CAGUIOA CASES

IN POLITICAL LAW
Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon
 PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Victoria Segovia et. al. v.. The Climate Change Commission, et. al., G.R. No. 211010, March 7,
2017: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that the petitioners failed to show any violation
on the part of the Climate Change Commission of their constitutional right to a balanced
ecology. Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue for the following reasons:
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to
the Climate Change Commission to be entitled to the writ. Second, the Road Sharing Principle
is merely a principle. There is no law which applies the principle. The writ of Kalikasan is an
extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for
a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights,
aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the
violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends
political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of
large-scale ecological threats.
 STATE IMMUNITY
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT UNDER A CONTRACT
Philippine Textile Research Institute, Dr. Carlos Tomboc, Fedelito A. Rufin, Engr.
May S. Rico, et al. v. Court of Appeals and E.A. Ramirez Construction, Inc.
represented by its President Engr. Eduardo A. Ramirez, G.R. No. 223319, October
9, 2019: E.A. Ramirez Construction Company lodged a Complaint for Breach of
Contract with Damages against PTRI and its officers. PTRI moved to dismiss the
case and argued being an attached agency of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST), it cannot be sued without the consent of the State. It also said
the immunity extended to the impleaded employees. The Court held that state
immunity is not absolute. It said that when PTRI executed the contract with
respondent, it descended to the level of an ordinary person holding itself liable to
suit. Based the facts and the evidence, the subject contract was clearly not
executed in the exercise of PTRI's governmental function of aiding the textile
industry.
 POWER TO EXPROPRIATE
NATURE OF PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO EXPROPRIATION
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No.
224936, September 4, 2019: The Court affirmed the power to expropriate of the National Grid
Corporation of the Philippines. By way of background, the NGCP filed an expropriation case
against PACF et al. over a property which is part of the Petrochemical Industrial Park. The
Petrochemical Industrial Park was originally part of a parcel of land of the public domain. In
1986, Presidential Proclamation No. 361 was issued, withdrawing 418 out of the 621 hectares of
land of the public domain from the coverage of E.O. No. 48. With the exclusion, the
Petrochemical Industrial Park was now converted into a patrimonial property.
With respondent NGCP's power to expropriate being a mere delegated power from Congress
by virtue of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the right of eminent domain over the
subject property must conform to the limits set under the said law. Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511
expressly granted NGCP this power.
The subject property, though owned by a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial
property that assumes the nature of private property. Thus, the same may be expropriated.
 GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO TAX
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Semirara Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 202922, June
19, 2017: SMC's claim for VAT exemption is anchored not on the paragraph deleted by R.A.
No. 9337 from the list of VAT exempt transactions under Section 109 of the NIRC of 1997,
as amended, but on tax incentives granted to operators of Coal Operating Companies
pursuant to P.D. No. 972.
Section 16 of PD No. 972 provides various incentives to COC operators, including tax
exemptions, to wit:
“SEC. 16. Incentives to Operators.-The provisions of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, a contract executed under this Decree may provide that the operator
shall have the following incentives:
a) Exemption from all taxes except income tax; x x x.”
As VAT is one of the national internal revenue taxes, it falls within the tax exemptions
provided under P.D. No. 972. Thus, the Court agreed with the CTA that the tax exemption
provided under Section 16 of P.D. No. 972 was not revoked, withdrawn or repealed expressly
or impliedly by Congress with the enactment of RA No. 9337. Thus, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue cannot assess SMC value-added tax.
•
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
POWER TO ENACT LAWS
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 &
218465, October 9, 2018: The Court ruled that the K to 12 Basic Education Program is
constitutional and does not violate various constitutional provisions. It presented the
following reasons:
First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the nationwide regional
consultations conducted by DepEd pursuant DepEd Memorandum Nos. 38 and 98, series
of 2011.
Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed is
conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due enactment.
Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative power in the enactment of the K to 12 Law. In
determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court cited provisions of the K-12 Law which cites the policy behind its adoption and
the parameters of its implementation.
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
JURISDICTION OF HRET
Piccio v. HRET, G.R. No. 248985, October 05, 2021: The Court upheld the findings of
HRET that the pieces of evidence adduced in the case unmistakably show that Vergara
had duly filed a petition for the re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225 and sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law. The HRET found
that Vergara had duly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship by observing the twin
requirements of the law, foremost of which is the taking of the Oath of Allegiance
and then, the renunciation of her American citizenship.
 EXECUTIVE BRANCH
POWER OF CONTROL
Proceso T. Domingo, Angelito D. Twaño and Susan M. Solo v. Hon. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 226648-49, March 27, 2019: The Court
upheld the action of the Office of the President finding petitioners guilty of
simple negligence and imposed on them the penalty of suspension for three
(3) months. The Office of the President likewise revoked the Career Executive
Service Officer (CESO) ranks previously conferred upon petitioners. It said
that the petitioners' act of signing the Resolutions recommending their own
appointments is contrary to the ethical standards imposed on, and the due
diligence demanded of public officers, then necessarily the conferment of CESO
ranks. The power of appointment and conversely, the power to remove, is
essentially discretionary and cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as
long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
JURISDICTION OF PET
Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, September 18, 2018: The setting of the
threshold of shading the spots for candidates for the 2016 elections is the
function of the COMELEC. However, this is a non-issue during the revision process.
