G.R. No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.

HARRY S. STONEHlLL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, Petitioners, v. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director of the National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila, JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila, JUDGE HERMOGENES
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN
JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, Respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer & Meer and Juan T . David,
for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,

Assistant Solicitor General Frine C . Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor
C . Padua for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY CONTEST LEGALITY THEREOF CASE
AT BAR. — It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby (Lewis v. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties (In. re Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda v. U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916; Lusco v. U.S., 287 F. 69;
Ganci v. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz v. U.S., 26 F. 2d. 444). Consequently, petitioner in the case at
bar may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the document, papers,
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporation adverted to, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity U.S., v. Gaas,
17 F. 2d. 997; People v. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).

2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Two points must be stressed
in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements
has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications
involved in the case at bar do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code",
— as alleged in aforementioned applications — without reference to any determine provision of
said laws or coders.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERAL WARRANTS ARE OUTLAWED BY THE CONSTITUTION. — To uphold the
validity of the warrants in question, would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the victims, caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision Sec.
1, par. 3 Art. III, Const.) — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. Such is the seriousness of the
irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed
it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court, by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 126) that "a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense." cralaw virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: "Books of accounts,
Financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers, showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements." Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transaction were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of
the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be
seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the
elimination of general warrants.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXCLUSIONARY RULE CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS

AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES. — Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is
contrary, not only to the letter, but also to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and
only possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause and hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is
the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of crime. crime. But when this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO SECURE ILLEGAL SEARCH WARRANT OR
MAKE UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS NO EXCUSE. — The theory that the criminal
prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or
seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the
fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have.
Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and
moral effect of the possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning
power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MONCADO DOCTRINE ABANDONED. — The doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; the warrants for the search of 3 residences of petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; the searches and seizures therein
made are illegal.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred
to as Respondent-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondent-Judges
— issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or
the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to any peace officer, to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of the following personal property to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)." cralaw virtua1aw library

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used
or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." cralaw virtua1aw library

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present
case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondent-Prosecutors, their agents
and or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or any copies thereof, in
the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners’ consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of
the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.

As regards the first group (those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations), we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom
the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that the Government’s action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the
corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised
only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not
affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus
v. United States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not
extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property
was taken . . ." (A. Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. v. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d, 786,
789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, denied the lifting of the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondent-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence
against petitioners herein.

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void.
In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." cralaw virtua1aw library

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes.

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil
sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of
keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that
"no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." cralaw virtua1aw library

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to
wit:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,

portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
statements." cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado v. People’s Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain that, even
if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers
and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature
deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the
common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be
repressed." 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions of the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp v. Ohio
(supra.):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Today we once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right of privacy
free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in
flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court.

"Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would
be ‘a form of words’, valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties, so too, ‘without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court’s high regard as a freedom implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’ At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen,
had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of
the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf ‘stoutly adhered’ to that proposition.
The right to privacy, when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not
susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment
had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches
— state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine —
an essential part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by
Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful
seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoinment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is
to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way
— by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ . . .

"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the
right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that
the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because
it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due
Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who,
in the name of law enforceable itself, chooses to suspend its enjoinment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." (Emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but, also, to spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is
not possible for the judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning, power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29,
1962, petitioners allege that Room Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club,
should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and
that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners’ theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
been advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be a readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the
theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions and motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners, to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it
being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.