KARL G.

LAREW*
cannot act alone as the policemen of the world.”
E

W These words were written i n October 1922 by

Andrew Bonar Law shortly before he replaced
Lloyd George as His Majesty’s first minister. Bonar
Law’s letter to the Times was a signal to the Tories that Lloyd
George must go; it was also an admission to the world that
Great Britain would certainly, after all of her vacillation and
blustering, abandon Chanak to the Turks. A combination of
public war-weariness, Allied disunity, Asian nationalism, and
Russian power had deprived Britain of an important out-post in
the game of global politics. Looked at in this fashion, the Greco-
Turkish War and the Chanak crisis have a special and poignant
meaning for the United States today, tortured by the problems
of South East Asia. T h e subsequent peace conference at Lausanne
- a far happier event - has a similar claim to our attention. T h e
recent publication of Britain’s Foreign Office documents for the
period 1921-1922 also prompts us to re-examine that Near Eastern
war of fifty years ago.*
+ T h e author is Associate Professor of History a t Towson State College. He
presented this article in a slightly altered form at the Phi Alpha Theta 1971 con-
vention in New Orleans.
Bonar Law quoted in Lord Kinross, Ataturk (New York, 1965), 3815.
‘Rohan HutIer and J. P. T. Bury, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-
1939, 1st Series, XV (London, 1967). and W. N. Meddicott, Douglas Dakin, and M.
E. Lainbert, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, XVII (Lon-
don, 1970), hereafter cited as DBFP. The best general works o n the Near Eastern
question are M. S. Anderson, T h e Eastern Question, 1774.1923 (New Yoxk, 1966), and
the older but still useful Turkey at the Slraitr, by J. T. Shotwell and Francis DeAk
(New Yolk, 1940). H. N. Howard, Partition of Turkey (Norman, Okla., 1931) is vital
for the period 1914-1923, especially for bibliography, while Harold Nicolson’s
Curzon: the Last Phase, 1919-1925 (New York, 1939) is extremely important for
interpretation. Apart from Kinross, Ataturk, the most important recent books are
Lord Beaverbrook, T h e Decline and Fall of Lloyd George (New York, 1963), and
David Walder, T h e Chanak Affair (London, 1969). G . A. Craig, “ T h e British Foreign
Office,” and R. H. Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne,” i n
G. A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, 1953) are also
very important to the subject.
256
 Greco-Turkish War
T h e Greek Army occupied Smyrna in May 1919. Britain,
France, and the United States authorized and even lent military
assistance to that landing, not really because of the supposed
Turkish threat to the native Greeks there, but rather because they
feared that Italy was about to seize Smyrna for herself. That
city had been promised to Italy during the Great War, but the
Big Three did not wish Italy to have her way until the question
of Fiurne was cleared up. T h e Greeks, led by Prime Minister
Eleutherios Venizelos, were therefore acting merely as agents of
the Peace Conference, occupying Smyrna only until the ultimate
settlement of the Turkish question. But Venizelos had in mind
the establishment of a Greater Mellas, and before long the Allies
were complaining that the Greek Army was in occupation of far
more than had been intended. T h e Greeks, moreover, had proved
that the Turks were not the only people who enjoyed massacring
their neighbors.
Lloyd George did not protest with any warmth. T h e prospect
of permanent Hellenic gains on the Ionian coast pleased him for
both emotiorial and strategic reasons. Even before the World War,
he had come to view the Turks as a “human cancer”; the Smyrna
Greeks therefore should, for their own welfare, belong to the
Hellenic Kingdom. As for his strategic aims, Lloyd George, along
with many other Britons, considered the Turkish Straits vital to
British imperial interests in the Arab lands, Persia, and India. A
friendly Greece in control of Smyrna would help to safeguard
these British interests from Russian and pan-Islamic intrigues. 4
France and Italy, on the other hand, were jealous of Greece from
the start, Italy especially so because the Greeks had snatched away
her prize. France resented British behavior in Syria and could see
no profit for herself in Britain’s love affair with Greece.5
Howard M. Sachar, T h e Emergence of the Middle East, 1914-1924 (New York,
1969), 314; Papers of Colonel E. M. House on the Peace Conference (used with the
permission of Sterling Library, Yale University), Drawer 30, numbers 33, 36, and
203; United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relatiom
of the United States, the Paris Peace Conference, 1919, XI1 (the “King-Crane
Report”), 748 (hereafter cited as FRUS); for the text of the Smyrna inquiry, see
FRUS, IX, 44-73; for discussions concerning Italy’s role in Anatolia and the Greek
landing at Smyrna, see FRUS, V, 482, 484, 501-04, and 554-55, 570; see also D. H.
Miller, N y Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents (New York, 1928), XIX,
558-59 (used with the permission of Sterling Library); DBFP, I, 331, and DBFp, 11,
230-31, contain Allied and Greek discussions of Greek expansion and atrocities in
conferences of August and November 1919 respectively.
‘Sachar, Emergence o f the d4iddle East, 315, citing in part a 1914 speech of
Lloyd George: see also Walder, Chanak Affair, 95, and David Lloyd George, Is it
Peace? (London, 1923), 262-63.
5Howard, Partition o f Turkey, 245; Z. N. Zeine, T h e Struggle for Arab Inde-
pendence (Beirut, 1960), 57, 63-64, 108-09. 138-39, 151-53; FRUS, XII, 749, 852-53
257
 The Historian
Still, the British were not inclined to be piggish over the
division of spoils. At San Remo, in April 1920, the Allies drew up
the Treaty of Skvres which they intended to dictate to the Turks.
