the Emperor Far Away’ (Shan gao, huangdi
yuan). Indeed, this irregular, illegal quality of regional cross-border
flows has significant implications for conventional theories of govern-
ance, in particular for contemporary debates regarding regulatory
368 Welch

regionalism (Jayasuriya, 2003, 2010; Robertson, 2008). For both

intra-ASEAN and China-ASEAN flows, irregular regionalism might
well be a better characterization of such cross-border currents (Scott,
2009; Welch, 2016, 2018).

13.4.3 Defining Corruption

As indicated, a broad definition of corruption, according to TI, is the
abuse of entrusted power for private gain, either material or personal.
As the above definition implies, the CPI is limited to public sector
corruption, involving public officials, civil servants, or politicians. But
when, in the private sector, someone is appointed to an academic
position as a result of nepotism or cronyism, a bribe is paid to secure
a place in a private university, or individuals pocket funds to which
they were not entitled, this is clearly no less corrupt than similar
occurrences in the public sector.
As instanced herein, using definitions and examples of corruption
that are confined to the public sector is inadequate in two senses.
Firstly, corruption is no respecter of arbitrary lines between public
and private; in practice, it is at least as evident in private HEIs. While
this is acknowledged by TI in framing their CPI – ‘Private sector
corruption is characterized by groups from this sector influencing
decisions and actions that lead to abuses of entrusted power’ (TI, n.
d.) – the definition is rather weak, and does not embrace several forms
of corruption detailed below. Secondly, the extension of private higher
education over the past decade or two has increased both the potential
for and the level of corruption. Again, the implications for governance
are substantial. As governments in the region increasingly resiled from
previous levels of support for public higher education, if not in absolute
terms then at least in per-student funding, public HEIs moved to
diversify their income streams. In East and Southeast Asia, a common
resort has been to establish private sector, for-profit arms. Hence, it is
proving to be increasingly difficult to draw clear lines between public
and private, including in higher education.
That this has clearly been the case is evident in both ASEAN
member states and China. Data from China illustrate the problem
starkly: while enrolments rose more than fivefold in a matter of years,
state support increased by a much smaller amount (Xinhuanet,
2010).9 Effectively, from 1998 to 2003, enrolments rose by
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 369

230 per cent, while state funding rose by only 140 per cent (Sun and
Barrientos, 2009, p. 192; Wu and Gao, 2010; Zhao and Sheng,
2008).10 In Viet Nam, a similar gap opened up: student numbers
rose 13-fold between 1987 and 2009, but higher education teaching
numbers rose only three-fold. Largely as a result of the resultant cost
squeeze, the financial condition of numerous HEIs in ASEAN member
states and in China has become fragile: more face financial difficulties,
and/or substantial levels of debt. In China, significant numbers are ‘in
the red’ (Wu and Gao, 2010), while in a recent survey, few public
HEIs in Thailand were assessed as financially solid (Welch, 2012a).
The effects on institutional governance can be profound, as the
President of an Indonesian university lamented some years ago: ‘My
main task is to raise funds and obtain money’ (Jakarta Post, 2006).
The potential for corruption is consequential.
The growing gap between spiralling enrolments and limited state
support forced public sector HEIs to diversify income sources, often
resorting to establishing parallel private programmes or institutions.
The effect is to substantially blur the line between public and private in
higher education (Welch, 2011, 2012b). As detailed below, the impli-
cations for corruption are substantial, if not always visible: data
regarding such new income streams are often neither complete nor
transparent, giving rise to numerous complaints and charges, including
of fraud. Hence, one effect of the blurring of the distinction between
public and private is to create more opportunities for corruption.

13.4.4 Measuring the Effects of Corruption

How important is it to measure the diverse effects of corruption?
Corruption erodes public trust, makes it increasingly difficult to deliver
basic services (by wasting scarce resources), and weakens good govern-
ance and civil society. Beyond these important effects, surveys and
analyses of corruption among ASEAN member states also provide
some measure of its economic effects (Wescott, 2003). It was estimated
by Thailand’s National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), for
example, that up to 30 per cent of government procurement budgets
could be lost due to corruption, an amount which, at the minimum,
almost equalled the entire budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. At the
upper end, it would exceed the combined budgets of Agriculture and
Public Health (Wescott, 2003). Data from Viet Nam revealed that in
370 Welch

1998, nearly one-third of Viet Nam’s public investment expenditure –

around 5 per cent of GDP – was lost to fraud and corruption,
a situation which had not improved during the following five years
(Wescott, 2003). As elsewhere in ASEAN, the situation in Viet Nam is
not helped by poor public sector pay and the associated widespread
practice of moonlighting. In China, it has been estimated that bribery,
kickbacks, theft, and misspent funds (including in higher education)
amounted to at least 3 per cent of GDP (Pei, 2007). Since 2013,
President Xi’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign has unearthed brib-
ery on a massive scale, including in the military, railways, power
industry, and higher education.

13.4.5 Academic Corruption

The above forms of corruption translate to higher education in a range
of ways, embracing behaviour that is illegal, unprofessional, or both.
As numerous analyses have shown, corrupt practices in higher educa-
tion take various forms. These can include issuing fraudulent certifi-
cates (for payment); distortions in procurement (regarding new
university buildings, or maintenance contracts); accepting or paying
bribes, or exploiting students for sex, in return for entry into university,
passing a course, or granting a degree; offering or accepting payments
for higher grades; levying private payments for additional tuition,
without which the student will not pass the exam; claiming fake qua-
lifications; engaging in cronyism/nepotism; engaging in plagiarism;
falsifying research results; passing off students’ research as that of the
professor; misusing research funds; or paying bribes to secure academic
posts, get promotion, or gain programme or institutional accreditation
(Bakhari and Leach, 2009; Caixin, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; China Daily,
2010a, 2010b; Hallak and Poisson, 2007; Heyneman, 2004, 2009,
2011; ICAC, 2015; IIEP/CHEA, 2016; qq.com, 2014; TI, 2005,
2013; Xinhuanet, 2015a, 2015b; Yang 2008, 2016). Such practices
weaken higher education by lowering quality overall, degrading public
and employer confidence in the abilities of graduates and qualifications
of HEIs, and undermining the strength of qualifications and quality of
governance. Many such forms of corruption relate directly to institu-
tional governance, as captured in the traditional Eastern idiom ‘An
open door to the safe is an invitation to thieve’ (Hallak and Poisson,
2007, p. 6).
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 371

This has broader implications for society: if an education system is

seen to be based on corruption and cronyism, there is a loss of trust not
only in educational qualifications and expertise, but in governance
more broadly and the political system as a whole (Heyneman, 2011).
In addition, the loss of economic efficiency can be substantial: it has
been estimated by some that, in extreme cases, rates of return to
education can be reduced by as much as 70 per cent, and life-time
earnings of individuals by as much as 50 per cent (Heyneman et al.,
2008).
Academic corruption is not limited to (South) East Asia, of course,
or even Asia (Mohanty, 2015; TI, 2013). It occurs in every environ-
ment, and is complicated by increasing global mobility, and under-
pinned by a move towards charging high fees, most notably for
international students. In even the wealthiest systems, the incentive
to enrol students into such high-fee-paying programmes, whether or
not the student actually attends, and whether their entry qualifica-
tions have been rigorously checked – and at times by falsely promising
a level of infrastructure that, upon arrival, the student finds sorely
lacking – has often proved to be too tempting (ICAC, 2015).11 The
links to lax governance were highlighted by the Colby Nolan case in
Pennsylvania in 2004. It centred on a student who paid US$ 299 for
a Bachelor’s degree, but was subsequently granted an MBA on the
basis that he had ‘work experience’, including baby-sitting and retail
management. That the ‘student’ was ultimately outed as a cat (named
Colby Nolan), underlined the failure to adequately regulate the
spread of degree mills that, in the USA and elsewhere, were very
willing to corruptly grant bogus degrees for cash (NBC News,
2004). But research malpractice is also more widespread than was
supposed (Martinson et al., 2005), while in Germany at least two
federal Ministers have resigned in recent years over allegations that
their PhDs were plagiarized. A third was ultimately cleared, after
review (BBC, 2015b; The Guardian, 2013; Reuters, 2016; see also
IIEP/CHEA, 2016, p. 2). Together with other examples, such as the
suspension of the President and two top aides of the University of
Toulon on charges of accepting bribes (Washington Post, 2009), these
cases highlight issues of the adequacy of governance, at both institu-
tional and national levels.
Nonetheless, although corruption may be ubiquitous, the levels
found in (South) East Asia are so pervasive that they are accepted by
372 Welch

some as routine. As an acting rector of a substantial university in

Thailand explained recently, ‘Ramkhamhaeng University considers
cheating in exams by students to be trivial. It is common in all exams’
(Young, 2013, p. 1). The same is true in Viet Nam (McCornac, 2009,
2012). The following section charts major contours of academic cor-
ruption in China and Southeast Asia, revealing both its pervasiveness
and its multiple forms.

13.5 Charting Corruption in East and Southeast Asian

Higher Education
It is hard to overstate the importance of understanding the forms and
extent of corruption in higher education in the region, and their links to
governance. Such corrupt practices involve lowering entry standards,
selling of posts, bribery, other illicit financial gains, and collusion, inter
alia. One index of growing concern is seen in Figure 13.1, which reveals
a major rise in Chinese journals of articles devoted to the twin themes
of academic misconduct and academic integrity.

250

200

150

100

500

0
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Academic Integrity
Academic Misconduct

Figure 13.1 Number of Chinese journal articles on academic integrity and

academic misconduct (1999–2013)
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 373

In Indonesia, too, concerns have been growing, including with

regard to the practice of Jalur Khusus (‘Special Path’), whereby places
in high-demand programmes such as Engineering are reserved and then
sold to wealthy families at very high rates – from 150 million Rupiah
(US$ 17,650) to 225 million Rupiah (US$ 26,470). At the highly
reputable Gadjah Madah University, 28 per cent of 34,000 applicants
for places in 2008 were found to have paid large ‘brokerage’ fees to
middlemen, in return for a guaranteed place (UWN, 2008; Welch,
2011, p. 43). While institutional leaders claim that such guaranteed
places are limited to about 10 per cent of the current student intake,
and that they cross-subsidize places for poorer students, it is often
much less clear whether such cross-subsidization indeed takes place,
and, if so, how many students benefit. In the absence of full transpar-
ency, critics allege that the proceeds of such sales have at times been
diverted into the pockets of institutional leaders (Jakarta Post, 2004,
2005; Tempo, 2003; UWN, 2008). It was suspected that Jalur Khusus
schemes, too, have benefitted individuals from the same HEIs (Jakarta
Post, 2005).
Other forms of corruption in Indonesian higher education relate to
the national quality assurance process, upon which individual HEIs’
reputations depend. A poor rating by the national accreditation
agency Badan Akredtitasi Nasional (BAN), for example, would
make it difficult to recruit students and secure income. In one such
case, a private HEI’s Faculty of Engineering, faced with an upcoming
evaluation of its facilities by BAN, knew all too well that its engineer-
ing infrastructure was inadequate. The Faculty thus approached local
engineering firms to borrow numerous items of major equipment.
The day after the inspection, which ultimately yielded a satisfactory
B rating, all items of equipment were promptly returned to the local
firms. Such stories are not uncommon: ‘Many private schools provide
engineering education without sufficient equipment to support the
curriculum and end up compromising the quality of their graduates’
(Buchori and Malik, 2004, p. 261). The system, which depends on
bribery of and collusion with relevant officials, underscores the need
for improved governance, in particular a more effective regulatory
regime, against a background where the widespread and persistent
culture of corruption (widely known in Indonesia as KKN – Korupsi,
Kolusi, Nepotisme) can undermine the effectiveness of quality assur-
ance procedures, and the quality of higher education more generally
374 Welch

(IIEP/CHEA, 2016, p. 4; Monocolumn, 2012; Siaputra and Santosa,

2015; Welch, 2011).
Corruption involving bribery and collusion in Viet Nam has been
exacerbated by the growth of private higher education, which, although
still relatively small, is targeted to grow to 40 per cent of total higher
education enrolments by 2020 (HERA, 2010). Serious problems at two
private HEIs – which, as non-state institutions, were ineligible to receive
public funds – related to over-enrolment, in a context where the Ministry
of Education and Training (MOET) legally defines enrolment limits for
such institutions. Dong Do University was found by MOET to have
over-enrolled its quota by 280 per cent. Accusations that Dong Do
officials were themselves profiting from the practice were allegedly part
of a wider pattern of corruption involving, inter alia, ‘score trading,
diploma fabrication, title purchasing, deceptive reporting, plagiarism
and misuse of funds’ (Tuoitrenews, 2012; see also McCornac, 2009,
2012; Viet Nam News, 2002a).
A second issue – that of entry standards – involved Dong Do leaders
accepting bribes by students or their families, in order to secure entry.
This, too, was strictly illegal, but allegedly occurred in an effort to
boost numbers of enrolments and income levels (Overland, 2006;
Welch, 2011). The practice, also common in Cambodia (Dawson,
2009), exacerbates inequalities, since poor students cannot afford the
bribes. As Seila, a 21-year-old from a poor family of rice farmers,
lamented in response to a government crackdown that saw pass rates
at the Grade 12 exam (which are critical to university entrance) plum-
met from 87 per cent the year before to just 26 per cent: ‘I think if
I could have cheated I could have passed, . . . but . . . I couldn’t get the
answer sheet’ (The Guardian, 2014).
Official investigations uncovered substantial breaches linked to
bribery and corruption: papers were given inflated grades, at times
by unqualified markers; several dozen students were enrolled without
even being on the list, or without upper secondary graduation certi-
ficates (Welch, 2011, pp. 143–144). As a result, Dong Do’s 2002
enrolments were cancelled and the university was given strict instruc-
tions to end such illegal practices. Ha Noi police were called in to
investigate, and, if necessary, to prosecute the Rector and other senior
staff responsible. The Deputy Chair of the university’s board of
management was subpoenaed ‘for his involvement in one of the
biggest scandals to date in the education sector’ (Viet Nam News,
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 375

2002a, 2002c). The former director of its training department was

also subsequently charged.
Such incidents clearly raise questions of governance – but also of
government. Of major concern is that, at times, gamekeeper has turned
poacher: the very officials responsible for ensuring standards and
transparency were themselves part of the corruption. In a separate
case in 2002, two senior MOET officials, each at Deputy Minister
level, were reprimanded or sacked after involvement in the ‘Asian
International University (AIU)’ scam. Both officials were linked to
a ‘bogus university, which . . . enrolled thousands, awarding worthless
paper degrees’ (Viet Nam News, 2002b). After five years, AIU ceased
operation, leaving more than 2,000 students stranded, and with col-
lective debts of hundreds of thousands of dollars. In another incident,
the so-called American Capital University (ACU) offered an MBA
programme together with a partner, the variously titled Singapore
(later Senior) Management Training Centre. Both institutions became
defunct, again leaving substantial numbers of students thousands of
dollars out of pocket (Ashwill, 2006).
Pressures for income diversification have also led to corrupt practices at
times. In the face of the kinds of cost pressures alluded to above, institu-
tional responses across ASEAN have been broadly similar: public HEIs in
several countries mounted what are variously termed ‘Extension’,
‘Diploma’, or ‘Executive’ courses, for high fees. Purportedly developed
in response to demand, the programmes have much lower entry criteria
than regular courses; in some cases, they are open to anyone who can pay.
Commonly, the same staff from the parent institution teach such
‘Extension’ courses, thereby lowering the quality of teaching and research
programmes within the mother institution, since staff involved are less
available to students and have no time to revise curricula or undertake
research. Quality is also problematic within many such ‘special’ courses,
where much the same qualification is offered, but with much less demand-
ing academic standards.
As alluded to earlier, Thailand’s Office for National Education
Standards and Quality Assessment (ONESQA) estimated that no more
than 10 universities, all public, were financially solid. But even those
became increasingly dependent on high-fee parallel programmes:
responding to the regional currency crisis of the late 1990s, public
HEIs raised income from other sources by 450 per cent, leading to
intense competition among public sector HEIs to offer ‘Executive’
376 Welch

programmes, of sometimes dubious quality, for substantial fees. Some

public HEIs reported 60 per cent of their income as having derived from
such commercial ventures, with individual faculties reporting as much as
75 per cent (Poapangsakorn, 2008). The resource squeeze drove public
HEIs to compete vigorously with private HEIs, particularly by establish-
ing fee-paying programmes at ‘learning centres’: ‘Many of them are
using shopping centres as their branches’ (Bangkok Post, 2008). Lack
of transparency in the dispersal of the significant additional income
earned via such programmes has only fuelled charges that funds were
at times being diverted to institutional leaders, and/or those leading the
programmes. Weak governance processes at both institutional and
national levels allowed such practices to continue.
Wider problems related to financial probity and transparency also
surfaced. In Malaysia, rising numbers of complaints to Malaysia’s
National Consumer Complaints Centre in 2009 centred on
‘Executive’ courses offered by public HEI ‘subsidiaries’. The CEO of
the Malaysian Qualifications Authority indicated that most of the
courses offered by commercial arms of public universities fell outside
the Malaysian Qualifications Framework. Once again, poor financial
transparency led to allegations that Deans and others were personally
profiting from such exercises. Cases in which the nominal student
allegedly paid someone else to complete academic work set for the
degree underline the failure of adequate governance processes at both
institutional and, arguably, national levels.

13.5.1 China: Academic Fraud, Bribery, Collusion,

Fake Degrees
Financial transparency, while important, is by no means the only
concern, however. Widespread academic corruption in China takes
many forms, and undermines the strength of the undoubted and
impressive rise of Chinese higher education and research in recent
years (Yang and Welch, 2012).12 The range and pervasiveness of aca-
demic fraud has led to it being characterized as ‘an industry of plagiar-
ism, invented research and fake journals that Wuhan University
estimated in 2009 was worth $150 m, a fivefold increase on just two
years earlier’ (The Economist, 2013). Paying bribes to place one’s
article in a journal is a widespread, and growing, practice.
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 377

In response to a Chinese government survey, Nature reported in

2010 that ‘a third of more than 6,000 scientific researchers at six
leading institutions admitted to plagiarism, falsification or fabrication’
(The Economist, 2013). A 2012 survey of the US PubMed database
revealed that China led the world in retractions due to duplication.13 In
2010, after finding that 70 papers submitted to an international journal
by Chinese scientists had been fabricated, the leading British medical
journal The Lancet urged the Chinese government to ‘assume stronger
leadership in scientific integrity’ (The Economist, 2010). In addition,
some mainland academic entrepreneurs fake scholarly articles which
they then sell to academics, as well as marketing counterfeit versions of
existing medical journals in which they sell publication slots. Placing an
article in one of the counterfeit journals could cost as much as US$ 650,
while buying a fake article is a comparative bargain, at perhaps US$
250. In one such case, according to police, the racket had netted its
creators several million yuan (US$ 500,000 or more) since 2009.
Buyers of such services were generally medical researchers in quest of
promotion (The Economist, 2013).
Bribery and corruption are not new, of course, having also been
reported in the ancient imperial systems of exams, and sometimes
resulting in the execution of perpetrators (He, 1967; Heyneman,
2009; Min, 2004; Miyazaki, 1981). In the fiercely competitive con-
temporary world of Chinese higher education, however, widespread
reports of misuse of research funds are attributed to a culture in which
‘sound research programmes are nothing compared with rapport with
officials in charge. It is even more disgusting that some intellectuals and
government officials collude to cheat, in the name of satisfying the
country’s strategic needs’ (China Daily, 2010b).
As seen, the actual allocation of major research grants, too, is
tainted: ‘the connections with bureaucrats and a few powerful scien-
tists are paramount . . . To obtain major grants in China it is an open
secret that doing good research is not as important as schmoozing with
powerful bureaucrats and their favourite experts’ (Shi and Rao, 2010,
p. 1128). Other investigations have highlighted the practice of paying
bribes to secure promotion, and buying and selling of positions, the
money for which is recouped by on-selling other, lower-level positions
(Caixin, 2016a, 2016b; CCTV, 2011; Huffington Post, 2014; qq.com,
2014; Xinhuanet, 2015a, 2015b). In 2015 alone, the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) listed 32 officials at
378 Welch

HEIs for investigation. Of these, 12 were suspected of severe disciplin-

ary violations, and 20 of violations of Party rules and the law
(Xinhuanet, 2015a).14
High-profile figures have been charged with listing fake degrees, part
of a wider pattern of business leaders and party officials ‘gilding their
resumes with doctorates’ (UWN, 2014a). Bribery to gain entry to well-
known universities is also not uncommon, netting one admissions
director some US$ 3.6 million from just 44 students (NY Times,
2015b). Collusion between businessmen and officials while jointly
undertaking Executive MBA (EMBA) programmes has been alleged
(UWN, 2014b), while a high-profile investigation of a leading univer-
sity by the CCDI led to recent charges of ‘misuse of research funds,
safety problems related to the university’s new campus construction
projects . . . and poor regulation of university-run enterprises including
hospitals associated with the university’. This, it claimed, created
a ‘ripe condition for corruption’ (UWN, 2014c). Misuse of research
funds, in particular, is said to be endemic: ‘Across academia, research
funding is used for personal travel, meals, entertainment and lodging.
Dinners with friends are written up as business meetings, and expenses
for custom-made home furnishings are labeled “buying pencils for
children”’ (Caixin, 2013).
Regular incidents of fake scientific results and plagiarism continue
to surface even at leading universities (with one president claiming to
have dealt with more than 40 cases at his own university within two
years). The high incidence has been linked to a publish-or-perish
culture known as jigong jinli – the quest for quick success and short-
term gain (Nature News, 2010). In 2008 a major Chinese scientific
journal editor’s scrutiny of submitted articles revealed 31 per cent of
2,233 articles contained examples of plagiarism (Nature News,
2012). A 2008 survey of 1,641 students at 10 universities revealed
that more than one in five students admitted to changing data that
didn’t match expectations. More troublingly, while 60 per cent of
PhD students reported that they sometimes witnessed misconduct,
only 5 per cent would report it. At least as troubling was that
students’ tolerance of misconduct increased the longer they stayed
in education. Once again, links to wider notions of governance were
important, with one researcher pointing to ‘a broader lack of honesty
in governance [that] makes it tough to build a culture of honest
research’ (Nature News, 2012). Indeed, in a high-profile case,
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 379

a Urology professor at the celebrated Huazhong University of Science

and Technology in Wuhan was jailed for five and a half months after
hiring thugs to beat up a critic and well-known exposer of academic
fraud who had argued against his election to the august Chinese
Academy of Science (CAS) (Chemistry World, 2010). In response to
this corrupt culture, the CCDI announced a third round of inspec-
tions of university science and technology departments in 2014;
despite this, 2015 yielded a further rich crop of convictions (UWN,
2014c, 2014d; Xinhuanet, 2015b). The effects on the system are
profound and pervasive. Inevitably, such an entrenched culture of
corruption ‘wastes resources, corrupts the spirit, and stymies innova-
tion’ (Shi and Rao, 2010, p. 1128; see also ScienceMag, 2011).

13.5.2 Cronyism, Nepotism, ‘Tuition Classes’

Cronyism in higher education appointments and promotions is
a further troublesome element that undermines sound governance
and weakens institutional and system efficiency. In China, the long-
standing and powerful culture of guanxi means that at times, the
strength of an individual’s relationship network is more important
than performance in determining promotions and results of job appli-
cations. In Malaysia, collusion and political interference have been
alleged in the appointment of Vice Chancellors, and in action taken
against academics whose independence is seen as a threat to the regime
(IIEP/CHEA, 2016, p. 4). The effective termination of the respected
Datuk Dr. Mohamad Redzuan Othman, the head of the University of
Malaya’s Centre for Democracy and Elections (UMcedel) in 2014 was
one such instance. After polls conducted by Professor Redzuan’s
Centre revealed falling support for both the ruling UMNO party and
its leader, he was instructed by the Education Ministry in mid-2014 to
resign as UMcedel Director, and told that his tenure as Dean of the
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in the university was also being
revoked. The action provoked a former Deputy Education Minister (at
the time a Senior Fellow at UM), to resign in protest at blatant political
interference. Direct interference from the university’s Board of
Directors Chairman was alleged: ‘UM is just like an UMNO branch
to Arshad’ (Malaysia Today, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; see also Wan and
Ahmad, 2015). In a further instance, two Deputy Vice Chancellors
from the same university were removed in early 2015, amid allegations
380 Welch

that their dismissals were politically motivated (Malaysian Insider,

2015).
Last, but not least, is the common practice of levying extra fees for
what are called in Myanmar ‘tuition classes’. While explained to some
extent by low public sector salaries in the region, the practice none-
theless falls within the definition of corruption indicated herein. By no
means limited to Myanmar, the practice there is common at all levels of
education. By restricting the curriculum content covered in regular
classes, the teacher ensures that students cannot pass without also
enrolling in additional, fee-based classes, taught out of hours, by the
same teacher. Students unable to afford the significant additional fees
are condemned to fail. The practice is also common in Cambodia (The
Guardian, 2014).

13.5.3 Countering Corruption: The Role of Governance

Better governance can certainly be a means to counter corruption in
higher education. As demonstrated in this chapter, however, in some
instances gamekeeper has turned poacher: the very officials charged
with countering corruption have themselves at times proved to be
perpetrators. Within HEIs, Deans and Deputy Presidents have on
occasion been perpetrators. Corruption is no respecter of rank; indeed,
the financial and other ‘rewards’ are often greater at higher levels.
A further barrier to effective regulation of corruption in the region is
limited state capacity. This is of particular importance given the Janus
face of privatization illustrated herein. On the one hand, the swift
growth of private sector HEIs and enrolments in the past decade or
two has, in a number of systems, outstripped growth in public sector
HEIs. On the other hand, there has been increasing privatization of
public sector HEIs, under pressure to diversify their income sources. The
rise in demand from both trends has exceeded the regulatory capacity of
related agencies, which has not kept pace with the swelling of enrol-
ments, new HEIs, and parallel ‘Executive’ or ‘Diploma’ programmes.
Arguably most important, however, is the prevailing culture of govern-
ance that may limit the willingness of governments and HEIs to imple-
ment effective anti-corruption measures. Thus, the Advisory Statement’s
admirably clear list of forms of corruption, and accompanying measures
that could be instituted to prevent them, fails to take into account the
resilient local cultures, which in Asia feature patriarchy and paternalism,
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 381

respect for authority, seniority, and age – all elements that militate against
effective anti-corruption measures. Yet, it is these cultural values that
often underpin governance norms and practices in many parts of the
region, including in higher education. In cultures, systems, and HEIs
where such values are still core, how likely is it, for example, that ‘trans-
parent processes for appointments to governing councils of all state bodies
involved in the regulation and administration of higher education’ would
be effectively implemented, or that QA or accreditation panels ‘exclude
individuals [with] conflict of interest’? (IIEP/CHAE, 2016, p. 5).

13.6 Conclusion
While corruption in higher education is by no means restricted to
East and Southeast Asia, the illustrations presented here show its
effects there to be both profound and pervasive. Examples of all three
of Indonesia’s trinity of Korrupsi, Kollusi, and Nepotisme have been
given. It is true that low public sector salaries throughout the region,
with the exception of Singapore, and to a lesser extent Malaysia and
Thailand, provide part of the explanation. As an academic from
Cambodia explained in 2014: ‘How can I live on $150 a month? If
you divide my salary by 30? In the morning, I spend 10,000 riel
($2.50) on coffee and noodles alone. So how about parties? Or food?
Or doctor’s visits? Or toothpaste? Or haircuts?’ (The Guardian,
2014).
Responses such as this underline that resilient local cultures of gov-
ernance are not the only factors involved in sustaining corruption in
higher education. In low-income systems such as Cambodia, Laos, and
Myanmar, where public sector salaries are routinely insufficient to
sustain a middle-class lifestyle, including high-quality education for
one’s children, should it come as a surprise that senior administrators
such as Deans, Vice-Presidents, and Presidents of HEIs (those charged
with implementing anti-corruption measures, but with the most to gain
from their absence) are not uncommonly perpetrators? And that those
in the lower echelons sell exam papers, or ensure that the reach of the
conventional formal curriculum is insufficient to pass the exam, so that
students are effectively compelled to attend ‘tutorial’ classes, after
hours, for fees? (IIEP/CHAE, 2016, p. 7).
However, the practices analysed in this chapter reflect a wider cul-
ture of corruption and fraud, by no means restricted to the lower
382 Welch

echelons, that delivers rich rewards to some while depriving many more
of access to good-quality higher education. As seen, corrupt practices
are not restricted to those on low wages. On the contrary, corruption
on a massive scale is often perpetrated by those with substantial assets –
because they can, and because the gains are large. The link between
low-level corruption by those at the base of the system and large-scale
corruption by leaders, including in higher education, was explained by
a Cambodian lecturer in philosophy: ‘They want to kill teachers for
corruption but why don’t they target corruption in their own office
first?’ (The Guardian, 2014). The link to governance, including in
higher education, is clear but limited. The absence of good governance
allows such practices to flourish, thereby weakening the quality of
higher education and exacerbating the gap between rich and poor,
weak and powerful. But, as this chapter has shown, other factors also
contribute.
Ultimately, the perpetuation of corrupt practices in universities
erodes trust in both these institutions and the wider society. On both
normative and economic grounds, societies need to nurture all the
available talent: male and female, rich and poor, rural and urban
(ADB, 2012). It is on both grounds, therefore, that the perpetuation
of corruption must at least be contained. While formal measures of
good governance are critical, they are insufficient without wider efforts
to change long-standing cultural practices that allow corrupt practices
to persist. Instituting transparency measures at institutional and
national levels, such as auditing and publishing HEI financial state-
ments, publicly advertising Codes of Conduct, and publishing regular
reports on corruption at both HEI and national levels, can be an
important means to mitigate opportunities for corruption
(Heyneman, 2004). Nevertheless, as the quotation that prefaced this
chapter underlines, it is an ongoing task of considerable proportions.

Notes
1. For details, see: Dang (2017); Jayasuriya (2003, 2010); Ka (2007); Kaur
et al. (2014); Malaysian Education Blueprint (2015); Norman and Aini
(2015); Raza (2010); Taib and Abdullah (2015); Wan and Ahmad (2015);
Welch (2012a, 2012b, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018); World Bank (2007).
2. The same system applies in Viet Nam, where the Party Secretaries exist
in parallel with Rectors, Deans, etc., and the Party ‘plays the leading role
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 383

in all decision-making processes at every level of the system. Senior

administration staff such as the Rector, have to be party members’
(Hong, 2011, p. 256; see also Khanh and Hayden, 2010, p. 132). An
early experiment by the Ministry of Higher Education (subsequently the
Ministry of Education and Training [MOET]), whereby the University
of Ha Noi – now part of Vietnam National University (VNU), Ha Noi –
could elect its own Rector, was abandoned at the expiry of his term. The
Ministry then resumed the right to appoint University leaders (Hong,
2011, p. 256).
3. During the period from the mid-fifteenth century, the Ming dynasty –
under pressure from the Mongol invasion – sold titles of ‘Student of the
Imperial Academy’ (He, 1967, p. 104).
4. The ‘Opinions’ in the 2015 document embraced seven domains: i)
Strengthening and improving higher education propaganda and
ideology work as a major and urgent strategic task; ii) Guiding
ideology, basic principles, and main tasks; iii) Realistically promoting
the entry of the theoretical system of Socialism with Chinese
characteristics into textbooks, classrooms, and minds; iv) Forcefully
raising the ideological and political quality of higher education
teaching teams; v) Incessantly expanding higher education mainstream
ideology and public opinion; vi) Striving to strengthen management of
the higher education propaganda and ideology battlefield; vii)
Realistically strengthening Party leadership over higher education
propaganda and ideology work (China Copyright and Media, 2015).
5. Again, the Vietnamese system is not much different: ‘Vietnamese
education is socialist education that is popular, national, scientific,
modern and founded on Marxism-Leninism and Hô Chi Minh
Thought’ (Hong, 2011, p. 227).
6. The 1 Malaysia Berhad (1Mdb) scandal erupted in 2015, when
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak was forced to admit that
more than RM 2.67 billion (circa US$ 700 million) from the heavily
indebted 1MDB (a national strategic development company) had been
channelled into his personal bank account. Since then, the scandal has
spawned investigations by the Wall Street Journal, the Times of
London, the Attorney General of Switzerland, Hong Kong Police, the
US Justice Department, and the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office.
7. The phrase ‘tigers and flies’ was used by President Xi to indicate that
both large and small examples of corrupt officials would be targeted. No
one was to be exempt. The anti-corruption campaign, initiated in 2013,
has seen thousands of officials prosecuted, at the national level as well as
at Shěng (Province), Xian (county), Chu (Division), Tin (department),
and Ju (Bureau) levels. Findings of bribery, embezzlement, and abuse of
384 Welch

power were made against some of China’s most senior officials,

including Bo Xilai, a member of the Standing Committee of the
Politburo (China’s Cabinet). (His wife, Gu Kailai, was charged with
murder.) Zhou Yongkang, another former member of the Politburo,
and Secretary of China’s Zhengfawei Central Legal and Political Affairs
Commission, was sentenced to life imprisonment in mid-2015, after
being found guilty of bribery, abuse of power, and intentionally
disclosing national secrets. Assets of more than US$ 14 billion were
seized as part of the investigation (BBC, 2015a; Caixin, 2016a, 2016b).
8. The first two are Provinces; the third is designated an Autonomous
Region, a status equivalent to other border regions of China, such as
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, in China’s Northwest.
9. Over several years from 1999, the Chinese government deliberately raised
higher education enrolments by between 25 and 30 per cent annually,
partly in response to the effects of the regional currency crisis, and partly
to reform Chinese HEIs.
10. In this period, government subsidies declined from 14,902 yuan per
student to 7,586 yuan, dropping further from 5,553 yuan per student in
2004 to 5,376 yuan in 2005. Operating expenditure per student declined
from 2,297 yuan to 2,238 yuan over the same time period.
11. In one instance, international students considering enrolment in
a tertiary college in Melbourne, Australia, were lured online with
photos of large and impressive colonial era buildings, only to find
upon arrival that the photos were of the central railway station.
12. As measured by their presence in the highly regarded Science Citation
Index (SCI), the number of articles from mainland China grew from
a negligible share in 2001 to 9.5% in 2011, second in the world to
America. According to a 2017 report published by the Institute of
Scientific and Technical Information (ISTIC) of China, more than
2 million Chinese papers were published in SCI journals from 2007 to
2017, ranking second only to the USA (in absolute terms), for number of
publications and citations (Jia 2017). The respected journal Nature
reported that in 2012 the number of mainland authored papers in the
journal’s 18 affiliated research publications rose by 35 per cent over the
previous year (The Economist, 2013; see also CRI, 2011; Yang and
Welch, 2012).
13. That is, the same article published in different journals. The extent of
such corrupt practices led some mainland scientists to joke that SCI
stands for ‘Stupid Chinese Idea’.
14. The practices of paying bribes for promotion, and buying and selling of
posts, have also been criticized in Viet Nam and elsewhere (Tuoitrenews,
2012).
Governance and Corruption in East and Southeast Asia 385

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14 Fixing the System?
Trends in African Higher Education
Governance
r o s e a m a z a n a n d k a s s ah u n k e b e d e
dawo

14.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the higher education sector and some policy
reforms in Africa, looking particularly at the area of university govern-
ance. It situates the trends in African higher education governance
reform within the broader context of international, continental,
national, and institutional policy shifts. It highlights a range of factors,
control mechanisms, and challenges that continue to impede the pro-
gress of university reform in African higher education.
To this end, the chapter begins by contextualizing the issues around
higher education governance in African universities, detailing some of
the central policy challenges and the impact of recent policy initiatives.
This will be followed by an examination of the various issues relating to
the diversity of governance in higher education in Africa. The section
goes on to explore the interplay of policy, the market, and state/govern-
ment involvement, while paying due attention to the historical and
political specificities of the continent; namely, colonization, extensive
state involvement in higher education, economic vicissitudes, the rapid
expansion of higher education, and two decades of state neglect of the
higher education sector.
Having painted the global picture of higher education governance in
Africa, the chapter then focuses on the governance of Ethiopian higher
education as an illustrative case. Drawing on empirical data, the aim
here is to explore the academic governance of public universities in
Ethiopia within the context of the higher education reform introduced
through the Education and Training Policy (FDRE-ETP, 1994) and the
Higher Education Proclamation No. 650/2009 (FDRE-HEP, 2009).

396
Fixing the System? 397

Although the case of Ethiopia cannot be wholly representative of the

situation of higher education governance in Africa, it allows for a fully
contextualized analysis of the way in which the shifts in governance
seen across parts of the continent are enacted in a highly mediated way.
It is important to note the existence of some common, underlying
geopolitical assumptions, although it is beyond the scope of this chap-
ter to examine these in detail. For example, any discussion of higher
education governance in Africa as a whole must take into account
various structural differences between regions. While there is no agreed
term for the subdivisions of countries and regions discussed here, we
might think about the differences, for example, between Southern
Africa and Northern Africa, including their specific histories of devel-
opment and colonization. Imported styles of government can also be
grouped to differentiate countries and their forms of higher education
systems: for example, one might contrast Francophone centralism with
Anglophone heterogeneity. These have an impact on the scope and
reach of the analysis herein.

14.2 Contextualizing the Issues

The revitalization of Africa’s higher education (HE) system is critical to
the continent’s development. To some extent we can agree with those
economic analyses that see capacity building and human resource
development as a way to propel growth and development. This vital
source of hope has been recognized by the African Union’s develop-
ment framework strategy, Agenda 2063, in achieving its set objectives.
These objectives include building ‘a prosperous Africa based on inclu-
sive growth and sustainable development, an Africa whose develop-
ment is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people . . .
[an] Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner’
(African Union, 2015, p. 2).
This transformative potential of education is both a challenge and an
engine of change, but it places huge demands upon the sector. Higher
education in Africa has undergone some dramatic changes in recent
decades, including the rapid expansion of both the public and the
private systems, an increase in fee-paying student schemes, the
increased enrolment of women and other groups, and a drop in public
expenditure from state governments and funding from international
donors. The effects of these changes are still being felt today in tertiary
398 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

institutions across the continent. These issues make institutional gov-

ernance and leadership crucial to success.
Generally speaking, African HE systems have experienced some
extreme difficulties in dealing with these changes and demands. The
1980s and 1990s saw a massive decline in most aspects of HE in
Africa. Over the last two decades, access to HE in Africa has
remained at 5 per cent, which is one-fifth of the global average of
25 per cent (Mba, 2017). Women are still significantly underrepre-
sented, especially in the STEM subjects (science, technology, engi-
neering, mathematics), as well as in the fields of agriculture and
health. The brain-drain phenomenon, coupled with the Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which reduced the role of the state
while introducing market ideology in the 1980s, exacerbated the
situation and continue to impede many parts of the African HE
system. More recently, factors associated with globalization and
marketization have impacted on the HE sector. Some argue that
the sector’s failure to respond to the pressures of the market are
responsible for the migration of skilled labour (Teferra, 2010;
Varghese, 2013). At the same time, many university graduates
who remain in their own countries are unemployed and unable to
secure good prospects. These issues can compound each other.
Due to the increased demands on HE, and the challenges that uni-
versities in Africa face in providing quality education, university gov-
ernance has become more of a focus. Higher education governance
debates often go hand in hand with a country’s interest in improving its
national productivity (El-Khawas, 2012). According to Jaramillo et al.
(2012), HE institutional governance is one of the most important
factors affecting the quality of tertiary education. Similarly, Hénard
and Mitterle (2010, p. 15) argue that ‘governance has become a major
leverage tool for improving quality in all aspects of higher education’.
Fundamental to the issue of governance is the relationship between
governments and higher education institutions themselves. Across
Africa, governments control all aspects of their countries’ HE systems
and seek to regulate the functions of HE. This state control model is
prevalent in many developing countries. According to the Task Force
on Higher Education and Society (TFHES, 2000, p. 53), ‘state control
has tended to undermine many major principles of good governance.
The direct involvement of politicians has generally politicized HE,
widening the possibilities for corruption, nepotism, and political
Fixing the System? 399

opportunism’. This state control reduces the autonomy of HE institu-

tions, a trend we see across the continent. According to Oanda and Sall
(2016, p. 62), ‘political interference in leadership and management of
universities infringed on institutional autonomy in a manner that com-
promised academic freedom’.
The World Bank (1988, 2000) has acknowledged governance as
a major constraint to the efficiency of African universities. The estab-
lishment of buffer organizations between governments and universi-
ties, and new institutional governing bodies, are signs of a move away
from direct government control in the context of the increasing demand
on the HE sector to be more accountable, efficient, and productive.
How these reforms/policies have impacted the governance and man-
agement of HE will be discussed herein.

14.2.1 Challenges Facing Higher Education Governance

in Africa
Modern HE in Africa was mainly imported from Europe and is rela-
tively young (Beverwijk, 2005; Varghese, 2004), with the majority of
first-generation African universities being established in the 1950s.
Public universities flourished after African countries achieved their
independence from their colonial governors. The monopoly of the
public HE institutions, however, came to an end in the closing decades
of the twentieth century when private sector institutions emerged as
viable alternatives. Reforms initiated by the ‘structural adjustment
programs, the deregulation policies and the financial crisis of the state
created an encouraging environment for the emergence of the private
higher education sector in Africa’ (Varghese, 2004, p. 4). Nevertheless,
in spite of competition from the ever-expanding private higher educa-
tion institutions (PRHEIs), the public higher education institutions
(PUHEIs) still account for a large segment of students. For instance,
within the sub-Saharan African (SSA) region, public institutions
account for 72 per cent of the total student enrolment, while the
remaining 28 per cent goes to private institutions (Mouton and
Wildschut, 2015, p. 4).
The massive growth in student enrolment numbers in both public
and private universities over the past 50 years contributes a great deal
to the numerous challenges that the African HE sector is currently
facing. These include: quality assurance issues; inadequate funding;
400 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

lack of human resources, in the sense of both inadequate and

unqualified staffing; poor facilities; pressures to expand; poor gov-
ernance; and leadership and management demands (Aina, 2010;
Pillay, 2010; Yizengaw, 2008). Increased demand for access to
higher education has led to the rapid expansion of HE institutions,
which has compromised the quality of the education on offer as
well as curricular relevance – the alignment of higher education
with the needs of the labour market (UNESCO, 2012; Varghese,
2016). Lack of opportunities for regional and international colla-
boration and partnership has also impacted on the quality and
relevance of teaching and research, leaving many graduates unable
to match their skills to labour demands (Aina, 2010; Pillay, 2010;
Yizengaw, 2008).
Arguably, most countries in Africa suffer from a shortage of
human resources, especially in the STEM fields (Mba, 2017). At
the same time, many university graduates are unemployed and have
difficulty securing suitable positions. According to Oanda and Sall
(2016), there are two factors which contribute to the continuation
of these two crises. They point to the lack of a holistic and strategic
policy, compounded by increased enrolments that the universities
cannot easily handle. This disconnect between market supply and
demand on the one hand, and national development needs and
graduates’ skills on the other, continues to slow economic develop-
ment and growth in many African countries. It is of course impor-
tant to recall that this tension/mismatch is a problem for the West
too, and is not unique to Africa or indeed other parts of the devel-
oping world. However, the focus here is on the situation as it affects
Africa.
According to a report by the Inter-University Council (IUCEA) –
a body created to regulate HE in East Africa1 – at least half of
graduates of East African universities lack skills which would
enhance employability, including technical mastery and basic work-
related capabilities (IUCEA and EABC, 2014). Uganda has the least
qualified graduates, with 63 per cent lacking the necessary skills,
followed closely by Tanzania at 61 per cent, Burundi at
55 per cent, Rwanda at 52 per cent, and Kenya at 51 per cent
(IUCEA and EABC, 2014). This problem stretches beyond East
Africa: South Africa is one of the most developed nations in this
region, and yet here too there are more than 800,000 vacancies in the
Fixing the System? 401

private sector alone, while 600,000 university graduates are unem-

ployed (The Economist, 2012). Global shifts in the nature of work
also play a role. The idea that rapid developments in the new econ-
omy might further complicate the relationship between current uni-
versity qualifications and actual job requirements is a challenge for
governments and social theorists alike.
Funding represents another major challenge. The decision of the
World Bank to concentrate on policies supporting basic education,
and neglecting HE, had dire consequences for funding. Most universi-
ties on the continent struggled to meet demand even with government
support; when state funding failed to keep up with the expansion of the
HE system, the result was a decline in teaching standards/quality of
education and a depletion of research facilities (Varghese, 2016). In
Ethiopia, for instance, ‘the rate of expansion of public provision in HE
has been so rapid that capital expenditure absorbed 65 per cent of the
total HE budget during 2003–08’ (Ravishankar et al., 2010, p. 20); as
a result, the government found it difficult to keep up with this recurrent
need.
This touches upon a series of interlocking arguments that will be
evident throughout this chapter. Governments want their education
systems to be efficient (defined partly in terms of helping to produce
‘good’ human capital). However, in order to make this happen, states
have had to intervene very directly in university structures and forms
of governance. As with economic liberalism in the nineteenth century,
governments are considerably less laissez faire than the classical
ideology might suggest. Thus, we often see the state using the market
ideology as a cover to dictate to universities how they want things
done.
Furthermore, the introduction of fee-paying students in the 1990s (to
compensate for lost revenue) was quite damaging (see Mamdani, 2007;
Oanda and Sall, 2016), setting back the public HE sector which was
still dealing with the consequences of the SAP era. As is often the case,
a squeeze on public expenditure effectively promotes the private.
Private HE was able to flourish and become one of the fastest growing
sectors in Africa (Mouton and Wildschut, 2015). For instance, within
the SSA region alone, the public HE sector comprises 109 universities
and 526 polytechnics/colleges, while there were 456 private universi-
ties/colleges in 2012 (Mouton and Wildschut, 2015, p. 4; see also
SARUA, 2012).
402 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

