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International Negotiation 11: 317–339, 2006. 317

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The Logic of a Soft Intervention Strategy:

The United States and Conflict Conciliation in Africa

DONALD ROTHCHILD*
Department of Political Science, University of California at Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis,
CA 95616 USA (Email: [email protected])

Abstract. What forms of U.S. intervention are likely to prove realizable and to be appropriate
for facilitating the implementation of peace agreements and protecting human rights in Africa?
The choices for action are certainly wider than the polar opposites of disengagement and large-
scale military intervention. Because the United States can afford neither prolonged military
hegemony nor the indulgence of neo-isolationism, it must find some form of creative engage-
ment that fulfills its obligations to facilitate and protect in ways that are acceptable to both
American and overseas opinion. Limited interests in Africa and the nature of public pressures
leave little alternative to utilizing soft intervention approaches in most cases. Within the cate-
gory of soft intervention, there appears to be a continuum of means leading to possible move-
ment into muscular intervention. At one end, there is coercive diplomacy, which is associated
with threats of military and economic sanctions; if these sanctions are actually used, the inter-
vening state becomes involved in muscular intervention. At the other end is diplomacy associ-
ated not with threats, but with the promise of rewards. Between the two poles lies diplomacy
that involves neither threats nor rewards (i.e., conciliation and mediation without the use of pres-
sures and incentives). In real world contexts, third parties tend to apply mixed packages of non-
coercive and coercive incentives, with coercive incentives becoming increasingly dominant as
the costs of altering preferences and the intensity of conflict rise.

Keywords: strategy, nonintervention, muscular intervention, soft intervention, pressures,

incentives, mediation, conflict management.

Internal negotiations between states and insurgents have had difficulty pro-
ducing enduring outcomes, in part because the state is a party to the conflict
and not in a position to identify with the interests of the society as a whole (De
Silva 2001: 437–439; Rothchild 1997: 89–91). When these negotiations have

* Donald Rothchild is professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.

His recent books include Managing Ethnic Conflict In Africa: Pressures And Incentives For
Cooperation (Brookings, 1997), co-author of Sovereignty As Responsibility: Conflict Manage-
ment In Africa (Brookings, 1996), and co-editor of The International Spread Of Ethnic
Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, And Escalation (Princeton, 1998); Ending Civil Wars: The Imple-
mentation Of Peace Agreements (Lynne Rienner, 2002); Sustainable Peace: Power And
Democracy After Civil Wars (Cornell, 2005); and Africa-US Relations: Strategic Encounters
(Lynne Rienner, 2006).

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318 DONALD ROTHCHILD

resulted in agreements, the protection of weaker ethnic interests within the

structures of sovereign states remains problematic (Rothchild 2000a). As a
consequence, weaker actors often feel they must look to external actors to
intercede and to help create the institutions that shape the incentives for coop-
eration and “coordinate the participants’ expectations and actions” (Snyder
1990, 30). External actors can play an important role during a transition from
authoritarianism or civil war, providing a context in which cooperation is fos-
tered and various forms of protection are offered – monitoring and guaran-
teeing peace accords, pressuring repressive governments, placing political
conditions on economic assistance, and, as a last resort, interceding militarily
to preserve the shaky balance of power between the contending actors.
Certainly, such external initiatives matter, for they reassure weaker parties
about their security. But what interventions are likely to prove realizable and
to assist in overcoming uncertainty? To help answer these questions, I look to
the experiences of the United States as a prime example of what a great power
can achieve in helping to manage Africa’s intrastate conflicts.
To remain a great power, that country must be involved in world affairs, and
must never ignore the mass starvation, health crises, grave abuses of human
rights, and ethnic murders that take place. For example, and quite appropri-
ately, in May 2005 the International Crisis Group urged a strong international
intervention to stop the ongoing killings in Darfur (International Crisis Group,
May 25, 2005), indicating that the time had come to act both effectively and
appropriately. In contrast to smaller powers, which promise little, a great
power such as the United States faces a credibility problem when it comes up
short on the tests of appropriateness and effectiveness. Because there are cur-
rently few other countries or international organizations capable of responding
to massive human rights violations, the task of leadership in meeting this chal-
lenge falls heavily, but not exclusively, on the United States (the only country
that has declared that genocide is occurring in Darfur [Lieber 2005: 52]).
Leadership in this case means using its position on the UN Security Council
to press for the deployment of a UN intervention force under Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter in support of the African Union mission in Darfur (“UN Must
Intervene” 2005) and most currently, a UN mission. However, when the
United States fails to rise to the challenge, as in the mass killings in Rwanda
(1994) and Darfur (2003–2004), it encounters legitimate domestic and inter-
national criticism for failing to effectively use its power and high status to pro-
tect the vulnerable (Pruitt 2001, 274–75). When the United States overreacts,
as in Iraq, its military power is undercut by an insufficient ethical purpose.
Because the United States can afford neither prolonged military hegemony
nor the indulgence of neo-isolationism, it must find some form of creative
engagement that fulfills its obligations to protect in ways that are acceptable

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THE LOGIC OF A SOFT INTERVENTION STRATEGY 319

to both American and overseas public opinion. Striking and maintaining the
balance between over-involvement and under-involvement are difficult tasks
and lead to the following question: what forms of U.S. intervention are suit-
able for the protection of basic human rights in the African context?
Appropriate U.S. interventions must meet two tests: (1) their purposes must
be legitimate – that is, they must seek to safeguard a people’s right to life and
protect them from gross human rights violations, and (2) the interveners must
have the political will and capacity to sustain their actions until the behavior
of the target state changes in a positive, life-affirming direction. In light of
these objectives, what types of great power interventions are likely to be
acceptable to both the African and American publics during the various phases
of conflict? Because of the intensity that often accompanies Africa’s ethnic and
religious clashes (particularly its civil wars), what kinds of initiatives will meet
the tests of appropriateness in such complex political environments? I hypoth-
esize that, when a developing country is substantially integrated into the
global economy, measures of soft intervention (especially pressures and incen-
tives) wielded by a great power can promote ripeness in negotiations and,
therefore, the consolidation of peace.