France, Italy, and Britain would all get their shares, and together
they would rule the Turkish Straits; Greece was to obtain Smyrna
and Thrace on a permanent basis after going through the formality
of a plebiscite some years later. T h e rump state of Turkey would
be an impotent puppet of the Allies, tied to them by economic
and judicial strings. Seldom has there been a more Carthaginian
peace. Colonel T. E. Lawrence of Arabia commented, however,
that Skvres was a happier treaty than Versailles in that i t would
not be revised -it would be forgotten6 H e was correct in part:
it was never formally revised because it was never formally
ratified; but it has not been entirely forgotten. Recently in
Washington, there was a demonstration by a group of Armenians
whose placards recalled the Treaty of Skvres. This is because the
Allies had by that Treaty created the new state of Armenia; they
offered it as a mandate to the United States. T h e U. S. Senate
quickly turned down the dubious honor, and Armenia was soon
crushed between the armies of Russia and Turkey.’
Turkey and Russia indeed soon tore u p almost all of the
Treaty of Skvres. Lenin and Trotsky, like the tsars before them,
feared Western, and especially British influence in the Straits area;
they therefore sent money and arms to Turkey in her struggle
against Greece. T h e Turks who were befriended by Russia in this
fashion were not, of course, the Sultan’s ministers, for these were
under the Allied thumb in Constantinople. It was rather a
revolutionary band of nationalist Turks, infuriated by the Greek
landing at Smyrna, which accepted Communist aid. Their leader,
Mustapha Kemal, later called Ataturk, persecuted Communists
in Turkey; but he fully intended to use Russian assistance to rid
his couniry of the Anglo-Greek presence.
-
(more of the “King-Crane Report”); H. H. Cumming, Franco-British Rivalry in
the Post-War Near East (London, 1938), 59-67, 89; W. S. Churchill, The World
Crisis: the Altermath (London, 1929), 416.
Lawrence is quoted in E. G . Mears, Modern Turkey (New York, 1924). 516.
TDUFP, VII, 89-93 give the text of the Allied agreement for enforcing peace
terms; DBFP, VIII, 141-43 give the San Remo agreements; the text of the treaty
itself is in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Treaiies of Peace,
1919-1923 (New York, 1924), 11. 787-941; see also Nicolson, Cunon, 307; X. J. Eudin
and R. C. North, Souiet Russia and the East, 1920-1927 (Stanford, 1957), 109;
L. J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930, an Economic Znterpre-
tation (Philadelphia, 1932). 28-29, 31; Chazi Mustapha Kemal, A Speech Delivered
by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Refiublic, October 1927
(Leipzig, 1929), 416-19; Papers of Admiral Mark L. Bristol (used with the per-
mission of the Library of Congress), box 36, letter to Admiral Benson June 3, 1919.
258
 Greco-Turkish War
Thus by the autumn of 1920, there were already some serious
cracks in the grand design of Skres. T h e British Army in Turkey
had been almost entirely withdrawn; consequently the only force
even remotely capable of upholding the still unratified treaty was
the Greek Army. Britain was preoccupied with the Irish dilemma
and was troubled by strikes and unemployment: many in the
Cabinet feared the effect of a n anti-Turkish policy on Moslem
opinion in India, and they worried about their own war-weary
constituency as well as the attitude of France. There had already
been serious fighting between Greeks and Turks in the summer of
1920 when Venizelos used the Greek Army to enforce Allied
terms on Turkey. What would happen in the event of an all-out
war between Greece and the Kemalists?
Worse was to come. I n October 1920, there occurred a twist
of fate so bizarre as to make historians chortle at the pretensions
of social science. T h e King of the Hellenes, young Alexander,
was bitten by his pet monkey as he tried to compose a canine-
simian quarrel in the garden. Alexander died of blood poisoning.
Constantine, father of Alexander, now claimed the throne.
Indeed, Constantine had ruled Greece before Alexander; he was
the king - and brother-in-law of the Kaiser - who had dared to
oppose the Allies’ violation of Greek neutrality during the World
War, thus earning their hatred. Venizelos and the Allies had
forced him into exile in 1917, but the dynastic question of 1920
resulted in a heavy electoral defeat for Venizelos, and Constantine
took the throne, outraging Allied public opinion. Lloyd George
and Lord Curzon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
though themselves distressed by the turn of events, were quick to
point out that the temporary aberration of Constantine’s return
should not upset a long-range policy based on friendship with the
Greek people and on British self-interest. But France and Italy
were now all the more ready to treat with Kemal’s Turks, and even
among the English there were very few willing to expend any
effort on Constantine’s behalf. T h e Allies cut off military and
economic aid to Greece in December 1920.8
This, then, was the setting for the London Conference of
January, February, and March 1921 among Allies, Greeks, and
Turks. It was inevitable that British policy should vacillate.
Harold Nicolson, a Foreign Office official, admitted that Britain
would risk a break with France if she tried to turn Greece into
another Egypt; but it would take that, he contended, for British
* O n Allied reactions to Constantine’s return, see conversation of Lloyd George
with Italian and French representatives, December 2, 1920, DBFP, VIII, 830, 833;
secretary’s notes of an Allied conference March 9, 1921, DBFP, XV, 345; letter of
S. N. Waterlow (Foreign Office) to the Secretary of the Admiralty January 5, 1921,
259
 The Historian
policy to succeed, and Britain must run the risk.O O n the other
hand, Sir Horace Kumbold, Britain’s High Commissioner i n
Constantinople, saw - although he did not recommend - the
possibility of using Constantine’s return as an excuse for
abandoning Greece. Lloyd George a i d Lord Curzon could not
bring themselves to adopt either of these extreme policies. They
could not face losing Britain’s position as defined by Skvres, nor
could they iace the prospect of fighting for it arid thus alienating
France at a time when Anglo-Russian and Anglo-American
relations were not favorable.
