American Association for Public Opinion Research

Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II

Author(s): Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz
Source: The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer, 1948), pp. 280-315
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Association for Public
Opinion Research
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Cohesionand Disintegration
in the Wehrmachtin
WorldWar II
BY EDWARD A. SHILS AND MORRIS JANOWITZ
The titleof thisarticlemaysuggestto somethatit is of interest onlyto the
student of military afairs.But it is a
of far wider scope. The public relationsex-
pert,theopinionanalyst,thepropagandist, theeducator,and all thosewho are
interested in relatingattitudes to thepsychology of theindividualand thestruc-
tureofthegroupwillfindit deserving of closeattention. For theauthors, in at-
tempting to determine whytheGermanArmyin WorldWarII foughtso stub-
bornlyto the end,have madean intensive studyof thesocialstructure of this'
army,of the symbols to which it responded, of the Nazi attempts to bolsterits
morale, and theAlliedattempts to breakit down.Theyhavefounda keyto many
of thebehaviorand attitude patterns of theindividualinfantryman in theinter-
personalrelationships withinthecompany-hisprimary group.His relationship
to thisprimary groupgoesfarto explainwhyhe respondsto one appealand not
to another, whyhe fights, and whyhe surrenders. This studythusprovidesan
exampleofthe-sociological andpsychological analysiswhichthepropagandist must
make if he is to obtain maximal response to his communications.
Professor Shilsis a memberof thefaculty of theUniversity of Chicagoand
oftheLondonSchoolofEconomics. Dr. Janowitz also teachesat theUniversity of
Chicago.Duringthewar,bothservedin theIntelligence Sectionof the Psycho-
logicalWarfare DivisionofSHAEF.

I. The Army as a Social Group feriorin equipment,the GermanArmy,

This studyis an attemptto analyze on all fronts,maintaineda high degree
the relative influenceof primaryand of organizationalintegrityand fighting
secondarygroup situationson the high effectivenessthrougha seriesof almost
degreeof stabilityof the German Army unbrokenretreatsover a period of sev-
in World War II. It also seeks to eralyears.In thefinalphase,theGerman
evaluate the impactof the WesternAl- armies were broken into unconnected
lies' propagandaon the GermanArmy's segments,and the remnantswere over-
fightingeffectiveness.' 1 For a further
treatment of theseproblems
Althoughdistinctly outnumberedand see Dicks, HenryV., Love, Moneyand War,
in a strategicsense quantitativelyin- London: KeeganPaul Rutledge(forthcoming).

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 28I

runas themajorlinesof communica- This basic hypothesis may be elab-

tionand commandwerebroken.Nev- oratedin thefollowing terms.
ertheless, resistancewhich was more i. It appearsthata soldier'sability
thantokenresistance on the part of to resistis a function of thecapacityof
mostdivisions continued untiltheywere his immediateprimarygroup (his
overpowered oroverrun in a waywhich, squad or section)to avoid social dis-
bybreaking communication lines,pre- integration. When theindividual'sim-
ventedindividualbattalions and com- mediategroup,and its supporting for-
paniesfromoperatingin a coherent mations,met his basic organicneeds,
fashion.Disintegration throughdeser- offered him affection and esteemfrom
tionwas insignificant, while active sur- both officers and comrades,supplied
render,individuallyor in groups, re- him with a senseof powerand ade-
mained extremelylimited throughout quatelyregulated his relations withau-
the entireWestern campaign. thority, the elementof self-concern in
In one sense the German High Com- battle,whichwouldlead to disruption
mand effectedas completea defenseof of the effective functioning of his pri-
the "European Fortress" as its own mary group, was minimized.
leadership qualities and the technical 2. The capacity oftheprimary group
means at its disposal permitted.Official to resistdisintegration was dependent
military analyses, including General on theacceptance of political,ideologi-
Eisenhower's report,have shown that cal,and cultural symbols (all secondary
lack of manpower, equipment, and symbols)onlyto the extentthatthese
transportation, as well as certain stra- secondary symbolsbecamedirectly as-
tegicalerrors,werethe limitingfactors.2 sociated with primary gratifications.
There was neithercompletecollapsenor 3. Once disruption ofprimary group
internallyorganized effortto terminate life resultedthrough separation, breaks
hostilities,such as signalized the end in communications, loss of leadership,
of thefirstworld war. depletionof personnel, or major and
This extraordinarytenacity of the prolonged breaksin thesupplyof food
German Armyhas frequentlybeen at-
and medicalcare,such an ascendancy
of preoccupation withphysicalsurvival
tributedto the strongNational Socialist
developed thattherewasverylittle"last-
politicalconvictionsof the German sol-
ditch"resistance.
diers. It is the main hypothesisof this
4. Finally,as long as the primary
paper, however,that the unity of the
groupstructure ofthecomponent units
German Army was in fact sustained
of the Wehrmacht persisted, attempts
only to a veryslightextentby the Na-
by the Allies to cause disaffection by
tional Socialist political convictionsof
theinvocation of secondary and politi-
its members,and that more important
cal symbols(e.g., about the ethical
in the motivationof the determinedre-
wrongfulness of the NationalSocialist
sistanceof the German soldierwas the
system) were mainly unsuccessful.
steady satisfactionof certain primary
personality
demandsaffordedby the Reportby the Supreme Commanderon
2

operationsin Europe by the Allied Expedi-

socialorganization
of the army. tionaryForce,June6, I944 to May8, 1945.

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 282 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1948

By contrast,where Allied propaganda b) bygroupsactingin concert

dealtwithprimaryand personalvalues, 2. Activesurrender(deliberatede-
particularlyphysical survival, it was cisionto give up to the enemyas he
morelikelyto be effective. approaches and takingstepstofacilitate
Long before D-Day in Western capture,e.g.,by sendingemissaries, by
France,researchwas undertakenin the callingout,bysignalling, etc.)
United Kingdom and North Africaon a) bysingleindividuals
thesesocial psychologicalaspectsof the b) bygroupas a unit
enemy'sforces.These studieswere con- (i) by mutualagreement
tinued afterD-Day by the Intelligence (2) byorderofor withapproval
Sectionof thePsychologicalWarfareDi- ofNCO or officer
vision of SHAEF. Although of course c) by pluralityof uncoordinated
theyare subjectto many scientificstric- individuals
tures,they provide a groundworkfor 3. Passivesurrender
the evaluationof the experiencesof the a) byindividuals actingalone
Germansoldier and for the analysisof (i) (allowingone-
non-resistance
the social organizationof the German self to be taken prisoner
Army. Methods of collectingdata in- without taking effective
cluded front line interrogation of stepsto facilitateor obstruct
prisonersof war (Ps/W) and intensive capture;passivity maybe a
psychologicalinterviewsin rear areas. means of facilitating sur-
Capturedenemydocuments,statements render)
of recapturedAllied militarypersonnel, (2) token resistance(allowing
and the reports of combat observers oneselfto be takenprisoner
were also studied. A monthlyopinion with nominal face-saving
poll of random samples of large num- gesturesof obstruction to
bersof Ps/W was also undertaken.This capture)
paper is based on a review of all these b) by pluralityof uncoordinated
data. individuals
4. Routineresistance: roteormechani-
Modes of Disintegration
cal, buteffective executionof ordersas
Preliminaryto the analysis of the givenfromabovewithdiscontinuance
functionof the primarygroup in the when the enemybecomesoverwhelm-
maintenanceof cohesionin the German inglypowerful and aggressive
Army, it is necessary to classifythe 5. "Last-ditch" resistancewhichends
modes of social disintegrationfound only with the exhaustionof fighting
in any modern army: equipment and subsequent surrender or
i. Desertion (deliberatelygoing over death.(This typeof soldieris greatly
to the enemylines) underrepresented in studiesof samples
a) by individualaction ofPs/W.Therefore thestudyofPs/W
(i) after discussion with com- alonedoesnotgivean adequatepicture
rades of theresistive qualitiesof theGerman
(2) without prior discussion soldier.)
with others A moredetaileddescription of each

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 283
oftheaboveclasseswillbe usefulin the hid in the cellarsor barns,sometimes
following analysis: self-narcotized by fear,or sometimes
Desertioninvolvedpositiveand de- deliberately waitingto be overrun.In
liberateactionby the Germansoldier both cases,theymade only the most
to deliverhimselfto Alliedsoldiersfor limitedexternalgesturesof resistance
captureby crossingthe lines,e.g., by when the enemyapproached.In the
planfully"losing himself"while on secondtypeofpassivesurrender-token
patroland "blundering" intothe ene- resistance-the surrendering soldierde-
my'sareaof controlor by deliberatelysiredtoavoidall thestigmaofdesertion
remaining behindduringa withdrawal or surrender but nevertheless showed
froma givenpositionso thatwhenthe reluctanceto undertakeaggressiveor
Alliedtroopscameup theycouldtake defensive actionswhichmighthavein-
him. terfered withhissurvival.
In activesurrenderbythegroupas a An examination of the basic social
unit,thepositiveact of movingacross organization of the GermanArmy,in
toenemy lineswas absentbuttherewas terms ofitsprimary groupstructure and
an elementcommonwithdesertion in the factorswhich strengthened and
thedeliberate attempttowithdraw from weakened its component primary
further combat.Like manycasesof de- groups,is firstrequiredin orderto ac-
sertion,the decisionto surrenderas a countforthe stability and cohesionof
group was arrivedat as a resultof resistance, and in orderto evaluatethe
group discussionand mutual agree- impactof Alliedpropaganda.
ment.The dividinglinebetweenactive II. The FunctionofthePrimaryGroup3
surrender and desertionbroughtabout "The companyis the only truly
bylaggingbehindwas shadowy.There existent community. This community
were otherformsof groupsurrender allowsneither timenorrestfora per-
whichwereclearlydifferent fromdeser- sonallife.It forcesus intoits circle,
tion,e.g.,thesendingof an emissary to forlife is at stake.Obviouslycom-
arrangetermswiththeenemy,there- promisesmustbe made and claims
fusalto carryout aggressive orders,or be surrendered. . . . Therefore the
to fighta wayoutof encirclement. 3"By primary groups I mean those charac-
In passivesurrender,theintention of terized by intimate face-to-faceassociation and
a soldierto removehimselffromthe cooperation . . . it is a 'we'; it involves the
and mutual identificationfor
battlewas oftennotclearevento him- sort of sympathy
which 'we' is the natural expression. One
self.The soldierwhowas takenprisoner lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the
by passivesurrender mighthave been chief aims of his will in that feeling" (p.
immobilizedor apatheticdue to anx- 23).... The most important spheres of this
association and cooperation-though
iety; he mighthave been in a state intimatemeans the only ones-are the family,
by no
of bewilderedisolationand not have the play group of children, and the neighbor-
thoughtof passivesurrender untilthe hood or community group of elders" (p.
perception ofan opportunitybrought it 24).... "the only essential thing being a
certain intimacy and fusion of personalities."
to his mind.Non-resistant passivesur-
(p. 26)
renderfrequently occurredin the case Cooley, Charles Horton, Social Organiza-
of soldierswholayin theirfoxholes or tion, New York, I909.

