January 29, 2020

G.R. No. 248395

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. ROBERTO REY E. GABIOSA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) filed by the People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the Decision2 dated
February 13, 2019 and Resolution3 dated July 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 08536-MIN, both of which declared Search Warrant No. 149-2017 (search warrant) issued by
Judge Arvin Sadiri B. Balagot (Judge Balagot) against Roberto Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr. (Gabiosa) null
and void.

The Facts

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

On January 20, 2017, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero (P/Supt Ajero), the Officer-in-
Charge of the Kidapawan City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against
petitioner before the Executive Judge Arvin Sadiri B. Balagot (Judge Balagot).

In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero attached the Affidavit of his witness, Police Officer 1
Rodolfo M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola). The material averments of the said affidavit are as follows:

xxxx

2. That sometime on January 7, 2017, our intelligence Section received information from
informant that Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo, a resident of Apo Sandawa Homes Phase 1,
Brgy. Poblacion, Kidapawan City is selling illegal drugs particularly Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu in his house located at the aforementioned place;

3. That after we conducted casing and monitoring, we noticed that there were male persons
come and go (sic) to his house and some of them are really noted as drug users and so I
and other Intel Operatives look(ed) for potential person to be used as Action Agent who can
buy shabu from Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo in order to help us in the conduct of test buy
against him until such time that I (was) able to recruit one (1) Action Agent.

4. That on or about 7:20 in the evening of January 18, 2017, I together with our Action Agent
on board with (sic) service vehicle wherein I was the driver and proceeded to the house of
Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo at Apo Sandawa Homes Phase I, Brgy. Poblacion,
Kidapawan City in order to buy shabu from him.

5. That upon our arrival at the place, I parked my driven service vehicle from the gate of the
house of Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo and my Action Agent called the target person
through cellphone and later one (1) male person more or less 55 years old went out from the
house and came nearer to the gate bringing umbrella who was told by the action agent to me
as Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo and then I together with my Action Agent alighted from
 the service vehicle and then we have conversation with Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo and
we agreed that we will be buying shabu from him in the amount of One Thousand Pesos
(Php 1,000.00) and at that instance, he gave to me one (1) piece small sachet containing a
suspected shabu and then also I gave to him the payment of One Thousand Pesos and
then, I confirmed that he really (is) selling illegal drugs.

6. That the house of Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo is a two storey house and made of
concrete. It is half concrete and half steel fence and with steel gate color(ed) red.

7. That I submitted the one (1) piece small sachet containing a suspected shabu being sold
by Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo to me to the Provincial Crime Laboratory Field Office,
Osmena Drive, Kidapawan City for qualitative examination and it turned out positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug as per Chemistry Report Number PC-D-
004-2017 dated January 18, 2017.

On the basis of the above-quoted Affidavit, Judge Balagot conducted a preliminary examination to
PO1 Geverola, which was administered, in this manner -

Q:

Now, you alleged here that in the evening of January 18, 2017, together with your informant you
went to the house of Roberto Rey Gabiosa; is this true?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Upon reaching to his house, what did you do?

A:

We were driving a four-wheeled vehicle and went to that place at that time.

Q:

And then?

A:

I was with our informant, we stopped in the house of the target.

Q:

After that, what happened else? (sic)

A:

Our Alpha called up and he said that the target went outside the house.
Q:

How did your informant or alpha called (sic) Gabiosa?

A:

Through cellphone.

Q:

And Gabiosa went out from his house?

A:

And after that, what else happened?

Q:

Yes, sir.

A:

We went down and we were just nearby and we talked to him that we will (sic) buy an item.

Q:

Now, were you the one who personally go (sic) to Roberto Gabiosa?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

He did not suspect that you are a police officer?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

What was the amount you purchased from Mr. Gabiosa?

A:

I gave P1,000.00 and in return he gave me the shabu.

Q:
Can you describe the house of Roberto Gabiosa?

A:

The house of Roberto Gabiosa is a two-storey, concrete, and with gate colored red.

Q:

There is a sketch attached to the application; is this the sketch reflecting the location of Mr.
Gabiosa?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

What did you do with that thing that Gabiosa delivered to you after giving him the P1,000.00?

A:

We made a request for crime laboratory examination.

Q:

What is the result?

A:

Positive, your Honor.

Q:

Now, the test buy, two days ago: do you have reason to believe that Gabiosa has still in possession
of the illegal drug?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Why do you say so?

A:

We have a man (and) who is observing him.

Q:
What car did you use in going to his house?

A:

Colored red, Suzuki four-wheeled vehicle.

xxxx

Judge Balagot, then, issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 after finding a probable cause for such
issuance. Thereafter, the aforementioned search warrant was served against petitioner.

Petitioner, however, questioned the validity of the search warrant issued against him. Thus, on
March 13, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and
Suppression of Evidence claiming that the issuance of the search warrant is grossly violative of his
fundamental constitutional and human right.4

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a Resolution5 dated September 26, 2017, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the Motion to
Quash (Search Warrant dated 20 January 2017) and Suppression of Evidence (Motion to Quash)
filed by Gabiosa. The RTC ruled against Gabiosa's contention that the search warrant was invalid as
the judge did not examine the complainant but only his witness. The RTC explained that the judge
was not mandatorily required to examine both the complainant and his witness.6 The RTC added
that "what is important is the existence of probable cause and the witness has personal knowledge
of the fact as basis for the court or judge in issuing the search warrant."7 In other words, the RTC
opined that the judge need not examine the complainant if the probable cause was already
established upon examination of one of the witnesses.

On Gabiosa's contention that the search warrant was invalid because the questions propounded by
the judge were mere rehash of the averments in the affidavit supporting the application, the RTC
ruled the same to be equally untenable. The RTC expounded:

Based on the requirements as enumerated above, the judge must examine the witness under oath
or affirmation. The rule does not prescribe what particular form of questions the judge must ask from
the witness. What is important is that the judge must satisfy himself personally that there is probable
cause to warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, asking the witness the same questions
which will illicit (sic) the same facts as stated in his affidavit will not matter for as long as the
examination is under oath and the witness' answers were based on his personal knowledge or
observations. The phrase used by law is "examination under oath or affirmation" simply means that
the judge can even asked (sic) the witness under oath even if he or she has no affidavit submitted or
if he or she has submitted one, to just asked (sic) him to affirm the same is enough if probable cause
is established.8

Gabiosa then sought reconsideration of the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash. However, in its
Resolution9 dated December 21, 2017, the RTC likewise denied Gabiosa's motion for
reconsideration. Undeterred, Gabiosa filed a Petition for Certiorari10 with the CA, alleging that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash.

Ruling of the CA
In its Decision11 dated February 13, 2019, the CA granted Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated September
26, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City in Criminal Case No. 4005-2017 is SET
ASIDE.

The Search Warrant No. 149-2017 is, hereby, declared null and void, and the search conducted on
its authority is also rendered void. Consequent thereto, any evidence gathered by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrant are inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SO ORDERED.12

In granting Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari, the CA reasoned that the text of the Constitution used
the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or," which thus "shows its clear intent to really require both
applicant and the witness to be personally examined by the issuing judge."13 The CA added that for
a search warrant to be valid, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce must be
personally examined by the judge.14

The CA likewise ruled that the search warrant was invalid because Judge Balagot, the judge who
issued the warrant, supposedly failed to propound probing and searching questions to the witness.
According to the CA, the questions propounded were superficial and perfunctory.15

The People of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
Decision. However, in a Resolution dated July 10, 2019, the CA denied the said motion.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue

For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari
filed by Gabiosa.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is granted. The Court rules that the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari,
considering that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the validity of the search
warrant.

In ruling that the search warrant was invalid, and that consequently, the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in upholding its validity, the CA relied heavily on statutory construction. The CA's main
basis for its ruling is the use of the word "and" in the constitutional provision on searches and
seizures. Thus:

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental constitutional
rights. This right has been indoctrinated in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos
Constitution and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the Philippines during
the American colonization, the 1935 Constitution, and the 1973 Constitution. Given the significance
of this right, the courts are mandated to be vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or
gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in place for its protection are observed.
Accordingly, the Constitution sets strict requirements that must be observed. Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution, thus, provides -

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.

From the provision above, it is noteworthy that the Constitution supplied the conjunction "and"
instead of "or" or "and/or" between the complainant/applicant and the witness, which shows its clear
intent to really require both applicant and the witness to be personally examined by the issuing
judge.

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, the intention of our laws to require the issuing judge to examine personally
both the applicant and the witness he/she may produce becomes very clear. In statutory
construction, the word "and" implies conjunction or union, which plainly means that both, and not
either, of the applicant and the witness are required to be personally examined by the
judge.16 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above reasoning of the CA is contrary to established jurisprudence, and defeats the very
purpose of the constitutional right involved in this case.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution - one of two provisions in the Bill of Rights preserving
the citizens' right to privacy17 - protects every citizen's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It preserves, in essence, the right of the people "to be let alone" vis-à-vis the far-reaching
and encompassing powers of the State, with respect to their persons, houses, papers, and effects. It
thus ensures protection of the individual from arbitrary searches and arrests initiated and perpetrated
by the State. The rationale for the right, particularly of the right to be secure in one's home, was
explained in the early case of US. v. Arceo,18 where the Court elucidated:

The inviolability of the house is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and
recognized in the political codes of civilized nations. No one can enter into the home of another
without the consent of its owners or occupants.