Britain was not alone in vacillation. Aristide Briand, premier
of France, wanted very much to cut French losses in the Near
East; but even he could not see giving up the Treaty of Skvres
altogether. Yet he vetoed any Allied military effort against
lurkey, and he was not convinced that the Greek Army alone
could uphold the treaty. Briand pointed to the hard fighting
which had occurred between the French Army and the Kemalists
in Cilicia, and he wondered if the Greeks could survive a similar
struggle. Lloyd George had carefully interrogated the Greeks
on that score, and he assured Briand that they were capable of
holding on to Smyrna, but the Frenchman was not impressed.
Italy, furthermore, was increasingly anxious to give Kcma1
whatever he wanted as the price for peace. T h e Allies concluded
that modification of the Treaty o€ Sevres in Turkey’s favor would
be necessary. Lloyd George insisted that the Allies should not
appear to be suing Kemal for peace; Lord Curzon, with hardly
more realism, maintained that the essence of Skvres must be
preserved at the price of minor concessions.ll
T h e question was, who should make the sacrifices necessary to
appease Kemal? T h e most obvious concession would be the return
of Smyrna to Turkey, but Lloyd George argued that giving in on
Smyrna would only encourage Kemal to demand Thrace, the
-
DBPP, XVII, 2 3; see also H. W. V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of
Paris (London, 1920-21), VI, 32; Churchill, Aftermath, 385 89; Nicolaon, Cicizon,
253, 255-58; Wdder, Chanak Affair, 95; Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy,” in Craig and
Gilbert, The Diplomats, 181.
Memo by Nicolson, January 8, 1921, DBFP, XVII, 7-8, 16.
10Rrimbold to Earl Curzon, January 20, 1921, ibid., 22.
l*Allied conference January 25, 1921, DBFP, XV, 32-35; interview by Lloyd
George of Monsieur Kalogeropoulos, head of the Greek delegation in London,
February 18, 1921, ibid., 125; the London Conference, February 21, 1921, ibid.,
148-56, 158-59; Allied conference, February 24, 1921, ibid., 191; see also Count
Carlo Sforza, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven, 1928),
53, 60; Sforza. Makers of Modern Europe (Indianapolis, 1930), 92; F. S. Nitti,
Peuceless Europe (London, 1922), 171-72.

2GO
 Greco-Turkish War
Straits, and everything else as well, including in effect the right to
massacre minorities. Was it for this that Britain had poured out
her blood and treasure during the War? Yet in Briand the British
found an immovable object. T h e Frenchman contended that
Lloyd George had exaggerated the effect on the Greeks of an
evacuation of Smyrna. T h e Greeks were, he said, accustomed as
a race to giving up: consider the prolonged sulk of Achilles and
the retreat of the 10,000f12
111the end, even Lloyd George was more willing to sacrifice
Greek interests rather than those more directly pertaining to
Britain. Me therefore proposed a plebiscite in the areas of Thrace
and Smyrna, the results of which would determine their fate.
Bekir Sami Bey, the chief Turkish delegate, agreed to the
proposal, provided that the Greek occupation was replaced by an
international administration before the plebiscite. Furthermore,
the Turks’ concession on this point, such as it was, was made on
the condition that the remainder of the Treaty of Skvres would
still be open to negotiation. O n the other hand, Monsieur
Gounaris, Constantine’s delegate to the Conference, refused to
accept Lloyd George’s plan in any form. T o conduct a new
plebiscite would be an insult to Greece because previous nose-
counts had been in her favor. Could Greece trust France and
Italy, who would have a hand i n such a plebiscite? What is more,
if the Greeks once withdrew, could they ever get back in no matter
what the results of the count? Could the Greek King and his party
survive any such concession?l3
T h e British Prime Minister understood these objections;
nevertheless, he was bitterly disappointed by the Greek refusal.
I n his annoyance with Gounaris, whom he had never regarded
highly anyway, Lloyd George even spoke in friendly tones with
Bekir Sami Bey. T h e latter pleaded with Lloyd George to under-
stand that Turkey could protect British interests at the Straits
better than could Greece, and Turkey would furthermore turn not
only anti-Bolshevik, but anti-Russian as well, if only her national
life and territory were assured. It almost seemed as if Lloyd George
would drift slightly toward the Turkish position. l4
la Allied conference, January 25, 1921, DBFP, XV, 35; conversation between
Lloyd George and Biimd, February 21, 1921, iDid., 128, 130; Allied conference,
February 21, 1921, ibid., 189-90.
l3Allied conference, January 25, 1921, ibid., 32-33; interview by Lloyd George
of Kalogeropoulos, February 18, 1921, ibid., 126; Allied conference, February 24,
1921, ibid., 189-91; Kemalist reply presented to the conference, February 25, 1921,
ibid., 202; Tuikish and Allied conference, February 25, 1921, ibid., 206; interview
by Lloyd George of Kalogeropoulos, March 4, 1921, ibid., 2G6-68.
14Zl~id.,267; interview by Lloyd George of Bekir Sami Bey, h4arch 4, 1921,
ibid., 270-75.
26 1
 The Historian
I n conferences with their allies, the British then suggested
further Greek concessions to be made to Kemal. Lloyd George,
however, insisted that others, that is, France, must also make some
sacrifices. Let the Turks collect their own taxes, he said, and as
for the Ottoman public debt - well, compromises could be
reached on that issue; after all, only financiers stood to lose. Rut
Briand, whose countrymen held sixty per cent of that debt,
refused to listen. He opposed appeasement on the debt issue
because he feared that Kemal would be encouraged to ask for
more. Briand maintained that the surrender of Smyrna, in contrast,
would not be appeasement in the bad sense. Smyrna was what
Kemal most wanted: if granted that, he would then follow the
advice of his own moderates and agree to a settlement favorable to
the Allies on the other issues.15
So, on March 10, Lloyd George went back to the Greeks and
the Turks with another plan; again, the Greeks would make most
of the sacrifices. T h e province of Smyrna would be Turkish-
there would be no plebiscite- but it would be ruled by a
Christian governor; the revenues of the province would be shared
by Greece and Turkey, and the Greek Army could remain in the
town of Smyrna, although elsewhere in the province a mixed
gendarmerie would operate. Greece would also keep Thrace and
Gallipoli, while the Allies would maintain a base at Chanak, a
strategic spot on the Asiatic shore of the Straits. T h e Turks, on
the other hand, would receive Constantinople, and complete
sovereignty in what had been defined at San Remo as the
autonomous province of Kurdistan. T h e Allies had dropped the
issue of Armenia.l*
Alas, the new plan was never put into effect; both Greeks and
Turks rejected it. T h e Turks saw Lloyd George’s proposal as a
prelude to the detachment of Smyrna from Turkey, while the
Greeks insisted that their army must have the right to guarantee
the entire province from Turkish aggression. They also felt that
the governor of the Smyrna district should either be a Greek
Interview by Lloyd George of Kalogeropoulos, March 4, 1921, ibid., 268-69;
Allied ronference, March 4, 1921, ibid., 280-81, 283; Allied conference, March 9,
1921, iDid., 363, 365; British and Greek Conference, March 10, 1921, ibid., 369-71;
Allied ronlerence, March 10, 1921, ibid., 375-77; draft of modification of Skvres
Treaty presented to Allied conference of March 10, ibid., 380.
lE Interview by Lloyd George of Kalogeropoulos, March 4, 1921, ibid., 267-69;
Allied conference, March 9, 1921, ibid., 363, 365; British and Greek conference,
March 10, 1921, ibid., 369-71; see also Kemal, Speech, 490-91; Sforza, Diplomatic
Europe, 62-63; Temperley, History of the Pence Conference, VI, 32-33; Nicolson,
Curzon, 258-59; Howard, Partition of Turkey, 260; Churchill. Aftermath, 990;
Walder, Chanak Aflair, 118-19; Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy,” in Craig and
Gilbert, T h e Diplomats, 189.

262
 Greco-Turkish War
national, or at least be approved by Greece rather than by the
League of Nations as the British had suggested. Once again the
English were disappointed i n their proteges. Lloyd George,
however, could not remain for long on bad terms with his
Greeks. At the very beginning of the Conference, he had told
them that they must appear, at least, to be more reasonable than
the Turks so as to win Allied support. This was hardly a way to
convince them to make substantial concessions. After the collapse
of his second plan, the Prime Minister hinted strongly to the
Greeks that they should go on the offensive; they might very well
hope for a loan from Britain, especially if, he reiterated, they
managed to appear more reasonable than the Turks1?
Indeed, the Greek Army was anxious to attack Kemal. Time
was running out for them, largely because of a resounding Turkish
diplomatic coup which had just split the Allies even further apart.
T h e Italian ambassador to Britain had already told the Foreign
Office on March 2 that the proposed plebiscite would, of course,
merely be a cover for the outright granting of Smyrna to Turkey.
What is more, the British suspected, despite Italian denials, that
the Kemalists were receiving arms from Italy. With heavy sarcasm,
the British sent Italy a rather detailed account of her arms traffic
with the Turks so that the Italians could trace the origins of such
“malevolent rumors.” l* Worse yet, Count Sforza, Italy’s Foreign
Minister and representative at the Conference, concluded an
agreement with Bekir Sami Bey providing for the withdrawal of
Italian troops from southwestern Turkey - Adalia - in return
for economic concessions there. This agreement was a betrayal of
an Allied pact concerning the enforcement of peace terms on
Turkey.
1‘ Interview by Lloyd George of Kalogeropoulos, February 18, 1921, DBFP, XV.
1 2 6 interview by Lloyd George of Kalogeropoulos, March 4, 1921, ibid., 267-68;
interview by Lloyd George of Bekir Sami, March 4, 1921, ibid., 275, 277; Allied
conference, March 9, 1921, ibid., 346; conversation of Lloyd George, Curzon, and
Greek representatives, March 10, 1921, ibid., 370; conversation of Curzon with the
Greeks, March 10, 1921, ibid., 382, 384; conversation of British and Greek repre-
sentatives, March 18, 1921, ibid., 451; see also Sforza, Diplomatic Europe, 62-63;
Howard, Partition of Turkey, 260; Nicolson, Curzon, 258-59; Davison, “Turkish
Diplomacy,” in Craig and Gilbert, T h e Dilhrnatr, 189.