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284 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1948
idea of fighting, living,and dying the bestof his abilityand to hold out as
forthe fatherland, for the cultural long as possible.For the ordinaryGer-
possessions of the fatherland, is but man soldier the decisive fact was that
a relativelydistantthought. At least he was a memberof a squad or section
it does not play a greatrole in the whichmaintaineditsstructuralintegrity
practicalmotivations of theindividu- and which coincided roughlywith the
al."4 social unit which satisfiedsome of his
Thuswrotean idealistic Germanstu- major primaryneeds.5 He was likely
dentin thefirstworldwar.A German to go on fighting,providedhe had the
sergeant, capturedtowardthe end of necessaryweapons,as long as the group
thesecondworldwar,was askedbyhis possessed leadership with which he
interrogators aboutthepolitical opinions could identifyhimself,and as long as
of his men. In reply,he laughedand he gave affectionto and receivedaffec-
said,"Whenyouask sucha question, I tion from the other members of his
realize well that you have no idea of squad and platoon. In other words, as
whatmakesa soldierfight. The soldiers long as he felthimselfto be a member
lie in theirholesand are happyif they of his primary group and therefore
livethrough the nextday.If we think bound by the expectationsand demands
at all,it'sabouttheend of thewar and of its other members, his soldierly
thenhome." achievementwas likely to be good.
The fighting effectiveness of thevast Modern social research has shown
majority of soldiersin combatdepends that the primarygroup is not merely
onlyto a smallextenton theirpreoccu- the chiefsourceof affectionand accord-
pationwiththe majorpoliticalvalues ingly the major factor in personality
whichmightbe affected bytheoutcome formation in infancy and childhood.
ofthewar and whichare theobjectof The primary group continues to be
concernto statesmenand publicists. the major source of social and psycho-
Thereare of coursesoldiersin whom logical sustenancethroughadulthood.6
such motivations are important. Vol- 4KriegsbriefegefallenerStudenten,I928,
unteerarmiesrecruited on thebasisof pp. I67-I72. Quoted by William K. Pfeiler,
ethicalor politicalloyalties, suchas the War and the GermanMind,New York, I94I,
International Brigadein the Spanish P. 77.
CivilWar,are affected bytheirdegree 5 On the relationsbetween the technical
group and
of orientation towardmajor political Leadershipsocial groupcf. Whitebead,T. N.,
in a Free Society, Cambridge,
goals.In theGermanArmy,the"hard Mass., 1936, Ch. IV.
core"of NationalSocialistswere sim- 6 Cooley,op. cit.,PartI, pp. 3-57; FreudS.,
ilarlymotivated. GroupPsychology and theAnalysisof theEgo,
Butin a conscript army,thecriterion Ch. IV; Mayo,Elton,The Human Problemsof
an IndustrialCivilization,New York, 1933;
of recruitment is muchless specialized Wilson,A. T. M., "The ServiceMan Comes
and thearmyis morerepresentative of Home," Pilot Papers:Social Essaysand Docu-
the totalpopulationliableto conscrip- ments,Vol. I, No. 2 (Apr. 1946), pp. 9-28;
tion.Therefore the valuesinvolvedin Grinker,R. R. and Spiegel,J. P., Men Under
politicaland social systemsor ethical Stress, Philadelphia,1945, Ch. 3; Whitehead,
T. N., op. cit., Ch. I, X, VII; also Lindsay,
schemesdo not have muchimpacton A. D., The Essentialsof Democracy,Oxford,
thedetermination ofa soldiertofight to 1935, 2nd ed., pp. 78-81.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 285
In thearmy, whenisolatedfromcivilian cent of the Germans were desertersor
primary groups,the individualsoldier potentialdeserters;55 per cent of the
comestodependmoreand moreon his Austriansfell into these two classes,as
military primary group.His spontane- did 78 per cent of the Czechs, Poles,
ous loyaltiesareto itsimmediate mem- and Yugoslavs. Of the 53 German de-
bers whom he sees daily and with serters,only one declared that he had
whomhe developsa high degreeof "political"motivesfordesertion.In the
intimacy. For the Germansoldierin WesternEuropean campaign,the bulk
particular,the demandsof his group, of the deserterscame fromamong the
reinforced by officially rules, "Volksdeutsche,"8Austrians,Poles, and
prescribed
had theeffect of an externalauthority.Russians who had been coerced into
It heldhis aggressiveness in check;it German militaryservice. It was clear
provided discipline, andfree- that in view of the apolitical character
protection,
dom fromautonomousdecision.7 of most of the deserters,the grounds
Armyunitswith a high degreeof for their desertionwere to be sought
primary groupintegrity sufferedlittle among thosevariableswhich prevented
fromdesertions or fromindividuallythe formationof close primarygroup
contrivedsurrenders.In theWehrmacht,bonds,the chiefof which were insuper-
desertions and surrenders were most able language differences,bitter re-
frequentin groupsof heterogeneoussentmentagainst their coerced condi-
ethniccomposition in whichAustrians, tion, and the unfriendlinessof the
Czechs,andPoleswererandomly inter- Germansin theirunits.
mixedwitheach other.In suchgroups Among German deserters,who re-
thedifficulties communica-mained few until the close of the war,
of linguistic
tion,the large amountof individual thefailureto assimilateintotheprimary
resentment and aggressivenessaboutco- group life of the Wehrmachtwas the
ercionintoGermanservice,the weak- most importantfactor,more important
enedsupport of leadershipdue to their indeed than politicaldissidence.Desert-
inability to identify with Germanof- ers were on the whole men who had
ficers-allthesefactorshamperedthe difficulty in personal adjustment,e.g.,
formation of cohesivegroups. in the acceptance of affectionor in the
Sampleinterviews withWehrmacht giving of affection.They were men who
deserters madein NorthAfricain I943 had shown these same difficultiesin
and in Franceand Germanyin I944 civilianlife,having had difficulties with
and I945 showedan overwhelmingly friends,work associates,and theirown
disproportionate representationof ele- families,or havinghad criminalrecords.
mentswhichcould not be assimilated Political dissidentson the other hand,
into primarygroups.A total of 443 when captured, justified their failure
Wehrmacht Ps/W captured towardthe to desert by invoking their sense of
end of the NorthAfricancampaign, 7 German combat soldiers almost always
consisting of i8o Germans,200 Austri- stressedthe high level of comradelinessin
ansand63 others(Czechs,Poles,Yugo- their units.They frequently
unitsas "one big family."
referredto their
slavs,etc.),had verymarkedly different 8 Individualsof Germanextractionresiding
tendenciestowardsdesertion:29 per outsidethe boundariesof Germany.

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286 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

withtheircomradesand ex- function

solidarity of the "hard core,"who ap-
pressedthe feelingthathad theyde- proximated abouttento fifteen percent
sertedwhengivena post of responsi- of the totalof enlistedmen; the per-
bilitytheircomradeswouldhaveinter- centagewas higherfor non-commis-
pretedit as a breachof solidarity.For sionedofficers andwas verymuchhigh-
the politicaldissident,the verbalex- er amongthe juniorofficers.10 These
pressionofpoliticaldissentwas as much were,on thewhole,youngmenbetween
as he couldafford, 24 and 28 yearsof age who had had a
anti-authoritarianism
and submission to his groupwas the gratifying adolescencein the mostre-
pricewhichhe had to payforit. wardingperiodof NationalSocialism.
The persistent strength of primary Theywereimbuedwiththeideologyof
groupcontrols was manifested evenin Gemeinschaft (community solidarity),"
thelastmonthof thewar,whenmany were enthusiasts for the military life,
desertersfeltthattheywouldnothave had definite homo-erotic tendencies and
beenable to havetakentheinitialstep accordingly placeda veryhighvalueon
in theirdesertion unlesstheyhad dis- "toughness," manlycomradeliness, and
cussedthematterwiththeircomrades group solidarity.'2 The presenceof a
and receivedsomekindof legitimationfew such men in the group,zealous,
forthe action,such as a statement of energetic, and unsparing of themselves,
approval.9And,on theotherhand,the providedmodelsforweakermen,and
sameongoingefficacy ofprimary group facilitated theprocessof identification.
sentiment was evidentin thestatementsFor thoseforwhomtheircharismadid
ofwould-be deserters
whodeclaredthey not suffice and who were accordingly
had neverbeenableto crossthethresh- difficult to incorporate fullyinto the
old becausetheyhad beentoldbytheir intimate primary group,frowns, harsh
officers
thatthecomrades whoremained wards,and threats servedas a checkon
behind(i.e., the comradesof the men divisivetendencies. The factthat the
who had deserted)would be shot. elite SS divisionsand paratroop
divi-
Hence,one of the chiefformsof dis- sions had a
larger"hard core" than
integrationwhichoccurredin the last other
divisionsof the army-so large
stagesofthewartooktheformQfgroup
surrender in which,afterample dis- 9 Approvalof desertionby a marriedman
cussionwithintheunit,the authoriza- with a large familyor with heavy familial
obligationswas often noted near the
tion of the leading personalities and end. For such men, the strongerties towar's
the
oftenof the NCO's had been granted familypreventedthe growthof insuperably
forthe offering of tokenresistance to strongtiesto the armyunit.
capture,or even foroutright 10The "hard core" correspondsto opinion
facilitate
leaders,as the termis currently
used in opin-
groupsurrender. ion research.
11Schmalenbach, Hermann,"Die soziologi-
FactorsStrengtheningPrimary sche Kategoriendes Bundes,"Die Dioskuren,
GroupSolidarity Vol. I, Miinchen, 1922, pp. 35-105; and
The Nazi nucleusof the primary Plessner,Hellmuth,Grenzender Gemeinschaft,
group: the "hard core." The stability Bonn, 1924.
12 Bluher,Hans, Die Rolle der Erotikin der
andmilitaryeffectiveness
ofthemilitary mannlichenGesellschaft. Jena, 192I, Vol. II,
primary groupwerein largemeasurea PartII especially,pp. 91-109; pp. I54-I77.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 287
as to embracealmostthe entiregroup comrade"and who, afterhavingbeen
membership duringmostof thewar- captured,expressedhis defeatism and
accountedfortheirgreaterfighting ef- willingnessto helpendthewar;he was
fectiveness.
And the factthat such a thereupon sentback intothe German
"hardcore"was almostentirely lack- linetotalkhiscomrades intogoingover
ing fromcertainVolksgrenadier divi- withhimto theAlliedlines.Here the
sionshelpedto a considerable extentto "soft core" man exploitedhis com-
accountforthe military inferiority of sadely solidarity and it was only on
theseunits. thatbasisthathe was able to remove
One of the functions of the "hard someofthemembers ofhisgroupfrom
core"was to minimizethe probabilitytheinfluence ofthe"hardcore."
of divisivepoliticaldiscussions.There Community of experience as a cohe-
was,of course,littleinclination to dis- sive force.The factorswhich affect
cusspoliticalmatters or even strategic groupsolidarity in generalwereon the
aspectsof the war among German wholecarefully manipulated bytheGer-
soldiers.For this reason widespread mangeneralstaff. Althoughduringthe
defeatism concerning the outcomeof war Germanywas morepermeated by
the war had littleconsequencein af- foreigners thanit had everbeenbefore
fectingbehavior(until the springof in itshistory, the armywas to a great
I945) becauseof thenearimpossibilityextentcarefully protectedfromdisin-
-objectiveas wellas subjective-of dis- tegratinginfluences of heterogeneityof
cussing orcarrying outalternative plans ethnicand nationalorigin,at leastin
of action. crucialmilitary situations.Germanof-
In contrastwith the "hard core, ficerssaw thatsolidarity is fosteredby
whichwas a disproportionately large the recollection of jointlyexperienced
strengthening factorin theintegrity of gratificationsand thataccordingly the
the military primarygroup,the "soft groupswho had gone througha vic-
core"was a sourceof infection which torytogethershouldnot be dissolved
was by no means comparablein ef- but shouldbe maintainedas unitsto
fectiveness.Unlikethefirstworldwar the greatest degreepossible.
experience in whichanti-warattitudes The replacement system oftheWehr-
wereoftenvigorously expressed and ea- machtoperatedto thesameend.13The
gerlylistenedtobymenwhowere"good entirepersonnelof a divisionwould
comrades,"in the secondworld war be withdrawnfromthe frontsimul-
thepoliticalanti-militaristor anti-Nazi taneouslyand refitted as a unit with
whoexpressed hisviewswithfrequency replacements. Sincenewmembers were
and vigorwas also in the main not a added to thedivisionwhileit was out
"good comrade."There was a complete
This policy sometimescreateda serious
1-3
absenceof soldiers'committees
and or- dilemma for the W'ehrmacht. to
Increasingly,
ganizedopposition,evenin Marchand preservethe sense of group identityand the
April I945 (exceptfor the Bavarian benefitsof solidaritywhich arose from it,
Freiheitsaktion
whichwas constitutedregimentswere allowed to become depleted
byrear-echelontroops).On isolatedoc- in manpowerby as muchas 50 to 75 per cent.
This, however, generatedsuch feelingsof
casions,the WesternAllies were able weaknessthat the solidarity
-gains were can-
toexploita manwhohad beena "good celled.

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288 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

oflinetheywerethereby giventheop- before the First U.S. Army drive in

portunity to assimilatethemselves into November. Thirty-fivePs/W interro-
thegroup;thenthegroupas a whole gated fromthisunit turnedout to have
was sent forward.This systemcon- been recentlyscrapedtogetherfromfif-
tinueduntilcloseto theend ofthewar teen different armyunits.
and helpedto explainthedurability of The most ineffective of all the mil-
theGermanArmyin the face of the itaryformationsemployedby the Wehr-
overwhelming numericaland material macht during the war were the Volks-
of the Alliedforces.
superiority sturmunits. They ranged in age from
Deterioration of groupsolidarityin boys to old men, and were not even
theWehrmacht whichbeganto appear given basic training in the weapons
towardthe veryend of the war was which theywere supposedto use. Their
mostfrequently foundin hastilyfabri- officerswere Nazi local functionaries
catedunits.These were made up of who were already objects of hostility
new recruits, dragoonedstragglers, air and who were thereforeunable to re-
forcemen who had been forcedinto lease a flow of affectionamong equals.
the infantry (and who felta loss of They had moreovernot broken their
statusin thechange),men transferredfamilyties to the slightestextent.They
fromthenavyintotheinfantry to meet still remained members of a primary
theemergency of manpowershortage, group which did not fuse into the mil-
older factoryworkers,concentrationitaryprimarygroup. Finally, they had
campinmates,and oldermarriedmen no uniforms.They had only brassards
whohad beenkeptin reservethrough-to identifythem and throughwhich to
out the war and who had remained
identifythemselveswith one another.
withthe familialprimarygroupuntil
The mutual identificationfunctionof
thelastmoment. The latter,who were
uniformwhich plays so greata role
the"catch"of thelast "totalmobiliza- the
in militaryunits was therebylost. As
tion"carriedwiththemtheresentment
andbitterness whichthe"total'mobiliza-soon as theywere leftto theirown de-
tion"produced andwhichprevented the vices, they disintegratedfrom within,
flowof affection necessaryfor group deserting in large numbers to their
formation. It was clearthatgroupsso homes, hiding, permittingthemselves
diversein age composition and back- to be captured,etc.
ground,and especiallyso mixed in
theirreactionsto becominginfantry-Factors Weakening Primary
Group Solidarity
men, could not veryquicklybecome
effectivefighting units.They had no Isolation.The disintegration of a pri-
timeto becomeusedto oneanother and mary group depends in part on the
todevelopthetypeoffriendliness which physical and spatial variables which
is possibleonlywhen loyaltiesto out- isolate it from the continuous pres-
side groupshave been renounced-or sure of face-to-face contact.The factor
at leastputintothebackground. A pre- of spatialproximityin the maintenance
viewof whatwas to occurwhenunits of group solidarityin militarysituations
became mixed was providedby the must not be underestimated.In Febru-
275thFusilierBattalion whichbrokeup ary and Marchof I945, isolatedrem-

