JUAN G.

FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

TOPIC: Local Govt. Officials (qualifications, disqualifications, term of office)

DOCTRINE:

• The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
• Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
o a citizen of the Philippines;
o a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
o a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
o able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
o In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on

January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo

In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States
as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February
21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said
orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits
scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen at the time of the election.

RULING: NO.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all
public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times"
and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate
for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter
of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section
1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the
specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983
per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the
petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing
his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not
yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done,
or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for
tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a
foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If,
say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission
acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge
to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established,
and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack
of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the
Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of
great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly
restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive
mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of
his loyalty and love.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:

(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any
event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECONDARY ISSUES:

1. Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

We do not agree.

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was
rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in
connection with the 1992 elections.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a

person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire,
or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, we held:
 Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.

2. Comelec's Jurisdiction Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution has given the Comelec ample power
to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length
on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives,
may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No.
95-317 obviously is one.

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed
only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.

3. Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?

No. there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to
"bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was
ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee --
should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again,
"obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching
of Labo:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office.

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his

citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995
elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.