14.2.2 The Impacts of Higher Education Policies/Reforms

on Governance in African Higher Education Institutions
The competing political discourses operating behind reform changes in
Africa can be attributed to market-driven approaches and struggles for
autonomy from state interference. Evidence shows that many reform
measures in HE in Africa are triggered by the realization that expansion
cannot be supported solely with public resources and funding
(Varghese, 2013, 2016). Thus, African universities are effectively
forced to take on market-friendly reforms, which in turn demand
changes to the institutional governance structure. This neoliberal
approach cherishes certain kinds of business models and strategies
which focus on deployment of the concept of ‘good governance’
through market-oriented reforms. These reforms include deregulation;
adoption of flatter management structures; establishment of semi-
autonomous agencies to replace public service departments; perfor-
mance-based accountability; and adoption of market-based leadership
and management strategies, principles, and techniques (Kebede, 2015).
While these market-driven reforms were an attempt to substitute
state control and reduce reliance on state funding, government influ-
ence over HE has not in fact declined. Rather, the role of the state in HE
has been redefined – some would say strengthened – in order to enforce/
regulate accountability measures (Varghese, 2016). As Capano et al.
(2015, p. 319) argue, ‘governments are still very much in charge, in
every governance mode’. To make sense of this, it might help us to
think about the state in terms of its remit. Unlike individual agencies in
the private sector, the state implicitly has a necessary relation to the
concept of the public interest and a responsibility for the whole coun-
try. This can be seen more in terms of the development of a framework
for operating and regulating the system than in terms of financing,
managing, and controlling institutions of HE (Varghese, 2016, p. 38).
A study by the International Institute for Educational Planning
which analyses the impacts of reform measures on the governance of
HE in five African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Ghana,
and Nigeria), found that, on the whole, reform measures such as the
establishment of a governing board, institutional autonomy, funding,
and reorganization of university structures and operations, facilitated
a move away from direct government control (Varghese, 2016).
However, as previously mentioned, this has not been successful. Saint
Fixing the System? 403

(2009), having reviewed the legal frameworks of 49 African countries,

identified only 15 out of 42 SSA countries where semi-autonomous
buffer bodies had been established. Such bodies are more commonly
found in Anglophone African countries; Francophone countries have
tended to create separate ministries of HE. For instance, in Ethiopia,
the change of the socialist government in 1991 and the resultant shift in
the political and economic condition of the country forced the incum-
bent government, the Ethiopia Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF), to introduce a series of reforms in the education system
in general, and in HE in particular (Weldemariam, 2008). These
reforms in the HE governance and management system were precipi-
tated especially by the urgent need to ensure ‘the academic freedom and
accountability of the HEIs [higher education institutions] as well as
their administrative autonomy’ (FDRE-MoE, 2005, p. 13). The intro-
duction of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) in 1994 focused on
the idea that Ethiopia’s education system needed to transform from the
previously elitist configuration to an open-to-all approach. This policy
was instrumental in the reform of the HE sector. The ETP clearly
outlined the rights and duties of all involved in education, as well as
stating the duties of educational management – that is, to create the
necessary conditions to expand, enrich, and improve the relevance,
quality, accessibility, and equity of education and training (FDRE-
ETP, 1994, Articles 3.8.1–3.8.5).
However, according to some authors (Nega, 2012; Saint, 2004;
Varghese, 2013) the situation on the ground is quite different from
that which was originally intended. Varghese (2013, p. 20) argues that
‘the success of reforms’ in Ethiopian HE is ‘still debatable’. Many
studies (Ashcroft and Rayner, 2011; Mehari, 2010; Nega, 2012;
Saint, 2009) have tried to identify the general governance problems
and challenges facing HE institutions in Ethiopia. Very few, however,
have addressed the issues of HE governance adequately.

14.3 Trends in Governance, Leadership and Management

in African Higher Education
In 2002, Dearlove warned that the governance of African HE had
become a recognized cause for concern. Further evidence is provided
in a study on the overhaul of governance, leadership, and management
in Ethiopia’s HE system, which concluded that there are ‘three central
404 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

problems related to governance, management, and leadership that lead

to a range of other related problems that could threaten the reform of
higher education in Ethiopia’ (FDRE-MoE, 2004, p. 5). These three
problems referred to a lack of readiness on the part of HE institutions,
the government, and its agencies to embrace the new ‘situation of
autonomy and accountability’. In this vein the authors of the study
also stressed the failure to establish a mature institutional culture
(FDRE-MoE, 2004, p. 5).
These issues are common across the continent. Many African
governments have attempted to mitigate some of the challenges
they face by trying to implement reforms and policies that alter
the nature of their relationship with universities. For instance, in
South Africa the government launched several policies and initia-
tives to address HE governance issues (often referred to by the new
term ‘cooperative governance’). The trail can be followed through
a 1996 report of the National Commission for Higher Education,
a 1996 Green Paper, a 1997 White Paper and Bill on Higher
Education, and the Higher Education Act of 1997 (see Mouton
and Wildschut, 2015). However, Sayed (2000) thinks the state of
HE governance in South Africa is better viewed as an outcome of
the politics of policy contestation. He argues that, while the idea
of cooperative governance may have a seductive appeal, unfortu-
nately ‘it masks a number of tensions and contradictions regarding
the balance between control and regulation, the nature of decision
making, the balance between consultation and co-decision making,
the relationship between the state and civil society, and the policy
mechanisms employed to steer the system’ (Sayed, 2000, p. 488).
These debates and discussions revolve around questions relating to
‘the purpose(s) of higher education, the tension between university
autonomy and public accountability, the balance between self-
regulation and governmental intervention and control, and the nat-
ure of academic freedom’ (Sayed, 2000, p. 477).
The bottom line is that state involvement in university affairs is the
norm in many African universities, which can create tension between
the government and the institution (Mouton and Wildschut, 2015;
Saint, 1992). Typically, the head of state is the ultimate authority in
appointing the executive body (e.g. vice chancellors, members of coun-
cil) (Mouton and Wildschut, 2015; Teferra and Altbach, 2004), mak-
ing political interference in university affairs an inevitable reality. The
Fixing the System? 405

manner in which these leaders are appointed (not necessarily based on

merit or calibre) creates challenges for achieving harmony in the sector.
African HE institutions are increasingly under the influence of ‘state
driven higher education policy and the constantly increasing interven-
tion of external quality assurance’ (Hénard and Mitterle, 2010, p. 2).
These increases in auditing are best seen in a relational way: for exam-
ple, reductions in funding have left some institutions starved of ongoing
funds. As Hénard and Mitterle (2010, p. 2) point out, there are ‘losses
of billions of dollars to individual universities because of decreasing
support from donors and possible future cuts in government spending
to counter-balance the subsidies’.
To an even greater extent than in developed economies, the rela-
tionship between the HE system and national governments in devel-
oping countries is often one of dependency and control. In some of its
earlier reports, the World Bank took the view that there was too
much government involvement in the HE sector in Africa (World
Bank, 1988, 2000). It saw this involvement as hindering the dyna-
mism of the education sector. However, in an apparent contradic-
tion, the same organization also identified inadequate governance as
a big limitation for universities in Africa. Following this logic, gov-
ernance should be via private, not state, mechanisms. When the
World Bank criticizes a national government (such as Ethiopia’s)
for excessive interference in an education sector, this might be seen
as a predictable critique from an organization that appears to be
ideologically committed to privatization. Is the World Bank open to
the charge of being contradictory here? At the very least we can
question its power to set agendas and priorities over the heads of
national governments.
It can be argued that the World Bank’s position should be viewed
with some scepticism as it seems to be overly influenced by the prevail-
ing neoliberal view that the market knows best, and that states should
not ‘bail out’ or prop up institutions, or even seek to run them with
government money. Irrespective of this, a number of initiatives by the
World Bank were proposed to mitigate the alleged interference of the
state, such as withdrawal of direct government involvement in accred-
itation processes and regulations; sharing governance with the minis-
tries of education, faculty, and university management; and securing
external funding to assure financial stability of institutions (Oanda and
Sall, 2016; World Bank, 1988, 2000).
406 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

A lot of work has gone into theorizing how governments govern, and
much of this could be related to the specifics of university governance.
As Capano et al. (2015) point out, we would need, at the very least, to
distinguish between governance and government (the latter referring to
purposive use of power, usually by a nation state, and the former being
a wider concept connoting the accumulation of relations between
government and non-government bodies). Maybe we need to think of
the way the state rules in a changed field of devolved functions and
relations as ‘new governance’. However, as Capano et al. suggest, it
would be dangerous when discussing policy formation or new ways of
‘ordering reality’ to think that states have been devolved out of exis-
tence or that they do not desire to be the ultimate arbiters and decision
makers. Notions of ‘de-governmentalization’ may be premature or
over-played: ‘there is plenty of evidence suggesting that while the role
of the state may indeed have changed to adapt to and accommodate
more complex and rapidly changing environments, the dominant role
of government in these new governance arrangements remains intact’
(Capano et al., 2015., p. 3).

14.3.1 Marketization of Higher Education Governance

in Africa
The shift to opening up the university sector to the market is a general
trend both in developing countries and the West. The market-
driven/neoliberal ideology in HE governance postulates that leaders
elected from the academic community cannot meet today’s demands.
As a result, the top leadership of universities are appointed from out-
side the university system and are expected to bring with them ‘presti-
gious contacts, research achievements, or knowledge of competitors’
(El-Khawas, 2012, p. 1). Thus, the traditional academic-driven govern-
ance model is no longer acceptable, and the corporate governance
model has taken its place.
Trends in decision making or governing bodies have also moved
away from the traditional academic-led model. Currently there is
a shift to new governance models which include shared governance
(participatory or stakeholder decision making), corporate governance
(an entrepreneurial approach in which the state plays a supervisory role
while policy and strategy are delegated to institutions), and flexible
governance (open to enhanced learning and adaptation to an
Fixing the System? 407

increasingly dynamic environment and market) (Kebede, 2015, p. 19).

As institutions move towards more market-oriented, cost-effective,
entrepreneurial models, governance will be concentrated in the hands
of the top management, and administration will move towards profes-
sional management with a New Public Management slant (Krug,
2011).
In the context of Ethiopia, Solomon (2010) argues that the shift from
the traditional approaches of academician-led decision making to
a government-controlled governance system resulted in a deterioration
of educational quality in HE institutions. Arguably, this has led to a lack
of trust in the ability of the current (government-dominated) HE sector
to bring about economic growth and development. However, others
contend that the reforms that have taken place in the country have
facilitated a number of improvements in HE governance and manage-
ment (Varghese, 2013; Yizengaw, 2003). They argue that the changes
have been positive in many ways, and that the universities are now more
autonomous financially, with concomitantly less intervention on the part
of the government in their affairs. The rest of this chapter will focus on
the case of Ethiopia.

14.3.2 Methodology
The main empirical data discussed here are drawn from a larger study
(see Kebede, 2015) on the academic governance system of public and
private universities centring upon Ethiopia. The focus of that study was
the academic governance of public and private HEIs with regard to
organizational structures and functions of academic units and their
governance structure, and their openness and transparency, as stipu-
lated in two documents: the Education and Training Policy of 1994
(FDRE-ETP, 1994) and the Higher Education Proclamation No. 650 of
2009 (FDRE-HEP, 2009).
Using cyclical processes of collecting and analysing data (follow-
ing Johnson and Christensen, 2012, p. 514), an in-depth investiga-
tion of the problem was conducted through a comparative case
study approach using a qualitative research design. This design was
selected because it allowed the case to be viewed through ‘a wide-
and deep-angle lens’, and facilitated an analysis of academic gov-
ernance in the case study universities (Johnson and Christensen,
2012).
408 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

The data set for the larger study consisted of 20 participants: these
included HE officials (2), quality assurance officers (5), department
and faculty heads (5), and teachers and students (8), all purposely
selected from two university cases, one public and one private. The
cases were selected based on: (i) year of establishment; (ii) whether the
university is being audited by the Higher Education Relevance and
Quality Agency (HERQA) for institutional performance; and (iii) the
status of the university in terms of total student enrolment. Findings
were also drawn from document analysis of secondary data such as
academic legislation, proclamations, regulations, and guidelines pro-
duced by the case study universities, HERQA, the Education Strategy
Centre (ESC), and the Ministry of Education (MoE). It should be
noted that since the focus of this chapter is on public universities in
Ethiopia, only data from the public university case will be discussed
here.

14.4 Higher Education in Ethiopia

14.4.1 Background and Legislative Framework

Public higher education institutions in general, and public universities
in particular, are a recent phenomenon in the history of Ethiopia.
Perhaps unlike some other African countries, Ethiopian HE has its
roots in traditional church education (Amare, 2005; Saint, 2004),
which was offered by the Orthodox Church at elementary, secondary,
college, and university levels (Amare, 1967). Modern HE in Ethiopia
began in the nineteenth century with the arrival of Christian mission-
aries who thought providing educational facilities would win hearts
and minds and make new converts. Many scholars believe that Addis
Ababa University, founded in 1950, was the country’s first public
university, but Amare (2005) dates modern HE in Ethiopia back to
the establishment by the government of the first technical school at
Gafat, near the town of Debretabor, in Amhara Region, to produce
weapons and to defend the country from the then European colonizers.
However, HE demonstrated little progress, even after the establishment
of Addis Ababa University, as this ‘remained the only higher learning
institution in the country for over half a century’ (Solomon, 2010,
p. 96). It was only after the EPRDF government came to power in
1991 that the expansion of HE began in earnest.
Fixing the System? 409

From that period Ethiopia adopted a wide range of reforms of its

education system, beginning with the introduction of the ETP which
focused on the need to transform the education system from an elitist
system. The HE sector went through three stages of reforms: the founda-
tion of a legal framework, expansion of facilities, and the improvement
and revitalization of the system (Higher Education Strategic Centre,
2012). The first phase was characterized by the preparation of major
legal frameworks such as the ETP, the Education Sector Development
Plans, and other relevant white papers; in the second and third phases,
the government focused on the actual expansion of the education sector
and reforms necessary to maintain quality and relevance within the
expanding HE system (Higher Education Strategic Centre, 2012). At
the same time, these measures created conditions ‘to encourage and give
support to private investors to open schools and establish various educa-
tional and training institutions’ (FDRE-ETP, 1994, Article 3.9.6).
Article 3.8 and sub-articles 3.8.1–3.8.5 of the ETP, and the Higher
Education Proclamation (HEP) No. 650/2009 (FDRE-HEP, 2009),
provide the legal ground for developing autonomous, active, and inter-
nationally recognized public and private universities. The policy set out
the necessity of a series of measures to reform the country’s educational
organization and management with the aim of ensuring that educa-
tional management is democratic, professional, coordinated, efficient,
and effective, and to encourage the participation of women. The policy
laid the ground work for educational institutions to be autonomous in
their internal administration and in the design and implementation of
education and training programmes. Further, overall coordination and
democratic leadership by boards or committees now includes members
from the community (FDRE-ETP, 1994, Article 3.8 and sub-articles
3.8.1–3.8.5).
Since these reforms, public universities in Ethiopia have been given
the power to design and implement their own strategic plans, income
diversification strategies, and ICT development. At the level of aca-
demic programmes, they can introduce new programmes in response to
the anticipated labour market needs that underpin the nation’s eco-
nomic development strategy as well as initiate graduate programmes
(Kebede, 2015). The university curricula have been upgraded and
a new buffer agency (HERQA), which monitors both quality and
relevance of academic programmes, has been established (FDRE-
HEP, 2003; World Bank, 2003).
410 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

14.4.2 Expansion/Evolution
With the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991, undergraduate enrol-
ment grew rapidly. In 1971 there were only 4,500 students enrolled in
HE out of a population of 34 million (Saint, 2004), which was far below
the average for the region. Before 1986, Ethiopia had only 11 HEIs, 2
universities, and 7 colleges and institutes in various parts of the country
(Wondimu, 2003). At the time of writing, the total number of public
universities had reached 38, and is due to grow to 47 by 2020 (see FDRE,
2016; FDRE-MoE, 2017). The total number of undergraduates enrolled
increased significantly between 2003/2004 and 2015/2016, from 56,072
to 778,766 (FDRE-MoE, 2017). The technical and vocational training
(TVET) sector has also experienced a massive boom. The number of
students enrolled in TVET institutions increased from 5,264 in 1999/
2000 to 271,389 in 2014/2015 (Seid et al., 2015).
The private HE sector has also grown, almost trebling in size since
2003. At the time of writing, the total number of PRHEIs – universities,
university colleges, and institutes – has reached 98, of which 4 hold
university status (i.e. Unity, St Mary’s, Admas, and Rift Valley
Universities). In terms of student numbers, research sponsored by
FDRE-MoE (2004) with the aim of overhauling higher education in
the country predicted that the share of private higher education in
terms of students’ enrolment would reach 40–50 per cent of total HE
enrolment by 2009. However, the 2017 MoE Education Statistics
Annual Abstract showed that private HE institutions were enrolling
only 118,577 of Ethiopia’s 778,766 higher education students – a mere
15.2 per cent (FDRE-MoE, 2017).
The number of teaching staff in HE has also increased enormously.
The total number of local and expatriate academic staff nearly tripled
from 11,028 in 2008/2009 to 30,496 in 2015/2016 (FDRE-MoE,
2017). Along with this expansion, the type, complexity, and modalities
of HE offered in the country have also increased hugely. There are now
regular, distance, summer, evening, and cross-border modes of delivery
in the system. The use of e-learning/virtual mode in HE institutions in
Ethiopia is still in its infancy as universities grapple with challenges (e.g.
lack of human resource and infrastructure, absence of policy, access,
awareness) in using this mode (see Anberbir, 2015).
Despite this growth and expansion, HE institutions in Ethiopia
(similar to the rest of Africa) have faced issues with the quality of the
Fixing the System? 411

educational offering and with assuring that their graduates’ abilities

match the skills needed to enter the workforce. The expansion, coupled
with the high population growth rate, has put tremendous pressure on
the Ethiopian labour market (Seid et al., 2015). According to the World
Bank (2007), approximately 600,000 individuals enter the Ethiopian
workforce every year. Since the Ethiopian economy is unable to keep
up with this demand for jobs, this represents a marked oversupply of
labour, resulting in high unemployment rates and long-lasting unem-
ployment, especially among young graduates (Seid et al., 2015). Some
have argued that the Ethiopian government was previously too con-
cerned with early schooling reforms to the detriment of supporting the
university sector. The emphasis on lower-age-range education led to
a long-term neglect in the production of highly skilled, fully employable
graduates. However, holding government education and employment
policies to account has proved difficult.
In part this relates to a perennial problem around education and
national economic development in changing times. Universities (like
schools) are not job agencies nor, crucially, do they ‘make jobs’. They
always have to play catch-up with the evolving employment scene. If
there are not enough jobs waiting for their graduates they can say –
with some justification – that it is not their fault. The government might
argue that the universities should turn out better (job-ready) graduates,
but the blame game at this point becomes circular. Nevertheless, some
form of supply and demand relationship must exist. Labour and jobs
are an integral element of market relations, and governments must take
whatever actions they can.

14.4.3 Higher Education Governance in Ethiopia

The governance and management structure of PUHEIs in Ethiopia
usually includes the board, the president, the senate, a managing coun-
cil, university council, academic unit council, academic unit managing
council, and department assembly, plus advisory or specialized com-
mittees or councils that may be established by the board, senate, or
university council.
As the chief executive officer (CEO) – itself a position title redolent of
the shift to corporate culture in HE – of the institution, the president is
responsible for overall operations and substantive transactions. The
board, which is the highest governing body in the institution, has
412 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

responsibilities ranging from examining, approving, and following up

the implementation of proposals for institutional reorganization, orga-
nizational plans, policies, administration, and academic programmes,
to the issuing of directives regarding qualification requirements and
procedures for nomination, appointment, and terms of office of the
vice-presidents, other academic officers, and members of the senate
(FDRE-HEP No. 650/2009, Articles 44: 1–4). Mintzberg (1983,
p. 15) describes the CEO as the most powerful influencer both ‘in and
around the organization’. The presidents are indeed powerful within
the universities; although accountable to their respective management
boards, they are chief executive officers, heads of the university coun-
cils, and the senate. While this has given the presidents adequate
executive power to get things pushed through the decision making
bodies easily, there is also the danger of using their power to infringe
the rights and independence of academic staff and units in the
universities.
The senate is the leading body of the institution for academic
matters. Some of the roles and responsibilities of the senate include
determining the academic calendar, ensuring proper implementation
of the institution’s statutes related to all academic and research
matters, and approving and nominating academic units as well as
employment of academic staff with the rank of professor. The pre-
sident is the chair of the senate. Another important governing or
advisory body in relation to academic affairs in public universities
is the university council. It is composed of members of the managing
council, all deans, directors, members of the senate standing commit-
tee, the chief librarian, the registrar, other key academic officers,
service department heads, academic staff, and student representa-
tives. The role of the university council is to advise the president on
matters such as plans, budget, organizational structures, academic
programmes, agreements of cooperation, splits and mergers, and
closures of academic units, as well as on the performance of depart-
ments (FDRE-ETP, 1994, Article 57: 1, 2).

14.4.4 Challenges Affecting Higher Education Governance

in Ethiopia
According to Varghese (2004), PUHEIs are faced with a number of
challenges. This is mainly because the expansion of public tertiary
Fixing the System? 413

institutions ‘has drained resources, overburdened faculty members,

encouraged “faculty flight” (academic staff leaving a faculty) and
reduced overall quality’ (Hayward, 2010, p. 35). Since research at
faculty level is a critical backbone of post-graduate education, this
has hindered the development of programmes, and of institutions over-
all (Hayward, 2010). The budgetary implications of the recent expan-
sion of HE have also been enormous.
Quality audit reports published by HERQA from 2011 to 20152
identify the following challenges as prevailing in PUHEIs in Ethiopia:
(1) lack of effective communication systems to reach internal and
external stakeholders who could effectively participate in the realiza-
tion of the visions, missions, and educational goals of the HEIs; (2)
lack of participatory and transparent governance systems, which
impacts on effectiveness in the assurance of quality and relevant
education; (3) lack of adequate systems to update and maintain
infrastructure and learning resources, with the result that most
HEIs suffer from inferior quality buildings and inadequate mainte-
nance practices; (4) shortage of effective staff development policies
and strategies, with HEIs depending on the MoE to send academic
staff for additional and long-term training; (5) lack of appropriate
systems to provide guidance and counselling to students, especially
those with special needs; and (6) for some of the audited universities,
lack of an effective system for programme approval, monitoring, and
evaluation (see also van Deuren et al., 2013; Tesfaye, 2015). Nor do
these HEIs have mechanisms through which stakeholders – such as
employers who are active in the labour market – can participate in
the design and review of programmes.
At the time of writing, very few of the audited public universities
have prepared policy guidelines for teaching and learning, or for stu-
dent assessment. Classrooms are still dominated by a teacher-centred
approach and norm-referenced types of student assessments. The main
reason given for this is that a high student to staff ratio, and inadequate
knowledge and skill on the part of the academic staff, make other
approaches unachievable. The HERQA findings also show that none
of the public universities has established alumni associations which
could contribute to the development and review of programmes. In
addition, there have been few efforts to foster or nurture national and
international networks, to reduce attrition in funding, or to oversee
research funds, leaving the HEIs underfunded and isolated.
414 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

There are other challenges too. In terms of staffing, there is a very

high gender disparity in all public universities, with males dominating
throughout, both in total numbers and in positions of authority. For
instance, in the 2015/2016 academic year only 3,455 of 27,892
(14 per cent) of the teaching staff in public HE institutions were
women (FDRE-MoE, 2017). This discrepancy between male and
female academics is even more evident in qualification levels, with
2,595 male PhDs versus 221 female academic staff (9 per cent) (FDRE-
MoE, 2017). In terms of research, there is no overall coordinating body
to ensure that the research undertaken by the HE sector as a whole is
meeting the country’s developmental needs. A case study at Jimma
University by Melese (2012) confirms that university teaching staff
are minimally (or not at all) engaged in research, despite articles in
university regulations stating that all teaching staff should devote
25 per cent of their work time to conducting research (van Deuren
et al., 2013). Enforcing this requirement is not easy – a problem which
is not unique to African universities.
According to van Deuren et al. (2013), weak leadership is another
challenge in Ethiopian HEIs. Their study found that Jigjiga
University, for instance, has a problem forming or communicating
a common vision and translating that vision into practicable day-to-
day activities. Top leaders spent the bulk of their time on routine
activities, a problem compounded by a quick turnover of middle
leadership. Weak communication among university communities,
and unattractive financial incentive mechanisms, partly explain
some of these challenges.
In our own study, one of the high-level academic staff participants
(HU7) identified the incompatibility between the inputs on the ground
(infrastructure, teachers, budgets, etc.), and the numbers of students
coming to the university, as a challenge. This has forced some of the top
leadership, such as the Academic Vice President (VPAR), to become
involved in non-academic activities, including facilitating student
catering, refurbishing student dormitories, and organizing the purchase
and administration of facilities such as water, electricity, and other
services. This, the respondent believes, diverts the attention of aca-
demic staff away from their core task – to produce skilled manpower
through teaching, learning, research, and community services. Another
issue raised by a participant (HU5) is that letters, documents, and other
important guidelines on quality assurance and related matters sent by
Fixing the System? 415

HERQA to the university are usually addressed to the VPAR, rather

than the offices of the quality assurance directorate. It seems that, in
many cases, these documents never reach their correct destination.
Another challenge mentioned by participants is the lack of relevant
content in courses, leaving thousands of young graduates with no real
hope of securing jobs (see also Oanda and Sall, 2016). It is worth
mentioning that Ethiopia has experienced some rapid economic
growth, averaging 11 per cent between 2005 and 2011 (Seid et al.,
2015). The most current available data suggest that, in general, there
has been a drop in the national unemployment rate from 8.2 per cent in
1999 to 5.4 per cent in 2013. Urban unemployment has also dropped,
from 26.1 to 21 per cent, in the same period (Seid et al., 2015). Despite
these achievements, there is a disconnect between the demands of the
labour market and the graduate skills being produced. According to
Seid et al. (Seid et al., 2015, p. 10), ‘anecdotal evidence suggests that
a large increase in the number of college graduates following the
expansion of tertiary education in recent years partly explains the
high unemployment rate and long unemployment duration among
new college graduates’. Serneels (2007) puts unemployment duration
among new graduates in Ethiopia at 45 months. Additionally, our
study found that ‘duplication and proliferation of programmes in the
universities’ (HU7) also contribute to this trend. Thus, graduate unem-
ployment is a real concern and should not be taken lightly. This is
a reality for many young graduates, not only in Ethiopia but across the
whole continent.
On a more optimistic note, the HERQA quality audit reports found
that most of the public HEIs have organizational structures that are
newly developed and that focus on effective and efficient service deliv-
ery and good governance. They are well structured, appropriate, and
effective, and decentralized to college level, indicating the duties and
responsibilities of the academic and support staff. Nevertheless, less
than two-thirds (62 per cent) of the PUHEIs had transparent govern-
ance systems at the time of the audits; some of the audited universities
did not have effective systems for programme approval, monitoring,
and evaluation. Nor did they (as mentioned earlier) have any mechan-
isms through which stakeholders such as employers could participate
in the design and review of programmes. A significant number of the
HEIs (25 per cent) had no participatory governance system (Tesfaye,
2015).
416 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

14.4.5 The Higher Education Relevance and Quality Agency

in Ethiopia
As implied, one of the factors that influences the academic governance
of a university is the structure created by the institution to dispense
quality education services. HERQA was established by HEP No. 650/
2009 (FDRE-HEP, 2009, Article 22). At programme level, HERQA
aims to support higher education institutions in providing informa-
tion about the quality of a programme. HERQA undertakes institu-
tional quality audits on government universities and procedures; it
creates institutional quality audit reports which pinpoint some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the universities regarding internal quality
assurance systems and distributes these to major stakeholders. The
objective of HERQA’s institutional quality audit is to assess the
appropriateness and effectiveness of a higher education institution’s
approach to quality assurance, its systems of accountability, and its
internal review mechanisms. In addition, the opportunity is taken to
recommend to the management specific ways of improving (Tesfaye,
2015).
However, HERQA faces some challenges of its own (relating to
status, autonomy, credibility, staff shortages, and low salaries) that
make it more difficult to do its job well. One such issue is its lack of
authority. The institutional quality audits undertaken by HERQA are
not mandatory and are mostly based on self-evaluations submitted
voluntarily to the agency by the universities (HERQA1 participant).
This means HEIs that are not willing to be audited are simply left out
of the process. Further, the audit reports do not have any conse-
quences, except for their dissemination to the public. While some
HEIs implement the recommendations in the audit reports, and
improve their quality assurance system, others ignore them.
Unfortunately, there is no legal or procedural provision which
makes public HEIs accountable if they do not follow HERQA’s
recommendations. Public universities in Ethiopia were largely estab-
lished by regulations based on Article 5 of HEP No. 650/2009 (FDRE-
HEP, 2009): they do not have to apply for accreditation or re-
accreditation from HERQA or any other government bodies for
their study programmes.
Additionally, although HERQA was mandated by HEP 650/2009,
which spelled out its autonomy, the agency is still struggling with its
Fixing the System? 417

status as an independent, autonomous, quality assurance agency. HEIs

sometimes voice their concerns and doubts about the work of the
agency because it is government funded and financially dependent on
the MoE. Its autonomous status has also been weakened by the fact
that decisions made by the agency have sometimes been reversed by ad
hoc appeal committees of the MoE, irrespective of procedures and
guidelines requiring an independent appeal process (see FDRE-HEP,
650/2009, Articles 82: 2 and 3). The current appeal procedure in action
at the MoE is, however, ignoring the requirements for an independent
process. HERQA finds itself in an unfortunate position: it is sometimes
seen by the HEIs as a watchdog for the government, while at the same
time the MoE sees it as a representative of the HEIs. Both perceptions
lead to an undermining of the credibility, autonomy, and authority of
HERQA.
To make matters worse, the MoE has recently established an
inspection branch of its own – the Higher Education Inspection
Directorate – engaging in the same activities as HERQA. Some of
the HERQA officials interviewed (HERQA1 and HERQA3) see this
newly established body as a duplication of HERQA and a waste of
time and scarce resources. Participants in our study (HERQA1 and
HERQA2) point to the overlap in the roles of HERQA and this new
department; they believe that the new Directorate is doing more
harm than good, leading to confusion in both the public and private
HE sectors. Both bodies send experts and use more or less the same
standards to assess the quality assurance status of universities, while
universities have to report the same information to both bodies.
Moreover, it could be argued that neither body contributes effec-
tively to higher standards in universities. Nevertheless, an expert
respondent from the MoE (MoE1) argues that the work of the
Directorate is complementary to that of HERQA, and does not
see any contradictions.

14.4.6 Transparency and Openness of Higher Education

Governance in Ethiopia
In the light of the above, we might ask if PUHEIs in Ethiopia have the
mechanisms to ensure openness and transparency – which, according
to Olsen (2004, p. 20), represent a ‘core strategic point in the organiza-
tion of work on quality assurance’. For example, procedures and
418 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

criteria used to promote academic staff to higher ranks and leadership

positions lack adequate transparency. Some of the participants of our
study believe that management uses some ‘unclear and hidden’ criteria –
such as ethnicity – to pick their favourite candidate for academic
positions. According to one respondent:
Unclear and hidden criteria such as ethnicity have been used to determine
who should be elected by the management. Most of the criteria used by the
management are subjective and unclear. . . . You may have good documents,
better peer evaluation results but the management may not allow you to take
the position . . . It is the management which determines who should be
appointed, based on ethnicity and other unclear criteria who should be
assigned in spite of your work and research experience. (HU8)

The government did attempt to add political considerations to staff

evaluation criteria in 2002, but this was found to interfere with the
process (Saint, 2004) and therefore was not implemented officially.
Overall, the study found that when staff witness individuals with
little or no experience and/or educational background getting pro-
motions and leadership positions, it creates doubts and lack of trust.
This feeds into a work environment where staff are ‘unhappy’, ‘dis-
satisfied’, and have no confidence in the processes or the institutional
governance. As a consequence, staff may develop negative attitudes
towards the new or promoted persons and treat them as ‘implants’
because they think these people are chosen for their ethnicity or their
political affiliation to the governing party. These sentiments are not
uncommon. In a study on Ethiopian diaspora mobility, Amazan
(2011) found that being affiliated with the ruling party does come
with certain perks and privileges. Returnees who were interviewed
felt that they were excluded from many opportunities because they
were non-partisan or were not of the right ethnic group (Amazan,
2011).
A related issue is the selection of academic staff for scholarships. It is
commonly believed that those who are favoured by the management
are rewarded by receiving opportunities to pursue their education in
Western countries such as Canada and Norway, while others are
restricted to studying locally or in Indian universities:
[S]cholarships to Western countries are not open. Mostly they are open to the
people in the management. These are people who have good affiliation with the
political leadership. They themselves tell you that they are from a given ethnic
Fixing the System? 419

group. If scholarship opportunities come from local universities, countries such

as India, it is free for competition. . . . They [management] tell you, of course,
that it is open for everybody for competition but those who compete for the
scholarship are those from the top management, not even from the middle
management. (HU8)

It was also found that academic staff have different understandings

regarding standards and criteria for promotion. Some felt that ‘the
standards are mostly abstract and vague’. The criteria are laid out in
different legislative documents; however, when dealing with the
actual process, something completely different occurs, echoing simi-
lar findings by Varghese (2013). In reality, if participants were not
affiliated with the ruling party, opportunities for promotions were
far more restricted (Amazan, 2011). Agreeing upon necessary stan-
dards and enforcing improvements is a complicated process and it is
one that is easier to describe than to do. In the university sector the
idea of improved quality is accepted as a common goal by universi-
ties, government, staff, and students. However, some would argue
that despite all the increased oversight and new attempts to regulate
and monitor the quality of education in Ethiopia, there has been only
limited progress (e.g. in classroom practices and student learning
experiences).
In Ethiopia, the problems of monitoring or auditing quality (by
HERQA and other bodies) continue. Respondents suggested that
audits are done but are not followed up. Since HERQA has no power
to enforce the recommendations they make to universities, issues and
problems may be identified repeatedly, but there seems to be little
evidence of universities as a whole acting on the auditors’ recommen-
dations. There are other, equally sensitive issues that also remain
unaddressed. These include the low salaries of some university staff,
which may have the unintended consequence of promoting corruption
as staff seek ways to supplement their income.

14.5 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed higher education governance in regions of
Africa with an emphasis on Ethiopian higher education governance,
including a reflective review and qualitative data on governance in
HEIs in Ethiopia.
420 Amazan and Kebede Dawo

The first part of the chapter laid out some commonalities of university
governance structures across Africa. It argued that university governance
is always overdetermined. It is a complex area full of contradictions and
the lags and discontinuities typical of applied policies. For example,
universities are burdened by government scrutiny and regulation and
are held to externally set targets while simultaneously being under-
resourced in their efforts to achieve those targets. Although the focus
of this chapter has been on Africa, it should be remembered that the same
could be said of the HE sector in many Western countries. The second
part of the chapter turned to the specific example of Ethiopia, which
shows both particularities and generalizable patterns.
The roots of many of the governance issues of African HE are
strongly grounded in politics and history and are marked by post-
coloniality and the growing independence from colonial powers/rule.
The governance, leadership, and management challenges that African
universities currently face are due in part to the systems inherited from
the days of colonization. However, as Sayed (2000) argues, these
debates take on a whole new form in an age of financial austerity and
neoliberalism. The increased reliance on market ideology as the solu-
tion in relation to both funding of the HE sector and university govern-
ance issues is a crucial ideological development, as is the drift towards
neoliberal thinking and practice. At the same time, we have to be
careful not to simply use neoliberalism as a catch-all phrase wheeled
into the analysis like a deus ex machina. It is still an influential ideology/
practice, but it has to be seen locally as composed of different strategies,
with their own contradictions and unintended consequences.
It would be wrong to conclude that the situation cannot improve.
There have already been some improvements and some individual
success stories. Most importantly, there are academics who care
about their jobs and teaching well, and the majority of stakeholders
realize there is a lot to be gained from a healthy and well-run HE sector.

Notes
1. IUCEA covers five countries: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Uganda.
2. These documents are not available to the public. For a summary of them,
please refer to Tesfaye 2015.
Fixing the System? 421

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15 Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals
in the Formation of Governance
Regimes in Latin America’s Higher
Education
m i g ue l a l e j a nd r o g o n z ál e z - l e d e s ma
a n d ge r m án ál v a r e z - m e n d i o l a

15.1 Introduction
A common idea in the literature on higher education in Latin America is
that in the 1980s, neoliberalism began to bring about a radical change
in policies: an almost absolute retraction of the state and generalized
market predomination (Schugurensky and Torres, 2001). A few dec-
ades later, when various Latin American governments began steering
toward the left, neoliberal policies were believed to have reached their
end (Pulido, 2009; Sader, 2008; Sader and Gentili, 2003). However, as
this chapter will show, neoliberalism did not eliminate the state, nor did
the market replace the old, underlying logic of political exchange in
traditional statist policies. Leftist governments, identified as post-
neoliberal, not only did not dismantle the reforms implemented in the
1990s, they also adapted some of them to develop systems of higher
education.
The literature shows increasing recognition of the differentiated
governance of neoliberal and post-neoliberal governments, although
they paradoxically share objectives such as increasing the supply and
coverage of education, expanding financing, and improving quality
(e.g. Bruner and Ganga, 2016; Oliveira and Feldfeber, 2016).
However, the pre-eminence of ideological focuses still relegates to the
background the analysis of differences and similarities among the con-
crete instruments and policies that are deployed in each nation to attain
common objectives. In the same sense, research on HE policy is still
scarce on the way the reforms implemented before the regional political
changes have conditioned the selection of policies and instruments in

426
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 427

regional systems of higher education since the second decade of this

century.
Our hypothesis regarding the political/electoral upheavals in several
nations since the late 1990s, in the sphere of public policies and the
governance of higher education, has been expressed in terms of the
emphasis placed on a certain type of policies, rather than on radical
changes in the steering of educational systems. Therefore, the differ-
ences and similarities among systems of higher education would be
determined by 1) the degree of conditioning of government action by
the policy legacy; and, therefore, 2) the processes of change in the forms
of system control and administration, in terms of the adjustment and
adaptation of policies.
To analyse these topics, Section 15.2 discusses the neoliberal policies
related to higher education in Latin America and the way these policies
have produced systems with a public component (subject to market
reforms), and a private component (with variable levels of state regula-
tion). The Section 15.3 of the chapter, based on the models of privatiz-
ing education developed by Verger, Fontdevila, and Zancajo (2017),
identifies three models of privatization in higher education. These
models are based on: a) a structural reform of the state; b) the privati-
zation of the supply and the reformation of public universities; and c)
the expansion of low-cost institutions. Section 15.4 addresses the
arrangements of governance that arise from processes that adjust and
adapt policies, based on two forms of accumulation or overlap of
policies, defined here as linear or convergent. In this respect, an analysis
is made of the way governments – independent from their political
orientation – have elevated their levels of coverage through the public
or private supply, or a combination of both. In conclusion (Section
15.5), we propose a categorization of regional systems of higher educa-
tion, based on three governance regimes. Formed by a combination of
actors, instruments, and performance in terms of systemic objectives
(enrolment, financing, and quality), these regimes are: a) private inte-
gration, b) dual governance, and c) loose governance.

15.2 Governance of Higher Education: Between

Neoliberalism and Post-neoliberalism
Governance alludes to the ways the actors involved in a certain policy
arena coordinate in solving collective problems. In the case of Latin
428 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

America’s higher education, the evolution of these forms of coordina-

tion must be analysed from the perspective of how governments have
directed change by conceding greater authority to market actors, along
with greater autonomy in decision making to public-sector actors.
In the past three decades, the region’s governments have structured
governance, increasing or reducing actors’ freedom as a function of
medium- or long-term objectives. In this sense, ‘governments design the
systemic forms for the governance of higher education through
a combination of strategic goals and means, and then establish the
nature of the policy instruments to be adopted for the pursuit of said
goals’ (Capano, 2011, p. 1626).
This statement has relevance for our analysis because of the imple-
mentation of market-based policies from the 1980s up through 1998,
without totally dismantling the traditional mechanisms of state con-
trol. Subsequent political shifts to the left in several countries of the
region, and the conformation of neoliberal and post-neoliberal blocs,
led to a reassessment of the state’s role in education. The result, how-
ever, has not been processes of renewed state control of higher educa-
tion or the abandonment of market policies and instruments.
Latin America’s move toward neoliberalism has translated into the
abandonment of a development model in which the state was
a protagonist in the political and economic organization of society.
The privatization of public assets and the liberalization of the profit
motive in previously restricted settings (education, health, and other
sectors) detonated a transformation process based on the state’s
assumed inability to promote goods and services in an efficient manner.
According to Ball (1998, cited by Magalhães and Amaral, 2009,
p. 184), ‘reforms were driven by the suspicion that the state bureau-
cracy and government officials were major obstacles to the attainment
of the public interest’.
With the economic crisis of the 1980s, a new generation of Latin
American rulers, government officials, and academics promoted mea-
sures aimed at reducing state intervention and favouring market
action. In the sphere of education in general, these actions led to the
increased rationalization of expenditure, administrative decentraliza-
tion, and the transfer of responsibilities to smaller regional units,
along with a series of reforms focused on deregulating teaching and
the entry requirements for private-sector providers of educational
services (Bonal, 2002).
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 429

Higher education in Latin America underwent – in varying mode,

scope, depth, and speed in each country – a general process of privati-
zation: a broadening of the private sector and the increased use of
private resources in system financing. In response to intense question-
ing about the efficiency, quality, and economic pertinence of higher
education, a reform agenda was created to generate mixed systems of
higher education. Such systems were characterized primarily by: a)
growing private-sector participation in the supply of educational ser-
vices; b) the implementation of quality assurance systems; c) the adop-
tion of market behaviours among public institutions; d) the strategic
administration of part of the government’s budget; e) the operation of
diverse systems of conditioned financing; and f) the implementation of
forms of institutional administration based on new public management
(González-Ledesma, 2014).
Enrolment in higher education in Latin America grew from 4 million
students in 1980 to 10 million in 2000. A large part of this increase was
due to the multiplication of the private-sector supply, especially in the
1990s. In 1995, 38.1% of the enrolment in higher education was in
a private institution (García-Guadilla, 1996). The implementation of
new forms of institutional governance and the Latin American state’s
strategic administration of public financing found counterparts in the
developed nations of North America and Europe; however, the priva-
tization of the supply is a distinguishing characteristic of the higher
education systems of Latin America and other regions in the world,
such as Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. The changes in systems of
higher education in the 1990s have represented the emergence of a new
order – a new order that has seemed to suggest that the state is no longer
at the centre (Huisman, 2009, pp. 3–5), and that the government is
limited to steering-at-a-distance through evaluation of results, discour-
agement/encouragement of behaviours, and the creation of broad mar-
gins for the entry of other actors (Neave and van Vught, 1991).1
However, the implementation of the plan of neoliberal reforms did
not occur without setbacks. Starting in the late 1980s, protests of
various sizes took place in universities to dispute the most polemical
aspects of the reforms, particularly those linked to the transfer of
educational costs to students and their families, and restrictions in
access to university enrolment. Student movements in Mexico,
Ecuador, Argentina, and Colombia expressed general ill will towards
the consequences of reduced social spending and increased poverty;
430 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

additional concerns were political instability and the corruption of high

government officials.
Social distress and the emergence of a new and unfavourable eco-
nomic situation between 1997 and 2002 (known as the ‘lost half-
decade’), along with historic maximums of unemployment and stagna-
tion (Ocampo, 2002; Carrera, 2004), established the conditions for the
electoral victories of leftist parties and leftist movements in several
nations.2 The arrival of Hugo Chávez as the president of Venezuela
(January 1999) marked the beginning of an unparalleled political
swing to the left in Latin America. The economic upsets of the ‘lost half-
decade’ (1998–2003), the exhaustion of the Washington Consensus,
and social discontent were also determining factors in the change of
government in Argentina (2000), Brazil (2003), Uruguay (2005),
Bolivia (2006), Ecuador (2000), Nicaragua (2007), and El Salvador
(2009). Thus, by 2015 more than 60 per cent of Latin America’s
population was living under leftist or central-left governments.
According to some researchers (Panizza, 2009; Segrera, 2016), this
leftward swing divided the region’s political map into two major blocs:
one formed by the post-neoliberal3 governments oriented to the ‘state’s
return’ and opposed to United States policy, and the other represented
by neoliberal governments (Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Peru,
Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Paraguay4), which have main-
tained free-market policies.
The ideological positioning of these blocs appeared in different poli-
tical programmes that openly confronted the Washington Consensus,
compensating for the state’s renewed role by not renouncing capitalism
as an economic system or representative democracy as a political system.
At the same time, liberal governments opted to accept more vigorous
state participation, without losing sight of the needed efficiency of the
economic system and government administration.
In nations that experienced administrative changes with a leftist
orientation, according to Pulido, the ‘point of inflection’ in education
was ‘caused by the progressive consolidation of the focus on human
rights, versus the mercantilist trend of neoliberalism’ (2010, p. 3).
These administrations promoted the public supply of higher education.
On the other hand, with arguments centred on the economic impor-
tance of raising the population’s educational levels, liberal govern-
ments returned to the expansive agenda of public high school and
higher education, focusing at the same time on addressing the quality
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 431

problems produced by unregulated expansion of the private sector.