18Record of conversation of Sir Eyre A. Crowe (Foreign Office) with the Italian
Ambassador, March 2, 1921, DEFP, XVII, 69-70; letter from C r o w to the Italian
Ambassador, March 18, 1921, ibid., 75-76.
leAllied conference, March 4, 1921, DBFP, XV, 280, 283; Allied conference,
March 9, 1921, i6id., 346; test of Italo-Turkish agreement in Mears, Modern
Turkey, 644-45, 653-55; see also Kemal, Speech, 498-99; Nitti, Peaceless Europe,
171-72; SforLa, Diplomatic Europe, 53, 60, 62-64; Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe,
92; Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy,” in Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, 181;
William Yale, T h e Near East (Ann Arbor, 1958), 279.

263
 T h e Historian
Even more serious was the defection of France. T h e French
had been fighting in Cilicia for some time and had as early as
May 1920 attempted to make a deal with Kemal there. On
March 10, 1921, Briand also reached agreement with Bekir Sami
Bey. There would be an armistice in Cilicia, and France would
withdraw from that province in return for economic concessions.
Thus France cut her losses and protected her Syrian mandate. T h e
armistice, of course, released large numbers of Turkish troops from
Cilicia for the western -that is, Greek - front. Hence the haste
with which the Greeks prepared their attack.20 T h e Hellenic
offensive of March 1921 failed, partly because the Turks were not
in fact the armed ”rabble” which Gounaris had said they were,
and partly because the Allies, against Lloyd George’s desire,
declared their neutrality in the conflict. This meant a continued
denial of economic aid to Greece, and an Allied refusal to allow
Greece to finance the war by inflating her currency-a right
the Allies claimed as the result of a much earlier Greco-Turkish
war. T h e Allies also withheld Anatolian railroad facilities from
the Greek Army and, most significant perhaps, adopted a policy
of preventing private industry from selling arms to either
belligerent. 21
British policy, however, continued to vacillate. During April,
May, and June, Lord Curzon tried to interpret Britain’s neutrality
in such a way as to favor Greece. He ignored a Turkish protest
against the use of the Straits by the Greek Navy; the War Office
was instructed not to interfere with Greek military traffic in the
Straits so long as Constantinople was not used as a base. One
reason for Curzon’s attitude was a growing fear i n Britain that
%0ForFiench activities in Cilicia, see Allicd conference, February 17, 1921,
DEFP, VII, 89-95; see also British Greek conference, Marrh IS, 1921, DUFP, XV,
448-49; the text of the Bridnd-Bckir Sami agrceuicnt is i n L‘Eurupe Nouuelle,
March 26, 1921, 407; see also Nicolson, Curzon, 63-65, 260-61; Sisley Huddleston,
Poincarc‘ (London, 1924), 159; A. J. Toynbce, T h e Western Question in Greece 2nd
Turkey: a Study in the Contact of Civilizatiunc (London, 1922), 60-62: Cuinnring,
Franco British Rivalry, 7 G ; Kemal, Speech, 390, 498-99; Zeine, Struggle for A?ab
Zndfpcndence, 146-47; Davison, “TurLish Diplomacy,” in Craig and Gilber t, T h e
Difilontats, 185; Miller, Diary, XIX, 566-67; Bristol Papers, box 27 (letter to
Anicricaii Mistion in Paris) and box 9 (reports of Mr. Ravndal, American Corn-
missioner in Constantinople); Jacques Bardouu, Lloyd George et la France (Paris,
1923), passim.
aAllied conference, August 10, 1921, DHFP, XV, 653; Ruinbold to Cur7on.
March 26, 1921, DRFP, XVII, 95; Lord Granville (Athens) to Curzon, April 2, 1921,
ibid., 105; hfarquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paiis), August 19, 1921,
ibid., 361; see also Kemal, Speech, 490-91; Churchill, Afterninth, 390, 393, 414:
Howard, Partition of Turkey, 260, 264-65; Nicolton, Curzon, 260; Temperley, History
of the Peace Conference, VI, 32-33; Daviaon, “Turkish Diplomacy,” in Craig and
Gilbert, T h e Diklomats, 192; Great Britain, Parliurnentury Debates, House of
Lords, 1922, XLIX, cols. 985-86.

264
 Greco-Turkish War
Russia might openly intervene. I n June 1921, it was rumored that
Russian mines and even submarines would be loaned to the
Kemalists, thus endangering the British fleet. T h e actual amount
of Russian aid to Turkey is not known. Years later, a Turkish
diplomat estimated one million rubles and enough equipment
for three divisions. I n any case, the Greeks, to save their amour-
propre, exaggerated Russian - and French and Italian - aid to
the Turks, while the Turks imagined all sorts of British aid to
Greece. Frightened by the Russian threat, the War Office
proposed a contingency plan for the withdrawal of British forces
from Turkey. I n Lloyd George’s opinion, the War Office was
full of pro-Turkish Tories; the Foreign Office, furthermore,
painted a dark picture of the consequences of Greek defeat:
Russian and pan-Islamic agitation would threaten Persia and
India. Therefore plans must be made to come to the financial
and material assistance of Greece, whose army had suffered from
Constantine’s purge of Venizelist officers as well as from lack of
money. A blockade of the Turkish coast by the British Navy, and
the enlistment of ex-British servicemen as volunteers in the Greek
Army, were also contemplated. 22
Curzon hoped to use the threat of such assistance to get the
Turks back to the negotiating table. T h e n he would offer an
autonomous Smyrna, entirely free of the Greek Army, although
under a Christian governor and with European officers in the
gendarmerie. Churchill, the Colonial Secretary and therefore
responsible for the safety of Mesopotamia, was in a mood to use
force on either Greeks or Turks, just so as to conclude the business.
But Curzon did not wish to bully Greece. When his plans were
presented to Briand in Paris, however, the Frenchman approved
only of the concessions to Turkey, not the threats, unless Greece
were threatened, too. Indeed, Briand insisted that, since Greece
was to blame for the impasse, facilities for Greek warships in
Constantinople should be denied. Curzon replied that this would
be unfair, since the Russians were supplying the Turks. Curzon
could see the importance of detaching Turkey from Russia, but
drastic steps to that end he would not take - yet. 23
=Allied conference, June 18, 1921, DBFP, XV, 589; letter from Mr. Oliphant
(Foreign OKce) to the Secretary of the Admiralty, ApriI 16, 1921, DBFP, XVII,
132; letter from Oliphant to the Secretary of the Army Council, May 4, 1921, ibid.,
167; memo by Crowe May 30, 1921, ibid., 207-08; Curzon to Hardinge, June 14.
1921, ibid., 216-47; letter from Mr. Osborne (Foreign Office) to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, August 18, 1921, ibid., 362; see also Walder, Chanak Aflair, 139, 141, 146.
149; Sachar, Emergence of the Middle East, 419; Beaverbrook, Fall of LIoyd
George, 152-53, quoting from Miss Frances Stevenson.
ea Allied conference, June 18, 1921, DBFP, XV, 558-90;Curzon to Hardinge, June
14, 1921, DBFP, XVII, 246; Curzon to Hardinge, July 1, 1921, ibid., 290; see also

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 The Historian
However, Briand’s policy was not consistent at this point.
T h e agreement he had made with Bekir Sami in March was
repudiated by Kemal, and the future of Franco-Turkish relations
was uncertain. Briand did not, therefore, wish to scuttle Greece
entirely. Indeed, he admitted, French industry was somehow or
other covertly supplying the Greeks with arms, despite the French
Government’s policy of neutrality and embargo. Lloyd George
then managed on August 10 to persuade the Allies to lift the
embargo on the private sale of arms. He cited Turkey’s advantage
during the embargo: 800 tons of Russian arms were said to have
been landed recently at Samsun. But Lloyd George’s move back-
fired: more Western arms appear to have reached Turkey than
Greece after August, and some of them came from England; nor
could the Greek Navy do much about it, since the French and
Italians refused to allow their cargo ships to be searched for
~ o n t r a b a n d .I~t ~was under these conditions that the Greeks, in
that same month of August 1921, launched their biggest offensive
yet, aimed at Kemal’s capital, Ankara. T h e campaign failed i n
September and the war settled down to a stalemate again. T h e
Greeks were going broke; their army’s morale was being drained
by the prolonged wait in the desolate hills of Anatolia as cold
weather set in. Tn October France re-negotiated her agreement
with Kemal, and Turkey inherited the surplus arms abandoned in
Cilicia by the French.26
At this point, Gounaris, now Greek Prime Minister, came to
London seeking aid. Curzon told him that Britain could not
afford to alienate Moslem opinion in India, where collections were
being taken up to aid Kemal; nor could she alienate public
opinion at home. H e said that the Greeks must put their fate in
his hands and accept the terms of the previous June. Gounaris
-
Walder, CRanak Aoair, 145; Beaverhrook, Fall of Lloyd George, 31; Thomas Jones,
Whitehall Diary, ed. Keith Middlemas (London, 1969), I (1916-1925), 163.
81 Allied ronference, June 18, 1921, DBFP, XV, 588-90, 593; Allied conference,

August 10, 1921, ibid., 653-55; Rumbold to Cuizon, May 15, 1921, DBFP, XVII, 179;
Curzon to Hardinge, May 26, 1921, ibid., 197; Hardinge to Curzon, June 11, 1921,
ibid., 232, Curzon to Rumbold, August 12, 1921, ibid., 352; Curzon to Hardinge,
August 19, 1921, ibid., 364; Curzon to Hardinge and Mr. Kennard (Rome), S e p
tember 6, 1921, ibid., 382.
23 Curzon’s conversation with Greek representatives, October 27, 1921, ibid., 453;
text of Franco-Turkish agreement is in Mears, Modern Turkey, 651-53; see also
Kemal, Speech, 498-99, 513-22; Howard, Partition of Turkey, 261-62; Nicolson,
Curzon, 261-62: Churchill, Aftermath, 397-402, 411; Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy,”
in Craig and Gilbert, T h e Diplomats, 189; Viscount d’Abernon, Rafiallo to Dawes,
1922-24, the Diary of an Ambassador (Garden City, 1930), 120-21; Louis Fischer,
T h e Soviets in World Aoairs (Princeton, 1951), I, 394; British Parliamentary Papers,
Accounts and Papers, State Papers, 1922, XIIT, 1-7 (Cmd. 1570).
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 Greco-Turkish War
reluctantly agreed, but later qualified his acceptance by suggesting
a larger province around Smyrna than Curzon had in mind, and
he further stated that the Greek Army must guarantee the
province. Under Curzon’s pressure, however, the Greeks backed
down, claiming that their qualifications were only thoughts on the
matter of protecting the Christians in Smyrna province. But now
the British, having forced Gounaris to make concessions, suddenly
realized that their entire policy would be overthrown, and their
own economic interests damaged, should Greece collapse
completely. Curzon at last took up the matter of that loan which
Greece had been pursuing like a will-’0-the-wispsince iMarch. T h e
British Government waived its lien on the security pledged by
Greece for her loan of 1918, thus enabling Gounaris to use the
same security for the negotiation of new credits. I n December
1921 the Exchequer authorized a loan of up to 15 million pounds
to be negotiated by Greece among British financiers. T h e loan
was apparently i n the bag; meanwhile, Britain’s policy was
further undermined by the course of events.2e
In January 1922 Raymond PoincarC became premier of
France; he was even more opposed to Greece than Briand had
been. I n March the Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montague,
published the Indian Viceroy’s opinion that his Moslems would
not stand for an anti-Turkish policy; disunity in the Empire was
thus fully exposed. Under these circumstances, the Greeks could
not raise the loan. Ostensibly the problem was commercial rather
than political, but in fact the Foreign Office refused to smile on
the transaction beyond waiving the lien. T h e British had
concluded that a loan would only perpetuate the fighting. Greece
might better end the war; she might then make better use of the
money.27
Conversation between Curzon and the Greek representatives October 27,
1921, DBFP, XVII, 453-66; conversation between Curzon and the Greeks, Kovember
2, 1921, ibid., 460; Curzan to Hardinge and Kennard, November 19 and 21, 1921,
ibid., 485-87; record of conversation, blr. R. G. Vansittart (Foreign Office) with
Monsieur Baltatzis, a Greek repiesentative, Dccember 2, 1921, ibid., 505-06; letter
from Crowe to Sir B. Blackett (Treasury), December 9, 1921, ibid., 518; Curzon
(by Waterlow) to blr. Bentinck (Athens), December 16, 1921, ibid., 526; Bentinck
to Curzon, December 22, 1921, ibid., 533; note by Curzon to a minute by Waterlow,
December 23, 1921, ibid., 534 (note 5); Curzon to Bentinck, January 3, 1922, ibid.,
559; see also Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1922, LII, cols. 343-44; Nicolson, Curion,
264-66, 278; Churchill, Altermath, 409- 10, 412-13; Leonard Mosley, T h e Glorious
Fault: the Life of Lord Curzon (New York, 1960), 245-47; the Earl of Ronaldshay,
T h e Life of Lord Curzon (London, n.d.), 111, 279-80; Jones, Whitehall Diary, I, 178.
*‘Conversation of Curzon and Poincark, January 16, 1922, DBFP, XVII, 579:
Curzon’s minute to record of talk by Mr. Lindsay (Foreign Office) with Gounariq,
February 16, 1922, ibid., 621 (note 2); Mr. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon, February
21, 1922 (mis-dated 1921), ibid., 636; letter from Curzon to Gounaris, March 6,
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 The Historian
Oddly enough, in utter contradiction to this policy, Curzon
actually encouraged a gloomy Gounaris to hold on in Anatolia.
Evidently, the British did not wish to throw away a bargaining
card without getting something in return. Yet when Curzon
offered both sides an armistice in March 1922, Poincark insisted
that the evacuation of Srnyrna must be conceded. T h e timing of
the evacuation was the only card Curzon was allowed to keep:
the Greeks would leave Smyrna, but only after the conclusion of
negotiations on other issues. Alas, the Turks refused, demanding
an immediate Greek withdrawal as part of the armistice terms;
then negotiations over other issues could take place.2s Once
again the British had failed to bring about peace; added to their
woes was the collapse of the Genoa Conference which not only
failed to split Russia off from Turkey, but actually saw Germany
and Russia become close friends. I t was obvious that only renewed
fighting could advance the negotiations. Constantine attempted
to seize Constantinople, either to use as a bargaining card, or to
keep in cotnpensation for the likely loss of Smyrna; but General
Charles (“Tim”) Haring ton, commanding Allied Forces in
Coristantinople, remained true to the Allied policy of neutrality
and refused to allow the Greeks into the city; Lloyd George was
outraged, but reluctantly accepted Harington’s on-the-spot
decision. Yet on August 4, the Prime Minister delivered a speech
which was so proGreek that his words were used by the Greek
Army to restore morale among the troops. It would take more
than speeches, however, to pull Britain’s chestnuts out of the
fire. Taking advantage of the splitting of Constantine’s forces -
two divisions had been earmarked for Constantinople - Kernal
struck on August 18, 1922 and routed the Greeks. “No loan can
save them now,” Lord Curzon commented as the Greeks were
driven out of Anatolia.20

1922, ibid,, 646; Nicolsoti’s minute to ;I Foreign Office draft, quoting a letter from
Sir George i\rmstrong (a partner o f :irnistrong’s Bank) to Viscount Long (former
First Lord of the Admiralty), January 22, 1922, ibid., 646 (note 3 , continued 647);
see also Nicolwn, Ciirzon, 267-68; Rcnaldshay, Life of Lord Czmon, 111, 285-86;
Howard, Partilion o/ Turkey, 265; Walder, C h m a k Anair, 112-13, 140, 160-62.