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 289
nantsof platoonsand companieswere er or smallerformations fromthemain
surrendering in groupswithincreasing group.'5
frequency. The tacticalsituationof de- Stragglersfirstbecame a moderately
fensivefighting underheavyAmerican serious problem in the German Army
artillerybombardment and the deploy- in Ootober I944. On October 22, I944,
mentofrearoutposts forcedsoldiersto GeneralKeitel orderedthata maximum
take refugein cellars,trenches,and of one to three days be allowed for
otherunderground sheltersin small stragglersto reattachthemselvesto their
groupsof threeand four.This pro- units.The previouslimithad been five
longedisolationfromthe nucleusof days. The aggravationof the straggler
the primarygroup for several days problem was furtherdocumented by
workedto reinforce thefearof destruc- General Blaskowitz'sorderof March 5,
tionof theself,and thushad a disin- I945, according to which the category
tegrativeinfluenceon primary groupre- of stragglerswas declaredto have ceased
A soldierwho was isolatedin to exist. Soldiers who lost contactwith
lations.14
a cellaror in a concretebunkerforsev- theirown units were directedto attach
eral days and whose anxietiesabout themselves immediatelyto the "first
physicalsurvivalwere aggravatedby troops in the line which he can con-
thetactical hopelessnessofhissituation, tact. . . ."
wasa muchmoreeasilyseparable mem- Familial ties and primary group
berofhisgroupthanone who,though disintegr-ation. Prisoners of war re-
fearingphysicaldestruction, was still marked with considerable frequency
boundbythecontinuous and vitalties that discussionsabout alternativepaths
ofworking, eating,sleeping,and being of actionbygroupsof soldierswho were
at leisuretogether withhis fellowsol- entirelydefeatistarose not fromdiscus-
diers. sions about the war in its political or
This proposition regarding the high strategicaspects,but ratherfromdiscus-
signiificance of the spatialvariablefor sions about the soldiers'families.16The
primary groupsolidarity and themain- recollectionof concretefamily experi-
tenanceof thefighting effectiveness
of 14This propositionis in oppositionto the
an armyis supported bythebehavior of frequently assertedview that social solidarity
of an intensesort is positivelyand linearly
theretreating GermanArmyin North relatedto fearof threatfromtheoutside.
Africa
in I943, andinFranceandGer- 15 The Germansin the Channelportswere
manyin September-October I944 and able to resistso long partlybecause the men
MarchI945. As longas a retreat
is or- remainedtogether wheretheywere constantly
in each other'spresence.Thus the authority
derlyand the structure of the com- of the group over the individualwas con-
ponentunitsof an armyis maintained, stantlyin play.
strategic
difficulties
do notbreakup the 16 A 36-year-oldsoldier-a Berlin radio-

army.An armyin retreatbreaksup worker-who surrenderedprematurely,said:

"Duringone monthin a bunkerwithoutlight
onlywhenthe retreat is poorlyorgan- and withoutmuch to do, the men oftendis-
ized, when commandis lost over the cussed capture. Conversationusually started
men, so that they become separated about families:who was marriedand what
fromtheirunitsand becomestragglers,was to becomeof his family?The subjectbe-
came more acute as the Americans ap-
orwhenenemypenetrations isolatelarg- proached."

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290 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

encesreactivated sentiments of depend- isolatedfrompersonalcontactwiththeir

enceonthefamily forpsychological sup- primarygroup fellows. When soldiers
portand correspondingly weakenedthe returnedto visittheirfamilies,thenthe
holdof themilitary primary group.It conflictbetween contradictoryprimary
was in suchcontexts thatGermansol- group loyaltiesbecame acute. The hold
dierstowardthe end of the war were of the militaryprimarygroup became
willing,todiscussgroupsurrender. debilitatedin the absenceof face-to-face
To prevent preoccupation withfamily contacts.The prospectof facing,on re-
concerns, the familiesof Germansol- turn to the front,physical destruction
dierswere givenstrictinstructions to or a prolonged loss of affectionfrom
avoidreferences to familydeprivationsthe civilian primarygroup, especially
to thefront.
in letters In thewinterand the family, prompted an increasing
springof I945, when Allied air raids numberof desertionswhile on furlough.
becameso destructive ofcommunal life, All of these factors contributedto
all telegramsto soldiersat thefronthad loosen the solidarityof the German
tobepassedbypartyofficials in orderto Army,especiallywhen the prospectof
insurethatno distracting newsreached physical destructionbegan to weigh
the soldiers.On the otherhand, care more heavily.Severe threatsto the safe-
was takenby partyand armyauthori- tyof the civilianprimarygroup created
tiesthatsoldiersshouldnot be leftin anxietywhich oftenweakened the hold
a stateof anxietyabout theirfamilies of the militaryprimarygroup. When
and to this end vigorouspropaganda the area of the soldier's home was oc-
was carried on to stimulatecorre- cupied by the enemy or when the sol-
spondencewith soldiersat the front. dier himselfwas fightingin the area,
For thosewho had no familiesand there was strong dispositionto desert
whoneededthesupplementary affectionhomeward.One such soldiersaid: "Now
whichthearmyunitcouldnotprovide, I have nothingmore forwhich to fight,
provisions were made to obtainmail because my home is occupied."
fromindividuals(includingpartyoffi- The strongpull of the civilian pri-
cials) who would befriendunmarried mary group became strongeras the
or family-less soldiers,withthe result coherenceof the armygroup weakened.
thatthepsychiceconomy of thesoldier But sometimes,the formerworked to
was keptin equilibrium. keep the men fightingin their units,
There was, however,a specialtype i.e., when theyreasoned that the short-
of situationin whichtheverystrengthest way home was to keep the group
offamilialtiesservedto keepthearmy intactand to avoid captureor desertion.
fromfurther disintegration.This arose Otherwise there would ensue a long
towardstheend of thewar,whensol-
was neveractuallycarriedout.
17 This threat
dierswerewarnedthatdesertion would Furthermore,the Sicherheitsdienst (Security
resultin severesanctions beinginflicted Service) admittedthe impossibilityof taking
on thedeserter's family.17 sanctionsagainstthe deserter'sfamilybecause
Towardtheend of thewar,soldiers of the difficulty of locatingthemin the dis-
tendedto breakaway fromthe army order of Germancivilianlife.As the German
soldiersbecameaware of the impotenceof the
moreoftenwhile theywere on leave SD in this respect,thisbarrieragainstdeser-
and withtheirfamilies,and thereforetion weakened.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 29T

period in an enemy P/W camp. On Indeed,as late as October I944, only

theotherhand,in eventof the defeatof I5 per centof a sample of 92 Ps/W de-
a stillintactarmy,therewould be only clared that they were at all dissatisfied
a shortperiod of waiting before de- with army food. By January,however,
mobilization. the situation changed and Ps/W re-
Demand for physical survival. The ported increased preoccupation with
individualsoldier's fear of destruction physical survival, with food, and the
ultimatelypressed to weaken primary shortageof clothing.Soldiersin certain
group cohesion;neverthelessit is strik- units were beginning to "scrounge."
ing to notethedegreeto whichdemands The extremecold of the winterof '44-
forphysicalsurvivalcould be exploited '45 also began to tell on the men whose
by Wehrmachtauthorityto the end of militaryself-esteem was being reduced
prolongingresistance.Where the social by the raggednessof theiruniformsand
conditionswereotherwisefavorable,the the failure to obtain replacementsfor
primarybonds of group solidaritywere unsatisfactoryequipment.
dissolvedonly under the most extreme Thus, to keep groups integral,it was
circumstances of threatto the individu- necessarynot only to provide positive
al organism-in situationswhere the gratificationsbut also to reduce to a
tacticalprospectswere utterlyhopeless, minimumthe alternativepossibilitiesof
underdevastatingartilleryand air bom- increasingthe chances for survival by
bardment,or where the basic food and leaving the unit. For this reason the
medical requirementswere not being Nazis sought to counteractthe fear of
met. Although aware for a long time personal physical destructionin battle
of the high probabilityof German de- by tellingthe men thataccuraterecords
featin the war and of the hopelessness were kept on desertersand that not
of thenumerousindividualbattles,very only would theirfamiliesand property
manyGerman soldierscontinuedto re- be made to sufferin the event of their
sistwithoutany seriousdeterioration in desertion,but that afterthe war, upon
the quality of their fightingskill. But their return to Germany, they, too,
where the most basic physiologicalde- would be veryseverelypunished.They
mands of the German soldier were were also told by theirofficers
thatGer-
threatened withcompletefrustration, the man agentswere operatingin American
bonds of group solidaritywere broken. and BritishP/W cages in order to re-
Concernabout food and about health port on violations of securityand on
alwaysreducesthe solidarityof a group. deserters.A Wehrmachtleafletto Ger-
Throughoutthe war, and until the pe- man soldiers mentionedthe names of
riod just beforethe end, German army two desertersof the 98oth Volksgrena-
medical serviceswere maintained at a dierewho were alleged to have divulged
high level of efficiency;the decline in informationand stated that not only
their efficiency coincides with the de- would theirfamiliesbe sent to prison
teriorationin the morale of the men. and sufferthe loss of theirpropertyand
Special care was also observed in the ration cards, but that the men them-
management of the food supply and selves would also be punished afterthe
accordinglyfew German soldiers felt war. In actuality,theywere oftenpun-
thatthe food supplieswere inadequate. ished in the P/W camps by the extreme

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 292 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

Nazis who exercised some control in lytheresultofruthless methods on both

certaincamps. sides.
For the same reason, as long as the The Nazis perceivedthefunction of
frontwas relativelystable, the Wehr- fear of personal destruction in the
machtofficers increasedthe naturalhaz- eventof captureas a factorin keeping
ards of war by orderingmine fieldsto a groupintactaftertheinternal bonds
be laid, barbed wire to be set up, and had beenloosened.Therewereaccord-
specialguards to be posted to limitthe inglysituationsin which SS detach-
freedomof movementof isolated and mentsdeliberately committed atrocities
psychologicallyunattached individuals on enemycivilians and soldiers in order
who, in situationswhich offeredthe to increasetheanxieties of Germansol-
chanceof safelywithdrawingfromthe diersas to whatwould befallthemin
war,would have moved overto theene- the eventof theirdefeatand capture.
my's lines. Although the number of This latterpolicywas particularly dras-
avowedlywould-be desertersremained ticallyappliedby the Waffen-SS in the
verysmalluntilnear theend of thewar, von Rundstedt counter-offensive. It ap-
even theywere frequentlyimmobilized pearsto havebeenan effort to convince
for fear of being killed by the devices Germansoldiersthat therewere no
set up to preventtheirseparationfrom alternatives but victory or resistance to
the group. The danger of destruction theveryend and thatsurrender or de-
by the Allies in event of desertionalso sertionwouldendwithslaughter ofthe
played a part in keeping men attached Germansoldiers, as it had in thecases
to theirmilitaryunits.As one P/W who of the Allied soldiers.This was not
had thoughtof desertionbut who never effective forthe mass of the German
took action said, "by day our own peo- soldiers,however, who werebecoming
ple shootat us, by nightyoursdo." convincedthatthe law-abiding British
Anotherphysicalnarcissisticelement andAmericans wouldnotin mostsitua-
which contributedsomewhat to resist- tionsharmthemuponcapture.
ance on the Westernfrontwas fear of The dreadof destruction of theself,
castrationin event of the loss of the
and the demand for physical survival,
whilebreaking up thespontaneous soli-
war. (This was effectiveonly among
darityof themilitary primary groupin
a minorityoftheGermansoldiers.)The
mostcases,thus servedundercertain
guilt feelingsof the Nazi soldierswho
conditionsto coercethe soldierinto
had slaughteredand marauded on the
adherenceto his groupand to the ex-
Easternfront,and elsewherein Europe, ecutionof the ordersof his superiors.
and theirprojectiononto the enemy of
theirown sadisticimpulses,heightened III. The Role of "SoldierlyHonor"
theirnarcissisticapprehensiveness about Americanand Britishsoldierstend
damage to theirvitalorgansand to their to considertheirwartimeserviceas a
physicalorganismas a whole. Rumors disagreeable necessity,as a taskwhich
of castrationat the hands of the Rus- had tobe performed becausetherewere
sians circulatedin the German Army no alternatives. For theGerman,being
throughoutthe last three years of the a soldierwas a morethan acceptable
war and it is likelythattheywere large- status.It was indeed honorable.The

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 293
King's Regulations whichgovernthe constituted an appeasement ofthesuper-
BritishArmy(1940) begin with the egowhichallowedthegroupmachinery
statement that the army consistsof to functionin an orderlymanner.
officers and men servingfor various The beliefin the efficacy and moral
lengths oftime.The Germanequivalent worthof discipline and in theinferior-
in the DefenseLaws of I935 opens ityofthespontaneous, primary reactions
witha declaration that"military serv- of thepersonality was expressed in the
iceis a serviceofhonorfortheGerman jettisoning oftheGermanArmyPsychi-
people,the Wehrmacht is the armed atricSelectionServicesin I942. When
barrierand the soldierly schoolof the the manpowershortagebecamestrin-
Germanpeople." gentandsuperfluities hadtobescrapped,
Emphasis on theelementofhonorin thepersonnel selection system basedon
themilitary profession has led in Ger- personality analyseswas one of those
manyto thepromulgation of elaborate activitieswhichwas thoughtto be dis-
rules of conductregulatingthe be- pensable.Apparently takingindividual
haviorof bothofficers and men in a personality differences intoaccountwas
greatvarietyof specificmilitaryand thought to be toomuchof a concession
extra-military situations.18The explicit to moralweaknesswhichcouldand in
and implicitcode of soldierlyhonor, any case shouldbe overcomeby hard,
regulating theresponsibilities of officerssoldierlydiscipline.
fortheirmen,determined behaviorin Strength as an element in honor.For
battleand established conditions under personswho havedeep-lying uncertain-
whichsurrender was honorable. It also ties over theirown weaknesses, who
provided a verycomprehensive bodyof fearsituations whichwill revealtheir
etiquette. Thiselaborate ritualization of weaknessin controlling themselves and
themilitary professionhad a significant-theirlack of manliness, membership in
lypositive influence on groupsolidarityan armywill tendto reduceanxieties.
and efficiency duringperiodsof stress. Subjugation todiscipline givessuchper-
"Honor"rootedin a rigidconscience sonssupport;it meansthattheydo not
(superego)servedin theGermanArmy have to depend on themselves, that
tokeepmenattheirtasksbetter thanin- someonestrongerthan themselves is
dividualreflection and evaluation could guidingand protecting them.Among
have done. When the individualwas youngmalesin middleand lateadoles-
leftto makedecisionsforhimself, the cence,thechallenges of love and voca-
wholehostofcontradictory impulsesto- tion aggravateanxietiesabout weak-
ward authority of officers and of the ness.At thisstagefearsaboutpotency
groupas an entitywas stimulated. are considerable.Whenmenwho have
Dominationbyhigherauthority was passedthrough thisstageare placedin
eagerlyacceptedby mostordinary sol- the entirely male societyof a military
diers,who fearedthatif theywereal- unit,freedfromthe controlof adult
lowedtoexercise theirinitiativetheirin- civiliansociety and missingitsgratifica-
nereSchweinhunde, i.e.,theirownnar- 18
Demeter,Karl, Das deutscheHeer und
cissisticand rebellious impulses,would seine Offiziere,Berlin, n.d., Ch. 3 and 5;
cometo the fore.On the otherhand, Broch,Hermann,The Sleepwalkers,London,
rigoroussuppression of theseimpulses n.d.