The purpose of the revision proceedings is simply to conduct a physical recount of
the ballots and thereafter provide both parties the opportunity to register their
objections and claims thereon. During the revision proceedings, there is yet no final
deduction or addition of votes. There is merely a preliminary segregation and
classification in order to facilitate the recording of objections or claims, if any. It
is only after the Tribunal has deliberated and ruled on the validity of the
objections or claims that a deduction or addition of votes will take place. For this
purpose, the Tribunal relies on how the Vote Counting Machines (VCMs) counted the
votes in order to segregate the ballots during the revision stage. The threshold used by
the VCMs is not the final determinant of whether a vote will be counted in favor of
protestant or protestee.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
TO DISCIPLINE COURT EMPLOYEES
Asuncion Y. Ariñola v. Angeles D. Almodiel, Jr., A.M. No. P-19-3925, January 7, 2019:
Four months having lapsed since the MTCC issued an order directing Sheriff
Almodiel to proceed with the enforcement of the execution, no action had yet
been taken by the Sheriff. Hence, an administrative complaint was filed against him.
The OCA found that the Sheriff failed to perform his mandated duty to implement
the writ of execution making him administratively liable for Simple Neglect of
Duty. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court mandates the sheriff to make a return on
the writ of execution to the Clerk or Judge issuing the Writ. A judgment, if not executed,
would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party; and sheriffs are the ones
primarily responsible for the execution of final judgments. The Supreme Court
GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and was FINED the amount of P5,000.00 with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
TO DISCIPLINE COURT EMPLOYEES
Rolando Soliva v. Reynaldo Taleon, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 10,
Dipolog City, Zamboanga Del Norte, A.M. No. P-16-3511, September 06, 2017: The
Court said that any act deviating from the procedure laid down in the Rules of
Court is a misconduct and warrants disciplinary action. While an urgent
motion for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction was pending, Sheriff Taleon issued notices of garnishment to several
banks without first making a demand on the judgment obligors before
resorting to garnishment and/or levy. The Court found Sheriff GUILTY of
simple misconduct and imposes upon him the penalty of SUSPENSION for
three (3) months without pay, effective upon receipt of the Court's Decision.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
POWER TO DISCIPLINE COURT EMPLOYEES
Office of the Court Administrator v. Cobarrubias (Clerk III) and Bravo (Clerk
Interpreter), A.M. No. P-15- 3379, November 22, 2017: The Court found
Cobarrubias guilty of dishonesty for making false entries in his DTR which
differ from the entries in the logbook. He admitted falsifying his DTRs for fear of
suspension for tardiness due to grave personal problems, and difficulty in traveling
from his residence in Bulacan to the office which gave him great stress and affected
his work performance. He was SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay,

On the other hand, Bravo was fined P20,000.00 for habitual absenteeism and
tardiness. While he admitted his absences and tardiness were due to
severe recurring pain in his joints which made it difficult for him to walk, he never
supported with claim with a medical certificate. It found him guilty of his
unauthorized and habitual absences and tardiness constitute a grave offense
tantamount to conduct prejudicial to the
service.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
POWER TO DISCIPLINE COURT STAFF
RE: Investigation Report of Judge Enrique Trespeces on the 25 February 2015
Incident Involving Utility Worker I Marion M. Durban, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Br. 9, Iloilo City, Iloilo, A.M. No. 15-09-102-MTCC. June 26, 2019: Security
Officer Marlino G. Agbayani filed an administrative complaint against Marion Durban,
Utility Worker I of Branch 9, MTCC, Iloilo City. In finding that Durban failed to
strictly observe the prescribed working hours, the Court took into
consideration his advanced age, his years of service, and the fact that this is his
first offense. In determining the penalty to be imposed, the Court considered the
facts of the case and factors which may serve as mitigating circumstances, such
as the respondent's length of service, the respondent's acknowledgment of his
or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, and respondent's advanced age, among others.
Thus, the Court deemed it appropriate to simply admonish Durban.
 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER JUDGES

Ferrer, Jr. v. Hon. Dating, RTC-Iriga City, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478, November 8, 2017.
: Section 2 of Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC explicitly mandates that "raffling
of cases shall be regularly conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every Monday
and/or Thursday as warranted by the number of cases to be raffled." For failure to
observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-S, in lieu
of suspension, the Court agreed with the OCA’s recommendation for the imposition
of a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) considering that this was his first
offense.
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
POWER TO REVIEW PERSONNEL ACTIONS
Mina C. Nacilla v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, G.R. No. 223449,
November 10, 2020: The Court held that Nacilla and Jacobe have lost their right to appeal
because they could no longer question the Adjudication Committee's decision. They failed to
appeal the same in the manner prescribed by law. The decision has become final and executory
as to them and no court, not even this Court, has the power to revise, review, change or alter it.
Res judicata also applies to decisions of administrative tribunals.
The CSC's jurisdiction over civil service disputes is settled. Sections 2(1) and 3 of Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution states that the powers of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
Government, include having jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation
of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. It is the sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. When the Adjudication Committee rendered a
decision against petitioners, the applicable CSC rule was MC 19, as amended by Resolution No.
07-0244. They should have filed their appeal of the decision of the Adjudication Committee with the
Court of Appeals. Resort to the Office of the President was not the proper remedy.
 COMELEC’S POWER TO REGULATE ACTIVITIES
DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 223505, October 03, 2017: The Court sustained the validity of the COMELEC
Resolution which provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or
transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement
of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more
commonly referred to as the "Gun Ban”. The Constitution specifically empowered
the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations implementing to ensure clean, honest and
orderly elections that includes the so-called Gun Ban during election period. Furthermore, the
COMELEC does not encroach upon this authority of the PNP to regulate private security agencies -
as it merely regulates the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons
by private security agencies and all other persons, during the election period. Moreover,
the license to operate as a private security agency and the right to possess and carry
firearms do not confer an absolute right on the private licensee, as this is still subject to
regulation.
