Northeastern Political Science Association

Thomas Hobbes: Power in the State of Nature, Power in Civil Society

Author(s): James H. Read
Source: Polity, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), pp. 505-525
Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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ThomasHobbes:Powerin the Stateof Nature,
Powerin Civil Society
JamesH. Read
College of St. Benedict& St. John's Universityof Minnesota

ThomasHobbesmaynot be thefirstpowertheoristin thehistoryof

westernpoliticalthought,buthe is surelyamongthemostthoroughly
studied.ThisessayanalyzeshowHobbes'sdescription of power
changesin the transition
from thestateof natureto civilsociety.
Whilethezero-sumideaof powerdoesnot change,theauthorargues
thatthechangedcontextfrom a stateof warof eachagainstall to one
in whichcommoninterestscan be realizedresultsin differentreasons
beinggivento justifythe use of power.In civilsociety,thezero-sum
conceptionbecomestheparadigm for thesovereignpowerof
command.
JamesH. Readis AssistantProfessorof Government at the College
of St. BenedictandSt. John'sUniversityof Minnesota.He has
publishedotherarticleson the ideaof powerandis currentlyat work
on a bookdealingwiththeconcept.

The Power of a Man (to take it Universally),is his presentmeansto obtain some
futureapparentGood.
-Leviathan

Becausethe powerof one man resistethand hindereththe effectsof another:power

simplyis no more, but the excessof the powerof one above that of another.For
equal powers opposed, destroy one another; and such opposition is called
contention.
-Elements of Law

It is often taken for grantedthat Hobbes has a zero-sumunderstanding

of power: one's gain is by definition another's loss.' This may seem

1. See for instanceThomasA. Spragens,Jr., The Politics of Motion: The Worldof

ThomasHobbs (Lexington:Universityof KentuckyPress, 1973), p. 190; see also C. B.
Macpherson,ThePoliticalTheoryof PossessiveIndividualism(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press, 1962)as well as his Introductionto the Penguineditionof Leviathan(New York:
Penguin, 1968),pp. 32-39.

Number 44 Summer 1991

Polity
Polity VolumeXXIII,
XXIII, Number Summer 1991

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506 Powerin the Stateof Nature

altogether obvious, since Hobbes himself, in the second of the two

passages quoted above, tells us directly that one's gain of power is
another'sloss. Yet the puzzleposed by the first passagein its relationto
the second has not receivedsufficientattention.Whenpower is defined
(in the firstpassage)as the presentmeansto obtainsome futureapparent
good, nothinglogicallyrequiresthat one's gain must come at another's
expense.Why then does Hobbesclaimthat in practicepoweris no more
than "the excess of the power of one above that of another."?2
One answerto this questionis straightforward.In the state of nature
as Hobbes describesit, wheretrustis nonexistent,one is forcedto act as
if one's gain were alwaysanother'sloss, even though, as Hobbes points
out, the collectiveoutcome of such action is loss for almost everyone.
And from this diffidenceof one another,there is no way for any
man to securehimselfe, so reasonable,as Anticipation;that is, by
force, or wiles, to masterthe personsof all men he can, so long, till
he see no otherpowergreatenoughto endangerhim:And this is no
more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally
allowed.3
Under such conditions, a purely relative descriptionof power is ap-
propriate.
But if this is the reasonwhy poweris describedin zero-sumterms,then
the establishmentof a civil state, which makes trust and cooperation
possible, should also change Hobbes's descriptionof power. In fact it
does not: even here, where the existenceof common interestsand the
means to realizethem are admitted,Hobbes describespower in purely
relativeterms.The powerof the Sovereign,for instance,is a functionof
the lack of powerof the subjects:"The Power and Honour of Subjects
vanishethin the presenceof the Power Sovereign."4Whyshouldthis be?
The fact that the Sovereignremainsin the state of naturewith respectto
his subjectsdoes not answerthe question, because an established,un-
contestedSovereignlacks the destructiveorientationtowardhis subjects
that makesthe stateof naturea zero-sumbattlefield."The riches,power
and honourof a Monarch,"Hobbestells us, "ariseonly fromthe riches,
strength,and reputationof his Subjects,"5and thus the Sovereignhas no

2. Thesecondof the two passagesabovecomesfroma workwrittena decadeearlierthan

Leviathan,and Hobbes'sideas changedin manyrespects.But the passagefromElements
of Law accuratelycharacterizespowerin the stateof natureas portrayedin Chapter13 of
Leviathan.
3. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,Chapter13 (New York:Penguin1968),p. 184.
4. Leviathan,Ch. 18, p. 237.
5. Ibid., Ch. 19, pp. 241-42.

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 JamesH. Read 507

reasondeliberatelyto weakenor harmhis subjects.This is not the case,

however, among men in the originalstate of nature. In short, it seems
that Hobbes'szero-sumconceptof poweris most appropriateto precise-
ly those conditions which the formation of civil society is intendedto
overcome.
That is the riddleI will attemptto unravelin this essay. Along the way,
I hope to shed some new light on certainold problemsconnectedwith
Hobbes'spoliticalphilosophy:the natureof the transitionfromthe state
of natureto civil society;the interplayof force, self-interest,and senseof
obligationin creatingmotives for obedienceto sovereignauthority;the
dynamicsof "chains of command" in Hobbes's commonwealth.But
another aim is to explore the concept of power itself, to gain a better
understandingof the practicalconnectionbetweenpowerunderstoodas
self-relatedcapacity("power-to")and powerunderstoodas a relationof
social control ("power-over").6
The thesis I advanceis that, althoughHobbes's concept of power is
zero-sumboth in the state of natureand in civil society, it is so for quite
differentreasons.Powerin fact changesits naturein the transitionfrom
the state of natureto civil society;it changesfrom naturalto artificial,
and in becomingartificialthe zero-sumformis retainedwhilethe content
changes.Whereasin the state of nature,it is the lack of, or the inability
to realize, common intereststhat makes one's gain of power another's
loss, in civil society, it is the causalfiction underlyingchains of com-
mand, which presupposethe existence of common interests, that ac-
counts for the purelyrelativecharacterof power.Hobbesborrowsa con-
cept of power from his natural philosophy-power as unidirectional,
transitivecausality-and constructssocialpowerrelationsso as to mirror
the causal relationsof nature. In the human "state of nature," the war
of all againstall, such unidirectionalcausalrelationsare lacking, which
is preciselythe problem.
This change in the nature of power is made possible by a changed
understandingof power on the part of humanbeings. Hobbes'ssubjects
internalizea certain"picture"of that powerand of their own roles and
obligations. Yet the image of power they internalizeis a strangeone:
whenpoweris describedas unidirectionalcausality,then one's gain is by