The privacy of the home - the place of abode, the place where a man with his family may dwell in
peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the king,
except in the rare cases - has always been regarded by civilized nations as one of the most sacred
personal rights to which men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the
right of absolute protection to the privacy of his home. The king was powerful; he was clothed with
majesty; his will was the law, but, with few exceptions, the humblest citizen or subject might shut the
door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy
which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. The poorest and most humble
citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to all the
powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-
beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its owner's will; none of the forces dare to cross the
threshold even the humblest tenement without its owner's consent.
A man's house is his castle, has become a maxim among the civilized peoples of the earth. His
protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in England, America, and Spain,
as well as in other countries.19

Despite the sanctity that the Constitution accords a person's abode, however, it still recognizes that
there may be circumstances when State-sanctioned intrusion to someone's home may be justified,
and as a consequence, also reasonable. This is also why the right only protects the individual
against unreasonable searches or seizures - because while State-sanctioned intrusion is, as a
general rule, unreasonable, the Constitution itself lays down the main exception on when it becomes
reasonable: when the State obtains a warrant from a judge who issues the same on the basis of
probable cause. Thus, the fundamental protection given by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to
issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.20

In turn, a warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
must be issued upon "probable cause;" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; and (4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.21

At the heart of these requisites, however, is that the intrusion on a citizen's privacy - whether it be in
his own person or in his house-must be based on probable cause determined personally by the
judge. In other words, the magistrate authorizing the State-sanctioned intrusion must therefore
himself or herself be personally satisfied that there is probable cause to disturb the person's privacy.

The CA's construction of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures was inaccurate

Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the CA, in invalidating the search warrant subject of this case,
focused on a word used by the Constitution - "and" - and then ruled that it was the intent of the
Constitution that both the applicant and the witnesses he or she may present must first be examined
by the judge before any warrant may be issued.

As stated at the very outset, this conclusion of the CA is neither supported by jurisprudence, nor by
the spirit which animates the right.

As early as 1937, in the case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas,22 the Court explained
that ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that probable cause
exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the witness/es if either one of them
is sufficient to establish probable cause. The Court explained at length:

x x x Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal
and cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.
In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by
affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessarily by him. Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or
justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano
G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders, No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more
than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is
necessary.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

If, despite the use of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as
probable cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse - the
judge examined the witness only and not the applicant - would not be valid as well. Again, the
purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is immaterial
in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant only, or the witness
only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration here is that the
judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual's privacy.
Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing undue importance on the Constitution's
use of the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or."

In addition, it would be a fruitless exercise to insist that the judge should have examined the
complainant as well when, as here, he admittedly did not have personal knowledge of the
circumstances that constitute the probable cause. Based on the affidavit submitted, it was Police
Officer 1 Rodolfo M. Geverola (PO1 Geverola) and his "Action Agent" who had personal knowledge
of the circumstances as they were the ones who conducted the surveillance and test buy. Even if, for
instance, Judge Balagot examined the complainant, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero
(P/Supt Ajero), he would have obtained nothing from the latter because of his lack of personal
knowledge. P/Supt Ajero was the complainant only because he was the Officer-in-Charge of the
Kidapawan City Police Station,24 but it was never alleged that he participated in any of the prior
surveillance conducted.

The CA likewise erred in holding that Judge Balagot failed to ask probing questions and searching
questions

As an additional basis in declaring the search warrant invalid, the CA stated:

Moreover, a cursory reading of the transcript of the preliminary examination conducted by the
issuing judge shows that Judge Balagot failed to propound probing and searching questions on the
witness. The questions therein were superficial and perfunctory.

This Court notes that when Judge Balagot asked PO1 Geverole (sic) where the residence of
petitioner is located, the latter merely answered that he forgot the specific block. Judge Balagot,
however, did not make follow up questions in order to determine whether the witness really knows
the actual location of petitioner's house. At the very least, Judge Balagot should have required PO1
Geverole (sic) to describe how to locate petitioner's residence or to explain the sketch that was
attached in the application. Additionally, when Judge Balagot asked the witness how can he be
certain that petitioner is still in possession of the illegal drugs, the latter plainly answered that he is
certain because they have a man observing the petitioner. PO1 Geverole's (sic) answer, therefore,
confirms that the information that petitioner was still in possession of the illegal drugs is not based on
his own personal knowledge.25

The conclusions of the CA, however, are unsupported and even contrary to what transpired based
on the transcript of the examination which, in turn, was quoted by the CA in its Decision. In the
examination, as quoted above, it is clear that the judge asked questions to satisfy himself that PO1
Geverola was indeed testifying based on his own personal knowledge of the facts because he
personally dealt with Gabiosa. PO1 Geverola's answer that someone else was watching Gabiosa
was in response to the query regarding his certainty that Gabiosa was still in possession of the
items. It did not affect, much less discredit, PO1 Geverola's testimony regarding his previous dealing
with Gabiosa.

