Hazard distances from hydrogen
flames and fire fighting
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Content
1. Types of hydrogen fires
2. Microflames
3. Hydrogen jet fires and the flame length
4. Radiation heat flux from hydrogen jet fires
5. Jet fires of hydrogen compared to CNG and LPG
6. Hydrogen fireballs
7. Pressure effects of hydrogen jet fires
8. Detection of hydrogen fires
9. Mitigation and extinction of hydrogen fires
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Objectives of the lecture
1. Distinguish between different types of hydrogen fires: from microflames to jet fires and fireballs
2. Evaluate hydrogen flame lengths with the aid of nomograms, dimensional and dimensionless correlations
3. Assess the average location of jet flame tip
4. Predict the hazard distances to protect people and structures
5. Explain the effect of different factors on the flame length of jet fire: nozzle size and shape, jet attachment,
buoyancy, barriers or walls
6. Compare the flame lengths and heat fluxes of jet fires of hydrogen and other common fuels (CNG and LPG)
7. Explain the pressure effects of hydrogen jet fires
8. Identify the main hydrogen fires detection methods
9. Recognise the mitigation techniques for hydrogen fires
10. Implement the hydrogen fires extinction practices
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Dimensionless numbers
❖ The Froude number, Fr=U2/gd, where U - velocity, d –
characteristic size, g – acceleration due to gravity, is a ratio of
inertial to gravity force (multiplied by the product of density by
area A).
❖ The Reynolds number, Re=Ud /, where – density, –
viscosity, is a ratio of inertial to viscous force.
❖ The Mach number, M=U/C, where C – speed of sound, is a
ratio of inertial force to inertial force at sonic flow.
RT
❖ The speed of sound in ideal gas is: C =
M
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Types of hydrogen flames/fires
• From microflames (10-9 kg/s) to high debit flames (10 kg/s).
• Laminar diffusion and turbulent non-premixed flames.
• Buoyancy- and momentum-controlled jets.
• Subsonic, sonic and under-expanded supersonic jet flames.
• Fireballs during storage tank failure in a fire.
• Liquefied hydrogen (LH2) fires - little knowledge.
• Impinging flames.
• Jet flames in the presence of obstacles, surfaces and in enclosures.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Quenching limits and blow-off
1000
100 • Tube burner is used.
• Quenching limits are nearly
Mass Flow Rate (mg/s)
H2 CH4 C3H8
10
Present ●
Matta et al.
Cheng et al. independent of diameter.
1 Kalghatgi et al. ○ ⃟
0.1
• Hydrogen has the lowest
quenching limit and the highest
0.01
blow-off limit.
0.001
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
Tube Diameter (mm)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Quenching diameter
100
For hydrogen at 690 bar,
any hole larger than
Quenching Diameter (m)
10 Methane 0.4 m will support a
stable flame.
Propane
1 Hydrogen
0.1
1 10 100 1000
Pressure (bar)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Leaky fittings
0.4
• Quenching limits for a 6 mm
Quenching Mass Flow Rate (mg/s)
0.3
0.378 mg/s compression fitting are shown.
0.336 mg/s
Hydrogen
• Limits are independent of
Methane
0.2 Propane pressure.
h
m
p
Linear (h)
• Limits are about 10 times of
0.1 0.028 mg/s Linear (m)
Linear (p) those of tube burners.
• Hydrogen limits are the lowest.
0
1 10 100 1000
Pressure (bar)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The length of microflames (1/2)
4 mm Test shown
LF=1 mm,
m=7.5 mg/s,
D=0.36 mm
Stand-off height
is 0.25 mm
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The length of microflames (2/2)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Laminar and turbulent jet flames
• The classic theoretical consideration of mixing and combustion in turbulent gas jets are given by Hottel and Hawthorne (1949).
• “The process of mixing is the controlling factor in determining progress of the combustion”.
• For the release of hydrogen into the still air transition from laminar diffusion to turbulent flames commences at Re ~ 2000.
Source: Hottel, HC and Hawthorne, WR (1949).