6. Forexplicitdiscussionof the "power-to,""power-over"distinction(whichis implicit

in many other analysesof power), see Talcott Parsons, "On the Conceptof Political
Power,"Proceedingsof theAmericanPhilosophicalSociety, 107(1963);WilliamConnol-
ly, Termsof PoliticalDiscourse(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress 1983);Peter
Morriss,Power:A PhilosophicalAnalysis (New York, 1987)as well as an earlieressay,
"The EssentiallyUncontestableConceptsof Power" from Frontiersof Political Theory
(NewYork:St. Martin'sPress, 1980);WilliamH. Riker,"SomeAmbiguitiesin the Notion
of Power," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,58 (1964):341-49.

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508 PowerintheStateof Nature

definitionanother'sloss.Therefore, eventhoughon thenaturallevelit is

possiblefor all or mostindividualsto gainpower,theartificially-created
poweruponwhichcivilpeacedependsfunctionsaccording to a zero-sum
model.Forthisreason,ouranswerto thequestionof whetherit is possi-
bleaccording to Hobbes'stheoryfor everyoneto becomemorepowerful
mustremainan ambiguousone. I will attemptto makethis basicam-
biguityas clearas possible.
I beginby describing thereasonswhyone'sgainof poweris another's
loss in the humanstateof nature.NextI describethe causalconceptof
power in Hobbes'snaturalphilosophyand show why this causal
paradigmdoesnot fit Hobbes'shumanstateof nature.ThenI analyze
authorityrelationsin Hobbes'scommonwealth, emphasizing thatthey
do mirrorthecausalparadigm.I thenputthesevariousideastogetherto
providea description of the transitionfromthe stateof natureto civil
society, and close withsomereflectionson theimplicationsthisstudyof
Hobbescarriesfor our moregeneralunderstanding of the notionof
power.

I. The Definition of Power and Basic Human Motives

Letus beginby recallingHobbes'smostgeneraldefinitionof poweras
one's "presentmeansto obtainsome futureapparentgood." An in-
terestingfeatureof thisdefinitionis that,althoughpoweris describedas
a relation(betweena means,on one hand,andan apparentgoodon the
other),it is not in the firstinstancea relationof controlamonghuman
beings.Onecanin principleattainapparentgoodsthroughisolatedac-
tivitieswhichaffectno one. Relationsof controlenterthediscussionim-
mediately,however,for practicalreasons:typically,the attainmentof
apparentgoods dependson others;one's own "naturalpower"is
insufficient."Therefore to haveservants,is Power;To havefriends,is
Power:for theyarestrengthsunited."7Thecooperation,willingor un-
willing,of othersfalls underthe categoryof "instrumental powers,"
withoutwhichwe wouldbe incapableof attainingmostof the apparent
goodswe seek.
Furthermore, oneshouldnotethatnothingin thisgeneraldefinitionof
powerrequiresthatthepowerof onecomeat theexpenseof thepowerof
another.Whetherand to what degreethis occurs dependson the
character of theapparentgoodsat whichone aims,andon themethods
usedto securethe cooperation of others.Letus turn,then,to theprac-

7. Leviathan,Ch. 10, p. 150.

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 James H. Read 509

tical conditions under which one tries to obtain apparent goods in the
state of nature.
Hobbes writes in Chapter 13 of the Leviathan:
If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they can-
not both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End,
(which is principally their owne conservation, and sometimes their
delectation only), endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another.8
Clearly if power is the means to some good, then in cases where that
good is such that one can only enjoy it at another's expense, the power of
one comes at the expense of the power of another. But for what reasons
does it happen that different men desire the same thing that they cannot
both enjoy? They might after all desire different things; or they might
desire the same thing in such a way that both can enjoy it. We need to
look more specifically at the causes of quarrel. Later in the same chapter
Hobbes gives a more concrete description of the causes of conflict:
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of
quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety;
and the third, for Reputation. The first use violence, to make them-
selves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell;
the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile,
a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct
in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends,
their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.9
Clearly all of these causes of quarrel can and do combine with one
another in complex ways. But let us examine them separately, since the
reasons why each is a cause of quarrel are different in each case.
We shall begin with Glory, as it is the strongest example of irreconcil-
able conflict. In the Elements of Law, Hobbes defines Glory as "that
passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our
own power, above the power of him that contendeth with us."10 Defined
in this way, the desire for glory is a motive perfectly tailored to the
description of power as the excess of the power of one over that of
another. One man's glory is another's lack of glory: it cannot be other-
wise. Thus if glory were the only good for which human beings strive, or