The CA also took issue with the fact that Judge Balagot did not ask further questions on the location
of Gabiosa's house. It is important to note, however, that there was a sketch attached to the
application - as also noted by the CA - and PO1 Geverola testified in the examination that the sketch
reflects the location of the house. He was even able to particularly describe the house as "a two-
storey house, concrete, and with gate colored red."26

Since probable cause is dependent largely on the findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, then his
findings deserve great weight.27 The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that
the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.28 As the Court
explained in the case of People v. Choi:29

The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. The judge must not simply rehash
the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits
or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. If the judge fails to determine probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before
issuing a search warrant, grave abuse of discretion is committed.

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are
those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No
law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule
for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a
given situation. The entirety of the questions propounded by the court and the answers thereto must
be considered by the judge.30

Given the foregoing, the CA thus erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in upholding the validity of the search warrant. Judge Balagot made sure that the witness had
personal knowledge of the facts by asking specifics, and asked how he obtained knowledge of the
same and how he was sure that the facts continue to exist. The questions propounded by Judge
Balagot, taken and viewed as a whole, were therefore probing and not merely superficial and
perfunctory. It was thus reversible error on the part of the CA to have set aside the search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 13, 2019
and Resolution dated July 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated
September 26, 2017 of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan City in Criminal Case No.
4005-2017 denying Roberto Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr.'s Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to
Suppress Evidence is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RONALD SUATING Y SAYON

ALIAS "BOK", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Only the police testified for the prosecution. The actual poseur - buyer was not presented,
and the police officers were 10 meters away. The alleged contraband was laid out on the table
when the barangay official came. There was no testimony on the chain of custody from the
attesting officers to the persons who tested the alleged contraband.

In contrast, the accused presented five (5) witnesses from the community to prove that the
alleged contraband was not taken from the accused, and that no buy-bust operation
occurred. The accused testified that when he was searched, they only found two pesos and
fifty centavos (P2.50) on his person.

Yet, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were willing to send this accused to a life in
prison and to impose a fine of P500,000.00 for allegedly selling a stick of marijuana.

We reverse. Efforts of law enforcers to go after the real drug syndicates are undermined by
these obviously fictitious arrests. All it accomplishes is alienate our people, enable corrupt
law enforcers, and undermine the confidence of our people—especially those who are
impoverished and underprivileged—on our court's ability to do justice.

Courts must exercise "heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs for these can be
readily planted and tampered."1

This Court resolves an Appeal2 filed by Ronald Suating y Sayon, alias "Bok" (Suating), from
the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CEB HC No. 01702 which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court4 ruling that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.5

Two separate (2) Informations were filed against Suating for violations of Sections 56 and 117
of Republic Act No. 9165,8 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002. The charging portions of the Informations provided:

Criminal Case No. 8451-69

"

That on November 9, 2011 in Silay City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell one large stick of marijuana cigarette marked as BOK-1, a
prohibited drug to an asset of the Silay City PNP posing as a poseur - buyer in exchange for
three 3 twenty peso bills with serial numbers RS65451 (sic), RT180921, and RT395576 all
marked with the underline in the last digit of each serial numbers. CONTRARY TO LAW .

"

Criminal Case No. 8452-69

"

That on November 9, 2011 in Silay City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in possession and control one (1) large rolled stick of
Marijuana cigarette with a total weight of 0.14 grams marked as BOK-2, a prohibited drug
without any license or permit to possess the same. CONTRARY TO LAW. 9

"

Upon arraignment, Suating pleaded not guilty to the charges.10 Joint trial on the merits
commenced.11

The testimonies of the witnesses12 for the prosecution corroborated the following account of
events:

Acting on a tip from concerned constituents and barangay officials, the Philippine National
Police of Silay City (PNP Silay) effected a surveillance to verify whether or not Suating was
selling marijuana within the area of Barangay Mambulac Elementary School.13 After several
test buys, the Information against Suating was confirmed.14

In coordination with the Regional Office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
in Iloilo City, the police officers planned a buy-bust operation. They prepared three (3) P20.00
bills with serial numbers RS654551, RT180921, and RT395576. As marking, they underlined
the last digit of each bill's serial number. They subscribed to the marked money before City
Prosecutor Ma. Lisa Lorraine Atotubo, and the use of the same was entered in their blotter
book under entry number 01723.15

Before the buy-bust operation, a short briefing commenced. PO2 Reynaldo Bernil (PO2
Bernil) handed the marked money to a confidential asset who was the designated poseur -
buyer.16

On the afternoon of November 9, 2011,17 the operation ensued.