External Intervention

For some writers, external intervention is restricted to a type of military action

or threat of military action that takes place within the jurisdiction of another
sovereign state and is intended to alter regime practices (Finnemore 2003:
9–10). I prefer, however, to take a broader approach that employs a combina-
tion of both military and nonmilitary means to shift in a desired direction the
behavior of a target regime (Jentleson 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2001: 7).
As used here, “intervention” is defined as an action by a relatively strong state
(e.g., the United States) to alter the identity, authority system, or behavior of
a relatively weak state (in this case, one found in Africa). Although I recognize
that the focus on military action lends itself to methodological rigor, I feel it
by no means exhausts the strategic options open to great powers. Intervention,
as Kofi Annan observes (1999):
should not be understood as referring only to the use of force. A tragic
irony of many of the crises that go unnoticed or unchallenged in the world
today is that they could be dealt with by far less perilous acts of inter-
vention than the one we saw this year in Yugoslavia.
This broader approach is useful in dealing with a variety of issues, such
as refugees, human rights, terrorism, environmental degradation, and the

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320 DONALD ROTHCHILD

movement of drugs; these require noncoercive as well as coercive responses.

Therefore, once the strategy options are widened to include nonmilitary ini-
tiatives, it becomes clear that states have a wide range of meaningful alterna-
tives at their disposal.
Clearly, the decision of an outside power to intervene, or to threaten to inter-
vene, must be both legitimate and credible. Whether unilateral or multilateral,
interested or disinterested, constructive or destructive, the outside power
gains legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its domestic and international
publics by securing regional or international organization approval prior to
taking action, and through its efforts to influence internal behavior in a con-
sensual, life-affirming direction. Such actions can be authorized by the UN
Security Council when it determines that a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression has occurred (Article 39 of the UN Charter). Yet
even with UN backing, the risks and costs of external interventions are often
unwisely minimized. In spite of multilateral support, domestic public support
for intervention may decline (Mueller 2005; Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006),
mission creep may result in unanticipated outlays or reputation costs, and the
target regime may increase its level of repressive acts.
Given the potential risks and costs of involvement, when does a humani-
tarian crisis affect U.S. interests or the public’s conscience sufficiently to
make an intervention of some type, alone or in association with others, appro-
priate to protect Africa’s vulnerable peoples? (See Touval 1996: 554.) And
when can the United States expect to influence the course of the conflict
sufficiently at an acceptable cost? The answers lie somewhere between two
types of confrontation: those with spillover effects that poison the international
environment, such as Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
or Sudan, and those that lack the same destructive potential and do not affect
vital U.S. interests in a significant manner. This involves determining rough
guidelines for the appropriate actions in advance of a crisis.
Setting guidelines for U.S. intervention, alone or in concert with others, is
a widely-debated issue. Whether intervention is justified or not, it involves
interference in the internal affairs of a target state and is therefore defensible
only to the extent that it protects a greater number of lives and fundamental
rights than it puts at risk (Haass 1997: 111). Admittedly, the positive and neg-
ative effects of intervention cannot always be known in advance, as was seen
with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia in 1990. Hence, caution combined with
effective intelligence is critically important for the determination of an appro-
priate benefit-cost calculation. The following set of guidelines represents an
initial starting point for the purposes of making more systematic choices on
appropriate U.S. interventions aimed at protecting vulnerable peoples. These

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guidelines, drawn largely from official administration statements and docu-

ments, include five key conditions: a clear formulation of purposes, the build-
ing of a broad support coalition, the generation of sufficient pressure to induce
compliance, a commitment to see the process through to the end, and a pre-
paredness to use military coercion as a last resort (Powell 1992–1993: 38;
Clinton 1997).

The Scope for Choice

It is important to note at the outset that many issues relating to possible

choices on U.S. intervention are not subject to extensive public scrutiny and
debate. Liberal democracies, like some authoritarian regimes, allow their
bureaucracies considerable discretion on low-intensity foreign policy matters.
Political leaders give foreign service officers, who have expert knowledge of
the conflict management process and the area of conflict, considerable freedom
to make decisions and to engage in negotiations (Liberia in 2003, Sudan in
2003–2005). Thus, the confrontations in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Western
Sahara, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda (1994), and Côte d’Ivoire
remained largely below the radar screens of high government officials. Only
in rare cases did Africa’s intrastate disputes become a domestic political issue
in the United States (as in Biafra, South Africa, and Darfur). Occasionally, as
Kennan (1951: 11) observes regarding the U.S. ultimatum to Spain in 1898
over the future of Cuba, public involvement has led to warmongering of the
worst sort. For the most part, however, the public has exhibited caution, reluc-
tant to give its full support to the military force option (Jentleson 1992: 72).
In the past, if it has given qualified support for soft interventions early in a cri-
sis, the U.S. public has tended to pull back from military engagement once the
full implications of the risks and costs of interceding became evident.
At different times, U.S. policymakers have pursued a two-value approach
that is supportive of both the state and minority elements. U.S. leaders often
choose to uphold the legitimacy of the African state (e.g., the Cold War regime
of Mobutu Sese Seko in the Congo) and the African state system. For the most
part, the United States supports the integrity of the state and tries “to define and
apply the concept of self-determination in a way that is conducive to integra-
tion” (Talbot 2000: 155). Frequently, this leads it to refrain from interference
in the domestic affairs of repressive states – only to reap a harvest of legitimate
criticism for abandoning its principles. On other occasions, the United States
champions the claims of people vulnerable to the state, as in southern Sudan,
Darfur, or the Kurds in Iraq. In 1997, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright sent clear signals of support for John Garang’s Sudan People’s