8. Ibid., Ch. 13, p. 184.

9. Ibid., Ch. 13, p. 185.
10. Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928),
Ch. 9, p. 28.

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510 Powerin the Stateof Nature

always the most importantgood, then the power of one would always
come at the expenseof the power of another.Even the formationof a
peaceful state, though it might protect men from violent death, would
merelycondemnmost men to a miserableexistence, frustratedin their
desireto attain what they want most.
But though Hobbes clearlyconsidersthe desirefor glory to be an im-
portantmotive, he deniesthat it is the principalmotive. He claimsthat
the aim of men who endeavorto destroyothers"is principallytheirowne
conservation";he adds that "delectation,"underwhich categoryglory
would presumablyfall, is sometimesa motive. Hobbesdoes not provide
any psychologicalanalysisof the motive itself, nor does he make clear
exactlyhow stronga motive glory is relativeto motivesother than self-
preservation.In any event, it would be difficultin the state of natureto
disentangleglory from gain or safety as a motive for quarrel.In civil
society, on the other hand, supposingthat one's safety and welfareare
reasonablysecure,glory emergesas a separateand disruptivemotive;it
may even tempt someoneto rebel againsta sovereign,Hobbes is clearly
worriedabout this motive. When he describesself-preservationas the
strongesthumanmotive, he is not merelydescribingbut also prescribing:
human beings should be persuadedto care less about glory and more
about peace and self-preservation.
To seek "Gain" or "Safety" is quite different from seeking glory,
since in the lattercase one's gain is by definitionanother'sloss, whilein
the firsttwo casesthe matteris morecomplex.Onemay sometimesenjoy
wealthpreciselybecauseothers lack what you have-luxury goods, for
instance-but this is dependenton the personand the situation;thereare
many other benefitsof materialwealththat do not dependon invidious
comparisons.Nor does the pursuitof wealth always come at another's
expense, for one can acquirewealth in any numberof different ways.
Some ways of acquiring wealth come directly at another's expense;
othersdo not. Hobbes recognizesthe possibilityof commongain in the
economicsphere;one of the problemswiththe stateof natureis precisely
that suchpotentialcommoninterestscannotbe realized:"In suchcondi-
tion, thereis no placefor Industry;becausethe fruitthereofis uncertain;
and consequentlyno Cultureof the Earth;no Navigation,nor use of the
commoditiesthat may be importedby Sea . .."
With "Safety" there is even less reason why one's gain should entail
another'sloss. One can pursuesafety either throughpeace or war; but
unlessone enjoys war for its own sake, one turnsto war reluctantlyand

11. Leviathan, Ch. 13, p. 186.

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 James H. Read 511

as a second-best solution, because in the long run war makes safety more
difficult for everyone. This is a case in which gain for one side is gain for
the other-assuming that peace and safety are the real aims of both sides.
Hobbes admits that there are some men who truly enjoy war and con-
quest, but for the most part he describes the motives responsible for the
"general inclination" to seek "power after power" as primarily defen-
sive: power is necessary simply to secure what one has, including one's
life. But if most human beings do in fact seek safety and peace, why is it
so difficult to secure? In part it is because of the few who do enjoy war,
but mostly because of the absence of trust. If neither side can be sure that
the other will honor his agreement to "lay down his arms," then war will
continue to subsist even among those who genuinely desire peace.
Hobbes's Fundamental Law of Nature perfectly reflects this problem:
"That every man, ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of
obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all
helps, and advantages of Warre."'2 Peace cannot be obtained without
Covenant, and Covenants are extremely fragile in the state of Nature.
Let us recall at this point the two passages quoted at the beginning of
the essay-the "present means" definition and the claim that power for
one means lack of power for another. Our discussion so far has made
clear that nothing in Hobbes's account of basic human aims requires a
zero-sum understanding of power.13

II. Power as Cause

Nothing yet has been said about the means used to secure another's
cooperation-about power as control, power as the instrumental use of
other human beings. Even in cases where the aim of one is compatible
with the aim of another, the power of one might come at another's ex-
pense for reasons connected with the methods used to realize the aim.
Since many if not most aims depend on the actions or inactions of others,
we must ask how one will cause another to act in the appropriate way. If
the methods someone uses to cause me to serve his ends prevent me from
realizing my ends, then his gain of power is my loss, even if our aims are
compatible in the abstract. We might both, for example, desire leisure, a
good which, unlike glory, does not logically depend on the deprivation of
another; but his gain is indeed my loss if his method of securing leisure is

12. Ibid., Ch. 14, p. 190.

13. For interpretations of the relative importance of glory which differ from mine, see
Spragens, pp. 182-83 and 190-91, and Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), Ch. 11.

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512 Powerin the Stateof Nature

to enslaveme. We mustthereforeconsidernot only Hobbes'sdescription

of typical aims, but also his descriptionof typical methodsof control.
But before we considerpower-as-controlon the humanlevel, it is in-
structiveto examinepower-as-controlin Hobbes's naturalphilosophy.
Many studentsof Hobbes arguethat there exists a disjunctionbetween
his descriptionof natureand his descriptionof humansocietyand moti-
vation, despite the fact that Hobbes apparentlythought his political
philosophywas firmlybased on naturalscience.14I do not quarrelwith
the scholarswho make this claim. Yet some of the patternsunderlying
Hobbes's natural philosophy have striking parallels in his political
philosophy,especiallythe patternsrelatedto powerand causality.These
patterns, even if they cannot be directly transferredto the political
sphere, may neverthelessoffer new insights into Hobbes's theory of
politicalpower.
In Hobbes's naturalphilosophy,the concept of power is identicalto
that of cause.15In De Corporehe writes:"Correspondentto cause and
effect, are POWERand ACT; nay, those and these are the same things;
thoughfor diverseconsiderations,they have diversenames." He goes on
to say:
For whensoeverany agent has all those accidentswhichare neces-
sarily requisitefor the productionof some effect in the patient,
then we say the agent haspower to producethat effect, if it be ap-
plied to a patient. .. [T]hesameaccidents,whichconstitutethe ef-
ficient cause, constitutealso the power of the agent . .16
Power-or causality-in nature has some interestingcharacteristicsin
Hobbes'sperfectlydeterministicuniverse.Thereare no partialcauses:if
A is the causeof B, then it is the completecauseof B; thereare no plural
causes. Furthermore,it follows that powerin natureis unidirectional:if
A is the causeof B, then B is in no sensethe cause of A; A and B cannot
exert power over one another simultaneously,Furthermore,power is
transitive:if A is the causeof B, and B the causeof C, thenA is the cause
of C; there is no point at which any other partialcauses of C can enter
into the chain of events, nor can C function as a cause with respectto
either B or A.
How does this conception of power comparewith the definition of

14. See for instanceStrauss,Political Philosophy of Hobbes; Spragens,pp. 164 ff;

StanleyBenn, "Hobbes on Power," in Hobbs and Rousseau,ed. Cranstonand Peters
(New York:Anchor, 1972),pp. 184-212.
15. My understandingof Hobbes'sconceptionof causalityand powerhas profitedfrom
StanleyBenn'sessay "Hobbeson Power."
16. ThomasHobbes,De Corpore.Citationborrowedfrom Benn, pp. 187-88.