 COMMISSION ON AUDIT
POWER TO DISALLOW
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Elaine R. Abanto et al. v. Board of Directors of the Development Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 207281 & 210922, March 5, 2019: The Supreme Court
reversed the disallowance of the grant of benefits to qualified officials and
employees of the DBP under the ERIP IV for Calendar Years 2003 and 2008. The
Court clarified that entitlement of qualified employees to receive separation
pay and retirement benefits is not covered by the constitutional
proscription on double compensation. This is because separation pay and
retirement benefits are different entitlements as they have different legal
bases, different sources of funds, and different intents.
 COMMISSION ON AUDIT
POWER O DISALLOW EXPENSES
DFA v. COA, G.R. No. 194530, July 07, 2020: Several Notices of Disallowances (NDs) were issued by COA
on the payment of terminal leave benefits for retired DFA employees and overseas and living quarter
allowances for the personnel of the Philippine Embassy in London. The DFA appealed the NDs. However,
the Resident Auditor returned without action the appeals for failure to comply with the payment of filing
fees prescribed by the Resolution. This prompted the DFA to file a motion before the COA to suspend the
implementation of the Resolution on the grounds that: 1) it violates Article IX-A, Section 6 of the
Constitution; and 2) the requirement of payment of filing fees before the COA Resident Auditor takes
cognizance of the appeals violates the due process clause and derogates substantive rights.
The Court dismissed the petition since Section 6, Article IX-A thereof expressly grants each
constitutional commission en banc to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. It found the filing fee of P10,000.00 as reasonable.
An en banc does not mean full membership of the Commission. The Court also pointed out that
the requirement that a matter must be acted upon by the en banc of a body or tribunal has been
interpreted to mean that it reaches a decision as a collegial body, and not necessarily, as an entire
body.
 COMMISSION OF AUDIT
APPRECIATION OF GOOD FAITH
Mario Madera v. COA, G.R. No. 244128, September 08, 2020: The Municipality of
Mondragon passed and approved Sangguniang Bayan Ordinance and Resolutions,
granting various allowances to its officials and employees. On post audit, the COA
disallowed the grant on the ground that the financial benefits were in violation of the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL).
The Court ruled that the petitioners, approving and certifying officers, need not
refund the disallowed amounts inasmuch as they acted in good faith. Since the
COA failed to show bad faith on the part of the approving officers, the alleged
refund should not be personally imposed on them, they being in good faith that
recipients richly deserved such benefits and the officers relied merely on the
yearly basis of granting additional allowances, without them being informed by
the COA or DBM that such disbursements were illegal. All other individuals who
benefitted from the subject ordinances were no longer asked to restore what they
received as passive recipients.
 COMMISSION ON AUDIT
DISALLOWANCE AND GOOD FAITH
SSS v. COA, G.R. No. 243278, November 3, 2020: The Court said that there are attendant
circumstances which may exempt the SSS' officers and employees from returning the
subject amounts.
First, at the time that the subject benefits and allowances were disbursed by the SSS, there
was no prevailing ruling specifically on the exemption of the SSS from the SSL.
Second, there was also no prevailing guideline as to its authority to determine the
reasonable compensation for the SSS personnel, vis-à-vis the requirement of approval by the
President/DBM prior to the grant of additional or increased benefits.
In several cases, the Court has considered the lack of knowledge of a similar ruling
prohibiting a particular disbursement as a badge of good faith. It applied that same
rule into P554,109,362.03 for C.Y. 2010 which COA disallowed.
 POWERS OF COA/LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
LIABILITY ON OVERPAYMENT OF CONTRACTS
Emerita Collado v. Hon Reynaldo Villar, G.R. No. 193143, December 01, 2020: Collado Isabela was found
severally and solidarily liable with several others for erroneously computing liquidated damages
(P252,114.79 instead of P2,400,134.65 resulting to an overpayment in the progress billings made to N.C.
Roxas, Inc. in the amount of P2,148,019.86) arising from the construction of the Philippine Science High School
(PSHS)-Mindanao Campus Building Complex. Notices of Disallowance were issued in December 2002. COA
affirmed the disallowance in 2008 and Collado’s Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 COA Resolution was
finally denied in a letter dated March 17, 2010. Collado appealed the case.
The Court exonerated Collado. It invoked the ruling in Madera v. COA where it settled once and for all the
nature and legal basis of the liability of approving and certifying officers and passive payees for illegal
expenditures as well as the proper treatment of such liability in cases where there are badges of good
faith attending the erroneous approval of the said expenditures. Sections 38 (1) and 39 of Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 would apply - Liability of Superior Officers. - Section 38 (1) A public officer shall
not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence; and SECTION 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. - No subordinate officer or
employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Bernabe, G.R. No. 237663, October 06, 2020: A Complaint
for Cancellation of Title and Reversion was filed by the Republic through the OSG against
respondent Ma. Bernabe, alleging that then Governor General of the Philippines, James Smith,
issued an unnumbered proclamation reserving certain parcels of land in the province of Pampanga
for military purposes. Proclamation 163 provides for the transfer of Clark Special Economic Zone
Areas, which "shall cover the lands consisting of the Clark military reservations, including
the Clark Air Base proper and portions of the Clark reverted as base lands (CAB Lands), to
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). The OSG claims that the Republic is
the real party in interest, being the owner of all lands of the public domain under the
concept of jura regalia. The Court held that the BCDA is a mere trustee of the Republic. The
BCDA's status as a mere trustee of the Clark Air Base lands is made obvious by the fact that under
the law creating it, its executive head cannot even sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the
Republic and only the President of the Republic is authorized to sign such deed of
conveyance, which is a recognition that the property being disposed of belongs to the
Republic pursuant to Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code.
Therefore, being the beneficial owner of the CAB Lands, the Republic is the real party in interest in
this case.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
REGISTRATION OF LAND
Fil-Estate Management, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192393, March 27, 2019:
Spouses Go filed an application registration of three parcels of land in Almanza, Las Pinas.