Diffusion in laminar flame jets. Proceedings of the
Combustion Institute. Vol. 3, pp. 254-266.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Flame length to diameter LF/d=f (Re)
• Dependence of the flame length to diameter ratio (LF/d) on Reynolds number Re
for different nozzle diameters
• Turbulent flame length limit Lt
1 – 1.45 mm; 9 – 51.7 mm
Source: Baev et al (1974) Source: Shevyakov and Komov (1977)
Can all these scattered data be correlated by one curve?
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Fr-based flame length correlations
• Dimensionless flame length correlations suggested previously are based on the
use of the Froude number (Fr) only, in one form or another.
• Recently Fr-based correlations were expanded to high pressure hydrogen jet fires
(under-expanded jets). The general idea of this technique is to correlate
experimental data with the modified Fr number that is built on so-called notional
or effective nozzle diameter instead of real nozzle diameter. However, the size
of the notional nozzle diameter and the velocity in the notional nozzle are
dependent on the theory applied, including a number of simplifying assumptions.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Fr-based correlation example
Momentum-
+50%
Scattering for
momentum jets
with high Re
is an issue
Under-expanded
jets are included!
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The dimensional correlation (2009)
Good
prediction for
high and poor
for small debit
jets
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The nomogram Flame L=5 m
Derived from the dimensional
correlation (best fit curve; please
multiply by 1.5 for a conservative
estimate).
Special feature: No flame
No stable flames (“non-combustible”
hydrogen) were observed for nozzle P=350 bar
diameters 0.1-0.2 mm – flame blew off
although the spouting pressure D=3 mm
increased up to 400 bar.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The under-expanded jet scheme
1- High pressure vessel
2- Nozzle entrance The notional nozzle exit, 4, parameters correspond to
3- Nozzle exit (= notional nozzle entrance) fully expanded jet with the pressure equal to ambient
4- Notional (effective) nozzle exit (3-4: no and uniform flow velocity equal to local speed of sound.
entrainment) In some cases, there can be essential minor and friction
P1 Storage pressure losses in the flow pathway 2-3 that cannot be neglected,
P2 Atmospheric pressure (after jet expansion) e.g. the case of very narrow crack.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
A dimensionless correlation?
• The dimensional correlation for flame length is LF ~ (ṁ.d)1/3
• Mass flow rate is proportional to the actual nozzle diameter squared ṁ ~ d2
• This implies that dimensionless flame length LF/d is an exponent function of
only density, N, and velocity, UN, in the nozzle
• The dimensionless density and velocity
RH 2 TN
can be introduced: N /S and UN /CN, CN =
(1 − b N )
• The correlation (next slide) is validated:
- hydrogen storage pressures up to 90 MPa;
- nozzle diameters from 0.4 to 51.7 mm.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
The dimensionless correlation (2011)
Kalghatgi, subsonic
Kalghatgi
Mogi et al. Validation:
Schefer et al., subsonic
1000
Schefer et al.
Proust et al. P =0.1-90 MPa
Studer et al.
Imamura et al.
Chevyakov et al., subsonic
d=0.4-51.7 mm
Hawthorne, subsonic
LF /dN
100 Line M = 1 (choked flow)
M (M < 1) -> (Re, Fr)
3
N U g N
M=1 N = Re Fr
10 S CN S CN
3
1E-009 1E-007 1E-005 0.001 0.1 10
.
(N/S) (UN/CN)3
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Change of Fr, Re, M
9 3
Froude number
Reynolds number
8
U 2
N d N U N U
Mach number
Fr
Fr = N
Re = M= N
dN g N CN 7
Fr=106 2
Log (Fr) and Log (Re)
6
Mach number
Re=2000: Laminar to turbulent 5
Re
Fr=106: Buoyancy to momentum 4
1
3
3 Re=2000
N UN g N M
= Re Fr 2
S CN S CN
3
M=1
1 0
1E-009 1E-007 1E-005 0.001 0.1 10
.
(N/S) (UN/CN)3
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
How to determine the flame length?
❖ Y axis: Lf /dn where Lf - flame length, dn - nozzle diameter
❖ X axis: (ρN/ρS)(UN/CN)3 where
❖ ρN - density at the nozzle exit, = 0.0838 kg/m3 at normal temperature and pressure (NTP) for sub-
sonic and expanded sonic jets, calculated in the same way as with similarity law for unignited jets.