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 JamesH. Read 513

humanpowerdiscussedabove, i.e., poweras one's presentmeansto ob-

tain some futureapparentgood? The two are not identical,but neither
are they obviously inconsistent. Power on the human level could be
regardedas an effective cause of the "apparentgood" one seeks.
But more interestingare the implicationsof this conceptof causality
for the exerciseof power over other humanbeings. Suppose for a mo-
mentthat the units of causeand effect hereare humanindividualsrather
than atoms and forces. An individualexercisingpower over another
would exercisecompletepower;it would be the most absoluteof tyran-
nies. Furthermore,one's gain of power would be another's loss for
reasonsthat have nothingto do withthe compatibilityor incompatibility
of intentions.The zero-sumconditionwould be a pure formality:if in-
dividualA is "cause," then individualB is "effect"; A is active, power-
ful, causal; B is passive, a mere effect. Finally, it would be possibleto
construct chains of command of indefinite length: suppose A (the
Sovereign)is the first causein the chainof causesand effects. If he is the
causeof B's action, and B the causeof C's action, and C the causeof D's
action, and so on without limit, then, in this perfectly deterministic
world, A's powerhas perfectlyand absolutelydeterminedthe actionsof
all of the others. Hobbes of courseadmitsthat only God, as the first of
all causes, possessessuch absolutesovereignty.
This strictlycausal, unidirectionalpowerexistingin natureis precisely
what is lackingin the human"state of nature."This is madeclearin the
openingparagraphof Chapter13 of Leviathan:
Nature have made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and
mind;as that thoughtherebee found one man sometimesmanifest-
ly strongerin body, or of quickermindthananother;yet whenall is
reckonedtogether,the differencebetweenman, and man, is not so
considerable,as that one man can thereuponclaimto himselfeany
benefit, to whichanothermay not pretend,as well as he. For as to
the strengthof body, the weakesthas strengthenough to kill the
strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacywith
others, that are in the same dangerwith himselfe.17
Yet victoryis short-lived:"And the Invaderagainis in the like dangerof
another."Humanbeingsdo exercisepoweroverone another(all of these
successiveinvasionsare expressionsof power)but the dynamicsof power
in no way resemblethe perfectunidirectionalityof naturalcausality.In-
dividualA may be strongerthan B, but the latterof quickerwit than A;
therefore,each could exercisepowerover the otherin some respect.Fur-

17. Leviathan, Ch. 13, p. 183.

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514 Powerin the Stateof Nature

thermore,circlesof power-impossible in naturalcausality-may occur

here:A mightcommandB, B mightdispossessC, and C kill A. Nothing
guaranteesthat chains of causes and effects on the human level will
travelin one directiononly.
This does not mean, of course,that the humansphereis separatefrom
that of naturalcausality;Hobbesmakesit quiteclearthat humanbeings
are just as determinedby naturalcauses and effects as anythingelse in
nature,animateor inanimate.But thesecausesand effects operateat the
level of some materialsubstratum,not at the level of humanindividuals
and humanintentions.Causesand effects continueas they alwayshave,
but in the state of naturethey have almost no connectionwith human
aims becausehumanintentionsare not effective causes of anything.
One can examinemore closelythe ineffectivenessof humanintentions
as causesby consideringthreeof the basicmethodsby whichone individ-
ual might cause another to act in a certain way: force; persuasion
("Counsell"1);and commandbasedon obligation.Thesethreemethods
of control are quite differentfrom one another(some importantdiffer-
enceswill be discussedbelow);but they are alikein that none of themcan
be used effectively in the state of nature. No one is strong enough to
establish lasting power based on force alone; persuasiondepends on
unstablecongruencesof interest,and on trust (whichis absent);obliga-
tion dependson prioragreementand on someoneable to enforceagree-
ments. As a consequence,humanbeingsin the state of natureare rela-
tively powerless,both with respectto realizingaims and with respectto
determiningthe actions of others. Everyoneacts as though one's gain
were another'sloss (zero-sum);the collectiveconsequenceis the loss of
power for everyone(negative-sum).

III. Coercion, Command,and Counsel

Let us now jump forwardto the dynamicsof powerunderan established
civil societywith an effectiveSovereign,leavingasidefor the momentthe
question of how sovereigntyis established.The first thing one notices
about the operationof power is that now it is, or at least seems to be,
unambiguouslycausaland unidirectionalin its operations.Thisis clearly
truefor the powerof the Sovereign,and since(as will be discussedbelow)
the Sovereignsomehow embodiesall the power in the entire society, it
follows that powerexhibitsthe samecharacteristicswhereverin societyit
is found. What are those characteristics?

18. "Counsell,is wherea mansaith,Doe, or Doe not this, anddeducethhis reasonsfrom

the benefitthat arrivethby it to him to whomhe saith it." Leviathan,Ch. 25, p. 303.