New agencies and agents came on stage in a context of revitalized
democratic life and the relative economic bonanza resulting from the
price of raw materials (Segrera, 2016).
The study of the governance of systems of higher education in Latin
America, however, faces a dilemma that emerges from the combination
of two situations linked to the change, adjustment, and adaptation of
policies. The first situation has to do with the conditioning and lasting
effect of policies that stimulate, on the one hand, the growth of the
private sector’s educational supply, and on the other, the adoption of
the market’s forms of administration and operation in public institu-
tions of higher education. The second situation is related to the way
that both neoliberal and post-neoliberal governments responded to
such realities to attain common objectives such as increasing the sup-
ply, financing, and quality; this situation lasted until 2016, when the
post-neoliberal cycle began to show signs of weakening.

15.3 Policy Change: Conformation of a Shared Background

Until 1998, Latin America’s systems of higher education were differ-
entiated by the forms national governments selected to increase pri-
vate-sector participation in providing educational services, as well as
by the promotion of reforms in the heart of public universities.
Although the limited or null presence of rules for operating the market
of private education was a common element of the expansive wave of
the private sector in the 1990s, it became clear that while some coun-
tries had opted to delegate almost all of the increased enrolment to the
private supply, other countries followed paths directed to the confor-
mation of mixed systems.
The new policy instruments destined to reform public institutions of
higher education were based on the principles of a rational budget,
economic pertinence of professional formation, efficiency, merit, and
competency among institutions and individuals. Yet applying these
instruments was problematic due to the political conflicts that some
aspects of the reform generated and the contradictions that arose from
interaction with pre-existing instruments and practices. In the first case,
we refer to measures of a structural nature, especially those of an
economic type, such as the implementation of fees and service charges
that encountered resistance in several countries in the region (mainly
432 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica). In the second case, we refer to the
coexistence of contradictory instruments, such as increased flexitime in
administrative and teaching posts versus the contract signed with tradi-
tional unions.
From the accumulation of political obstacles and gradual mea-
sures, a mixed governance of systems of higher education was
devised. Such governance combined various degrees of develop-
ment in the administrative reform of the public sub-system with
policies of involvement in market expansion. In this context, the
privatization of supply was the most tangible result. This fact will
help us to analyse the initial change of policies, since encouraging
market participation was one of the solutions adopted to deal with
the drastic cuts in social spending in the 1980s. It was also a way
to meet the demand for educational services that public institutions
could not satisfy. Because of projected growth in the sector, private
education was a good option for attaining the objective of broad-
ening the coverage of higher education, which had widely varying
proportions in the countries in the region.
Taking into account the classification by Rama (2009) of the
levels of coverage in Latin America, systems of higher education in
the late 1990s can be divided into three groups: elite (from 8.8%
to 13.1%), minority (from 16% to 28.5%), and massive (from
34.4% to 46%).5 At the same time, each nation had levels of
privatization of the supply that ranged from low (from 10.9% to
28.4%), intermediate (from 35.3% to 48.6%), and high (from
58.3% to 71.7%). The combination of both dimensions in each
country illustrates the trajectories of the increasing coverage and
the relationship with the systems’ opening to the market – factors
that correspond to three of the six models of privatization of
education as identified at the international level by Verger et al.
(2017).6 These models are: a) state structural reform, b) scaling-up
privatization, and c) expansion of low-fee private schooling in low-
income countries (See Figure 15.1).
According to Verger et al. (2017), each model includes a set of
‘contextual mechanisms, agents, and devices that operate in conform-
ing visible trajectories of reform’ (Verger et al., 2017, p. 2). In other
words, the models give structure, based on meaning (in this case,
privatization and expansion of coverage), to certain governance
arrangements that can be evaluated according to their results.
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 433

90
Elites Minorities Masses
80 SLV COL
% of private participation on HE

BRA
High CHL
70

60
PRY

50
PER
Medium GTM VEN
40
MEX ECU
30
BOL
20 HND ARG
Low
10 URY PAN

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
% of total HE enrolment

Figure 15.1 Systems of higher education in Latin America: privatization and

enrolment after neoliberal shifts (1998)
Elaborated by Authors. Based on Rama (2009) and Verger et al. (2017). Data
from UIS-UNESCO, World Bank Data, National Institute of Statistics
(Bolivia).

15.3.1 Models of Privatization

The Product of a State Structural Reform. This is about a radical
reconfiguration not only of the state’s role in the educational setting,
but also in the policies of education in legal, political, discursive, and
ideological terms. Chile is the only country in the region that corre-
sponds to this model. The reconfiguration of the Chilean state was
possible thanks to a combination of extreme social discipline, imposed
by the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), and
neoliberal policies. The restructuring of the educational system per-
mitted the implementation of market instruments for administering
schools, as well as mechanisms for the functioning of a highly inte-
grated services market. Institutions of higher education functioned as
private suppliers of a public service, in a market where some institu-
tions could obtain state financing of various types, but where student
possibilities to attain higher education rested almost entirely on their
purchasing power (Fried and Abuhabda, 1991). The Chilean system is
distinguished by its combination of a high degree of privatization with
434 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

total coverage of the masses. However, Chile’s higher education faced

problems due to 1) the weaknesses of its structure of governance,
specifically the difficulty of regulating the proliferation of low-quality
private institutions under the protection of the liberalization of the
1990s; 2) the assignment of subsidies based more on historic (inert)
criteria than on performance indicators; 3) persistent inequity in access
to higher education; and 4) the absence of transversal mechanisms for
quality assurance (Brunner, 2005).
A Result of the Gradual Expansion of Privatization. According to
Verger (2017), this type of privatization, in contrast with the preceding
model, advances through the accumulation of small, gradual changes
that alter educational systems significantly over the long term. This is the
case of the systems of higher education of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
They have all promoted the growth of the private supply, as well as the
implementation of reforms in the public sub-system. Their variations
depend on 1) the accumulation of problematic results upon the imple-
mentation of polemical measures; 2) the interaction among new policies,
pre-existing instruments, and system dimensions; and 3) the priorities of
the neoliberal agenda, defined by the situations of national policy, which
in various countries relegated higher education in the last place. The first
two factors are included in the sphere of higher education and are
therefore easier to identify. The last factor is difficult to attribute to
specific governmental choices without making an exhaustive analysis
of the historical trajectories in each case. However, it is possible to
identify the way these dynamics operated and their consequences for
educational systems through the priority financing of elementary educa-
tion, and the incentives provided to self-financing and the recuperation
of costs at public universities – matters recommended by international
financial organizations (González-Ledesma, 2010).
In light of government cutbacks and student opposition to the collec-
tion of fees, public universities have been financially strangled. In addition
to the loss of competitiveness and the deterioration of institutional qual-
ity, such events have translated into a severe contraction of the public
supply. The result has been the exclusion of increasingly higher numbers
of young people lacking in economic resources to pay a private institution
or overcome barriers to entry, especially in public universities with great-
est demand. Towards the end of the past century, the accelerated expan-
sion of private higher education came to a halt. The supply had surpassed
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 435

the aggregate demand for this type of service, and the state was beginning
to reactivate its role as a provider of higher education – a phenomenon
that appeared in full during the first decade of the current century, as in
Mexico (Álvarez-Mendiola, 2011). In some countries with massive cover-
age, such as Bolivia, Panama, and Ecuador, the result was a significant loss
in the capacity of public supply to meet the growing demand for higher
education. This phenomenon is similar in Brazil, Colombia, and Peru,
with coverage of minorities and masses, but with the difference that the
private sector did not absorb the growing demand, since the elevated
relative costs and the economic dynamics in each case prevented ulterior
growth. In the case of Mexico and Venezuela, classified as systems for
minorities, the restriction in growth was the product of combined defi-
ciencies in the public and private subsystems.
Private growth in Argentina and Uruguay was limited by the difficul-
ties associated with pre-existing policies and instruments. Both countries
had strong public systems, with institutions of direct, unrestricted access
and ample freedom for students and teachers in decision making. In this
context, although the market for higher education broadened, the new
institutions could not compete with the old institutions of a religious
nature, which were not interested in expanding beyond the elites they
traditionally served (Bernasconi, 2008). Therefore, in the late 1990s,
Uruguay had the least private participation in the region (10.9%).
Argentina, on the other hand, stood out for having the highest levels of
coverage (46%), mostly by public institutions.
The problems of the mixed systems vary according to the emphasis
placed on either increasing private supply or reforming public institu-
tions. The principal problems include: 1) the exclusion of students due
to economic reasons, available supply, or both; 2) evidence of low-
quality/poor practices among the private institutions of higher educa-
tion; 3) the absence of clear rules for operating private institutions of
higher education; 4) the lack of public investment in higher education;
and 5) reduction in the rate of growth of coverage.
The Result of the Expansion of Low-fee Private Institutions. This
type of institution exists in low-income countries where the state’s role
is limited or non-existent and the demand for educational services is
met almost exclusively through the market or through humanitarian
aid. For Verger et al., the nations that correspond to this model are in
Africa (Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana), southern Asia (India and
Pakistan), and Central America. Most of the private institutions of
436 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

higher education from the expansive phase of the 1990s in Latin

America could fit the authors’ description, especially because of the
quality deficiencies in the course they offer, profitability as their first
objective, and the assumed economic convenience for clients with
limited resources. However, these elements assume unique character-
istics in countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Paraguay, due to
their low levels of coverage. El Salvador, with a high degree of priva-
tization, dedicates a very low percentage of its GDP to public higher
education (0.2%). In cases such as this one, although the coverage is of
minorities, it is clear that the state does not have the will or the ability to
encourage the development of a public supply.7 In fact, the main
characteristic of these systems of higher education is the government’s
decision not to expand or develop the public sub-system.
The problems this development model of higher education faces are
similar to those of the private spectrum of mixed systems, while aggra-
vated by the government’s permissiveness toward expansion. With few
exceptions, the educational supply consists of catch-all institutions that
offer formative options not requiring major investment and directed to
sectors of the population with low resources. In contrast with private elite
institutions, the prestigious market in this type of institution of higher
education is based on the mobilization of aspirational messages that do not
reflect the quality of education offered (Álvarez-Mendiola and González-
Ledesma, 2018). The owners and authorities at this type of institution
sustain that they offer better quality (Tooley and Dixon 2005, cited by
Verger et al., 2017, p. 16). Families choose them because access to the
limited space available in public options is extremely competitive; in
addition, they perceive public institutions as deficient, disconnected from
the job market, and low in quality. On the other hand, most nations with
systems of higher education of this type lack information systems that
allow obtaining data on the number of institutions and their students, or
the quality of private institutions of higher education.

15.4 Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals: Two Ways

of Adjusting but One Way to Adapt
In the current decade, systems of higher education are distinguished by
their forms of articulating governance regimes as they: a) confront the
problematic results generated in the 1990s; b) establish the rules of
the game for coordinating among educational actors; and c) make the
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 437

necessary adjustments for increasing coverage, improving financing,

and increasing the quality of higher education. In contrast with the
stage of reform we addressed in the previous section, these arrange-
ments arise from ideologically differentiated national governments,
based on different diagnoses of the nature of the problems at hand,
the identity of the actors that need to coordinate in their solution, and
the type of policy instruments to attain their objectives.
Still controversial among scholars is the degree of relevance of these
differences in explaining the evolution of systems of higher education in
Latin America. The emergence of post-neoliberal governments moti-
vated some scholars to announce the dismantling of the privatizing
policies implemented in the 1990s (De Sousa, 2015, p. 88–153). Other
scholars warned of a possible modification of the market’s role in
higher education in countries that had remained firm in implementing
neoliberal reforms (Brunner, 2016). In general, as the left accumulated
electoral wins, many authors attempted to establish an identity
between the ideological profile of governments and their policies in
higher education (Gentili, 1999). Yet according to our analysis, this
division does not explain the maintenance, adaptation, or even imple-
mentation of policies of higher education based on market instruments
in countries with post-neoliberal governments; nor does it account for
the implementation of policies centred on state intervention in coun-
tries with neoliberal governments.
In the first place, the individuals, parties, and movements that led
political change claimed power thanks to competitive elections. Once
in power, they did not dispute representative democracy as a political
system, or capitalism as an economic system, although they rhetorically
rejected the policies of the Washington Consensus and neoliberalism in
general. In second place, higher education was not among the political
priorities of the new governments, as it was the recuperation of control
of strategic resources (oil, minerals, and water). Lastly, the evidence
accumulated in the past 20 years shows that the trajectories of regional
systems of higher education are more coherent with the central ideas of
the reform that began in the 1990s, rather than with any other alter-
native educational project.
Based on the classification of Rama (2009), no country analysed here
has elite coverage, and the systems of higher education that boasted
high levels of enrolment have moved toward universal and absolute
coverage. From 2000 to 2014, the percentage of Latin American youth
438 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

aged 18 to 24 and enrolled in an institution of higher education

increased from 21 per cent to slightly more than 40 per cent.
According to the World Bank (Ferreyra et al., 2017), this increase
was due to: 1) the higher participation of young people living in poverty
(which grew from 16 per cent to 25% of the enrolment); 2) the diversi-
fication of the supply of higher education and the rise in enrolment in
existing public institutions of higher education; and, above all, 3) the
growth of the private sector, whose average participation in the region
reached 50 per cent.
During this period, the systems of higher education under ana-
lysis are divided into minorities (20.7–30.8 per cent), massive
(35.1–47.2 per cent), universal (51.1–77 per cent), and absolute
(86–88.4 per cent). To better understand the levels of privatization
in the supply we have broadened the range of each group, so that
the systems with a low level of privatization are from 18.1–
34.4 per cent, the intermediate level is from 37–49.2 per cent,
and those with a high level are from 68.8–84.6 per cent. The
types of privatization led to processes of policy adjustment and
adaptation that are linked to the ideological profile of the govern-
ment in power, as well as to the nature of the processes of policy
accumulation and policy instruments associated with the objectives
of privatization.
With regard to the ideological profile of the government, neoliberal
administrations can be considered a relatively homogeneous bloc.
Their differences (in addition to the dimensions of their economies
and degree of development) lay in the way they attempted to strengthen
their models of privatization while correcting the errors of their emer-
ging educational markets in order to improve the indicators of cover-
age, financing, and quality (Briseño Roa, 2013; Sader, 2008). Post-
neoliberal administrations, on the other hand, were divided into gov-
ernments of agreement (Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay),
which sought to establish a balance among the pre-existing market
policies and a more active state, but were self-limiting in their actions,
and governments of rupture (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela), which
have looked to create an educational system in which the state reas-
sumes the central role as provider and coordinator (Sader, 2008;
Stefanoni, 2012). According to Pulido (2010), the post-neoliberal gov-
ernments aimed at indicators of coverage, financing, and quality, with
a focus on the ‘expansion of rights’.
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 439

The processes of accumulation of policies of a linear type are character-

ized by the coherence of objectives and instruments, and although they are
not lacking in conflict, they follow a logical route with previous policies.
In processes of a convergent type, on the other hand, accumulation is
through successive approximations, at times indirect or imprecise. The
difference between one type and another lies in the degree of coherence of
the projection of policy objectives and the instruments used to attain those
objectives. In the case of Chile and Peru, the processes of accumulation
were of a linear type, with a predominantly private impulse; and, in
Argentina and Venezuela, a predominantly public impulse. The remaining
countries, with reforms of scaling up and the expansion of low-fee private
schooling, produced convergent processes of accumulation. In countries
such as Chile and Argentina, coherence has historically been very high,
while in Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico the processes of accumulation
have been gradual, with low alignment between objectives and policy
instruments, although meaningful due to their political and policy-related
consequences (Verger et al., 2017, p. 8).
If an identity exists between the government’s ideological profile
and the type of policies implemented, this identity should be
expressed as either an increase or a decrease in the privatization of
the supply. However, of the seven countries identified as post-
neoliberal, only Venezuela demonstrates a clear tendency away
from privatization, with a decrease of 14.1 per cent in private enrol-
ment. Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay experienced marginal growth
(in contrast with the increase in public enrolment); El Salvador
experienced a slight decrease (–1.5 per cent). In Ecuador, private
enrolment rose by ten points and the nation retained intermediate
levels of privatization, in spite of a government of rupture, while
Brazil, with a government of agreement, is the only nation from the
post-neoliberal bloc that has, for historical reasons, one of the most
privatized systems of higher education in the region (73.4 per cent).
Among the neoliberal nations, Paraguay, Honduras, Panama, and
Peru boast levels of private growth between 11 per cent and
25 per cent, a trend clearly in agreement with their market opening.
In Chile, the private sector strengthened its expansion with the
implementation of broader instruments of indirect financing, with
a positive response from demand. The low growth of coverage in
Mexico, one of the most coherent nations with free-market policies in
general, depended primarily on the public supply, as in Guatemala.
440 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

100
Elites Minorities Masses Universal Absolute
90 CHL
High
% of private participation on HE

80 BRA

SLV PER
70
PRY
60
Medium COL
50 GTM
ECU
40
HND PAN
30 ARG
MEX VEN

20 Low URY
BOL
10

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of total HE enrolment

Figure 15.2 Systems of higher education in Latin America: privatization and

enrolment after post-neoliberal shifts (2016)
Elaborated by Authors. Based on Rama (2009). Data from UIS-UNESCO,
World Bank Data, National Institute of Statistics (Bolivia).

Colombia, however, is the most surprising case, since the years from
1998 to 2016 show a trend away from privatization greater than that
of Venezuela (–17.3 per cent) (See Figure 15.2).
An analysis of the trend of coverage in the region clearly shows that
during this second stage, the objective of increasing the participation of
young people in higher education has been more relevant than the ideolo-
gical coherence of the policies used to attain it. The ideological principles
have an impact on the way the governments select a determined course of
action, yet other factors also exist and at times are more powerful in
influencing decision making. These factors may be linked to problematic
results that appear during the first stage, such as low market performance
in satisfying the demand for higher education. In addition, the pressures
exerted by traditional actors (students, teachers, workers) to promote the
growth of public universities counteract the trend towards privatization;
while new actors (business leaders in education, economic sectors, agen-
cies of evaluation) often react against government policies that endanger
the processes of opening systems of higher education to the market, to the
economic sector, or to evaluation.
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 441

Argentina (agreement) and Chile (neoliberal), for example, attained

levels of absolute coverage in completely different ways. Argentina has
maintained a growth policy sustained by the public supply and
a minimum increase in public spending (0.3 per cent of GDP from
1998 to 2016), which assumes a reduced cost per student and low
investment in research and development. In Chile, starting in 2005,
the large amounts of public funds channelled through Credit with State
Guarantee (CAE [Spanish acronym for Crédito con Aval del Estado]),
a financing instrument that along with private loans and other eco-
nomic aid, has allowed the nation to increase its coverage to almost
90 per cent. In the first case, the weight of co-governance and univer-
sities’ autonomous tradition is a decisive factor for maintaining the
status quo. In the second case, private-sector interests have been more
in tune with the government, even when traditional actors have
demanded the deprivatization of higher education.
Venezuela (rupture) and Peru (neoliberal) are examples of policies
of differentiated attention for the public and private sectors. They
showed notable dynamism in the period under analysis, both with
processes of linear accumulation (although with more important
public/private components than Argentina and Chile). Both nations
have universal coverage, but while Peru implemented incentives for
private expansion at the same time that it increased the financing of
its traditional public universities, Venezuela – due to ideological
reasons – created a third system of universities through Misión
Sucre, to promote the growth of enrolment without becoming
involved in (or supporting) the development of traditional autono-
mous universities. It did not regulate or prohibit the activity of
private institutions, however.
In Ecuador (rupture), which has massive coverage, enrolment has
increased to a large degree thanks to the private supply. However, the
nation’s ministry of education keeps strict control over private institu-
tion of higher education; for example, in 2012, with the help of the
police, the ministry closed 14 universities, based on their low quality.
This measure, which affected more than 40,000 students (not including
alumni), represented strong encouragement for other institutions to
accept the quality verification procedures as demanded by the state
(El Espectador, 2012). Bolivia (rupture), with similar coverage, fol-
lowed a policy of inertial growth, but increased subsidies for univer-
sities and research (from 1.4 per cent to 1.8 per cent of GDP).
442 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

The case of Mexico (neoliberal) shows a modest comparative

increase in its percentage of coverage (lower than that of other nations
with equivalent or lower levels of economic development), primarily
through public institutions, yet with important participation from
a loosely regulated private sector. Paraguay (neoliberal) has a higher
rate of coverage (35.1 per cent), whose growth follows a dual logic of
encouragement for both the public and private sectors.
The case of Brazil is unique. In the analysed period, the nation moved
from a neoliberal government to a government of agreement, whose
policies of expanded coverage attained, within a decade, the system’s
advancement from the coverage of elites to universal coverage (from
16 per cent in 1998 to 51.5 per cent in 2015). The means was pre-
dominantly private, with policies of positive discrimination to enable
access for students from public schools and of African or indigenous
origin (Lloyd, 2016). Colombia is also a special case since it encour-
aged, without relevant change in the ideological orientation of govern-
ments (neoliberalism), the expansion of coverage to a large scale; it
advanced from a system of minorities to a universal system in the
analysed period (from 22.6 per cent to 55.7 per cent), through the
public sector. Growth in coverage was achieved primarily by expand-
ing the non-university supply of higher education (Melo-Becerra et al.,
2017) – which according to Ferreyra et al. (2017) is ‘low range’.8
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras form a separate group of
nations because of their low level of coverage. Important differences
are seen, however, in El Salvador’s movement from a neoliberal gov-
ernment to one of agreement, which allocated support to the private
sector and achieved growth in coverage from 22 per cent to
28.1 per cent. Guatemala, under neoliberal government, also backed
the public sector, expending notorious effort on raising coverage from
8.8 per cent to 21.3 per cent. While also under neoliberal government,
Honduras weakly promoted coverage through the private sector.