Fil-Estate Management et al., filed an opposition since portions of the land being applied for
by Sps. Go overlap the titled properties in the name of Fil-Estate Consortium, hence, these
could not be subject to land registration.
Despite the opposition, the application for title was granted by the trial court. Fil-Estate appealed.
The CA granted the appeal but only resolved the issue on whether Spouses Go were able to
comply with the requirements imposed by law before the registration of title could be
granted. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals acted correctly based on its findings
that Spouses Go failed to prove that the parcels of land applied for are alienable public
land, and that they openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously possessed and
occupied the same since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Indeed, the deeds of sale and tax
declarations that Spouses Go adduced are insufficient to prove that the subject parcels of
land are alienable and disposable land of the public domain and their imperfect title
thereon. The government retains ownership of the contested land.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
CONFLICTS IN GRANT OF MINING PERMITS

MR Holdings, Inc. and Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Rolando A. De Jesus

and Vicente S. Paragas, G.R. No. 217837, September 4, 2019: The Court held
that the Philippine Mining Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute
involving conflicts in claims relative to permits and clearances issued under the
law with the Panel of Arbitrators. Both Onephil Mineral Resources, Inc. which
filed an Exploration Permit Application before the Mines and Geo-Sciences
Bureau and Marcopper Mining Corporation’s pending application for Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement before the same office will have to resolved by
the Panel of Arbitrators. Recourse to the courts is premature until the
Panel of Arbitrators completes its administrative proceedings.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY CONCEPT
OF CONTROL OF
PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES
Jose M. Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, The Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, G.R. No. 207246,
November 22, 2016: In the Gamboa ruling, the Court held that the term "capital" in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall
include such preferred shares. Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 clearly incorporates the Voting
Control Test or the controlling interest requirement. In fact, Section 2 goes beyond
requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino nationals in the voting stocks; it moreover
requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the total number of outstanding shares of
stock, whether voting or not. The SEC formulated SEC-MC No. 8 to adhere to the Court's
unambiguous pronouncement that "[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights is required." Clearly,
SEC-MC No. 8 cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
 NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY –
FULL BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF A STOCK
Jose M. Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, The Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, G.R. No. 207246, April 18, 2017: If the Filipino has the voting
power of the "specific stock", i.e., he can vote the stock or direct another
to vote for him, or the Filipino has the investment power over the
"specific stock", i.e., he can dispose of the stock or direct another to
dispose of it for him, or both, i.e., he can vote and dispose of that "specific
stock" or direct another to vote or dispose it for him, then such Filipino is
the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock."
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – DELEGATION OF
LEGAL REPRESENTATION
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Jose Amagan and Aurora Amagan, and
John Doe, G.R. No. 209794, June 27, 2016: Rule 5, Section 1 of the Rules Governing
the Exercise by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel of its Authority,
Duties and Powers as Principal Law Office of all GOCCs (2011 OGCC Rules) states
that the OGCC shall handle all cases by the GOCCs, unless the legal departments
of its client government corporations or entities are duly authorized or
deputized by the OGCC. Thus, the Court reversed the dismissal of the replevin case
instituted by the LBP Legal Services Group against Spouses Amagan in General
Santos City. The OGCC furnished the trial court of the Letter of Authority issued by
General Counsel, Atty. Raoul Creencia. This complies with the OGCC procedure to
deputize specific legal offices of the government owned and controlled corporations
to institute actions in court.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
San Francisco Inn v. San Pablo City Water District and the SPCWD
Investigating Board, G.R. No. 204639, February 15, 2017: The Court held
that the San Pablo City Water District (SPCWD) cannot validly impose
assessment fees for all deep well users without complying with the
following requirements: 1. A prior notice and hearing; and 2. A
resolution by the Board of Directors of the water district entity:
(i) finding that the production of ground water by such operators/users
within the district is injuring or reducing the water district entity's
financial condition and is impairing its ground water source; and (ii)
adopting and levying a ground water production assessment at fixed rates
to compensate for such loss.
The Court granted the petition for failure of the San Pablo City Water
District to comply with the foregoing requirements.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS-
FILING OF SALN
Leovigildo A. De Castro v. Field Investigation Office, Office of The Ombudsman
and The Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 192723, June 05, 2017: While mere
omission from or misdeclaration in one's SALN per se do not constitute
Dishonesty, an omission or misdeclaration qualifies as such offense when it is
attended with malicious intent to conceal the truth. Dishonesty implies a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. When a public officer's accumulated
wealth is manifestly disproportionate to his lawful income and such public officer
fails to properly account for or explain where such wealth had been sourced, he
becomes administratively liable for Dishonesty. In this case, the disproportion
between Spouses De Castro’s declared income (P10,841,412.28) and the
acquisition cost of the Disputed Assets (P23,717,226.89) is too stark to be
ignored. Thus, he was meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE and the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the
government service.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
NEGLECT OF DUTY
Atty. Arolf M. Ancheta v. Felomino C. Villa, G.R. No. 229634, January 15, 2020: Felomino C. Villa
filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Arolf M. Ancheta, former Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty and for violation of R.A. No. 3019 in
connection with Ancheta's alleged irregular issuance of an Order granting the quashal of a writ of
execution in favor of Villa. Ancheta denied the charges against him, mainly arguing that Villa's
claims were all hearsay and unsupported by evidence. Despite that, the Ombudsman found Ancheta
guilty of simple neglect of duty. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. However, the
Supreme Court exonerated Ancheta since the Ombudsman had insufficient basis to hold him
liable. It found that there was no malice on the part of Ancheta not to pay the correct docket fees
when he sought reconsideration of findings of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman also failed to
prove the existence of subject order which Ancheta alleged prepared. Thus, in the absence of the
questioned order, it was unenforceable and invalid as it was not released officially. Also, Ancheta
averred that Villa was not prejudiced as he was still in possession of the subject landholding.