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 JamesH. Read 515

A few passages from the Leviathanwill illustratethe way in which

sovereignpoweris implicitlydescribedas strictcausality.Firstconsider
Hobbes's definitionof "command," a privilegethat lies at the core of
sovereignpower: "Commandis, where a man saith, doe this, or Doe
not this, without expectingother reasonthan the Will of him that says
it."19 Command is distinguishedfrom "counsel," in which one at-
tempts to persuadeanotherthat a certainaction is to the other's own
benefit, but without possessingany authorityto commandthe other to
act. The conceptof commanddirectlymirrorsnaturalcausality:the will
of the one who commandsis, at least in principle,the efficient cause of
the other's action. No "partialcauses," like the self-interestof the com-
mandedsubject,play any role here;it is as if the one who is commanded
possessedno will of his own.
Hobbes's notion of Dominion, which establishesthe right to com-
mand, likewise mirrorsnaturalcausality. In Chapter20 of Leviathan,
Hobbes describesthe characteristicof Dominion:
He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also
over the childrenof the Child;and over their Children'sChildren.
For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man hath
Dominion over all that is his.20
The resemblancesbetweenDominion and a naturalchain of causesand
effects are difficult to overlook;only if we think of dominionin strictly
causaltermsdoes the passageabovemakesense. Hobbesclaimsthat if A
has dominion over B ("the Child") and B dominion over C ("the
childrenof the Child"), then A necessarilyhas dominionover C. It is the
same as sayingthat if A is the cause of B and B the cause of C, then A
is the causeof both B and C. One shouldrecallthat in the humanstateof
nature, power does not follow this unidirectionalpattern. Dominion,
like command, mirrors natural causality only because it has been
designedthat way; neitherdominionnor commandis natural.
Once one begins to look for it, one notices the same causal pattern
throughoutHobbes's politicaltheory. Hobbes's rejectionof separation
of powers, for example, displaysthe same logic. To limit the power of
another is to exercise power over him and, according to Hobbes,
whoevercan limit the powerof anotheris the latter'smaster:"that King
whose power is limited, is not superiorto him, or them that have the
powerto limitit; and he that is not superior,is not supreme;that is to say

19. Ibid., Ch. 25, p. 303.

20. Ibid., Ch. 20, p. 255.

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516 Powerin the Stateof Nature

not Sovereign."21Once again, poweris describedas though it operated

along strictlycausal lines: if the king is "cause," the assemblymust be
"effect"; king and assemblycannot both be causalwith respectto each
other at the same time.
If power relations do not naturallyfollow the unidirectionalcausal
pattern,how is it possibleto constructthemin accordancewith that pat-
tern?To answerthis question,it is necessaryto look more closely at the
basic mechanismsof control:persuasion,coercion, and obligation.All
threeof these are effectiveto some limiteddegreein the state of nature,
for if they were not, Hobbes could not build upon them. They may
overlapand blend in any numberof ways, but they remainanalytically
distinct.Persuasion(or in Hobbes'sterms, "Counsell")dependson the
presentexistenceof sharedinterestsbetweenthe one who persuadesand
the one who is persuaded.Coercionimpliesthe absenceof sharedinter-
ests, or at least the inabilityto motivatethe otherby appealingto shared
interests. Thus, coercion is the method most appropriateto the pure
zero-summodel of powerwhereinterestsare irreconcilableand for that
reason one's gain is another'sloss. Obligationis based on prior agree-
mentand is supposedto bindwhetheror not it is one's presentinterestto
fulfill the obligation.We can assumethat the originalagreementestab-
lishingthe obligationwas based on perceivedcommon interest,but the
agreementis bindingeven if it is no longerin the presentinterestof one
or the other to fulfill his end of the bargain.If the other has performed
first, for example,one may be temptedto default. Obligation,therefore,
to be effective, must be backed by the power to compel. Nevertheless,
despite this need for enforcement,obligation is qualitativelydifferent
from coercion,just as both of these are distinctfrom persuasion.
If we keep in mind the respectivecharacteristicsof persuasion,coer-
cion, and obligation, while recallingthe artificiallyconstructedcausal
model of powerdiscussedearlier,we notice some interestingthings.Per-
suasion is unique in that it can in no way be assimilatedto the causal
model: the persuader'sargumentsare never a sufficient cause of the
desiredoutcome; the self-interestof the other is always necessaryas a
partial cause of the desired outcome. Furthermore,persuasionrarely
moves in one directiononly; far more common is the bargainingsitua-
tion in which each side seeks to persuadethe other, or in other words,
seeks to exercisepower over the other. Thereforepersuasiondisplays
none of the formalcharacteristicsof a strictlycausalchainof command.
The threat or direct applicationof force, in contrast, does approxi-

21. Ibid., Ch. 19, p. 246.

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 James H. Read 517

mate the formal characteristics of natural causality. Suppose one

possessing a preponderance of military force confronts another who is
wholly unarmed. If the former simply kills or imprisons the latter, then
the act of control is purely unidirectional. Suppose on the other hand the
desired behavior is induced by means of threats: do such and such or I
will kill you. In this case, the act of control is not unambiguously causal,
for there are after all times when human beings choose to die rather than
obey, but it comes very close because most of the time this "cause" will
achieve the desired "effect."
But this is not the only way in which to mirror natural causality. Power
relations based on an internalized sense of obligation may likewise be
constructed according to a unidirectional causal model and may operate
with very little use or threat of coercion. Consider, for instance, the
military chain of command. In theory, the manner in which superiors
command inferiors is strictly unidirectional: the general commands the
colonel who commands the sergeant, and so on; never does a sergeant
command a captain, a captain a colonel, a colonel a general. It is as
though one billiard ball were striking another, and that one a third, the
third a fourth. This simplified military model describes well the way in
which, at least in principle, the power of Hobbes's sovereign is com-
municated.
How is this mysteriously efficient chain of causes and effects possible?
One might point out, correctly, that formal command is not the only
form of power here, that subordinates in the military or in a civilian
bureaucracy possess any number of means of exercising power over their
superiors. Yet the formal chain of command does operate to an impor-
tant degree, for if it did not, the organi7ation would collapse. To the
degree that it does follow the unidirectional causal pattern, it does so
because the chain of command has been deliberately designed to resem-
ble a causal chain and because those within that chain recognize their
duties and roles, not because their actions have been mechanically
"caused." In order for such a chain of command to function effectively,
the behavior of a subordinate must be as much active as reactive; some
degree of initiative and discretion must be entrusted to the subordinate.
Yet insofar as the action is in obedience to a command, it is symbolically
understood by superior and subordinate as though it were strictly cause
and effect. In other words, the causal relation is based on a fiction shared
by superior and subordinate: one knows, at one level, that the subordi-
nate's action is not a direct effect of the superior's will (if it were, no
sense of obligation on the part of the subordinate would be necessary);
on the other hand, one is obligated to "pretend" that the superior's com-
mand alone is the cause of the subordinate's obedience.