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322 DONALD ROTHCHILD

Liberation Army, urging the insurgents to bring about a change in the Sudanese
regime either through peaceful or military means (Turkish Daily News
Archive 1997). This obligation to protect flows in part from the long-standing
commitment of the United States to the stability of the state system and to
human rights (Huntington 1981, 17, 244). Though such a two-value approach
may be justified, U.S. goals can appear confusing as a result.
Certainly, U.S. strategies on diplomatic and military intervention cannot be
applied across the board. They must take account of a number of independent
variables, such as the extent of state weakness, the intensity of the conflict, and
group perceptions of security or insecurity. The choices for action are undoubt-
edly wider than the polar opposites of disengagement and large-scale military
intervention. There is, as Power (2002: xviii) writes, a “continuum of inter-
vention,” steps that may prove useful in promoting ethnic cooperation.

The Lack of a U.S. Grand Strategy on African Conflicts

Grand strategies are more likely to emerge when great powers wish to main-
tain or expand their involvement in a region. For the most part, the United
States does not wish to do so in Africa at this time. As one well-placed
Washington official confirmed (Confidential interview, April 24, 2001), the
United States generally lacks a consistent overall strategy on nationality-
related issues because the U.S. foreign policy elite has limited economic and
political interests in Africa, and because no well-organized U.S. constituency
exists to support African concerns. The result is a low-profile approach to
African issues that contributes to extreme pragmatism and to the lack of a
developed strategy. As noted, there are occasional exceptions to this finding,
shown by apartheid South Africa, Biafra, or Somalia, but for the most part U.S.
policy is left in the hands of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Foreign service
officers generally advance their own self-interest through a cautious approach
toward African matters, and are inclined to take few risks and to follow estab-
lished routines (Allison 1971: 84). Not surprisingly, few African issues get to
the Principals Committee (the highest interagency forum) for discussion
(Rothchild and Emmanuel 2005, 82) and for the most part, the organizational
preferences of the bureaucracy lead to routinized behavior.
Although the United States still continues to be what Haass 1997 calls a
“reluctant sheriff,” it nonetheless is moving cautiously toward a somewhat
higher profile on African humanitarian issues. U.S. policymakers appear to be
influenced by the increasing responsibilities that the international community
is prepared to assume to protect the vulnerable (Evans and Sahnoun 2002). If
the United States eluded responsibility and remained largely disengaged from

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Africa’s humanitarian affairs in the past, indicated by the lack of U.S. involve-
ment in preventing the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the avoidance of entan-
glement in such human rights outrages will likely become more difficult in
the future. This change has become evident with the application of smart sanc-
tions (travel restrictions and halting bilateral trade with the U.S.) against
Zimbabwe’s president Robert Mugabe and the higher echelons of the
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. It also surfaced with the
2004 crisis in Darfur, when a U.S. President and Congress were explicit about
the existence of genocide, and went on to display a new willingness to support
external intervention in the form of sanctions against human rights violators
and the dispatch of UN forces to the area.
Even though post-Cold War U.S. administrations have displayed diverse
overarching policy approaches toward Africa, it seems unwise to overstate the
extent of their variances with respect to African issues (Schlesinger 1986: 47;
Huntington 1981: 241). Clearly, the preference to maintain a low profile on
African conflicts has remained steady; nevertheless, these administrations
have shown notable differences in their perceptions of U.S./African economic
relations and security interests. What emerges are three basic strategic
approaches for coping with African crisis situations: (1) nonintervention,
(2) muscular intervention, and (3) soft intervention. All these take place within
a larger low-profile orientation, but they involve different levels of commit-
ment. I will discuss the costs and benefits of each of these strategic approaches
in turn, emphasizing their logics as to the ways in which the United States
deals with human rights and conflict on the African continent.

Nonintervention

In general, noninterventionists seek to advance U.S. national interests by

refusing to accept calls to intercede in internal state conflicts abroad. Those
championing a noninterventionist strategy reject claims that such interventions
are vital to U.S. national interests. Instead, they emphasize the need to invest
heavily in U.S. economic and military strength and to avoid commitments that
would weaken that strength. General Richard Myers, warning against sending
U.S. forces to Liberia in July 2003, argued that U.S. troops were already
stretched thin in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the Liberian political situation
was too unstable to warrant the dispatch of U.S. soldiers (Weisman 2003: A8).
In addition, academics and policymakers, many of whom perceive ethnic
conflict in essentialist terms (e.g., based on rigid differences and therefore non-
negotiable) have sometimes argued that the United States should resist the
temptation to intervene in Africa’s intrastate conflicts and let wars “among the
lesser powers” burn themselves out (Luttwak 1999: 36). Others have