Additionally, Ancheta claimed that he could not influence the Regional Adjudicator who inherited
the case since the latter was higher in rank than him and has a mind of his own.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
GRANT OF BENEFITS TO MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
John N. Celeste, Edgar M. Buted, Danilo V. Gomez, Luzvimindo Caguioa, Lelito
Valdez, Renato P. Millan, Catalina De Leon, Roberto Q. Abule v. Commission On
Audit, G.R. No. 237843, June 15, 2021: The Court held that the House of
Representatives’ Joint Resolution 4 is in the nature of a law and should therefore be
given effect to allow the grant of CNAI to managerial employees. The Joint
Resolution is not an automatic grant of the CNAI to managerial employees since
there must first be the issuance of guidelines by the CSC and the DBM. Absent
such, the CNAI granted to managerial employees should be disallowed. The
necessary guidelines and regulations must first be promulgated, and
government agencies seeking to grant CNAI to their managerial employees
must show compliance with such guidelines.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
APPELLATE REVIEW OF ACTIONS
OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288, August 1, 2018: A
criminal complaint was filed against Gatchalian for violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019. The complaint arose from the sale of shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc.
in which Gatchalian was a stockholder, to District Water Company, a
government-owned and controlled corporation. The Ombudsman found probable
cause that Gatchalian conspired with others and profited from the sale of shares,
and that the windfall he received must be deemed an unwarranted benefit,
advantage, or preference. Gatchalian filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals to
challenge the finding of probable cause against him. The OSG argued that the Court
of Appeals had no jurisdiction to review a criminal resolution of the Ombudsman.
The Court held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office
of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
LIABILITY UNDER BIDDING RULES
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group v.
Villafuerte, G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018: A complaint was filed by
the OMB-Field Investigation Office, charging several PNP officers and private
respondents, including Villafuerte, a member of the BAC Secretariat, with Serious
Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Villafuerte
claimed that his only participation in the procurement process was the drafting of
several documents for the purchase of three brand new helicopters for the use of
the PNP under the instruction of his superior officer. Upon inspection, it turned out
that the helicopters were not brand-new. Villarfuerte asked that he should be
excluded from the information since he only performed a ministerial duty. The
Court granted Villafuerte’s prayer. The nature of the functions of the BAC Secretariat
under the Amended IRR-A of R.A. No. 9184 confirms that respondent Villafuerte
does not possess recommendatory authority of any kind. Villafuerte cannot be
deemed liable for merely discharging the ministerial functions of his office,
especially when such acts were made pursuant to the instructions of his superiors.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
LIABILITY UNDER R.A. 9184
RESORT TO EMERGENCY PURCHASE
Atty Aldo Turiano v. Task Force Abono Field Investigation Office (FIO) Office of The Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 222998, December 09, 2020: The Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of
Iriga City, chaired by Atty. Aldo Turiano, approved the immediate purchase of the fertilizers on
the basis of a Certificate of Emergency Purchase. The Field Investigation Office of the
Ombudsman filed a complaint charging Turiano, the PBAC members, and other local government
officials involved in the procurement of the fertilizers with various criminal and
administrative offenses, including: (1)violation of paragraphs (e) and (g), Section 3 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019,10 in relation to R.A. No. 9184; (2) violation of Section 88 of the Commission on
Audit (COA) Circular No. 92-386; and (3) dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service under paragraphs 1, 3, and 20, Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS). The Court said that the totality of the facts
showed the glaring irregularities in the procurement proceedings undertaken by Iriga City
and despite that, Turiano nevertheless signed the Acceptance and Inspection Reports and
checks. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Atty. Turiano.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
NTC’S POWER TO IMPOSE FINES
GMA Network, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. Nos.
192128 & 192135-36, September 13, 2017: The Court upheld the legal position of
NTC that the prescriptive period under the Public Service Act can be availed of
as a defense only in criminal proceedings filed under Chapter IV thereof and
not in proceedings pertaining to the regulatory or administrative powers of
the NTC over a public service utility's observance of the terms and conditions
of its Provisional Authority. NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under its special and technical expertise and
possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, it is in the
best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines. Thus, the Court
sustained the fine of about P600, 000.00 imposed on GMA Network, Inc. for
operating without a valid Provisional Authority prior to the approval of its
congressional franchise was proper.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
REQUIREMENT FOR CESO POSITIONS
Dangerous Drugs Board v. Maria Belen Angelita V. Matibag, G.R. No. 210013, January 22,
2020: The Office of the President issued the Guidelines Implementing Memorandum
Circular No. 1, which states that "all non-CESOs occupying CES positions in all agencies of
the Executive Branch shall remain in office and continue to perform their duties and
discharge their responsibilities until July 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been
accepted, and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated,
whichever comes first, unless they are reappointed in the meantime.“
Matibag was served notice that her services are terminated since she has not fully qualified
to hold the post of Deputy Executive Director for Operations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
She did not complete yet the process of upgrading her eligibility status as a Career Execuive
Service Officer. Nevertheless, she challenged her dismissal.
The Court affirmed the order of dismissal for failure of Matibag to to prove that she has
completed the last two stages of the examination process under CESB Resolution No. 811.