The poseur - buyer went to the premises of Barangay Mambulac Elementary School, ahead of
the police officers.18 Shortly thereafter, he called PO2 Bernil when Suating was already
"within his sight."19 The rest of the police officers followed, positioning themselves
approximately 10 meters away from the area of operation and about 50 meters away from the
school.20

PO2 Bernil was the point person of the entrapment. He saw the poseur - buyer approach
Suating and engage in a short conversation with him. He also witnessed when Suating left
the area of operation, only to return to the poseur - buyer after a few minutes. While Suating
and the poseur - buyer were talking, the latter took out the marked money from his pocket
and gave it to Suating. In exchange, Suating handed unknown articles suspected to be
marijuana.21

After the sale, the poseur - buyer left the area. He proceeded to where PO2 Bernil was in
order to surrender the large stick of suspected marijuana cigarette bought from Suating. PO2
Bernil then handed the item to PO2 Ian Libo-on (PO2 Libo-on), who marked it with "BOK-1."22

PO2 Bernil and the other police officers immediately moved towards Suating and restrained
his hands. After introducing themselves as persons of authority, they apprehended Suating
and informed him of his constitutional rights. Suating's father, along with the other
unidentified individuals, attempted to stop the arrest but to no avail.23
Thereafter, the police officers brought Suating to a police station in Silay City, and proceeded
to conduct a body search on him in the presence of Kagawad Jose Junsay of Barangay
Mambulac. Found in his possession were the marked money used during the operation,
together with another large rolled cigarette stick of suspected marijuana, which was marked
"BOK-2" by PO2 Libo-on.24

In the presence of an elected official, the police officers inventoried and photographed the
confiscated items. After the request letter was prepared, the items were brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory25 of the Negros Occidental Police Provincial Office in Bacolod City.26
Under Chemistry Report No. D-217-2011, Forensic Officer Paul Jerome Puentespina (Forensic
Officer Puentespina) examined the seized illicit drugs, which yielded positive for
marijuana.27

On the other hand, Suating denied all charges against him and claimed that he was merely
framed by the police.28

Suating detailed in his testimony, which the witnesses corroborated,29 that he was allegedly
buying fish in the flea market of Barangay Mambulac30 on the day of the buy-bust operation,
when a police officer suddenly apprehended him. The police officer brought him to a room in
Silay City Police Station where they asked him certain questions. When Barangay Kagawad
Junsay arrived, Suating was frisked. However, they were only able to recover two pesos and
fifty centavos (P2.50) from his possession. Thereafter, the police officers took his photo,
made him sign a document, and later brought him to the Negros Occidental Police Provincial
Office where he was made to urinate in a disposable cup.31

The Regional Trial Court convicted Suating of the charges.32

The Regional Trial Court did not find merit in Suating's contention that the buy-bust
operation did not happen,33 specifying how Suating was apprehended through a well-
planned entrapment, which was conducted after monitoring and validation by the police
officers.34

The Regional Trial Court found the testimonies of police officers Bernil and Libo-on to be
"detailed and straightforward."35 Hinging on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties, and in the absence of any convincing proof that they
have ill intent to falsely testify against Suating, the trial court upheld the testimonies of the
arresting officers.36 The dispositive portion of the trial court Decision read:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED:

In Criminal Case No. 8451-69, this Court finds accused, Ronald Suating y Sayon a.k.a. "Bok",
GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 , Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", as his guilt
was proven by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, this Court sentences accused , Ronald Suating y Sayon a.k.a "Bok ", to suffer
the penalty of Life Imprisonment, the same to be served by him at the National Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal.

Accused named is, further, ordered by this Court to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.

In Criminal Case No. 8452-69 , this Court finds accused, Ronald Suating y Sayon a.k.a. "Bok",
GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 ", as his guilt
was proven by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.

Accordingly , and in application of the pertinent provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence

Law , this Court sentences accused, Ronald Suating y Sayon a.k.a. "Bok", to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of sic from TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS , the same to be served by him at the National Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal.