If the jet is under expanded, then the density is calculated by an under-expanded jet theory (UU)
❖ ρS - density of the surroundings = 1.205 kg/m 3 for air
P RT
❖ CN - is the speed of sound in hydrogen at the nozzle exit, C N = =
M
❖ UN - the velocity of the hydrogen at the jet exit P
UN = 2
UN = CN for sonic and supersonic jets,
for subsonic jets:
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Where is a jet flame tip location?
❖ Flammable envelope = 4 vol. % (LFL)
❖ Flame tip location = 11 vol. % in unignited jet (8-16 vol.%)
Kalghatgi sonic, 1984
Mogi et al. 0.4 mm, 2005
Mogi et al. 0.8 mm, 2005
Mogi et al. 2 mm, 2005
Mogi et al. 4 mm, 2005
Flame is 2.2 times (16%) or 4.7
8% Schefer et al. 5.08 mm, 2007
times (8%) longer than the
Proust et al. 1 mm, 2008
x/D and LF /D
1000
Proust et al. 2 mm, 2008
Proust et al. 3mm, 2008
distance to axial concentration
Studer et al. 4 mm, 2008
16% Studer et al. 7 mm, 2008
29.5% (stoichiometric hydrogen-air
Studer et al. 10 mm, 2008
Imamura et al. 1 mm, 2008 mixture)!
Imamura et al. 2 mm, 2008
11% Imamura et al. 3 mm, 2008
Imamura et al. 4 mm, 2008
100 HySAFER model - 16% by vol
HySAFER model - 11% by vol
1 10 100 1000
pcont, bar HySAFER model - 8% by vol
Best fit 70 points
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Hazard and separation distances
• Hazard distance is a recently introduced term.
• In early publications (before 2015) you may find terms such as separation distance =
safety distance = setback distance.
• As per draft definition, ISO TC197 hazard distance is a distance from the (source of)
hazard to a determined (by physical or numerical modelling, or by a regulation) physical
effect value (normally, thermal or pressure) that may lead to a harm condition (ranging
from “no harm” to “max harm”) to people, equipment or environment.
• The hazard distance will be different for:
➢ Unignited releases;
➢ Fires;
➢ Blast wave;
➢ Fireball
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Harm criteria
• In the case of free fires this would be temperature, heat flux and overpressure (in
the case of enclosure fires - asphyxiation may also be relevant).
• For people direct flame contact as a result of a jet fire is generally assumed to
result in third degree burns.
• For people not in the flame, there is still potential for exposure to high radiation
heat fluxes.
• Harmful heat flux criteria are presented in the Lecture ‘Harm criteria for people and
damage criteria for structures.
• 70 oC - “no harm” limit; 115 oC - pain limit for 5 min exposure; 309 oC - third degree
burns for 20 s (“fatality” limit).
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Temperature decay along jet fire axis
• Momentum-dominated leak
• Jet fires (three hazard
distances):
x = 3.5LF for “no harm” (70 oC)
x = 3LF for pain limit (115 oC, 5
min)
x = 2LF for third degree burns
(309oC, 20 s)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Unignited versus ignited jets x4% = 1708 N D
• The ratios of a hazard distance to LFL (non-reacting jet) to three hazard distances based on the choice of
harm criteria for jet fire are (average flame tip location 11 vol. % in non-reacting jet):
➢ x4%/xT=70C = x4%/(3.5.x11%) = 2.95/3.5 = 0.84 (“no harm”);
➢ x4%/xT=115C = 2.95/3 = 0.98 (“pain limit”);
➢ x4%/xT=309C = 2.95/2 = 1.48 (“fatality limit” – unprotected).
• In the conservative case (flame tip location 8 vol. %) these ratios:
➢ x4%/xT=70C(8%) = 2.08/3.5 = 0.59 (“no harm”);
➢ x4%/xT=115C(8%) = 2.08/3 = 0.69 (“pain limit”);
➢ x4%/xT=309C(8%) = 2.08/2 = 1.04 (“fatality limit” – unprotected).