Given this, she was not CES Eligible at the time she held the position of Deputy Executive
Director for Operations of PDEA, and she did not enjoy security of tenure.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
NEPOTISM
Cecilia Quiño, Rejas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 241576 & 241623, November 03,
2020: In "Diosdado N. Ditona vs. Rogelio N. Quiño, et al,." the Ombudsman found Rejas
administratively liable for grave misconduct and was meted the penalty of dismissal from
service in conspiracy with her brother, Mayor Rogelio Quiño, for having approved several
appointments of their brother, Antonio N. Quiño, Jr. as Mechanical Shop Foreman. The
Ombudsman said these appointments violated the rule on nepotism. Rejas moved for
reconsideration arguing that that her mere certifications as to the availability of
appropriations in the Plantilla for Casual Appointments of Antonio did not have anything to
do directly with the gradual increase in his salary grades and were duly supported by
appropriation ordinances. These were duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner also
stressed that these included all the heads of the Economic Enterprise Division of the LGU and not
just Antonio, Jr.
The Court held that Rejas cannot be held liable for grave misconduct absent any evidence of
corruption, intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of any established rule. It said that
in order to establish administrative liability for misconduct, there must be a nexus between the
public official's acts and the functions of his or her office.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
POWER OF MTRCB TO DISCIPLINE
Mina C. Nacilla v. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, G.R. No.
223449, November 10, 2020: Petitioners Nacilla and Jacobe were former employees of
the MTRCB. Nacilla held the position of Administrative Officer V while Jacobe [who
passed away on May 21, 2011] was formerly employed as Secretary I or
Administrative Assistant I. They were found to be responsible for the falsification
of the 2005 CNA or at least making it appear as a new CNA covering a different
period in order to secure benefits. The Adjudication Committee of the MTRCB found
them guilty of violating civil service rules on dishonesty, grave misconduct and
falsification of official documents under Section 52(A) 1, 3 and 6 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The Adjudication Committee initially
ordered the preventive suspension of petitioners and then it imposed the penalty
of dismissal from service. The Court affirmed the power of the Adjudication
Committee since the MTCRB delegated the power to discipline its employees to
Adjudication Committee.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
Virgilio Bote v. San Pedro Cineplex. Inc., G.R. No. 203471, September 14, 2020:
The Court affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that Mayor Bote was
acting in his personal capacity since the incident arose from a private dispute
between him and SPCPI involving a private property. While Mayor Bote was a
municipal mayor at the time of the incident, records are bereft of any indication
that he was acting as such, or on behalf of or upon authority of the State,
when he confronted the occupants of the property. Hence, there can be no
"culpable violation of the Constitution" for which he may be administratively
disciplined. The Court said that SCPCI may find redress through a civil or
criminal suit, but not through an administrative one.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
PROOF REQUIRED TO PROVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Lynna Chung v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239871, March 18, 2021:
Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that the accused perpetrated
acts in the criminal manner, there is no basis for declaring the existence of
probable cause. In every prosecution, the Court said that the Ombudsman has
the burden to show, to justify a probable cause finding, that said violation of
the contract was attended with corrupt motives or fraudulent intent.
Moreover, relationship alone of petitioner with Jaewoo Chung, her adopted son,
should not be determinative of liability of petitioner, absent any kind of
showing that it was used improperly or with corrupt motives to the disadvantage
of the government.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
FINANCIAL LIABILITY OF A PUBLIC SERVANT
FFIB-MOLEO v. Major Jandayan, G.R. No. 218155, September 22, 2020: The Philippine Marine
Corps released funds amounting to P36,768,028.95 intended for the combat clothing
allowance, equivalent to P8,3 81.75 per person, and individual equipment allowance,
equivalent to P6,337.80 per person of enlisted personnel in active duty. To cover these, checks
were issued by way of cash advances, for which various documents were submitted. Upon
investigations, it was revealed that the Philippine Marine Corps enlisted personnel never
received their CCIE allowance. Jandayan certified that the expenses were lawful and incurred
under his direct supervision For all the irregularities established by evidence, the Ombudsman
found Jandayan in conspiracy with others of issuing a roster of troops and disbursement
vouchers certifying that the expenses were necessary. The Court affirmed the findings of the
Ombudsman. It found Jandayan guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. Evidence showed that
Jandayan signed a roster of troops and disbursement voucher to support the liquidation of
the cash advances. Further, he actually received the funds even though he had no authority to
do so. Making matters worse, he failed to show where the money went. His acts, taken together
with that of his co-respondents before the Ombudsman, show an utter disregard of the trust reposed
in him as a public officer and for which he should be held liable.
 LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS IN
PROCUREMENT OF GOVERNMENT SUPPLIES
Claudio Delos Santos Gaspar, Jr., v. Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229032,
June 16, 2021: The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman holding Claudio Delos
Santos Gaspar, Jr. (Gaspar), among others, guilty of serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and meted him the penalty of dismissal from service with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold
office, or if resigned or retired, the fine equivalent to one year's salary and the same accessory
penalties. On appeal, the Supreme Court exonerated Gaspar, Jr. because the WTCD Report clearly
reflected that the helicopters failed to comply with the NAPOLCOM specifications. Gaspar, Jr. cannot
therefore be held administratively liable for having signed an accurate report as there is nothing in the
WTCD Report which shows that he distorted or concealed the truth, or that he caused serious damage to
the government or that he abused his authority as the WTCD Report reflected that the helicopters failed
to meet the NAPOLCOM specifications. His conduct did not also tarnish the image and integrity of
his public office, thus his act of signing an accurate report is not considered as conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
ADHERENCE TO BIDDING RULES
Mansue Lukban v. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 238563, February 12,
2020: Lukban, as Chief of the Management Division of the PNP Directorate for
Comptrollership, affixed his signature on the "NOTED" portion of the Inspection
Report Form for purchase of procurement of light police operational helicopters
(LPOHs) for use of the Philippine National Police (PNP). However, an investigation
later revealed that the LPOHs did not meet the NAPOLCOM specifications. The
Ombudsman found him guilty of conspiring other officers of the PNP but
Lukban moved for his exclusion from the charge holding him
administratively liable.