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324 DONALD ROTHCHILD

expressed fears that military interventions abroad might have an adverse

effect on the maintenance of freedoms at home (McDougall 1997: 10).
These sentiments should not be dismissed cavalierly. Schneider (1983: 41)
estimates that the noninterventionists include a significant segment of the
American people – almost one half. On most African issues, the American
public tends to be united in its view that African interethnic or interreligious
problems are internal matters that do not threaten vital U.S. economic or
security interests (Posen and Ross 1996–1997: 12). Regarding their country
as a hegemonic actor, the public and its leaders are concerned primarily with
major global challenges and do not appear to be greatly concerned with
Africa’s internal wars – as long as they do not destabilize the international sys-
tem. However, this attitude changes when African issues become important to
the American public. Thus, in certain high-profile cases such as Darfur, the
percentage of noninterventionists in the American public fell to 17 percent,
with 13 percent listed as not sure (International Crisis Group 2005: 3).
The effects that a sizable noninterventionist public stance have had on pol-
icy formulation have been noticeable over the years. After European decolo-
nization took place in Africa in the 1960s, U.S. policymakers were quite
prepared to leave external action to the former colonial powers (Rothchild
1979: 307); they stood largely on the sidelines, exhorting African belligerents
to negotiate their differences, but otherwise allowing the conflicts to follow
their own course. In Biafra, for example, a 1967 National Security Council
Note described the United States as “remaining neutral” in the conflict,
explaining: “The trouble arises primarily out of tribal difference” (National
Security Council 1967a). With no solution in sight, the United States deplored
the use of force by either side, reaffirmed its support for the federal military
government and for Nigerian unity, and placed sanctions on the supply of
ammunition to the warring parties. Otherwise, it pursued a “hands-off posture”
(National Security Council 1967b). In South Africa in the late 1960s, U.S. pol-
icymakers spoke disapprovingly of violence by either side but shrank away
from decisive action to end apartheid. U.S. State Department officials, speak-
ing at a senior interdepartmental meeting, “concluded that we could not hope
to moderate South Africa’s racial policies by either greater pressures or closer,
more friendly relations” and recommended a damage-limiting, status quo
course of action (U.S. Department of State Memorandum 1968). Constructive
engagement (quiet diplomacy) became the guiding principle of the times.
Following the advent of African independence in the 1960s and the emer-
gence of the Cold War, both superpowers increased their involvement, acting
at times as “aggravating external factor[s]” in African affairs and at other times
“both as third parties and as mutually neutralizing allies” (Deng 1993, 34). By
the 1990s, the disengagement of the superpowers from Africa’s conflicts

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became fashionable in certain circles. After Somali National Alliance forces

engaged in a damaging battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 that left eighteen
Americans, one Malaysian, and hundreds of Somalis dead, American public
opinion, shocked over televised airings of an American serviceman dragged
through the streets of Mogadishu, turned against a continued U.S. presence
there (Rothchild 2000b: 176–178). Support for a sustained “humanitarian”
mission in Somalia largely evaporated in the Senate, and President Bill Clinton
was left with little choice but to declare his intention to withdraw U.S. forces
the following year.
Events in Somalia had broad ramifications for U.S. thinking in future crises.
As a frenzy of mass killings occurred in Rwanda in April 1994, the U.S. gov-
ernment resisted intervention in any significant manner, with the view that the
risks of sending troops outweighed the potential benefits. U.S. leaders down-
played the nature and extent of the violence, and questioned whether the
killings, in fact, constituted a genuine case of genocide. Not only did these
leaders fail to take action in line with oft-stated principles, but they also
thwarted efforts by the United Nations to intercede and prevent the hard-line
Hutus from carrying their planned genocide to its logical conclusion. U.S. dis-
engagement reached a high point in May 1994, when Clinton’s Presidential
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) formally set out current U.S. thinking on the
circumstances under which future interventions would be sponsored.
While contending that the “U.S. cannot be the world’s policeman,” PDD 25
did recognize the need for future multilateral interventions. At the same time,
it called for more U.S. and UN discipline in determining when U.S. national
interests were served by interventions in the ethnic conflicts and civil wars of
Africa. Thus, PDD 25 affirmed “that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for
advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both
U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effec-
tive” (Clinton 1994) [author’s emphasis]. The consequences of this call for
reduced U.S. engagement were noticeable in the years that followed. In
Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, and the DRC in the 1990s, the United States stood
largely on the sidelines while intrastate conflict wreaked havoc upon these
societies. The U.S. did play a critical role in Burundi in 1996, scrapping a pro-
posal to intervene in favor of a new effort to facilitate peace (Maundi 2003:
337); in the other cases, however, it remained largely uninvolved. Adopting a
low-profile approach on African issues, the United States was primarily con-
cerned with major global challenges to its leadership; therefore, it was not
alarmed by intrastate conflicts in Africa that did not destabilize the interna-
tional system.
With the advent of the George W. Bush administration, the United States
increasingly reengaged with Africa, although in a selective and very cautious

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manner. Following the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, the Bush team adopted a more activist stance on African
issues. It created or enlarged such programs as the African Growth and
Opportunity Act, the Millennium Challenge Account, and the HIV-AIDS ini-
tiatives; increased various military support efforts to bolster Africa’s states; and
engaged in mediatory activities in Liberia and Sudan. This reengagement in
part reflected the administration’s strategic priorities of pursuing petroleum
resources and combating terrorism around the world (Bush 2002). Involving
both strategic and human security assistance, this broadened engagement was
aimed toward enabling Africa’s weak states to strengthen their institutions and
economies and to increase their ability to protect themselves from the forces
of destabilization (Rothchild and Keller 2006). In respect to intervening in
Africa’s intrastate conflicts to protect the vulnerable, the Bush administration
was cautiously reengaging with Africa. However, in general it spoke strongly,
but wielded a frail stick.
The Bush administration’s two most far-reaching interventions in intrastate
conflicts occurred in Liberia and Sudan. In these two mediatory efforts, U.S.
diplomats largely wielded influence indirectly – through persuasion, commu-
nication, mediation, the arrangement of talks, the exertion of pressures, and the
offering of incentives. Although the United States did participate in the nego-
tiation processes, it was careful to maintain a low profile, mounting its efforts
under the auspices of another state or international organization. “One of the
keys to success” in Sudan, explained Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Charles R. Snyder, “is actually falling in behind the work already done by the
Africans, reinvigorating it, and taking it further” to include new, expanded
measures (U.S. Department of State 2004). In the Liberian negotiations, I
interviewed prominent sources who emphasized that the United States was
active in a supporting role and that the leadership of the peace process was
regional (Confidential interview 2003).
Even though U.S. diplomats were circumspect in their interventions in the
Liberian and Sudanese conflicts, this is not to say that these initiatives lacked
direction or forcefulness. On occasion, U.S. diplomats adopted a high-profile
stance. For example, in an effort to overcome an impasse in the Sudanese
peace talks, U.S. mediators took center stage and proposed that the oil-rich
region of Abyei be granted interim self-administering status, pending a refer-
endum on whether to join the north or south (Majtenyi 2004). And during the
Liberian negotiations, U.S. mediators were quite specific on ruling out the pos-
sibility of a military victory by one of the Liberian factions. They promoted
the principle of inclusiveness in cabinet appointments as well as the selection
of a leader acceptable to all major parties.