British-Greek conference, January 12, 1922, DBFF, XV11, 572-73; Allied
conference, hlrtrcli 22, 1922, with Anncx I giving the Allied term for scLtlement,
ibid., 677; Allied conference, March 23, 1922, ibid., 682; Rumbold to Curzon, April
5, 1!)22, ibid., 773; Curzon to Rumhold, April 12, 1922, ibid., 782; see also Beaver-
hrool;, Full of Lloyd George, 154; Walder, Chanuk Affair, 149; Parlicnzentary
Pnpei.r, 1922, XIIJ, 3-6 (Cmd. 1614); Parlinmentnry Debates, Lords, 1922, XLIX,
col. 989; I<cmal, Speech, 545-59; Nicolsun, Curzon, 268-69; ’I‘einperley, History of the
Peace Conference, VI, 35-36.
anCur~on’s remark is i t i DBFP, XVII, 933 (note 2); see also memo by hlr. Ryan
(Foreign Ofice), Fehruary 17, 1922, ibid., 628, Reaverbrook, Fall of Lloyd George,
268
 Greco-Turkish War
Now the Turkish Army approached the zone of the Straits
where Allied garrisons were stationed. T h e Italians and French
pulled out, leaving a tiny British force at Chanak to face the
Turks. War seemed likely. Britain, although unwilling to fight
for Greece, was now willing to fight for her honor. Negotiations
the British Cabinet would accept, but they would not run like
dogs with their tails between their legs. Lloyd George even hoped
to revive the Greek Army and renew the war, this time with full
British support. H e never got the chance. Outside of the Cabinet,
no one wanted war. PoincarC was very much opposed, and
Britain’s dominions, summoned by an extraordinary telegram,
were distinctly cool to the idea. English public opinion was also
in favor of peace. Russia loomed in the background, and
Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, even imagined that Britain
might end up at war with France. General Harington ignored
the blusterings and ultimata issued by the Cabinet, and tactfully
arranged for an armistice with Kemal, who also saw no reason for
further bloodshed.a0 Curzon joined the dove camp, Bonar Law
sent his letter to the Times, the Tories pulled out of the coalition
on October 19, and Lloyd George’s government fell. Ireland,
unemployment, strikes in steel and coal, and the honors scandal,
were all causes of his fall, but the Chanak crisis was the last straw.
Kemal deposed the Sultan; i n Greece, Constantine fled, and
Gounaris (so ill that he had to sit before the firing squad) was
executed by revolutionaries.
Curzon remained as foreign secretary in Bonar Law’s govern-
ment i n order to negotiate with the Turks. T h e subsequent peace
conference at Lausanne produced some surprises. Venizelos,
re-employed as head of the Greek delegation, surrendered all
claims to Turkish territory. Turkish economic and judicial
sovereignty was conceded by the French and Italians. I n return
for all this, the Turks faced West, just as Bekir Sami Bey had
predicted, and virtually abandoned the Russian alliance, giving

157; Churchill, Aftermath, 414, 417-18; Nicolson, Curzon, 268-70; Ronaldshay, Life
of Lord Curron, 111, 298; text of Lloyd George’s speech on August 4, 1922 is in
Mears, Modern Turkey, 656-57; A. T. Chester, ”History’s Verdict on Kew Turkey’s
Rise to Power,” in Current History, October 1923.
=Walder, Chanak Affair, 181, 188, 198, 212-13, 224, 237; Sachar, Emergence
of the Middle East, 432, 438; Beaverbrook, Fall of Lloyd George, 158-61, 166;
Churchill, Aftermath, 420-28, 431-39; Nicolson, Curzon, 271-76; Ronaldshay, Life
of Lord Curzon, 111, 300-04: B. E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (New York,
1937), 263; A. J. Toynbee, The Conduct of British Einpire Foreign Relations since
the Peace Settlement (London, 1928), 48-51; d’Abernon, Diary, 113-19, Mean,
Modern Turkey, 568-69, 658-59; Kemal, Speech, 569: Davison, “Turkish Diplomacy,”
in Craig and Gilbert, T h e Diplomats, 197; David Lloyd George, The Truth about
the Treaties (London, 1938), 11, 1350.

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 ‘The Historian
favorable terms to the Allies concerning the passage of warships
through the Straits: much to Russia’s dismay, the Straits were
de-militarized and each of the Allies was allowed to send a fleet
into the Black Sea equal to that of Russia; there would be no
restrictions on tonnage if the Allies were acting under a mandate
of the (Allied controlled) League of Nations. Eventually, the
the British also got what they wanted in the area of Mosul: oil
rich territory. 31
In such fashion, the primary objects of British policy in the
Near East - apart form Lloyd George’s emotional commitment
to Greece-were achieved without the necessity of a new war.
Britain’s dilemma prior to Lausanne had been caused largely by
circumstances and forces, such as Turkish nationalism, which
were beyond her understanding and control. Some problems
could perhaps have been avoided by wiser policy, but a mere
change in government personnel would not have altered British
behavior very much: Lloyd George was by no means alone in his
convictions until very near the end of the process by which Greece
lost her Anatoiian empire. At most, a Tory government in 1920,
or 1921-22, could have sped up that process, although Tory
willingness to abandon Greece might have been forgotten if the
responsibility for that abandonment had been theirs before the
collapse of the Greek Army. A more strongly entrenched Lloyd
George might have been able to turn the Chanak crisis into a
new war, but the ultimate outcome of such a war would probably
not have been significantly different, given the advantages enjoyed
by Turkey with or without Kemal; only the agony would have
been prolonged.

31Parliarnentary Papers, 1923, XXVI (Cmd. 1814) contains records of the

Lausannc Conference; the text of the Lausanne Treaty is in Carnegie Endowment,
Treuties of Peace, 11, 959-1052; see also Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 1923, LIII,
col. 42; Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, VI, 39, 107-09, 112-13; Craig,
“The British Foreign Oftke,” in Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, 37; Nicolson,
Curzon, 282, 311-12, 312, 349; Howard, Paytition of Turkey, 278-79; Jane Degras,
Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London, 1951-53), 342-43; Halide Edib,
7urkey Faces West (New Haven, 1930). passim.
270