• “Unexpected” conclusion - in the conservative case all three distances for jet fire are either longer
or equal to the hazard distance based on LFL (non-reacting release).
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Flame length & hazard distance calculation – e-Laboratory
URL:https://elab.hysafer.ulster.ac.uk/
Login: HyResponderTrainer
Password: safetyfirst
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Similarity law for hydrogen concentration decay– e-Laboratory
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Unattached and attached jets
Unattached Attached
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGEEFgShQhQ&lis https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tyj95QElNCc&list=
t=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=9 PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=16
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Attachment effect on jet flame length
• 205 bar (20.5 MPa), ignition delay 800 ms.
• Attached jets – 0.11 m above the ground.
• Unattached jets – 1.2 m above the ground.
• Release along the ground or walls in proximity to them can increase the flame length.
Orifice diameter, Flame length, m Flame length, m Flame length
mm Attached jets Unattached jets increase, times
1.5 5.5 3 x1.83
3.2 9 6 x1.50
6.4 11 9 x1.22
9.5 13 11 x1.18
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Round nozzles (p =35 MPa)
1m 1m
(a) d = 0.0004 m
(b) d = 0.0008 m
(c) d = 0.002 m
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Round and plane nozzles
p=40 MPa (constant nozzle area 0.8 mm 2) (A=constant)
Nozzle Side view Front view
d = 0.001 m
0.0004×0.002 m
(AF = 5)
0.00025×0.0032 m
(AF = 12.8)
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Nozzle shape effect on flame length
3.0 1.5
d =0.001m d = 0.001m
AR =5 AF = 5
Maximum flame widthWf [m]
2.5 AF = 12.8 d = 0.0032m
AR =12.8 1.2
Flame length Lf [m]
2.0
0.9 d = 0.002m
1.5
0.6
1.0
d =0.0004m
0.3
0.5 d =0.00025m
0.0 0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50 0 10 20 30 40 50
Release pressure p0 [MPa] Release pressure p0 [MPa]
Length Width
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Effect of a barrier wall on delayed ignition of hydrogen
Barrier 90o: 9.5 mm, 800 ms Barrier 60o: 9.5 mm, 800 ms
(42 kPa; free jet only 16 kPa) (57 kPa; free jet only 16 kPa)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bCIdzIjqxkQ&list= https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8SeqGHpTkzc&list
PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=2 =PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=3
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Effect of an orifice diameter on overpressure
Orifice diameter, mm Ignition delay, ms Max overpressure, kPa
1.5 800 Not recordable
1.5 400 Not recordable
3.2 800 3.5
3.2 400 2.1
6.4 800 15.2
6.4 400 2.7-3.7
9.5 800 16.5
9.5 400 3.3-5.4
Conclusion:
❖ Reduce orifice diameter ALARP to reduce overpressure following delayed ignition
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Effect of ignition source location on overpressure
Orifice d = 6.4 mm. Fixed ignition delay: 800 ms.
The ignition position (pyrotechnic system) was varied from 3 m to 10 m (h=1.2 m).
Ignition position, m Max overpressure, kPa
3 5.0
4 2.1
5 2.1
6 Not recordable
8 Not recordable
10 No ignition
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Delayed ignition: Test conditions (HSL)
• Storage pressure: 205 bar (two 50 litre cylinders).
• Stainless steel tubing ID=11.9 mm, a series of ball valves with internal bore of 9.5 mm.
Restrictors of 2 mm length and diameter: 1.5, 3.2, 6.4 mm.
• Ignition by a match head with small amount of pyrotechnic material. Ignition 1.2 m above
the ground.
• The release point is 1.2 m above the ground.
• Ignition point is located 2-10 m from the release point.
• Piezo-resistive transducers pointed out upwards (except for wall mounted). Sensors are
located at axial distance 2.8 m from the nozzle, 1.5 m (then +1.1 m and +1.1 m)
perpendicular to the axis, at height 0.5 m.
• 260 ms to fully open the valve, 140 ms for hydrogen to reach 2 m, i.e. 400 ms is shortest
ignition delay.