15.5 Politics and Policy: Different Governance Regimes

of Higher Education in Latin America
According to Guy Peters, ‘policy choices can be conceptualized as both
a dependent variable for the political process . . . and an independent
variable for explaining the steering capacity of the political system’
(2012, p. 22). In the conformation of higher education governance
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 443

regimes in Latin America, Peters’ reasoning is relevant if we take into

account the politically contingent character that prevails in the decision
making at all times – that is, the dimension politics – or if we consider
the way in which the policy mix affects the governance performance of
the higher education systems over time – that is, the policy dimension. If
we read the actions of governments with respect to the privatization of
supply and the evolution of coverage in terms of the adjustment and
adaptation of policies, rather than in terms of ideological positions, we
can offer alternative interpretations of the dynamics produced by the
combination of the dimensions of politics and policies.
On comparing the ‘focus on rights’ of the policies of post-neoliberal
governments with the neoliberal governments’ state intervention in
‘market errors’, what emerges is that the differences between them lay
in the emphasis given to one or another type of policy. Post-neoliberal
governments do not object to capitalism or to market participation in
education. The proof is that the private supply has continued to grow
and diversify, becoming the main engine behind the region’s increased
coverage. In any case, private actors’ capacity for action varies from
country to country. In some countries, private actors can access public
funds, obtain earnings, open lines of credit, and even establish alliances
with economic groups that operate in the educational markets of other
nations. Such is the case for Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador. In certain
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, an important portion of the private
supply corresponds to corporate groups that include various locations or
campuses and even institutions with different names. Outstanding
among these groups are the transnational suppliers, such as Laureate
International.9 In more restrictive contexts, such as Argentina, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Venezuela, institutions of higher education still operate as
non-profit associations or foundations linked to religious groups; this
situation has not represented an obstacle for conserving or even expand-
ing their market niches (Altbach, 1999; Rama, 2017).
Except for systems consisting mainly of low-cost institutions, the
public supply experienced dynamics of growth and diversification in
almost the entire region. The autonomous universities and technical
universities that appeared during this second stage were favoured by the
increase in public spending, a result of international increases in raw
materials prices, particularly oil. The backing for these institutions of
higher education, however, was part of government policies designed to
deal with the limits of growth of the private supply. In addition, the
444 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

creation of technological universities was part of national development

plans based on the training of human resources with high technical
abilities. Found in this situation are the systems of higher education of
Mexico, Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and especially Colombia.
It is important to point out that both public and private institutions
of higher education created or strengthened different types of associa-
tions of rectors (in some cases, simultaneously public and private), with
the purpose of collectively negotiating government policies of higher
education. This type of association frequently participates, proposes,
or opposes government decisions with varying degrees of success.
Among private institutions, on the other hand, membership in groups
of this type is a relevant factor in accessing government resources, and
thus attaining a privileged market position (Brunner and Miranda,
2016; Rama, 2017).
Agencies of evaluation and certification constitute another type of
actor that can have considerable influence on systems of higher educa-
tion and are present in all nations. Although such agencies evaluate
increasingly more private institutions of higher education, their influ-
ence is greater in the public sub-system. Evaluating agencies can oper-
ate from the government – either as part of an area of the ministry of
education or as autonomous public agencies – or perform as private
organizations. The power of these agencies lies in their ability to define
the access to economic and symbolic resources for institutions (univer-
sities and their programmes) as well as individuals (students who hope
to enter a university, economic stimuli, and financing for teachers’
projects).
Another common element in Latin American nations was the intro-
duction of various instruments to promote the expansion of coverage
of higher education. In many nations, this type of instrument is directed
to students from both public and private institutions, and in some cases
constitutes mechanisms of positive discrimination aimed at remedying
unequal access. Acción Afirmativa, in Brazil, is perhaps the most nota-
ble example. The programme was first tested in the state of Río de
Janeiro in 2003, and later spread to all public institutions of higher
education and to hundreds of private institutions throughout the
nation, ultimately becoming national policy through the Fees Federal
Law of 2012 (Lloyd, 2016). As in Colombia, Brazil’s institutions of
higher education can grant loans to students with certain economic
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 445

stipulations (interest rates, discounted fees, part-time work on campus)

and academic conditions (merit- or fee-based), at prices always lower
than market prices. In Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay, and Bolivia, scho-
larships are concentrated in the public sector (which offers practically
free education) and consist of monthly stipends to support student
living expenses. In Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, existing instruments are
designed exclusively for private institutions of higher education whose
end is to cover part or all of the cost of education.

15.5.1 Governance Regimes

For our purposes, governance regimes are based on three elements: a)
the emergence of new actors who have various ends, interests, and
capacity of action; b) combinations of instruments that oscillate
between coherent configurations and problematic mixtures; and c)
effectiveness in attaining common objectives. Governance regimes are
the result of the ability to adjust or adapt policies to solve the proble-
matic consequences of previous policies, which can become aligned
with more or less effectiveness for attaining systemic objectives (Knill
and Tosun, 2012). In some cases, the confluence of diverse actors
occurs in a search for common objectives in the system, such as the
growth of enrolment, forms of financing, and quality assurance, while
adjustment and adaptation occur in decision-making processes with
broad consensus. In other cases, the results of the governance arrange-
ment reflect the interests of certain dominant groups in society,
a situation that erodes the legitimacy of the system as other interests
are ignored (Peters, 2008).
According to the characteristics and processes of development of the
systems under analysis, we can identify three types of governance
regimes:
a) Regime of Private Integration. The mixed character in the provision
of educational services is, as we have seen, a feature of all regional
systems of higher education. In this regime, however, governance occurs
primarily through a process of public and private sector integration, with
a predominance of market participation and organizational market
forms. Actors, instruments, and policies are aligned through plans of
systemic conduction aimed at privatization. 1) Actors. Ministries of
446 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola
education, associations of institutions of higher education, autonomous
assessment agencies, private companies, credit institutions (in the case of
Chile, student organizations). 2) Instruments. Incentives and disincen-
tives, conditional financing, credit market, instruments of positive dis-
crimination, competition among institutions, restricted access, general
examinations to select and classify students. 3) Objectives. The systems
of higher education in this regime are distinguished by having greater
coherence between instruments and the objectives of the general arrange-
ment. The differences among the countries that have this type of govern-
ance regime are related to degree and have to do with the absence or low
performance of some instruments, as well as the degree of integration of
the public and private subsystems in each case. According to their levels
of coverage, the most successful systems of higher education in this
group are Chile (88.4 per cent ) and Peru (69.6 per cent), followed by
Brazil (51.1 per cent), and Paraguay (35.1 per cent). The accumulation
processes in the first two cases are linear, while those of the latter two
cases are convergent. The main difference between Chile and the other
nations consists of the structural character that it has shown since the
beginning of its process of reform.

b) Regime of Dual Governance. Systems of higher education can be

fundamentally public or private, but no trend towards integration
exists. In most cases, the subsystems are governed with different cri-
teria, although government actions promote the expansion of the sup-
ply according to the public-sector institutions on one the hand, and to
the private-sector institutions on the other. Because of its characteris-
tics, this regime has actors of greater diversity (and their resources and
capacity of influence are asymmetrical), and instruments tend to com-
bine in a contradictory manner. 1) Actors. Ministries of education,
associations of rectors of private universities, assessment agencies (pub-
lic and private), other actors (students, teachers, workers) with differ-
ent degrees of participation (institutionalized) and influence; business
leaders, credit institutions. 2) Instruments. Unrestricted or restricted
access; incentives and disincentives; lump and conditional subsidies;
selective or universal supports. 3) Objectives. Except for the case of
Argentina and Venezuela, which have a degree of coherence based on
processes of linear accumulation, the coexistence of subsystems tends
to be problematic or contradictory in the remaining nations. In terms of
coverage, the most successful country is Argentina (86 per cent),
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 447
followed by Venezuela (77 per cent); both have linear processes of
accumulation, although Argentina has maintained a more coherent
policy in terms of the expansive model of the public supply.
Colombia (55.7 per cent), Uruguay (55.5 per cent), Panama
(47.2 per cent), and Ecuador (45.5 per cent) have shown better perfor-
mance. Ecuador and Panama are outstanding, and their growth engine
has been fundamentally the private sector. Bolivia (39 per cent) and
Mexico (30.8 per cent) are the farthest behind in this group, although
for different reasons. While Bolivia has opted to considerably increase
its investment per student and has granted priority to developing
elementary and secondary schools in general, Mexico has selected an
inertial policy in coverage as well as in financing, which has resulted in
more than a decade of stagnation in the nation’s systems of higher
education.

c) Regime of Loose Governance. The systems that form this group

have been coherent with laissez-faire policies towards the private
sector. 1) Actors. In all cases, the participation of government public
entities is weak; public institutions, especially in El Salvador and
Guatemala, operate under difficult conditions, although they are
able to compete and remain afloat thanks to their dimensions and
policies to recover costs. Private institutions of higher education con-
centrate most of the demand, but are not grouped into associations;
within a permissive context, they are focused on winning market
niches based on the territory and the characteristics of their academic
supply, primarily in majors that require little investment. 2)
Instruments. At the government level, except for sporadic financing
(such as public infrastructure) and block resources for public institu-
tions, the governments of these nations opt to not-do. The public
universities, in contrast, have their own scholarship programmes for
the economic sustenance of students or substantial discounts in fees;
in addition, they channel international student support (such as the
Carolina foundation scholarships from Spain). 3) Objectives. Due to
historical issues, in addition to the development models of higher
education that nations select following a neoliberal shift (from priva-
tization though low-cost institutions of higher education), El
Salvador (28.1 per cent), Guatemala (21.3 per cent), and Honduras
(20.1 per cent) have the lowest levels of coverage and, in general, the
lowest performance in the region.
448 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

15.6 Final Remarks

This chapter has shown that no causal relationship exists between the
political/ideological orientation of Latin America’s governments and
the reform processes of their systems of higher education. In the neo-
liberal phase, governments established new governance arrangements
based on market or market-like mechanisms to conduct institutions of
higher education from a distance, under new rules of the game. In the
public sector, the new rules consisted of assessment of individuals,
programmes, and institutions to grant incentives and thus condition
institutions’ and actors’ behaviours. In the private sector, greater free-
doms were granted to open institutions and permit or tolerate educa-
tional profits. In some cases, private institutions of higher education
were obligated to enter into processes of quality assurance.
In this phase, the systems’ coverage grew, quite noticeably in some
countries. In contrast, the private sector gained pre-eminence in almost
all of the nations. Over the years, as actors’ resistance was overcome,
the types of evaluation, conditioned financing, and privatization of
enrolment became the normal forms of conducting systems.
However, after two decades, the neoliberal systems began to show
signs of exhaustion. Several countries made a leftward shift, and the
state’s role in providing education acquired renewed importance.
Focuses based on rights and justice and expanding enrolment gained
relevance, and the private sector faced severe questioning for its low
quality and interest in profits. Thus, public financing in many countries
tended to increase, encouragement was given to the growth of cover-
age, and pressure was placed on the control of private institutions of
higher education. Nevertheless, all of these actions occurred in mark-
edly different ways through processes to adjust and adapt policies. Both
neoliberal and post-neoliberal governments kept instruments of market
inspiration while using instruments of direct state intervention to
finance systems and control them – a process we have called the
accumulation of policies. In some cases, countries followed more or
less linear processes of accumulation to expand systems; in other
countries, thanks to gradual change and the expansion of low-cost
institutions, policies have accumulated in a convergent manner,
through successive, imprecise, and indirect approximations.
The specific form in which both neoliberal and post-neoliberal gov-
ernments used market or statist policies results in three types of
Neoliberals versus Post-Neoliberals 449

governance regimes. In some countries, actors and policies depended

on the market and market-like instruments to take charge of most
expanded coverage, system financing, and quality. This sort of inte-
grating regime is predominantly private. However, other countries
developed a different type of governance regime that is dual, in which
the public and private sectors seem to develop on different paths: public
policies and instruments intended for the public sector do not reach the
private sector or only reach it in tangential form. The third type of
governance is predominantly private, with low state interference, as
experienced in Central American nations.

Notes
1. Almost all nations, regardless of the political orientation of their
government, increased public spending and conditional financing, and
continued using quality assurance policies in the public sector that were
also promoted in the private sector. In various forms, all of the countries
in Latin America encouraged programmes of positive discrimination and
localization to expand traditionally marginalized sectors’ access to higher
education or support economically disadvantaged students. These
countries also tended to conserve policies of efficiency in educational
administration, inspired by the principles of New Public Management.
In short, more than creating paradigms of totally statist or totally
neoliberal policies, systems of policies have acquired mixed forms that
combine elements of both, centred on justice and the right to education in
the first case, and, in the second case, on economic considerations
(conditional financing, competency instruments, and human capital).
2. ‘In 1999, 9% of Latin America’s population was unemployed and 43%
was below the poverty line’ (CEPAL, 2004). It is important to underline
that in Latin America, government/opposition interaction tends to
influence voter behavior more than voter identification with political
parties on the left/right scale (Panizza, 2009, p. 77). As Stoessel
indicates, ‘the electoral victory of the left responds more to the anti-
party stances that new leaders offer, than to their ideological stances’
(Panizza, 2009, p. 130). This fact is fundamental for understanding how
the discourse of personalities such as Hugo Chávez (Venezuela) or Lula
da Silva (Brazil) was successful in linking the political exhaustion of the
right in power with the need for a change in direction under their own
leadership.
3. Regarding the debate on terms, see Stoessel, 2014
450 González-Ledesma and Álvarez-Mendiola

4. From 2008 to 2012, Paraguay was governed by Fernando Lugo, from the
leftist Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio.
5. Martin Trow (1974) stated that the development of higher education can be
analysed from the gross rate of enrollment, which he divides into elite
(<15%), massive (from 15 per cent to 50 per cent), and universal
(>50 per cent). For the case of Latin America, Claudio Rama proposes
a different scale in search of ‘more divisions that permit distinguishing
more clearly . . . the access of elites up to 15%, the access of minorities
from 15% to 30%, of the masses up to 50%, universal access up to 85%,
and absolute access with a higher percentage than universal access’ (Rama,
2009).
6. The other models identified by Verger and colleagues are privatization in
social democratic welfare states, historical public–private partnerships in
education systems with a tradition of religious schooling, and
privatization through catastrophe.
7. Verger et al. consider Peru to be part of the group of poor nations with
a low-cost educational supply. While the nation undoubtedly has these
characteristics, the dimensions of its system (more than 1 million
students), the proportion of public–private supply in total coverage
(47–53%), and the tradition of its public universities do not justify its
inclusion in the category.
8. The shift toward extending coverage through the public sector is probably
explained at least in part by the government’s peace efforts and attention to
social needs carried out in a political context of conflict and negotiation to
disarm Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).
9. For the case of transnational suppliers and corporate groups of higher
education in Mexico, see Álvarez-Mendiola, 2015 and Álvarez-Mendiola
and Urrego-Cedillo, 2017.

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Index

AACU. See Association of American liberalization and, 105

Colleges and Universities reinforcement of, 105–106
AASCU. See American Association of managerialization, 84
State Colleges and Universities market-style management, 336–337
AAU. See Association of American politique contractuelle, 217,
Universities 219–220
academic autonomy, 7, 60–61 recentralization, 326
academic board composition, recruiting systems, 91
252–253 research–teaching nexus, 56–57
academic capitalism, 4–5, 20, 115 self-directed strategic action, 350
academic work, 255–257 self-governance, 79–80, 225–226
capitalism, 430, 443 academic, 86
capitalist globalization, 357–358 managerial, 86
capitalist industrialization, 45–46 new forms of, 130
casualization and, 51, 52, 53 resilience of, 122–123, 124–125
changing academic profession (CAP), self-governing bodies, 108–109
257 semi-autonomous agencies, 402
commodification, 20–23 workforce, 410–411
counterattacks on, 43–44 academic collegiality, 105
resistance to, 61 academic communities, 116–117, 120,
commodification of knowledge, 5 128–129
commodity form, 46–47 academic credentialism, 22–23
commodity production, 44–45 academic education, 270–271
deprofessionalization, 43–44, 45–47, academic employment, 344–345
60 academic entrepreneurialism, 289–290
disciplinary authority, 4–5, 28 academic entrepreneurship, 258
disciplinary autonomy, 5–6 academic freedom, 51–52, 209, 229
global knowledge competition, academic governance. See governance
16–17 academic guilds, 3–4
individual autonomy, 106 academic integrity. See academic
individual freedom, 308 probity
individual performance, 189–190 academic interests, 292
individualism, 302 academic labour productivity, 186–187
managerial accountability, 212–214 academic labour, 4–6
managerial autonomy, 120 casualization and, 51, 52, 53
managerial self-governance, 86 (See changing academic profession (CAP),
also academic management) 257
managerialism, 4–5, 48–49, 57–58, commodification of knowledge, 5
192, 249 commodity form, 46–47
Germany and, 107–108 commodity production, 44–45

455
456 Index

academic labour (cont.) organizational composition, 3

faculty flight, 412–413 organizational legacies, 307–309
grassroots staff, 262 organizational performance,
group identity, 6–7 189–190
guildism, 6–7 (See also standpoint- organizational sociologies, 28
guildism) organizational theory, 286, 288–289
human capital, 75–76, 278, 401 organizational uncertainty, 142
human resources, 127–128, 399–400 professional management, 188
individual autonomy, 106 professionalism, 43–44, 48–49, 57,
individual freedom, 308 59, 61
individual performance, 189–190 scientific management, 319–320
individualism, 302 self-governing bodies, 108–109
politique contractuelle, 217, semi-autonomous agencies, 402
219–220 academic misconduct. See academic
proletarianization of, 43–47, 61 probity
recentralization, 326 academic mobility, 17–19, 169,
recruiting systems, 91 170–171, 173–174, 418
regulatory state and, 60 academic, 17–19
remuneration, 89–90 international flows, 159–160
research–teaching nexus, 56–57 migration, 173–174, 357–358, 398
resistance, 54, 56–61 outgoing, 174–175
self-directed strategic action, 350 student, 16–17, 20–21
self-governance, 79–80, 225–226 student mobility, 16–17, 20–21
academic, 86 student movements, 429–430
managerial, 86 academic oligarchy, 107, 115, 336, 349
new forms of, 130 academic power relations, 22–23,
resilience of, 122–123, 124–125 58–59, 114–117, 270
spoils-system practices, 130–131 decision-making processes and,
transformation of, 47–48 246–247
workforce, 410–411 power confrontation, 129
academic management, 280 academic probity, 283–284, 355–356,
internal knowledge, 123 366, 370–372, 376–379. See
internal steering capabilities, 120 also ASEAN, corruption
lay members on governing boards, among; Asia, corruption in
125–126 academic, 370–372
managerial accountability, 212–214 anti-corruption campaign, 366,
managerial autonomy, 120 369–370
managerialism, 4–5, 48–49, 57–58, among ASEAN member states,
192, 249 369–370
Germany and, 107–108 bribery, 368, 369–370, 376–379
liberalization and, 105 breaches linked to, 374–375
reinforcement of, 105–106 charting, 372–376
managerialization, 84 China and, 376–379
market-style management, 336–337 collusion, 376–380
organizational actors, 3 countering, 380–381
organizational autonomy, 5–6 defining, 368–369
organizational hierarchies, 7 fake degrees, 376–379
organizational autonomy, 281, fake scientific results, 378–379
339–340, 343–344, 350 forms of, 362
organizational complexity, 131–132 low-level, 381–382
Index 457

measuring effects of, 369–370 professional accountability, 213,

perpetuation of, 382 215, 225, 228–229
scope and role of, 365–366 regimes, 208
academic self-governance, 86 relevance of, 209–212
academic standards, 375 Romania and, 208, 229–232
academic strategy, 255–257 socio-economic, 228–229
Academic Vice President (VPAR), socio-economic accountability,
414–415 228–229
academic voice, 252–254. See also accreditation, 6–7, 8–10, 315–316,
academic capitalism; academic 370, 405
governance; academic labour ACCT. See Association of Community
access to higher education, middle class, College Trustees
276 administrative autonomy, 359–360
Acción Afirmativa, 444–445 administrative centralization, 124,
accountability, 85, 143–144, 161, 189, 127–128
216–216, 281–282 advanced vocational education,
administrative, 212–213 270–271
constitutional perspective of, AERES. See France, Agence de
212–213 l’évaluation de la recherche et de
democratic perspective of, 212–213 l’enseignement supérieur
desire to introduce, 303 Africa, 138, 396–397, 419–420,
forms of, 212–216 435–436
France and, 208, 217–220 challenges in, 399–401
Germany and, 208, 220–225 context of, 397–399
hierarchical, 213, 225, 228–229 Education and Training Policy (ETP),
hierarchical accountability, 213, 225, 402–403, 409
228–229 Education and Training Policy
institutionalization of, 233 (FDRE-ETP, 1994), 396–397,
instruments of, 216, 237 407
internal, 228–229 Education Sector Development Plans,
internal accountability, 228–229 409
learning perspective of, 212–213 Education Strategy Centre (ESC),
learning perspective of 408
accountability, 212–213 Inter-University Council (IUCEA),
legal, 213, 225 400–401
legal accountability, 213, 225 marketization and, 406–407
managerial, 212–214, 233–237 reform and, 402–403
measures, 402 Task Force on Higher Education and
mechanisms of, 336–337 Society (TFHES), 398–399
overview of mechanisms of, 234–236 trends in leadership and management
partisan preferences and, 238 in, 403–406
performance-based, 402 agency theory, 286, 288–289, 290–291
Poland and, 208, 225–229 AIU. See Asian International University
political, 212–213, 215, 225, 232 Akkreditierungsrat (Accreditation
political accountability, 212–213, Council), 223
215, 225, 232 alienation, 56–60
procedural, 214–214 alignment, 160
procedural accountability, 214–214 Althusser, L., 59
professional, 213, 215, 225, Amare, A., 408
228–229, 233–237 Amazan, R., 418
458 Index