Accused named is, further, ordered by this Court to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
(P300,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.

The two (2) rolled sticks of marijuana cigarettes (Exhibits "H-1" and "H-2", prosecution) are
ordered remitted to the office of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) at Negros
Occidental Provincial Police Office (NOPPO), Camp Alfredo Montelibano, Sr., Bacolod City,
for proper disposition.

In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused named shall be given
full credit for the entire period of his detention pending trial.

NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.
On appeal,38 Suating assailed his conviction, asserting that the trial court was mistaken in
relying on the weakness of his defense. He insisted that the prosecution failed to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as the identity of the confiscated illicit drugs were not
sufficiently proven due to non-conformity with the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165.39

The Court of Appeals ruled against Suating.40

It held that the illegal sale transaction was effectively completed when Suating gave the hand
rolled marijuana cigarette to the poseur - buyer in exchange for the marked money. As to the
elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, Suating failed to persuade that he had
legal authority to possess the marijuana cigarette found when he was frisked.41 Moreover,
his previous act of selling marijuana to the poseur buyer showed his intention to "freely and
consciously "42 possess illicit drugs.43

Relative to the alleged non-conformity with the chain of custody, the Court of Appeals
underscored that the prosecution was able to prove that there was "no gap or confusion in
the confiscation, handling, custody and examination"44 of the confiscated illicit drugs. The
dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 29, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 69 of Silay City, in Criminal Case No. 8451-69 to 8452-69, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.45 (Emphasis in the original)

Hence, this appeal.46

On July 27, 2015, the Court of Appeals forwarded the records of this case to this Court47
pursuant to its June 10, 2015 Resolution which gave due course to Suating's Notice of
Appeal.48

In its November 11, 2015 Resolution,49 this Court noted the records forwarded by the Court
of Appeals. In the same Resolution, the parties were required to file their Supplemental Briefs
within 30 days from notice, should they desire to do so. Both parties manifested that they no
longer intend to file Supplemental Briefs.50
For this Court's resolution is whether or not the guilt of Suating was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Subsumed in the resolution of this issue is whether or not the police
officers complied with the chain of custody as provided for under Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules.

Suating maintains his innocence.51

While he concedes that the defense of frame-up and denial is weak, he asserts that this
cannot be utilized to further the prosecution's cause, as the latter's evidence "must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of his
defense."52

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals,53 Suating claims that the prosecution failed to
establish the illegal sale of illicit drugs. Arguing that the police officers were 10 meters away
from the area of operation, he insists that it would be impossible for them to observe or even
hear what transpired during the alleged transaction.54 He then questions why the
prosecution failed to present the poseur - buyer as witness when only the latter can best
ascertain the necessary details surrounding the sale.55

As to the chain of custody in handling the seized illicit drugs, Suating underscores the
following irregularities on the part of the police officers:56

First, he points out that the marking of the large stick of marijuana cigarette was done neither
in his presence nor in the presence of third-party witnesses.57 Moreover, Suating
emphasizes that during the inventory, the confiscated illicit drugs were already laid down on
the table when the barangay officials came.58 Hence, they have no personal knowledge on
how the items were taken from his possession.59

Second, he also stresses that since the body search was belatedly undertaken, there is a
possibility that the second item might have been merely planted by the police.60

Lastly, Suating also stresses his misgivings on whether or not the articles allegedly seized
from him were the same ones tested by the forensic chemist in the first place, and eventually,
the ones presented in court. He posits that the records failed to provide details on who
handled the confiscated illicit drugs after examination and up to the moment they were
offered as evidence in court.61

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General62 insists that the statements of PO2
Bernil, who had the opportunity to observe the sale from a distance, duly substantiated the
identities of both the buyer and seller.63 That even if the actual dialogue cannot be heard, the
actions of both the accused and the poseur - buyer supports the conclusion that the sale of
illicit drugs did happen.64

The Office of the Solicitor General also underscores that the testimony of the poseur - buyer
is neither necessary for conviction nor crucial to a plausible prosecution of the charges. With
the statements made by the police officers, the testimony of the poseur - buyer is only
corroborative.65

As to the alleged broken chain of custody, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that PO2
Bernil and PO2 Libo-on were able to ascertain the identities of the marked seized illicit drugs.
Further, non-conformity with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not immediately
render the apprehension of an accused as illegal, or the articles seized inadmissible.66

Finally, it argues that the defense of frame-up necessarily involves the assessment of the
credibility and statements of witnesses. It underscores that, as an often repeated rule that
higher courts mostly accede to the evaluation of trial courts, which have the opportunity to
hear and observe the actuations of witnesses during the proceedings.67

This Court rules in favor of Suating.