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294 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

tions,theytendto regressto theadoles- suspensionfromduty simplyon the

centcondition.The show of "tough- groundsof unehrliche Gesinnung(dis-
ness"and hardnesswhichis regarded honorableattitude)derogatory to the
as a virtueamongsoldiersis a response statusof t1he officerclass.Externaldis-
to thesereactivatedadolescentanxieties ciplinepenetrated thus into even the
aboutweakness. mostprivatesphereto give assurance
In theGermanArmy,all thesetend- thatsoldierly honorwouldbe operative
encieswereintensified by the military even in the recessesof the individual
code,and theyaccountedfor a con- mind.19The officers' courtof honor
siderableshareof thecohesionand re- not onlyservedas an "externalsuper-
sistanceup to theverylaststagesofthe ego,"butbyitscontinuous emphasis on
war.Amongthoseat the extremeend "honor"and "dishonor," it heightened
of thescale-the "hardcore"of Nazi thesensibilities of theofficers to thede-
last-ditch resisters-inwhom the pre- mandsof theirown superego.
occupation withstrength and weakness One of the mostelaboratedaspects
is tobe foundin mostpronounced form of soldierly honoras relatedto combat
-this attitudewas manifested in un- behaviordealtwiththe conditions un-
willingness ofsometo acknowledge de- der whichsurrender could be honor-
feateven aftercapture. ably performed. In this respect,great
The honorof theofficer. To control stresswas laidon theoathwhichbound
thebehaviorof officers and to protect soldiersnotto desertor surrender, and
soldierlyhonor,the Court of Honor muchcasuistical effort was expendedto
procedureof the ImperialArmywas make surrender compatiblewith sol-
reestablishedwhentheNazis cameinto dierlyhonor.In somecasessoldiersar-
power.Its functionwas to adjudicate rangedcircumstances in sucha way as
disagreements and quarrelsbetweenof- would appearto others,as well as to
ficersin an authoritative way, and it themselves, thattheyhad beencaptured
did succeedin minimizingdisagree- againsttheirwill. In othercases,sur-
mentsand unpleasanttensionsamong renderwas excusedas legitimateac-
officersin bothprofessionaland private cordingto acceptedmilitary standards.
affairs whichmightotherwise haveen- In a fewcases,fortification command-
dangeredsolidarityof the group by ers requiredthat a token round of
divisionamongthosein immediate au- phosphorous shellsbe firedagainsttheir
thority. The settlement,whichwas ar- positionin orderto satisfy therequire-
rivedat in secretbyofficersofthesame mentsof theirhonor.Desertersoften
rankas thoseinvolvedin the dispute, attempted to appease theirconscience
was almostalwaysacceptedwithouta by ingeniousarguments to the effect
murmurby bothparties.Its minutely thatthe oathswhichtheytook were
detailedprocedural andsubstantiverules signedwithpencil,or thatthesergeant
reducedto a minimumthe possibilitywho administered the oath turnedhis
thatan officer mightfeelthatthe col- back on them,or thattheyhad been
lectiveauthority whichruledoverhim 19 Indeed, a well known
was weak, negligible, German general
or impotentin during the periodof captivityfeltso strongly
any sphere.The code went so far as the pressureof soldierlyhonorthathe always
to empowerthe courtto recommend wentto sleep wearinghi- monocle.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 295
forcedintosigningtheoathwhichwas coursenotdueexclusively tomotivations
incompatible withthe"requirements of of conscience; it was buttressed by the
a freeconscience." efficient
functioning of thesecurity sys-
The stoutdefenseof the Channel tem.The failureof theJuly20 Putsch
ports,whichdeniedvital communica- resulted in thecarefully contrivedisola-
tioncenters to theAllies,was in large tionof seniorcommanding officersand
parttheresultof the determination of theirdomination byNazi secretpolice.
the commanding officerswhose sense The establishment of an independent
ofmilitary honorrequiredthemto car- chainofcommand forNationalSocialist
ryouttotheletterordersforresistance,Fiihrungs-offiziere (GuidanceOfficers)
regardlessof thecostin menor of the was an additionaltechniqueestablished
apparentstrategic oftheiropera- forspyingon generals.
futility Asidefromtheir
tion. moraleduties,whicharedescribed else-
Even afterthe extremereversesin where,thesefanaticalNazi Guidance
February and Marchof I945, German Officers at higherheadquarters busied
colonelsand generalssoughtto have themselves in reporting on Germangen-
theirunitscapturedand overrunin an eralswhoappearedtobe unlikely to car-
approvedmanner.CapturedGerman ryout ordersforfinalresistance.
seniorofficers oftendeclaredthatthey Companygradeand battalion officers
had been aware of certaindefeatin on thewholebehavedsimilarly to their
theirsectorbut,despitethis,theytook superiors.The deterioration of their
littleor no actionto terminate hostili- effectivenesswhichoccurred was due in
ties.The mostpositiveactionsomeof greatermeasureto thegreatreduction
themwereable to take was to follow in theirnumbers ratherthanto anyloss
theirinstructions to hold fastin such of skillor determination. At the end,
a manneras to facilitate thecaptureof the German Army sufferedseverely
theirown commandpostswhen they frombeingunderofficered, ratherthan
werenotableto retreat. Butthevarious poorlyofficered. As early as January
subterfuges to maketheirsurrender or 1945, theratioofofficers toenlistedmen
captureacceptable to their superego fellto about50 percentofwhatit had
were apparently and after been undernormalconditions.
insufficient,
capturetheirsenseof guiltforhaving Tensionbetweenofficer's honorand
infringed on themoralrequirements of solicitudeof men. There was, how-
officershipusuallyproducedregressiveever,a difference betweenthebehavior
manifestations in theformof elaborate ofjuniorand seniorofficers, whichcan
for theirinadequacy. in part be explainedby the latter's
self-justifications
In somecases it wentto the extreme closerphysicalproximity and moreex-
formofimagining howtheywouldjus- tensivecontactwith theirmen. The
tifythemselves in theeventthatHitler sense of obligationwhich the junior
wereto confront themat theverymo- officer feltforthe welfareof his men
mentand wereto ask themwhythey oftentemperedhis conceptionof the
had allowedthemselves to be captured. properrelations between honor
soldierly
The reluctance of seniorand general and surrender, especiallywhenhe was
officers
to enterintonegotiations to sur- in a position torecognize thattherewas
renderon theirown initiative was of no military valuein further resistance.

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296 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

Nonetheless,desertionby German of- theirconsciences by declaringthatfur-

ficerswas extremelyrare, and only oc- therbloodshedwould have servedno
casionally did they bring about the further military purpose.
group surrenderof their men; more The infantry soldier's
honor.The code
typicallythey protectedtheir soldierly of soldierlyhonorand its ramifications
honor by allowing themselves to be took a deep rootin the personality of
overrun. the Germansoldiersof the line-even
Senior non-commissioned dis-
officers those who were totally apolitical.
played a sense of militaryhonor very Identification withthe sternauthority
similar to that of junior officers,but associatedwith the symbolsof State
even closer identificationwith their power gave the ordinaryGerman
comradesprecipitateda crisis in loyal- soldiera feelingthathe becamestrong
tieswhichweighedstillmoreheavilyon and morallyelevatedby submitting to
their consciences.Ordinarily,soldierly discipline.For thesepeoplea military
honorand primarygroup solidarityare careerwas a good and nobleone, en-
not only congruous with one another joyinghighintrinsic ethicalvalue.Even
but actually mutually supporting. In apathetic and inarticulatesoldierssome-
crisis situations,however, the diver- timesgreweloquenton the valuesof
gence between them begins to appear themilitary life.
and loyaltyto the larger army group The mostdefeatist soldier,who in-
relevantunit), which
(the strategically sistedthathe longedto be captured and
is an essential componentof soldierly thathe offered littleor no resistance,
honor, enters into contradiction to was careful to pointoutthathe was not
loyaltyto the primarygroup. a deserter,and showedanxietylestthe
Until the failureof von Rundstedt's conditions underwhichhe wascaptured
counter-offensive, soldierly honor on mightbe interpreted as desertion.This
the partof seniorNCO's tended to out- was of courseto someextenttheresult
weigh primarygroup solidaritywhere- of the fearthatGermanpolicewould
ever theycame into conflictwith each retaliateagainsthis familyif his com-
other.As the final Allied drive against panycommander reportedthathe had
the homeland developed, they became deserted and thattheNazis wouldseek
less disposed to carry out "last-ditch" revenge againsthim,eitherin theP/W
resistance, but when captured they camp,or afterthe war in Germany.
showed signs of having experienced Butatleastofequal significance washis
guilt feelingsfor not having done so. desireto maintainhis pridein having
The recognitionof the overwhelming beena good soldierwho had donehis
Allied strength in their particular duty.20Anti-Nazi German soldierswho
20 FrequentlyGerman soldiers who were
sectors,togetherwith physical absence
reluctantto desertseparated,themselvesfrom
from the immediate environmentof
battleby hidingin cellarsor dugouts,waiting
their superior officers(which was a to be overrun.Such soldiersoftenthoughtit
functionof the decreasingratio of of- morallynecessaryto volunteerthe explanation
ficersto men) made it possibleforthem for their capturethat they had been found
by the enemybecause theyhad fallen asleep
to offeronlytokenresistanceor to allow fromexhaustionand had been taken against
themselvesto be overrun.They relieved theirwill.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 297
wentto somelengthto informthein- them.He mustbe a modelto his men;
terrogators
of theiranti-Nazipolitical he mustbe an all-powerful, and still
attitudes
feltno inconsistency in in- benevolent,authority.
sistingthat despite everything they He mustlook afterhis men'sneeds,
were"ioo per cent soldiers."Only a and be able to do all themen'sduties
verysmallminorityadmittedfreelythat betterthantheythemselves in training
theydeserted. and undercombatconditions. The men
mustalso be sure thattheirofficer is
IV. RelationswithAuthority: duly considerateof theirlives: they
Officer-Man Relations
mustknowthathe does not squander
The basisof theofficers' status.The his humanresources, thatthelossesof
primarygroup relationsin modern life whichoccurunderhis command
armies,especiallyin theGermanArmy, will be minimaland justified. In the
dependas muchon the acceptanceof trainingof NCO's for officers, the
the variousauthorities to which the GermanArmyacted on the basis of
soldier
is subjected as on mutualrespect suchmaxims,despitetheNazi Party's
and lovebetweenindividuals of equal propagandisticpreoccupation withsuch
rank.The non-commissioned and the secondaryaspectsof moraleas political
juniorofficers
are theagentson whom ideology.
the individualsoldierdependsin his The positionsoftheofficer and ofthe
withtherestof thearmy
relationships NCO weredependent on disciplineand
outsidehisimmediate group,and in his on thesanctions bywhichdiscipline is
relationswith the outer world (the maintainedand enforced. Duringtrain-
homefront andtheenemy).Theyhave ingtheWehrmacht laid downthemost
chargeof his safety, and theyare the severedisciplinary rules. In combat,
channelsthroughwhich flow food, even beforeGermany'smilitaryfortunes
equipment, and othertypesof supplies began to contract,lifeand death powers
as well as chance symbolicgratifica-over the troops were vested in lower
tionssuch as decorations, promotions,commanders.At the same time elab-
leave,etc.For theGermansoldier, with orate precautionswere taken to control
his authoritarian background, the of- and even to counteracttheirseverityin
ficer-man relationis one of submission certain spheres of behavior. Officers
to an overriding authority. were warned against senselessand un-
An exceptionally talentedregular necessaryinsults directedagainst their
German Army officer, bred in the men. Special orders were issued and
Germanmilitarytradition, once tried particular attentionwas paid in the
to summarize to his interrogator what trainingof officers
to fatherlyand con-
madetheGermanArmy"work":polit- sideratebehaviorin relationswith their
icalindoctrinationand "peptalks"were men; the combinationof sternnessand
"all rot";whetherthemen would fol- benevolence was strongly counseled.
low him dependedupon the person- Numerous small indicationsof affection
alityof theofficer.The leadermustbe such as congratulationson birthdays
a manwhopossesses militaryskill:then and on anniversaries, and fatherly
hismenwillknowthathe is protectingmodes of address,e.g., "Kinder" (chil-