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In sum, a noninterventionist approach is certainly satisfactory to a signi-

ficant segment of the American public. But, it can come at a substantial cost.
First, a failure to become involved and to protect the vulnerable can contribute
to a weakening of U.S. credibility. That may not have been the case prior to
World War II, but the recent development of norms on international equality
and responsibility has created new pressures for intervention (Finnemore
2003: 52). Second, standing aside and letting the stronger side win seems
deterministic and needlessly negative regarding the possibilities for preven-
tive action. And third, inaction in the face of genocide involves costs in terms
of purpose and self-esteem on the part of a great power and its people that must
not be underestimated.

Muscular Intervention

Those that advocate the use of U.S. military might, either unilaterally or mul-
tilaterally, to help manage intrastate conflicts and the abuse of human rights,
generally contend that force or the threat of military force is an important
option that must not be dismissed. Scholars holding this view often contend
that the threat of military force is particularly efficacious in intense conflict sit-
uations. When diplomatic options prove insufficient, a great power actor with
enormous resources under its control may become indispensable in pressur-
ing target states and movements to alter their behavior. Not only can a great
power use diplomatic and military force to help bring the fighting to a halt, it
can also engage in operations other than war (OOTW): sending peacekeepers,
monitoring demobilization and disarmament, providing logistical support and
financial backing to implement peace agreements, and assisting in enforcing
the peace. It may be preferable, for reasons of legitimacy, to have the UN or
regional organizations act as the agent of intervention in internal conflicts in
African states, but at times there may be no alternative to unilateral interven-
tions by powerful actors. A failure to proceed decisively in threatening situa-
tions may thwart the achievement of U.S. purposes and damage the reputation
of the United States.
The legitimacy of military operations is very much a matter of context –
whether the intervener is defending a state against external aggression or
interceding in an internal war, whether the action is endorsed by the United
Nations or a regional organization, whether it is multilateral or unilateral, or
whether the intervener uses air strikes or commits ground forces (Eichenberg
2005). States must move quickly to head off and/or deal with threats to
vulnerable ethnic and religious interests within African states. Preferably,
the international community, acting through its regional and international

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328 DONALD ROTHCHILD

organizations, will assume the primary task of authorizing and directing

interventions. For UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, external interventions
are acceptable when they are “based on legitimate and universal principles.”
He notes:
The tragedy of East Timor, coming so soon after that of Kosovo, has
focused attention once again on the need for timely intervention by the
international community when death and suffering are being inflicted on
large numbers of people, and when the state nominally in charge is
unable or unwilling to stop it (Annan 1999).
In line with Annan’s defense of armed intervention in extreme circumstances,
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001:
32) prudently set out six criteria for military intervention with the purpose of
human protection: right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional
means, and reasonable prospects.
Because it can be difficult for multilateral organizations to mobilize and
launch interventions aimed at regime change, the need to act sometimes falls
on the shoulders of individual states. Given U.S. military and economic “pri-
macy” in the current international environment, such initiatives all too often
require U.S. leadership. As Jentleson (1992: 72) indicates, the American pub-
lic differentiates “prudently” between policy objectives regarding the appro-
priateness of military force, giving higher support to humanitarian intervention
than to internal political change. The costs of military interventions to achieve
regime change are potentially high, not only in terms of casualties, financial
outlays, and increasing resistance from other great powers (e.g., Soviet com-
petition during the Cold War and China’s current role in Sudan and Zimbabwe
[see Lyman and Morrison 2006: 50]), but also in terms of declining domestic
public support and international legitimacy. U.S. interventions may, as in
Somalia or Iraq, encounter unanticipated resistance by local leaders, who
charge the United States with an illegal occupation and with favoritism. This
effect can gravely try the patience of the American public as the costs of
conflict grow (Mueller 2005; Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006). Interventions
in internal wars soon lose their popularity with the American public, partly
because the conflicts are perceived to be protracted, the risks of casualties are
viewed as potentially high, and the exit options remain uncertain. As
Eichenberg (2005: 173) observes, “Involvement in situations of internal polit-
ical change [lacks the support given to restraining aggression]: other things
being equal, intervention in what are essentially civil war situations yields sup-
port well below a majority.” Survey data indicates, as prospect theory would
predict, that Americans are more likely to support the military option if it may
prevent a loss to some position the United States has already reached, rather