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518 Powerin the Stateof Nature

Whichof thesetwo methodsof mirroringnaturalcausalityis moreim-

portantfor Hobbes?Certainlyhe considersboth coercionand obligation
necessaryto some degree.But he considersthe latterat leastas important
as the former,if not moreso. Otherwise,why wouldhe considerit so im-
portant that men know their obligations?22The grounds of the
Sovereign'sright to command, he says, "have the rather need to be
taughtdiligently,and trulytaught;becausethey cannotbe maintainedby
any civil law, or terrorof legal punishment."23
But how are these artificialcausalchains,whetherbasedon obligation
or coercion, establishedin the first place? And how are they relatedto
the first notion of power discussed in this essay, i.e., the means of
obtainingsome apparentgood? Giventhat, on the formallevel at least,
this causal model of poweris zero-sum,does it follow that power itself
remains zero-sum even in civil society? Or should we conclude that
power is not zero-sumsince human beings mutuallysecuretheir "ap-
parentgoods" betterthan in the state of nature?To answersuch ques-
tions we mustturn, finally, to an analysisof the transitionfrom the state
of natureto civil society.

IV. Power Transformed

Let us recallat this point the puzzleposed at the beginningof the essay:it
would seem that Hobbes'szero-sumconceptof poweris most appropri-
ate to preciselythose conditionswhichthe formationof civil societyis in-
tended to overcome. By making it possible for most of us (or at least
those of us not motivatedprincipallyby the desire for glory) to better
realizeour "apparentgoods," the presenceof a Sovereignoughtto make
most of us more powerful.Yet Hobbes makesit difficult for us to draw
this conclusion,for powerremainszero-sumin importantrespectsalbeit
for differentreasonsthan in the state of nature. My purposehere is to
show that the transitionfrom the state of natureto civil societydepends
on a redefinitionof power:artificialpoweris created,and predominates
overnaturalpower.Whereason the naturallevelpowerneednot be zero-
sum in civil society, it is zero-sumby definitionon the artificiallevel.
In Chapter 17 of the Leviathan, Hobbes describes the nature of
sovereign power: "The only way to erect such a Common Power ... is,

22. BrianBarryasks: "If Hobbes's'message'werethatwe oughtto obey for fearof the

police, why shouldhe have thoughtthat havinghis doctrinetaughtin the universitiesand
preachedin the pulpitswould make Englanda less turbulentcountry?It was precisely
becausehe had seen the fragilityof regimesrestingonly on bayonetsthat he wroteLevia-
than." "Warrenderand His Critics,"from Hobbes and Rousseau,pp. 37-65.
23. Leviathan,Ch. 30, p. 377.

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 JamesH. Read 519

to conferre all their power and strengthupon one Man, or upon one
Assemblyof men, that may reduceall theirWills, by pluralityof voices,
unto one Will."24The power describedhere is qualitativelydifferent
from the types of power found in the state of nature. The method by
which power is created-the conferralof all power and strengthupon
one man or assemblyof men-distinguishes sovereignpower not only
from the powerof an individual,but also fromthe powerof any faction,
no matterhow large.Factionscan existin the stateof nature;sovereignty
cannot. The following passage illustrates the difference between
sovereignpower and factional power:
The Greatestof humanePowers,is that whichis compoundedof
the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person,
Naturall,or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending
on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth:Or depend-
ing on the wills of eachparticular;suchas is the Powerof a faction,
or of diversefactions leagued.25
The Power of a commonwealth,whereall wills becomeone, is quite dif-
ferent from that of a faction, where the wills remain particular.One
might suppose that the differencebetweenthe power of a faction and
that of the Sovereignis one of degree, that the Sovereignis simplythe
"biggestfish in the pond," i.e., the most powerfulfactionin the society.
But Hobbes specificallyrejectssuch an interpretation:
... thereis little groundfor the opinionof them, that say of Sover-
aignKings,thoughthey be singulismajores,of greaterPowerthan
everyone of theirSubjects,yet they be Universisminores,of lesser
powerthan them all together.For if by all together,they meannot
the collectivebody as one person,then all together,and everyone,
signifie the same; and the speechis absurd.But if by all together,
they understandthem as one Person (whichpersonthe Soveraign
bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the
Soveraign'spower;and so again the speechis absurd.26
Hobbes shows in this passagethat the Sovereignliterallydisposesof all
the powersof all subjects.The one exception,of course,is that each sub-
ject retainsthe right of individualself-preservation.
From the perspectiveof natural power, this is impossible:no king,
howeverpowerful, howeverlarge his army, howeverloyal his subjects,

24. Ibid., Ch. 17, p. 227.

25. Ibid., Ch. 10, p. 150.
26. Ibid., Ch. 18, p. 237.

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520 Power in the State of Nature

ever has complete control over the actions and possessions of his sub-
jects. Muscles and brains, for instance, are forms of power, yet the
Sovereign does not strip the subjects of their muscles and brains. Nor
does he strip them of "instrumental powers" such as wealth and reputa-
tion: "The riches, power and honour of a Monarch arise only from the
riches, strength, and reputation of his Subjects."27 In what sense, then, is
the Sovereign all-powerful?
The all-powerful sovereign is all-powerful only by definition. It is
agreed that he is omnipotent; this is the condition under which power is
granted to him in the first place. It is in the common interest of all to put
an end to the "war of all against all," and according to Hobbes, the only
way to do so is to grant absolute power to someone. Since the power
itself is an invented one, those who design it can endow it with whatever
characteristics they consider necessary or useful to its operation.
Sovereign omnipotence is one of these definitionally-created character-
istics; unidirectionality and transitivity, as described in the preceding sec-
tion, are likewise invented for the purpose. The whole system works
because the subjects themselves accept its symbols and duties. The power
exercised over the subjects originates from the subjects themselves, from
their agreement that there shall be an absolute power. There is nothing
comparable to this for power in the state of nature.28
One could regard sovereign power as a sort of "banking" of natural
powers of individuals: subjects transfer their natural powers over to a
sovereign, who possesses those powers insofar as he reserves the right to
use them in whatever way he considers necessary. But just as in banking
the same money is counted twice-once as a deposit, once again as a
bank loan-so too in this case power is counted twice: the "riches,
strength, and reputation" of the subjects count once as their own, and
once again as instruments under the direction of an all-powerful
sovereign. There are of course flaws in the bank analogy: Hobbes's sub-