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298 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

dren),wererecommended as helpingto all typesof aggressivesocialbehavior

buildthe properrelationsbetweenof- outsidethe armygroup.Privateper-
ficersand men. sonal transgressions of "civil" ethics
The results of thisapproachto status wereregardedas of slightimportance,
relationshipsappearto havebeengood. since theywere outsidethe limitsof
Differences in privilegesbetweenof- the"manlycomradeship" ofthemilitary
ficers
and enlisted menin combatunits primary group.Drunkenness and hav-
almostneveremergedas an objectof ingwomenin thebarracks werecrimes
complaint on thepartofenlisted Ps/W. which the officers overlooked;in oc-
On the contrary, complaints of "soft- cupiedandenemycountries thelatitude
ness" were more frequentlydirected in personaland privatetransgressions
againstofficersand enlistedmenin the was evengreater.Provisionwas made
rear.The infantry soldierseldomat- for officialhouses of prostitution in
temptedto attributedeficienciesin which soldierscould reassurethem-
militaryoperationsto his immediate selves about theirmanlinesswithout
superiors.Spontaneouspraise,in fact, disrupting thedisciplinary structureof
was frequent. the Wehrmacht. This combination of
Germansoldiers-bothofficers and practiceslowered the probabilityof
men-greatlyappreciatedthe ceremo- tensions in officer-manrelationships.
nial acknowledgment of hierarchical NCO's and juniorofficers. In battle,
differencesas expressed, forexample,in leadershipresponsibility devolved in
themilitary salute.CapturedGermans actuality on theseniorNCO's (the op-
whosaw theAmericanArmyin Great positenumbersof Americanplatoon
BritainbeforeD-Day were oftencon- sergeants)and on the companygrade
temptuous of an enemywho was ob- officers. Onlyseldomdid a line soldier
viouslyso lax in dressand salute.Many see his battalioncommander and even
of themsaid thatthe AmericanArmy less frequently was he spokento by
could not be expectedto fightwell him. Thus battalioncommanders and
sincetherelations betweenofficers and other higher officersplayed a less
enlistedmenwereso informal. "This is centralrole in the personality system
no army." Such views of the value of of the German soldier.They were
the ceremonialaspectsof disciplineper- therefore less directlyrelatedto the
sistedin defeat.Ps/W taken late in the solidarity ofthemilitary primary group.
war, when theycommentedon Ameri- Nearly all non-commissioned and
can officer-manrelations,oftenremarked commissioned officersof the company
with incredulouswonderment:"I don't gradelevelwereregardedby the Ger-
see how it works!" man soldierthroughout the Western
Not onlywas the positionof German campaignas brave,efficient, and con-
officersstrengthenedby their mixture siderate.It was onlyin the veryfinal
of severe dominion and benevolence, phases of the war that Ps/W occa-
but additionalsupportfortheirauthor- sionallycomplained thattheyhad been
ity came from the provision for the abandonedby theirofficers, and there
blameless gratification of primitive was reasonto believethat such com-
impulses and from the sanctioningof plaintswerejustified not by factsbut

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 299

by the resurgenceof uninhibitedhos- officer candidate's chancesforselection,

who, having been if he lackedthenecessary
tilityagainstofficers qualifications
defeated,could now be looked upon formakinga good officer.
as havingshown weakness. Equallyimportant in theprovision of
In addition, the slight increase in firm, "hard,"and protective leadership,
sentimentwhich occurred were the seniornon-commissioned
anti-officer or-
duringthelast two monthsof the war, ficers, whowereeverywhere appreciated
may be related not to the decline in as the mostsolid assetof the Wehr-
competence,courage, or devotion on macht. Until1943, morethanhalfof
thepartof the officers,but ratherto the the NCO's who became Ps/W had
factthatthe heavy losses of the Wehr- belonged to the pre-Ig35 German
macht'strainedjunior officershad led Army.These men were neithervery
to a large reductionin the ratio of the interested in politicsnorveryaggressive,
junior officersto men. In consequence, butwerethoroughly trained, solidmen
in order to use the available officers who were doing theirjob out of a
most economically,it was necessaryto deeply-rooted sense of duty to the
"thin" them out.21 This resultedin a soldierly profession.
reductionin the amount of face-to-face As thewarprogressed, theirnumbers
contactbetween officersand men and declinedand lesswell-trained mentook
in reducedfeelingof the officers'pro- theirplace. In the last stagesof the
tective function. And this, in turn, war,whenthespeedin reforming units
sometimestipped the balance of the was increased,the top non-commis-
submissiveness-rebelliousness scale, in sionedofficers oftendid not have suf-
the successfulmanipulation of which ficient timeto promotethe growthof
lay the secretof the effectivecontrolof strongidentifications betweenthem-
the GermanArmy. selvesand theirmen.In February1945,
The juniorofficersof the Wehrmacht forthefirst time,Ps/W beganto com-
were, in general, very well selected. plainthat"theydidn'tevenhave time
They were better educated than the to learnournames."The disintegration
average German, and had receivedex- whichsetin in theWehrmacht at this
tensivepreliminarytraining.Although
timewas in partdue to the declining
Nazi Partypoliticsplayed a role in the
valueof theNCO as a cohesivefactor
generalselectionof officers (despite the
in themilitary primary group.
faSade of a non-politicalWehrmacht)
Senior officers. The High Command
the junior officerranks neverbecame a
and the seniorofficers, althoughgen-
field of patronage.High technicaland
personalityrequirementswere made of 21 relaxeddisciplinary
The absenceof officers
all candidatesfor officership,Nazi and controls.Thus soldierswho lay in bunkersand
who "didn't see any officersfor weeks" were
non-Nazi. more likelyto desertor to allow themselves
These facts were appreciated by to be captured.The presenceof the officerhad
many of the more intelligentenlisted the same functionas other primarygroup,
Ps/W who testifiedthat the influence members-he strengthened the superego by
grantingaffectionfordutiesperformed and by
of highlyplaced friendsor of Partycon- threateningto withdrawit for duties disre-
nectionshad practicallyno effecton an garded.

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300 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

erallyesteemed, were not directly rel- agentsand symbols ofpolitical authority

evantin the psychological structure of -junior officers, NCO's, and concep-
themilitary primary group.Theywere tionsof soldierly honor-wereeffective
in the main less admiredthan the becauseof theirconsistency with the
junior officersbecause their physical personality systemof the individual
remoteness made it easier to express soldier.In this section,we shall ex-
hostilesentiments againstthem;they aminethe effectiveness of the remoter
stood betweenthe Fiihrer and the -or secondary-agents and symbols of
juniorofficersand NCO's. And while stateauthority.
thelatterthreeobtaineda positive affect Strategic aspectsof thewar.For the
fromthe ambivalentattitudetoward massoftheGermanArmy,thestrategic
authority of so manyof the soldiers, phasesofthewarwereviewedapatheti-
the generalofficers themselveswere cally. The ignoranceof the German
madeto someextentintotherecipients troopsaboutimportant military events,
ofthehostilecomponent ofthesoldier's evenon theirown front, was partlya
authority-attitude.The failureof the resultof the povertyof information
Putsch of July20 served to lower the abouttheactualcourseof thewar-it-
esteemin whichthe High Command selfa part of Nazi policy.22But the de-
washeld,although in generaltherewas liberatemanagement ofignorance need
not a verylivelyreactionto thatin- not alwaysresultin such far-reaching
cident.StalwartNazis viewedit as a indifference as the German soldiers
caseof treason,and forthetimebeing showed.Deliberately maintained igno-
theconcentration of theirhostilityon rancewould have resultedin a flood
generalswhosenameswereannounced of rumors,had the Germansoldiers
in publicincreasedtheirconfidence in been more eager to know about the
thosegeneralswhom the Fiihrerleft strategic phasesof thewar. As it was,
in charge.Othersoldiers,less passion- therewere veryfew rumorson the
atelypolitical,were inclinedto turn subject-merelyapathy.Three weeks
theirbackson theunsuccessful plotters afterthefallofthecityofAachen,there
becauseof theweaknessmanifested in were stillmanyprisoners beingtaken
theirfailures.
Butthesituation was only in theadjoiningareawhodid notknow
temporary, and in anycase theofficersthatthe cityhad fallen.For at leasta
on whomthemenin thefieldfeltthey weekafterthebeginning of vonRund-
dependedwerebut littleaffected. The stedt'scounter-offensive, most of the
loss of prestigeof the immediateof- troopson the northern hinge of the
ficerswas toosmallto makeanydiffer- bulgedid not knowthatthe offensive
ence in battlebehavior,while senior was takingplace and were not much
officersin whom confidence had de- interested when theywere told after
clinedto a greaterextentweretoo re- capture.Of I40 Ps/W takenbetween
mnoteinthesoldier'smindtomakemuch
December23-24, I944, only35 percent
differencein his combatefficiency.
had heardof thecounter-offensive and
V. SecondarySymbols 22 Nazi propagandists,
with their hyper-
Fromtheprecedingsectionit is ap- politicalorientation,tendedto overestimate the
parentthat the immediately present Germansoldier'sresponsiveness
to politics.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 30I

only7 percentsaid thattheythought consequencesof an Anglo-Americanoc-

it significant.23 cupation.The continuingmonthlyopin-
Some exceptionto thisextensivestra- ion poll conductedby the Psychological
tegicindifference existedwithrespectto Warfare Branch,mentionedelsewhere,
the Eastern front.Although the Ger- nevershowed more than 20 per cent of
man soldierswere extremelyignorant the prisonersanswering "yes" to the
of the stateof affairson thatfrontand question,"Do you believe that revenge
made littleattemptto reduce their ig- will be taken against the population
norance,still the question of Russians afterthe war?" Those who fearedretri-
was so emotionally charged,so much the bution were confirmedNazis. Yet the
sourceof anxiety,that it is quite likely general absence of fear of revengedid
thatfearof the Russians did play a role not cause a diminutionof German re-
in strengthening resistance.National So- sistance.
cialistpropagandahad long worked on Neither did expectationsabout the
the traditionalrepugnanceand fear of outcome of the war play a great role
the German towardsthe Russian. The in the integrationor disintegrationof
experienceof the German soldiers in the German Army. The statisticsre-
Russia in 194I and 1942 increasedthis garding German soldier opinion cited
repugnanceby directperceptionof the below show that pessimismas to final
primitivelife of the Russian villager. triumphwas quite compatiblewith ex-
But probablymore importantwas the cellence in fightingbehavior. The far
projection onto the Russians of the greater effectivenessof considerations
guilt feelingsgeneratedby the ruthless and theirvast pre-
of self-preservation,
brutality of the Germansin Russia dur- ponderanceoverinterestin the outcome
ing the occupationperiod.The shudder of the war and the strategicsituation,is
ofhorrorwhichfrequently accompanied shownby Germanprisonerrecallof the
a German soldier'sremarksabout Rus- contentsof Allied propaganda leaflets
sia was a resultof all of these factors.
(see Table i). In the last two months
These attitudesinfluencedGerman re-
of 1944 and the firsttwo monthsof
sistancein the West throughthe shift
I945, not less than 59 per cent of the
of soldiersfromEast to West and the
sample of prisonerstaken each month
consequentdiffusionof their attitudes
recalled referencesto the preservation
among theircomrades.They also took
of the individual,and the figurerose to
effectby making soldiersworryabout
of I945. On the
76 percentin February
what would happen to theirfamiliesif
the Russians entered Germany. Of otherhand, the proportionof prisoners
to the totalstrategic
recallingreferences
course,it should also be mentionedthat
thisfearof the Russiansalso made some situationof the war and the prospect
Germansoldierswelcomea speediercol- of the outcome of the war seldom
lapse on the Westernfrontin the hope 23 The factthatthe High Commandmade

that a larger part of Germany would no attemptto explainaway the defeatof the
fall under Anglo-Americancontrol. counter-offensivemay have been due, among
otherthings,to itsconvictionof theirrelevance
Before the actual occupation,only a of strategic
considerationin the moraleof the
small minorityexpressed fear of the ordinarysoldier.