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THE LOGIC OF A SOFT INTERVENTION STRATEGY 329

than achieve something that is, as yet, an unattained prospect (Nincic 1997:
101). Because U.S. intervention to protect Africa’s vulnerable through inter-
nal political change falls into the latter category, it makes the prospect of using
military might for this purpose less probable.
Furthermore, not only is the American public reluctant to see the United
States embroiled in overseas combat, but it may also resist the use of U.S. mil-
itary forces to achieve humanitarian objectives. Even though a 2005 poll
showed that 78 percent of U.S. respondents agree that democracy is the best
form of government, 66 percent said that “warning a government that the U.S.
might intervene militarily if it does not carry out some democratic reforms”
does more harm than good (Chicago Council 2005: 3). The use of the
American military to achieve regime change also received a cool response:
52 percent reportedly favored using military means to overthrow a dictator,
with 48 percent responding that such actions do more harm than good
(Chicago Council 2005: 3). Clearly, experience has taught many observers
that a great power has the military capacity to intervene in civil wars and
to push its humanitarian purposes, but that the effects of such actions may be
disappointing.
Conflict management theory has paid too little attention to the way a mus-
cular external actor such as the United States can use its military power to end
intrastate warfare and provide a structure of incentives that encourages democ-
racy and cooperation. Clearly, there is a potentially important role for a great
power intervener to play in two areas – avoiding the entrapment of African
groups in unending conflicts and the construction of supportive institutions to
help protect ethnic and religious minorities living within sovereign states. The
asymmetry of power that exists between the United States and African actors
puts it at a favorable vantage point to influence African behavior. U.S. actions
to bring about a cessation of fighting have considerable credibility – provided,
of course, that the United States has the political will to threaten adversaries
with unwanted costs and to act on these threats when necessary, and given
that the adversaries and their allies perceive U.S. threats or possible actions
to be real.
At the same time, these provisos go to the heart of the problems associated
with the use of military force to protect the vulnerable. U.S. military power,
although great, is not always usable power in the African context. As Iraq indi-
cates, such incursions may not have clear-cut international legitimation, the
financial and human costs may be higher than anticipated, the advanced
weaponry may have little relevance, and the tendency to favor one set of actors
against the others may generate intense resistance (Diamond 2005). In addi-
tion, limited American public support for military intervention may make a
commitment to prolonged warfare difficult to sustain. Because U.S. military

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330 DONALD ROTHCHILD

might can provide it with credible leverage in certain circumstances, U.S. strat-
egy must retain a place for military operations and the threat of military action
as a last resort. If it does prove necessary, it is preferable that it be multilateral
(possibly including Africa’s influential states as well as the European Union,
China, and Japan) and its cause viewed by the public as worthwhile. Even so,
when not used effectively or when combined with favoritism, military force
is too costly and inefficient to serve as the main approach for dealing with most
of Africa’s humanitarian challenges.

Soft Intervention

The proponents of a soft intervention approach contend that, in the long run,
U.S. diplomatic influences will be more effective in protecting Africa’s vul-
nerable peoples and more sustainable than either of the other approaches. With
U.S. power peaking, Kupchan (2002: 67) argues that the United States must
prepare itself and the world “for a new and more discriminating brand of
American internationalism.” Limited interests in Africa and the nature of
public pressure in most cases leave little alternative to the utilization of a soft
intervention approach. In contrast to muscular intervention, which is directed
against a target state or a movement’s capabilities, soft intervention seeks to
mold that country’s intentions. Those favoring soft intervention view the risks
and costs of diplomatic intervention to be within acceptable limits. Because it
involves U.S. diplomats in an effort (albeit a limited one) to prevent or end a
crisis, this approach avoids the aloofness and lack of concern associated with
noninvolvement. Those advocating a diplomatic course of action accept the
reality of Africa’s preferences and work in concert with them to encourage
local peoples to change their own behavior. As Jentleson (2003–2004: 10) puts
it, the greatest challenge the United States faces is “not about doing what it
wants to do but about getting others to do what it wants them to do.”
Because a soft intervention strategy involves a limited commitment to the
management of conflict, it is not surprising that its results show a mixed
record of failures and successes. The archetype of a soft intervention approach,
the U.S. mediation of conflicts in Africa, is a general case in point. This
approach entails the noncoercive intervention of an external third party or par-
ties in the internal affairs of Africa’s sovereign states. By intervening in the
conflict, the mediator exerts various types (exhortations, incentives, economic
and political pressures, threat, coercion) and levels of influence on state and
substate (ethnoregional, religious, or other) elites in an attempt to get them to
move toward increased cooperation. Invariably, the mediator transforms the
bargaining encounter from a dyadic to a triadic relationship, persuading or
inducing the parties to change their attitudes on the issues at hand (Zartman

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THE LOGIC OF A SOFT INTERVENTION STRATEGY 331

1992: 31–33; Kubicek 1997). Such a reconstitution of the conflict encounters

the constraints of commitment, political will, and local and external resistance.
The possibility of failure and a return to civil war, as in Angola and Liberia,
can never be dismissed. These prospects can at times discourage potential third
parties from taking on a diplomatic initiative, since it affects the ties between
the external actor and the parties – and even the credibility of the third party
country itself.
A third party’s power comes from its ability to facilitate an outcome that is
minimally acceptable to both bargaining parties or that threatens a worse out-
come by allying the third party with one of the local rivals (Zartman and
Touval 1985: 261). At the most basic level, as in Mozambique, Burundi, and
Rwanda, U.S. intermediaries have used a variety of noncoercive means to keep
the channels of communication open and to provide information on the inten-
tions of rival interests. At the next level, as in Sudan and Liberia in 2003–2004,
U.S. mediators were more proactive, persuading and criticizing, giving advice,
encouraging parties to reconsider their options, and formulating proposals. At
an even more involved level, as seen in the Angolan-Namibian negotiations
and the Ethiopian negotiations in 1991, high-level U.S. public officials have
intervened and influenced the strategies of local actors through direct media-
tion and the use of various pressures and incentives. Finally, in Somalia
and briefly in Liberia, the United States combined diplomacy with military
intervention to promote a cessation of fighting and to promote a return to
normal relations.
In most circumstances, it is imprudent for a great power mediator to impose
its views on the political elites of developing countries. Too much external
pressure can prove counterproductive, lessening the negotiating parties’ com-
mitment to the process (Kelman 1997: 187). Because U.S. third-party inter-
vention represents an unequal power relationship with Africa’s governments
and movements, it is important for U.S. intermediaries to exercise consider-
able restraint and to be prepared to use its economic and political resources to
push for a peaceful settlement. In dealing with the Sudanese and Liberian
negotiators, U.S. intermediaries I interviewed expressed considerable aware-
ness of their limited ability to wield influence. They opted to hold themselves
in reserve and preferred to act as observers, communicators, advisers, and,
possibly, formulators. In these instances, they avoided assuming the more
assertive functions that accompany manipulation. Had U.S. diplomats taken
on the role of lead mediator, as the Liberians pressed them to do, they would
have had to use their power and resources with extreme care and sensitivity.
“Mediation,” Zartman (2004: 152) asserts, “requires an ability . . . to create
incentives for Need-based situations to receive even-handed government
attention.” Incentives, particularly coercive ones, are the means that enable a