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Free jet fire: 9.5 mm, 800 ms (16.5 kPa)
Daytime fire
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txNANqq7rJ4&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=13
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Infrared 4.1-5.3 microns (16.5 kPa)
Nighttime fire
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myOTYcPCw0I&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=12
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Effect of ignition delay on overpressure
Orifice d=6.4 mm. Ignition 2 m from the orifice.
Ignition delay, ms Max overpressure, kPa
400 3.7
500 18.4
600 19.4
800 15.2
1000 11.7
1200 12.5
2000 9.5
Spontaneous ignition should reduce overpressure of self-ignited release (no SI observed with a valve use).
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Visibility of hydrogen flames
• Hydrogen burns with invisible in the daylight flame.
• Real jet flame can be visible due to combustion of entrained particulates.
• Radiation emitted from hydrogen flames is very low.
The emissivity1 < 0.1 (ADL,1960).
Sandia National Laboratory (US) research: emissivity < 0.3.
1Emissivity is defined as the ratio of the energy radiated from a material's surface to that radiated from a perfect emitter, known
as a blackbody, at the same temperature and wavelength and under the same viewing conditions.
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Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Heat flux prediction (1/2)
1. Evaluation of the radiant fraction 𝝌: fraction of total chemical energy release converted into energy
radiated to the surroundings.
The expression of radiant fraction used in the model was derived by Molina:
4
𝜒 = 0.08916 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑡𝑓 ∙ 𝛼𝑓 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑑 − 1.2172
𝜋 𝜌𝑓 ∙ 𝑊𝑓2 ∙ 𝐿𝑓 ∙ 𝑌𝑠
Turns and Myhr’s equation for residence time evaluation: 𝑡𝑓 =
12 𝑚ሶ
𝑃𝑎𝑚𝑏 ∙ 𝑀𝑊𝑠𝑡
𝜌𝑓 is the flame density and it is evaluated through the following expression: 𝜌𝑓 =
𝑅𝑢 ∙ 𝑇𝑎𝑑
𝑡𝑓 : flame residence time (milliseconds); 𝛼𝑓 : Plank’s mean absorption coefficient for the product species (𝛼𝑓,𝐻2𝑂 =0.23
𝑚−1 ); 𝑇𝑎𝑑 : adiabatic flame temperature; 𝑌𝑠 : hydrogen stoichiometric mass fraction (𝑌𝑠 =0.0281); 𝐿𝑓 : visible flame
length; 𝑊𝑓 : visible flame width; 𝑚:ሶ mass flow rate; 𝑃𝑎𝑚𝑏 : ambient pressure;
𝑀𝑊𝑠𝑡 : stoichiometric molecular weight of the hydrogen combustion products in air (𝑀𝑊𝑠𝑡 =24.52 g/mol);
𝑅𝑢 : universal gas constant (𝑅𝑢 =8314.47 g/(kmol·K).
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Heat flux prediction (2/2)
2. Evaluation of surface emissive power S: 𝑆 = 𝜒 ∙ 𝑚ሶ ∙ ∆𝐻𝑐
∆𝐻𝑐 : gas heat of combustion (∆𝐻𝑐,𝐻20 = −119 𝑀𝐽/𝑘𝑔); 𝑚:
ሶ mass flow rate
3. Evaluation of the radiative heat flux at the observer location q is a product of the surface
emissive power, of the view factor VF and the atmospheric transmissivity 𝜏: 𝑞 = 𝑉𝐹 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝜏
The view factor VF and the atmospheric transmissivity 𝜏 are function of the model chosen to represent the
flame:
• single source emitter: the source is considered as a point located at the middle point of the predicted flame
length.
• weighted multi-source model: decomposition of the jet flame axis in N points, with N decided accordingly to
the characteristics of the problem. Afterwards, each point is considered as a radiation emitter and it has a
different contribution on the final balance of the heat flux.