Every criminal proceeding begins with the constitutionally safeguarded presumption that the
accused is innocent, which can only be overturn by proof beyond reasonable doubt.68 The
prosecution has the burden of proof. It must not depend on the weakness of the defense;
rather, it must depend on the strength of its own cause.69

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, "or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment," is
crucial in overthrowing the presumption of innocence.70 In the event that the prosecution
falls short of meeting the standard of evidence called for, it would be needless for the
defense to offer evidence on its behalf.71 The presumption of innocence stands, and the
accused is accordingly acquitted of the charge.72

In order to guarantee a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
prove the following:
(1) The identity of the buyer and the seller , the object of the sale and its consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.73

In sum, the occurrence of the sale should be established.

Moreover, the object of the deal should also be offered as evidence and must similarly be
proven as the same one confiscated from the accused.74

As to the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements should be

ascertained:

1 The accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; 2 such possession was not
authorized by law; and 3 the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in
possession of dangerous drugs.75

In both cases, the confiscated illicit drugs from the accused comprises the corpus delicti of
the charges,76 "i.e., the body or substance of the crime which establishes that a crime has
actually been committed."77 It is of paramount importance to maintain the integrity and the
identity of the corpus delicti. Thus, the chain of custody rule warrants that "unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."78

The chain of custody is "the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs. . . of each stage, from the time of seizure or confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."79 As a means of verifying
evidence, it demands "that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by [Proof sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be."80
Accordingly, the prosecution must be able to monitor each of the following links in the chain
of custody over the illicit drugs:

First , the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer;

Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;

Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic
chemist to the court.81 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In this case, a prearranged police entrapment led to Suating's apprehension. However,

despite a carefully planned and coordinated buy-bust operation, there were still irregularities
committed in the course of the entrapment, which caused apparent lapses to the chain of
custody rule.82

For this reason, the identity of the corpus delicti was not duly established beyond reasonable
doubt. We are no longer certain whether or not the miniscule quantities of 0.1583 and 0.14
grams84 of marijuana, presented as evidence against Suating in court, were the very same
ones allegedly confiscated from him.

II

The apprehension of Suating and the consequent seizure of illegal drugs in his possession
were due to a buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, after prior surveillance
and investigation.85 Although this type of operation has been recognized to be effective in
eliminating unlawful dealings that are covertly undertaken, it has a notable "downside that
has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law."86 Buy-bust operations are
vulnerable "to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion."87

Accordingly, police officers are mandated to strictly observe the procedure for confiscation
and custody of prohibited drugs under Republic Act No. 9165.88 The initial procedural
safeguard89 under Article II, Section 2190 thereof provides:

-1

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In effecting the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations92 read:
a)

The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall ,
immediately after seizure and confiscation , physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, furtlter, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;93 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Notwithstanding the mandatory directive of the law as construed from its use of the word
"shall,"94 the police officers miserably failed to comply with the specific procedures in
handling the seized marijuana cigarettes allegedly taken from accused-appellant.

The initial link in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated illicit drugs. Marking
precludes any contamination, switching or planting of evidence. Through it, the evidence is
separated from the corpus of other similar and correlated evidence, starting from
confiscation until its disposal at the close of criminal proceedings.95 To be at par with the
rule on the chain of custody, the marking of the confiscated articles should be undertaken:
(1) in the presence of the accused; and (2) immediately upon seizure.96 This effectively
guarantees that the articles seized "are the same items that entered the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence. "97

In this case, the prosecution offered no reason as to why the marking of the seized marijuana
labelled "BOK-1" was not immediately done after confiscation, but rather only after a
considerable lapse of time, thereto when the poseur buyer was able to leave the area of
operation:, away from the sight of the accused. Moreover, they particularly failed to explain
why the police officers could not have promptly marked the item in the presence of Suating,
if only to remove any uncertainty that the marijuana cigarette marked by PO2 Libo-on, and
later subjected to laboratory testing, was the very same one allegedly sold by the accused to
the poseur - buyer.98 Here, an apparent break in the chain of custody already existed before
the item was even marked.