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332 DONALD ROTHCHILD

mediator to influence the parties to a conflict. As Larson (1998: 123) writes,

“Power entails the use of a broad range of instruments, including threats and
promises as well as rewards and punishments, to induce the other to behave
in a desired fashion.” Incentives signal to those in the target state in positions
of power the intent of the intervener regarding its preferences. They consist of
structural arrangements, distributive or symbolic rewards, or punishments
used by third parties to encourage the movement or shift of a target state’s
priorities in a desired direction (Rothchild 2003: 36). Whether noncoercive
(e.g., recognition, economic aid, trade concessions, membership in interna-
tional organizations) or coercive (diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or military
force), incentives attempt “to raise the opportunity cost of continuing on the
previous course of action by changing the calculation of costs and benefits”
(Cortright 1997, 273).
Within the category of soft intervention, there is a continuum of means that
lead to the possible movement towards muscular intervention. At one end is
found coercive diplomacy, which is associated with threats of military and eco-
nomic sanctions; if these sanctions are actually used, the intervening state
becomes involved in muscular intervention. At the other end is diplomacy,
associated not with threats, but with the promise of rewards. Between the two
poles lies diplomacy that involves neither threats nor rewards (i.e., concilia-
tion and mediation without the use of pressures and incentives). In a real world
context, third parties tend to apply mixed packages of noncoercive and coer-
cive incentives, with coercive incentives increasingly dominant as the costs of
altering preferences and the intensity of conflicts rise. Provided they are cred-
ible and sufficient to deal with the crisis at hand, combined strategies of incen-
tives and disincentives may prevent the escalation of conflict; they make the
adversaries aware of the benefits of a negotiated outcome while alerting them
to the increasing costs of bargaining failure and the advent or renewal of war.
In light of the economic and political resources at their disposal, U.S. diplo-
mats are particularly well placed to employ a variety of incentives and disin-
centives either to end Africa’s civil wars or to protect its vulnerable religious
or ethnic groups. Leverage can be essential if the mediator is to be in a position
to exert pressure, provide incentives, or offer desirable alternatives. “[T]he
level of incentives necessary to change behavior is not fixed,” Zartman (2001:
298) observes, “but shifts according to the circumstances.” When conflict is
intense and strong third-party influence is needed, mediators require the
capacity to raise the costs of proceeding on a given course of action (Cortright
1997: 273). It is in those difficult circumstances when the mediator seeks
to manipulate the parties and to reconcile their differences that pressures
and incentives are of great consequence, as indicated by the cases of Liberia
and Sudan.

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THE LOGIC OF A SOFT INTERVENTION STRATEGY 333

Although U.S. diplomats operated behind the scenes during the Liberian
negotiations, their use of pressures and incentives surfaced from time to time.
They were adamant during the 2003 negotiations about ruling out the possi-
bility of a military victory by any of the Liberian factions, and urged the adop-
tion of a policy of inclusion in the recruitment of leaders to the transition
cabinet. U.S. diplomats also conditioned a resumption of aid in 1999 on a
full investigation of the shooting that took place at the U.S. embassy; briefly
positioned U.S. forces offshore in 2003, sending a few hundred troops to
protect the embassy and airport; and provided financial assistance in 2004 for
use in restructuring the army. In exerting these pressures on Liberian author-
ities, the external actor was clearly influenced by the preferences of domestic
interests who strengthened its calls for a change of regimes and policies
(Kubicek 1997: 83).
In Sudan, where U.S. intermediaries could negotiate with government
and opposition leaders, their use of diplomatic pressures and incentives was
more varied and extensive. Secretary of State Powell noted in 2002 that
sanctions would not be removed until the North-South agreement was signed
and implemented and in October 2003, Powell suggested that the United
States might lift sanctions if Sudan reached a peace accord with the South.
U.S. pressures and incentives were also evident in other countries (Rothchild
1997; Rothchild 2003), indicating a preparedness on the part of U.S. public
officials to make ready use of these cost-effective diplomatic approaches
to protect Africa’s vulnerable peoples and to advance the causes of peace
and stability.
The inclination to use diplomatic leverage to advance U.S. purposes in
Liberia, Sudan and elsewhere in Africa has been buttressed by public support
for soft intervention. The American public’s preference for diplomacy over
military intervention was noted by Russett and Nincic (1976: 430), whose sur-
vey data indicated that it was far more prepared to send military supplies or
“even” conventionally armed U.S. troops than nuclear weapons to defend
other countries abroad. More recently, the 1999 Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations came to a similar finding: the public expressed low support for send-
ing U.S. troops abroad, even in a multilateral context, but stated a clear pref-
erence for responding to external threats through judicial and diplomatic
means (Riley 1999: 26–27). The Council’s report noted, as follows: “Sug-
gesting a more nuanced approach to a sensational problem is the approval of
79% of the public and 96% of leaders for diplomatic efforts to improve
U.S. relations with potential adversary countries” (Riley 1999: 27). Similarly,
a survey of 162 polls from six African conflicts indicates that the public
prefers indirect over direct military involvement (see Figure 1; Rothchild and
Emmanuel 2006).