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302 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948
TABLE i
TABULATION OF ALLIED LEAFLET PROPAGANDA THEMES
REMEMBERED BY GERMAN PS/W

Dec. 15-31 Jan. I-15 Jan. 15-31 Feb. I-I5

'944 '945 '945 '945

Number of Ps/W 6o 83 99 I35

Themesand appeals remembered:
a. Promise of good treatmentas
Ps/W and self-preservation
through surrender 63% 65% 59% 76%
b. Militarynews I5 17 I9 30
c. Strategicalhopelessnessof Ger-
many's position I3 I2 25 26
d. Hopelessness of a local tactical
situation 3 I 7 7
e. Political attackson German lead-
ers 7 5 4 8
f. Bombing of German cities 2 8 6
g. Allied MilitaryGovernment 7 3
h. Appeals to civilians 5 4 2
(The percentages
add up to morethan ioo% sincesomePs/W remembered morethanone topic.
Only Ps/W remembering at least one themewere includedin this tabulation.)

amountedto morethan 20 per cent, said thatGermanyhad been morally

while references to politicalsubjects wrongtoattackPoland,orRussia.Most
seldomamountedto morethanI0 per of themthoughtthatif anything had
cent.The generaltendency was notto beenwrongaboutthewar,itwaslargely
thinkabout the outcomeof the war in therealmoftechnical decisions.The
unlessforcedto do so by directinter- decisionto extirpatetheJewshad been
rogation.
Even pessimism was counter- too drasticnotbecauseof its immoral-
balancedby the reassurances provided ity but because it unitedthe world
by identification
witha strongand be- againstGermany.The declarationof
nevolentFiihrer,by identification
with waragainsttheSovietUnionwaswrong
and by the psychologicalonlybecauseit createda two-front
good officers, war.
supportof a closelyintegratedprimary But thesewere all argumentswhich
group. had to be forcedfromthePs/W. Left
The ethicsof war and patriotism.to themselves, theyseldommentioned
Quiteconsistently,
ethicalaspectsofthe them.
wardid nottroubletheGermansoldier The assumption underlying thesear-
much.When pressedby Allied inter- gumentswas thatthe strongnational
rogators,
Ps/W saidthatGermany had stateis a goodin itself.But it was not,
beenforcedto fightforits life.There in fact,thehighest goodforanybutthe
were veryfew Germansoldierswho "hard core." In September1944, for

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 303

example,only5 per cent of a sample of Germany encircled bythedark,threat-

634 Ps/W said that theywere worried eningcloud of Bolsheviks, Jews,Ne-
about anythingother than personal or groes,etc.,and perpetually in danger
familial problems,while in the very frominnerenemiesas well. But for
same survey,more than half of the mostof theGermansoldiers, thepoliti-
Ps/W said theybelievedthat Germany cal system ofNationalSocialismwas of
was losingthe war or thattheywere at littleinterest.
bestuncertainof the war's outcome.In The system was indeedofveryslight
brief,fearforGermany'sfutureas a na- concernto Germanciviliansalso,even
tion does not seem to have been very thoughdissatisfaction increasedto a
importantin the ordinarysoldier'sout- highpitchtowardstheend of thewar.
look and in motivatinghis combat be- Soldierson the whole were out of
havior.As a matterof fact,as the war touchwiththe operation of the Party
becamemoreand morepatentlya threat on thehomefront. Hence thepolitical
to the persistenceof the German na- systemimpingedlittleon theircon-
tional state,the narcissismof the Ger- sciousness.Thus, for example,of 53
man soldierincreasedcorrespondingly, potentialand actual deserters in the
so thatthe idea of nationalsurvivaldid Mediterranean theater,onlyone alleged
notbecomean objectof widespreadpre- politicalgroundsfor his action.The
occupation even when it might have irrelevance of partypoliticsto effec-
been expectedto become so.24 tivesoldiering has alreadybeentreated
Ethical-religious scruplesseemto have above: here we need only repeatthe
played an equally small role. Although statement ofa Germansoldier, "Nazism
therewerea fewinteresting cases of Ro- beginstenmilesbehindthefront line."
man Catholic deserters,Roman Cath- Nor did the soldiersreact in any
olics (except Austrians, Czechs and noticeable way to the variousattempts
Polish nationals) do not seem to have to Nazifythe army.When the Nazi
deserted disproportionately.Prisoners Partysalutewas introduced in 1944, it
seldom expressed remorse for Nazi was acceptedas just one more army
atrocities,and practicallyno case was order,about equal in significance to
noted of a desertionbecause of moral an orderrequiring thecarrying of gas
repugnanceagainst Nazi atrocities. masks.The introduction oftheNational
Political ideals. The significanceof Socialistische Fiihrungsoffiziere (Guid-
political ideals, of symbolsof political ance,or Indoctrination Officer), usually
systems,was ratherpronouncedin the knownas theNSFO, was regarded apa-
case of the "hard core" minorityof 24 The proposition
oftenassertedduringthe
ferventNazis in the German Army. war that the Allies' refusal to promise a
Their desire for discipline under a "softpeace" to the Germanswas prolonging
strong leader made them enthusiasts the war, i.e., thatGermanmilitaryresistance
was motivated,by fear of what the Allies
for the totalitarian political system. would do to Germanyin eventof its defeat,
Their passionateaggressiveness also pro- scarcelyfindssupportin the fact thatin Oc-
moted projectivetendencieswhich fa- toberI944, whentheGerman frontwas stiff-
ening,74 per cent of a sampleof 345 Ps/W
cilitatedtheir acceptance of the Nazi said theydid not expectrevengeto be taken
picture of an innocent and harmless againstthe Germanpopulationafterthe war.

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 304 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

or as a joke.The contempt
thetically for deep, communications-cutting penetra-
theNSFO was derivednot fromhis tions,did confidence in Hitlerfall to
Nazi connection butfromhis statusas the unprecedentedly low level of 30
an "outsider"who was not a real sol- per cent. Even when defeatism was ris-
dier.The especiallyNazifiedWaffen ing to the point at whichonly one-
SS divisionswere neverthe objectof tenthoftheprisoners takenas ofMarch
on thepartoftheordinary
hostility sol- 1945 believedthattheGermans had any
dier,even when the responsibility for chanceof success,stilla thirdretained
was attributed
atrocities tothem.On the confidencein Hitler.26
contrary,theWaffenSS was highlyes- Beliefin the good intentions of the
teemed,not as a Nazi formation, but Fiihrer, in his eminentmoralqualities,
foritsexcellentfighting capacity.Wehr- in his devotionand contributions to
machtsoldiersalwaysfeltsaferwhen the well-being of the Germanpeople,
therewas a WaffenSS unit on their continued on an evenhigherlevel.This
flank. strongattachment grew in large part
Devotionto Hitler.In contrast to the fromthefeelingofstrength and protec-
utterlyapoliticalattitudeof the Ger- tionwhichtheGermansoldiergotfrom
man infantry soldiertowardsalmost hisconception oftheFiihrerpersonality.
all secondary symbols, an intenseand For older men, who had lived
personaldevotionto Adolph Hitler through theunemployment of theclos-
was maintained in the GermanArmy ing yearsof theWeimarRepublicand
throughout the war. There could be who experienced thejoy of beingrein-
littledoubtthata highdegreeof iden- statedin gainfulemployment by Nazi
tificationwiththe Fiihrerwas an im- full-employment policies,Hitler was
portantfactorin prolongingGerman above all the man who had provided
resistance.Despite fluctuations in ex- economic security.This attitude extend-
pectationsas to theoutcomeof thewar ed even to leftwing soldiersof this
thetrustin Hitlerremainedat a very generation, who denouncedthe Na-
highlevelevenafterthebeginningof tional Socialistpoliticalsystem,but
theseriousreverses in Franceand Ger- foundoccasionto saya good wordfor
many.In monthly opinionpollsof Ger- Hitleras a manwhohad restored order
man Ps/W opinionfromD-Day until and workin Germany. For menof the
January1945, in all but two samples generation between 22-35, whohadfirst
over6o percentexpressed confidence in experiencedHitler's charismain the
Hitler,25and confidence in January was strugglesto establishtheirmanliness
nearlyas highas it was in thepreced- duringlateadolescence, Hitlerwas the
ingJune.Duringthissameperiodcon- prototype of strength and masculinity.
siderablymorethanhalfoftheGerman 25
See Gurfein,M. I., and Janowitz,Mor-
soldiersin sevenout of eightpollssaid ris, "Trends in WehrmachtMorale," The
theybelievedthatit was impossible for Public Opinion Quarterly,Vol. IO, No. i
theGermanArmyto defeattheAllies (I946), p. 78.
in France.OnlywhentheGermanAr- 26 Much of the reduction of trustin Hitler
whichoccurredin thisfinalperiodwas simply
my began to break up in the face of a diminutionin esteemfor Hitler'stechnical
overwhelming Allied firepower and skill as a strategistand as a diplomat.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 305
For the youngerNazi fanatics,he was theresponsibility fordetermining their
a fathersubstitute,providingthe vigi- fate.American and Britishsoldiers often
lant discipline and the repressionof complained thatthe complexity of the
dangerousimpulses both in the indi- armyorganization and strategy was so
vidual and in the social environment; greatand theirownparticular partwas
for them he had the additional merit so smallthattheycouldnotseetherole
of legitimatingrevoltagainstthe family oftheirpersonal missions.Theirfailure
and traditionalrestraints. to seetheconnection madethemmiser-
Prisonersspoke of Hitler with enthu- able becauseit reducedtheirsenseof
siasm,and even thosewho expressedre- personalautonomy. In theGermanAr-
gretoverthe difficulties which his poli- my,on the otherhand,therewas no
cieshad broughton Germanyby engen- difficulty for soldierswho were used
deringa two-front war and by allowing throughout theirlivesto havingother
the Jewsto be persecutedso fiercelyas personsdetermine theirobjectivesfor
to arouseworldhatred-even thesemen them.
retainedtheirwarm esteemforhis good It is also possiblethattheveryhigh
intentions.They found it necessaryto devotionto Hitlerunderconditions of
exculpatehim in some way by attribut- greatstresswas in parta reactionfor-
ing his errorsto dishonestadvisorswho mationgrowing froma hostilityagainst
kept the truthfromhim, or to certain lesserauthorities, whichemergedas the
technicaldifficultiesin his strategicdoc- weaknessof these authorities became
trineswhich did not in any way reflect moremanifest. In the last yearof the
on his fundamentalmoral greatnessor war,hostility and contempt on thepart
nobility. of the GermansoldierstowardNazi
It was difficultfor German soldiers, Partyfunctionaries and towardNazi
as long as theyhad thisattitudetoward PartyleadersbelowHitler(particularly
Hitler, to rebel mentally against the Goebbelsand Goering)was increasing.
war. Time after time, prisonerswho AfterthePutschofJuly20, hostility to-
were asked why Hitler continued the wardseniorWehrmacht officersalso in-
war when theythemselvesadmittedit creasedsomewhat,althoughit never
was so obviouslylost, said he wouldn't reachedthelevelsof hostility displayed
continuethe war and waste lives if he by civiliansagainstlocal civilianParty
did not have a good, even though un- officials and leaders.It is possible, there-
disclosed,strategicreason for doing so, fore, that guilt created in ambivalent
or if he didn't have the resourcesto personalities bygivingexpression, even
realize his ends. Nazis as well as non- though verbally,to hostilityagainst
Nazis answered in this way. Or else subordinate agentsof authority, had to
theywould say, "the Fiihrer has never be alleviated byreaffirmed beliefin the
deceivedus," or, "he must have a good centraland highestauthority.
reason for doing what he does." Weakening of theHitlersymbol.As
There was obviouslya fearof render- the integralpatternof defensewas
ing an independentjudgmentof events brokendown,however, and as danger
among the German soldiers and a de- to physical survival increased,devotion
sire for some strongleader to assume to Hitlerdeteriorated. The tendency to

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306 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

attributevirtueto the strongand im- derstandthe curve of Hitler'sfame

morality to theweaktookholdincreas- amongtheGermanpeople.Hitler,the
ingly,and whileit did not lead to a fathersymbol, was lovedforhis power
complete of Hitler,it reached and his great accomplishments
rejection and
a higherpointthanat anyotherstage hatedforhisoppressiveness, butthelat-
in the historyof NationalSocialism. tersentiment was repressed. While he
The announcement of Hitler'sdeath remainedstrongit was psychologically
metan incapacity to respondon the expedient-aswellas politically expedi-
partofmanysoldiers. Thereseemedto ent-to identify withHitlerand to dis-
be no willingness to questionthetruth place hostility on to weakerminority
of thereport, butthegreatupsurgeof groupsandforeigners. ButonceHitler's
preoccupation withphysicalsurvivalas authority had been undermined, the
a resultofdisintegration ofthemilitary Germansoldiersrejectedit and tended
primary group,thelossof contactwith to expresstheirhostility by projecting
juniorofficersandthegreatly intensifiedtheirown weaknesson to him.
threatof destruction, causeda deaden- Thus the onlyimportant secondary
ing of the powerto respondto this symbolin motivating the behaviorof
event.For thevasthordeofdishevelled, the Germansoldiersduringtherecent
dirty,bewilderedprisoners, who were war also lostits efficacy whenthepri-
beingtakenin thelastweeksofthewar, marygrouprelations of comradeliness,
Hitlerwas of slightimportance along- solidarity and subordination to junior
sidetheproblemof theirown biologi- officers brokedown, and with it the
cal survivaland the welfareof their superegoof the individual,on which
families.For the smallminority who theeffective functioning oftheprimary
still had sufficient energyto occupy group depends.27
themselves with"largerproblems," the VI. Nazi Machineryfor Maintaining
newsofHitler'sdeathreleaseda sortof ArmySolidarityand Fighting
amorphous resentment againstthefallen Effectiveness
leaderwhoseweaknessand immorality Administrative machinery and per-
had beenprovenby the failureof his sonnel.Evenbeforetheoutbreak ofthe
strategy.But evenhere,theresentmentwar, the Nazi Partytook an active
was notexpressed in explicitdenuncia- handin theinternal highpolicyof the
tionsof Hitler'scharacter or personal- Wehrmacht and in theselection of the
ity.The emphasiswas all on technical 27
The mixtureof apathyand resentment
deficienciesand weaknesses. againstHitlerpersistedthroughthe firstpart
The explanation of thedeteriorationof thedemobilization periodfollowingtheend
and final-thoughprobablyonlytem- of the war, but as life began to reorganize
porary-hostility towardHitlermayin and to takeon new meaningand theattitudes
towardauthority, which sustainand are sus-
partbe soughtin theaverageGerman tained by the routinesof daily life, revived,
soldier'sambivalence towardthe sym- esteemfor Hitler also began to revive.It is
bols of authority. This psychologicallikelyto revivestillfurtherand to assumea
mechanism, whichalsohelpsto explain prominentplace in German life once more,
if the new elitewhichis being createdunder
thelackofa significant resistance
move- the Allied occupation shows weakness and
mentinsideGermany, enablesus to un- lack of decisivenessand self-confidence.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 307
Chiefof Staffand his entourage.From mandswheretheycouldbe closelysu-
September 1939 to the signingof the pervised.
capitulation in May 1945 thisprocessof As theGermantroopsretreated into
Nazificationcontinuedsteadilyuntilthe Germany, SS and statepoliceunits,in-
Wehrmachtwas finallyrenderedpow- steadoftheWehrmacht militarypolice,
erlessto make its own decisions.Nazi weregiventhenormalmilitary function
Partycontrolover the Wehrmachtwas of maintaining thelineof demarcation
designedto insure (i) that Nazi stra- betweenthe frontlines and the rear
tegic intentionswould be carried out areas.A capturedorder,issuedby the
(2) that capitulationwould be made CO of the SS forcesin the West on
impossibleand (3) thatinternalsolidar- September 2I, I944, indicated thatthese
ity down to the lowest private would unitswouldhavethetaskofpreventing
be maintained. contactbetweenthecivilianpopulation
Most ambitiousand successfulof the and thetroops, as wellas thearrestand
early effortsat Nazification were the execution of deserters fromthearmy.28
recruitment and trainingof the special In addition to these securityprocedures,
Waffen SS (Elite) Divisions. These the Nazis made effectiveuse of ex-
unitsinitiallycontainedonly fanatically ploiting theindividual Germansoldier's
devotedNazi volunteersand had officer fearof physicaldestruction as was de-
staffs whichwere thoroughlypermeated scribed above in the section,Demand
with Nazi stalwarts.They became the for physical survival.
Nazi Party army within the Wehr- But thesemeasureswereof a nega-
macht,and theirmilitaryprowessgreat- tivenature.In orderto strengthen the
ly enhanced the prestigeof the Nazi traditionalWehrmachtindoctrination
Partyand weakened the positionof the efforts, theNazi Partyappointed in the
GeneralStaff. winter of I943 politicalindoctrination
At the outbreakof the war, the do- officers, called National Socialistische
mestic securityand police servicesin- Fiihrungsoffiziere (NSFO), to all mili-
side the Reich were completelyunified tary formations. Later in September
I944, whentheNazis felttheneedfor
under the command of Himmler. Al-
though the Wehrmacht had its own intensifying theirindoctrination efforts,
the positionof these officers
was strength-
elaborate systemof security,elements
ened by theestablishment of an inde-
of the Sicherheitsdienst operatedin oc-
pendentchainof commandwhichen-
cupied areas, in conjunctionwith the
abledthemtocommunicate withhigher
Wehrmacht. As the fortunesof war
headquarters without Wehrmacht inter-
declined,the Nazi Partyacceleratedthe
ference.29The NSFO's weregiventhe
extensionof its securityand indoctrina-
power,in casesof "particular political
tion servicesover the Wehrmacht.The
significance orwheredelayimpliesdan-
securitynet around the German High
ger"to reportimmediately and directly
Command was drawn most tightlyin
28 Order of Commanding Officerof SS
response to the 20th of July Putsch.
In addition to those officers
who were Forces in theWest,September2I, 1944.
29 This step was regarded as sufficiently
a
executed, large number of doubtful importantto be promulgatedin an Order
loyaltywere removedor put into com- appearingover Hitler'ssignature.

