BELGICA V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G. R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

FACTS:
The “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of the Legislative
and the Executive branches of the government. The “congressional pork barrel” known as Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and the “presidential pork barrel” comprising of Malampaya
Funds and Presidential Social Fund are encompassed in the term “Pork Barrel System”. There were
various controversies over the decades as the “pork” funds have been reportedly used by the previous
presidents to gain congressional support and some of these huge sums of government money reportedly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.

According to the petitioners, the “Pork Barrel System” is the collusion between the Legislative and
Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse.

The petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for The Immediate
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual “Pork Barrel System” and the Executive’s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Fund and the Presidential Social Fund be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, the petitioners pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on separation of
powers.

RULING:

The court favors the petitioners. As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all
forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by
constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere." Thus, "the legislature
has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the
law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." The principle of separation of powers
and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must
be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would
avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.  To achieve this
purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable
of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the
inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.

There is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in
the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive
branch of government. Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should
not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly
the domain of the Executive. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern itself
with details for implementation by the Executive."

From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere
oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions