Interactional Sociolinguistics
Interactional Sociolinguistics
January 2008
Interactional sociolinguistics
Interactional Sociolinguistics
Benjamin Bailey
University of Massachusetts Amherst
to be understood and how each sentence relates to what precedes or follows” (1982a, 131).
These surface forms range across semiotic modes, including such varied phenomena as
prosody, code and lexical choice, formulaic expressions, sequencing choices, and visual
and gestural phenomena. They are united in a common, functional category by their use,
commonly in constellations of multiple features. They cue interpretive frameworks in
which to interpret the propositional content of utterances, which can otherwise be
ambiguous.
An example can illustrate the dual functioning of the communicative stream as both
referential content and a context in which to interpret that very referential content. In
American English, the utterance “Nice tie!” can represent a sincere compliment, or it can
represent a joking insult, i.e., that the speaker finds the tie somehow inappropriate.
Contextualization cues within the performance of the utterance can suggest the frame
in which the utterance is to be interpreted. A broad smile and marked intonation
accompanying the words “Nice tie!” can serve as contextualization cues that channel
inferential processes toward a particular interpretation. Contextualization cues do not
directly index or refer to a specific interpretive frame, but rather serve as prods to
inferential processes. A smile, for example, does not always indicate a joking insult frame
for the talk that it accompanies. The functioning of a given cue is made even more
ambiguous by the fact that such cues typically occur in constellations of features, e.g., a
smile and a marked intonation contour, in which the constellation of features channels
inferential processes differently than any one feature, in isolation, might.
The functioning of such cues also depends on the broader socio-cultural context. A
“joking insult frame” is more likely to occur in some US settings than in others, e.g., in
informal interaction between male friends. Inferring a “joking insult” meaning of the
utterance “Nice tie!” thus involves interpreting both the external, socio-cultural context of
the interaction and the moment-to-moment interpretive contexts created within the
stream of communicative behavior itself. Such cues and inferential patterns are acquired
through prolonged and intensive face-to-face interaction in particular cultural settings,
typically as part of one’s primary language socialization. Contextualization conventions
vary across cultures and sub-cultures, just as languages and accents vary across social
groupings. They thus form part of one’s socio-cultural background, just as other cultural
practices and beliefs do.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
Cultural differences in contextualization conventions can undermine intergroup commun-
ication insidiously because individuals tend to be unconscious of this dimension of
interaction. Contextualization cues have several characteristics that make them difficult
to recognize. They tend to be scalar, i.e., they vary along a continuum, such as pitch,
rather than existing as discrete forms, such as individual lexical items. Most such cues are
nonreferential, i.e., they carry no direct propositional information, but rather serve meta-
communicative framing functions. Finally, their meanings are a function of the context of
their use, so that individual cues cannot be analyzed in isolation from their use or assigned
a single, stable function or meaning. It is thus very difficult for individuals to recognize these
cues or the roles that they are playing in communication. While individuals from different
2316 Interactional Sociolinguistics
cultures may well be aware of speaking different languages or dressing differently, they are
seldom aware of the ways in which slight differences in contextualization conventions can
create interactional difficulties.
Gumperz (1982a, 173) reports, e.g., how intonation in uttering a single word led to
misunderstandings that damaged relations between South Asian immigrant cafeteria
workers and Anglo British workers at a British airport. When an Anglo British cafeteria
server in this workplace offered gravy to a person in line, she would say “Gravy?” with a
rising intonation contour. Anglo British workers used this prosodic information to
interpret the utterance as an offer or question: “Would you like gravy?” In contrast, when
recently-immigrated South Asian cafeteria workers asked employees if they wanted gravy,
they said “Gravy” with falling intonation. Anglo British workers interpreted the falling
intonation as contextualizing a statement (akin to “This is gravy – take it or leave it”),
which they found redundant and rude. Neither Anglo British nor South Asian workers
were able to articulate the role that intonation played in their problematic interactions
until it was pointed out by outside trainers. Thus, while two groups may “speak the same
language,” i.e., share syntax, phonology, and vocabulary, they may differ in the ways they
meta-communicatively define the moment-to-moment activities in which they are
engaging.