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308 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

toNSF officers of highercommandsand be relievedof thisunpopulartask,as

upward to the highestcommand, irre- well as the evenmoreunpopulartask
spectiveofroutinecommunicationchan- of organizing the Werewolfresistance,
nels.To interfere with the NSFO chain whichthe Nazi Partyassumedforit-
ofcommandwas made a militarycrime. selfcompletely.
The NSFO "organization"came to pub- Propagandathemes.The moststrik-
lish or directlysupervisemost of the ing aspectof Nazi indoctrination of
publicationsand radio stationsfor the theirown menduringcombatwas the
troops,and to preparethe leafletswhich employment of negativeappeals and
were distributedto or dropped on the counter-propaganda, which attempted
Germantroops.Their job also included lessto replydirectly
to thesubstance of
periodic indoctrinationmeetings. The our claimsthanto explainthereasons
officialpublication for the indoctrina- whytheAllieswereusingpropaganda.
tionof theofficers' corps,Mitteilungfur The Nazis frankly believedthatthey
die Truppe, which had been published could employour propagandaefforts
throughoutthe war by the Wehrmacht, as a pointof departure forstrengthen-
was also taken over by Nazi Party ingtheunpolitical resolveoftheirmen.
functionaries(NS Fiihrungsstab der They had the legendof the effective-
Wehrmacht)in November 1944. ness of Allied propagandain World
The NSF officers,with their inde- War I as a warningfromwhich to
pendentchain of command,also became "conclude"thatif the Germansfailed
securityofficersof the Nazi Party.They to be trickedby propagandathistime,
spent a great deal of time pryinginto successwas assured.A typicalinstance
the morale and political convictionsof of thisattitudewas containedin a cap-
higher officersin order to warn head- turedorderissued by the Officerin
quartersof the need to replace men of Commandof thegarrisonof Boulogne
falteringfaith.80CapturedGermangen- on September
i I, I944, in whichhe
erals, perhapsmotivatedby a desire to appealedto his men not to be misled
exculpate themselves,told how during byAlliedpropaganda.The Germanor-
the closing months of the war, they derclaimedthatthepropagandaattack
came to feel completelysubjugated by in theformof leaflets
was in itselfan
the indoctrination officers.
They report- expression
oftheweaknessoftheAllied
ed thattheseNazi junior officers main- whichwas in desperate
offensive, need
tainedan independentreportingsystem oftheportforcommunications. During
on seniorofficersand oftensaid "You're thesameperiod,an NSF officer issued
done if he gives a bad accountof you." in whichhe re-
an elaboratestatement
The finalstep in the Nazi Partyen-
30 Numerousorders menaced officers who
croachmenton the administration of the
might become politicaldissidents.One such
Wehrmacht came when the levee en documentcirculatedin ArmyGroup B, dated
masse,the Volkssturm, was raised.Here, January2I, I945, stated that Himmlerhad
the Nazi Party assumed completecon- drawnup a set of instructionsconcerningof-
trol of trainingand indoctrinationand ficeroffenderswhich were to be reviewedat
leastonce a month.Politicaldivergenceswere
units were to be turned over to the
to be harshlydealt with, regardlessof the
Wehrmachtonlyforactual deployment. previousmilitaryor political serviceof the
No doubt the Wehrmachtwas glad to officer
in question.

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 309

mindedthegarrisonat Le Havre that ited numbers.This was beingcarried

the"enemyresorts to propagandaas a outat thesametimethatmutually con-
weaponwhichhe usedin thelaststages tradictory ordersforthe completede-
of the firstworld war," in orderto struction ofall enemypropaganda were
pointoutthatGermanvictory depended beingissued.The explanation, in part,
on the determination of the German is thattheNazis realizedthatit would
soldierto resistAlliedpropaganda. be impossible to suppressthe floodof
In thefall and winterof I944, the Alliedleaflets, and therefore soughtto
campaignto counteract Allied propa- clearlylabel themas such and to em-
gandaby"exposing"it was intensifiedploythemas a pointof departure for
and elaborated. (This methodhad the counter-propaganda.
obviousadvantagethat directrefuta- The procedureof overstamping Al-
tionsof Alliedclaimscouldlargelybe lied leaflets was linkedwithfollow-up
avoided.)Mitteilungfur die Truppe indoctrination talks. Such indoctrina-
(October1944), a newspaperfor of- tionlectures, whichwereconducted by
ficerindoctrination, reviewed themajor theNazi NSFO's, becametowardsthe
weapons in the"poisonoffensive." They endofthewaroneofthemainvehicles
included:attacksagainstthePartyand of Nazi indoctrination of theirown
itspredominant leaders("thisis notsur- troops.Ps/W claimed,althoughit was
prising as theenemywill,of course,at- probably notentirely correct,thatthey
tack thoseinstitutions which give us usuallysleptthroughsuchsessions,or
our greatest strength"); appealsto the at least paid littleattention, untilthe
Austrians to separatethemselves from closingSieg Heil was sounded.At this
theGermans("thetimewhenwe were late datein thewar,emphasison oral
splitup in smallstateswas thetimeof propaganda was madenecessary bythe
ourgreatest weakness")sympathy with markeddisruption of communications.
thepoorGermanwomenwho workin Radiolistening at thefrontwas almost
hellishfactories ("the institution must non-existent due to the lack of equip-
be a good one, otherwisethe enemy ment;whenin reserve, troopslistened
wouldnotattackit"). morefrequently. Newspapersweredis-
Otherthemes"exposed"in leaflets tributed onlywithgreatdifficulty. More
were: the enemyattempts to separate important weretheleaflets whichwere
the leadersfromthe people ("Justas eitherdroppedby air on theirown
theKaiserwas blamedin I9I8, it now troopsor distributed through command
is Hitlerwho is supposedto be re- channels.
sponsible");theenemyadmitshis own "Strength through fear."Majorlines
lossesin an exaggerated way in order of the negativeapproachemployedby
to obtainthereputation of veracityand theseleafletsin indoctrination talks,in
to lie all the more at the opportune the rumorscirculated by NSF officers,
moment. "strength
stressed through fear,"partic-
Even earlierin the Westerncam- ularlyfearof Russia and the general
paign,theGermansfollowedthepolicy consequencesof completedestruction
of stampingAllied leafletswith the that,wouldfollowdefeat.
imprint,"Hostile Propaganda,"and Becauseof theGermansoldier'scon-
thenallowingthemto circulate in lim- cern about the welfareof his family

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3IO PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

living inside Germany,Nazi agencies Such announcements receivedlittle

wereconstantly issuingstatements about attention amongthetroopsactuallyen-
the successfulevacuation of German gaged in the counter-offensive because
civiliansto the east bank of the Rhine. of theobviousdifficulties in disseminat-
Equally stressed in the strength ing propaganda to fighting troops.
through fear theme were retaliation Nevertheless, afterthefailureof the
threatsagainstthe familiesof deserters, counter-attack, the Nazis felt called
mistreatmentof prisoners of war in upon to formulate a plausibleline to
Anglo-Americanprisoncamps, and the explainthesumtotalresultofthatmil-
ultimatefate of prisoners.The phrase itaryeffort, especiallyforthosewhofelt
Sieg oder Sibirien (Victoryor Siberia) that bettermilitaryjudgmentwould
was emphasizedand much materialwas have resultedin a purelydefensive
releasedto provethatthe Anglo-Ameri- strategyagainstRussia. On January25,
cans planned to turn over theirprison- Front und Heimat announced that the
ers to the Russians. When the U.S. December offensivehad smashed the
ArmystoppedshippingGerman Ps/W plan fora simultaneousonslaught:"The
to the United States,Nazi propaganda East can hold only if the West does
officersspread the rumor among Ger- too. . . . Every fighting man in the
man soldiers "that the way to Siberia West knows that the Anglo-Americans
is shorterfrom France than from the are doing all they can, although be-
United States." latedly,to startthe assault on the For-
Statementsby Ps/W revealed that tress Germany. Our task in the West
shortlybefore the Rundstedt counter- now is to postponethattime as long as
attack, speeches by NSFO's were in- possible and to guard the back of our
creased.One of the main subjectsseems Armies in the East."
to have been weapons. In retrospect, Despite the obvious limitationson
the intentof the directivesunder which theefficacy ofpropagandaduringMarch
they were working was obvious. At- and April I945, the Nazis continuedto
temptswere made to explain the ab- the very end to keep up their propa-
senceof the Luftwaffe, while the arrival ganda efforts.Due to the confusion
in the near futureof new and better within the ranks of the Wehrmacht
weapons was guaranteed. and the resultingdifficultiesof dissemi-
Psychological preparation for the nation,the task devolvedalmostwholly
December counter-offensive was built on theNSFO's who spentmuch of their
around the Rundstedtorder of the day time reading to the troopsthe most re-
that "everythingis at stake." Exhorta- centordersgoverningdesertion.Leaflets
tionswere backed up with exaggerated called largelyon the Landser's military
statementsby unit commanders that spiritto carryon. One even demanded
large amounts of men and material that he remain silent (zu schweigen).
wereto be employed.Immediatelythere- The Nazis taxed their fancy to create
after, officialstatementswere issued rumorsas the last means of bolstering
that significantpenetrationshad been morale. Here a favoritetechnique for
achieved; special editions of troop pa- stimulatingfavorable rumors was for
pers were prepared announcing that CO's to read to their men "classified"
40,ooo Americanshad been killed. documentsfrom officialsources which

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 3i1

containedpromisesof secretweapons Some fortyof these Ps/W offeredex-

the greatlossesbeingin- tendedcommentsas to what theymeant
or discussed
upontheAllies.
flicted when they said they believed the con-
tentsof Allied leaflets.
VII. The Impact of Allied Propaganda
on WehrmachtSolidarity Five stated outrightthat they be-
The systemof controlswhich the so- lieved the messagesand thatthe leaf-
cial structureof the Wehrmacht ex- lets assistedthem and theircomrades
ercised over its individual members to surrender.
greatlyreduced those areas in which Seven declared they believed the
symbolicappeals of the Allies could leaflets,but were powerlessto do any-
work.But the millionsof leafletswhich thingabout appeals to surrender.
were droppedweekly and the "round- Eight statedthat theybelieved the
the-clock"broadcasts to the German contents,but neverthelessas soldiers
troopscertainlydid not fail to produce and decent individuals would never
some reactions. thinkof deserting.
The very firstGerman Ps/W who Twenty-two declared that events
were interrogateddirectlyon their re- justified belief in the leaflets,but
actionsto Allied propaganda soon re- they clearly implied that this had
vealed a stereotypedrange of answers been of little importance in their
whichcould be predictedfromtheirde- battleexperiences.
greeof Nazification.The fanaticalNazi In Normandy, where the relatively
claimed, "No German would believe small frontwas blanketedwith printed
anythingthe enemyhas to say," while material,up to go per centof the Ps/W
an extremeattitudeof acceptancewas reportedthat theyhad read Allied leaf-
typifiedby a confirmedanti-Nazi who lets, yet this period was characterized
pleaded with his captors: "Now is the by veryhigh German morale and stiff
momentto floodthe troopswithleaflets. resistance.
You have no idea of the effectsober Throughout the Western campaign,
and effective leafletshave on retreating with the exception of periods of ex-
troops."But these extremereactionsof tremelybad weatheror when the front
soldierswere of low frequency;Nazi was fluid, the cumulative percentage
soldiersmight admit the truthof our of exposure ranged between 6o and
leafletsbut usually would not accept 8o per cent. (This cumulativepercent-
theirconclusionsand implications. age of exposure was based on state-
The fundamentallyindifferent reac- ments by Ps/W that they had seen
tion to Allied propagandawas most in- leaflets sometime while fighting on
terestinglyshown in an intensivestudy the WesternfrontafterD-Day. A few
of I50 Ps/W capturedin October I944 samples indicatedthat penetrationdur-
of whom 65 per centhad seen our leaf- ing any single month covered about
lets and for the most part professed 20 per cent of the prisoners.)Radio lis-
that they believed their contents.This tening among combat troops was con-
was a group which had foughtveryob- fined to a minute fractiondue to the
stinately,and the numberof active de- lack of equipment; rear troopslistened
serters,if any, was extremelysmall. more frequently.In the case of both