27. Ibid., Ch. 19, pp. 241-42.

28. David Johnstonin TheRhetoricof Leviathanwrites:"By depictingsovereigntyas
the productof a positiveact of authorization,foundedupon the unitedstrengthof all sub-
jects, ratherthan an essentiallynegativeact of renunciation[as Johnstonclaimswas the
casein theElementsof Law], it implicatedthosesubjectsin the actsof theirsovereignmore
fullythanthe earlierversionsof his theoryhaddone." TheRhetoricof Leviathan:Thomas
Hobbesand the Politicsof CulturalTransformation (Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1986),p. 82.
".... No sovereigncould maintainthe powerand rightsof his office withoutachieving
generalrecognitionof the grounds, legitimacy,and properscope of those rights. This
recognitionis in effect the productof an interpretationmen impose upon their circum-
stances, a set of lenses throughwhichthey read and understandtheirrelationshipswith
others"(84; emphasisadded).

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 JamesH. Read 521

jects may not freely withdrawthe deposit once made. (Thereis a "sub-
stantialpenalty," not merelyfor "early withdrawal"but for any with-
drawalat all.) Powermay be susceptibleof universalgain on the natural
level, when countedas belongingto subjects,and yet be zero-sumwhen
regardedas a transferof powerover to the sovereign,whosegain is their
loss. The powerthey transferis differentin naturefrom the powerthey
keep.29
It is the common interestof human beings that establishessovereign
power in the first place. But once established, this power works as
though common interest were unnecessary:command and obligation,
unlike counsel, are supposed to control the actions of subjects in-
dependentlyof considerationsof interest.Commoninterestis not partof
the operation of sovereign power because it is common interest that
createssovereignpower. Common interestis an elementbuilt into the
machine itself, so to speak, and there is no need to load the machine
twice.
This is not to deny the role of coercion as a necessary support.
Although the principalsource of sovereignpower is the self-interestof
the subjects, importantconflicts of interestamong subjects, as well as
betweenSovereignand subject, will remainand would be repressedby
force if necessary.Mutualgain in some respectsdoes not precludecon-
flict in other respects:glory may be a weakermotive, but will remain;
commerceand industrymay increasethe supply of goods, but they re-
main scarce and men will contend over their distribution.For these
reasons, among others, the need for coercion will never disappear
altogether.
V. Conclusion
Before concludingthis essay, I will make brief comparisonsbetween
Hobbes's view of powerand that of threecontemporarysocial theorists
who describepower and who, like Hobbes, take as their startingpoint
the conceptionof poweras cause. I cannot do justice to these writersin
such brief treatment;my purposeis only to demonstratethe continuing
relevanceof the problemsHobbes raises. One point of view on the con-
cept of poweras cause is representedby RobertDahl3Pand Felix Oppen-
heim;31a quite differentunderstandingof cause is found in the work of
Steven Lukes.32Each of these schools of thought about power bears

29. For an interestingdiscussionof the concept of "banking"of power, see Barry

Barnes,TheNatureof Power (Urbana:Universityof IllinoisPress, 1988).
30. Dahl, "The Conceptof Power."
31. Felix Oppenheim,Political Concepts:A Reconstruction(Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress), 1981.
32. StevenLukes,Power:A Radical View(London:Macmillan,1974).

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522 Powerin the Stateof Nature

resemblancesto one side of Hobbes's theory of power: the former to

powerin Hobbes'sstate of nature;the latterto the unidirectional,transi-
tive Sovereignpower of command.
For Dahl and Oppenheim,poweris causality.But one humanbeingis
not necessarilythe cause of everythinganotherhuman being does; the
power relationis not always a unidirectionalrelationof commandand
obedience.Instead,poweris differentiatedinto any numberof different
aspectsor "scopes"; A mightexercisepowerover B in one respectwhile
B has power over A in another. Thus "countervailingpower" and
"checks and balances" are clear possibilities:power may be unidirec-
tional and causal,but only withinone narrowlydefinedscope;withinthe
samesocialor politicalrelationtheremay be otherscopesin whichpower
goes the other way. Therefore,poweris in no sense necessarilydespotic
or oppressive, as would be the case if there were no differentiation
among scopes.
We saw earlierthat powerin Hobbes's state of natureis pluralrather
than causal and transitive:A may dispossess B, but B kills A. Such
pluralismis exactly what Hobbes seeks to change;pluralismof power
leadsto anarchyand civil war. Here, of course,he differsfrom Dahl and
Oppenheim,both of whom believe that power can be plural without
being anarchic.
Steven Lukes, on the other hand, believes there exists in modern
capitalist democraciessomethingakin to the absolute, unidirectional,
causal power of commanddescribedby Hobbes. One must, however,
substitutea bourgeois"powerelite" for Hobbes's Sovereign.Pluralism
is a sham;in fact the rulingclassmanufacturesthe appearanceof consent
by givingthe ruledthe beliefsand desiresit wantsthemto have:"Indeed,
is it not the supremeexerciseof powerto get anotheror othersto have
the desiresyou wantthemto have-that is, to securecomplianceby con-
trolling their thoughts and desires?3 Thereforeit is the case that one
class entirelycontrols another with respect to all importantscopes of
power. Power by definition excludes common interest: "A exercises
powerover B whenA affects B in a mannercontraryto B's interests."34
Thereforeit would follow, thoughLukesdoes not explicitlysay this, that
poweris zero-sum:one's gain is another'sloss. Luke'sown radicalideal
is a social orderin which poweritself is abolished.
The most interestingand importantdifferencebetweenHobbes'sview

33. Ibid., p. 23.

34. Ibid., p. 34. For a similar, though somewhatless one-sidedview of power, see
WilliamE. Connolly, Termsof PoliticalDiscourse(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1983).