The Court granted his petition and said that conspiracy as a means of
incurring liability is strictly confined to criminal cases; even assuming that
the records indicate the existence of a felonious scheme, the administrative
liability of a person allegedly involved in such scheme cannot be established
through conspiracy, considering that one's administrative liability is separate
and distinct from penal liability. Thus, in administrative cases, the only
inquiry in determining liability is simply whether the respondent, through
his individual actions, committed the charges against him that render him
administratively liable.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS – VALID ORDINANCE

City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation and Shell Philippines

Exploration B.V., G.R. No. 195003, June 07, 2017: The assailed ordinance which
requires heavy industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the
territorial jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate
the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities contravenes the Water
Code of the Philippines encroaches upon the power of the National Water
Resources Board to regulate and control the Philippines' water resources. In order
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
concerned LGU to enact but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the
State, it is incumbent upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal,
the State.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO EXECUTE A
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, the Governor of Bataan et al. (Third Division), G.R.
No. 190728-29, November 18, 2020:. The Mayor of the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, initiated a
complaint before the Ombudsman against Governor Garcia and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan based on the undue injury allegedly suffered by the Province of Bataan as a result of
the grossly disadvantageous terms of the Compromise Agreement it executed with the PCGG and
BASECO. The Sandiganbayan found no probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against Garcia and his
co-accused. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Garcia and his co-accused. It said (1) that at the
time private respondents entered into the Compromise Agreement, the Province of Bataan did not
enjoy any vested right over the subject properties, and therefore, private respondents could not
have injured a right or interest that did not exist; and (2) that private respondents' decision to
negotiate and enter into the Compromise Agreement with the PCGG and BASECO is their collective
judgment call pursuant to the corporate powers of the local government unit, and may not be
interfered with absent competent proof showing any ill motive on the part of private respondents.
Section 468(a) of R.A. 7160 [Local Government Code] authorizes the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
pass resolutions and ordinances for the welfare of the province.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POWER TO REORGANIZE
Cerilles v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 180845, November 22, 2017: While
Governor Cerilles of Zamboanga del Sur was authorized by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to undertake the reorganization of the provincial
government and to implement a new staffing pattern, where the plantilla positions
were reduced, the Court found her guilty of bad faith. Evidence showed that the
governor appointed new employees to the new positions under the
reorganization. Some permanent employees were not given
placement preference and were instead terminated without valid cause and
against their will. Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act.
However, it must be reconciled with the provisions of R.A. 6656. This law provides
that when reorganization is done in bad faith, the aggrieved employee, having
been removed without valid cause, may demand for his reinstatement or
reappointment. Hence, there is no encroachment on the discretion of the
appointing authority when the CSC revokes an appointment on the such ground.
In such instance, the CSC is not actually directing the appointment of another
but simply ordering the reinstatement of the illegally removed employee.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
POWER OF THE MAYOR TO APPOINT
Marey Marzan v. City Government of Olongapo, G.R. No. 232769, November 03,
2020: Marzan was appointed as City Government Department Head II of the City
Planning Department Office, as issued by then Mayor Gordon and approved by the
Civil Service Commission. Eventually, she was appointed by the Mayor as City
Government Department Head II of the City Budget Office. It was a lateral transfer. A
new mayor was subsequently elected and appointed another person to Marzan’s
former position as Department Head II of the CPDO. The CSC disapproved of Marzan's
appointment in the CBO due to a discrepancy in the appointment dates. Marzan
sought reinstatement to her former post as Department Head of CPDO by way of a
writ of mandamus.
The Court held that Marzan's reinstatement constitutes a discretionary act which
cannot be compelled through a writ of mandamus.
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
MAYOR’S POWER TO ISSUE BUSINESS PERMITS
Mayor Corazon M. Lacap v. Sandiganbayan [Fourth Division] and the People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017: In an application for a mayor's permit or
license to do business in a municipality or city, the procedure is fairly standard and
uncomplicated. It requires the submission of the required documents and the payment
of the assessed business taxes and fees. In case of failure to comply with the
requirements, the application deserves to be disapproved. If the application is
compliant, then approval is the action to be taken. An inaction or refusal to act is a
course of action anathema to public service with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
If the deliberate refusal to act or intentional inaction on an application for mayor's
permit is motivated by personal conflicts and political considerations, it thus becomes
discriminatory, and constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Supreme Court affirmed the penalty imposed of Lacap consisting of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month
imprisonment, as minimum, to ten (10) years imprisonment, as maximum, with
perpetual disqualification from public office.
 FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Denmark S. Valmores v. Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo, G.R.
No. 217453, July 19, 2017: The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum may
be compelled by a writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty by a tribunal, board, officer, or person. A
plain reading of the CHED memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon higher educational institutions. Its policy is crystal clear: a
student's religious obligations takes precedence over his academic
responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and
enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on
all higher educational institutions to exempt students, as well as faculty members,
from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious
obligations. Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, these educational
institutions do not possess absolute discretion to grant or deny requests for
exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum only imposes
minimum standards should an institution of higher learning decide to require
remedial work.
 FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE
Rubio v. Basada, OCA IPI N. 15-4429-P, December 06, 2017: The Court found Basada not
guilty of any administrative offense as he was merely performing a civic duty as
President of their homeowners’ association. As such, he is not actually engaged in
outside employment or any private business or profession, the requirement of
obtaining authority from the head of office to engage in outside employment obviously
does not apply to him.
To require respondent Basada to relinquish his post as president of the homeowners'
association would effectively deprive him of his freedom of association guaranteed by
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he
right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 204895, March 21, 2018: The Court said that it is incumbent
upon the State and the private complainants, where applicable, to exert reasonable efforts
to prosecute the case, especially in cases where the accused is incarcerated. The delay to
present evidence against Domingo despite four settings shows that the prosecution and the
private complainants failed to exert the reasonable efforts to even present any evidence.