Sources: Houf et al (2013). International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, Vol. 38 8092-8099; Ekoto et al (2014), International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, Vol. 39 39 , 20570-20577
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Comparison of hydrogen jets to common fuels
• Jet fires: Thermal effects
Jet fires: Flame length
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Fireballs (rupture of a storage tank in a fire)
Hydrogen fireball about 70 ms after tank rupture (under the vehicle) Hydrogen fireball about 170 ms after tank rupture (under the vehicle)
Two tests:
1) stand alone hydrogen tank. Catastrophic rupture after 6 min 27 s. Diameter 𝐷𝑓𝑏 = 7.7 𝑚; time 𝑡𝑓𝑏 = 4.5 𝑠
2) hydrogen tank installed on a typical SUV. Catastrophic rupture after 12 min 18 s. Diameter 𝐷𝑓𝑏 = 24 𝑚; time
𝑡𝑓𝑏 = 4.5 𝑠 (please see two images above)
Source: Zalosh, 2007
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Hydrogen fire sensors
Type Pluses Minuses
UV/IR Moderate speed. False alarms possible in
Moderate sensitivity. case of combination of IR
Low false alarm rate. and UV sources.
Not blinded by CO2 fire Blinded by thick smoke and
protections discharges. vapours.
Automatic self-test. Price.
Triple IR Very high sensitivity. Price
Very high speed.
IR/vis imaging Images the flame. Price
Used by NASA.
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UV/IR Hydrogen fire detectors
• The detection range of a hydrogen-specific flame detector for a plume 15–20 cm (6–8 inches) high
and 15 cm (6 inches) in diameter. This flame detector can detect the on-axis range of 4.6 m (15 ft)
up to ± 55°, providing broad angular coverage.
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Overview of vehicle fires
Statistics:
According to Fire statistics (2011-2012) in
• UK - 28,800 road vehicle fires in 2011-12
• USA - 172,500 automobile fires in 2012 Great Britain:
• Types of vehicles: motor cars, heavy goods ➢ The majority (65%) of fires occurred in
vehicles, light goods vehicles, public transport cars, 10% were in vans, 4% were in
vehicles etc. lorries and 2% in buses or minibuses.
➢ Fire causes: accidental, deliberate or
unknown
➢ The majority of deliberate fires (43%)
involved road vehicles – 13,900 fires.
➢ The number of fatalities in road vehicle
fires in 2011-12 was 37.
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Risks and statistics
• Recent data shows that about 10% of vessel failure is catastrophic! This means that catastrophic
failure cannot be ruled out of the risk assessment [1].
• People/customers would not be happy to know that they might die with a probability of 10-4 or 10-6.
They wish to know that everything is done for safety.
• During 2000-2006: 20 documented CNG tank failures, 11 have been attributed to vehicle fires [2]. Of
these 11 incidents, the evidence suggests that the majority of the TPRDs failed to activate (localized
fire).
• CNG and hydrogen storage tanks: “testing has shown that all fuel tanks regardless of working
pressure are highly susceptible to rapid degradation due to localized fires” [2].
Sources:
[1] The relative frequency of failure modes. http://www.h2safe.com/case_safety.html [2] Gambone, L.R. and Wong, J.Y., Fire Protection Strategy for Compressed Hydrogen-Powered Vehicles, ICHS2, 2007).
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Upward release from a TPRD
A vehicle equipped with two cylinders (34 L capacity, at 35 MPa) fitted with a TPRD, 5 mm in diameter.
TPRD was actuated after 14 min 36 sec (Watanabe et al, 2007).
Is 10-15 m flame length from a car acceptable?
“No harm” distance is 25-40 m and a high-pitched noise from the jet!
What if a car parked in a garage or in a multi-storey parking facility (“domino” effect)?
Source: Watanabe, S, Tamura, Y, Suzuki, J (2007). The new facility for hydrogen and fuel cell vehicle safety evaluation. Int. J. Hydrogen Energy. Vol. 32 (13), pp. 2154-2161.
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
TPRD release directed downwards
• A fire was initiated on the instrumentation panel ashtrays. The TPRD was actuated in 16 min 16 sec
(downward). Blow-down in less than 5 min (no catastrophic tank failure, but…).
Current size of TPRD does not allow self-evacuation and rescue operations.
What if a car is indoors?