American Association of State Colleges intra-ASEAN and China-ASEAN

and Universities (AASCU), flows, 367–368
323–324 member states of, 368–369
Anderson, G., 47–48, 57–58 Athanasiou, A., 45, 52–53
Andres, L., 349 auditing quality, 419
Andrews, S., 52 Austin, I., 269–270, 286
Anglo–American model, 103–106, 249. Australia, 11–12, 17–19, 50–56,
See also Anglo-Saxon model 166–167, 169. See also
Continental European higher federalism
education systems and, Australian Graduate Survey, 54–55
109–110, 120 Australian Learning and Teaching
Anglophone nations, 248, 252, 254. Council, 51–52
See also Continental European Commonwealth and, 191
higher education systems Course Experience Questionnaire
Anglo-Saxon model, 348. See also (CEQ), 54–55
Anglo–American model; Excellence in Research for Australia
Continental European higher (ERA), 55
education systems market-oriented higher education
Antikainen, A., 348 systems in, 285–286
ARACIS. See Romania, Agenț ia migration and, 173–174
Română de Asigurare a Calităț ii National Tertiary Education Union,
în Învăț ământul Superior 52, 60–61
Argentina, 429–430, 434, 439–440, performance measurement and,
441, 444–445 185–186, 196–201
arms-length steering, 210 research assessment and, 186–187
ASEAN. See Association of Southeast U. K. and Canada and, 190–196
Asian Nations university funds, 44–45
Asia, 82–83, 138. See also East Asia; Austria, 81, 345–346
Southeast Asia; specific
countries Badan Akredtitasi Nasional (BAN)
corruption in, 366 (Indonesia), 373–374
Asian International University (AIU), Badan Berkanun Persekutuan (Federal
375 Statutory Bodies), 364
association for non-university higher Badan Hukum Milik Negera (BHMN),
education institutions in Europe 364–365
(EURASHE), 145, 148–149 Balibar, E., 45–46, 57, 58–60
Association of American Colleges and Ball, S. J., 5, 428
Universities (AACU), BAN. See Badan Akredtitasi Nasional
323–324 Barry, J., 47
Association of American Universities Behn, R. D., 188
(AAU), 323–324 Belgium, 12, 170
Association of Community College Berdahl, R., 214–214
Trustees (ACCT), 323 Bexley, E., 56–57
Association of Southeast Asian Nations BFUG. See Bologna Follow-Up Group
(ASEAN), 19–20, 160, 356, BHMN. See Badan Hukum Milik
359–360 Negera
ASEAN Integrity Community, 367 bicameralism, 314–315
corruption among, 369–370 (See also Black, J., 48
academic probity) Blackmore, J., 54–55
income diversification and, 375 Bladh, A., 5
Index 459

Bleiklie, I., 5 provincial distribution of public

block grants, 105, 222 universities in, 313
board membership, 284–285 provincial governance, 318–319,
Bolden, R., 260–261 325
Bolivia, 430, 434–435, 439–440, 441, provincial governance and, 318–319
443–445 provincial government, 314–315
Bologna Declaration, 145 public higher education in, 308, 313
Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG), research assessment and, 203
149 segmented policy dynamics in, 325
Bologna Process, 68, 140–141, 147, structure of higher education system
158, 167–168. See also of, 310–315
Germany student enrolments in, 202
harmonization, 151, 160 United Kingdom and Australia and,
skills recognition, 8–10 190–196
Bouckaert, G., 192 USA differentiation from, 307–308
Bourdieu, P., 59 Universities Canada, 315
Bovens, M., 212–213 Cantwell, B., 4–5
Braun, D., 192, 336 CAP. See academic capitalism;
Braverman, H., 45–46, 54 academic labour
Brazil, 430, 434–435, 439, 442, Capano, G., 77, 91, 93, 402, 406
443–445 capitalist accumulation and knowledge
Fees Federal Law of 2012, economy, 49–50
444–445 Carnegie Classification of Institutions
Brignall, S., 188–189 of Higher Education, 310
British higher education systems, 3–4 CAS. See China, Chinese Academy of
Bulgaria, 346–347 Science
Burdon, P., 58–59 CCDI. See China, Central Commission
bureaucratic arrangements, 84 for Discipline Inspection
bureaucratization. See governance CCP. See China, Chinese Communist
Burundi, 400–401 Party
Butler, J., 45, 52–53, 59 Ceauşescu, Nicolae, 232
CEI. See Spain, International Campus
Cambodia, 374, 380, 381 of Excellence
Canada, 17–19, 166, 170, 301–304. See Central American nations,
also federalism 448–449
bi-partisan dynamics in, 326 Centre for Degree and Graduate
changes in, 324–325 Education, 361
Council of Independent Colleges Centre national de la recherche
(CIC), 323–324 scientifique (CNRS), 218–219
Council of Ministers of Education, CEQ. See Australia, Course Experience
Canada (CMEC), 317 Questionnaire
federal funding, 317 certification, 344–345, 444
federal government in, 317–318 Cerych, L., 122, 128–129,
financial dimension in, 325 343–344
institutional autonomy and, 314–315 Chakrabarty, D., 45
Jones on, 322 Chávez, Hugo, 430
Kirby on, 320–321 Cheng, M., 48–49
performance measurement and, CHEPS Consortium, 346
185–186, 196–201 Chile, 433–434, 439–440, 441, 443,
private sector in, 314–314 444–445
460 Index

China, 19–20, 51, 81, 84, 355 classification

bureaucratic arrangements and, 84 goods and markets, 15, 20, 22–23
Central Commission for Discipline institutions of higher education, 310
Inspection (CCDI), international classification,
377–378 270–271
Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), policy instruments and, 92
378–379 private and public, 269–270
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), regimes, 22–23
361–362 value construction and, 15
corruption and, 376–379 Cloete, N., 5
data from, 368–369 CMEC. See Canada, Council of
economic growth of, 356 Ministers of Education
guanxi, 362–364, 379–380 CNE. See France, Comité National
Higher Education Law of the PRC, d’Evaluation
361 CNER. See France, Comité national
Institute of Scientific and Technical d’évaluation de la recherche
Information (ISTIC), 384 CNRS. See Centre national de la
Institution of Supreme Learning recherche scientifique
(Taixue), 360–361 Coates, H., 54–55
intra-ASEAN and China-ASEAN Coen, D., 142
flows, 367–368 Cold War, 309
National Evaluation Committee, 361 Colino, C., 305
National People’s Congress, collective identify – and higher
361–362 education, 121
number of article on academic collective leadership, 123–124,
misconduct and academic 126–127, 131–132
integrity, 372 college for the sons of the Emperor
zizhiquan, 360 (Guozijian), 360–361
zizhuquan, 360 Colombia, 429–430, 434–435,
Christaller, W., 16–17 439–440, 443–444
Christensen, T., 212–213 commercial interests, 292
Churchman, D., 57–58 Connell, R., 56
CIC. See Canada, Council of Considine, M., 48
Independent Colleges; U. S., constitutional separation of powers,
Council of Independent Colleges 304
civic university model, 268–269 Continental European higher education
Clark, Burton, 3–4, 5–6, 28, 73–74, systems, 3–4, 77, 79–80,
75–77, 336 103–104, 134. See also
Cartesian triangulation and, 5–6 Anglo–American model
Continental European higher Anglo–American model and,
education systems and, 109–110, 120
109–110, 134 based on spoils system, 117
continental model and, 78–79 continental model, 78–79
The Higher Education System growth of, 271–272
(Clark), 3–4 objectives and directions of change
and methodological downwardness, in, 106–109
4–10, 15–16 contractualisation procedure, 95–96,
systemic governance and, 80 217–218, 219–220
Triangle of coordination model, 5–6, coordination principles, 73
10, 73–74, 76–77, 336 corruption. See academic probity
Index 461

Corruption Perception Index (CPI), E4 group, 146–147

366, 368 East Asia, 82, 355, 358, 359–360
CPI. See Corruption Perception Index corruption in, 366, 372–376
Croatia, 340–341 Eckel, P., 257–258
cronyism, 355–356, 364, 368, 370, economic development, 71–72, 75–76,
379–380 161–162, 163, 165, 230–231,
forms of, 362 400, 409, 411, 442
culturally homogeneous societies, 306 economic diversity, 192
curricula, 106, 115, 283–284 economic dynamism, 116
Currie, J., 208 economic efficiency, 371
Czech Republic, 346–347 economic expansion, 276
economic growth, 356
Dauter, L., 27 economic hegemony, 156
de Boer, H., 5, 85–86, 337–338, economic liberalism, 401
339–341, 345–346 economic recessions, 333–334
Deardorff, D. K., 172–173 national development, 292
Dearlove, J., 403–404 national distinctiveness, 163
decision-making processes in higher national economic development, 165
education, 104, 246 regional development, 292
autonomy in, 427–428 socio-economic development, 159,
changes in, 248–251 163
collective nature of, 127 Ecuador, 429–430, 434–435, 441, 443,
hierarchical arrangements, 253–254 444–445
impact on effectiveness of, 251–259 education spending, 13, 14
influencing, 440 educational attainment, 276
new models of, 259–263 educational demands, 75–76
power relations and, 246–247 educational efficiency, 231
tightening, 109 EEA. See European Economic Area
verticalization of, 108–109, 131–132 Effective International Practice,
Deem, R., 4–5 355–356
degrees, 106 egalitarianism, 302
democratic perspective of El Salvador, 430, 442
accountability, 212–213 Elazar, D. S., 305
democratic revitalization, 117–118 e-learning, 270–271, 410
democratic revolution, 107 elite non-profit private universities,
democratization, 107, 115 275
demographic fluctuations, 156 elitism, 302
demographic growth and higher EMBA. See Executive MBA
education, 276 Enders, J., 4–5, 85–86, 339–340
Denmark, 81, 170 English-speaking world, 81–82
Dill, D., 4–5, 114 ENQA. See European Association for
DiMaggio, P. J., 21–22 Quality Assurance in Higher
Directory of State Higher Education Education
Agencies, 323 enseignants-chercheurs (lecturing
Dobbins, M., 342, 346–347 researchers), 219–220
doctoral-granting universities, 250 EPRDF. See Ethiopia, Ethiopia Peoples’
doctoral studies, 159–160 Revolutionary Democratic Front
Douglass, J. A., 5 EQAR. See European Quality
dual governance regimes, 446–447 Assurance Register for Higher
dynamic conservatism, 72 Education
462 Index

equality, 161–162 European Association for Quality

ERA. See Australia, Excellence in Assurance in Higher Education
Research for Australia (ENQA), 140–141, 142, 143,
Erasmus Mundus programme, 160 144
Erkkilä, T., 8–10 development of, 150–152
ESC. See Ethiopia, Education Strategy purposes of, 147–148
Centre European Commission, 142, 143,
Esping-Andersen, G., 348 150–151, 270–271
Estermann, T., 346 European countries, 81, 83, 84, 138,
Estonia, 170 346, 349. See also Western
ESU. See European Student Union Europe; specific countries
Ethiopia, 401, 407–408, 411–412, comparative studies across, 345–348
419–420 economic recessions in, 333–334
challenges affecting, 412–415 ESG (See European Standards and
Education and Training Policy (ETP), Guidelines for Quality
402–403, 409 Assurance)
Education and Training Policy redistribution of authorities in, 339
(FDRE-ETP, 1994), 396–397, European Court, 338–339
407 European Economic Area (EEA), 175
Education Sector Development Plans, European Higher Education Area,
409 140–141
e-learning in, 410 European Quality Assurance Register
Ethiopia Peoples’ Revolutionary for Higher Education (EQAR),
Democratic Front (EPRDF), 140–141, 142, 143, 144
402–403, 408, 410 development of, 150–152
Higher Education Inspection establishment of, 145–147
Directorate, 417 purposes of, 147–148
Higher Education Proclamation European Standards and Guidelines for
No. 650/2009 (FDRE-HEP, Quality Assurance (ESG), 145,
2009), 396–397, 407, 409 147, 151
Higher Education Relevance and European Student Union (ESU), 145
Quality Agency (HERQA), 408, European Union (EU), 109–110,
413, 415, 416–417 138–139, 160
increased undergraduates in, 410 harmonization, 151, 160
legislative framework in, European University Association
408–409 (EUA), 145
Ministry of Education (MoE), 360, Europeanization, 158–159, 333–334
408, 416–417 Eurydice, 335–336
transparency and, 417–419 evaluation and higher education,
workforce of, 410–411 93–94. See also performance
ETP. See Africa, Education and and evaluation of higher
Training Policy; Ethiopia, education
Education and Training accountability and, 54–55
Policy accreditation and, 90–91
EU. See European Union assessment and, 83
EUA. See European University Comité National d’Evaluation
Association (CNE), 218–219, 238
EURASHE. See association for non- concept of, 89
university higher education evaluation panels, 223
institutions in Europe institutional evaluation, 223–224
Index 463

National Evaluation Committee, 361 public funding, 43–44, 60, 76

performance and funding, 83, amount of, 83
186–187 lack of, 82
research evaluation, 82, 204 public investment, 116
teaching evaluation, 94 publicly funded higher education,
types of, 93–94, 448 292–293
exchange economy frameworks, 21–22 public/private divide, 95–96
Executive MBA (EMBA), 378 public–private partnerships, 275
export income, 51 remuneration, 89–90
scholarships, 418–419
federal countries, 301, 304–307, spending budgets, 338–339
315–318 state fiscal crises, 76
constitutional separation of powers state funding, 310–313
in, 304 student-loan system, 273–274
shift in, 302 taxation, 50–51, 89–90
Federal Statutory Bodies (Badan tuition fees, 174–175, 273–274,
Berkanun Persekutuan), 364 280–281, 316–317
federalism, 190–191, 325 user-pays financing models, 12
accommodating, 306–307 Finland, 11–12, 170, 175, 340–342,
balanced, 305–306 347
competitive, 307 Fischer, F., 4–5
conflicting nature of, 302 Fligstein, N., 27
segmented, 306 Fontdevila, C., 427
unitary, 306 Fordist production system, 119
varieties of, 305 foreign language proficiency, 168
Ferlie, E., 104, 127, 129–130 foreign students, 25
Fielden, J., 275, 284–286 for-profit global education businesses,
File, J., 346 275
finance and higher education for-profit private higher education, 273
expenditure, 89–90, 190, 428 Foucault, M., 45–46, 49–50, 58–59
fee-for-service financing models, 12 France, 11–12, 107–108, 124–125,
financial aid, 309 216–216, 233–237, 340–341
financial austerity, 420 accountability regimes in, 208,
financial crises, 68, 316–317 217–220
financial management, 127–128 administrative councils (conseils
financial services, 17 d’administration), 218–218,
funding mechanisms, 81 219–220
grants, 91, 377–378 Bologna Process and, 218–219
block, 105, 222 Comité National d’Evaluation
lump-sum, 83 (CNE), 218–219, 238
income diversification, 280, 375 Comité national d’évaluation de la
income streams, 369 recherche (CNER), 238
lump-sum funding, 230–231 conseils d’administration
lump-sum grants, 83 (administrative councils),
performance-based funding, 218–218, 219–220
214–215, 217–218, 221–223, expenditure reports for parliament
227–228, 230–231, 233–237 (projets annuels de
private expenditure, 12 performance), 217
private funding, 60, 83 Mission scientifique, technique et
public expenditure, 115, 279–280 pédagogique (MSTP), 238
464 Index

France (cont.) bureaucratic arrangements and, 84

Napoleonic model, 268–269, 348 bureaucratization and, 7
projets annuels de performance centralization and, 124, 127–128
(expenditure reports for coercion and, 45
parliament), 217 collegial bodies and, 122–123, 124
Friedrich, C. J., 305 collegialism and, 117, 282–283, 287
competitiveness, 8–10, 20–21, 119,
Gable, A., 55–56 156, 166, 199, 202, 321,
game theory, 129 341–342, 434–435
garbage can model, 157–158 conditional financing and, 449
Germany, 11–12, 124–125, 170, corporate boards and, 284–285
216–216, 233–237, 345–346. corporate culturalism and, 57–58
See also federalism corporate enterprise model and, 107
accountability regimes in, 208, corporate governance and, 406–407
220–225 corporate organization and, 72
Accreditation Council corporatization and, 84, 105, 187
(Akkreditierungsrat), 223 of public higher education, 359
Bologna Process and, 223 cross-national variation, 3–4
Bundesländer, 220–221, 224–225 decentralization, 124, 127–128, 320,
Hochschulräte (university boards), 326
117–118, 224–225 administrative, 428
Länder, 220–223, 224–225 of corruption, 365–366
managerialism and, 107–108 decoupling, 157–158, 161–162
quality assurance and, 223–224 de-governmentalization, 406
global marketplaces, 248 deregulation, 11–12, 23–24, 84, 187,
global policy instruments, 8–10 338–339, 402
global rankings, 11–12, 164, 171–172. discretionary powers, higher
See also international bench- education institutions, 338–339
marking; Quacquarelli Symonds drift perspective, 143–144, 148–150
rankings; Shanghai Academic executives, 262
Ranking of World Universities exogenous agency, 11, 15–16
Global South, 17–19 explanatory paucity of in higher
globalizing models of higher education, education, 11–12
10–11, 15–17 flexible governance, 406–407
globalization, 5, 16–17, 20, 68, formal autonomy, 339–340
138–139, 333–334, 341–342 government control, 349
capitalist forms of, 357–358 government failures, 339
effects of, 203 government interventions, 279
growing, 151 governmental dynamics, 305
policy and, 139 government–university relationships,
public policy and, 69 288–289
regionalism and, 358 hierarchical governance, 77–78
Goldfinch, S., 24–26 horizontal arrangements, 253–254
Gornitzka, Å., 88, 343–344, 348, 349 hybrid governance, 93–95
governance hybridity, 10–13, 29, 95–97
academic governance and committee age of, 95–97
structure, 261–262 varieties of, 93–95
age of, 80 hybridization, 70
agency problems, 289–290 incrementalism, 70
autonomization (of universities), 84 inwardness, 4–10, 15–16
Index 465

liberalization, 11–12, 105, 187, stakeholders, 121, 290–291, 420

338–339, 428 state authority, 336, 338
market-like instruments, 448–449 state governance, 318–319, 325
methodological nationalism and, state initiatives, 282
7–8, 28 state regulation, 86
mimetic isomorphism and, 287–288 state steering, 349
ministerial intervention, 210 state supervising model, 77
multi-actor governance, 141–144 state supervision model, 336,
multilevel governance, 141–144 344–345
multi-stakeholder constituencies, 10 state-centred model, 209, 216
national systemic governance steering and rowing government,
approaches, 80 356–357
Network Governance, 113–114, steering from a distance, 77, 79–80,
186–187 84, 109–110, 334–335, 358, 429
networkization, 321–322, 324 European countries and, 81
normative isomorphism, 287–288 hybrid modes of, 93
political conflicts, 431–432 shift towards, 84
political economy, 15–20 steering government, 356–357
political interference, 379–380, stewardship theory, 286, 290–291
404–405 structuralist accounts, 11
procedural autonomy, 74 supra-national organizations,
procedural governance, 78–79 342–343
procedural power, 84 surveillance systems, 60
procedural rules, 93–94 systemic governance, 68–70, 78–79,
processes of coercion, 45 80
professional associations, 119 arrangements and dynamics of, 86
professional autonomy, 4, 6–7, hybrid modes of, 85–87, 93–95
343–344 hybrids in, 88–89
regimes, 436–437, 445–447, modes, 77, 78
448–449 national approaches to, 80
regulation, 81–82, 89–90 policy mix and hybridity in, 87–89
regulatory capitalism, 5 variants of, 86–87
regulatory conversations, 48, 54 upwardness, 4–10, 15–16
regulatory frameworks, 292 vested interests, 301
regulatory organizations, 138–139 graduate employability, 54–55, 115,
regulatory power, 146 161, 166, 238. See also graduate
regulatory state, 47–50 unemployment
academic labour and, 60 graduate unemployment, 415
structural imperatives of, 54 graduation ceremonies, 45
sameness, 10–11 guanxi, 362–364, 379–380
scholarly academies, or societies Guatemala, 439–440, 442
(Shuyuan), 360–361 Gumport, P. J., 5
self-governing bodies, 108–109 Guozijian (college for the sons of the
self-regulation, 6–7 Emperor), 360–361
semi-autonomous agencies, 402
shared governance, 406–407 Hanlin Academy, 360–361
stakeholder governance, 219–220, harmonization, skills recognition, 8–10
224–225, 228–229, 232 Harootunian, H., 44, 46–47, 48–50,
stakeholder guidance, 86, 217–217 57, 60
stakeholder theory, 286 Harvard University, USA, 275
466 Index

Harvey, D., 47 Canada, segmented policy dynamics

Heath, M., 58–59 in, 325
Helms, R. M., 172–173, 177 change, 431–432
Hénard, F., 398, 405 conscious design of, 70
Henman, P., 54–56 coordination of, 68
HERQA. See Ethiopia, Higher dynamics of, 151–152
Education Relevance and effectiveness of, 82–83
Quality Agency globalization and, 139
heterogeneity implementation of, 175–176
governance of higher education and, initiatives, 279
28 instruments, 73, 89–93, 112
in higher education, 132–134 operationalization of, 95–96
higher education models and, 132 integration, 348
higher education systems and, 275 internationalization and, 139
higher education – and employment, in Latin America, 442–445
169–170, 174–175. See also legacy, 427
graduate unemployment making, 22, 133–134
higher education – and enrolment, 429, market-based, 428
433, 440 mix, 87–88
higher education institutions of neoliberalism, 426
institutional autonomy, 81–83, 134, networks, 321–324
289–290 outputs, 25
Canada and, 314–315 performance, 89, 189–190
dimensions of, 341–342 practitioners, 11
exercise of, 288 public, 69
increasing, 85, 120, 211–212, rhetoric, 270
214–215, 280, 281–282 statements, 278
infringing on, 398–399 strategies, 79–80, 110–111
NPM and, 210–211 success or failure of, 122
institutional capacity, 231 systemic governance, policy mix and
institutional complexity, 142 hybridity in, 87–89
institutional efficiency, 279–280 higher education policy, ideological
institutional interest articulation, 4 coherence, 440
institutional isomorphism, 23–24 higher education reform, 23–24, 74–75,
institutional legacies, 307–309 103–104, 347–348
institutional logics, 345 Africa and, 402–403
institutional missions, 72, 83 big, 340–342
institutional performance, 321 collegial bodies and, 124
institutional quality audits, 416 implementation of, 109–113
institutional theory, 286 Italy and, 132–133
institutional transformation, 5 NPM and, 187, 202
institutionalization, 80, 233 promotion of, 431
higher education policy, 15, 26–27, 68, public sector, 141–142
70, 78, 80, 83–84, 158, unexpected outcomes of, 128–130
186–187, 282, 314, 405 unintended consequences of,
accumulation of, 448 121–124
adjustment and adaptation, 438, waves of, 80–85
442–443 Hogan, 127–128
Bologna Process, policy learning and, Holzinger, K., 25–26
211 Honduras, 439–440, 442
Index 467