The reason for their failure is likewise unsubstantiated. Furthermore, in instances where
the State has been given every opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to do so, it
cannot claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its evidence. Such
failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of the accused even if
it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case and will bar another prosecution
of the accused for the same offense. This is an exception to the rule that a dismissal, upon
the motion or with the express consent of the accused, will not be a bar to the subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
The dismissal of the case resulted to the bar of another prosecution against Domingo for
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder.
 RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
VALID SEARCH WARRANT
People of the Philippines v. Roberto Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr., G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020: The
Court ruled that the search warrant was validly issued by the trial court judge. Executive Judge Balago
based the Affidavit of witness of the applicant, Police Superintendent Ajero. The judge conducted his
searching question on PO1 Geverola based on his sworn statement.
If, despite the use of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as
probable cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse — the
judge examined the witness only and not the applicant — would not be valid as well. Again, the
purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is
immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant only, or
the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial consideration
here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the particular individual's
privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Suprme Court, the CA erred in placing undue importance on the
Constitution's use of the word "and“ instead of "or" or "and/or."
 REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
A warrant that justifies the intrusion, to be valid, must satisfy the following
requirements:
(1) it must be issued upon "probable cause;”
(2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge;
(3) such judge must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; and
(4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
At the heart of these requisites, however, is that the intrusion on a citizen's privacy
— whether it be in his own person or in his house — must be based on probable cause
determined personally by the judge. In other words, the magistrate authorizing the State-
sanctioned intrusion must therefore himself or herself be personally satisfied that there is
probable cause to disturb the person's privacy.
 RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH
People of the Philippines v. Jerry Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020: An officer on duty received a call
from a concerned citizen, who informed them that one male individual would be transporting marijuana
from Kalinga into Isabela. Their hotline received a text message, stating that the subject male person was
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on board a
passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. A joint checkpoint was organized.
In the process, it flagged down a jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 as received from a text
message. They then effected a search on Sapla and he was charged with a violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165. The trial court convicted Sapla and the Court of Appeals affirmed it.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court said that peace officers in warrantless
search and seizure of moving vehicles, are limited to "routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection.” Extensive search of a vehicle is permissible only when "the
officers made it upon probable cause.” In situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law
enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.” A tip is still hearsay no
matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.
 FREEDOM OF SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS
THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
People v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 196094, 196720 & 197324, March 5, 2018: In 1999, nine
counts of libel were filed against Macaset on account of nine interrelated newspaper articles
where statements allegedly derogatory to the then Governor and the former Undersecretary
of the Department of Interior and Local Government . In 2007, more than 8 years after the
filing, the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed without prejudice the complaints for want of
jurisdiction by reason of improper venue. It was only in 2008 that the DOJ issued a
Resolution finding probable cause which resulted to the filing of two separate Informations
for libel against Macasaet.
The Court said that the more than eight years it took the Provincial Prosecutor to resolve
a rather routine issue is clearly inordinate, unreasonable and unjustified. Under the
circumstances, it cannot be said "that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.” The more than eight years delay the
Provincial Prosecutor incurred is an affront to a reasonable dispensation of justice
and such delay could only be perpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive
manner. Thus, the libel charges against Macasaet were all dismissed.
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Nancy Catamco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 243560-62 and G.R. Nos. 243261-63, July
28, 2020: On June 21, 2013, a complaint was filed against Catamco and other twelve
(12) co-respondents. On July 17, 2017, Ombudsman found probable cause against
Catamco and their co-respondents. On April 27, 2018, the Ombudsman filed the
informations against Cotamco and her co-accused before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners invoked their right to speedy disposition of cases. The Court granted the
petition. It said that a protracted investigation of more than two (2) years from the
time the last counter-affidavit was filed is still quite unreasonable especially
considering that, at the end of the day, the Ombudsman merely relied on, and even
adopted as its only facts, the audit findings and previous issuances of the COA. In this
light, the Ombudsman's delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation against
all respondents was clearly unjustified. Thus, the Court ordered the dismissal the
informations against Cotamco and her co-accused.
 RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Pete Javier v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020: On July 4, 2011, a complaint
was filed against Javier and Tumamao who were the Provincial Accountant and Provincial
Agriculturist of Isabela, respectively. After almost five (5) years, the Ombudsman issued
its Resolution, finding probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3(e), of RA
No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the Resolution on November 22, 2016 and an
Information was filed against them. After 5 years and 4 months, the Sandiganbayan set
the arraignment of Javier and Tumamao. The accused moved to quash the information on
the ground of denial of the speedy disposition of a criminal case. The Court granted the
petition and ordered the dismissal of the information against them.
The Court said that the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind the "steady stream
of cases that reach their office" despite the Court's recognition of such reality. "Steady
stream of cases“ and "clogged dockets" are not talismanic phrases that may be invoked
at whim to magically justify every case of long delays in the disposition of cases. It
should still be subject to proof to its effects on a particular case, bearing in mind the
importance of the right to speedy disposition of cases as a fundamental right.
 PROOF REQUIRED THAT DELAY IS
REASONABLE AND JUSTIFIED
In Cagang, the Court held that once the burden of proof shifts to
prosecution, the prosecution must prove the following:
"1) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and in the prosecution of the case;
2) that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the
delay inevitable; and
3) that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay."
 FACTORS TO CONSIDER IF THERE IS DENIAL
RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
1. Length of delay
2. Reason for the delay
3. Assertion or non-assertion of the right to speedy disposition of cases
4. Prejudice caused by the delay
END OF LECTURE
Thank you.