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 James H. Read 523

of power and that of Lukes concerns the role of common interest. One
might readily equate the internalized fiction of absolute, causal
sovereign power with the false consciousness described by Lukes. In
both cases a unidirectional relation of power and subjection depends on
the subjects believing that their own interests are best served by support-
ing the ruling authority; neither Hobbes nor Lukes believes that violence
alone is sufficient to establish a ruling power. The type of power charac-
teristic of sovereign command is, as noted earlier, highly artificial; it
requires the active cooperation of those subject to it. But for Hobbes the
subjects' belief that their own interests are best served by the existence of
a sovereign power is an authentic belief; without that belief, sovereign
power could never have been created in the first place. A subject might
later conclude, contrary to Hobbes, that the belief in the necessity of an
absolutely powerful Sovereign was a mistaken one-it could be that the
cure turns out worse than the disease, or that some less harsh cure could
be developed for the same disease-but at any rate the belief originates
with the subjects themselves.
For Lukes, this belief in common interest under bourgeois authority is
a deception, deliberately manufactured for the subjects by the ruling
class itself. But then Lukes has no way of explaining how this structure
of causal power could have come into existence in the first place. The
(false) belief that the authority structure serves one's real interests, on
which the operation of that structure depends, could only have been
created by some previously existing absolute power capable of molding
the passive minds of subjects like clay. Where could this power come
from? The effect would have to become the cause. Lukes does not ad-
dress this problem.

I return now to the original question: is Hobbes's conception of power

zero-sum, where one's gain necessarily entails an equal loss for another?
The answer is: yes and no-no for natural power, yes for artificial
power. When power is regarded as the capacity to realize some in-
terest-some "apparent good"-it is not the case that one's gain neces-
sarily entails another's loss; everyone, or almost everyone, gains by the
establishment of civil society. Furthermore, that act, at least initially, is
their exercise of power, not something they passively receive. But
Hobbes combines this with a concept of power-as-control in which one's
gain is another's loss.
Therefore, one cannot unambiguously conclude that individuals
become more powerful by subjecting themselves to the authority of
Hobbes's Sovereign, even if he promotes their common interests. The
reason is that it is questionable whether a mutual increase of power can

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524 Powerin the Stateof Nature

occurunlessit is consciouslyrecognizedas suchby those involved,unless

it is founded on a concept of individualautonomy.
Hobbes's subjectsrealizetheir interests,but only at the cost of inter-
nalizingan interpretationof their own actions which mirrorsthe causal
determinismof nature,a determinismwhich, if it functionedliterallyon
the humanlevel, wouldconstitutethe most completeform of slavery.Of
course this determinismis a fiction. The only reasonwhy the grandfic-
tion of absolute, unidirectional,causal Sovereignpower works at all is
that it servesthe commoninterestsof those subjectto it, who give it their
active support. But strangelyenough, it works because they actively
regardthemselvesas passive. It is as though the left hand did not know
what the right is doing. Power, understoodas the capacity to realize
some "apparentgood," impliesthat one still activelychooseswhatthose
apparentgoods are. No matter how much discretionone retains over
one's own actions in practice, if one has truly transferredto the
Sovereign "my Right of Governingmy selfe' then it is questionable
whether the individual has power at all, no matter how much one
benefits.
This raises an importantquestion:how can one describepower such
that it is compatiblewithnotionsof individualautonomy,andvice versa:
whatnotions of autonomyare compatiblewith the unavoidablefact that
in civil society someoneexercisespowerover someoneelse? Any Robin-
son Crusoe-likeconceptof autonomy,in whichto be free is to be unaf-
fectedby the powerof othersor, conversely,to be affectedin any way by
another'spower is to be unfree, would effectivelymake it impossibleto
increase power for everyone. Yet neither is it possible to re-educate
humanbeingsso completelythat they experienceeveryexerciseof power
over them as true liberation.Autonomymay be flexiblebut it is not in-
finitely malleable.
I would suggest that in some respects our practiceis ahead of our
theory.A democraticpoliticalorderin whichthe principleof consenthas
been successfullyincorporatedinto the public and privatespheresis in
fact one in which individualsexercisepower over one another all the
time, though in a mannerrelativelycompatiblewith the power of the
other. A contractis a bilateralexerciseof power;so too is an exchange.
On the more abstractlevel, the contracttheorieswhich serveto justify
democratic political orders could be regarded as attempts to make
governmentalpowercompatiblewith the powerof those over whom it is
exercised.But contracttheoriesrarelyspeakexplicitlyof poweron both
sides; instead, we speak of the power of the state, the liberty of the
citizen,as thoughthe libertyenjoyedby citizenswerenot also a sourceof
power for them.

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 JamesH. Read 525

We have troubleconceivingof anythingmutuallybeneficialas power.

Traditionhas handed down to us a political languagein which certain
things have been divorced. Those, such as John Rawls and Robert
Nozick, who take contracttheoryseriously,tend to conceiveof contract
as the cessationof the powerof one over anotherratherthan one way in
which power can be expressed;and those who regardcontractsand ex-
changes as expressionsof power and dismiss social contracttheory as
ideology tend to fall back on a crudenotion of power as exploitation.
This split withinour politicallanguagehas the effect, not only of im-
poverishingour analysisof presentlyexistinginstitutionsand practices,
but also of limitingour capacityto handlepowerconflictsin the future.
To an ever-increasingdegree,our world is one in whichthe actions and
hencethe powerof one affect in some way the action or capacityfor ac-
tion of another.The problemscausedby such a high degreeof interde-
pendenceare difficult enoughalready;to continueto conceiveof power
in zero-sumcategories,in termsof unidirectionalcontroland subjection,
will not make solutions any easier.

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