REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASIG RIZAL CO., INC.
,’
GR No. 213207
FACTS:
In 2010, Esperanza filed before the RTC an application for original registration of title
over the Subject Property which she inherited from her deceased husband Manuel Dee Han.
Since no opposition was entered against application the RTC decided to confirm the PRCI’s title
over the Subject matter.
In 2012 the Republic through OSG assailed the RTC Decision before the CA. The CA dismissed
the appeal, stating that the evidence presented by PRCI sufficiently establishes that the subject
property is alienable and disposable. On the other hand, the RTC held that PRCI was able to
establish that it had been in open, actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the
Subject Property in the concept of an owner for the period then required by law for the
acquisition of title
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PRCI sufficiently proves that it is entitled to a decree of registration over the
subject property.
HOLDING:
The Court resolves to remand the petition to the CA. The Court discusses relevant concepts
relating to property, ownership and land classification.
How did the case modify the holding of the Supreme Court in Malabanan?
In Malabanan the Court laid down the requirement for original registration. The second
Malabanan requirement, that is, the express government manifestation that the land constitutes
patrimonial property, was anchored on the premise that “all lands owned by the State, although
declared alienable or disposable, remain as property of public dominion and ought to be used
only by the Government. However the Court states that this is not absolute.
Once property of public dominion is classified by the State as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, it immediately becomes open to private acquisition. To emphasize, all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are generally presumed to
be part of the public domain.
Consequently, those who seek registration on the basis of title over land forming part of the
public domain must overcome the presumption of State ownership. To do so, the applicant must
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable and thus susceptible of
acquisition and subsequent registration. However, once the presumption of State ownership is
discharged by the applicant, the burden to refute the applicant’s claim that the land in question is
patrimonial in nature necessarily falls on the State.
In other words, placing on the applicant the burden to prove the State’s lack of intent to retain
the property would be unreasonable and that the plaintiff should not be made to bear the burden
of proving it.
The application of the second Malabanan requirement is thus improper.
How did the case clarify the classification of state owned lands?
The Civil Code classifies the property of the State into two (2) categories, thus:
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public
use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character, (2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property.
ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
With the passage of RA 11573 the requirements for confirmation of title have been clarified.
The Court further stresses that the issues involved in a land registration proceeding rest heavily
on factual considerations, as they require the determination of land classification status and the
nature of actual physical possession over the property subject of the action.
The petition is denied in part. The Court affirms that Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the Subject Property since
1956. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the Subject
Property’s land classification status based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 11573.