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3P2 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER I948

leafletsand radio it was found that availableof thetotalnumberof prison-

there waswidespread butdesultorycom- ers capturedby the use of such tech-
mentonthepropaganda, muchofwhich niques,but signal successesinvolving
comment distorted the actualcontents. hundredsof isolatedtroopsin theNor-
Not onlywas therewide penetrationmandycampaignhavebeencredited to
by Alliedleafletsand newssheets, but psychological warfarecombat teams.
Germansoldiersfrequently circulated Even more successful were the loud-
them extensively among their com- speaker-carrying tanksemployed in the
rades.A readership studyofNachricht-Rhine Riveroffensive, when the first
en furdie Truppe,a dailynewssheet signsof weakeningresistance wereen-
publishedby the Allied Psychologicalcountered.For example,the Fourth
WarfareDivision,showed that each Armored Divisionreported thatitspsy-
copywhichwas pickedup had an av- chologicalwarfareunit capturedover
eragereadership of betweenfourand 500 prisoners in a four-day dash from
fivesoldiers-afigure whichis extreme-theKyllRiverto theRhine.Firsthand
ly largein view of the conditionsof investigation of theseloudspeaker mis-
combatlife.Notonlywereleaflets wide- sions, and interrogation of prisoners
lycirculated, butitbecamea widespread capturedundersuchcircumstances, es-
practicefor soldiersto carryAllied tablishthatAlliedpropaganda waseffec-
leaflets on theirperson,especiallythe tivein describing thetacticalsituation
"safeconductpass"leaflets whichbore to totallyisolatedand helplesssoldiers
a statementby General Eisenhower and in arrangingan Allied cease
guaranteeing thebearerswiftand safe fireandthereby presentingan assurance
conductthroughAllied lines and the to the Germansoldierof a safe sur-
protection of the Geneva convention.render.The successful targetsforsuch
Thereis evidencethatin certainsectors broadcasts weregroupswheresolidarity
of thefront, Germansoldierseven or- and a!bility to function as a unitwere
ganizedblack-market tradingin Allied largely destroyed.Leafletsespecially
propaganda materials. writtenforspecificsectors
and dropped
It is relevantto discussherethediffer-on pin pointtargetsby fighter-bombs
encesin effectiveness betweentactical wereusedinsteadofloudspeakers where
and strategic propaganda.By tactical largerunitswerecutoff.This method
propaganda,we referto propaganda provedless successful, sincethe units
whichseeksto promiseimmediatere- to which they were addressedwere
sults in the tacticalsituation.The usuallybetterintegrated and theneces-
clearestexampleof thistypeof propa- saryceasefireconditions could not be
gandais afforded by "acrossthelines" arranged.
loudspeakerbroadcasts,which some- Less spectacular, butmoreextensive,
timesfacilitated immediatecaptureof was strategic propaganda.Allieddirec-
the prisonersof war-not by propa- tivescalledforemphasis on fourthemes
gandain theordinary sense,butbygiv- in thistypeofpropaganda:(i) Ideolog-
ing instructions on how to surrender ical attackson theNazi Partyand Ger-
safely, oncethewishto surrender was many'swar aims, (2) the strategical
present. hopelessness
of Germany's militaryand
No sufficiently accurateestimateis economicposition,(3) the justnessof

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 313

theUnitedNationswar aimsand their was carriedout in such a way as to

unityand determination to carrythem avoid stressing the unconditional sur-
out (unconditional surrender, although renderaspectsof our intentions, while
madeknownto the troops,was never emphasizingpostwarpeace intentions
stressed),(4) promisesof good treat- and organizational efforts;much was
mentto prisoners of war,withappeals madeof UnitedNationsunity.All this
to self-preservationthroughsurrender.fell on deaf ears,forof thismaterial
Althoughit is extremelydifficult,onlya smallminority of Ps/W (about
especially in viewof thelack of essen- 5 per cent) recalledspecific statements
tialdata,to assessthe efficacy of these aboutmilitary government plansforthe
variousthemes,some tentativeclues Germanoccupation.
mightbe seen in the answersgiven As has been pointedout previously,
to the key attitudequestionsin the thethemeswhichweremostsuccessful,
monthly PsychologicalWarfareopinion at leastin attracting attention and re-
poll of capturedGerman soldiers.3' maining fixed in the memory,were
Thus,therewas no significant decline thosepromisinggood treatmentas pris-
in attachment to Nazi ideologyuntil oners of war. In other words, propa-
Februaryand March I945. In other ganda referringto immediateconcrete
words,propagandaattackson Nazi situationsand problemsseems to have
ideologyseem to have been of little been most effectivein some respects.
avail,and attachment to secondary sym- The single leafletmost effectivein
bols,e.g., Hitler,declinedonlywhen communicatingthe promise of good
the smallermilitaryunits began to treatmentwas the "safe conductpass."
breakup underveryheavypressure. Significantly, it was usually printedon
Sincethe Germansoldierwas quite the back of leafletswhich containedno
ignorantof militarynews on other elaborate propaganda appeals except
fronts,it was believedthata greatdeal those of self-preservation. The rank
of printed materialshouldcontainfac- and filetendedto be favorablydisposed
tual reportsof the militarysituation, to its officiallanguage and legal, docu-
stressing thestrategicalhopelessness of ment-likecharacter.In one sectorwhere
the Germanposition.As a result,the GeneralEisenhower'ssignaturewas left
thirdmostfrequently recalleditemsof off the leaflet,doubt was cast on its
ourpropaganda werethemilitary news authenticity.
reports. It seemsreasonableto believe Belief in the veracityof this appeal
thattheemphasison thesesubjectsdid was no doubt based on the attitudethat
contribute to the development of de- the British and the Americans were
featistsentiment. respectable law-abiding soldiers who
Despitethevastamountof spacede- would treattheircaptivesaccordingto
votedto ideologicalattackson German internationallaw. As a result of this
leaders,onlyaboutfivepercentof the predispositionand the wide use of the
Ps/W mentionedthis topic-a fact safe conduct leaflets,as well as our
whichsupported the contentionas to actual practices in treating prisoners
thegeneralfailureof ideological
or,sec- well, the German soldier came to have
ondaryappeals.Finally,the presenta- 31 Cf. Gurfein,M. I., and Janowitz,Mor-
tion of the justnessof our war aims ris, op. cit.

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 314 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, SUMMER 1948
no fearof captureby Britishor Ameri- strengthened in his resolveto end hos-
can troops.The mostthatcan be claimed tilities,forhimselfat least.
for this lack of fear was that it may
Conclusion
have decreased or undercutany tend-
encyto fightto the death; it produced At thebeginning ofthesecondworld
no active oppositionto continuedhos- war,manypublicists and specialists
in
tilities. propagandaattributed almostsupreme
As an extensionof the safe-conduct importance to psychologicalwarfareop-
approach,leafletswerepreparedinstruct- erations.The legendarysuccessesof
ing non-commissionedofficersin de- Alliedpropaganda againsttheGerman
tailed proceduresby which their men Armyat theend ofthefirst worldwar
could safelybe removedfrombattleso and the tremendous expansionof the
as to avoid our fireand at the same time advertisingand mass communications
avoid evacuation by the German field industries in the ensuingtwo decades
police. If the Germanscould not be in- had convinced manypeoplethathuman
duced to withdraw from combat ac- behaviorcould be extensively manipu-
tively,Allied propaganda appealed to lated by mass communications. They
themto hide in cellars.This in factbe- tendedfurthermore to stressthatmili-
came a favoritetechniqueof surrender, tarymoralewas to a greatextenta
since it avoided the need of facing the function ofthebeliefin therightness of
conscience-twinging desertionproblem. the "larger"cause whichwas at issue
As a resultof psychologicalwarfare in the war; good soldierswere there-
research,a series of leafletswas pre- forethosewho clearlyunderstood the
pared whose attackwas aimed at prima- political andmoralimplications ofwhat
ry group organizationin the German was at stake.Theyexplainedthe strik-
Army, without recourse to ideologi- ing successesof the GermanArmyin
cal symbols. Group organization de- theearlyphasesofthewarbythe"ideo-
pended on the acceptanceof immediate logicalpossession" of the Germansol-
leadershipand mutual trust.Therefore diers,and theyaccordingly thoughtthat
this series of leafletssought to stimu- propaganda attacking doctrinalconcep-
late group discussion among the men tionswouldbe defeating thisarmy.
and to bring into theirfocus of atten- StudiesoftheGermanArmy'smorale
tion concernswhich would loosen soli- and fighting effectivenessmade during
darity. One leaiet declared, "Do not th- last threeyearsof the war throw
take our (the Allies) word for it; ask considerable doubton thesehypotheses.
your comrade; findout how he feels." The solidarity oftheGermanArmywas
Thereupon followed a series of ques- discovered by thesestudies-whichleft
tionson personalconcerns,familyprob- muchto be desiredfromthestandpoint
lems, tacticalconsiderationand supply of scientific rigor-to be based only
problems.Discussion of theseproblems veryindirectly and verypartiallyon
was expectedto increaseanxiety.It was politicalconvictions or broaderethical
assumed thatto the degreethatthe sol- beliefs.Whereconditions weresuchas
dier found that he was not isolated in to allowprimary grouplifeto function
his opinion,to thatdegreehe would be smoothly, andwheretheprimary group

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 COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION IN THE WEHRMACHT 3I5

developeda high degreeof cohesion, ganda less hortatory or analytical,but

moralewashighand resistance effectiveaddressing theintensified desireto sur-
or at leastverydetermined, regardless vive, and describingthe precisepro-
in themain of t4e politicalattitudes ceduresbywhichphysical survivalcould
of thesoldiers.The conditions of pri- be achieved,was likely to facilitate
marygrouplifewererelatedto spatial further disintegration.Furthermore, in
proximity, the capacityfor intimate somecases aspectsof theenvironment
communication, theprovision of pater- towardswhichthesoldiermighthither-
nalprotectiveness byNCO's and junior to have been emotionally indifferent
officers,
and thegratification of certain weredefinedforhimbyprolonged ex-
personalityneeds,e.g.,manliness, bythe posureto propagandaunderconditions
military organization and its activities. of disintegration.Some of thesewider
The largerstructure ofthearmyserved aspects,e.g., particularstrategiccon-
to maintain moralethroughtheprovi- siderations, thentendedto be takeninto
sion of the framework in which po- accountin his motivation and he was
tentiallyindividuating physicalthreats morelikelyto implement his defeatist
werekeptat a minimum-through the moodbysurrender thanhe wouldhave
organization of suppliesand through been withoutexposureto propaganda.
adequatestrategic dispositions. It seemsnecessary, therefore, to re-
The behaviorof the GermanArmy consider thepotentialitiesofpropaganda
demonstrated thatthe focusof atten- in thecontext of all theothervariables
tionand concernbeyondone'simmedi- whichinfluence behavior.The errone-
ate face-to-facesocialcirclesmightbe ous viewsconcerning the omnipotence
slightindeedand stillnotinterfere with of propagandamustbe givenup and
the achievement of a high degreeof theirplacemustbe takenbymuchmore
militaryeffectiveness. It also showed differentiated viewsas to the possibili-
that attemptsto modifybehaviorby tiesof certainkindsof propagandaun-
meansof symbolsreferring to events der different setsof conditions.
or valuesoutsidethefocusof attention It must be recognizedthat on the
and concernwould be givenan indif- moralplanemostmenare members of
ferent responseby thevastmajority of thelargersociety byvirtueofidentifica-
the Germansoldiers.This was almost tionswhichare mediatedthroughthe
equallytrue underconditionsof pri- humanbeingswithwhomtheyare in
marygroupintegrity and undercondi- personalrelationships. Manyare bound
tionsofextreme primary groupdisinte- intothelargersocietyonlyby primary
gration.In the former, primaryneeds groupidentifications. Onlya smallpro-
weremetadequately through thegratifi-portionpossessingspecialtrainingor
cationsprovidedby theothermembers ratherparticular kindsof personalities
ofthegroup;inthelatter, theindividual are capableof givinga preponderant
had regressed to a narcissistic statein shareof theirattention and concernto
whichsymbolsreferring to the outer the symbolsof the largerworld.The
worldwereirrelevant to his firstcon- conditions underwhichthesedifferent
cern-"savinghis own skin." groupswillrespondto propaganda will
At moments of primary groupdisin- differ, as will also the typeof propa-
tegration,a particular kind of propa- gandato whichtheywill respond.

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