Hong Kong, 19–20, 178 mutual understanding and, 165

Hood, Christopher, 188 national economic development, 165
Huisman, J., 208, 346–347 outcomes of, 167–168
Humboldtian model, 209, 216, policy and, 139
220–221, 232, 233–237, political arguments, 165
346–347, 348 practices of, 175–176
promotion of, 156–157, 160–161,
identity institutions (religious, cultural), 171–172
275 public diplomacy and, 168
Ilieva, J., 166, 170–171, 177 public policy and, 69
illegal logging, 367 of quality assurance, 152
immediacy of interests, 122 script of, 168–170
India, 82 strategies of, 170–171
Indonesia, 19–20, 381. See also Badan synergies in, 177
Berkanun Persekutuan (Federal world society theory and, 157–163
Statutory Bodies) Investment Capital for University
industrialization, 45–46 Research (UNIK), 340–341
institutional adaptation, 72 Ireland, 170
institutional esteem, spatially uneven ISTIC. See China, Institute of Scientific
distribution of, 23 and Technical Information
institutional isomorphism, 158–159, Italy, 11–12, 107–108
163, 187, 287–288 reform and, 132–133
intellectual property, 320 IUCEA. See Africa, Inter-University
intercultural awareness, 167–168 Council
intercultural knowledge, 52–53
intergovernmental relations, 304–305, Jacobs, G. J., 5
306–307 Jalur Khusus (Special Path), 373
international benchmarking, 11, 16–17. Japan, 81, 84, 170, 355
See also global rankings; bureaucratic arrangements and, 84
Quacquarelli Symonds rankings; Jaramillo, A., 398
Shanghai Academic Ranking of Jayasuriya, K., 4–5
World Universities Jessop, B., 5–6
International Institute for Educational Jones, G. A., 269–270, 286, 314–315,
Planning, 402–403 322
international interests, 172–173 Jongbloed, B., 337–338
international markets for higher Jungblut, J., 88–89
education, 5, 18, 19, 20 jurisdictional authority, 192
international organizations, 342–343
international students, 166–167 Kauppinen, I., 4–5
internationalization and higher Kazakhstan, 170
education, 10–11, 20, 68, Kehm, B. M., 4–5
138–139, 175, 320, 333–334 KEJN. See Komitet Ewaluacji Jednostek
blurring of categories by, 274–275 Naukowych
commitment to, 176 Keller, A., 276–277
discourse of, 157 Kenya, 400–401
divergence and, 172 Kezar, A. J., 257–258
of doctoral and master’s studies, King, R., 4–5, 187
159–160 Kinser, K., 271–272
economic rationale for, 177 Kirby, D., 315, 320–321
growing, 151 Kizniene, D., 347
468 Index

KKN. See Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme logique de performance (performance

Knill, C., 25–26, 342 basis), 217
KNOW. See Krajowe Naukowe loose governance regimes, 447
Ośrodki Wiodą ce Lorenz, C., 57–58
knowledge economy, 187, 248 low-fee private institutions, 435–436
innovation discourses, 248 Lucas, L., 4–5
knowledge creation, 116–117
knowledge generation, 75–76 Maassen, P., 88, 343–344, 348, 349
knowledge production, 56 Macfarlane, B., 47
knowledge society, 210 Malaysia, 19–20, 170, 364, 376,
knowledge-based economies, 116 379–380, 381. See also Badan
Kogan, M., 5 Akredtitasi Nasional; Badan
Komitet Ewaluacji Jednostek Berkanun Persekutuan (Federal
Naukowych (KEJN), 227–228 Statutory Bodies)
Korea, 12, 355 National Consumer Complaints
Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme (KKN), Centre (NCCC), 376
373–374, 381 Malicki, R., 167
Krajowe Naukowe Ośrodki Wiodą ce Mandell, A., 4–5
(KNOW), 227–228 Marga, Andrei, 230
KRASP. See Polish Rectors Conference Marginson, S., 5, 48
Kulati, T., 5 marketization and higher education,
11–12, 23–24, 29, 81–82,
labour market, 115, 166, 174–175, 192–193
276. See also graduate employ- Africa and, 406–407
ability; graduate unemployment differences in, 346–347
needs of, 399–400 dynamics, 310–313
pressure on, 410–411 negative social effects from,
Lægreid, P., 212–213 325
The Lancet (journal), 377 protection from, 44–45
Lange, L., 112–113, 124–125, 129 public policy and, 69
Laos, 381 segmentation, 60
Latin America, 82, 83, 95, 271–272, market-oriented higher education
426–427. See also specific systems, 285–286
countries markets and higher education, 4–5,
levels of coverage in, 432 10–11, 15–20, 46, 121, 140,
neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism 158, 411, 428, 432
in, 427–431 Marx, Karl, 45–46, 58–59
political/ideological orientation of Marxism, 361–362
governments in, 448 massification of higher education, 68,
politics and policy in, 442–445 76–77, 209–210, 320
Laureate International, 443 social appropriation, 119
lecturing researchers (enseignants- social aspirations, 276
chercheurs), 219–220 social distress, 430
Leisyte, L., 347 social division of labour, 45–46
Leslie, L. L., 4–5 May, R., 51–52
Levy, D. C., 275 Mayson, S., 52–53
Lie, J., 21 McCarthy, G., 4–5
Lipset, S. M., 308 Melese, W., 414
Lisbon strategy, 116–117 mergers, 341–342
Lithuania, 347 Merrien, F.-X., 336
Index 469

Merton, R., 122, 131 neoliberalism, 69, 84, 333–334, 406,

Mexico, 429–430, 434–435, 439, 442, 420. See also post-neoliberalism
443–445 critics of, 85
Meyer, J. W., 287–288 definitional umbrella of, 84–85
Middlehurst, R., 131–132 educational agenda of, 434
Miller, B., 4–5 policies of, 426
Mitterle, A., 398, 405 shifts, 433
Modell, S., 188–189 subjectivity of, 57–58
modernization of higher education, systemic objectives of, 427
110, 115, 270–271, 288 World Bank and, 405
MoE. See Ethiopia, Ministry of neo-Marxism, 43–44
Education nepotism, 355–356, 368, 370, 379–380
MOET. See Vietnam, Ministry of Netherlands, 81, 107–108, 166, 170,
Education and Training 345–346
Mok, K. H., 5 neutral administrative disclosure,
Mondragon University of Spain, 90–91
259–260 New Public Management (NPM),
monopolies 11–12, 69, 113, 117, 319–321,
degree granting, 320–321 345–346
state monopolies, 114 adherence to, 184
Morrissey, J., 4–5 adoption of, 303
MSTP. See France, Mission scientifique, developments, 347
technique et pédagogique Hood and, 188
municipal governments, 324 impact of, 303
Musselin, C., 5, 6–7, 113, 121, impressions of, 342–343
128–129 individualized management typical
Myanmar, 380, 381 of, 127
institutional administration based on,
NAICU. See U. S., National Association 429
of Independent Colleges and institutional autonomy and, 210–211
Universities instruments of, 186–187
Napoleonic model, 268–269, 348 limits of, 113–114
NASULGC. See U. S., National moving towards, 406–407
Association of State Universities recipes, 118
and Land-Grant Colleges reform and, 187, 202
nation state model, 161 restructuring by, 333–334
National Research Council, U. S., 204 rise of, 185
national scholarship programmes, shifts towards, 303
169–170 subjection to, 133–134
National Tertiary Education Union New Zealand, 11–12, 47–48, 81–82,
(Australia), 52, 60–61 166, 186–187
NCBR. See Poland, Narodowe Nicaragua, 430
Centrum Badań i Rozwoju Nokkala, T., 341–342, 346
NCCC. See Thailand, National Nolan, Colby, 371
Counter Corruption non-profit private higher education
Commission institutions, 273, 285
NCN. See Poland, Narodowe Centrum Nordic model, 348
Nauki North America, 429
Neave, G., 277–278 Norway, 170, 340–341
neo-institutionalism, 111–112 NPM. See New Public Management
470 Index

Oanda, I., 398–399, 400 Peters, Guy, 442–443

Obama, Barack, 315–316 Peters, M. A., 53
O’Brien, J., 54 Phan, N. H. L., 54–55
Olsen, J. P., 349, 417–418 Piironen, O., 8–10
Olson, T., 105 Pinochet, Augusto, 433–434
1 Malaysia Berhad (1Mdb) scandal, place theory, 17
383 plagiarism, 370, 376, 378–379
ONESQA. See Thailand, Office for pluralism, 324
National Education Standards Poland, 170, 216, 233–237, 346–347
and Quality Assessment accountability regimes in, 208,
opportunism, 130–131, 289–290 225–229
O’Shea, S., 56–57 General Council for Higher
Otherhood, 159–160, 162–163, 175 Education (Rada Glówna
Othman, Mohamad Redzuan, 379–380 Szkolnictwa Wyż szego),
Oxbridge model, 268–269 225–226
Narodowe Centrum Badań
Panama, 434–435, 439–440 i Rozwoju (NCBR), 227–228
Pan-Canadian Assessment Programme, Narodowe Centrum Nauki (NCN),
317 227–228
Paradeise, C., 110 Państwowa Komisja Akredytacyjna
Paraguay, 439–440, 442, 443–444 (State Accreditation
parliamentarianism, 190–191, 306 Commission), 226–227
participation rates, in higher education, State Accreditation Commission
75–76 (Państwowa Komisja
paternalism, 380–381 Akredytacyjna), 226–227
path dependencies, 15–16, 177 policy change, shared background,
patriarchy, 380–381 431–432
Peak, M., 166, 170–171, 177 Polish HE Act of 2011, 226–228
Pechar, H., 349 Polish Rectors Conference (KRASP),
performance and evaluation of higher 225–226
education political élites, 118
performance agreements polity, 15, 26–27
(Zielvereinbarungen), 221–223 Pollitt, C., 23–24, 25–26, 187,
performance basis (logique de 192, 203
performance), 217 populism, 302
performance indicators, 214–215, post-graduate education, master’s
217–218, 221–223, 227–228, studies, 159–160
230–231 post-neoliberalism, 426, 427–431,
performance measurement, 184–186, 436–442, 448. See also aca-
188–201 demic capitalism; marketization
fashionable, 185 and higher education; markets
funding and, 193 and higher education;
importance of, 185 neoliberalism
mechanisms for defining high capitalism and, 443
performance, 203 governments and, 426–427
Perguruan Tinggi yang shifts, 440
Diselenggarakan Pemerintah Potts, D., 167
(PTP), 364–365 poverty, 429–430, 437–438
Peru, 434–435, 439–440, 441, 443, power separation model, 192
444–445, 450 President responsibility system, 361
Index 471

PRHEIs. See private higher education of public higher education, 359

institutions tendencies away from, 439–440
pricing systems, 338–339 of university funds, 43–44
primus inter pares, 107, 123–124, welfare states and, 450
131–132 professional education, 270–271
Pritoni, A., 91, 93 Programme for Education Reform and
private companies, 279 Development in China, 361
private higher education, 82, 268–270, PTP. See Perguruan Tinggi yang
271–276, 283–286 Diselenggarakan Pemerintah
elite non-profit private universities, public administrations, 119
275 public assets, 428
for-profit, 273 public bureaucracies, 189
funding of, 292–293 public choice assumption, 114
non-profit, 273, 285 public diplomacy, 168
relative importance of, 272 public goods, 130–131
rise of, 338–339 public higher education, 268–270,
semi-elite private universities, 275 271–276, 318
system and institutional levels of, in Canada, 308, 313
276–278 corporatization of, 359
theoretical perspectives on, funding of, 292–293
286–291 privatization of, 359
in United States, 308 system and institutional levels of,
private higher education institutions 276–278
(PRHEIs), 399 theoretical perspectives on, 286–291
private institutions, 291 public higher education institutions
private integration, 445–446 (PUHEIs), 399, 415
private non-profit organizations, public law, 138
310–313 public organizations, 356–357
private sector, 278, 279–280, 283 public sector, 140, 278–279, 444–445,
in Canada, 314 448
gaining pre-eminence, 448 demands for efficiency in,
introducing greater involvement of, 209–210
321 monopolies, 320–321
privatization, 11–12, 29, 83, 84–85, public service departments, 402
166, 356–357, 433. See also public services, 303
academic capitalism; market- public spending, 449
oriented higher education sys- reform, 141–142
tems; marketization and higher restructuring of, 333–334
education; markets and higher PubMed, 377
education PUHEIs. See public higher education
blurring of categories by, institutions
274–275 Pulido, C., 430–431, 438
commitment to, 405
enrolment and, 440 Quacquarelli Symonds rankings,
extensive, 319–320 184–185. See also global rank-
general process of, 429 ings; international benchmark-
of knowledge, 320 ing; Shanghai Academic
levels of, 438 Ranking of World Universities;
models of, 427, 433–436 Shanghai Jiao Tong
of public assets, 428 quality assessment, 81
472 Index

quality assurance, 76, 140, 141, 144, Romania, 216, 233–237, 346–347
215, 218–219, 226–227, 449. accountability regimes in, 208,
See also specific 229–232
agencies Agence de l’évaluation de la
build-up of, 145 recherche et de l’enseignement
development of, 150 supérieur (AERES), 218–219
domestic, 146–147 Agenț ia Română de Asigurare
Germany and, 223–224 a Calităț ii în Învăț ământul
improvement to, 416 Superior (ARACIS), 231
internationalization of, 152 quality assurance and, 231 (See also
mechanisms, 346 accountability; quality
Poland and, 226–227 assurance)
processes of, 448 Romzek, B. S., 213–214, 225
quality audit reports, 413, 415 Rowan, B., 287–288
quality control, 215 Rwanda, 400–401
quality management, 231 Ryan, S., 57–58
Romania and, 231
skills recognition, 8–10 Sabatier, P., 122, 128–129, 343–344
Quebec, 302 Saint, W., 402–403
Salamon, L. M., 90–91
Rada Glówna Szkolnictwa Wyż szego Sall, E., 398–399, 400
(General Council for Higher Sam, C., 5
Education), 225–226 Sandel, M. J., 5
Rama, C., 432, 437–438 SAPs. See Structural Adjustment
rates of adoption, 158 Programmes; World Bank
rationales, 159, 163, 164–169 Sayed, Y., 404, 420
Rawls, John, 7–8 Scandinavian institutionalism, 344–345
regionalism, 358, 359, 367–368 Schapper, J., 52–53
representative democracy, 430 Scharpf, F. W., 344
republic of scholars ontology, 4–10 Schimank, U., 4–5, 85–86, 112–113,
beyond, 15 124–125, 129
conflicted, 10–11 Schon, D. A., 72
hallmarks of, 11–12 Schulze-Cleven, T., 105
limitations of, 12–13 SCI. See Science Citation Index
predominance of, 20, 27–28 science, technology, engineering,
research mathematics (STEM), 398, 400
research assessment, 94, 128, 164, Science Citation Index (SCI), 384
186–187, 193, 203, 228 scientific environment, 126
research concentration, 23 scientific patents, 17–19
research infrastructure, 17–19 Scotland, 190–191
research productivity, 164 Scott, J. C., 57–58
research status, 193 Scottish model, 268–269
research universities, 317 self-advancing utility-maximizing
research–teaching nexus, 56–57 behaviours, 288–289
resistance, 54, 56–61 self-management, 229
resource dependence theory, 286, 288 self-mastery, 360
Rhoades, G., 4–5, 320 self-referential rationality, 71–72
Rinne, R., 348 semi-elite private universities, 275
Rip, A., 5 Serneels, P., 415
Roberts, P., 53 service providers, 257–259
Index 473

Shanghai Academic Ranking of World standpoint-guildism, 7–8, 10–11,

Universities, 164. See also global 15–16
rankings; international bench- abandoning, 15
marking; Quacquarelli Symonds group processes mediated by,
rankings 27–28
Shanghai Jiao Tong, 184–185. See also limitations of, 12–13
global rankings; international Stanford, 275
benchmarking; Quacquarelli state centralization, 124, 127–128
Symonds rankings state contract model, 336–337
Shattock, M. L., 127–128, 268–269, state control model, 77, 336, 428
273–274, 282–283 State Higher Education Executive
Shore, C., 48–49 Officer Network (SHEEO), 323
Shuyuan (scholarly academies, or statism, 302
societies), 360–361 STEM. See science, technology,
Sijde, P., 5 engineering, mathematics
Singapore, 19–20, 381 strategic resources, 437
skills recognition, 8–10 stratification, 20–23
Slaughter, S., 4–5, 320. See also aca- Streeck, W., 105
demic capitalism; academic Structural Adjustment Programmes
labour (SAPs), 398, 401. See also
Smith, Adam, 130–131 World Bank
Snydman, S. K., 5 student assessments, 413
social justice, 309 student enrolments, 202
Socialism with Chinese characteristics, student recruitment, 76
361–362 student satisfaction, 238
societal obligations, 283–284 student voice, 254–255
societal problems, 333–334 subjectivity, 45–46, 59
societal well-being, 292 sub-organizational interests, 3
socio-economic challenges, 95–96 sub-Saharan African (SSA), 399,
soft power, 168 402–403
Solomon, A., 407 Sutton, S., 172–173
Song, X., 4–5 Sweden, 81, 166
South Africa, 400–401, 404 Switzerland, 170
South America, 138 systemic coordination, 70–71
South Korea, 81, 84 forms of, 83
bureaucratic arrangements and, 84 general frameworks of, 82
Southeast Asia, 355, 358, 359–360,
364–365 Taiwan, 355
corruption in, 366, 372–376 (See also Taixue (Institution of Supreme
ASEAN) Learning), 360–361
sovereignty, 280 Talbot, Colin, 189
Spain, 170 Tanzania, 400–401
International Campus of Excellence Taylor, B. J., 5, 10–11
(CEI), 340–341 technical and vocational training
Sparke, M., 58–59 (TVET), 410
Special Path (Jalur Khusus), 373 Teixeira, P., 113, 121, 128–129, 275
specialist language, 6–7 tertiary education, 13, 14
Spivak, J., 45 Tesfaye, T., 420
SSA. See sub-Saharan African TFHES. See Africa, Task Force on
standardization, 53, 160 Higher Education and Society
474 Index

Thailand, 372, 375–376, 381 Higher Education Funding Council

National Counter Corruption of England, 202
Commission (NCCC), 369–370 market-oriented higher education
Office for National Education systems in, 285–286
Standards and Quality migration and, 173–174
Assessment (ONESQA), performance measurement and,
375–376 185–186, 196–201 (See also
Thatcher, M., 142 evaluation and higher education;
Thelen, K., 105 research assessment)
TI. See Transparency International research assessment and, 186–187
Times Higher Education, 184–185 Shattock on, 268–269, 282–283
TNE. See transnational education United States (USA), 12, 17–19, 82, 97,
traditional actors, 118–119 169, 301–304, 326, 430. See
training and technology – for local also Anglo–American model;
communities, 75–76 federalism
transaction cost reasoning, 336–337 Canada, 307–308
transnational education (TNE), Canada differentiation from,
274–275 307–308
transparency, 108–109, 189, 321, Carnegie Classification of Institutions
355–356, 375–376. See also of Higher Education and, 310
accountability changes in, 324–325
Ethiopia and, 417–419 coordinating boards, 308–309
Transparency International (TI), 366, Council of Independent Colleges
368 (CIC), 323–324
Treib, O., 26–27 enrolment by classification type in,
Triangle of coordination (Clark), 5–6, 311–312
10, 73–74, 76–77, 336. See also Federal Department of Education,
Clark, Burton 315–316
Cartesian triangulation and, 5–6 federal government of, 316
Trow, Martin, 75–76, 450 federalism and, 325
TVET. See technical and vocational financial dimension in, 325
training Higher Education Act of 1965,
315–316
UK See United Kingdom National Association of Independent
USA See United States Colleges and Universities
UK Leadership Foundation for Higher (NAICU), 323–324
Education, 253–254, 260 National Association of State
UNIK. See Investment Capital for Universities and Land-Grant
University Research Colleges (NASULGC), 323–324
United Kingdom (UK), 12, 17–19, National Research Council, 204
47–48, 74, 81–82, 169, negative social effects in, 325
273–274, 345–346. See also policy networks in, 323
Anglo–American model private higher education in, 308
Australia and Canada and, 190–196 rationalization by, 319–320
British Research Assessment SHEEO (See State Higher Education
Exercise, 227–228 Executive Officer Network)
decentralization and centralization state-wide/consolidated governing
in, 128 boards in, 308–309
Higher Education Corporation, structure of higher education system
268–269 of, 310–315
Index 475

Universities Canada, 315 Western Europe, 333

university boards (Hochschulräte), Western governments, 186–187
117–118, 224–225 Westminster model, 190–191
university corporatization, 4–5 Weyer, E., 5
university power, 250 Whitchurch, Celia, 258–259
university–industrial collaboration, 238 Williamson, O. E., 336–337
Uruguay, 430, 434, 435, 439–440, 443 Willmott, H., 57–58
utility-maximizing behaviour, 289–290 Winter, R., 57–58
women’s empowerment, 357–358
Välimaa, J., 341–342 World Bank, 357, 399, 401, 405,
van Deuren, R., 414 410–411, 437–438
Van Vught, F., 77, 210, 277–278, 336 neoliberalism and, 405
Varghese, N., 412–413, 418–419 world culture, 158–159
Venezuela, 430, 434–435, 439–440, diffusion of, 159
441, 443 inconsistencies of, 162
Verger, A., 427, 432, 434, 435–436, nation state model and, 161
450 world society theory, 157–163, 169,
Vicentini, G., 91 175, 176
Vietnam, 368–370, 382–383 World War II, 309
Ministry of Education and Training Wright, S., 48–49
(MOET), 374, 375
VPAR. See Academic Vice President Xi Jinping, 361–362, 366, 369–370,
383–384
Waks, L. J., 4–5
Wales, 190–191, 340–341 Yale, 275
Wallis, J., 24–26 youth population, 119
Washington Consensus, 430, 437. See
also Structural Adjustment Zancajo, A., 427
Programmes; World Bank Zielvereinbarungen (performance
Webber, K. L., 5 agreements), 221–223
Weber, Max, 7 zizhiquan, 360
welfare states, 95, 114, 333–334, 450 zizhuquan, 360