Additionally, the prosecution's failure to present the poseur - buyer is prejudicial to their
cause.99 To emphasize, the negotiations during the assailed transaction was intimately
between the poseur buyer and Suating. PO2 Bernil, whose exact location from the area of
operation was not specifically stated, was merely observing from a distance.100 Considering
that the poseur buyer was the one who has personal knowledge of the illegal sale transaction
since he was the one who conducted the same, his testimony is not merely corroborative to
that of the police officers.101 The quantity of dangerous drugs here is "so small that the
reason for not presenting the poseur- buyer does not square with such a miniscule
amount."102

Moreover, this Court observed that while there was a narration that the confiscated items
were inventoried and photographed in the police station,103 it is not, however, clear104
whether such procedures were done in the presence of the required third-party witnesses. To
underscore, the prosecution's narrative in the Court of Appeals' Decision states that both the
inventory and photograph of the confiscated articles were undertaken before "an elected
public official."105 However, in the Appellee's Brief, the mandatory procedures were
allegedly made "in the presence of Hon. Ireneo Celis and the Barangay Kagawad."106

The inconsistencies in the prosecution's narration of events points out that the required
attendance of representatives (from both the media and the Department of Justice) during the
inventory and photographing was not faithfully complied with, despite having more than
enough time to secure their presence during preparation of the allegedly well-planned
entrapment. Although their absence does not per se make the seized articles inadmissible as
evidence, the prosecution must prove that it has acceptable reason for such failure, or a
showing that it exerted "genuine and sufficient effort" to secure their presence,107 which, in
this case, the prosecution failed to do.

The attendance of third-party witnesses is called for in order "to ensure that the chain of
custody rule is observed and thus, it removes any suspicion of tampering, switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence which could considerably affect a case. "108 Even
assuming that the inventory and photographing of the seized articles were made in the
presence of two (2) elected public officials-still, the superfluity cannot justify the absence of
the other required personalities therein.

With the glaring lapses committed by the police officers, which inevitably tainted the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized illicit drugs, we cannot help but subscribe to Suating 's
contention that there is a possibility that the marijuana stick allegedly confiscated from his
possession was merely planted, considering that the body search was belatedly done at the
police station and only after more than an hour from his apprehension.109

Finally, the prosecution's narration of facts ended when the confiscated articles were
examined by Forensic Officer Puentespina, whose findings under Chemistry Report No. D-
217-2011 provided that the items yielded positive for marijuana.110 This finding, however,
leaves the following questions unresolved: (1) did the confiscated drugs remain under
Forensic Officer Puentespina's custody; and (2) were they conveyed to some other place
until their presentation in court as evidence? The lack of details on the post-chemical
examination custody111 of the confiscated illicit drugs creates another substantial gap in the
chain of custody rule, particularly on the must accounted "turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court."112

Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 "is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be
brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects."113 Moreover, it "spells out matters that are
imperative."114 Even performing actions, which seemingly near compliance but do not really
conform to its requisites, is not enough.115 More so, "when the prosecution claims that the
seizure of drugs is the result of carefully planned operations, as is the case here."116

In addition, the prosecution cannot merely assert the saving clause under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. Non-confonnity with Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 is certainly not fatal to the cause of the prosecution, as long as the lapses
committed by police officers in the handling of evidence were "recognized and explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
seized must be shown to have also been preserved."117

However, these requirements were not present in this case, since the prosecution, to begin
with, failed to acknowledge that there were lapses committed by police officers while dealing
with the custody of the seized illicit drugs. These irregularities created major gaps in the
chain of custody rule, which, if remained unjustified, is prejudicial to the claim of the
prosecution.118

To emphasize, only 0.15 119 and 0.14 grams120 of marijuana were confiscated from accused-
appellant. For this reason, courts must exercise "heightened scrutiny, consistent with the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule
amounts of drugs, for these can be readily planted and tampered. " 121

III

Contrary to the rulings of both the trial122 and appellate court,123 the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties cannot stand in favor of the police officers on
account of the glaring lapses committed in handling the seized illicit drugs. To underscore,
this presumption is neither definite nor conclusive. By itself, it cannot overturn the
constitutional safeguarded presumption of innocence.124 When the assailed official act "is
irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course.
"125

From the standpoint of the accused, we concede that his defense126 of denial and frame-up
is weak.127 In our jurisdiction, these defenses, "like alibis, have been viewed with disfavor
for these can easily be concocted and are common defense ploy s in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act."128 However, this cannot strengthen or aid the case of
the prosecution. "If the prosecution cannot establish, in the first place, the appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce evidence in its behalf in fact
never arises. "129 Additionally, "however weak the defense evidence might be, the
prosecution's whole case still falls. " 130

Considering that non-conformity with Section 21 equates to "failure in establishing the

identity of corpus delicti, which is an essential element"131 of the charges, Suating's
acquittal is therefore in order.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' December 22, 2014 Decision in CA-GR CEB HC No.
01702 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ronald Suating y Sayon is hereby
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is
ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. For their
information, copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National
Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the two (2) sticks of marijuana cigarettes
subject of this case to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.