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334 DONALD ROTHCHILD

Figure 1. Level of U.S. Public Opinion Support by Type of Intervention Combination of

Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, and Sudan

100

90

80

70
Level of Support

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
0 1 2 3 4
1 = Non-Coercive 2 = OOTW 3 = Coercive / Combat

Source: Lexus-Nexus Universe, “Polls and Surveys.”

Note: OOTW refers to operations other than war.

Conclusion: Conflict Management and Soft Intervention

Because it is extremely difficult to rely on the state to end Africa’s internal wars
and to guarantee the human rights of citizens that belong to weaker groups,
vulnerable peoples often look to external actors to intercede and create oppor-
tunities for cooperation. These exposed peoples often favor great powers, epit-
omized by the United States, as third parties, since they are seen to possess the
leverage needed to induce a change of behavior on the part of local interests.
However, for this potential leverage to prove meaningful, more than political
capacity and the will to sustain the intervener’s actions are required. An appro-
priate and effective intervention by a great power also depends on the presence
of both legitimate purpose and the “ability to credibly commit not to abuse the
authority conferred upon it” by the African states (Lake 2006: 27).
External intervention, as used here, is described broadly to include non-
military initiatives as well as military incursions. Both are included in the
conflict management literature and are important options for use by those
attempting to pressure state and insurgent elites to halt the fighting and to

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THE LOGIC OF A SOFT INTERVENTION STRATEGY 335

encourage respect for human rights. Even though both noncoercive and coer-
cive strategies have their place, it is important to ask, which is most likely to
prove effective in managing conflict at a reasonable cost as well as prove
acceptable over time to the American elite and public opinion? Clearly, as
Rwanda shows, nonintervention is not a sufficient strategy for a great power
to choose in the face of genocide or massive denials of human rights. A great
power’s failure to take a stand and its disregard of emerging global norms
about the protection of the vulnerable carries substantial potential costs – in
terms of credibility, purpose, and self-esteem. Hence, if the circumstances
appear to require intervention, the question remains: what kind of intervention
strategy or combination of strategies is prudent?
As noted, military force or the threat of it is an important option that can-
not be ignored at certain junctures. In Liberia, where the local public urged the
United States to send troops to bring about an enduring peace, a combination
of force and diplomacy proved stabilizing. But despite the apparent asymme-
try in power between the United States and African states, or between the U.S.
and Iraq, the unanticipated risks and costs of military intervention could be
high when local forces resist and prolonged occupation leads to lost credibil-
ity, mounting casualties, and soaring financial outlays. What begins as a pub-
licly supported intervention may turn sour and run into heavy criticism. The
American public, reluctant in ordinary times to send its troops into combat
abroad, may become quite negative as the casualties rise and no honorable exit
from the fray is apparent. As Riley (1999: 40) contends, “policies which over
time are contrary to public sentiment will almost certainly fail – along with the
leaders responsible for them.”
If a great power is disinclined to pursue strategies of nonintervention and
muscular intervention in Africa, then it must settle on a middle course that is
both effective and sustainable. In some circumstances, as in Darfur or
Palestine, a soft intervention approach may well prove to be a second best solu-
tion, even if it is the only feasible option in the context of a failing or failed
administrative entity. Thus, side payments, political and economic condition-
ality, persuasion, incentives, pressure, negotiations, threats, sanctions, and
other forms of diplomatic influence can be experimented with in an effort to
push resistant regimes toward more cooperative positions. In its purest form,
a great power such as the United States can use these instruments of soft power
to strengthen mediatory initiatives, as was evident in Angola and
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the past and in Liberia and the Sudan today.
Therefore, a soft intervention strategy seems to be a reasonable compromise
in many constrained and uncertain circumstances. Because it relies on diplo-
matic initiative, soft intervention lowers the risks and costs of becoming
deeply involved in conflicts in Africa or other countries in the developing

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336 DONALD ROTHCHILD

world. Nevertheless, even if the intervener finds soft intervention prudent,

such a course may not prove sufficient to cope with situations of intense
conflict. In high stakes encounters, these measures may provoke strong local
resistance, which makes the achievement of conflict conciliation problematic.
Where this local state or societal resistance is buttressed by great power back-
ing (as with China’s support of the Sudanese government position today), such
undertakings may need to be strengthened with more coercive initiatives, or
given a lower priority. Thus, even though these diplomatic initiatives are
launched relatively easily and have the backing of the American public, they
may display limited ability to achieve positive outcomes.
In brief, conflict management depends on context. Although there is no one-
size-fits-all solution, U.S. government and public commitment to intervenion
in Africa’s intrastate conflicts and its human rights crises on a sustained basis
makes soft intervention a preferable approach in most, but not all, circum-
stances. Selecting which strategy of soft intervention is appropriate therefore
becomes the critical challenge in terms of achieving the conflict conciliation
objectives of great powers.

Acknowledgements
I wish to express my appreciation to Nikolas Emmanuel, Bruce W. Jentleson,
Miroslav Nincic, Edith Rothchild, Timothy Sisk, Bertram I. Spector, Marc
Scarcelli and Camille Sumner for their comments on the second draft of this
manuscript.

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