Because socio-cultural differences in contextualization conventions are unconscious,
they are not a readily available explanation to participants for breakdowns in commun-
ication or stilted, asynchronous interactions. When a person recognizes an apparent
communicative breakdown or disjuncture in interaction, a psychological idiom is readily
available to explain an interlocutor’s behavior, i.e., the other’s behavior can be accounted
for in terms of rudeness, insensitivity, selfishness, or some other personality trait. When
such problematic interactions come to be associated with interaction across ethnic or
cultural lines, it can result in pejorative stereotyping of entire groups and the reinforce-
ment of intergroup boundaries.
inferential processes and social and cultural worlds outside of that talk. With anthropology
it shares a focus on cultural variation and the meanings that participants themselves
attribute to their lives and actions. From philosophy of language and linguistics it
borrows such notions as implicature and speech acts, but it attends to real people in their
actual, messy interactions. With research in communication, it shares an interest in
actors’ apparent strategies and intended meanings in talk, and it overlaps with strands
in many of these disciplines that attend to communicative frames and meta-discursivity
in talk and interaction.
Some scholars have criticized interactional sociolinguistic accounts of intercultural
miscommunication, arguing that apparent miscommunication is more a function of
social and political inequality than of divergent patterns for linking surface commun-
icative forms and meanings. Problematic interactions are thus seen not as “misunder-
standings,” but as a form of communication that highlights ongoing differences in
perspective and socio-political interests. Many studies of intercultural miscommunication
have failed to attend to the role of inequality in such interactions. This is not a
shortcoming in the perspective of interactional sociolinguistics per se, but a limitation of
such studies themselves. Interactional sociolinguistics is first and foremost a method for
analyzing how social knowledge and linguistic knowledge intersect in creating meaning in
talk. Such a method can be used to show how inequality and conflicting interests are
negotiated in talk just as it can be used to show how cultural and linguistic differences can
play out in such interaction.
Interactional sociolinguistics, with its notions of contextualization cues and conversa-
tional inferencing, provides a powerful framework for examining meaning-making at
the intersection of talk and culture. Like other perspectives, such as indexicality, that
focus on the intersection of talk, culture, and meaning, interactional sociolinguistics
is fundamentally interpretive, rather than predictive. With its eclectic toolbox and
unabashedly functional orientation, interactional sociolinguistics lacks the theoretical
austerity of many approaches to interaction and meaning. However, it makes up for this
lack of theoretical elegance with its usefulness and its insights into the social and cultural
nature of communicative action. It helps to account for how different dimensions of
communicative behavior are related, e.g., prosody and words, and to explain the
achievement, or lack of achievement, of intersubjective understanding in particular
instances of interaction.
Coupland, N., Giles, H., & Wiemann, J. (eds.) (1991). “Miscommunication” and problematic talk.
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Eerdmans, S. L., Prevignano, C. L., & Thibault, P. J. (eds.) (2003). Language and interaction:
Discussions with John J. Gumperz. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Gumperz, J. J. (1982a). Discourse strategies. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gumperz, J. J. (ed.) (1982b). Language and social identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tannen, D. (1990). You just don’t understand: Women and men in conversation. New York: Morrow.
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INTERACTIVITY
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Interactivity, Concept of
W. Russell Neuman
University of Michigan
Interactivity is a relatively new, evolving, and still elusive concept in the study of com-
munication, most frequently associated with new digital media technologies (→ Digital
Media, History of). The concept’s elusiveness may result from the common use of the
term to identify a loosely defined bundle of attributes rather than a single attribute or
phenomenon. At its core, interactivity refers to the phenomenon of mutual adaptation,
usually between a communication medium such as the Internet or a video game and a
human user of that medium.
A seminal, if somewhat technical, definition of interactivity was offered by Rafaeli
(1988, 111): “Formally stated, interactivity is an expression of the extent that in a given
series of communication exchanges, any third (or later) transmission (or message) is
related to the degree to which previous exchanges referred to even earlier transmissions.”
The key element is responsiveness – what one says or does depends on another – a notion
clearly rooted in human face-to-face conversation. However, given the rich possibilities of
human–machine communication, Rafaeli warned that a model narrowly based on dyadic
human conversation would be too simplistic and reductive. Interactivity, to Rafaeli, is a
quintessential concept regarding the nature of communication.
In his original account of interactivity, Rafaeli considered the term “intuitively
appealing but underdefined.” Similarly, Jensen (1998) found it “frequently used but
seldom understood” and “outrageously complex,” while Sundar (2004) characterized it as
“much touted but undertheorized.” In a review of the literature, Bucy (2004, 373) concluded
that “interactivity has been identified as a core concept of new media, yet despite nearly
three decades of study and analysis, we scarcely know what interactivity is, let alone what
it does, and have scant insight into the conditions in which interactive processes are likely
to be consequential for members of a social system.”