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Flame length: 10.9 m down to 5.2 m
• Release 0o (flame temperature 1300oC)
Flame length 10.9 m (correlation), 5.2 m by CFD (longest in 2 s)
length of free jet fire from 4.2 mm release (350 bar): 10.9 m
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPT7KePqMrs&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=20
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
No harm distance: 38 m down to 6 m
• Release 0o (temperature 70oC envelope)
No harm (horizontal!) 10.9x3.5=38 m (correlation), 6 m (CFD)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBi9GEZUEa8&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=10
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Flame length: 10.9 m down to 9.7 m
• Release 30o (evacuation route still blocked)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VflBVfK8Tc&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=21
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Flame length: 10.9 m “down” to 10.5 m
• Release 45o (evacuation and rescue possible)
No-harm distance decreases from 38 m (correlation) to 23 m (CFD)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Lf_zBhgjCg&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=22
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Hazard distances (1/2)
Hazard distance from visible hydrogen fire (1300 oC flame) - Release 0o
35 MPa 70 MPa
8.4 m
5.2 m
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Hazard distances (2/2)
Hazard distance for people standing on the ground (below 2m) - Release 0o
35 MPa 70 MPa
6.0 m 9.5 m
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
70 C envelope (70 MPa)
Release 0o
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_Hq6lXzHKE&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=11
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Jet fire prevention and mitigation
• Direction of the jet flow
The flow shall be directed so that it will not reach people or equipment. For example, flanges
(components where leaks are likely) should be placed and directed in such way that a potential leak
would not cause any domino effects.
• Shielding or barriers
It will reduce the rate of heat transfer to the potential targets in the vicinity of a hydrogen fire. Flame
shields are specifically intended to reduce the radiant heat flux by preventing direct flame impingement on
systems or equipment. The correct choice of materials for shields or barriers is very important.
• Reduction of flame length
For example through the use of innovative PRDs with decreased diameter and use of plane nozzles (see
next slide).
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Innovative TPRD (350 bar)
Flame length reduction: 7.5 –> 1.8 m Flame length reduction: 6.1 –> 1.8 m
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKVVSBX- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chamCusodSk&list
3As&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=15 =PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=14
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Innovative PRD: shorter flame
Current PRD Current PRD
Back view Side view
Short flame TPRD Short flame TPRD
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Use of thermal insulation
• The purpose of thermal insulation is to reduce the rate of heat transfer to potential
targets, e.g. hydrogen tanks located near hydrogen jet fire
• The equipment is usually protected with the materials which:
• Have relatively low heat conductivity
• Are non-combustible and do not produce smoke or toxic gases when subjected to high
temperatures
• Provide uniform protection
• Allow efficient and uniform application
• Durable and have sufficient bond strength
• Weather-resistant
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Fire protection coatings
Fire protection coatings (e.g. intumescent) for hydrogen storage tanks (research on-going at Ulster)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SW33J-Yr3Qo&list=PLlphoM9ggM3Rf-Npmdq0S3WrCSpx0U4SL&index=19
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Extinction of hydrogen fires
The recommendations from the US National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Emergency Response Training, 2014
Responders should:
• listen for venting gas, and watch for thermal waves that would signal hydrogen flames
• if only one FC vehicle is involved, approach from a 45° angle as per standard procedures, and from a
downhill and upwind position
• if a hydrogen fire is present:
➢ Allow the hydrogen supply to burn out if safe to do so and protect adjacent exposures; then approach and
extinguish.
➢ If a hydrocarbon fire is also present, attack the fire with a straight water stream from a distance, but avoid
directing the water stream into the hydrogen tank’s pressure-relief-device vent line. Control fire spread and
cool exposures.
➢ If possible, direct venting hydrogen that is not burning away from ignition sources and dissipate if necessary
with fog nozzle streams.
➢ Spray foam on petrol or diesel leaks near FC vehicle.
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
Hazard distances from hydrogen flames and fire fighting
Reference (1/5)
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European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
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European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders
This project has received funding from the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 2 Joint Undertaking (JU) under grant agreement No
875089. The JU receives support from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and
United Kingdom, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, Czechia, Switzerland, Norway
European Hydrogen Train the Trainer Programme for Responders